From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Dec 1 00:10:19 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Mon, 1 Dec 2014 08:10:19 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? In-Reply-To: References: <1417397991972.17078@unm.edu>, Message-ID: <1417421418432.49655@unm.edu> David and Larry, For the record, this is definitely an article I'll read. Why? because of this sentence that caught my eye: "One of the factors motivating this new collaborative spirit is the realization that artists have made certain discoveries about the way the human brain works that are only now being uncovered by scientists." !!!! This kind of reading I can do happily! David you are crafty, like a fox in standard Chinese shoes. You certainly make an impression even with your non-image based representing shoes. No wonder your wife was beguiled! Larry, I'm quite interested in your path of thought, please continue sharing? Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of David Kellogg Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:53 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? Larry, Annalisa: People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" when we met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of anything except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe available for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a non-image based mental representation. As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations are images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. In fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against Titchener and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated that many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically anterior to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would not have time or ability to process complex problems in real time. I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more reading to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than I am (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels like she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do NOT read this article--instead, look at Figure 11. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure of Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any actual images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural experience associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then deliberately frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any recognizable figures upon which to focus. However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine Chapel fresco for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He or she can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting and wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not notice the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in it. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > Hi Larry and David, > > Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! > > I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are at the root of all thinking. > > Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, based upon previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a phrase I like a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it by the same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it. > > With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as Hackett describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have you already given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be willing to take a look. > > As I understand, the topic of mental representations is controversial. It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone says "this is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble observation. > > It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever that process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at hand? Just a thought. > > What is it that appeals to you about this model, metaphoricity? > > (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Larry Purss > Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? > > David K > I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. My reason for > exploring these authors is I have been following a path pursuing a basic > question. > > Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? > > Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic guiding images > upon which thinking rests" > > The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring appearances and > illusions was also exploring this theme. > > Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new phenomenological path > that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names this process > *metaphoricity*. > > Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible image-character of the > *spontaneous event* of meaning. > > He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he brackets - > finds itself implicated in this guiding image. > > AND > > it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* finds the > meaning of its very self. > > Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this > image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of metaphor can > invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated in > *objectivity* > > This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. > > Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of itself *in* the > mode [path] of the concept > occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding images has been > established. > > In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the path of > conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived from the > image-character of the guiding image. > > I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial this topic may > become [again] > > However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this basic > question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these images as > occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images emerge > spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. > > This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is transcendental] and is > not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. It seems to > have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. > > I also realize this question may already be answered in Vygotsky's writings > and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of XMCA. I > personally am following this path for now. > > Larry > From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Dec 1 00:41:39 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Mon, 1 Dec 2014 08:41:39 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya In-Reply-To: References: <1417327948145.17025@unm.edu> <1417369203201.33878@unm.edu>, Message-ID: <1417423298756.15810@unm.edu> Dear Ulvi, I think it absolutely depends on what you mean by happiness! :) But to Zoya, it seems that she became the person she became from the deep reading she did. I'm sure writing in a notebook is a part of that as well. I suspect in the backdrop of her hard life, these past-times were essential to her development, especially concerning her imagination. Have you noticed how cows are not bothered if they have matching horns or crooked horns? Or cats do not complain that their silly acrobatics are posted on the internet? If we evolve to a state of being non-self-conscious, as animals are, we might be happier than we are now. Though maybe I am wrong. Maybe happiness is just _being_ happy? Kind regards, Annalisa From ulvi.icil@gmail.com Mon Dec 1 03:04:54 2014 From: ulvi.icil@gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?VWx2aSDEsMOnaWw=?=) Date: Mon, 1 Dec 2014 13:04:54 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya In-Reply-To: <1417423298756.15810@unm.edu> References: <1417327948145.17025@unm.edu> <1417369203201.33878@unm.edu> <1417423298756.15810@unm.edu> Message-ID: Thank you Annalisa. You are right. There is certainly many many happinnesses. But the question was: One big, common happiness for all. Is there such happiness? Anf if there is, what are its preconditions? Kind regards, Ulvi 2014-12-01 10:41 GMT+02:00 Annalisa Aguilar : > Dear Ulvi, > > I think it absolutely depends on what you mean by happiness! :) > > But to Zoya, it seems that she became the person she became from the deep > reading she did. I'm sure writing in a notebook is a part of that as well. > I suspect in the backdrop of her hard life, these past-times were essential > to her development, especially concerning her imagination. > > Have you noticed how cows are not bothered if they have matching horns or > crooked horns? Or cats do not complain that their silly acrobatics are > posted on the internet? > > If we evolve to a state of being non-self-conscious, as animals are, we > might be happier than we are now. Though maybe I am wrong. > > Maybe happiness is just _being_ happy? > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Mon Dec 1 03:28:06 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Mon, 1 Dec 2014 11:28:06 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? In-Reply-To: References: <1417397991972.17078@unm.edu> Message-ID: An interesting article, David. One way in which it is interesting, to me at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used, even once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images in the world around us - material representations - and he tries to define the "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. Martin On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > Larry, Annalisa: > > People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" when we > met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of anything > except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe available > for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember > whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the > beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a > non-image based mental representation. > > As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations are > images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. In > fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against Titchener > and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, > everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated that > many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically anterior > to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would not have > time or ability to process complex problems in real time. > > I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are > genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more reading > to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than I am > (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels like > she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do NOT read > this article--instead, look at Figure 11. > > http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ > > The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure of > Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any actual > images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural experience > associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then deliberately > frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any > recognizable figures upon which to focus. > > However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine Chapel fresco > for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He or she > can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting and > wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not notice > the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in it. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >> Hi Larry and David, >> >> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! >> >> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are at the root of all thinking. >> >> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, based upon previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a phrase I like a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it by the same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it. >> >> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as Hackett describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have you already given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be willing to take a look. >> >> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is controversial. It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone says "this is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble observation. >> >> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever that process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at hand? Just a thought. >> >> What is it that appeals to you about this model, metaphoricity? >> >> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) >> >> Kind regards, >> >> Annalisa >> >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Larry Purss >> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? >> >> David K >> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. My reason for >> exploring these authors is I have been following a path pursuing a basic >> question. >> >> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? >> >> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic guiding images >> upon which thinking rests" >> >> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring appearances and >> illusions was also exploring this theme. >> >> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new phenomenological path >> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names this process >> *metaphoricity*. >> >> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible image-character of the >> *spontaneous event* of meaning. >> >> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he brackets - >> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. >> >> AND >> >> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* finds the >> meaning of its very self. >> >> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this >> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of metaphor can >> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated in >> *objectivity* >> >> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. >> >> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of itself *in* the >> mode [path] of the concept >> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding images has been >> established. >> >> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the path of >> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived from the >> image-character of the guiding image. >> >> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial this topic may >> become [again] >> >> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this basic >> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these images as >> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images emerge >> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. >> >> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is transcendental] and is >> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. It seems to >> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. >> >> I also realize this question may already be answered in Vygotsky's writings >> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of XMCA. I >> personally am following this path for now. >> >> Larry >> > From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Mon Dec 1 05:14:22 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Mon, 01 Dec 2014 08:14:22 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] (no subject) Message-ID: This is the article many of you requested. ? Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info? -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 17528631.2014.972703-1.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 121165 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141201/abdcca03/attachment.pdf From helenaworthen@gmail.com Mon Dec 1 11:28:28 2014 From: helenaworthen@gmail.com (Helena Worthen) Date: Mon, 1 Dec 2014 11:28:28 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: History(ies) of this discourse community and futures past In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <3685D4EB-BB26-4BA0-B583-A2841AA11371@gmail.com> Greetings: I have now read the Gack and Finkelstein 1992 piece, The Seeds of XLCHC, and most of Eva Ekblad's 1998 piece, Contact, Community and Multilogue: Communication in the Practice of Scholarship, up to the section "Relations of Interweaving and Tension". There is a lot to think about here. However, I feel some urgency to find out more about this statement, which is in a quote on page 3-4 of Gack and Finkelstein: Only grant proposals that de-emphasized social factors in favor of individual change, or which promoted new technologies in a culturally neutral way, won support (Carnegie, 40) There is no entry for Carnegie in the References on page 49. However, on the timeline at the back of the paper there is a mention of a 1984 Carnegie interim report and a 1985 request for funding. I am interested to see "social factors" opposed to "individual change." I assume social factors include things like race, poverty, diversity in a classroom. "Individual change" would be the kind of things that are measured by standardized tests. I would like to know if it's possible to track the overall de-funding of research on social factors and the shift to focus on individual change into the present time. At what point did it stop even being a topic that people talked about? The unspoken phrase, from my point of view, is "collective change," in the sense that social factors affect collective change (and collective learning), whereas what affects individual change is inherent personal factors. So the study of social contexts, specifically learning and development in their social context, is a politically charged topic. Am I on the right track, here? I will read the rest of Eva's paper soon. She's one of the most brilliant people ever to have been on this list. Where is she now? Helena Worthen 510-828-2845 helenaworthen@gmail.com From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Dec 1 12:13:17 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Mon, 1 Dec 2014 20:13:17 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: (no subject) In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1417464797735.30146@unm.edu> Dear Paul! Perfect timing! Thank you for making your paper available. I look forward to this READING! I hope there will be good and kindly discussion about it. I'd like to post this poem from John Donne, as excerpted by Hemingway, which seems apropos? No man is an island, Entire of itself. Each is a piece of the continent, A part of the main. If a clod be washed away by the sea, Europe is the less. As well as if a promontory were. As well as if a manor of thine own Or of thine friend's were. Each man's death diminishes me, For I am involved in mankind. Therefore, send not to know For whom the bell tolls, It tolls for thee. I post this here for a particular reason: The easy read is that we are all connected to one another (possibly through metaphor). However, the more subtle reading, which I intend, has to do with the present moment This Moment and how The World will present itself to us at any given time, and when it does, the meaning that we give to these presentations, as they present themselves to us in the instant that they present themselves to us. In that vein of thought, I find Paul's paper a True Gift, and though he did not give it directly to me, I accept it that way. Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Dr. Paul C. Mocombe Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 6:14 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] (no subject) This is the article many of you requested. Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com www.readingroomcurriculum.com www.paulcmocombe.info From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon Dec 1 12:22:21 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 1 Dec 2014 12:22:21 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: History(ies) of this discourse community and futures past In-Reply-To: <3685D4EB-BB26-4BA0-B583-A2841AA11371@gmail.com> References: <3685D4EB-BB26-4BA0-B583-A2841AA11371@gmail.com> Message-ID: Hi Helena-- There are a couple of fuller discussions of the funding shenanigans that began in the Reagan era on the lchc web site. The Carnegie report is the first item on the history/archive page. The actual events were rawer than we put in print at the time, and the report is almost certainly more than most people want to read, but you can see how things looked from where LCHC stood in 1984. The general topic of funding in relationship to reigning ideologies is certainly worth the attention of people on this list. Last I heard, Eva was busy weaving in Sweden. mike On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 11:28 AM, Helena Worthen wrote: > Greetings: > > I have now read the Gack and Finkelstein 1992 piece, The Seeds of XLCHC, > and most of Eva Ekblad's 1998 piece, Contact, Community and Multilogue: > Communication in the Practice of Scholarship, up to the section "Relations > of Interweaving and Tension". > > There is a lot to think about here. However, I feel some urgency to find > out more about this statement, which is in a quote on page 3-4 of Gack and > Finkelstein: > > Only grant proposals that de-emphasized social factors in favor > of individual change, or which promoted new technologies > in a culturally neutral way, won support (Carnegie, 40) > > There is no entry for Carnegie in the References on page 49. However, on > the timeline at the back of the paper there is a mention of a 1984 Carnegie > interim report and a 1985 request for funding. > > I am interested to see "social factors" opposed to "individual change." I > assume social factors include things like race, poverty, diversity in a > classroom. "Individual change" would be the kind of things that are > measured by standardized tests. > > I would like to know if it's possible to track the overall de-funding of > research on social factors and the shift to focus on individual change into > the present time. At what point did it stop even being a topic that people > talked about? > > The unspoken phrase, from my point of view, is "collective change," in the > sense that social factors affect collective change (and collective > learning), whereas what affects individual change is inherent personal > factors. So the study of social contexts, specifically learning and > development in their social context, is a politically charged topic. > > Am I on the right track, here? > > I will read the rest of Eva's paper soon. She's one of the most brilliant > people ever to have been on this list. Where is she now? > > Helena Worthen > 510-828-2845 > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Dec 1 12:26:12 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Mon, 1 Dec 2014 20:26:12 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya In-Reply-To: References: <1417327948145.17025@unm.edu> <1417369203201.33878@unm.edu> <1417423298756.15810@unm.edu>, Message-ID: <1417465572384.17829@unm.edu> Hi Ulvi, I would say that the preconditions are self-acceptance, which is my reason for mentioning cows and cats. Of course cows and cats are not self-conscious so I was being a little ironic to say that we could evolve to their state. More to your point, it is because we don't accept ourselves as we are that causes unhappiness. So to be more precise about how to think of it is to consider the removal of non-self-acceptance rather than an addition of self-acceptance, because as infants and children we accept ourselves just fine! Why are children so happy? Zoya seems to have accepted herself as herself, living in her present moment, living to the task at hand as was necessary. It is my belief the reason why she was able to face her death so fearlessly, and why she was so remarkable to the people around her while she lived. I would not call being in the present moment idealistic, but realistic. :) Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Ulvi ??il Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:04 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya Thank you Annalisa. You are right. There is certainly many many happinnesses. But the question was: One big, common happiness for all. Is there such happiness? Anf if there is, what are its preconditions? Kind regards, Ulvi 2014-12-01 10:41 GMT+02:00 Annalisa Aguilar : > Dear Ulvi, > > I think it absolutely depends on what you mean by happiness! :) > > But to Zoya, it seems that she became the person she became from the deep > reading she did. I'm sure writing in a notebook is a part of that as well. > I suspect in the backdrop of her hard life, these past-times were essential > to her development, especially concerning her imagination. > > Have you noticed how cows are not bothered if they have matching horns or > crooked horns? Or cats do not complain that their silly acrobatics are > posted on the internet? > > If we evolve to a state of being non-self-conscious, as animals are, we > might be happier than we are now. Though maybe I am wrong. > > Maybe happiness is just _being_ happy? > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > From ulvi.icil@gmail.com Mon Dec 1 13:42:34 2014 From: ulvi.icil@gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?VWx2aSDEsMOnaWw=?=) Date: Mon, 1 Dec 2014 23:42:34 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya In-Reply-To: <1417465572384.17829@unm.edu> References: <1417327948145.17025@unm.edu> <1417369203201.33878@unm.edu> <1417423298756.15810@unm.edu> <1417465572384.17829@unm.edu> Message-ID: I understand your point. After the decision to go to the front, she seems to have reached an equilibrium, and she was ready for death. But; prior to this decision, it seems that she was, as a child, from even ages like 10 or 11, in a constant search for something. This something, I think, is to be a person of highest ideals, a devotion to these ideals. It was defense of Soviet Union after the war broke out. Prior to this, I think she was not in a state of equilibrium. Best, Ulvi 2014-12-01 22:26 GMT+02:00 Annalisa Aguilar : > > Hi Ulvi, > > I would say that the preconditions are self-acceptance, which is my reason > for mentioning cows and cats. Of course cows and cats are not > self-conscious so I was being a little ironic to say that we could evolve > to their state. More to your point, it is because we don't accept ourselves > as we are that causes unhappiness. So to be more precise about how to think > of it is to consider the removal of non-self-acceptance rather than an > addition of self-acceptance, because as infants and children we accept > ourselves just fine! Why are children so happy? > > Zoya seems to have accepted herself as herself, living in her present > moment, living to the task at hand as was necessary. It is my belief the > reason why she was able to face her death so fearlessly, and why she was so > remarkable to the people around her while she lived. > > I would not call being in the present moment idealistic, but realistic. :) > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Ulvi ??il > Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:04 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya > > Thank you Annalisa. > > You are right. There is certainly many many happinnesses. > > But the question was: One big, common happiness for all. Is there such > happiness? > > Anf if there is, what are its preconditions? > > Kind regards, > > Ulvi > > > 2014-12-01 10:41 GMT+02:00 Annalisa Aguilar : > > > Dear Ulvi, > > > > I think it absolutely depends on what you mean by happiness! :) > > > > But to Zoya, it seems that she became the person she became from the deep > > reading she did. I'm sure writing in a notebook is a part of that as > well. > > I suspect in the backdrop of her hard life, these past-times were > essential > > to her development, especially concerning her imagination. > > > > Have you noticed how cows are not bothered if they have matching horns or > > crooked horns? Or cats do not complain that their silly acrobatics are > > posted on the internet? > > > > If we evolve to a state of being non-self-conscious, as animals are, we > > might be happier than we are now. Though maybe I am wrong. > > > > Maybe happiness is just _being_ happy? > > > > Kind regards, > > > > Annalisa > > > > From hshonerd@gmail.com Mon Dec 1 14:31:29 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Mon, 1 Dec 2014 15:31:29 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? In-Reply-To: References: <1417397991972.17078@unm.edu> Message-ID: David, I am off-line as I write this email, so it will probably be late to the ball, but: Image vs Process?Would this be analogous in some way to declarative and procedural? (like your wife was focused on shopping procedures when she met you) Even noun and verb? You say of the importance of thinking and acting, ?else we would not have time or ability to process complex problems in real time?? Would it be fair to say that the timing of thinking and acting is rhythmic? We often talk of time as a constraint, comes in finite packets, but maybe it?s a matrix. Like a womb, with a beating heart. (?matrix? in Spanish means both matrix and womb). Just wondering. Larry, Yeah, I?m with David: Why the metaphoricity? Henry > On Nov 30, 2014, at 11:53 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > > Larry, Annalisa: > > People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" when we > met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of anything > except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe available > for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember > whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the > beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a > non-image based mental representation. > > As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations are > images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. In > fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against Titchener > and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, > everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated that > many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically anterior > to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would not have > time or ability to process complex problems in real time. > > I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are > genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more reading > to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than I am > (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels like > she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do NOT read > this article--instead, look at Figure 11. > > http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ > > The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure of > Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any actual > images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural experience > associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then deliberately > frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any > recognizable figures upon which to focus. > > However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine Chapel fresco > for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He or she > can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting and > wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not notice > the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in it. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar > wrote: >> >> Hi Larry and David, >> >> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! >> >> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are at the root of all thinking. >> >> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, based upon previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a phrase I like a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it by the same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it. >> >> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as Hackett describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have you already given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be willing to take a look. >> >> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is controversial. It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone says "this is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble observation. >> >> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever that process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at hand? Just a thought. >> >> What is it that appeals to you about this model, metaphoricity? >> >> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) >> >> Kind regards, >> >> Annalisa >> >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Larry Purss > >> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? >> >> David K >> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. My reason for >> exploring these authors is I have been following a path pursuing a basic >> question. >> >> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? >> >> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic guiding images >> upon which thinking rests" >> >> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring appearances and >> illusions was also exploring this theme. >> >> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new phenomenological path >> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names this process >> *metaphoricity*. >> >> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible image-character of the >> *spontaneous event* of meaning. >> >> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he brackets - >> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. >> >> AND >> >> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* finds the >> meaning of its very self. >> >> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this >> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of metaphor can >> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated in >> *objectivity* >> >> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. >> >> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of itself *in* the >> mode [path] of the concept >> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding images has been >> established. >> >> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the path of >> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived from the >> image-character of the guiding image. >> >> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial this topic may >> become [again] >> >> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this basic >> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these images as >> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images emerge >> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. >> >> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is transcendental] and is >> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. It seems to >> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. >> >> I also realize this question may already be answered in Vygotsky's writings >> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of XMCA. I >> personally am following this path for now. >> >> Larry >> > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Mon Dec 1 16:55:19 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Mon, 1 Dec 2014 17:55:19 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: History(ies) of this discourse community and futures past In-Reply-To: References: <3685D4EB-BB26-4BA0-B583-A2841AA11371@gmail.com> Message-ID: Helena and others, In the event you would like to see the full report, here is the link to the link for the Carnegie report: http://lchc.ucsd.edu/Histarch/carnegie_rpt.html Cheers, The links guy On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 1:22 PM, mike cole wrote: > Hi Helena-- > > There are a couple of fuller discussions of the funding shenanigans that > began in the Reagan era on the lchc web site. The Carnegie report is the > first item on the history/archive page. The actual events were rawer than > we put in print at the time, and the report is almost certainly more than > most people want to read, but you can see how things looked from where LCHC > stood in 1984. > > The general topic of funding in relationship to reigning ideologies is > certainly worth the attention of people on this list. > > Last I heard, Eva was busy weaving in Sweden. > mike > > > > On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 11:28 AM, Helena Worthen > wrote: > > > Greetings: > > > > I have now read the Gack and Finkelstein 1992 piece, The Seeds of XLCHC, > > and most of Eva Ekblad's 1998 piece, Contact, Community and Multilogue: > > Communication in the Practice of Scholarship, up to the section > "Relations > > of Interweaving and Tension". > > > > There is a lot to think about here. However, I feel some urgency to find > > out more about this statement, which is in a quote on page 3-4 of Gack > and > > Finkelstein: > > > > Only grant proposals that de-emphasized social factors in favor > > of individual change, or which promoted new technologies > > in a culturally neutral way, won support (Carnegie, 40) > > > > There is no entry for Carnegie in the References on page 49. However, on > > the timeline at the back of the paper there is a mention of a 1984 > Carnegie > > interim report and a 1985 request for funding. > > > > I am interested to see "social factors" opposed to "individual change." I > > assume social factors include things like race, poverty, diversity in a > > classroom. "Individual change" would be the kind of things that are > > measured by standardized tests. > > > > I would like to know if it's possible to track the overall de-funding of > > research on social factors and the shift to focus on individual change > into > > the present time. At what point did it stop even being a topic that > people > > talked about? > > > > The unspoken phrase, from my point of view, is "collective change," in > the > > sense that social factors affect collective change (and collective > > learning), whereas what affects individual change is inherent personal > > factors. So the study of social contexts, specifically learning and > > development in their social context, is a politically charged topic. > > > > Am I on the right track, here? > > > > I will read the rest of Eva's paper soon. She's one of the most brilliant > > people ever to have been on this list. Where is she now? > > > > Helena Worthen > > 510-828-2845 > > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From Dana.Walker@unco.edu Mon Dec 1 17:45:46 2014 From: Dana.Walker@unco.edu (Walker, Dana) Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2014 01:45:46 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: "The political" and "power" in learning Message-ID: Hi Miguel, I would be very interested in continuing this thread on "the political" and "power" in learning. My participation will be slow, as I will be at the LRA conference in Florida and then finals and so on, but will follow with interest. I have changed thread title in anticipation of pursuing this exploration. Does Ferguson (or Oakland, or New York, or Hong Kong, or Cairo) matter in considerations of 'the political' and 'power' in learning (and teaching)? Dana On 11/28/14 5:07 PM, "Zavala, Miguel" wrote: >Hi Dana, > >I believe there are several ways to go with an analysis of "the political" >or "power" in learning. First, is to search for its >articulation/theorization in existing studies (whether conceptual or >empirical) within the learning sciences more generally. Who has attempted >this work? Also, In the general absence of studies theorizing "the >political" or "power" in learning (which I gather is an accurate depiction >of the field), one might pursue the ways in which "context" is narrowly >framed in distinct frames/theories of learning. In what ways does/can >CHAT enable the analysis of "the political" and "power" in learning? > >Now, due to time constraints, this project may take time; perhaps there is >a smaller group that would like to continue with this thread/exploration >of "the political" or "power" in learning. I place questions of politics >and power in quotation marks because they need to be unpacked, like many >concepts. > >I believe there is another route one can take, and that is to begin with >our own political biographies, how we view the world and its >transformation. In a sense, we all have our biographies of coming to CHAT. >How is CHAT a tool in our practical work (as educators, >action-researchers, community organizers, etc.)? Because processes are >relational, I imagine that our own biographies, positionalities, and >standpoints (which function more like collective consciousness and >practices, borrowing here from the work of Sandra Harding) are not only >inflected in our appropriations of CHAT but are interwoven; they shift >from "external" to "internal" processes of of both research and praxis >(informed by our politics). I recognize there are many points being made >here and "dangers", especially when one views learning as a-political or >mechanistic, but I take that risk. > >Attached is a chapter outlining my political philosophy. It was published >as part of a text that asked contributors to name our "pedagogic creeds" >(? la Dewey). > >-Miguel > > >On 11/27/14 8:12 AM, "Walker, Dana" wrote: > >>Gracias Miguel, and Mike and Larry for responding and for moving forward >>this thread of thought begun by Annalisa. >> >>Miguel, I remember now (based on a conference presentation of yours years >>ago) that your pedagogical and theoretical work involving migrant >>students >>at UCLA addressed questions of power, subjectivity, and embodied selves >>in >>boundary crossing processes in ways that other CHAT theorists (e.g., >>Tuomi-Grohn & Engestrom, 2003; Grossen & Zittoun, 2012) do not. I wonder >>if this is a place where we could begin exploring the question of power >>in >>relation to learning and development? Is there an article of yours that >>you might suggest on this subject? >> >>Dana >> >> >>On 11/27/14 12:02 AM, "Zavala, Miguel" >>wrote: >> >>>Gracias Annalisa and Dana. >>> >>>Questions of power have always been central to my work and I am a new >>>member of this list (and community) and don't have a broader context as >>>to >>>why it was created and whether it is by design meant to grow in its own >>>way over time, etc. What I have noticed though is a tendency to focus on >>>conceptual clarity (of the work of Vygotsky and Cultural Historical >>>Activity Theory and prior, such as Marx). So, I am learning anew in this >>>space, taking notes, re-reading. In many ways it reminds me of the CHAT >>>reading group many of us at UCLA visualized but never materialized >>>formally, except that our reading and writing the world with Vygotsky's >>>ideas (and others) did materialize in the beautiful pedagogical work we >>>did with migrant students at that time... >>> >>>I hope the question of how we use, expand, enrich, re-envision, and >>>carry >>>forward the ideas of Vygotsky (and how these intersect with or >>>interweave >>>with power) are considered in an open and non-controlled way. By >>>"non-controlled" I mean the parallel tendency in particular >>>circles/communities to challenge work that grows out of particular ideas >>>and if those ideas do not adhere to some party-line (or experts on said >>>theory don't agree on it) then such work should not define itself as >>>"Vygotskian", "CHAT-based", or "Socio-Cultural," etc. My own motivation >>>to >>>chime in and contribute would increase if we followed this strand, that >>>looks at power and how it is integral to (not a 'factor' or 'external' >>>context) learning? Although the reading group orientation is still >>>useful. >>> >>>Warmly, >>> >>>Miguel Zavala >>> >>> >>> >>>On 11/26/14 10:38 PM, "Walker, Dana" wrote: >>> >>>>Before we leave this topic, I would like to suggest that we pause to >>>>consider Annalisa's question: >>>> >>>>I'm curious how others have been inspired by Vygotsky and >>>>sociocultural theory, and even other manifestations of his ideas, such >>>>as >>>>CHAT, etc and how people are using these approaches in their work. What >>>>is >>>>that like for you? And to be more specific, what is that like for women >>>>and >>>>people of color? I'm also interested in thinking-out-loud with others >>>>about >>>>Vygotskian concepts that are not easy to understand; to employ in real >>>>time >>>>dialogue and social interaction to leap over zopeds together. Isn't >>>>that >>>>what a listserv is for? Or am I being too idealistic? >>>> >>>> >>>>For many years I have wondered why the participants on this list so >>>>seldom >>>>talk from contextualized positions, specifically positioning the self >>>>in >>>>relation to others and to power relations shaped by race, class, >>>>gender, >>>>and so on. I am myself very aware of power relations being played out >>>>through the discursive positioning of people in this space, which is >>>>why >>>>I >>>>choose not to speak. I am wondering if any of the subscribers to this >>>>list >>>>are interested such questions, including the one framed by Annalisa >>>>above? >>>>Kris Gutierrez is the only one I know of in CHAT/sociocultural theory >>>>who >>>>deals with these issues, for example in her article "Developing a >>>>Sociocritical Literacy in the Third Space"(2008). But I'm sure there >>>>are >>>>others. >>>> >>>>Dana >>>> >>>>On 11/26/14 10:49 PM, "Carol Macdonald" wrote: >>>> >>>>>Hi >>>>> >>>>>There have been some off list postings about this phenomenon. None of >>>>>it >>>>>complimentary. This cannot be sorted out in one move. >>>>> >>>>>I propose that we move onto a different thread - topic. >>>>> >>>>>Mike, would you like to start us off on something new? >>>>> >>>>>Carol >>>>> >>>>>On 27 November 2014 at 02:49, Martin John Packer >>>>> >>>>>wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Andy, if you're going to retire, then retire. But don't aim one or >>>>>>two >>>>>> more underhand blows behind the feint of retiring. >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin >>>>>> >>>>>> On Nov 26, 2014, at 7:24 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> > Well this bloke will retire again at this point. I thought for a >>>>>>brief >>>>>> moment there, I thought we had a breakthrough. Certainly, Huw's >>>>>>"real >>>>>> illusion" is perfectly apt to my mind (it's an expression Marx >>>>>>uses), >>>>>>or >>>>>> in Eric Fromm's words, an illusion with "survival value." Martin >>>>>>says >>>>>> "Consciousness is an objective process that *sometimes* can *give >>>>>>rise >>>>>>to* >>>>>> illusions." As Vygotsky says "For him psychology is partly >>>>>>phenomenology." >>>>>> > Andy >>>>>> > >>>>>>--------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>>- >>>>>>- >>>>>>- >>>>>> > *Andy Blunden* >>>>>> > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > Bruce Robinson wrote: >>>>>> >> Henry, >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> Your wife's question leads to another: who speaks for the silent >>>>>> majority, many of whom, like me, must be getting fed up with what >>>>>>David >>>>>>K >>>>>> calls a "rather blokish struggle for power over particular words'? >>>>>>[Not >>>>>> Richard Nixon :)] >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> Bruce R >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> PS: You may also note that I have not changed the subject heading >>>>>>of >>>>>> this message so that it bears no relation to the content. Something >>>>>>else I >>>>>> find irritating... >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> On 26/11/2014 17:16, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>>>>> >>> Sister Analisa, >>>>>> >>> Thank you for responding! I was just talking to my wife (getting >>>>>> personal!) about the chat. She asked me, "How does anyone get to >>>>>> participate in the (XMCA) chat if only a few people take part?" I >>>>>>wondered >>>>>> in my email below if too much was expected of written communication >>>>>>in >>>>>>the >>>>>> XMCA chat. With 800 people potentially taking turns, well...what is >>>>>>even >>>>>> possible logistically? Mike Cole has talked about this, and, I >>>>>>think, >>>>>>has >>>>>> some suggestions on how to deal with the bottlenecking. But even >>>>>>small >>>>>> scale communication can be daunting. I watched, with my wife, a >>>>>>Richard >>>>>> Linklater movie last night, "Before Midnight". Two people, face to >>>>>>face, in >>>>>> a totally committed relationship, smart people, good people, trying >>>>>>so >>>>>>hard >>>>>> to get it right. Always a work in progress. But it's worth it. The >>>>>> alternative is despair. I am sure of this: This chat, which seems to >>>>>>get >>>>>> bogged down in abstractions, pure thinking in the mud, is really >>>>>> consequential beyond the sensitivities of academics. I said we >>>>>> >> va >>>>>> >>> lue Vygotsky's "heroism", but that's too macho. I should have >>>>>>said >>>>>> courage. >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> >>> The Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis is a powerful idea, often >>>>>>called >>>>>> the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis. Google it. Really. See what you think. >>>>>>One >>>>>> gauge of the power of an idea is if it has found its way into >>>>>>popular >>>>>> discourse. I just this morning heard an NPR radio program (thanks >>>>>>again >>>>>>to >>>>>> my wife, who was listening when she heard something she thought I >>>>>>would >>>>>>be >>>>>> interested in) that dealt with the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis in its >>>>>>strong >>>>>>and >>>>>> weak form. >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> >>> Henry >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> >>>> On Nov 25, 2014, at 10:11 PM, Annalisa Aguilar >>>>>> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>> >>>>>> >>>> Dear Henry, >>>>>> >>>> >>>>>> >>>> Thank you for your reply. >>>>>> >>>> >>>>>> >>>> I don't think being personal (or even personable) requires >>>>>>being >>>>>> heated. Does this have to do with my comment of warmth as a sign of >>>>>>welcome? >>>>>> >>>> >>>>>> >>>> To speak about culture non-personally is not something I am >>>>>>adept >>>>>>at >>>>>> doing. We are always speaking from where we stand, the culture that >>>>>>we >>>>>>are >>>>>> in or from, what-have-you. >>>>>> >>>> >>>>>> >>>> Respectfully, I do not know what "linguistic relativity >>>>>>hypothesis" >>>>>> is. So please be patient with me while I connect this academic idea >>>>>>you >>>>>> have offered to this conversation so that I can relate that to my >>>>>>personal >>>>>> experience speaking on this thread, though clearly I'm not speaking >>>>>> literally right now, but it is speech from me, not a sock puppet >>>>>>with >>>>>>my >>>>>> voice thrown from the position of objective reality. >>>>>> >>>> >>>>>> >>>> You are talking about speaking two languages. But it seems we >>>>>>are >>>>>>all >>>>>> speaking English on this list. So I'm a bit lost right there what >>>>>>you >>>>>>are >>>>>> trying to say to me. >>>>>> >>>> >>>>>> >>>> Then, you speak of metalinguistics and how it represents >>>>>>different >>>>>> worldviews, if you don't mind me swapping your use of "perspective" >>>>>>for >>>>>> worldview. There is a lot of time clearing muckups to get it right. >>>>>>I'm >>>>>>not >>>>>> sure that it ever gets right though, which troubles me. I have found >>>>>>that >>>>>> many people who have different worldviews communicate by "talking >>>>>>to," >>>>>> rather than "talking at." I feel, for example, you and I are talking >>>>>>to >>>>>>one >>>>>> another, despite our likely different POVs. >>>>>> >>>> >>>>>> >>>> I don't know what the "perish and dapple of Andy" means when >>>>>>you >>>>>>say >>>>>> that. From what I can tell he's trying to define something for >>>>>>himself >>>>>> asking for the help of others. That's fine and I'm learning that >>>>>> definitions are very bas-relief for him. I think my interests are a >>>>>>little >>>>>> different. So I'd prefer to orient to my interests, if that is OK. >>>>>> >>>> >>>>>> >>>> Speaking of metalinguistics, rather than debate over >>>>>>definitions, >>>>>>I'm >>>>>> more interested in speaking to the very different people who are on >>>>>>this >>>>>> list. The rumor is there are 800 folks out there. Where are you? :) >>>>>>To >>>>>> reference a highly academic quote from the Wizard of Oz: >>>>>> >>>> >>>>>> >>>> "Come out, come out wherever you are, and meet the young lady >>>>>>who >>>>>> fell from the star!" >>>>>> >>>> --Glinda, the Good Witch from the North (waves magic wand) >>>>>> >>>> >>>>>> >>>> I'm curious how others have been inspired by Vygotsky and >>>>>> sociocultural theory, and even other manifestations of his ideas, >>>>>>such >>>>>>as >>>>>> CHAT, etc and how people are using these approaches in their work. >>>>>>What >>>>>>is >>>>>> that like for you? And to be more specific, what is that like for >>>>>>women >>>>>>and >>>>>> people of color? I'm also interested in thinking-out-loud with >>>>>>others >>>>>>about >>>>>> Vygotskian concepts that are not easy to understand; to employ in >>>>>>real >>>>>>time >>>>>> dialogue and social interaction to leap over zopeds together. Isn't >>>>>>that >>>>>> what a listserv is for? Or am I being too idealistic? >>>>>> >>>> >>>>>> >>>> I have tried to speak in an open, easy, and immediate manner, >>>>>>to >>>>>> allow others to engage. But I fear that engagement is never going to >>>>>>happen >>>>>> because all that persists are conversations about definitions, or >>>>>>whether >>>>>> nothing can come from nothing, and voila! subsequent debates ensue. >>>>>>Or >>>>>> someone will say, "We already discussed this 20 years ago!" Which >>>>>>means >>>>>>I >>>>>> missed the party, I suppose. Unfortunately, if I disagree with a >>>>>>position >>>>>> because I interpret differently, then I'm told to go read something >>>>>>without >>>>>> really a clear explanation why I'm supposed to go read something. >>>>>> >>>> >>>>>> >>>> I don't really agree with the approach of "read this," as an >>>>>>academic >>>>>> argument. Anyone is free to use it, and I have myself, but because I >>>>>>know >>>>>> how obtuse that can be, I couch it with my reasons why I think it >>>>>>would >>>>>>be >>>>>> a good read for that person, and what I think there is learn from >>>>>>reading. >>>>>> I think the "read this" approach, when it is offered with the tone >>>>>>of >>>>>>"now >>>>>> go eat your vegetables!" fails in the making of speech between >>>>>>people. >>>>>>All >>>>>> it does is shut things down. >>>>>> >>>> >>>>>> >>>> If the reading truly is relevant, it seems far more productive >>>>>>in >>>>>>the >>>>>> moment of speech to cue a person what to look for, to supply a >>>>>>context, >>>>>> especially when referencing an entire book, for example, or the link >>>>>>to >>>>>>an >>>>>> entire website full of texts. >>>>>> >>>> >>>>>> >>>> Your assessment in the physicality of language is something >>>>>>with >>>>>> which I am completely in agreement. Especially since we all seem to >>>>>>agree >>>>>> with the material aspects of language. So the question at hand is a >>>>>>matter >>>>>> of form. Form has an aesthetic but also has a purpose. Are we >>>>>>throwing >>>>>> ropes or throwing boulders? If throwing boulders, where does that >>>>>>need >>>>>>to >>>>>> throw boulders come from? If throwing ropes, then at least >>>>>>connections >>>>>>are >>>>>> being made for those who might not be very clear about ideas and who >>>>>>may >>>>>> require a helping hand. >>>>>> >>>> >>>>>> >>>> Then there's the old, but handy, elliptical comment, something >>>>>>like a >>>>>> boomerang... meant to be subtle or ironic at the expense of someone >>>>>>who >>>>>>may >>>>>> not understand. >>>>>> >>>> >>>>>> >>>> At this point, I'd to emphasize that being ignorant is not >>>>>>being >>>>>> stupid, but it seems someone who is ignorant is frequently treated >>>>>>as >>>>>> stupid (um, on this list). This "phenomenon" has made me reflect >>>>>>upon >>>>>>how >>>>>> little time is spent upon the nature of ignorance in education and >>>>>>the >>>>>> dynamics of ignorance in speaking. Every one of us is ignorant about >>>>>>most >>>>>> things in the world. And yet being ignorant is seen as an >>>>>>embarrassment, a >>>>>> deficiency, a lapse in character. I vehemently disagree with this >>>>>>reception >>>>>> to ignorance. Even Einstein said something like, "The more I know, >>>>>>the >>>>>>more >>>>>> I see how much I don't know." Such an aggressive position toward >>>>>>ignorance >>>>>> is nothing but hurtful, even arrogant. Arrogance is a blister, a >>>>>>defense >>>>>> mechanism from previous hurt. A person who is honest about one's own >>>>>> ignorance is a very strong person and is showing a willingness to >>>>>>learn >>>>>> something. I think all teachers will agree that a person who knows >>>>>>one >>>>>> doesn't know is an easier student to teach tha >>>>>> >> n >>>>>> >>> one who doesn't know one doesn't know. >>>>>> >>>> Iconicity is something I can hang my hat on. I see it is >>>>>>related >>>>>>to >>>>>> pointing. What I like about pointing is that it is a gesture, which >>>>>>implies >>>>>> movement, in the way the word is also movement. I hope I have made >>>>>> sufficient personal connections to your concepts without the heat. >>>>>>Thank >>>>>> you for offering them to me. >>>>>> >>>> >>>>>> >>>> Kind regards, >>>>>> >>>> >>>>>> >>>> Annalisa >>>>>> >>>> >>>>>> >>> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> > >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>-- >>>>>Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>>>>Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> >> > From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon Dec 1 18:07:29 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 1 Dec 2014 18:07:29 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: "The political" and "power" in learning In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: I fully agree, Dana. Several interconnected issues that Miguel is raising are of central concern to xmca. Miguel-- I think that the notion of decolonializing pedagogy relates in pretty direct way with Maisha Winn's ideas of African Diaspora Participatory Literacy. She writes about that in the next issue of MCA. I also like the idea of autobiographical accounts of one's own positionality with respect to the events that have shaped your scholarship. There is an interesting article by a group of South African pedagogs that illustrates again, what seems like, a similar idea of locating one's academic work within the context of one's political engagements. And then we are gifted with Paul's article in a journal devoted to the centrality of class in a journal entitled *African and Black Diaspora. * Synchronic a-causality or Zeitgeist? mike On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 5:45 PM, Walker, Dana wrote: > Hi Miguel, > > I would be very interested in continuing this thread on "the political" > and "power" in learning. My participation will be slow, as I will be at > the LRA conference in Florida and then finals and so on, but will follow > with interest. I have changed thread title in anticipation of pursuing > this exploration. > > Does Ferguson (or Oakland, or New York, or Hong Kong, or Cairo) matter in > considerations of 'the political' and 'power' in learning (and teaching)? > > Dana > > On 11/28/14 5:07 PM, "Zavala, Miguel" > wrote: > > >Hi Dana, > > > >I believe there are several ways to go with an analysis of "the political" > >or "power" in learning. First, is to search for its > >articulation/theorization in existing studies (whether conceptual or > >empirical) within the learning sciences more generally. Who has attempted > >this work? Also, In the general absence of studies theorizing "the > >political" or "power" in learning (which I gather is an accurate depiction > >of the field), one might pursue the ways in which "context" is narrowly > >framed in distinct frames/theories of learning. In what ways does/can > >CHAT enable the analysis of "the political" and "power" in learning? > > > >Now, due to time constraints, this project may take time; perhaps there is > >a smaller group that would like to continue with this thread/exploration > >of "the political" or "power" in learning. I place questions of politics > >and power in quotation marks because they need to be unpacked, like many > >concepts. > > > >I believe there is another route one can take, and that is to begin with > >our own political biographies, how we view the world and its > >transformation. In a sense, we all have our biographies of coming to CHAT. > >How is CHAT a tool in our practical work (as educators, > >action-researchers, community organizers, etc.)? Because processes are > >relational, I imagine that our own biographies, positionalities, and > >standpoints (which function more like collective consciousness and > >practices, borrowing here from the work of Sandra Harding) are not only > >inflected in our appropriations of CHAT but are interwoven; they shift > >from "external" to "internal" processes of of both research and praxis > >(informed by our politics). I recognize there are many points being made > >here and "dangers", especially when one views learning as a-political or > >mechanistic, but I take that risk. > > > >Attached is a chapter outlining my political philosophy. It was published > >as part of a text that asked contributors to name our "pedagogic creeds" > >(? la Dewey). > > > >-Miguel > > > > > >On 11/27/14 8:12 AM, "Walker, Dana" wrote: > > > >>Gracias Miguel, and Mike and Larry for responding and for moving forward > >>this thread of thought begun by Annalisa. > >> > >>Miguel, I remember now (based on a conference presentation of yours years > >>ago) that your pedagogical and theoretical work involving migrant > >>students > >>at UCLA addressed questions of power, subjectivity, and embodied selves > >>in > >>boundary crossing processes in ways that other CHAT theorists (e.g., > >>Tuomi-Grohn & Engestrom, 2003; Grossen & Zittoun, 2012) do not. I wonder > >>if this is a place where we could begin exploring the question of power > >>in > >>relation to learning and development? Is there an article of yours that > >>you might suggest on this subject? > >> > >>Dana > >> > >> > >>On 11/27/14 12:02 AM, "Zavala, Miguel" > >>wrote: > >> > >>>Gracias Annalisa and Dana. > >>> > >>>Questions of power have always been central to my work and I am a new > >>>member of this list (and community) and don't have a broader context as > >>>to > >>>why it was created and whether it is by design meant to grow in its own > >>>way over time, etc. What I have noticed though is a tendency to focus on > >>>conceptual clarity (of the work of Vygotsky and Cultural Historical > >>>Activity Theory and prior, such as Marx). So, I am learning anew in this > >>>space, taking notes, re-reading. In many ways it reminds me of the CHAT > >>>reading group many of us at UCLA visualized but never materialized > >>>formally, except that our reading and writing the world with Vygotsky's > >>>ideas (and others) did materialize in the beautiful pedagogical work we > >>>did with migrant students at that time... > >>> > >>>I hope the question of how we use, expand, enrich, re-envision, and > >>>carry > >>>forward the ideas of Vygotsky (and how these intersect with or > >>>interweave > >>>with power) are considered in an open and non-controlled way. By > >>>"non-controlled" I mean the parallel tendency in particular > >>>circles/communities to challenge work that grows out of particular ideas > >>>and if those ideas do not adhere to some party-line (or experts on said > >>>theory don't agree on it) then such work should not define itself as > >>>"Vygotskian", "CHAT-based", or "Socio-Cultural," etc. My own motivation > >>>to > >>>chime in and contribute would increase if we followed this strand, that > >>>looks at power and how it is integral to (not a 'factor' or 'external' > >>>context) learning? Although the reading group orientation is still > >>>useful. > >>> > >>>Warmly, > >>> > >>>Miguel Zavala > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>On 11/26/14 10:38 PM, "Walker, Dana" wrote: > >>> > >>>>Before we leave this topic, I would like to suggest that we pause to > >>>>consider Annalisa's question: > >>>> > >>>>I'm curious how others have been inspired by Vygotsky and > >>>>sociocultural theory, and even other manifestations of his ideas, such > >>>>as > >>>>CHAT, etc and how people are using these approaches in their work. What > >>>>is > >>>>that like for you? And to be more specific, what is that like for women > >>>>and > >>>>people of color? I'm also interested in thinking-out-loud with others > >>>>about > >>>>Vygotskian concepts that are not easy to understand; to employ in real > >>>>time > >>>>dialogue and social interaction to leap over zopeds together. Isn't > >>>>that > >>>>what a listserv is for? Or am I being too idealistic? > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>For many years I have wondered why the participants on this list so > >>>>seldom > >>>>talk from contextualized positions, specifically positioning the self > >>>>in > >>>>relation to others and to power relations shaped by race, class, > >>>>gender, > >>>>and so on. I am myself very aware of power relations being played out > >>>>through the discursive positioning of people in this space, which is > >>>>why > >>>>I > >>>>choose not to speak. I am wondering if any of the subscribers to this > >>>>list > >>>>are interested such questions, including the one framed by Annalisa > >>>>above? > >>>>Kris Gutierrez is the only one I know of in CHAT/sociocultural theory > >>>>who > >>>>deals with these issues, for example in her article "Developing a > >>>>Sociocritical Literacy in the Third Space"(2008). But I'm sure there > >>>>are > >>>>others. > >>>> > >>>>Dana > >>>> > >>>>On 11/26/14 10:49 PM, "Carol Macdonald" wrote: > >>>> > >>>>>Hi > >>>>> > >>>>>There have been some off list postings about this phenomenon. None of > >>>>>it > >>>>>complimentary. This cannot be sorted out in one move. > >>>>> > >>>>>I propose that we move onto a different thread - topic. > >>>>> > >>>>>Mike, would you like to start us off on something new? > >>>>> > >>>>>Carol > >>>>> > >>>>>On 27 November 2014 at 02:49, Martin John Packer > >>>>> > >>>>>wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> Andy, if you're going to retire, then retire. But don't aim one or > >>>>>>two > >>>>>> more underhand blows behind the feint of retiring. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Martin > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On Nov 26, 2014, at 7:24 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > Well this bloke will retire again at this point. I thought for a > >>>>>>brief > >>>>>> moment there, I thought we had a breakthrough. Certainly, Huw's > >>>>>>"real > >>>>>> illusion" is perfectly apt to my mind (it's an expression Marx > >>>>>>uses), > >>>>>>or > >>>>>> in Eric Fromm's words, an illusion with "survival value." Martin > >>>>>>says > >>>>>> "Consciousness is an objective process that *sometimes* can *give > >>>>>>rise > >>>>>>to* > >>>>>> illusions." As Vygotsky says "For him psychology is partly > >>>>>>phenomenology." > >>>>>> > Andy > >>>>>> > > >>>>>>--------------------------------------------------------------------- > >>>>>>- > >>>>>>- > >>>>>>- > >>>>>> > *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>> > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > Bruce Robinson wrote: > >>>>>> >> Henry, > >>>>>> >> > >>>>>> >> Your wife's question leads to another: who speaks for the silent > >>>>>> majority, many of whom, like me, must be getting fed up with what > >>>>>>David > >>>>>>K > >>>>>> calls a "rather blokish struggle for power over particular words'? > >>>>>>[Not > >>>>>> Richard Nixon :)] > >>>>>> >> > >>>>>> >> Bruce R > >>>>>> >> > >>>>>> >> PS: You may also note that I have not changed the subject heading > >>>>>>of > >>>>>> this message so that it bears no relation to the content. Something > >>>>>>else I > >>>>>> find irritating... > >>>>>> >> > >>>>>> >> On 26/11/2014 17:16, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >>>>>> >>> Sister Analisa, > >>>>>> >>> Thank you for responding! I was just talking to my wife (getting > >>>>>> personal!) about the chat. She asked me, "How does anyone get to > >>>>>> participate in the (XMCA) chat if only a few people take part?" I > >>>>>>wondered > >>>>>> in my email below if too much was expected of written communication > >>>>>>in > >>>>>>the > >>>>>> XMCA chat. With 800 people potentially taking turns, well...what is > >>>>>>even > >>>>>> possible logistically? Mike Cole has talked about this, and, I > >>>>>>think, > >>>>>>has > >>>>>> some suggestions on how to deal with the bottlenecking. But even > >>>>>>small > >>>>>> scale communication can be daunting. I watched, with my wife, a > >>>>>>Richard > >>>>>> Linklater movie last night, "Before Midnight". Two people, face to > >>>>>>face, in > >>>>>> a totally committed relationship, smart people, good people, trying > >>>>>>so > >>>>>>hard > >>>>>> to get it right. Always a work in progress. But it's worth it. The > >>>>>> alternative is despair. I am sure of this: This chat, which seems to > >>>>>>get > >>>>>> bogged down in abstractions, pure thinking in the mud, is really > >>>>>> consequential beyond the sensitivities of academics. I said we > >>>>>> >> va > >>>>>> >>> lue Vygotsky's "heroism", but that's too macho. I should have > >>>>>>said > >>>>>> courage. > >>>>>> >>> > >>>>>> >>> The Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis is a powerful idea, often > >>>>>>called > >>>>>> the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis. Google it. Really. See what you think. > >>>>>>One > >>>>>> gauge of the power of an idea is if it has found its way into > >>>>>>popular > >>>>>> discourse. I just this morning heard an NPR radio program (thanks > >>>>>>again > >>>>>>to > >>>>>> my wife, who was listening when she heard something she thought I > >>>>>>would > >>>>>>be > >>>>>> interested in) that dealt with the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis in its > >>>>>>strong > >>>>>>and > >>>>>> weak form. > >>>>>> >>> > >>>>>> >>> Henry > >>>>>> >>> > >>>>>> >>>> On Nov 25, 2014, at 10:11 PM, Annalisa Aguilar > >>>>>> > >>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>> >>>> > >>>>>> >>>> Dear Henry, > >>>>>> >>>> > >>>>>> >>>> Thank you for your reply. > >>>>>> >>>> > >>>>>> >>>> I don't think being personal (or even personable) requires > >>>>>>being > >>>>>> heated. Does this have to do with my comment of warmth as a sign of > >>>>>>welcome? > >>>>>> >>>> > >>>>>> >>>> To speak about culture non-personally is not something I am > >>>>>>adept > >>>>>>at > >>>>>> doing. We are always speaking from where we stand, the culture that > >>>>>>we > >>>>>>are > >>>>>> in or from, what-have-you. > >>>>>> >>>> > >>>>>> >>>> Respectfully, I do not know what "linguistic relativity > >>>>>>hypothesis" > >>>>>> is. So please be patient with me while I connect this academic idea > >>>>>>you > >>>>>> have offered to this conversation so that I can relate that to my > >>>>>>personal > >>>>>> experience speaking on this thread, though clearly I'm not speaking > >>>>>> literally right now, but it is speech from me, not a sock puppet > >>>>>>with > >>>>>>my > >>>>>> voice thrown from the position of objective reality. > >>>>>> >>>> > >>>>>> >>>> You are talking about speaking two languages. But it seems we > >>>>>>are > >>>>>>all > >>>>>> speaking English on this list. So I'm a bit lost right there what > >>>>>>you > >>>>>>are > >>>>>> trying to say to me. > >>>>>> >>>> > >>>>>> >>>> Then, you speak of metalinguistics and how it represents > >>>>>>different > >>>>>> worldviews, if you don't mind me swapping your use of "perspective" > >>>>>>for > >>>>>> worldview. There is a lot of time clearing muckups to get it right. > >>>>>>I'm > >>>>>>not > >>>>>> sure that it ever gets right though, which troubles me. I have found > >>>>>>that > >>>>>> many people who have different worldviews communicate by "talking > >>>>>>to," > >>>>>> rather than "talking at." I feel, for example, you and I are talking > >>>>>>to > >>>>>>one > >>>>>> another, despite our likely different POVs. > >>>>>> >>>> > >>>>>> >>>> I don't know what the "perish and dapple of Andy" means when > >>>>>>you > >>>>>>say > >>>>>> that. From what I can tell he's trying to define something for > >>>>>>himself > >>>>>> asking for the help of others. That's fine and I'm learning that > >>>>>> definitions are very bas-relief for him. I think my interests are a > >>>>>>little > >>>>>> different. So I'd prefer to orient to my interests, if that is OK. > >>>>>> >>>> > >>>>>> >>>> Speaking of metalinguistics, rather than debate over > >>>>>>definitions, > >>>>>>I'm > >>>>>> more interested in speaking to the very different people who are on > >>>>>>this > >>>>>> list. The rumor is there are 800 folks out there. Where are you? :) > >>>>>>To > >>>>>> reference a highly academic quote from the Wizard of Oz: > >>>>>> >>>> > >>>>>> >>>> "Come out, come out wherever you are, and meet the young lady > >>>>>>who > >>>>>> fell from the star!" > >>>>>> >>>> --Glinda, the Good Witch from the North (waves magic wand) > >>>>>> >>>> > >>>>>> >>>> I'm curious how others have been inspired by Vygotsky and > >>>>>> sociocultural theory, and even other manifestations of his ideas, > >>>>>>such > >>>>>>as > >>>>>> CHAT, etc and how people are using these approaches in their work. > >>>>>>What > >>>>>>is > >>>>>> that like for you? And to be more specific, what is that like for > >>>>>>women > >>>>>>and > >>>>>> people of color? I'm also interested in thinking-out-loud with > >>>>>>others > >>>>>>about > >>>>>> Vygotskian concepts that are not easy to understand; to employ in > >>>>>>real > >>>>>>time > >>>>>> dialogue and social interaction to leap over zopeds together. Isn't > >>>>>>that > >>>>>> what a listserv is for? Or am I being too idealistic? > >>>>>> >>>> > >>>>>> >>>> I have tried to speak in an open, easy, and immediate manner, > >>>>>>to > >>>>>> allow others to engage. But I fear that engagement is never going to > >>>>>>happen > >>>>>> because all that persists are conversations about definitions, or > >>>>>>whether > >>>>>> nothing can come from nothing, and voila! subsequent debates ensue. > >>>>>>Or > >>>>>> someone will say, "We already discussed this 20 years ago!" Which > >>>>>>means > >>>>>>I > >>>>>> missed the party, I suppose. Unfortunately, if I disagree with a > >>>>>>position > >>>>>> because I interpret differently, then I'm told to go read something > >>>>>>without > >>>>>> really a clear explanation why I'm supposed to go read something. > >>>>>> >>>> > >>>>>> >>>> I don't really agree with the approach of "read this," as an > >>>>>>academic > >>>>>> argument. Anyone is free to use it, and I have myself, but because I > >>>>>>know > >>>>>> how obtuse that can be, I couch it with my reasons why I think it > >>>>>>would > >>>>>>be > >>>>>> a good read for that person, and what I think there is learn from > >>>>>>reading. > >>>>>> I think the "read this" approach, when it is offered with the tone > >>>>>>of > >>>>>>"now > >>>>>> go eat your vegetables!" fails in the making of speech between > >>>>>>people. > >>>>>>All > >>>>>> it does is shut things down. > >>>>>> >>>> > >>>>>> >>>> If the reading truly is relevant, it seems far more productive > >>>>>>in > >>>>>>the > >>>>>> moment of speech to cue a person what to look for, to supply a > >>>>>>context, > >>>>>> especially when referencing an entire book, for example, or the link > >>>>>>to > >>>>>>an > >>>>>> entire website full of texts. > >>>>>> >>>> > >>>>>> >>>> Your assessment in the physicality of language is something > >>>>>>with > >>>>>> which I am completely in agreement. Especially since we all seem to > >>>>>>agree > >>>>>> with the material aspects of language. So the question at hand is a > >>>>>>matter > >>>>>> of form. Form has an aesthetic but also has a purpose. Are we > >>>>>>throwing > >>>>>> ropes or throwing boulders? If throwing boulders, where does that > >>>>>>need > >>>>>>to > >>>>>> throw boulders come from? If throwing ropes, then at least > >>>>>>connections > >>>>>>are > >>>>>> being made for those who might not be very clear about ideas and who > >>>>>>may > >>>>>> require a helping hand. > >>>>>> >>>> > >>>>>> >>>> Then there's the old, but handy, elliptical comment, something > >>>>>>like a > >>>>>> boomerang... meant to be subtle or ironic at the expense of someone > >>>>>>who > >>>>>>may > >>>>>> not understand. > >>>>>> >>>> > >>>>>> >>>> At this point, I'd to emphasize that being ignorant is not > >>>>>>being > >>>>>> stupid, but it seems someone who is ignorant is frequently treated > >>>>>>as > >>>>>> stupid (um, on this list). This "phenomenon" has made me reflect > >>>>>>upon > >>>>>>how > >>>>>> little time is spent upon the nature of ignorance in education and > >>>>>>the > >>>>>> dynamics of ignorance in speaking. Every one of us is ignorant about > >>>>>>most > >>>>>> things in the world. And yet being ignorant is seen as an > >>>>>>embarrassment, a > >>>>>> deficiency, a lapse in character. I vehemently disagree with this > >>>>>>reception > >>>>>> to ignorance. Even Einstein said something like, "The more I know, > >>>>>>the > >>>>>>more > >>>>>> I see how much I don't know." Such an aggressive position toward > >>>>>>ignorance > >>>>>> is nothing but hurtful, even arrogant. Arrogance is a blister, a > >>>>>>defense > >>>>>> mechanism from previous hurt. A person who is honest about one's own > >>>>>> ignorance is a very strong person and is showing a willingness to > >>>>>>learn > >>>>>> something. I think all teachers will agree that a person who knows > >>>>>>one > >>>>>> doesn't know is an easier student to teach tha > >>>>>> >> n > >>>>>> >>> one who doesn't know one doesn't know. > >>>>>> >>>> Iconicity is something I can hang my hat on. I see it is > >>>>>>related > >>>>>>to > >>>>>> pointing. What I like about pointing is that it is a gesture, which > >>>>>>implies > >>>>>> movement, in the way the word is also movement. I hope I have made > >>>>>> sufficient personal connections to your concepts without the heat. > >>>>>>Thank > >>>>>> you for offering them to me. > >>>>>> >>>> > >>>>>> >>>> Kind regards, > >>>>>> >>>> > >>>>>> >>>> Annalisa > >>>>>> >>>> > >>>>>> >>> > >>>>>> >> > >>>>>> >> > >>>>>> >> > >>>>>> >> > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>-- > >>>>>Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > >>>>>Developmental psycholinguist > >>>>>Academic, Researcher, and Editor > >>>>>Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu Mon Dec 1 18:26:21 2014 From: mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu (Zavala, Miguel) Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2014 02:26:21 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: "The political" and "power" in learning In-Reply-To: Message-ID: Thanks Dana for sorting this new thread. Mike, I'll follow up with the articles you mention... I am also pressed for time so will be somewhat slow in replying. I see the threads are like roundtables or spaces within a larger venue, a thinking conference. Miguel On 12/1/14 6:07 PM, "mike cole" wrote: >I fully agree, Dana. Several interconnected issues that Miguel is raising >are of central concern to xmca. > >Miguel-- > >I think that the notion of decolonializing pedagogy relates in pretty >direct way with Maisha Winn's ideas of African Diaspora Participatory >Literacy. She writes about that in the next issue of MCA. I also like the >idea of autobiographical accounts of one's own positionality with respect >to the events that have shaped your scholarship. There is an interesting >article by a group of South African pedagogs that illustrates again, what >seems like, a similar idea of locating one's academic work within the >context of one's political engagements. And then we are gifted with Paul's >article in a journal devoted to the centrality of class in a journal >entitled *African and Black Diaspora. * > >Synchronic a-causality or Zeitgeist? >mike > > > >On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 5:45 PM, Walker, Dana wrote: > >> Hi Miguel, >> >> I would be very interested in continuing this thread on "the political" >> and "power" in learning. My participation will be slow, as I will be at >> the LRA conference in Florida and then finals and so on, but will follow >> with interest. I have changed thread title in anticipation of pursuing >> this exploration. >> >> Does Ferguson (or Oakland, or New York, or Hong Kong, or Cairo) matter >>in >> considerations of 'the political' and 'power' in learning (and >>teaching)? >> >> Dana >> >> On 11/28/14 5:07 PM, "Zavala, Miguel" >> wrote: >> >> >Hi Dana, >> > >> >I believe there are several ways to go with an analysis of "the >>political" >> >or "power" in learning. First, is to search for its >> >articulation/theorization in existing studies (whether conceptual or >> >empirical) within the learning sciences more generally. Who has >>attempted >> >this work? Also, In the general absence of studies theorizing "the >> >political" or "power" in learning (which I gather is an accurate >>depiction >> >of the field), one might pursue the ways in which "context" is narrowly >> >framed in distinct frames/theories of learning. In what ways does/can >> >CHAT enable the analysis of "the political" and "power" in learning? >> > >> >Now, due to time constraints, this project may take time; perhaps >>there is >> >a smaller group that would like to continue with this >>thread/exploration >> >of "the political" or "power" in learning. I place questions of >>politics >> >and power in quotation marks because they need to be unpacked, like >>many >> >concepts. >> > >> >I believe there is another route one can take, and that is to begin >>with >> >our own political biographies, how we view the world and its >> >transformation. In a sense, we all have our biographies of coming to >>CHAT. >> >How is CHAT a tool in our practical work (as educators, >> >action-researchers, community organizers, etc.)? Because processes are >> >relational, I imagine that our own biographies, positionalities, and >> >standpoints (which function more like collective consciousness and >> >practices, borrowing here from the work of Sandra Harding) are not only >> >inflected in our appropriations of CHAT but are interwoven; they shift >> >from "external" to "internal" processes of of both research and praxis >> >(informed by our politics). I recognize there are many points being >>made >> >here and "dangers", especially when one views learning as a-political >>or >> >mechanistic, but I take that risk. >> > >> >Attached is a chapter outlining my political philosophy. It was >>published >> >as part of a text that asked contributors to name our "pedagogic >>creeds" >> >(? la Dewey). >> > >> >-Miguel >> > >> > >> >On 11/27/14 8:12 AM, "Walker, Dana" wrote: >> > >> >>Gracias Miguel, and Mike and Larry for responding and for moving >>forward >> >>this thread of thought begun by Annalisa. >> >> >> >>Miguel, I remember now (based on a conference presentation of yours >>years >> >>ago) that your pedagogical and theoretical work involving migrant >> >>students >> >>at UCLA addressed questions of power, subjectivity, and embodied >>selves >> >>in >> >>boundary crossing processes in ways that other CHAT theorists (e.g., >> >>Tuomi-Grohn & Engestrom, 2003; Grossen & Zittoun, 2012) do not. I >>wonder >> >>if this is a place where we could begin exploring the question of >>power >> >>in >> >>relation to learning and development? Is there an article of yours >>that >> >>you might suggest on this subject? >> >> >> >>Dana >> >> >> >> >> >>On 11/27/14 12:02 AM, "Zavala, Miguel" >> >> >>wrote: >> >> >> >>>Gracias Annalisa and Dana. >> >>> >> >>>Questions of power have always been central to my work and I am a new >> >>>member of this list (and community) and don't have a broader context >>as >> >>>to >> >>>why it was created and whether it is by design meant to grow in its >>own >> >>>way over time, etc. What I have noticed though is a tendency to >>focus on >> >>>conceptual clarity (of the work of Vygotsky and Cultural Historical >> >>>Activity Theory and prior, such as Marx). So, I am learning anew in >>this >> >>>space, taking notes, re-reading. In many ways it reminds me of the >>CHAT >> >>>reading group many of us at UCLA visualized but never materialized >> >>>formally, except that our reading and writing the world with >>Vygotsky's >> >>>ideas (and others) did materialize in the beautiful pedagogical work >>we >> >>>did with migrant students at that time... >> >>> >> >>>I hope the question of how we use, expand, enrich, re-envision, and >> >>>carry >> >>>forward the ideas of Vygotsky (and how these intersect with or >> >>>interweave >> >>>with power) are considered in an open and non-controlled way. By >> >>>"non-controlled" I mean the parallel tendency in particular >> >>>circles/communities to challenge work that grows out of particular >>ideas >> >>>and if those ideas do not adhere to some party-line (or experts on >>said >> >>>theory don't agree on it) then such work should not define itself as >> >>>"Vygotskian", "CHAT-based", or "Socio-Cultural," etc. My own >>motivation >> >>>to >> >>>chime in and contribute would increase if we followed this strand, >>that >> >>>looks at power and how it is integral to (not a 'factor' or >>'external' >> >>>context) learning? Although the reading group orientation is still >> >>>useful. >> >>> >> >>>Warmly, >> >>> >> >>>Miguel Zavala >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>On 11/26/14 10:38 PM, "Walker, Dana" wrote: >> >>> >> >>>>Before we leave this topic, I would like to suggest that we pause to >> >>>>consider Annalisa's question: >> >>>> >> >>>>I'm curious how others have been inspired by Vygotsky and >> >>>>sociocultural theory, and even other manifestations of his ideas, >>such >> >>>>as >> >>>>CHAT, etc and how people are using these approaches in their work. >>What >> >>>>is >> >>>>that like for you? And to be more specific, what is that like for >>women >> >>>>and >> >>>>people of color? I'm also interested in thinking-out-loud with >>others >> >>>>about >> >>>>Vygotskian concepts that are not easy to understand; to employ in >>real >> >>>>time >> >>>>dialogue and social interaction to leap over zopeds together. Isn't >> >>>>that >> >>>>what a listserv is for? Or am I being too idealistic? >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>For many years I have wondered why the participants on this list so >> >>>>seldom >> >>>>talk from contextualized positions, specifically positioning the >>self >> >>>>in >> >>>>relation to others and to power relations shaped by race, class, >> >>>>gender, >> >>>>and so on. I am myself very aware of power relations being played >>out >> >>>>through the discursive positioning of people in this space, which is >> >>>>why >> >>>>I >> >>>>choose not to speak. I am wondering if any of the subscribers to >>this >> >>>>list >> >>>>are interested such questions, including the one framed by Annalisa >> >>>>above? >> >>>>Kris Gutierrez is the only one I know of in CHAT/sociocultural >>theory >> >>>>who >> >>>>deals with these issues, for example in her article "Developing a >> >>>>Sociocritical Literacy in the Third Space"(2008). But I'm sure there >> >>>>are >> >>>>others. >> >>>> >> >>>>Dana >> >>>> >> >>>>On 11/26/14 10:49 PM, "Carol Macdonald" >>wrote: >> >>>> >> >>>>>Hi >> >>>>> >> >>>>>There have been some off list postings about this phenomenon. None >>of >> >>>>>it >> >>>>>complimentary. This cannot be sorted out in one move. >> >>>>> >> >>>>>I propose that we move onto a different thread - topic. >> >>>>> >> >>>>>Mike, would you like to start us off on something new? >> >>>>> >> >>>>>Carol >> >>>>> >> >>>>>On 27 November 2014 at 02:49, Martin John Packer >> >>>>> >> >>>>>wrote: >> >>>>> >> >>>>>> Andy, if you're going to retire, then retire. But don't aim one >>or >> >>>>>>two >> >>>>>> more underhand blows behind the feint of retiring. >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> Martin >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> On Nov 26, 2014, at 7:24 PM, Andy Blunden >> wrote: >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> > Well this bloke will retire again at this point. I thought for >>a >> >>>>>>brief >> >>>>>> moment there, I thought we had a breakthrough. Certainly, Huw's >> >>>>>>"real >> >>>>>> illusion" is perfectly apt to my mind (it's an expression Marx >> >>>>>>uses), >> >>>>>>or >> >>>>>> in Eric Fromm's words, an illusion with "survival value." Martin >> >>>>>>says >> >>>>>> "Consciousness is an objective process that *sometimes* can *give >> >>>>>>rise >> >>>>>>to* >> >>>>>> illusions." As Vygotsky says "For him psychology is partly >> >>>>>>phenomenology." >> >>>>>> > Andy >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>>>>-- >> >>>>>>- >> >>>>>>- >> >>>>>>- >> >>>>>> > *Andy Blunden* >> >>>>>> > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> > Bruce Robinson wrote: >> >>>>>> >> Henry, >> >>>>>> >> >> >>>>>> >> Your wife's question leads to another: who speaks for the >>silent >> >>>>>> majority, many of whom, like me, must be getting fed up with what >> >>>>>>David >> >>>>>>K >> >>>>>> calls a "rather blokish struggle for power over particular >>words'? >> >>>>>>[Not >> >>>>>> Richard Nixon :)] >> >>>>>> >> >> >>>>>> >> Bruce R >> >>>>>> >> >> >>>>>> >> PS: You may also note that I have not changed the subject >>heading >> >>>>>>of >> >>>>>> this message so that it bears no relation to the content. >>Something >> >>>>>>else I >> >>>>>> find irritating... >> >>>>>> >> >> >>>>>> >> On 26/11/2014 17:16, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >> >>>>>> >>> Sister Analisa, >> >>>>>> >>> Thank you for responding! I was just talking to my wife >>(getting >> >>>>>> personal!) about the chat. She asked me, "How does anyone get to >> >>>>>> participate in the (XMCA) chat if only a few people take part?" I >> >>>>>>wondered >> >>>>>> in my email below if too much was expected of written >>communication >> >>>>>>in >> >>>>>>the >> >>>>>> XMCA chat. With 800 people potentially taking turns, well...what >>is >> >>>>>>even >> >>>>>> possible logistically? Mike Cole has talked about this, and, I >> >>>>>>think, >> >>>>>>has >> >>>>>> some suggestions on how to deal with the bottlenecking. But even >> >>>>>>small >> >>>>>> scale communication can be daunting. I watched, with my wife, a >> >>>>>>Richard >> >>>>>> Linklater movie last night, "Before Midnight". Two people, face >>to >> >>>>>>face, in >> >>>>>> a totally committed relationship, smart people, good people, >>trying >> >>>>>>so >> >>>>>>hard >> >>>>>> to get it right. Always a work in progress. But it's worth it. >>The >> >>>>>> alternative is despair. I am sure of this: This chat, which >>seems to >> >>>>>>get >> >>>>>> bogged down in abstractions, pure thinking in the mud, is really >> >>>>>> consequential beyond the sensitivities of academics. I said we >> >>>>>> >> va >> >>>>>> >>> lue Vygotsky's "heroism", but that's too macho. I should >>have >> >>>>>>said >> >>>>>> courage. >> >>>>>> >>> >> >>>>>> >>> The Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis is a powerful idea, >>often >> >>>>>>called >> >>>>>> the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis. Google it. Really. See what you >>think. >> >>>>>>One >> >>>>>> gauge of the power of an idea is if it has found its way into >> >>>>>>popular >> >>>>>> discourse. I just this morning heard an NPR radio program (thanks >> >>>>>>again >> >>>>>>to >> >>>>>> my wife, who was listening when she heard something she thought I >> >>>>>>would >> >>>>>>be >> >>>>>> interested in) that dealt with the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis in its >> >>>>>>strong >> >>>>>>and >> >>>>>> weak form. >> >>>>>> >>> >> >>>>>> >>> Henry >> >>>>>> >>> >> >>>>>> >>>> On Nov 25, 2014, at 10:11 PM, Annalisa Aguilar >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> wrote: >> >>>>>> >>>> >> >>>>>> >>>> Dear Henry, >> >>>>>> >>>> >> >>>>>> >>>> Thank you for your reply. >> >>>>>> >>>> >> >>>>>> >>>> I don't think being personal (or even personable) requires >> >>>>>>being >> >>>>>> heated. Does this have to do with my comment of warmth as a sign >>of >> >>>>>>welcome? >> >>>>>> >>>> >> >>>>>> >>>> To speak about culture non-personally is not something I am >> >>>>>>adept >> >>>>>>at >> >>>>>> doing. We are always speaking from where we stand, the culture >>that >> >>>>>>we >> >>>>>>are >> >>>>>> in or from, what-have-you. >> >>>>>> >>>> >> >>>>>> >>>> Respectfully, I do not know what "linguistic relativity >> >>>>>>hypothesis" >> >>>>>> is. So please be patient with me while I connect this academic >>idea >> >>>>>>you >> >>>>>> have offered to this conversation so that I can relate that to my >> >>>>>>personal >> >>>>>> experience speaking on this thread, though clearly I'm not >>speaking >> >>>>>> literally right now, but it is speech from me, not a sock puppet >> >>>>>>with >> >>>>>>my >> >>>>>> voice thrown from the position of objective reality. >> >>>>>> >>>> >> >>>>>> >>>> You are talking about speaking two languages. But it seems >>we >> >>>>>>are >> >>>>>>all >> >>>>>> speaking English on this list. So I'm a bit lost right there what >> >>>>>>you >> >>>>>>are >> >>>>>> trying to say to me. >> >>>>>> >>>> >> >>>>>> >>>> Then, you speak of metalinguistics and how it represents >> >>>>>>different >> >>>>>> worldviews, if you don't mind me swapping your use of >>"perspective" >> >>>>>>for >> >>>>>> worldview. There is a lot of time clearing muckups to get it >>right. >> >>>>>>I'm >> >>>>>>not >> >>>>>> sure that it ever gets right though, which troubles me. I have >>found >> >>>>>>that >> >>>>>> many people who have different worldviews communicate by "talking >> >>>>>>to," >> >>>>>> rather than "talking at." I feel, for example, you and I are >>talking >> >>>>>>to >> >>>>>>one >> >>>>>> another, despite our likely different POVs. >> >>>>>> >>>> >> >>>>>> >>>> I don't know what the "perish and dapple of Andy" means when >> >>>>>>you >> >>>>>>say >> >>>>>> that. From what I can tell he's trying to define something for >> >>>>>>himself >> >>>>>> asking for the help of others. That's fine and I'm learning that >> >>>>>> definitions are very bas-relief for him. I think my interests >>are a >> >>>>>>little >> >>>>>> different. So I'd prefer to orient to my interests, if that is >>OK. >> >>>>>> >>>> >> >>>>>> >>>> Speaking of metalinguistics, rather than debate over >> >>>>>>definitions, >> >>>>>>I'm >> >>>>>> more interested in speaking to the very different people who are >>on >> >>>>>>this >> >>>>>> list. The rumor is there are 800 folks out there. Where are you? >>:) >> >>>>>>To >> >>>>>> reference a highly academic quote from the Wizard of Oz: >> >>>>>> >>>> >> >>>>>> >>>> "Come out, come out wherever you are, and meet the young >>lady >> >>>>>>who >> >>>>>> fell from the star!" >> >>>>>> >>>> --Glinda, the Good Witch from the North (waves magic wand) >> >>>>>> >>>> >> >>>>>> >>>> I'm curious how others have been inspired by Vygotsky and >> >>>>>> sociocultural theory, and even other manifestations of his ideas, >> >>>>>>such >> >>>>>>as >> >>>>>> CHAT, etc and how people are using these approaches in their >>work. >> >>>>>>What >> >>>>>>is >> >>>>>> that like for you? And to be more specific, what is that like for >> >>>>>>women >> >>>>>>and >> >>>>>> people of color? I'm also interested in thinking-out-loud with >> >>>>>>others >> >>>>>>about >> >>>>>> Vygotskian concepts that are not easy to understand; to employ in >> >>>>>>real >> >>>>>>time >> >>>>>> dialogue and social interaction to leap over zopeds together. >>Isn't >> >>>>>>that >> >>>>>> what a listserv is for? Or am I being too idealistic? >> >>>>>> >>>> >> >>>>>> >>>> I have tried to speak in an open, easy, and immediate >>manner, >> >>>>>>to >> >>>>>> allow others to engage. But I fear that engagement is never >>going to >> >>>>>>happen >> >>>>>> because all that persists are conversations about definitions, or >> >>>>>>whether >> >>>>>> nothing can come from nothing, and voila! subsequent debates >>ensue. >> >>>>>>Or >> >>>>>> someone will say, "We already discussed this 20 years ago!" Which >> >>>>>>means >> >>>>>>I >> >>>>>> missed the party, I suppose. Unfortunately, if I disagree with a >> >>>>>>position >> >>>>>> because I interpret differently, then I'm told to go read >>something >> >>>>>>without >> >>>>>> really a clear explanation why I'm supposed to go read something. >> >>>>>> >>>> >> >>>>>> >>>> I don't really agree with the approach of "read this," as an >> >>>>>>academic >> >>>>>> argument. Anyone is free to use it, and I have myself, but >>because I >> >>>>>>know >> >>>>>> how obtuse that can be, I couch it with my reasons why I think it >> >>>>>>would >> >>>>>>be >> >>>>>> a good read for that person, and what I think there is learn from >> >>>>>>reading. >> >>>>>> I think the "read this" approach, when it is offered with the >>tone >> >>>>>>of >> >>>>>>"now >> >>>>>> go eat your vegetables!" fails in the making of speech between >> >>>>>>people. >> >>>>>>All >> >>>>>> it does is shut things down. >> >>>>>> >>>> >> >>>>>> >>>> If the reading truly is relevant, it seems far more >>productive >> >>>>>>in >> >>>>>>the >> >>>>>> moment of speech to cue a person what to look for, to supply a >> >>>>>>context, >> >>>>>> especially when referencing an entire book, for example, or the >>link >> >>>>>>to >> >>>>>>an >> >>>>>> entire website full of texts. >> >>>>>> >>>> >> >>>>>> >>>> Your assessment in the physicality of language is something >> >>>>>>with >> >>>>>> which I am completely in agreement. Especially since we all seem >>to >> >>>>>>agree >> >>>>>> with the material aspects of language. So the question at hand >>is a >> >>>>>>matter >> >>>>>> of form. Form has an aesthetic but also has a purpose. Are we >> >>>>>>throwing >> >>>>>> ropes or throwing boulders? If throwing boulders, where does that >> >>>>>>need >> >>>>>>to >> >>>>>> throw boulders come from? If throwing ropes, then at least >> >>>>>>connections >> >>>>>>are >> >>>>>> being made for those who might not be very clear about ideas and >>who >> >>>>>>may >> >>>>>> require a helping hand. >> >>>>>> >>>> >> >>>>>> >>>> Then there's the old, but handy, elliptical comment, >>something >> >>>>>>like a >> >>>>>> boomerang... meant to be subtle or ironic at the expense of >>someone >> >>>>>>who >> >>>>>>may >> >>>>>> not understand. >> >>>>>> >>>> >> >>>>>> >>>> At this point, I'd to emphasize that being ignorant is not >> >>>>>>being >> >>>>>> stupid, but it seems someone who is ignorant is frequently >>treated >> >>>>>>as >> >>>>>> stupid (um, on this list). This "phenomenon" has made me reflect >> >>>>>>upon >> >>>>>>how >> >>>>>> little time is spent upon the nature of ignorance in education >>and >> >>>>>>the >> >>>>>> dynamics of ignorance in speaking. Every one of us is ignorant >>about >> >>>>>>most >> >>>>>> things in the world. And yet being ignorant is seen as an >> >>>>>>embarrassment, a >> >>>>>> deficiency, a lapse in character. I vehemently disagree with this >> >>>>>>reception >> >>>>>> to ignorance. Even Einstein said something like, "The more I >>know, >> >>>>>>the >> >>>>>>more >> >>>>>> I see how much I don't know." Such an aggressive position toward >> >>>>>>ignorance >> >>>>>> is nothing but hurtful, even arrogant. Arrogance is a blister, a >> >>>>>>defense >> >>>>>> mechanism from previous hurt. A person who is honest about one's >>own >> >>>>>> ignorance is a very strong person and is showing a willingness to >> >>>>>>learn >> >>>>>> something. I think all teachers will agree that a person who >>knows >> >>>>>>one >> >>>>>> doesn't know is an easier student to teach tha >> >>>>>> >> n >> >>>>>> >>> one who doesn't know one doesn't know. >> >>>>>> >>>> Iconicity is something I can hang my hat on. I see it is >> >>>>>>related >> >>>>>>to >> >>>>>> pointing. What I like about pointing is that it is a gesture, >>which >> >>>>>>implies >> >>>>>> movement, in the way the word is also movement. I hope I have >>made >> >>>>>> sufficient personal connections to your concepts without the >>heat. >> >>>>>>Thank >> >>>>>> you for offering them to me. >> >>>>>> >>>> >> >>>>>> >>>> Kind regards, >> >>>>>> >>>> >> >>>>>> >>>> Annalisa >> >>>>>> >>>> >> >>>>>> >>> >> >>>>>> >> >> >>>>>> >> >> >>>>>> >> >> >>>>>> >> >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>> >> >>>>> >> >>>>>-- >> >>>>>Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >> >>>>>Developmental psycholinguist >> >>>>>Academic, Researcher, and Editor >> >>>>>Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >> >> >> >> > >> >> >> > > >-- >It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Dec 1 19:23:12 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2014 03:23:12 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? In-Reply-To: References: <1417397991972.17078@unm.edu> , Message-ID: <1417490593837.73384@unm.edu> Martin! Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental representation" is coming closer! For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's theory of affordances. This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed article. But I wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is important not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a grenade pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the list. If you can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look forward to your reply, Martin. Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that being at UCSD and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that influences your position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find community in it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more voluntary phrased that way). Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Martin John Packer Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? An interesting article, David. One way in which it is interesting, to me at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used, even once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images in the world around us - material representations - and he tries to define the "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. Martin On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > Larry, Annalisa: > > People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" when we > met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of anything > except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe available > for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember > whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the > beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a > non-image based mental representation. > > As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations are > images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. In > fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against Titchener > and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, > everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated that > many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically anterior > to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would not have > time or ability to process complex problems in real time. > > I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are > genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more reading > to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than I am > (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels like > she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do NOT read > this article--instead, look at Figure 11. > > http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ > > The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure of > Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any actual > images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural experience > associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then deliberately > frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any > recognizable figures upon which to focus. > > However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine Chapel fresco > for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He or she > can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting and > wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not notice > the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in it. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >> Hi Larry and David, >> >> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! >> >> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are at the root of all thinking. >> >> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, based upon previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a phrase I like a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it by the same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it. >> >> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as Hackett describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have you already given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be willing to take a look. >> >> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is controversial. It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone says "this is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble observation. >> >> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever that process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at hand? Just a thought. >> >> What is it that appeals to you about this model, metaphoricity? >> >> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) >> >> Kind regards, >> >> Annalisa >> >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Larry Purss >> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? >> >> David K >> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. My reason for >> exploring these authors is I have been following a path pursuing a basic >> question. >> >> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? >> >> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic guiding images >> upon which thinking rests" >> >> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring appearances and >> illusions was also exploring this theme. >> >> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new phenomenological path >> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names this process >> *metaphoricity*. >> >> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible image-character of the >> *spontaneous event* of meaning. >> >> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he brackets - >> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. >> >> AND >> >> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* finds the >> meaning of its very self. >> >> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this >> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of metaphor can >> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated in >> *objectivity* >> >> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. >> >> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of itself *in* the >> mode [path] of the concept >> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding images has been >> established. >> >> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the path of >> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived from the >> image-character of the guiding image. >> >> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial this topic may >> become [again] >> >> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this basic >> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these images as >> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images emerge >> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. >> >> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is transcendental] and is >> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. It seems to >> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. >> >> I also realize this question may already be answered in Vygotsky's writings >> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of XMCA. I >> personally am following this path for now. >> >> Larry >> > From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Dec 1 19:58:43 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2014 03:58:43 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: "The political" and "power" in learning In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: <1417492722805.55666@unm.edu> Miguel, et al., I would like to post my registration to the thinking conference, please. Where to find my lanyard? Regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Zavala, Miguel Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 7:26 PM To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: "The political" and "power" in learning Thanks Dana for sorting this new thread. Mike, I'll follow up with the articles you mention... I am also pressed for time so will be somewhat slow in replying. I see the threads are like roundtables or spaces within a larger venue, a thinking conference. Miguel On 12/1/14 6:07 PM, "mike cole" wrote: >I fully agree, Dana. Several interconnected issues that Miguel is raising >are of central concern to xmca. > >Miguel-- > >I think that the notion of decolonializing pedagogy relates in pretty >direct way with Maisha Winn's ideas of African Diaspora Participatory >Literacy. She writes about that in the next issue of MCA. I also like the >idea of autobiographical accounts of one's own positionality with respect >to the events that have shaped your scholarship. There is an interesting >article by a group of South African pedagogs that illustrates again, what >seems like, a similar idea of locating one's academic work within the >context of one's political engagements. And then we are gifted with Paul's >article in a journal devoted to the centrality of class in a journal >entitled *African and Black Diaspora. * > >Synchronic a-causality or Zeitgeist? >mike > > > >On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 5:45 PM, Walker, Dana wrote: > >> Hi Miguel, >> >> I would be very interested in continuing this thread on "the political" >> and "power" in learning. My participation will be slow, as I will be at >> the LRA conference in Florida and then finals and so on, but will follow >> with interest. I have changed thread title in anticipation of pursuing >> this exploration. >> >> Does Ferguson (or Oakland, or New York, or Hong Kong, or Cairo) matter >>in >> considerations of 'the political' and 'power' in learning (and >>teaching)? >> >> Dana >> >> On 11/28/14 5:07 PM, "Zavala, Miguel" >> wrote: >> >> >Hi Dana, >> > >> >I believe there are several ways to go with an analysis of "the >>political" >> >or "power" in learning. First, is to search for its >> >articulation/theorization in existing studies (whether conceptual or >> >empirical) within the learning sciences more generally. Who has >>attempted >> >this work? Also, In the general absence of studies theorizing "the >> >political" or "power" in learning (which I gather is an accurate >>depiction >> >of the field), one might pursue the ways in which "context" is narrowly >> >framed in distinct frames/theories of learning. In what ways does/can >> >CHAT enable the analysis of "the political" and "power" in learning? >> > >> >Now, due to time constraints, this project may take time; perhaps >>there is >> >a smaller group that would like to continue with this >>thread/exploration >> >of "the political" or "power" in learning. I place questions of >>politics >> >and power in quotation marks because they need to be unpacked, like >>many >> >concepts. >> > >> >I believe there is another route one can take, and that is to begin >>with >> >our own political biographies, how we view the world and its >> >transformation. In a sense, we all have our biographies of coming to >>CHAT. >> >How is CHAT a tool in our practical work (as educators, >> >action-researchers, community organizers, etc.)? Because processes are >> >relational, I imagine that our own biographies, positionalities, and >> >standpoints (which function more like collective consciousness and >> >practices, borrowing here from the work of Sandra Harding) are not only >> >inflected in our appropriations of CHAT but are interwoven; they shift >> >from "external" to "internal" processes of of both research and praxis >> >(informed by our politics). I recognize there are many points being >>made >> >here and "dangers", especially when one views learning as a-political >>or >> >mechanistic, but I take that risk. >> > >> >Attached is a chapter outlining my political philosophy. It was >>published >> >as part of a text that asked contributors to name our "pedagogic >>creeds" >> >(? la Dewey). >> > >> >-Miguel >> > >> > >> >On 11/27/14 8:12 AM, "Walker, Dana" wrote: >> > >> >>Gracias Miguel, and Mike and Larry for responding and for moving >>forward >> >>this thread of thought begun by Annalisa. >> >> >> >>Miguel, I remember now (based on a conference presentation of yours >>years >> >>ago) that your pedagogical and theoretical work involving migrant >> >>students >> >>at UCLA addressed questions of power, subjectivity, and embodied >>selves >> >>in >> >>boundary crossing processes in ways that other CHAT theorists (e.g., >> >>Tuomi-Grohn & Engestrom, 2003; Grossen & Zittoun, 2012) do not. I >>wonder >> >>if this is a place where we could begin exploring the question of >>power >> >>in >> >>relation to learning and development? Is there an article of yours >>that >> >>you might suggest on this subject? >> >> >> >>Dana >> >> >> >> >> >>On 11/27/14 12:02 AM, "Zavala, Miguel" >> >> >>wrote: >> >> >> >>>Gracias Annalisa and Dana. >> >>> >> >>>Questions of power have always been central to my work and I am a new >> >>>member of this list (and community) and don't have a broader context >>as >> >>>to >> >>>why it was created and whether it is by design meant to grow in its >>own >> >>>way over time, etc. What I have noticed though is a tendency to >>focus on >> >>>conceptual clarity (of the work of Vygotsky and Cultural Historical >> >>>Activity Theory and prior, such as Marx). So, I am learning anew in >>this >> >>>space, taking notes, re-reading. In many ways it reminds me of the >>CHAT >> >>>reading group many of us at UCLA visualized but never materialized >> >>>formally, except that our reading and writing the world with >>Vygotsky's >> >>>ideas (and others) did materialize in the beautiful pedagogical work >>we >> >>>did with migrant students at that time... >> >>> >> >>>I hope the question of how we use, expand, enrich, re-envision, and >> >>>carry >> >>>forward the ideas of Vygotsky (and how these intersect with or >> >>>interweave >> >>>with power) are considered in an open and non-controlled way. By >> >>>"non-controlled" I mean the parallel tendency in particular >> >>>circles/communities to challenge work that grows out of particular >>ideas >> >>>and if those ideas do not adhere to some party-line (or experts on >>said >> >>>theory don't agree on it) then such work should not define itself as >> >>>"Vygotskian", "CHAT-based", or "Socio-Cultural," etc. My own >>motivation >> >>>to >> >>>chime in and contribute would increase if we followed this strand, >>that >> >>>looks at power and how it is integral to (not a 'factor' or >>'external' >> >>>context) learning? Although the reading group orientation is still >> >>>useful. >> >>> >> >>>Warmly, >> >>> >> >>>Miguel Zavala >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>>On 11/26/14 10:38 PM, "Walker, Dana" wrote: >> >>> >> >>>>Before we leave this topic, I would like to suggest that we pause to >> >>>>consider Annalisa's question: >> >>>> >> >>>>I'm curious how others have been inspired by Vygotsky and >> >>>>sociocultural theory, and even other manifestations of his ideas, >>such >> >>>>as >> >>>>CHAT, etc and how people are using these approaches in their work. >>What >> >>>>is >> >>>>that like for you? And to be more specific, what is that like for >>women >> >>>>and >> >>>>people of color? I'm also interested in thinking-out-loud with >>others >> >>>>about >> >>>>Vygotskian concepts that are not easy to understand; to employ in >>real >> >>>>time >> >>>>dialogue and social interaction to leap over zopeds together. Isn't >> >>>>that >> >>>>what a listserv is for? Or am I being too idealistic? >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>>For many years I have wondered why the participants on this list so >> >>>>seldom >> >>>>talk from contextualized positions, specifically positioning the >>self >> >>>>in >> >>>>relation to others and to power relations shaped by race, class, >> >>>>gender, >> >>>>and so on. I am myself very aware of power relations being played >>out >> >>>>through the discursive positioning of people in this space, which is >> >>>>why >> >>>>I >> >>>>choose not to speak. I am wondering if any of the subscribers to >>this >> >>>>list >> >>>>are interested such questions, including the one framed by Annalisa >> >>>>above? >> >>>>Kris Gutierrez is the only one I know of in CHAT/sociocultural >>theory >> >>>>who >> >>>>deals with these issues, for example in her article "Developing a >> >>>>Sociocritical Literacy in the Third Space"(2008). But I'm sure there >> >>>>are >> >>>>others. >> >>>> >> >>>>Dana >> >>>> >> >>>>On 11/26/14 10:49 PM, "Carol Macdonald" >>wrote: >> >>>> >> >>>>>Hi >> >>>>> >> >>>>>There have been some off list postings about this phenomenon. None >>of >> >>>>>it >> >>>>>complimentary. This cannot be sorted out in one move. >> >>>>> >> >>>>>I propose that we move onto a different thread - topic. >> >>>>> >> >>>>>Mike, would you like to start us off on something new? >> >>>>> >> >>>>>Carol >> >>>>> >> >>>>>On 27 November 2014 at 02:49, Martin John Packer >> >>>>> >> >>>>>wrote: >> >>>>> >> >>>>>> Andy, if you're going to retire, then retire. But don't aim one >>or >> >>>>>>two >> >>>>>> more underhand blows behind the feint of retiring. >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> Martin >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> On Nov 26, 2014, at 7:24 PM, Andy Blunden >> wrote: >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> > Well this bloke will retire again at this point. I thought for >>a >> >>>>>>brief >> >>>>>> moment there, I thought we had a breakthrough. Certainly, Huw's >> >>>>>>"real >> >>>>>> illusion" is perfectly apt to my mind (it's an expression Marx >> >>>>>>uses), >> >>>>>>or >> >>>>>> in Eric Fromm's words, an illusion with "survival value." Martin >> >>>>>>says >> >>>>>> "Consciousness is an objective process that *sometimes* can *give >> >>>>>>rise >> >>>>>>to* >> >>>>>> illusions." As Vygotsky says "For him psychology is partly >> >>>>>>phenomenology." >> >>>>>> > Andy >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>>>>-- >> >>>>>>- >> >>>>>>- >> >>>>>>- >> >>>>>> > *Andy Blunden* >> >>>>>> > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> > Bruce Robinson wrote: >> >>>>>> >> Henry, >> >>>>>> >> >> >>>>>> >> Your wife's question leads to another: who speaks for the >>silent >> >>>>>> majority, many of whom, like me, must be getting fed up with what >> >>>>>>David >> >>>>>>K >> >>>>>> calls a "rather blokish struggle for power over particular >>words'? >> >>>>>>[Not >> >>>>>> Richard Nixon :)] >> >>>>>> >> >> >>>>>> >> Bruce R >> >>>>>> >> >> >>>>>> >> PS: You may also note that I have not changed the subject >>heading >> >>>>>>of >> >>>>>> this message so that it bears no relation to the content. >>Something >> >>>>>>else I >> >>>>>> find irritating... >> >>>>>> >> >> >>>>>> >> On 26/11/2014 17:16, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >> >>>>>> >>> Sister Analisa, >> >>>>>> >>> Thank you for responding! I was just talking to my wife >>(getting >> >>>>>> personal!) about the chat. She asked me, "How does anyone get to >> >>>>>> participate in the (XMCA) chat if only a few people take part?" I >> >>>>>>wondered >> >>>>>> in my email below if too much was expected of written >>communication >> >>>>>>in >> >>>>>>the >> >>>>>> XMCA chat. With 800 people potentially taking turns, well...what >>is >> >>>>>>even >> >>>>>> possible logistically? Mike Cole has talked about this, and, I >> >>>>>>think, >> >>>>>>has >> >>>>>> some suggestions on how to deal with the bottlenecking. But even >> >>>>>>small >> >>>>>> scale communication can be daunting. I watched, with my wife, a >> >>>>>>Richard >> >>>>>> Linklater movie last night, "Before Midnight". Two people, face >>to >> >>>>>>face, in >> >>>>>> a totally committed relationship, smart people, good people, >>trying >> >>>>>>so >> >>>>>>hard >> >>>>>> to get it right. Always a work in progress. But it's worth it. >>The >> >>>>>> alternative is despair. I am sure of this: This chat, which >>seems to >> >>>>>>get >> >>>>>> bogged down in abstractions, pure thinking in the mud, is really >> >>>>>> consequential beyond the sensitivities of academics. I said we >> >>>>>> >> va >> >>>>>> >>> lue Vygotsky's "heroism", but that's too macho. I should >>have >> >>>>>>said >> >>>>>> courage. >> >>>>>> >>> >> >>>>>> >>> The Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis is a powerful idea, >>often >> >>>>>>called >> >>>>>> the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis. Google it. Really. See what you >>think. >> >>>>>>One >> >>>>>> gauge of the power of an idea is if it has found its way into >> >>>>>>popular >> >>>>>> discourse. I just this morning heard an NPR radio program (thanks >> >>>>>>again >> >>>>>>to >> >>>>>> my wife, who was listening when she heard something she thought I >> >>>>>>would >> >>>>>>be >> >>>>>> interested in) that dealt with the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis in its >> >>>>>>strong >> >>>>>>and >> >>>>>> weak form. >> >>>>>> >>> >> >>>>>> >>> Henry >> >>>>>> >>> >> >>>>>> >>>> On Nov 25, 2014, at 10:11 PM, Annalisa Aguilar >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> wrote: >> >>>>>> >>>> >> >>>>>> >>>> Dear Henry, >> >>>>>> >>>> >> >>>>>> >>>> Thank you for your reply. >> >>>>>> >>>> >> >>>>>> >>>> I don't think being personal (or even personable) requires >> >>>>>>being >> >>>>>> heated. Does this have to do with my comment of warmth as a sign >>of >> >>>>>>welcome? >> >>>>>> >>>> >> >>>>>> >>>> To speak about culture non-personally is not something I am >> >>>>>>adept >> >>>>>>at >> >>>>>> doing. We are always speaking from where we stand, the culture >>that >> >>>>>>we >> >>>>>>are >> >>>>>> in or from, what-have-you. >> >>>>>> >>>> >> >>>>>> >>>> Respectfully, I do not know what "linguistic relativity >> >>>>>>hypothesis" >> >>>>>> is. So please be patient with me while I connect this academic >>idea >> >>>>>>you >> >>>>>> have offered to this conversation so that I can relate that to my >> >>>>>>personal >> >>>>>> experience speaking on this thread, though clearly I'm not >>speaking >> >>>>>> literally right now, but it is speech from me, not a sock puppet >> >>>>>>with >> >>>>>>my >> >>>>>> voice thrown from the position of objective reality. >> >>>>>> >>>> >> >>>>>> >>>> You are talking about speaking two languages. But it seems >>we >> >>>>>>are >> >>>>>>all >> >>>>>> speaking English on this list. So I'm a bit lost right there what >> >>>>>>you >> >>>>>>are >> >>>>>> trying to say to me. >> >>>>>> >>>> >> >>>>>> >>>> Then, you speak of metalinguistics and how it represents >> >>>>>>different >> >>>>>> worldviews, if you don't mind me swapping your use of >>"perspective" >> >>>>>>for >> >>>>>> worldview. There is a lot of time clearing muckups to get it >>right. >> >>>>>>I'm >> >>>>>>not >> >>>>>> sure that it ever gets right though, which troubles me. I have >>found >> >>>>>>that >> >>>>>> many people who have different worldviews communicate by "talking >> >>>>>>to," >> >>>>>> rather than "talking at." I feel, for example, you and I are >>talking >> >>>>>>to >> >>>>>>one >> >>>>>> another, despite our likely different POVs. >> >>>>>> >>>> >> >>>>>> >>>> I don't know what the "perish and dapple of Andy" means when >> >>>>>>you >> >>>>>>say >> >>>>>> that. From what I can tell he's trying to define something for >> >>>>>>himself >> >>>>>> asking for the help of others. That's fine and I'm learning that >> >>>>>> definitions are very bas-relief for him. I think my interests >>are a >> >>>>>>little >> >>>>>> different. So I'd prefer to orient to my interests, if that is >>OK. >> >>>>>> >>>> >> >>>>>> >>>> Speaking of metalinguistics, rather than debate over >> >>>>>>definitions, >> >>>>>>I'm >> >>>>>> more interested in speaking to the very different people who are >>on >> >>>>>>this >> >>>>>> list. The rumor is there are 800 folks out there. Where are you? >>:) >> >>>>>>To >> >>>>>> reference a highly academic quote from the Wizard of Oz: >> >>>>>> >>>> >> >>>>>> >>>> "Come out, come out wherever you are, and meet the young >>lady >> >>>>>>who >> >>>>>> fell from the star!" >> >>>>>> >>>> --Glinda, the Good Witch from the North (waves magic wand) >> >>>>>> >>>> >> >>>>>> >>>> I'm curious how others have been inspired by Vygotsky and >> >>>>>> sociocultural theory, and even other manifestations of his ideas, >> >>>>>>such >> >>>>>>as >> >>>>>> CHAT, etc and how people are using these approaches in their >>work. >> >>>>>>What >> >>>>>>is >> >>>>>> that like for you? And to be more specific, what is that like for >> >>>>>>women >> >>>>>>and >> >>>>>> people of color? I'm also interested in thinking-out-loud with >> >>>>>>others >> >>>>>>about >> >>>>>> Vygotskian concepts that are not easy to understand; to employ in >> >>>>>>real >> >>>>>>time >> >>>>>> dialogue and social interaction to leap over zopeds together. >>Isn't >> >>>>>>that >> >>>>>> what a listserv is for? Or am I being too idealistic? >> >>>>>> >>>> >> >>>>>> >>>> I have tried to speak in an open, easy, and immediate >>manner, >> >>>>>>to >> >>>>>> allow others to engage. But I fear that engagement is never >>going to >> >>>>>>happen >> >>>>>> because all that persists are conversations about definitions, or >> >>>>>>whether >> >>>>>> nothing can come from nothing, and voila! subsequent debates >>ensue. >> >>>>>>Or >> >>>>>> someone will say, "We already discussed this 20 years ago!" Which >> >>>>>>means >> >>>>>>I >> >>>>>> missed the party, I suppose. Unfortunately, if I disagree with a >> >>>>>>position >> >>>>>> because I interpret differently, then I'm told to go read >>something >> >>>>>>without >> >>>>>> really a clear explanation why I'm supposed to go read something. >> >>>>>> >>>> >> >>>>>> >>>> I don't really agree with the approach of "read this," as an >> >>>>>>academic >> >>>>>> argument. Anyone is free to use it, and I have myself, but >>because I >> >>>>>>know >> >>>>>> how obtuse that can be, I couch it with my reasons why I think it >> >>>>>>would >> >>>>>>be >> >>>>>> a good read for that person, and what I think there is learn from >> >>>>>>reading. >> >>>>>> I think the "read this" approach, when it is offered with the >>tone >> >>>>>>of >> >>>>>>"now >> >>>>>> go eat your vegetables!" fails in the making of speech between >> >>>>>>people. >> >>>>>>All >> >>>>>> it does is shut things down. >> >>>>>> >>>> >> >>>>>> >>>> If the reading truly is relevant, it seems far more >>productive >> >>>>>>in >> >>>>>>the >> >>>>>> moment of speech to cue a person what to look for, to supply a >> >>>>>>context, >> >>>>>> especially when referencing an entire book, for example, or the >>link >> >>>>>>to >> >>>>>>an >> >>>>>> entire website full of texts. >> >>>>>> >>>> >> >>>>>> >>>> Your assessment in the physicality of language is something >> >>>>>>with >> >>>>>> which I am completely in agreement. Especially since we all seem >>to >> >>>>>>agree >> >>>>>> with the material aspects of language. So the question at hand >>is a >> >>>>>>matter >> >>>>>> of form. Form has an aesthetic but also has a purpose. Are we >> >>>>>>throwing >> >>>>>> ropes or throwing boulders? If throwing boulders, where does that >> >>>>>>need >> >>>>>>to >> >>>>>> throw boulders come from? If throwing ropes, then at least >> >>>>>>connections >> >>>>>>are >> >>>>>> being made for those who might not be very clear about ideas and >>who >> >>>>>>may >> >>>>>> require a helping hand. >> >>>>>> >>>> >> >>>>>> >>>> Then there's the old, but handy, elliptical comment, >>something >> >>>>>>like a >> >>>>>> boomerang... meant to be subtle or ironic at the expense of >>someone >> >>>>>>who >> >>>>>>may >> >>>>>> not understand. >> >>>>>> >>>> >> >>>>>> >>>> At this point, I'd to emphasize that being ignorant is not >> >>>>>>being >> >>>>>> stupid, but it seems someone who is ignorant is frequently >>treated >> >>>>>>as >> >>>>>> stupid (um, on this list). This "phenomenon" has made me reflect >> >>>>>>upon >> >>>>>>how >> >>>>>> little time is spent upon the nature of ignorance in education >>and >> >>>>>>the >> >>>>>> dynamics of ignorance in speaking. Every one of us is ignorant >>about >> >>>>>>most >> >>>>>> things in the world. And yet being ignorant is seen as an >> >>>>>>embarrassment, a >> >>>>>> deficiency, a lapse in character. I vehemently disagree with this >> >>>>>>reception >> >>>>>> to ignorance. Even Einstein said something like, "The more I >>know, >> >>>>>>the >> >>>>>>more >> >>>>>> I see how much I don't know." Such an aggressive position toward >> >>>>>>ignorance >> >>>>>> is nothing but hurtful, even arrogant. Arrogance is a blister, a >> >>>>>>defense >> >>>>>> mechanism from previous hurt. A person who is honest about one's >>own >> >>>>>> ignorance is a very strong person and is showing a willingness to >> >>>>>>learn >> >>>>>> something. I think all teachers will agree that a person who >>knows >> >>>>>>one >> >>>>>> doesn't know is an easier student to teach tha >> >>>>>> >> n >> >>>>>> >>> one who doesn't know one doesn't know. >> >>>>>> >>>> Iconicity is something I can hang my hat on. I see it is >> >>>>>>related >> >>>>>>to >> >>>>>> pointing. What I like about pointing is that it is a gesture, >>which >> >>>>>>implies >> >>>>>> movement, in the way the word is also movement. I hope I have >>made >> >>>>>> sufficient personal connections to your concepts without the >>heat. >> >>>>>>Thank >> >>>>>> you for offering them to me. >> >>>>>> >>>> >> >>>>>> >>>> Kind regards, >> >>>>>> >>>> >> >>>>>> >>>> Annalisa >> >>>>>> >>>> >> >>>>>> >>> >> >>>>>> >> >> >>>>>> >> >> >>>>>> >> >> >>>>>> >> >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> >> >>>>> >> >>>>> >> >>>>>-- >> >>>>>Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >> >>>>>Developmental psycholinguist >> >>>>>Academic, Researcher, and Editor >> >>>>>Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >> >> >> >> > >> >> >> > > >-- >It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Dec 1 20:09:44 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2014 04:09:44 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya In-Reply-To: References: <1417327948145.17025@unm.edu> <1417369203201.33878@unm.edu> <1417423298756.15810@unm.edu> <1417465572384.17829@unm.edu>, Message-ID: <1417493384496.17564@unm.edu> Dear Ulvi, I do not think I would describe it as a state of equilibrium, as this would suggest that she was unbalanced prior to that. For what my contribution is worth, which may not be that much, I don't believe this was her experience. But that is how I interpret it. It seems different for you, and this is OK! :) Living in the present moment (for me) is about clearing away preconceived notions and their labels, and in doing so possessing a personal clarity that is unencumbered by these labels. It is the act of being alive, in my estimation. As I have considered it, crisis can bring about this experience, but it is not necessary that crisis be present for this clarity to be present. This clarity is there all the time if we choose to let it reveal itself to us. It may be better to say, to as-though let it reveal itself to us, because it is not an entity with a volition that provides an annunciation to us, but more like opening the curtains to my windows to let the sun shine enter the space. This is why I like the word clarity over equilibrium. I speculate that this is what it was like for Zoya. I could be wrong, however. Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Ulvi ??il Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 2:42 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya I understand your point. After the decision to go to the front, she seems to have reached an equilibrium, and she was ready for death. But; prior to this decision, it seems that she was, as a child, from even ages like 10 or 11, in a constant search for something. This something, I think, is to be a person of highest ideals, a devotion to these ideals. It was defense of Soviet Union after the war broke out. Prior to this, I think she was not in a state of equilibrium. Best, Ulvi 2014-12-01 22:26 GMT+02:00 Annalisa Aguilar : > > Hi Ulvi, > > I would say that the preconditions are self-acceptance, which is my reason > for mentioning cows and cats. Of course cows and cats are not > self-conscious so I was being a little ironic to say that we could evolve > to their state. More to your point, it is because we don't accept ourselves > as we are that causes unhappiness. So to be more precise about how to think > of it is to consider the removal of non-self-acceptance rather than an > addition of self-acceptance, because as infants and children we accept > ourselves just fine! Why are children so happy? > > Zoya seems to have accepted herself as herself, living in her present > moment, living to the task at hand as was necessary. It is my belief the > reason why she was able to face her death so fearlessly, and why she was so > remarkable to the people around her while she lived. > > I would not call being in the present moment idealistic, but realistic. :) > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Ulvi ??il > Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:04 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya > > Thank you Annalisa. > > You are right. There is certainly many many happinnesses. > > But the question was: One big, common happiness for all. Is there such > happiness? > > Anf if there is, what are its preconditions? > > Kind regards, > > Ulvi > > > 2014-12-01 10:41 GMT+02:00 Annalisa Aguilar : > > > Dear Ulvi, > > > > I think it absolutely depends on what you mean by happiness! :) > > > > But to Zoya, it seems that she became the person she became from the deep > > reading she did. I'm sure writing in a notebook is a part of that as > well. > > I suspect in the backdrop of her hard life, these past-times were > essential > > to her development, especially concerning her imagination. > > > > Have you noticed how cows are not bothered if they have matching horns or > > crooked horns? Or cats do not complain that their silly acrobatics are > > posted on the internet? > > > > If we evolve to a state of being non-self-conscious, as animals are, we > > might be happier than we are now. Though maybe I am wrong. > > > > Maybe happiness is just _being_ happy? > > > > Kind regards, > > > > Annalisa > > > > From helenaworthen@gmail.com Mon Dec 1 20:20:09 2014 From: helenaworthen@gmail.com (Helena Worthen) Date: Mon, 1 Dec 2014 20:20:09 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: "The political" and "power" in learning In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Dana -- Thanks for linking Hong Kong (students) Ferguson and Oakland (following the murder of Oscar Grant, I assume; young Black men). And let's include the 43 disappeared students at the teacher training school in Iguala, Mexico. Those students were enrolled at one of the rural teacher training schools that date back into the Mexican revolution and take on politics and power directly. This is the best reporting of the 43 Disappeareds that I've seen in the US. It's very close to what La Jornada was publishing in early November. http://www.vice.com/video/the-missing-43-mexicos-disappeared-students-full-length-678 Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com On Dec 1, 2014, at 5:45 PM, Walker, Dana wrote: > Hi Miguel, > > I would be very interested in continuing this thread on "the political" > and "power" in learning. My participation will be slow, as I will be at > the LRA conference in Florida and then finals and so on, but will follow > with interest. I have changed thread title in anticipation of pursuing > this exploration. > > Does Ferguson (or Oakland, or New York, or Hong Kong, or Cairo) matter in > considerations of 'the political' and 'power' in learning (and teaching)? > > Dana > > On 11/28/14 5:07 PM, "Zavala, Miguel" > wrote: > >> Hi Dana, >> >> I believe there are several ways to go with an analysis of "the political" >> or "power" in learning. First, is to search for its >> articulation/theorization in existing studies (whether conceptual or >> empirical) within the learning sciences more generally. Who has attempted >> this work? Also, In the general absence of studies theorizing "the >> political" or "power" in learning (which I gather is an accurate depiction >> of the field), one might pursue the ways in which "context" is narrowly >> framed in distinct frames/theories of learning. In what ways does/can >> CHAT enable the analysis of "the political" and "power" in learning? >> >> Now, due to time constraints, this project may take time; perhaps there is >> a smaller group that would like to continue with this thread/exploration >> of "the political" or "power" in learning. I place questions of politics >> and power in quotation marks because they need to be unpacked, like many >> concepts. >> >> I believe there is another route one can take, and that is to begin with >> our own political biographies, how we view the world and its >> transformation. In a sense, we all have our biographies of coming to CHAT. >> How is CHAT a tool in our practical work (as educators, >> action-researchers, community organizers, etc.)? Because processes are >> relational, I imagine that our own biographies, positionalities, and >> standpoints (which function more like collective consciousness and >> practices, borrowing here from the work of Sandra Harding) are not only >> inflected in our appropriations of CHAT but are interwoven; they shift >> from "external" to "internal" processes of of both research and praxis >> (informed by our politics). I recognize there are many points being made >> here and "dangers", especially when one views learning as a-political or >> mechanistic, but I take that risk. >> >> Attached is a chapter outlining my political philosophy. It was published >> as part of a text that asked contributors to name our "pedagogic creeds" >> (? la Dewey). >> >> -Miguel >> >> >> On 11/27/14 8:12 AM, "Walker, Dana" wrote: >> >>> Gracias Miguel, and Mike and Larry for responding and for moving forward >>> this thread of thought begun by Annalisa. >>> >>> Miguel, I remember now (based on a conference presentation of yours years >>> ago) that your pedagogical and theoretical work involving migrant >>> students >>> at UCLA addressed questions of power, subjectivity, and embodied selves >>> in >>> boundary crossing processes in ways that other CHAT theorists (e.g., >>> Tuomi-Grohn & Engestrom, 2003; Grossen & Zittoun, 2012) do not. I wonder >>> if this is a place where we could begin exploring the question of power >>> in >>> relation to learning and development? Is there an article of yours that >>> you might suggest on this subject? >>> >>> Dana >>> >>> >>> On 11/27/14 12:02 AM, "Zavala, Miguel" >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Gracias Annalisa and Dana. >>>> >>>> Questions of power have always been central to my work and I am a new >>>> member of this list (and community) and don't have a broader context as >>>> to >>>> why it was created and whether it is by design meant to grow in its own >>>> way over time, etc. What I have noticed though is a tendency to focus on >>>> conceptual clarity (of the work of Vygotsky and Cultural Historical >>>> Activity Theory and prior, such as Marx). So, I am learning anew in this >>>> space, taking notes, re-reading. In many ways it reminds me of the CHAT >>>> reading group many of us at UCLA visualized but never materialized >>>> formally, except that our reading and writing the world with Vygotsky's >>>> ideas (and others) did materialize in the beautiful pedagogical work we >>>> did with migrant students at that time... >>>> >>>> I hope the question of how we use, expand, enrich, re-envision, and >>>> carry >>>> forward the ideas of Vygotsky (and how these intersect with or >>>> interweave >>>> with power) are considered in an open and non-controlled way. By >>>> "non-controlled" I mean the parallel tendency in particular >>>> circles/communities to challenge work that grows out of particular ideas >>>> and if those ideas do not adhere to some party-line (or experts on said >>>> theory don't agree on it) then such work should not define itself as >>>> "Vygotskian", "CHAT-based", or "Socio-Cultural," etc. My own motivation >>>> to >>>> chime in and contribute would increase if we followed this strand, that >>>> looks at power and how it is integral to (not a 'factor' or 'external' >>>> context) learning? Although the reading group orientation is still >>>> useful. >>>> >>>> Warmly, >>>> >>>> Miguel Zavala >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 11/26/14 10:38 PM, "Walker, Dana" wrote: >>>> >>>>> Before we leave this topic, I would like to suggest that we pause to >>>>> consider Annalisa's question: >>>>> >>>>> I'm curious how others have been inspired by Vygotsky and >>>>> sociocultural theory, and even other manifestations of his ideas, such >>>>> as >>>>> CHAT, etc and how people are using these approaches in their work. What >>>>> is >>>>> that like for you? And to be more specific, what is that like for women >>>>> and >>>>> people of color? I'm also interested in thinking-out-loud with others >>>>> about >>>>> Vygotskian concepts that are not easy to understand; to employ in real >>>>> time >>>>> dialogue and social interaction to leap over zopeds together. Isn't >>>>> that >>>>> what a listserv is for? Or am I being too idealistic? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> For many years I have wondered why the participants on this list so >>>>> seldom >>>>> talk from contextualized positions, specifically positioning the self >>>>> in >>>>> relation to others and to power relations shaped by race, class, >>>>> gender, >>>>> and so on. I am myself very aware of power relations being played out >>>>> through the discursive positioning of people in this space, which is >>>>> why >>>>> I >>>>> choose not to speak. I am wondering if any of the subscribers to this >>>>> list >>>>> are interested such questions, including the one framed by Annalisa >>>>> above? >>>>> Kris Gutierrez is the only one I know of in CHAT/sociocultural theory >>>>> who >>>>> deals with these issues, for example in her article "Developing a >>>>> Sociocritical Literacy in the Third Space"(2008). But I'm sure there >>>>> are >>>>> others. >>>>> >>>>> Dana >>>>> >>>>> On 11/26/14 10:49 PM, "Carol Macdonald" wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Hi >>>>>> >>>>>> There have been some off list postings about this phenomenon. None of >>>>>> it >>>>>> complimentary. This cannot be sorted out in one move. >>>>>> >>>>>> I propose that we move onto a different thread - topic. >>>>>> >>>>>> Mike, would you like to start us off on something new? >>>>>> >>>>>> Carol >>>>>> >>>>>> On 27 November 2014 at 02:49, Martin John Packer >>>>>> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy, if you're going to retire, then retire. But don't aim one or >>>>>>> two >>>>>>> more underhand blows behind the feint of retiring. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Nov 26, 2014, at 7:24 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Well this bloke will retire again at this point. I thought for a >>>>>>> brief >>>>>>> moment there, I thought we had a breakthrough. Certainly, Huw's >>>>>>> "real >>>>>>> illusion" is perfectly apt to my mind (it's an expression Marx >>>>>>> uses), >>>>>>> or >>>>>>> in Eric Fromm's words, an illusion with "survival value." Martin >>>>>>> says >>>>>>> "Consciousness is an objective process that *sometimes* can *give >>>>>>> rise >>>>>>> to* >>>>>>> illusions." As Vygotsky says "For him psychology is partly >>>>>>> phenomenology." >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>>> - >>>>>>> - >>>>>>> - >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Bruce Robinson wrote: >>>>>>>>> Henry, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Your wife's question leads to another: who speaks for the silent >>>>>>> majority, many of whom, like me, must be getting fed up with what >>>>>>> David >>>>>>> K >>>>>>> calls a "rather blokish struggle for power over particular words'? >>>>>>> [Not >>>>>>> Richard Nixon :)] >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Bruce R >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> PS: You may also note that I have not changed the subject heading >>>>>>> of >>>>>>> this message so that it bears no relation to the content. Something >>>>>>> else I >>>>>>> find irritating... >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 26/11/2014 17:16, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>>>>>>>>> Sister Analisa, >>>>>>>>>> Thank you for responding! I was just talking to my wife (getting >>>>>>> personal!) about the chat. She asked me, "How does anyone get to >>>>>>> participate in the (XMCA) chat if only a few people take part?" I >>>>>>> wondered >>>>>>> in my email below if too much was expected of written communication >>>>>>> in >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> XMCA chat. With 800 people potentially taking turns, well...what is >>>>>>> even >>>>>>> possible logistically? Mike Cole has talked about this, and, I >>>>>>> think, >>>>>>> has >>>>>>> some suggestions on how to deal with the bottlenecking. But even >>>>>>> small >>>>>>> scale communication can be daunting. I watched, with my wife, a >>>>>>> Richard >>>>>>> Linklater movie last night, "Before Midnight". Two people, face to >>>>>>> face, in >>>>>>> a totally committed relationship, smart people, good people, trying >>>>>>> so >>>>>>> hard >>>>>>> to get it right. Always a work in progress. But it's worth it. The >>>>>>> alternative is despair. I am sure of this: This chat, which seems to >>>>>>> get >>>>>>> bogged down in abstractions, pure thinking in the mud, is really >>>>>>> consequential beyond the sensitivities of academics. I said we >>>>>>>>> va >>>>>>>>>> lue Vygotsky's "heroism", but that's too macho. I should have >>>>>>> said >>>>>>> courage. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> The Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis is a powerful idea, often >>>>>>> called >>>>>>> the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis. Google it. Really. See what you think. >>>>>>> One >>>>>>> gauge of the power of an idea is if it has found its way into >>>>>>> popular >>>>>>> discourse. I just this morning heard an NPR radio program (thanks >>>>>>> again >>>>>>> to >>>>>>> my wife, who was listening when she heard something she thought I >>>>>>> would >>>>>>> be >>>>>>> interested in) that dealt with the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis in its >>>>>>> strong >>>>>>> and >>>>>>> weak form. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Nov 25, 2014, at 10:11 PM, Annalisa Aguilar >>>>>>> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Dear Henry, >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Thank you for your reply. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I don't think being personal (or even personable) requires >>>>>>> being >>>>>>> heated. Does this have to do with my comment of warmth as a sign of >>>>>>> welcome? >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> To speak about culture non-personally is not something I am >>>>>>> adept >>>>>>> at >>>>>>> doing. We are always speaking from where we stand, the culture that >>>>>>> we >>>>>>> are >>>>>>> in or from, what-have-you. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Respectfully, I do not know what "linguistic relativity >>>>>>> hypothesis" >>>>>>> is. So please be patient with me while I connect this academic idea >>>>>>> you >>>>>>> have offered to this conversation so that I can relate that to my >>>>>>> personal >>>>>>> experience speaking on this thread, though clearly I'm not speaking >>>>>>> literally right now, but it is speech from me, not a sock puppet >>>>>>> with >>>>>>> my >>>>>>> voice thrown from the position of objective reality. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> You are talking about speaking two languages. But it seems we >>>>>>> are >>>>>>> all >>>>>>> speaking English on this list. So I'm a bit lost right there what >>>>>>> you >>>>>>> are >>>>>>> trying to say to me. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Then, you speak of metalinguistics and how it represents >>>>>>> different >>>>>>> worldviews, if you don't mind me swapping your use of "perspective" >>>>>>> for >>>>>>> worldview. There is a lot of time clearing muckups to get it right. >>>>>>> I'm >>>>>>> not >>>>>>> sure that it ever gets right though, which troubles me. I have found >>>>>>> that >>>>>>> many people who have different worldviews communicate by "talking >>>>>>> to," >>>>>>> rather than "talking at." I feel, for example, you and I are talking >>>>>>> to >>>>>>> one >>>>>>> another, despite our likely different POVs. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I don't know what the "perish and dapple of Andy" means when >>>>>>> you >>>>>>> say >>>>>>> that. From what I can tell he's trying to define something for >>>>>>> himself >>>>>>> asking for the help of others. That's fine and I'm learning that >>>>>>> definitions are very bas-relief for him. I think my interests are a >>>>>>> little >>>>>>> different. So I'd prefer to orient to my interests, if that is OK. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Speaking of metalinguistics, rather than debate over >>>>>>> definitions, >>>>>>> I'm >>>>>>> more interested in speaking to the very different people who are on >>>>>>> this >>>>>>> list. The rumor is there are 800 folks out there. Where are you? :) >>>>>>> To >>>>>>> reference a highly academic quote from the Wizard of Oz: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> "Come out, come out wherever you are, and meet the young lady >>>>>>> who >>>>>>> fell from the star!" >>>>>>>>>>> --Glinda, the Good Witch from the North (waves magic wand) >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I'm curious how others have been inspired by Vygotsky and >>>>>>> sociocultural theory, and even other manifestations of his ideas, >>>>>>> such >>>>>>> as >>>>>>> CHAT, etc and how people are using these approaches in their work. >>>>>>> What >>>>>>> is >>>>>>> that like for you? And to be more specific, what is that like for >>>>>>> women >>>>>>> and >>>>>>> people of color? I'm also interested in thinking-out-loud with >>>>>>> others >>>>>>> about >>>>>>> Vygotskian concepts that are not easy to understand; to employ in >>>>>>> real >>>>>>> time >>>>>>> dialogue and social interaction to leap over zopeds together. Isn't >>>>>>> that >>>>>>> what a listserv is for? Or am I being too idealistic? >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I have tried to speak in an open, easy, and immediate manner, >>>>>>> to >>>>>>> allow others to engage. But I fear that engagement is never going to >>>>>>> happen >>>>>>> because all that persists are conversations about definitions, or >>>>>>> whether >>>>>>> nothing can come from nothing, and voila! subsequent debates ensue. >>>>>>> Or >>>>>>> someone will say, "We already discussed this 20 years ago!" Which >>>>>>> means >>>>>>> I >>>>>>> missed the party, I suppose. Unfortunately, if I disagree with a >>>>>>> position >>>>>>> because I interpret differently, then I'm told to go read something >>>>>>> without >>>>>>> really a clear explanation why I'm supposed to go read something. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I don't really agree with the approach of "read this," as an >>>>>>> academic >>>>>>> argument. Anyone is free to use it, and I have myself, but because I >>>>>>> know >>>>>>> how obtuse that can be, I couch it with my reasons why I think it >>>>>>> would >>>>>>> be >>>>>>> a good read for that person, and what I think there is learn from >>>>>>> reading. >>>>>>> I think the "read this" approach, when it is offered with the tone >>>>>>> of >>>>>>> "now >>>>>>> go eat your vegetables!" fails in the making of speech between >>>>>>> people. >>>>>>> All >>>>>>> it does is shut things down. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> If the reading truly is relevant, it seems far more productive >>>>>>> in >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> moment of speech to cue a person what to look for, to supply a >>>>>>> context, >>>>>>> especially when referencing an entire book, for example, or the link >>>>>>> to >>>>>>> an >>>>>>> entire website full of texts. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Your assessment in the physicality of language is something >>>>>>> with >>>>>>> which I am completely in agreement. Especially since we all seem to >>>>>>> agree >>>>>>> with the material aspects of language. So the question at hand is a >>>>>>> matter >>>>>>> of form. Form has an aesthetic but also has a purpose. Are we >>>>>>> throwing >>>>>>> ropes or throwing boulders? If throwing boulders, where does that >>>>>>> need >>>>>>> to >>>>>>> throw boulders come from? If throwing ropes, then at least >>>>>>> connections >>>>>>> are >>>>>>> being made for those who might not be very clear about ideas and who >>>>>>> may >>>>>>> require a helping hand. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Then there's the old, but handy, elliptical comment, something >>>>>>> like a >>>>>>> boomerang... meant to be subtle or ironic at the expense of someone >>>>>>> who >>>>>>> may >>>>>>> not understand. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> At this point, I'd to emphasize that being ignorant is not >>>>>>> being >>>>>>> stupid, but it seems someone who is ignorant is frequently treated >>>>>>> as >>>>>>> stupid (um, on this list). This "phenomenon" has made me reflect >>>>>>> upon >>>>>>> how >>>>>>> little time is spent upon the nature of ignorance in education and >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> dynamics of ignorance in speaking. Every one of us is ignorant about >>>>>>> most >>>>>>> things in the world. And yet being ignorant is seen as an >>>>>>> embarrassment, a >>>>>>> deficiency, a lapse in character. I vehemently disagree with this >>>>>>> reception >>>>>>> to ignorance. Even Einstein said something like, "The more I know, >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> more >>>>>>> I see how much I don't know." Such an aggressive position toward >>>>>>> ignorance >>>>>>> is nothing but hurtful, even arrogant. Arrogance is a blister, a >>>>>>> defense >>>>>>> mechanism from previous hurt. A person who is honest about one's own >>>>>>> ignorance is a very strong person and is showing a willingness to >>>>>>> learn >>>>>>> something. I think all teachers will agree that a person who knows >>>>>>> one >>>>>>> doesn't know is an easier student to teach tha >>>>>>>>> n >>>>>>>>>> one who doesn't know one doesn't know. >>>>>>>>>>> Iconicity is something I can hang my hat on. I see it is >>>>>>> related >>>>>>> to >>>>>>> pointing. What I like about pointing is that it is a gesture, which >>>>>>> implies >>>>>>> movement, in the way the word is also movement. I hope I have made >>>>>>> sufficient personal connections to your concepts without the heat. >>>>>>> Thank >>>>>>> you for offering them to me. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>>>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon Dec 1 20:35:00 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 1 Dec 2014 20:35:00 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: "The political" and "power" in learning In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: I hope you will find time to continue to engage here, Miguel. The issues you raise speak to essential issues confronting humanity. Imperialism was not invented in the 21st century and the consequences of 19th century colonialism have by no means evaporated. Mike On Monday, December 1, 2014, Zavala, Miguel wrote: > Thanks Dana for sorting this new thread. Mike, I'll follow up with the > articles you mention... > > I am also pressed for time so will be somewhat slow in replying. I see > the threads are like roundtables or spaces within a larger venue, a > thinking conference. > > Miguel > > On 12/1/14 6:07 PM, "mike cole" > wrote: > > >I fully agree, Dana. Several interconnected issues that Miguel is raising > >are of central concern to xmca. > > > >Miguel-- > > > >I think that the notion of decolonializing pedagogy relates in pretty > >direct way with Maisha Winn's ideas of African Diaspora Participatory > >Literacy. She writes about that in the next issue of MCA. I also like the > >idea of autobiographical accounts of one's own positionality with respect > >to the events that have shaped your scholarship. There is an interesting > >article by a group of South African pedagogs that illustrates again, what > >seems like, a similar idea of locating one's academic work within the > >context of one's political engagements. And then we are gifted with Paul's > >article in a journal devoted to the centrality of class in a journal > >entitled *African and Black Diaspora. * > > > >Synchronic a-causality or Zeitgeist? > >mike > > > > > > > >On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 5:45 PM, Walker, Dana > wrote: > > > >> Hi Miguel, > >> > >> I would be very interested in continuing this thread on "the political" > >> and "power" in learning. My participation will be slow, as I will be at > >> the LRA conference in Florida and then finals and so on, but will follow > >> with interest. I have changed thread title in anticipation of pursuing > >> this exploration. > >> > >> Does Ferguson (or Oakland, or New York, or Hong Kong, or Cairo) matter > >>in > >> considerations of 'the political' and 'power' in learning (and > >>teaching)? > >> > >> Dana > >> > >> On 11/28/14 5:07 PM, "Zavala, Miguel" > > >> wrote: > >> > >> >Hi Dana, > >> > > >> >I believe there are several ways to go with an analysis of "the > >>political" > >> >or "power" in learning. First, is to search for its > >> >articulation/theorization in existing studies (whether conceptual or > >> >empirical) within the learning sciences more generally. Who has > >>attempted > >> >this work? Also, In the general absence of studies theorizing "the > >> >political" or "power" in learning (which I gather is an accurate > >>depiction > >> >of the field), one might pursue the ways in which "context" is narrowly > >> >framed in distinct frames/theories of learning. In what ways does/can > >> >CHAT enable the analysis of "the political" and "power" in learning? > >> > > >> >Now, due to time constraints, this project may take time; perhaps > >>there is > >> >a smaller group that would like to continue with this > >>thread/exploration > >> >of "the political" or "power" in learning. I place questions of > >>politics > >> >and power in quotation marks because they need to be unpacked, like > >>many > >> >concepts. > >> > > >> >I believe there is another route one can take, and that is to begin > >>with > >> >our own political biographies, how we view the world and its > >> >transformation. In a sense, we all have our biographies of coming to > >>CHAT. > >> >How is CHAT a tool in our practical work (as educators, > >> >action-researchers, community organizers, etc.)? Because processes are > >> >relational, I imagine that our own biographies, positionalities, and > >> >standpoints (which function more like collective consciousness and > >> >practices, borrowing here from the work of Sandra Harding) are not only > >> >inflected in our appropriations of CHAT but are interwoven; they shift > >> >from "external" to "internal" processes of of both research and praxis > >> >(informed by our politics). I recognize there are many points being > >>made > >> >here and "dangers", especially when one views learning as a-political > >>or > >> >mechanistic, but I take that risk. > >> > > >> >Attached is a chapter outlining my political philosophy. It was > >>published > >> >as part of a text that asked contributors to name our "pedagogic > >>creeds" > >> >(? la Dewey). > >> > > >> >-Miguel > >> > > >> > > >> >On 11/27/14 8:12 AM, "Walker, Dana" > wrote: > >> > > >> >>Gracias Miguel, and Mike and Larry for responding and for moving > >>forward > >> >>this thread of thought begun by Annalisa. > >> >> > >> >>Miguel, I remember now (based on a conference presentation of yours > >>years > >> >>ago) that your pedagogical and theoretical work involving migrant > >> >>students > >> >>at UCLA addressed questions of power, subjectivity, and embodied > >>selves > >> >>in > >> >>boundary crossing processes in ways that other CHAT theorists (e.g., > >> >>Tuomi-Grohn & Engestrom, 2003; Grossen & Zittoun, 2012) do not. I > >>wonder > >> >>if this is a place where we could begin exploring the question of > >>power > >> >>in > >> >>relation to learning and development? Is there an article of yours > >>that > >> >>you might suggest on this subject? > >> >> > >> >>Dana > >> >> > >> >> > >> >>On 11/27/14 12:02 AM, "Zavala, Miguel" > >>> > >> >>wrote: > >> >> > >> >>>Gracias Annalisa and Dana. > >> >>> > >> >>>Questions of power have always been central to my work and I am a new > >> >>>member of this list (and community) and don't have a broader context > >>as > >> >>>to > >> >>>why it was created and whether it is by design meant to grow in its > >>own > >> >>>way over time, etc. What I have noticed though is a tendency to > >>focus on > >> >>>conceptual clarity (of the work of Vygotsky and Cultural Historical > >> >>>Activity Theory and prior, such as Marx). So, I am learning anew in > >>this > >> >>>space, taking notes, re-reading. In many ways it reminds me of the > >>CHAT > >> >>>reading group many of us at UCLA visualized but never materialized > >> >>>formally, except that our reading and writing the world with > >>Vygotsky's > >> >>>ideas (and others) did materialize in the beautiful pedagogical work > >>we > >> >>>did with migrant students at that time... > >> >>> > >> >>>I hope the question of how we use, expand, enrich, re-envision, and > >> >>>carry > >> >>>forward the ideas of Vygotsky (and how these intersect with or > >> >>>interweave > >> >>>with power) are considered in an open and non-controlled way. By > >> >>>"non-controlled" I mean the parallel tendency in particular > >> >>>circles/communities to challenge work that grows out of particular > >>ideas > >> >>>and if those ideas do not adhere to some party-line (or experts on > >>said > >> >>>theory don't agree on it) then such work should not define itself as > >> >>>"Vygotskian", "CHAT-based", or "Socio-Cultural," etc. My own > >>motivation > >> >>>to > >> >>>chime in and contribute would increase if we followed this strand, > >>that > >> >>>looks at power and how it is integral to (not a 'factor' or > >>'external' > >> >>>context) learning? Although the reading group orientation is still > >> >>>useful. > >> >>> > >> >>>Warmly, > >> >>> > >> >>>Miguel Zavala > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>>On 11/26/14 10:38 PM, "Walker, Dana" > wrote: > >> >>> > >> >>>>Before we leave this topic, I would like to suggest that we pause to > >> >>>>consider Annalisa's question: > >> >>>> > >> >>>>I'm curious how others have been inspired by Vygotsky and > >> >>>>sociocultural theory, and even other manifestations of his ideas, > >>such > >> >>>>as > >> >>>>CHAT, etc and how people are using these approaches in their work. > >>What > >> >>>>is > >> >>>>that like for you? And to be more specific, what is that like for > >>women > >> >>>>and > >> >>>>people of color? I'm also interested in thinking-out-loud with > >>others > >> >>>>about > >> >>>>Vygotskian concepts that are not easy to understand; to employ in > >>real > >> >>>>time > >> >>>>dialogue and social interaction to leap over zopeds together. Isn't > >> >>>>that > >> >>>>what a listserv is for? Or am I being too idealistic? > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>>>For many years I have wondered why the participants on this list so > >> >>>>seldom > >> >>>>talk from contextualized positions, specifically positioning the > >>self > >> >>>>in > >> >>>>relation to others and to power relations shaped by race, class, > >> >>>>gender, > >> >>>>and so on. I am myself very aware of power relations being played > >>out > >> >>>>through the discursive positioning of people in this space, which is > >> >>>>why > >> >>>>I > >> >>>>choose not to speak. I am wondering if any of the subscribers to > >>this > >> >>>>list > >> >>>>are interested such questions, including the one framed by Annalisa > >> >>>>above? > >> >>>>Kris Gutierrez is the only one I know of in CHAT/sociocultural > >>theory > >> >>>>who > >> >>>>deals with these issues, for example in her article "Developing a > >> >>>>Sociocritical Literacy in the Third Space"(2008). But I'm sure there > >> >>>>are > >> >>>>others. > >> >>>> > >> >>>>Dana > >> >>>> > >> >>>>On 11/26/14 10:49 PM, "Carol Macdonald" > > >>wrote: > >> >>>> > >> >>>>>Hi > >> >>>>> > >> >>>>>There have been some off list postings about this phenomenon. None > >>of > >> >>>>>it > >> >>>>>complimentary. This cannot be sorted out in one move. > >> >>>>> > >> >>>>>I propose that we move onto a different thread - topic. > >> >>>>> > >> >>>>>Mike, would you like to start us off on something new? > >> >>>>> > >> >>>>>Carol > >> >>>>> > >> >>>>>On 27 November 2014 at 02:49, Martin John Packer > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>wrote: > >> >>>>> > >> >>>>>> Andy, if you're going to retire, then retire. But don't aim one > >>or > >> >>>>>>two > >> >>>>>> more underhand blows behind the feint of retiring. > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> Martin > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> On Nov 26, 2014, at 7:24 PM, Andy Blunden > > >> wrote: > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> > Well this bloke will retire again at this point. I thought for > >>a > >> >>>>>>brief > >> >>>>>> moment there, I thought we had a breakthrough. Certainly, Huw's > >> >>>>>>"real > >> >>>>>> illusion" is perfectly apt to my mind (it's an expression Marx > >> >>>>>>uses), > >> >>>>>>or > >> >>>>>> in Eric Fromm's words, an illusion with "survival value." Martin > >> >>>>>>says > >> >>>>>> "Consciousness is an objective process that *sometimes* can *give > >> >>>>>>rise > >> >>>>>>to* > >> >>>>>> illusions." As Vygotsky says "For him psychology is partly > >> >>>>>>phenomenology." > >> >>>>>> > Andy > >> >>>>>> > > >> > >>>>>>>>------------------------------------------------------------------- > >>>>>>>>-- > >> >>>>>>- > >> >>>>>>- > >> >>>>>>- > >> >>>>>> > *Andy Blunden* > >> >>>>>> > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> >>>>>> > > >> >>>>>> > > >> >>>>>> > Bruce Robinson wrote: > >> >>>>>> >> Henry, > >> >>>>>> >> > >> >>>>>> >> Your wife's question leads to another: who speaks for the > >>silent > >> >>>>>> majority, many of whom, like me, must be getting fed up with what > >> >>>>>>David > >> >>>>>>K > >> >>>>>> calls a "rather blokish struggle for power over particular > >>words'? > >> >>>>>>[Not > >> >>>>>> Richard Nixon :)] > >> >>>>>> >> > >> >>>>>> >> Bruce R > >> >>>>>> >> > >> >>>>>> >> PS: You may also note that I have not changed the subject > >>heading > >> >>>>>>of > >> >>>>>> this message so that it bears no relation to the content. > >>Something > >> >>>>>>else I > >> >>>>>> find irritating... > >> >>>>>> >> > >> >>>>>> >> On 26/11/2014 17:16, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >> >>>>>> >>> Sister Analisa, > >> >>>>>> >>> Thank you for responding! I was just talking to my wife > >>(getting > >> >>>>>> personal!) about the chat. She asked me, "How does anyone get to > >> >>>>>> participate in the (XMCA) chat if only a few people take part?" I > >> >>>>>>wondered > >> >>>>>> in my email below if too much was expected of written > >>communication > >> >>>>>>in > >> >>>>>>the > >> >>>>>> XMCA chat. With 800 people potentially taking turns, well...what > >>is > >> >>>>>>even > >> >>>>>> possible logistically? Mike Cole has talked about this, and, I > >> >>>>>>think, > >> >>>>>>has > >> >>>>>> some suggestions on how to deal with the bottlenecking. But even > >> >>>>>>small > >> >>>>>> scale communication can be daunting. I watched, with my wife, a > >> >>>>>>Richard > >> >>>>>> Linklater movie last night, "Before Midnight". Two people, face > >>to > >> >>>>>>face, in > >> >>>>>> a totally committed relationship, smart people, good people, > >>trying > >> >>>>>>so > >> >>>>>>hard > >> >>>>>> to get it right. Always a work in progress. But it's worth it. > >>The > >> >>>>>> alternative is despair. I am sure of this: This chat, which > >>seems to > >> >>>>>>get > >> >>>>>> bogged down in abstractions, pure thinking in the mud, is really > >> >>>>>> consequential beyond the sensitivities of academics. I said we > >> >>>>>> >> va > >> >>>>>> >>> lue Vygotsky's "heroism", but that's too macho. I should > >>have > >> >>>>>>said > >> >>>>>> courage. > >> >>>>>> >>> > >> >>>>>> >>> The Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis is a powerful idea, > >>often > >> >>>>>>called > >> >>>>>> the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis. Google it. Really. See what you > >>think. > >> >>>>>>One > >> >>>>>> gauge of the power of an idea is if it has found its way into > >> >>>>>>popular > >> >>>>>> discourse. I just this morning heard an NPR radio program (thanks > >> >>>>>>again > >> >>>>>>to > >> >>>>>> my wife, who was listening when she heard something she thought I > >> >>>>>>would > >> >>>>>>be > >> >>>>>> interested in) that dealt with the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis in its > >> >>>>>>strong > >> >>>>>>and > >> >>>>>> weak form. > >> >>>>>> >>> > >> >>>>>> >>> Henry > >> >>>>>> >>> > >> >>>>>> >>>> On Nov 25, 2014, at 10:11 PM, Annalisa Aguilar > >> >>>>>>> > >> >>>>>> wrote: > >> >>>>>> >>>> > >> >>>>>> >>>> Dear Henry, > >> >>>>>> >>>> > >> >>>>>> >>>> Thank you for your reply. > >> >>>>>> >>>> > >> >>>>>> >>>> I don't think being personal (or even personable) requires > >> >>>>>>being > >> >>>>>> heated. Does this have to do with my comment of warmth as a sign > >>of > >> >>>>>>welcome? > >> >>>>>> >>>> > >> >>>>>> >>>> To speak about culture non-personally is not something I am > >> >>>>>>adept > >> >>>>>>at > >> >>>>>> doing. We are always speaking from where we stand, the culture > >>that > >> >>>>>>we > >> >>>>>>are > >> >>>>>> in or from, what-have-you. > >> >>>>>> >>>> > >> >>>>>> >>>> Respectfully, I do not know what "linguistic relativity > >> >>>>>>hypothesis" > >> >>>>>> is. So please be patient with me while I connect this academic > >>idea > >> >>>>>>you > >> >>>>>> have offered to this conversation so that I can relate that to my > >> >>>>>>personal > >> >>>>>> experience speaking on this thread, though clearly I'm not > >>speaking > >> >>>>>> literally right now, but it is speech from me, not a sock puppet > >> >>>>>>with > >> >>>>>>my > >> >>>>>> voice thrown from the position of objective reality. > >> >>>>>> >>>> > >> >>>>>> >>>> You are talking about speaking two languages. But it seems > >>we > >> >>>>>>are > >> >>>>>>all > >> >>>>>> speaking English on this list. So I'm a bit lost right there what > >> >>>>>>you > >> >>>>>>are > >> >>>>>> trying to say to me. > >> >>>>>> >>>> > >> >>>>>> >>>> Then, you speak of metalinguistics and how it represents > >> >>>>>>different > >> >>>>>> worldviews, if you don't mind me swapping your use of > >>"perspective" > >> >>>>>>for > >> >>>>>> worldview. There is a lot of time clearing muckups to get it > >>right. > >> >>>>>>I'm > >> >>>>>>not > >> >>>>>> sure that it ever gets right though, which troubles me. I have > >>found > >> >>>>>>that > >> >>>>>> many people who have different worldviews communicate by "talking > >> >>>>>>to," > >> >>>>>> rather than "talking at." I feel, for example, you and I are > >>talking > >> >>>>>>to > >> >>>>>>one > >> >>>>>> another, despite our likely different POVs. > >> >>>>>> >>>> > >> >>>>>> >>>> I don't know what the "perish and dapple of Andy" means when > >> >>>>>>you > >> >>>>>>say > >> >>>>>> that. From what I can tell he's trying to define something for > >> >>>>>>himself > >> >>>>>> asking for the help of others. That's fine and I'm learning that > >> >>>>>> definitions are very bas-relief for him. I think my interests > >>are a > >> >>>>>>little > >> >>>>>> different. So I'd prefer to orient to my interests, if that is > >>OK. > >> >>>>>> >>>> > >> >>>>>> >>>> Speaking of metalinguistics, rather than debate over > >> >>>>>>definitions, > >> >>>>>>I'm > >> >>>>>> more interested in speaking to the very different people who are > >>on > >> >>>>>>this > >> >>>>>> list. The rumor is there are 800 folks out there. Where are you? > >>:) > >> >>>>>>To > >> >>>>>> reference a highly academic quote from the Wizard of Oz: > >> >>>>>> >>>> > >> >>>>>> >>>> "Come out, come out wherever you are, and meet the young > >>lady > >> >>>>>>who > >> >>>>>> fell from the star!" > >> >>>>>> >>>> --Glinda, the Good Witch from the North (waves magic wand) > >> >>>>>> >>>> > >> >>>>>> >>>> I'm curious how others have been inspired by Vygotsky and > >> >>>>>> sociocultural theory, and even other manifestations of his ideas, > >> >>>>>>such > >> >>>>>>as > >> >>>>>> CHAT, etc and how people are using these approaches in their > >>work. > >> >>>>>>What > >> >>>>>>is > >> >>>>>> that like for you? And to be more specific, what is that like for > >> >>>>>>women > >> >>>>>>and > >> >>>>>> people of color? I'm also interested in thinking-out-loud with > >> >>>>>>others > >> >>>>>>about > >> >>>>>> Vygotskian concepts that are not easy to understand; to employ in > >> >>>>>>real > >> >>>>>>time > >> >>>>>> dialogue and social interaction to leap over zopeds together. > >>Isn't > >> >>>>>>that > >> >>>>>> what a listserv is for? Or am I being too idealistic? > >> >>>>>> >>>> > >> >>>>>> >>>> I have tried to speak in an open, easy, and immediate > >>manner, > >> >>>>>>to > >> >>>>>> allow others to engage. But I fear that engagement is never > >>going to > >> >>>>>>happen > >> >>>>>> because all that persists are conversations about definitions, or > >> >>>>>>whether > >> >>>>>> nothing can come from nothing, and voila! subsequent debates > >>ensue. > >> >>>>>>Or > >> >>>>>> someone will say, "We already discussed this 20 years ago!" Which > >> >>>>>>means > >> >>>>>>I > >> >>>>>> missed the party, I suppose. Unfortunately, if I disagree with a > >> >>>>>>position > >> >>>>>> because I interpret differently, then I'm told to go read > >>something > >> >>>>>>without > >> >>>>>> really a clear explanation why I'm supposed to go read something. > >> >>>>>> >>>> > >> >>>>>> >>>> I don't really agree with the approach of "read this," as an > >> >>>>>>academic > >> >>>>>> argument. Anyone is free to use it, and I have myself, but > >>because I > >> >>>>>>know > >> >>>>>> how obtuse that can be, I couch it with my reasons why I think it > >> >>>>>>would > >> >>>>>>be > >> >>>>>> a good read for that person, and what I think there is learn from > >> >>>>>>reading. > >> >>>>>> I think the "read this" approach, when it is offered with the > >>tone > >> >>>>>>of > >> >>>>>>"now > >> >>>>>> go eat your vegetables!" fails in the making of speech between > >> >>>>>>people. > >> >>>>>>All > >> >>>>>> it does is shut things down. > >> >>>>>> >>>> > >> >>>>>> >>>> If the reading truly is relevant, it seems far more > >>productive > >> >>>>>>in > >> >>>>>>the > >> >>>>>> moment of speech to cue a person what to look for, to supply a > >> >>>>>>context, > >> >>>>>> especially when referencing an entire book, for example, or the > >>link > >> >>>>>>to > >> >>>>>>an > >> >>>>>> entire website full of texts. > >> >>>>>> >>>> > >> >>>>>> >>>> Your assessment in the physicality of language is something > >> >>>>>>with > >> >>>>>> which I am completely in agreement. Especially since we all seem > >>to > >> >>>>>>agree > >> >>>>>> with the material aspects of language. So the question at hand > >>is a > >> >>>>>>matter > >> >>>>>> of form. Form has an aesthetic but also has a purpose. Are we > >> >>>>>>throwing > >> >>>>>> ropes or throwing boulders? If throwing boulders, where does that > >> >>>>>>need > >> >>>>>>to > >> >>>>>> throw boulders come from? If throwing ropes, then at least > >> >>>>>>connections > >> >>>>>>are > >> >>>>>> being made for those who might not be very clear about ideas and > >>who > >> >>>>>>may > >> >>>>>> require a helping hand. > >> >>>>>> >>>> > >> >>>>>> >>>> Then there's the old, but handy, elliptical comment, > >>something > >> >>>>>>like a > >> >>>>>> boomerang... meant to be subtle or ironic at the expense of > >>someone > >> >>>>>>who > >> >>>>>>may > >> >>>>>> not understand. > >> >>>>>> >>>> > >> >>>>>> >>>> At this point, I'd to emphasize that being ignorant is not > >> >>>>>>being > >> >>>>>> stupid, but it seems someone who is ignorant is frequently > >>treated > >> >>>>>>as > >> >>>>>> stupid (um, on this list). This "phenomenon" has made me reflect > >> >>>>>>upon > >> >>>>>>how > >> >>>>>> little time is spent upon the nature of ignorance in education > >>and > >> >>>>>>the > >> >>>>>> dynamics of ignorance in speaking. Every one of us is ignorant > >>about > >> >>>>>>most > >> >>>>>> things in the world. And yet being ignorant is seen as an > >> >>>>>>embarrassment, a > >> >>>>>> deficiency, a lapse in character. I vehemently disagree with this > >> >>>>>>reception > >> >>>>>> to ignorance. Even Einstein said something like, "The more I > >>know, > >> >>>>>>the > >> >>>>>>more > >> >>>>>> I see how much I don't know." Such an aggressive position toward > >> >>>>>>ignorance > >> >>>>>> is nothing but hurtful, even arrogant. Arrogance is a blister, a > >> >>>>>>defense > >> >>>>>> mechanism from previous hurt. A person who is honest about one's > >>own > >> >>>>>> ignorance is a very strong person and is showing a willingness to > >> >>>>>>learn > >> >>>>>> something. I think all teachers will agree that a person who > >>knows > >> >>>>>>one > >> >>>>>> doesn't know is an easier student to teach tha > >> >>>>>> >> n > >> >>>>>> >>> one who doesn't know one doesn't know. > >> >>>>>> >>>> Iconicity is something I can hang my hat on. I see it is > >> >>>>>>related > >> >>>>>>to > >> >>>>>> pointing. What I like about pointing is that it is a gesture, > >>which > >> >>>>>>implies > >> >>>>>> movement, in the way the word is also movement. I hope I have > >>made > >> >>>>>> sufficient personal connections to your concepts without the > >>heat. > >> >>>>>>Thank > >> >>>>>> you for offering them to me. > >> >>>>>> >>>> > >> >>>>>> >>>> Kind regards, > >> >>>>>> >>>> > >> >>>>>> >>>> Annalisa > >> >>>>>> >>>> > >> >>>>>> >>> > >> >>>>>> >> > >> >>>>>> >> > >> >>>>>> >> > >> >>>>>> >> > >> >>>>>> > > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>> > >> >>>>> > >> >>>>>-- > >> >>>>>Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > >> >>>>>Developmental psycholinguist > >> >>>>>Academic, Researcher, and Editor > >> >>>>>Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >> > >> >> > >> > > >> > >> > >> > > > > > >-- > >It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > >object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon Dec 1 21:39:15 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 1 Dec 2014 21:39:15 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? In-Reply-To: <1417490593837.73384@unm.edu> References: <1417397991972.17078@unm.edu> <1417490593837.73384@unm.edu> Message-ID: The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And, co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive artifacts right about that time at UCSD. If it were possible to find a source that makes these connections visible and available to read about it might be a step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of intro for newcomers to the discussion. I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a newcomer's introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is seeking to sort out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am insuficiently read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted! A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many rocks, so little time"! Mike A On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Martin! > > Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental representation" is > coming closer! > > For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's theory of > affordances. > > This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed article. But I > wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is important > not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. > > I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a grenade > pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the list. If you > can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look forward to your > reply, Martin. > > Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that being at UCSD > and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that influences your > position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find community in > it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more voluntary phrased > that way). > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Martin John > Packer > > Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > An interesting article, David. One way in which it is interesting, to me > at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used, even > once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images in the > world around us - material representations - and he tries to define the > "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. > > Martin > > On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg > wrote: > > > Larry, Annalisa: > > > > People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" when we > > met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of anything > > except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe available > > for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember > > whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the > > beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a > > non-image based mental representation. > > > > As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations are > > images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. In > > fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against Titchener > > and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, > > everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated that > > many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically anterior > > to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would not have > > time or ability to process complex problems in real time. > > > > I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are > > genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more reading > > to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than I am > > (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels like > > she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do NOT read > > this article--instead, look at Figure 11. > > > > http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ > > > > The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure of > > Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any actual > > images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural experience > > associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then deliberately > > frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any > > recognizable figures upon which to focus. > > > > However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine Chapel fresco > > for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He or she > > can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting and > > wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not notice > > the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in it. > > > > David Kellogg > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar > wrote: > >> > >> Hi Larry and David, > >> > >> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! > >> > >> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are at the > root of all thinking. > >> > >> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, based upon > previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in > combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a phrase I like > a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it by the > same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it. > >> > >> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as Hackett > describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have you already > given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be willing to > take a look. > >> > >> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is controversial. > It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone says "this > is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble observation. > >> > >> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever that > process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at hand? Just a > thought. > >> > >> What is it that appeals to you about this model, metaphoricity? > >> > >> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) > >> > >> Kind regards, > >> > >> Annalisa > >> > >> > >> ________________________________________ > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Larry Purss < > lpscholar2@gmail.com > > >> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? > >> > >> David K > >> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. My reason > for > >> exploring these authors is I have been following a path pursuing a basic > >> question. > >> > >> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? > >> > >> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic guiding > images > >> upon which thinking rests" > >> > >> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring appearances and > >> illusions was also exploring this theme. > >> > >> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new phenomenological path > >> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names this > process > >> *metaphoricity*. > >> > >> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible image-character of > the > >> *spontaneous event* of meaning. > >> > >> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he brackets - > >> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. > >> > >> AND > >> > >> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* finds the > >> meaning of its very self. > >> > >> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this > >> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of metaphor > can > >> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated in > >> *objectivity* > >> > >> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. > >> > >> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of itself *in* > the > >> mode [path] of the concept > >> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding images has > been > >> established. > >> > >> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the path of > >> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived from the > >> image-character of the guiding image. > >> > >> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial this topic > may > >> become [again] > >> > >> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this basic > >> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these images as > >> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images emerge > >> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. > >> > >> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is transcendental] and > is > >> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. It seems to > >> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. > >> > >> I also realize this question may already be answered in Vygotsky's > writings > >> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of XMCA. I > >> personally am following this path for now. > >> > >> Larry > >> > > > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Dec 1 21:53:09 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2014 05:53:09 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? In-Reply-To: References: <1417397991972.17078@unm.edu> <1417490593837.73384@unm.edu>, Message-ID: <1417499588620.61068@unm.edu> Hi Mike, It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied that wish! Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important connections. I was not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I learned about Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science (1985). Is there some history that is not part of the common story? I looked here for clarity: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to cognitive artifacts? There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in play, and even joy! When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however until then I will remain with the ineffable. Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of mike cole Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And, co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive artifacts right about that time at UCSD. If it were possible to find a source that makes these connections visible and available to read about it might be a step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of intro for newcomers to the discussion. I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a newcomer's introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is seeking to sort out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am insuficiently read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted! A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many rocks, so little time"! Mike A On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Martin! > > Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental representation" is > coming closer! > > For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's theory of > affordances. > > This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed article. But I > wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is important > not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. > > I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a grenade > pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the list. If you > can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look forward to your > reply, Martin. > > Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that being at UCSD > and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that influences your > position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find community in > it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more voluntary phrased > that way). > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Martin John > Packer > > Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > An interesting article, David. One way in which it is interesting, to me > at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used, even > once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images in the > world around us - material representations - and he tries to define the > "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. > > Martin > > On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg > wrote: > > > Larry, Annalisa: > > > > People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" when we > > met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of anything > > except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe available > > for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember > > whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the > > beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a > > non-image based mental representation. > > > > As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations are > > images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. In > > fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against Titchener > > and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, > > everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated that > > many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically anterior > > to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would not have > > time or ability to process complex problems in real time. > > > > I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are > > genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more reading > > to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than I am > > (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels like > > she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do NOT read > > this article--instead, look at Figure 11. > > > > http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ > > > > The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure of > > Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any actual > > images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural experience > > associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then deliberately > > frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any > > recognizable figures upon which to focus. > > > > However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine Chapel fresco > > for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He or she > > can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting and > > wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not notice > > the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in it. > > > > David Kellogg > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar > wrote: > >> > >> Hi Larry and David, > >> > >> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! > >> > >> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are at the > root of all thinking. > >> > >> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, based upon > previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in > combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a phrase I like > a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it by the > same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it. > >> > >> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as Hackett > describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have you already > given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be willing to > take a look. > >> > >> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is controversial. > It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone says "this > is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble observation. > >> > >> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever that > process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at hand? Just a > thought. > >> > >> What is it that appeals to you about this model, metaphoricity? > >> > >> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) > >> > >> Kind regards, > >> > >> Annalisa > >> > >> > >> ________________________________________ > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Larry Purss < > lpscholar2@gmail.com > > >> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? > >> > >> David K > >> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. My reason > for > >> exploring these authors is I have been following a path pursuing a basic > >> question. > >> > >> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? > >> > >> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic guiding > images > >> upon which thinking rests" > >> > >> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring appearances and > >> illusions was also exploring this theme. > >> > >> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new phenomenological path > >> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names this > process > >> *metaphoricity*. > >> > >> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible image-character of > the > >> *spontaneous event* of meaning. > >> > >> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he brackets - > >> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. > >> > >> AND > >> > >> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* finds the > >> meaning of its very self. > >> > >> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this > >> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of metaphor > can > >> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated in > >> *objectivity* > >> > >> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. > >> > >> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of itself *in* > the > >> mode [path] of the concept > >> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding images has > been > >> established. > >> > >> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the path of > >> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived from the > >> image-character of the guiding image. > >> > >> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial this topic > may > >> become [again] > >> > >> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this basic > >> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these images as > >> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images emerge > >> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. > >> > >> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is transcendental] and > is > >> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. It seems to > >> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. > >> > >> I also realize this question may already be answered in Vygotsky's > writings > >> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of XMCA. I > >> personally am following this path for now. > >> > >> Larry > >> > > > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From lpscholar2@gmail.com Mon Dec 1 22:24:02 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Mon, 1 Dec 2014 22:24:02 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: "The political" and "power" in learning In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Miguel your phrase: {*the threads* ARE LIKE *roundtables* or *spaces* within a larger venue} Is an example of meta-phor which captures [grasps] a particular notion of *thinking* as developing within conference. I will go no further down this *path* [or way] as the theme of this *thread* is questioning the relation of the political and power in learning. Your particular *journey* as expressed in your article. I will now *turn* my attention to your article and focus on the section "decolonizing Pedagogies: Standpoint and Tenets". The power of your writing shines through the images which you invoke with metaphor as *signposts* to help me enter your understanding. Your *under*standing *in*formed and growing *out* of collective experience you name Chicano stand*point*. The place from which you stand and point as a single gesture. This place IS a *vision* by and for Chicanos. This stand*point* or *vision* is emergent as it comes into being within my *community* of Chicanos who are always reinventing the vision of what it *means* to *be* Chicano. Miguel you then persuasively share your *believe* [your vision] which you express AS a question [a quest]: For Chicanos,Is the question of colonialism central to the curriculum and its investigation [as a quest] SHOULD emerge as an expression of Chicano communities' self-determination? The term "believe" holds an image, which is symbolic, of Chicano Community which you, Miguel are imagining and you are persuading other Chicanos to accompany you on this quest . You are acting from this imaginal *space* [standpoint] as an open space of possibility which can be populated by Chicano *selves* which emerge AS the Chicano community comes to be what is imagined and believed AS Chicano community. This phenomena of reinvention, emerging from this imaginal possibility, will be incarnated [made flesh, made physical] through *articulated* principles forming within Chicano community. Miguel, to turn again to your phrase which I indicated through repetition is to return to the phenomena of the thinking *conference* as emerging at *roundtables* or *open spaces* of possibility. I question if I am *off base* with my thinking process was carried away to talking at roundtables. If this is intruding on this thread whose focus is exploring power and the political within learning communities, I apologize. As a reader, I entered the realm of intentional and interpretive communities which are imagined places which SHOULD bring forth actual communities. Miguel your passion and compassion are necessary to bring into being [to generate] Chicano communities which form through shared experiences and shared expressions of those experiences. The relation of the *seeing AS* and the *saying* AS shared projects. The phenomenological AND cultural historical quests sharing a family resemblance, though using different symbols and metaphors. Are they gesturing or indicating a shared quest? On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 6:26 PM, Zavala, Miguel < mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu> wrote: > Thanks Dana for sorting this new thread. Mike, I'll follow up with the > articles you mention... > > I am also pressed for time so will be somewhat slow in replying. I see > the threads are like roundtables or spaces within a larger venue, a > thinking conference. > > Miguel > > On 12/1/14 6:07 PM, "mike cole" wrote: > > >I fully agree, Dana. Several interconnected issues that Miguel is raising > >are of central concern to xmca. > > > >Miguel-- > > > >I think that the notion of decolonializing pedagogy relates in pretty > >direct way with Maisha Winn's ideas of African Diaspora Participatory > >Literacy. She writes about that in the next issue of MCA. I also like the > >idea of autobiographical accounts of one's own positionality with respect > >to the events that have shaped your scholarship. There is an interesting > >article by a group of South African pedagogs that illustrates again, what > >seems like, a similar idea of locating one's academic work within the > >context of one's political engagements. And then we are gifted with Paul's > >article in a journal devoted to the centrality of class in a journal > >entitled *African and Black Diaspora. * > > > >Synchronic a-causality or Zeitgeist? > >mike > > > > > > > >On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 5:45 PM, Walker, Dana > wrote: > > > >> Hi Miguel, > >> > >> I would be very interested in continuing this thread on "the political" > >> and "power" in learning. My participation will be slow, as I will be at > >> the LRA conference in Florida and then finals and so on, but will follow > >> with interest. I have changed thread title in anticipation of pursuing > >> this exploration. > >> > >> Does Ferguson (or Oakland, or New York, or Hong Kong, or Cairo) matter > >>in > >> considerations of 'the political' and 'power' in learning (and > >>teaching)? > >> > >> Dana > >> > >> On 11/28/14 5:07 PM, "Zavala, Miguel" > >> wrote: > >> > >> >Hi Dana, > >> > > >> >I believe there are several ways to go with an analysis of "the > >>political" > >> >or "power" in learning. First, is to search for its > >> >articulation/theorization in existing studies (whether conceptual or > >> >empirical) within the learning sciences more generally. Who has > >>attempted > >> >this work? Also, In the general absence of studies theorizing "the > >> >political" or "power" in learning (which I gather is an accurate > >>depiction > >> >of the field), one might pursue the ways in which "context" is narrowly > >> >framed in distinct frames/theories of learning. In what ways does/can > >> >CHAT enable the analysis of "the political" and "power" in learning? > >> > > >> >Now, due to time constraints, this project may take time; perhaps > >>there is > >> >a smaller group that would like to continue with this > >>thread/exploration > >> >of "the political" or "power" in learning. I place questions of > >>politics > >> >and power in quotation marks because they need to be unpacked, like > >>many > >> >concepts. > >> > > >> >I believe there is another route one can take, and that is to begin > >>with > >> >our own political biographies, how we view the world and its > >> >transformation. In a sense, we all have our biographies of coming to > >>CHAT. > >> >How is CHAT a tool in our practical work (as educators, > >> >action-researchers, community organizers, etc.)? Because processes are > >> >relational, I imagine that our own biographies, positionalities, and > >> >standpoints (which function more like collective consciousness and > >> >practices, borrowing here from the work of Sandra Harding) are not only > >> >inflected in our appropriations of CHAT but are interwoven; they shift > >> >from "external" to "internal" processes of of both research and praxis > >> >(informed by our politics). I recognize there are many points being > >>made > >> >here and "dangers", especially when one views learning as a-political > >>or > >> >mechanistic, but I take that risk. > >> > > >> >Attached is a chapter outlining my political philosophy. It was > >>published > >> >as part of a text that asked contributors to name our "pedagogic > >>creeds" > >> >(? la Dewey). > >> > > >> >-Miguel > >> > > >> > > >> >On 11/27/14 8:12 AM, "Walker, Dana" wrote: > >> > > >> >>Gracias Miguel, and Mike and Larry for responding and for moving > >>forward > >> >>this thread of thought begun by Annalisa. > >> >> > >> >>Miguel, I remember now (based on a conference presentation of yours > >>years > >> >>ago) that your pedagogical and theoretical work involving migrant > >> >>students > >> >>at UCLA addressed questions of power, subjectivity, and embodied > >>selves > >> >>in > >> >>boundary crossing processes in ways that other CHAT theorists (e.g., > >> >>Tuomi-Grohn & Engestrom, 2003; Grossen & Zittoun, 2012) do not. I > >>wonder > >> >>if this is a place where we could begin exploring the question of > >>power > >> >>in > >> >>relation to learning and development? Is there an article of yours > >>that > >> >>you might suggest on this subject? > >> >> > >> >>Dana > >> >> > >> >> > >> >>On 11/27/14 12:02 AM, "Zavala, Miguel" > >> > >> >>wrote: > >> >> > >> >>>Gracias Annalisa and Dana. > >> >>> > >> >>>Questions of power have always been central to my work and I am a new > >> >>>member of this list (and community) and don't have a broader context > >>as > >> >>>to > >> >>>why it was created and whether it is by design meant to grow in its > >>own > >> >>>way over time, etc. What I have noticed though is a tendency to > >>focus on > >> >>>conceptual clarity (of the work of Vygotsky and Cultural Historical > >> >>>Activity Theory and prior, such as Marx). So, I am learning anew in > >>this > >> >>>space, taking notes, re-reading. In many ways it reminds me of the > >>CHAT > >> >>>reading group many of us at UCLA visualized but never materialized > >> >>>formally, except that our reading and writing the world with > >>Vygotsky's > >> >>>ideas (and others) did materialize in the beautiful pedagogical work > >>we > >> >>>did with migrant students at that time... > >> >>> > >> >>>I hope the question of how we use, expand, enrich, re-envision, and > >> >>>carry > >> >>>forward the ideas of Vygotsky (and how these intersect with or > >> >>>interweave > >> >>>with power) are considered in an open and non-controlled way. By > >> >>>"non-controlled" I mean the parallel tendency in particular > >> >>>circles/communities to challenge work that grows out of particular > >>ideas > >> >>>and if those ideas do not adhere to some party-line (or experts on > >>said > >> >>>theory don't agree on it) then such work should not define itself as > >> >>>"Vygotskian", "CHAT-based", or "Socio-Cultural," etc. My own > >>motivation > >> >>>to > >> >>>chime in and contribute would increase if we followed this strand, > >>that > >> >>>looks at power and how it is integral to (not a 'factor' or > >>'external' > >> >>>context) learning? Although the reading group orientation is still > >> >>>useful. > >> >>> > >> >>>Warmly, > >> >>> > >> >>>Miguel Zavala > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >>>On 11/26/14 10:38 PM, "Walker, Dana" wrote: > >> >>> > >> >>>>Before we leave this topic, I would like to suggest that we pause to > >> >>>>consider Annalisa's question: > >> >>>> > >> >>>>I'm curious how others have been inspired by Vygotsky and > >> >>>>sociocultural theory, and even other manifestations of his ideas, > >>such > >> >>>>as > >> >>>>CHAT, etc and how people are using these approaches in their work. > >>What > >> >>>>is > >> >>>>that like for you? And to be more specific, what is that like for > >>women > >> >>>>and > >> >>>>people of color? I'm also interested in thinking-out-loud with > >>others > >> >>>>about > >> >>>>Vygotskian concepts that are not easy to understand; to employ in > >>real > >> >>>>time > >> >>>>dialogue and social interaction to leap over zopeds together. Isn't > >> >>>>that > >> >>>>what a listserv is for? Or am I being too idealistic? > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>>>For many years I have wondered why the participants on this list so > >> >>>>seldom > >> >>>>talk from contextualized positions, specifically positioning the > >>self > >> >>>>in > >> >>>>relation to others and to power relations shaped by race, class, > >> >>>>gender, > >> >>>>and so on. I am myself very aware of power relations being played > >>out > >> >>>>through the discursive positioning of people in this space, which is > >> >>>>why > >> >>>>I > >> >>>>choose not to speak. I am wondering if any of the subscribers to > >>this > >> >>>>list > >> >>>>are interested such questions, including the one framed by Annalisa > >> >>>>above? > >> >>>>Kris Gutierrez is the only one I know of in CHAT/sociocultural > >>theory > >> >>>>who > >> >>>>deals with these issues, for example in her article "Developing a > >> >>>>Sociocritical Literacy in the Third Space"(2008). But I'm sure there > >> >>>>are > >> >>>>others. > >> >>>> > >> >>>>Dana > >> >>>> > >> >>>>On 11/26/14 10:49 PM, "Carol Macdonald" > >>wrote: > >> >>>> > >> >>>>>Hi > >> >>>>> > >> >>>>>There have been some off list postings about this phenomenon. None > >>of > >> >>>>>it > >> >>>>>complimentary. This cannot be sorted out in one move. > >> >>>>> > >> >>>>>I propose that we move onto a different thread - topic. > >> >>>>> > >> >>>>>Mike, would you like to start us off on something new? > >> >>>>> > >> >>>>>Carol > >> >>>>> > >> >>>>>On 27 November 2014 at 02:49, Martin John Packer > >> >>>>> > >> >>>>>wrote: > >> >>>>> > >> >>>>>> Andy, if you're going to retire, then retire. But don't aim one > >>or > >> >>>>>>two > >> >>>>>> more underhand blows behind the feint of retiring. > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> Martin > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> On Nov 26, 2014, at 7:24 PM, Andy Blunden > >> wrote: > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> > Well this bloke will retire again at this point. I thought for > >>a > >> >>>>>>brief > >> >>>>>> moment there, I thought we had a breakthrough. Certainly, Huw's > >> >>>>>>"real > >> >>>>>> illusion" is perfectly apt to my mind (it's an expression Marx > >> >>>>>>uses), > >> >>>>>>or > >> >>>>>> in Eric Fromm's words, an illusion with "survival value." Martin > >> >>>>>>says > >> >>>>>> "Consciousness is an objective process that *sometimes* can *give > >> >>>>>>rise > >> >>>>>>to* > >> >>>>>> illusions." As Vygotsky says "For him psychology is partly > >> >>>>>>phenomenology." > >> >>>>>> > Andy > >> >>>>>> > > >> > >>>>>>>>------------------------------------------------------------------- > >>>>>>>>-- > >> >>>>>>- > >> >>>>>>- > >> >>>>>>- > >> >>>>>> > *Andy Blunden* > >> >>>>>> > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> >>>>>> > > >> >>>>>> > > >> >>>>>> > Bruce Robinson wrote: > >> >>>>>> >> Henry, > >> >>>>>> >> > >> >>>>>> >> Your wife's question leads to another: who speaks for the > >>silent > >> >>>>>> majority, many of whom, like me, must be getting fed up with what > >> >>>>>>David > >> >>>>>>K > >> >>>>>> calls a "rather blokish struggle for power over particular > >>words'? > >> >>>>>>[Not > >> >>>>>> Richard Nixon :)] > >> >>>>>> >> > >> >>>>>> >> Bruce R > >> >>>>>> >> > >> >>>>>> >> PS: You may also note that I have not changed the subject > >>heading > >> >>>>>>of > >> >>>>>> this message so that it bears no relation to the content. > >>Something > >> >>>>>>else I > >> >>>>>> find irritating... > >> >>>>>> >> > >> >>>>>> >> On 26/11/2014 17:16, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >> >>>>>> >>> Sister Analisa, > >> >>>>>> >>> Thank you for responding! I was just talking to my wife > >>(getting > >> >>>>>> personal!) about the chat. She asked me, "How does anyone get to > >> >>>>>> participate in the (XMCA) chat if only a few people take part?" I > >> >>>>>>wondered > >> >>>>>> in my email below if too much was expected of written > >>communication > >> >>>>>>in > >> >>>>>>the > >> >>>>>> XMCA chat. With 800 people potentially taking turns, well...what > >>is > >> >>>>>>even > >> >>>>>> possible logistically? Mike Cole has talked about this, and, I > >> >>>>>>think, > >> >>>>>>has > >> >>>>>> some suggestions on how to deal with the bottlenecking. But even > >> >>>>>>small > >> >>>>>> scale communication can be daunting. I watched, with my wife, a > >> >>>>>>Richard > >> >>>>>> Linklater movie last night, "Before Midnight". Two people, face > >>to > >> >>>>>>face, in > >> >>>>>> a totally committed relationship, smart people, good people, > >>trying > >> >>>>>>so > >> >>>>>>hard > >> >>>>>> to get it right. Always a work in progress. But it's worth it. > >>The > >> >>>>>> alternative is despair. I am sure of this: This chat, which > >>seems to > >> >>>>>>get > >> >>>>>> bogged down in abstractions, pure thinking in the mud, is really > >> >>>>>> consequential beyond the sensitivities of academics. I said we > >> >>>>>> >> va > >> >>>>>> >>> lue Vygotsky's "heroism", but that's too macho. I should > >>have > >> >>>>>>said > >> >>>>>> courage. > >> >>>>>> >>> > >> >>>>>> >>> The Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis is a powerful idea, > >>often > >> >>>>>>called > >> >>>>>> the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis. Google it. Really. See what you > >>think. > >> >>>>>>One > >> >>>>>> gauge of the power of an idea is if it has found its way into > >> >>>>>>popular > >> >>>>>> discourse. I just this morning heard an NPR radio program (thanks > >> >>>>>>again > >> >>>>>>to > >> >>>>>> my wife, who was listening when she heard something she thought I > >> >>>>>>would > >> >>>>>>be > >> >>>>>> interested in) that dealt with the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis in its > >> >>>>>>strong > >> >>>>>>and > >> >>>>>> weak form. > >> >>>>>> >>> > >> >>>>>> >>> Henry > >> >>>>>> >>> > >> >>>>>> >>>> On Nov 25, 2014, at 10:11 PM, Annalisa Aguilar > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> wrote: > >> >>>>>> >>>> > >> >>>>>> >>>> Dear Henry, > >> >>>>>> >>>> > >> >>>>>> >>>> Thank you for your reply. > >> >>>>>> >>>> > >> >>>>>> >>>> I don't think being personal (or even personable) requires > >> >>>>>>being > >> >>>>>> heated. Does this have to do with my comment of warmth as a sign > >>of > >> >>>>>>welcome? > >> >>>>>> >>>> > >> >>>>>> >>>> To speak about culture non-personally is not something I am > >> >>>>>>adept > >> >>>>>>at > >> >>>>>> doing. We are always speaking from where we stand, the culture > >>that > >> >>>>>>we > >> >>>>>>are > >> >>>>>> in or from, what-have-you. > >> >>>>>> >>>> > >> >>>>>> >>>> Respectfully, I do not know what "linguistic relativity > >> >>>>>>hypothesis" > >> >>>>>> is. So please be patient with me while I connect this academic > >>idea > >> >>>>>>you > >> >>>>>> have offered to this conversation so that I can relate that to my > >> >>>>>>personal > >> >>>>>> experience speaking on this thread, though clearly I'm not > >>speaking > >> >>>>>> literally right now, but it is speech from me, not a sock puppet > >> >>>>>>with > >> >>>>>>my > >> >>>>>> voice thrown from the position of objective reality. > >> >>>>>> >>>> > >> >>>>>> >>>> You are talking about speaking two languages. But it seems > >>we > >> >>>>>>are > >> >>>>>>all > >> >>>>>> speaking English on this list. So I'm a bit lost right there what > >> >>>>>>you > >> >>>>>>are > >> >>>>>> trying to say to me. > >> >>>>>> >>>> > >> >>>>>> >>>> Then, you speak of metalinguistics and how it represents > >> >>>>>>different > >> >>>>>> worldviews, if you don't mind me swapping your use of > >>"perspective" > >> >>>>>>for > >> >>>>>> worldview. There is a lot of time clearing muckups to get it > >>right. > >> >>>>>>I'm > >> >>>>>>not > >> >>>>>> sure that it ever gets right though, which troubles me. I have > >>found > >> >>>>>>that > >> >>>>>> many people who have different worldviews communicate by "talking > >> >>>>>>to," > >> >>>>>> rather than "talking at." I feel, for example, you and I are > >>talking > >> >>>>>>to > >> >>>>>>one > >> >>>>>> another, despite our likely different POVs. > >> >>>>>> >>>> > >> >>>>>> >>>> I don't know what the "perish and dapple of Andy" means when > >> >>>>>>you > >> >>>>>>say > >> >>>>>> that. From what I can tell he's trying to define something for > >> >>>>>>himself > >> >>>>>> asking for the help of others. That's fine and I'm learning that > >> >>>>>> definitions are very bas-relief for him. I think my interests > >>are a > >> >>>>>>little > >> >>>>>> different. So I'd prefer to orient to my interests, if that is > >>OK. > >> >>>>>> >>>> > >> >>>>>> >>>> Speaking of metalinguistics, rather than debate over > >> >>>>>>definitions, > >> >>>>>>I'm > >> >>>>>> more interested in speaking to the very different people who are > >>on > >> >>>>>>this > >> >>>>>> list. The rumor is there are 800 folks out there. Where are you? > >>:) > >> >>>>>>To > >> >>>>>> reference a highly academic quote from the Wizard of Oz: > >> >>>>>> >>>> > >> >>>>>> >>>> "Come out, come out wherever you are, and meet the young > >>lady > >> >>>>>>who > >> >>>>>> fell from the star!" > >> >>>>>> >>>> --Glinda, the Good Witch from the North (waves magic wand) > >> >>>>>> >>>> > >> >>>>>> >>>> I'm curious how others have been inspired by Vygotsky and > >> >>>>>> sociocultural theory, and even other manifestations of his ideas, > >> >>>>>>such > >> >>>>>>as > >> >>>>>> CHAT, etc and how people are using these approaches in their > >>work. > >> >>>>>>What > >> >>>>>>is > >> >>>>>> that like for you? And to be more specific, what is that like for > >> >>>>>>women > >> >>>>>>and > >> >>>>>> people of color? I'm also interested in thinking-out-loud with > >> >>>>>>others > >> >>>>>>about > >> >>>>>> Vygotskian concepts that are not easy to understand; to employ in > >> >>>>>>real > >> >>>>>>time > >> >>>>>> dialogue and social interaction to leap over zopeds together. > >>Isn't > >> >>>>>>that > >> >>>>>> what a listserv is for? Or am I being too idealistic? > >> >>>>>> >>>> > >> >>>>>> >>>> I have tried to speak in an open, easy, and immediate > >>manner, > >> >>>>>>to > >> >>>>>> allow others to engage. But I fear that engagement is never > >>going to > >> >>>>>>happen > >> >>>>>> because all that persists are conversations about definitions, or > >> >>>>>>whether > >> >>>>>> nothing can come from nothing, and voila! subsequent debates > >>ensue. > >> >>>>>>Or > >> >>>>>> someone will say, "We already discussed this 20 years ago!" Which > >> >>>>>>means > >> >>>>>>I > >> >>>>>> missed the party, I suppose. Unfortunately, if I disagree with a > >> >>>>>>position > >> >>>>>> because I interpret differently, then I'm told to go read > >>something > >> >>>>>>without > >> >>>>>> really a clear explanation why I'm supposed to go read something. > >> >>>>>> >>>> > >> >>>>>> >>>> I don't really agree with the approach of "read this," as an > >> >>>>>>academic > >> >>>>>> argument. Anyone is free to use it, and I have myself, but > >>because I > >> >>>>>>know > >> >>>>>> how obtuse that can be, I couch it with my reasons why I think it > >> >>>>>>would > >> >>>>>>be > >> >>>>>> a good read for that person, and what I think there is learn from > >> >>>>>>reading. > >> >>>>>> I think the "read this" approach, when it is offered with the > >>tone > >> >>>>>>of > >> >>>>>>"now > >> >>>>>> go eat your vegetables!" fails in the making of speech between > >> >>>>>>people. > >> >>>>>>All > >> >>>>>> it does is shut things down. > >> >>>>>> >>>> > >> >>>>>> >>>> If the reading truly is relevant, it seems far more > >>productive > >> >>>>>>in > >> >>>>>>the > >> >>>>>> moment of speech to cue a person what to look for, to supply a > >> >>>>>>context, > >> >>>>>> especially when referencing an entire book, for example, or the > >>link > >> >>>>>>to > >> >>>>>>an > >> >>>>>> entire website full of texts. > >> >>>>>> >>>> > >> >>>>>> >>>> Your assessment in the physicality of language is something > >> >>>>>>with > >> >>>>>> which I am completely in agreement. Especially since we all seem > >>to > >> >>>>>>agree > >> >>>>>> with the material aspects of language. So the question at hand > >>is a > >> >>>>>>matter > >> >>>>>> of form. Form has an aesthetic but also has a purpose. Are we > >> >>>>>>throwing > >> >>>>>> ropes or throwing boulders? If throwing boulders, where does that > >> >>>>>>need > >> >>>>>>to > >> >>>>>> throw boulders come from? If throwing ropes, then at least > >> >>>>>>connections > >> >>>>>>are > >> >>>>>> being made for those who might not be very clear about ideas and > >>who > >> >>>>>>may > >> >>>>>> require a helping hand. > >> >>>>>> >>>> > >> >>>>>> >>>> Then there's the old, but handy, elliptical comment, > >>something > >> >>>>>>like a > >> >>>>>> boomerang... meant to be subtle or ironic at the expense of > >>someone > >> >>>>>>who > >> >>>>>>may > >> >>>>>> not understand. > >> >>>>>> >>>> > >> >>>>>> >>>> At this point, I'd to emphasize that being ignorant is not > >> >>>>>>being > >> >>>>>> stupid, but it seems someone who is ignorant is frequently > >>treated > >> >>>>>>as > >> >>>>>> stupid (um, on this list). This "phenomenon" has made me reflect > >> >>>>>>upon > >> >>>>>>how > >> >>>>>> little time is spent upon the nature of ignorance in education > >>and > >> >>>>>>the > >> >>>>>> dynamics of ignorance in speaking. Every one of us is ignorant > >>about > >> >>>>>>most > >> >>>>>> things in the world. And yet being ignorant is seen as an > >> >>>>>>embarrassment, a > >> >>>>>> deficiency, a lapse in character. I vehemently disagree with this > >> >>>>>>reception > >> >>>>>> to ignorance. Even Einstein said something like, "The more I > >>know, > >> >>>>>>the > >> >>>>>>more > >> >>>>>> I see how much I don't know." Such an aggressive position toward > >> >>>>>>ignorance > >> >>>>>> is nothing but hurtful, even arrogant. Arrogance is a blister, a > >> >>>>>>defense > >> >>>>>> mechanism from previous hurt. A person who is honest about one's > >>own > >> >>>>>> ignorance is a very strong person and is showing a willingness to > >> >>>>>>learn > >> >>>>>> something. I think all teachers will agree that a person who > >>knows > >> >>>>>>one > >> >>>>>> doesn't know is an easier student to teach tha > >> >>>>>> >> n > >> >>>>>> >>> one who doesn't know one doesn't know. > >> >>>>>> >>>> Iconicity is something I can hang my hat on. I see it is > >> >>>>>>related > >> >>>>>>to > >> >>>>>> pointing. What I like about pointing is that it is a gesture, > >>which > >> >>>>>>implies > >> >>>>>> movement, in the way the word is also movement. I hope I have > >>made > >> >>>>>> sufficient personal connections to your concepts without the > >>heat. > >> >>>>>>Thank > >> >>>>>> you for offering them to me. > >> >>>>>> >>>> > >> >>>>>> >>>> Kind regards, > >> >>>>>> >>>> > >> >>>>>> >>>> Annalisa > >> >>>>>> >>>> > >> >>>>>> >>> > >> >>>>>> >> > >> >>>>>> >> > >> >>>>>> >> > >> >>>>>> >> > >> >>>>>> > > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>>> > >> >>>>> > >> >>>>> > >> >>>>>-- > >> >>>>>Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > >> >>>>>Developmental psycholinguist > >> >>>>>Academic, Researcher, and Editor > >> >>>>>Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > >> >>>> > >> >>>> > >> >>> > >> >>> > >> >> > >> >> > >> > > >> > >> > >> > > > > > >-- > >It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > >object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > From Peg.Griffin@att.net Tue Dec 2 06:38:28 2014 From: Peg.Griffin@att.net (Peg Griffin) Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2014 09:38:28 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: "The political" and "power" in learning In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <002501d00e3d$a4213ce0$ec63b6a0$@att.net> Thanks, Helena. http://sync.democraticunderground.com/user_avatars/147749.jpg -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Helena Worthen Sent: Monday, December 01, 2014 11:20 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: "The political" and "power" in learning Dana -- Thanks for linking Hong Kong (students) Ferguson and Oakland (following the murder of Oscar Grant, I assume; young Black men). And let's include the 43 disappeared students at the teacher training school in Iguala, Mexico. Those students were enrolled at one of the rural teacher training schools that date back into the Mexican revolution and take on politics and power directly. This is the best reporting of the 43 Disappeareds that I've seen in the US. It's very close to what La Jornada was publishing in early November. http://www.vice.com/video/the-missing-43-mexicos-disappeared-students-full-l ength-678 Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com On Dec 1, 2014, at 5:45 PM, Walker, Dana wrote: > Hi Miguel, > > I would be very interested in continuing this thread on "the political" > and "power" in learning. My participation will be slow, as I will be > at the LRA conference in Florida and then finals and so on, but will > follow with interest. I have changed thread title in anticipation of > pursuing this exploration. > > Does Ferguson (or Oakland, or New York, or Hong Kong, or Cairo) matter > in considerations of 'the political' and 'power' in learning (and teaching)? > > Dana > > On 11/28/14 5:07 PM, "Zavala, Miguel" > < mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu> > wrote: > >> Hi Dana, >> >> I believe there are several ways to go with an analysis of "the political" >> or "power" in learning. First, is to search for its >> articulation/theorization in existing studies (whether conceptual or >> empirical) within the learning sciences more generally. Who has >> attempted this work? Also, In the general absence of studies >> theorizing "the political" or "power" in learning (which I gather is >> an accurate depiction of the field), one might pursue the ways in >> which "context" is narrowly framed in distinct frames/theories of >> learning. In what ways does/can CHAT enable the analysis of "the political" and "power" in learning? >> >> Now, due to time constraints, this project may take time; perhaps >> there is a smaller group that would like to continue with this >> thread/exploration of "the political" or "power" in learning. I place >> questions of politics and power in quotation marks because they need >> to be unpacked, like many concepts. >> >> I believe there is another route one can take, and that is to begin >> with our own political biographies, how we view the world and its >> transformation. In a sense, we all have our biographies of coming to CHAT. >> How is CHAT a tool in our practical work (as educators, >> action-researchers, community organizers, etc.)? Because processes >> are relational, I imagine that our own biographies, positionalities, >> and standpoints (which function more like collective consciousness >> and practices, borrowing here from the work of Sandra Harding) are >> not only inflected in our appropriations of CHAT but are interwoven; >> they shift from "external" to "internal" processes of of both >> research and praxis (informed by our politics). I recognize there >> are many points being made here and "dangers", especially when one >> views learning as a-political or mechanistic, but I take that risk. >> >> Attached is a chapter outlining my political philosophy. It was >> published as part of a text that asked contributors to name our "pedagogic creeds" >> (? la Dewey). >> >> -Miguel >> >> >> On 11/27/14 8:12 AM, "Walker, Dana" < Dana.Walker@unco.edu> wrote: >> >>> Gracias Miguel, and Mike and Larry for responding and for moving >>> forward this thread of thought begun by Annalisa. >>> >>> Miguel, I remember now (based on a conference presentation of yours >>> years >>> ago) that your pedagogical and theoretical work involving migrant >>> students at UCLA addressed questions of power, subjectivity, and >>> embodied selves in boundary crossing processes in ways that other >>> CHAT theorists (e.g., Tuomi-Grohn & Engestrom, 2003; Grossen & >>> Zittoun, 2012) do not. I wonder if this is a place where we could >>> begin exploring the question of power in relation to learning and >>> development? Is there an article of yours that you might suggest on >>> this subject? >>> >>> Dana >>> >>> >>> On 11/27/14 12:02 AM, "Zavala, Miguel" >>> < mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Gracias Annalisa and Dana. >>>> >>>> Questions of power have always been central to my work and I am a >>>> new member of this list (and community) and don't have a broader >>>> context as to why it was created and whether it is by design meant >>>> to grow in its own way over time, etc. What I have noticed though >>>> is a tendency to focus on conceptual clarity (of the work of >>>> Vygotsky and Cultural Historical Activity Theory and prior, such as >>>> Marx). So, I am learning anew in this space, taking notes, >>>> re-reading. In many ways it reminds me of the CHAT reading group >>>> many of us at UCLA visualized but never materialized formally, >>>> except that our reading and writing the world with Vygotsky's ideas >>>> (and others) did materialize in the beautiful pedagogical work we >>>> did with migrant students at that time... >>>> >>>> I hope the question of how we use, expand, enrich, re-envision, and >>>> carry forward the ideas of Vygotsky (and how these intersect with >>>> or interweave with power) are considered in an open and >>>> non-controlled way. By "non-controlled" I mean the parallel >>>> tendency in particular circles/communities to challenge work that >>>> grows out of particular ideas and if those ideas do not adhere to >>>> some party-line (or experts on said theory don't agree on it) then >>>> such work should not define itself as "Vygotskian", "CHAT-based", >>>> or "Socio-Cultural," etc. My own motivation to chime in and >>>> contribute would increase if we followed this strand, that looks at >>>> power and how it is integral to (not a 'factor' or 'external' >>>> context) learning? Although the reading group orientation is still >>>> useful. >>>> >>>> Warmly, >>>> >>>> Miguel Zavala >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 11/26/14 10:38 PM, "Walker, Dana" < Dana.Walker@unco.edu> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Before we leave this topic, I would like to suggest that we pause >>>>> to consider Annalisa's question: >>>>> >>>>> I'm curious how others have been inspired by Vygotsky and >>>>> sociocultural theory, and even other manifestations of his ideas, >>>>> such as CHAT, etc and how people are using these approaches in >>>>> their work. What is that like for you? And to be more specific, >>>>> what is that like for women and people of color? I'm also >>>>> interested in thinking-out-loud with others about Vygotskian >>>>> concepts that are not easy to understand; to employ in real time >>>>> dialogue and social interaction to leap over zopeds together. >>>>> Isn't that what a listserv is for? Or am I being too idealistic? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> For many years I have wondered why the participants on this list >>>>> so seldom talk from contextualized positions, specifically >>>>> positioning the self in relation to others and to power relations >>>>> shaped by race, class, gender, and so on. I am myself very aware >>>>> of power relations being played out through the discursive >>>>> positioning of people in this space, which is why I choose not to >>>>> speak. I am wondering if any of the subscribers to this list are >>>>> interested such questions, including the one framed by Annalisa >>>>> above? >>>>> Kris Gutierrez is the only one I know of in CHAT/sociocultural >>>>> theory who deals with these issues, for example in her article >>>>> "Developing a Sociocritical Literacy in the Third Space"(2008). >>>>> But I'm sure there are others. >>>>> >>>>> Dana >>>>> >>>>> On 11/26/14 10:49 PM, "Carol Macdonald" < carolmacdon@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Hi >>>>>> >>>>>> There have been some off list postings about this phenomenon. >>>>>> None of it complimentary. This cannot be sorted out in one move. >>>>>> >>>>>> I propose that we move onto a different thread - topic. >>>>>> >>>>>> Mike, would you like to start us off on something new? >>>>>> >>>>>> Carol >>>>>> >>>>>> On 27 November 2014 at 02:49, Martin John Packer >>>>>> < mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy, if you're going to retire, then retire. But don't aim one >>>>>>> or two more underhand blows behind the feint of retiring. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Nov 26, 2014, at 7:24 PM, Andy Blunden < ablunden@mira.net> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Well this bloke will retire again at this point. I thought for >>>>>>>> a >>>>>>> brief >>>>>>> moment there, I thought we had a breakthrough. Certainly, Huw's >>>>>>> "real illusion" is perfectly apt to my mind (it's an expression >>>>>>> Marx uses), or in Eric Fromm's words, an illusion with >>>>>>> "survival value." Martin says "Consciousness is an objective >>>>>>> process that *sometimes* can *give rise >>>>>>> to* >>>>>>> illusions." As Vygotsky says "For him psychology is partly >>>>>>> phenomenology." >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>>> ----- >>>>>>> - >>>>>>> - >>>>>>> - >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Bruce Robinson wrote: >>>>>>>>> Henry, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Your wife's question leads to another: who speaks for the >>>>>>>>> silent >>>>>>> majority, many of whom, like me, must be getting fed up with >>>>>>> what David K calls a "rather blokish struggle for power over >>>>>>> particular words'? >>>>>>> [Not >>>>>>> Richard Nixon :)] >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Bruce R >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> PS: You may also note that I have not changed the subject >>>>>>>>> heading >>>>>>> of >>>>>>> this message so that it bears no relation to the content. >>>>>>> Something else I find irritating... >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 26/11/2014 17:16, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>>>>>>>>> Sister Analisa, >>>>>>>>>> Thank you for responding! I was just talking to my wife >>>>>>>>>> (getting >>>>>>> personal!) about the chat. She asked me, "How does anyone get to >>>>>>> participate in the (XMCA) chat if only a few people take part?" >>>>>>> I wondered in my email below if too much was expected of written >>>>>>> communication in the XMCA chat. With 800 people potentially >>>>>>> taking turns, well...what is even possible logistically? Mike >>>>>>> Cole has talked about this, and, I think, has some suggestions >>>>>>> on how to deal with the bottlenecking. But even small scale >>>>>>> communication can be daunting. I watched, with my wife, a >>>>>>> Richard Linklater movie last night, "Before Midnight". Two >>>>>>> people, face to face, in a totally committed relationship, smart >>>>>>> people, good people, trying so hard to get it right. Always a >>>>>>> work in progress. But it's worth it. The alternative is despair. >>>>>>> I am sure of this: This chat, which seems to get bogged down in >>>>>>> abstractions, pure thinking in the mud, is really consequential >>>>>>> beyond the sensitivities of academics. I said we >>>>>>>>> va >>>>>>>>>> lue Vygotsky's "heroism", but that's too macho. I should have >>>>>>> said >>>>>>> courage. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> The Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis is a powerful idea, >>>>>>>>>> often >>>>>>> called >>>>>>> the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis. Google it. Really. See what you think. >>>>>>> One >>>>>>> gauge of the power of an idea is if it has found its way into >>>>>>> popular discourse. I just this morning heard an NPR radio >>>>>>> program (thanks again to my wife, who was listening when she >>>>>>> heard something she thought I would be interested in) that dealt >>>>>>> with the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis in its strong and weak form. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Nov 25, 2014, at 10:11 PM, Annalisa Aguilar >>>>>>> < annalisa@unm.edu> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Dear Henry, >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Thank you for your reply. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I don't think being personal (or even personable) requires >>>>>>> being >>>>>>> heated. Does this have to do with my comment of warmth as a sign >>>>>>> of welcome? >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> To speak about culture non-personally is not something I am >>>>>>> adept >>>>>>> at >>>>>>> doing. We are always speaking from where we stand, the culture >>>>>>> that we are in or from, what-have-you. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Respectfully, I do not know what "linguistic relativity >>>>>>> hypothesis" >>>>>>> is. So please be patient with me while I connect this academic >>>>>>> idea you have offered to this conversation so that I can relate >>>>>>> that to my personal experience speaking on this thread, though >>>>>>> clearly I'm not speaking literally right now, but it is speech >>>>>>> from me, not a sock puppet with my voice thrown from the >>>>>>> position of objective reality. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> You are talking about speaking two languages. But it seems >>>>>>>>>>> we >>>>>>> are >>>>>>> all >>>>>>> speaking English on this list. So I'm a bit lost right there >>>>>>> what you are trying to say to me. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Then, you speak of metalinguistics and how it represents >>>>>>> different >>>>>>> worldviews, if you don't mind me swapping your use of "perspective" >>>>>>> for >>>>>>> worldview. There is a lot of time clearing muckups to get it right. >>>>>>> I'm >>>>>>> not >>>>>>> sure that it ever gets right though, which troubles me. I have >>>>>>> found that many people who have different worldviews communicate >>>>>>> by "talking to," >>>>>>> rather than "talking at." I feel, for example, you and I are >>>>>>> talking to one another, despite our likely different POVs. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I don't know what the "perish and dapple of Andy" means when >>>>>>> you >>>>>>> say >>>>>>> that. From what I can tell he's trying to define something for >>>>>>> himself asking for the help of others. That's fine and I'm >>>>>>> learning that definitions are very bas-relief for him. I think >>>>>>> my interests are a little different. So I'd prefer to orient to >>>>>>> my interests, if that is OK. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Speaking of metalinguistics, rather than debate over >>>>>>> definitions, >>>>>>> I'm >>>>>>> more interested in speaking to the very different people who are >>>>>>> on this list. The rumor is there are 800 folks out there. Where >>>>>>> are you? :) To reference a highly academic quote from the Wizard >>>>>>> of Oz: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> "Come out, come out wherever you are, and meet the young >>>>>>>>>>> lady >>>>>>> who >>>>>>> fell from the star!" >>>>>>>>>>> --Glinda, the Good Witch from the North (waves magic wand) >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I'm curious how others have been inspired by Vygotsky and >>>>>>> sociocultural theory, and even other manifestations of his >>>>>>> ideas, such as CHAT, etc and how people are using these >>>>>>> approaches in their work. >>>>>>> What >>>>>>> is >>>>>>> that like for you? And to be more specific, what is that like >>>>>>> for women and people of color? I'm also interested in >>>>>>> thinking-out-loud with others about Vygotskian concepts that are >>>>>>> not easy to understand; to employ in real time dialogue and >>>>>>> social interaction to leap over zopeds together. Isn't that what >>>>>>> a listserv is for? Or am I being too idealistic? >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I have tried to speak in an open, easy, and immediate >>>>>>>>>>> manner, >>>>>>> to >>>>>>> allow others to engage. But I fear that engagement is never >>>>>>> going to happen because all that persists are conversations >>>>>>> about definitions, or whether nothing can come from nothing, and >>>>>>> voila! subsequent debates ensue. >>>>>>> Or >>>>>>> someone will say, "We already discussed this 20 years ago!" >>>>>>> Which means I missed the party, I suppose. Unfortunately, if I >>>>>>> disagree with a position because I interpret differently, then >>>>>>> I'm told to go read something without really a clear explanation >>>>>>> why I'm supposed to go read something. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I don't really agree with the approach of "read this," as an >>>>>>> academic >>>>>>> argument. Anyone is free to use it, and I have myself, but >>>>>>> because I know how obtuse that can be, I couch it with my >>>>>>> reasons why I think it would be a good read for that person, and >>>>>>> what I think there is learn from reading. >>>>>>> I think the "read this" approach, when it is offered with the >>>>>>> tone of "now go eat your vegetables!" fails in the making of >>>>>>> speech between people. >>>>>>> All >>>>>>> it does is shut things down. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> If the reading truly is relevant, it seems far more >>>>>>>>>>> productive >>>>>>> in >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> moment of speech to cue a person what to look for, to supply a >>>>>>> context, especially when referencing an entire book, for >>>>>>> example, or the link to an entire website full of texts. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Your assessment in the physicality of language is something >>>>>>> with >>>>>>> which I am completely in agreement. Especially since we all seem >>>>>>> to agree with the material aspects of language. So the question >>>>>>> at hand is a matter of form. Form has an aesthetic but also has >>>>>>> a purpose. Are we throwing ropes or throwing boulders? If >>>>>>> throwing boulders, where does that need to throw boulders come >>>>>>> from? If throwing ropes, then at least connections are being >>>>>>> made for those who might not be very clear about ideas and who >>>>>>> may require a helping hand. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Then there's the old, but handy, elliptical comment, >>>>>>>>>>> something >>>>>>> like a >>>>>>> boomerang... meant to be subtle or ironic at the expense of >>>>>>> someone who may not understand. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> At this point, I'd to emphasize that being ignorant is not >>>>>>> being >>>>>>> stupid, but it seems someone who is ignorant is frequently >>>>>>> treated as stupid (um, on this list). This "phenomenon" has made >>>>>>> me reflect upon how little time is spent upon the nature of >>>>>>> ignorance in education and the dynamics of ignorance in >>>>>>> speaking. Every one of us is ignorant about most things in the >>>>>>> world. And yet being ignorant is seen as an embarrassment, a >>>>>>> deficiency, a lapse in character. I vehemently disagree with >>>>>>> this reception to ignorance. Even Einstein said something like, >>>>>>> "The more I know, the more I see how much I don't know." Such an >>>>>>> aggressive position toward ignorance is nothing but hurtful, >>>>>>> even arrogant. Arrogance is a blister, a defense mechanism from >>>>>>> previous hurt. A person who is honest about one's own ignorance >>>>>>> is a very strong person and is showing a willingness to learn >>>>>>> something. I think all teachers will agree that a person who >>>>>>> knows one doesn't know is an easier student to teach tha >>>>>>>>> n >>>>>>>>>> one who doesn't know one doesn't know. >>>>>>>>>>> Iconicity is something I can hang my hat on. I see it is >>>>>>> related >>>>>>> to >>>>>>> pointing. What I like about pointing is that it is a gesture, >>>>>>> which implies movement, in the way the word is also movement. I >>>>>>> hope I have made sufficient personal connections to your >>>>>>> concepts without the heat. >>>>>>> Thank >>>>>>> you for offering them to me. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: >>>>>> Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> > > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: image/jpeg Size: 898 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141202/e78fbba8/attachment.jpe From Peg.Griffin@att.net Tue Dec 2 06:57:45 2014 From: Peg.Griffin@att.net (Peg Griffin) Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2014 09:57:45 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: "The political" and "power" in learning In-Reply-To: <002501d00e3d$a4213ce0$ec63b6a0$@att.net> References: <002501d00e3d$a4213ce0$ec63b6a0$@att.net> Message-ID: <003a01d00e40$559f8d80$00dea880$@att.net> Sorry -- didn't mean to send the links just the jpeg -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Peg Griffin Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 9:38 AM To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: "The political" and "power" in learning Thanks, Helena. http://sync.democraticunderground.com/user_avatars/147749.jpg -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Helena Worthen Sent: Monday, December 01, 2014 11:20 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: "The political" and "power" in learning Dana -- Thanks for linking Hong Kong (students) Ferguson and Oakland (following the murder of Oscar Grant, I assume; young Black men). And let's include the 43 disappeared students at the teacher training school in Iguala, Mexico. Those students were enrolled at one of the rural teacher training schools that date back into the Mexican revolution and take on politics and power directly. This is the best reporting of the 43 Disappeareds that I've seen in the US. It's very close to what La Jornada was publishing in early November. http://www.vice.com/video/the-missing-43-mexicos-disappeared-students-full-l ength-678 Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com On Dec 1, 2014, at 5:45 PM, Walker, Dana wrote: > Hi Miguel, > > I would be very interested in continuing this thread on "the political" > and "power" in learning. My participation will be slow, as I will be > at the LRA conference in Florida and then finals and so on, but will > follow with interest. I have changed thread title in anticipation of > pursuing this exploration. > > Does Ferguson (or Oakland, or New York, or Hong Kong, or Cairo) matter > in considerations of 'the political' and 'power' in learning (and teaching)? > > Dana > > On 11/28/14 5:07 PM, "Zavala, Miguel" > < mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu> > wrote: > >> Hi Dana, >> >> I believe there are several ways to go with an analysis of "the political" >> or "power" in learning. First, is to search for its >> articulation/theorization in existing studies (whether conceptual or >> empirical) within the learning sciences more generally. Who has >> attempted this work? Also, In the general absence of studies >> theorizing "the political" or "power" in learning (which I gather is >> an accurate depiction of the field), one might pursue the ways in >> which "context" is narrowly framed in distinct frames/theories of >> learning. In what ways does/can CHAT enable the analysis of "the political" and "power" in learning? >> >> Now, due to time constraints, this project may take time; perhaps >> there is a smaller group that would like to continue with this >> thread/exploration of "the political" or "power" in learning. I place >> questions of politics and power in quotation marks because they need >> to be unpacked, like many concepts. >> >> I believe there is another route one can take, and that is to begin >> with our own political biographies, how we view the world and its >> transformation. In a sense, we all have our biographies of coming to CHAT. >> How is CHAT a tool in our practical work (as educators, >> action-researchers, community organizers, etc.)? Because processes >> are relational, I imagine that our own biographies, positionalities, >> and standpoints (which function more like collective consciousness >> and practices, borrowing here from the work of Sandra Harding) are >> not only inflected in our appropriations of CHAT but are interwoven; >> they shift from "external" to "internal" processes of of both >> research and praxis (informed by our politics). I recognize there >> are many points being made here and "dangers", especially when one >> views learning as a-political or mechanistic, but I take that risk. >> >> Attached is a chapter outlining my political philosophy. It was >> published as part of a text that asked contributors to name our "pedagogic creeds" >> (? la Dewey). >> >> -Miguel >> >> >> On 11/27/14 8:12 AM, "Walker, Dana" < Dana.Walker@unco.edu> wrote: >> >>> Gracias Miguel, and Mike and Larry for responding and for moving >>> forward this thread of thought begun by Annalisa. >>> >>> Miguel, I remember now (based on a conference presentation of yours >>> years >>> ago) that your pedagogical and theoretical work involving migrant >>> students at UCLA addressed questions of power, subjectivity, and >>> embodied selves in boundary crossing processes in ways that other >>> CHAT theorists (e.g., Tuomi-Grohn & Engestrom, 2003; Grossen & >>> Zittoun, 2012) do not. I wonder if this is a place where we could >>> begin exploring the question of power in relation to learning and >>> development? Is there an article of yours that you might suggest on >>> this subject? >>> >>> Dana >>> >>> >>> On 11/27/14 12:02 AM, "Zavala, Miguel" >>> < mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Gracias Annalisa and Dana. >>>> >>>> Questions of power have always been central to my work and I am a >>>> new member of this list (and community) and don't have a broader >>>> context as to why it was created and whether it is by design meant >>>> to grow in its own way over time, etc. What I have noticed though >>>> is a tendency to focus on conceptual clarity (of the work of >>>> Vygotsky and Cultural Historical Activity Theory and prior, such as >>>> Marx). So, I am learning anew in this space, taking notes, >>>> re-reading. In many ways it reminds me of the CHAT reading group >>>> many of us at UCLA visualized but never materialized formally, >>>> except that our reading and writing the world with Vygotsky's ideas >>>> (and others) did materialize in the beautiful pedagogical work we >>>> did with migrant students at that time... >>>> >>>> I hope the question of how we use, expand, enrich, re-envision, and >>>> carry forward the ideas of Vygotsky (and how these intersect with >>>> or interweave with power) are considered in an open and >>>> non-controlled way. By "non-controlled" I mean the parallel >>>> tendency in particular circles/communities to challenge work that >>>> grows out of particular ideas and if those ideas do not adhere to >>>> some party-line (or experts on said theory don't agree on it) then >>>> such work should not define itself as "Vygotskian", "CHAT-based", >>>> or "Socio-Cultural," etc. My own motivation to chime in and >>>> contribute would increase if we followed this strand, that looks at >>>> power and how it is integral to (not a 'factor' or 'external' >>>> context) learning? Although the reading group orientation is still >>>> useful. >>>> >>>> Warmly, >>>> >>>> Miguel Zavala >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 11/26/14 10:38 PM, "Walker, Dana" < >>>> Dana.Walker@unco.edu> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Before we leave this topic, I would like to suggest that we pause >>>>> to consider Annalisa's question: >>>>> >>>>> I'm curious how others have been inspired by Vygotsky and >>>>> sociocultural theory, and even other manifestations of his ideas, >>>>> such as CHAT, etc and how people are using these approaches in >>>>> their work. What is that like for you? And to be more specific, >>>>> what is that like for women and people of color? I'm also >>>>> interested in thinking-out-loud with others about Vygotskian >>>>> concepts that are not easy to understand; to employ in real time >>>>> dialogue and social interaction to leap over zopeds together. >>>>> Isn't that what a listserv is for? Or am I being too idealistic? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> For many years I have wondered why the participants on this list >>>>> so seldom talk from contextualized positions, specifically >>>>> positioning the self in relation to others and to power relations >>>>> shaped by race, class, gender, and so on. I am myself very aware >>>>> of power relations being played out through the discursive >>>>> positioning of people in this space, which is why I choose not to >>>>> speak. I am wondering if any of the subscribers to this list are >>>>> interested such questions, including the one framed by Annalisa >>>>> above? >>>>> Kris Gutierrez is the only one I know of in CHAT/sociocultural >>>>> theory who deals with these issues, for example in her article >>>>> "Developing a Sociocritical Literacy in the Third Space"(2008). >>>>> But I'm sure there are others. >>>>> >>>>> Dana >>>>> >>>>> On 11/26/14 10:49 PM, "Carol Macdonald" < carolmacdon@gmail.com> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Hi >>>>>> >>>>>> There have been some off list postings about this phenomenon. >>>>>> None of it complimentary. This cannot be sorted out in one move. >>>>>> >>>>>> I propose that we move onto a different thread - topic. >>>>>> >>>>>> Mike, would you like to start us off on something new? >>>>>> >>>>>> Carol >>>>>> >>>>>> On 27 November 2014 at 02:49, Martin John Packer >>>>>> < mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy, if you're going to retire, then retire. But don't aim one >>>>>>> or two more underhand blows behind the feint of retiring. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Nov 26, 2014, at 7:24 PM, Andy Blunden < ablunden@mira.net> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Well this bloke will retire again at this point. I thought for >>>>>>>> a >>>>>>> brief >>>>>>> moment there, I thought we had a breakthrough. Certainly, Huw's >>>>>>> "real illusion" is perfectly apt to my mind (it's an expression >>>>>>> Marx uses), or in Eric Fromm's words, an illusion with >>>>>>> "survival value." Martin says "Consciousness is an objective >>>>>>> process that *sometimes* can *give rise >>>>>>> to* >>>>>>> illusions." As Vygotsky says "For him psychology is partly >>>>>>> phenomenology." >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>>> ----- >>>>>>> - >>>>>>> - >>>>>>> - >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Bruce Robinson wrote: >>>>>>>>> Henry, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Your wife's question leads to another: who speaks for the >>>>>>>>> silent >>>>>>> majority, many of whom, like me, must be getting fed up with >>>>>>> what David K calls a "rather blokish struggle for power over >>>>>>> particular words'? >>>>>>> [Not >>>>>>> Richard Nixon :)] >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Bruce R >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> PS: You may also note that I have not changed the subject >>>>>>>>> heading >>>>>>> of >>>>>>> this message so that it bears no relation to the content. >>>>>>> Something else I find irritating... >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 26/11/2014 17:16, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>>>>>>>>> Sister Analisa, >>>>>>>>>> Thank you for responding! I was just talking to my wife >>>>>>>>>> (getting >>>>>>> personal!) about the chat. She asked me, "How does anyone get to >>>>>>> participate in the (XMCA) chat if only a few people take part?" >>>>>>> I wondered in my email below if too much was expected of written >>>>>>> communication in the XMCA chat. With 800 people potentially >>>>>>> taking turns, well...what is even possible logistically? Mike >>>>>>> Cole has talked about this, and, I think, has some suggestions >>>>>>> on how to deal with the bottlenecking. But even small scale >>>>>>> communication can be daunting. I watched, with my wife, a >>>>>>> Richard Linklater movie last night, "Before Midnight". Two >>>>>>> people, face to face, in a totally committed relationship, smart >>>>>>> people, good people, trying so hard to get it right. Always a >>>>>>> work in progress. But it's worth it. The alternative is despair. >>>>>>> I am sure of this: This chat, which seems to get bogged down in >>>>>>> abstractions, pure thinking in the mud, is really consequential >>>>>>> beyond the sensitivities of academics. I said we >>>>>>>>> va >>>>>>>>>> lue Vygotsky's "heroism", but that's too macho. I should have >>>>>>> said >>>>>>> courage. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> The Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis is a powerful idea, >>>>>>>>>> often >>>>>>> called >>>>>>> the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis. Google it. Really. See what you think. >>>>>>> One >>>>>>> gauge of the power of an idea is if it has found its way into >>>>>>> popular discourse. I just this morning heard an NPR radio >>>>>>> program (thanks again to my wife, who was listening when she >>>>>>> heard something she thought I would be interested in) that dealt >>>>>>> with the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis in its strong and weak form. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Nov 25, 2014, at 10:11 PM, Annalisa Aguilar >>>>>>> < annalisa@unm.edu> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Dear Henry, >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Thank you for your reply. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I don't think being personal (or even personable) requires >>>>>>> being >>>>>>> heated. Does this have to do with my comment of warmth as a sign >>>>>>> of welcome? >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> To speak about culture non-personally is not something I am >>>>>>> adept >>>>>>> at >>>>>>> doing. We are always speaking from where we stand, the culture >>>>>>> that we are in or from, what-have-you. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Respectfully, I do not know what "linguistic relativity >>>>>>> hypothesis" >>>>>>> is. So please be patient with me while I connect this academic >>>>>>> idea you have offered to this conversation so that I can relate >>>>>>> that to my personal experience speaking on this thread, though >>>>>>> clearly I'm not speaking literally right now, but it is speech >>>>>>> from me, not a sock puppet with my voice thrown from the >>>>>>> position of objective reality. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> You are talking about speaking two languages. But it seems >>>>>>>>>>> we >>>>>>> are >>>>>>> all >>>>>>> speaking English on this list. So I'm a bit lost right there >>>>>>> what you are trying to say to me. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Then, you speak of metalinguistics and how it represents >>>>>>> different >>>>>>> worldviews, if you don't mind me swapping your use of "perspective" >>>>>>> for >>>>>>> worldview. There is a lot of time clearing muckups to get it right. >>>>>>> I'm >>>>>>> not >>>>>>> sure that it ever gets right though, which troubles me. I have >>>>>>> found that many people who have different worldviews communicate >>>>>>> by "talking to," >>>>>>> rather than "talking at." I feel, for example, you and I are >>>>>>> talking to one another, despite our likely different POVs. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I don't know what the "perish and dapple of Andy" means when >>>>>>> you >>>>>>> say >>>>>>> that. From what I can tell he's trying to define something for >>>>>>> himself asking for the help of others. That's fine and I'm >>>>>>> learning that definitions are very bas-relief for him. I think >>>>>>> my interests are a little different. So I'd prefer to orient to >>>>>>> my interests, if that is OK. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Speaking of metalinguistics, rather than debate over >>>>>>> definitions, >>>>>>> I'm >>>>>>> more interested in speaking to the very different people who are >>>>>>> on this list. The rumor is there are 800 folks out there. Where >>>>>>> are you? :) To reference a highly academic quote from the Wizard >>>>>>> of Oz: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> "Come out, come out wherever you are, and meet the young >>>>>>>>>>> lady >>>>>>> who >>>>>>> fell from the star!" >>>>>>>>>>> --Glinda, the Good Witch from the North (waves magic wand) >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I'm curious how others have been inspired by Vygotsky and >>>>>>> sociocultural theory, and even other manifestations of his >>>>>>> ideas, such as CHAT, etc and how people are using these >>>>>>> approaches in their work. >>>>>>> What >>>>>>> is >>>>>>> that like for you? And to be more specific, what is that like >>>>>>> for women and people of color? I'm also interested in >>>>>>> thinking-out-loud with others about Vygotskian concepts that are >>>>>>> not easy to understand; to employ in real time dialogue and >>>>>>> social interaction to leap over zopeds together. Isn't that what >>>>>>> a listserv is for? Or am I being too idealistic? >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I have tried to speak in an open, easy, and immediate >>>>>>>>>>> manner, >>>>>>> to >>>>>>> allow others to engage. But I fear that engagement is never >>>>>>> going to happen because all that persists are conversations >>>>>>> about definitions, or whether nothing can come from nothing, and >>>>>>> voila! subsequent debates ensue. >>>>>>> Or >>>>>>> someone will say, "We already discussed this 20 years ago!" >>>>>>> Which means I missed the party, I suppose. Unfortunately, if I >>>>>>> disagree with a position because I interpret differently, then >>>>>>> I'm told to go read something without really a clear explanation >>>>>>> why I'm supposed to go read something. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I don't really agree with the approach of "read this," as an >>>>>>> academic >>>>>>> argument. Anyone is free to use it, and I have myself, but >>>>>>> because I know how obtuse that can be, I couch it with my >>>>>>> reasons why I think it would be a good read for that person, and >>>>>>> what I think there is learn from reading. >>>>>>> I think the "read this" approach, when it is offered with the >>>>>>> tone of "now go eat your vegetables!" fails in the making of >>>>>>> speech between people. >>>>>>> All >>>>>>> it does is shut things down. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> If the reading truly is relevant, it seems far more >>>>>>>>>>> productive >>>>>>> in >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> moment of speech to cue a person what to look for, to supply a >>>>>>> context, especially when referencing an entire book, for >>>>>>> example, or the link to an entire website full of texts. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Your assessment in the physicality of language is something >>>>>>> with >>>>>>> which I am completely in agreement. Especially since we all seem >>>>>>> to agree with the material aspects of language. So the question >>>>>>> at hand is a matter of form. Form has an aesthetic but also has >>>>>>> a purpose. Are we throwing ropes or throwing boulders? If >>>>>>> throwing boulders, where does that need to throw boulders come >>>>>>> from? If throwing ropes, then at least connections are being >>>>>>> made for those who might not be very clear about ideas and who >>>>>>> may require a helping hand. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Then there's the old, but handy, elliptical comment, >>>>>>>>>>> something >>>>>>> like a >>>>>>> boomerang... meant to be subtle or ironic at the expense of >>>>>>> someone who may not understand. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> At this point, I'd to emphasize that being ignorant is not >>>>>>> being >>>>>>> stupid, but it seems someone who is ignorant is frequently >>>>>>> treated as stupid (um, on this list). This "phenomenon" has made >>>>>>> me reflect upon how little time is spent upon the nature of >>>>>>> ignorance in education and the dynamics of ignorance in >>>>>>> speaking. Every one of us is ignorant about most things in the >>>>>>> world. And yet being ignorant is seen as an embarrassment, a >>>>>>> deficiency, a lapse in character. I vehemently disagree with >>>>>>> this reception to ignorance. Even Einstein said something like, >>>>>>> "The more I know, the more I see how much I don't know." Such an >>>>>>> aggressive position toward ignorance is nothing but hurtful, >>>>>>> even arrogant. Arrogance is a blister, a defense mechanism from >>>>>>> previous hurt. A person who is honest about one's own ignorance >>>>>>> is a very strong person and is showing a willingness to learn >>>>>>> something. I think all teachers will agree that a person who >>>>>>> knows one doesn't know is an easier student to teach tha >>>>>>>>> n >>>>>>>>>> one who doesn't know one doesn't know. >>>>>>>>>>> Iconicity is something I can hang my hat on. I see it is >>>>>>> related >>>>>>> to >>>>>>> pointing. What I like about pointing is that it is a gesture, >>>>>>> which implies movement, in the way the word is also movement. I >>>>>>> hope I have made sufficient personal connections to your >>>>>>> concepts without the heat. >>>>>>> Thank >>>>>>> you for offering them to me. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: >>>>>> Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> > > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: winmail.dat Type: application/ms-tnef Size: 32685 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141202/1d8e417c/attachment.bin From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Dec 2 07:58:33 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2014 07:58:33 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? In-Reply-To: <1417499588620.61068@unm.edu> References: <1417397991972.17078@unm.edu> <1417490593837.73384@unm.edu> <1417499588620.61068@unm.edu> Message-ID: Annalisa- I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation not discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set against Gibson's ideas. The change of views coincided with the advent of the d-cog idea which also has deep roots in chat. No hidden history i know of, but interesting connections among the notion of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion of these connections can be found, among other places, in Cole, M. & Engestr?m, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach to distributed* *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition: Psychological and educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press. mike On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > Hi Mike, > > It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied that wish! > > Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important connections. I was > not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I learned about > Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science (1985). > > Is there some history that is not part of the common story? > > I looked here for clarity: > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance > > Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to cognitive > artifacts? > > There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in play, and > even joy! > > When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however until then > I will remain with the ineffable. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of mike cole > Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And, > co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive artifacts > right about that time at UCSD. If it were possible to find a source that > makes these connections visible and available to read about it might be a > step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of intro for > newcomers to the discussion. > > I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a newcomer's > introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is seeking to sort > out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am insuficiently > read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted! > > A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many rocks, so > little time"! > > Mike > > A > > On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > Martin! > > > > Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental representation" is > > coming closer! > > > > For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's theory of > > affordances. > > > > This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed article. But I > > wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is important > > not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. > > > > I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a grenade > > pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the list. If > you > > can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look forward to > your > > reply, Martin. > > > > Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that being at UCSD > > and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that influences your > > position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find community > in > > it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more voluntary phrased > > that way). > > > > Kind regards, > > > > Annalisa > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Martin John > > Packer > > > Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > An interesting article, David. One way in which it is interesting, to me > > at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used, even > > once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images in the > > world around us - material representations - and he tries to define the > > "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. > > > > Martin > > > > On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg > > wrote: > > > > > Larry, Annalisa: > > > > > > People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" when we > > > met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of anything > > > except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe available > > > for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember > > > whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the > > > beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a > > > non-image based mental representation. > > > > > > As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations are > > > images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. In > > > fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against Titchener > > > and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, > > > everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated that > > > many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically anterior > > > to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would not have > > > time or ability to process complex problems in real time. > > > > > > I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are > > > genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more reading > > > to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than I am > > > (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels like > > > she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do NOT read > > > this article--instead, look at Figure 11. > > > > > > http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ > > > > > > The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure of > > > Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any actual > > > images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural experience > > > associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then deliberately > > > frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any > > > recognizable figures upon which to focus. > > > > > > However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine Chapel fresco > > > for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He or she > > > can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting and > > > wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not notice > > > the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in it. > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar > > wrote: > > >> > > >> Hi Larry and David, > > >> > > >> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! > > >> > > >> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are at the > > root of all thinking. > > >> > > >> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, based upon > > previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in > > combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a phrase I > like > > a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it by the > > same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it. > > >> > > >> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as Hackett > > describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have you > already > > given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be willing to > > take a look. > > >> > > >> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is controversial. > > It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone says > "this > > is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble observation. > > >> > > >> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever that > > process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at hand? > Just a > > thought. > > >> > > >> What is it that appeals to you about this model, metaphoricity? > > >> > > >> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) > > >> > > >> Kind regards, > > >> > > >> Annalisa > > >> > > >> > > >> ________________________________________ > > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Larry > Purss < > > lpscholar2@gmail.com > > > >> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM > > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? > > >> > > >> David K > > >> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. My reason > > for > > >> exploring these authors is I have been following a path pursuing a > basic > > >> question. > > >> > > >> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? > > >> > > >> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic guiding > > images > > >> upon which thinking rests" > > >> > > >> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring appearances and > > >> illusions was also exploring this theme. > > >> > > >> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new phenomenological > path > > >> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names this > > process > > >> *metaphoricity*. > > >> > > >> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible image-character > of > > the > > >> *spontaneous event* of meaning. > > >> > > >> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he > brackets - > > >> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. > > >> > > >> AND > > >> > > >> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* finds the > > >> meaning of its very self. > > >> > > >> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this > > >> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of > metaphor > > can > > >> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated in > > >> *objectivity* > > >> > > >> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. > > >> > > >> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of itself > *in* > > the > > >> mode [path] of the concept > > >> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding images has > > been > > >> established. > > >> > > >> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the path of > > >> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived from > the > > >> image-character of the guiding image. > > >> > > >> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial this topic > > may > > >> become [again] > > >> > > >> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this basic > > >> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these images as > > >> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images emerge > > >> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. > > >> > > >> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is transcendental] and > > is > > >> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. It seems > to > > >> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. > > >> > > >> I also realize this question may already be answered in Vygotsky's > > writings > > >> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of XMCA. I > > >> personally am following this path for now. > > >> > > >> Larry > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From glassman.13@osu.edu Tue Dec 2 08:09:56 2014 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2014 16:09:56 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? In-Reply-To: References: <1417397991972.17078@unm.edu> <1417490593837.73384@unm.edu> <1417499588620.61068@unm.edu>, Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074ADB@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea). He actually cops to both of them. The first was not to distinguish between affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which are designed. I think this is related to the issue of artifacts. Meaning are artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to be discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong word, if anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances. It is a complex question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes based on context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one context may result in organic affordances in another context. The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is that he was not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and constraints. Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived affordances or are they designed to create constraints. Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the mention just spurred me to throw this up. Hope I'm not being too much of an interloper. Michael ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? Annalisa- I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation not discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set against Gibson's ideas. The change of views coincided with the advent of the d-cog idea which also has deep roots in chat. No hidden history i know of, but interesting connections among the notion of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion of these connections can be found, among other places, in Cole, M. & Engestr?m, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach to distributed* *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition: Psychological and educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press. mike On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > Hi Mike, > > It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied that wish! > > Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important connections. I was > not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I learned about > Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science (1985). > > Is there some history that is not part of the common story? > > I looked here for clarity: > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance > > Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to cognitive > artifacts? > > There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in play, and > even joy! > > When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however until then > I will remain with the ineffable. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of mike cole > Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And, > co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive artifacts > right about that time at UCSD. If it were possible to find a source that > makes these connections visible and available to read about it might be a > step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of intro for > newcomers to the discussion. > > I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a newcomer's > introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is seeking to sort > out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am insuficiently > read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted! > > A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many rocks, so > little time"! > > Mike > > A > > On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > Martin! > > > > Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental representation" is > > coming closer! > > > > For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's theory of > > affordances. > > > > This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed article. But I > > wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is important > > not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. > > > > I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a grenade > > pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the list. If > you > > can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look forward to > your > > reply, Martin. > > > > Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that being at UCSD > > and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that influences your > > position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find community > in > > it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more voluntary phrased > > that way). > > > > Kind regards, > > > > Annalisa > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Martin John > > Packer > > > Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > An interesting article, David. One way in which it is interesting, to me > > at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used, even > > once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images in the > > world around us - material representations - and he tries to define the > > "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. > > > > Martin > > > > On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg > > wrote: > > > > > Larry, Annalisa: > > > > > > People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" when we > > > met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of anything > > > except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe available > > > for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember > > > whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the > > > beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a > > > non-image based mental representation. > > > > > > As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations are > > > images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. In > > > fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against Titchener > > > and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, > > > everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated that > > > many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically anterior > > > to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would not have > > > time or ability to process complex problems in real time. > > > > > > I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are > > > genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more reading > > > to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than I am > > > (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels like > > > she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do NOT read > > > this article--instead, look at Figure 11. > > > > > > http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ > > > > > > The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure of > > > Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any actual > > > images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural experience > > > associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then deliberately > > > frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any > > > recognizable figures upon which to focus. > > > > > > However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine Chapel fresco > > > for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He or she > > > can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting and > > > wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not notice > > > the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in it. > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar > > wrote: > > >> > > >> Hi Larry and David, > > >> > > >> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! > > >> > > >> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are at the > > root of all thinking. > > >> > > >> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, based upon > > previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in > > combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a phrase I > like > > a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it by the > > same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it. > > >> > > >> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as Hackett > > describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have you > already > > given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be willing to > > take a look. > > >> > > >> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is controversial. > > It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone says > "this > > is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble observation. > > >> > > >> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever that > > process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at hand? > Just a > > thought. > > >> > > >> What is it that appeals to you about this model, metaphoricity? > > >> > > >> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) > > >> > > >> Kind regards, > > >> > > >> Annalisa > > >> > > >> > > >> ________________________________________ > > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Larry > Purss < > > lpscholar2@gmail.com > > > >> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM > > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? > > >> > > >> David K > > >> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. My reason > > for > > >> exploring these authors is I have been following a path pursuing a > basic > > >> question. > > >> > > >> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? > > >> > > >> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic guiding > > images > > >> upon which thinking rests" > > >> > > >> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring appearances and > > >> illusions was also exploring this theme. > > >> > > >> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new phenomenological > path > > >> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names this > > process > > >> *metaphoricity*. > > >> > > >> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible image-character > of > > the > > >> *spontaneous event* of meaning. > > >> > > >> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he > brackets - > > >> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. > > >> > > >> AND > > >> > > >> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* finds the > > >> meaning of its very self. > > >> > > >> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this > > >> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of > metaphor > > can > > >> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated in > > >> *objectivity* > > >> > > >> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. > > >> > > >> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of itself > *in* > > the > > >> mode [path] of the concept > > >> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding images has > > been > > >> established. > > >> > > >> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the path of > > >> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived from > the > > >> image-character of the guiding image. > > >> > > >> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial this topic > > may > > >> become [again] > > >> > > >> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this basic > > >> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these images as > > >> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images emerge > > >> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. > > >> > > >> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is transcendental] and > > is > > >> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. It seems > to > > >> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. > > >> > > >> I also realize this question may already be answered in Vygotsky's > > writings > > >> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of XMCA. I > > >> personally am following this path for now. > > >> > > >> Larry > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Dec 2 08:39:19 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2014 08:39:19 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074ADB@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> References: <1417397991972.17078@unm.edu> <1417490593837.73384@unm.edu> <1417499588620.61068@unm.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074ADB@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: Interloper, Michael? The discussions at UCSD preceeding Don's use of affordances and cognitive artifacts were accompanied by other, related papers. One by Engestrom on "when is an artifact" and one or more by Ed Hutchins. If people are interested in pursuing this thread/topic the materials could be gathered up. mike On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea). He > actually cops to both of them. The first was not to distinguish between > affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which are > designed. I think this is related to the issue of artifacts. Meaning are > artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to be > discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong word, if > anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances. It is a complex > question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes based on > context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one context may > result in organic affordances in another context. > > The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is that he was > not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and constraints. > Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived affordances or are > they designed to create constraints. > > Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the mention > just spurred me to throw this up. Hope I'm not being too much of an > interloper. > > Michael > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > Annalisa- > > I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation not > discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of > affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set against > Gibson's ideas. The change of views coincided with the advent of the d-cog > idea which also has deep roots in chat. > > No hidden history i know of, but interesting connections among the notion > of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion of these > connections can be found, among other places, in > > Cole, M. & Engestr?m, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach to > distributed* > *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition: Psychological and > educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press. > > mike > > > > > > On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > > > Hi Mike, > > > > It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied that > wish! > > > > Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important connections. I was > > not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I learned about > > Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science (1985). > > > > Is there some history that is not part of the common story? > > > > I looked here for clarity: > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance > > > > Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to cognitive > > artifacts? > > > > There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in play, and > > even joy! > > > > When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however until then > > I will remain with the ineffable. > > > > Kind regards, > > > > Annalisa > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > on behalf of mike cole > > Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And, > > co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive artifacts > > right about that time at UCSD. If it were possible to find a source that > > makes these connections visible and available to read about it might be a > > step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of intro > for > > newcomers to the discussion. > > > > I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a newcomer's > > introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is seeking to > sort > > out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am > insuficiently > > read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted! > > > > A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many rocks, so > > little time"! > > > > Mike > > > > A > > > > On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > > > Martin! > > > > > > Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental representation" is > > > coming closer! > > > > > > For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's theory of > > > affordances. > > > > > > This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed article. But > I > > > wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is > important > > > not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. > > > > > > I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a grenade > > > pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the list. If > > you > > > can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look forward to > > your > > > reply, Martin. > > > > > > Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that being at > UCSD > > > and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that influences > your > > > position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find > community > > in > > > it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more voluntary > phrased > > > that way). > > > > > > Kind regards, > > > > > > Annalisa > > > ________________________________________ > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Martin > John > > > Packer > > > > Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > > > An interesting article, David. One way in which it is interesting, to > me > > > at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used, even > > > once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images in the > > > world around us - material representations - and he tries to define the > > > "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg > > > wrote: > > > > > > > Larry, Annalisa: > > > > > > > > People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" when we > > > > met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of > anything > > > > except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe available > > > > for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember > > > > whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the > > > > beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a > > > > non-image based mental representation. > > > > > > > > As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations are > > > > images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. In > > > > fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against > Titchener > > > > and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, > > > > everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated that > > > > many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically anterior > > > > to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would not have > > > > time or ability to process complex problems in real time. > > > > > > > > I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are > > > > genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more reading > > > > to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than I am > > > > (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels like > > > > she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do NOT read > > > > this article--instead, look at Figure 11. > > > > > > > > http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ > > > > > > > > The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure of > > > > Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any actual > > > > images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural > experience > > > > associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then deliberately > > > > frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any > > > > recognizable figures upon which to focus. > > > > > > > > However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine Chapel fresco > > > > for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He or she > > > > can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting and > > > > wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not notice > > > > the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in it. > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar > > > wrote: > > > >> > > > >> Hi Larry and David, > > > >> > > > >> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! > > > >> > > > >> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are at the > > > root of all thinking. > > > >> > > > >> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, based upon > > > previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in > > > combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a phrase I > > like > > > a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it by > the > > > same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it. > > > >> > > > >> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as > Hackett > > > describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have you > > already > > > given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be willing > to > > > take a look. > > > >> > > > >> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is > controversial. > > > It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone says > > "this > > > is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble > observation. > > > >> > > > >> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever that > > > process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at hand? > > Just a > > > thought. > > > >> > > > >> What is it that appeals to you about this model, metaphoricity? > > > >> > > > >> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) > > > >> > > > >> Kind regards, > > > >> > > > >> Annalisa > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> ________________________________________ > > > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Larry > > Purss < > > > lpscholar2@gmail.com > > > > >> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM > > > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity > > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? > > > >> > > > >> David K > > > >> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. My > reason > > > for > > > >> exploring these authors is I have been following a path pursuing a > > basic > > > >> question. > > > >> > > > >> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? > > > >> > > > >> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic guiding > > > images > > > >> upon which thinking rests" > > > >> > > > >> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring appearances > and > > > >> illusions was also exploring this theme. > > > >> > > > >> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new phenomenological > > path > > > >> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names this > > > process > > > >> *metaphoricity*. > > > >> > > > >> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible image-character > > of > > > the > > > >> *spontaneous event* of meaning. > > > >> > > > >> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he > > brackets - > > > >> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. > > > >> > > > >> AND > > > >> > > > >> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* finds the > > > >> meaning of its very self. > > > >> > > > >> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this > > > >> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of > > metaphor > > > can > > > >> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated in > > > >> *objectivity* > > > >> > > > >> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. > > > >> > > > >> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of itself > > *in* > > > the > > > >> mode [path] of the concept > > > >> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding images > has > > > been > > > >> established. > > > >> > > > >> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the path of > > > >> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived from > > the > > > >> image-character of the guiding image. > > > >> > > > >> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial this > topic > > > may > > > >> become [again] > > > >> > > > >> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this basic > > > >> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these images as > > > >> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images emerge > > > >> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. > > > >> > > > >> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is transcendental] > and > > > is > > > >> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. It > seems > > to > > > >> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. > > > >> > > > >> I also realize this question may already be answered in Vygotsky's > > > writings > > > >> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of XMCA. I > > > >> personally am following this path for now. > > > >> > > > >> Larry > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From glassman.13@osu.edu Tue Dec 2 08:44:37 2014 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2014 16:44:37 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? In-Reply-To: References: <1417397991972.17078@unm.edu> <1417490593837.73384@unm.edu> <1417499588620.61068@unm.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074ADB@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu>, Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074B00@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> I'd be interested in anybody else is. Michael ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 11:39 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? Interloper, Michael? The discussions at UCSD preceeding Don's use of affordances and cognitive artifacts were accompanied by other, related papers. One by Engestrom on "when is an artifact" and one or more by Ed Hutchins. If people are interested in pursuing this thread/topic the materials could be gathered up. mike On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea). He > actually cops to both of them. The first was not to distinguish between > affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which are > designed. I think this is related to the issue of artifacts. Meaning are > artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to be > discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong word, if > anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances. It is a complex > question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes based on > context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one context may > result in organic affordances in another context. > > The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is that he was > not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and constraints. > Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived affordances or are > they designed to create constraints. > > Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the mention > just spurred me to throw this up. Hope I'm not being too much of an > interloper. > > Michael > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > Annalisa- > > I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation not > discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of > affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set against > Gibson's ideas. The change of views coincided with the advent of the d-cog > idea which also has deep roots in chat. > > No hidden history i know of, but interesting connections among the notion > of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion of these > connections can be found, among other places, in > > Cole, M. & Engestr?m, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach to > distributed* > *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition: Psychological and > educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press. > > mike > > > > > > On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > > > Hi Mike, > > > > It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied that > wish! > > > > Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important connections. I was > > not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I learned about > > Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science (1985). > > > > Is there some history that is not part of the common story? > > > > I looked here for clarity: > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance > > > > Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to cognitive > > artifacts? > > > > There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in play, and > > even joy! > > > > When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however until then > > I will remain with the ineffable. > > > > Kind regards, > > > > Annalisa > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > on behalf of mike cole > > Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And, > > co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive artifacts > > right about that time at UCSD. If it were possible to find a source that > > makes these connections visible and available to read about it might be a > > step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of intro > for > > newcomers to the discussion. > > > > I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a newcomer's > > introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is seeking to > sort > > out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am > insuficiently > > read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted! > > > > A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many rocks, so > > little time"! > > > > Mike > > > > A > > > > On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > > > Martin! > > > > > > Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental representation" is > > > coming closer! > > > > > > For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's theory of > > > affordances. > > > > > > This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed article. But > I > > > wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is > important > > > not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. > > > > > > I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a grenade > > > pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the list. If > > you > > > can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look forward to > > your > > > reply, Martin. > > > > > > Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that being at > UCSD > > > and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that influences > your > > > position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find > community > > in > > > it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more voluntary > phrased > > > that way). > > > > > > Kind regards, > > > > > > Annalisa > > > ________________________________________ > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Martin > John > > > Packer > > > > Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > > > An interesting article, David. One way in which it is interesting, to > me > > > at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used, even > > > once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images in the > > > world around us - material representations - and he tries to define the > > > "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg > > > wrote: > > > > > > > Larry, Annalisa: > > > > > > > > People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" when we > > > > met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of > anything > > > > except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe available > > > > for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember > > > > whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the > > > > beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a > > > > non-image based mental representation. > > > > > > > > As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations are > > > > images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. In > > > > fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against > Titchener > > > > and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, > > > > everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated that > > > > many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically anterior > > > > to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would not have > > > > time or ability to process complex problems in real time. > > > > > > > > I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are > > > > genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more reading > > > > to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than I am > > > > (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels like > > > > she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do NOT read > > > > this article--instead, look at Figure 11. > > > > > > > > http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ > > > > > > > > The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure of > > > > Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any actual > > > > images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural > experience > > > > associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then deliberately > > > > frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any > > > > recognizable figures upon which to focus. > > > > > > > > However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine Chapel fresco > > > > for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He or she > > > > can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting and > > > > wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not notice > > > > the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in it. > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar > > > wrote: > > > >> > > > >> Hi Larry and David, > > > >> > > > >> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! > > > >> > > > >> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are at the > > > root of all thinking. > > > >> > > > >> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, based upon > > > previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in > > > combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a phrase I > > like > > > a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it by > the > > > same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it. > > > >> > > > >> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as > Hackett > > > describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have you > > already > > > given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be willing > to > > > take a look. > > > >> > > > >> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is > controversial. > > > It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone says > > "this > > > is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble > observation. > > > >> > > > >> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever that > > > process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at hand? > > Just a > > > thought. > > > >> > > > >> What is it that appeals to you about this model, metaphoricity? > > > >> > > > >> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) > > > >> > > > >> Kind regards, > > > >> > > > >> Annalisa > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> ________________________________________ > > > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Larry > > Purss < > > > lpscholar2@gmail.com > > > > >> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM > > > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity > > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? > > > >> > > > >> David K > > > >> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. My > reason > > > for > > > >> exploring these authors is I have been following a path pursuing a > > basic > > > >> question. > > > >> > > > >> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? > > > >> > > > >> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic guiding > > > images > > > >> upon which thinking rests" > > > >> > > > >> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring appearances > and > > > >> illusions was also exploring this theme. > > > >> > > > >> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new phenomenological > > path > > > >> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names this > > > process > > > >> *metaphoricity*. > > > >> > > > >> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible image-character > > of > > > the > > > >> *spontaneous event* of meaning. > > > >> > > > >> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he > > brackets - > > > >> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. > > > >> > > > >> AND > > > >> > > > >> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* finds the > > > >> meaning of its very self. > > > >> > > > >> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this > > > >> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of > > metaphor > > > can > > > >> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated in > > > >> *objectivity* > > > >> > > > >> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. > > > >> > > > >> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of itself > > *in* > > > the > > > >> mode [path] of the concept > > > >> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding images > has > > > been > > > >> established. > > > >> > > > >> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the path of > > > >> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived from > > the > > > >> image-character of the guiding image. > > > >> > > > >> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial this > topic > > > may > > > >> become [again] > > > >> > > > >> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this basic > > > >> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these images as > > > >> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images emerge > > > >> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. > > > >> > > > >> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is transcendental] > and > > > is > > > >> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. It > seems > > to > > > >> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. > > > >> > > > >> I also realize this question may already be answered in Vygotsky's > > > writings > > > >> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of XMCA. I > > > >> personally am following this path for now. > > > >> > > > >> Larry > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Tue Dec 2 09:35:53 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2014 17:35:53 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074B00@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> References: <1417397991972.17078@unm.edu> <1417490593837.73384@unm.edu> <1417499588620.61068@unm.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074ADB@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074B00@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: I'd take a look. Michael, utility or technical affordance might fit. My equivalent of your perceived/discovered distinction is one of planned and technically manifest. Huw On 2 December 2014 at 16:44, Glassman, Michael wrote: > I'd be interested in anybody else is. > > Michael > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 11:39 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > Interloper, Michael? > > The discussions at UCSD preceeding Don's use of affordances and cognitive > artifacts were accompanied by other, related papers. One by Engestrom on > "when is an artifact" and one or more by Ed Hutchins. If people are > interested in pursuing this thread/topic the materials could be gathered > up. > > mike > > On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Glassman, Michael > wrote: > > > But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea). He > > actually cops to both of them. The first was not to distinguish between > > affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which are > > designed. I think this is related to the issue of artifacts. Meaning > are > > artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to be > > discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong word, if > > anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances. It is a > complex > > question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes based on > > context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one context > may > > result in organic affordances in another context. > > > > The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is that he > was > > not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and > constraints. > > Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived affordances or are > > they designed to create constraints. > > > > Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the mention > > just spurred me to throw this up. Hope I'm not being too much of an > > interloper. > > > > Michael > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > > on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > > Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > Annalisa- > > > > I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation not > > discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of > > affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set against > > Gibson's ideas. The change of views coincided with the advent of the > d-cog > > idea which also has deep roots in chat. > > > > No hidden history i know of, but interesting connections among the > notion > > of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion of these > > connections can be found, among other places, in > > > > Cole, M. & Engestr?m, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach to > > distributed* > > *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition: Psychological > and > > educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press. > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar > wrote: > > > > > > > > Hi Mike, > > > > > > It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied that > > wish! > > > > > > Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important connections. I > was > > > not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I learned > about > > > Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science (1985). > > > > > > Is there some history that is not part of the common story? > > > > > > I looked here for clarity: > > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance > > > > > > Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to > cognitive > > > artifacts? > > > > > > There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in play, > and > > > even joy! > > > > > > When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however until > then > > > I will remain with the ineffable. > > > > > > Kind regards, > > > > > > Annalisa > > > ________________________________________ > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > on behalf of mike cole > > > Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > > > The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And, > > > co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive > artifacts > > > right about that time at UCSD. If it were possible to find a source > that > > > makes these connections visible and available to read about it might > be a > > > step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of intro > > for > > > newcomers to the discussion. > > > > > > I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a > newcomer's > > > introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is seeking to > > sort > > > out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am > > insuficiently > > > read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted! > > > > > > A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many rocks, > so > > > little time"! > > > > > > Mike > > > > > > A > > > > > > On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar > wrote: > > > > > > > Martin! > > > > > > > > Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental representation" > is > > > > coming closer! > > > > > > > > For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's theory > of > > > > affordances. > > > > > > > > This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed article. > But > > I > > > > wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is > > important > > > > not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. > > > > > > > > I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a > grenade > > > > pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the list. > If > > > you > > > > can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look forward to > > > your > > > > reply, Martin. > > > > > > > > Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that being at > > UCSD > > > > and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that influences > > your > > > > position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find > > community > > > in > > > > it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more voluntary > > phrased > > > > that way). > > > > > > > > Kind regards, > > > > > > > > Annalisa > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Martin > > John > > > > Packer > > > > > Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > > > > > An interesting article, David. One way in which it is interesting, to > > me > > > > at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used, > even > > > > once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images in > the > > > > world around us - material representations - and he tries to define > the > > > > "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > Larry, Annalisa: > > > > > > > > > > People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" when > we > > > > > met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of > > anything > > > > > except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe available > > > > > for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember > > > > > whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the > > > > > beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a > > > > > non-image based mental representation. > > > > > > > > > > As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations are > > > > > images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. In > > > > > fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against > > Titchener > > > > > and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, > > > > > everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated that > > > > > many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically > anterior > > > > > to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would not > have > > > > > time or ability to process complex problems in real time. > > > > > > > > > > I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are > > > > > genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more > reading > > > > > to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than I am > > > > > (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels like > > > > > she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do NOT > read > > > > > this article--instead, look at Figure 11. > > > > > > > > > > http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ > > > > > > > > > > The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure of > > > > > Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any actual > > > > > images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural > > experience > > > > > associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then deliberately > > > > > frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any > > > > > recognizable figures upon which to focus. > > > > > > > > > > However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine Chapel > fresco > > > > > for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He or > she > > > > > can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting and > > > > > wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not notice > > > > > the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in it. > > > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > > > On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar > > > > wrote: > > > > >> > > > > >> Hi Larry and David, > > > > >> > > > > >> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! > > > > >> > > > > >> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are at > the > > > > root of all thinking. > > > > >> > > > > >> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, based > upon > > > > previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in > > > > combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a phrase > I > > > like > > > > a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it by > > the > > > > same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it. > > > > >> > > > > >> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as > > Hackett > > > > describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have you > > > already > > > > given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be willing > > to > > > > take a look. > > > > >> > > > > >> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is > > controversial. > > > > It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone says > > > "this > > > > is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble > > observation. > > > > >> > > > > >> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever > that > > > > process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at hand? > > > Just a > > > > thought. > > > > >> > > > > >> What is it that appeals to you about this model, metaphoricity? > > > > >> > > > > >> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) > > > > >> > > > > >> Kind regards, > > > > >> > > > > >> Annalisa > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> ________________________________________ > > > > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Larry > > > Purss < > > > > lpscholar2@gmail.com > > > > > >> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM > > > > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity > > > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? > > > > >> > > > > >> David K > > > > >> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. My > > reason > > > > for > > > > >> exploring these authors is I have been following a path pursuing a > > > basic > > > > >> question. > > > > >> > > > > >> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? > > > > >> > > > > >> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic > guiding > > > > images > > > > >> upon which thinking rests" > > > > >> > > > > >> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring appearances > > and > > > > >> illusions was also exploring this theme. > > > > >> > > > > >> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new phenomenological > > > path > > > > >> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names this > > > > process > > > > >> *metaphoricity*. > > > > >> > > > > >> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible > image-character > > > of > > > > the > > > > >> *spontaneous event* of meaning. > > > > >> > > > > >> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he > > > brackets - > > > > >> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. > > > > >> > > > > >> AND > > > > >> > > > > >> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* finds > the > > > > >> meaning of its very self. > > > > >> > > > > >> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this > > > > >> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of > > > metaphor > > > > can > > > > >> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated in > > > > >> *objectivity* > > > > >> > > > > >> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. > > > > >> > > > > >> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of itself > > > *in* > > > > the > > > > >> mode [path] of the concept > > > > >> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding images > > has > > > > been > > > > >> established. > > > > >> > > > > >> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the path of > > > > >> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived > from > > > the > > > > >> image-character of the guiding image. > > > > >> > > > > >> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial this > > topic > > > > may > > > > >> become [again] > > > > >> > > > > >> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this > basic > > > > >> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these images > as > > > > >> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images emerge > > > > >> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. > > > > >> > > > > >> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is transcendental] > > and > > > > is > > > > >> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. It > > seems > > > to > > > > >> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. > > > > >> > > > > >> I also realize this question may already be answered in Vygotsky's > > > > writings > > > > >> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of XMCA. I > > > > >> personally am following this path for now. > > > > >> > > > > >> Larry > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > From glassman.13@osu.edu Tue Dec 2 09:43:45 2014 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2014 17:43:45 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? In-Reply-To: References: <1417397991972.17078@unm.edu> <1417490593837.73384@unm.edu> <1417499588620.61068@unm.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074ADB@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074B00@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu>, Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074B4E@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Hi Huw, Perceived in Norman's description, not sure I'd be comfortable changing it at this point. Could you explain what you mean by technical? Michael ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Huw Lloyd [huw.softdesigns@gmail.com] Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 12:35 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? I'd take a look. Michael, utility or technical affordance might fit. My equivalent of your perceived/discovered distinction is one of planned and technically manifest. Huw On 2 December 2014 at 16:44, Glassman, Michael wrote: > I'd be interested in anybody else is. > > Michael > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 11:39 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > Interloper, Michael? > > The discussions at UCSD preceeding Don's use of affordances and cognitive > artifacts were accompanied by other, related papers. One by Engestrom on > "when is an artifact" and one or more by Ed Hutchins. If people are > interested in pursuing this thread/topic the materials could be gathered > up. > > mike > > On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Glassman, Michael > wrote: > > > But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea). He > > actually cops to both of them. The first was not to distinguish between > > affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which are > > designed. I think this is related to the issue of artifacts. Meaning > are > > artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to be > > discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong word, if > > anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances. It is a > complex > > question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes based on > > context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one context > may > > result in organic affordances in another context. > > > > The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is that he > was > > not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and > constraints. > > Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived affordances or are > > they designed to create constraints. > > > > Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the mention > > just spurred me to throw this up. Hope I'm not being too much of an > > interloper. > > > > Michael > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > > on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > > Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > Annalisa- > > > > I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation not > > discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of > > affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set against > > Gibson's ideas. The change of views coincided with the advent of the > d-cog > > idea which also has deep roots in chat. > > > > No hidden history i know of, but interesting connections among the > notion > > of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion of these > > connections can be found, among other places, in > > > > Cole, M. & Engestr?m, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach to > > distributed* > > *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition: Psychological > and > > educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press. > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar > wrote: > > > > > > > > Hi Mike, > > > > > > It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied that > > wish! > > > > > > Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important connections. I > was > > > not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I learned > about > > > Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science (1985). > > > > > > Is there some history that is not part of the common story? > > > > > > I looked here for clarity: > > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance > > > > > > Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to > cognitive > > > artifacts? > > > > > > There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in play, > and > > > even joy! > > > > > > When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however until > then > > > I will remain with the ineffable. > > > > > > Kind regards, > > > > > > Annalisa > > > ________________________________________ > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > on behalf of mike cole > > > Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > > > The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And, > > > co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive > artifacts > > > right about that time at UCSD. If it were possible to find a source > that > > > makes these connections visible and available to read about it might > be a > > > step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of intro > > for > > > newcomers to the discussion. > > > > > > I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a > newcomer's > > > introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is seeking to > > sort > > > out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am > > insuficiently > > > read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted! > > > > > > A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many rocks, > so > > > little time"! > > > > > > Mike > > > > > > A > > > > > > On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar > wrote: > > > > > > > Martin! > > > > > > > > Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental representation" > is > > > > coming closer! > > > > > > > > For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's theory > of > > > > affordances. > > > > > > > > This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed article. > But > > I > > > > wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is > > important > > > > not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. > > > > > > > > I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a > grenade > > > > pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the list. > If > > > you > > > > can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look forward to > > > your > > > > reply, Martin. > > > > > > > > Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that being at > > UCSD > > > > and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that influences > > your > > > > position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find > > community > > > in > > > > it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more voluntary > > phrased > > > > that way). > > > > > > > > Kind regards, > > > > > > > > Annalisa > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Martin > > John > > > > Packer > > > > > Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > > > > > An interesting article, David. One way in which it is interesting, to > > me > > > > at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used, > even > > > > once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images in > the > > > > world around us - material representations - and he tries to define > the > > > > "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > Larry, Annalisa: > > > > > > > > > > People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" when > we > > > > > met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of > > anything > > > > > except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe available > > > > > for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember > > > > > whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the > > > > > beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a > > > > > non-image based mental representation. > > > > > > > > > > As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations are > > > > > images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. In > > > > > fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against > > Titchener > > > > > and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, > > > > > everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated that > > > > > many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically > anterior > > > > > to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would not > have > > > > > time or ability to process complex problems in real time. > > > > > > > > > > I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are > > > > > genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more > reading > > > > > to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than I am > > > > > (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels like > > > > > she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do NOT > read > > > > > this article--instead, look at Figure 11. > > > > > > > > > > http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ > > > > > > > > > > The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure of > > > > > Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any actual > > > > > images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural > > experience > > > > > associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then deliberately > > > > > frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any > > > > > recognizable figures upon which to focus. > > > > > > > > > > However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine Chapel > fresco > > > > > for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He or > she > > > > > can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting and > > > > > wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not notice > > > > > the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in it. > > > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > > > On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar > > > > wrote: > > > > >> > > > > >> Hi Larry and David, > > > > >> > > > > >> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! > > > > >> > > > > >> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are at > the > > > > root of all thinking. > > > > >> > > > > >> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, based > upon > > > > previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in > > > > combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a phrase > I > > > like > > > > a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it by > > the > > > > same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it. > > > > >> > > > > >> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as > > Hackett > > > > describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have you > > > already > > > > given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be willing > > to > > > > take a look. > > > > >> > > > > >> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is > > controversial. > > > > It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone says > > > "this > > > > is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble > > observation. > > > > >> > > > > >> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever > that > > > > process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at hand? > > > Just a > > > > thought. > > > > >> > > > > >> What is it that appeals to you about this model, metaphoricity? > > > > >> > > > > >> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) > > > > >> > > > > >> Kind regards, > > > > >> > > > > >> Annalisa > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> ________________________________________ > > > > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Larry > > > Purss < > > > > lpscholar2@gmail.com > > > > > >> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM > > > > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity > > > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? > > > > >> > > > > >> David K > > > > >> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. My > > reason > > > > for > > > > >> exploring these authors is I have been following a path pursuing a > > > basic > > > > >> question. > > > > >> > > > > >> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? > > > > >> > > > > >> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic > guiding > > > > images > > > > >> upon which thinking rests" > > > > >> > > > > >> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring appearances > > and > > > > >> illusions was also exploring this theme. > > > > >> > > > > >> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new phenomenological > > > path > > > > >> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names this > > > > process > > > > >> *metaphoricity*. > > > > >> > > > > >> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible > image-character > > > of > > > > the > > > > >> *spontaneous event* of meaning. > > > > >> > > > > >> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he > > > brackets - > > > > >> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. > > > > >> > > > > >> AND > > > > >> > > > > >> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* finds > the > > > > >> meaning of its very self. > > > > >> > > > > >> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this > > > > >> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of > > > metaphor > > > > can > > > > >> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated in > > > > >> *objectivity* > > > > >> > > > > >> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. > > > > >> > > > > >> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of itself > > > *in* > > > > the > > > > >> mode [path] of the concept > > > > >> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding images > > has > > > > been > > > > >> established. > > > > >> > > > > >> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the path of > > > > >> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived > from > > > the > > > > >> image-character of the guiding image. > > > > >> > > > > >> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial this > > topic > > > > may > > > > >> become [again] > > > > >> > > > > >> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this > basic > > > > >> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these images > as > > > > >> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images emerge > > > > >> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. > > > > >> > > > > >> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is transcendental] > > and > > > > is > > > > >> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. It > > seems > > > to > > > > >> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. > > > > >> > > > > >> I also realize this question may already be answered in Vygotsky's > > > > writings > > > > >> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of XMCA. I > > > > >> personally am following this path for now. > > > > >> > > > > >> Larry > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Dec 2 09:49:14 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2014 09:49:14 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? In-Reply-To: References: <1417397991972.17078@unm.edu> <1417490593837.73384@unm.edu> <1417499588620.61068@unm.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074ADB@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074B00@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: Part of what is interesting about Gibson as a kind of modern origin of the notion of affordances is that he had relatively little to say about culturally materialize affordancess. Hence both Gerry Balzano, a Gibsonian cog sci music maker from Standord, and I, a cultural historical (or cultural historically confused!) psychologist took a heavy beating in the early CHIP seminars. Gibson because he "emptied the head" by focusing on what the head is in, and Vygotsky for thinking that there were problems with the way they thought of the role of culture in human development and this difficulty was getting in their way. It was a productive period at CHIP, as attention to it now indicates. mike On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 9:35 AM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > I'd take a look. > > Michael, utility or technical affordance might fit. My equivalent of your > perceived/discovered distinction is one of planned and technically > manifest. > > Huw > > > On 2 December 2014 at 16:44, Glassman, Michael > wrote: > > > I'd be interested in anybody else is. > > > > Michael > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > > on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > > Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 11:39 AM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > Interloper, Michael? > > > > The discussions at UCSD preceeding Don's use of affordances and cognitive > > artifacts were accompanied by other, related papers. One by Engestrom on > > "when is an artifact" and one or more by Ed Hutchins. If people are > > interested in pursuing this thread/topic the materials could be gathered > > up. > > > > mike > > > > On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Glassman, Michael > > wrote: > > > > > But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea). He > > > actually cops to both of them. The first was not to distinguish > between > > > affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which are > > > designed. I think this is related to the issue of artifacts. Meaning > > are > > > artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to be > > > discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong word, if > > > anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances. It is a > > complex > > > question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes based on > > > context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one context > > may > > > result in organic affordances in another context. > > > > > > The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is that he > > was > > > not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and > > constraints. > > > Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived affordances or > are > > > they designed to create constraints. > > > > > > Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the > mention > > > just spurred me to throw this up. Hope I'm not being too much of an > > > interloper. > > > > > > Michael > > > ________________________________________ > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > ] > > > on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > > > Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > > > Annalisa- > > > > > > I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation not > > > discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of > > > affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set against > > > Gibson's ideas. The change of views coincided with the advent of the > > d-cog > > > idea which also has deep roots in chat. > > > > > > No hidden history i know of, but interesting connections among the > > notion > > > of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion of > these > > > connections can be found, among other places, in > > > > > > Cole, M. & Engestr?m, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach to > > > distributed* > > > *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition: Psychological > > and > > > educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press. > > > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > Hi Mike, > > > > > > > > It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied that > > > wish! > > > > > > > > Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important connections. I > > was > > > > not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I learned > > about > > > > Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science (1985). > > > > > > > > Is there some history that is not part of the common story? > > > > > > > > I looked here for clarity: > > > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance > > > > > > > > Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to > > cognitive > > > > artifacts? > > > > > > > > There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in play, > > and > > > > even joy! > > > > > > > > When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however until > > then > > > > I will remain with the ineffable. > > > > > > > > Kind regards, > > > > > > > > Annalisa > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > > on behalf of mike cole > > > > Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > > > > > The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And, > > > > co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive > > artifacts > > > > right about that time at UCSD. If it were possible to find a source > > that > > > > makes these connections visible and available to read about it might > > be a > > > > step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of > intro > > > for > > > > newcomers to the discussion. > > > > > > > > I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a > > newcomer's > > > > introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is seeking > to > > > sort > > > > out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am > > > insuficiently > > > > read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted! > > > > > > > > A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many > rocks, > > so > > > > little time"! > > > > > > > > Mike > > > > > > > > A > > > > > > > > On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > Martin! > > > > > > > > > > Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental > representation" > > is > > > > > coming closer! > > > > > > > > > > For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's > theory > > of > > > > > affordances. > > > > > > > > > > This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed article. > > But > > > I > > > > > wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is > > > important > > > > > not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. > > > > > > > > > > I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a > > grenade > > > > > pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the list. > > If > > > > you > > > > > can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look forward > to > > > > your > > > > > reply, Martin. > > > > > > > > > > Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that being > at > > > UCSD > > > > > and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that > influences > > > your > > > > > position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find > > > community > > > > in > > > > > it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more voluntary > > > phrased > > > > > that way). > > > > > > > > > > Kind regards, > > > > > > > > > > Annalisa > > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > > > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > Martin > > > John > > > > > Packer > > > > > > Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM > > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > > > > > > > An interesting article, David. One way in which it is interesting, > to > > > me > > > > > at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used, > > even > > > > > once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images in > > the > > > > > world around us - material representations - and he tries to define > > the > > > > > "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. > > > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > Larry, Annalisa: > > > > > > > > > > > > People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" when > > we > > > > > > met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of > > > anything > > > > > > except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe > available > > > > > > for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember > > > > > > whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the > > > > > > beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a > > > > > > non-image based mental representation. > > > > > > > > > > > > As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations > are > > > > > > images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. > In > > > > > > fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against > > > Titchener > > > > > > and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, > > > > > > everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated that > > > > > > many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically > > anterior > > > > > > to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would not > > have > > > > > > time or ability to process complex problems in real time. > > > > > > > > > > > > I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are > > > > > > genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more > > reading > > > > > > to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than I > am > > > > > > (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels like > > > > > > she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do NOT > > read > > > > > > this article--instead, look at Figure 11. > > > > > > > > > > > > http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ > > > > > > > > > > > > The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure of > > > > > > Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any > actual > > > > > > images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural > > > experience > > > > > > associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then > deliberately > > > > > > frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any > > > > > > recognizable figures upon which to focus. > > > > > > > > > > > > However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine Chapel > > fresco > > > > > > for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He or > > she > > > > > > can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting > and > > > > > > wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not > notice > > > > > > the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in > it. > > > > > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > > > > > On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar > > > > > wrote: > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Hi Larry and David, > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! > > > > > >> > > > > > >> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are at > > the > > > > > root of all thinking. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, based > > upon > > > > > previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in > > > > > combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a > phrase > > I > > > > like > > > > > a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it > by > > > the > > > > > same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as > > > Hackett > > > > > describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have you > > > > already > > > > > given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be > willing > > > to > > > > > take a look. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is > > > controversial. > > > > > It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone > says > > > > "this > > > > > is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble > > > observation. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever > > that > > > > > process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at > hand? > > > > Just a > > > > > thought. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> What is it that appeals to you about this model, metaphoricity? > > > > > >> > > > > > >> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Kind regards, > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Annalisa > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> ________________________________________ > > > > > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > > > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Larry > > > > Purss < > > > > > lpscholar2@gmail.com > > > > > > >> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM > > > > > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity > > > > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? > > > > > >> > > > > > >> David K > > > > > >> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. My > > > reason > > > > > for > > > > > >> exploring these authors is I have been following a path > pursuing a > > > > basic > > > > > >> question. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic > > guiding > > > > > images > > > > > >> upon which thinking rests" > > > > > >> > > > > > >> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring > appearances > > > and > > > > > >> illusions was also exploring this theme. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new > phenomenological > > > > path > > > > > >> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names > this > > > > > process > > > > > >> *metaphoricity*. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible > > image-character > > > > of > > > > > the > > > > > >> *spontaneous event* of meaning. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he > > > > brackets - > > > > > >> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> AND > > > > > >> > > > > > >> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* finds > > the > > > > > >> meaning of its very self. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this > > > > > >> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of > > > > metaphor > > > > > can > > > > > >> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated > in > > > > > >> *objectivity* > > > > > >> > > > > > >> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of > itself > > > > *in* > > > > > the > > > > > >> mode [path] of the concept > > > > > >> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding > images > > > has > > > > > been > > > > > >> established. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the path > of > > > > > >> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived > > from > > > > the > > > > > >> image-character of the guiding image. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial this > > > topic > > > > > may > > > > > >> become [again] > > > > > >> > > > > > >> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this > > basic > > > > > >> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these > images > > as > > > > > >> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images emerge > > > > > >> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is > transcendental] > > > and > > > > > is > > > > > >> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. It > > > seems > > > > to > > > > > >> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> I also realize this question may already be answered in > Vygotsky's > > > > > writings > > > > > >> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of > XMCA. I > > > > > >> personally am following this path for now. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Larry > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > an > > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From annalisa@unm.edu Tue Dec 2 09:59:36 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2014 17:59:36 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] The meaning of affordances In-Reply-To: References: <1417397991972.17078@unm.edu> <1417490593837.73384@unm.edu> <1417499588620.61068@unm.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074ADB@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074B00@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu>, Message-ID: <1417543176078.99950@unm.edu> I thought I'd do the honors and start a new thread on affordances, which isn't related to Larry's discussion of basic images. I figured as well to offer Gibson's words on affordances since it is a word he invented to describe something he saw in the world. Of course the life of affordances has been full of controversy, especially with regard to understanding what they are. Gibson's Affordances is a theory I find instrumental to connecting outside to inside experiences and I intuit that it is related to perezhivanie in some fashion. After reading the wikipage more closely, I regret offering a link to the text there because it isn't very clear what Gibson means or what Norman means. To me, a "perceived affordance" is like saying "wet water." In any case, here are 3 quotes of Gibson in his own words, that I could find: The affordances of the environment are what it _offers_ the animal, what it _provides_ or _furnishes_, either for good or ill. The verb "to afford" is found in the dictionary, the noun "affordance" is not. I have made it up. I mean by it something that refers both to the environment and the animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies the complementarity of the animal and the environment (Gibson, 1977/1986). and What is meant by an _affordance_? ?Subject to revision, I suggest that the affordance of anything is a specific combination of the properties of its substance and its surfaces taken with reference to an animal. The reference may be to an animal as distinguished from other species (Gibson, 1977/1986). and An important fact about affordances of the environment is that they are in a sense objective, real, and physical, unlike values and meanings, which are often supposed to be subjective, phenomenal, and mental. But actually, an affordance is neither an objective property nor a subjective property; or it is both if you like. An affordance cuts across the dichotomy of subjective-objective and helps us to understand its inadequacy. It is equally a fact of the environment and a fact of behavior. It is both physical and psychical, yet neither. An affordance points both ways, to the environment and to the observer (Gibson, 1977/1986). These quotes are important to keep in mind, I hope they help. I might also suggest looking at Mace(1977) who described very carefully how Gibson got from stimuli to affordance, given that people on this list value history, learning, and development. Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Huw Lloyd Sent: Tuesday, December 2, 2014 10:35 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? I'd take a look. Michael, utility or technical affordance might fit. My equivalent of your perceived/discovered distinction is one of planned and technically manifest. Huw On 2 December 2014 at 16:44, Glassman, Michael wrote: > I'd be interested in anybody else is. > > Michael > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 11:39 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > Interloper, Michael? > > The discussions at UCSD preceeding Don's use of affordances and cognitive > artifacts were accompanied by other, related papers. One by Engestrom on > "when is an artifact" and one or more by Ed Hutchins. If people are > interested in pursuing this thread/topic the materials could be gathered > up. > > mike > > On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Glassman, Michael > wrote: > > > But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea). He > > actually cops to both of them. The first was not to distinguish between > > affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which are > > designed. I think this is related to the issue of artifacts. Meaning > are > > artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to be > > discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong word, if > > anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances. It is a > complex > > question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes based on > > context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one context > may > > result in organic affordances in another context. > > > > The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is that he > was > > not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and > constraints. > > Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived affordances or are > > they designed to create constraints. > > > > Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the mention > > just spurred me to throw this up. Hope I'm not being too much of an > > interloper. > > > > Michael > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > > on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > > Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > Annalisa- > > > > I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation not > > discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of > > affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set against > > Gibson's ideas. The change of views coincided with the advent of the > d-cog > > idea which also has deep roots in chat. > > > > No hidden history i know of, but interesting connections among the > notion > > of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion of these > > connections can be found, among other places, in > > > > Cole, M. & Engestr?m, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach to > > distributed* > > *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition: Psychological > and > > educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press. > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar > wrote: > > > > > > > > Hi Mike, > > > > > > It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied that > > wish! > > > > > > Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important connections. I > was > > > not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I learned > about > > > Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science (1985). > > > > > > Is there some history that is not part of the common story? > > > > > > I looked here for clarity: > > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance > > > > > > Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to > cognitive > > > artifacts? > > > > > > There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in play, > and > > > even joy! > > > > > > When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however until > then > > > I will remain with the ineffable. > > > > > > Kind regards, > > > > > > Annalisa > > > ________________________________________ > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > on behalf of mike cole > > > Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > > > The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And, > > > co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive > artifacts > > > right about that time at UCSD. If it were possible to find a source > that > > > makes these connections visible and available to read about it might > be a > > > step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of intro > > for > > > newcomers to the discussion. > > > > > > I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a > newcomer's > > > introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is seeking to > > sort > > > out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am > > insuficiently > > > read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted! > > > > > > A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many rocks, > so > > > little time"! > > > > > > Mike > > > > > > A > > > > > > On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar > wrote: > > > > > > > Martin! > > > > > > > > Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental representation" > is > > > > coming closer! > > > > > > > > For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's theory > of > > > > affordances. > > > > > > > > This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed article. > But > > I > > > > wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is > > important > > > > not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. > > > > > > > > I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a > grenade > > > > pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the list. > If > > > you > > > > can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look forward to > > > your > > > > reply, Martin. > > > > > > > > Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that being at > > UCSD > > > > and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that influences > > your > > > > position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find > > community > > > in > > > > it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more voluntary > > phrased > > > > that way). > > > > > > > > Kind regards, > > > > > > > > Annalisa > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Martin > > John > > > > Packer > > > > > Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > > > > > An interesting article, David. One way in which it is interesting, to > > me > > > > at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used, > even > > > > once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images in > the > > > > world around us - material representations - and he tries to define > the > > > > "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > Larry, Annalisa: > > > > > > > > > > People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" when > we > > > > > met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of > > anything > > > > > except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe available > > > > > for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember > > > > > whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the > > > > > beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a > > > > > non-image based mental representation. > > > > > > > > > > As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations are > > > > > images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. In > > > > > fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against > > Titchener > > > > > and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, > > > > > everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated that > > > > > many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically > anterior > > > > > to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would not > have > > > > > time or ability to process complex problems in real time. > > > > > > > > > > I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are > > > > > genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more > reading > > > > > to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than I am > > > > > (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels like > > > > > she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do NOT > read > > > > > this article--instead, look at Figure 11. > > > > > > > > > > http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ > > > > > > > > > > The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure of > > > > > Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any actual > > > > > images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural > > experience > > > > > associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then deliberately > > > > > frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any > > > > > recognizable figures upon which to focus. > > > > > > > > > > However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine Chapel > fresco > > > > > for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He or > she > > > > > can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting and > > > > > wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not notice > > > > > the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in it. > > > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > > > On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar > > > > wrote: > > > > >> > > > > >> Hi Larry and David, > > > > >> > > > > >> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! > > > > >> > > > > >> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are at > the > > > > root of all thinking. > > > > >> > > > > >> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, based > upon > > > > previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in > > > > combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a phrase > I > > > like > > > > a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it by > > the > > > > same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it. > > > > >> > > > > >> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as > > Hackett > > > > describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have you > > > already > > > > given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be willing > > to > > > > take a look. > > > > >> > > > > >> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is > > controversial. > > > > It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone says > > > "this > > > > is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble > > observation. > > > > >> > > > > >> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever > that > > > > process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at hand? > > > Just a > > > > thought. > > > > >> > > > > >> What is it that appeals to you about this model, metaphoricity? > > > > >> > > > > >> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) > > > > >> > > > > >> Kind regards, > > > > >> > > > > >> Annalisa > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> ________________________________________ > > > > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Larry > > > Purss < > > > > lpscholar2@gmail.com > > > > > >> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM > > > > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity > > > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? > > > > >> > > > > >> David K > > > > >> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. My > > reason > > > > for > > > > >> exploring these authors is I have been following a path pursuing a > > > basic > > > > >> question. > > > > >> > > > > >> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? > > > > >> > > > > >> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic > guiding > > > > images > > > > >> upon which thinking rests" > > > > >> > > > > >> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring appearances > > and > > > > >> illusions was also exploring this theme. > > > > >> > > > > >> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new phenomenological > > > path > > > > >> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names this > > > > process > > > > >> *metaphoricity*. > > > > >> > > > > >> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible > image-character > > > of > > > > the > > > > >> *spontaneous event* of meaning. > > > > >> > > > > >> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he > > > brackets - > > > > >> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. > > > > >> > > > > >> AND > > > > >> > > > > >> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* finds > the > > > > >> meaning of its very self. > > > > >> > > > > >> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this > > > > >> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of > > > metaphor > > > > can > > > > >> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated in > > > > >> *objectivity* > > > > >> > > > > >> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. > > > > >> > > > > >> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of itself > > > *in* > > > > the > > > > >> mode [path] of the concept > > > > >> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding images > > has > > > > been > > > > >> established. > > > > >> > > > > >> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the path of > > > > >> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived > from > > > the > > > > >> image-character of the guiding image. > > > > >> > > > > >> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial this > > topic > > > > may > > > > >> become [again] > > > > >> > > > > >> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this > basic > > > > >> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these images > as > > > > >> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images emerge > > > > >> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. > > > > >> > > > > >> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is transcendental] > > and > > > > is > > > > >> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. It > > seems > > > to > > > > >> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. > > > > >> > > > > >> I also realize this question may already be answered in Vygotsky's > > > > writings > > > > >> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of XMCA. I > > > > >> personally am following this path for now. > > > > >> > > > > >> Larry > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Dec 2 10:19:45 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2014 10:19:45 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances In-Reply-To: <1417543176078.99950@unm.edu> References: <1417397991972.17078@unm.edu> <1417490593837.73384@unm.edu> <1417499588620.61068@unm.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074ADB@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074B00@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <1417543176078.99950@unm.edu> Message-ID: Those definitions help a lot Annalisa and touch on the fact that gibson seemed to empty the organism (if one were so inclined to interpret him) and he dismissed culutral mediation as secondary at best. Still, they share the idea that a part of the structure that psychologist theorize as a located inside of individual crania is in fact "our there" in the phylgenetically and cultural-historically constitued environment. And that drove cognitive psychologists, our co discussants, nuts. Until, "they got it" and then sought to mold it to their own ends and pre-existing means. mike On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 9:59 AM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > I thought I'd do the honors and start a new thread on affordances, which > isn't related to Larry's discussion of basic images. > > I figured as well to offer Gibson's words on affordances since it is a > word he invented to describe something he saw in the world. Of course the > life of affordances has been full of controversy, especially with regard to > understanding what they are. > > Gibson's Affordances is a theory I find instrumental to connecting outside > to inside experiences and I intuit that it is related to perezhivanie in > some fashion. > > After reading the wikipage more closely, I regret offering a link to the > text there because it isn't very clear what Gibson means or what Norman > means. To me, a "perceived affordance" is like saying "wet water." > > In any case, here are 3 quotes of Gibson in his own words, that I could > find: > > The affordances of the environment are what it _offers_ the animal, what > it _provides_ or _furnishes_, either for good or ill. The verb "to afford" > is found in the dictionary, the noun "affordance" is not. I have made it > up. I mean by it something that refers both to the environment and the > animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies the complementarity > of the animal and the environment (Gibson, 1977/1986). > > and > > What is meant by an _affordance_? ?Subject to revision, I suggest that the > affordance of anything is a specific combination of the properties of its > substance and its surfaces taken with reference to an animal. The reference > may be to an animal as distinguished from other species (Gibson, 1977/1986). > > and > > An important fact about affordances of the environment is that they are in > a sense objective, real, and physical, unlike values and meanings, which > are often supposed to be subjective, phenomenal, and mental. But actually, > an affordance is neither an objective property nor a subjective property; > or it is both if you like. An affordance cuts across the dichotomy of > subjective-objective and helps us to understand its inadequacy. It is > equally a fact of the environment and a fact of behavior. It is both > physical and psychical, yet neither. An affordance points both ways, to the > environment and to the observer (Gibson, 1977/1986). > > These quotes are important to keep in mind, I hope they help. > > I might also suggest looking at Mace(1977) who described very carefully > how Gibson got from stimuli to affordance, given that people on this list > value history, learning, and development. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > > > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Huw Lloyd > Sent: Tuesday, December 2, 2014 10:35 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > I'd take a look. > > Michael, utility or technical affordance might fit. My equivalent of your > perceived/discovered distinction is one of planned and technically > manifest. > > Huw > > > On 2 December 2014 at 16:44, Glassman, Michael > wrote: > > > I'd be interested in anybody else is. > > > > Michael > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > > on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > > Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 11:39 AM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > Interloper, Michael? > > > > The discussions at UCSD preceeding Don's use of affordances and cognitive > > artifacts were accompanied by other, related papers. One by Engestrom on > > "when is an artifact" and one or more by Ed Hutchins. If people are > > interested in pursuing this thread/topic the materials could be gathered > > up. > > > > mike > > > > On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Glassman, Michael > > wrote: > > > > > But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea). He > > > actually cops to both of them. The first was not to distinguish > between > > > affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which are > > > designed. I think this is related to the issue of artifacts. Meaning > > are > > > artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to be > > > discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong word, if > > > anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances. It is a > > complex > > > question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes based on > > > context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one context > > may > > > result in organic affordances in another context. > > > > > > The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is that he > > was > > > not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and > > constraints. > > > Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived affordances or > are > > > they designed to create constraints. > > > > > > Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the > mention > > > just spurred me to throw this up. Hope I'm not being too much of an > > > interloper. > > > > > > Michael > > > ________________________________________ > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > ] > > > on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > > > Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > > > Annalisa- > > > > > > I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation not > > > discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of > > > affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set against > > > Gibson's ideas. The change of views coincided with the advent of the > > d-cog > > > idea which also has deep roots in chat. > > > > > > No hidden history i know of, but interesting connections among the > > notion > > > of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion of > these > > > connections can be found, among other places, in > > > > > > Cole, M. & Engestr?m, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach to > > > distributed* > > > *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition: Psychological > > and > > > educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press. > > > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > Hi Mike, > > > > > > > > It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied that > > > wish! > > > > > > > > Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important connections. I > > was > > > > not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I learned > > about > > > > Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science (1985). > > > > > > > > Is there some history that is not part of the common story? > > > > > > > > I looked here for clarity: > > > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance > > > > > > > > Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to > > cognitive > > > > artifacts? > > > > > > > > There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in play, > > and > > > > even joy! > > > > > > > > When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however until > > then > > > > I will remain with the ineffable. > > > > > > > > Kind regards, > > > > > > > > Annalisa > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > > on behalf of mike cole > > > > Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > > > > > The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And, > > > > co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive > > artifacts > > > > right about that time at UCSD. If it were possible to find a source > > that > > > > makes these connections visible and available to read about it might > > be a > > > > step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of > intro > > > for > > > > newcomers to the discussion. > > > > > > > > I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a > > newcomer's > > > > introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is seeking > to > > > sort > > > > out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am > > > insuficiently > > > > read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted! > > > > > > > > A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many > rocks, > > so > > > > little time"! > > > > > > > > Mike > > > > > > > > A > > > > > > > > On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > Martin! > > > > > > > > > > Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental > representation" > > is > > > > > coming closer! > > > > > > > > > > For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's > theory > > of > > > > > affordances. > > > > > > > > > > This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed article. > > But > > > I > > > > > wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is > > > important > > > > > not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. > > > > > > > > > > I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a > > grenade > > > > > pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the list. > > If > > > > you > > > > > can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look forward > to > > > > your > > > > > reply, Martin. > > > > > > > > > > Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that being > at > > > UCSD > > > > > and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that > influences > > > your > > > > > position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find > > > community > > > > in > > > > > it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more voluntary > > > phrased > > > > > that way). > > > > > > > > > > Kind regards, > > > > > > > > > > Annalisa > > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > > > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > Martin > > > John > > > > > Packer > > > > > > Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM > > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > > > > > > > An interesting article, David. One way in which it is interesting, > to > > > me > > > > > at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used, > > even > > > > > once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images in > > the > > > > > world around us - material representations - and he tries to define > > the > > > > > "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. > > > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > Larry, Annalisa: > > > > > > > > > > > > People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" when > > we > > > > > > met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of > > > anything > > > > > > except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe > available > > > > > > for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember > > > > > > whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the > > > > > > beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a > > > > > > non-image based mental representation. > > > > > > > > > > > > As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations > are > > > > > > images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. > In > > > > > > fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against > > > Titchener > > > > > > and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, > > > > > > everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated that > > > > > > many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically > > anterior > > > > > > to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would not > > have > > > > > > time or ability to process complex problems in real time. > > > > > > > > > > > > I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are > > > > > > genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more > > reading > > > > > > to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than I > am > > > > > > (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels like > > > > > > she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do NOT > > read > > > > > > this article--instead, look at Figure 11. > > > > > > > > > > > > http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ > > > > > > > > > > > > The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure of > > > > > > Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any > actual > > > > > > images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural > > > experience > > > > > > associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then > deliberately > > > > > > frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any > > > > > > recognizable figures upon which to focus. > > > > > > > > > > > > However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine Chapel > > fresco > > > > > > for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He or > > she > > > > > > can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting > and > > > > > > wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not > notice > > > > > > the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in > it. > > > > > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > > > > > On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar > > > > > wrote: > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Hi Larry and David, > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! > > > > > >> > > > > > >> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are at > > the > > > > > root of all thinking. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, based > > upon > > > > > previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in > > > > > combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a > phrase > > I > > > > like > > > > > a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it > by > > > the > > > > > same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as > > > Hackett > > > > > describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have you > > > > already > > > > > given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be > willing > > > to > > > > > take a look. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is > > > controversial. > > > > > It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone > says > > > > "this > > > > > is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble > > > observation. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever > > that > > > > > process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at > hand? > > > > Just a > > > > > thought. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> What is it that appeals to you about this model, metaphoricity? > > > > > >> > > > > > >> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Kind regards, > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Annalisa > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> ________________________________________ > > > > > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > > > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Larry > > > > Purss < > > > > > lpscholar2@gmail.com > > > > > > >> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM > > > > > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity > > > > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? > > > > > >> > > > > > >> David K > > > > > >> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. My > > > reason > > > > > for > > > > > >> exploring these authors is I have been following a path > pursuing a > > > > basic > > > > > >> question. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic > > guiding > > > > > images > > > > > >> upon which thinking rests" > > > > > >> > > > > > >> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring > appearances > > > and > > > > > >> illusions was also exploring this theme. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new > phenomenological > > > > path > > > > > >> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names > this > > > > > process > > > > > >> *metaphoricity*. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible > > image-character > > > > of > > > > > the > > > > > >> *spontaneous event* of meaning. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he > > > > brackets - > > > > > >> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> AND > > > > > >> > > > > > >> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* finds > > the > > > > > >> meaning of its very self. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this > > > > > >> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of > > > > metaphor > > > > > can > > > > > >> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated > in > > > > > >> *objectivity* > > > > > >> > > > > > >> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of > itself > > > > *in* > > > > > the > > > > > >> mode [path] of the concept > > > > > >> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding > images > > > has > > > > > been > > > > > >> established. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the path > of > > > > > >> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived > > from > > > > the > > > > > >> image-character of the guiding image. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial this > > > topic > > > > > may > > > > > >> become [again] > > > > > >> > > > > > >> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this > > basic > > > > > >> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these > images > > as > > > > > >> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images emerge > > > > > >> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is > transcendental] > > > and > > > > > is > > > > > >> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. It > > > seems > > > > to > > > > > >> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> I also realize this question may already be answered in > Vygotsky's > > > > > writings > > > > > >> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of > XMCA. I > > > > > >> personally am following this path for now. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Larry > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > an > > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From glassman.13@osu.edu Tue Dec 2 10:45:22 2014 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2014 18:45:22 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances In-Reply-To: References: <1417397991972.17078@unm.edu> <1417490593837.73384@unm.edu> <1417499588620.61068@unm.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074ADB@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074B00@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <1417543176078.99950@unm.edu>, Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074C0F@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Hi Annalisa, Mike, Huw I tend to be somebody who reacts better to concrete examples than definitions. I believe this also comes from Gibson's 1977 book, You are walking across a field and come to a stream which you can to get across. You notice a plank across the stream. It is wide enough for you to keep your balance and thick enough to hold your weight, in using it you recognize its affordance as a crossing point. It is the intersection of the movement, the perception of the plank, short term goal of the activity (getting across the stream) - the recognition of the affordance comes in the subjective use of the object (which is why it is neither subjective or objective). It is also important that you have the abilities (the correct weight, the balance) to recognize the affordance, otherwise you pass the plank by. As far as perceived affordance. I think I have this right - the perceived is not in the person who recognizes the affordance (otherwise you are right, that is wet water) it is whether there is an intention in the design of the object. So I create a light switch with the intention of designing it as having a perceived affordance for somebody who wants to switch on a light. As you can see different from the relationship to the plank, where there is no prior design. Here is my question (perhaps answered in the Engestrom paper) The light switch is certainly an artifact, but is the plank? Michael ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 1:19 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances Those definitions help a lot Annalisa and touch on the fact that gibson seemed to empty the organism (if one were so inclined to interpret him) and he dismissed culutral mediation as secondary at best. Still, they share the idea that a part of the structure that psychologist theorize as a located inside of individual crania is in fact "our there" in the phylgenetically and cultural-historically constitued environment. And that drove cognitive psychologists, our co discussants, nuts. Until, "they got it" and then sought to mold it to their own ends and pre-existing means. mike On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 9:59 AM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > I thought I'd do the honors and start a new thread on affordances, which > isn't related to Larry's discussion of basic images. > > I figured as well to offer Gibson's words on affordances since it is a > word he invented to describe something he saw in the world. Of course the > life of affordances has been full of controversy, especially with regard to > understanding what they are. > > Gibson's Affordances is a theory I find instrumental to connecting outside > to inside experiences and I intuit that it is related to perezhivanie in > some fashion. > > After reading the wikipage more closely, I regret offering a link to the > text there because it isn't very clear what Gibson means or what Norman > means. To me, a "perceived affordance" is like saying "wet water." > > In any case, here are 3 quotes of Gibson in his own words, that I could > find: > > The affordances of the environment are what it _offers_ the animal, what > it _provides_ or _furnishes_, either for good or ill. The verb "to afford" > is found in the dictionary, the noun "affordance" is not. I have made it > up. I mean by it something that refers both to the environment and the > animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies the complementarity > of the animal and the environment (Gibson, 1977/1986). > > and > > What is meant by an _affordance_? ?Subject to revision, I suggest that the > affordance of anything is a specific combination of the properties of its > substance and its surfaces taken with reference to an animal. The reference > may be to an animal as distinguished from other species (Gibson, 1977/1986). > > and > > An important fact about affordances of the environment is that they are in > a sense objective, real, and physical, unlike values and meanings, which > are often supposed to be subjective, phenomenal, and mental. But actually, > an affordance is neither an objective property nor a subjective property; > or it is both if you like. An affordance cuts across the dichotomy of > subjective-objective and helps us to understand its inadequacy. It is > equally a fact of the environment and a fact of behavior. It is both > physical and psychical, yet neither. An affordance points both ways, to the > environment and to the observer (Gibson, 1977/1986). > > These quotes are important to keep in mind, I hope they help. > > I might also suggest looking at Mace(1977) who described very carefully > how Gibson got from stimuli to affordance, given that people on this list > value history, learning, and development. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > > > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Huw Lloyd > Sent: Tuesday, December 2, 2014 10:35 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > I'd take a look. > > Michael, utility or technical affordance might fit. My equivalent of your > perceived/discovered distinction is one of planned and technically > manifest. > > Huw > > > On 2 December 2014 at 16:44, Glassman, Michael > wrote: > > > I'd be interested in anybody else is. > > > > Michael > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > > on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > > Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 11:39 AM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > Interloper, Michael? > > > > The discussions at UCSD preceeding Don's use of affordances and cognitive > > artifacts were accompanied by other, related papers. One by Engestrom on > > "when is an artifact" and one or more by Ed Hutchins. If people are > > interested in pursuing this thread/topic the materials could be gathered > > up. > > > > mike > > > > On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Glassman, Michael > > wrote: > > > > > But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea). He > > > actually cops to both of them. The first was not to distinguish > between > > > affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which are > > > designed. I think this is related to the issue of artifacts. Meaning > > are > > > artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to be > > > discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong word, if > > > anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances. It is a > > complex > > > question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes based on > > > context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one context > > may > > > result in organic affordances in another context. > > > > > > The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is that he > > was > > > not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and > > constraints. > > > Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived affordances or > are > > > they designed to create constraints. > > > > > > Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the > mention > > > just spurred me to throw this up. Hope I'm not being too much of an > > > interloper. > > > > > > Michael > > > ________________________________________ > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > ] > > > on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > > > Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > > > Annalisa- > > > > > > I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation not > > > discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of > > > affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set against > > > Gibson's ideas. The change of views coincided with the advent of the > > d-cog > > > idea which also has deep roots in chat. > > > > > > No hidden history i know of, but interesting connections among the > > notion > > > of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion of > these > > > connections can be found, among other places, in > > > > > > Cole, M. & Engestr?m, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach to > > > distributed* > > > *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition: Psychological > > and > > > educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press. > > > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > Hi Mike, > > > > > > > > It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied that > > > wish! > > > > > > > > Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important connections. I > > was > > > > not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I learned > > about > > > > Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science (1985). > > > > > > > > Is there some history that is not part of the common story? > > > > > > > > I looked here for clarity: > > > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance > > > > > > > > Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to > > cognitive > > > > artifacts? > > > > > > > > There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in play, > > and > > > > even joy! > > > > > > > > When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however until > > then > > > > I will remain with the ineffable. > > > > > > > > Kind regards, > > > > > > > > Annalisa > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > > on behalf of mike cole > > > > Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > > > > > The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And, > > > > co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive > > artifacts > > > > right about that time at UCSD. If it were possible to find a source > > that > > > > makes these connections visible and available to read about it might > > be a > > > > step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of > intro > > > for > > > > newcomers to the discussion. > > > > > > > > I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a > > newcomer's > > > > introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is seeking > to > > > sort > > > > out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am > > > insuficiently > > > > read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted! > > > > > > > > A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many > rocks, > > so > > > > little time"! > > > > > > > > Mike > > > > > > > > A > > > > > > > > On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > Martin! > > > > > > > > > > Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental > representation" > > is > > > > > coming closer! > > > > > > > > > > For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's > theory > > of > > > > > affordances. > > > > > > > > > > This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed article. > > But > > > I > > > > > wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is > > > important > > > > > not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. > > > > > > > > > > I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a > > grenade > > > > > pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the list. > > If > > > > you > > > > > can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look forward > to > > > > your > > > > > reply, Martin. > > > > > > > > > > Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that being > at > > > UCSD > > > > > and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that > influences > > > your > > > > > position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find > > > community > > > > in > > > > > it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more voluntary > > > phrased > > > > > that way). > > > > > > > > > > Kind regards, > > > > > > > > > > Annalisa > > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > > > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > Martin > > > John > > > > > Packer > > > > > > Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM > > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > > > > > > > An interesting article, David. One way in which it is interesting, > to > > > me > > > > > at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used, > > even > > > > > once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images in > > the > > > > > world around us - material representations - and he tries to define > > the > > > > > "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. > > > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > Larry, Annalisa: > > > > > > > > > > > > People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" when > > we > > > > > > met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of > > > anything > > > > > > except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe > available > > > > > > for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember > > > > > > whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the > > > > > > beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a > > > > > > non-image based mental representation. > > > > > > > > > > > > As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations > are > > > > > > images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. > In > > > > > > fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against > > > Titchener > > > > > > and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, > > > > > > everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated that > > > > > > many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically > > anterior > > > > > > to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would not > > have > > > > > > time or ability to process complex problems in real time. > > > > > > > > > > > > I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are > > > > > > genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more > > reading > > > > > > to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than I > am > > > > > > (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels like > > > > > > she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do NOT > > read > > > > > > this article--instead, look at Figure 11. > > > > > > > > > > > > http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ > > > > > > > > > > > > The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure of > > > > > > Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any > actual > > > > > > images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural > > > experience > > > > > > associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then > deliberately > > > > > > frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any > > > > > > recognizable figures upon which to focus. > > > > > > > > > > > > However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine Chapel > > fresco > > > > > > for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He or > > she > > > > > > can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting > and > > > > > > wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not > notice > > > > > > the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in > it. > > > > > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > > > > > On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar > > > > > wrote: > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Hi Larry and David, > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! > > > > > >> > > > > > >> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are at > > the > > > > > root of all thinking. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, based > > upon > > > > > previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in > > > > > combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a > phrase > > I > > > > like > > > > > a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it > by > > > the > > > > > same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as > > > Hackett > > > > > describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have you > > > > already > > > > > given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be > willing > > > to > > > > > take a look. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is > > > controversial. > > > > > It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone > says > > > > "this > > > > > is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble > > > observation. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever > > that > > > > > process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at > hand? > > > > Just a > > > > > thought. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> What is it that appeals to you about this model, metaphoricity? > > > > > >> > > > > > >> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Kind regards, > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Annalisa > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> ________________________________________ > > > > > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > > > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Larry > > > > Purss < > > > > > lpscholar2@gmail.com > > > > > > >> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM > > > > > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity > > > > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? > > > > > >> > > > > > >> David K > > > > > >> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. My > > > reason > > > > > for > > > > > >> exploring these authors is I have been following a path > pursuing a > > > > basic > > > > > >> question. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic > > guiding > > > > > images > > > > > >> upon which thinking rests" > > > > > >> > > > > > >> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring > appearances > > > and > > > > > >> illusions was also exploring this theme. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new > phenomenological > > > > path > > > > > >> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names > this > > > > > process > > > > > >> *metaphoricity*. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible > > image-character > > > > of > > > > > the > > > > > >> *spontaneous event* of meaning. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he > > > > brackets - > > > > > >> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> AND > > > > > >> > > > > > >> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* finds > > the > > > > > >> meaning of its very self. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this > > > > > >> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of > > > > metaphor > > > > > can > > > > > >> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated > in > > > > > >> *objectivity* > > > > > >> > > > > > >> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of > itself > > > > *in* > > > > > the > > > > > >> mode [path] of the concept > > > > > >> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding > images > > > has > > > > > been > > > > > >> established. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the path > of > > > > > >> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived > > from > > > > the > > > > > >> image-character of the guiding image. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial this > > > topic > > > > > may > > > > > >> become [again] > > > > > >> > > > > > >> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this > > basic > > > > > >> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these > images > > as > > > > > >> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images emerge > > > > > >> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is > transcendental] > > > and > > > > > is > > > > > >> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. It > > > seems > > > > to > > > > > >> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> I also realize this question may already be answered in > Vygotsky's > > > > > writings > > > > > >> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of > XMCA. I > > > > > >> personally am following this path for now. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Larry > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > an > > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From hshonerd@gmail.com Tue Dec 2 10:49:54 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2014 11:49:54 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? In-Reply-To: <1417490593837.73384@unm.edu> References: <1417397991972.17078@unm.edu> <, > <1417490593837.73384@unm.edu> Message-ID: <9F6BE3D8-123E-4204-B0A3-657EBEE09F53@gmail.com> Peeps, I come late to this, but I was thinking this morning at the bus stop about David K?s narrative of kids learning about light. I though maybe a parallel: Representation = Reflection and Procedural = Refraction. I think of both as imagery, just that representation is sort of nouny and procedural is verby. Procedural imagery involves, depending on the angle of incidence, deviation from the the initial vector. But procedural imagery keeps things on the move. An affordance. I have forgotten my physics, but does refraction slow things down in any way? Henry > On Dec 1, 2014, at 8:23 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > Martin! > > Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental representation" is coming closer! > > For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's theory of affordances. > > This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed article. But I wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is important not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. > > I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a grenade pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the list. If you can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look forward to your reply, Martin. > > Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that being at UCSD and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that influences your position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find community in it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more voluntary phrased that way). > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Martin John Packer > Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > An interesting article, David. One way in which it is interesting, to me at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used, even once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images in the world around us - material representations - and he tries to define the "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. > > Martin > > On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > >> Larry, Annalisa: >> >> People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" when we >> met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of anything >> except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe available >> for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember >> whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the >> beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a >> non-image based mental representation. >> >> As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations are >> images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. In >> fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against Titchener >> and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, >> everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated that >> many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically anterior >> to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would not have >> time or ability to process complex problems in real time. >> >> I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are >> genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more reading >> to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than I am >> (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels like >> she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do NOT read >> this article--instead, look at Figure 11. >> >> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ >> >> The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure of >> Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any actual >> images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural experience >> associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then deliberately >> frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any >> recognizable figures upon which to focus. >> >> However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine Chapel fresco >> for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He or she >> can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting and >> wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not notice >> the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in it. >> >> David Kellogg >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >> On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>> >>> Hi Larry and David, >>> >>> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! >>> >>> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are at the root of all thinking. >>> >>> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, based upon previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a phrase I like a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it by the same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it. >>> >>> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as Hackett describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have you already given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be willing to take a look. >>> >>> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is controversial. It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone says "this is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble observation. >>> >>> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever that process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at hand? Just a thought. >>> >>> What is it that appeals to you about this model, metaphoricity? >>> >>> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) >>> >>> Kind regards, >>> >>> Annalisa >>> >>> >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Larry Purss >>> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? >>> >>> David K >>> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. My reason for >>> exploring these authors is I have been following a path pursuing a basic >>> question. >>> >>> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? >>> >>> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic guiding images >>> upon which thinking rests" >>> >>> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring appearances and >>> illusions was also exploring this theme. >>> >>> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new phenomenological path >>> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names this process >>> *metaphoricity*. >>> >>> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible image-character of the >>> *spontaneous event* of meaning. >>> >>> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he brackets - >>> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. >>> >>> AND >>> >>> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* finds the >>> meaning of its very self. >>> >>> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this >>> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of metaphor can >>> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated in >>> *objectivity* >>> >>> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. >>> >>> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of itself *in* the >>> mode [path] of the concept >>> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding images has been >>> established. >>> >>> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the path of >>> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived from the >>> image-character of the guiding image. >>> >>> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial this topic may >>> become [again] >>> >>> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this basic >>> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these images as >>> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images emerge >>> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. >>> >>> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is transcendental] and is >>> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. It seems to >>> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. >>> >>> I also realize this question may already be answered in Vygotsky's writings >>> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of XMCA. I >>> personally am following this path for now. >>> >>> Larry >>> >> > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Dec 2 11:18:23 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2014 11:18:23 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? In-Reply-To: <9F6BE3D8-123E-4204-B0A3-657EBEE09F53@gmail.com> References: <1417397991972.17078@unm.edu> <1417490593837.73384@unm.edu> <9F6BE3D8-123E-4204-B0A3-657EBEE09F53@gmail.com> Message-ID: I think I am with you on re-fraction rather than re-presentation, Henry. Although there are circumstances in which representation seems an appropriate enough word. I would like to continue the half of the conversation that continued to talk about images (despite their bad rep) and imagination (despite its trendiness). I take the core of the discussion to be about the nature of/existence of/signficicance of "mental images" and their relation (or lack thereof) to the polysemic concept of imagination. To go way back in time (not so far as Wundt and Tichner, but all the way back to 1978) I attach a paper by Stephen Kosslyn that seems relevant to think about images as processes so that the verbiness of imag(ing) is brought to the fore. On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 10:49 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > Peeps, > I come late to this, but I was thinking this morning at the bus stop about > David K?s narrative of kids learning about light. I though maybe a > parallel: Representation = Reflection and Procedural = Refraction. I think > of both as imagery, just that representation is sort of nouny and > procedural is verby. Procedural imagery involves, depending on the angle of > incidence, deviation from the the initial vector. But procedural imagery > keeps things on the move. An affordance. I have forgotten my physics, but > does refraction slow things down in any way? > Henry > > > On Dec 1, 2014, at 8:23 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > > Martin! > > > > Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental representation" is > coming closer! > > > > For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's theory of > affordances. > > > > This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed article. But I > wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is important > not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. > > > > I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a grenade > pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the list. If you > can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look forward to your > reply, Martin. > > > > Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that being at > UCSD and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that influences > your position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find > community in it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more > voluntary phrased that way). > > > > Kind regards, > > > > Annalisa > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Martin John Packer > > Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > An interesting article, David. One way in which it is interesting, to me > at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used, even > once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images in the > world around us - material representations - and he tries to define the > "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. > > > > Martin > > > > On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > >> Larry, Annalisa: > >> > >> People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" when we > >> met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of anything > >> except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe available > >> for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember > >> whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the > >> beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a > >> non-image based mental representation. > >> > >> As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations are > >> images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. In > >> fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against Titchener > >> and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, > >> everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated that > >> many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically anterior > >> to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would not have > >> time or ability to process complex problems in real time. > >> > >> I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are > >> genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more reading > >> to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than I am > >> (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels like > >> she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do NOT read > >> this article--instead, look at Figure 11. > >> > >> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ > >> > >> The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure of > >> Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any actual > >> images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural experience > >> associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then deliberately > >> frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any > >> recognizable figures upon which to focus. > >> > >> However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine Chapel fresco > >> for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He or she > >> can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting and > >> wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not notice > >> the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in it. > >> > >> David Kellogg > >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >> > >> On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >>> > >>> Hi Larry and David, > >>> > >>> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! > >>> > >>> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are at the > root of all thinking. > >>> > >>> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, based upon > previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in > combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a phrase I like > a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it by the > same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it. > >>> > >>> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as Hackett > describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have you already > given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be willing to > take a look. > >>> > >>> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is controversial. > It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone says "this > is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble observation. > >>> > >>> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever that > process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at hand? Just a > thought. > >>> > >>> What is it that appeals to you about this model, metaphoricity? > >>> > >>> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) > >>> > >>> Kind regards, > >>> > >>> Annalisa > >>> > >>> > >>> ________________________________________ > >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Larry Purss > >>> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM > >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? > >>> > >>> David K > >>> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. My reason > for > >>> exploring these authors is I have been following a path pursuing a > basic > >>> question. > >>> > >>> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? > >>> > >>> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic guiding > images > >>> upon which thinking rests" > >>> > >>> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring appearances and > >>> illusions was also exploring this theme. > >>> > >>> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new phenomenological path > >>> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names this > process > >>> *metaphoricity*. > >>> > >>> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible image-character > of the > >>> *spontaneous event* of meaning. > >>> > >>> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he brackets > - > >>> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. > >>> > >>> AND > >>> > >>> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* finds the > >>> meaning of its very self. > >>> > >>> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this > >>> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of > metaphor can > >>> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated in > >>> *objectivity* > >>> > >>> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. > >>> > >>> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of itself > *in* the > >>> mode [path] of the concept > >>> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding images has > been > >>> established. > >>> > >>> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the path of > >>> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived from the > >>> image-character of the guiding image. > >>> > >>> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial this topic > may > >>> become [again] > >>> > >>> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this basic > >>> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these images as > >>> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images emerge > >>> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. > >>> > >>> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is transcendental] and > is > >>> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. It seems > to > >>> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. > >>> > >>> I also realize this question may already be answered in Vygotsky's > writings > >>> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of XMCA. I > >>> personally am following this path for now. > >>> > >>> Larry > >>> > >> > > > > > > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: dev.image1.&cit%3Apub=Developmental+Psychology&cit%3Avol=10&cit%3Aiss=5&cit%3Apg=716&cit%3Adate=Sep+1974&ic=true&c Type: application/octet-stream Size: 435167 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141202/db7baef9/attachment-0001.obj From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Dec 2 11:22:16 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2014 11:22:16 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? In-Reply-To: References: <1417397991972.17078@unm.edu> <1417490593837.73384@unm.edu> <9F6BE3D8-123E-4204-B0A3-657EBEE09F53@gmail.com> Message-ID: Oopps! Send the wrong paper. Sort of interesting but afield. Here is the Kosslyn paper i meant to send. mike On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 11:18 AM, mike cole wrote: > I think I am with you on re-fraction rather than re-presentation, Henry. > Although there are circumstances in which representation seems an > appropriate enough word. > > I would like to continue the half of the conversation that continued to > talk about images (despite their bad rep) and imagination (despite its > trendiness). > > I take the core of the discussion to be about the nature of/existence > of/signficicance of "mental images" and their relation (or lack thereof) to > the polysemic concept of imagination. > > To go way back in time (not so far as Wundt and Tichner, but all the way > back to 1978) I attach a paper by Stephen Kosslyn that seems relevant to > think about images as processes so that the verbiness of imag(ing) is > brought to the fore. > > > On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 10:49 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >> Peeps, >> I come late to this, but I was thinking this morning at the bus stop >> about David K?s narrative of kids learning about light. I though maybe a >> parallel: Representation = Reflection and Procedural = Refraction. I think >> of both as imagery, just that representation is sort of nouny and >> procedural is verby. Procedural imagery involves, depending on the angle of >> incidence, deviation from the the initial vector. But procedural imagery >> keeps things on the move. An affordance. I have forgotten my physics, but >> does refraction slow things down in any way? >> Henry >> >> > On Dec 1, 2014, at 8:23 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> > >> > Martin! >> > >> > Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental representation" is >> coming closer! >> > >> > For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's theory of >> affordances. >> > >> > This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed article. But >> I wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is important >> not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. >> > >> > I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a grenade >> pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the list. If you >> can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look forward to your >> reply, Martin. >> > >> > Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that being at >> UCSD and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that influences >> your position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find >> community in it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more >> voluntary phrased that way). >> > >> > Kind regards, >> > >> > Annalisa >> > ________________________________________ >> > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> on behalf of Martin John Packer >> > Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM >> > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >> > >> > An interesting article, David. One way in which it is interesting, to >> me at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used, even >> once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images in the >> world around us - material representations - and he tries to define the >> "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. >> > >> > Martin >> > >> > On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >> > >> >> Larry, Annalisa: >> >> >> >> People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" when we >> >> met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of anything >> >> except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe available >> >> for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember >> >> whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the >> >> beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a >> >> non-image based mental representation. >> >> >> >> As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations are >> >> images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. In >> >> fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against Titchener >> >> and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, >> >> everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated that >> >> many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically anterior >> >> to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would not have >> >> time or ability to process complex problems in real time. >> >> >> >> I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are >> >> genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more reading >> >> to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than I am >> >> (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels like >> >> she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do NOT read >> >> this article--instead, look at Figure 11. >> >> >> >> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ >> >> >> >> The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure of >> >> Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any actual >> >> images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural experience >> >> associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then deliberately >> >> frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any >> >> recognizable figures upon which to focus. >> >> >> >> However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine Chapel fresco >> >> for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He or she >> >> can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting and >> >> wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not notice >> >> the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in it. >> >> >> >> David Kellogg >> >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >> >> >> On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar >> wrote: >> >>> >> >>> Hi Larry and David, >> >>> >> >>> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! >> >>> >> >>> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are at the >> root of all thinking. >> >>> >> >>> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, based upon >> previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in >> combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a phrase I like >> a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it by the >> same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it. >> >>> >> >>> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as Hackett >> describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have you already >> given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be willing to >> take a look. >> >>> >> >>> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is >> controversial. It is likely controversial because no one likes it when >> someone says "this is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my >> humble observation. >> >>> >> >>> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever that >> process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at hand? Just a >> thought. >> >>> >> >>> What is it that appeals to you about this model, metaphoricity? >> >>> >> >>> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) >> >>> >> >>> Kind regards, >> >>> >> >>> Annalisa >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> ________________________________________ >> >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> on behalf of Larry Purss < >> lpscholar2@gmail.com> >> >>> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM >> >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity >> >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? >> >>> >> >>> David K >> >>> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. My >> reason for >> >>> exploring these authors is I have been following a path pursuing a >> basic >> >>> question. >> >>> >> >>> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? >> >>> >> >>> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic guiding >> images >> >>> upon which thinking rests" >> >>> >> >>> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring appearances and >> >>> illusions was also exploring this theme. >> >>> >> >>> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new phenomenological >> path >> >>> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names this >> process >> >>> *metaphoricity*. >> >>> >> >>> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible image-character >> of the >> >>> *spontaneous event* of meaning. >> >>> >> >>> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he >> brackets - >> >>> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. >> >>> >> >>> AND >> >>> >> >>> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* finds the >> >>> meaning of its very self. >> >>> >> >>> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this >> >>> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of >> metaphor can >> >>> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated in >> >>> *objectivity* >> >>> >> >>> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. >> >>> >> >>> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of itself >> *in* the >> >>> mode [path] of the concept >> >>> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding images has >> been >> >>> established. >> >>> >> >>> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the path of >> >>> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived from >> the >> >>> image-character of the guiding image. >> >>> >> >>> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial this >> topic may >> >>> become [again] >> >>> >> >>> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this basic >> >>> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these images as >> >>> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images emerge >> >>> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. >> >>> >> >>> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is transcendental] >> and is >> >>> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. It seems >> to >> >>> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. >> >>> >> >>> I also realize this question may already be answered in Vygotsky's >> writings >> >>> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of XMCA. I >> >>> personally am following this path for now. >> >>> >> >>> Larry >> >>> >> >> >> > >> > >> > >> >> >> > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: kosslyn.image2.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 1208487 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141202/a59bb9d8/attachment-0001.pdf From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Dec 2 11:26:46 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2014 11:26:46 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074C0F@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> References: <1417397991972.17078@unm.edu> <1417490593837.73384@unm.edu> <1417499588620.61068@unm.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074ADB@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074B00@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <1417543176078.99950@unm.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074C0F@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: My view? The plank is for certain an artifact, no less than the light bulb. On what grounds, or under what circumstances, would you classify it otherwise? What's gained, what's lost? mike On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > Hi Annalisa, Mike, Huw > > I tend to be somebody who reacts better to concrete examples than > definitions. I believe this also comes from Gibson's 1977 book, > > You are walking across a field and come to a stream which you can to get > across. You notice a plank across the stream. It is wide enough for you > to keep your balance and thick enough to hold your weight, in using it you > recognize its affordance as a crossing point. It is the intersection of > the movement, the perception of the plank, short term goal of the activity > (getting across the stream) - the recognition of the affordance comes in > the subjective use of the object (which is why it is neither subjective or > objective). It is also important that you have the abilities (the correct > weight, the balance) to recognize the affordance, otherwise you pass the > plank by. > > As far as perceived affordance. I think I have this right - the perceived > is not in the person who recognizes the affordance (otherwise you are > right, that is wet water) it is whether there is an intention in the design > of the object. So I create a light switch with the intention of designing > it as having a perceived affordance for somebody who wants to switch on a > light. As you can see different from the relationship to the plank, where > there is no prior design. > > Here is my question (perhaps answered in the Engestrom paper) > > The light switch is certainly an artifact, but is the plank? > > Michael > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 1:19 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances > > Those definitions help a lot Annalisa and touch on the fact that gibson > seemed to empty the organism (if one were so inclined to interpret him) and > he dismissed culutral mediation as secondary at best. Still, they share the > idea that a part of the structure that psychologist theorize as a located > inside of individual crania is in fact "our there" in the phylgenetically > and cultural-historically constitued environment. And that drove cognitive > psychologists, our co discussants, nuts. Until, "they got it" and then > sought to mold it to their own ends and pre-existing means. > mike > > On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 9:59 AM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > I thought I'd do the honors and start a new thread on affordances, which > > isn't related to Larry's discussion of basic images. > > > > I figured as well to offer Gibson's words on affordances since it is a > > word he invented to describe something he saw in the world. Of course the > > life of affordances has been full of controversy, especially with regard > to > > understanding what they are. > > > > Gibson's Affordances is a theory I find instrumental to connecting > outside > > to inside experiences and I intuit that it is related to perezhivanie in > > some fashion. > > > > After reading the wikipage more closely, I regret offering a link to the > > text there because it isn't very clear what Gibson means or what Norman > > means. To me, a "perceived affordance" is like saying "wet water." > > > > In any case, here are 3 quotes of Gibson in his own words, that I could > > find: > > > > The affordances of the environment are what it _offers_ the animal, what > > it _provides_ or _furnishes_, either for good or ill. The verb "to > afford" > > is found in the dictionary, the noun "affordance" is not. I have made it > > up. I mean by it something that refers both to the environment and the > > animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies the > complementarity > > of the animal and the environment (Gibson, 1977/1986). > > > > and > > > > What is meant by an _affordance_? ?Subject to revision, I suggest that > the > > affordance of anything is a specific combination of the properties of its > > substance and its surfaces taken with reference to an animal. The > reference > > may be to an animal as distinguished from other species (Gibson, > 1977/1986). > > > > and > > > > An important fact about affordances of the environment is that they are > in > > a sense objective, real, and physical, unlike values and meanings, which > > are often supposed to be subjective, phenomenal, and mental. But > actually, > > an affordance is neither an objective property nor a subjective property; > > or it is both if you like. An affordance cuts across the dichotomy of > > subjective-objective and helps us to understand its inadequacy. It is > > equally a fact of the environment and a fact of behavior. It is both > > physical and psychical, yet neither. An affordance points both ways, to > the > > environment and to the observer (Gibson, 1977/1986). > > > > These quotes are important to keep in mind, I hope they help. > > > > I might also suggest looking at Mace(1977) who described very carefully > > how Gibson got from stimuli to affordance, given that people on this list > > value history, learning, and development. > > > > Kind regards, > > > > Annalisa > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > on behalf of Huw Lloyd > > Sent: Tuesday, December 2, 2014 10:35 AM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > I'd take a look. > > > > Michael, utility or technical affordance might fit. My equivalent of > your > > perceived/discovered distinction is one of planned and technically > > manifest. > > > > Huw > > > > > > On 2 December 2014 at 16:44, Glassman, Michael > > wrote: > > > > > I'd be interested in anybody else is. > > > > > > Michael > > > ________________________________________ > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > ] > > > on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > > > Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 11:39 AM > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > > > Interloper, Michael? > > > > > > The discussions at UCSD preceeding Don's use of affordances and > cognitive > > > artifacts were accompanied by other, related papers. One by Engestrom > on > > > "when is an artifact" and one or more by Ed Hutchins. If people are > > > interested in pursuing this thread/topic the materials could be > gathered > > > up. > > > > > > mike > > > > > > On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Glassman, Michael > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea). He > > > > actually cops to both of them. The first was not to distinguish > > between > > > > affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which are > > > > designed. I think this is related to the issue of artifacts. > Meaning > > > are > > > > artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to be > > > > discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong word, > if > > > > anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances. It is a > > > complex > > > > question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes based > on > > > > context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one > context > > > may > > > > result in organic affordances in another context. > > > > > > > > The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is that > he > > > was > > > > not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and > > > constraints. > > > > Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived affordances or > > are > > > > they designed to create constraints. > > > > > > > > Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the > > mention > > > > just spurred me to throw this up. Hope I'm not being too much of an > > > > interloper. > > > > > > > > Michael > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > ] > > > > on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > > > > Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > > > > > Annalisa- > > > > > > > > I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation > not > > > > discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of > > > > affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set against > > > > Gibson's ideas. The change of views coincided with the advent of the > > > d-cog > > > > idea which also has deep roots in chat. > > > > > > > > No hidden history i know of, but interesting connections among the > > > notion > > > > of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion of > > these > > > > connections can be found, among other places, in > > > > > > > > Cole, M. & Engestr?m, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach to > > > > distributed* > > > > *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition: > Psychological > > > and > > > > educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press. > > > > > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Hi Mike, > > > > > > > > > > It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied > that > > > > wish! > > > > > > > > > > Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important connections. > I > > > was > > > > > not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I learned > > > about > > > > > Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science > (1985). > > > > > > > > > > Is there some history that is not part of the common story? > > > > > > > > > > I looked here for clarity: > > > > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance > > > > > > > > > > Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to > > > cognitive > > > > > artifacts? > > > > > > > > > > There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in > play, > > > and > > > > > even joy! > > > > > > > > > > When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however > until > > > then > > > > > I will remain with the ineffable. > > > > > > > > > > Kind regards, > > > > > > > > > > Annalisa > > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > > > > on behalf of mike cole > > > > > Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM > > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > > > > > > > The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And, > > > > > co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive > > > artifacts > > > > > right about that time at UCSD. If it were possible to find a > source > > > that > > > > > makes these connections visible and available to read about it > might > > > be a > > > > > step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of > > intro > > > > for > > > > > newcomers to the discussion. > > > > > > > > > > I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a > > > newcomer's > > > > > introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is seeking > > to > > > > sort > > > > > out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am > > > > insuficiently > > > > > read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted! > > > > > > > > > > A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many > > rocks, > > > so > > > > > little time"! > > > > > > > > > > Mike > > > > > > > > > > A > > > > > > > > > > On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > Martin! > > > > > > > > > > > > Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental > > representation" > > > is > > > > > > coming closer! > > > > > > > > > > > > For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's > > theory > > > of > > > > > > affordances. > > > > > > > > > > > > This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed > article. > > > But > > > > I > > > > > > wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is > > > > important > > > > > > not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. > > > > > > > > > > > > I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a > > > grenade > > > > > > pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the > list. > > > If > > > > > you > > > > > > can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look > forward > > to > > > > > your > > > > > > reply, Martin. > > > > > > > > > > > > Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that being > > at > > > > UCSD > > > > > > and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that > > influences > > > > your > > > > > > position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find > > > > community > > > > > in > > > > > > it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more voluntary > > > > phrased > > > > > > that way). > > > > > > > > > > > > Kind regards, > > > > > > > > > > > > Annalisa > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > > > > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > > Martin > > > > John > > > > > > Packer > > > > > > > Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM > > > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > > > > > > > > > An interesting article, David. One way in which it is > interesting, > > to > > > > me > > > > > > at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used, > > > even > > > > > > once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images > in > > > the > > > > > > world around us - material representations - and he tries to > define > > > the > > > > > > "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. > > > > > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > > > On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > Larry, Annalisa: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" > when > > > we > > > > > > > met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of > > > > anything > > > > > > > except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe > > available > > > > > > > for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember > > > > > > > whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the > > > > > > > beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a > > > > > > > non-image based mental representation. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations > > are > > > > > > > images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. > > In > > > > > > > fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against > > > > Titchener > > > > > > > and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, > > > > > > > everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated > that > > > > > > > many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically > > > anterior > > > > > > > to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would > not > > > have > > > > > > > time or ability to process complex problems in real time. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are > > > > > > > genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more > > > reading > > > > > > > to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than > I > > am > > > > > > > (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels > like > > > > > > > she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do > NOT > > > read > > > > > > > this article--instead, look at Figure 11. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ > > > > > > > > > > > > > > The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure > of > > > > > > > Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any > > actual > > > > > > > images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural > > > > experience > > > > > > > associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then > > deliberately > > > > > > > frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any > > > > > > > recognizable figures upon which to focus. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine Chapel > > > fresco > > > > > > > for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He > or > > > she > > > > > > > can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting > > and > > > > > > > wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not > > notice > > > > > > > the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in > > it. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar < > annalisa@unm.edu > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> Hi Larry and David, > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are > at > > > the > > > > > > root of all thinking. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, > based > > > upon > > > > > > previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in > > > > > > combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a > > phrase > > > I > > > > > like > > > > > > a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it > > by > > > > the > > > > > > same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as > > > > Hackett > > > > > > describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have > you > > > > > already > > > > > > given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be > > willing > > > > to > > > > > > take a look. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is > > > > controversial. > > > > > > It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone > > says > > > > > "this > > > > > > is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble > > > > observation. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever > > > that > > > > > > process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at > > hand? > > > > > Just a > > > > > > thought. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> What is it that appeals to you about this model, > metaphoricity? > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> Kind regards, > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> Annalisa > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> ________________________________________ > > > > > > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > > > > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > Larry > > > > > Purss < > > > > > > lpscholar2@gmail.com > > > > > > > >> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM > > > > > > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity > > > > > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> David K > > > > > > >> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. > My > > > > reason > > > > > > for > > > > > > >> exploring these authors is I have been following a path > > pursuing a > > > > > basic > > > > > > >> question. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic > > > guiding > > > > > > images > > > > > > >> upon which thinking rests" > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring > > appearances > > > > and > > > > > > >> illusions was also exploring this theme. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new > > phenomenological > > > > > path > > > > > > >> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names > > this > > > > > > process > > > > > > >> *metaphoricity*. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible > > > image-character > > > > > of > > > > > > the > > > > > > >> *spontaneous event* of meaning. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he > > > > > brackets - > > > > > > >> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> AND > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* > finds > > > the > > > > > > >> meaning of its very self. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this > > > > > > >> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of > > > > > metaphor > > > > > > can > > > > > > >> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated > > in > > > > > > >> *objectivity* > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of > > itself > > > > > *in* > > > > > > the > > > > > > >> mode [path] of the concept > > > > > > >> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding > > images > > > > has > > > > > > been > > > > > > >> established. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the > path > > of > > > > > > >> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived > > > from > > > > > the > > > > > > >> image-character of the guiding image. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial > this > > > > topic > > > > > > may > > > > > > >> become [again] > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this > > > basic > > > > > > >> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these > > images > > > as > > > > > > >> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images > emerge > > > > > > >> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is > > transcendental] > > > > and > > > > > > is > > > > > > >> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. > It > > > > seems > > > > > to > > > > > > >> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> I also realize this question may already be answered in > > Vygotsky's > > > > > > writings > > > > > > >> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of > > XMCA. I > > > > > > >> personally am following this path for now. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> Larry > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > > an > > > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > an > > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Tue Dec 2 11:36:47 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2014 19:36:47 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? In-Reply-To: References: <1417397991972.17078@unm.edu> <1417490593837.73384@unm.edu> <9F6BE3D8-123E-4204-B0A3-657EBEE09F53@gmail.com> Message-ID: <33EBE126-8039-464F-951B-E656D6A7715D@uniandes.edu.co> Mike, I don't know whether you agree with me, but I'd say that "mental images" are examples of the "simulations" that Larry Barsalou has been studying. Barsalou is one of the proponents of "grounded cognition": here is the abstract from one of his papers: "Grounded cognition rejects traditional views that cognition is computation on amodal symbols in a modular system, independent of the brain?s modal systems for perception, action, and introspection. Instead, grounded cognition proposes that modal simulations, bodily states, and situated action underlie cognition. Accumulating behavioral and neural evidence supporting this view is reviewed from research on perception, memory, knowledge, language, thought, so- cial cognition, and development. Theories of grounded cognition are also reviewed, as are origins of the area and common misperceptions of it. Theoretical, empirical, and methodological issues are raised whose future treatment is likely to affect the growth and impact of grounded cognition." (Available here:) In my view, LSV helps us break away from the core assumption of cognitive psychology: that the brain (and or mind) operates with *amodal* 'mental' representations ('amodal' simply means independent of the perceptual modalities of sight, sound, touch, etc.). That assumption leads into intractable dualism, and into exactly the problems that LSV described. But certainly we can create *modal* simulations, as LSV knew well - 'inner' speech is one example (though it's still not clear what goes on in the brain when we do this). Grounded cognition is one of the new turns in psychology that I think aligns well with cultural psychology/CHAT. Perhaps Barsalou was in contact with the folk at UCSD? Martin On Dec 2, 2014, at 2:18 PM, mike cole wrote: > I think I am with you on re-fraction rather than re-presentation, Henry. > Although there are circumstances in which representation seems an > appropriate enough word. > > I would like to continue the half of the conversation that continued to > talk about images (despite their bad rep) and imagination (despite its > trendiness). > > I take the core of the discussion to be about the nature of/existence > of/signficicance of "mental images" and their relation (or lack thereof) to > the polysemic concept of imagination. > > To go way back in time (not so far as Wundt and Tichner, but all the way > back to 1978) I attach a paper by Stephen Kosslyn that seems relevant to > think about images as processes so that the verbiness of imag(ing) is > brought to the fore. > > > On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 10:49 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >> Peeps, >> I come late to this, but I was thinking this morning at the bus stop about >> David K?s narrative of kids learning about light. I though maybe a >> parallel: Representation = Reflection and Procedural = Refraction. I think >> of both as imagery, just that representation is sort of nouny and >> procedural is verby. Procedural imagery involves, depending on the angle of >> incidence, deviation from the the initial vector. But procedural imagery >> keeps things on the move. An affordance. I have forgotten my physics, but >> does refraction slow things down in any way? >> Henry >> >>> On Dec 1, 2014, at 8:23 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>> >>> Martin! >>> >>> Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental representation" is >> coming closer! >>> >>> For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's theory of >> affordances. >>> >>> This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed article. But I >> wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is important >> not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. >>> >>> I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a grenade >> pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the list. If you >> can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look forward to your >> reply, Martin. >>> >>> Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that being at >> UCSD and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that influences >> your position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find >> community in it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more >> voluntary phrased that way). >>> >>> Kind regards, >>> >>> Annalisa >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> on behalf of Martin John Packer >>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>> >>> An interesting article, David. One way in which it is interesting, to me >> at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used, even >> once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images in the >> world around us - material representations - and he tries to define the >> "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >>> >>>> Larry, Annalisa: >>>> >>>> People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" when we >>>> met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of anything >>>> except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe available >>>> for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember >>>> whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the >>>> beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a >>>> non-image based mental representation. >>>> >>>> As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations are >>>> images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. In >>>> fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against Titchener >>>> and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, >>>> everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated that >>>> many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically anterior >>>> to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would not have >>>> time or ability to process complex problems in real time. >>>> >>>> I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are >>>> genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more reading >>>> to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than I am >>>> (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels like >>>> she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do NOT read >>>> this article--instead, look at Figure 11. >>>> >>>> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ >>>> >>>> The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure of >>>> Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any actual >>>> images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural experience >>>> associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then deliberately >>>> frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any >>>> recognizable figures upon which to focus. >>>> >>>> However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine Chapel fresco >>>> for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He or she >>>> can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting and >>>> wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not notice >>>> the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in it. >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>> >>>> On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Hi Larry and David, >>>>> >>>>> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! >>>>> >>>>> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are at the >> root of all thinking. >>>>> >>>>> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, based upon >> previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in >> combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a phrase I like >> a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it by the >> same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it. >>>>> >>>>> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as Hackett >> describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have you already >> given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be willing to >> take a look. >>>>> >>>>> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is controversial. >> It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone says "this >> is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble observation. >>>>> >>>>> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever that >> process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at hand? Just a >> thought. >>>>> >>>>> What is it that appeals to you about this model, metaphoricity? >>>>> >>>>> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) >>>>> >>>>> Kind regards, >>>>> >>>>> Annalisa >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> on behalf of Larry Purss >>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? >>>>> >>>>> David K >>>>> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. My reason >> for >>>>> exploring these authors is I have been following a path pursuing a >> basic >>>>> question. >>>>> >>>>> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? >>>>> >>>>> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic guiding >> images >>>>> upon which thinking rests" >>>>> >>>>> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring appearances and >>>>> illusions was also exploring this theme. >>>>> >>>>> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new phenomenological path >>>>> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names this >> process >>>>> *metaphoricity*. >>>>> >>>>> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible image-character >> of the >>>>> *spontaneous event* of meaning. >>>>> >>>>> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he brackets >> - >>>>> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. >>>>> >>>>> AND >>>>> >>>>> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* finds the >>>>> meaning of its very self. >>>>> >>>>> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this >>>>> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of >> metaphor can >>>>> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated in >>>>> *objectivity* >>>>> >>>>> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. >>>>> >>>>> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of itself >> *in* the >>>>> mode [path] of the concept >>>>> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding images has >> been >>>>> established. >>>>> >>>>> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the path of >>>>> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived from the >>>>> image-character of the guiding image. >>>>> >>>>> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial this topic >> may >>>>> become [again] >>>>> >>>>> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this basic >>>>> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these images as >>>>> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images emerge >>>>> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. >>>>> >>>>> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is transcendental] and >> is >>>>> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. It seems >> to >>>>> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. >>>>> >>>>> I also realize this question may already be answered in Vygotsky's >> writings >>>>> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of XMCA. I >>>>> personally am following this path for now. >>>>> >>>>> Larry >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > From Dana.Walker@unco.edu Tue Dec 2 11:40:50 2014 From: Dana.Walker@unco.edu (Walker, Dana) Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2014 19:40:50 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: "The political" and "power" in learning In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: Helena, yes i remembered the disappeared students from the teachers college in ayuntzinapa after sending the post. Democracynow.org has had excellent coverage including the history of repression of rural teachers colleges by the Mexican state, and the relationship to u.s. policy of war on drugs. I wonder what conditions are created for teaching and learning in these areas ? Sent from my iPhone > On Dec 1, 2014, at 9:21 PM, Helena Worthen wrote: > > Dana -- > > Thanks for linking Hong Kong (students) Ferguson and Oakland (following the murder of Oscar Grant, I assume; young Black men). And let's include the 43 disappeared students at the teacher training school in Iguala, Mexico. Those students were enrolled at one of the rural teacher training schools that date back into the Mexican revolution and take on politics and power directly. > > This is the best reporting of the 43 Disappeareds that I've seen in the US. It's very close to what La Jornada was publishing in early November. > > http://www.vice.com/video/the-missing-43-mexicos-disappeared-students-full-length-678 > > > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > >> On Dec 1, 2014, at 5:45 PM, Walker, Dana wrote: >> >> Hi Miguel, >> >> I would be very interested in continuing this thread on "the political" >> and "power" in learning. My participation will be slow, as I will be at >> the LRA conference in Florida and then finals and so on, but will follow >> with interest. I have changed thread title in anticipation of pursuing >> this exploration. >> >> Does Ferguson (or Oakland, or New York, or Hong Kong, or Cairo) matter in >> considerations of 'the political' and 'power' in learning (and teaching)? >> >> Dana >> >> On 11/28/14 5:07 PM, "Zavala, Miguel" >> wrote: >> >>> Hi Dana, >>> >>> I believe there are several ways to go with an analysis of "the political" >>> or "power" in learning. First, is to search for its >>> articulation/theorization in existing studies (whether conceptual or >>> empirical) within the learning sciences more generally. Who has attempted >>> this work? Also, In the general absence of studies theorizing "the >>> political" or "power" in learning (which I gather is an accurate depiction >>> of the field), one might pursue the ways in which "context" is narrowly >>> framed in distinct frames/theories of learning. In what ways does/can >>> CHAT enable the analysis of "the political" and "power" in learning? >>> >>> Now, due to time constraints, this project may take time; perhaps there is >>> a smaller group that would like to continue with this thread/exploration >>> of "the political" or "power" in learning. I place questions of politics >>> and power in quotation marks because they need to be unpacked, like many >>> concepts. >>> >>> I believe there is another route one can take, and that is to begin with >>> our own political biographies, how we view the world and its >>> transformation. In a sense, we all have our biographies of coming to CHAT. >>> How is CHAT a tool in our practical work (as educators, >>> action-researchers, community organizers, etc.)? Because processes are >>> relational, I imagine that our own biographies, positionalities, and >>> standpoints (which function more like collective consciousness and >>> practices, borrowing here from the work of Sandra Harding) are not only >>> inflected in our appropriations of CHAT but are interwoven; they shift >>> from "external" to "internal" processes of of both research and praxis >>> (informed by our politics). I recognize there are many points being made >>> here and "dangers", especially when one views learning as a-political or >>> mechanistic, but I take that risk. >>> >>> Attached is a chapter outlining my political philosophy. It was published >>> as part of a text that asked contributors to name our "pedagogic creeds" >>> (? la Dewey). >>> >>> -Miguel >>> >>> >>>> On 11/27/14 8:12 AM, "Walker, Dana" wrote: >>>> >>>> Gracias Miguel, and Mike and Larry for responding and for moving forward >>>> this thread of thought begun by Annalisa. >>>> >>>> Miguel, I remember now (based on a conference presentation of yours years >>>> ago) that your pedagogical and theoretical work involving migrant >>>> students >>>> at UCLA addressed questions of power, subjectivity, and embodied selves >>>> in >>>> boundary crossing processes in ways that other CHAT theorists (e.g., >>>> Tuomi-Grohn & Engestrom, 2003; Grossen & Zittoun, 2012) do not. I wonder >>>> if this is a place where we could begin exploring the question of power >>>> in >>>> relation to learning and development? Is there an article of yours that >>>> you might suggest on this subject? >>>> >>>> Dana >>>> >>>> >>>> On 11/27/14 12:02 AM, "Zavala, Miguel" >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Gracias Annalisa and Dana. >>>>> >>>>> Questions of power have always been central to my work and I am a new >>>>> member of this list (and community) and don't have a broader context as >>>>> to >>>>> why it was created and whether it is by design meant to grow in its own >>>>> way over time, etc. What I have noticed though is a tendency to focus on >>>>> conceptual clarity (of the work of Vygotsky and Cultural Historical >>>>> Activity Theory and prior, such as Marx). So, I am learning anew in this >>>>> space, taking notes, re-reading. In many ways it reminds me of the CHAT >>>>> reading group many of us at UCLA visualized but never materialized >>>>> formally, except that our reading and writing the world with Vygotsky's >>>>> ideas (and others) did materialize in the beautiful pedagogical work we >>>>> did with migrant students at that time... >>>>> >>>>> I hope the question of how we use, expand, enrich, re-envision, and >>>>> carry >>>>> forward the ideas of Vygotsky (and how these intersect with or >>>>> interweave >>>>> with power) are considered in an open and non-controlled way. By >>>>> "non-controlled" I mean the parallel tendency in particular >>>>> circles/communities to challenge work that grows out of particular ideas >>>>> and if those ideas do not adhere to some party-line (or experts on said >>>>> theory don't agree on it) then such work should not define itself as >>>>> "Vygotskian", "CHAT-based", or "Socio-Cultural," etc. My own motivation >>>>> to >>>>> chime in and contribute would increase if we followed this strand, that >>>>> looks at power and how it is integral to (not a 'factor' or 'external' >>>>> context) learning? Although the reading group orientation is still >>>>> useful. >>>>> >>>>> Warmly, >>>>> >>>>> Miguel Zavala >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> On 11/26/14 10:38 PM, "Walker, Dana" wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Before we leave this topic, I would like to suggest that we pause to >>>>>> consider Annalisa's question: >>>>>> >>>>>> I'm curious how others have been inspired by Vygotsky and >>>>>> sociocultural theory, and even other manifestations of his ideas, such >>>>>> as >>>>>> CHAT, etc and how people are using these approaches in their work. What >>>>>> is >>>>>> that like for you? And to be more specific, what is that like for women >>>>>> and >>>>>> people of color? I'm also interested in thinking-out-loud with others >>>>>> about >>>>>> Vygotskian concepts that are not easy to understand; to employ in real >>>>>> time >>>>>> dialogue and social interaction to leap over zopeds together. Isn't >>>>>> that >>>>>> what a listserv is for? Or am I being too idealistic? >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> For many years I have wondered why the participants on this list so >>>>>> seldom >>>>>> talk from contextualized positions, specifically positioning the self >>>>>> in >>>>>> relation to others and to power relations shaped by race, class, >>>>>> gender, >>>>>> and so on. I am myself very aware of power relations being played out >>>>>> through the discursive positioning of people in this space, which is >>>>>> why >>>>>> I >>>>>> choose not to speak. I am wondering if any of the subscribers to this >>>>>> list >>>>>> are interested such questions, including the one framed by Annalisa >>>>>> above? >>>>>> Kris Gutierrez is the only one I know of in CHAT/sociocultural theory >>>>>> who >>>>>> deals with these issues, for example in her article "Developing a >>>>>> Sociocritical Literacy in the Third Space"(2008). But I'm sure there >>>>>> are >>>>>> others. >>>>>> >>>>>> Dana >>>>>> >>>>>>> On 11/26/14 10:49 PM, "Carol Macdonald" wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Hi >>>>>>> >>>>>>> There have been some off list postings about this phenomenon. None of >>>>>>> it >>>>>>> complimentary. This cannot be sorted out in one move. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I propose that we move onto a different thread - topic. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Mike, would you like to start us off on something new? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Carol >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 27 November 2014 at 02:49, Martin John Packer >>>>>>> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy, if you're going to retire, then retire. But don't aim one or >>>>>>>> two >>>>>>>> more underhand blows behind the feint of retiring. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Nov 26, 2014, at 7:24 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Well this bloke will retire again at this point. I thought for a >>>>>>>> brief >>>>>>>> moment there, I thought we had a breakthrough. Certainly, Huw's >>>>>>>> "real >>>>>>>> illusion" is perfectly apt to my mind (it's an expression Marx >>>>>>>> uses), >>>>>>>> or >>>>>>>> in Eric Fromm's words, an illusion with "survival value." Martin >>>>>>>> says >>>>>>>> "Consciousness is an objective process that *sometimes* can *give >>>>>>>> rise >>>>>>>> to* >>>>>>>> illusions." As Vygotsky says "For him psychology is partly >>>>>>>> phenomenology." >>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> --------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>>>>> - >>>>>>>> - >>>>>>>> - >>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Bruce Robinson wrote: >>>>>>>>>> Henry, >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Your wife's question leads to another: who speaks for the silent >>>>>>>> majority, many of whom, like me, must be getting fed up with what >>>>>>>> David >>>>>>>> K >>>>>>>> calls a "rather blokish struggle for power over particular words'? >>>>>>>> [Not >>>>>>>> Richard Nixon :)] >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Bruce R >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> PS: You may also note that I have not changed the subject heading >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>> this message so that it bears no relation to the content. Something >>>>>>>> else I >>>>>>>> find irritating... >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On 26/11/2014 17:16, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> Sister Analisa, >>>>>>>>>>> Thank you for responding! I was just talking to my wife (getting >>>>>>>> personal!) about the chat. She asked me, "How does anyone get to >>>>>>>> participate in the (XMCA) chat if only a few people take part?" I >>>>>>>> wondered >>>>>>>> in my email below if too much was expected of written communication >>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> XMCA chat. With 800 people potentially taking turns, well...what is >>>>>>>> even >>>>>>>> possible logistically? Mike Cole has talked about this, and, I >>>>>>>> think, >>>>>>>> has >>>>>>>> some suggestions on how to deal with the bottlenecking. But even >>>>>>>> small >>>>>>>> scale communication can be daunting. I watched, with my wife, a >>>>>>>> Richard >>>>>>>> Linklater movie last night, "Before Midnight". Two people, face to >>>>>>>> face, in >>>>>>>> a totally committed relationship, smart people, good people, trying >>>>>>>> so >>>>>>>> hard >>>>>>>> to get it right. Always a work in progress. But it's worth it. The >>>>>>>> alternative is despair. I am sure of this: This chat, which seems to >>>>>>>> get >>>>>>>> bogged down in abstractions, pure thinking in the mud, is really >>>>>>>> consequential beyond the sensitivities of academics. I said we >>>>>>>>>> va >>>>>>>>>>> lue Vygotsky's "heroism", but that's too macho. I should have >>>>>>>> said >>>>>>>> courage. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> The Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis is a powerful idea, often >>>>>>>> called >>>>>>>> the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis. Google it. Really. See what you think. >>>>>>>> One >>>>>>>> gauge of the power of an idea is if it has found its way into >>>>>>>> popular >>>>>>>> discourse. I just this morning heard an NPR radio program (thanks >>>>>>>> again >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>> my wife, who was listening when she heard something she thought I >>>>>>>> would >>>>>>>> be >>>>>>>> interested in) that dealt with the Whorf/Sapir hypothesis in its >>>>>>>> strong >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>> weak form. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Nov 25, 2014, at 10:11 PM, Annalisa Aguilar >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Dear Henry, >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Thank you for your reply. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I don't think being personal (or even personable) requires >>>>>>>> being >>>>>>>> heated. Does this have to do with my comment of warmth as a sign of >>>>>>>> welcome? >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> To speak about culture non-personally is not something I am >>>>>>>> adept >>>>>>>> at >>>>>>>> doing. We are always speaking from where we stand, the culture that >>>>>>>> we >>>>>>>> are >>>>>>>> in or from, what-have-you. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Respectfully, I do not know what "linguistic relativity >>>>>>>> hypothesis" >>>>>>>> is. So please be patient with me while I connect this academic idea >>>>>>>> you >>>>>>>> have offered to this conversation so that I can relate that to my >>>>>>>> personal >>>>>>>> experience speaking on this thread, though clearly I'm not speaking >>>>>>>> literally right now, but it is speech from me, not a sock puppet >>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>> my >>>>>>>> voice thrown from the position of objective reality. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> You are talking about speaking two languages. But it seems we >>>>>>>> are >>>>>>>> all >>>>>>>> speaking English on this list. So I'm a bit lost right there what >>>>>>>> you >>>>>>>> are >>>>>>>> trying to say to me. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Then, you speak of metalinguistics and how it represents >>>>>>>> different >>>>>>>> worldviews, if you don't mind me swapping your use of "perspective" >>>>>>>> for >>>>>>>> worldview. There is a lot of time clearing muckups to get it right. >>>>>>>> I'm >>>>>>>> not >>>>>>>> sure that it ever gets right though, which troubles me. I have found >>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>> many people who have different worldviews communicate by "talking >>>>>>>> to," >>>>>>>> rather than "talking at." I feel, for example, you and I are talking >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>> one >>>>>>>> another, despite our likely different POVs. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I don't know what the "perish and dapple of Andy" means when >>>>>>>> you >>>>>>>> say >>>>>>>> that. From what I can tell he's trying to define something for >>>>>>>> himself >>>>>>>> asking for the help of others. That's fine and I'm learning that >>>>>>>> definitions are very bas-relief for him. I think my interests are a >>>>>>>> little >>>>>>>> different. So I'd prefer to orient to my interests, if that is OK. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Speaking of metalinguistics, rather than debate over >>>>>>>> definitions, >>>>>>>> I'm >>>>>>>> more interested in speaking to the very different people who are on >>>>>>>> this >>>>>>>> list. The rumor is there are 800 folks out there. Where are you? :) >>>>>>>> To >>>>>>>> reference a highly academic quote from the Wizard of Oz: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> "Come out, come out wherever you are, and meet the young lady >>>>>>>> who >>>>>>>> fell from the star!" >>>>>>>>>>>> --Glinda, the Good Witch from the North (waves magic wand) >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I'm curious how others have been inspired by Vygotsky and >>>>>>>> sociocultural theory, and even other manifestations of his ideas, >>>>>>>> such >>>>>>>> as >>>>>>>> CHAT, etc and how people are using these approaches in their work. >>>>>>>> What >>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>> that like for you? And to be more specific, what is that like for >>>>>>>> women >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>> people of color? I'm also interested in thinking-out-loud with >>>>>>>> others >>>>>>>> about >>>>>>>> Vygotskian concepts that are not easy to understand; to employ in >>>>>>>> real >>>>>>>> time >>>>>>>> dialogue and social interaction to leap over zopeds together. Isn't >>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>> what a listserv is for? Or am I being too idealistic? >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I have tried to speak in an open, easy, and immediate manner, >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>> allow others to engage. But I fear that engagement is never going to >>>>>>>> happen >>>>>>>> because all that persists are conversations about definitions, or >>>>>>>> whether >>>>>>>> nothing can come from nothing, and voila! subsequent debates ensue. >>>>>>>> Or >>>>>>>> someone will say, "We already discussed this 20 years ago!" Which >>>>>>>> means >>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>> missed the party, I suppose. Unfortunately, if I disagree with a >>>>>>>> position >>>>>>>> because I interpret differently, then I'm told to go read something >>>>>>>> without >>>>>>>> really a clear explanation why I'm supposed to go read something. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I don't really agree with the approach of "read this," as an >>>>>>>> academic >>>>>>>> argument. Anyone is free to use it, and I have myself, but because I >>>>>>>> know >>>>>>>> how obtuse that can be, I couch it with my reasons why I think it >>>>>>>> would >>>>>>>> be >>>>>>>> a good read for that person, and what I think there is learn from >>>>>>>> reading. >>>>>>>> I think the "read this" approach, when it is offered with the tone >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>> "now >>>>>>>> go eat your vegetables!" fails in the making of speech between >>>>>>>> people. >>>>>>>> All >>>>>>>> it does is shut things down. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> If the reading truly is relevant, it seems far more productive >>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> moment of speech to cue a person what to look for, to supply a >>>>>>>> context, >>>>>>>> especially when referencing an entire book, for example, or the link >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>> an >>>>>>>> entire website full of texts. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Your assessment in the physicality of language is something >>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>> which I am completely in agreement. Especially since we all seem to >>>>>>>> agree >>>>>>>> with the material aspects of language. So the question at hand is a >>>>>>>> matter >>>>>>>> of form. Form has an aesthetic but also has a purpose. Are we >>>>>>>> throwing >>>>>>>> ropes or throwing boulders? If throwing boulders, where does that >>>>>>>> need >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>> throw boulders come from? If throwing ropes, then at least >>>>>>>> connections >>>>>>>> are >>>>>>>> being made for those who might not be very clear about ideas and who >>>>>>>> may >>>>>>>> require a helping hand. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Then there's the old, but handy, elliptical comment, something >>>>>>>> like a >>>>>>>> boomerang... meant to be subtle or ironic at the expense of someone >>>>>>>> who >>>>>>>> may >>>>>>>> not understand. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> At this point, I'd to emphasize that being ignorant is not >>>>>>>> being >>>>>>>> stupid, but it seems someone who is ignorant is frequently treated >>>>>>>> as >>>>>>>> stupid (um, on this list). This "phenomenon" has made me reflect >>>>>>>> upon >>>>>>>> how >>>>>>>> little time is spent upon the nature of ignorance in education and >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> dynamics of ignorance in speaking. Every one of us is ignorant about >>>>>>>> most >>>>>>>> things in the world. And yet being ignorant is seen as an >>>>>>>> embarrassment, a >>>>>>>> deficiency, a lapse in character. I vehemently disagree with this >>>>>>>> reception >>>>>>>> to ignorance. Even Einstein said something like, "The more I know, >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> more >>>>>>>> I see how much I don't know." Such an aggressive position toward >>>>>>>> ignorance >>>>>>>> is nothing but hurtful, even arrogant. Arrogance is a blister, a >>>>>>>> defense >>>>>>>> mechanism from previous hurt. A person who is honest about one's own >>>>>>>> ignorance is a very strong person and is showing a willingness to >>>>>>>> learn >>>>>>>> something. I think all teachers will agree that a person who knows >>>>>>>> one >>>>>>>> doesn't know is an easier student to teach tha >>>>>>>>>> n >>>>>>>>>>> one who doesn't know one doesn't know. >>>>>>>>>>>> Iconicity is something I can hang my hat on. I see it is >>>>>>>> related >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>> pointing. What I like about pointing is that it is a gesture, which >>>>>>>> implies >>>>>>>> movement, in the way the word is also movement. I hope I have made >>>>>>>> sufficient personal connections to your concepts without the heat. >>>>>>>> Thank >>>>>>>> you for offering them to me. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>>>>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Tue Dec 2 11:52:47 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2014 19:52:47 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074B4E@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> References: <1417397991972.17078@unm.edu> <1417490593837.73384@unm.edu> <1417499588620.61068@unm.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074ADB@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074B00@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074B4E@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: On 2 December 2014 at 17:43, Glassman, Michael wrote: > Hi Huw, > > Perceived in Norman's description, not sure I'd be comfortable changing it > at this point. Could you explain what you mean by technical? > Yes. In this sense pertaining to the etymological origins: http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=techno-&allowed_in_frame=0 techno- [image: Look up techno- at Dictionary.com] word-forming element meaning "art, craft, skill," later "technical, technology," from Latinized form of Greek tekhno-, combining form of tekhne "art, skill, craft in work; method, system, an art, a system or method of making or doing," from PIE *teks-na- "craft" (of weaving or fabricating), from suffixed form of root *teks- "to weave, fabricate, make" (cognates: Sanskrit taksan "carpenter," Greek tekton "carpenter," Latin texere "to weave;" see texture (n.)). Huw > Michael > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > on behalf of Huw Lloyd [huw.softdesigns@gmail.com] > Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 12:35 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > I'd take a look. > > Michael, utility or technical affordance might fit. My equivalent of your > perceived/discovered distinction is one of planned and technically > manifest. > > Huw > > > On 2 December 2014 at 16:44, Glassman, Michael > wrote: > > > I'd be interested in anybody else is. > > > > Michael > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > > on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > > Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 11:39 AM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > Interloper, Michael? > > > > The discussions at UCSD preceeding Don's use of affordances and cognitive > > artifacts were accompanied by other, related papers. One by Engestrom on > > "when is an artifact" and one or more by Ed Hutchins. If people are > > interested in pursuing this thread/topic the materials could be gathered > > up. > > > > mike > > > > On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Glassman, Michael > > wrote: > > > > > But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea). He > > > actually cops to both of them. The first was not to distinguish > between > > > affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which are > > > designed. I think this is related to the issue of artifacts. Meaning > > are > > > artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to be > > > discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong word, if > > > anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances. It is a > > complex > > > question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes based on > > > context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one context > > may > > > result in organic affordances in another context. > > > > > > The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is that he > > was > > > not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and > > constraints. > > > Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived affordances or > are > > > they designed to create constraints. > > > > > > Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the > mention > > > just spurred me to throw this up. Hope I'm not being too much of an > > > interloper. > > > > > > Michael > > > ________________________________________ > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > ] > > > on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > > > Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > > > Annalisa- > > > > > > I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation not > > > discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of > > > affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set against > > > Gibson's ideas. The change of views coincided with the advent of the > > d-cog > > > idea which also has deep roots in chat. > > > > > > No hidden history i know of, but interesting connections among the > > notion > > > of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion of > these > > > connections can be found, among other places, in > > > > > > Cole, M. & Engestr?m, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach to > > > distributed* > > > *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition: Psychological > > and > > > educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press. > > > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > Hi Mike, > > > > > > > > It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied that > > > wish! > > > > > > > > Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important connections. I > > was > > > > not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I learned > > about > > > > Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science (1985). > > > > > > > > Is there some history that is not part of the common story? > > > > > > > > I looked here for clarity: > > > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance > > > > > > > > Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to > > cognitive > > > > artifacts? > > > > > > > > There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in play, > > and > > > > even joy! > > > > > > > > When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however until > > then > > > > I will remain with the ineffable. > > > > > > > > Kind regards, > > > > > > > > Annalisa > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > > on behalf of mike cole > > > > Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > > > > > The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And, > > > > co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive > > artifacts > > > > right about that time at UCSD. If it were possible to find a source > > that > > > > makes these connections visible and available to read about it might > > be a > > > > step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of > intro > > > for > > > > newcomers to the discussion. > > > > > > > > I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a > > newcomer's > > > > introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is seeking > to > > > sort > > > > out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am > > > insuficiently > > > > read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted! > > > > > > > > A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many > rocks, > > so > > > > little time"! > > > > > > > > Mike > > > > > > > > A > > > > > > > > On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > Martin! > > > > > > > > > > Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental > representation" > > is > > > > > coming closer! > > > > > > > > > > For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's > theory > > of > > > > > affordances. > > > > > > > > > > This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed article. > > But > > > I > > > > > wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is > > > important > > > > > not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. > > > > > > > > > > I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a > > grenade > > > > > pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the list. > > If > > > > you > > > > > can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look forward > to > > > > your > > > > > reply, Martin. > > > > > > > > > > Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that being > at > > > UCSD > > > > > and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that > influences > > > your > > > > > position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find > > > community > > > > in > > > > > it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more voluntary > > > phrased > > > > > that way). > > > > > > > > > > Kind regards, > > > > > > > > > > Annalisa > > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > > > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > Martin > > > John > > > > > Packer > > > > > > Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM > > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > > > > > > > An interesting article, David. One way in which it is interesting, > to > > > me > > > > > at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used, > > even > > > > > once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images in > > the > > > > > world around us - material representations - and he tries to define > > the > > > > > "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. > > > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > Larry, Annalisa: > > > > > > > > > > > > People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" when > > we > > > > > > met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of > > > anything > > > > > > except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe > available > > > > > > for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember > > > > > > whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the > > > > > > beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a > > > > > > non-image based mental representation. > > > > > > > > > > > > As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations > are > > > > > > images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. > In > > > > > > fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against > > > Titchener > > > > > > and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, > > > > > > everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated that > > > > > > many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically > > anterior > > > > > > to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would not > > have > > > > > > time or ability to process complex problems in real time. > > > > > > > > > > > > I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are > > > > > > genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more > > reading > > > > > > to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than I > am > > > > > > (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels like > > > > > > she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do NOT > > read > > > > > > this article--instead, look at Figure 11. > > > > > > > > > > > > http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ > > > > > > > > > > > > The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure of > > > > > > Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any > actual > > > > > > images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural > > > experience > > > > > > associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then > deliberately > > > > > > frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any > > > > > > recognizable figures upon which to focus. > > > > > > > > > > > > However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine Chapel > > fresco > > > > > > for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He or > > she > > > > > > can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting > and > > > > > > wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not > notice > > > > > > the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in > it. > > > > > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > > > > > On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar > > > > > wrote: > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Hi Larry and David, > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! > > > > > >> > > > > > >> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are at > > the > > > > > root of all thinking. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, based > > upon > > > > > previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in > > > > > combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a > phrase > > I > > > > like > > > > > a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it > by > > > the > > > > > same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as > > > Hackett > > > > > describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have you > > > > already > > > > > given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be > willing > > > to > > > > > take a look. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is > > > controversial. > > > > > It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone > says > > > > "this > > > > > is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble > > > observation. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever > > that > > > > > process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at > hand? > > > > Just a > > > > > thought. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> What is it that appeals to you about this model, metaphoricity? > > > > > >> > > > > > >> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Kind regards, > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Annalisa > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> ________________________________________ > > > > > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > > > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Larry > > > > Purss < > > > > > lpscholar2@gmail.com > > > > > > >> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM > > > > > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity > > > > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? > > > > > >> > > > > > >> David K > > > > > >> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. My > > > reason > > > > > for > > > > > >> exploring these authors is I have been following a path > pursuing a > > > > basic > > > > > >> question. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic > > guiding > > > > > images > > > > > >> upon which thinking rests" > > > > > >> > > > > > >> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring > appearances > > > and > > > > > >> illusions was also exploring this theme. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new > phenomenological > > > > path > > > > > >> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names > this > > > > > process > > > > > >> *metaphoricity*. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible > > image-character > > > > of > > > > > the > > > > > >> *spontaneous event* of meaning. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he > > > > brackets - > > > > > >> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> AND > > > > > >> > > > > > >> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* finds > > the > > > > > >> meaning of its very self. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this > > > > > >> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of > > > > metaphor > > > > > can > > > > > >> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated > in > > > > > >> *objectivity* > > > > > >> > > > > > >> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of > itself > > > > *in* > > > > > the > > > > > >> mode [path] of the concept > > > > > >> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding > images > > > has > > > > > been > > > > > >> established. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the path > of > > > > > >> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived > > from > > > > the > > > > > >> image-character of the guiding image. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial this > > > topic > > > > > may > > > > > >> become [again] > > > > > >> > > > > > >> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this > > basic > > > > > >> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these > images > > as > > > > > >> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images emerge > > > > > >> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is > transcendental] > > > and > > > > > is > > > > > >> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. It > > > seems > > > > to > > > > > >> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> I also realize this question may already be answered in > Vygotsky's > > > > > writings > > > > > >> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of > XMCA. I > > > > > >> personally am following this path for now. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Larry > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > an > > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Dec 2 12:01:21 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2014 12:01:21 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? In-Reply-To: <33EBE126-8039-464F-951B-E656D6A7715D@uniandes.edu.co> References: <1417397991972.17078@unm.edu> <1417490593837.73384@unm.edu> <9F6BE3D8-123E-4204-B0A3-657EBEE09F53@gmail.com> <33EBE126-8039-464F-951B-E656D6A7715D@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: I think that my current and changing views are consistent with Barsalou, Martin. I come at this from Alexander Suvorov's charactrization of imagination as "rising off of the world and returning to it again" (he was blind & deaf, a circumstance that seems relevant to his characterization of the process. A process, through time, and where you land is not where you began, even if you are trying to jump exactly the same way twice. To me kosslyn results I attached earlier have always been thought provoking about images and imagination as process. mike mike. On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 11:36 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: > Mike, > > I don't know whether you agree with me, but I'd say that "mental images" > are examples of the "simulations" that Larry Barsalou has been studying. > Barsalou is one of the proponents of "grounded cognition": here is the > abstract from one of his papers: > > "Grounded cognition rejects traditional views that cognition is > computation on amodal symbols in a modular system, independent of the > brain?s modal systems for perception, action, and introspection. Instead, > grounded cognition proposes that modal simulations, bodily states, and > situated action underlie cognition. Accumulating behavioral and neural > evidence supporting this view is reviewed from research on perception, > memory, knowledge, language, thought, so- cial cognition, and development. > Theories of grounded cognition are also reviewed, as are origins of the > area and common misperceptions of it. Theoretical, empirical, and > methodological issues are raised whose future treatment is likely to affect > the growth and impact of grounded cognition." > > (Available here:) > < > http://www.cogsci.ucsd.edu/~ajyu/Teaching/Cogs202_sp12/Readings/barsalou08_grounded.pdf > > > > In my view, LSV helps us break away from the core assumption of cognitive > psychology: that the brain (and or mind) operates with *amodal* 'mental' > representations ('amodal' simply means independent of the perceptual > modalities of sight, sound, touch, etc.). That assumption leads into > intractable dualism, and into exactly the problems that LSV described. But > certainly we can create *modal* simulations, as LSV knew well - 'inner' > speech is one example (though it's still not clear what goes on in the > brain when we do this). Grounded cognition is one of the new turns in > psychology that I think aligns well with cultural psychology/CHAT. Perhaps > Barsalou was in contact with the folk at UCSD? > > Martin > > On Dec 2, 2014, at 2:18 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > I think I am with you on re-fraction rather than re-presentation, Henry. > > Although there are circumstances in which representation seems an > > appropriate enough word. > > > > I would like to continue the half of the conversation that continued to > > talk about images (despite their bad rep) and imagination (despite its > > trendiness). > > > > I take the core of the discussion to be about the nature of/existence > > of/signficicance of "mental images" and their relation (or lack thereof) > to > > the polysemic concept of imagination. > > > > To go way back in time (not so far as Wundt and Tichner, but all the way > > back to 1978) I attach a paper by Stephen Kosslyn that seems relevant to > > think about images as processes so that the verbiness of imag(ing) is > > brought to the fore. > > > > > > On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 10:49 AM, HENRY SHONERD > wrote: > > > >> Peeps, > >> I come late to this, but I was thinking this morning at the bus stop > about > >> David K?s narrative of kids learning about light. I though maybe a > >> parallel: Representation = Reflection and Procedural = Refraction. I > think > >> of both as imagery, just that representation is sort of nouny and > >> procedural is verby. Procedural imagery involves, depending on the > angle of > >> incidence, deviation from the the initial vector. But procedural imagery > >> keeps things on the move. An affordance. I have forgotten my physics, > but > >> does refraction slow things down in any way? > >> Henry > >> > >>> On Dec 1, 2014, at 8:23 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >>> > >>> Martin! > >>> > >>> Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental representation" is > >> coming closer! > >>> > >>> For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's theory of > >> affordances. > >>> > >>> This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed article. But > I > >> wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is important > >> not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. > >>> > >>> I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a grenade > >> pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the list. If > you > >> can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look forward to > your > >> reply, Martin. > >>> > >>> Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that being at > >> UCSD and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that > influences > >> your position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find > >> community in it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more > >> voluntary phrased that way). > >>> > >>> Kind regards, > >>> > >>> Annalisa > >>> ________________________________________ > >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > >> on behalf of Martin John Packer > >>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM > >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > >>> > >>> An interesting article, David. One way in which it is interesting, to > me > >> at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used, even > >> once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images in the > >> world around us - material representations - and he tries to define the > >> "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. > >>> > >>> Martin > >>> > >>> On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg > wrote: > >>> > >>>> Larry, Annalisa: > >>>> > >>>> People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" when we > >>>> met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of anything > >>>> except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe available > >>>> for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember > >>>> whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the > >>>> beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a > >>>> non-image based mental representation. > >>>> > >>>> As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations are > >>>> images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. In > >>>> fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against Titchener > >>>> and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, > >>>> everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated that > >>>> many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically anterior > >>>> to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would not have > >>>> time or ability to process complex problems in real time. > >>>> > >>>> I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are > >>>> genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more reading > >>>> to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than I am > >>>> (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels like > >>>> she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do NOT read > >>>> this article--instead, look at Figure 11. > >>>> > >>>> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ > >>>> > >>>> The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure of > >>>> Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any actual > >>>> images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural experience > >>>> associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then deliberately > >>>> frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any > >>>> recognizable figures upon which to focus. > >>>> > >>>> However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine Chapel fresco > >>>> for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He or she > >>>> can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting and > >>>> wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not notice > >>>> the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in it. > >>>> > >>>> David Kellogg > >>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >>>> > >>>> On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar > wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> Hi Larry and David, > >>>>> > >>>>> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! > >>>>> > >>>>> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are at the > >> root of all thinking. > >>>>> > >>>>> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, based upon > >> previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in > >> combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a phrase I > like > >> a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it by the > >> same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it. > >>>>> > >>>>> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as Hackett > >> describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have you > already > >> given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be willing to > >> take a look. > >>>>> > >>>>> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is > controversial. > >> It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone says > "this > >> is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble observation. > >>>>> > >>>>> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever that > >> process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at hand? > Just a > >> thought. > >>>>> > >>>>> What is it that appeals to you about this model, metaphoricity? > >>>>> > >>>>> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) > >>>>> > >>>>> Kind regards, > >>>>> > >>>>> Annalisa > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> ________________________________________ > >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu> > >> on behalf of Larry Purss > >>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM > >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity > >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? > >>>>> > >>>>> David K > >>>>> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. My > reason > >> for > >>>>> exploring these authors is I have been following a path pursuing a > >> basic > >>>>> question. > >>>>> > >>>>> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? > >>>>> > >>>>> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic guiding > >> images > >>>>> upon which thinking rests" > >>>>> > >>>>> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring appearances and > >>>>> illusions was also exploring this theme. > >>>>> > >>>>> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new phenomenological > path > >>>>> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names this > >> process > >>>>> *metaphoricity*. > >>>>> > >>>>> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible image-character > >> of the > >>>>> *spontaneous event* of meaning. > >>>>> > >>>>> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he > brackets > >> - > >>>>> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. > >>>>> > >>>>> AND > >>>>> > >>>>> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* finds the > >>>>> meaning of its very self. > >>>>> > >>>>> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this > >>>>> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of > >> metaphor can > >>>>> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated in > >>>>> *objectivity* > >>>>> > >>>>> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. > >>>>> > >>>>> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of itself > >> *in* the > >>>>> mode [path] of the concept > >>>>> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding images has > >> been > >>>>> established. > >>>>> > >>>>> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the path of > >>>>> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived from > the > >>>>> image-character of the guiding image. > >>>>> > >>>>> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial this > topic > >> may > >>>>> become [again] > >>>>> > >>>>> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this basic > >>>>> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these images as > >>>>> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images emerge > >>>>> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. > >>>>> > >>>>> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is transcendental] > and > >> is > >>>>> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. It seems > >> to > >>>>> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. > >>>>> > >>>>> I also realize this question may already be answered in Vygotsky's > >> writings > >>>>> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of XMCA. I > >>>>> personally am following this path for now. > >>>>> > >>>>> Larry > >>>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From Dana.Walker@unco.edu Tue Dec 2 12:08:09 2014 From: Dana.Walker@unco.edu (Walker, Dana) Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2014 20:08:09 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074C0F@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> References: <1417397991972.17078@unm.edu> <1417490593837.73384@unm.edu> <1417499588620.61068@unm.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074ADB@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074B00@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <1417543176078.99950@unm.edu>, , <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074C0F@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: And yet the plank did have a prior design, but a human being rejected that design intent (to be used for building a structure) in favor of another form of use (with its own history). I've wondered about the relationship between artifact, intended design, improvisation, and human agency Sent from my iPhone > On Dec 2, 2014, at 11:48 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > > Hi Annalisa, Mike, Huw > > I tend to be somebody who reacts better to concrete examples than definitions. I believe this also comes from Gibson's 1977 book, > > You are walking across a field and come to a stream which you can to get across. You notice a plank across the stream. It is wide enough for you to keep your balance and thick enough to hold your weight, in using it you recognize its affordance as a crossing point. It is the intersection of the movement, the perception of the plank, short term goal of the activity (getting across the stream) - the recognition of the affordance comes in the subjective use of the object (which is why it is neither subjective or objective). It is also important that you have the abilities (the correct weight, the balance) to recognize the affordance, otherwise you pass the plank by. > > As far as perceived affordance. I think I have this right - the perceived is not in the person who recognizes the affordance (otherwise you are right, that is wet water) it is whether there is an intention in the design of the object. So I create a light switch with the intention of designing it as having a perceived affordance for somebody who wants to switch on a light. As you can see different from the relationship to the plank, where there is no prior design. > > Here is my question (perhaps answered in the Engestrom paper) > > The light switch is certainly an artifact, but is the plank? > > Michael > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 1:19 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances > > Those definitions help a lot Annalisa and touch on the fact that gibson > seemed to empty the organism (if one were so inclined to interpret him) and > he dismissed culutral mediation as secondary at best. Still, they share the > idea that a part of the structure that psychologist theorize as a located > inside of individual crania is in fact "our there" in the phylgenetically > and cultural-historically constitued environment. And that drove cognitive > psychologists, our co discussants, nuts. Until, "they got it" and then > sought to mold it to their own ends and pre-existing means. > mike > >> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 9:59 AM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >> I thought I'd do the honors and start a new thread on affordances, which >> isn't related to Larry's discussion of basic images. >> >> I figured as well to offer Gibson's words on affordances since it is a >> word he invented to describe something he saw in the world. Of course the >> life of affordances has been full of controversy, especially with regard to >> understanding what they are. >> >> Gibson's Affordances is a theory I find instrumental to connecting outside >> to inside experiences and I intuit that it is related to perezhivanie in >> some fashion. >> >> After reading the wikipage more closely, I regret offering a link to the >> text there because it isn't very clear what Gibson means or what Norman >> means. To me, a "perceived affordance" is like saying "wet water." >> >> In any case, here are 3 quotes of Gibson in his own words, that I could >> find: >> >> The affordances of the environment are what it _offers_ the animal, what >> it _provides_ or _furnishes_, either for good or ill. The verb "to afford" >> is found in the dictionary, the noun "affordance" is not. I have made it >> up. I mean by it something that refers both to the environment and the >> animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies the complementarity >> of the animal and the environment (Gibson, 1977/1986). >> >> and >> >> What is meant by an _affordance_? ?Subject to revision, I suggest that the >> affordance of anything is a specific combination of the properties of its >> substance and its surfaces taken with reference to an animal. The reference >> may be to an animal as distinguished from other species (Gibson, 1977/1986). >> >> and >> >> An important fact about affordances of the environment is that they are in >> a sense objective, real, and physical, unlike values and meanings, which >> are often supposed to be subjective, phenomenal, and mental. But actually, >> an affordance is neither an objective property nor a subjective property; >> or it is both if you like. An affordance cuts across the dichotomy of >> subjective-objective and helps us to understand its inadequacy. It is >> equally a fact of the environment and a fact of behavior. It is both >> physical and psychical, yet neither. An affordance points both ways, to the >> environment and to the observer (Gibson, 1977/1986). >> >> These quotes are important to keep in mind, I hope they help. >> >> I might also suggest looking at Mace(1977) who described very carefully >> how Gibson got from stimuli to affordance, given that people on this list >> value history, learning, and development. >> >> Kind regards, >> >> Annalisa >> >> >> >> >> >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> on behalf of Huw Lloyd >> Sent: Tuesday, December 2, 2014 10:35 AM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >> >> I'd take a look. >> >> Michael, utility or technical affordance might fit. My equivalent of your >> perceived/discovered distinction is one of planned and technically >> manifest. >> >> Huw >> >> >> On 2 December 2014 at 16:44, Glassman, Michael >> wrote: >> >>> I'd be interested in anybody else is. >>> >>> Michael >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 11:39 AM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>> >>> Interloper, Michael? >>> >>> The discussions at UCSD preceeding Don's use of affordances and cognitive >>> artifacts were accompanied by other, related papers. One by Engestrom on >>> "when is an artifact" and one or more by Ed Hutchins. If people are >>> interested in pursuing this thread/topic the materials could be gathered >>> up. >>> >>> mike >>> >>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Glassman, Michael >>> wrote: >>> >>>> But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea). He >>>> actually cops to both of them. The first was not to distinguish >> between >>>> affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which are >>>> designed. I think this is related to the issue of artifacts. Meaning >>> are >>>> artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to be >>>> discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong word, if >>>> anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances. It is a >>> complex >>>> question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes based on >>>> context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one context >>> may >>>> result in organic affordances in another context. >>>> >>>> The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is that he >>> was >>>> not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and >>> constraints. >>>> Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived affordances or >> are >>>> they designed to create constraints. >>>> >>>> Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the >> mention >>>> just spurred me to throw this up. Hope I'm not being too much of an >>>> interloper. >>>> >>>> Michael >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> ] >>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>> >>>> Annalisa- >>>> >>>> I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation not >>>> discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of >>>> affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set against >>>> Gibson's ideas. The change of views coincided with the advent of the >>> d-cog >>>> idea which also has deep roots in chat. >>>> >>>> No hidden history i know of, but interesting connections among the >>> notion >>>> of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion of >> these >>>> connections can be found, among other places, in >>>> >>>> Cole, M. & Engestr?m, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach to >>>> distributed* >>>> *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition: Psychological >>> and >>>> educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press. >>>> >>>> mike >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Hi Mike, >>>>> >>>>> It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied that >>>> wish! >>>>> >>>>> Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important connections. I >>> was >>>>> not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I learned >>> about >>>>> Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science (1985). >>>>> >>>>> Is there some history that is not part of the common story? >>>>> >>>>> I looked here for clarity: >>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance >>>>> >>>>> Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to >>> cognitive >>>>> artifacts? >>>>> >>>>> There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in play, >>> and >>>>> even joy! >>>>> >>>>> When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however until >>> then >>>>> I will remain with the ineffable. >>>>> >>>>> Kind regards, >>>>> >>>>> Annalisa >>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >>>>> on behalf of mike cole >>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>> >>>>> The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And, >>>>> co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive >>> artifacts >>>>> right about that time at UCSD. If it were possible to find a source >>> that >>>>> makes these connections visible and available to read about it might >>> be a >>>>> step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of >> intro >>>> for >>>>> newcomers to the discussion. >>>>> >>>>> I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a >>> newcomer's >>>>> introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is seeking >> to >>>> sort >>>>> out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am >>>> insuficiently >>>>> read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted! >>>>> >>>>> A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many >> rocks, >>> so >>>>> little time"! >>>>> >>>>> Mike >>>>> >>>>> A >>>>> >>>>> On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar >>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Martin! >>>>>> >>>>>> Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental >> representation" >>> is >>>>>> coming closer! >>>>>> >>>>>> For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's >> theory >>> of >>>>>> affordances. >>>>>> >>>>>> This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed article. >>> But >>>> I >>>>>> wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is >>>> important >>>>>> not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. >>>>>> >>>>>> I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a >>> grenade >>>>>> pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the list. >>> If >>>>> you >>>>>> can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look forward >> to >>>>> your >>>>>> reply, Martin. >>>>>> >>>>>> Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that being >> at >>>> UCSD >>>>>> and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that >> influences >>>> your >>>>>> position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find >>>> community >>>>> in >>>>>> it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more voluntary >>>> phrased >>>>>> that way). >>>>>> >>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>> >>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of >> Martin >>>> John >>>>>> Packer > >>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>> >>>>>> An interesting article, David. One way in which it is interesting, >> to >>>> me >>>>>> at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used, >>> even >>>>>> once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images in >>> the >>>>>> world around us - material representations - and he tries to define >>> the >>>>>> "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin >>>>>> >>>>>> On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg >>>>> > wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Larry, Annalisa: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" when >>> we >>>>>>> met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of >>>> anything >>>>>>> except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe >> available >>>>>>> for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember >>>>>>> whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the >>>>>>> beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a >>>>>>> non-image based mental representation. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations >> are >>>>>>> images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. >> In >>>>>>> fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against >>>> Titchener >>>>>>> and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, >>>>>>> everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated that >>>>>>> many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically >>> anterior >>>>>>> to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would not >>> have >>>>>>> time or ability to process complex problems in real time. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are >>>>>>> genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more >>> reading >>>>>>> to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than I >> am >>>>>>> (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels like >>>>>>> she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do NOT >>> read >>>>>>> this article--instead, look at Figure 11. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure of >>>>>>> Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any >> actual >>>>>>> images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural >>>> experience >>>>>>> associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then >> deliberately >>>>>>> frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any >>>>>>> recognizable figures upon which to focus. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine Chapel >>> fresco >>>>>>> for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He or >>> she >>>>>>> can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting >> and >>>>>>> wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not >> notice >>>>>>> the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in >> it. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar >>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Hi Larry and David, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are at >>> the >>>>>> root of all thinking. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, based >>> upon >>>>>> previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in >>>>>> combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a >> phrase >>> I >>>>> like >>>>>> a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it >> by >>>> the >>>>>> same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as >>>> Hackett >>>>>> describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have you >>>>> already >>>>>> given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be >> willing >>>> to >>>>>> take a look. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is >>>> controversial. >>>>>> It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone >> says >>>>> "this >>>>>> is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble >>>> observation. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever >>> that >>>>>> process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at >> hand? >>>>> Just a >>>>>> thought. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> What is it that appeals to you about this model, metaphoricity? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Larry >>>>> Purss < >>>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com > >>>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM >>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity >>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> David K >>>>>>>> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. My >>>> reason >>>>>> for >>>>>>>> exploring these authors is I have been following a path >> pursuing a >>>>> basic >>>>>>>> question. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic >>> guiding >>>>>> images >>>>>>>> upon which thinking rests" >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring >> appearances >>>> and >>>>>>>> illusions was also exploring this theme. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new >> phenomenological >>>>> path >>>>>>>> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names >> this >>>>>> process >>>>>>>> *metaphoricity*. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible >>> image-character >>>>> of >>>>>> the >>>>>>>> *spontaneous event* of meaning. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he >>>>> brackets - >>>>>>>> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> AND >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* finds >>> the >>>>>>>> meaning of its very self. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this >>>>>>>> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of >>>>> metaphor >>>>>> can >>>>>>>> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated >> in >>>>>>>> *objectivity* >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of >> itself >>>>> *in* >>>>>> the >>>>>>>> mode [path] of the concept >>>>>>>> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding >> images >>>> has >>>>>> been >>>>>>>> established. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the path >> of >>>>>>>> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived >>> from >>>>> the >>>>>>>> image-character of the guiding image. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial this >>>> topic >>>>>> may >>>>>>>> become [again] >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this >>> basic >>>>>>>> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these >> images >>> as >>>>>>>> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images emerge >>>>>>>> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is >> transcendental] >>>> and >>>>>> is >>>>>>>> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. It >>>> seems >>>>> to >>>>>>>> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I also realize this question may already be answered in >> Vygotsky's >>>>>> writings >>>>>>>> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of >> XMCA. I >>>>>>>> personally am following this path for now. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Larry >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >> an >>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>> >>> >>> -- >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Dec 2 12:10:27 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2014 12:10:27 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? In-Reply-To: References: <1417397991972.17078@unm.edu> <1417490593837.73384@unm.edu> <1417499588620.61068@unm.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074ADB@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074B00@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074B4E@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: How interesting: techno word-forming element meaning "art, craft, skill," later "technical, technology," from Latinized form of Greek tekhno-, combining form of tekhne "art, skill, craft in work; method, system, an art, a system or method of making or doing," from PIE *teks-na- "craft" (of weaving or fabricating), from suffixed form of root *teks- "to weave, fabricate, make" (cognates: Sanskrit taksan "carpenter," Greek tekton "carpenter," Latin texere "to weave;" see texture (n.)). *And contextere traces its roots back to the same morpheme. * *Context as weaving together* *mike* On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 11:52 AM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > On 2 December 2014 at 17:43, Glassman, Michael > wrote: > > > Hi Huw, > > > > Perceived in Norman's description, not sure I'd be comfortable changing > it > > at this point. Could you explain what you mean by technical? > > > > Yes. In this sense pertaining to the etymological origins: > > http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=techno-&allowed_in_frame=0 > > techno- > > [image: > Look up techno- at Dictionary.com] > word-forming element > meaning "art, craft, skill," later "technical, technology," from Latinized > form of Greek tekhno-, combining form of tekhne "art, skill, craft in work; > method, system, an art, a system or method of making or doing," from PIE > *teks-na- "craft" (of weaving or fabricating), from suffixed form of root > *teks- "to weave, fabricate, make" (cognates: Sanskrit taksan "carpenter," > Greek tekton "carpenter," Latin texere "to weave;" see texture > > (n.)). > > Huw > > > > Michael > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > > on behalf of Huw Lloyd [huw.softdesigns@gmail.com] > > Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 12:35 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > I'd take a look. > > > > Michael, utility or technical affordance might fit. My equivalent of > your > > perceived/discovered distinction is one of planned and technically > > manifest. > > > > Huw > > > > > > On 2 December 2014 at 16:44, Glassman, Michael > > wrote: > > > > > I'd be interested in anybody else is. > > > > > > Michael > > > ________________________________________ > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > ] > > > on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > > > Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 11:39 AM > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > > > Interloper, Michael? > > > > > > The discussions at UCSD preceeding Don's use of affordances and > cognitive > > > artifacts were accompanied by other, related papers. One by Engestrom > on > > > "when is an artifact" and one or more by Ed Hutchins. If people are > > > interested in pursuing this thread/topic the materials could be > gathered > > > up. > > > > > > mike > > > > > > On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Glassman, Michael > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea). He > > > > actually cops to both of them. The first was not to distinguish > > between > > > > affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which are > > > > designed. I think this is related to the issue of artifacts. > Meaning > > > are > > > > artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to be > > > > discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong word, > if > > > > anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances. It is a > > > complex > > > > question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes based > on > > > > context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one > context > > > may > > > > result in organic affordances in another context. > > > > > > > > The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is that > he > > > was > > > > not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and > > > constraints. > > > > Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived affordances or > > are > > > > they designed to create constraints. > > > > > > > > Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the > > mention > > > > just spurred me to throw this up. Hope I'm not being too much of an > > > > interloper. > > > > > > > > Michael > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > ] > > > > on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > > > > Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > > > > > Annalisa- > > > > > > > > I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation > not > > > > discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of > > > > affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set against > > > > Gibson's ideas. The change of views coincided with the advent of the > > > d-cog > > > > idea which also has deep roots in chat. > > > > > > > > No hidden history i know of, but interesting connections among the > > > notion > > > > of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion of > > these > > > > connections can be found, among other places, in > > > > > > > > Cole, M. & Engestr?m, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach to > > > > distributed* > > > > *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition: > Psychological > > > and > > > > educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press. > > > > > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Hi Mike, > > > > > > > > > > It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied > that > > > > wish! > > > > > > > > > > Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important connections. > I > > > was > > > > > not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I learned > > > about > > > > > Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science > (1985). > > > > > > > > > > Is there some history that is not part of the common story? > > > > > > > > > > I looked here for clarity: > > > > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance > > > > > > > > > > Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to > > > cognitive > > > > > artifacts? > > > > > > > > > > There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in > play, > > > and > > > > > even joy! > > > > > > > > > > When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however > until > > > then > > > > > I will remain with the ineffable. > > > > > > > > > > Kind regards, > > > > > > > > > > Annalisa > > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > > > > on behalf of mike cole > > > > > Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM > > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > > > > > > > The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And, > > > > > co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive > > > artifacts > > > > > right about that time at UCSD. If it were possible to find a > source > > > that > > > > > makes these connections visible and available to read about it > might > > > be a > > > > > step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of > > intro > > > > for > > > > > newcomers to the discussion. > > > > > > > > > > I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a > > > newcomer's > > > > > introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is seeking > > to > > > > sort > > > > > out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am > > > > insuficiently > > > > > read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted! > > > > > > > > > > A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many > > rocks, > > > so > > > > > little time"! > > > > > > > > > > Mike > > > > > > > > > > A > > > > > > > > > > On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > Martin! > > > > > > > > > > > > Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental > > representation" > > > is > > > > > > coming closer! > > > > > > > > > > > > For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's > > theory > > > of > > > > > > affordances. > > > > > > > > > > > > This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed > article. > > > But > > > > I > > > > > > wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is > > > > important > > > > > > not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. > > > > > > > > > > > > I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a > > > grenade > > > > > > pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the > list. > > > If > > > > > you > > > > > > can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look > forward > > to > > > > > your > > > > > > reply, Martin. > > > > > > > > > > > > Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that being > > at > > > > UCSD > > > > > > and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that > > influences > > > > your > > > > > > position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find > > > > community > > > > > in > > > > > > it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more voluntary > > > > phrased > > > > > > that way). > > > > > > > > > > > > Kind regards, > > > > > > > > > > > > Annalisa > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > > > > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > > Martin > > > > John > > > > > > Packer > > > > > > > Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM > > > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > > > > > > > > > An interesting article, David. One way in which it is > interesting, > > to > > > > me > > > > > > at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used, > > > even > > > > > > once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images > in > > > the > > > > > > world around us - material representations - and he tries to > define > > > the > > > > > > "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. > > > > > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > > > On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > Larry, Annalisa: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" > when > > > we > > > > > > > met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of > > > > anything > > > > > > > except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe > > available > > > > > > > for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember > > > > > > > whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the > > > > > > > beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a > > > > > > > non-image based mental representation. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations > > are > > > > > > > images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. > > In > > > > > > > fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against > > > > Titchener > > > > > > > and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, > > > > > > > everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated > that > > > > > > > many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically > > > anterior > > > > > > > to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would > not > > > have > > > > > > > time or ability to process complex problems in real time. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are > > > > > > > genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more > > > reading > > > > > > > to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than > I > > am > > > > > > > (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels > like > > > > > > > she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do > NOT > > > read > > > > > > > this article--instead, look at Figure 11. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ > > > > > > > > > > > > > > The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure > of > > > > > > > Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any > > actual > > > > > > > images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural > > > > experience > > > > > > > associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then > > deliberately > > > > > > > frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any > > > > > > > recognizable figures upon which to focus. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine Chapel > > > fresco > > > > > > > for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He > or > > > she > > > > > > > can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting > > and > > > > > > > wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not > > notice > > > > > > > the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in > > it. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar < > annalisa@unm.edu > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> Hi Larry and David, > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are > at > > > the > > > > > > root of all thinking. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, > based > > > upon > > > > > > previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in > > > > > > combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a > > phrase > > > I > > > > > like > > > > > > a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it > > by > > > > the > > > > > > same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as > > > > Hackett > > > > > > describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have > you > > > > > already > > > > > > given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be > > willing > > > > to > > > > > > take a look. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is > > > > controversial. > > > > > > It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone > > says > > > > > "this > > > > > > is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble > > > > observation. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever > > > that > > > > > > process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at > > hand? > > > > > Just a > > > > > > thought. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> What is it that appeals to you about this model, > metaphoricity? > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> Kind regards, > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> Annalisa > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> ________________________________________ > > > > > > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > > > > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > Larry > > > > > Purss < > > > > > > lpscholar2@gmail.com > > > > > > > >> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM > > > > > > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity > > > > > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> David K > > > > > > >> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. > My > > > > reason > > > > > > for > > > > > > >> exploring these authors is I have been following a path > > pursuing a > > > > > basic > > > > > > >> question. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic > > > guiding > > > > > > images > > > > > > >> upon which thinking rests" > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring > > appearances > > > > and > > > > > > >> illusions was also exploring this theme. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new > > phenomenological > > > > > path > > > > > > >> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names > > this > > > > > > process > > > > > > >> *metaphoricity*. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible > > > image-character > > > > > of > > > > > > the > > > > > > >> *spontaneous event* of meaning. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he > > > > > brackets - > > > > > > >> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> AND > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* > finds > > > the > > > > > > >> meaning of its very self. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this > > > > > > >> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of > > > > > metaphor > > > > > > can > > > > > > >> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated > > in > > > > > > >> *objectivity* > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of > > itself > > > > > *in* > > > > > > the > > > > > > >> mode [path] of the concept > > > > > > >> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding > > images > > > > has > > > > > > been > > > > > > >> established. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the > path > > of > > > > > > >> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived > > > from > > > > > the > > > > > > >> image-character of the guiding image. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial > this > > > > topic > > > > > > may > > > > > > >> become [again] > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this > > > basic > > > > > > >> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these > > images > > > as > > > > > > >> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images > emerge > > > > > > >> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is > > transcendental] > > > > and > > > > > > is > > > > > > >> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. > It > > > > seems > > > > > to > > > > > > >> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> I also realize this question may already be answered in > > Vygotsky's > > > > > > writings > > > > > > >> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of > > XMCA. I > > > > > > >> personally am following this path for now. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> Larry > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > > an > > > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > an > > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From glassman.13@osu.edu Tue Dec 2 12:34:49 2014 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2014 20:34:49 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances In-Reply-To: References: <1417397991972.17078@unm.edu> <1417490593837.73384@unm.edu> <1417499588620.61068@unm.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074ADB@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074B00@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <1417543176078.99950@unm.edu>, , <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074C0F@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu>, Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074C96@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Dana, You almost took the words straight off my keyboard. What is the relationship between design, agency and object in the concept of artifact. Michael ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Walker, Dana [Dana.Walker@unco.edu] Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 3:08 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances And yet the plank did have a prior design, but a human being rejected that design intent (to be used for building a structure) in favor of another form of use (with its own history). I've wondered about the relationship between artifact, intended design, improvisation, and human agency Sent from my iPhone > On Dec 2, 2014, at 11:48 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > > Hi Annalisa, Mike, Huw > > I tend to be somebody who reacts better to concrete examples than definitions. I believe this also comes from Gibson's 1977 book, > > You are walking across a field and come to a stream which you can to get across. You notice a plank across the stream. It is wide enough for you to keep your balance and thick enough to hold your weight, in using it you recognize its affordance as a crossing point. It is the intersection of the movement, the perception of the plank, short term goal of the activity (getting across the stream) - the recognition of the affordance comes in the subjective use of the object (which is why it is neither subjective or objective). It is also important that you have the abilities (the correct weight, the balance) to recognize the affordance, otherwise you pass the plank by. > > As far as perceived affordance. I think I have this right - the perceived is not in the person who recognizes the affordance (otherwise you are right, that is wet water) it is whether there is an intention in the design of the object. So I create a light switch with the intention of designing it as having a perceived affordance for somebody who wants to switch on a light. As you can see different from the relationship to the plank, where there is no prior design. > > Here is my question (perhaps answered in the Engestrom paper) > > The light switch is certainly an artifact, but is the plank? > > Michael > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 1:19 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances > > Those definitions help a lot Annalisa and touch on the fact that gibson > seemed to empty the organism (if one were so inclined to interpret him) and > he dismissed culutral mediation as secondary at best. Still, they share the > idea that a part of the structure that psychologist theorize as a located > inside of individual crania is in fact "our there" in the phylgenetically > and cultural-historically constitued environment. And that drove cognitive > psychologists, our co discussants, nuts. Until, "they got it" and then > sought to mold it to their own ends and pre-existing means. > mike > >> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 9:59 AM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >> I thought I'd do the honors and start a new thread on affordances, which >> isn't related to Larry's discussion of basic images. >> >> I figured as well to offer Gibson's words on affordances since it is a >> word he invented to describe something he saw in the world. Of course the >> life of affordances has been full of controversy, especially with regard to >> understanding what they are. >> >> Gibson's Affordances is a theory I find instrumental to connecting outside >> to inside experiences and I intuit that it is related to perezhivanie in >> some fashion. >> >> After reading the wikipage more closely, I regret offering a link to the >> text there because it isn't very clear what Gibson means or what Norman >> means. To me, a "perceived affordance" is like saying "wet water." >> >> In any case, here are 3 quotes of Gibson in his own words, that I could >> find: >> >> The affordances of the environment are what it _offers_ the animal, what >> it _provides_ or _furnishes_, either for good or ill. The verb "to afford" >> is found in the dictionary, the noun "affordance" is not. I have made it >> up. I mean by it something that refers both to the environment and the >> animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies the complementarity >> of the animal and the environment (Gibson, 1977/1986). >> >> and >> >> What is meant by an _affordance_? ?Subject to revision, I suggest that the >> affordance of anything is a specific combination of the properties of its >> substance and its surfaces taken with reference to an animal. The reference >> may be to an animal as distinguished from other species (Gibson, 1977/1986). >> >> and >> >> An important fact about affordances of the environment is that they are in >> a sense objective, real, and physical, unlike values and meanings, which >> are often supposed to be subjective, phenomenal, and mental. But actually, >> an affordance is neither an objective property nor a subjective property; >> or it is both if you like. An affordance cuts across the dichotomy of >> subjective-objective and helps us to understand its inadequacy. It is >> equally a fact of the environment and a fact of behavior. It is both >> physical and psychical, yet neither. An affordance points both ways, to the >> environment and to the observer (Gibson, 1977/1986). >> >> These quotes are important to keep in mind, I hope they help. >> >> I might also suggest looking at Mace(1977) who described very carefully >> how Gibson got from stimuli to affordance, given that people on this list >> value history, learning, and development. >> >> Kind regards, >> >> Annalisa >> >> >> >> >> >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> on behalf of Huw Lloyd >> Sent: Tuesday, December 2, 2014 10:35 AM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >> >> I'd take a look. >> >> Michael, utility or technical affordance might fit. My equivalent of your >> perceived/discovered distinction is one of planned and technically >> manifest. >> >> Huw >> >> >> On 2 December 2014 at 16:44, Glassman, Michael >> wrote: >> >>> I'd be interested in anybody else is. >>> >>> Michael >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 11:39 AM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>> >>> Interloper, Michael? >>> >>> The discussions at UCSD preceeding Don's use of affordances and cognitive >>> artifacts were accompanied by other, related papers. One by Engestrom on >>> "when is an artifact" and one or more by Ed Hutchins. If people are >>> interested in pursuing this thread/topic the materials could be gathered >>> up. >>> >>> mike >>> >>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Glassman, Michael >>> wrote: >>> >>>> But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea). He >>>> actually cops to both of them. The first was not to distinguish >> between >>>> affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which are >>>> designed. I think this is related to the issue of artifacts. Meaning >>> are >>>> artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to be >>>> discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong word, if >>>> anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances. It is a >>> complex >>>> question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes based on >>>> context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one context >>> may >>>> result in organic affordances in another context. >>>> >>>> The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is that he >>> was >>>> not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and >>> constraints. >>>> Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived affordances or >> are >>>> they designed to create constraints. >>>> >>>> Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the >> mention >>>> just spurred me to throw this up. Hope I'm not being too much of an >>>> interloper. >>>> >>>> Michael >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> ] >>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>> >>>> Annalisa- >>>> >>>> I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation not >>>> discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of >>>> affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set against >>>> Gibson's ideas. The change of views coincided with the advent of the >>> d-cog >>>> idea which also has deep roots in chat. >>>> >>>> No hidden history i know of, but interesting connections among the >>> notion >>>> of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion of >> these >>>> connections can be found, among other places, in >>>> >>>> Cole, M. & Engestr?m, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach to >>>> distributed* >>>> *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition: Psychological >>> and >>>> educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press. >>>> >>>> mike >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Hi Mike, >>>>> >>>>> It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied that >>>> wish! >>>>> >>>>> Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important connections. I >>> was >>>>> not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I learned >>> about >>>>> Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science (1985). >>>>> >>>>> Is there some history that is not part of the common story? >>>>> >>>>> I looked here for clarity: >>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance >>>>> >>>>> Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to >>> cognitive >>>>> artifacts? >>>>> >>>>> There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in play, >>> and >>>>> even joy! >>>>> >>>>> When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however until >>> then >>>>> I will remain with the ineffable. >>>>> >>>>> Kind regards, >>>>> >>>>> Annalisa >>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >>>>> on behalf of mike cole >>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>> >>>>> The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And, >>>>> co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive >>> artifacts >>>>> right about that time at UCSD. If it were possible to find a source >>> that >>>>> makes these connections visible and available to read about it might >>> be a >>>>> step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of >> intro >>>> for >>>>> newcomers to the discussion. >>>>> >>>>> I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a >>> newcomer's >>>>> introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is seeking >> to >>>> sort >>>>> out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am >>>> insuficiently >>>>> read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted! >>>>> >>>>> A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many >> rocks, >>> so >>>>> little time"! >>>>> >>>>> Mike >>>>> >>>>> A >>>>> >>>>> On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar >>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Martin! >>>>>> >>>>>> Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental >> representation" >>> is >>>>>> coming closer! >>>>>> >>>>>> For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's >> theory >>> of >>>>>> affordances. >>>>>> >>>>>> This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed article. >>> But >>>> I >>>>>> wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is >>>> important >>>>>> not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. >>>>>> >>>>>> I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a >>> grenade >>>>>> pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the list. >>> If >>>>> you >>>>>> can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look forward >> to >>>>> your >>>>>> reply, Martin. >>>>>> >>>>>> Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that being >> at >>>> UCSD >>>>>> and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that >> influences >>>> your >>>>>> position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find >>>> community >>>>> in >>>>>> it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more voluntary >>>> phrased >>>>>> that way). >>>>>> >>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>> >>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of >> Martin >>>> John >>>>>> Packer > >>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>> >>>>>> An interesting article, David. One way in which it is interesting, >> to >>>> me >>>>>> at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used, >>> even >>>>>> once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images in >>> the >>>>>> world around us - material representations - and he tries to define >>> the >>>>>> "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin >>>>>> >>>>>> On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg >>>>> > wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Larry, Annalisa: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" when >>> we >>>>>>> met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of >>>> anything >>>>>>> except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe >> available >>>>>>> for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember >>>>>>> whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the >>>>>>> beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a >>>>>>> non-image based mental representation. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations >> are >>>>>>> images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. >> In >>>>>>> fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against >>>> Titchener >>>>>>> and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, >>>>>>> everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated that >>>>>>> many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically >>> anterior >>>>>>> to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would not >>> have >>>>>>> time or ability to process complex problems in real time. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are >>>>>>> genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more >>> reading >>>>>>> to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than I >> am >>>>>>> (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels like >>>>>>> she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do NOT >>> read >>>>>>> this article--instead, look at Figure 11. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure of >>>>>>> Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any >> actual >>>>>>> images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural >>>> experience >>>>>>> associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then >> deliberately >>>>>>> frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any >>>>>>> recognizable figures upon which to focus. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine Chapel >>> fresco >>>>>>> for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He or >>> she >>>>>>> can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting >> and >>>>>>> wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not >> notice >>>>>>> the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in >> it. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar >>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Hi Larry and David, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are at >>> the >>>>>> root of all thinking. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, based >>> upon >>>>>> previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in >>>>>> combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a >> phrase >>> I >>>>> like >>>>>> a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it >> by >>>> the >>>>>> same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as >>>> Hackett >>>>>> describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have you >>>>> already >>>>>> given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be >> willing >>>> to >>>>>> take a look. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is >>>> controversial. >>>>>> It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone >> says >>>>> "this >>>>>> is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble >>>> observation. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever >>> that >>>>>> process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at >> hand? >>>>> Just a >>>>>> thought. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> What is it that appeals to you about this model, metaphoricity? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Larry >>>>> Purss < >>>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com > >>>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM >>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity >>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> David K >>>>>>>> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. My >>>> reason >>>>>> for >>>>>>>> exploring these authors is I have been following a path >> pursuing a >>>>> basic >>>>>>>> question. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic >>> guiding >>>>>> images >>>>>>>> upon which thinking rests" >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring >> appearances >>>> and >>>>>>>> illusions was also exploring this theme. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new >> phenomenological >>>>> path >>>>>>>> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names >> this >>>>>> process >>>>>>>> *metaphoricity*. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible >>> image-character >>>>> of >>>>>> the >>>>>>>> *spontaneous event* of meaning. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he >>>>> brackets - >>>>>>>> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> AND >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* finds >>> the >>>>>>>> meaning of its very self. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this >>>>>>>> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of >>>>> metaphor >>>>>> can >>>>>>>> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated >> in >>>>>>>> *objectivity* >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of >> itself >>>>> *in* >>>>>> the >>>>>>>> mode [path] of the concept >>>>>>>> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding >> images >>>> has >>>>>> been >>>>>>>> established. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the path >> of >>>>>>>> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived >>> from >>>>> the >>>>>>>> image-character of the guiding image. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial this >>>> topic >>>>>> may >>>>>>>> become [again] >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this >>> basic >>>>>>>> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these >> images >>> as >>>>>>>> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images emerge >>>>>>>> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is >> transcendental] >>>> and >>>>>> is >>>>>>>> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. It >>>> seems >>>>> to >>>>>>>> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I also realize this question may already be answered in >> Vygotsky's >>>>>> writings >>>>>>>> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of >> XMCA. I >>>>>>>> personally am following this path for now. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Larry >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >> an >>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>> >>> >>> -- >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Dec 2 12:58:50 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2014 12:58:50 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Research Fellowship at the Center for Childhood Creativity In-Reply-To: <89E1DCE5BF0F5B4FB0129A2E3A1443481C9C7E@BD-VM-EX-01.badm.org> References: <89E1DCE5BF0F5B4FB0129A2E3A1443481C9C7E@BD-VM-EX-01.badm.org> Message-ID: ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Helen Shwe Hadani Date: Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 12:55 PM Subject: [COGDEVSOC] Research Fellowship at the Center for Childhood Creativity To: "cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org" Dear colleagues, I?m excited to share an opportunity for a research fellowship at the Bay Area Discovery Museum/Center for Childhood Creativity for doctoral candidates in Northern California. Please see the attached posting for more details. Best, Helen ------------- Helen Hadani, Ph.D. Associate Director of Research Center for Childhood Creativity Sausalito, CA 94965 530.220.0453 hhadani@centerforchildhoodcreativity.org http://www.centerforchildhoodcreativity.org/ _______________________________________________ To post to the CDS listserv, send your message to: cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org (If you belong to the listserv and have not included any large attachments, your message will be posted without moderation--so be careful!) To subscribe or unsubscribe from the listserv, visit: http://lists.cogdevsoc.org/listinfo.cgi/cogdevsoc-cogdevsoc.org -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Thomas Murphy Fellow at the CCC_11.19.14.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 119846 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141202/4a183e66/attachment.pdf From ewall@umich.edu Tue Dec 2 13:19:18 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2014 15:19:18 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? In-Reply-To: References: <1417397991972.17078@unm.edu> <1417490593837.73384@unm.edu> <1417499588620.61068@unm.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074ADB@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074B00@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074B4E@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: Mike Nice and important. Ed On Dec 2, 2014, at 2:10 PM, mike cole wrote: > How interesting: > techno > > word-forming element meaning "art, craft, skill," later "technical, > technology," from Latinized form of Greek tekhno-, combining form of > tekhne "art, > skill, craft in work; method, system, an art, a system or method of making > or doing," from PIE *teks-na- "craft" (of weaving or fabricating), from > suffixed form of root *teks- "to weave, fabricate, make" (cognates: > Sanskrit taksan "carpenter," Greek tekton "carpenter," Latin texere "to > weave;" see texture > (n.)). > > *And contextere traces its roots back to the same morpheme. * > *Context as weaving together* > *mike* > > > On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 11:52 AM, Huw Lloyd > wrote: > >> On 2 December 2014 at 17:43, Glassman, Michael >> wrote: >> >>> Hi Huw, >>> >>> Perceived in Norman's description, not sure I'd be comfortable changing >> it >>> at this point. Could you explain what you mean by technical? >>> >> >> Yes. In this sense pertaining to the etymological origins: >> >> http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=techno-&allowed_in_frame=0 >> >> techno- >> >> [image: >> Look up techno- at Dictionary.com] >> word-forming element >> meaning "art, craft, skill," later "technical, technology," from Latinized >> form of Greek tekhno-, combining form of tekhne "art, skill, craft in work; >> method, system, an art, a system or method of making or doing," from PIE >> *teks-na- "craft" (of weaving or fabricating), from suffixed form of root >> *teks- "to weave, fabricate, make" (cognates: Sanskrit taksan "carpenter," >> Greek tekton "carpenter," Latin texere "to weave;" see texture >> >> (n.)). >> >> Huw >> >> >>> Michael >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>> on behalf of Huw Lloyd [huw.softdesigns@gmail.com] >>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 12:35 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>> >>> I'd take a look. >>> >>> Michael, utility or technical affordance might fit. My equivalent of >> your >>> perceived/discovered distinction is one of planned and technically >>> manifest. >>> >>> Huw >>> >>> >>> On 2 December 2014 at 16:44, Glassman, Michael >>> wrote: >>> >>>> I'd be interested in anybody else is. >>>> >>>> Michael >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> ] >>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 11:39 AM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>> >>>> Interloper, Michael? >>>> >>>> The discussions at UCSD preceeding Don's use of affordances and >> cognitive >>>> artifacts were accompanied by other, related papers. One by Engestrom >> on >>>> "when is an artifact" and one or more by Ed Hutchins. If people are >>>> interested in pursuing this thread/topic the materials could be >> gathered >>>> up. >>>> >>>> mike >>>> >>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Glassman, Michael >> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea). He >>>>> actually cops to both of them. The first was not to distinguish >>> between >>>>> affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which are >>>>> designed. I think this is related to the issue of artifacts. >> Meaning >>>> are >>>>> artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to be >>>>> discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong word, >> if >>>>> anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances. It is a >>>> complex >>>>> question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes based >> on >>>>> context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one >> context >>>> may >>>>> result in organic affordances in another context. >>>>> >>>>> The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is that >> he >>>> was >>>>> not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and >>>> constraints. >>>>> Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived affordances or >>> are >>>>> they designed to create constraints. >>>>> >>>>> Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the >>> mention >>>>> just spurred me to throw this up. Hope I'm not being too much of an >>>>> interloper. >>>>> >>>>> Michael >>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> ] >>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>> >>>>> Annalisa- >>>>> >>>>> I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation >> not >>>>> discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of >>>>> affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set against >>>>> Gibson's ideas. The change of views coincided with the advent of the >>>> d-cog >>>>> idea which also has deep roots in chat. >>>>> >>>>> No hidden history i know of, but interesting connections among the >>>> notion >>>>> of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion of >>> these >>>>> connections can be found, among other places, in >>>>> >>>>> Cole, M. & Engestr?m, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach to >>>>> distributed* >>>>> *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition: >> Psychological >>>> and >>>>> educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press. >>>>> >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar >>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Hi Mike, >>>>>> >>>>>> It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied >> that >>>>> wish! >>>>>> >>>>>> Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important connections. >> I >>>> was >>>>>> not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I learned >>>> about >>>>>> Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science >> (1985). >>>>>> >>>>>> Is there some history that is not part of the common story? >>>>>> >>>>>> I looked here for clarity: >>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance >>>>>> >>>>>> Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to >>>> cognitive >>>>>> artifacts? >>>>>> >>>>>> There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in >> play, >>>> and >>>>>> even joy! >>>>>> >>>>>> When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however >> until >>>> then >>>>>> I will remain with the ineffable. >>>>>> >>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>> >>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> >>>>>> on behalf of mike cole >>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>> >>>>>> The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And, >>>>>> co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive >>>> artifacts >>>>>> right about that time at UCSD. If it were possible to find a >> source >>>> that >>>>>> makes these connections visible and available to read about it >> might >>>> be a >>>>>> step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of >>> intro >>>>> for >>>>>> newcomers to the discussion. >>>>>> >>>>>> I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a >>>> newcomer's >>>>>> introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is seeking >>> to >>>>> sort >>>>>> out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am >>>>> insuficiently >>>>>> read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted! >>>>>> >>>>>> A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many >>> rocks, >>>> so >>>>>> little time"! >>>>>> >>>>>> Mike >>>>>> >>>>>> A >>>>>> >>>>>> On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar >>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Martin! >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental >>> representation" >>>> is >>>>>>> coming closer! >>>>>>> >>>>>>> For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's >>> theory >>>> of >>>>>>> affordances. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed >> article. >>>> But >>>>> I >>>>>>> wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is >>>>> important >>>>>>> not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a >>>> grenade >>>>>>> pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the >> list. >>>> If >>>>>> you >>>>>>> can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look >> forward >>> to >>>>>> your >>>>>>> reply, Martin. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that being >>> at >>>>> UCSD >>>>>>> and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that >>> influences >>>>> your >>>>>>> position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find >>>>> community >>>>>> in >>>>>>> it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more voluntary >>>>> phrased >>>>>>> that way). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of >>> Martin >>>>> John >>>>>>> Packer > >>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM >>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> An interesting article, David. One way in which it is >> interesting, >>> to >>>>> me >>>>>>> at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used, >>>> even >>>>>>> once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images >> in >>>> the >>>>>>> world around us - material representations - and he tries to >> define >>>> the >>>>>>> "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg >>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Larry, Annalisa: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" >> when >>>> we >>>>>>>> met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of >>>>> anything >>>>>>>> except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe >>> available >>>>>>>> for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember >>>>>>>> whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the >>>>>>>> beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a >>>>>>>> non-image based mental representation. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations >>> are >>>>>>>> images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. >>> In >>>>>>>> fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against >>>>> Titchener >>>>>>>> and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, >>>>>>>> everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated >> that >>>>>>>> many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically >>>> anterior >>>>>>>> to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would >> not >>>> have >>>>>>>> time or ability to process complex problems in real time. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are >>>>>>>> genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more >>>> reading >>>>>>>> to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than >> I >>> am >>>>>>>> (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels >> like >>>>>>>> she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do >> NOT >>>> read >>>>>>>> this article--instead, look at Figure 11. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure >> of >>>>>>>> Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any >>> actual >>>>>>>> images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural >>>>> experience >>>>>>>> associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then >>> deliberately >>>>>>>> frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any >>>>>>>> recognizable figures upon which to focus. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine Chapel >>>> fresco >>>>>>>> for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He >> or >>>> she >>>>>>>> can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting >>> and >>>>>>>> wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not >>> notice >>>>>>>> the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in >>> it. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar < >> annalisa@unm.edu >>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Hi Larry and David, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are >> at >>>> the >>>>>>> root of all thinking. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, >> based >>>> upon >>>>>>> previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in >>>>>>> combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a >>> phrase >>>> I >>>>>> like >>>>>>> a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it >>> by >>>>> the >>>>>>> same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as >>>>> Hackett >>>>>>> describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have >> you >>>>>> already >>>>>>> given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be >>> willing >>>>> to >>>>>>> take a look. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is >>>>> controversial. >>>>>>> It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone >>> says >>>>>> "this >>>>>>> is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble >>>>> observation. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever >>>> that >>>>>>> process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at >>> hand? >>>>>> Just a >>>>>>> thought. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> What is it that appeals to you about this model, >> metaphoricity? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of >> Larry >>>>>> Purss < >>>>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com > >>>>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM >>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity >>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> David K >>>>>>>>> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. >> My >>>>> reason >>>>>>> for >>>>>>>>> exploring these authors is I have been following a path >>> pursuing a >>>>>> basic >>>>>>>>> question. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic >>>> guiding >>>>>>> images >>>>>>>>> upon which thinking rests" >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring >>> appearances >>>>> and >>>>>>>>> illusions was also exploring this theme. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new >>> phenomenological >>>>>> path >>>>>>>>> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names >>> this >>>>>>> process >>>>>>>>> *metaphoricity*. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible >>>> image-character >>>>>> of >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> *spontaneous event* of meaning. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he >>>>>> brackets - >>>>>>>>> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> AND >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* >> finds >>>> the >>>>>>>>> meaning of its very self. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this >>>>>>>>> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of >>>>>> metaphor >>>>>>> can >>>>>>>>> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated >>> in >>>>>>>>> *objectivity* >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of >>> itself >>>>>> *in* >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> mode [path] of the concept >>>>>>>>> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding >>> images >>>>> has >>>>>>> been >>>>>>>>> established. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the >> path >>> of >>>>>>>>> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived >>>> from >>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> image-character of the guiding image. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial >> this >>>>> topic >>>>>>> may >>>>>>>>> become [again] >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this >>>> basic >>>>>>>>> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these >>> images >>>> as >>>>>>>>> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images >> emerge >>>>>>>>> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is >>> transcendental] >>>>> and >>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. >> It >>>>> seems >>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I also realize this question may already be answered in >>> Vygotsky's >>>>>>> writings >>>>>>>>> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of >>> XMCA. I >>>>>>>>> personally am following this path for now. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>> an >>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >> an >>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Tue Dec 2 13:19:57 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2014 21:19:57 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? In-Reply-To: References: <1417397991972.17078@unm.edu> <1417490593837.73384@unm.edu> <1417499588620.61068@unm.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074ADB@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074B00@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074B4E@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: Yes, my preference is to respect the etymological roots of these words whenever my ignorance doesn't get in the way... >From what I can discern, the most confusion that folk have with artefact (artifact) is its association with tool. This is further compounded by notions of "mental tools" etc. Whereas tools, proper, come into material interaction and their affordances are discovered through their technical use, so called "mental tools" serve merely to organise the use of tools. They do not interact in the manner of proper tools. Software, for example, offers a clear distinction here. A program is an artefact, yet "it" is only a tool when it is executed (run) on a computer. Strictly speaking, it is the computer that is the tool (or the virtual computer as modelled by single running thread). Marx, also, noted the distinction between (mere) tools and machines. That remains a useful distinction when one is considering the application of signs to organise machines, as exemplified by the Jacquard loom. Huw On 2 December 2014 at 20:10, mike cole wrote: > How interesting: > techno > > word-forming element meaning "art, craft, skill," later "technical, > technology," from Latinized form of Greek tekhno-, combining form of > tekhne "art, > skill, craft in work; method, system, an art, a system or method of making > or doing," from PIE *teks-na- "craft" (of weaving or fabricating), from > suffixed form of root *teks- "to weave, fabricate, make" (cognates: > Sanskrit taksan "carpenter," Greek tekton "carpenter," Latin texere "to > weave;" see texture > >(n.)). > > *And contextere traces its roots back to the same morpheme. * > *Context as weaving together* > *mike* > > > On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 11:52 AM, Huw Lloyd > wrote: > > > On 2 December 2014 at 17:43, Glassman, Michael > > wrote: > > > > > Hi Huw, > > > > > > Perceived in Norman's description, not sure I'd be comfortable changing > > it > > > at this point. Could you explain what you mean by technical? > > > > > > > Yes. In this sense pertaining to the etymological origins: > > > > http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=techno-&allowed_in_frame=0 > > > > techno- > > > > [image: > > Look up techno- at Dictionary.com] > > word-forming element > > meaning "art, craft, skill," later "technical, technology," from > Latinized > > form of Greek tekhno-, combining form of tekhne "art, skill, craft in > work; > > method, system, an art, a system or method of making or doing," from PIE > > *teks-na- "craft" (of weaving or fabricating), from suffixed form of root > > *teks- "to weave, fabricate, make" (cognates: Sanskrit taksan > "carpenter," > > Greek tekton "carpenter," Latin texere "to weave;" see texture > > > > (n.)). > > > > Huw > > > > > > > Michael > > > ________________________________________ > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > ] > > > on behalf of Huw Lloyd [huw.softdesigns@gmail.com] > > > Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 12:35 PM > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > > > I'd take a look. > > > > > > Michael, utility or technical affordance might fit. My equivalent of > > your > > > perceived/discovered distinction is one of planned and technically > > > manifest. > > > > > > Huw > > > > > > > > > On 2 December 2014 at 16:44, Glassman, Michael > > > wrote: > > > > > > > I'd be interested in anybody else is. > > > > > > > > Michael > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > ] > > > > on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > > > > Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 11:39 AM > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > > > > > Interloper, Michael? > > > > > > > > The discussions at UCSD preceeding Don's use of affordances and > > cognitive > > > > artifacts were accompanied by other, related papers. One by Engestrom > > on > > > > "when is an artifact" and one or more by Ed Hutchins. If people are > > > > interested in pursuing this thread/topic the materials could be > > gathered > > > > up. > > > > > > > > mike > > > > > > > > On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Glassman, Michael < > glassman.13@osu.edu > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea). > He > > > > > actually cops to both of them. The first was not to distinguish > > > between > > > > > affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which > are > > > > > designed. I think this is related to the issue of artifacts. > > Meaning > > > > are > > > > > artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to > be > > > > > discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong > word, > > if > > > > > anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances. It is a > > > > complex > > > > > question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes > based > > on > > > > > context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one > > context > > > > may > > > > > result in organic affordances in another context. > > > > > > > > > > The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is that > > he > > > > was > > > > > not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and > > > > constraints. > > > > > Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived affordances > or > > > are > > > > > they designed to create constraints. > > > > > > > > > > Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the > > > mention > > > > > just spurred me to throw this up. Hope I'm not being too much of > an > > > > > interloper. > > > > > > > > > > Michael > > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > ] > > > > > on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > > > > > Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM > > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > > > > > > > Annalisa- > > > > > > > > > > I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation > > not > > > > > discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of > > > > > affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set > against > > > > > Gibson's ideas. The change of views coincided with the advent of > the > > > > d-cog > > > > > idea which also has deep roots in chat. > > > > > > > > > > No hidden history i know of, but interesting connections among the > > > > notion > > > > > of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion of > > > these > > > > > connections can be found, among other places, in > > > > > > > > > > Cole, M. & Engestr?m, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach > to > > > > > distributed* > > > > > *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition: > > Psychological > > > > and > > > > > educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press. > > > > > > > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Hi Mike, > > > > > > > > > > > > It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied > > that > > > > > wish! > > > > > > > > > > > > Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important > connections. > > I > > > > was > > > > > > not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I > learned > > > > about > > > > > > Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science > > (1985). > > > > > > > > > > > > Is there some history that is not part of the common story? > > > > > > > > > > > > I looked here for clarity: > > > > > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance > > > > > > > > > > > > Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to > > > > cognitive > > > > > > artifacts? > > > > > > > > > > > > There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in > > play, > > > > and > > > > > > even joy! > > > > > > > > > > > > When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however > > until > > > > then > > > > > > I will remain with the ineffable. > > > > > > > > > > > > Kind regards, > > > > > > > > > > > > Annalisa > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > > > > > > on behalf of mike cole > > > > > > Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM > > > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > > > > > > > > > The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And, > > > > > > co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive > > > > artifacts > > > > > > right about that time at UCSD. If it were possible to find a > > source > > > > that > > > > > > makes these connections visible and available to read about it > > might > > > > be a > > > > > > step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of > > > intro > > > > > for > > > > > > newcomers to the discussion. > > > > > > > > > > > > I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a > > > > newcomer's > > > > > > introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is > seeking > > > to > > > > > sort > > > > > > out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am > > > > > insuficiently > > > > > > read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted! > > > > > > > > > > > > A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many > > > rocks, > > > > so > > > > > > little time"! > > > > > > > > > > > > Mike > > > > > > > > > > > > A > > > > > > > > > > > > On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > Martin! > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental > > > representation" > > > > is > > > > > > > coming closer! > > > > > > > > > > > > > > For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's > > > theory > > > > of > > > > > > > affordances. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed > > article. > > > > But > > > > > I > > > > > > > wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is > > > > > important > > > > > > > not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a > > > > grenade > > > > > > > pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the > > list. > > > > If > > > > > > you > > > > > > > can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look > > forward > > > to > > > > > > your > > > > > > > reply, Martin. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that > being > > > at > > > > > UCSD > > > > > > > and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that > > > influences > > > > > your > > > > > > > position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find > > > > > community > > > > > > in > > > > > > > it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more > voluntary > > > > > phrased > > > > > > > that way). > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Kind regards, > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Annalisa > > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > > > > > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > > > Martin > > > > > John > > > > > > > Packer > > > > > > > > Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM > > > > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > An interesting article, David. One way in which it is > > interesting, > > > to > > > > > me > > > > > > > at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not > used, > > > > even > > > > > > > once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" > images > > in > > > > the > > > > > > > world around us - material representations - and he tries to > > define > > > > the > > > > > > > "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg < > dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Larry, Annalisa: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" > > when > > > > we > > > > > > > > met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of > > > > > anything > > > > > > > > except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe > > > available > > > > > > > > for a standard price all over China) She does not even > remember > > > > > > > > whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was > the > > > > > > > > beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as > a > > > > > > > > non-image based mental representation. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental > representations > > > are > > > > > > > > images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth > century. > > > In > > > > > > > > fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against > > > > > Titchener > > > > > > > > and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, > > > > > > > > everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated > > that > > > > > > > > many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically > > > > anterior > > > > > > > > to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would > > not > > > > have > > > > > > > > time or ability to process complex problems in real time. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that > are > > > > > > > > genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more > > > > reading > > > > > > > > to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read > than > > I > > > am > > > > > > > > (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels > > like > > > > > > > > she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do > > NOT > > > > read > > > > > > > > this article--instead, look at Figure 11. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color > structure > > of > > > > > > > > Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any > > > actual > > > > > > > > images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural > > > > > experience > > > > > > > > associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then > > > deliberately > > > > > > > > frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any > > > > > > > > recognizable figures upon which to focus. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine > Chapel > > > > fresco > > > > > > > > for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. > He > > or > > > > she > > > > > > > > can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the > painting > > > and > > > > > > > > wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not > > > notice > > > > > > > > the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful > in > > > it. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar < > > annalisa@unm.edu > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> Hi Larry and David, > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are > > at > > > > the > > > > > > > root of all thinking. > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, > > based > > > > upon > > > > > > > previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, > in > > > > > > > combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a > > > phrase > > > > I > > > > > > like > > > > > > > a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on > it > > > by > > > > > the > > > > > > > same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know > it. > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think > as > > > > > Hackett > > > > > > > describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have > > you > > > > > > already > > > > > > > given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be > > > willing > > > > > to > > > > > > > take a look. > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is > > > > > controversial. > > > > > > > It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone > > > says > > > > > > "this > > > > > > > is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble > > > > > observation. > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and > whatever > > > > that > > > > > > > process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at > > > hand? > > > > > > Just a > > > > > > > thought. > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> What is it that appeals to you about this model, > > metaphoricity? > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> Kind regards, > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> Annalisa > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> ________________________________________ > > > > > > > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > > > > > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > > Larry > > > > > > Purss < > > > > > > > lpscholar2@gmail.com > > > > > > > > >> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM > > > > > > > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity > > > > > > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> David K > > > > > > > >> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. > > My > > > > > reason > > > > > > > for > > > > > > > >> exploring these authors is I have been following a path > > > pursuing a > > > > > > basic > > > > > > > >> question. > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic > > > > guiding > > > > > > > images > > > > > > > >> upon which thinking rests" > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring > > > appearances > > > > > and > > > > > > > >> illusions was also exploring this theme. > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new > > > phenomenological > > > > > > path > > > > > > > >> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names > > > this > > > > > > > process > > > > > > > >> *metaphoricity*. > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible > > > > image-character > > > > > > of > > > > > > > the > > > > > > > >> *spontaneous event* of meaning. > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which > he > > > > > > brackets - > > > > > > > >> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> AND > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* > > finds > > > > the > > > > > > > >> meaning of its very self. > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this > > > > > > > >> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion > of > > > > > > metaphor > > > > > > > can > > > > > > > >> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is > implicated > > > in > > > > > > > >> *objectivity* > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of > > > itself > > > > > > *in* > > > > > > > the > > > > > > > >> mode [path] of the concept > > > > > > > >> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding > > > images > > > > > has > > > > > > > been > > > > > > > >> established. > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the > > path > > > of > > > > > > > >> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is > derived > > > > from > > > > > > the > > > > > > > >> image-character of the guiding image. > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial > > this > > > > > topic > > > > > > > may > > > > > > > >> become [again] > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by > this > > > > basic > > > > > > > >> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these > > > images > > > > as > > > > > > > >> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images > > emerge > > > > > > > >> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is > > > transcendental] > > > > > and > > > > > > > is > > > > > > > >> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. > > It > > > > > seems > > > > > > to > > > > > > > >> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> I also realize this question may already be answered in > > > Vygotsky's > > > > > > > writings > > > > > > > >> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of > > > XMCA. I > > > > > > > >> personally am following this path for now. > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> Larry > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > with > > > an > > > > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > > an > > > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > an > > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Tue Dec 2 14:15:38 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2014 07:15:38 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? In-Reply-To: <9F6BE3D8-123E-4204-B0A3-657EBEE09F53@gmail.com> References: <1417397991972.17078@unm.edu> <1417490593837.73384@unm.edu> <9F6BE3D8-123E-4204-B0A3-657EBEE09F53@gmail.com> Message-ID: I'm going to try to defend "mental representation" and also complain a little about "affordance". My first line of defense is that Vygotsky uses mental representation. This isn't much of a defense, I know; Vygotsky uses a lot of words that were just "in the air" at the time, and this is surely one of them. And when Vygotsky uses a word it usually doesn't mean quite what it meant when he first read or hear it used. For example, I am starting to realize that Vygotsky's notion of "pedology" has very little to do with what others meant by the term and everything to do with what we are trying to pin down when we try to figure out what he meant by "analysis into units". In fact, I think that "pedology" is a really good example of what I mean when I try to figure out what I mean by a thematic, transdisciplinary approach rather than an object-oriented, inter-disciplinary one. So my second line of defense is Halliday. Let's assume that Martin's right, and that "read" is a better way to express Vygotsky's meaning. Imagine that you are looking at Vermeer's "Christ in the House of Mary and Martha" and you are comparing it to Velazquez's treatment of the same subject: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christ_in_the_House_of_Martha_and_Mary_(Vermeer)#mediaviewer/File:Johannes_(Jan)_Vermeer_-_Christ_in_the_House_of_Martha_and_Mary_-_Google_Art_Project.jpg http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christ_in_the_House_of_Martha_and_Mary_(Vel%C3%A1zquez)#mediaviewer/File:Christ_in_the_house_of_Marthe_and_Marry_V%C3%A9lazquez.jpg Vermeer is image-based, and he doesn't usually tell stories. So you look up Luke 38: 10, and you get a dozen different translations. Some of them look like this: a) Now it came to pass, as they went, that he entered into a certain town, and a certain woman named Martha, received him into her house." (1599 Geneva Bible) b) Jesus and his disciples, journeying onward, came to the village where an older woman and her younger sister gave them hospitality. (Invented) You can see that there is a difference in meaning. A town is not a village, and in one it is Christ who is named while in the other is is Mary. I will say the difference here is representational, and it produces a different image: a) is much closer to Velazquez and b) much closer to Vermeer. Halliday calls this difference in meaning representational. Why is that useful? Well, compare: a) Jesus and his desciples, journeying onward, came to the village where the older woman and her younger sister gave them hospitality. b) Did Jesus and his disciples, journeying onward, come to the village where the older woman and her younger sister gave them hospitality? Here too there is a difference in meaning, but the difference is not a difference in representation. The image is exaclty the same, and it's Vermeer rather than Velazquez. The difference is what Halliday calls "interpersonal", because it's a difference between getting information and giving it. That difference is every bit as meaningful as the difference between producing a commodity and consuming it, but it doesn't actually have to do with the nature of the representation; it has to do with the nature of the relations surrounding its production. Finally--let me complain a little bit about the term affordance, which seems an extreme form of behaviorism to me. When Gibson tries to explain language as an affordance, he ends up claiming that phonemes are affordances. That is, they are actually perceivable, in the air; they are not constructions in the mind. Consider the following pairs of words: a) back b) bag c) calf d) cave e) mace f) maze Now imagine you are holding a bag standing in a cave in the middle of maze. You are conveying a mental representation of your predicament to someone at a distance--they are far away, so they cannot hear the final stop /k/ or /g/, /f/ or /v/, /s/ or /z/, and even if they could, they couldn't tell whether it was a voiced stop (i.e. /g/, /v/, or /z/) or an unvoiced one, because your mouth is actually shut when you provide the vocal cord vibration that differentiates them. Nonetheless, they understand you perfectly. How is this possible? According to Gibson, it cannot be. If an affordance is not perceptible, it isn't there. But in fact although the phoneme is not there, the mind has a way of supplying it, and it's very simple. All vowels are voiced in English; no vowels are unvoiced. So when the vowel is lengthened, as in "bag", "cave", and "maze", it means that it doesn't stop but continues on into the final consonant. So your interlocutor will judge from the length of the vowel whether the final stop is voiced or unvoiced. There's an affordance, all right, but it's not in the environment or even in your interlocutor's relationship to the environment; it's in the language system, as instantiated in your interlocutor's mind. In other words, it's a mental re-presentation. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies Why is it useful to call this kind of meaning representational (which is c) In a) it is Martha and Mary who are named and On 3 December 2014 at 03:49, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > Peeps, > I come late to this, but I was thinking this morning at the bus stop about David K?s narrative of kids learning about light. I though maybe a parallel: Representation = Reflection and Procedural = Refraction. I think of both as imagery, just that representation is sort of nouny and procedural is verby. Procedural imagery involves, depending on the angle of incidence, deviation from the the initial vector. But procedural imagery keeps things on the move. An affordance. I have forgotten my physics, but does refraction slow things down in any way? > Henry > >> On Dec 1, 2014, at 8:23 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >> Martin! >> >> Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental representation" is coming closer! >> >> For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's theory of affordances. >> >> This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed article. But I wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is important not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. >> >> I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a grenade pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the list. If you can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look forward to your reply, Martin. >> >> Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that being at UCSD and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that influences your position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find community in it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more voluntary phrased that way). >> >> Kind regards, >> >> Annalisa >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Martin John Packer >> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >> >> An interesting article, David. One way in which it is interesting, to me at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used, even once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images in the world around us - material representations - and he tries to define the "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. >> >> Martin >> >> On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >> >>> Larry, Annalisa: >>> >>> People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" when we >>> met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of anything >>> except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe available >>> for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember >>> whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the >>> beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a >>> non-image based mental representation. >>> >>> As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations are >>> images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. In >>> fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against Titchener >>> and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, >>> everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated that >>> many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically anterior >>> to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would not have >>> time or ability to process complex problems in real time. >>> >>> I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are >>> genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more reading >>> to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than I am >>> (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels like >>> she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do NOT read >>> this article--instead, look at Figure 11. >>> >>> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ >>> >>> The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure of >>> Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any actual >>> images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural experience >>> associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then deliberately >>> frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any >>> recognizable figures upon which to focus. >>> >>> However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine Chapel fresco >>> for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He or she >>> can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting and >>> wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not notice >>> the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in it. >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>> >>> On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>>> >>>> Hi Larry and David, >>>> >>>> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! >>>> >>>> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are at the root of all thinking. >>>> >>>> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, based upon previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a phrase I like a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it by the same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it. >>>> >>>> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as Hackett describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have you already given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be willing to take a look. >>>> >>>> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is controversial. It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone says "this is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble observation. >>>> >>>> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever that process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at hand? Just a thought. >>>> >>>> What is it that appeals to you about this model, metaphoricity? >>>> >>>> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) >>>> >>>> Kind regards, >>>> >>>> Annalisa >>>> >>>> >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Larry Purss >>>> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? >>>> >>>> David K >>>> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. My reason for >>>> exploring these authors is I have been following a path pursuing a basic >>>> question. >>>> >>>> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? >>>> >>>> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic guiding images >>>> upon which thinking rests" >>>> >>>> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring appearances and >>>> illusions was also exploring this theme. >>>> >>>> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new phenomenological path >>>> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names this process >>>> *metaphoricity*. >>>> >>>> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible image-character of the >>>> *spontaneous event* of meaning. >>>> >>>> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he brackets - >>>> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. >>>> >>>> AND >>>> >>>> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* finds the >>>> meaning of its very self. >>>> >>>> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this >>>> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of metaphor can >>>> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated in >>>> *objectivity* >>>> >>>> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. >>>> >>>> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of itself *in* the >>>> mode [path] of the concept >>>> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding images has been >>>> established. >>>> >>>> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the path of >>>> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived from the >>>> image-character of the guiding image. >>>> >>>> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial this topic may >>>> become [again] >>>> >>>> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this basic >>>> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these images as >>>> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images emerge >>>> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. >>>> >>>> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is transcendental] and is >>>> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. It seems to >>>> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. >>>> >>>> I also realize this question may already be answered in Vygotsky's writings >>>> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of XMCA. I >>>> personally am following this path for now. >>>> >>>> Larry >>>> >>> >> >> >> > > From hshonerd@gmail.com Tue Dec 2 14:50:52 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2014 15:50:52 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? In-Reply-To: References: <1417397991972.17078@unm.edu> <1417490593837.73384@unm.edu> Message-ID: > On Dec 1, 2014, at 10:39 PM, mike cole wrote: > > The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And, > co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive artifacts > right about that time at UCSD. If it were possible to find a source that > makes these connections visible and available to read about it might be a > step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of intro for > newcomers to the discussion. > > I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a newcomer's > introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is seeking to sort > out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am insuficiently > read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted! > > A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many rocks, so > little time"! > > Mike > > A > > On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >> Martin! >> >> Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental representation" is >> coming closer! >> >> For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's theory of >> affordances. >> >> This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed article. But I >> wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is important >> not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. >> >> I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a grenade >> pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the list. If you >> can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look forward to your >> reply, Martin. >> >> Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that being at UCSD >> and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that influences your >> position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find community in >> it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more voluntary phrased >> that way). >> >> Kind regards, >> >> Annalisa >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Martin John >> Packer > >> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >> >> An interesting article, David. One way in which it is interesting, to me >> at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used, even >> once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images in the >> world around us - material representations - and he tries to define the >> "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. >> >> Martin >> >> On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg > > wrote: >> >>> Larry, Annalisa: >>> >>> People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" when we >>> met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of anything >>> except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe available >>> for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember >>> whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the >>> beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a >>> non-image based mental representation. >>> >>> As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations are >>> images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. In >>> fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against Titchener >>> and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, >>> everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated that >>> many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically anterior >>> to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would not have >>> time or ability to process complex problems in real time. >>> >>> I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are >>> genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more reading >>> to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than I am >>> (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels like >>> she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do NOT read >>> this article--instead, look at Figure 11. >>> >>> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ >>> >>> The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure of >>> Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any actual >>> images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural experience >>> associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then deliberately >>> frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any >>> recognizable figures upon which to focus. >>> >>> However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine Chapel fresco >>> for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He or she >>> can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting and >>> wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not notice >>> the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in it. >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>> >>> On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar > > wrote: >>>> >>>> Hi Larry and David, >>>> >>>> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! >>>> >>>> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are at the >> root of all thinking. >>>> >>>> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, based upon >> previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in >> combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a phrase I like >> a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it by the >> same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it. >>>> >>>> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as Hackett >> describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have you already >> given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be willing to >> take a look. >>>> >>>> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is controversial. >> It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone says "this >> is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble observation. >>>> >>>> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever that >> process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at hand? Just a >> thought. >>>> >>>> What is it that appeals to you about this model, metaphoricity? >>>> >>>> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) >>>> >>>> Kind regards, >>>> >>>> Annalisa >>>> >>>> >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Larry Purss < >> lpscholar2@gmail.com > >>>> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? >>>> >>>> David K >>>> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. My reason >> for >>>> exploring these authors is I have been following a path pursuing a basic >>>> question. >>>> >>>> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? >>>> >>>> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic guiding >> images >>>> upon which thinking rests" >>>> >>>> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring appearances and >>>> illusions was also exploring this theme. >>>> >>>> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new phenomenological path >>>> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names this >> process >>>> *metaphoricity*. >>>> >>>> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible image-character of >> the >>>> *spontaneous event* of meaning. >>>> >>>> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he brackets - >>>> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. >>>> >>>> AND >>>> >>>> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* finds the >>>> meaning of its very self. >>>> >>>> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this >>>> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of metaphor >> can >>>> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated in >>>> *objectivity* >>>> >>>> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. >>>> >>>> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of itself *in* >> the >>>> mode [path] of the concept >>>> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding images has >> been >>>> established. >>>> >>>> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the path of >>>> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived from the >>>> image-character of the guiding image. >>>> >>>> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial this topic >> may >>>> become [again] >>>> >>>> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this basic >>>> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these images as >>>> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images emerge >>>> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. >>>> >>>> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is transcendental] and >> is >>>> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. It seems to >>>> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. >>>> >>>> I also realize this question may already be answered in Vygotsky's >> writings >>>> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of XMCA. I >>>> personally am following this path for now. >>>> >>>> Larry >>>> >>> >> >> >> >> > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From hshonerd@gmail.com Tue Dec 2 14:54:15 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2014 15:54:15 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? In-Reply-To: References: <1417397991972.17078@unm.edu> <1417490593837.73384@unm.edu> Message-ID: <214679DF-5A21-4D40-8ED7-71AC526A73D9@gmail.com> Yes! Sculpture takes time. Duh! It?s about logistics! Tools, affordances, artifacts. It isn?t just about good intentions. Not that good intentions don?t count. H > On Dec 1, 2014, at 10:39 PM, mike cole wrote: > > The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And, > co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive artifacts > right about that time at UCSD. If it were possible to find a source that > makes these connections visible and available to read about it might be a > step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of intro for > newcomers to the discussion. > > I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a newcomer's > introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is seeking to sort > out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am insuficiently > read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted! > > A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many rocks, so > little time"! > > Mike > > A > > On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >> Martin! >> >> Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental representation" is >> coming closer! >> >> For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's theory of >> affordances. >> >> This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed article. But I >> wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is important >> not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. >> >> I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a grenade >> pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the list. If you >> can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look forward to your >> reply, Martin. >> >> Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that being at UCSD >> and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that influences your >> position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find community in >> it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more voluntary phrased >> that way). >> >> Kind regards, >> >> Annalisa >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Martin John >> Packer > >> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >> >> An interesting article, David. One way in which it is interesting, to me >> at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used, even >> once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images in the >> world around us - material representations - and he tries to define the >> "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. >> >> Martin >> >> On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg > > wrote: >> >>> Larry, Annalisa: >>> >>> People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" when we >>> met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of anything >>> except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe available >>> for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember >>> whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the >>> beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a >>> non-image based mental representation. >>> >>> As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations are >>> images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. In >>> fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against Titchener >>> and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, >>> everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated that >>> many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically anterior >>> to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would not have >>> time or ability to process complex problems in real time. >>> >>> I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are >>> genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more reading >>> to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than I am >>> (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels like >>> she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do NOT read >>> this article--instead, look at Figure 11. >>> >>> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ >>> >>> The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure of >>> Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any actual >>> images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural experience >>> associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then deliberately >>> frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any >>> recognizable figures upon which to focus. >>> >>> However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine Chapel fresco >>> for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He or she >>> can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting and >>> wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not notice >>> the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in it. >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>> >>> On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar > > wrote: >>>> >>>> Hi Larry and David, >>>> >>>> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! >>>> >>>> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are at the >> root of all thinking. >>>> >>>> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, based upon >> previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in >> combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a phrase I like >> a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it by the >> same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it. >>>> >>>> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as Hackett >> describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have you already >> given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be willing to >> take a look. >>>> >>>> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is controversial. >> It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone says "this >> is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble observation. >>>> >>>> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever that >> process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at hand? Just a >> thought. >>>> >>>> What is it that appeals to you about this model, metaphoricity? >>>> >>>> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) >>>> >>>> Kind regards, >>>> >>>> Annalisa >>>> >>>> >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Larry Purss < >> lpscholar2@gmail.com > >>>> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? >>>> >>>> David K >>>> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. My reason >> for >>>> exploring these authors is I have been following a path pursuing a basic >>>> question. >>>> >>>> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? >>>> >>>> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic guiding >> images >>>> upon which thinking rests" >>>> >>>> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring appearances and >>>> illusions was also exploring this theme. >>>> >>>> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new phenomenological path >>>> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names this >> process >>>> *metaphoricity*. >>>> >>>> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible image-character of >> the >>>> *spontaneous event* of meaning. >>>> >>>> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he brackets - >>>> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. >>>> >>>> AND >>>> >>>> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* finds the >>>> meaning of its very self. >>>> >>>> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this >>>> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of metaphor >> can >>>> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated in >>>> *objectivity* >>>> >>>> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. >>>> >>>> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of itself *in* >> the >>>> mode [path] of the concept >>>> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding images has >> been >>>> established. >>>> >>>> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the path of >>>> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived from the >>>> image-character of the guiding image. >>>> >>>> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial this topic >> may >>>> become [again] >>>> >>>> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this basic >>>> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these images as >>>> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images emerge >>>> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. >>>> >>>> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is transcendental] and >> is >>>> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. It seems to >>>> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. >>>> >>>> I also realize this question may already be answered in Vygotsky's >> writings >>>> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of XMCA. I >>>> personally am following this path for now. >>>> >>>> Larry >>>> >>> >> >> >> >> > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From hshonerd@gmail.com Tue Dec 2 16:23:04 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2014 17:23:04 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074B00@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> References: <1417397991972.17078@unm.edu> <1417490593837.73384@unm.edu> <1417499588620.61068@unm.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074ADB@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <, > <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074B00@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: <59FDD43F-0C18-4FE5-B60A-AA273DBD0233@gmail.com> I?m game. I tried to find your article with Engstrom and got nowhere. I would like to read it. I need an affordance here to see if I?m using the right word. Henry > On Dec 2, 2014, at 9:44 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > > I'd be interested in anybody else is. > > Michael > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 11:39 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > Interloper, Michael? > > The discussions at UCSD preceeding Don's use of affordances and cognitive > artifacts were accompanied by other, related papers. One by Engestrom on > "when is an artifact" and one or more by Ed Hutchins. If people are > interested in pursuing this thread/topic the materials could be gathered > up. > > mike > > On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Glassman, Michael > wrote: > >> But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea). He >> actually cops to both of them. The first was not to distinguish between >> affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which are >> designed. I think this is related to the issue of artifacts. Meaning are >> artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to be >> discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong word, if >> anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances. It is a complex >> question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes based on >> context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one context may >> result in organic affordances in another context. >> >> The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is that he was >> not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and constraints. >> Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived affordances or are >> they designed to create constraints. >> >> Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the mention >> just spurred me to throw this up. Hope I'm not being too much of an >> interloper. >> >> Michael >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >> >> Annalisa- >> >> I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation not >> discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of >> affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set against >> Gibson's ideas. The change of views coincided with the advent of the d-cog >> idea which also has deep roots in chat. >> >> No hidden history i know of, but interesting connections among the notion >> of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion of these >> connections can be found, among other places, in >> >> Cole, M. & Engestr?m, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach to >> distributed* >> *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition: Psychological and >> educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press. >> >> mike >> >> >> >> >> >> On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >>> >>> Hi Mike, >>> >>> It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied that >> wish! >>> >>> Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important connections. I was >>> not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I learned about >>> Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science (1985). >>> >>> Is there some history that is not part of the common story? >>> >>> I looked here for clarity: >>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance >>> >>> Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to cognitive >>> artifacts? >>> >>> There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in play, and >>> even joy! >>> >>> When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however until then >>> I will remain with the ineffable. >>> >>> Kind regards, >>> >>> Annalisa >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> on behalf of mike cole >>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>> >>> The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And, >>> co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive artifacts >>> right about that time at UCSD. If it were possible to find a source that >>> makes these connections visible and available to read about it might be a >>> step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of intro >> for >>> newcomers to the discussion. >>> >>> I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a newcomer's >>> introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is seeking to >> sort >>> out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am >> insuficiently >>> read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted! >>> >>> A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many rocks, so >>> little time"! >>> >>> Mike >>> >>> A >>> >>> On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>> >>>> Martin! >>>> >>>> Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental representation" is >>>> coming closer! >>>> >>>> For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's theory of >>>> affordances. >>>> >>>> This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed article. But >> I >>>> wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is >> important >>>> not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. >>>> >>>> I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a grenade >>>> pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the list. If >>> you >>>> can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look forward to >>> your >>>> reply, Martin. >>>> >>>> Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that being at >> UCSD >>>> and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that influences >> your >>>> position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find >> community >>> in >>>> it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more voluntary >> phrased >>>> that way). >>>> >>>> Kind regards, >>>> >>>> Annalisa >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Martin >> John >>>> Packer > >>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>> >>>> An interesting article, David. One way in which it is interesting, to >> me >>>> at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used, even >>>> once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images in the >>>> world around us - material representations - and he tries to define the >>>> "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg >>> > wrote: >>>> >>>>> Larry, Annalisa: >>>>> >>>>> People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" when we >>>>> met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of >> anything >>>>> except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe available >>>>> for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember >>>>> whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the >>>>> beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a >>>>> non-image based mental representation. >>>>> >>>>> As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations are >>>>> images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. In >>>>> fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against >> Titchener >>>>> and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, >>>>> everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated that >>>>> many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically anterior >>>>> to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would not have >>>>> time or ability to process complex problems in real time. >>>>> >>>>> I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are >>>>> genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more reading >>>>> to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than I am >>>>> (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels like >>>>> she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do NOT read >>>>> this article--instead, look at Figure 11. >>>>> >>>>> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ >>>>> >>>>> The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure of >>>>> Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any actual >>>>> images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural >> experience >>>>> associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then deliberately >>>>> frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any >>>>> recognizable figures upon which to focus. >>>>> >>>>> However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine Chapel fresco >>>>> for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He or she >>>>> can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting and >>>>> wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not notice >>>>> the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in it. >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>> >>>>> On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar >>> > wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Hi Larry and David, >>>>>> >>>>>> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! >>>>>> >>>>>> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are at the >>>> root of all thinking. >>>>>> >>>>>> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, based upon >>>> previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in >>>> combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a phrase I >>> like >>>> a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it by >> the >>>> same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it. >>>>>> >>>>>> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as >> Hackett >>>> describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have you >>> already >>>> given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be willing >> to >>>> take a look. >>>>>> >>>>>> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is >> controversial. >>>> It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone says >>> "this >>>> is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble >> observation. >>>>>> >>>>>> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever that >>>> process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at hand? >>> Just a >>>> thought. >>>>>> >>>>>> What is it that appeals to you about this model, metaphoricity? >>>>>> >>>>>> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) >>>>>> >>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>> >>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Larry >>> Purss < >>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com > >>>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? >>>>>> >>>>>> David K >>>>>> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. My >> reason >>>> for >>>>>> exploring these authors is I have been following a path pursuing a >>> basic >>>>>> question. >>>>>> >>>>>> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? >>>>>> >>>>>> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic guiding >>>> images >>>>>> upon which thinking rests" >>>>>> >>>>>> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring appearances >> and >>>>>> illusions was also exploring this theme. >>>>>> >>>>>> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new phenomenological >>> path >>>>>> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names this >>>> process >>>>>> *metaphoricity*. >>>>>> >>>>>> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible image-character >>> of >>>> the >>>>>> *spontaneous event* of meaning. >>>>>> >>>>>> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he >>> brackets - >>>>>> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. >>>>>> >>>>>> AND >>>>>> >>>>>> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* finds the >>>>>> meaning of its very self. >>>>>> >>>>>> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this >>>>>> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of >>> metaphor >>>> can >>>>>> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated in >>>>>> *objectivity* >>>>>> >>>>>> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. >>>>>> >>>>>> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of itself >>> *in* >>>> the >>>>>> mode [path] of the concept >>>>>> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding images >> has >>>> been >>>>>> established. >>>>>> >>>>>> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the path of >>>>>> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived from >>> the >>>>>> image-character of the guiding image. >>>>>> >>>>>> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial this >> topic >>>> may >>>>>> become [again] >>>>>> >>>>>> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this basic >>>>>> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these images as >>>>>> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images emerge >>>>>> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. >>>>>> >>>>>> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is transcendental] >> and >>>> is >>>>>> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. It >> seems >>> to >>>>>> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. >>>>>> >>>>>> I also realize this question may already be answered in Vygotsky's >>>> writings >>>>>> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of XMCA. I >>>>>> personally am following this path for now. >>>>>> >>>>>> Larry >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> -- >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>> >>> >> >> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> >> > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Dec 2 16:50:30 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2014 16:50:30 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? In-Reply-To: <59FDD43F-0C18-4FE5-B60A-AA273DBD0233@gmail.com> References: <1417397991972.17078@unm.edu> <1417490593837.73384@unm.edu> <1417499588620.61068@unm.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074ADB@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074B00@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <59FDD43F-0C18-4FE5-B60A-AA273DBD0233@gmail.com> Message-ID: I do not have a copy of the distributed cognition article with Engestrom, either, Henry. Maybe someone on the list does, or I can get one made. Here is a copy of a paper by Ed Hutchins originally given as a talk at a Sylvia Scribner memorial meeting at (I think) the anthro meetings. I think lots of affinities between perspectives are on display here. mike for the "this thread" library :-) On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 4:23 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > I?m game. I tried to find your article with Engstrom and got nowhere. I > would like to read it. I need an affordance here to see if I?m using the > right word. > Henry > > > On Dec 2, 2014, at 9:44 AM, Glassman, Michael > wrote: > > > > I'd be interested in anybody else is. > > > > Michael > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > > Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 11:39 AM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > Interloper, Michael? > > > > The discussions at UCSD preceeding Don's use of affordances and cognitive > > artifacts were accompanied by other, related papers. One by Engestrom on > > "when is an artifact" and one or more by Ed Hutchins. If people are > > interested in pursuing this thread/topic the materials could be gathered > > up. > > > > mike > > > > On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Glassman, Michael > > wrote: > > > >> But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea). He > >> actually cops to both of them. The first was not to distinguish between > >> affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which are > >> designed. I think this is related to the issue of artifacts. Meaning > are > >> artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to be > >> discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong word, if > >> anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances. It is a > complex > >> question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes based on > >> context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one context > may > >> result in organic affordances in another context. > >> > >> The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is that he > was > >> not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and > constraints. > >> Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived affordances or > are > >> they designed to create constraints. > >> > >> Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the > mention > >> just spurred me to throw this up. Hope I'm not being too much of an > >> interloper. > >> > >> Michael > >> ________________________________________ > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > >> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > >> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > >> > >> Annalisa- > >> > >> I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation not > >> discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of > >> affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set against > >> Gibson's ideas. The change of views coincided with the advent of the > d-cog > >> idea which also has deep roots in chat. > >> > >> No hidden history i know of, but interesting connections among the > notion > >> of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion of > these > >> connections can be found, among other places, in > >> > >> Cole, M. & Engestr?m, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach to > >> distributed* > >> *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition: Psychological > and > >> educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press. > >> > >> mike > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar > wrote: > >> > >>> > >>> Hi Mike, > >>> > >>> It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied that > >> wish! > >>> > >>> Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important connections. I > was > >>> not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I learned > about > >>> Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science (1985). > >>> > >>> Is there some history that is not part of the common story? > >>> > >>> I looked here for clarity: > >>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance > >>> > >>> Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to > cognitive > >>> artifacts? > >>> > >>> There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in play, > and > >>> even joy! > >>> > >>> When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however until > then > >>> I will remain with the ineffable. > >>> > >>> Kind regards, > >>> > >>> Annalisa > >>> ________________________________________ > >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > >>> on behalf of mike cole > >>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM > >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > >>> > >>> The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And, > >>> co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive > artifacts > >>> right about that time at UCSD. If it were possible to find a source > that > >>> makes these connections visible and available to read about it might > be a > >>> step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of intro > >> for > >>> newcomers to the discussion. > >>> > >>> I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a > newcomer's > >>> introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is seeking to > >> sort > >>> out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am > >> insuficiently > >>> read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted! > >>> > >>> A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many rocks, > so > >>> little time"! > >>> > >>> Mike > >>> > >>> A > >>> > >>> On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar > wrote: > >>> > >>>> Martin! > >>>> > >>>> Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental representation" > is > >>>> coming closer! > >>>> > >>>> For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's theory > of > >>>> affordances. > >>>> > >>>> This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed article. But > >> I > >>>> wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is > >> important > >>>> not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. > >>>> > >>>> I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a grenade > >>>> pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the list. If > >>> you > >>>> can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look forward to > >>> your > >>>> reply, Martin. > >>>> > >>>> Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that being at > >> UCSD > >>>> and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that influences > >> your > >>>> position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find > >> community > >>> in > >>>> it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more voluntary > >> phrased > >>>> that way). > >>>> > >>>> Kind regards, > >>>> > >>>> Annalisa > >>>> ________________________________________ > >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > >>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Martin > >> John > >>>> Packer > > >>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM > >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > >>>> > >>>> An interesting article, David. One way in which it is interesting, to > >> me > >>>> at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used, even > >>>> once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images in > the > >>>> world around us - material representations - and he tries to define > the > >>>> "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. > >>>> > >>>> Martin > >>>> > >>>> On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg >>>> > wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> Larry, Annalisa: > >>>>> > >>>>> People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" when we > >>>>> met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of > >> anything > >>>>> except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe available > >>>>> for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember > >>>>> whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the > >>>>> beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a > >>>>> non-image based mental representation. > >>>>> > >>>>> As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations are > >>>>> images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. In > >>>>> fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against > >> Titchener > >>>>> and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, > >>>>> everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated that > >>>>> many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically anterior > >>>>> to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would not have > >>>>> time or ability to process complex problems in real time. > >>>>> > >>>>> I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are > >>>>> genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more reading > >>>>> to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than I am > >>>>> (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels like > >>>>> she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do NOT read > >>>>> this article--instead, look at Figure 11. > >>>>> > >>>>> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ > >>>>> > >>>>> The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure of > >>>>> Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any actual > >>>>> images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural > >> experience > >>>>> associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then deliberately > >>>>> frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any > >>>>> recognizable figures upon which to focus. > >>>>> > >>>>> However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine Chapel fresco > >>>>> for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He or she > >>>>> can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting and > >>>>> wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not notice > >>>>> the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in it. > >>>>> > >>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >>>>> > >>>>> On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar >>>> > wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Hi Larry and David, > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are at the > >>>> root of all thinking. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, based upon > >>>> previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in > >>>> combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a phrase I > >>> like > >>>> a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it by > >> the > >>>> same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as > >> Hackett > >>>> describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have you > >>> already > >>>> given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be willing > >> to > >>>> take a look. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is > >> controversial. > >>>> It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone says > >>> "this > >>>> is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble > >> observation. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever that > >>>> process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at hand? > >>> Just a > >>>> thought. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> What is it that appeals to you about this model, metaphoricity? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Kind regards, > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Annalisa > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> ________________________________________ > >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > >>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Larry > >>> Purss < > >>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com > > >>>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM > >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> David K > >>>>>> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. My > >> reason > >>>> for > >>>>>> exploring these authors is I have been following a path pursuing a > >>> basic > >>>>>> question. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic guiding > >>>> images > >>>>>> upon which thinking rests" > >>>>>> > >>>>>> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring appearances > >> and > >>>>>> illusions was also exploring this theme. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new phenomenological > >>> path > >>>>>> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names this > >>>> process > >>>>>> *metaphoricity*. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible image-character > >>> of > >>>> the > >>>>>> *spontaneous event* of meaning. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he > >>> brackets - > >>>>>> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> AND > >>>>>> > >>>>>> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* finds the > >>>>>> meaning of its very self. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this > >>>>>> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of > >>> metaphor > >>>> can > >>>>>> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated in > >>>>>> *objectivity* > >>>>>> > >>>>>> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of itself > >>> *in* > >>>> the > >>>>>> mode [path] of the concept > >>>>>> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding images > >> has > >>>> been > >>>>>> established. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the path of > >>>>>> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived from > >>> the > >>>>>> image-character of the guiding image. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial this > >> topic > >>>> may > >>>>>> become [again] > >>>>>> > >>>>>> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this basic > >>>>>> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these images as > >>>>>> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images emerge > >>>>>> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is transcendental] > >> and > >>>> is > >>>>>> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. It > >> seems > >>> to > >>>>>> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I also realize this question may already be answered in Vygotsky's > >>>> writings > >>>>>> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of XMCA. I > >>>>>> personally am following this path for now. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Larry > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> -- > >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> -- > >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >> > >> > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Hutchins Cockpit.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 87905 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141202/117f4ec0/attachment.pdf From annalisa@unm.edu Tue Dec 2 18:02:40 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2014 02:02:40 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Mocombian Being in the World In-Reply-To: References: <1417397991972.17078@unm.edu> <1417490593837.73384@unm.edu> <1417499588620.61068@unm.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074ADB@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074B00@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> , Message-ID: <1417572159741.49420@unm.edu> Dear fellow brothers and sisters of the list deemed to be and steeped within Mind, Culture, and Activity (of the extended family remix in the Matrix no less), I have completed Paul's paper! I actually find much in it that is brilliant, despite my ignorance about various pieces of the content, and of course certain circumstances of context. The entire paper before me has tons of underlining! I say this to offer that the paper really made me stretch. I think I need to read it a second time, but because I did not want to leave Paul waiting, I am going to offer my first and certainly flawed impressions, which are all my own. >From the top-down, which is the way I like to think and it is more comfortable for me, I see in the paper a parallel to my own search for a suitable "stance" (I do like this word, Paul), in regard to technology design. The assertions Paul makes about reproduction of class is in black consciousness is, in a sense, what I attempt to convey in my thesis on a philosophy of design for technology (concerning a Theory of Pattern), I am just not as explicit at saying it, which is for two reasons: 1) it is a thesis, not a dissertation, and 2) I did not feel equipped to bring in the hot mess of culture and the history of oppression. I could not tackle the structures/strictures of class, from the bottom up, so my strategy was to remain in the theoretical space of ideas, namely the top-down, and so for me, I focused upon models of the mind, which *of course* are constructed by history and by class, and by many, many things cultural and then some. I apologize to begin with a reference to myself and my interests, but this is how I was able to find sense in it. I do not think I am projecting my own-ness upon his work, because I see that the themes Paul is concerned with are the questions, "what is makes up a subject and what is personal experience of the world?" and, "what is the way to freedom despite constraints that present bondage to this subject?" These are questions I wrangled with myself, but pertaining to technology design. So I want to say that much like artists can sense the zeitgeist, that without intent he and I are attempting to answer similar questions that have to do with being as a Being in the World in a post-capitalist world, and what agency is left after all the history and all the tools and all the class structures, and all the everything-else have had their way with us and how we think about ourselves (in terms of identity and notions of self). But getting to the paper, standing on its own without piling on high what resonates with my own interests, I found the theoretical move of going down to the particle to up to the cultural incredibly smart and strategic, because it destroys the stance of what-we-have-inherited-from-those-before-us as the normative stance that can be acted upon without question (OK, sorry... I can't resist...is it possible too see here how this might pertain to the "inevitable" stance of technology and its design?) I also enjoy how Paul was able to critique, without demolishing the value of, Marxist thought and to contextualize it in a larger framework (of particles to the cultural), because I believe we are more than what we do, and this "more-ness" is something less about material and more about form and formlessness (please! sans Plato) in terms of how one chooses to aggregate our particles, so to speak. :) By performing this move, I find that Paul does what Lakoff does when Lakoff shows us what happens when we are told, "Don't think of an elephant," what is the first thing we do? Think of an elephant. Marx in constructing a picture of the world around capitalism orients always to capitalism, but then again that was the project for the time, when capitalism was kinda the new rage, the new thing, even if it was just a specter, so to speak. Marxist thought has its place, but Marx cannot comment on the state of the world today because it was beyond his understanding. What he might say about it is speculation. Telling the future is hard and I don't believe Marx was a clairvoyant or that he could astrotravel, although Scrooge did do some fictional astrotravel in a Dickens story about the value of Christmases, I believe. I hope I have not whizbang-put-anyone's-back-out-of-alignment by saying this, it is just my humble stance. So this is to say (with less words) that Paul recognizes the trap set out by orienting to capitalism as the normative stance, even if it is to be against the tragedy wrought upon the many people of the world by this economic system. I would also like to say that having studied Vedic thought, there is some confirmation there in Paul's theoretical construct. I am interested to offer this not as an expert on Vedic thought, but as a recognizer of similar patterns which may offer some grist to the thinking mill. I am very unsteady with phenomenology, so please if you blow on me I'm likely to fall over on my backside, but if you can given me a little breathing room, it seems to me that phenomenology takes the position that consciousness is a product of the mind, as well as culture, language, frameworks, all that Paul described in his paper. Vedic thought, as I understand it and as I enjoy it, takes the position that mind is a manifestation of consciousness and that everything here is consciousness, including the world, which possesses its own forms of consciousness in infinite multiplicity. That is why phenomenology need not be wrong, because the processes of mind reflecting consciousness are going to be the same, it's just a matter of where you say the consciousness is. Phenomenology says, the mind, Vedic thought says, everywhere without limits. So having shared that, I don't expect this explanation to stick, especially for those who are deeply deeply invested in consciousness as a product of the mind. I only want to offer that there is another way to think about consciousness that is borne of ancient thinking (sans Descartes), that may speak to these problems. As such, Vedic thought has its own vocabulary about consciousness and it is very "lightweight" and fluid, once the concepts are grasped. But you'd have to take my word for that, for now. With this in mind, these patterns of similiarity are what I like about Paul's theory, because it shows how oppression and bondage are imaginary constructs if seen from the perspective of the particle. In Vedic thought, it wouldn't be a particle, but Brahman, which is non-dual being with no qualities and no parts (being non-dual). It is not a small thing but a big thing, without being a thing at all. In fact, the definition of the word Brahman is "the big" as an adjective, not a noun. So I offer all that, and certainly there is far more to it than I have described, with the intention to suggest that we might take a viewpoints or worldviews (as if looking through a telescope to see what it looks like for ourselves, as subjects) that are unfamiliar to us. It is a method by which to look outside the worldviews to which we are so inured that we don't think that they are worldviews anymore, but the way the world IS. I think Paul's paper provides this freshness of viewpoint. As Vygotsky has said, (I paraphrase) we come to learn our own language by learning another. So I mean it like that. Thank you, Paul, for a very enriching reading experience and some expansion in my notions pertaining to subjective beingness in the world. Kind regards, Annalisa From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Tue Dec 2 18:22:17 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Tue, 02 Dec 2014 21:22:17 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mocombian Being in the World Message-ID: Annalisa, Thank you for that in depth reading. ?It is funny that you would bring up the vedic tradition. ?My phenomenological structuralism is an attempt to synthesize Haitian vodou (which is very similar to hinduism), with physics, phenomenology, marxism, and Wittgenstein ' s notion of language game (my forthcoming book is titled, "vodou, physics, and phenomenological structuralism"). ?I believe Henri Bergson's metaphysic, in the western tradition of philosophy, is a parallel to what I am attempting to do, which is a theory of everything! Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: Annalisa Aguilar
Date:12/02/2014 9:02 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Mocombian Being in the World
Dear fellow brothers and sisters of the list deemed to be and steeped within Mind, Culture, and Activity (of the extended family remix in the Matrix no less), I have completed Paul's paper! I actually find much in it that is brilliant, despite my ignorance about various pieces of the content, and of course certain circumstances of context. The entire paper before me has tons of underlining! I say this to offer that the paper really made me stretch. I think I need to read it a second time, but because I did not want to leave Paul waiting, I am going to offer my first and certainly flawed impressions, which are all my own. >From the top-down, which is the way I like to think and it is more comfortable for me, I see in the paper a parallel to my own search for a suitable "stance" (I do like this word, Paul), in regard to technology design. The assertions Paul makes about reproduction of class is in black consciousness is, in a sense, what I attempt to convey in my thesis on a philosophy of design for technology (concerning a Theory of Pattern), I am just not as explicit at saying it, which is for two reasons: 1) it is a thesis, not a dissertation, and 2) I did not feel equipped to bring in the hot mess of culture and the history of oppression. I could not tackle the structures/strictures of class, from the bottom up, so my strategy was to remain in the theoretical space of ideas, namely the top-down, and so for me, I focused upon models of the mind, which *of course* are constructed by history and by class, and by many, many things cultural and then some. I apologize to begin with a reference to myself and my interests, but this is how I was able to find sense in it. I do not think I am projecting my own-ness upon his work, because I see that the themes Paul is concerned with are the questions, "what is makes up a subject and what is personal experience of the world?" and, "what is the way to freedom despite constraints that present bondage to this subject?" These are questions I wrangled with myself, but pertaining to technology design. So I want to say that much like artists can sense the zeitgeist, that without intent he and I are attempting to answer similar questions that have to do with being as a Being in the World in a post-capitalist world, and what agency is left after all the history and all the tools and all the class structures, and all the everything-else have had their way with us and how we think about ourselves (in terms of identity and notions of self). But getting to the paper, standing on its own without piling on high what resonates with my own interests, I found the theoretical move of going down to the particle to up to the cultural incredibly smart and strategic, because it destroys the stance of what-we-have-inherited-from-those-before-us as the normative stance that can be acted upon without question (OK, sorry... I can't resist...is it possible too see here how this might pertain to the "inevitable" stance of technology and its design?) I also enjoy how Paul was able to critique, without demolishing the value of, Marxist thought and to contextualize it in a larger framework (of particles to the cultural), because I believe we are more than what we do, and this "more-ness" is something less about material and more about form and formlessness (please! sans Plato) in terms of how one chooses to aggregate our particles, so to speak. :) By performing this move, I find that Paul does what Lakoff does when Lakoff shows us what happens when we are told, "Don't think of an elephant," what is the first thing we do? Think of an elephant. Marx in constructing a picture of the world around capitalism orients always to capitalism, but then again that was the project for the time, when capitalism was kinda the new rage, the new thing, even if it was just a specter, so to speak. Marxist thought has its place, but Marx cannot comment on the state of the world today because it was beyond his understanding. What he might say about it is speculation. Telling the future is hard and I don't believe Marx was a clairvoyant or that he could astrotravel, although Scrooge did do some fictional astrotravel in a Dickens story about the value of Christmases, I believe. I hope I have not whizbang-put-anyone's-back-out-of-alignment by saying this, it is just my humble stance. So this is to say (with less words) that Paul recognizes the trap set out by orienting to capitalism as the normative stance, even if it is to be against the tragedy wrought upon the many people of the world by this economic system. I would also like to say that having studied Vedic thought, there is some confirmation there in Paul's theoretical construct. I am interested to offer this not as an expert on Vedic thought, but as a recognizer of similar patterns which may offer some grist to the thinking mill. I am very unsteady with phenomenology, so please if you blow on me I'm likely to fall over on my backside, but if you can given me a little breathing room, it seems to me that phenomenology takes the position that consciousness is a product of the mind, as well as culture, language, frameworks, all that Paul described in his paper. Vedic thought, as I understand it and as I enjoy it, takes the position that mind is a manifestation of consciousness and that everything here is consciousness, including the world, which possesses its own forms of consciousness in infinite multiplicity. That is why phenomenology need not be wrong, because the processes of mind reflecting consciousness are going to be the same, it's just a matter of where you say the consciousness is. Phenomenology says, the mind, Vedic thought says, everywhere without limits. So having shared that, I don't expect this explanation to stick, especially for those who are deeply deeply invested in consciousness as a product of the mind. I only want to offer that there is another way to think about consciousness that is borne of ancient thinking (sans Descartes), that may speak to these problems. As such, Vedic thought has its own vocabulary about consciousness and it is very "lightweight" and fluid, once the concepts are grasped. But you'd have to take my word for that, for now. With this in mind, these patterns of similiarity are what I like about Paul's theory, because it shows how oppression and bondage are imaginary constructs if seen from the perspective of the particle. In Vedic thought, it wouldn't be a particle, but Brahman, which is non-dual being with no qualities and no parts (being non-dual). It is not a small thing but a big thing, without being a thing at all. In fact, the definition of the word Brahman is "the big" as an adjective, not a noun. So I offer all that, and certainly there is far more to it than I have described, with the intention to suggest that we might take a viewpoints or worldviews (as if looking through a telescope to see what it looks like for ourselves, as subjects) that are unfamiliar to us. It is a method by which to look outside the worldviews to which we are so inured that we don't think that they are worldviews anymore, but the way the world IS. I think Paul's paper provides this freshness of viewpoint. As Vygotsky has said, (I paraphrase) we come to learn our own language by learning another. So I mean it like that. Thank you, Paul, for a very enriching reading experience and some expansion in my notions pertaining to subjective beingness in the world. Kind regards, Annalisa From hshonerd@gmail.com Tue Dec 2 18:33:59 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2014 19:33:59 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074C0F@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> References: <1417397991972.17078@unm.edu> <1417490593837.73384@unm.edu> <1417499588620.61068@unm.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074ADB@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074B00@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <1417543176078.99950@unm.edu> <, > <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074C0F@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: Dumb question: Suppose I use the affordance differently from what it was designed for? Henry > On Dec 2, 2014, at 11:45 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > > Hi Annalisa, Mike, Huw > > I tend to be somebody who reacts better to concrete examples than definitions. I believe this also comes from Gibson's 1977 book, > > You are walking across a field and come to a stream which you can to get across. You notice a plank across the stream. It is wide enough for you to keep your balance and thick enough to hold your weight, in using it you recognize its affordance as a crossing point. It is the intersection of the movement, the perception of the plank, short term goal of the activity (getting across the stream) - the recognition of the affordance comes in the subjective use of the object (which is why it is neither subjective or objective). It is also important that you have the abilities (the correct weight, the balance) to recognize the affordance, otherwise you pass the plank by. > > As far as perceived affordance. I think I have this right - the perceived is not in the person who recognizes the affordance (otherwise you are right, that is wet water) it is whether there is an intention in the design of the object. So I create a light switch with the intention of designing it as having a perceived affordance for somebody who wants to switch on a light. As you can see different from the relationship to the plank, where there is no prior design. > > Here is my question (perhaps answered in the Engestrom paper) > > The light switch is certainly an artifact, but is the plank? > > Michael > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 1:19 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances > > Those definitions help a lot Annalisa and touch on the fact that gibson > seemed to empty the organism (if one were so inclined to interpret him) and > he dismissed culutral mediation as secondary at best. Still, they share the > idea that a part of the structure that psychologist theorize as a located > inside of individual crania is in fact "our there" in the phylgenetically > and cultural-historically constitued environment. And that drove cognitive > psychologists, our co discussants, nuts. Until, "they got it" and then > sought to mold it to their own ends and pre-existing means. > mike > > On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 9:59 AM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >> I thought I'd do the honors and start a new thread on affordances, which >> isn't related to Larry's discussion of basic images. >> >> I figured as well to offer Gibson's words on affordances since it is a >> word he invented to describe something he saw in the world. Of course the >> life of affordances has been full of controversy, especially with regard to >> understanding what they are. >> >> Gibson's Affordances is a theory I find instrumental to connecting outside >> to inside experiences and I intuit that it is related to perezhivanie in >> some fashion. >> >> After reading the wikipage more closely, I regret offering a link to the >> text there because it isn't very clear what Gibson means or what Norman >> means. To me, a "perceived affordance" is like saying "wet water." >> >> In any case, here are 3 quotes of Gibson in his own words, that I could >> find: >> >> The affordances of the environment are what it _offers_ the animal, what >> it _provides_ or _furnishes_, either for good or ill. The verb "to afford" >> is found in the dictionary, the noun "affordance" is not. I have made it >> up. I mean by it something that refers both to the environment and the >> animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies the complementarity >> of the animal and the environment (Gibson, 1977/1986). >> >> and >> >> What is meant by an _affordance_? ?Subject to revision, I suggest that the >> affordance of anything is a specific combination of the properties of its >> substance and its surfaces taken with reference to an animal. The reference >> may be to an animal as distinguished from other species (Gibson, 1977/1986). >> >> and >> >> An important fact about affordances of the environment is that they are in >> a sense objective, real, and physical, unlike values and meanings, which >> are often supposed to be subjective, phenomenal, and mental. But actually, >> an affordance is neither an objective property nor a subjective property; >> or it is both if you like. An affordance cuts across the dichotomy of >> subjective-objective and helps us to understand its inadequacy. It is >> equally a fact of the environment and a fact of behavior. It is both >> physical and psychical, yet neither. An affordance points both ways, to the >> environment and to the observer (Gibson, 1977/1986). >> >> These quotes are important to keep in mind, I hope they help. >> >> I might also suggest looking at Mace(1977) who described very carefully >> how Gibson got from stimuli to affordance, given that people on this list >> value history, learning, and development. >> >> Kind regards, >> >> Annalisa >> >> >> >> >> >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> on behalf of Huw Lloyd >> Sent: Tuesday, December 2, 2014 10:35 AM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >> >> I'd take a look. >> >> Michael, utility or technical affordance might fit. My equivalent of your >> perceived/discovered distinction is one of planned and technically >> manifest. >> >> Huw >> >> >> On 2 December 2014 at 16:44, Glassman, Michael >> wrote: >> >>> I'd be interested in anybody else is. >>> >>> Michael >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 11:39 AM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>> >>> Interloper, Michael? >>> >>> The discussions at UCSD preceeding Don's use of affordances and cognitive >>> artifacts were accompanied by other, related papers. One by Engestrom on >>> "when is an artifact" and one or more by Ed Hutchins. If people are >>> interested in pursuing this thread/topic the materials could be gathered >>> up. >>> >>> mike >>> >>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Glassman, Michael >>> wrote: >>> >>>> But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea). He >>>> actually cops to both of them. The first was not to distinguish >> between >>>> affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which are >>>> designed. I think this is related to the issue of artifacts. Meaning >>> are >>>> artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to be >>>> discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong word, if >>>> anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances. It is a >>> complex >>>> question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes based on >>>> context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one context >>> may >>>> result in organic affordances in another context. >>>> >>>> The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is that he >>> was >>>> not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and >>> constraints. >>>> Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived affordances or >> are >>>> they designed to create constraints. >>>> >>>> Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the >> mention >>>> just spurred me to throw this up. Hope I'm not being too much of an >>>> interloper. >>>> >>>> Michael >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> ] >>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>> >>>> Annalisa- >>>> >>>> I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation not >>>> discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of >>>> affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set against >>>> Gibson's ideas. The change of views coincided with the advent of the >>> d-cog >>>> idea which also has deep roots in chat. >>>> >>>> No hidden history i know of, but interesting connections among the >>> notion >>>> of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion of >> these >>>> connections can be found, among other places, in >>>> >>>> Cole, M. & Engestr?m, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach to >>>> distributed* >>>> *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition: Psychological >>> and >>>> educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press. >>>> >>>> mike >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar >>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Hi Mike, >>>>> >>>>> It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied that >>>> wish! >>>>> >>>>> Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important connections. I >>> was >>>>> not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I learned >>> about >>>>> Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science (1985). >>>>> >>>>> Is there some history that is not part of the common story? >>>>> >>>>> I looked here for clarity: >>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance >>>>> >>>>> Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to >>> cognitive >>>>> artifacts? >>>>> >>>>> There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in play, >>> and >>>>> even joy! >>>>> >>>>> When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however until >>> then >>>>> I will remain with the ineffable. >>>>> >>>>> Kind regards, >>>>> >>>>> Annalisa >>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >>>>> on behalf of mike cole >>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>> >>>>> The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And, >>>>> co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive >>> artifacts >>>>> right about that time at UCSD. If it were possible to find a source >>> that >>>>> makes these connections visible and available to read about it might >>> be a >>>>> step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of >> intro >>>> for >>>>> newcomers to the discussion. >>>>> >>>>> I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a >>> newcomer's >>>>> introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is seeking >> to >>>> sort >>>>> out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am >>>> insuficiently >>>>> read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted! >>>>> >>>>> A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many >> rocks, >>> so >>>>> little time"! >>>>> >>>>> Mike >>>>> >>>>> A >>>>> >>>>> On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar >>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Martin! >>>>>> >>>>>> Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental >> representation" >>> is >>>>>> coming closer! >>>>>> >>>>>> For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's >> theory >>> of >>>>>> affordances. >>>>>> >>>>>> This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed article. >>> But >>>> I >>>>>> wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is >>>> important >>>>>> not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. >>>>>> >>>>>> I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a >>> grenade >>>>>> pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the list. >>> If >>>>> you >>>>>> can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look forward >> to >>>>> your >>>>>> reply, Martin. >>>>>> >>>>>> Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that being >> at >>>> UCSD >>>>>> and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that >> influences >>>> your >>>>>> position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find >>>> community >>>>> in >>>>>> it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more voluntary >>>> phrased >>>>>> that way). >>>>>> >>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>> >>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of >> Martin >>>> John >>>>>> Packer > >>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>> >>>>>> An interesting article, David. One way in which it is interesting, >> to >>>> me >>>>>> at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used, >>> even >>>>>> once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images in >>> the >>>>>> world around us - material representations - and he tries to define >>> the >>>>>> "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin >>>>>> >>>>>> On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg >>>>> > wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Larry, Annalisa: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" when >>> we >>>>>>> met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of >>>> anything >>>>>>> except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe >> available >>>>>>> for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember >>>>>>> whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the >>>>>>> beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a >>>>>>> non-image based mental representation. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations >> are >>>>>>> images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. >> In >>>>>>> fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against >>>> Titchener >>>>>>> and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, >>>>>>> everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated that >>>>>>> many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically >>> anterior >>>>>>> to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would not >>> have >>>>>>> time or ability to process complex problems in real time. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are >>>>>>> genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more >>> reading >>>>>>> to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than I >> am >>>>>>> (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels like >>>>>>> she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do NOT >>> read >>>>>>> this article--instead, look at Figure 11. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure of >>>>>>> Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any >> actual >>>>>>> images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural >>>> experience >>>>>>> associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then >> deliberately >>>>>>> frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any >>>>>>> recognizable figures upon which to focus. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine Chapel >>> fresco >>>>>>> for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He or >>> she >>>>>>> can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting >> and >>>>>>> wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not >> notice >>>>>>> the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in >> it. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar >>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Hi Larry and David, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are at >>> the >>>>>> root of all thinking. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, based >>> upon >>>>>> previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in >>>>>> combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a >> phrase >>> I >>>>> like >>>>>> a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it >> by >>>> the >>>>>> same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as >>>> Hackett >>>>>> describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have you >>>>> already >>>>>> given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be >> willing >>>> to >>>>>> take a look. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is >>>> controversial. >>>>>> It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone >> says >>>>> "this >>>>>> is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble >>>> observation. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever >>> that >>>>>> process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at >> hand? >>>>> Just a >>>>>> thought. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> What is it that appeals to you about this model, metaphoricity? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Larry >>>>> Purss < >>>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com > >>>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM >>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity >>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> David K >>>>>>>> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. My >>>> reason >>>>>> for >>>>>>>> exploring these authors is I have been following a path >> pursuing a >>>>> basic >>>>>>>> question. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic >>> guiding >>>>>> images >>>>>>>> upon which thinking rests" >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring >> appearances >>>> and >>>>>>>> illusions was also exploring this theme. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new >> phenomenological >>>>> path >>>>>>>> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names >> this >>>>>> process >>>>>>>> *metaphoricity*. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible >>> image-character >>>>> of >>>>>> the >>>>>>>> *spontaneous event* of meaning. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he >>>>> brackets - >>>>>>>> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> AND >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* finds >>> the >>>>>>>> meaning of its very self. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this >>>>>>>> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of >>>>> metaphor >>>>>> can >>>>>>>> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated >> in >>>>>>>> *objectivity* >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of >> itself >>>>> *in* >>>>>> the >>>>>>>> mode [path] of the concept >>>>>>>> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding >> images >>>> has >>>>>> been >>>>>>>> established. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the path >> of >>>>>>>> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived >>> from >>>>> the >>>>>>>> image-character of the guiding image. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial this >>>> topic >>>>>> may >>>>>>>> become [again] >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this >>> basic >>>>>>>> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these >> images >>> as >>>>>>>> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images emerge >>>>>>>> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is >> transcendental] >>>> and >>>>>> is >>>>>>>> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. It >>>> seems >>>>> to >>>>>>>> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I also realize this question may already be answered in >> Vygotsky's >>>>>> writings >>>>>>>> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of >> XMCA. I >>>>>>>> personally am following this path for now. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >> an >>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>> >>> >> >> > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > From hshonerd@gmail.com Tue Dec 2 18:40:06 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2014 19:40:06 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? In-Reply-To: References: <1417397991972.17078@unm.edu> <1417490593837.73384@unm.edu> <9F6BE3D8-123E-4204-B0A3-657EBEE09F53@gmail.com> Message-ID: After I sent my email you have graciously answered, I thought precisely of the way representations afford time to dwell on something, rather than responding ballistically, as in controlled vs. automatic processing. Round peg and square hole here? > On Dec 2, 2014, at 12:18 PM, mike cole wrote: > > I think I am with you on re-fraction rather than re-presentation, Henry. > Although there are circumstances in which representation seems an > appropriate enough word. > > I would like to continue the half of the conversation that continued to > talk about images (despite their bad rep) and imagination (despite its > trendiness). > > I take the core of the discussion to be about the nature of/existence > of/signficicance of "mental images" and their relation (or lack thereof) to > the polysemic concept of imagination. > > To go way back in time (not so far as Wundt and Tichner, but all the way > back to 1978) I attach a paper by Stephen Kosslyn that seems relevant to > think about images as processes so that the verbiness of imag(ing) is > brought to the fore. > > > On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 10:49 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >> Peeps, >> I come late to this, but I was thinking this morning at the bus stop about >> David K?s narrative of kids learning about light. I though maybe a >> parallel: Representation = Reflection and Procedural = Refraction. I think >> of both as imagery, just that representation is sort of nouny and >> procedural is verby. Procedural imagery involves, depending on the angle of >> incidence, deviation from the the initial vector. But procedural imagery >> keeps things on the move. An affordance. I have forgotten my physics, but >> does refraction slow things down in any way? >> Henry >> >>> On Dec 1, 2014, at 8:23 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>> >>> Martin! >>> >>> Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental representation" is >> coming closer! >>> >>> For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's theory of >> affordances. >>> >>> This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed article. But I >> wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is important >> not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. >>> >>> I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a grenade >> pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the list. If you >> can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look forward to your >> reply, Martin. >>> >>> Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that being at >> UCSD and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that influences >> your position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find >> community in it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more >> voluntary phrased that way). >>> >>> Kind regards, >>> >>> Annalisa >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> on behalf of Martin John Packer >>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>> >>> An interesting article, David. One way in which it is interesting, to me >> at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used, even >> once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images in the >> world around us - material representations - and he tries to define the >> "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >>> >>>> Larry, Annalisa: >>>> >>>> People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" when we >>>> met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of anything >>>> except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe available >>>> for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember >>>> whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the >>>> beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a >>>> non-image based mental representation. >>>> >>>> As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations are >>>> images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. In >>>> fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against Titchener >>>> and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, >>>> everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated that >>>> many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically anterior >>>> to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would not have >>>> time or ability to process complex problems in real time. >>>> >>>> I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are >>>> genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more reading >>>> to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than I am >>>> (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels like >>>> she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do NOT read >>>> this article--instead, look at Figure 11. >>>> >>>> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ >>>> >>>> The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure of >>>> Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any actual >>>> images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural experience >>>> associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then deliberately >>>> frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any >>>> recognizable figures upon which to focus. >>>> >>>> However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine Chapel fresco >>>> for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He or she >>>> can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting and >>>> wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not notice >>>> the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in it. >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>> >>>> On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Hi Larry and David, >>>>> >>>>> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! >>>>> >>>>> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are at the >> root of all thinking. >>>>> >>>>> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, based upon >> previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in >> combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a phrase I like >> a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it by the >> same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it. >>>>> >>>>> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as Hackett >> describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have you already >> given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be willing to >> take a look. >>>>> >>>>> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is controversial. >> It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone says "this >> is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble observation. >>>>> >>>>> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever that >> process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at hand? Just a >> thought. >>>>> >>>>> What is it that appeals to you about this model, metaphoricity? >>>>> >>>>> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) >>>>> >>>>> Kind regards, >>>>> >>>>> Annalisa >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> on behalf of Larry Purss >>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? >>>>> >>>>> David K >>>>> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. My reason >> for >>>>> exploring these authors is I have been following a path pursuing a >> basic >>>>> question. >>>>> >>>>> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? >>>>> >>>>> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic guiding >> images >>>>> upon which thinking rests" >>>>> >>>>> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring appearances and >>>>> illusions was also exploring this theme. >>>>> >>>>> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new phenomenological path >>>>> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names this >> process >>>>> *metaphoricity*. >>>>> >>>>> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible image-character >> of the >>>>> *spontaneous event* of meaning. >>>>> >>>>> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he brackets >> - >>>>> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. >>>>> >>>>> AND >>>>> >>>>> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* finds the >>>>> meaning of its very self. >>>>> >>>>> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this >>>>> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of >> metaphor can >>>>> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated in >>>>> *objectivity* >>>>> >>>>> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. >>>>> >>>>> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of itself >> *in* the >>>>> mode [path] of the concept >>>>> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding images has >> been >>>>> established. >>>>> >>>>> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the path of >>>>> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived from the >>>>> image-character of the guiding image. >>>>> >>>>> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial this topic >> may >>>>> become [again] >>>>> >>>>> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this basic >>>>> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these images as >>>>> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images emerge >>>>> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. >>>>> >>>>> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is transcendental] and >> is >>>>> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. It seems >> to >>>>> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. >>>>> >>>>> I also realize this question may already be answered in Vygotsky's >> writings >>>>> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of XMCA. I >>>>> personally am following this path for now. >>>>> >>>>> Larry >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > From hshonerd@gmail.com Tue Dec 2 18:52:34 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2014 19:52:34 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances In-Reply-To: References: <1417397991972.17078@unm.edu> <1417490593837.73384@unm.edu> <1417499588620.61068@unm.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074ADB@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074B00@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <1417543176078.99950@unm.edu> <, > <, > <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074C0F@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: Dana, Ditto! In jazz, when you improvise, you throw out something, but imposing your design compromises agency. But I understand Bach was a great improviser, so... Henry > On Dec 2, 2014, at 1:08 PM, Walker, Dana wrote: > > And yet the plank did have a prior design, but a human being rejected that design intent (to be used for building a structure) in favor of another form of use (with its own history). I've wondered about the relationship between artifact, intended design, improvisation, and human agency > > Sent from my iPhone > >> On Dec 2, 2014, at 11:48 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: >> >> Hi Annalisa, Mike, Huw >> >> I tend to be somebody who reacts better to concrete examples than definitions. I believe this also comes from Gibson's 1977 book, >> >> You are walking across a field and come to a stream which you can to get across. You notice a plank across the stream. It is wide enough for you to keep your balance and thick enough to hold your weight, in using it you recognize its affordance as a crossing point. It is the intersection of the movement, the perception of the plank, short term goal of the activity (getting across the stream) - the recognition of the affordance comes in the subjective use of the object (which is why it is neither subjective or objective). It is also important that you have the abilities (the correct weight, the balance) to recognize the affordance, otherwise you pass the plank by. >> >> As far as perceived affordance. I think I have this right - the perceived is not in the person who recognizes the affordance (otherwise you are right, that is wet water) it is whether there is an intention in the design of the object. So I create a light switch with the intention of designing it as having a perceived affordance for somebody who wants to switch on a light. As you can see different from the relationship to the plank, where there is no prior design. >> >> Here is my question (perhaps answered in the Engestrom paper) >> >> The light switch is certainly an artifact, but is the plank? >> >> Michael >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 1:19 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances >> >> Those definitions help a lot Annalisa and touch on the fact that gibson >> seemed to empty the organism (if one were so inclined to interpret him) and >> he dismissed culutral mediation as secondary at best. Still, they share the >> idea that a part of the structure that psychologist theorize as a located >> inside of individual crania is in fact "our there" in the phylgenetically >> and cultural-historically constitued environment. And that drove cognitive >> psychologists, our co discussants, nuts. Until, "they got it" and then >> sought to mold it to their own ends and pre-existing means. >> mike >> >>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 9:59 AM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>> >>> I thought I'd do the honors and start a new thread on affordances, which >>> isn't related to Larry's discussion of basic images. >>> >>> I figured as well to offer Gibson's words on affordances since it is a >>> word he invented to describe something he saw in the world. Of course the >>> life of affordances has been full of controversy, especially with regard to >>> understanding what they are. >>> >>> Gibson's Affordances is a theory I find instrumental to connecting outside >>> to inside experiences and I intuit that it is related to perezhivanie in >>> some fashion. >>> >>> After reading the wikipage more closely, I regret offering a link to the >>> text there because it isn't very clear what Gibson means or what Norman >>> means. To me, a "perceived affordance" is like saying "wet water." >>> >>> In any case, here are 3 quotes of Gibson in his own words, that I could >>> find: >>> >>> The affordances of the environment are what it _offers_ the animal, what >>> it _provides_ or _furnishes_, either for good or ill. The verb "to afford" >>> is found in the dictionary, the noun "affordance" is not. I have made it >>> up. I mean by it something that refers both to the environment and the >>> animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies the complementarity >>> of the animal and the environment (Gibson, 1977/1986). >>> >>> and >>> >>> What is meant by an _affordance_? ?Subject to revision, I suggest that the >>> affordance of anything is a specific combination of the properties of its >>> substance and its surfaces taken with reference to an animal. The reference >>> may be to an animal as distinguished from other species (Gibson, 1977/1986). >>> >>> and >>> >>> An important fact about affordances of the environment is that they are in >>> a sense objective, real, and physical, unlike values and meanings, which >>> are often supposed to be subjective, phenomenal, and mental. But actually, >>> an affordance is neither an objective property nor a subjective property; >>> or it is both if you like. An affordance cuts across the dichotomy of >>> subjective-objective and helps us to understand its inadequacy. It is >>> equally a fact of the environment and a fact of behavior. It is both >>> physical and psychical, yet neither. An affordance points both ways, to the >>> environment and to the observer (Gibson, 1977/1986). >>> >>> These quotes are important to keep in mind, I hope they help. >>> >>> I might also suggest looking at Mace(1977) who described very carefully >>> how Gibson got from stimuli to affordance, given that people on this list >>> value history, learning, and development. >>> >>> Kind regards, >>> >>> Annalisa >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> on behalf of Huw Lloyd >>> Sent: Tuesday, December 2, 2014 10:35 AM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>> >>> I'd take a look. >>> >>> Michael, utility or technical affordance might fit. My equivalent of your >>> perceived/discovered distinction is one of planned and technically >>> manifest. >>> >>> Huw >>> >>> >>> On 2 December 2014 at 16:44, Glassman, Michael >>> wrote: >>> >>>> I'd be interested in anybody else is. >>>> >>>> Michael >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 11:39 AM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>> >>>> Interloper, Michael? >>>> >>>> The discussions at UCSD preceeding Don's use of affordances and cognitive >>>> artifacts were accompanied by other, related papers. One by Engestrom on >>>> "when is an artifact" and one or more by Ed Hutchins. If people are >>>> interested in pursuing this thread/topic the materials could be gathered >>>> up. >>>> >>>> mike >>>> >>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Glassman, Michael >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea). He >>>>> actually cops to both of them. The first was not to distinguish >>> between >>>>> affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which are >>>>> designed. I think this is related to the issue of artifacts. Meaning >>>> are >>>>> artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to be >>>>> discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong word, if >>>>> anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances. It is a >>>> complex >>>>> question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes based on >>>>> context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one context >>>> may >>>>> result in organic affordances in another context. >>>>> >>>>> The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is that he >>>> was >>>>> not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and >>>> constraints. >>>>> Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived affordances or >>> are >>>>> they designed to create constraints. >>>>> >>>>> Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the >>> mention >>>>> just spurred me to throw this up. Hope I'm not being too much of an >>>>> interloper. >>>>> >>>>> Michael >>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> ] >>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>> >>>>> Annalisa- >>>>> >>>>> I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation not >>>>> discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of >>>>> affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set against >>>>> Gibson's ideas. The change of views coincided with the advent of the >>>> d-cog >>>>> idea which also has deep roots in chat. >>>>> >>>>> No hidden history i know of, but interesting connections among the >>>> notion >>>>> of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion of >>> these >>>>> connections can be found, among other places, in >>>>> >>>>> Cole, M. & Engestr?m, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach to >>>>> distributed* >>>>> *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition: Psychological >>>> and >>>>> educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press. >>>>> >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Hi Mike, >>>>>> >>>>>> It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied that >>>>> wish! >>>>>> >>>>>> Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important connections. I >>>> was >>>>>> not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I learned >>>> about >>>>>> Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science (1985). >>>>>> >>>>>> Is there some history that is not part of the common story? >>>>>> >>>>>> I looked here for clarity: >>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance >>>>>> >>>>>> Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to >>>> cognitive >>>>>> artifacts? >>>>>> >>>>>> There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in play, >>>> and >>>>>> even joy! >>>>>> >>>>>> When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however until >>>> then >>>>>> I will remain with the ineffable. >>>>>> >>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>> >>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> >>>>>> on behalf of mike cole >>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>> >>>>>> The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And, >>>>>> co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive >>>> artifacts >>>>>> right about that time at UCSD. If it were possible to find a source >>>> that >>>>>> makes these connections visible and available to read about it might >>>> be a >>>>>> step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of >>> intro >>>>> for >>>>>> newcomers to the discussion. >>>>>> >>>>>> I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a >>>> newcomer's >>>>>> introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is seeking >>> to >>>>> sort >>>>>> out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am >>>>> insuficiently >>>>>> read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted! >>>>>> >>>>>> A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many >>> rocks, >>>> so >>>>>> little time"! >>>>>> >>>>>> Mike >>>>>> >>>>>> A >>>>>> >>>>>> On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar >>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Martin! >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental >>> representation" >>>> is >>>>>>> coming closer! >>>>>>> >>>>>>> For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's >>> theory >>>> of >>>>>>> affordances. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed article. >>>> But >>>>> I >>>>>>> wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is >>>>> important >>>>>>> not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a >>>> grenade >>>>>>> pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the list. >>>> If >>>>>> you >>>>>>> can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look forward >>> to >>>>>> your >>>>>>> reply, Martin. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that being >>> at >>>>> UCSD >>>>>>> and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that >>> influences >>>>> your >>>>>>> position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find >>>>> community >>>>>> in >>>>>>> it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more voluntary >>>>> phrased >>>>>>> that way). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of >>> Martin >>>>> John >>>>>>> Packer > >>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM >>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> An interesting article, David. One way in which it is interesting, >>> to >>>>> me >>>>>>> at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used, >>>> even >>>>>>> once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images in >>>> the >>>>>>> world around us - material representations - and he tries to define >>>> the >>>>>>> "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg >>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Larry, Annalisa: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" when >>>> we >>>>>>>> met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of >>>>> anything >>>>>>>> except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe >>> available >>>>>>>> for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember >>>>>>>> whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the >>>>>>>> beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a >>>>>>>> non-image based mental representation. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations >>> are >>>>>>>> images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. >>> In >>>>>>>> fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against >>>>> Titchener >>>>>>>> and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, >>>>>>>> everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated that >>>>>>>> many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically >>>> anterior >>>>>>>> to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would not >>>> have >>>>>>>> time or ability to process complex problems in real time. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are >>>>>>>> genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more >>>> reading >>>>>>>> to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than I >>> am >>>>>>>> (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels like >>>>>>>> she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do NOT >>>> read >>>>>>>> this article--instead, look at Figure 11. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure of >>>>>>>> Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any >>> actual >>>>>>>> images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural >>>>> experience >>>>>>>> associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then >>> deliberately >>>>>>>> frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any >>>>>>>> recognizable figures upon which to focus. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine Chapel >>>> fresco >>>>>>>> for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He or >>>> she >>>>>>>> can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting >>> and >>>>>>>> wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not >>> notice >>>>>>>> the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in >>> it. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar >>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Hi Larry and David, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are at >>>> the >>>>>>> root of all thinking. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, based >>>> upon >>>>>>> previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in >>>>>>> combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a >>> phrase >>>> I >>>>>> like >>>>>>> a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it >>> by >>>>> the >>>>>>> same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as >>>>> Hackett >>>>>>> describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have you >>>>>> already >>>>>>> given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be >>> willing >>>>> to >>>>>>> take a look. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is >>>>> controversial. >>>>>>> It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone >>> says >>>>>> "this >>>>>>> is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble >>>>> observation. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever >>>> that >>>>>>> process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at >>> hand? >>>>>> Just a >>>>>>> thought. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> What is it that appeals to you about this model, metaphoricity? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Larry >>>>>> Purss < >>>>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com > >>>>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM >>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity >>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> David K >>>>>>>>> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. My >>>>> reason >>>>>>> for >>>>>>>>> exploring these authors is I have been following a path >>> pursuing a >>>>>> basic >>>>>>>>> question. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic >>>> guiding >>>>>>> images >>>>>>>>> upon which thinking rests" >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring >>> appearances >>>>> and >>>>>>>>> illusions was also exploring this theme. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new >>> phenomenological >>>>>> path >>>>>>>>> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names >>> this >>>>>>> process >>>>>>>>> *metaphoricity*. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible >>>> image-character >>>>>> of >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> *spontaneous event* of meaning. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he >>>>>> brackets - >>>>>>>>> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> AND >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* finds >>>> the >>>>>>>>> meaning of its very self. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this >>>>>>>>> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of >>>>>> metaphor >>>>>>> can >>>>>>>>> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated >>> in >>>>>>>>> *objectivity* >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of >>> itself >>>>>> *in* >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> mode [path] of the concept >>>>>>>>> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding >>> images >>>>> has >>>>>>> been >>>>>>>>> established. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the path >>> of >>>>>>>>> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived >>>> from >>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> image-character of the guiding image. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial this >>>>> topic >>>>>>> may >>>>>>>>> become [again] >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this >>>> basic >>>>>>>>> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these >>> images >>>> as >>>>>>>>> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images emerge >>>>>>>>> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is >>> transcendental] >>>>> and >>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. It >>>>> seems >>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I also realize this question may already be answered in >>> Vygotsky's >>>>>>> writings >>>>>>>>> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of >>> XMCA. I >>>>>>>>> personally am following this path for now. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>> an >>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> >> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> > From hshonerd@gmail.com Tue Dec 2 19:36:37 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2014 20:36:37 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? In-Reply-To: References: <1417397991972.17078@unm.edu> <1417490593837.73384@unm.edu> <9F6BE3D8-123E-4204-B0A3-657EBEE09F53@gmail.com> Message-ID: <9475CD51-25E4-492B-A7D0-5C655EC01239@gmail.com> David, For a long time I have been interested in juxtaposing path and target in the articulation of consonants in both spoken and signed language. You give evidence for the importance of path (medial vowels) on the way to final consonants, demonstrated by experiments that actually snip out the consonants on audio tapes. As you say, listeners still perceive them. I wonder if similar experiments have been done with video tapes in sign language. A visual cloze. What killed me about the art: Velazquez?s use of a mirror, which puts Christ and the two women in the mirror. Compare that to Las Meninas, where Velazquez, ostensibly, uses two mirrors, and puts himself and las Medians in one of them, the king and queen in another. All about representation and reflection. What verbal artistry can do it justice? Henry > On Dec 2, 2014, at 3:15 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > I'm going to try to defend "mental representation" and also complain a > little about "affordance". > > My first line of defense is that Vygotsky uses mental representation. > This isn't much of a defense, I know; Vygotsky uses a lot of words > that were just "in the air" at the time, and this is surely one of > them. And when Vygotsky uses a word it usually doesn't mean quite what > it meant when he first read or hear it used. For example, I am > starting to realize that Vygotsky's notion of "pedology" has very > little to do with what others meant by the term and everything to do > with what we are trying to pin down when we try to figure out what he > meant by "analysis into units". In fact, I think that "pedology" is a > really good example of what I mean when I try to figure out what I > mean by a thematic, transdisciplinary approach rather than an > object-oriented, inter-disciplinary one. > > So my second line of defense is Halliday. Let's assume that Martin's > right, and that "read" is a better way to express Vygotsky's meaning. > Imagine that you are looking at Vermeer's "Christ in the House of Mary > and Martha" and you are comparing it to Velazquez's treatment of the > same subject: > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christ_in_the_House_of_Martha_and_Mary_(Vermeer)#mediaviewer/File:Johannes_(Jan)_Vermeer_-_Christ_in_the_House_of_Martha_and_Mary_-_Google_Art_Project.jpg > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christ_in_the_House_of_Martha_and_Mary_(Vel%C3%A1zquez)#mediaviewer/File:Christ_in_the_house_of_Marthe_and_Marry_V%C3%A9lazquez.jpg > > Vermeer is image-based, and he doesn't usually tell stories. So you > look up Luke 38: 10, and you get a dozen different translations. Some > of them look like this: > > a) Now it came to pass, as they went, that he entered into a certain > town, and a certain woman named Martha, received him into her house." > (1599 Geneva Bible) > b) Jesus and his disciples, journeying onward, came to the village > where an older woman and her younger sister gave them hospitality. > (Invented) > > You can see that there is a difference in meaning. A town is not a > village, and in one it is Christ who is named while in the other is is > Mary. I will say the difference here is representational, and it > produces a different image: a) is much closer to Velazquez and b) much > closer to Vermeer. > > Halliday calls this difference in meaning representational. Why is > that useful? Well, compare: > > a) Jesus and his desciples, journeying onward, came to the village > where the older woman and her younger sister gave them hospitality. > b) Did Jesus and his disciples, journeying onward, come to the village > where the older woman and her younger sister gave them hospitality? > > Here too there is a difference in meaning, but the difference is not a > difference in representation. The image is exaclty the same, and it's > Vermeer rather than Velazquez. The difference is what Halliday calls > "interpersonal", because it's a difference between getting information > and giving it. That difference is every bit as meaningful as the > difference between producing a commodity and consuming it, but it > doesn't actually have to do with the nature of the representation; it > has to do with the nature of the relations surrounding its production. > > Finally--let me complain a little bit about the term affordance, which > seems an extreme form of behaviorism to me. When Gibson tries to > explain language as an affordance, he ends up claiming that phonemes > are affordances. That is, they are actually perceivable, in the air; > they are not constructions in the mind. > > Consider the following pairs of words: > > a) back > b) bag > > c) calf > d) cave > > e) mace > f) maze > > Now imagine you are holding a bag standing in a cave in the middle of > maze. You are conveying a mental representation of your predicament to > someone at a distance--they are far away, so they cannot hear the > final stop /k/ or /g/, /f/ or /v/, /s/ or /z/, and even if they could, > they couldn't tell whether it was a voiced stop (i.e. /g/, /v/, or > /z/) or an unvoiced one, because your mouth is actually shut when you > provide the vocal cord vibration that differentiates them. > Nonetheless, they understand you perfectly. How is this possible? > > According to Gibson, it cannot be. If an affordance is not > perceptible, it isn't there. But in fact although the phoneme is not > there, the mind has a way of supplying it, and it's very simple. All > vowels are voiced in English; no vowels are unvoiced. So when the > vowel is lengthened, as in "bag", "cave", and "maze", it means that it > doesn't stop but continues on into the final consonant. So your > interlocutor will judge from the length of the vowel whether the final > stop is voiced or unvoiced. There's an affordance, all right, but it's > not in the environment or even in your interlocutor's relationship to > the environment; it's in the language system, as instantiated in your > interlocutor's mind. In other words, it's a mental re-presentation. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > Why is it useful to call this kind of meaning representational (which > is c) In a) it is Martha and Mary who are named and > > > > > > > On 3 December 2014 at 03:49, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >> Peeps, >> I come late to this, but I was thinking this morning at the bus stop about David K?s narrative of kids learning about light. I though maybe a parallel: Representation = Reflection and Procedural = Refraction. I think of both as imagery, just that representation is sort of nouny and procedural is verby. Procedural imagery involves, depending on the angle of incidence, deviation from the the initial vector. But procedural imagery keeps things on the move. An affordance. I have forgotten my physics, but does refraction slow things down in any way? >> Henry >> >>> On Dec 1, 2014, at 8:23 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>> >>> Martin! >>> >>> Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental representation" is coming closer! >>> >>> For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's theory of affordances. >>> >>> This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed article. But I wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is important not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. >>> >>> I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a grenade pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the list. If you can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look forward to your reply, Martin. >>> >>> Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that being at UCSD and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that influences your position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find community in it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more voluntary phrased that way). >>> >>> Kind regards, >>> >>> Annalisa >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Martin John Packer >>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>> >>> An interesting article, David. One way in which it is interesting, to me at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used, even once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images in the world around us - material representations - and he tries to define the "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >>> >>>> Larry, Annalisa: >>>> >>>> People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" when we >>>> met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of anything >>>> except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe available >>>> for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember >>>> whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the >>>> beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a >>>> non-image based mental representation. >>>> >>>> As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations are >>>> images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. In >>>> fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against Titchener >>>> and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, >>>> everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated that >>>> many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically anterior >>>> to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would not have >>>> time or ability to process complex problems in real time. >>>> >>>> I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are >>>> genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more reading >>>> to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than I am >>>> (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels like >>>> she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do NOT read >>>> this article--instead, look at Figure 11. >>>> >>>> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ >>>> >>>> The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure of >>>> Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any actual >>>> images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural experience >>>> associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then deliberately >>>> frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any >>>> recognizable figures upon which to focus. >>>> >>>> However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine Chapel fresco >>>> for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He or she >>>> can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting and >>>> wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not notice >>>> the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in it. >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>> >>>> On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Hi Larry and David, >>>>> >>>>> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! >>>>> >>>>> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are at the root of all thinking. >>>>> >>>>> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, based upon previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a phrase I like a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it by the same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it. >>>>> >>>>> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as Hackett describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have you already given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be willing to take a look. >>>>> >>>>> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is controversial. It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone says "this is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble observation. >>>>> >>>>> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever that process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at hand? Just a thought. >>>>> >>>>> What is it that appeals to you about this model, metaphoricity? >>>>> >>>>> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) >>>>> >>>>> Kind regards, >>>>> >>>>> Annalisa >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Larry Purss >>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? >>>>> >>>>> David K >>>>> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. My reason for >>>>> exploring these authors is I have been following a path pursuing a basic >>>>> question. >>>>> >>>>> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? >>>>> >>>>> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic guiding images >>>>> upon which thinking rests" >>>>> >>>>> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring appearances and >>>>> illusions was also exploring this theme. >>>>> >>>>> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new phenomenological path >>>>> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names this process >>>>> *metaphoricity*. >>>>> >>>>> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible image-character of the >>>>> *spontaneous event* of meaning. >>>>> >>>>> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he brackets - >>>>> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. >>>>> >>>>> AND >>>>> >>>>> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* finds the >>>>> meaning of its very self. >>>>> >>>>> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this >>>>> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of metaphor can >>>>> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated in >>>>> *objectivity* >>>>> >>>>> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. >>>>> >>>>> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of itself *in* the >>>>> mode [path] of the concept >>>>> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding images has been >>>>> established. >>>>> >>>>> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the path of >>>>> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived from the >>>>> image-character of the guiding image. >>>>> >>>>> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial this topic may >>>>> become [again] >>>>> >>>>> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this basic >>>>> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these images as >>>>> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images emerge >>>>> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. >>>>> >>>>> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is transcendental] and is >>>>> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. It seems to >>>>> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. >>>>> >>>>> I also realize this question may already be answered in Vygotsky's writings >>>>> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of XMCA. I >>>>> personally am following this path for now. >>>>> >>>>> Larry >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> > From hshonerd@gmail.com Tue Dec 2 19:39:49 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2014 20:39:49 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? In-Reply-To: References: <1417397991972.17078@unm.edu> <1417490593837.73384@unm.edu> <1417499588620.61068@unm.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074ADB@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9074B00@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <59FDD43F-0C18-4FE5-B60A-AA273DBD0233@gmail.com> Message-ID: Muito obrigado! > On Dec 2, 2014, at 5:50 PM, mike cole wrote: > > I do not have a copy of the distributed cognition article with Engestrom, > either, Henry. > Maybe someone on the list does, or I can get one made. > > Here is a copy of a paper by Ed Hutchins originally given as a talk at a > Sylvia Scribner > memorial meeting at (I think) the anthro meetings. I think lots of > affinities between perspectives are on display here. > mike > for the "this thread" library :-) > > > > On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 4:23 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >> I?m game. I tried to find your article with Engstrom and got nowhere. I >> would like to read it. I need an affordance here to see if I?m using the >> right word. >> Henry >> >>> On Dec 2, 2014, at 9:44 AM, Glassman, Michael >> wrote: >>> >>> I'd be interested in anybody else is. >>> >>> Michael >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 11:39 AM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>> >>> Interloper, Michael? >>> >>> The discussions at UCSD preceeding Don's use of affordances and cognitive >>> artifacts were accompanied by other, related papers. One by Engestrom on >>> "when is an artifact" and one or more by Ed Hutchins. If people are >>> interested in pursuing this thread/topic the materials could be gathered >>> up. >>> >>> mike >>> >>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Glassman, Michael >>> wrote: >>> >>>> But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea). He >>>> actually cops to both of them. The first was not to distinguish between >>>> affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which are >>>> designed. I think this is related to the issue of artifacts. Meaning >> are >>>> artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to be >>>> discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong word, if >>>> anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances. It is a >> complex >>>> question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes based on >>>> context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one context >> may >>>> result in organic affordances in another context. >>>> >>>> The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is that he >> was >>>> not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and >> constraints. >>>> Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived affordances or >> are >>>> they designed to create constraints. >>>> >>>> Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the >> mention >>>> just spurred me to throw this up. Hope I'm not being too much of an >>>> interloper. >>>> >>>> Michael >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>> >>>> Annalisa- >>>> >>>> I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation not >>>> discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of >>>> affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set against >>>> Gibson's ideas. The change of views coincided with the advent of the >> d-cog >>>> idea which also has deep roots in chat. >>>> >>>> No hidden history i know of, but interesting connections among the >> notion >>>> of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion of >> these >>>> connections can be found, among other places, in >>>> >>>> Cole, M. & Engestr?m, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach to >>>> distributed* >>>> *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition: Psychological >> and >>>> educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press. >>>> >>>> mike >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar >> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Hi Mike, >>>>> >>>>> It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied that >>>> wish! >>>>> >>>>> Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important connections. I >> was >>>>> not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I learned >> about >>>>> Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science (1985). >>>>> >>>>> Is there some history that is not part of the common story? >>>>> >>>>> I looked here for clarity: >>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance >>>>> >>>>> Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to >> cognitive >>>>> artifacts? >>>>> >>>>> There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in play, >> and >>>>> even joy! >>>>> >>>>> When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however until >> then >>>>> I will remain with the ineffable. >>>>> >>>>> Kind regards, >>>>> >>>>> Annalisa >>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >>>>> on behalf of mike cole >>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>> >>>>> The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And, >>>>> co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive >> artifacts >>>>> right about that time at UCSD. If it were possible to find a source >> that >>>>> makes these connections visible and available to read about it might >> be a >>>>> step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of intro >>>> for >>>>> newcomers to the discussion. >>>>> >>>>> I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a >> newcomer's >>>>> introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is seeking to >>>> sort >>>>> out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am >>>> insuficiently >>>>> read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted! >>>>> >>>>> A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many rocks, >> so >>>>> little time"! >>>>> >>>>> Mike >>>>> >>>>> A >>>>> >>>>> On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar >> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Martin! >>>>>> >>>>>> Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental representation" >> is >>>>>> coming closer! >>>>>> >>>>>> For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's theory >> of >>>>>> affordances. >>>>>> >>>>>> This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed article. But >>>> I >>>>>> wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is >>>> important >>>>>> not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. >>>>>> >>>>>> I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a grenade >>>>>> pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the list. If >>>>> you >>>>>> can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look forward to >>>>> your >>>>>> reply, Martin. >>>>>> >>>>>> Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that being at >>>> UCSD >>>>>> and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that influences >>>> your >>>>>> position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find >>>> community >>>>> in >>>>>> it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more voluntary >>>> phrased >>>>>> that way). >>>>>> >>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>> >>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Martin >>>> John >>>>>> Packer > >>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>> >>>>>> An interesting article, David. One way in which it is interesting, to >>>> me >>>>>> at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used, even >>>>>> once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images in >> the >>>>>> world around us - material representations - and he tries to define >> the >>>>>> "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin >>>>>> >>>>>> On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg >>>>> > wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Larry, Annalisa: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" when we >>>>>>> met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of >>>> anything >>>>>>> except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe available >>>>>>> for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember >>>>>>> whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the >>>>>>> beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a >>>>>>> non-image based mental representation. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations are >>>>>>> images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. In >>>>>>> fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against >>>> Titchener >>>>>>> and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, >>>>>>> everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated that >>>>>>> many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically anterior >>>>>>> to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would not have >>>>>>> time or ability to process complex problems in real time. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are >>>>>>> genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more reading >>>>>>> to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than I am >>>>>>> (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels like >>>>>>> she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do NOT read >>>>>>> this article--instead, look at Figure 11. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure of >>>>>>> Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any actual >>>>>>> images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural >>>> experience >>>>>>> associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then deliberately >>>>>>> frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any >>>>>>> recognizable figures upon which to focus. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine Chapel fresco >>>>>>> for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He or she >>>>>>> can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting and >>>>>>> wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not notice >>>>>>> the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in it. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar >>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Hi Larry and David, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are at the >>>>>> root of all thinking. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, based upon >>>>>> previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in >>>>>> combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a phrase I >>>>> like >>>>>> a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it by >>>> the >>>>>> same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as >>>> Hackett >>>>>> describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have you >>>>> already >>>>>> given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be willing >>>> to >>>>>> take a look. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is >>>> controversial. >>>>>> It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone says >>>>> "this >>>>>> is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble >>>> observation. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever that >>>>>> process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at hand? >>>>> Just a >>>>>> thought. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> What is it that appeals to you about this model, metaphoricity? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Larry >>>>> Purss < >>>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com > >>>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM >>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity >>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> David K >>>>>>>> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. My >>>> reason >>>>>> for >>>>>>>> exploring these authors is I have been following a path pursuing a >>>>> basic >>>>>>>> question. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic guiding >>>>>> images >>>>>>>> upon which thinking rests" >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring appearances >>>> and >>>>>>>> illusions was also exploring this theme. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new phenomenological >>>>> path >>>>>>>> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names this >>>>>> process >>>>>>>> *metaphoricity*. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible image-character >>>>> of >>>>>> the >>>>>>>> *spontaneous event* of meaning. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he >>>>> brackets - >>>>>>>> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> AND >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* finds the >>>>>>>> meaning of its very self. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this >>>>>>>> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of >>>>> metaphor >>>>>> can >>>>>>>> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated in >>>>>>>> *objectivity* >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of itself >>>>> *in* >>>>>> the >>>>>>>> mode [path] of the concept >>>>>>>> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding images >>>> has >>>>>> been >>>>>>>> established. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the path of >>>>>>>> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived from >>>>> the >>>>>>>> image-character of the guiding image. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial this >>>> topic >>>>>> may >>>>>>>> become [again] >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this basic >>>>>>>> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these images as >>>>>>>> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images emerge >>>>>>>> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is transcendental] >>>> and >>>>>> is >>>>>>>> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. It >>>> seems >>>>> to >>>>>>>> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I also realize this question may already be answered in Vygotsky's >>>>>> writings >>>>>>>> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of XMCA. I >>>>>>>> personally am following this path for now. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>> >> >> >> > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Dec 2 20:11:18 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2014 20:11:18 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? In-Reply-To: References: <1417397991972.17078@unm.edu> <1417490593837.73384@unm.edu> <9F6BE3D8-123E-4204-B0A3-657EBEE09F53@gmail.com> Message-ID: Yes, perhaps they act as removal/spatial "stabilizers" of thought in motion. Mike On Tuesday, December 2, 2014, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > After I sent my email you have graciously answered, I thought precisely of > the way representations afford time to dwell on something, rather than > responding ballistically, as in controlled vs. automatic processing. Round > peg and square hole here? > > > On Dec 2, 2014, at 12:18 PM, mike cole > > wrote: > > > > I think I am with you on re-fraction rather than re-presentation, Henry. > > Although there are circumstances in which representation seems an > > appropriate enough word. > > > > I would like to continue the half of the conversation that continued to > > talk about images (despite their bad rep) and imagination (despite its > > trendiness). > > > > I take the core of the discussion to be about the nature of/existence > > of/signficicance of "mental images" and their relation (or lack thereof) > to > > the polysemic concept of imagination. > > > > To go way back in time (not so far as Wundt and Tichner, but all the way > > back to 1978) I attach a paper by Stephen Kosslyn that seems relevant to > > think about images as processes so that the verbiness of imag(ing) is > > brought to the fore. > > > > > > On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 10:49 AM, HENRY SHONERD > wrote: > > > >> Peeps, > >> I come late to this, but I was thinking this morning at the bus stop > about > >> David K?s narrative of kids learning about light. I though maybe a > >> parallel: Representation = Reflection and Procedural = Refraction. I > think > >> of both as imagery, just that representation is sort of nouny and > >> procedural is verby. Procedural imagery involves, depending on the > angle of > >> incidence, deviation from the the initial vector. But procedural imagery > >> keeps things on the move. An affordance. I have forgotten my physics, > but > >> does refraction slow things down in any way? > >> Henry > >> > >>> On Dec 1, 2014, at 8:23 PM, Annalisa Aguilar > wrote: > >>> > >>> Martin! > >>> > >>> Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental representation" is > >> coming closer! > >>> > >>> For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's theory of > >> affordances. > >>> > >>> This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed article. But > I > >> wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is important > >> not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. > >>> > >>> I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a grenade > >> pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the list. If > you > >> can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look forward to > your > >> reply, Martin. > >>> > >>> Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that being at > >> UCSD and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that > influences > >> your position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find > >> community in it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more > >> voluntary phrased that way). > >>> > >>> Kind regards, > >>> > >>> Annalisa > >>> ________________________________________ > >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > >> on behalf of Martin John Packer > > > >>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM > >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > >>> > >>> An interesting article, David. One way in which it is interesting, to > me > >> at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used, even > >> once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images in the > >> world around us - material representations - and he tries to define the > >> "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. > >>> > >>> Martin > >>> > >>> On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg > wrote: > >>> > >>>> Larry, Annalisa: > >>>> > >>>> People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" when we > >>>> met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of anything > >>>> except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe available > >>>> for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember > >>>> whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the > >>>> beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a > >>>> non-image based mental representation. > >>>> > >>>> As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations are > >>>> images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. In > >>>> fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against Titchener > >>>> and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, > >>>> everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated that > >>>> many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically anterior > >>>> to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would not have > >>>> time or ability to process complex problems in real time. > >>>> > >>>> I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are > >>>> genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more reading > >>>> to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than I am > >>>> (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels like > >>>> she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do NOT read > >>>> this article--instead, look at Figure 11. > >>>> > >>>> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ > >>>> > >>>> The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure of > >>>> Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any actual > >>>> images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural experience > >>>> associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then deliberately > >>>> frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any > >>>> recognizable figures upon which to focus. > >>>> > >>>> However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine Chapel fresco > >>>> for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He or she > >>>> can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting and > >>>> wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not notice > >>>> the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in it. > >>>> > >>>> David Kellogg > >>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >>>> > >>>> On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar > wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> Hi Larry and David, > >>>>> > >>>>> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! > >>>>> > >>>>> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are at the > >> root of all thinking. > >>>>> > >>>>> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, based upon > >> previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in > >> combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a phrase I > like > >> a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it by the > >> same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it. > >>>>> > >>>>> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as Hackett > >> describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have you > already > >> given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be willing to > >> take a look. > >>>>> > >>>>> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is > controversial. > >> It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone says > "this > >> is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble observation. > >>>>> > >>>>> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever that > >> process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at hand? > Just a > >> thought. > >>>>> > >>>>> What is it that appeals to you about this model, metaphoricity? > >>>>> > >>>>> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) > >>>>> > >>>>> Kind regards, > >>>>> > >>>>> Annalisa > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> ________________________________________ > >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > >> on behalf of Larry Purss > > >>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM > >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity > >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? > >>>>> > >>>>> David K > >>>>> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. My > reason > >> for > >>>>> exploring these authors is I have been following a path pursuing a > >> basic > >>>>> question. > >>>>> > >>>>> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? > >>>>> > >>>>> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic guiding > >> images > >>>>> upon which thinking rests" > >>>>> > >>>>> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring appearances and > >>>>> illusions was also exploring this theme. > >>>>> > >>>>> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new phenomenological > path > >>>>> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names this > >> process > >>>>> *metaphoricity*. > >>>>> > >>>>> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible image-character > >> of the > >>>>> *spontaneous event* of meaning. > >>>>> > >>>>> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he > brackets > >> - > >>>>> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. > >>>>> > >>>>> AND > >>>>> > >>>>> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* finds the > >>>>> meaning of its very self. > >>>>> > >>>>> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this > >>>>> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of > >> metaphor can > >>>>> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated in > >>>>> *objectivity* > >>>>> > >>>>> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. > >>>>> > >>>>> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of itself > >> *in* the > >>>>> mode [path] of the concept > >>>>> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding images has > >> been > >>>>> established. > >>>>> > >>>>> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the path of > >>>>> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived from > the > >>>>> image-character of the guiding image. > >>>>> > >>>>> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial this > topic > >> may > >>>>> become [again] > >>>>> > >>>>> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this basic > >>>>> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these images as > >>>>> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images emerge > >>>>> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. > >>>>> > >>>>> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is transcendental] > and > >> is > >>>>> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. It seems > >> to > >>>>> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. > >>>>> > >>>>> I also realize this question may already be answered in Vygotsky's > >> writings > >>>>> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of XMCA. I > >>>>> personally am following this path for now. > >>>>> > >>>>> Larry > >>>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From annalisa@unm.edu Tue Dec 2 20:28:32 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2014 04:28:32 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mocombian Being in the World In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1417580911564.62538@unm.edu> Hi Paul, You are most welcome and I hope I have been able to appropriately express my delight from reading your paper. I'd happy to explain that when I refer to the Vedic thought and the Vedic tradition, I do not necessarily mean hinduism. "Hinduism" is a word given from outside the culture, ironically in same the way Native Americans (or whatever the appropriate designation is), were called "Indians." So I'm referring to the Vedas more specifically than the hindu religion, which derives from the Vedas. This is to say hinduism is the cultural expression of the Vedic tradition, but Vedic thought can be referenced without referencing hinduism, and so that is why I make this distinction, which is important. I'm not sure if there is this such a distinction from other texts that explain worldviews. I respect the religion and its cultural expression, but in this context I believe it is worth peeling away the religious references to focus on the considerations of consciousness. There are a few intersections of Vedic thought and Western thought that someday I would like to examine. The only one I know at the present time, is Schopenhauer. But I seem to have the feeling there are other German philosophers. I was curious why Heidegger did not go back in time past the Pre-Socratics, because I actually believe Parmenides has some direct parallels to Vedic thought. I also believe Wittgenstein stumbles across unconsciously and approaches a pramana does; it is as if he were trying to construct one (Pramana is Sanskrit for "means of knowledge"), and this is seen not only in his Tractatus, but also in his last work On Certainty, which I find to be oh-so beautiful. I haven't done a complete reading of Investigations so I can't comment there. So I'm just sharing connections I've seen, which may only be surface connections and therefore only superficial. I have not heard of Bergson, do you recommend an entry point for reading? An intro? Also, are there any questions or comments you might have for the list for points of discussion? It may take a little bit of time I suspect because the threads on mental representation and affordances have just taken off. What sort of reception have you had so far to your paper elsewhere? Or is it too early (or too late) to ask that? Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Dr. Paul C. Mocombe Sent: Tuesday, December 2, 2014 7:22 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mocombian Being in the World Annalisa, Thank you for that in depth reading. It is funny that you would bring up the vedic tradition. My phenomenological structuralism is an attempt to synthesize Haitian vodou (which is very similar to hinduism), with physics, phenomenology, marxism, and Wittgenstein ' s notion of language game (my forthcoming book is titled, "vodou, physics, and phenomenological structuralism"). I believe Henri Bergson's metaphysic, in the western tradition of philosophy, is a parallel to what I am attempting to do, which is a theory of everything! Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com www.readingroomcurriculum.com www.paulcmocombe.info
-------- Original message --------
From: Annalisa Aguilar
Date:12/02/2014 9:02 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Mocombian Being in the World
Dear fellow brothers and sisters of the list deemed to be and steeped within Mind, Culture, and Activity (of the extended family remix in the Matrix no less), I have completed Paul's paper! I actually find much in it that is brilliant, despite my ignorance about various pieces of the content, and of course certain circumstances of context. The entire paper before me has tons of underlining! I say this to offer that the paper really made me stretch. I think I need to read it a second time, but because I did not want to leave Paul waiting, I am going to offer my first and certainly flawed impressions, which are all my own. >From the top-down, which is the way I like to think and it is more comfortable for me, I see in the paper a parallel to my own search for a suitable "stance" (I do like this word, Paul), in regard to technology design. The assertions Paul makes about reproduction of class is in black consciousness is, in a sense, what I attempt to convey in my thesis on a philosophy of design for technology (concerning a Theory of Pattern), I am just not as explicit at saying it, which is for two reasons: 1) it is a thesis, not a dissertation, and 2) I did not feel equipped to bring in the hot mess of culture and the history of oppression. I could not tackle the structures/strictures of class, from the bottom up, so my strategy was to remain in the theoretical space of ideas, namely the top-down, and so for me, I focused upon models of the mind, which *of course* are constructed by history and by class, and by many, many things cultural and then some. I apologize to begin with a reference to myself and my interests, but this is how I was able to find sense in it. I do not think I am projecting my own-ness upon his work, because I see that the themes Paul is concerned with are the questions, "what is makes up a subject and what is personal experience of the world?" and, "what is the way to freedom despite constraints that present bondage to this subject?" These are questions I wrangled with myself, but pertaining to technology design. So I want to say that much like artists can sense the zeitgeist, that without intent he and I are attempting to answer similar questions that have to do with being as a Being in the World in a post-capitalist world, and what agency is left after all the history and all the tools and all the class structures, and all the everything-else have had their way with us and how we think about ourselves (in terms of identity and notions of self). But getting to the paper, standing on its own without piling on high what resonates with my own interests, I found the theoretical move of going down to the particle to up to the cultural incredibly smart and strategic, because it destroys the stance of what-we-have-inherited-from-those-before-us as the normative stance that can be acted upon without question (OK, sorry... I can't resist...is it possible too see here how this might pertain to the "inevitable" stance of technology and its design?) I also enjoy how Paul was able to critique, without demolishing the value of, Marxist thought and to contextualize it in a larger framework (of particles to the cultural), because I believe we are more than what we do, and this "more-ness" is something less about material and more about form and formlessness (please! sans Plato) in terms of how one chooses to aggregate our particles, so to speak. :) By performing this move, I find that Paul does what Lakoff does when Lakoff shows us what happens when we are told, "Don't think of an elephant," what is the first thing we do? Think of an elephant. Marx in constructing a picture of the world around capitalism orients always to capitalism, but then again that was the project for the time, when capitalism was kinda the new rage, the new thing, even if it was just a specter, so to speak. Marxist thought has its place, but Marx cannot comment on the state of the world today because it was beyond his understanding. What he might say about it is speculation. Telling the future is hard and I don't believe Marx was a clairvoyant or that he could astrotravel, although Scrooge did do some fictional astrotravel in a Dickens story about the value of Christmases, I believe. I hope I have not whizbang-put-anyone's-back-out-of-alignment by saying this, it is just my humble stance. So this is to say (with less words) that Paul recognizes the trap set out by orienting to capitalism as the normative stance, even if it is to be against the tragedy wrought upon the many people of the world by this economic system. I would also like to say that having studied Vedic thought, there is some confirmation there in Paul's theoretical construct. I am interested to offer this not as an expert on Vedic thought, but as a recognizer of similar patterns which may offer some grist to the thinking mill. I am very unsteady with phenomenology, so please if you blow on me I'm likely to fall over on my backside, but if you can given me a little breathing room, it seems to me that phenomenology takes the position that consciousness is a product of the mind, as well as culture, language, frameworks, all that Paul described in his paper. Vedic thought, as I understand it and as I enjoy it, takes the position that mind is a manifestation of consciousness and that everything here is consciousness, including the world, which possesses its own forms of consciousness in infinite multiplicity. That is why phenomenology need not be wrong, because the processes of mind reflecting consciousness are going to be the same, it's just a matter of where you say the consciousness is. Phenomenology says, the mind, Vedic thought says, everywhere without limits. So having shared that, I don't expect this explanation to stick, especially for those who are deeply deeply invested in consciousness as a product of the mind. I only want to offer that there is another way to think about consciousness that is borne of ancient thinking (sans Descartes), that may speak to these problems. As such, Vedic thought has its own vocabulary about consciousness and it is very "lightweight" and fluid, once the concepts are grasped. But you'd have to take my word for that, for now. With this in mind, these patterns of similiarity are what I like about Paul's theory, because it shows how oppression and bondage are imaginary constructs if seen from the perspective of the particle. In Vedic thought, it wouldn't be a particle, but Brahman, which is non-dual being with no qualities and no parts (being non-dual). It is not a small thing but a big thing, without being a thing at all. In fact, the definition of the word Brahman is "the big" as an adjective, not a noun. So I offer all that, and certainly there is far more to it than I have described, with the intention to suggest that we might take a viewpoints or worldviews (as if looking through a telescope to see what it looks like for ourselves, as subjects) that are unfamiliar to us. It is a method by which to look outside the worldviews to which we are so inured that we don't think that they are worldviews anymore, but the way the world IS. I think Paul's paper provides this freshness of viewpoint. As Vygotsky has said, (I paraphrase) we come to learn our own language by learning another. So I mean it like that. Thank you, Paul, for a very enriching reading experience and some expansion in my notions pertaining to subjective beingness in the world. Kind regards, Annalisa From annalisa@unm.edu Tue Dec 2 20:39:09 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2014 04:39:09 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Gold, et al article on Daydreaming, Self-Concept and Academic Performance Message-ID: <1417581548494.39282@unm.edu> Hello all, A fortnight ago David Preiss was looking for the Gold et al article on Daydreaming, Self-Concept, and Academic Performance (1985) I was able to finagle a copy. Here's the abstract: ----x---- A continuous interaction model was proposed to explain the relationship among daydreaming, self concept and academic performance. Daydreams were hypothesized to both influence performance and attitudes and in turn be affected by performance outcomes and self concept. A second aim of the study was to evaluate the usefulness of a semantic differential scale as a method for subjects to rate their own daydreams. Subjects recorded school-related daydreams during two time periods in a semester, completed three self concept scales and took four psychology exams. Multiple regressions were used to analyze the proposed model. The second self concept score was predicted by the initial self concept score, daydream activity, and gender. The third self concept score was explained by the second self concept score and an exam score. The three summary dimensions of the semantic differential were independent and stable over seven weeks. ----x---- If anyone was curious to have it, let me know? Kind regards, Annalisa From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Tue Dec 2 21:05:57 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Wed, 03 Dec 2014 00:05:57 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mocombian Being in the World Message-ID: Annalisa, For bergson I would start with "time and free will: an essay on the immediate data of consciousness" (1889) and "creative evolution"(1907)... I have received some feedback on the paper in philosophical and afrocentric circles...the afrocentric people, molefi asante in particular, have a problem with it bcuz it is a direct attack on their attempt to create a so-called afrocentric paradigm among african american scholars, which I argue is problematic due to the fact that I posit that the initial ideological apparatuses of the africans in america were replaced with European ideological apparatuses. ?Even the black american church is a simulacra of the white church...the philosophy people asked me to develop the theory independent of my application of it. ?I?am in the process of doing so in a more indepth paper for the journal sociological theory... I am with you on the distinction between the vedas and hinduism. ?The same process happened with haitian vodou when america occupied the island in 1915. ?I am interested in the philosophy of vodou as opposed to its religious manifestation. ?Vodou philosophy parallels the vedic tradition, I.e., the world and everything in it are a manifestation of an energy source, bondye, god...etc. ? Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: Annalisa Aguilar
Date:12/02/2014 11:28 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mocombian Being in the World
Hi Paul, You are most welcome and I hope I have been able to appropriately express my delight from reading your paper. I'd happy to explain that when I refer to the Vedic thought and the Vedic tradition, I do not necessarily mean hinduism. "Hinduism" is a word given from outside the culture, ironically in same the way Native Americans (or whatever the appropriate designation is), were called "Indians." So I'm referring to the Vedas more specifically than the hindu religion, which derives from the Vedas. This is to say hinduism is the cultural expression of the Vedic tradition, but Vedic thought can be referenced without referencing hinduism, and so that is why I make this distinction, which is important. I'm not sure if there is this such a distinction from other texts that explain worldviews. I respect the religion and its cultural expression, but in this context I believe it is worth peeling away the religious references to focus on the considerations of consciousness. There are a few intersections of Vedic thought and Western thought that someday I would like to examine. The only one I know at the present time, is Schopenhauer. But I seem to have the feeling there are other German philosophers. I was curious why Heidegger did not go back in time past the Pre-Socratics, because I actually believe Parmenides has some direct parallels to Vedic thought. I also believe Wittgenstein stumbles across unconsciously and approaches a pramana does; it is as if he were trying to construct one (Pramana is Sanskrit for "means of knowledge"), and this is seen not only in his Tractatus, but also in his last work On Certainty, which I find to be oh-so beautiful. I haven't done a complete reading of Investigations so I can't comment there. So I'm just sharing connections I've seen, which may only be surface connections and therefore only superficial. I have not heard of Bergson, do you recommend an entry point for reading? An intro? Also, are there any questions or comments you might have for the list for points of discussion? It may take a little bit of time I suspect because the threads on mental representation and affordances have just taken off. What sort of reception have you had so far to your paper elsewhere? Or is it too early (or too late) to ask that? Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Dr. Paul C. Mocombe Sent: Tuesday, December 2, 2014 7:22 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mocombian Being in the World Annalisa, Thank you for that in depth reading. It is funny that you would bring up the vedic tradition. My phenomenological structuralism is an attempt to synthesize Haitian vodou (which is very similar to hinduism), with physics, phenomenology, marxism, and Wittgenstein ' s notion of language game (my forthcoming book is titled, "vodou, physics, and phenomenological structuralism"). I believe Henri Bergson's metaphysic, in the western tradition of philosophy, is a parallel to what I am attempting to do, which is a theory of everything! Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com www.readingroomcurriculum.com www.paulcmocombe.info
-------- Original message --------
From: Annalisa Aguilar
Date:12/02/2014 9:02 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Mocombian Being in the World
Dear fellow brothers and sisters of the list deemed to be and steeped within Mind, Culture, and Activity (of the extended family remix in the Matrix no less), I have completed Paul's paper! I actually find much in it that is brilliant, despite my ignorance about various pieces of the content, and of course certain circumstances of context. The entire paper before me has tons of underlining! I say this to offer that the paper really made me stretch. I think I need to read it a second time, but because I did not want to leave Paul waiting, I am going to offer my first and certainly flawed impressions, which are all my own. >From the top-down, which is the way I like to think and it is more comfortable for me, I see in the paper a parallel to my own search for a suitable "stance" (I do like this word, Paul), in regard to technology design. The assertions Paul makes about reproduction of class is in black consciousness is, in a sense, what I attempt to convey in my thesis on a philosophy of design for technology (concerning a Theory of Pattern), I am just not as explicit at saying it, which is for two reasons: 1) it is a thesis, not a dissertation, and 2) I did not feel equipped to bring in the hot mess of culture and the history of oppression. I could not tackle the structures/strictures of class, from the bottom up, so my strategy was to remain in the theoretical space of ideas, namely the top-down, and so for me, I focused upon models of the mind, which *of course* are constructed by history and by class, and by many, many things cultural and then some. I apologize to begin with a reference to myself and my interests, but this is how I was able to find sense in it. I do not think I am projecting my own-ness upon his work, because I see that the themes Paul is concerned with are the questions, "what is makes up a subject and what is personal experience of the world?" and, "what is the way to freedom despite constraints that present bondage to this subject?" These are questions I wrangled with myself, but pertaining to technology design. So I want to say that much like artists can sense the zeitgeist, that without intent he and I are attempting to answer similar questions that have to do with being as a Being in the World in a post-capitalist world, and what agency is left after all the history and all the tools and all the class structures, and all the everything-else have had their way with us and how we think about ourselves (in terms of identity and notions of self). But getting to the paper, standing on its own without piling on high what resonates with my own interests, I found the theoretical move of going down to the particle to up to the cultural incredibly smart and strategic, because it destroys the stance of what-we-have-inherited-from-those-before-us as the normative stance that can be acted upon without question (OK, sorry... I can't resist...is it possible too see here how this might pertain to the "inevitable" stance of technology and its design?) I also enjoy how Paul was able to critique, without demolishing the value of, Marxist thought and to contextualize it in a larger framework (of particles to the cultural), because I believe we are more than what we do, and this "more-ness" is something less about material and more about form and formlessness (please! sans Plato) in terms of how one chooses to aggregate our particles, so to speak. :) By performing this move, I find that Paul does what Lakoff does when Lakoff shows us what happens when we are told, "Don't think of an elephant," what is the first thing we do? Think of an elephant. Marx in constructing a picture of the world around capitalism orients always to capitalism, but then again that was the project for the time, when capitalism was kinda the new rage, the new thing, even if it was just a specter, so to speak. Marxist thought has its place, but Marx cannot comment on the state of the world today because it was beyond his understanding. What he might say about it is speculation. Telling the future is hard and I don't believe Marx was a clairvoyant or that he could astrotravel, although Scrooge did do some fictional astrotravel in a Dickens story about the value of Christmases, I believe. I hope I have not whizbang-put-anyone's-back-out-of-alignment by saying this, it is just my humble stance. So this is to say (with less words) that Paul recognizes the trap set out by orienting to capitalism as the normative stance, even if it is to be against the tragedy wrought upon the many people of the world by this economic system. I would also like to say that having studied Vedic thought, there is some confirmation there in Paul's theoretical construct. I am interested to offer this not as an expert on Vedic thought, but as a recognizer of similar patterns which may offer some grist to the thinking mill. I am very unsteady with phenomenology, so please if you blow on me I'm likely to fall over on my backside, but if you can given me a little breathing room, it seems to me that phenomenology takes the position that consciousness is a product of the mind, as well as culture, language, frameworks, all that Paul described in his paper. Vedic thought, as I understand it and as I enjoy it, takes the position that mind is a manifestation of consciousness and that everything here is consciousness, including the world, which possesses its own forms of consciousness in infinite multiplicity. That is why phenomenology need not be wrong, because the processes of mind reflecting consciousness are going to be the same, it's just a matter of where you say the consciousness is. Phenomenology says, the mind, Vedic thought says, everywhere without limits. So having shared that, I don't expect this explanation to stick, especially for those who are deeply deeply invested in consciousness as a product of the mind. I only want to offer that there is another way to think about consciousness that is borne of ancient thinking (sans Descartes), that may speak to these problems. As such, Vedic thought has its own vocabulary about consciousness and it is very "lightweight" and fluid, once the concepts are grasped. But you'd have to take my word for that, for now. With this in mind, these patterns of similiarity are what I like about Paul's theory, because it shows how oppression and bondage are imaginary constructs if seen from the perspective of the particle. In Vedic thought, it wouldn't be a particle, but Brahman, which is non-dual being with no qualities and no parts (being non-dual). It is not a small thing but a big thing, without being a thing at all. In fact, the definition of the word Brahman is "the big" as an adjective, not a noun. So I offer all that, and certainly there is far more to it than I have described, with the intention to suggest that we might take a viewpoints or worldviews (as if looking through a telescope to see what it looks like for ourselves, as subjects) that are unfamiliar to us. It is a method by which to look outside the worldviews to which we are so inured that we don't think that they are worldviews anymore, but the way the world IS. I think Paul's paper provides this freshness of viewpoint. As Vygotsky has said, (I paraphrase) we come to learn our own language by learning another. So I mean it like that. Thank you, Paul, for a very enriching reading experience and some expansion in my notions pertaining to subjective beingness in the world. Kind regards, Annalisa From annalisa@unm.edu Tue Dec 2 22:27:28 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2014 06:27:28 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mocombian Being in the World In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1417588047686.55710@unm.edu> Hi Paul! Thanks for the references! A couple of aspects that may be worth considering as an exploration is, how does learning and development take place in your system? How would you explain where liberation comes from? What is the definition of freedom? I do believe you have a good foundation to stand on regarding projection or, as you say, simulacra of the dominant culture upon the oppressed culture. But I hope that you do not develop your theory so far that it cannot be applied!!! If you were to examine how Vygotsky developed his theories (and if I am wrong about this someone will likely jump in to correct me), he didn't theorize beyond what could be applied. (anyone? anyone? am I wrong?) For some reason, this makes me want to attach this short-but-sweet book review by Guthrie (1977) concerning Luria's trip to Uzkbekistan in the 1930s. Luria was a student of Vygotsky, one might say a disciple. He went on to become an important neuroscience researcher. You might find something of interest in the article from a few angles, mostly I'm thinking how it discusses tools and culture (and also the relationship of education to abstract thinking), but also how it pertains to subjectivity, where might be said it is an obstruction to liberation if the individual cannot go beyond personal experience. I wonder out loud if there is a connection there to black experience? I'm just plumbing top-down patterns, is all. Of course, you may or may not know that Mike studied with Luria! So depending on the nature of your quest and I'm thinking mostly about your discussion of neuronal energies...you might have some direct access to some history in the flesh, so to speak, if the speaker within the flesh is so inclined to speak of the history! :) Kind regards, Annalisa -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Guthrie_Research Views Literacy and Thinking_1977.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 402821 bytes Desc: Guthrie_Research Views Literacy and Thinking_1977.pdf Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141203/30963c67/attachment-0001.pdf From lpscholar2@gmail.com Tue Dec 2 22:25:14 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Tue, 2 Dec 2014 22:25:14 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Barsalou's Grounded Cognition Theory Message-ID: Martin, Thank You for the article on Grounded theory that is exploring the multimodal synthesis of perceptual, action, linguistic, and conceptual phenomena. [his Perceptual Symbol System's or PSS theory]. On page 623 Barsalou explores *memory theories* and says his Perceptual Symbol System Theory shares similarities with Rubin's *Basic Systems Theory* In Barsalou's words, "Basic Systems Theory proposes that a complex memory contains many multimodal components from vision, audition, action, space, affect, language, etc., and that retrieving a memory involves simulating its multimodal components together. Rubin was articulating a more complex and richer form of memory which includes autobiographical memory and oral history. On page 622 Barsalou articulates his PSS theory and indicates how grounded cognition can implement symbolic functions naturally. He states, "Through the construct of simulators - corresponding roughly to concepts and types in standard theories - PSS implements the standard symbolic functions of type-token, binding, inference, productivity, recursion and propositions." I am curious how you understand the relation of Barsalou's Perceptual Symbol System theory of grounded cognition as it engages with another complex aspect of the symbolic memory system which points to more expansive notions of memory through historical time. Ricoeur has engaged deeply with this more expansive symbolic memory. which he describes as a schema of existence. As a concrete example he refers to the symbol of *captivity* which trans*forms* an actual historical event such as the Jewish Egyptian captivity and then the Babylonian captivity into a *schema of existence* Ricouer conjectures that symbolism such as the schema of captivity precedes reflection as a *guiding metaphor*. It is this complex, multimodal aspect of memory that I was pointing to. Ricouer posits a relation between the *literal* and the *metaphoric* in the power or force of the living symbol. He says in the analogous relation [A is to B as C is to D] and these terms can be objective. BUT in symbolic metaphor I cannot *objectivize* the analogous relation. By living in the first *literal* meaning in this literal act I am drawn or carried *beyond* this literal understanding [i.e. captivity] The symbolic *meaning* is *constituted* IN AND THROUGH the literal *meaning*. I am not sure where to situate Ricouer's exploration of the symbolic relation that *binds* literal *meaning* and symbolic *meaning*. As another aspects of multimodal cognition can Ricouer's extension of *memory systems* beyond autobiography and oral history be included in Barsalou's PASS theory of grounded cognition? Would Barsalou situate Ricouer's metaphorical understanding of symbolism as a simulation? From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Wed Dec 3 03:50:29 2014 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (Haydi Zulfei) Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2014 11:50:29 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1682996975.4827904.1417607429293.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11144.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> Hi First of all , so resentfully I wonder If I can demand Andy's return to the discussions !! No one can deny his great contributions to this Forum . Second , I might have been lost completely in your words , terms , premises , and compositional nuances and colourings of your script as native speakers , etc. Third , because of obvious sensitivities towards ANL , I've altogether put him to one side ; otherwise , in this concrete example of Michael , the triad , activity , action , operation are boldly in view . Fourth , I suppose LSV himself in two or three chapters of the "History of Higher Mental Functions" has provided full response to our inquiries . Andy , in time , sent the first two chapters to all . 1. He , after preliminary remarks , puts heavy emphasis on use of tools and work activity in the parentheses and in italic characters . He emphasizes that use of tool very naturally gets significant just within the work activity process . Without the work activity we cannot expect much of it . Then , as most of the time , he time and again references Marx and Engels so as to prove his claims . 2. Mike is so and for good reasons enchanted in "rudiments" of culture phenomena (throwing dice and bones , knots , notches in the wood to remember speech) . Good for him and us all . Yes , Buridan's ass gets spoilt in its indecision But man through inventing stimulus-device gets to salvation . But the problem is how many times has Mike , our Boss and confirmed global figure no need for it to be documented , asked himself what went before that juncture of time for the man to become 'MAN' ?? At this moment we are with LSV and at a very critical point of time . No more return to 'culture' to prove 'culture' . LSV says the error for some is to recount the story of mental through mental while they should know that mental processes go parallel with 'social' processes . What I gather at this very point is that he expects us to infer that the 'our present man of some will' owes his man/ness and decisiveness to his previous work activity necessitating use of tools . It seems we cannot take the idea to the uterine because V focuses on use of tools for a baby of 6 or of 10-12 months of age . It seems , both phylogenetically and ontogenetically , that it's not the case that 'gestures' ' eye contacts' come of their own and because of the man/ness and for the tuning-up with the universe through sounds and hymns and angels , etc. Man worked for life , performed ups and downs , shook his extremeties (one pair of hand) , consumed ! collective yellings and gesturing (as concomitant of work) . V says we can distinguish independent history of natural processes and independent history of cultural development separately 'phylogenetically' but not ontogenetically . In ontology , nature and culture work simultaneously contrary to phylogenesis . One cannot with ease and comfort say whichone goes with whichone . ? 3. Andy who is well aware of both CH and AT , on his sending of the four pages and then the said two chapters , disclosed a very important point neglected so far at the forum and that was the idea of the distinction between tool and sign so fruitfully and enormously discussed by V and the deep meaning that the simple diagram denoted . V says 'artifact' could be cheating and deceitful but no one cares ! They invariably use artifacts and through this , they ultimately remove 'material activity' from the domain altogether . V is everywhere clear with both 'cultural , ideal activity' and 'material activity' . Here is where quotes don't work . The one more return to the plus-thousand previous reflections . No loss really ! V , if necessary , prefers just 'mediation' . ? 4. With these in mind , I say for certain that here the plank is a tool not an 'artifact' because it is not a sign signaling any other genuine thing . It's all to itself . Also the light switch . And the whole activity is a material one . Life put it in the way . According to V sign activity affects one's own societal individual behaviour . We cannot generalize its effect to the border of transforming Nature . Man through speech , dialogue , discourse , talk , genre , etc. decides for the change in personal behaviour ; if this potential preparedness for individual behavioral change gets fossilized or ossified , then man will not reach the threshhold of the bigger act and the vast field of the Mother Universe with its motley rich material phenomena out of which each time he can select an object for a circle of activity : starting an activity with a probable cryptic 'motive' (what we don't yet know about which took him to the point of crossing) , with a conscious goal (reaching the other side) through a concrete action (crossing) operating according to the conditions at hand and on the ground (light switching , wrestling between the ideal and the material (object , subject , that is , thinking ideally about what to do with the whole thing and the plank , then observing with the help of the light acting on the object , again back to thinking if flaws are observed , etc. etc. no blending of objective and subjective whatsoever . And I wonder why taking affordance for a tool . Soooooooooo much for one post .? I considered spaces but wonder if it works .? I'll also be very quiet and slow in replying ! Best? Haydi ? ?? ?? ?? From: mike cole To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Tuesday, 2 December 2014, 11:26:46 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances My view? The plank is for certain an artifact, no less than the light bulb. On what grounds, or under what circumstances,? would you classify it otherwise? What's gained, what's lost? mike On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > Hi Annalisa, Mike, Huw > > I tend to? be somebody who reacts better to concrete examples than > definitions.? I believe this also comes from Gibson's 1977 book, > > You are walking across a field and come to a stream which you can to get > across.? You notice a plank across the stream.? It is wide enough for you > to keep your balance and thick enough to hold your weight, in using it you > recognize its affordance as a crossing point.? It is the intersection of > the movement, the perception of the plank, short term goal of the activity > (getting across the stream) - the recognition of the affordance comes in > the subjective use of the object (which is why it is neither subjective or > objective).? It is also important that you have the abilities (the correct > weight, the balance) to recognize the affordance, otherwise you pass the > plank by. > > As far as perceived affordance.? I think I have this right - the perceived > is not in the person who recognizes the affordance (otherwise you are > right, that is wet water) it is whether there is an intention in the design > of the object.? So I create a light switch with the intention of designing > it as having a perceived affordance for somebody who wants to switch on a > light.? As you can see different from the relationship to the plank, where > there is no prior design. > > Here is my question (perhaps answered in the Engestrom paper) > > The light switch is certainly an artifact, but is the plank? > > Michael > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 1:19 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances > > Those definitions help a lot Annalisa and touch on the fact that gibson > seemed to empty the organism (if one were so inclined to interpret him) and > he dismissed culutral mediation as secondary at best. Still, they share the > idea that a part of the structure that psychologist theorize as a located > inside of individual crania is in fact "our there" in the phylgenetically > and cultural-historically constitued environment. And that drove cognitive > psychologists, our co discussants, nuts. Until, "they got it" and then > sought to mold it to their own ends and pre-existing means. > mike > > On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 9:59 AM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > I thought I'd do the honors and start a new thread on affordances, which > > isn't related to Larry's discussion of basic images. > > > > I figured as well to offer Gibson's words on affordances since it is a > > word he invented to describe something he saw in the world. Of course the > > life of affordances has been full of controversy, especially with regard > to > > understanding what they are. > > > > Gibson's Affordances is a theory I find instrumental to connecting > outside > > to inside experiences and I intuit that it is related to perezhivanie in > > some fashion. > > > > After reading the wikipage more closely, I regret offering a link to the > > text there because it isn't very clear what Gibson means or what Norman > > means. To me, a "perceived affordance" is like saying "wet water." > > > > In any case, here are 3 quotes of Gibson in his own words, that I could > > find: > > > > The affordances of the environment are what it _offers_ the animal, what > > it _provides_ or _furnishes_, either for good or ill. The verb "to > afford" > > is found in the dictionary, the noun "affordance" is not. I have made it > > up. I mean by it something that refers both to the environment and the > > animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies the > complementarity > > of the animal and the environment (Gibson, 1977/1986). > > > > and > > > > What is meant by an _affordance_? ?Subject to revision, I suggest that > the > > affordance of anything is a specific combination of the properties of its > > substance and its surfaces taken with reference to an animal. The > reference > > may be to an animal as distinguished from other species (Gibson, > 1977/1986). > > > > and > > > > An important fact about affordances of the environment is that they are > in > > a sense objective, real, and physical, unlike values and meanings, which > > are often supposed to be subjective, phenomenal, and mental. But > actually, > > an affordance is neither an objective property nor a subjective property; > > or it is both if you like. An affordance cuts across the dichotomy of > > subjective-objective and helps us to understand its inadequacy. It is > > equally a fact of the environment and a fact of behavior. It is both > > physical and psychical, yet neither. An affordance points both ways, to > the > > environment and to the observer (Gibson, 1977/1986). > > > > These quotes are important to keep in mind, I hope they help. > > > > I might also suggest looking at Mace(1977) who described very carefully > > how Gibson got from stimuli to affordance, given that people on this list > > value history, learning, and development. > > > > Kind regards, > > > > Annalisa > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > on behalf of Huw Lloyd > > Sent: Tuesday, December 2, 2014 10:35 AM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > I'd take a look. > > > > Michael, utility or technical affordance might fit.? My equivalent of > your > > perceived/discovered distinction is one of planned and technically > > manifest. > > > > Huw > > > > > > On 2 December 2014 at 16:44, Glassman, Michael > > wrote: > > > > > I'd be interested in anybody else is. > > > > > > Michael > > > ________________________________________ > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > ] > > > on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > > > Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 11:39 AM > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > > > Interloper, Michael? > > > > > > The discussions at UCSD preceeding Don's use of affordances and > cognitive > > > artifacts were accompanied by other, related papers. One by Engestrom > on > > > "when is an artifact" and one or more by Ed Hutchins. If people are > > > interested in pursuing this thread/topic the materials could be > gathered > > > up. > > > > > > mike > > > > > > On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Glassman, Michael > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea).? He > > > > actually cops to both of them.? The first was not to distinguish > > between > > > > affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which are > > > > designed.? I think this is related to the issue of artifacts. > Meaning > > > are > > > > artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to be > > > > discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong word, > if > > > > anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances.? It is a > > > complex > > > > question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes based > on > > > > context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one > context > > > may > > > > result in organic affordances in another context. > > > > > > > > The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is that > he > > > was > > > > not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and > > > constraints. > > > > Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived affordances or > > are > > > > they designed to create constraints. > > > > > > > > Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the > > mention > > > > just spurred me to throw this up.? Hope I'm not being too much of an > > > > interloper. > > > > > > > > Michael > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > ] > > > > on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > > > > Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > > > > > Annalisa- > > > > > > > > I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation > not > > > > discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of > > > > affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set against > > > > Gibson's ideas.? The change of views coincided with the advent of the > > > d-cog > > > > idea which also has deep roots in chat. > > > > > > > > No hidden? history i know of, but interesting connections among the > > > notion > > > > of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion? of > > these > > > > connections can be found, among other places, in > > > > > > > >? Cole, M. & Engestr?m, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach to > > > > distributed* > > > > *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition: > Psychological > > > and > > > > educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press. > > > > > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Hi Mike, > > > > > > > > > > It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied > that > > > > wish! > > > > > > > > > > Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important connections. > I > > > was > > > > > not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I learned > > > about > > > > > Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science > (1985). > > > > > > > > > > Is there some history that is not part of the common story? > > > > > > > > > > I looked here for clarity: > > > > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance > > > > > > > > > > Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to > > > cognitive > > > > > artifacts? > > > > > > > > > > There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in > play, > > > and > > > > > even joy! > > > > > > > > > > When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however > until > > > then > > > > > I will remain with the ineffable. > > > > > > > > > > Kind regards, > > > > > > > > > > Annalisa > > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > > > > on behalf of mike cole > > > > > Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM > > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > > > > > > > The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And, > > > > > co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive > > > artifacts > > > > > right about that time at UCSD.? If it were possible to find a > source > > > that > > > > > makes these connections visible and available to read about it > might > > > be a > > > > > step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of > > intro > > > > for > > > > > newcomers to the discussion. > > > > > > > > > > I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a > > > newcomer's > > > > > introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is seeking > > to > > > > sort > > > > > out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am > > > > insuficiently > > > > > read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted! > > > > > > > > > > A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many > > rocks, > > > so > > > > > little time"! > > > > > > > > > > Mike > > > > > > > > > > A > > > > > > > > > > On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > Martin! > > > > > > > > > > > > Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental > > representation" > > > is > > > > > > coming closer! > > > > > > > > > > > > For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's > > theory > > > of > > > > > > affordances. > > > > > > > > > > > > This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed > article. > > > But > > > > I > > > > > > wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is > > > > important > > > > > > not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. > > > > > > > > > > > > I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a > > > grenade > > > > > > pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the > list. > > > If > > > > > you > > > > > > can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look > forward > > to > > > > > your > > > > > > reply, Martin. > > > > > > > > > > > > Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that being > > at > > > > UCSD > > > > > > and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that > > influences > > > > your > > > > > > position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find > > > > community > > > > > in > > > > > > it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more voluntary > > > > phrased > > > > > > that way). > > > > > > > > > > > > Kind regards, > > > > > > > > > > > > Annalisa > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > > > > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > > Martin > > > > John > > > > > > Packer > > > > > > > Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM > > > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > > > > > > > > > An interesting article, David. One way in which it is > interesting, > > to > > > > me > > > > > > at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used, > > > even > > > > > > once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images > in > > > the > > > > > > world around us - material representations - and he tries to > define > > > the > > > > > > "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. > > > > > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > > > On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > Larry, Annalisa: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" > when > > > we > > > > > > > met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of > > > > anything > > > > > > > except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe > > available > > > > > > > for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember > > > > > > > whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the > > > > > > > beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a > > > > > > > non-image based mental representation. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations > > are > > > > > > > images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. > > In > > > > > > > fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against > > > > Titchener > > > > > > > and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, > > > > > > > everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated > that > > > > > > > many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically > > > anterior > > > > > > > to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would > not > > > have > > > > > > > time or ability to process complex problems in real time. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are > > > > > > > genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more > > > reading > > > > > > > to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than > I > > am > > > > > > > (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels > like > > > > > > > she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do > NOT > > > read > > > > > > > this article--instead, look at Figure 11. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ > > > > > > > > > > > > > > The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure > of > > > > > > > Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any > > actual > > > > > > > images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural > > > > experience > > > > > > > associates with Renaissance paintings.? Pepperell then > > deliberately > > > > > > > frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any > > > > > > > recognizable figures upon which to focus. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine Chapel > > > fresco > > > > > > > for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He > or > > > she > > > > > > > can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting > > and > > > > > > > wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not > > notice > > > > > > > the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in > > it. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar < > annalisa@unm.edu > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> Hi Larry and David, > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are > at > > > the > > > > > > root of all thinking. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, > based > > > upon > > > > > > previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in > > > > > > combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a > > phrase > > > I > > > > > like > > > > > > a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it > > by > > > > the > > > > > > same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as > > > > Hackett > > > > > > describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have > you > > > > > already > > > > > > given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be > > willing > > > > to > > > > > > take a look. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is > > > > controversial. > > > > > > It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone > > says > > > > > "this > > > > > > is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble > > > > observation. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever > > > that > > > > > > process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at > > hand? > > > > > Just a > > > > > > thought. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> What is it that appeals to you about this model, > metaphoricity? > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> Kind regards, > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> Annalisa > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> ________________________________________ > > > > > > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > > > > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > Larry > > > > > Purss < > > > > > > lpscholar2@gmail.com > > > > > > > >> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM > > > > > > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity > > > > > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l]? How *basic* are images? > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> David K > > > > > > >> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. > My > > > > reason > > > > > > for > > > > > > >> exploring these authors is I have been following a path > > pursuing a > > > > > basic > > > > > > >> question. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic > > > guiding > > > > > > images > > > > > > >> upon which thinking rests" > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring > > appearances > > > > and > > > > > > >> illusions was also exploring this theme. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new > > phenomenological > > > > > path > > > > > > >> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names > > this > > > > > > process > > > > > > >> *metaphoricity*. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible > > > image-character > > > > > of > > > > > > the > > > > > > >> *spontaneous event* of meaning. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he > > > > > brackets - > > > > > > >> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> AND > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* > finds > > > the > > > > > > >> meaning of its very self. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this > > > > > > >> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of > > > > > metaphor > > > > > > can > > > > > > >> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated > > in > > > > > > >> *objectivity* > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of > > itself > > > > > *in* > > > > > > the > > > > > > >> mode [path] of the concept > > > > > > >> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding > > images > > > > has > > > > > > been > > > > > > >> established. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the > path > > of > > > > > > >> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived > > > from > > > > > the > > > > > > >> image-character of the guiding image. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial > this > > > > topic > > > > > > may > > > > > > >> become [again] > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this > > > basic > > > > > > >> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these > > images > > > as > > > > > > >> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images > emerge > > > > > > >> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is > > transcendental] > > > > and > > > > > > is > > > > > > >> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. > It > > > > seems > > > > > to > > > > > > >> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> I also realize this question may already be answered in > > Vygotsky's > > > > > > writings > > > > > > >> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of > > XMCA. I > > > > > > >> personally am following this path for now. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> Larry > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > > an > > > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > an > > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Wed Dec 3 05:09:34 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2014 13:09:34 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Barsalou's Grounded Cognition Theory In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <67F07A73-F9F6-408E-B45E-FFF20B5A64E2@uniandes.edu.co> Hi Larry, I've read a lot of Ricoeur, but he wrote faster than I can read so I haven't covered it all. This sounds like his book Symbolism and Evil? If so, it's one I didn't read... Martin On Dec 3, 2014, at 1:25 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > Martin, > Thank You for the article on Grounded theory that is exploring the > multimodal synthesis of perceptual, action, linguistic, and conceptual > phenomena. [his Perceptual Symbol System's or PSS theory]. On page 623 > Barsalou explores *memory theories* and says his Perceptual Symbol System > Theory shares similarities with Rubin's *Basic Systems Theory* > In Barsalou's words, > "Basic Systems Theory proposes that a complex memory contains many > multimodal components from vision, audition, action, space, affect, > language, etc., and that retrieving a memory involves simulating its > multimodal components together. > Rubin was articulating a more complex and richer form of memory which > includes autobiographical memory and oral history. > > On page 622 Barsalou articulates his PSS theory and indicates how grounded > cognition can implement symbolic functions naturally. He states, > > "Through the construct of simulators - corresponding roughly to concepts > and types in standard theories - PSS implements the standard symbolic > functions of type-token, binding, inference, productivity, recursion and > propositions." > > I am curious how you understand the relation of Barsalou's Perceptual > Symbol System theory of grounded cognition as it engages with another > complex aspect of the symbolic memory system which points to more expansive > notions of memory through historical time. Ricoeur has engaged deeply with > this more expansive symbolic memory. which he describes as a schema of > existence. As a concrete example he refers to the symbol of *captivity* > which trans*forms* an actual historical event such as the Jewish Egyptian > captivity and then the Babylonian captivity into a *schema of existence* > Ricouer conjectures that symbolism such as the schema of captivity precedes > reflection as a *guiding metaphor*. > It is this complex, multimodal aspect of memory that I was pointing to. > > Ricouer posits a relation between the *literal* and the *metaphoric* in the > power or force of the living symbol. He says in the analogous relation [A > is to B as C is to D] and these terms can be objective. BUT in symbolic > metaphor I cannot *objectivize* the analogous relation. By living in the > first *literal* meaning in this literal act I am drawn or carried *beyond* > this literal understanding [i.e. captivity] The symbolic *meaning* is > *constituted* IN AND THROUGH the literal *meaning*. > > I am not sure where to situate Ricouer's exploration of the symbolic > relation that *binds* literal *meaning* and symbolic *meaning*. As > another aspects of multimodal cognition can Ricouer's extension of *memory > systems* beyond autobiography and oral history be included in Barsalou's > PASS theory of grounded cognition? Would Barsalou situate Ricouer's > metaphorical understanding of symbolism as a simulation? From r.j.s.parsons@open.ac.uk Wed Dec 3 06:42:23 2014 From: r.j.s.parsons@open.ac.uk (rjsp2) Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2014 14:42:23 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Gold, et al article on Daydreaming, Self-Concept and Academic Performance In-Reply-To: <1417581548494.39282@unm.edu> References: <1417581548494.39282@unm.edu> Message-ID: <547F214F.4090902@open.ac.uk> Hi Annalisa I would very much like to see a copy of this. When I'm not marking, I am thinking about purposeless walking, feature spaces and other related issues. This sounds right up my street. Rob On 03/12/2014 04:39, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hello all, > > > A fortnight ago David Preiss was looking for the Gold et al article on Daydreaming, Self-Concept, and Academic Performance (1985) I was able to finagle a copy. > > > Here's the abstract: > > ----x---- > > A continuous interaction model was proposed to explain the relationship among daydreaming, self concept and academic performance. Daydreams were hypothesized to both influence performance and attitudes and in turn be affected by performance outcomes and self concept. A second aim of the study was to > evaluate the usefulness of a semantic differential scale as a method for subjects to rate their own daydreams. Subjects recorded school-related daydreams during two time periods in a semester, completed three self concept scales and took four psychology exams. Multiple regressions were used to analyze the proposed model. The second self concept score was predicted by the initial self concept score, daydream activity, and gender. The third self concept score was explained by the second self concept score and an exam score. The three summary dimensions of the semantic differential were independent and stable over seven weeks. > > ----x---- > > > If anyone was curious to have it, let me know? > > > Kind regards, > > > Annalisa -- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC 038302). The Open University is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority. From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed Dec 3 07:52:44 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2014 07:52:44 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Barsalou's Grounded Cognition Theory In-Reply-To: <67F07A73-F9F6-408E-B45E-FFF20B5A64E2@uniandes.edu.co> References: <67F07A73-F9F6-408E-B45E-FFF20B5A64E2@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Martin, The example comes from an article he wrote, "The Hermeneutics of Symbols and Philosophical Reflection" I was actually using the imaginal symbol of *captivity* to point to the more general relationship of the *literal* and the *beyond* which comes into *being through the symbolic. The way these cultural historical symbols guide or orient *interpretive communities* Suzanne Kirschner wrote a book "the Religious and Romantic Roots of Psychanalysis" which outlines the symbolic imaginal of "falling away AND return" which she traces through Neo-Platonism, the Protestant mystical tradition and moves through or in to psychoanalysis. It was Ricouer's general exploration of symbol [at this level or time scale of situations the level that guides zeitgeists] that I was attempting to weave together with *grounded cognition*. If Ricouer and Kirschner are pointing to a *real* phenomena then the relation of the *literal* and the *metaphorical* exploring *trans* positioning opens up stituations or *events* to what Merleau Ponty calls *excess* [the beyond] It is this realm which I'm suggesting is a *gap* which metaphorical power or force assists in coming into being through the imaginal. I am speculating that to understand *cognition* as multimodal then this time scale as a mode or path also guides our *quests* or questions. In other words the questions as grounded in the literal but calling us beyond the literal is the realm Ricouer and Kirschner are exploring. To situate Suzanne Kirscher, she co-authored the book "The sociocultural Turn in Psychology* with Jack Martin. Larry On Wed, Dec 3, 2014 at 5:09 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: > Hi Larry, > > I've read a lot of Ricoeur, but he wrote faster than I can read so I > haven't covered it all. This sounds like his book Symbolism and Evil? If > so, it's one I didn't read... > > Martin > > On Dec 3, 2014, at 1:25 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > Martin, > > Thank You for the article on Grounded theory that is exploring the > > multimodal synthesis of perceptual, action, linguistic, and conceptual > > phenomena. [his Perceptual Symbol System's or PSS theory]. On page 623 > > Barsalou explores *memory theories* and says his Perceptual Symbol System > > Theory shares similarities with Rubin's *Basic Systems Theory* > > In Barsalou's words, > > "Basic Systems Theory proposes that a complex memory contains many > > multimodal components from vision, audition, action, space, affect, > > language, etc., and that retrieving a memory involves simulating its > > multimodal components together. > > Rubin was articulating a more complex and richer form of memory which > > includes autobiographical memory and oral history. > > > > On page 622 Barsalou articulates his PSS theory and indicates how > grounded > > cognition can implement symbolic functions naturally. He states, > > > > "Through the construct of simulators - corresponding roughly to concepts > > and types in standard theories - PSS implements the standard symbolic > > functions of type-token, binding, inference, productivity, recursion and > > propositions." > > > > I am curious how you understand the relation of Barsalou's Perceptual > > Symbol System theory of grounded cognition as it engages with another > > complex aspect of the symbolic memory system which points to more > expansive > > notions of memory through historical time. Ricoeur has engaged deeply > with > > this more expansive symbolic memory. which he describes as a schema of > > existence. As a concrete example he refers to the symbol of *captivity* > > which trans*forms* an actual historical event such as the Jewish Egyptian > > captivity and then the Babylonian captivity into a *schema of existence* > > Ricouer conjectures that symbolism such as the schema of captivity > precedes > > reflection as a *guiding metaphor*. > > It is this complex, multimodal aspect of memory that I was pointing to. > > > > Ricouer posits a relation between the *literal* and the *metaphoric* in > the > > power or force of the living symbol. He says in the analogous relation [A > > is to B as C is to D] and these terms can be objective. BUT in symbolic > > metaphor I cannot *objectivize* the analogous relation. By living in the > > first *literal* meaning in this literal act I am drawn or carried > *beyond* > > this literal understanding [i.e. captivity] The symbolic *meaning* is > > *constituted* IN AND THROUGH the literal *meaning*. > > > > I am not sure where to situate Ricouer's exploration of the symbolic > > relation that *binds* literal *meaning* and symbolic *meaning*. As > > another aspects of multimodal cognition can Ricouer's extension of > *memory > > systems* beyond autobiography and oral history be included in Barsalou's > > PASS theory of grounded cognition? Would Barsalou situate Ricouer's > > metaphorical understanding of symbolism as a simulation? > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Dec 3 10:00:10 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2014 10:00:10 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances In-Reply-To: <1682996975.4827904.1417607429293.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11144.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> References: <1682996975.4827904.1417607429293.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11144.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> Message-ID: Haydi-- Like anyone on xmca, you can demand whatever you like. Getting people to implement your demands may be more difficult. In general, I have not experienced demands and resentment as particularly helpful on xmca, but thing are changing, so who knows. I am not putting ANL aside because of the concerns expressed in MCA in the past year or so. The concerns are real, at least to me. But there are many productive programs of research that use his ideas, along with those of LSV and many others, both Russian and non-Russian. I believe it would be helpful in receiving answers to your various comments and suggestions if some of them were constrained to particular threads. For example, the discussion of plank versus a piece of electronic equipment vis a vis the notion of artifact and mediation through artifacts, etc., might be be placed in that thread. etc. I clearly can be wrong in all of these judgments! mike On Wed, Dec 3, 2014 at 3:50 AM, Haydi Zulfei wrote: > Hi > > First of all , so resentfully I wonder If I can demand Andy's return to > the discussions !! No one can deny his great contributions to this Forum . > > Second , I might have been lost completely in your words , terms , > premises , and compositional nuances and colourings of your script as > native speakers , etc. > > > Third , because of obvious sensitivities towards ANL , I've altogether put > him to one side ; otherwise , in this concrete example of Michael , the > triad , activity , action , operation are boldly in view . > > > Fourth , I suppose LSV himself in two or three chapters of the "History of > Higher Mental Functions" has provided full response to our inquiries . Andy > , in time , sent the first two chapters to all . > > 1. He , after preliminary remarks , puts heavy emphasis on use of tools > and work activity in the parentheses and in italic characters . He > emphasizes that use of tool very naturally gets significant just within the > work activity process . Without the work activity we cannot expect much of > it . Then , as most of the time , he time and again references Marx and > Engels so as to prove his claims . > > > 2. Mike is so and for good reasons enchanted in "rudiments" of culture > phenomena (throwing dice and bones , knots , notches in the wood to > remember speech) . Good for him and us all . Yes , Buridan's ass gets > spoilt in its indecision But man through inventing stimulus-device gets to > salvation . But the problem is how many times has Mike , our Boss and > confirmed global figure no need for it to be documented , asked himself > what went before that juncture of time for the man to become 'MAN' ?? At > this moment we are with LSV and at a very critical point of time . No more > return to 'culture' to prove 'culture' . LSV says the error for some is to > recount the story of mental through mental while they should know that > mental processes go parallel with 'social' processes . What I gather at > this very point is that he expects us to infer that the 'our present man of > some will' owes his man/ness and decisiveness to his previous work activity > necessitating use of tools . It seems we cannot take the idea to the > uterine because V focuses on use of tools for a baby of 6 or of 10-12 > months of age . It seems , both phylogenetically and ontogenetically , that > it's not the case that 'gestures' ' eye contacts' come of their own and > because of the man/ness and for the tuning-up with the universe through > sounds and hymns and angels , etc. Man worked for life , performed ups and > downs , shook his extremeties (one pair of hand) , consumed ! collective > yellings and gesturing (as concomitant of work) . V says we can distinguish > independent history of natural processes and independent history of > cultural development separately 'phylogenetically' but not ontogenetically > . In ontology , nature and culture work simultaneously contrary to > phylogenesis . One cannot with ease and comfort say whichone goes with > whichone . > > > 3. Andy who is well aware of both CH and AT , on his sending of the four > pages and then the said two chapters , disclosed a very important point > neglected so far at the forum and that was the idea of the distinction > between tool and sign so fruitfully and enormously discussed by V and the > deep meaning that the simple diagram denoted . V says 'artifact' could be > cheating and deceitful but no one cares ! They invariably use artifacts and > through this , they ultimately remove 'material activity' from the domain > altogether . V is everywhere clear with both 'cultural , ideal activity' > and 'material activity' . Here is where quotes don't work . The one more > return to the plus-thousand previous reflections . No loss really ! V , if > necessary , prefers just 'mediation' . > > 4. With these in mind , I say for certain that here the plank is a tool > not an 'artifact' because it is not a sign signaling any other genuine > thing . It's all to itself . Also the light switch . And the whole activity > is a material one . Life put it in the way . According to V sign activity > affects one's own societal individual behaviour . We cannot generalize its > effect to the border of transforming Nature . Man through speech , dialogue > , discourse , talk , genre , etc. decides for the change in personal > behaviour ; if this potential preparedness for individual behavioral change > gets fossilized or ossified , then man will not reach the threshhold of the > bigger act and the vast field of the Mother Universe with its motley rich > material phenomena out of which each time he can select an object for a > circle of activity : starting an activity with a probable cryptic 'motive' > (what we don't yet know about which took him to the point of crossing) , > with a conscious goal (reaching the other side) through a concrete action > (crossing) operating according to the conditions at hand and on the ground > (light switching , wrestling between the ideal and the material (object , > subject , that is , thinking ideally about what to do with the whole thing > and the plank , then observing with the help of the light acting on the > object , again back to thinking if flaws are observed , etc. etc. no > blending of objective and subjective whatsoever . And I wonder why taking > affordance for a tool . > > > Soooooooooo much for one post . > > I considered spaces but wonder if it works . > I'll also be very quiet and slow in replying ! > > Best > > Haydi > > > > > > > > From: mike cole > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Sent: Tuesday, 2 December 2014, 11:26:46 > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances > > My view? > The plank is for certain an artifact, no less than the light bulb. On what > grounds, or under what circumstances, would you classify it otherwise? > What's gained, what's lost? > mike > > > On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Glassman, Michael > wrote: > > > Hi Annalisa, Mike, Huw > > > > I tend to be somebody who reacts better to concrete examples than > > definitions. I believe this also comes from Gibson's 1977 book, > > > > You are walking across a field and come to a stream which you can to get > > across. You notice a plank across the stream. It is wide enough for you > > to keep your balance and thick enough to hold your weight, in using it > you > > recognize its affordance as a crossing point. It is the intersection of > > the movement, the perception of the plank, short term goal of the > activity > > (getting across the stream) - the recognition of the affordance comes in > > the subjective use of the object (which is why it is neither subjective > or > > objective). It is also important that you have the abilities (the > correct > > weight, the balance) to recognize the affordance, otherwise you pass the > > plank by. > > > > As far as perceived affordance. I think I have this right - the > perceived > > is not in the person who recognizes the affordance (otherwise you are > > right, that is wet water) it is whether there is an intention in the > design > > of the object. So I create a light switch with the intention of > designing > > it as having a perceived affordance for somebody who wants to switch on a > > light. As you can see different from the relationship to the plank, > where > > there is no prior design. > > > > Here is my question (perhaps answered in the Engestrom paper) > > > > The light switch is certainly an artifact, but is the plank? > > > > Michael > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > > on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > > Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 1:19 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances > > > > Those definitions help a lot Annalisa and touch on the fact that gibson > > seemed to empty the organism (if one were so inclined to interpret him) > and > > he dismissed culutral mediation as secondary at best. Still, they share > the > > idea that a part of the structure that psychologist theorize as a located > > inside of individual crania is in fact "our there" in the phylgenetically > > and cultural-historically constitued environment. And that drove > cognitive > > psychologists, our co discussants, nuts. Until, "they got it" and then > > sought to mold it to their own ends and pre-existing means. > > mike > > > > On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 9:59 AM, Annalisa Aguilar > wrote: > > > > > I thought I'd do the honors and start a new thread on affordances, > which > > > isn't related to Larry's discussion of basic images. > > > > > > I figured as well to offer Gibson's words on affordances since it is a > > > word he invented to describe something he saw in the world. Of course > the > > > life of affordances has been full of controversy, especially with > regard > > to > > > understanding what they are. > > > > > > Gibson's Affordances is a theory I find instrumental to connecting > > outside > > > to inside experiences and I intuit that it is related to perezhivanie > in > > > some fashion. > > > > > > After reading the wikipage more closely, I regret offering a link to > the > > > text there because it isn't very clear what Gibson means or what Norman > > > means. To me, a "perceived affordance" is like saying "wet water." > > > > > > In any case, here are 3 quotes of Gibson in his own words, that I could > > > find: > > > > > > The affordances of the environment are what it _offers_ the animal, > what > > > it _provides_ or _furnishes_, either for good or ill. The verb "to > > afford" > > > is found in the dictionary, the noun "affordance" is not. I have made > it > > > up. I mean by it something that refers both to the environment and the > > > animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies the > > complementarity > > > of the animal and the environment (Gibson, 1977/1986). > > > > > > and > > > > > > What is meant by an _affordance_? ?Subject to revision, I suggest that > > the > > > affordance of anything is a specific combination of the properties of > its > > > substance and its surfaces taken with reference to an animal. The > > reference > > > may be to an animal as distinguished from other species (Gibson, > > 1977/1986). > > > > > > and > > > > > > An important fact about affordances of the environment is that they are > > in > > > a sense objective, real, and physical, unlike values and meanings, > which > > > are often supposed to be subjective, phenomenal, and mental. But > > actually, > > > an affordance is neither an objective property nor a subjective > property; > > > or it is both if you like. An affordance cuts across the dichotomy of > > > subjective-objective and helps us to understand its inadequacy. It is > > > equally a fact of the environment and a fact of behavior. It is both > > > physical and psychical, yet neither. An affordance points both ways, to > > the > > > environment and to the observer (Gibson, 1977/1986). > > > > > > These quotes are important to keep in mind, I hope they help. > > > > > > I might also suggest looking at Mace(1977) who described very carefully > > > how Gibson got from stimuli to affordance, given that people on this > list > > > value history, learning, and development. > > > > > > Kind regards, > > > > > > Annalisa > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > on behalf of Huw Lloyd > > > Sent: Tuesday, December 2, 2014 10:35 AM > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > > > I'd take a look. > > > > > > Michael, utility or technical affordance might fit. My equivalent of > > your > > > perceived/discovered distinction is one of planned and technically > > > manifest. > > > > > > Huw > > > > > > > > > On 2 December 2014 at 16:44, Glassman, Michael > > > wrote: > > > > > > > I'd be interested in anybody else is. > > > > > > > > Michael > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > ] > > > > on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > > > > Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 11:39 AM > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > > > > > Interloper, Michael? > > > > > > > > The discussions at UCSD preceeding Don's use of affordances and > > cognitive > > > > artifacts were accompanied by other, related papers. One by Engestrom > > on > > > > "when is an artifact" and one or more by Ed Hutchins. If people are > > > > interested in pursuing this thread/topic the materials could be > > gathered > > > > up. > > > > > > > > mike > > > > > > > > On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Glassman, Michael < > glassman.13@osu.edu > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea). > He > > > > > actually cops to both of them. The first was not to distinguish > > > between > > > > > affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which > are > > > > > designed. I think this is related to the issue of artifacts. > > Meaning > > > > are > > > > > artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to > be > > > > > discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong > word, > > if > > > > > anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances. It is a > > > > complex > > > > > question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes > based > > on > > > > > context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one > > context > > > > may > > > > > result in organic affordances in another context. > > > > > > > > > > The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is that > > he > > > > was > > > > > not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and > > > > constraints. > > > > > Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived affordances > or > > > are > > > > > they designed to create constraints. > > > > > > > > > > Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the > > > mention > > > > > just spurred me to throw this up. Hope I'm not being too much of > an > > > > > interloper. > > > > > > > > > > Michael > > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > ] > > > > > on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > > > > > Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM > > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > > > > > > > Annalisa- > > > > > > > > > > I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation > > not > > > > > discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of > > > > > affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set > against > > > > > Gibson's ideas. The change of views coincided with the advent of > the > > > > d-cog > > > > > idea which also has deep roots in chat. > > > > > > > > > > No hidden history i know of, but interesting connections among the > > > > notion > > > > > of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion of > > > these > > > > > connections can be found, among other places, in > > > > > > > > > > Cole, M. & Engestr?m, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach > to > > > > > distributed* > > > > > *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition: > > Psychological > > > > and > > > > > educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press. > > > > > > > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Hi Mike, > > > > > > > > > > > > It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied > > that > > > > > wish! > > > > > > > > > > > > Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important > connections. > > I > > > > was > > > > > > not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I > learned > > > > about > > > > > > Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science > > (1985). > > > > > > > > > > > > Is there some history that is not part of the common story? > > > > > > > > > > > > I looked here for clarity: > > > > > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance > > > > > > > > > > > > Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to > > > > cognitive > > > > > > artifacts? > > > > > > > > > > > > There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in > > play, > > > > and > > > > > > even joy! > > > > > > > > > > > > When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however > > until > > > > then > > > > > > I will remain with the ineffable. > > > > > > > > > > > > Kind regards, > > > > > > > > > > > > Annalisa > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > > > > > > on behalf of mike cole > > > > > > Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM > > > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > > > > > > > > > The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And, > > > > > > co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive > > > > artifacts > > > > > > right about that time at UCSD. If it were possible to find a > > source > > > > that > > > > > > makes these connections visible and available to read about it > > might > > > > be a > > > > > > step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of > > > intro > > > > > for > > > > > > newcomers to the discussion. > > > > > > > > > > > > I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a > > > > newcomer's > > > > > > introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is > seeking > > > to > > > > > sort > > > > > > out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am > > > > > insuficiently > > > > > > read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted! > > > > > > > > > > > > A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many > > > rocks, > > > > so > > > > > > little time"! > > > > > > > > > > > > Mike > > > > > > > > > > > > A > > > > > > > > > > > > On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > Martin! > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental > > > representation" > > > > is > > > > > > > coming closer! > > > > > > > > > > > > > > For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's > > > theory > > > > of > > > > > > > affordances. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed > > article. > > > > But > > > > > I > > > > > > > wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is > > > > > important > > > > > > > not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a > > > > grenade > > > > > > > pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the > > list. > > > > If > > > > > > you > > > > > > > can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look > > forward > > > to > > > > > > your > > > > > > > reply, Martin. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that > being > > > at > > > > > UCSD > > > > > > > and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that > > > influences > > > > > your > > > > > > > position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find > > > > > community > > > > > > in > > > > > > > it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more > voluntary > > > > > phrased > > > > > > > that way). > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Kind regards, > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Annalisa > > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > > > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > > > > > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > > > Martin > > > > > John > > > > > > > Packer > > > > > > > > Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM > > > > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > An interesting article, David. One way in which it is > > interesting, > > > to > > > > > me > > > > > > > at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not > used, > > > > even > > > > > > > once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" > images > > in > > > > the > > > > > > > world around us - material representations - and he tries to > > define > > > > the > > > > > > > "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg < > dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Larry, Annalisa: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" > > when > > > > we > > > > > > > > met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of > > > > > anything > > > > > > > > except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe > > > available > > > > > > > > for a standard price all over China) She does not even > remember > > > > > > > > whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was > the > > > > > > > > beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as > a > > > > > > > > non-image based mental representation. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental > representations > > > are > > > > > > > > images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth > century. > > > In > > > > > > > > fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against > > > > > Titchener > > > > > > > > and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, > > > > > > > > everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated > > that > > > > > > > > many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically > > > > anterior > > > > > > > > to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would > > not > > > > have > > > > > > > > time or ability to process complex problems in real time. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that > are > > > > > > > > genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more > > > > reading > > > > > > > > to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read > than > > I > > > am > > > > > > > > (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels > > like > > > > > > > > she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do > > NOT > > > > read > > > > > > > > this article--instead, look at Figure 11. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color > structure > > of > > > > > > > > Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any > > > actual > > > > > > > > images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural > > > > > experience > > > > > > > > associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then > > > deliberately > > > > > > > > frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any > > > > > > > > recognizable figures upon which to focus. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine > Chapel > > > > fresco > > > > > > > > for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. > He > > or > > > > she > > > > > > > > can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the > painting > > > and > > > > > > > > wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not > > > notice > > > > > > > > the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful > in > > > it. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar < > > annalisa@unm.edu > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> Hi Larry and David, > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are > > at > > > > the > > > > > > > root of all thinking. > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, > > based > > > > upon > > > > > > > previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, > in > > > > > > > combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a > > > phrase > > > > I > > > > > > like > > > > > > > a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on > it > > > by > > > > > the > > > > > > > same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know > it. > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think > as > > > > > Hackett > > > > > > > describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have > > you > > > > > > already > > > > > > > given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be > > > willing > > > > > to > > > > > > > take a look. > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is > > > > > controversial. > > > > > > > It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone > > > says > > > > > > "this > > > > > > > is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble > > > > > observation. > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and > whatever > > > > that > > > > > > > process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at > > > hand? > > > > > > Just a > > > > > > > thought. > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> What is it that appeals to you about this model, > > metaphoricity? > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> Kind regards, > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> Annalisa > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> ________________________________________ > > > > > > > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > > > > > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > > Larry > > > > > > Purss < > > > > > > > lpscholar2@gmail.com > > > > > > > > >> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM > > > > > > > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity > > > > > > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> David K > > > > > > > >> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. > > My > > > > > reason > > > > > > > for > > > > > > > >> exploring these authors is I have been following a path > > > pursuing a > > > > > > basic > > > > > > > >> question. > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic > > > > guiding > > > > > > > images > > > > > > > >> upon which thinking rests" > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring > > > appearances > > > > > and > > > > > > > >> illusions was also exploring this theme. > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new > > > phenomenological > > > > > > path > > > > > > > >> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names > > > this > > > > > > > process > > > > > > > >> *metaphoricity*. > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible > > > > image-character > > > > > > of > > > > > > > the > > > > > > > >> *spontaneous event* of meaning. > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which > he > > > > > > brackets - > > > > > > > >> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> AND > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* > > finds > > > > the > > > > > > > >> meaning of its very self. > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this > > > > > > > >> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion > of > > > > > > metaphor > > > > > > > can > > > > > > > >> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is > implicated > > > in > > > > > > > >> *objectivity* > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of > > > itself > > > > > > *in* > > > > > > > the > > > > > > > >> mode [path] of the concept > > > > > > > >> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding > > > images > > > > > has > > > > > > > been > > > > > > > >> established. > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the > > path > > > of > > > > > > > >> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is > derived > > > > from > > > > > > the > > > > > > > >> image-character of the guiding image. > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial > > this > > > > > topic > > > > > > > may > > > > > > > >> become [again] > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by > this > > > > basic > > > > > > > >> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these > > > images > > > > as > > > > > > > >> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images > > emerge > > > > > > > >> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is > > > transcendental] > > > > > and > > > > > > > is > > > > > > > >> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. > > It > > > > > seems > > > > > > to > > > > > > > >> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> I also realize this question may already be answered in > > > Vygotsky's > > > > > > > writings > > > > > > > >> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of > > > XMCA. I > > > > > > > >> personally am following this path for now. > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> Larry > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > with > > > an > > > > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > > an > > > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > an > > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed Dec 3 10:05:54 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2014 11:05:54 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? In-Reply-To: References: <1417397991972.17078@unm.edu> <1417490593837.73384@unm.edu> <9F6BE3D8-123E-4204-B0A3-657EBEE09F53@gmail.com> Message-ID: Mike and David and the rest of La Gente, I?m reading Langacker on ?symbolic assemblies?, intersubjectively evoked in real (now) and conceptualized (past and future) time during discourse. ( These assemblies are ?stabalizing?, but protean, and can be contrasted with grammatical ?constituents?, structures. Some 30 years ago Langacker and Lakoff parted ways with Chomsky on autonomous syntax. Now Langacker is mashing up (blending) embodied cognition with discourse in real time, though his examples still seem explanatory, rather than descriptive. I have ordered Halliday?s Learning How to Mean and have just scanned the text of an interview with Halliday in 1986. I am not absolutely sure if, after I do some in-depth reading of Halliday (and even deeper reading of Langacker), I will find mappings between Langacker and Halliday useful for the chat?s puzzles. If I do, I would like to write a paper that might go out to the LCHC list.I am thinking the article might quote from the chat, where relevant to the focus of the article. To repeat, this would be an article just for the chat. What happens here stays here. Until and if cultural psychology goes viral. Then, Katie bar the door! Henry > On Dec 2, 2014, at 9:11 PM, mike cole wrote: > > Yes, perhaps they act as removal/spatial "stabilizers" of thought in motion. > Mike > > On Tuesday, December 2, 2014, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >> After I sent my email you have graciously answered, I thought precisely of >> the way representations afford time to dwell on something, rather than >> responding ballistically, as in controlled vs. automatic processing. Round >> peg and square hole here? >> >>> On Dec 2, 2014, at 12:18 PM, mike cole > >> wrote: >>> >>> I think I am with you on re-fraction rather than re-presentation, Henry. >>> Although there are circumstances in which representation seems an >>> appropriate enough word. >>> >>> I would like to continue the half of the conversation that continued to >>> talk about images (despite their bad rep) and imagination (despite its >>> trendiness). >>> >>> I take the core of the discussion to be about the nature of/existence >>> of/signficicance of "mental images" and their relation (or lack thereof) >> to >>> the polysemic concept of imagination. >>> >>> To go way back in time (not so far as Wundt and Tichner, but all the way >>> back to 1978) I attach a paper by Stephen Kosslyn that seems relevant to >>> think about images as processes so that the verbiness of imag(ing) is >>> brought to the fore. >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 10:49 AM, HENRY SHONERD > > wrote: >>> >>>> Peeps, >>>> I come late to this, but I was thinking this morning at the bus stop >> about >>>> David K?s narrative of kids learning about light. I though maybe a >>>> parallel: Representation = Reflection and Procedural = Refraction. I >> think >>>> of both as imagery, just that representation is sort of nouny and >>>> procedural is verby. Procedural imagery involves, depending on the >> angle of >>>> incidence, deviation from the the initial vector. But procedural imagery >>>> keeps things on the move. An affordance. I have forgotten my physics, >> but >>>> does refraction slow things down in any way? >>>> Henry >>>> >>>>> On Dec 1, 2014, at 8:23 PM, Annalisa Aguilar > > wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Martin! >>>>> >>>>> Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental representation" is >>>> coming closer! >>>>> >>>>> For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's theory of >>>> affordances. >>>>> >>>>> This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed article. But >> I >>>> wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is important >>>> not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. >>>>> >>>>> I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a grenade >>>> pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the list. If >> you >>>> can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look forward to >> your >>>> reply, Martin. >>>>> >>>>> Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that being at >>>> UCSD and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that >> influences >>>> your position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find >>>> community in it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more >>>> voluntary phrased that way). >>>>> >>>>> Kind regards, >>>>> >>>>> Annalisa >>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>> on behalf of Martin John Packer >>> >>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>> >>>>> An interesting article, David. One way in which it is interesting, to >> me >>>> at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used, even >>>> once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images in the >>>> world around us - material representations - and he tries to define the >>>> "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>> On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg > > wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Larry, Annalisa: >>>>>> >>>>>> People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" when we >>>>>> met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of anything >>>>>> except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe available >>>>>> for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember >>>>>> whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the >>>>>> beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a >>>>>> non-image based mental representation. >>>>>> >>>>>> As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations are >>>>>> images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. In >>>>>> fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against Titchener >>>>>> and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, >>>>>> everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated that >>>>>> many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically anterior >>>>>> to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would not have >>>>>> time or ability to process complex problems in real time. >>>>>> >>>>>> I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are >>>>>> genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more reading >>>>>> to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than I am >>>>>> (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels like >>>>>> she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do NOT read >>>>>> this article--instead, look at Figure 11. >>>>>> >>>>>> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ >>>>>> >>>>>> The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure of >>>>>> Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any actual >>>>>> images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural experience >>>>>> associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then deliberately >>>>>> frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any >>>>>> recognizable figures upon which to focus. >>>>>> >>>>>> However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine Chapel fresco >>>>>> for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He or she >>>>>> can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting and >>>>>> wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not notice >>>>>> the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in it. >>>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>> >>>>>> On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar > > wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Hi Larry and David, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are at the >>>> root of all thinking. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, based upon >>>> previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in >>>> combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a phrase I >> like >>>> a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it by the >>>> same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as Hackett >>>> describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have you >> already >>>> given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be willing to >>>> take a look. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is >> controversial. >>>> It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone says >> "this >>>> is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble observation. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever that >>>> process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at hand? >> Just a >>>> thought. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> What is it that appeals to you about this model, metaphoricity? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>> on behalf of Larry Purss > >>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM >>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> David K >>>>>>> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. My >> reason >>>> for >>>>>>> exploring these authors is I have been following a path pursuing a >>>> basic >>>>>>> question. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic guiding >>>> images >>>>>>> upon which thinking rests" >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring appearances and >>>>>>> illusions was also exploring this theme. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new phenomenological >> path >>>>>>> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names this >>>> process >>>>>>> *metaphoricity*. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible image-character >>>> of the >>>>>>> *spontaneous event* of meaning. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he >> brackets >>>> - >>>>>>> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> AND >>>>>>> >>>>>>> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* finds the >>>>>>> meaning of its very self. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this >>>>>>> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of >>>> metaphor can >>>>>>> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated in >>>>>>> *objectivity* >>>>>>> >>>>>>> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of itself >>>> *in* the >>>>>>> mode [path] of the concept >>>>>>> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding images has >>>> been >>>>>>> established. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the path of >>>>>>> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived from >> the >>>>>>> image-character of the guiding image. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial this >> topic >>>> may >>>>>>> become [again] >>>>>>> >>>>>>> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this basic >>>>>>> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these images as >>>>>>> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images emerge >>>>>>> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is transcendental] >> and >>>> is >>>>>>> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. It seems >>>> to >>>>>>> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I also realize this question may already be answered in Vygotsky's >>>> writings >>>>>>> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of XMCA. I >>>>>>> personally am following this path for now. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>> >> >> >> >> > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed Dec 3 11:26:23 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2014 12:26:23 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances In-Reply-To: References: <1682996975.4827904.1417607429293.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11144.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <3A40602C-44A1-45C7-A7D1-36E1A842E92B@gmail.com> Haydi, Thank you so much! Here?s how it is for me: I too have been waiting for Andy to come back. He is the reason I am in the chat. I have known about Vygotsky through Vera since the early 80s. But I, after my dissertation on L2 fluency in 1986, I worked as a teacher educator where research and publication wasn?t necessary for tenure and promotion. The college where I was working closed (bankruptcy) five years back and, like any working stiff, I am having to reinvent myself. So, in thrashing about I came to read Andy?s articles on "collaborative project" as a unit of analysis a few years back, started emailing with him one-on-one (and he was so generous with his time and patience in answering my questions about activity theory and Vygotsky), until he said it was time for me to join the chat. Andy mentored me until I had the courage to pipe up. Andy just edited a book on collaborative projects; Vera has written one of the papers for the book. I love them both. That?s how it is for me. Let me say that I consider myself a rank learner, always beginning. Mike has wisely rejected the role of Caesar on the chat. But we go to him asking him to sort out things amongst the unruly class. As a teacher, the hardest thing for me ever to do was to deal with disrespect between students. I have finally come to realize and accept that I want to be in a school where the students are nice to each other. Where respect and trust abound. Where human flourishing is possible. There is no father god to rescue us. We have to do it for ourselves. Well, like the song goes, ?I?m still willin?? Let?s make this a creative project, which means no unethical use of power. We can?t afford it. In my humble opinion. In gratitude and hope, Henry > On Dec 3, 2014, at 11:00 AM, mike cole wrote: > > Haydi-- > > Like anyone on xmca, you can demand whatever you like. Getting people to > implement your demands may be more > difficult. In general, I have not experienced demands and resentment as > particularly helpful on xmca, but thing are changing, > so who knows. > > I am not putting ANL aside because of the concerns expressed in MCA in the > past year or so. The concerns are real, at least to me. > But there are many productive programs of research that use his ideas, > along with those of LSV and many others, both Russian and non-Russian. > > I believe it would be helpful in receiving answers to your various comments > and suggestions if some of them were constrained to particular threads. For > example, the discussion of plank versus a piece of electronic equipment vis > a vis the notion of artifact and mediation through artifacts, etc., might > be be placed in that thread. > > etc. > > I clearly can be wrong in all of these judgments! > mike > > > > On Wed, Dec 3, 2014 at 3:50 AM, Haydi Zulfei > wrote: > >> Hi >> >> First of all , so resentfully I wonder If I can demand Andy's return to >> the discussions !! No one can deny his great contributions to this Forum . >> >> Second , I might have been lost completely in your words , terms , >> premises , and compositional nuances and colourings of your script as >> native speakers , etc. >> >> >> Third , because of obvious sensitivities towards ANL , I've altogether put >> him to one side ; otherwise , in this concrete example of Michael , the >> triad , activity , action , operation are boldly in view . >> >> >> Fourth , I suppose LSV himself in two or three chapters of the "History of >> Higher Mental Functions" has provided full response to our inquiries . Andy >> , in time , sent the first two chapters to all . >> >> 1. He , after preliminary remarks , puts heavy emphasis on use of tools >> and work activity in the parentheses and in italic characters . He >> emphasizes that use of tool very naturally gets significant just within the >> work activity process . Without the work activity we cannot expect much of >> it . Then , as most of the time , he time and again references Marx and >> Engels so as to prove his claims . >> >> >> 2. Mike is so and for good reasons enchanted in "rudiments" of culture >> phenomena (throwing dice and bones , knots , notches in the wood to >> remember speech) . Good for him and us all . Yes , Buridan's ass gets >> spoilt in its indecision But man through inventing stimulus-device gets to >> salvation . But the problem is how many times has Mike , our Boss and >> confirmed global figure no need for it to be documented , asked himself >> what went before that juncture of time for the man to become 'MAN' ?? At >> this moment we are with LSV and at a very critical point of time . No more >> return to 'culture' to prove 'culture' . LSV says the error for some is to >> recount the story of mental through mental while they should know that >> mental processes go parallel with 'social' processes . What I gather at >> this very point is that he expects us to infer that the 'our present man of >> some will' owes his man/ness and decisiveness to his previous work activity >> necessitating use of tools . It seems we cannot take the idea to the >> uterine because V focuses on use of tools for a baby of 6 or of 10-12 >> months of age . It seems , both phylogenetically and ontogenetically , that >> it's not the case that 'gestures' ' eye contacts' come of their own and >> because of the man/ness and for the tuning-up with the universe through >> sounds and hymns and angels , etc. Man worked for life , performed ups and >> downs , shook his extremeties (one pair of hand) , consumed ! collective >> yellings and gesturing (as concomitant of work) . V says we can distinguish >> independent history of natural processes and independent history of >> cultural development separately 'phylogenetically' but not ontogenetically >> . In ontology , nature and culture work simultaneously contrary to >> phylogenesis . One cannot with ease and comfort say whichone goes with >> whichone . >> >> >> 3. Andy who is well aware of both CH and AT , on his sending of the four >> pages and then the said two chapters , disclosed a very important point >> neglected so far at the forum and that was the idea of the distinction >> between tool and sign so fruitfully and enormously discussed by V and the >> deep meaning that the simple diagram denoted . V says 'artifact' could be >> cheating and deceitful but no one cares ! They invariably use artifacts and >> through this , they ultimately remove 'material activity' from the domain >> altogether . V is everywhere clear with both 'cultural , ideal activity' >> and 'material activity' . Here is where quotes don't work . The one more >> return to the plus-thousand previous reflections . No loss really ! V , if >> necessary , prefers just 'mediation' . >> >> 4. With these in mind , I say for certain that here the plank is a tool >> not an 'artifact' because it is not a sign signaling any other genuine >> thing . It's all to itself . Also the light switch . And the whole activity >> is a material one . Life put it in the way . According to V sign activity >> affects one's own societal individual behaviour . We cannot generalize its >> effect to the border of transforming Nature . Man through speech , dialogue >> , discourse , talk , genre , etc. decides for the change in personal >> behaviour ; if this potential preparedness for individual behavioral change >> gets fossilized or ossified , then man will not reach the threshhold of the >> bigger act and the vast field of the Mother Universe with its motley rich >> material phenomena out of which each time he can select an object for a >> circle of activity : starting an activity with a probable cryptic 'motive' >> (what we don't yet know about which took him to the point of crossing) , >> with a conscious goal (reaching the other side) through a concrete action >> (crossing) operating according to the conditions at hand and on the ground >> (light switching , wrestling between the ideal and the material (object , >> subject , that is , thinking ideally about what to do with the whole thing >> and the plank , then observing with the help of the light acting on the >> object , again back to thinking if flaws are observed , etc. etc. no >> blending of objective and subjective whatsoever . And I wonder why taking >> affordance for a tool . >> >> >> Soooooooooo much for one post . >> >> I considered spaces but wonder if it works . >> I'll also be very quiet and slow in replying ! >> >> Best >> >> Haydi >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> From: mike cole >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >> Sent: Tuesday, 2 December 2014, 11:26:46 >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances >> >> My view? >> The plank is for certain an artifact, no less than the light bulb. On what >> grounds, or under what circumstances, would you classify it otherwise? >> What's gained, what's lost? >> mike >> >> >> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Glassman, Michael >> wrote: >> >>> Hi Annalisa, Mike, Huw >>> >>> I tend to be somebody who reacts better to concrete examples than >>> definitions. I believe this also comes from Gibson's 1977 book, >>> >>> You are walking across a field and come to a stream which you can to get >>> across. You notice a plank across the stream. It is wide enough for you >>> to keep your balance and thick enough to hold your weight, in using it >> you >>> recognize its affordance as a crossing point. It is the intersection of >>> the movement, the perception of the plank, short term goal of the >> activity >>> (getting across the stream) - the recognition of the affordance comes in >>> the subjective use of the object (which is why it is neither subjective >> or >>> objective). It is also important that you have the abilities (the >> correct >>> weight, the balance) to recognize the affordance, otherwise you pass the >>> plank by. >>> >>> As far as perceived affordance. I think I have this right - the >> perceived >>> is not in the person who recognizes the affordance (otherwise you are >>> right, that is wet water) it is whether there is an intention in the >> design >>> of the object. So I create a light switch with the intention of >> designing >>> it as having a perceived affordance for somebody who wants to switch on a >>> light. As you can see different from the relationship to the plank, >> where >>> there is no prior design. >>> >>> Here is my question (perhaps answered in the Engestrom paper) >>> >>> The light switch is certainly an artifact, but is the plank? >>> >>> Michael >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 1:19 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances >>> >>> Those definitions help a lot Annalisa and touch on the fact that gibson >>> seemed to empty the organism (if one were so inclined to interpret him) >> and >>> he dismissed culutral mediation as secondary at best. Still, they share >> the >>> idea that a part of the structure that psychologist theorize as a located >>> inside of individual crania is in fact "our there" in the phylgenetically >>> and cultural-historically constitued environment. And that drove >> cognitive >>> psychologists, our co discussants, nuts. Until, "they got it" and then >>> sought to mold it to their own ends and pre-existing means. >>> mike >>> >>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 9:59 AM, Annalisa Aguilar >> wrote: >>> >>>> I thought I'd do the honors and start a new thread on affordances, >> which >>>> isn't related to Larry's discussion of basic images. >>>> >>>> I figured as well to offer Gibson's words on affordances since it is a >>>> word he invented to describe something he saw in the world. Of course >> the >>>> life of affordances has been full of controversy, especially with >> regard >>> to >>>> understanding what they are. >>>> >>>> Gibson's Affordances is a theory I find instrumental to connecting >>> outside >>>> to inside experiences and I intuit that it is related to perezhivanie >> in >>>> some fashion. >>>> >>>> After reading the wikipage more closely, I regret offering a link to >> the >>>> text there because it isn't very clear what Gibson means or what Norman >>>> means. To me, a "perceived affordance" is like saying "wet water." >>>> >>>> In any case, here are 3 quotes of Gibson in his own words, that I could >>>> find: >>>> >>>> The affordances of the environment are what it _offers_ the animal, >> what >>>> it _provides_ or _furnishes_, either for good or ill. The verb "to >>> afford" >>>> is found in the dictionary, the noun "affordance" is not. I have made >> it >>>> up. I mean by it something that refers both to the environment and the >>>> animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies the >>> complementarity >>>> of the animal and the environment (Gibson, 1977/1986). >>>> >>>> and >>>> >>>> What is meant by an _affordance_? ?Subject to revision, I suggest that >>> the >>>> affordance of anything is a specific combination of the properties of >> its >>>> substance and its surfaces taken with reference to an animal. The >>> reference >>>> may be to an animal as distinguished from other species (Gibson, >>> 1977/1986). >>>> >>>> and >>>> >>>> An important fact about affordances of the environment is that they are >>> in >>>> a sense objective, real, and physical, unlike values and meanings, >> which >>>> are often supposed to be subjective, phenomenal, and mental. But >>> actually, >>>> an affordance is neither an objective property nor a subjective >> property; >>>> or it is both if you like. An affordance cuts across the dichotomy of >>>> subjective-objective and helps us to understand its inadequacy. It is >>>> equally a fact of the environment and a fact of behavior. It is both >>>> physical and psychical, yet neither. An affordance points both ways, to >>> the >>>> environment and to the observer (Gibson, 1977/1986). >>>> >>>> These quotes are important to keep in mind, I hope they help. >>>> >>>> I might also suggest looking at Mace(1977) who described very carefully >>>> how Gibson got from stimuli to affordance, given that people on this >> list >>>> value history, learning, and development. >>>> >>>> Kind regards, >>>> >>>> Annalisa >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >>>> on behalf of Huw Lloyd >>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 2, 2014 10:35 AM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>> >>>> I'd take a look. >>>> >>>> Michael, utility or technical affordance might fit. My equivalent of >>> your >>>> perceived/discovered distinction is one of planned and technically >>>> manifest. >>>> >>>> Huw >>>> >>>> >>>> On 2 December 2014 at 16:44, Glassman, Michael >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> I'd be interested in anybody else is. >>>>> >>>>> Michael >>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> ] >>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 11:39 AM >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>> >>>>> Interloper, Michael? >>>>> >>>>> The discussions at UCSD preceeding Don's use of affordances and >>> cognitive >>>>> artifacts were accompanied by other, related papers. One by Engestrom >>> on >>>>> "when is an artifact" and one or more by Ed Hutchins. If people are >>>>> interested in pursuing this thread/topic the materials could be >>> gathered >>>>> up. >>>>> >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Glassman, Michael < >> glassman.13@osu.edu >>>> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea). >> He >>>>>> actually cops to both of them. The first was not to distinguish >>>> between >>>>>> affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which >> are >>>>>> designed. I think this is related to the issue of artifacts. >>> Meaning >>>>> are >>>>>> artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to >> be >>>>>> discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong >> word, >>> if >>>>>> anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances. It is a >>>>> complex >>>>>> question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes >> based >>> on >>>>>> context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one >>> context >>>>> may >>>>>> result in organic affordances in another context. >>>>>> >>>>>> The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is that >>> he >>>>> was >>>>>> not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and >>>>> constraints. >>>>>> Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived affordances >> or >>>> are >>>>>> they designed to create constraints. >>>>>> >>>>>> Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the >>>> mention >>>>>> just spurred me to throw this up. Hope I'm not being too much of >> an >>>>>> interloper. >>>>>> >>>>>> Michael >>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ >>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> ] >>>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>> >>>>>> Annalisa- >>>>>> >>>>>> I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation >>> not >>>>>> discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of >>>>>> affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set >> against >>>>>> Gibson's ideas. The change of views coincided with the advent of >> the >>>>> d-cog >>>>>> idea which also has deep roots in chat. >>>>>> >>>>>> No hidden history i know of, but interesting connections among the >>>>> notion >>>>>> of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion of >>>> these >>>>>> connections can be found, among other places, in >>>>>> >>>>>> Cole, M. & Engestr?m, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach >> to >>>>>> distributed* >>>>>> *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition: >>> Psychological >>>>> and >>>>>> educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press. >>>>>> >>>>>> mike >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar >> >>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Hi Mike, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied >>> that >>>>>> wish! >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important >> connections. >>> I >>>>> was >>>>>>> not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I >> learned >>>>> about >>>>>>> Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science >>> (1985). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Is there some history that is not part of the common story? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I looked here for clarity: >>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to >>>>> cognitive >>>>>>> artifacts? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in >>> play, >>>>> and >>>>>>> even joy! >>>>>>> >>>>>>> When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however >>> until >>>>> then >>>>>>> I will remain with the ineffable. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>> >>>>>>> on behalf of mike cole >>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM >>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And, >>>>>>> co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive >>>>> artifacts >>>>>>> right about that time at UCSD. If it were possible to find a >>> source >>>>> that >>>>>>> makes these connections visible and available to read about it >>> might >>>>> be a >>>>>>> step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of >>>> intro >>>>>> for >>>>>>> newcomers to the discussion. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a >>>>> newcomer's >>>>>>> introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is >> seeking >>>> to >>>>>> sort >>>>>>> out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am >>>>>> insuficiently >>>>>>> read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted! >>>>>>> >>>>>>> A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many >>>> rocks, >>>>> so >>>>>>> little time"! >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Mike >>>>>>> >>>>>>> A >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar >>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Martin! >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental >>>> representation" >>>>> is >>>>>>>> coming closer! >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's >>>> theory >>>>> of >>>>>>>> affordances. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed >>> article. >>>>> But >>>>>> I >>>>>>>> wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is >>>>>> important >>>>>>>> not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a >>>>> grenade >>>>>>>> pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the >>> list. >>>>> If >>>>>>> you >>>>>>>> can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look >>> forward >>>> to >>>>>>> your >>>>>>>> reply, Martin. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that >> being >>>> at >>>>>> UCSD >>>>>>>> and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that >>>> influences >>>>>> your >>>>>>>> position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find >>>>>> community >>>>>>> in >>>>>>>> it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more >> voluntary >>>>>> phrased >>>>>>>> that way). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of >>>> Martin >>>>>> John >>>>>>>> Packer > >>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM >>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> An interesting article, David. One way in which it is >>> interesting, >>>> to >>>>>> me >>>>>>>> at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not >> used, >>>>> even >>>>>>>> once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" >> images >>> in >>>>> the >>>>>>>> world around us - material representations - and he tries to >>> define >>>>> the >>>>>>>> "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg < >> dkellogg60@gmail.com >>>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Larry, Annalisa: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" >>> when >>>>> we >>>>>>>>> met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of >>>>>> anything >>>>>>>>> except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe >>>> available >>>>>>>>> for a standard price all over China) She does not even >> remember >>>>>>>>> whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was >> the >>>>>>>>> beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as >> a >>>>>>>>> non-image based mental representation. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental >> representations >>>> are >>>>>>>>> images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth >> century. >>>> In >>>>>>>>> fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against >>>>>> Titchener >>>>>>>>> and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, >>>>>>>>> everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated >>> that >>>>>>>>> many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically >>>>> anterior >>>>>>>>> to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would >>> not >>>>> have >>>>>>>>> time or ability to process complex problems in real time. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that >> are >>>>>>>>> genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more >>>>> reading >>>>>>>>> to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read >> than >>> I >>>> am >>>>>>>>> (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels >>> like >>>>>>>>> she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do >>> NOT >>>>> read >>>>>>>>> this article--instead, look at Figure 11. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color >> structure >>> of >>>>>>>>> Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any >>>> actual >>>>>>>>> images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural >>>>>> experience >>>>>>>>> associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then >>>> deliberately >>>>>>>>> frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any >>>>>>>>> recognizable figures upon which to focus. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine >> Chapel >>>>> fresco >>>>>>>>> for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. >> He >>> or >>>>> she >>>>>>>>> can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the >> painting >>>> and >>>>>>>>> wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not >>>> notice >>>>>>>>> the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful >> in >>>> it. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar < >>> annalisa@unm.edu >>>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Hi Larry and David, >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are >>> at >>>>> the >>>>>>>> root of all thinking. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, >>> based >>>>> upon >>>>>>>> previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, >> in >>>>>>>> combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a >>>> phrase >>>>> I >>>>>>> like >>>>>>>> a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on >> it >>>> by >>>>>> the >>>>>>>> same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know >> it. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think >> as >>>>>> Hackett >>>>>>>> describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have >>> you >>>>>>> already >>>>>>>> given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be >>>> willing >>>>>> to >>>>>>>> take a look. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is >>>>>> controversial. >>>>>>>> It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone >>>> says >>>>>>> "this >>>>>>>> is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble >>>>>> observation. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and >> whatever >>>>> that >>>>>>>> process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at >>>> hand? >>>>>>> Just a >>>>>>>> thought. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> What is it that appeals to you about this model, >>> metaphoricity? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of >>> Larry >>>>>>> Purss < >>>>>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com > >>>>>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM >>>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity >>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> David K >>>>>>>>>> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. >>> My >>>>>> reason >>>>>>>> for >>>>>>>>>> exploring these authors is I have been following a path >>>> pursuing a >>>>>>> basic >>>>>>>>>> question. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic >>>>> guiding >>>>>>>> images >>>>>>>>>> upon which thinking rests" >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring >>>> appearances >>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>> illusions was also exploring this theme. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new >>>> phenomenological >>>>>>> path >>>>>>>>>> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names >>>> this >>>>>>>> process >>>>>>>>>> *metaphoricity*. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible >>>>> image-character >>>>>>> of >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> *spontaneous event* of meaning. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which >> he >>>>>>> brackets - >>>>>>>>>> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> AND >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* >>> finds >>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> meaning of its very self. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this >>>>>>>>>> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion >> of >>>>>>> metaphor >>>>>>>> can >>>>>>>>>> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is >> implicated >>>> in >>>>>>>>>> *objectivity* >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of >>>> itself >>>>>>> *in* >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> mode [path] of the concept >>>>>>>>>> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding >>>> images >>>>>> has >>>>>>>> been >>>>>>>>>> established. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the >>> path >>>> of >>>>>>>>>> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is >> derived >>>>> from >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> image-character of the guiding image. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial >>> this >>>>>> topic >>>>>>>> may >>>>>>>>>> become [again] >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by >> this >>>>> basic >>>>>>>>>> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these >>>> images >>>>> as >>>>>>>>>> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images >>> emerge >>>>>>>>>> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is >>>> transcendental] >>>>>> and >>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. >>> It >>>>>> seems >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I also realize this question may already be answered in >>>> Vygotsky's >>>>>>>> writings >>>>>>>>>> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of >>>> XMCA. I >>>>>>>>>> personally am following this path for now. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >> with >>>> an >>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>> an >>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >> an >>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>> >>> >> >> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> >> >> > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Wed Dec 3 12:30:27 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2014 20:30:27 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Barsalou's Grounded Cognition Theory In-Reply-To: References: <67F07A73-F9F6-408E-B45E-FFF20B5A64E2@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Larry, Almost every developmental theorist sees "the semiotic function" as a crucial aspect of a child's development, one that occurs at about 24 to 30 months of age. They differ, however, in what this 'function' consists in. For Piaget, it was the ability construct 'mental representations,' on which the child could carry out 'mental actions' and so move to a brand new level over and above the physical actions of the sensorimotor stage. As I read it, LSV was proposing that the semiotic function is the ability to understand that we live in a world full of *material* representations. Pictures, maps, signs, gestures, clothing... the list is endless. Central among these is language: the strings of sound vibrations that we generate with lungs, vocal cords, mouth, tongue and lips are material, and for a specific community they are representations. (Of the Peircian rather than the Saussurian kind, I would argue, but that's another matter). So I would locate the symbolic, once again, in the material. In what humans do with the material. Material representations are things that humans specialize in creating, and they open up possibilities beyond the here-&-now of concrete situations. But I'm not certain this really addresses your question!? Martin On Dec 3, 2014, at 10:52 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > Martin, > The example comes from an article he wrote, "The Hermeneutics of Symbols > and Philosophical Reflection" > I was actually using the imaginal symbol of *captivity* to point to the > more general relationship of the *literal* and the *beyond* which comes > into *being through the symbolic. > > The way these cultural historical symbols guide or orient *interpretive > communities* > Suzanne Kirschner wrote a book "the Religious and Romantic Roots of > Psychanalysis" which outlines the symbolic imaginal of "falling away AND > return" which she traces through Neo-Platonism, the Protestant mystical > tradition and moves through or in to psychoanalysis. > > It was Ricouer's general exploration of symbol [at this level or time scale > of situations the level that guides zeitgeists] that I was attempting to > weave together with *grounded cognition*. > If Ricouer and Kirschner are pointing to a *real* phenomena then the > relation of the *literal* and the *metaphorical* exploring *trans* > positioning opens up stituations or *events* to what Merleau Ponty calls > *excess* [the beyond] > It is this realm which I'm suggesting is a *gap* which metaphorical power > or force assists in coming into being through the imaginal. > I am speculating that to understand *cognition* as multimodal then this > time scale as a mode or path also guides our *quests* or questions. > In other words the questions as grounded in the literal but calling us > beyond the literal is the realm Ricouer and Kirschner are exploring. > > To situate Suzanne Kirscher, she co-authored the book "The sociocultural > Turn in Psychology* with Jack Martin. > Larry > > On Wed, Dec 3, 2014 at 5:09 AM, Martin John Packer > wrote: > >> Hi Larry, >> >> I've read a lot of Ricoeur, but he wrote faster than I can read so I >> haven't covered it all. This sounds like his book Symbolism and Evil? If >> so, it's one I didn't read... >> >> Martin >> >> On Dec 3, 2014, at 1:25 AM, Larry Purss wrote: >> >>> Martin, >>> Thank You for the article on Grounded theory that is exploring the >>> multimodal synthesis of perceptual, action, linguistic, and conceptual >>> phenomena. [his Perceptual Symbol System's or PSS theory]. On page 623 >>> Barsalou explores *memory theories* and says his Perceptual Symbol System >>> Theory shares similarities with Rubin's *Basic Systems Theory* >>> In Barsalou's words, >>> "Basic Systems Theory proposes that a complex memory contains many >>> multimodal components from vision, audition, action, space, affect, >>> language, etc., and that retrieving a memory involves simulating its >>> multimodal components together. >>> Rubin was articulating a more complex and richer form of memory which >>> includes autobiographical memory and oral history. >>> >>> On page 622 Barsalou articulates his PSS theory and indicates how >> grounded >>> cognition can implement symbolic functions naturally. He states, >>> >>> "Through the construct of simulators - corresponding roughly to concepts >>> and types in standard theories - PSS implements the standard symbolic >>> functions of type-token, binding, inference, productivity, recursion and >>> propositions." >>> >>> I am curious how you understand the relation of Barsalou's Perceptual >>> Symbol System theory of grounded cognition as it engages with another >>> complex aspect of the symbolic memory system which points to more >> expansive >>> notions of memory through historical time. Ricoeur has engaged deeply >> with >>> this more expansive symbolic memory. which he describes as a schema of >>> existence. As a concrete example he refers to the symbol of *captivity* >>> which trans*forms* an actual historical event such as the Jewish Egyptian >>> captivity and then the Babylonian captivity into a *schema of existence* >>> Ricouer conjectures that symbolism such as the schema of captivity >> precedes >>> reflection as a *guiding metaphor*. >>> It is this complex, multimodal aspect of memory that I was pointing to. >>> >>> Ricouer posits a relation between the *literal* and the *metaphoric* in >> the >>> power or force of the living symbol. He says in the analogous relation [A >>> is to B as C is to D] and these terms can be objective. BUT in symbolic >>> metaphor I cannot *objectivize* the analogous relation. By living in the >>> first *literal* meaning in this literal act I am drawn or carried >> *beyond* >>> this literal understanding [i.e. captivity] The symbolic *meaning* is >>> *constituted* IN AND THROUGH the literal *meaning*. >>> >>> I am not sure where to situate Ricouer's exploration of the symbolic >>> relation that *binds* literal *meaning* and symbolic *meaning*. As >>> another aspects of multimodal cognition can Ricouer's extension of >> *memory >>> systems* beyond autobiography and oral history be included in Barsalou's >>> PASS theory of grounded cognition? Would Barsalou situate Ricouer's >>> metaphorical understanding of symbolism as a simulation? >> >> >> From ablunden@mira.net Wed Dec 3 17:41:17 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Thu, 04 Dec 2014 12:41:17 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances In-Reply-To: <1682996975.4827904.1417607429293.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11144.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> References: <1682996975.4827904.1417607429293.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11144.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <547FBBBD.8050806@mira.net> Haydi, sometimes for my own health and that of the list I need to take a break. As to the question of whether the plank across the creek is an artefact. "Artefact" is meant to group together both tools and symbols, or rather things used as tools or symbols, so we cannot counterpose artefact to tool. An artefact can also be both a tool and a symbol, since the point is only ever its functional role in human actions, not its properties, and in this computer age, things can be playing both roles simultaneously. At a trivial level of course the plank is an artefact. A plank is a product of human art. But what is of interest is the psychological role of the plank, that is what interests us. A constellation of stars is not a product of human art strictly speaking, but because these constellations have been identified and their shape, position and significance passed on culturally for use in navigation and astrology, we have to say that the constellations and the heavenly bodies generally, insofar as they are known and identified by their place in culture, are artefacts; and they figure as mediating artefact-symbols in human actions. Reading the stars is a culturally-transmitted, learned activity. But what if we were talking about a tree which had accidentally fallen across the creek only the night before and was discovered by the walker for the first time? In crossing the creek using the fallen tree is the walker doing an artefact-mediated action? In my opinion, this is a question which can be resolved only by psychological investigation, not philosophy. A squirrel could run across the fallen tree just as much as a human, but does a human use the tree in just the same way as a squirrel? That is the question of interest. Or is the human being's knowledge of bridges and their function, and familiarity with stories about fallen trees and the use of timber in building all contributing to the decision to use the tree as a bridge and controlling the walker's action in playing Friar Tuck and Little John? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Haydi Zulfei wrote: > Hi > > First of all , so resentfully I wonder If I can demand Andy's return to the discussions !! No one can deny his great contributions to this Forum . > > Second , I might have been lost completely in your words , terms , premises , and compositional nuances and colourings of your script as native speakers , etc. > > > Third , because of obvious sensitivities towards ANL , I've altogether put him to one side ; otherwise , in this concrete example of Michael , the triad , activity , action , operation are boldly in view . > > > Fourth , I suppose LSV himself in two or three chapters of the "History of Higher Mental Functions" has provided full response to our inquiries . Andy , in time , sent the first two chapters to all . > > 1. He , after preliminary remarks , puts heavy emphasis on use of tools and work activity in the parentheses and in italic characters . He emphasizes that use of tool very naturally gets significant just within the work activity process . Without the work activity we cannot expect much of it . Then , as most of the time , he time and again references Marx and Engels so as to prove his claims . > > > 2. Mike is so and for good reasons enchanted in "rudiments" of culture phenomena (throwing dice and bones , knots , notches in the wood to remember speech) . Good for him and us all . Yes , Buridan's ass gets spoilt in its indecision But man through inventing stimulus-device gets to salvation . But the problem is how many times has Mike , our Boss and confirmed global figure no need for it to be documented , asked himself what went before that juncture of time for the man to become 'MAN' ?? At this moment we are with LSV and at a very critical point of time . No more return to 'culture' to prove 'culture' . LSV says the error for some is to recount the story of mental through mental while they should know that mental processes go parallel with 'social' processes . What I gather at this very point is that he expects us to infer that the 'our present man of some will' owes his man/ness and decisiveness to his previous work activity necessitating use of tools . It seems we cannot take the idea to the uterine because V focuses on use of tools for a baby of 6 or of 10-12 months of age . It seems , both phylogenetically and ontogenetically , that it's not the case that 'gestures' ' eye contacts' come of their own and because of the man/ness and for the tuning-up with the universe through sounds and hymns and angels , etc. Man worked for life , performed ups and downs , shook his extremeties (one pair of hand) , consumed ! collective yellings and gesturing (as concomitant of work) . V says we can distinguish independent history of natural processes and independent history of cultural development separately 'phylogenetically' but not ontogenetically . In ontology , nature and culture work simultaneously contrary to phylogenesis . One cannot with ease and comfort say whichone goes with whichone . > > > 3. Andy who is well aware of both CH and AT , on his sending of the four pages and then the said two chapters , disclosed a very important point neglected so far at the forum and that was the idea of the distinction between tool and sign so fruitfully and enormously discussed by V and the deep meaning that the simple diagram denoted . V says 'artifact' could be cheating and deceitful but no one cares ! They invariably use artifacts and through this , they ultimately remove 'material activity' from the domain altogether . V is everywhere clear with both 'cultural , ideal activity' and 'material activity' . Here is where quotes don't work . The one more return to the plus-thousand previous reflections . No loss really ! V , if necessary , prefers just 'mediation' . > > 4. With these in mind , I say for certain that here the plank is a tool not an 'artifact' because it is not a sign signaling any other genuine thing . It's all to itself . Also the light switch . And the whole activity is a material one . Life put it in the way . According to V sign activity affects one's own societal individual behaviour . We cannot generalize its effect to the border of transforming Nature . Man through speech , dialogue , discourse , talk , genre , etc. decides for the change in personal behaviour ; if this potential preparedness for individual behavioral change gets fossilized or ossified , then man will not reach the threshhold of the bigger act and the vast field of the Mother Universe with its motley rich material phenomena out of which each time he can select an object for a circle of activity : starting an activity with a probable cryptic 'motive' (what we don't yet know about which took him to the point of crossing) , with a conscious goal (reaching the other side) through a concrete action (crossing) operating according to the conditions at hand and on the ground (light switching , wrestling between the ideal and the material (object , subject , that is , thinking ideally about what to do with the whole thing and the plank , then observing with the help of the light acting on the object , again back to thinking if flaws are observed , etc. etc. no blending of objective and subjective whatsoever . And I wonder why taking affordance for a tool . > > > Soooooooooo much for one post . > > I considered spaces but wonder if it works . > I'll also be very quiet and slow in replying ! > > Best > > Haydi > > > > > > > > From: mike cole > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Sent: Tuesday, 2 December 2014, 11:26:46 > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances > > My view? > The plank is for certain an artifact, no less than the light bulb. On what > grounds, or under what circumstances, would you classify it otherwise? > What's gained, what's lost? > mike > > > On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Glassman, Michael > wrote: > > >> Hi Annalisa, Mike, Huw >> >> I tend to be somebody who reacts better to concrete examples than >> definitions. I believe this also comes from Gibson's 1977 book, >> >> You are walking across a field and come to a stream which you can to get >> across. You notice a plank across the stream. It is wide enough for you >> to keep your balance and thick enough to hold your weight, in using it you >> recognize its affordance as a crossing point. It is the intersection of >> the movement, the perception of the plank, short term goal of the activity >> (getting across the stream) - the recognition of the affordance comes in >> the subjective use of the object (which is why it is neither subjective or >> objective). It is also important that you have the abilities (the correct >> weight, the balance) to recognize the affordance, otherwise you pass the >> plank by. >> >> As far as perceived affordance. I think I have this right - the perceived >> is not in the person who recognizes the affordance (otherwise you are >> right, that is wet water) it is whether there is an intention in the design >> of the object. So I create a light switch with the intention of designing >> it as having a perceived affordance for somebody who wants to switch on a >> light. As you can see different from the relationship to the plank, where >> there is no prior design. >> >> Here is my question (perhaps answered in the Engestrom paper) >> >> The light switch is certainly an artifact, but is the plank? >> >> Michael >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 1:19 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances >> >> Those definitions help a lot Annalisa and touch on the fact that gibson >> seemed to empty the organism (if one were so inclined to interpret him) and >> he dismissed culutral mediation as secondary at best. Still, they share the >> idea that a part of the structure that psychologist theorize as a located >> inside of individual crania is in fact "our there" in the phylgenetically >> and cultural-historically constitued environment. And that drove cognitive >> psychologists, our co discussants, nuts. Until, "they got it" and then >> sought to mold it to their own ends and pre-existing means. >> mike >> >> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 9:59 AM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >> >>> I thought I'd do the honors and start a new thread on affordances, which >>> isn't related to Larry's discussion of basic images. >>> >>> I figured as well to offer Gibson's words on affordances since it is a >>> word he invented to describe something he saw in the world. Of course the >>> life of affordances has been full of controversy, especially with regard >>> >> to >> >>> understanding what they are. >>> >>> Gibson's Affordances is a theory I find instrumental to connecting >>> >> outside >> >>> to inside experiences and I intuit that it is related to perezhivanie in >>> some fashion. >>> >>> After reading the wikipage more closely, I regret offering a link to the >>> text there because it isn't very clear what Gibson means or what Norman >>> means. To me, a "perceived affordance" is like saying "wet water." >>> >>> In any case, here are 3 quotes of Gibson in his own words, that I could >>> find: >>> >>> The affordances of the environment are what it _offers_ the animal, what >>> it _provides_ or _furnishes_, either for good or ill. The verb "to >>> >> afford" >> >>> is found in the dictionary, the noun "affordance" is not. I have made it >>> up. I mean by it something that refers both to the environment and the >>> animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies the >>> >> complementarity >> >>> of the animal and the environment (Gibson, 1977/1986). >>> >>> and >>> >>> What is meant by an _affordance_? ?Subject to revision, I suggest that >>> >> the >> >>> affordance of anything is a specific combination of the properties of its >>> substance and its surfaces taken with reference to an animal. The >>> >> reference >> >>> may be to an animal as distinguished from other species (Gibson, >>> >> 1977/1986). >> >>> and >>> >>> An important fact about affordances of the environment is that they are >>> >> in >> >>> a sense objective, real, and physical, unlike values and meanings, which >>> are often supposed to be subjective, phenomenal, and mental. But >>> >> actually, >> >>> an affordance is neither an objective property nor a subjective property; >>> or it is both if you like. An affordance cuts across the dichotomy of >>> subjective-objective and helps us to understand its inadequacy. It is >>> equally a fact of the environment and a fact of behavior. It is both >>> physical and psychical, yet neither. An affordance points both ways, to >>> >> the >> >>> environment and to the observer (Gibson, 1977/1986). >>> >>> These quotes are important to keep in mind, I hope they help. >>> >>> I might also suggest looking at Mace(1977) who described very carefully >>> how Gibson got from stimuli to affordance, given that people on this list >>> value history, learning, and development. >>> >>> Kind regards, >>> >>> Annalisa >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> on behalf of Huw Lloyd >>> Sent: Tuesday, December 2, 2014 10:35 AM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>> >>> I'd take a look. >>> >>> Michael, utility or technical affordance might fit. My equivalent of >>> >> your >> >>> perceived/discovered distinction is one of planned and technically >>> manifest. >>> >>> Huw >>> >>> >>> On 2 December 2014 at 16:44, Glassman, Michael >>> wrote: >>> >>> >>>> I'd be interested in anybody else is. >>>> >>>> Michael >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >> ] >> >>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 11:39 AM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>> >>>> Interloper, Michael? >>>> >>>> The discussions at UCSD preceeding Don's use of affordances and >>>> >> cognitive >> >>>> artifacts were accompanied by other, related papers. One by Engestrom >>>> >> on >> >>>> "when is an artifact" and one or more by Ed Hutchins. If people are >>>> interested in pursuing this thread/topic the materials could be >>>> >> gathered >> >>>> up. >>>> >>>> mike >>>> >>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Glassman, Michael >>> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea). He >>>>> actually cops to both of them. The first was not to distinguish >>>>> >>> between >>> >>>>> affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which are >>>>> designed. I think this is related to the issue of artifacts. >>>>> >> Meaning >> >>>> are >>>> >>>>> artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to be >>>>> discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong word, >>>>> >> if >> >>>>> anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances. It is a >>>>> >>>> complex >>>> >>>>> question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes based >>>>> >> on >> >>>>> context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one >>>>> >> context >> >>>> may >>>> >>>>> result in organic affordances in another context. >>>>> >>>>> The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is that >>>>> >> he >> >>>> was >>>> >>>>> not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and >>>>> >>>> constraints. >>>> >>>>> Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived affordances or >>>>> >>> are >>> >>>>> they designed to create constraints. >>>>> >>>>> Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the >>>>> >>> mention >>> >>>>> just spurred me to throw this up. Hope I'm not being too much of an >>>>> interloper. >>>>> >>>>> Michael >>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ >>>>> >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >>> ] >>> >>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>> >>>>> Annalisa- >>>>> >>>>> I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation >>>>> >> not >> >>>>> discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of >>>>> affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set against >>>>> Gibson's ideas. The change of views coincided with the advent of the >>>>> >>>> d-cog >>>> >>>>> idea which also has deep roots in chat. >>>>> >>>>> No hidden history i know of, but interesting connections among the >>>>> >>>> notion >>>> >>>>> of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion of >>>>> >>> these >>> >>>>> connections can be found, among other places, in >>>>> >>>>> Cole, M. & Engestr?m, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach to >>>>> distributed* >>>>> *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition: >>>>> >> Psychological >> >>>> and >>>> >>>>> educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press. >>>>> >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar >>>>> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>>> Hi Mike, >>>>>> >>>>>> It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied >>>>>> >> that >> >>>>> wish! >>>>> >>>>>> Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important connections. >>>>>> >> I >> >>>> was >>>> >>>>>> not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I learned >>>>>> >>>> about >>>> >>>>>> Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science >>>>>> >> (1985). >> >>>>>> Is there some history that is not part of the common story? >>>>>> >>>>>> I looked here for clarity: >>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance >>>>>> >>>>>> Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to >>>>>> >>>> cognitive >>>> >>>>>> artifacts? >>>>>> >>>>>> There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in >>>>>> >> play, >> >>>> and >>>> >>>>>> even joy! >>>>>> >>>>>> When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however >>>>>> >> until >> >>>> then >>>> >>>>>> I will remain with the ineffable. >>>>>> >>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>> >>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>> >>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>>>>> on behalf of mike cole >>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>> >>>>>> The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And, >>>>>> co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive >>>>>> >>>> artifacts >>>> >>>>>> right about that time at UCSD. If it were possible to find a >>>>>> >> source >> >>>> that >>>> >>>>>> makes these connections visible and available to read about it >>>>>> >> might >> >>>> be a >>>> >>>>>> step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of >>>>>> >>> intro >>> >>>>> for >>>>> >>>>>> newcomers to the discussion. >>>>>> >>>>>> I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a >>>>>> >>>> newcomer's >>>> >>>>>> introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is seeking >>>>>> >>> to >>> >>>>> sort >>>>> >>>>>> out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am >>>>>> >>>>> insuficiently >>>>> >>>>>> read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted! >>>>>> >>>>>> A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many >>>>>> >>> rocks, >>> >>>> so >>>> >>>>>> little time"! >>>>>> >>>>>> Mike >>>>>> >>>>>> A >>>>>> >>>>>> On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar >>>>>> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>>>> Martin! >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental >>>>>>> >>> representation" >>> >>>> is >>>> >>>>>>> coming closer! >>>>>>> >>>>>>> For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's >>>>>>> >>> theory >>> >>>> of >>>> >>>>>>> affordances. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed >>>>>>> >> article. >> >>>> But >>>> >>>>> I >>>>> >>>>>>> wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is >>>>>>> >>>>> important >>>>> >>>>>>> not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a >>>>>>> >>>> grenade >>>> >>>>>>> pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the >>>>>>> >> list. >> >>>> If >>>> >>>>>> you >>>>>> >>>>>>> can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look >>>>>>> >> forward >> >>> to >>> >>>>>> your >>>>>> >>>>>>> reply, Martin. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that being >>>>>>> >>> at >>> >>>>> UCSD >>>>> >>>>>>> and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that >>>>>>> >>> influences >>> >>>>> your >>>>> >>>>>>> position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find >>>>>>> >>>>> community >>>>> >>>>>> in >>>>>> >>>>>>> it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more voluntary >>>>>>> >>>>> phrased >>>>> >>>>>>> that way). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of >>>>>>> >>> Martin >>> >>>>> John >>>>> >>>>>>> Packer > >>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM >>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> An interesting article, David. One way in which it is >>>>>>> >> interesting, >> >>> to >>> >>>>> me >>>>> >>>>>>> at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used, >>>>>>> >>>> even >>>> >>>>>>> once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images >>>>>>> >> in >> >>>> the >>>> >>>>>>> world around us - material representations - and he tries to >>>>>>> >> define >> >>>> the >>>> >>>>>>> "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg >>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Larry, Annalisa: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" >>>>>>>> >> when >> >>>> we >>>> >>>>>>>> met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of >>>>>>>> >>>>> anything >>>>> >>>>>>>> except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe >>>>>>>> >>> available >>> >>>>>>>> for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember >>>>>>>> whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the >>>>>>>> beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a >>>>>>>> non-image based mental representation. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations >>>>>>>> >>> are >>> >>>>>>>> images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. >>>>>>>> >>> In >>> >>>>>>>> fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against >>>>>>>> >>>>> Titchener >>>>> >>>>>>>> and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, >>>>>>>> everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated >>>>>>>> >> that >> >>>>>>>> many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically >>>>>>>> >>>> anterior >>>> >>>>>>>> to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would >>>>>>>> >> not >> >>>> have >>>> >>>>>>>> time or ability to process complex problems in real time. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are >>>>>>>> genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more >>>>>>>> >>>> reading >>>> >>>>>>>> to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than >>>>>>>> >> I >> >>> am >>> >>>>>>>> (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels >>>>>>>> >> like >> >>>>>>>> she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do >>>>>>>> >> NOT >> >>>> read >>>> >>>>>>>> this article--instead, look at Figure 11. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure >>>>>>>> >> of >> >>>>>>>> Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any >>>>>>>> >>> actual >>> >>>>>>>> images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural >>>>>>>> >>>>> experience >>>>> >>>>>>>> associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then >>>>>>>> >>> deliberately >>> >>>>>>>> frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any >>>>>>>> recognizable figures upon which to focus. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine Chapel >>>>>>>> >>>> fresco >>>> >>>>>>>> for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He >>>>>>>> >> or >> >>>> she >>>> >>>>>>>> can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting >>>>>>>> >>> and >>> >>>>>>>> wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not >>>>>>>> >>> notice >>> >>>>>>>> the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in >>>>>>>> >>> it. >>> >>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar < >>>>>>>> >> annalisa@unm.edu >> >>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Hi Larry and David, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are >>>>>>>>> >> at >> >>>> the >>>> >>>>>>> root of all thinking. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, >>>>>>>>> >> based >> >>>> upon >>>> >>>>>>> previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in >>>>>>> combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a >>>>>>> >>> phrase >>> >>>> I >>>> >>>>>> like >>>>>> >>>>>>> a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it >>>>>>> >>> by >>> >>>>> the >>>>> >>>>>>> same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as >>>>>>>>> >>>>> Hackett >>>>> >>>>>>> describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have >>>>>>> >> you >> >>>>>> already >>>>>> >>>>>>> given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be >>>>>>> >>> willing >>> >>>>> to >>>>> >>>>>>> take a look. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is >>>>>>>>> >>>>> controversial. >>>>> >>>>>>> It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone >>>>>>> >>> says >>> >>>>>> "this >>>>>> >>>>>>> is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble >>>>>>> >>>>> observation. >>>>> >>>>>>>>> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever >>>>>>>>> >>>> that >>>> >>>>>>> process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at >>>>>>> >>> hand? >>> >>>>>> Just a >>>>>> >>>>>>> thought. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> What is it that appeals to you about this model, >>>>>>>>> >> metaphoricity? >> >>>>>>>>> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of >>>>>>> >> Larry >> >>>>>> Purss < >>>>>> >>>>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com > >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM >>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity >>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> David K >>>>>>>>> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. >>>>>>>>> >> My >> >>>>> reason >>>>> >>>>>>> for >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> exploring these authors is I have been following a path >>>>>>>>> >>> pursuing a >>> >>>>>> basic >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> question. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic >>>>>>>>> >>>> guiding >>>> >>>>>>> images >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> upon which thinking rests" >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring >>>>>>>>> >>> appearances >>> >>>>> and >>>>> >>>>>>>>> illusions was also exploring this theme. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new >>>>>>>>> >>> phenomenological >>> >>>>>> path >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names >>>>>>>>> >>> this >>> >>>>>>> process >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> *metaphoricity*. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible >>>>>>>>> >>>> image-character >>>> >>>>>> of >>>>>> >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> *spontaneous event* of meaning. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> brackets - >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> AND >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* >>>>>>>>> >> finds >> >>>> the >>>> >>>>>>>>> meaning of its very self. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this >>>>>>>>> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> metaphor >>>>>> >>>>>>> can >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated >>>>>>>>> >>> in >>> >>>>>>>>> *objectivity* >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of >>>>>>>>> >>> itself >>> >>>>>> *in* >>>>>> >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> mode [path] of the concept >>>>>>>>> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding >>>>>>>>> >>> images >>> >>>>> has >>>>> >>>>>>> been >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> established. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the >>>>>>>>> >> path >> >>> of >>> >>>>>>>>> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived >>>>>>>>> >>>> from >>>> >>>>>> the >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> image-character of the guiding image. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial >>>>>>>>> >> this >> >>>>> topic >>>>> >>>>>>> may >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> become [again] >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this >>>>>>>>> >>>> basic >>>> >>>>>>>>> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these >>>>>>>>> >>> images >>> >>>> as >>>> >>>>>>>>> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images >>>>>>>>> >> emerge >> >>>>>>>>> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is >>>>>>>>> >>> transcendental] >>> >>>>> and >>>>> >>>>>>> is >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. >>>>>>>>> >> It >> >>>>> seems >>>>> >>>>>> to >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I also realize this question may already be answered in >>>>>>>>> >>> Vygotsky's >>> >>>>>>> writings >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of >>>>>>>>> >>> XMCA. I >>> >>>>>>>>> personally am following this path for now. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>>>>> >>> an >>> >>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>>>> >> an >> >>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> -- >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> >> >> > > > From annalisa@unm.edu Wed Dec 3 18:26:02 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2014 02:26:02 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances In-Reply-To: <547FBBBD.8050806@mira.net> References: <1682996975.4827904.1417607429293.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11144.mail.ir2.yahoo.com>, <547FBBBD.8050806@mira.net> Message-ID: <1417659964000.86913@unm.edu> Hi Andy, Very eloquently put. I need to do a closer reading of the thread on affordances, it's been a busy day, but I wonder if the assignment of affordances to the environment and the assignment of artefacts to the human mind is the way to think about this. Believe it or not, I'm not attempting to be antagonistic here. I think it is the topic that possesses a sticky affordance rather than the people involved speaking about it. Certainly Gibson himself suffered in trying to explain what an affordance was, and this was to people much more hostile in temperament than on this list. :) Unless the affordance/artefact construct is about layers and direction of movement perhaps? Points of genesis? Still, I feel more at ease with the idea of the affordance pertaining to the environment and the subject in the way that there is no dichotomy. I could see that an artefact could arise in response within an individual to an affordance, but not as a distinct "side" of the interaction(objective vs subjective), but rather more of a prompted response, because the artefact is the sense-meaning part of the interaction, and an affordance is something somewhat passive, because if proffers an opportunity. Thinking about it this way, I'd say the plank is both an affordance and an artefact at the same time. Can one have an artefact present without an affordance? and... can one have an affordance present without an artefact? And when both are present how do they relate? These are questions that may tease things apart, perhaps. Such is how it is for me. :) Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden Sent: Wednesday, December 3, 2014 6:41 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances Haydi, sometimes for my own health and that of the list I need to take a break. As to the question of whether the plank across the creek is an artefact. "Artefact" is meant to group together both tools and symbols, or rather things used as tools or symbols, so we cannot counterpose artefact to tool. An artefact can also be both a tool and a symbol, since the point is only ever its functional role in human actions, not its properties, and in this computer age, things can be playing both roles simultaneously. At a trivial level of course the plank is an artefact. A plank is a product of human art. But what is of interest is the psychological role of the plank, that is what interests us. A constellation of stars is not a product of human art strictly speaking, but because these constellations have been identified and their shape, position and significance passed on culturally for use in navigation and astrology, we have to say that the constellations and the heavenly bodies generally, insofar as they are known and identified by their place in culture, are artefacts; and they figure as mediating artefact-symbols in human actions. Reading the stars is a culturally-transmitted, learned activity. But what if we were talking about a tree which had accidentally fallen across the creek only the night before and was discovered by the walker for the first time? In crossing the creek using the fallen tree is the walker doing an artefact-mediated action? In my opinion, this is a question which can be resolved only by psychological investigation, not philosophy. A squirrel could run across the fallen tree just as much as a human, but does a human use the tree in just the same way as a squirrel? That is the question of interest. Or is the human being's knowledge of bridges and their function, and familiarity with stories about fallen trees and the use of timber in building all contributing to the decision to use the tree as a bridge and controlling the walker's action in playing Friar Tuck and Little John? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Haydi Zulfei wrote: > Hi > > First of all , so resentfully I wonder If I can demand Andy's return to the discussions !! No one can deny his great contributions to this Forum . > > Second , I might have been lost completely in your words , terms , premises , and compositional nuances and colourings of your script as native speakers , etc. > > > Third , because of obvious sensitivities towards ANL , I've altogether put him to one side ; otherwise , in this concrete example of Michael , the triad , activity , action , operation are boldly in view . > > > Fourth , I suppose LSV himself in two or three chapters of the "History of Higher Mental Functions" has provided full response to our inquiries . Andy , in time , sent the first two chapters to all . > > 1. He , after preliminary remarks , puts heavy emphasis on use of tools and work activity in the parentheses and in italic characters . He emphasizes that use of tool very naturally gets significant just within the work activity process . Without the work activity we cannot expect much of it . Then , as most of the time , he time and again references Marx and Engels so as to prove his claims . > > > 2. Mike is so and for good reasons enchanted in "rudiments" of culture phenomena (throwing dice and bones , knots , notches in the wood to remember speech) . Good for him and us all . Yes , Buridan's ass gets spoilt in its indecision But man through inventing stimulus-device gets to salvation . But the problem is how many times has Mike , our Boss and confirmed global figure no need for it to be documented , asked himself what went before that juncture of time for the man to become 'MAN' ?? At this moment we are with LSV and at a very critical point of time . No more return to 'culture' to prove 'culture' . LSV says the error for some is to recount the story of mental through mental while they should know that mental processes go parallel with 'social' processes . What I gather at this very point is that he expects us to infer that the 'our present man of some will' owes his man/ness and decisiveness to his previous work activity necessitating use of tools . It seems we can not take the idea to the uterine because V focuses on use of tools for a baby of 6 or of 10-12 months of age . It seems , both phylogenetically and ontogenetically , that it's not the case that 'gestures' ' eye contacts' come of their own and because of the man/ness and for the tuning-up with the universe through sounds and hymns and angels , etc. Man worked for life , performed ups and downs , shook his extremeties (one pair of hand) , consumed ! collective yellings and gesturing (as concomitant of work) . V says we can distinguish independent history of natural processes and independent history of cultural development separately 'phylogenetically' but not ontogenetically . In ontology , nature and culture work simultaneously contrary to phylogenesis . One cannot with ease and comfort say whichone goes with whichone . > > > 3. Andy who is well aware of both CH and AT , on his sending of the four pages and then the said two chapters , disclosed a very important point neglected so far at the forum and that was the idea of the distinction between tool and sign so fruitfully and enormously discussed by V and the deep meaning that the simple diagram denoted . V says 'artifact' could be cheating and deceitful but no one cares ! They invariably use artifacts and through this , they ultimately remove 'material activity' from the domain altogether . V is everywhere clear with both 'cultural , ideal activity' and 'material activity' . Here is where quotes don't work . The one more return to the plus-thousand previous reflections . No loss really ! V , if necessary , prefers just 'mediation' . > > 4. With these in mind , I say for certain that here the plank is a tool not an 'artifact' because it is not a sign signaling any other genuine thing . It's all to itself . Also the light switch . And the whole activity is a material one . Life put it in the way . According to V sign activity affects one's own societal individual behaviour . We cannot generalize its effect to the border of transforming Nature . Man through speech , dialogue , discourse , talk , genre , etc. decides for the change in personal behaviour ; if this potential preparedness for individual behavioral change gets fossilized or ossified , then man will not reach the threshhold of the bigger act and the vast field of the Mother Universe with its motley rich material phenomena out of which each time he can select an object for a circle of activity : starting an activity with a probable cryptic 'motive' (what we don't yet know about which took him to the point of crossing) , with a conscious goal (reachi ng the other side) through a concrete action (crossing) operating according to the conditions at hand and on the ground (light switching , wrestling between the ideal and the material (object , subject , that is , thinking ideally about what to do with the whole thing and the plank , then observing with the help of the light acting on the object , again back to thinking if flaws are observed , etc. etc. no blending of objective and subjective whatsoever . And I wonder why taking affordance for a tool . > > > Soooooooooo much for one post . > > I considered spaces but wonder if it works . > I'll also be very quiet and slow in replying ! > > Best > > Haydi > > > > > > > > From: mike cole > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Sent: Tuesday, 2 December 2014, 11:26:46 > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances > > My view? > The plank is for certain an artifact, no less than the light bulb. On what > grounds, or under what circumstances, would you classify it otherwise? > What's gained, what's lost? > mike > > > On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Glassman, Michael > wrote: > > >> Hi Annalisa, Mike, Huw >> >> I tend to be somebody who reacts better to concrete examples than >> definitions. I believe this also comes from Gibson's 1977 book, >> >> You are walking across a field and come to a stream which you can to get >> across. You notice a plank across the stream. It is wide enough for you >> to keep your balance and thick enough to hold your weight, in using it you >> recognize its affordance as a crossing point. It is the intersection of >> the movement, the perception of the plank, short term goal of the activity >> (getting across the stream) - the recognition of the affordance comes in >> the subjective use of the object (which is why it is neither subjective or >> objective). It is also important that you have the abilities (the correct >> weight, the balance) to recognize the affordance, otherwise you pass the >> plank by. >> >> As far as perceived affordance. I think I have this right - the perceived >> is not in the person who recognizes the affordance (otherwise you are >> right, that is wet water) it is whether there is an intention in the design >> of the object. So I create a light switch with the intention of designing >> it as having a perceived affordance for somebody who wants to switch on a >> light. As you can see different from the relationship to the plank, where >> there is no prior design. >> >> Here is my question (perhaps answered in the Engestrom paper) >> >> The light switch is certainly an artifact, but is the plank? >> >> Michael >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 1:19 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances >> >> Those definitions help a lot Annalisa and touch on the fact that gibson >> seemed to empty the organism (if one were so inclined to interpret him) and >> he dismissed culutral mediation as secondary at best. Still, they share the >> idea that a part of the structure that psychologist theorize as a located >> inside of individual crania is in fact "our there" in the phylgenetically >> and cultural-historically constitued environment. And that drove cognitive >> psychologists, our co discussants, nuts. Until, "they got it" and then >> sought to mold it to their own ends and pre-existing means. >> mike >> >> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 9:59 AM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >> >>> I thought I'd do the honors and start a new thread on affordances, which >>> isn't related to Larry's discussion of basic images. >>> >>> I figured as well to offer Gibson's words on affordances since it is a >>> word he invented to describe something he saw in the world. Of course the >>> life of affordances has been full of controversy, especially with regard >>> >> to >> >>> understanding what they are. >>> >>> Gibson's Affordances is a theory I find instrumental to connecting >>> >> outside >> >>> to inside experiences and I intuit that it is related to perezhivanie in >>> some fashion. >>> >>> After reading the wikipage more closely, I regret offering a link to the >>> text there because it isn't very clear what Gibson means or what Norman >>> means. To me, a "perceived affordance" is like saying "wet water." >>> >>> In any case, here are 3 quotes of Gibson in his own words, that I could >>> find: >>> >>> The affordances of the environment are what it _offers_ the animal, what >>> it _provides_ or _furnishes_, either for good or ill. The verb "to >>> >> afford" >> >>> is found in the dictionary, the noun "affordance" is not. I have made it >>> up. I mean by it something that refers both to the environment and the >>> animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies the >>> >> complementarity >> >>> of the animal and the environment (Gibson, 1977/1986). >>> >>> and >>> >>> What is meant by an _affordance_? ?Subject to revision, I suggest that >>> >> the >> >>> affordance of anything is a specific combination of the properties of its >>> substance and its surfaces taken with reference to an animal. The >>> >> reference >> >>> may be to an animal as distinguished from other species (Gibson, >>> >> 1977/1986). >> >>> and >>> >>> An important fact about affordances of the environment is that they are >>> >> in >> >>> a sense objective, real, and physical, unlike values and meanings, which >>> are often supposed to be subjective, phenomenal, and mental. But >>> >> actually, >> >>> an affordance is neither an objective property nor a subjective property; >>> or it is both if you like. An affordance cuts across the dichotomy of >>> subjective-objective and helps us to understand its inadequacy. It is >>> equally a fact of the environment and a fact of behavior. It is both >>> physical and psychical, yet neither. An affordance points both ways, to >>> >> the >> >>> environment and to the observer (Gibson, 1977/1986). >>> >>> These quotes are important to keep in mind, I hope they help. >>> >>> I might also suggest looking at Mace(1977) who described very carefully >>> how Gibson got from stimuli to affordance, given that people on this list >>> value history, learning, and development. >>> >>> Kind regards, >>> >>> Annalisa >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> on behalf of Huw Lloyd >>> Sent: Tuesday, December 2, 2014 10:35 AM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>> >>> I'd take a look. >>> >>> Michael, utility or technical affordance might fit. My equivalent of >>> >> your >> >>> perceived/discovered distinction is one of planned and technically >>> manifest. >>> >>> Huw >>> >>> >>> On 2 December 2014 at 16:44, Glassman, Michael >>> wrote: >>> >>> >>>> I'd be interested in anybody else is. >>>> >>>> Michael >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >> ] >> >>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 11:39 AM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>> >>>> Interloper, Michael? >>>> >>>> The discussions at UCSD preceeding Don's use of affordances and >>>> >> cognitive >> >>>> artifacts were accompanied by other, related papers. One by Engestrom >>>> >> on >> >>>> "when is an artifact" and one or more by Ed Hutchins. If people are >>>> interested in pursuing this thread/topic the materials could be >>>> >> gathered >> >>>> up. >>>> >>>> mike >>>> >>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Glassman, Michael >>> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea). He >>>>> actually cops to both of them. The first was not to distinguish >>>>> >>> between >>> >>>>> affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which are >>>>> designed. I think this is related to the issue of artifacts. >>>>> >> Meaning >> >>>> are >>>> >>>>> artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to be >>>>> discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong word, >>>>> >> if >> >>>>> anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances. It is a >>>>> >>>> complex >>>> >>>>> question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes based >>>>> >> on >> >>>>> context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one >>>>> >> context >> >>>> may >>>> >>>>> result in organic affordances in another context. >>>>> >>>>> The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is that >>>>> >> he >> >>>> was >>>> >>>>> not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and >>>>> >>>> constraints. >>>> >>>>> Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived affordances or >>>>> >>> are >>> >>>>> they designed to create constraints. >>>>> >>>>> Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the >>>>> >>> mention >>> >>>>> just spurred me to throw this up. Hope I'm not being too much of an >>>>> interloper. >>>>> >>>>> Michael >>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ >>>>> >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >>> ] >>> >>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>> >>>>> Annalisa- >>>>> >>>>> I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation >>>>> >> not >> >>>>> discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of >>>>> affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set against >>>>> Gibson's ideas. The change of views coincided with the advent of the >>>>> >>>> d-cog >>>> >>>>> idea which also has deep roots in chat. >>>>> >>>>> No hidden history i know of, but interesting connections among the >>>>> >>>> notion >>>> >>>>> of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion of >>>>> >>> these >>> >>>>> connections can be found, among other places, in >>>>> >>>>> Cole, M. & Engestr?m, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach to >>>>> distributed* >>>>> *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition: >>>>> >> Psychological >> >>>> and >>>> >>>>> educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press. >>>>> >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar >>>>> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>>> Hi Mike, >>>>>> >>>>>> It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied >>>>>> >> that >> >>>>> wish! >>>>> >>>>>> Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important connections. >>>>>> >> I >> >>>> was >>>> >>>>>> not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I learned >>>>>> >>>> about >>>> >>>>>> Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science >>>>>> >> (1985). >> >>>>>> Is there some history that is not part of the common story? >>>>>> >>>>>> I looked here for clarity: >>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance >>>>>> >>>>>> Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to >>>>>> >>>> cognitive >>>> >>>>>> artifacts? >>>>>> >>>>>> There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in >>>>>> >> play, >> >>>> and >>>> >>>>>> even joy! >>>>>> >>>>>> When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however >>>>>> >> until >> >>>> then >>>> >>>>>> I will remain with the ineffable. >>>>>> >>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>> >>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>> >>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>>>>> on behalf of mike cole >>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>> >>>>>> The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And, >>>>>> co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive >>>>>> >>>> artifacts >>>> >>>>>> right about that time at UCSD. If it were possible to find a >>>>>> >> source >> >>>> that >>>> >>>>>> makes these connections visible and available to read about it >>>>>> >> might >> >>>> be a >>>> >>>>>> step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of >>>>>> >>> intro >>> >>>>> for >>>>> >>>>>> newcomers to the discussion. >>>>>> >>>>>> I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a >>>>>> >>>> newcomer's >>>> >>>>>> introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is seeking >>>>>> >>> to >>> >>>>> sort >>>>> >>>>>> out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am >>>>>> >>>>> insuficiently >>>>> >>>>>> read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted! >>>>>> >>>>>> A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many >>>>>> >>> rocks, >>> >>>> so >>>> >>>>>> little time"! >>>>>> >>>>>> Mike >>>>>> >>>>>> A >>>>>> >>>>>> On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar >>>>>> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>>>> Martin! >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental >>>>>>> >>> representation" >>> >>>> is >>>> >>>>>>> coming closer! >>>>>>> >>>>>>> For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's >>>>>>> >>> theory >>> >>>> of >>>> >>>>>>> affordances. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed >>>>>>> >> article. >> >>>> But >>>> >>>>> I >>>>> >>>>>>> wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is >>>>>>> >>>>> important >>>>> >>>>>>> not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a >>>>>>> >>>> grenade >>>> >>>>>>> pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the >>>>>>> >> list. >> >>>> If >>>> >>>>>> you >>>>>> >>>>>>> can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look >>>>>>> >> forward >> >>> to >>> >>>>>> your >>>>>> >>>>>>> reply, Martin. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that being >>>>>>> >>> at >>> >>>>> UCSD >>>>> >>>>>>> and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that >>>>>>> >>> influences >>> >>>>> your >>>>> >>>>>>> position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find >>>>>>> >>>>> community >>>>> >>>>>> in >>>>>> >>>>>>> it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more voluntary >>>>>>> >>>>> phrased >>>>> >>>>>>> that way). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of >>>>>>> >>> Martin >>> >>>>> John >>>>> >>>>>>> Packer > >>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM >>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> An interesting article, David. One way in which it is >>>>>>> >> interesting, >> >>> to >>> >>>>> me >>>>> >>>>>>> at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used, >>>>>>> >>>> even >>>> >>>>>>> once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images >>>>>>> >> in >> >>>> the >>>> >>>>>>> world around us - material representations - and he tries to >>>>>>> >> define >> >>>> the >>>> >>>>>>> "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg >>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Larry, Annalisa: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" >>>>>>>> >> when >> >>>> we >>>> >>>>>>>> met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of >>>>>>>> >>>>> anything >>>>> >>>>>>>> except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe >>>>>>>> >>> available >>> >>>>>>>> for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember >>>>>>>> whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the >>>>>>>> beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a >>>>>>>> non-image based mental representation. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations >>>>>>>> >>> are >>> >>>>>>>> images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. >>>>>>>> >>> In >>> >>>>>>>> fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against >>>>>>>> >>>>> Titchener >>>>> >>>>>>>> and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, >>>>>>>> everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated >>>>>>>> >> that >> >>>>>>>> many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically >>>>>>>> >>>> anterior >>>> >>>>>>>> to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would >>>>>>>> >> not >> >>>> have >>>> >>>>>>>> time or ability to process complex problems in real time. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are >>>>>>>> genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more >>>>>>>> >>>> reading >>>> >>>>>>>> to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than >>>>>>>> >> I >> >>> am >>> >>>>>>>> (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels >>>>>>>> >> like >> >>>>>>>> she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do >>>>>>>> >> NOT >> >>>> read >>>> >>>>>>>> this article--instead, look at Figure 11. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure >>>>>>>> >> of >> >>>>>>>> Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any >>>>>>>> >>> actual >>> >>>>>>>> images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural >>>>>>>> >>>>> experience >>>>> >>>>>>>> associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then >>>>>>>> >>> deliberately >>> >>>>>>>> frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any >>>>>>>> recognizable figures upon which to focus. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine Chapel >>>>>>>> >>>> fresco >>>> >>>>>>>> for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He >>>>>>>> >> or >> >>>> she >>>> >>>>>>>> can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting >>>>>>>> >>> and >>> >>>>>>>> wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not >>>>>>>> >>> notice >>> >>>>>>>> the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in >>>>>>>> >>> it. >>> >>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar < >>>>>>>> >> annalisa@unm.edu >> >>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Hi Larry and David, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are >>>>>>>>> >> at >> >>>> the >>>> >>>>>>> root of all thinking. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, >>>>>>>>> >> based >> >>>> upon >>>> >>>>>>> previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in >>>>>>> combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a >>>>>>> >>> phrase >>> >>>> I >>>> >>>>>> like >>>>>> >>>>>>> a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it >>>>>>> >>> by >>> >>>>> the >>>>> >>>>>>> same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as >>>>>>>>> >>>>> Hackett >>>>> >>>>>>> describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have >>>>>>> >> you >> >>>>>> already >>>>>> >>>>>>> given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be >>>>>>> >>> willing >>> >>>>> to >>>>> >>>>>>> take a look. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is >>>>>>>>> >>>>> controversial. >>>>> >>>>>>> It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone >>>>>>> >>> says >>> >>>>>> "this >>>>>> >>>>>>> is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble >>>>>>> >>>>> observation. >>>>> >>>>>>>>> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever >>>>>>>>> >>>> that >>>> >>>>>>> process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at >>>>>>> >>> hand? >>> >>>>>> Just a >>>>>> >>>>>>> thought. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> What is it that appeals to you about this model, >>>>>>>>> >> metaphoricity? >> >>>>>>>>> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of >>>>>>> >> Larry >> >>>>>> Purss < >>>>>> >>>>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com > >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM >>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity >>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> David K >>>>>>>>> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. >>>>>>>>> >> My >> >>>>> reason >>>>> >>>>>>> for >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> exploring these authors is I have been following a path >>>>>>>>> >>> pursuing a >>> >>>>>> basic >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> question. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic >>>>>>>>> >>>> guiding >>>> >>>>>>> images >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> upon which thinking rests" >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring >>>>>>>>> >>> appearances >>> >>>>> and >>>>> >>>>>>>>> illusions was also exploring this theme. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new >>>>>>>>> >>> phenomenological >>> >>>>>> path >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names >>>>>>>>> >>> this >>> >>>>>>> process >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> *metaphoricity*. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible >>>>>>>>> >>>> image-character >>>> >>>>>> of >>>>>> >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> *spontaneous event* of meaning. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> brackets - >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> AND >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* >>>>>>>>> >> finds >> >>>> the >>>> >>>>>>>>> meaning of its very self. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this >>>>>>>>> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> metaphor >>>>>> >>>>>>> can >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated >>>>>>>>> >>> in >>> >>>>>>>>> *objectivity* >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of >>>>>>>>> >>> itself >>> >>>>>> *in* >>>>>> >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> mode [path] of the concept >>>>>>>>> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding >>>>>>>>> >>> images >>> >>>>> has >>>>> >>>>>>> been >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> established. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the >>>>>>>>> >> path >> >>> of >>> >>>>>>>>> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived >>>>>>>>> >>>> from >>>> >>>>>> the >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> image-character of the guiding image. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial >>>>>>>>> >> this >> >>>>> topic >>>>> >>>>>>> may >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> become [again] >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this >>>>>>>>> >>>> basic >>>> >>>>>>>>> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these >>>>>>>>> >>> images >>> >>>> as >>>> >>>>>>>>> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images >>>>>>>>> >> emerge >> >>>>>>>>> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is >>>>>>>>> >>> transcendental] >>> >>>>> and >>>>> >>>>>>> is >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. >>>>>>>>> >> It >> >>>>> seems >>>>> >>>>>> to >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I also realize this question may already be answered in >>>>>>>>> >>> Vygotsky's >>> >>>>>>> writings >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of >>>>>>>>> >>> XMCA. I >>> >>>>>>>>> personally am following this path for now. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>>>>> >>> an >>> >>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>>>> >> an >> >>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> -- >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> >> >> > > > From annalisa@unm.edu Wed Dec 3 19:27:06 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2014 03:27:06 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Gold, et al article on Daydreaming, Self-Concept and Academic Performance In-Reply-To: <547F214F.4090902@open.ac.uk> References: <1417581548494.39282@unm.edu>,<547F214F.4090902@open.ac.uk> Message-ID: <1417663628412.14817@unm.edu> Here you go! Cheers, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of rjsp2 c.uk> Sent: Wednesday, December 3, 2014 7:42 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Gold, et al article on Daydreaming, Self-Concept and Academic Performance Hi Annalisa I would very much like to see a copy of this. When I'm not marking, I am thinking about purposeless walking, feature spaces and other related issues. This sounds right up my street. Rob On 03/12/2014 04:39, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hello all, > > > A fortnight ago David Preiss was looking for the Gold et al article on Daydreaming, Self-Concept, and Academic Performance (1985) I was able to finagle a copy. > > > Here's the abstract: > > ----x---- > > A continuous interaction model was proposed to explain the relationship among daydreaming, self concept and academic performance. Daydreams were hypothesized to both influence performance and attitudes and in turn be affected by performance outcomes and self concept. A second aim of the study was to > evaluate the usefulness of a semantic differential scale as a method for subjects to rate their own daydreams. Subjects recorded school-related daydreams during two time periods in a semester, completed three self concept scales and took four psychology exams. Multiple regressions were used to analyze the proposed model. The second self concept score was predicted by the initial self concept score, daydream activity, and gender. The third self concept score was explained by the second self concept score and an exam score. The three summary dimensions of the semantic differential were independent and stable over seven weeks. > > ----x---- > > > If anyone was curious to have it, let me know? > > > Kind regards, > > > Annalisa -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: gold_daydreaming self concept and academic performance_1985.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 375722 bytes Desc: gold_daydreaming self concept and academic performance_1985.pdf Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141204/8e03a334/attachment.pdf From arturo.escandon@gmail.com Wed Dec 3 19:58:55 2014 From: arturo.escandon@gmail.com (Arturo Escandon) Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2014 12:58:55 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Soviet/Russian critique of West neurosciences Message-ID: I am working on a presentation about the importance of introducing a sound unit of analysis in micro and ontogenesis to avoid the reductionistic type of approach to "behaviour" in neurosciences. The standpoint is philosophical. Even in early Soviet psychology you could see a split between the sociogenetic approach and the Pavlovian one, which was considered closer to neurophysiology as it was carried out in the West. Most of what I have read is scattered in different papers though. Has anyone come across a monograph or a stand-alone paper that deals with the differences in approach between the sociogenetic, object-directed-activity, Soviet/Russian approach and the kind of neuroscientific approach used in the West? Mike's paper Phylogeny and cultural history in ontogeny has the above narrative in the background, and has been extremely helpful, but I hope to find a more metatheoretical paper. Best, Arturo Escandon From nataliag@sfu.ca Wed Dec 3 20:21:59 2014 From: nataliag@sfu.ca (Natalia Gajdamaschko) Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2014 20:21:59 -0800 (PST) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Soviet/Russian critique of West neurosciences In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1368108635.5453603.1417666919960.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> Hi Arturo, I think if you'd look at Luria's archive that Mike created, you'll find lots of useful stuff for your task there. I'd recommend this article of Tatiana Akhutina, for starters: http://luria.ucsd.edu/Vygotsky-n-Luria_DevelopemntalNeuropsychology.pdf Good luck! Natalia. ----- Original Message ----- From: "Arturo Escandon" To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Sent: Wednesday, December 3, 2014 7:58:55 PM Subject: [Xmca-l] Soviet/Russian critique of West neurosciences I am working on a presentation about the importance of introducing a sound unit of analysis in micro and ontogenesis to avoid the reductionistic type of approach to "behaviour" in neurosciences. The standpoint is philosophical. Even in early Soviet psychology you could see a split between the sociogenetic approach and the Pavlovian one, which was considered closer to neurophysiology as it was carried out in the West. Most of what I have read is scattered in different papers though. Has anyone come across a monograph or a stand-alone paper that deals with the differences in approach between the sociogenetic, object-directed-activity, Soviet/Russian approach and the kind of neuroscientific approach used in the West? Mike's paper Phylogeny and cultural history in ontogeny has the above narrative in the background, and has been extremely helpful, but I hope to find a more metatheoretical paper. Best, Arturo Escandon From arturo.escandon@gmail.com Wed Dec 3 20:49:08 2014 From: arturo.escandon@gmail.com (Arturo ESCANDON) Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2014 13:49:08 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Soviet/Russian critique of West neurosciences In-Reply-To: <1368108635.5453603.1417666919960.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> References: <1368108635.5453603.1417666919960.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> Message-ID: <139B4BD1-8C52-4F81-9B7F-05B116598F06@gmail.com> Thank you very much Natalia, I will. All the best Arturo Sent from my mobile device > On 4 Dec 2014, at 13:21, Natalia Gajdamaschko wrote: > > Hi Arturo, > I think if you'd look at Luria's archive that Mike created, you'll find lots of useful stuff for your task there. I'd recommend this article of Tatiana Akhutina, for starters: http://luria.ucsd.edu/Vygotsky-n-Luria_DevelopemntalNeuropsychology.pdf > Good luck! > Natalia. > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Arturo Escandon" > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Sent: Wednesday, December 3, 2014 7:58:55 PM > Subject: [Xmca-l] Soviet/Russian critique of West neurosciences > > > I am working on a presentation about the importance of introducing a sound unit of analysis in micro and ontogenesis to avoid the reductionistic type of approach to "behaviour" in neurosciences. The standpoint is philosophical. > > Even in early Soviet psychology you could see a split between the sociogenetic approach and the Pavlovian one, which was considered closer to neurophysiology as it was carried out in the West. > > Most of what I have read is scattered in different papers though. Has anyone come across a monograph or a stand-alone paper that deals with the differences in approach between the sociogenetic, object-directed-activity, Soviet/Russian approach and the kind of neuroscientific approach used in the West? > > Mike's paper Phylogeny and cultural history in ontogeny has the above narrative in the background, and has been extremely helpful, but I hope to find a more metatheoretical paper. > > > Best, > > Arturo Escandon > From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Dec 3 22:24:55 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 3 Dec 2014 22:24:55 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Soviet/Russian critique of West neurosciences In-Reply-To: <139B4BD1-8C52-4F81-9B7F-05B116598F06@gmail.com> References: <1368108635.5453603.1417666919960.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <139B4BD1-8C52-4F81-9B7F-05B116598F06@gmail.com> Message-ID: Hi Arturo-- Excellent topic, says me from my biased perspective. You might check out the lead article here. (At least the refs should be decipherable and there is a bonus article by Harry Daniels!): http://psyjournals.ru/kip/2014/n3/index.shtml I agree with Natalia that Tanya Akhutina is also an excellent person to turn to, along with Bella Kotik-Friedgut who is on this list. They can certainly point you further. mike On Wed, Dec 3, 2014 at 8:49 PM, Arturo ESCANDON wrote: > Thank you very much Natalia, I will. > > All the best > > Arturo > > Sent from my mobile device > > > On 4 Dec 2014, at 13:21, Natalia Gajdamaschko wrote: > > > > Hi Arturo, > > I think if you'd look at Luria's archive that Mike created, you'll find > lots of useful stuff for your task there. I'd recommend this article of > Tatiana Akhutina, for starters: > http://luria.ucsd.edu/Vygotsky-n-Luria_DevelopemntalNeuropsychology.pdf > > Good luck! > > Natalia. > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > > From: "Arturo Escandon" > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > Sent: Wednesday, December 3, 2014 7:58:55 PM > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Soviet/Russian critique of West neurosciences > > > > > > I am working on a presentation about the importance of introducing a > sound unit of analysis in micro and ontogenesis to avoid the reductionistic > type of approach to "behaviour" in neurosciences. The standpoint is > philosophical. > > > > Even in early Soviet psychology you could see a split between the > sociogenetic approach and the Pavlovian one, which was considered closer to > neurophysiology as it was carried out in the West. > > > > Most of what I have read is scattered in different papers though. Has > anyone come across a monograph or a stand-alone paper that deals with the > differences in approach between the sociogenetic, object-directed-activity, > Soviet/Russian approach and the kind of neuroscientific approach used in > the West? > > > > Mike's paper Phylogeny and cultural history in ontogeny has the above > narrative in the background, and has been extremely helpful, but I hope to > find a more metatheoretical paper. > > > > > > Best, > > > > Arturo Escandon > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From ablunden@mira.net Wed Dec 3 22:44:22 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Thu, 04 Dec 2014 17:44:22 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] labour and signs In-Reply-To: <1682996975.4827904.1417607429293.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11144.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> References: <1682996975.4827904.1417607429293.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11144.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <548002C6.5030907@mira.net> Haydi, I will try and respond to your point 2., on the relation between the "labour (tool) paradigm" and the "semiotic paradigm". This is a complex question because the two lines of development implied here are distinct but interconnected in the history of Marxist psychology and in Vygotsky's own theoretical development, as well as in both phylogenesis and ontogenesis. On top of this, the question has become entangled in disputes involving the counterposition of Activity Theory and Vygotsky's original work. So the first and most important thing to note is that both these lines of development have their place in all the relevant processes and they are interconnected throughout, and I personally would be very hesitant to ascribe an unambiguous priority to one or the other. I think the "labour paradigm" is what Vygotsky is referring to when he writes to ANL about instrumental psychology being an "unprofitable pursuit", but in the same group of letters we see that he advocates and promotes "the instrumental method". There is no question that offering subjects artefacts which the subject can use as symbols to control their own behaviour is a central part of Vygotsky's unique approach (emulating in the laboratory the cultural process of providing symbols for people), and I presume this is what "the instrumental method" means. But even in Thinking and Speech, he finds a place for tool-use in the development of intelligence, but he describes this as a "pre-linguistic" stage, both phylogenetically and ontogenetically. The reason that Vygotsky gives us this story about the knot in the handkerchief and the coin-toss is that he wants to suggest a genesis of the semiotic use of artefacts which does *not* originate from the use of tools for working on matter. His claim is of course entirely speculative and I take it to be a rhetorical move. So far as I know, Vygotsky is in agreement with the idea that collaboration creates the situation in which people need to share generalisations and thus "invent" speech properly so called. Here is in agreement with Engels, but I think he wants to assign only a very early (pre-linguistic) role to the tool, holding that the tool can only give rise to the *potential concept* and not a *true concept* as such. This idea is consistent with what the distributed cognition people want to do and also with the phylogenetic story told in the labour paradigm. In our own day, the role of tools in the formation of mind is really unmistakable. But I think we need to be just as flexible as I think Vygotsky was on these questions. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Haydi Zulfei wrote: > 2. Mike is so and for good reasons enchanted in "rudiments" of culture phenomena (throwing dice and bones , knots , notches in the wood to remember speech) . Good for him and us all . Yes , Buridan's ass gets spoilt in its indecision But man through inventing stimulus-device gets to salvation . But the problem is how many times has Mike , our Boss and confirmed global figure no need for it to be documented , asked himself what went before that juncture of time for the man to become 'MAN' ?? At this moment we are with LSV and at a very critical point of time . No more return to 'culture' to prove 'culture' . LSV says the error for some is to recount the story of mental through mental while they should know that mental processes go parallel with 'social' processes . What I gather at this very point is that he expects us to infer that the 'our present man of some will' owes his man/ness and decisiveness to his previous work activity necessitating use of tools . It seems we cannot take the idea to the uterine because V focuses on use of tools for a baby of 6 or of 10-12 months of age . It seems , both phylogenetically and ontogenetically , that it's not the case that 'gestures' ' eye contacts' come of their own and because of the man/ness and for the tuning-up with the universe through sounds and hymns and angels , etc. Man worked for life , performed ups and downs , shook his extremeties (one pair of hand) , consumed ! collective yellings and gesturing (as concomitant of work) . V says we can distinguish independent history of natural processes and independent history of cultural development separately 'phylogenetically' but not ontogenetically . In ontology , nature and culture work simultaneously contrary to phylogenesis . One cannot with ease and comfort say whichone goes with whichone . > > > From arturo.escandon@gmail.com Wed Dec 3 23:18:38 2014 From: arturo.escandon@gmail.com (Arturo Escandon) Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2014 16:18:38 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Soviet/Russian critique of West neurosciences In-Reply-To: References: <1368108635.5453603.1417666919960.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> <139B4BD1-8C52-4F81-9B7F-05B116598F06@gmail.com> Message-ID: <7663A4C2-1BD3-4D66-A8F1-386310767D11@gmail.com> Thank you Mike. Yes, the references can be ascertained. I am also biased. The purpose of the presentation is to introduce the sociogenetic principles of the development of higher psychological functions linked to neurosciences. I just came back from a symp in Chile about neurosciences, philosophy and free will and it was quite surprising to see some philosophers presenting to neuroscientists Aristotelian notions such as habit or virtue to account for the social, ethical context of "behaviour". Have a look if you want http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4217385/ Cultural-historical psychology does a much better job bridging micro, onto and phylogenesis and so I will further present on this matter. All the best Arturo > On 4 Dec 2014, at 15:24, mike cole wrote: > > Hi Arturo-- > > Excellent topic, says me from my biased perspective. You might check out > the lead article here. (At least the refs should be decipherable and there > is a bonus article by Harry Daniels!): > > http://psyjournals.ru/kip/2014/n3/index.shtml > > I agree with Natalia that Tanya Akhutina is also an excellent person to > turn to, along with Bella Kotik-Friedgut who is on this list. They can > certainly point you further. > > mike > > On Wed, Dec 3, 2014 at 8:49 PM, Arturo ESCANDON > wrote: > >> Thank you very much Natalia, I will. >> >> All the best >> >> Arturo >> >> Sent from my mobile device >> >>> On 4 Dec 2014, at 13:21, Natalia Gajdamaschko wrote: >>> >>> Hi Arturo, >>> I think if you'd look at Luria's archive that Mike created, you'll find >> lots of useful stuff for your task there. I'd recommend this article of >> Tatiana Akhutina, for starters: >> http://luria.ucsd.edu/Vygotsky-n-Luria_DevelopemntalNeuropsychology.pdf >>> Good luck! >>> Natalia. >>> >>> ----- Original Message ----- >>> From: "Arturo Escandon" >>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> Sent: Wednesday, December 3, 2014 7:58:55 PM >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Soviet/Russian critique of West neurosciences >>> >>> >>> I am working on a presentation about the importance of introducing a >> sound unit of analysis in micro and ontogenesis to avoid the reductionistic >> type of approach to "behaviour" in neurosciences. The standpoint is >> philosophical. >>> >>> Even in early Soviet psychology you could see a split between the >> sociogenetic approach and the Pavlovian one, which was considered closer to >> neurophysiology as it was carried out in the West. >>> >>> Most of what I have read is scattered in different papers though. Has >> anyone come across a monograph or a stand-alone paper that deals with the >> differences in approach between the sociogenetic, object-directed-activity, >> Soviet/Russian approach and the kind of neuroscientific approach used in >> the West? >>> >>> Mike's paper Phylogeny and cultural history in ontogeny has the above >> narrative in the background, and has been extremely helpful, but I hope to >> find a more metatheoretical paper. >>> >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Arturo Escandon > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Thu Dec 4 00:08:02 2014 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (Haydi Zulfei) Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2014 08:08:02 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances In-Reply-To: <3A40602C-44A1-45C7-A7D1-36E1A842E92B@gmail.com> References: <3A40602C-44A1-45C7-A7D1-36E1A842E92B@gmail.com> Message-ID: <960959130.5308930.1417680482491.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11131.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> Henry Jaan? (Jaan means more than the dearest) As you said before and you are saying now , here , We learn ,? We take our heart closer to that of the 'other' , And if just one drop falls down ,? All sterility turns to Green !! Love for all? Haydi From: HENRY SHONERD To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Wednesday, 3 December 2014, 11:26:23 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances Haydi, Thank you so much! Here?s how it is for me: I too have been waiting for Andy to come back. He is the reason I am in the chat. I have known about Vygotsky through Vera since the early 80s. But I, after my dissertation on L2 fluency in 1986, I worked as a teacher educator where research and publication wasn?t necessary for tenure and promotion. The college where I was working closed (bankruptcy) five years back and, like any working stiff, I am having to reinvent myself. So, in thrashing about I came to read Andy?s articles on "collaborative project" as a unit of analysis a few years back, started emailing with him one-on-one (and he was so generous with his time and patience in answering my questions about activity theory and Vygotsky), until he said it was time for me to join the chat. Andy mentored me until I had the courage to pipe up. Andy just edited a book on collaborative projects; Vera has written one of the papers for the book. I love them both. That?s how it is for me. Let me say that I consider myself a rank learner, always beginning. Mike has wisely rejected the role of Caesar on the chat. But we go to him asking him to sort out things amongst the unruly class. As a teacher, the hardest thing for me ever to do was to deal with disrespect between students. I have finally come to realize and accept that I want to be in a school where the students are nice to each other. Where respect and trust abound. Where human flourishing is possible. There is no father god to rescue us. We have to do it for ourselves. Well, like the song goes, ?I?m still willin?? Let?s make this a creative project, which means no unethical use of power. We can?t afford it. In my humble opinion. In gratitude and hope, Henry ? ? > On Dec 3, 2014, at 11:00 AM, mike cole wrote: > > Haydi-- > > Like anyone on xmca, you can demand whatever you like. Getting people to > implement your demands may be more > difficult. In general, I have not experienced demands and resentment as > particularly helpful on xmca, but thing are changing, > so who knows. > > I am not putting ANL aside because of the concerns expressed in MCA in the > past year or so. The concerns are real, at least to me. > But there are many productive programs of research that use his ideas, > along with those of LSV and many others, both Russian and non-Russian. > > I believe it would be helpful in receiving answers to your various comments > and suggestions if some of them were constrained to particular threads. For > example, the discussion of plank versus a piece of electronic equipment vis > a vis the notion of artifact and mediation through artifacts, etc., might > be be placed in that thread. > > etc. > > I clearly can be wrong in all of these judgments! > mike > > > > On Wed, Dec 3, 2014 at 3:50 AM, Haydi Zulfei > wrote: > >> Hi >> >> First of all , so resentfully I wonder If I can demand Andy's return to >> the discussions !! No one can deny his great contributions to this Forum . >> >> Second , I might have been lost completely in your words , terms , >> premises , and compositional nuances and colourings of your script as >> native speakers , etc. >> >> >> Third , because of obvious sensitivities towards ANL , I've altogether put >> him to one side ; otherwise , in this concrete example of Michael , the >> triad , activity , action , operation are boldly in view . >> >> >> Fourth , I suppose LSV himself in two or three chapters of the "History of >> Higher Mental Functions" has provided full response to our inquiries . Andy >> , in time , sent the first two chapters to all . >> >> 1. He , after preliminary remarks , puts heavy emphasis on use of tools >> and work activity in the parentheses and in italic characters . He >> emphasizes that use of tool very naturally gets significant just within the >> work activity process . Without the work activity we cannot expect much of >> it . Then , as most of the time , he time and again references Marx and >> Engels so as to prove his claims . >> >> >> 2. Mike is so and for good reasons enchanted in "rudiments" of culture >> phenomena (throwing dice and bones , knots , notches in the wood to >> remember speech) . Good for him and us all . Yes , Buridan's ass gets >> spoilt in its indecision But man through inventing stimulus-device gets to >> salvation . But the problem is how many times has Mike , our Boss and >> confirmed global figure no need for it to be documented , asked himself >> what went before that juncture of time for the man to become 'MAN' ?? At >> this moment we are with LSV and at a very critical point of time . No more >> return to 'culture' to prove 'culture' . LSV says the error for some is to >> recount the story of mental through mental while they should know that >> mental processes go parallel with 'social' processes . What I gather at >> this very point is that he expects us to infer that the 'our present man of >> some will' owes his man/ness and decisiveness to his previous work activity >> necessitating use of tools . It seems we cannot take the idea to the >> uterine because V focuses on use of tools for a baby of 6 or of 10-12 >> months of age . It seems , both phylogenetically and ontogenetically , that >> it's not the case that 'gestures' ' eye contacts' come of their own and >> because of the man/ness and for the tuning-up with the universe through >> sounds and hymns and angels , etc. Man worked for life , performed ups and >> downs , shook his extremeties (one pair of hand) , consumed ! collective >> yellings and gesturing (as concomitant of work) . V says we can distinguish >> independent history of natural processes and independent history of >> cultural development separately 'phylogenetically' but not ontogenetically >> . In ontology , nature and culture work simultaneously contrary to >> phylogenesis . One cannot with ease and comfort say whichone goes with >> whichone . >> >> >> 3. Andy who is well aware of both CH and AT , on his sending of the four >> pages and then the said two chapters , disclosed a very important point >> neglected so far at the forum and that was the idea of the distinction >> between tool and sign so fruitfully and enormously discussed by V and the >> deep meaning that the simple diagram denoted . V says 'artifact' could be >> cheating and deceitful but no one cares ! They invariably use artifacts and >> through this , they ultimately remove 'material activity' from the domain >> altogether . V is everywhere clear with both 'cultural , ideal activity' >> and 'material activity' . Here is where quotes don't work . The one more >> return to the plus-thousand previous reflections . No loss really ! V , if >> necessary , prefers just 'mediation' . >> >> 4. With these in mind , I say for certain that here the plank is a tool >> not an 'artifact' because it is not a sign signaling any other genuine >> thing . It's all to itself . Also the light switch . And the whole activity >> is a material one . Life put it in the way . According to V sign activity >> affects one's own societal individual behaviour . We cannot generalize its >> effect to the border of transforming Nature . Man through speech , dialogue >> , discourse , talk , genre , etc. decides for the change in personal >> behaviour ; if this potential preparedness for individual behavioral change >> gets fossilized or ossified , then man will not reach the threshhold of the >> bigger act and the vast field of the Mother Universe with its motley rich >> material phenomena out of which each time he can select an object for a >> circle of activity : starting an activity with a probable cryptic 'motive' >> (what we don't yet know about which took him to the point of crossing) , >> with a conscious goal (reaching the other side) through a concrete action >> (crossing) operating according to the conditions at hand and on the ground >> (light switching , wrestling between the ideal and the material (object , >> subject , that is , thinking ideally about what to do with the whole thing >> and the plank , then observing with the help of the light acting on the >> object , again back to thinking if flaws are observed , etc. etc. no >> blending of objective and subjective whatsoever . And I wonder why taking >> affordance for a tool . >> >> >> Soooooooooo much for one post . >> >> I considered spaces but wonder if it works . >> I'll also be very quiet and slow in replying ! >> >> Best >> >> Haydi >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>? ? From: mike cole >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >> Sent: Tuesday, 2 December 2014, 11:26:46 >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances >> >> My view? >> The plank is for certain an artifact, no less than the light bulb. On what >> grounds, or under what circumstances,? would you classify it otherwise? >> What's gained, what's lost? >> mike >> >> >> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Glassman, Michael >> wrote: >> >>> Hi Annalisa, Mike, Huw >>> >>> I tend to? be somebody who reacts better to concrete examples than >>> definitions.? I believe this also comes from Gibson's 1977 book, >>> >>> You are walking across a field and come to a stream which you can to get >>> across.? You notice a plank across the stream.? It is wide enough for you >>> to keep your balance and thick enough to hold your weight, in using it >> you >>> recognize its affordance as a crossing point.? It is the intersection of >>> the movement, the perception of the plank, short term goal of the >> activity >>> (getting across the stream) - the recognition of the affordance comes in >>> the subjective use of the object (which is why it is neither subjective >> or >>> objective).? It is also important that you have the abilities (the >> correct >>> weight, the balance) to recognize the affordance, otherwise you pass the >>> plank by. >>> >>> As far as perceived affordance.? I think I have this right - the >> perceived >>> is not in the person who recognizes the affordance (otherwise you are >>> right, that is wet water) it is whether there is an intention in the >> design >>> of the object.? So I create a light switch with the intention of >> designing >>> it as having a perceived affordance for somebody who wants to switch on a >>> light.? As you can see different from the relationship to the plank, >> where >>> there is no prior design. >>> >>> Here is my question (perhaps answered in the Engestrom paper) >>> >>> The light switch is certainly an artifact, but is the plank? >>> >>> Michael >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 1:19 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances >>> >>> Those definitions help a lot Annalisa and touch on the fact that gibson >>> seemed to empty the organism (if one were so inclined to interpret him) >> and >>> he dismissed culutral mediation as secondary at best. Still, they share >> the >>> idea that a part of the structure that psychologist theorize as a located >>> inside of individual crania is in fact "our there" in the phylgenetically >>> and cultural-historically constitued environment. And that drove >> cognitive >>> psychologists, our co discussants, nuts. Until, "they got it" and then >>> sought to mold it to their own ends and pre-existing means. >>> mike >>> >>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 9:59 AM, Annalisa Aguilar >> wrote: >>> >>>> I thought I'd do the honors and start a new thread on affordances, >> which >>>> isn't related to Larry's discussion of basic images. >>>> >>>> I figured as well to offer Gibson's words on affordances since it is a >>>> word he invented to describe something he saw in the world. Of course >> the >>>> life of affordances has been full of controversy, especially with >> regard >>> to >>>> understanding what they are. >>>> >>>> Gibson's Affordances is a theory I find instrumental to connecting >>> outside >>>> to inside experiences and I intuit that it is related to perezhivanie >> in >>>> some fashion. >>>> >>>> After reading the wikipage more closely, I regret offering a link to >> the >>>> text there because it isn't very clear what Gibson means or what Norman >>>> means. To me, a "perceived affordance" is like saying "wet water." >>>> >>>> In any case, here are 3 quotes of Gibson in his own words, that I could >>>> find: >>>> >>>> The affordances of the environment are what it _offers_ the animal, >> what >>>> it _provides_ or _furnishes_, either for good or ill. The verb "to >>> afford" >>>> is found in the dictionary, the noun "affordance" is not. I have made >> it >>>> up. I mean by it something that refers both to the environment and the >>>> animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies the >>> complementarity >>>> of the animal and the environment (Gibson, 1977/1986). >>>> >>>> and >>>> >>>> What is meant by an _affordance_? ?Subject to revision, I suggest that >>> the >>>> affordance of anything is a specific combination of the properties of >> its >>>> substance and its surfaces taken with reference to an animal. The >>> reference >>>> may be to an animal as distinguished from other species (Gibson, >>> 1977/1986). >>>> >>>> and >>>> >>>> An important fact about affordances of the environment is that they are >>> in >>>> a sense objective, real, and physical, unlike values and meanings, >> which >>>> are often supposed to be subjective, phenomenal, and mental. But >>> actually, >>>> an affordance is neither an objective property nor a subjective >> property; >>>> or it is both if you like. An affordance cuts across the dichotomy of >>>> subjective-objective and helps us to understand its inadequacy. It is >>>> equally a fact of the environment and a fact of behavior. It is both >>>> physical and psychical, yet neither. An affordance points both ways, to >>> the >>>> environment and to the observer (Gibson, 1977/1986). >>>> >>>> These quotes are important to keep in mind, I hope they help. >>>> >>>> I might also suggest looking at Mace(1977) who described very carefully >>>> how Gibson got from stimuli to affordance, given that people on this >> list >>>> value history, learning, and development. >>>> >>>> Kind regards, >>>> >>>> Annalisa >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >>>> on behalf of Huw Lloyd >>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 2, 2014 10:35 AM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>> >>>> I'd take a look. >>>> >>>> Michael, utility or technical affordance might fit.? My equivalent of >>> your >>>> perceived/discovered distinction is one of planned and technically >>>> manifest. >>>> >>>> Huw >>>> >>>> >>>> On 2 December 2014 at 16:44, Glassman, Michael >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> I'd be interested in anybody else is. >>>>> >>>>> Michael >>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> ] >>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 11:39 AM >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>> >>>>> Interloper, Michael? >>>>> >>>>> The discussions at UCSD preceeding Don's use of affordances and >>> cognitive >>>>> artifacts were accompanied by other, related papers. One by Engestrom >>> on >>>>> "when is an artifact" and one or more by Ed Hutchins. If people are >>>>> interested in pursuing this thread/topic the materials could be >>> gathered >>>>> up. >>>>> >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Glassman, Michael < >> glassman.13@osu.edu >>>> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea). >> He >>>>>> actually cops to both of them.? The first was not to distinguish >>>> between >>>>>> affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which >> are >>>>>> designed.? I think this is related to the issue of artifacts. >>> Meaning >>>>> are >>>>>> artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to >> be >>>>>> discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong >> word, >>> if >>>>>> anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances.? It is a >>>>> complex >>>>>> question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes >> based >>> on >>>>>> context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one >>> context >>>>> may >>>>>> result in organic affordances in another context. >>>>>> >>>>>> The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is that >>> he >>>>> was >>>>>> not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and >>>>> constraints. >>>>>> Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived affordances >> or >>>> are >>>>>> they designed to create constraints. >>>>>> >>>>>> Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the >>>> mention >>>>>> just spurred me to throw this up.? Hope I'm not being too much of >> an >>>>>> interloper. >>>>>> >>>>>> Michael >>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ >>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> ] >>>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>> >>>>>> Annalisa- >>>>>> >>>>>> I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation >>> not >>>>>> discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of >>>>>> affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set >> against >>>>>> Gibson's ideas.? The change of views coincided with the advent of >> the >>>>> d-cog >>>>>> idea which also has deep roots in chat. >>>>>> >>>>>> No hidden? history i know of, but interesting connections among the >>>>> notion >>>>>> of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion? of >>>> these >>>>>> connections can be found, among other places, in >>>>>> >>>>>> Cole, M. & Engestr?m, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach >> to >>>>>> distributed* >>>>>> *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition: >>> Psychological >>>>> and >>>>>> educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press. >>>>>> >>>>>> mike >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar >> >>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Hi Mike, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied >>> that >>>>>> wish! >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important >> connections. >>> I >>>>> was >>>>>>> not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I >> learned >>>>> about >>>>>>> Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science >>> (1985). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Is there some history that is not part of the common story? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I looked here for clarity: >>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to >>>>> cognitive >>>>>>> artifacts? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in >>> play, >>>>> and >>>>>>> even joy! >>>>>>> >>>>>>> When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however >>> until >>>>> then >>>>>>> I will remain with the ineffable. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>> >>>>>>> on behalf of mike cole >>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM >>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And, >>>>>>> co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive >>>>> artifacts >>>>>>> right about that time at UCSD.? If it were possible to find a >>> source >>>>> that >>>>>>> makes these connections visible and available to read about it >>> might >>>>> be a >>>>>>> step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of >>>> intro >>>>>> for >>>>>>> newcomers to the discussion. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a >>>>> newcomer's >>>>>>> introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is >> seeking >>>> to >>>>>> sort >>>>>>> out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am >>>>>> insuficiently >>>>>>> read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted! >>>>>>> >>>>>>> A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many >>>> rocks, >>>>> so >>>>>>> little time"! >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Mike >>>>>>> >>>>>>> A >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar >>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Martin! >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental >>>> representation" >>>>> is >>>>>>>> coming closer! >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's >>>> theory >>>>> of >>>>>>>> affordances. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed >>> article. >>>>> But >>>>>> I >>>>>>>> wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is >>>>>> important >>>>>>>> not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a >>>>> grenade >>>>>>>> pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the >>> list. >>>>> If >>>>>>> you >>>>>>>> can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look >>> forward >>>> to >>>>>>> your >>>>>>>> reply, Martin. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that >> being >>>> at >>>>>> UCSD >>>>>>>> and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that >>>> influences >>>>>> your >>>>>>>> position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find >>>>>> community >>>>>>> in >>>>>>>> it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more >> voluntary >>>>>> phrased >>>>>>>> that way). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of >>>> Martin >>>>>> John >>>>>>>> Packer > >>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM >>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> An interesting article, David. One way in which it is >>> interesting, >>>> to >>>>>> me >>>>>>>> at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not >> used, >>>>> even >>>>>>>> once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" >> images >>> in >>>>> the >>>>>>>> world around us - material representations - and he tries to >>> define >>>>> the >>>>>>>> "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg < >> dkellogg60@gmail.com >>>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Larry, Annalisa: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" >>> when >>>>> we >>>>>>>>> met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of >>>>>> anything >>>>>>>>> except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe >>>> available >>>>>>>>> for a standard price all over China) She does not even >> remember >>>>>>>>> whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was >> the >>>>>>>>> beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as >> a >>>>>>>>> non-image based mental representation. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental >> representations >>>> are >>>>>>>>> images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth >> century. >>>> In >>>>>>>>> fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against >>>>>> Titchener >>>>>>>>> and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, >>>>>>>>> everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated >>> that >>>>>>>>> many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically >>>>> anterior >>>>>>>>> to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would >>> not >>>>> have >>>>>>>>> time or ability to process complex problems in real time. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that >> are >>>>>>>>> genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more >>>>> reading >>>>>>>>> to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read >> than >>> I >>>> am >>>>>>>>> (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels >>> like >>>>>>>>> she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do >>> NOT >>>>> read >>>>>>>>> this article--instead, look at Figure 11. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color >> structure >>> of >>>>>>>>> Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any >>>> actual >>>>>>>>> images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural >>>>>> experience >>>>>>>>> associates with Renaissance paintings.? Pepperell then >>>> deliberately >>>>>>>>> frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any >>>>>>>>> recognizable figures upon which to focus. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine >> Chapel >>>>> fresco >>>>>>>>> for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. >> He >>> or >>>>> she >>>>>>>>> can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the >> painting >>>> and >>>>>>>>> wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not >>>> notice >>>>>>>>> the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful >> in >>>> it. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar < >>> annalisa@unm.edu >>>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Hi Larry and David, >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are >>> at >>>>> the >>>>>>>> root of all thinking. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, >>> based >>>>> upon >>>>>>>> previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, >> in >>>>>>>> combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a >>>> phrase >>>>> I >>>>>>> like >>>>>>>> a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on >> it >>>> by >>>>>> the >>>>>>>> same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know >> it. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think >> as >>>>>> Hackett >>>>>>>> describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have >>> you >>>>>>> already >>>>>>>> given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be >>>> willing >>>>>> to >>>>>>>> take a look. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is >>>>>> controversial. >>>>>>>> It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone >>>> says >>>>>>> "this >>>>>>>> is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble >>>>>> observation. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and >> whatever >>>>> that >>>>>>>> process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at >>>> hand? >>>>>>> Just a >>>>>>>> thought. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> What is it that appeals to you about this model, >>> metaphoricity? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of >>> Larry >>>>>>> Purss < >>>>>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com > >>>>>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM >>>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity >>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l]? How *basic* are images? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> David K >>>>>>>>>> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. >>> My >>>>>> reason >>>>>>>> for >>>>>>>>>> exploring these authors is I have been following a path >>>> pursuing a >>>>>>> basic >>>>>>>>>> question. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic >>>>> guiding >>>>>>>> images >>>>>>>>>> upon which thinking rests" >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring >>>> appearances >>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>> illusions was also exploring this theme. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new >>>> phenomenological >>>>>>> path >>>>>>>>>> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names >>>> this >>>>>>>> process >>>>>>>>>> *metaphoricity*. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible >>>>> image-character >>>>>>> of >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> *spontaneous event* of meaning. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which >> he >>>>>>> brackets - >>>>>>>>>> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> AND >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* >>> finds >>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> meaning of its very self. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this >>>>>>>>>> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion >> of >>>>>>> metaphor >>>>>>>> can >>>>>>>>>> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is >> implicated >>>> in >>>>>>>>>> *objectivity* >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of >>>> itself >>>>>>> *in* >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> mode [path] of the concept >>>>>>>>>> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding >>>> images >>>>>> has >>>>>>>> been >>>>>>>>>> established. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the >>> path >>>> of >>>>>>>>>> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is >> derived >>>>> from >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> image-character of the guiding image. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial >>> this >>>>>> topic >>>>>>>> may >>>>>>>>>> become [again] >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by >> this >>>>> basic >>>>>>>>>> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these >>>> images >>>>> as >>>>>>>>>> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images >>> emerge >>>>>>>>>> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is >>>> transcendental] >>>>>> and >>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. >>> It >>>>>> seems >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I also realize this question may already be answered in >>>> Vygotsky's >>>>>>>> writings >>>>>>>>>> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of >>>> XMCA. I >>>>>>>>>> personally am following this path for now. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >> with >>>> an >>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>> an >>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >> an >>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>> >>> >> >> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> >> >> > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Thu Dec 4 01:18:48 2014 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (Haydi Zulfei) Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2014 09:18:48 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances In-Reply-To: <547FBBBD.8050806@mira.net> References: <547FBBBD.8050806@mira.net> Message-ID: <1337338493.5351531.1417684728612.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11123.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> Andy, Good ! Ok ! Now the health of both sides is secured no problem what lay beneath ! It was not the case that we didn't know that for years we've been using 'artifact' indicating both tools and signs . The question is what V meant at the time and it's all clear there . He discovered 'sign' to mediate the very psychological activity AS 'TOOL' MEDIATED MAN'S MATERIAL ACTIVITY WITH NATURE .?And the diagram does not consist of two parallel lines .That's all .? Best Haydi From: Andy Blunden To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Wednesday, 3 December 2014, 17:41:17 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances Haydi, sometimes for my own health and that of the list I need to take a break. As to the question of whether the plank across the creek is an artefact. "Artefact" is meant to group together both tools and symbols, or rather things used as tools or symbols, so we cannot counterpose artefact to tool. An artefact can also be both a tool and a symbol, since the point is only ever its functional role in human actions, not its properties, and in this computer age, things can be playing both roles simultaneously. At a trivial level of course the plank is an artefact. A plank is a product of human art. But what is of interest is the psychological role of the plank, that is what interests us. A constellation of stars is not a product of human art strictly speaking, but because these constellations have been identified and their shape, position and significance passed on culturally for use in navigation and astrology, we have to say that the constellations and the heavenly bodies generally, insofar as they are known and identified by their place in culture, are artefacts; and they figure as mediating artefact-symbols in human actions. Reading the stars is a culturally-transmitted, learned activity. But what if we were talking about a tree which had accidentally fallen across the creek only the night before and was discovered by the walker for the first time? In crossing the creek using the fallen tree is the walker doing an artefact-mediated action? In my opinion, this is a question which can be resolved only by psychological investigation, not philosophy. A squirrel could run across the fallen tree just as much as a human, but does a human use the tree in just the same way as a squirrel? That is the question of interest. Or is the human being's knowledge of bridges and their function, and familiarity with stories about fallen trees and the use of timber in building all contributing to the decision to use the tree as a bridge and controlling the walker's action in playing Friar Tuck and Little John? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Haydi Zulfei wrote: > Hi > > First of all , so resentfully I wonder If I can demand Andy's return to the discussions !! No one can deny his great contributions to this Forum . > > Second , I might have been lost completely in your words , terms , premises , and compositional nuances and colourings of your script as native speakers , etc. > > > Third , because of obvious sensitivities towards ANL , I've altogether put him to one side ; otherwise , in this concrete example of Michael , the triad , activity , action , operation are boldly in view . > > > Fourth , I suppose LSV himself in two or three chapters of the "History of Higher Mental Functions" has provided full response to our inquiries . Andy , in time , sent the first two chapters to all . > > 1. He , after preliminary remarks , puts heavy emphasis on use of tools and work activity in the parentheses and in italic characters . He emphasizes that use of tool very naturally gets significant just within the work activity process . Without the work activity we cannot expect much of it . Then , as most of the time , he time and again references Marx and Engels so as to prove his claims . > > > 2. Mike is so and for good reasons enchanted in "rudiments" of culture phenomena (throwing dice and bones , knots , notches in the wood to remember speech) . Good for him and us all . Yes , Buridan's ass gets spoilt in its indecision But man through inventing stimulus-device gets to salvation . But the problem is how many times has Mike , our Boss and confirmed global figure no need for it to be documented , asked himself what went before that juncture of time for the man to become 'MAN' ?? At this moment we are with LSV and at a very critical point of time . No more return to 'culture' to prove 'culture' . LSV says the error for some is to recount the story of mental through mental while they should know that mental processes go parallel with 'social' processes . What I gather at this very point is that he expects us to infer that the 'our present man of some will' owes his man/ness and decisiveness to his previous work activity necessitating use of tools . It seems we cannot take the idea to the uterine because V focuses on use of tools for a baby of 6 or of 10-12 months of age . It seems , both phylogenetically and ontogenetically , that it's not the case that 'gestures' ' eye contacts' come of their own and because of the man/ness and for the tuning-up with the universe through sounds and hymns and angels , etc. Man worked for life , performed ups and downs , shook his extremeties (one pair of hand) , consumed ! collective yellings and gesturing (as concomitant of work) . V says we can distinguish independent history of natural processes and independent history of cultural development separately 'phylogenetically' but not ontogenetically . In ontology , nature and culture work simultaneously contrary to phylogenesis . One cannot with ease and comfort say whichone goes with whichone .? > > > 3. Andy who is well aware of both CH and AT , on his sending of the four pages and then the said two chapters , disclosed a very important point neglected so far at the forum and that was the idea of the distinction between tool and sign so fruitfully and enormously discussed by V and the deep meaning that the simple diagram denoted . V says 'artifact' could be cheating and deceitful but no one cares ! They invariably use artifacts and through this , they ultimately remove 'material activity' from the domain altogether . V is everywhere clear with both 'cultural , ideal activity' and 'material activity' . Here is where quotes don't work . The one more return to the plus-thousand previous reflections . No loss really ! V , if necessary , prefers just 'mediation' .? > > 4. With these in mind , I say for certain that here the plank is a tool not an 'artifact' because it is not a sign signaling any other genuine thing . It's all to itself . Also the light switch . And the whole activity is a material one . Life put it in the way . According to V sign activity affects one's own societal individual behaviour . We cannot generalize its effect to the border of transforming Nature . Man through speech , dialogue , discourse , talk , genre , etc. decides for the change in personal behaviour ; if this potential preparedness for individual behavioral change gets fossilized or ossified , then man will not reach the threshhold of the bigger act and the vast field of the Mother Universe with its motley rich material phenomena out of which each time he can select an object for a circle of activity : starting an activity with a probable cryptic 'motive' (what we don't yet know about which took him to the point of crossing) , with a conscious goal (reaching the other side) through a concrete action (crossing) operating according to the conditions at hand and on the ground (light switching , wrestling between the ideal and the material (object , subject , that is , thinking ideally about what to do with the whole thing and the plank , then observing with the help of the light acting on the object , again back to thinking if flaws are observed , etc. etc. no blending of objective and subjective whatsoever . And I wonder why taking affordance for a tool . > > > Soooooooooo much for one post . > > I considered spaces but wonder if it works . > I'll also be very quiet and slow in replying ! > > Best > > Haydi? ? > >? > > >? >? > >? ? ? From: mike cole >? To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >? Sent: Tuesday, 2 December 2014, 11:26:46 >? Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances >? ? > My view? > The plank is for certain an artifact, no less than the light bulb. On what > grounds, or under what circumstances,? would you classify it otherwise? > What's gained, what's lost? > mike > > > On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Glassman, Michael > wrote: > >? >> Hi Annalisa, Mike, Huw >> >> I tend to? be somebody who reacts better to concrete examples than >> definitions.? I believe this also comes from Gibson's 1977 book, >> >> You are walking across a field and come to a stream which you can to get >> across.? You notice a plank across the stream.? It is wide enough for you >> to keep your balance and thick enough to hold your weight, in using it you >> recognize its affordance as a crossing point.? It is the intersection of >> the movement, the perception of the plank, short term goal of the activity >> (getting across the stream) - the recognition of the affordance comes in >> the subjective use of the object (which is why it is neither subjective or >> objective).? It is also important that you have the abilities (the correct >> weight, the balance) to recognize the affordance, otherwise you pass the >> plank by. >> >> As far as perceived affordance.? I think I have this right - the perceived >> is not in the person who recognizes the affordance (otherwise you are >> right, that is wet water) it is whether there is an intention in the design >> of the object.? So I create a light switch with the intention of designing >> it as having a perceived affordance for somebody who wants to switch on a >> light.? As you can see different from the relationship to the plank, where >> there is no prior design. >> >> Here is my question (perhaps answered in the Engestrom paper) >> >> The light switch is certainly an artifact, but is the plank? >> >> Michael >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 1:19 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances >> >> Those definitions help a lot Annalisa and touch on the fact that gibson >> seemed to empty the organism (if one were so inclined to interpret him) and >> he dismissed culutral mediation as secondary at best. Still, they share the >> idea that a part of the structure that psychologist theorize as a located >> inside of individual crania is in fact "our there" in the phylgenetically >> and cultural-historically constitued environment. And that drove cognitive >> psychologists, our co discussants, nuts. Until, "they got it" and then >> sought to mold it to their own ends and pre-existing means. >> mike >> >> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 9:59 AM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >>? ? >>> I thought I'd do the honors and start a new thread on affordances, which >>> isn't related to Larry's discussion of basic images. >>> >>> I figured as well to offer Gibson's words on affordances since it is a >>> word he invented to describe something he saw in the world. Of course the >>> life of affordances has been full of controversy, especially with regard >>>? ? ? >> to >>? ? >>> understanding what they are. >>> >>> Gibson's Affordances is a theory I find instrumental to connecting >>>? ? ? >> outside >>? ? >>> to inside experiences and I intuit that it is related to perezhivanie in >>> some fashion. >>> >>> After reading the wikipage more closely, I regret offering a link to the >>> text there because it isn't very clear what Gibson means or what Norman >>> means. To me, a "perceived affordance" is like saying "wet water." >>> >>> In any case, here are 3 quotes of Gibson in his own words, that I could >>> find: >>> >>> The affordances of the environment are what it _offers_ the animal, what >>> it _provides_ or _furnishes_, either for good or ill. The verb "to >>>? ? ? >> afford" >>? ? >>> is found in the dictionary, the noun "affordance" is not. I have made it >>> up. I mean by it something that refers both to the environment and the >>> animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies the >>>? ? ? >> complementarity >>? ? >>> of the animal and the environment (Gibson, 1977/1986). >>> >>> and >>> >>> What is meant by an _affordance_? ?Subject to revision, I suggest that >>>? ? ? >> the >>? ? >>> affordance of anything is a specific combination of the properties of its >>> substance and its surfaces taken with reference to an animal. The >>>? ? ? >> reference >>? ? >>> may be to an animal as distinguished from other species (Gibson, >>>? ? ? >> 1977/1986). >>? ? >>> and >>> >>> An important fact about affordances of the environment is that they are >>>? ? ? >> in >>? ? >>> a sense objective, real, and physical, unlike values and meanings, which >>> are often supposed to be subjective, phenomenal, and mental. But >>>? ? ? >> actually, >>? ? >>> an affordance is neither an objective property nor a subjective property; >>> or it is both if you like. An affordance cuts across the dichotomy of >>> subjective-objective and helps us to understand its inadequacy. It is >>> equally a fact of the environment and a fact of behavior. It is both >>> physical and psychical, yet neither. An affordance points both ways, to >>>? ? ? >> the >>? ? >>> environment and to the observer (Gibson, 1977/1986). >>> >>> These quotes are important to keep in mind, I hope they help. >>> >>> I might also suggest looking at Mace(1977) who described very carefully >>> how Gibson got from stimuli to affordance, given that people on this list >>> value history, learning, and development. >>> >>> Kind regards, >>> >>> Annalisa >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> on behalf of Huw Lloyd >>> Sent: Tuesday, December 2, 2014 10:35 AM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>> >>> I'd take a look. >>> >>> Michael, utility or technical affordance might fit.? My equivalent of >>>? ? ? >> your >>? ? >>> perceived/discovered distinction is one of planned and technically >>> manifest. >>> >>> Huw >>> >>> >>> On 2 December 2014 at 16:44, Glassman, Michael >>> wrote: >>> >>>? ? ? >>>> I'd be interested in anybody else is. >>>> >>>> Michael >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>? ? ? ? >> ] >>? ? >>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 11:39 AM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>> >>>> Interloper, Michael? >>>> >>>> The discussions at UCSD preceeding Don's use of affordances and >>>>? ? ? ? >> cognitive >>? ? >>>> artifacts were accompanied by other, related papers. One by Engestrom >>>>? ? ? ? >> on >>? ? >>>> "when is an artifact" and one or more by Ed Hutchins. If people are >>>> interested in pursuing this thread/topic the materials could be >>>>? ? ? ? >> gathered >>? ? >>>> up. >>>> >>>> mike >>>> >>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Glassman, Michael >>>? ? ? ? >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>> But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea).? He >>>>> actually cops to both of them.? The first was not to distinguish >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>> between >>>? ? ? >>>>> affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which are >>>>> designed.? I think this is related to the issue of artifacts. >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >> Meaning >>? ? >>>> are >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>> artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to be >>>>> discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong word, >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >> if >>? ? >>>>> anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances.? It is a >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>> complex >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>> question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes based >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >> on >>? ? >>>>> context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >> context >>? ? >>>> may >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>> result in organic affordances in another context. >>>>> >>>>> The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is that >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >> he >>? ? >>>> was >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>> not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>> constraints. >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>> Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived affordances or >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>> are >>>? ? ? >>>>> they designed to create constraints. >>>>> >>>>> Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>> mention >>>? ? ? >>>>> just spurred me to throw this up.? Hope I'm not being too much of an >>>>> interloper. >>>>> >>>>> Michael >>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>? ? >>> ] >>>? ? ? >>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>> >>>>> Annalisa- >>>>> >>>>> I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >> not >>? ? >>>>> discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of >>>>> affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set against >>>>> Gibson's ideas.? The change of views coincided with the advent of the >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>> d-cog >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>> idea which also has deep roots in chat. >>>>> >>>>> No hidden? history i know of, but interesting connections among the >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>> notion >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>> of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion? of >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>> these >>>? ? ? >>>>> connections can be found, among other places, in >>>>> >>>>>? Cole, M. & Engestr?m, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach to >>>>> distributed* >>>>> *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition: >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >> Psychological >>? ? >>>> and >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>> educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press. >>>>> >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>> wrote: >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>> Hi Mike, >>>>>> >>>>>> It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >> that >>? ? >>>>> wish! >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>>>> Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important connections. >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >> I >>? ? >>>> was >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>> not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I learned >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>>> about >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>> Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >> (1985). >>? ? >>>>>> Is there some history that is not part of the common story? >>>>>> >>>>>> I looked here for clarity: >>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance >>>>>> >>>>>> Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>>> cognitive >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>> artifacts? >>>>>> >>>>>> There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >> play, >>? ? >>>> and >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>> even joy! >>>>>> >>>>>> When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >> until >>? ? >>>> then >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>> I will remain with the ineffable. >>>>>> >>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>> >>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>? ? ? >>>>>> on behalf of mike cole >>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>> >>>>>> The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And, >>>>>> co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>>> artifacts >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>> right about that time at UCSD.? If it were possible to find a >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >> source >>? ? >>>> that >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>> makes these connections visible and available to read about it >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >> might >>? ? >>>> be a >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>> step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>> intro >>>? ? ? >>>>> for >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>>>> newcomers to the discussion. >>>>>> >>>>>> I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>>> newcomer's >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>> introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is seeking >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>> to >>>? ? ? >>>>> sort >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>>>> out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>> insuficiently >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>>>> read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted! >>>>>> >>>>>> A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>> rocks, >>>? ? ? >>>> so >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>> little time"! >>>>>> >>>>>> Mike >>>>>> >>>>>> A >>>>>> >>>>>> On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>>> wrote: >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>>> Martin! >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> representation" >>>? ? ? >>>> is >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>>> coming closer! >>>>>>> >>>>>>> For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> theory >>>? ? ? >>>> of >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>>> affordances. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> article. >>? ? >>>> But >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>> I >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>> important >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>> grenade >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>>> pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> list. >>? ? >>>> If >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>> you >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> forward >>? ? >>> to >>>? ? ? >>>>>> your >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> reply, Martin. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that being >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> at >>>? ? ? >>>>> UCSD >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> influences >>>? ? ? >>>>> your >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>> community >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>>>> in >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more voluntary >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>> phrased >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> that way). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> Martin >>>? ? ? >>>>> John >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> Packer > >>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM >>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> An interesting article, David. One way in which it is >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> interesting, >>? ? >>> to >>>? ? ? >>>>> me >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used, >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>> even >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>>> once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> in >>? ? >>>> the >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>>> world around us - material representations - and he tries to >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> define >>? ? >>>> the >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>>> "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg >>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>> Larry, Annalisa: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" >>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> when >>? ? >>>> we >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>>>> met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of >>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>> anything >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>> except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe >>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> available >>>? ? ? >>>>>>>> for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember >>>>>>>> whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the >>>>>>>> beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a >>>>>>>> non-image based mental representation. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations >>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> are >>>? ? ? >>>>>>>> images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. >>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> In >>>? ? ? >>>>>>>> fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against >>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>> Titchener >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>> and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, >>>>>>>> everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated >>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> that >>? ? >>>>>>>> many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically >>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>> anterior >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>>>> to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would >>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> not >>? ? >>>> have >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>>>> time or ability to process complex problems in real time. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are >>>>>>>> genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more >>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>> reading >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>>>> to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than >>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> I >>? ? >>> am >>>? ? ? >>>>>>>> (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels >>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> like >>? ? >>>>>>>> she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do >>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> NOT >>? ? >>>> read >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>>>> this article--instead, look at Figure 11. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure >>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> of >>? ? >>>>>>>> Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any >>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> actual >>>? ? ? >>>>>>>> images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural >>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>> experience >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>> associates with Renaissance paintings.? Pepperell then >>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> deliberately >>>? ? ? >>>>>>>> frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any >>>>>>>> recognizable figures upon which to focus. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine Chapel >>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>> fresco >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>>>> for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He >>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> or >>? ? >>>> she >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>>>> can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting >>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> and >>>? ? ? >>>>>>>> wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not >>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> notice >>>? ? ? >>>>>>>> the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in >>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> it. >>>? ? ? >>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar < >>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> annalisa@unm.edu >>? ? >>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>>> Hi Larry and David, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> at >>? ? >>>> the >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>>> root of all thinking. >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>>> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> based >>? ? >>>> upon >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>>> previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in >>>>>>> combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> phrase >>>? ? ? >>>> I >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>> like >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> by >>>? ? ? >>>>> the >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it. >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>>> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>> Hackett >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> you >>? ? >>>>>> already >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> willing >>>? ? ? >>>>> to >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> take a look. >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>>> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>> controversial. >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> says >>>? ? ? >>>>>> "this >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>> observation. >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>>> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>> that >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>>> process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> hand? >>>? ? ? >>>>>> Just a >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> thought. >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>>> What is it that appeals to you about this model, >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> metaphoricity? >>? ? >>>>>>>>> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> Larry >>? ? >>>>>> Purss < >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com > >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM >>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity >>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l]? How *basic* are images? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> David K >>>>>>>>> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> My >>? ? >>>>> reason >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> for >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>>> exploring these authors is I have been following a path >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> pursuing a >>>? ? ? >>>>>> basic >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>>> question. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>> guiding >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>>> images >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>>> upon which thinking rests" >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> appearances >>>? ? ? >>>>> and >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>>> illusions was also exploring this theme. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> phenomenological >>>? ? ? >>>>>> path >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>>> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> this >>>? ? ? >>>>>>> process >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>>> *metaphoricity*. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>> image-character >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>> of >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>>> *spontaneous event* of meaning. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>> brackets - >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>>> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> AND >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> finds >>? ? >>>> the >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>>>>> meaning of its very self. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this >>>>>>>>> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>> metaphor >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> can >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>>> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> in >>>? ? ? >>>>>>>>> *objectivity* >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> itself >>>? ? ? >>>>>> *in* >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>>> mode [path] of the concept >>>>>>>>> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> images >>>? ? ? >>>>> has >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> been >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>>> established. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> path >>? ? >>> of >>>? ? ? >>>>>>>>> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>> from >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>> the >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>>> image-character of the guiding image. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> this >>? ? >>>>> topic >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> may >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>>> become [again] >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>> basic >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>>>>> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> images >>>? ? ? >>>> as >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>>>>> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> emerge >>? ? >>>>>>>>> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> transcendental] >>>? ? ? >>>>> and >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> is >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>>> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> It >>? ? >>>>> seems >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>>>> to >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>>> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I also realize this question may already be answered in >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> Vygotsky's >>>? ? ? >>>>>>> writings >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>>> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> XMCA. I >>>? ? ? >>>>>>>>> personally am following this path for now. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>> -- >>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>> an >>>? ? ? >>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>> -- >>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >> an >>? ? >>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>> -- >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>> >>>> >>>>? ? ? ? >>>? ? ? >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> >> >>? ? > > >? From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Thu Dec 4 01:18:48 2014 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (Haydi Zulfei) Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2014 09:18:48 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances In-Reply-To: <547FBBBD.8050806@mira.net> References: <547FBBBD.8050806@mira.net> Message-ID: <1337338493.5351531.1417684728612.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11123.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> Andy, Good ! Ok ! Now the health of both sides is secured no problem what lay beneath ! It was not the case that we didn't know that for years we've been using 'artifact' indicating both tools and signs . The question is what V meant at the time and it's all clear there . He discovered 'sign' to mediate the very psychological activity AS 'TOOL' MEDIATED MAN'S MATERIAL ACTIVITY WITH NATURE .?And the diagram does not consist of two parallel lines .That's all .? Best Haydi From: Andy Blunden To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Wednesday, 3 December 2014, 17:41:17 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances Haydi, sometimes for my own health and that of the list I need to take a break. As to the question of whether the plank across the creek is an artefact. "Artefact" is meant to group together both tools and symbols, or rather things used as tools or symbols, so we cannot counterpose artefact to tool. An artefact can also be both a tool and a symbol, since the point is only ever its functional role in human actions, not its properties, and in this computer age, things can be playing both roles simultaneously. At a trivial level of course the plank is an artefact. A plank is a product of human art. But what is of interest is the psychological role of the plank, that is what interests us. A constellation of stars is not a product of human art strictly speaking, but because these constellations have been identified and their shape, position and significance passed on culturally for use in navigation and astrology, we have to say that the constellations and the heavenly bodies generally, insofar as they are known and identified by their place in culture, are artefacts; and they figure as mediating artefact-symbols in human actions. Reading the stars is a culturally-transmitted, learned activity. But what if we were talking about a tree which had accidentally fallen across the creek only the night before and was discovered by the walker for the first time? In crossing the creek using the fallen tree is the walker doing an artefact-mediated action? In my opinion, this is a question which can be resolved only by psychological investigation, not philosophy. A squirrel could run across the fallen tree just as much as a human, but does a human use the tree in just the same way as a squirrel? That is the question of interest. Or is the human being's knowledge of bridges and their function, and familiarity with stories about fallen trees and the use of timber in building all contributing to the decision to use the tree as a bridge and controlling the walker's action in playing Friar Tuck and Little John? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Haydi Zulfei wrote: > Hi > > First of all , so resentfully I wonder If I can demand Andy's return to the discussions !! No one can deny his great contributions to this Forum . > > Second , I might have been lost completely in your words , terms , premises , and compositional nuances and colourings of your script as native speakers , etc. > > > Third , because of obvious sensitivities towards ANL , I've altogether put him to one side ; otherwise , in this concrete example of Michael , the triad , activity , action , operation are boldly in view . > > > Fourth , I suppose LSV himself in two or three chapters of the "History of Higher Mental Functions" has provided full response to our inquiries . Andy , in time , sent the first two chapters to all . > > 1. He , after preliminary remarks , puts heavy emphasis on use of tools and work activity in the parentheses and in italic characters . He emphasizes that use of tool very naturally gets significant just within the work activity process . Without the work activity we cannot expect much of it . Then , as most of the time , he time and again references Marx and Engels so as to prove his claims . > > > 2. Mike is so and for good reasons enchanted in "rudiments" of culture phenomena (throwing dice and bones , knots , notches in the wood to remember speech) . Good for him and us all . Yes , Buridan's ass gets spoilt in its indecision But man through inventing stimulus-device gets to salvation . But the problem is how many times has Mike , our Boss and confirmed global figure no need for it to be documented , asked himself what went before that juncture of time for the man to become 'MAN' ?? At this moment we are with LSV and at a very critical point of time . No more return to 'culture' to prove 'culture' . LSV says the error for some is to recount the story of mental through mental while they should know that mental processes go parallel with 'social' processes . What I gather at this very point is that he expects us to infer that the 'our present man of some will' owes his man/ness and decisiveness to his previous work activity necessitating use of tools . It seems we cannot take the idea to the uterine because V focuses on use of tools for a baby of 6 or of 10-12 months of age . It seems , both phylogenetically and ontogenetically , that it's not the case that 'gestures' ' eye contacts' come of their own and because of the man/ness and for the tuning-up with the universe through sounds and hymns and angels , etc. Man worked for life , performed ups and downs , shook his extremeties (one pair of hand) , consumed ! collective yellings and gesturing (as concomitant of work) . V says we can distinguish independent history of natural processes and independent history of cultural development separately 'phylogenetically' but not ontogenetically . In ontology , nature and culture work simultaneously contrary to phylogenesis . One cannot with ease and comfort say whichone goes with whichone .? > > > 3. Andy who is well aware of both CH and AT , on his sending of the four pages and then the said two chapters , disclosed a very important point neglected so far at the forum and that was the idea of the distinction between tool and sign so fruitfully and enormously discussed by V and the deep meaning that the simple diagram denoted . V says 'artifact' could be cheating and deceitful but no one cares ! They invariably use artifacts and through this , they ultimately remove 'material activity' from the domain altogether . V is everywhere clear with both 'cultural , ideal activity' and 'material activity' . Here is where quotes don't work . The one more return to the plus-thousand previous reflections . No loss really ! V , if necessary , prefers just 'mediation' .? > > 4. With these in mind , I say for certain that here the plank is a tool not an 'artifact' because it is not a sign signaling any other genuine thing . It's all to itself . Also the light switch . And the whole activity is a material one . Life put it in the way . According to V sign activity affects one's own societal individual behaviour . We cannot generalize its effect to the border of transforming Nature . Man through speech , dialogue , discourse , talk , genre , etc. decides for the change in personal behaviour ; if this potential preparedness for individual behavioral change gets fossilized or ossified , then man will not reach the threshhold of the bigger act and the vast field of the Mother Universe with its motley rich material phenomena out of which each time he can select an object for a circle of activity : starting an activity with a probable cryptic 'motive' (what we don't yet know about which took him to the point of crossing) , with a conscious goal (reaching the other side) through a concrete action (crossing) operating according to the conditions at hand and on the ground (light switching , wrestling between the ideal and the material (object , subject , that is , thinking ideally about what to do with the whole thing and the plank , then observing with the help of the light acting on the object , again back to thinking if flaws are observed , etc. etc. no blending of objective and subjective whatsoever . And I wonder why taking affordance for a tool . > > > Soooooooooo much for one post . > > I considered spaces but wonder if it works . > I'll also be very quiet and slow in replying ! > > Best > > Haydi? ? > >? > > >? >? > >? ? ? From: mike cole >? To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >? Sent: Tuesday, 2 December 2014, 11:26:46 >? Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances >? ? > My view? > The plank is for certain an artifact, no less than the light bulb. On what > grounds, or under what circumstances,? would you classify it otherwise? > What's gained, what's lost? > mike > > > On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Glassman, Michael > wrote: > >? >> Hi Annalisa, Mike, Huw >> >> I tend to? be somebody who reacts better to concrete examples than >> definitions.? I believe this also comes from Gibson's 1977 book, >> >> You are walking across a field and come to a stream which you can to get >> across.? You notice a plank across the stream.? It is wide enough for you >> to keep your balance and thick enough to hold your weight, in using it you >> recognize its affordance as a crossing point.? It is the intersection of >> the movement, the perception of the plank, short term goal of the activity >> (getting across the stream) - the recognition of the affordance comes in >> the subjective use of the object (which is why it is neither subjective or >> objective).? It is also important that you have the abilities (the correct >> weight, the balance) to recognize the affordance, otherwise you pass the >> plank by. >> >> As far as perceived affordance.? I think I have this right - the perceived >> is not in the person who recognizes the affordance (otherwise you are >> right, that is wet water) it is whether there is an intention in the design >> of the object.? So I create a light switch with the intention of designing >> it as having a perceived affordance for somebody who wants to switch on a >> light.? As you can see different from the relationship to the plank, where >> there is no prior design. >> >> Here is my question (perhaps answered in the Engestrom paper) >> >> The light switch is certainly an artifact, but is the plank? >> >> Michael >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 1:19 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances >> >> Those definitions help a lot Annalisa and touch on the fact that gibson >> seemed to empty the organism (if one were so inclined to interpret him) and >> he dismissed culutral mediation as secondary at best. Still, they share the >> idea that a part of the structure that psychologist theorize as a located >> inside of individual crania is in fact "our there" in the phylgenetically >> and cultural-historically constitued environment. And that drove cognitive >> psychologists, our co discussants, nuts. Until, "they got it" and then >> sought to mold it to their own ends and pre-existing means. >> mike >> >> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 9:59 AM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >>? ? >>> I thought I'd do the honors and start a new thread on affordances, which >>> isn't related to Larry's discussion of basic images. >>> >>> I figured as well to offer Gibson's words on affordances since it is a >>> word he invented to describe something he saw in the world. Of course the >>> life of affordances has been full of controversy, especially with regard >>>? ? ? >> to >>? ? >>> understanding what they are. >>> >>> Gibson's Affordances is a theory I find instrumental to connecting >>>? ? ? >> outside >>? ? >>> to inside experiences and I intuit that it is related to perezhivanie in >>> some fashion. >>> >>> After reading the wikipage more closely, I regret offering a link to the >>> text there because it isn't very clear what Gibson means or what Norman >>> means. To me, a "perceived affordance" is like saying "wet water." >>> >>> In any case, here are 3 quotes of Gibson in his own words, that I could >>> find: >>> >>> The affordances of the environment are what it _offers_ the animal, what >>> it _provides_ or _furnishes_, either for good or ill. The verb "to >>>? ? ? >> afford" >>? ? >>> is found in the dictionary, the noun "affordance" is not. I have made it >>> up. I mean by it something that refers both to the environment and the >>> animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies the >>>? ? ? >> complementarity >>? ? >>> of the animal and the environment (Gibson, 1977/1986). >>> >>> and >>> >>> What is meant by an _affordance_? ?Subject to revision, I suggest that >>>? ? ? >> the >>? ? >>> affordance of anything is a specific combination of the properties of its >>> substance and its surfaces taken with reference to an animal. The >>>? ? ? >> reference >>? ? >>> may be to an animal as distinguished from other species (Gibson, >>>? ? ? >> 1977/1986). >>? ? >>> and >>> >>> An important fact about affordances of the environment is that they are >>>? ? ? >> in >>? ? >>> a sense objective, real, and physical, unlike values and meanings, which >>> are often supposed to be subjective, phenomenal, and mental. But >>>? ? ? >> actually, >>? ? >>> an affordance is neither an objective property nor a subjective property; >>> or it is both if you like. An affordance cuts across the dichotomy of >>> subjective-objective and helps us to understand its inadequacy. It is >>> equally a fact of the environment and a fact of behavior. It is both >>> physical and psychical, yet neither. An affordance points both ways, to >>>? ? ? >> the >>? ? >>> environment and to the observer (Gibson, 1977/1986). >>> >>> These quotes are important to keep in mind, I hope they help. >>> >>> I might also suggest looking at Mace(1977) who described very carefully >>> how Gibson got from stimuli to affordance, given that people on this list >>> value history, learning, and development. >>> >>> Kind regards, >>> >>> Annalisa >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> on behalf of Huw Lloyd >>> Sent: Tuesday, December 2, 2014 10:35 AM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>> >>> I'd take a look. >>> >>> Michael, utility or technical affordance might fit.? My equivalent of >>>? ? ? >> your >>? ? >>> perceived/discovered distinction is one of planned and technically >>> manifest. >>> >>> Huw >>> >>> >>> On 2 December 2014 at 16:44, Glassman, Michael >>> wrote: >>> >>>? ? ? >>>> I'd be interested in anybody else is. >>>> >>>> Michael >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>? ? ? ? >> ] >>? ? >>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 11:39 AM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>> >>>> Interloper, Michael? >>>> >>>> The discussions at UCSD preceeding Don's use of affordances and >>>>? ? ? ? >> cognitive >>? ? >>>> artifacts were accompanied by other, related papers. One by Engestrom >>>>? ? ? ? >> on >>? ? >>>> "when is an artifact" and one or more by Ed Hutchins. If people are >>>> interested in pursuing this thread/topic the materials could be >>>>? ? ? ? >> gathered >>? ? >>>> up. >>>> >>>> mike >>>> >>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Glassman, Michael >>>? ? ? ? >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>> But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea).? He >>>>> actually cops to both of them.? The first was not to distinguish >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>> between >>>? ? ? >>>>> affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which are >>>>> designed.? I think this is related to the issue of artifacts. >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >> Meaning >>? ? >>>> are >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>> artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to be >>>>> discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong word, >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >> if >>? ? >>>>> anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances.? It is a >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>> complex >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>> question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes based >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >> on >>? ? >>>>> context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >> context >>? ? >>>> may >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>> result in organic affordances in another context. >>>>> >>>>> The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is that >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >> he >>? ? >>>> was >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>> not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>> constraints. >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>> Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived affordances or >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>> are >>>? ? ? >>>>> they designed to create constraints. >>>>> >>>>> Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>> mention >>>? ? ? >>>>> just spurred me to throw this up.? Hope I'm not being too much of an >>>>> interloper. >>>>> >>>>> Michael >>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>? ? >>> ] >>>? ? ? >>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>> >>>>> Annalisa- >>>>> >>>>> I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >> not >>? ? >>>>> discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of >>>>> affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set against >>>>> Gibson's ideas.? The change of views coincided with the advent of the >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>> d-cog >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>> idea which also has deep roots in chat. >>>>> >>>>> No hidden? history i know of, but interesting connections among the >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>> notion >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>> of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion? of >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>> these >>>? ? ? >>>>> connections can be found, among other places, in >>>>> >>>>>? Cole, M. & Engestr?m, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach to >>>>> distributed* >>>>> *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition: >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >> Psychological >>? ? >>>> and >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>> educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press. >>>>> >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>> wrote: >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>> Hi Mike, >>>>>> >>>>>> It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >> that >>? ? >>>>> wish! >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>>>> Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important connections. >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >> I >>? ? >>>> was >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>> not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I learned >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>>> about >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>> Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >> (1985). >>? ? >>>>>> Is there some history that is not part of the common story? >>>>>> >>>>>> I looked here for clarity: >>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance >>>>>> >>>>>> Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>>> cognitive >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>> artifacts? >>>>>> >>>>>> There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >> play, >>? ? >>>> and >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>> even joy! >>>>>> >>>>>> When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >> until >>? ? >>>> then >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>> I will remain with the ineffable. >>>>>> >>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>> >>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>? ? ? >>>>>> on behalf of mike cole >>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>> >>>>>> The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And, >>>>>> co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>>> artifacts >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>> right about that time at UCSD.? If it were possible to find a >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >> source >>? ? >>>> that >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>> makes these connections visible and available to read about it >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >> might >>? ? >>>> be a >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>> step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>> intro >>>? ? ? >>>>> for >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>>>> newcomers to the discussion. >>>>>> >>>>>> I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>>> newcomer's >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>> introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is seeking >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>> to >>>? ? ? >>>>> sort >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>>>> out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>> insuficiently >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>>>> read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted! >>>>>> >>>>>> A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>> rocks, >>>? ? ? >>>> so >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>> little time"! >>>>>> >>>>>> Mike >>>>>> >>>>>> A >>>>>> >>>>>> On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>>> wrote: >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>>> Martin! >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> representation" >>>? ? ? >>>> is >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>>> coming closer! >>>>>>> >>>>>>> For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> theory >>>? ? ? >>>> of >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>>> affordances. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> article. >>? ? >>>> But >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>> I >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>> important >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>> grenade >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>>> pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> list. >>? ? >>>> If >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>> you >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> forward >>? ? >>> to >>>? ? ? >>>>>> your >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> reply, Martin. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that being >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> at >>>? ? ? >>>>> UCSD >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> influences >>>? ? ? >>>>> your >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>> community >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>>>> in >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more voluntary >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>> phrased >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> that way). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> Martin >>>? ? ? >>>>> John >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> Packer > >>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM >>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> An interesting article, David. One way in which it is >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> interesting, >>? ? >>> to >>>? ? ? >>>>> me >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used, >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>> even >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>>> once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> in >>? ? >>>> the >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>>> world around us - material representations - and he tries to >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> define >>? ? >>>> the >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>>> "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg >>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>> Larry, Annalisa: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" >>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> when >>? ? >>>> we >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>>>> met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of >>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>> anything >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>> except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe >>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> available >>>? ? ? >>>>>>>> for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember >>>>>>>> whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the >>>>>>>> beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a >>>>>>>> non-image based mental representation. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations >>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> are >>>? ? ? >>>>>>>> images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. >>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> In >>>? ? ? >>>>>>>> fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against >>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>> Titchener >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>> and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, >>>>>>>> everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated >>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> that >>? ? >>>>>>>> many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically >>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>> anterior >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>>>> to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would >>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> not >>? ? >>>> have >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>>>> time or ability to process complex problems in real time. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are >>>>>>>> genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more >>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>> reading >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>>>> to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than >>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> I >>? ? >>> am >>>? ? ? >>>>>>>> (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels >>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> like >>? ? >>>>>>>> she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do >>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> NOT >>? ? >>>> read >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>>>> this article--instead, look at Figure 11. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure >>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> of >>? ? >>>>>>>> Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any >>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> actual >>>? ? ? >>>>>>>> images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural >>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>> experience >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>> associates with Renaissance paintings.? Pepperell then >>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> deliberately >>>? ? ? >>>>>>>> frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any >>>>>>>> recognizable figures upon which to focus. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine Chapel >>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>> fresco >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>>>> for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He >>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> or >>? ? >>>> she >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>>>> can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting >>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> and >>>? ? ? >>>>>>>> wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not >>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> notice >>>? ? ? >>>>>>>> the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in >>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> it. >>>? ? ? >>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar < >>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> annalisa@unm.edu >>? ? >>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>>> Hi Larry and David, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> at >>? ? >>>> the >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>>> root of all thinking. >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>>> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> based >>? ? >>>> upon >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>>> previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in >>>>>>> combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> phrase >>>? ? ? >>>> I >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>> like >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> by >>>? ? ? >>>>> the >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it. >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>>> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>> Hackett >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> you >>? ? >>>>>> already >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> willing >>>? ? ? >>>>> to >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> take a look. >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>>> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>> controversial. >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> says >>>? ? ? >>>>>> "this >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>> observation. >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>>> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>> that >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>>> process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> hand? >>>? ? ? >>>>>> Just a >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> thought. >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>>> What is it that appeals to you about this model, >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> metaphoricity? >>? ? >>>>>>>>> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> Larry >>? ? >>>>>> Purss < >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com > >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM >>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity >>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l]? How *basic* are images? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> David K >>>>>>>>> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> My >>? ? >>>>> reason >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> for >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>>> exploring these authors is I have been following a path >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> pursuing a >>>? ? ? >>>>>> basic >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>>> question. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>> guiding >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>>> images >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>>> upon which thinking rests" >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> appearances >>>? ? ? >>>>> and >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>>> illusions was also exploring this theme. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> phenomenological >>>? ? ? >>>>>> path >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>>> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> this >>>? ? ? >>>>>>> process >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>>> *metaphoricity*. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>> image-character >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>> of >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>>> *spontaneous event* of meaning. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>> brackets - >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>>> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> AND >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> finds >>? ? >>>> the >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>>>>> meaning of its very self. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this >>>>>>>>> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>> metaphor >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> can >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>>> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> in >>>? ? ? >>>>>>>>> *objectivity* >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> itself >>>? ? ? >>>>>> *in* >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>>> mode [path] of the concept >>>>>>>>> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> images >>>? ? ? >>>>> has >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> been >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>>> established. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> path >>? ? >>> of >>>? ? ? >>>>>>>>> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>> from >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>> the >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>>> image-character of the guiding image. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> this >>? ? >>>>> topic >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> may >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>>> become [again] >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>> basic >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>>>>> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> images >>>? ? ? >>>> as >>>>? ? ? ? >>>>>>>>> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> emerge >>? ? >>>>>>>>> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> transcendental] >>>? ? ? >>>>> and >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> is >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>>> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >> It >>? ? >>>>> seems >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>>>> to >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>>> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I also realize this question may already be answered in >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> Vygotsky's >>>? ? ? >>>>>>> writings >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>>>> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>> XMCA. I >>>? ? ? >>>>>>>>> personally am following this path for now. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>>> -- >>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>> an >>>? ? ? >>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>? ? ? ? ? ? >>>>> -- >>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >> an >>? ? >>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>? ? ? ? ? >>>> -- >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>> >>>> >>>>? ? ? ? >>>? ? ? >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> >> >>? ? > > >? From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Thu Dec 4 02:30:29 2014 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (Haydi Zulfei) Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2014 10:30:29 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances In-Reply-To: <1417659964000.86913@unm.edu> References: <1417659964000.86913@unm.edu> Message-ID: <1643869288.5362833.1417689029773.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11109.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> Dear Annalisa, "but I wonder if the assignment of affordances to the environment and the assignment of artefacts to the human mind is the way to think about this."? This was the problem I explained with the support of V's clear text . Before going further , I very humbly ask you not to talk in a way that would supposedly or out of some passing confusion mean : to disagree is to be hostile !? In the above quote , if by 'artifact' , we could mean that aspect of the term which conveys 'tool' , this, V would not allow . Because psychological functions do need 'signs' not 'tools' . Stimuli , stimuli-devices and Tools (technofacts) initially signalize ; signs signify . Signs go inward ; tools go outward .? What caused me to distinguish between tool and affordance MIGHT have come out of my ignorance , but the least I can say in this respect besides years of discussion of the ZPD phenomenon tied to the idea of affordance and the Diad , is the idea that with affordance some 'additiveness' is concerned while with tool this 'additiveness' is gone . "because the artefact is the sense-meaning part of the interaction" Maybe it's my fault that I can't see the 'personification' or 'particularization' trait that V attributes to 'sense' and not to artifact in both its aspects . Kindest regards Haydi From: Annalisa Aguilar To: Andy Blunden ; "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Wednesday, 3 December 2014, 18:26:02 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances Hi Andy, Very eloquently put. I need to do a closer reading of the thread on affordances, it's been a busy day, but I wonder if the assignment of affordances to the environment and the assignment of artefacts to the human mind is the way to think about this. Believe it or not, I'm not attempting to be antagonistic here. I think it is the topic that possesses a sticky affordance rather than the people involved speaking about it. Certainly Gibson himself suffered in trying to explain what an affordance was, and this was to people much more hostile in temperament than on this list. :) Unless the affordance/artefact construct is about layers and direction of movement perhaps? Points of genesis? Still, I feel more at ease with the idea of the affordance pertaining to the environment and the subject in the way that there is no dichotomy. I could see that an artefact could arise in response within an individual to an affordance, but not as a distinct "side" of the interaction(objective vs subjective), but rather more of a prompted response, because the artefact is the sense-meaning part of the interaction, and an affordance is something somewhat passive, because if proffers an opportunity. Thinking about it this way, I'd say the plank is both an affordance and an artefact at the same time. Can one have an artefact present without an affordance? and... can one have an affordance present without an artefact? And when both are present how do they relate? These are questions that may tease things apart, perhaps. Such is how it is for me. :) Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden Sent: Wednesday, December 3, 2014 6:41 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances Haydi, sometimes for my own health and that of the list I need to take a break. As to the question of whether the plank across the creek is an artefact. "Artefact" is meant to group together both tools and symbols, or rather things used as tools or symbols, so we cannot counterpose artefact to tool. An artefact can also be both a tool and a symbol, since the point is only ever its functional role in human actions, not its properties, and in this computer age, things can be playing both roles simultaneously. At a trivial level of course the plank is an artefact. A plank is a product of human art. But what is of interest is the psychological role of the plank, that is what interests us. A constellation of stars is not a product of human art strictly speaking, but because these constellations have been identified and their shape, position and significance passed on culturally for use in navigation and astrology, we have to say that the constellations and the heavenly bodies generally, insofar as they are known and identified by their place in culture, are artefacts; and they figure as mediating artefact-symbols in human actions. Reading the stars is a culturally-transmitted, learned activity. But what if we were talking about a tree which had accidentally fallen across the creek only the night before and was discovered by the walker for the first time? In crossing the creek using the fallen tree is the walker doing an artefact-mediated action? In my opinion, this is a question which can be resolved only by psychological investigation, not philosophy. A squirrel could run across the fallen tree just as much as a human, but does a human use the tree in just the same way as a squirrel? That is the question of interest. Or is the human being's knowledge of bridges and their function, and familiarity with stories about fallen trees and the use of timber in building all contributing to the decision to use the tree as a bridge and controlling the walker's action in playing Friar Tuck and Little John? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Haydi Zulfei wrote: > Hi > > First of all , so resentfully I wonder If I can demand Andy's return to the discussions !! No one can deny his great contributions to this Forum . > > Second , I might have been lost completely in your words , terms , premises , and compositional nuances and colourings of your script as native speakers , etc. > > > Third , because of obvious sensitivities towards ANL , I've altogether put him to one side ; otherwise , in this concrete example of Michael , the triad , activity , action , operation are boldly in view . > > > Fourth , I suppose LSV himself in two or three chapters of the "History of Higher Mental Functions" has provided full response to our inquiries . Andy , in time , sent the first two chapters to all . > > 1. He , after preliminary remarks , puts heavy emphasis on use of tools and work activity in the parentheses and in italic characters . He emphasizes that use of tool very naturally gets significant just within the work activity process . Without the work activity we cannot expect much of it . Then , as most of the time , he time and again references Marx and Engels so as to prove his claims . > > > 2. Mike is so and for good reasons enchanted in "rudiments" of culture phenomena (throwing dice and bones , knots , notches in the wood to remember speech) . Good for him and us all . Yes , Buridan's ass gets spoilt in its indecision But man through inventing stimulus-device gets to salvation . But the problem is how many times has Mike , our Boss and confirmed global figure no need for it to be documented , asked himself what went before that juncture of time for the man to become 'MAN' ?? At this moment we are with LSV and at a very critical point of time . No more return to 'culture' to prove 'culture' . LSV says the error for some is to recount the story of mental through mental while they should know that mental processes go parallel with 'social' processes . What I gather at this very point is that he expects us to infer that the 'our present man of some will' owes his man/ness and decisiveness to his previous work activity necessitating use of tools . It seems we can not take the idea to the uterine because V focuses on use of tools for a baby of 6 or of 10-12 months of age . It seems , both phylogenetically and ontogenetically , that it's not the case that 'gestures' ' eye contacts' come of their own and because of the man/ness and for the tuning-up with the universe through sounds and hymns and angels , etc. Man worked for life , performed ups and downs , shook his extremeties (one pair of hand) , consumed ! collective yellings and gesturing (as concomitant of work) . V says we can distinguish independent history of natural processes and independent history of cultural development separately 'phylogenetically' but not ontogenetically . In ontology , nature and culture work simultaneously contrary to phylogenesis . One cannot with ease and comfort say whichone goes with whichone . > > > 3. Andy who is well aware of both CH and AT , on his sending of the four pages and then the said two chapters , disclosed a very important point neglected so far at the forum and that was the idea of the distinction between tool and sign so fruitfully and enormously discussed by V and the deep meaning that the simple diagram denoted . V says 'artifact' could be cheating and deceitful but no one cares ! They invariably use artifacts and through this , they ultimately remove 'material activity' from the domain altogether . V is everywhere clear with both 'cultural , ideal activity' and 'material activity' . Here is where quotes don't work . The one more return to the plus-thousand previous reflections . No loss really ! V , if necessary , prefers just 'mediation' . > > 4. With these in mind , I say for certain that here the plank is a tool not an 'artifact' because it is not a sign signaling any other genuine thing . It's all to itself . Also the light switch . And the whole activity is a material one . Life put it in the way . According to V sign activity affects one's own societal individual behaviour . We cannot generalize its effect to the border of transforming Nature . Man through speech , dialogue , discourse , talk , genre , etc. decides for the change in personal behaviour ; if this potential preparedness for individual behavioral change gets fossilized or ossified , then man will not reach the threshhold of the bigger act and the vast field of the Mother Universe with its motley rich material phenomena out of which each time he can select an object for a circle of activity : starting an activity with a probable cryptic 'motive' (what we don't yet know about which took him to the point of crossing) , with a conscious goal (reachi ng the other side) through a concrete action (crossing) operating according to the conditions at hand and on the ground (light switching , wrestling between the ideal and the material (object , subject , that is , thinking ideally about what to do with the whole thing and the plank , then observing with the help of the light acting on the object , again back to thinking if flaws are observed , etc. etc. no blending of objective and subjective whatsoever . And I wonder why taking affordance for a tool . > > > Soooooooooo much for one post . > > I considered spaces but wonder if it works . > I'll also be very quiet and slow in replying ! > > Best > > Haydi > > > > > > > >? ? ? From: mike cole >? To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >? Sent: Tuesday, 2 December 2014, 11:26:46 >? Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances > > My view? > The plank is for certain an artifact, no less than the light bulb. On what > grounds, or under what circumstances,? would you classify it otherwise? > What's gained, what's lost? > mike > > > On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Glassman, Michael > wrote: > > >> Hi Annalisa, Mike, Huw >> >> I tend to? be somebody who reacts better to concrete examples than >> definitions.? I believe this also comes from Gibson's 1977 book, >> >> You are walking across a field and come to a stream which you can to get >> across.? You notice a plank across the stream.? It is wide enough for you >> to keep your balance and thick enough to hold your weight, in using it you >> recognize its affordance as a crossing point.? It is the intersection of >> the movement, the perception of the plank, short term goal of the activity >> (getting across the stream) - the recognition of the affordance comes in >> the subjective use of the object (which is why it is neither subjective or >> objective).? It is also important that you have the abilities (the correct >> weight, the balance) to recognize the affordance, otherwise you pass the >> plank by. >> >> As far as perceived affordance.? I think I have this right - the perceived >> is not in the person who recognizes the affordance (otherwise you are >> right, that is wet water) it is whether there is an intention in the design >> of the object.? So I create a light switch with the intention of designing >> it as having a perceived affordance for somebody who wants to switch on a >> light.? As you can see different from the relationship to the plank, where >> there is no prior design. >> >> Here is my question (perhaps answered in the Engestrom paper) >> >> The light switch is certainly an artifact, but is the plank? >> >> Michael >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 1:19 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances >> >> Those definitions help a lot Annalisa and touch on the fact that gibson >> seemed to empty the organism (if one were so inclined to interpret him) and >> he dismissed culutral mediation as secondary at best. Still, they share the >> idea that a part of the structure that psychologist theorize as a located >> inside of individual crania is in fact "our there" in the phylgenetically >> and cultural-historically constitued environment. And that drove cognitive >> psychologists, our co discussants, nuts. Until, "they got it" and then >> sought to mold it to their own ends and pre-existing means. >> mike >> >> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 9:59 AM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >> >>> I thought I'd do the honors and start a new thread on affordances, which >>> isn't related to Larry's discussion of basic images. >>> >>> I figured as well to offer Gibson's words on affordances since it is a >>> word he invented to describe something he saw in the world. Of course the >>> life of affordances has been full of controversy, especially with regard >>> >> to >> >>> understanding what they are. >>> >>> Gibson's Affordances is a theory I find instrumental to connecting >>> >> outside >> >>> to inside experiences and I intuit that it is related to perezhivanie in >>> some fashion. >>> >>> After reading the wikipage more closely, I regret offering a link to the >>> text there because it isn't very clear what Gibson means or what Norman >>> means. To me, a "perceived affordance" is like saying "wet water." >>> >>> In any case, here are 3 quotes of Gibson in his own words, that I could >>> find: >>> >>> The affordances of the environment are what it _offers_ the animal, what >>> it _provides_ or _furnishes_, either for good or ill. The verb "to >>> >> afford" >> >>> is found in the dictionary, the noun "affordance" is not. I have made it >>> up. I mean by it something that refers both to the environment and the >>> animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies the >>> >> complementarity >> >>> of the animal and the environment (Gibson, 1977/1986). >>> >>> and >>> >>> What is meant by an _affordance_? ?Subject to revision, I suggest that >>> >> the >> >>> affordance of anything is a specific combination of the properties of its >>> substance and its surfaces taken with reference to an animal. The >>> >> reference >> >>> may be to an animal as distinguished from other species (Gibson, >>> >> 1977/1986). >> >>> and >>> >>> An important fact about affordances of the environment is that they are >>> >> in >> >>> a sense objective, real, and physical, unlike values and meanings, which >>> are often supposed to be subjective, phenomenal, and mental. But >>> >> actually, >> >>> an affordance is neither an objective property nor a subjective property; >>> or it is both if you like. An affordance cuts across the dichotomy of >>> subjective-objective and helps us to understand its inadequacy. It is >>> equally a fact of the environment and a fact of behavior. It is both >>> physical and psychical, yet neither. An affordance points both ways, to >>> >> the >> >>> environment and to the observer (Gibson, 1977/1986). >>> >>> These quotes are important to keep in mind, I hope they help. >>> >>> I might also suggest looking at Mace(1977) who described very carefully >>> how Gibson got from stimuli to affordance, given that people on this list >>> value history, learning, and development. >>> >>> Kind regards, >>> >>> Annalisa >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> on behalf of Huw Lloyd >>> Sent: Tuesday, December 2, 2014 10:35 AM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>> >>> I'd take a look. >>> >>> Michael, utility or technical affordance might fit.? My equivalent of >>> >> your >> >>> perceived/discovered distinction is one of planned and technically >>> manifest. >>> >>> Huw >>> >>> >>> On 2 December 2014 at 16:44, Glassman, Michael >>> wrote: >>> >>> >>>> I'd be interested in anybody else is. >>>> >>>> Michael >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >> ] >> >>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 11:39 AM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>> >>>> Interloper, Michael? >>>> >>>> The discussions at UCSD preceeding Don's use of affordances and >>>> >> cognitive >> >>>> artifacts were accompanied by other, related papers. One by Engestrom >>>> >> on >> >>>> "when is an artifact" and one or more by Ed Hutchins. If people are >>>> interested in pursuing this thread/topic the materials could be >>>> >> gathered >> >>>> up. >>>> >>>> mike >>>> >>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Glassman, Michael >>> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea).? He >>>>> actually cops to both of them.? The first was not to distinguish >>>>> >>> between >>> >>>>> affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which are >>>>> designed.? I think this is related to the issue of artifacts. >>>>> >> Meaning >> >>>> are >>>> >>>>> artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to be >>>>> discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong word, >>>>> >> if >> >>>>> anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances.? It is a >>>>> >>>> complex >>>> >>>>> question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes based >>>>> >> on >> >>>>> context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one >>>>> >> context >> >>>> may >>>> >>>>> result in organic affordances in another context. >>>>> >>>>> The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is that >>>>> >> he >> >>>> was >>>> >>>>> not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and >>>>> >>>> constraints. >>>> >>>>> Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived affordances or >>>>> >>> are >>> >>>>> they designed to create constraints. >>>>> >>>>> Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the >>>>> >>> mention >>> >>>>> just spurred me to throw this up.? Hope I'm not being too much of an >>>>> interloper. >>>>> >>>>> Michael >>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ >>>>> >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >>> ] >>> >>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>> >>>>> Annalisa- >>>>> >>>>> I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation >>>>> >> not >> >>>>> discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of >>>>> affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set against >>>>> Gibson's ideas.? The change of views coincided with the advent of the >>>>> >>>> d-cog >>>> >>>>> idea which also has deep roots in chat. >>>>> >>>>> No hidden? history i know of, but interesting connections among the >>>>> >>>> notion >>>> >>>>> of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion? of >>>>> >>> these >>> >>>>> connections can be found, among other places, in >>>>> >>>>>? Cole, M. & Engestr?m, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach to >>>>> distributed* >>>>> *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition: >>>>> >> Psychological >> >>>> and >>>> >>>>> educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press. >>>>> >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar >>>>> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>>> Hi Mike, >>>>>> >>>>>> It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied >>>>>> >> that >> >>>>> wish! >>>>> >>>>>> Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important connections. >>>>>> >> I >> >>>> was >>>> >>>>>> not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I learned >>>>>> >>>> about >>>> >>>>>> Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science >>>>>> >> (1985). >> >>>>>> Is there some history that is not part of the common story? >>>>>> >>>>>> I looked here for clarity: >>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance >>>>>> >>>>>> Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to >>>>>> >>>> cognitive >>>> >>>>>> artifacts? >>>>>> >>>>>> There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in >>>>>> >> play, >> >>>> and >>>> >>>>>> even joy! >>>>>> >>>>>> When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however >>>>>> >> until >> >>>> then >>>> >>>>>> I will remain with the ineffable. >>>>>> >>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>> >>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>> >>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>>>>> on behalf of mike cole >>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>> >>>>>> The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And, >>>>>> co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive >>>>>> >>>> artifacts >>>> >>>>>> right about that time at UCSD.? If it were possible to find a >>>>>> >> source >> >>>> that >>>> >>>>>> makes these connections visible and available to read about it >>>>>> >> might >> >>>> be a >>>> >>>>>> step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of >>>>>> >>> intro >>> >>>>> for >>>>> >>>>>> newcomers to the discussion. >>>>>> >>>>>> I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a >>>>>> >>>> newcomer's >>>> >>>>>> introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is seeking >>>>>> >>> to >>> >>>>> sort >>>>> >>>>>> out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am >>>>>> >>>>> insuficiently >>>>> >>>>>> read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted! >>>>>> >>>>>> A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many >>>>>> >>> rocks, >>> >>>> so >>>> >>>>>> little time"! >>>>>> >>>>>> Mike >>>>>> >>>>>> A >>>>>> >>>>>> On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar >>>>>> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>>>> Martin! >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental >>>>>>> >>> representation" >>> >>>> is >>>> >>>>>>> coming closer! >>>>>>> >>>>>>> For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's >>>>>>> >>> theory >>> >>>> of >>>> >>>>>>> affordances. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed >>>>>>> >> article. >> >>>> But >>>> >>>>> I >>>>> >>>>>>> wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is >>>>>>> >>>>> important >>>>> >>>>>>> not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a >>>>>>> >>>> grenade >>>> >>>>>>> pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the >>>>>>> >> list. >> >>>> If >>>> >>>>>> you >>>>>> >>>>>>> can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look >>>>>>> >> forward >> >>> to >>> >>>>>> your >>>>>> >>>>>>> reply, Martin. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that being >>>>>>> >>> at >>> >>>>> UCSD >>>>> >>>>>>> and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that >>>>>>> >>> influences >>> >>>>> your >>>>> >>>>>>> position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find >>>>>>> >>>>> community >>>>> >>>>>> in >>>>>> >>>>>>> it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more voluntary >>>>>>> >>>>> phrased >>>>> >>>>>>> that way). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of >>>>>>> >>> Martin >>> >>>>> John >>>>> >>>>>>> Packer > >>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM >>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> An interesting article, David. One way in which it is >>>>>>> >> interesting, >> >>> to >>> >>>>> me >>>>> >>>>>>> at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used, >>>>>>> >>>> even >>>> >>>>>>> once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images >>>>>>> >> in >> >>>> the >>>> >>>>>>> world around us - material representations - and he tries to >>>>>>> >> define >> >>>> the >>>> >>>>>>> "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg >>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Larry, Annalisa: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" >>>>>>>> >> when >> >>>> we >>>> >>>>>>>> met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of >>>>>>>> >>>>> anything >>>>> >>>>>>>> except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe >>>>>>>> >>> available >>> >>>>>>>> for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember >>>>>>>> whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the >>>>>>>> beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a >>>>>>>> non-image based mental representation. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations >>>>>>>> >>> are >>> >>>>>>>> images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. >>>>>>>> >>> In >>> >>>>>>>> fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against >>>>>>>> >>>>> Titchener >>>>> >>>>>>>> and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, >>>>>>>> everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated >>>>>>>> >> that >> >>>>>>>> many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically >>>>>>>> >>>> anterior >>>> >>>>>>>> to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would >>>>>>>> >> not >> >>>> have >>>> >>>>>>>> time or ability to process complex problems in real time. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are >>>>>>>> genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more >>>>>>>> >>>> reading >>>> >>>>>>>> to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than >>>>>>>> >> I >> >>> am >>> >>>>>>>> (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels >>>>>>>> >> like >> >>>>>>>> she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do >>>>>>>> >> NOT >> >>>> read >>>> >>>>>>>> this article--instead, look at Figure 11. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure >>>>>>>> >> of >> >>>>>>>> Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any >>>>>>>> >>> actual >>> >>>>>>>> images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural >>>>>>>> >>>>> experience >>>>> >>>>>>>> associates with Renaissance paintings.? Pepperell then >>>>>>>> >>> deliberately >>> >>>>>>>> frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any >>>>>>>> recognizable figures upon which to focus. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine Chapel >>>>>>>> >>>> fresco >>>> >>>>>>>> for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He >>>>>>>> >> or >> >>>> she >>>> >>>>>>>> can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting >>>>>>>> >>> and >>> >>>>>>>> wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not >>>>>>>> >>> notice >>> >>>>>>>> the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in >>>>>>>> >>> it. >>> >>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar < >>>>>>>> >> annalisa@unm.edu >> >>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Hi Larry and David, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are >>>>>>>>> >> at >> >>>> the >>>> >>>>>>> root of all thinking. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, >>>>>>>>> >> based >> >>>> upon >>>> >>>>>>> previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in >>>>>>> combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a >>>>>>> >>> phrase >>> >>>> I >>>> >>>>>> like >>>>>> >>>>>>> a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it >>>>>>> >>> by >>> >>>>> the >>>>> >>>>>>> same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as >>>>>>>>> >>>>> Hackett >>>>> >>>>>>> describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have >>>>>>> >> you >> >>>>>> already >>>>>> >>>>>>> given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be >>>>>>> >>> willing >>> >>>>> to >>>>> >>>>>>> take a look. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is >>>>>>>>> >>>>> controversial. >>>>> >>>>>>> It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone >>>>>>> >>> says >>> >>>>>> "this >>>>>> >>>>>>> is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble >>>>>>> >>>>> observation. >>>>> >>>>>>>>> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever >>>>>>>>> >>>> that >>>> >>>>>>> process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at >>>>>>> >>> hand? >>> >>>>>> Just a >>>>>> >>>>>>> thought. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> What is it that appeals to you about this model, >>>>>>>>> >> metaphoricity? >> >>>>>>>>> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of >>>>>>> >> Larry >> >>>>>> Purss < >>>>>> >>>>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com > >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM >>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity >>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l]? How *basic* are images? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> David K >>>>>>>>> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. >>>>>>>>> >> My >> >>>>> reason >>>>> >>>>>>> for >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> exploring these authors is I have been following a path >>>>>>>>> >>> pursuing a >>> >>>>>> basic >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> question. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic >>>>>>>>> >>>> guiding >>>> >>>>>>> images >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> upon which thinking rests" >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring >>>>>>>>> >>> appearances >>> >>>>> and >>>>> >>>>>>>>> illusions was also exploring this theme. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new >>>>>>>>> >>> phenomenological >>> >>>>>> path >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names >>>>>>>>> >>> this >>> >>>>>>> process >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> *metaphoricity*. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible >>>>>>>>> >>>> image-character >>>> >>>>>> of >>>>>> >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> *spontaneous event* of meaning. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> brackets - >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> AND >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* >>>>>>>>> >> finds >> >>>> the >>>> >>>>>>>>> meaning of its very self. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this >>>>>>>>> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> metaphor >>>>>> >>>>>>> can >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated >>>>>>>>> >>> in >>> >>>>>>>>> *objectivity* >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of >>>>>>>>> >>> itself >>> >>>>>> *in* >>>>>> >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> mode [path] of the concept >>>>>>>>> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding >>>>>>>>> >>> images >>> >>>>> has >>>>> >>>>>>> been >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> established. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the >>>>>>>>> >> path >> >>> of >>> >>>>>>>>> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived >>>>>>>>> >>>> from >>>> >>>>>> the >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> image-character of the guiding image. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial >>>>>>>>> >> this >> >>>>> topic >>>>> >>>>>>> may >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> become [again] >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this >>>>>>>>> >>>> basic >>>> >>>>>>>>> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these >>>>>>>>> >>> images >>> >>>> as >>>> >>>>>>>>> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images >>>>>>>>> >> emerge >> >>>>>>>>> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is >>>>>>>>> >>> transcendental] >>> >>>>> and >>>>> >>>>>>> is >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. >>>>>>>>> >> It >> >>>>> seems >>>>> >>>>>> to >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I also realize this question may already be answered in >>>>>>>>> >>> Vygotsky's >>> >>>>>>> writings >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of >>>>>>>>> >>> XMCA. I >>> >>>>>>>>> personally am following this path for now. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>>>>> >>> an >>> >>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>>>> >> an >> >>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> -- >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> >> >> > > > From eg100@hermes.cam.ac.uk Thu Dec 4 03:25:06 2014 From: eg100@hermes.cam.ac.uk (Esther Goody) Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2014 11:25:06 -0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances In-Reply-To: <1643869288.5362833.1417689029773.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11109.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> References: <1417659964000.86913@unm.edu> <1643869288.5362833.1417689029773.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11109.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> Message-ID: I found using 'affordance' helpful in thinking about how individuals' actions shape, and are shaped by detailed 'things' in socio-cultural worlds. Here these are shared realities. See my chapter in Mike Cole's and David Olson's Festschrift for Jack Goody. This is how I see 'culture' as effecting how we interact. .....................? Esther Goody -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Haydi Zulfei Sent: 04 December 2014 10:30 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Andy Blunden Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances Dear Annalisa, "but I wonder if the assignment of affordances to the environment and the assignment of artefacts to the human mind is the way to think about this."? This was the problem I explained with the support of V's clear text . Before going further , I very humbly ask you not to talk in a way that would supposedly or out of some passing confusion mean : to disagree is to be hostile !? In the above quote , if by 'artifact' , we could mean that aspect of the term which conveys 'tool' , this, V would not allow . Because psychological functions do need 'signs' not 'tools' . Stimuli , stimuli-devices and Tools (technofacts) initially signalize ; signs signify . Signs go inward ; tools go outward .? What caused me to distinguish between tool and affordance MIGHT have come out of my ignorance , but the least I can say in this respect besides years of discussion of the ZPD phenomenon tied to the idea of affordance and the Diad , is the idea that with affordance some 'additiveness' is concerned while with tool this 'additiveness' is gone . "because the artefact is the sense-meaning part of the interaction" Maybe it's my fault that I can't see the 'personification' or 'particularization' trait that V attributes to 'sense' and not to artifact in both its aspects . Kindest regards Haydi From: Annalisa Aguilar To: Andy Blunden ; "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Wednesday, 3 December 2014, 18:26:02 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances Hi Andy, Very eloquently put. I need to do a closer reading of the thread on affordances, it's been a busy day, but I wonder if the assignment of affordances to the environment and the assignment of artefacts to the human mind is the way to think about this. Believe it or not, I'm not attempting to be antagonistic here. I think it is the topic that possesses a sticky affordance rather than the people involved speaking about it. Certainly Gibson himself suffered in trying to explain what an affordance was, and this was to people much more hostile in temperament than on this list. :) Unless the affordance/artefact construct is about layers and direction of movement perhaps? Points of genesis? Still, I feel more at ease with the idea of the affordance pertaining to the environment and the subject in the way that there is no dichotomy. I could see that an artefact could arise in response within an individual to an affordance, but not as a distinct "side" of the interaction(objective vs subjective), but rather more of a prompted response, because the artefact is the sense-meaning part of the interaction, and an affordance is something somewhat passive, because if proffers an opportunity. Thinking about it this way, I'd say the plank is both an affordance and an artefact at the same time. Can one have an artefact present without an affordance? and... can one have an affordance present without an artefact? And when both are present how do they relate? These are questions that may tease things apart, perhaps. Such is how it is for me. :) Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden Sent: Wednesday, December 3, 2014 6:41 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances Haydi, sometimes for my own health and that of the list I need to take a break. As to the question of whether the plank across the creek is an artefact. "Artefact" is meant to group together both tools and symbols, or rather things used as tools or symbols, so we cannot counterpose artefact to tool. An artefact can also be both a tool and a symbol, since the point is only ever its functional role in human actions, not its properties, and in this computer age, things can be playing both roles simultaneously. At a trivial level of course the plank is an artefact. A plank is a product of human art. But what is of interest is the psychological role of the plank, that is what interests us. A constellation of stars is not a product of human art strictly speaking, but because these constellations have been identified and their shape, position and significance passed on culturally for use in navigation and astrology, we have to say that the constellations and the heavenly bodies generally, insofar as they are known and identified by their place in culture, are artefacts; and they figure as mediating artefact-symbols in human actions. Reading the stars is a culturally-transmitted, learned activity. But what if we were talking about a tree which had accidentally fallen across the creek only the night before and was discovered by the walker for the first time? In crossing the creek using the fallen tree is the walker doing an artefact-mediated action? In my opinion, this is a question which can be resolved only by psychological investigation, not philosophy. A squirrel could run across the fallen tree just as much as a human, but does a human use the tree in just the same way as a squirrel? That is the question of interest. Or is the human being's knowledge of bridges and their function, and familiarity with stories about fallen trees and the use of timber in building all contributing to the decision to use the tree as a bridge and controlling the walker's action in playing Friar Tuck and Little John? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Haydi Zulfei wrote: > Hi > > First of all , so resentfully I wonder If I can demand Andy's return to the discussions !! No one can deny his great contributions to this Forum . > > Second , I might have been lost completely in your words , terms , premises , and compositional nuances and colourings of your script as native speakers , etc. > > > Third , because of obvious sensitivities towards ANL , I've altogether put him to one side ; otherwise , in this concrete example of Michael , the triad , activity , action , operation are boldly in view . > > > Fourth , I suppose LSV himself in two or three chapters of the "History of Higher Mental Functions" has provided full response to our inquiries . Andy , in time , sent the first two chapters to all . > > 1. He , after preliminary remarks , puts heavy emphasis on use of tools and work activity in the parentheses and in italic characters . He emphasizes that use of tool very naturally gets significant just within the work activity process . Without the work activity we cannot expect much of it . Then , as most of the time , he time and again references Marx and Engels so as to prove his claims . > > > 2. Mike is so and for good reasons enchanted in "rudiments" of culture phenomena (throwing dice and bones , knots , notches in the wood to remember speech) . Good for him and us all . Yes , Buridan's ass gets spoilt in its indecision But man through inventing stimulus-device gets to salvation . But the problem is how many times has Mike , our Boss and confirmed global figure no need for it to be documented , asked himself what went before that juncture of time for the man to become 'MAN' ?? At this moment we are with LSV and at a very critical point of time . No more return to 'culture' to prove 'culture' . LSV says the error for some is to recount the story of mental through mental while they should know that mental processes go parallel with 'social' processes . What I gather at this very point is that he expects us to infer that the 'our present man of some will' owes his man/ness and decisiveness to his previous work activity necessitating use of tools . It seems we can not take the idea to the uterine because V focuses on use of tools for a baby of 6 or of 10-12 months of age . It seems , both phylogenetically and ontogenetically , that it's not the case that 'gestures' ' eye contacts' come of their own and because of the man/ness and for the tuning-up with the universe through sounds and hymns and angels , etc. Man worked for life , performed ups and downs , shook his extremeties (one pair of hand) , consumed ! collective yellings and gesturing (as concomitant of work) . V says we can distinguish independent history of natural processes and independent history of cultural development separately 'phylogenetically' but not ontogenetically . In ontology , nature and culture work simultaneously contrary to phylogenesis . One cannot with ease and comfort say whichone goes with whichone . > > > 3. Andy who is well aware of both CH and AT , on his sending of the four pages and then the said two chapters , disclosed a very important point neglected so far at the forum and that was the idea of the distinction between tool and sign so fruitfully and enormously discussed by V and the deep meaning that the simple diagram denoted . V says 'artifact' could be cheating and deceitful but no one cares ! They invariably use artifacts and through this , they ultimately remove 'material activity' from the domain altogether . V is everywhere clear with both 'cultural , ideal activity' and 'material activity' . Here is where quotes don't work . The one more return to the plus-thousand previous reflections . No loss really ! V , if necessary , prefers just 'mediation' . > > 4. With these in mind , I say for certain that here the plank is a tool not an 'artifact' because it is not a sign signaling any other genuine thing . It's all to itself . Also the light switch . And the whole activity is a material one . Life put it in the way . According to V sign activity affects one's own societal individual behaviour . We cannot generalize its effect to the border of transforming Nature . Man through speech , dialogue , discourse , talk , genre , etc. decides for the change in personal behaviour ; if this potential preparedness for individual behavioral change gets fossilized or ossified , then man will not reach the threshhold of the bigger act and the vast field of the Mother Universe with its motley rich material phenomena out of which each time he can select an object for a circle of activity : starting an activity with a probable cryptic 'motive' (what we don't yet know about which took him to the point of crossing) , with a conscious goal (reachi ng the other side) through a concrete action (crossing) operating according to the conditions at hand and on the ground (light switching , wrestling between the ideal and the material (object , subject , that is , thinking ideally about what to do with the whole thing and the plank , then observing with the help of the light acting on the object , again back to thinking if flaws are observed , etc. etc. no blending of objective and subjective whatsoever . And I wonder why taking affordance for a tool . > > > Soooooooooo much for one post . > > I considered spaces but wonder if it works . > I'll also be very quiet and slow in replying ! > > Best > > Haydi > > > > > > > >? ? ? From: mike cole >? To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >? Sent: Tuesday, 2 December 2014, 11:26:46 >? Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances > > My view? > The plank is for certain an artifact, no less than the light bulb. On what > grounds, or under what circumstances,? would you classify it otherwise? > What's gained, what's lost? > mike > > > On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Glassman, Michael > wrote: > > >> Hi Annalisa, Mike, Huw >> >> I tend to? be somebody who reacts better to concrete examples than >> definitions.? I believe this also comes from Gibson's 1977 book, >> >> You are walking across a field and come to a stream which you can to get >> across.? You notice a plank across the stream.? It is wide enough for you >> to keep your balance and thick enough to hold your weight, in using it you >> recognize its affordance as a crossing point.? It is the intersection of >> the movement, the perception of the plank, short term goal of the activity >> (getting across the stream) - the recognition of the affordance comes in >> the subjective use of the object (which is why it is neither subjective or >> objective).? It is also important that you have the abilities (the correct >> weight, the balance) to recognize the affordance, otherwise you pass the >> plank by. >> >> As far as perceived affordance.? I think I have this right - the perceived >> is not in the person who recognizes the affordance (otherwise you are >> right, that is wet water) it is whether there is an intention in the design >> of the object.? So I create a light switch with the intention of designing >> it as having a perceived affordance for somebody who wants to switch on a >> light.? As you can see different from the relationship to the plank, where >> there is no prior design. >> >> Here is my question (perhaps answered in the Engestrom paper) >> >> The light switch is certainly an artifact, but is the plank? >> >> Michael >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 1:19 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances >> >> Those definitions help a lot Annalisa and touch on the fact that gibson >> seemed to empty the organism (if one were so inclined to interpret him) and >> he dismissed culutral mediation as secondary at best. Still, they share the >> idea that a part of the structure that psychologist theorize as a located >> inside of individual crania is in fact "our there" in the phylgenetically >> and cultural-historically constitued environment. And that drove cognitive >> psychologists, our co discussants, nuts. Until, "they got it" and then >> sought to mold it to their own ends and pre-existing means. >> mike >> >> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 9:59 AM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >> >>> I thought I'd do the honors and start a new thread on affordances, which >>> isn't related to Larry's discussion of basic images. >>> >>> I figured as well to offer Gibson's words on affordances since it is a >>> word he invented to describe something he saw in the world. Of course the >>> life of affordances has been full of controversy, especially with regard >>> >> to >> >>> understanding what they are. >>> >>> Gibson's Affordances is a theory I find instrumental to connecting >>> >> outside >> >>> to inside experiences and I intuit that it is related to perezhivanie in >>> some fashion. >>> >>> After reading the wikipage more closely, I regret offering a link to the >>> text there because it isn't very clear what Gibson means or what Norman >>> means. To me, a "perceived affordance" is like saying "wet water." >>> >>> In any case, here are 3 quotes of Gibson in his own words, that I could >>> find: >>> >>> The affordances of the environment are what it _offers_ the animal, what >>> it _provides_ or _furnishes_, either for good or ill. The verb "to >>> >> afford" >> >>> is found in the dictionary, the noun "affordance" is not. I have made it >>> up. I mean by it something that refers both to the environment and the >>> animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies the >>> >> complementarity >> >>> of the animal and the environment (Gibson, 1977/1986). >>> >>> and >>> >>> What is meant by an _affordance_? Subject to revision, I suggest that >>> >> the >> >>> affordance of anything is a specific combination of the properties of its >>> substance and its surfaces taken with reference to an animal. The >>> >> reference >> >>> may be to an animal as distinguished from other species (Gibson, >>> >> 1977/1986). >> >>> and >>> >>> An important fact about affordances of the environment is that they are >>> >> in >> >>> a sense objective, real, and physical, unlike values and meanings, which >>> are often supposed to be subjective, phenomenal, and mental. But >>> >> actually, >> >>> an affordance is neither an objective property nor a subjective property; >>> or it is both if you like. An affordance cuts across the dichotomy of >>> subjective-objective and helps us to understand its inadequacy. It is >>> equally a fact of the environment and a fact of behavior. It is both >>> physical and psychical, yet neither. An affordance points both ways, to >>> >> the >> >>> environment and to the observer (Gibson, 1977/1986). >>> >>> These quotes are important to keep in mind, I hope they help. >>> >>> I might also suggest looking at Mace(1977) who described very carefully >>> how Gibson got from stimuli to affordance, given that people on this list >>> value history, learning, and development. >>> >>> Kind regards, >>> >>> Annalisa >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> on behalf of Huw Lloyd >>> Sent: Tuesday, December 2, 2014 10:35 AM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>> >>> I'd take a look. >>> >>> Michael, utility or technical affordance might fit.? My equivalent of >>> >> your >> >>> perceived/discovered distinction is one of planned and technically >>> manifest. >>> >>> Huw >>> >>> >>> On 2 December 2014 at 16:44, Glassman, Michael >>> wrote: >>> >>> >>>> I'd be interested in anybody else is. >>>> >>>> Michael >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >> ] >> >>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 11:39 AM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>> >>>> Interloper, Michael? >>>> >>>> The discussions at UCSD preceeding Don's use of affordances and >>>> >> cognitive >> >>>> artifacts were accompanied by other, related papers. One by Engestrom >>>> >> on >> >>>> "when is an artifact" and one or more by Ed Hutchins. If people are >>>> interested in pursuing this thread/topic the materials could be >>>> >> gathered >> >>>> up. >>>> >>>> mike >>>> >>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Glassman, Michael >>> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea).? He >>>>> actually cops to both of them.? The first was not to distinguish >>>>> >>> between >>> >>>>> affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which are >>>>> designed.? I think this is related to the issue of artifacts. >>>>> >> Meaning >> >>>> are >>>> >>>>> artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to be >>>>> discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong word, >>>>> >> if >> >>>>> anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances.? It is a >>>>> >>>> complex >>>> >>>>> question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes based >>>>> >> on >> >>>>> context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one >>>>> >> context >> >>>> may >>>> >>>>> result in organic affordances in another context. >>>>> >>>>> The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is that >>>>> >> he >> >>>> was >>>> >>>>> not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and >>>>> >>>> constraints. >>>> >>>>> Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived affordances or >>>>> >>> are >>> >>>>> they designed to create constraints. >>>>> >>>>> Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the >>>>> >>> mention >>> >>>>> just spurred me to throw this up.? Hope I'm not being too much of an >>>>> interloper. >>>>> >>>>> Michael >>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ >>>>> >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> >>> ] >>> >>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>> >>>>> Annalisa- >>>>> >>>>> I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation >>>>> >> not >> >>>>> discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of >>>>> affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set against >>>>> Gibson's ideas.? The change of views coincided with the advent of the >>>>> >>>> d-cog >>>> >>>>> idea which also has deep roots in chat. >>>>> >>>>> No hidden? history i know of, but interesting connections among the >>>>> >>>> notion >>>> >>>>> of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion? of >>>>> >>> these >>> >>>>> connections can be found, among other places, in >>>>> >>>>>? Cole, M. & Engestr?m, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach to >>>>> distributed* >>>>> *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition: >>>>> >> Psychological >> >>>> and >>>> >>>>> educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press. >>>>> >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar >>>>> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>>> Hi Mike, >>>>>> >>>>>> It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied >>>>>> >> that >> >>>>> wish! >>>>> >>>>>> Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important connections. >>>>>> >> I >> >>>> was >>>> >>>>>> not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I learned >>>>>> >>>> about >>>> >>>>>> Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science >>>>>> >> (1985). >> >>>>>> Is there some history that is not part of the common story? >>>>>> >>>>>> I looked here for clarity: >>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance >>>>>> >>>>>> Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to >>>>>> >>>> cognitive >>>> >>>>>> artifacts? >>>>>> >>>>>> There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in >>>>>> >> play, >> >>>> and >>>> >>>>>> even joy! >>>>>> >>>>>> When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however >>>>>> >> until >> >>>> then >>>> >>>>>> I will remain with the ineffable. >>>>>> >>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>> >>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>> >>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>>>>> on behalf of mike cole >>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>> >>>>>> The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And, >>>>>> co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive >>>>>> >>>> artifacts >>>> >>>>>> right about that time at UCSD.? If it were possible to find a >>>>>> >> source >> >>>> that >>>> >>>>>> makes these connections visible and available to read about it >>>>>> >> might >> >>>> be a >>>> >>>>>> step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of >>>>>> >>> intro >>> >>>>> for >>>>> >>>>>> newcomers to the discussion. >>>>>> >>>>>> I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a >>>>>> >>>> newcomer's >>>> >>>>>> introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is seeking >>>>>> >>> to >>> >>>>> sort >>>>> >>>>>> out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am >>>>>> >>>>> insuficiently >>>>> >>>>>> read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted! >>>>>> >>>>>> A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many >>>>>> >>> rocks, >>> >>>> so >>>> >>>>>> little time"! >>>>>> >>>>>> Mike >>>>>> >>>>>> A >>>>>> >>>>>> On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar >>>>>> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>>>> Martin! >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental >>>>>>> >>> representation" >>> >>>> is >>>> >>>>>>> coming closer! >>>>>>> >>>>>>> For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's >>>>>>> >>> theory >>> >>>> of >>>> >>>>>>> affordances. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed >>>>>>> >> article. >> >>>> But >>>> >>>>> I >>>>> >>>>>>> wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is >>>>>>> >>>>> important >>>>> >>>>>>> not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a >>>>>>> >>>> grenade >>>> >>>>>>> pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the >>>>>>> >> list. >> >>>> If >>>> >>>>>> you >>>>>> >>>>>>> can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look >>>>>>> >> forward >> >>> to >>> >>>>>> your >>>>>> >>>>>>> reply, Martin. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that being >>>>>>> >>> at >>> >>>>> UCSD >>>>> >>>>>>> and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that >>>>>>> >>> influences >>> >>>>> your >>>>> >>>>>>> position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find >>>>>>> >>>>> community >>>>> >>>>>> in >>>>>> >>>>>>> it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more voluntary >>>>>>> >>>>> phrased >>>>> >>>>>>> that way). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of >>>>>>> >>> Martin >>> >>>>> John >>>>> >>>>>>> Packer > >>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM >>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> An interesting article, David. One way in which it is >>>>>>> >> interesting, >> >>> to >>> >>>>> me >>>>> >>>>>>> at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not used, >>>>>>> >>>> even >>>> >>>>>>> once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" images >>>>>>> >> in >> >>>> the >>>> >>>>>>> world around us - material representations - and he tries to >>>>>>> >> define >> >>>> the >>>> >>>>>>> "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg >>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Larry, Annalisa: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" >>>>>>>> >> when >> >>>> we >>>> >>>>>>>> met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of >>>>>>>> >>>>> anything >>>>> >>>>>>>> except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe >>>>>>>> >>> available >>> >>>>>>>> for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember >>>>>>>> whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the >>>>>>>> beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a >>>>>>>> non-image based mental representation. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations >>>>>>>> >>> are >>> >>>>>>>> images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. >>>>>>>> >>> In >>> >>>>>>>> fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against >>>>>>>> >>>>> Titchener >>>>> >>>>>>>> and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, >>>>>>>> everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated >>>>>>>> >> that >> >>>>>>>> many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically >>>>>>>> >>>> anterior >>>> >>>>>>>> to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would >>>>>>>> >> not >> >>>> have >>>> >>>>>>>> time or ability to process complex problems in real time. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are >>>>>>>> genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more >>>>>>>> >>>> reading >>>> >>>>>>>> to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than >>>>>>>> >> I >> >>> am >>> >>>>>>>> (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels >>>>>>>> >> like >> >>>>>>>> she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do >>>>>>>> >> NOT >> >>>> read >>>> >>>>>>>> this article--instead, look at Figure 11. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure >>>>>>>> >> of >> >>>>>>>> Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any >>>>>>>> >>> actual >>> >>>>>>>> images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural >>>>>>>> >>>>> experience >>>>> >>>>>>>> associates with Renaissance paintings.? Pepperell then >>>>>>>> >>> deliberately >>> >>>>>>>> frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any >>>>>>>> recognizable figures upon which to focus. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine Chapel >>>>>>>> >>>> fresco >>>> >>>>>>>> for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He >>>>>>>> >> or >> >>>> she >>>> >>>>>>>> can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting >>>>>>>> >>> and >>> >>>>>>>> wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not >>>>>>>> >>> notice >>> >>>>>>>> the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in >>>>>>>> >>> it. >>> >>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar < >>>>>>>> >> annalisa@unm.edu >> >>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Hi Larry and David, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are >>>>>>>>> >> at >> >>>> the >>>> >>>>>>> root of all thinking. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, >>>>>>>>> >> based >> >>>> upon >>>> >>>>>>> previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in >>>>>>> combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a >>>>>>> >>> phrase >>> >>>> I >>>> >>>>>> like >>>>>> >>>>>>> a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it >>>>>>> >>> by >>> >>>>> the >>>>> >>>>>>> same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as >>>>>>>>> >>>>> Hackett >>>>> >>>>>>> describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have >>>>>>> >> you >> >>>>>> already >>>>>> >>>>>>> given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be >>>>>>> >>> willing >>> >>>>> to >>>>> >>>>>>> take a look. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is >>>>>>>>> >>>>> controversial. >>>>> >>>>>>> It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone >>>>>>> >>> says >>> >>>>>> "this >>>>>> >>>>>>> is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble >>>>>>> >>>>> observation. >>>>> >>>>>>>>> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever >>>>>>>>> >>>> that >>>> >>>>>>> process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at >>>>>>> >>> hand? >>> >>>>>> Just a >>>>>> >>>>>>> thought. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> What is it that appeals to you about this model, >>>>>>>>> >> metaphoricity? >> >>>>>>>>> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of >>>>>>> >> Larry >> >>>>>> Purss < >>>>>> >>>>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com > >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM >>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity >>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l]? How *basic* are images? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> David K >>>>>>>>> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. >>>>>>>>> >> My >> >>>>> reason >>>>> >>>>>>> for >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> exploring these authors is I have been following a path >>>>>>>>> >>> pursuing a >>> >>>>>> basic >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> question. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic >>>>>>>>> >>>> guiding >>>> >>>>>>> images >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> upon which thinking rests" >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring >>>>>>>>> >>> appearances >>> >>>>> and >>>>> >>>>>>>>> illusions was also exploring this theme. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new >>>>>>>>> >>> phenomenological >>> >>>>>> path >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names >>>>>>>>> >>> this >>> >>>>>>> process >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> *metaphoricity*. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible >>>>>>>>> >>>> image-character >>>> >>>>>> of >>>>>> >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> *spontaneous event* of meaning. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> brackets - >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> AND >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* >>>>>>>>> >> finds >> >>>> the >>>> >>>>>>>>> meaning of its very self. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this >>>>>>>>> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> metaphor >>>>>> >>>>>>> can >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated >>>>>>>>> >>> in >>> >>>>>>>>> *objectivity* >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of >>>>>>>>> >>> itself >>> >>>>>> *in* >>>>>> >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> mode [path] of the concept >>>>>>>>> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding >>>>>>>>> >>> images >>> >>>>> has >>>>> >>>>>>> been >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> established. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the >>>>>>>>> >> path >> >>> of >>> >>>>>>>>> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived >>>>>>>>> >>>> from >>>> >>>>>> the >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> image-character of the guiding image. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial >>>>>>>>> >> this >> >>>>> topic >>>>> >>>>>>> may >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> become [again] >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this >>>>>>>>> >>>> basic >>>> >>>>>>>>> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these >>>>>>>>> >>> images >>> >>>> as >>>> >>>>>>>>> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images >>>>>>>>> >> emerge >> >>>>>>>>> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is >>>>>>>>> >>> transcendental] >>> >>>>> and >>>>> >>>>>>> is >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. >>>>>>>>> >> It >> >>>>> seems >>>>> >>>>>> to >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I also realize this question may already be answered in >>>>>>>>> >>> Vygotsky's >>> >>>>>>> writings >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of >>>>>>>>> >>> XMCA. I >>> >>>>>>>>> personally am following this path for now. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>>>>> >>> an >>> >>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>>>> >> an >> >>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> -- >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> >> >> > > > ----- No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com Version: 2014.0.4794 / Virus Database: 4235/8677 - Release Date: 12/04/14 From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Thu Dec 4 05:27:31 2014 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (Haydi Zulfei) Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2014 13:27:31 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: labour and signs In-Reply-To: <548002C6.5030907@mira.net> References: <548002C6.5030907@mira.net> Message-ID: <1638274843.445412.1417699651665.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11124.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> Andy, Thanks ! I'd like to get finished up with everything ; hope folks will tolerate brevity .? If I may , ask you to read within the body of your well-constituted message ! From: Andy Blunden To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Wednesday, 3 December 2014, 22:44:22 Subject: [Xmca-l] labour and signs Haydi, I will try and respond to your point 2., on the relation between the "labour (tool) paradigm" and the "semiotic paradigm". This is a complex question because the two lines of development implied here are distinct but interconnected in the history of Marxist psychology and in Vygotsky's own theoretical development, as well as in both phylogenesis and ontogenesis. On top of this, the question has become entangled in disputes involving the counterposition of Activity Theory and Vygotsky's original work. So the first and most important thing to note is that both these lines of development have their place in all the relevant processes and they are interconnected throughout, and I personally would be very hesitant to ascribe an unambiguous priority to one or the other. well-said I think the "labour paradigm" is what Vygotsky is referring to when he writes to ANL about instrumental psychology being an "unprofitable pursuit", but in the same group of letters we see that he advocates and promotes "the instrumental method". There is no question that offering subjects artefacts which the subject can use as symbols to control their own behaviour is a central part of Vygotsky's unique approach (emulating in the laboratory the cultural process of providing symbols for people), and I presume this is what "the instrumental method" means. But even in Thinking and Speech, he finds a place for tool-use in the development of intelligence, but he describes this as a "pre-linguistic" stage, both phylogenetically and ontogenetically. I'm no authority to say things act this way or that way but I'm allowed to display my understanding . In this very piece , V challenges "instrumental method" . In "Crisis" , he does the same . I wonder what you might take by encountering so much talk about the "New Psychology" or the "New Methodology" with lots of evidence he showers on us to document his sayings . Shortly , was he a Marxist of the Day or Not ? This could help us with many things . What seems to be ambiguous for me is the last three lines of the paragraph . Is that what you mean by pre-linguistic stage that after this stage , no use of tools is to be observed ? I'm sure you won't . Mike is all right with the term 'rudimentary' because the to-be MAN (primitive) acts on the instant , is interested in THROWING bones or dice not in their physical or chemical properties as is the case with later stages . Hence use of stimulus-device not sign-device . But with full use of tools and their sophistication we approach the appearance of language which converts the NATURAL functions . V even locates their due places , one the stem of the brain , the other the different layers of the cortex . We know about ANL saying a day might be reached when scientists become full workers and workers full scientists or quasi-scientists but that day has not yet arrived . Not to become lengthy , I refer to the important point that we do not internalize tools but we do internalize signs , speech and this is where V warns us against . ? The reason that Vygotsky gives us this story about the knot in the handkerchief and the coin-toss is that he wants to suggest a genesis of the semiotic use of artefacts which does *not* originate from the use of tools for working on matter. Yes , yes , Vygotsky says , I parrot it many times . Then , I put the question where does it come from (before rudiments) . Let me once again stress on the fact that V asserts the two lines of development are separate one from the other in phylogenesis .? His claim is of course entirely speculative and I take it to be a rhetorical move. So far as I know, Vygotsky is in agreement with the idea that collaboration creates the situation in which people need to share generalisations and thus "invent" speech properly so called. Here is in agreement with Engels, but I think he wants to assign only a very early (pre-linguistic) role to the tool, holding that the tool can only give rise to the *potential concept* and not a *true concept* as such. This idea is consistent with what the distributed cognition people want to do and also with the phylogenetic story told in the labour paradigm. In our own day, the role of tools in the formation of mind is really unmistakable. But I think we need to be just as flexible as I think Vygotsky was on these questions. What V says is use of tools finds its meaning within 'work activity' of which you are a master . But these lines smack of historic precedence of speech and co-constructing of speech over working activity . Where have I got wrong ? Haydi Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Haydi Zulfei wrote: > 2. Mike is so and for good reasons enchanted in "rudiments" of culture phenomena (throwing dice and bones , knots , notches in the wood to remember speech) . Good for him and us all . Yes , Buridan's ass gets spoilt in its indecision But man through inventing stimulus-device gets to salvation . But the problem is how many times has Mike , our Boss and confirmed global figure no need for it to be documented , asked himself what went before that juncture of time for the man to become 'MAN' ?? At this moment we are with LSV and at a very critical point of time . No more return to 'culture' to prove 'culture' . LSV says the error for some is to recount the story of mental through mental while they should know that mental processes go parallel with 'social' processes . What I gather at this very point is that he expects us to infer that the 'our present man of some will' owes his man/ness and decisiveness to his previous work activity necessitating use of tools . It seems we cannot take the idea to the uterine because V focuses on use of tools for a baby of 6 or of 10-12 months of age . It seems , both phylogenetically and ontogenetically , that it's not the case that 'gestures' ' eye contacts' come of their own and because of the man/ness and for the tuning-up with the universe through sounds and hymns and angels , etc. Man worked for life , performed ups and downs , shook his extremeties (one pair of hand) , consumed ! collective yellings and gesturing (as concomitant of work) . V says we can distinguish independent history of natural processes and independent history of cultural development separately 'phylogenetically' but not ontogenetically . In ontology , nature and culture work simultaneously contrary to phylogenesis . One cannot with ease and comfort say whichone goes with whichone .? > >? > From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Thu Dec 4 05:27:31 2014 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (Haydi Zulfei) Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2014 13:27:31 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: labour and signs In-Reply-To: <548002C6.5030907@mira.net> References: <548002C6.5030907@mira.net> Message-ID: <1638274843.445412.1417699651665.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11124.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> Andy, Thanks ! I'd like to get finished up with everything ; hope folks will tolerate brevity .? If I may , ask you to read within the body of your well-constituted message ! From: Andy Blunden To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Wednesday, 3 December 2014, 22:44:22 Subject: [Xmca-l] labour and signs Haydi, I will try and respond to your point 2., on the relation between the "labour (tool) paradigm" and the "semiotic paradigm". This is a complex question because the two lines of development implied here are distinct but interconnected in the history of Marxist psychology and in Vygotsky's own theoretical development, as well as in both phylogenesis and ontogenesis. On top of this, the question has become entangled in disputes involving the counterposition of Activity Theory and Vygotsky's original work. So the first and most important thing to note is that both these lines of development have their place in all the relevant processes and they are interconnected throughout, and I personally would be very hesitant to ascribe an unambiguous priority to one or the other. well-said I think the "labour paradigm" is what Vygotsky is referring to when he writes to ANL about instrumental psychology being an "unprofitable pursuit", but in the same group of letters we see that he advocates and promotes "the instrumental method". There is no question that offering subjects artefacts which the subject can use as symbols to control their own behaviour is a central part of Vygotsky's unique approach (emulating in the laboratory the cultural process of providing symbols for people), and I presume this is what "the instrumental method" means. But even in Thinking and Speech, he finds a place for tool-use in the development of intelligence, but he describes this as a "pre-linguistic" stage, both phylogenetically and ontogenetically. I'm no authority to say things act this way or that way but I'm allowed to display my understanding . In this very piece , V challenges "instrumental method" . In "Crisis" , he does the same . I wonder what you might take by encountering so much talk about the "New Psychology" or the "New Methodology" with lots of evidence he showers on us to document his sayings . Shortly , was he a Marxist of the Day or Not ? This could help us with many things . What seems to be ambiguous for me is the last three lines of the paragraph . Is that what you mean by pre-linguistic stage that after this stage , no use of tools is to be observed ? I'm sure you won't . Mike is all right with the term 'rudimentary' because the to-be MAN (primitive) acts on the instant , is interested in THROWING bones or dice not in their physical or chemical properties as is the case with later stages . Hence use of stimulus-device not sign-device . But with full use of tools and their sophistication we approach the appearance of language which converts the NATURAL functions . V even locates their due places , one the stem of the brain , the other the different layers of the cortex . We know about ANL saying a day might be reached when scientists become full workers and workers full scientists or quasi-scientists but that day has not yet arrived . Not to become lengthy , I refer to the important point that we do not internalize tools but we do internalize signs , speech and this is where V warns us against . ? The reason that Vygotsky gives us this story about the knot in the handkerchief and the coin-toss is that he wants to suggest a genesis of the semiotic use of artefacts which does *not* originate from the use of tools for working on matter. Yes , yes , Vygotsky says , I parrot it many times . Then , I put the question where does it come from (before rudiments) . Let me once again stress on the fact that V asserts the two lines of development are separate one from the other in phylogenesis .? His claim is of course entirely speculative and I take it to be a rhetorical move. So far as I know, Vygotsky is in agreement with the idea that collaboration creates the situation in which people need to share generalisations and thus "invent" speech properly so called. Here is in agreement with Engels, but I think he wants to assign only a very early (pre-linguistic) role to the tool, holding that the tool can only give rise to the *potential concept* and not a *true concept* as such. This idea is consistent with what the distributed cognition people want to do and also with the phylogenetic story told in the labour paradigm. In our own day, the role of tools in the formation of mind is really unmistakable. But I think we need to be just as flexible as I think Vygotsky was on these questions. What V says is use of tools finds its meaning within 'work activity' of which you are a master . But these lines smack of historic precedence of speech and co-constructing of speech over working activity . Where have I got wrong ? Haydi Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Haydi Zulfei wrote: > 2. Mike is so and for good reasons enchanted in "rudiments" of culture phenomena (throwing dice and bones , knots , notches in the wood to remember speech) . Good for him and us all . Yes , Buridan's ass gets spoilt in its indecision But man through inventing stimulus-device gets to salvation . But the problem is how many times has Mike , our Boss and confirmed global figure no need for it to be documented , asked himself what went before that juncture of time for the man to become 'MAN' ?? At this moment we are with LSV and at a very critical point of time . No more return to 'culture' to prove 'culture' . LSV says the error for some is to recount the story of mental through mental while they should know that mental processes go parallel with 'social' processes . What I gather at this very point is that he expects us to infer that the 'our present man of some will' owes his man/ness and decisiveness to his previous work activity necessitating use of tools . It seems we cannot take the idea to the uterine because V focuses on use of tools for a baby of 6 or of 10-12 months of age . It seems , both phylogenetically and ontogenetically , that it's not the case that 'gestures' ' eye contacts' come of their own and because of the man/ness and for the tuning-up with the universe through sounds and hymns and angels , etc. Man worked for life , performed ups and downs , shook his extremeties (one pair of hand) , consumed ! collective yellings and gesturing (as concomitant of work) . V says we can distinguish independent history of natural processes and independent history of cultural development separately 'phylogenetically' but not ontogenetically . In ontology , nature and culture work simultaneously contrary to phylogenesis . One cannot with ease and comfort say whichone goes with whichone .? > >? > From ablunden@mira.net Thu Dec 4 05:58:56 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 05 Dec 2014 00:58:56 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: labour and signs In-Reply-To: <1638274843.445412.1417699651665.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11124.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> References: <548002C6.5030907@mira.net> <1638274843.445412.1417699651665.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11124.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <548068A0.4080203@mira.net> Haydi, exactly what Vygotsky's idea was about this or that, at this or that time, is something beyond my powers to know. I just try to make sense as best I can of what I find in his writings. So I can only say what conclusions this has led me to. Participation in the labour process obviously conditions our activity and our thinking. But I take it that *true concepts* appear only through the use of signs. It will still be the case that such concept formation rests on tool-use - you can't eat words. Participation in the labour process (however broadly understood) necessarily entails using tools. I think the relation between tool and sign in concept formation is found in those two passages to which you drew our attention on "Word and Action": http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1934/tool-symbol.htm#s25 I don't think these two lines of development are separate - they are *distinct*, but not separate. I tend think that "historically" tool use was "prior" but it may not be the case, and I don't really think it matters. For example, according to Marx, the first phase of development of capital entailed gathering workers together in a workshop as wage workers, without making any change whatsoever in the labour process itself, and all the revolutionising of machinery only happened later. http://marxists.catbull.com/archive/marx/works/1864/economic/ch02a.htm So if that was how it worked in the dawn of humanity, that is, that the form of cooperation preceded the revolutionising of the means of labour, this would support the claim for sign use to pre-date tool-use in the formation of intellect. But I don't know and I doubt that anyone knows. The point is just that these two lines of development have their distinct bases and develop side by side in connection with one another. Hope that helps, Haydi. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Haydi Zulfei wrote: > > > I'm no authority to say things act this way or that way but I'm > allowed to display my understanding . In this very piece , V > challenges "instrumental method" . In "Crisis" , he does the same . I > wonder what you might take by encountering so much talk about the "New > Psychology" or the "New Methodology" with lots of evidence he showers > on us to document his sayings . Shortly , was he a Marxist of the Day > or Not ? This could help us with many things . What seems to be > ambiguous for me is the last three lines of the paragraph . Is that > what you mean by pre-linguistic stage that after this stage , no use > of tools is to be observed ? I'm sure you won't . Mike is all right > with the term 'rudimentary' because the to-be MAN (primitive) acts on > the instant , is interested in THROWING bones or dice not in their > physical or chemical properties as is the case with later stages . > Hence use of stimulus-device not sign-device . But with full use of > tools and their sophistication we approach the appearance of language > which converts the NATURAL functions . V even locates their due places > , one the stem of the brain , the other the different layers of the > cortex . We know about ANL saying a day might be reached when > scientists become full workers and workers full scientists or > quasi-scientists but that day has not yet arrived . Not to become > lengthy , I refer to the important point that we do not internalize > tools but we do internalize signs , speech and this is where V warns > us against . > > The reason that Vygotsky gives us this story about the knot in the > handkerchief and the coin-toss is that he wants to suggest a genesis of > the semiotic use of artefacts which does *not* originate from the use of > tools for working on matter. > > > Yes , yes , Vygotsky says , I parrot it many times . Then , I put the > question where does it come from (before rudiments) . Let me once > again stress on the fact that V asserts the two lines of development > are separate one from the other in phylogenesis . > > > > His claim is of course entirely speculative > and I take it to be a rhetorical move. So far as I know, Vygotsky is in > agreement with the idea that collaboration creates the situation in > which people need to share generalisations and thus "invent" speech > properly so called. Here is in agreement with Engels, but I think he > wants to assign only a very early (pre-linguistic) role to the tool, > holding that the tool can only give rise to the *potential concept* and > not a *true concept* as such. This idea is consistent with what the > distributed cognition people want to do and also with the phylogenetic > story told in the labour paradigm. In our own day, the role of tools in > the formation of mind is really unmistakable. But I think we need to be > just as flexible as I think Vygotsky was on these questions. > > > > What V says is use of tools finds its meaning within 'work activity' > of which you are a master . But these lines smack of historic > precedence of speech and co-constructing of speech over working > activity . Where have I got wrong ? > > > Haydi > > From hshonerd@gmail.com Thu Dec 4 10:35:43 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2014 11:35:43 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: labour and signs In-Reply-To: <548068A0.4080203@mira.net> References: <548002C6.5030907@mira.net> <1638274843.445412.1417699651665.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11124.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> <548068A0.4080203@mira.net> Message-ID: <66B9A63B-0FDB-44AF-9A3D-07BC658C2277@gmail.com> Andy and Haydi, Does it make any difference to this discussion that in the link to ?Word and Action?, word is equated with speech? What if word is equated with gesture, as in sign language? Henry > On Dec 4, 2014, at 6:58 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > Haydi, exactly what Vygotsky's idea was about this or that, at this or that time, is something beyond my powers to know. I just try to make sense as best I can of what I find in his writings. So I can only say what conclusions this has led me to. Participation in the labour process obviously conditions our activity and our thinking. But I take it that *true concepts* appear only through the use of signs. It will still be the case that such concept formation rests on tool-use - you can't eat words. Participation in the labour process (however broadly understood) necessarily entails using tools. I think the relation between tool and sign in concept formation is found in those two passages to which you drew our attention on "Word and Action": > > http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1934/tool-symbol.htm#s25 > > I don't think these two lines of development are separate - they are *distinct*, but not separate. > > I tend think that "historically" tool use was "prior" but it may not be the case, and I don't really think it matters. For example, according to Marx, the first phase of development of capital entailed gathering workers together in a workshop as wage workers, without making any change whatsoever in the labour process itself, and all the revolutionising of machinery only happened later. > > http://marxists.catbull.com/archive/marx/works/1864/economic/ch02a.htm > > So if that was how it worked in the dawn of humanity, that is, that the form of cooperation preceded the revolutionising of the means of labour, this would support the claim for sign use to pre-date tool-use in the formation of intellect. But I don't know and I doubt that anyone knows. The point is just that these two lines of development have their distinct bases and develop side by side in connection with one another. > > Hope that helps, Haydi. > Andy > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Haydi Zulfei wrote: >> >> >> I'm no authority to say things act this way or that way but I'm allowed to display my understanding . In this very piece , V challenges "instrumental method" . In "Crisis" , he does the same . I wonder what you might take by encountering so much talk about the "New Psychology" or the "New Methodology" with lots of evidence he showers on us to document his sayings . Shortly , was he a Marxist of the Day or Not ? This could help us with many things . What seems to be ambiguous for me is the last three lines of the paragraph . Is that what you mean by pre-linguistic stage that after this stage , no use of tools is to be observed ? I'm sure you won't . Mike is all right with the term 'rudimentary' because the to-be MAN (primitive) acts on the instant , is interested in THROWING bones or dice not in their physical or chemical properties as is the case with later stages . Hence use of stimulus-device not sign-device . But with full use of tools and their sophistication we approach the appearance of language which converts the NATURAL functions . V even locates their due places , one the stem of the brain , the other the different layers of the cortex . We know about ANL saying a day might be reached when scientists become full workers and workers full scientists or quasi-scientists but that day has not yet arrived . Not to become lengthy , I refer to the important point that we do not internalize tools but we do internalize signs , speech and this is where V warns us against . >> The reason that Vygotsky gives us this story about the knot in the >> handkerchief and the coin-toss is that he wants to suggest a genesis of >> the semiotic use of artefacts which does *not* originate from the use of >> tools for working on matter. >> >> >> Yes , yes , Vygotsky says , I parrot it many times . Then , I put the question where does it come from (before rudiments) . Let me once again stress on the fact that V asserts the two lines of development are separate one from the other in phylogenesis . >> >> >> His claim is of course entirely speculative >> and I take it to be a rhetorical move. So far as I know, Vygotsky is in >> agreement with the idea that collaboration creates the situation in >> which people need to share generalisations and thus "invent" speech >> properly so called. Here is in agreement with Engels, but I think he >> wants to assign only a very early (pre-linguistic) role to the tool, >> holding that the tool can only give rise to the *potential concept* and >> not a *true concept* as such. This idea is consistent with what the >> distributed cognition people want to do and also with the phylogenetic >> story told in the labour paradigm. In our own day, the role of tools in >> the formation of mind is really unmistakable. But I think we need to be >> just as flexible as I think Vygotsky was on these questions. >> >> >> >> What V says is use of tools finds its meaning within 'work activity' of which you are a master . But these lines smack of historic precedence of speech and co-constructing of speech over working activity . Where have I got wrong ? >> >> >> Haydi >> >> > From hshonerd@gmail.com Thu Dec 4 11:57:27 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2014 12:57:27 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances In-Reply-To: <960959130.5308930.1417680482491.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11131.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> References: <3A40602C-44A1-45C7-A7D1-36E1A842E92B@gmail.com> <960959130.5308930.1417680482491.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11131.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <53F75C8C-A8C4-41BC-A766-EBF960019B2B@gmail.com> Haydi, Thank you! I was overwrought, but well-meaning, in my response you you. There?s plenty of green in this chat. So, I?ll just stay grounded. Henry > On Dec 4, 2014, at 1:08 AM, Haydi Zulfei wrote: > > Henry Jaan > > (Jaan means more than the dearest) > > As you said before and you are saying now , here , > > We learn , > > We take our heart closer to that of the 'other' , > > And if just one drop falls down , > > All sterility turns to Green !! > > Love for all > > Haydi > > From: HENRY SHONERD > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Sent: Wednesday, 3 December 2014, 11:26:23 > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances > > Haydi, > Thank you so much! Here?s how it is for me: > I too have been waiting for Andy to come back. He is the reason I am in the chat. I have known about Vygotsky through Vera since the early 80s. But I, after my dissertation on L2 fluency in 1986, I worked as a teacher educator where research and publication wasn?t necessary for tenure and promotion. The college where I was working closed (bankruptcy) five years back and, like any working stiff, I am having to reinvent myself. So, in thrashing about I came to read Andy?s articles on "collaborative project" as a unit of analysis a few years back, started emailing with him one-on-one (and he was so generous with his time and patience in answering my questions about activity theory and Vygotsky), until he said it was time for me to join the chat. Andy mentored me until I had the courage to pipe up. Andy just edited a book on collaborative projects; Vera has written one of the papers for the book. I love them both. That?s how it is for me. > > Let me say that I consider myself a rank learner, always beginning. Mike has wisely rejected the role of Caesar on the chat. But we go to him asking him to sort out things amongst the unruly class. As a teacher, the hardest thing for me ever to do was to deal with disrespect between students. I have finally come to realize and accept that I want to be in a school where the students are nice to each other. Where respect and trust abound. Where human flourishing is possible. There is no father god to rescue us. We have to do it for ourselves. Well, like the song goes, ?I?m still willin?? Let?s make this a creative project, which means no unethical use of power. We can?t afford it. In my humble opinion. > > In gratitude and hope, > Henry > >> On Dec 3, 2014, at 11:00 AM, mike cole wrote: >> >> Haydi-- >> >> Like anyone on xmca, you can demand whatever you like. Getting people to >> implement your demands may be more >> difficult. In general, I have not experienced demands and resentment as >> particularly helpful on xmca, but thing are changing, >> so who knows. >> >> I am not putting ANL aside because of the concerns expressed in MCA in the >> past year or so. The concerns are real, at least to me. >> But there are many productive programs of research that use his ideas, >> along with those of LSV and many others, both Russian and non-Russian. >> >> I believe it would be helpful in receiving answers to your various comments >> and suggestions if some of them were constrained to particular threads. For >> example, the discussion of plank versus a piece of electronic equipment vis >> a vis the notion of artifact and mediation through artifacts, etc., might >> be be placed in that thread. >> >> etc. >> >> I clearly can be wrong in all of these judgments! >> mike >> >> >> >> On Wed, Dec 3, 2014 at 3:50 AM, Haydi Zulfei >> wrote: >> >>> Hi >>> >>> First of all , so resentfully I wonder If I can demand Andy's return to >>> the discussions !! No one can deny his great contributions to this Forum . >>> >>> Second , I might have been lost completely in your words , terms , >>> premises , and compositional nuances and colourings of your script as >>> native speakers , etc. >>> >>> >>> Third , because of obvious sensitivities towards ANL , I've altogether put >>> him to one side ; otherwise , in this concrete example of Michael , the >>> triad , activity , action , operation are boldly in view . >>> >>> >>> Fourth , I suppose LSV himself in two or three chapters of the "History of >>> Higher Mental Functions" has provided full response to our inquiries . Andy >>> , in time , sent the first two chapters to all . >>> >>> 1. He , after preliminary remarks , puts heavy emphasis on use of tools >>> and work activity in the parentheses and in italic characters . He >>> emphasizes that use of tool very naturally gets significant just within the >>> work activity process . Without the work activity we cannot expect much of >>> it . Then , as most of the time , he time and again references Marx and >>> Engels so as to prove his claims . >>> >>> >>> 2. Mike is so and for good reasons enchanted in "rudiments" of culture >>> phenomena (throwing dice and bones , knots , notches in the wood to >>> remember speech) . Good for him and us all . Yes , Buridan's ass gets >>> spoilt in its indecision But man through inventing stimulus-device gets to >>> salvation . But the problem is how many times has Mike , our Boss and >>> confirmed global figure no need for it to be documented , asked himself >>> what went before that juncture of time for the man to become 'MAN' ?? At >>> this moment we are with LSV and at a very critical point of time . No more >>> return to 'culture' to prove 'culture' . LSV says the error for some is to >>> recount the story of mental through mental while they should know that >>> mental processes go parallel with 'social' processes . What I gather at >>> this very point is that he expects us to infer that the 'our present man of >>> some will' owes his man/ness and decisiveness to his previous work activity >>> necessitating use of tools . It seems we cannot take the idea to the >>> uterine because V focuses on use of tools for a baby of 6 or of 10-12 >>> months of age . It seems , both phylogenetically and ontogenetically , that >>> it's not the case that 'gestures' ' eye contacts' come of their own and >>> because of the man/ness and for the tuning-up with the universe through >>> sounds and hymns and angels , etc. Man worked for life , performed ups and >>> downs , shook his extremeties (one pair of hand) , consumed ! collective >>> yellings and gesturing (as concomitant of work) . V says we can distinguish >>> independent history of natural processes and independent history of >>> cultural development separately 'phylogenetically' but not ontogenetically >>> . In ontology , nature and culture work simultaneously contrary to >>> phylogenesis . One cannot with ease and comfort say whichone goes with >>> whichone . >>> >>> >>> 3. Andy who is well aware of both CH and AT , on his sending of the four >>> pages and then the said two chapters , disclosed a very important point >>> neglected so far at the forum and that was the idea of the distinction >>> between tool and sign so fruitfully and enormously discussed by V and the >>> deep meaning that the simple diagram denoted . V says 'artifact' could be >>> cheating and deceitful but no one cares ! They invariably use artifacts and >>> through this , they ultimately remove 'material activity' from the domain >>> altogether . V is everywhere clear with both 'cultural , ideal activity' >>> and 'material activity' . Here is where quotes don't work . The one more >>> return to the plus-thousand previous reflections . No loss really ! V , if >>> necessary , prefers just 'mediation' . >>> >>> 4. With these in mind , I say for certain that here the plank is a tool >>> not an 'artifact' because it is not a sign signaling any other genuine >>> thing . It's all to itself . Also the light switch . And the whole activity >>> is a material one . Life put it in the way . According to V sign activity >>> affects one's own societal individual behaviour . We cannot generalize its >>> effect to the border of transforming Nature . Man through speech , dialogue >>> , discourse , talk , genre , etc. decides for the change in personal >>> behaviour ; if this potential preparedness for individual behavioral change >>> gets fossilized or ossified , then man will not reach the threshhold of the >>> bigger act and the vast field of the Mother Universe with its motley rich >>> material phenomena out of which each time he can select an object for a >>> circle of activity : starting an activity with a probable cryptic 'motive' >>> (what we don't yet know about which took him to the point of crossing) , >>> with a conscious goal (reaching the other side) through a concrete action >>> (crossing) operating according to the conditions at hand and on the ground >>> (light switching , wrestling between the ideal and the material (object , >>> subject , that is , thinking ideally about what to do with the whole thing >>> and the plank , then observing with the help of the light acting on the >>> object , again back to thinking if flaws are observed , etc. etc. no >>> blending of objective and subjective whatsoever . And I wonder why taking >>> affordance for a tool . >>> >>> >>> Soooooooooo much for one post . >>> >>> I considered spaces but wonder if it works . >>> I'll also be very quiet and slow in replying ! >>> >>> Best >>> >>> Haydi >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> From: mike cole >>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>> Sent: Tuesday, 2 December 2014, 11:26:46 >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances >>> >>> My view? >>> The plank is for certain an artifact, no less than the light bulb. On what >>> grounds, or under what circumstances, would you classify it otherwise? >>> What's gained, what's lost? >>> mike >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Glassman, Michael >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Hi Annalisa, Mike, Huw >>>> >>>> I tend to be somebody who reacts better to concrete examples than >>>> definitions. I believe this also comes from Gibson's 1977 book, >>>> >>>> You are walking across a field and come to a stream which you can to get >>>> across. You notice a plank across the stream. It is wide enough for you >>>> to keep your balance and thick enough to hold your weight, in using it >>> you >>>> recognize its affordance as a crossing point. It is the intersection of >>>> the movement, the perception of the plank, short term goal of the >>> activity >>>> (getting across the stream) - the recognition of the affordance comes in >>>> the subjective use of the object (which is why it is neither subjective >>> or >>>> objective). It is also important that you have the abilities (the >>> correct >>>> weight, the balance) to recognize the affordance, otherwise you pass the >>>> plank by. >>>> >>>> As far as perceived affordance. I think I have this right - the >>> perceived >>>> is not in the person who recognizes the affordance (otherwise you are >>>> right, that is wet water) it is whether there is an intention in the >>> design >>>> of the object. So I create a light switch with the intention of >>> designing >>>> it as having a perceived affordance for somebody who wants to switch on a >>>> light. As you can see different from the relationship to the plank, >>> where >>>> there is no prior design. >>>> >>>> Here is my question (perhaps answered in the Engestrom paper) >>>> >>>> The light switch is certainly an artifact, but is the plank? >>>> >>>> Michael >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 1:19 PM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances >>>> >>>> Those definitions help a lot Annalisa and touch on the fact that gibson >>>> seemed to empty the organism (if one were so inclined to interpret him) >>> and >>>> he dismissed culutral mediation as secondary at best. Still, they share >>> the >>>> idea that a part of the structure that psychologist theorize as a located >>>> inside of individual crania is in fact "our there" in the phylgenetically >>>> and cultural-historically constitued environment. And that drove >>> cognitive >>>> psychologists, our co discussants, nuts. Until, "they got it" and then >>>> sought to mold it to their own ends and pre-existing means. >>>> mike >>>> >>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 9:59 AM, Annalisa Aguilar >>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> I thought I'd do the honors and start a new thread on affordances, >>> which >>>>> isn't related to Larry's discussion of basic images. >>>>> >>>>> I figured as well to offer Gibson's words on affordances since it is a >>>>> word he invented to describe something he saw in the world. Of course >>> the >>>>> life of affordances has been full of controversy, especially with >>> regard >>>> to >>>>> understanding what they are. >>>>> >>>>> Gibson's Affordances is a theory I find instrumental to connecting >>>> outside >>>>> to inside experiences and I intuit that it is related to perezhivanie >>> in >>>>> some fashion. >>>>> >>>>> After reading the wikipage more closely, I regret offering a link to >>> the >>>>> text there because it isn't very clear what Gibson means or what Norman >>>>> means. To me, a "perceived affordance" is like saying "wet water." >>>>> >>>>> In any case, here are 3 quotes of Gibson in his own words, that I could >>>>> find: >>>>> >>>>> The affordances of the environment are what it _offers_ the animal, >>> what >>>>> it _provides_ or _furnishes_, either for good or ill. The verb "to >>>> afford" >>>>> is found in the dictionary, the noun "affordance" is not. I have made >>> it >>>>> up. I mean by it something that refers both to the environment and the >>>>> animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies the >>>> complementarity >>>>> of the animal and the environment (Gibson, 1977/1986). >>>>> >>>>> and >>>>> >>>>> What is meant by an _affordance_? ?Subject to revision, I suggest that >>>> the >>>>> affordance of anything is a specific combination of the properties of >>> its >>>>> substance and its surfaces taken with reference to an animal. The >>>> reference >>>>> may be to an animal as distinguished from other species (Gibson, >>>> 1977/1986). >>>>> >>>>> and >>>>> >>>>> An important fact about affordances of the environment is that they are >>>> in >>>>> a sense objective, real, and physical, unlike values and meanings, >>> which >>>>> are often supposed to be subjective, phenomenal, and mental. But >>>> actually, >>>>> an affordance is neither an objective property nor a subjective >>> property; >>>>> or it is both if you like. An affordance cuts across the dichotomy of >>>>> subjective-objective and helps us to understand its inadequacy. It is >>>>> equally a fact of the environment and a fact of behavior. It is both >>>>> physical and psychical, yet neither. An affordance points both ways, to >>>> the >>>>> environment and to the observer (Gibson, 1977/1986). >>>>> >>>>> These quotes are important to keep in mind, I hope they help. >>>>> >>>>> I might also suggest looking at Mace(1977) who described very carefully >>>>> how Gibson got from stimuli to affordance, given that people on this >>> list >>>>> value history, learning, and development. >>>>> >>>>> Kind regards, >>>>> >>>>> Annalisa >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>>>> on behalf of Huw Lloyd >>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 2, 2014 10:35 AM >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>> >>>>> I'd take a look. >>>>> >>>>> Michael, utility or technical affordance might fit. My equivalent of >>>> your >>>>> perceived/discovered distinction is one of planned and technically >>>>> manifest. >>>>> >>>>> Huw >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 2 December 2014 at 16:44, Glassman, Michael >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> I'd be interested in anybody else is. >>>>>> >>>>>> Michael >>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ >>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> ] >>>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 11:39 AM >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>> >>>>>> Interloper, Michael? >>>>>> >>>>>> The discussions at UCSD preceeding Don's use of affordances and >>>> cognitive >>>>>> artifacts were accompanied by other, related papers. One by Engestrom >>>> on >>>>>> "when is an artifact" and one or more by Ed Hutchins. If people are >>>>>> interested in pursuing this thread/topic the materials could be >>>> gathered >>>>>> up. >>>>>> >>>>>> mike >>>>>> >>>>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Glassman, Michael < >>> glassman.13@osu.edu >>>>> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea). >>> He >>>>>>> actually cops to both of them. The first was not to distinguish >>>>> between >>>>>>> affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which >>> are >>>>>>> designed. I think this is related to the issue of artifacts. >>>> Meaning >>>>>> are >>>>>>> artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to >>> be >>>>>>> discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong >>> word, >>>> if >>>>>>> anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances. It is a >>>>>> complex >>>>>>> question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes >>> based >>>> on >>>>>>> context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one >>>> context >>>>>> may >>>>>>> result in organic affordances in another context. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is that >>>> he >>>>>> was >>>>>>> not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and >>>>>> constraints. >>>>>>> Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived affordances >>> or >>>>> are >>>>>>> they designed to create constraints. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the >>>>> mention >>>>>>> just spurred me to throw this up. Hope I'm not being too much of >>> an >>>>>>> interloper. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Michael >>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ >>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> ] >>>>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM >>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Annalisa- >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation >>>> not >>>>>>> discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of >>>>>>> affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set >>> against >>>>>>> Gibson's ideas. The change of views coincided with the advent of >>> the >>>>>> d-cog >>>>>>> idea which also has deep roots in chat. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> No hidden history i know of, but interesting connections among the >>>>>> notion >>>>>>> of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion of >>>>> these >>>>>>> connections can be found, among other places, in >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Cole, M. & Engestr?m, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach >>> to >>>>>>> distributed* >>>>>>> *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition: >>>> Psychological >>>>>> and >>>>>>> educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> mike >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar >>> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Hi Mike, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied >>>> that >>>>>>> wish! >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important >>> connections. >>>> I >>>>>> was >>>>>>>> not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I >>> learned >>>>>> about >>>>>>>> Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science >>>> (1985). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Is there some history that is not part of the common story? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I looked here for clarity: >>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to >>>>>> cognitive >>>>>>>> artifacts? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in >>>> play, >>>>>> and >>>>>>>> even joy! >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however >>>> until >>>>>> then >>>>>>>> I will remain with the ineffable. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> on behalf of mike cole >>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM >>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And, >>>>>>>> co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive >>>>>> artifacts >>>>>>>> right about that time at UCSD. If it were possible to find a >>>> source >>>>>> that >>>>>>>> makes these connections visible and available to read about it >>>> might >>>>>> be a >>>>>>>> step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of >>>>> intro >>>>>>> for >>>>>>>> newcomers to the discussion. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a >>>>>> newcomer's >>>>>>>> introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is >>> seeking >>>>> to >>>>>>> sort >>>>>>>> out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am >>>>>>> insuficiently >>>>>>>> read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted! >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many >>>>> rocks, >>>>>> so >>>>>>>> little time"! >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Mike >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> A >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Martin! >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental >>>>> representation" >>>>>> is >>>>>>>>> coming closer! >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's >>>>> theory >>>>>> of >>>>>>>>> affordances. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed >>>> article. >>>>>> But >>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>> wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is >>>>>>> important >>>>>>>>> not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a >>>>>> grenade >>>>>>>>> pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the >>>> list. >>>>>> If >>>>>>>> you >>>>>>>>> can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look >>>> forward >>>>> to >>>>>>>> your >>>>>>>>> reply, Martin. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that >>> being >>>>> at >>>>>>> UCSD >>>>>>>>> and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that >>>>> influences >>>>>>> your >>>>>>>>> position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find >>>>>>> community >>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>> it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more >>> voluntary >>>>>>> phrased >>>>>>>>> that way). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of >>>>> Martin >>>>>>> John >>>>>>>>> Packer > >>>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM >>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> An interesting article, David. One way in which it is >>>> interesting, >>>>> to >>>>>>> me >>>>>>>>> at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not >>> used, >>>>>> even >>>>>>>>> once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" >>> images >>>> in >>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> world around us - material representations - and he tries to >>>> define >>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg < >>> dkellogg60@gmail.com >>>>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Larry, Annalisa: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" >>>> when >>>>>> we >>>>>>>>>> met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of >>>>>>> anything >>>>>>>>>> except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe >>>>> available >>>>>>>>>> for a standard price all over China) She does not even >>> remember >>>>>>>>>> whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was >>> the >>>>>>>>>> beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as >>> a >>>>>>>>>> non-image based mental representation. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental >>> representations >>>>> are >>>>>>>>>> images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth >>> century. >>>>> In >>>>>>>>>> fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against >>>>>>> Titchener >>>>>>>>>> and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, >>>>>>>>>> everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated >>>> that >>>>>>>>>> many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically >>>>>> anterior >>>>>>>>>> to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would >>>> not >>>>>> have >>>>>>>>>> time or ability to process complex problems in real time. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that >>> are >>>>>>>>>> genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more >>>>>> reading >>>>>>>>>> to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read >>> than >>>> I >>>>> am >>>>>>>>>> (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels >>>> like >>>>>>>>>> she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do >>>> NOT >>>>>> read >>>>>>>>>> this article--instead, look at Figure 11. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color >>> structure >>>> of >>>>>>>>>> Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any >>>>> actual >>>>>>>>>> images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural >>>>>>> experience >>>>>>>>>> associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then >>>>> deliberately >>>>>>>>>> frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any >>>>>>>>>> recognizable figures upon which to focus. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine >>> Chapel >>>>>> fresco >>>>>>>>>> for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. >>> He >>>> or >>>>>> she >>>>>>>>>> can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the >>> painting >>>>> and >>>>>>>>>> wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not >>>>> notice >>>>>>>>>> the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful >>> in >>>>> it. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar < >>>> annalisa@unm.edu >>>>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Hi Larry and David, >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are >>>> at >>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> root of all thinking. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, >>>> based >>>>>> upon >>>>>>>>> previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, >>> in >>>>>>>>> combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a >>>>> phrase >>>>>> I >>>>>>>> like >>>>>>>>> a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on >>> it >>>>> by >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know >>> it. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think >>> as >>>>>>> Hackett >>>>>>>>> describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have >>>> you >>>>>>>> already >>>>>>>>> given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be >>>>> willing >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> take a look. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is >>>>>>> controversial. >>>>>>>>> It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone >>>>> says >>>>>>>> "this >>>>>>>>> is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble >>>>>>> observation. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and >>> whatever >>>>>> that >>>>>>>>> process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at >>>>> hand? >>>>>>>> Just a >>>>>>>>> thought. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> What is it that appeals to you about this model, >>>> metaphoricity? >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of >>>> Larry >>>>>>>> Purss < >>>>>>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com > >>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM >>>>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity >>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> David K >>>>>>>>>>> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. >>>> My >>>>>>> reason >>>>>>>>> for >>>>>>>>>>> exploring these authors is I have been following a path >>>>> pursuing a >>>>>>>> basic >>>>>>>>>>> question. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic >>>>>> guiding >>>>>>>>> images >>>>>>>>>>> upon which thinking rests" >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring >>>>> appearances >>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>> illusions was also exploring this theme. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new >>>>> phenomenological >>>>>>>> path >>>>>>>>>>> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names >>>>> this >>>>>>>>> process >>>>>>>>>>> *metaphoricity*. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible >>>>>> image-character >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> *spontaneous event* of meaning. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which >>> he >>>>>>>> brackets - >>>>>>>>>>> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> AND >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* >>>> finds >>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> meaning of its very self. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this >>>>>>>>>>> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion >>> of >>>>>>>> metaphor >>>>>>>>> can >>>>>>>>>>> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is >>> implicated >>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>> *objectivity* >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of >>>>> itself >>>>>>>> *in* >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> mode [path] of the concept >>>>>>>>>>> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding >>>>> images >>>>>>> has >>>>>>>>> been >>>>>>>>>>> established. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the >>>> path >>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is >>> derived >>>>>> from >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> image-character of the guiding image. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial >>>> this >>>>>>> topic >>>>>>>>> may >>>>>>>>>>> become [again] >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by >>> this >>>>>> basic >>>>>>>>>>> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these >>>>> images >>>>>> as >>>>>>>>>>> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images >>>> emerge >>>>>>>>>>> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is >>>>> transcendental] >>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>>> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. >>>> It >>>>>>> seems >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I also realize this question may already be answered in >>>>> Vygotsky's >>>>>>>>> writings >>>>>>>>>>> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of >>>>> XMCA. I >>>>>>>>>>> personally am following this path for now. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >>> with >>>>> an >>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>>> an >>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>> an >>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Thu Dec 4 12:18:47 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2014 20:18:47 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] worth forwarding: Fwd: Quick dispatch from the ground References: <76aebab17e6301d4536d3ebec89776b3@bounce.bluestatedigital.com> Message-ID: <205E6BF0-B948-40AC-87E9-409F7FFED3F1@uniandes.edu.co> [NAACP] As the journey for justice enters its sixth day here in Missouri, our hearts are with our brothers and sisters in Staten Island. Another police officer will walk free from even a trial for killing an unarmed black man. I have simply run out of words to describe this anguish. Tomorrow we will reach the Governor's Mansion in Jefferson City, where we will summon the strength in memory of Eric, and Michael, and every other victim of injustice to demand action. Governor Nixon will see us here on the ground, but Martin, we need America to hear you online, too. Lend your Twitter and your Facebook feeds to our shared cause. Join us in demanding REAL police reforms and an end to police brutality and militarization. Earlier this week, President Obama announced new funding for police officers to wear cameras, and a modest tightening on the military equipment available to local departments. It is a good start, but the events of this week have made it clear it's simply not enough. So we march?for Michael Brown, for Eric Garner, and for the systemic, fundamental reforms of policing needed on the federal, state, AND local levels. I am ready to end the era in which our loved ones fear for their lives while walking down the street; in which those charged with serving and protecting too often do neither. If you are too, help us keep this vital issue in the public eye, and in the minds of those who can make a change. We need you on Friday. Dedicate your Facebook and Twitter feeds today: http://action.naacp.org/For-Michael-For-Eric In solidarity, Cornell William Brooks President and CEO NAACP [Dontate] [Find the NAACP on Facebook] [Follow the NAACP on Twitter] Donate | Join the NAACP | Blog | Take Action | Find Your Local Unit | Unsubscribe From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Thu Dec 4 13:22:03 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2014 21:22:03 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] classroom videos Message-ID: Folks, I'm searching for classroom videos that record consecutive lessons (preferably maths) for the same class (or group). Searching databases and online for videos with this kind of specificity seems to be rather problematic. So far, I've uncovered this link, which has numerous videos of single lessons. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/teachers-tv/teachers-tv If anyone here has some leads, it'd be good to hear them. Thanks, Huw From mcole@ucsd.edu Thu Dec 4 13:25:49 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2014 13:25:49 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: labour and signs In-Reply-To: <66B9A63B-0FDB-44AF-9A3D-07BC658C2277@gmail.com> References: <548002C6.5030907@mira.net> <1638274843.445412.1417699651665.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11124.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> <548068A0.4080203@mira.net> <66B9A63B-0FDB-44AF-9A3D-07BC658C2277@gmail.com> Message-ID: What if word is used in the context "in the beginning was the word"? It seems that in different contexts, LSV use of the term, word, varies in meaning. So being careful about the topic/context of usage may help us. (You don't have to take my word for it). :-) mike On Thu, Dec 4, 2014 at 10:35 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > Andy and Haydi, > Does it make any difference to this discussion that in the link to ?Word > and Action?, word is equated with speech? What if word is equated with > gesture, as in sign language? > Henry > > > On Dec 4, 2014, at 6:58 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > > Haydi, exactly what Vygotsky's idea was about this or that, at this or > that time, is something beyond my powers to know. I just try to make sense > as best I can of what I find in his writings. So I can only say what > conclusions this has led me to. Participation in the labour process > obviously conditions our activity and our thinking. But I take it that > *true concepts* appear only through the use of signs. It will still be the > case that such concept formation rests on tool-use - you can't eat words. > Participation in the labour process (however broadly understood) > necessarily entails using tools. I think the relation between tool and sign > in concept formation is found in those two passages to which you drew our > attention on "Word and Action": > > > > http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1934/tool-symbol.htm#s25 > > > > I don't think these two lines of development are separate - they are > *distinct*, but not separate. > > > > I tend think that "historically" tool use was "prior" but it may not be > the case, and I don't really think it matters. For example, according to > Marx, the first phase of development of capital entailed gathering workers > together in a workshop as wage workers, without making any change > whatsoever in the labour process itself, and all the revolutionising of > machinery only happened later. > > > > http://marxists.catbull.com/archive/marx/works/1864/economic/ch02a.htm > > > > So if that was how it worked in the dawn of humanity, that is, that the > form of cooperation preceded the revolutionising of the means of labour, > this would support the claim for sign use to pre-date tool-use in the > formation of intellect. But I don't know and I doubt that anyone knows. The > point is just that these two lines of development have their distinct bases > and develop side by side in connection with one another. > > > > Hope that helps, Haydi. > > Andy > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > Haydi Zulfei wrote: > >> > >> > >> I'm no authority to say things act this way or that way but I'm allowed > to display my understanding . In this very piece , V challenges > "instrumental method" . In "Crisis" , he does the same . I wonder what you > might take by encountering so much talk about the "New Psychology" or the > "New Methodology" with lots of evidence he showers on us to document his > sayings . Shortly , was he a Marxist of the Day or Not ? This could help us > with many things . What seems to be ambiguous for me is the last three > lines of the paragraph . Is that what you mean by pre-linguistic stage that > after this stage , no use of tools is to be observed ? I'm sure you won't . > Mike is all right with the term 'rudimentary' because the to-be MAN > (primitive) acts on the instant , is interested in THROWING bones or dice > not in their physical or chemical properties as is the case with later > stages . Hence use of stimulus-device not sign-device . But with full use > of tools and their sophistication we approach the appearance of language > which converts the NATURAL functions . V even locates their due places , > one the stem of the brain , the other the different layers of the cortex . > We know about ANL saying a day might be reached when scientists become full > workers and workers full scientists or quasi-scientists but that day has > not yet arrived . Not to become lengthy , I refer to the important point > that we do not internalize tools but we do internalize signs , speech and > this is where V warns us against . > >> The reason that Vygotsky gives us this story about the knot in the > >> handkerchief and the coin-toss is that he wants to suggest a genesis of > >> the semiotic use of artefacts which does *not* originate from the use of > >> tools for working on matter. > >> > >> > >> Yes , yes , Vygotsky says , I parrot it many times . Then , I put the > question where does it come from (before rudiments) . Let me once again > stress on the fact that V asserts the two lines of development are separate > one from the other in phylogenesis . > >> > >> > >> His claim is of course entirely speculative > >> and I take it to be a rhetorical move. So far as I know, Vygotsky is in > >> agreement with the idea that collaboration creates the situation in > >> which people need to share generalisations and thus "invent" speech > >> properly so called. Here is in agreement with Engels, but I think he > >> wants to assign only a very early (pre-linguistic) role to the tool, > >> holding that the tool can only give rise to the *potential concept* and > >> not a *true concept* as such. This idea is consistent with what the > >> distributed cognition people want to do and also with the phylogenetic > >> story told in the labour paradigm. In our own day, the role of tools in > >> the formation of mind is really unmistakable. But I think we need to be > >> just as flexible as I think Vygotsky was on these questions. > >> > >> > >> > >> What V says is use of tools finds its meaning within 'work activity' of > which you are a master . But these lines smack of historic precedence of > speech and co-constructing of speech over working activity . Where have I > got wrong ? > >> > >> > >> Haydi > >> > >> > > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From compernolle@gmail.com Thu Dec 4 13:30:00 2014 From: compernolle@gmail.com (=?windows-1252?Q?=22R=E9mi_A=2E_van_Compernolle=22?=) Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2014 16:30:00 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: classroom videos In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: you might check out http://talkbank.org/ there?s a lot of stuff there - not sure about consecutive lessons in math though. adam R?mi A. van Compernolle Assistant Professor of Second Language Acquisition & French and Francophone Studies Department of Modern Languages Carnegie Mellon University Baker Hall A60M 412-268-1122 On Dec 4, 2014, at 4:22 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > Folks, > > I'm searching for classroom videos that record consecutive lessons > (preferably maths) for the same class (or group). > > Searching databases and online for videos with this kind of specificity > seems to be rather problematic. > > So far, I've uncovered this link, which has numerous videos of single > lessons. > > https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/teachers-tv/teachers-tv > > If anyone here has some leads, it'd be good to hear them. > > Thanks, > Huw From alefstein@gmail.com Thu Dec 4 13:35:21 2014 From: alefstein@gmail.com (Adam Lefstein) Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2014 23:35:21 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: classroom videos In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: I'm not sure about consecutive lessons. For maths, I think you'll find the links here helpful: http://rationalexpressions.blogspot.com/p/classroom-footage.html (and check out his blog too). Good luck, adam On 4 December 2014 at 23:30, "R?mi A. van Compernolle" < compernolle@gmail.com> wrote: > you might check out http://talkbank.org/ > > there?s a lot of stuff there - not sure about consecutive lessons in math > though. > > adam > > > R?mi A. van Compernolle > Assistant Professor of Second Language Acquisition & French and > Francophone Studies > Department of Modern Languages > Carnegie Mellon University > Baker Hall A60M > 412-268-1122 > > > > On Dec 4, 2014, at 4:22 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > Folks, > > > > I'm searching for classroom videos that record consecutive lessons > > (preferably maths) for the same class (or group). > > > > Searching databases and online for videos with this kind of specificity > > seems to be rather problematic. > > > > So far, I've uncovered this link, which has numerous videos of single > > lessons. > > > > https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/teachers-tv/teachers-tv > > > > If anyone here has some leads, it'd be good to hear them. > > > > Thanks, > > Huw > > > -- Adam Lefstein Department of Education Ben-Gurion University of the Negev lefstein@bgu.ac.il Now published: *Better than Best Practice: Developing Teaching and Learning through Dialogue *(with Julia Snell, from Routledge). For details, see dialogicpedagogy.com . From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Thu Dec 4 13:35:12 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2014 21:35:12 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: classroom videos In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <37DB7D55-03D9-45C0-AD5C-42832B94DA65@uniandes.edu.co> Maggie Lambert at U Michigan created a huge database of videos (and more) of her own math instruction, if I remember correctly. Martin On Dec 4, 2014, at 4:30 PM, R?mi A. van Compernolle wrote: > you might check out http://talkbank.org/ > > there?s a lot of stuff there - not sure about consecutive lessons in math though. > > adam > > > R?mi A. van Compernolle > Assistant Professor of Second Language Acquisition & French and Francophone Studies > Department of Modern Languages > Carnegie Mellon University > Baker Hall A60M > 412-268-1122 > > > > On Dec 4, 2014, at 4:22 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> Folks, >> >> I'm searching for classroom videos that record consecutive lessons >> (preferably maths) for the same class (or group). >> >> Searching databases and online for videos with this kind of specificity >> seems to be rather problematic. >> >> So far, I've uncovered this link, which has numerous videos of single >> lessons. >> >> https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/teachers-tv/teachers-tv >> >> If anyone here has some leads, it'd be good to hear them. >> >> Thanks, >> Huw > > From ewall@umich.edu Thu Dec 4 14:34:48 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2014 16:34:48 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: classroom videos In-Reply-To: <37DB7D55-03D9-45C0-AD5C-42832B94DA65@uniandes.edu.co> References: <37DB7D55-03D9-45C0-AD5C-42832B94DA65@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Both Deborah Ball and Maggie Lampert at UM (same year, different grades) created a huge collection. I don't think Maggie will let you a have access to hers although you might be able to view it in person ( I guess you could ask Tim Boerst to see what he says - tboerst@umich.edu); however, it may be possible if you contact Kara Suzuki( ksuzuka@umich.edu )- as she manages the interface for Deborah Ball's collection - that you would be allowed to access, with some substantial constraints, Deborah's collection. Also Ruth Heaton taught the same year as Maggie and Deborah a grad student and she wrote up her experience (I think there were some consecutive lessons in her book ('Teaching Mathematics to the New Standards). There was a large project in the Netherlands to do video work also, but I believe it has been discontinued. Perhaps some of the people at the Freudenthal Institute would have information. The UM has also put on line what is termed the Teaching & Learning Exploratory (https://tle.soe.umich.edu/) which does have a large number of classroom lessons (but I don't think any consecutive; however, I've never checked). Again, there are constraints that you would need to observe and not being able to use the lessons for research purposes is one of the usual. In any case,as I indicated, it is somewhat unlikely that anyone would give you access - because of the human subjects business - without some substantial constraints. I would suggest that you find somebody that is doing a study and become a member of the research team or, as a number of persons at UM, do doctoral work under someone who has such a database. I know that if and how giving people access to such video for research purposes is an ongoing debate. Ed On Dec 4, 2014, at 3:35 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > Maggie Lambert at U Michigan created a huge database of videos (and more) of her own math instruction, if I remember correctly. > > Martin > > On Dec 4, 2014, at 4:30 PM, R?mi A. van Compernolle wrote: > >> you might check out http://talkbank.org/ >> >> there?s a lot of stuff there - not sure about consecutive lessons in math though. >> >> adam >> >> >> R?mi A. van Compernolle >> Assistant Professor of Second Language Acquisition & French and Francophone Studies >> Department of Modern Languages >> Carnegie Mellon University >> Baker Hall A60M >> 412-268-1122 >> >> >> >> On Dec 4, 2014, at 4:22 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: >> >>> Folks, >>> >>> I'm searching for classroom videos that record consecutive lessons >>> (preferably maths) for the same class (or group). >>> >>> Searching databases and online for videos with this kind of specificity >>> seems to be rather problematic. >>> >>> So far, I've uncovered this link, which has numerous videos of single >>> lessons. >>> >>> https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/teachers-tv/teachers-tv >>> >>> If anyone here has some leads, it'd be good to hear them. >>> >>> Thanks, >>> Huw >> >> > > From ewall@umich.edu Thu Dec 4 14:43:18 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2014 16:43:18 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: classroom videos In-Reply-To: References: <37DB7D55-03D9-45C0-AD5C-42832B94DA65@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <1E6D5767-977B-4AF3-9EFC-79C325954053@umich.edu> I just remembered (I was thinking of school based classes in the previous email) that you may be able to get access to the real thing (and again some constrained use of video) by observing a summer class taught by Deborah Ball at the UM (I assume it will be taught again this year) where she does two weeks of a mathematics class (usually going into 5th) with struggling students. You get to watch, look at the video, and talk with her and others (smile). Ed On Dec 4, 2014, at 4:34 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > Both Deborah Ball and Maggie Lampert at UM (same year, different grades) created a huge collection. I don't think Maggie will let you a have access to hers although you might be able to view it in person ( I guess you could ask Tim Boerst to see what he says - tboerst@umich.edu); however, it may be possible if you contact Kara Suzuki( ksuzuka@umich.edu )- as she manages the interface for Deborah Ball's collection - that you would be allowed to access, with some substantial constraints, Deborah's collection. Also Ruth Heaton taught the same year as Maggie and Deborah a grad student and she wrote up her experience (I think there were some consecutive lessons in her book ('Teaching Mathematics to the New Standards). There was a large project in the Netherlands to do video work also, but I believe it has been discontinued. Perhaps some of the people at the Freudenthal Institute would have information. > The UM has also put on line what is termed the Teaching & Learning Exploratory (https://tle.soe.umich.edu/) which does have a large number of classroom lessons (but I don't think any consecutive; however, I've never checked). Again, there are constraints that you would need to observe and not being able to use the lessons for research purposes is one of the usual. > > In any case,as I indicated, it is somewhat unlikely that anyone would give you access - because of the human subjects business - without some substantial constraints. I would suggest that you find somebody that is doing a study and become a member of the research team or, as a number of persons at UM, do doctoral work under someone who has such a database. > > I know that if and how giving people access to such video for research purposes is an ongoing debate. > > Ed > > On Dec 4, 2014, at 3:35 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > >> Maggie Lambert at U Michigan created a huge database of videos (and more) of her own math instruction, if I remember correctly. >> >> Martin >> >> On Dec 4, 2014, at 4:30 PM, R?mi A. van Compernolle wrote: >> >>> you might check out http://talkbank.org/ >>> >>> there?s a lot of stuff there - not sure about consecutive lessons in math though. >>> >>> adam >>> >>> >>> R?mi A. van Compernolle >>> Assistant Professor of Second Language Acquisition & French and Francophone Studies >>> Department of Modern Languages >>> Carnegie Mellon University >>> Baker Hall A60M >>> 412-268-1122 >>> >>> >>> >>> On Dec 4, 2014, at 4:22 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: >>> >>>> Folks, >>>> >>>> I'm searching for classroom videos that record consecutive lessons >>>> (preferably maths) for the same class (or group). >>>> >>>> Searching databases and online for videos with this kind of specificity >>>> seems to be rather problematic. >>>> >>>> So far, I've uncovered this link, which has numerous videos of single >>>> lessons. >>>> >>>> https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/teachers-tv/teachers-tv >>>> >>>> If anyone here has some leads, it'd be good to hear them. >>>> >>>> Thanks, >>>> Huw >>> >>> >> >> > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Thu Dec 4 15:14:47 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2014 23:14:47 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: classroom videos In-Reply-To: References: <37DB7D55-03D9-45C0-AD5C-42832B94DA65@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Remi, Adam, Martin & Ed, Thanks for all these links, which I'm starting to step through. I think the points Ed raises are rather significant ones. Access to quality data can transform a field of research. Huw On 4 December 2014 at 22:34, Ed Wall wrote: > Both Deborah Ball and Maggie Lampert at UM (same year, different > grades) created a huge collection. I don't think Maggie will let you a have > access to hers although you might be able to view it in person ( I guess > you could ask Tim Boerst to see what he says - tboerst@umich.edu); > however, it may be possible if you contact Kara Suzuki( ksuzuka@umich.edu > )- as she manages the interface for Deborah Ball's collection - that you > would be allowed to access, with some substantial constraints, Deborah's > collection. Also Ruth Heaton taught the same year as Maggie and Deborah a > grad student and she wrote up her experience (I think there were some > consecutive lessons in her book ('Teaching Mathematics to the New > Standards). There was a large project in the Netherlands to do video work > also, but I believe it has been discontinued. Perhaps some of the people at > the Freudenthal Institute would have information. > The UM has also put on line what is termed the Teaching & Learning > Exploratory (https://tle.soe.umich.edu/) which does have a large number > of classroom lessons (but I don't think any consecutive; however, I've > never checked). Again, there are constraints that you would need to observe > and not being able to use the lessons for research purposes is one of the > usual. > > In any case,as I indicated, it is somewhat unlikely that anyone would > give you access - because of the human subjects business - without some > substantial constraints. I would suggest that you find somebody that is > doing a study and become a member of the research team or, as a number of > persons at UM, do doctoral work under someone who has such a database. > > I know that if and how giving people access to such video for > research purposes is an ongoing debate. > > Ed > > On Dec 4, 2014, at 3:35 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > > > Maggie Lambert at U Michigan created a huge database of videos (and > more) of her own math instruction, if I remember correctly. > > > > Martin > > > > On Dec 4, 2014, at 4:30 PM, R?mi A. van Compernolle < > compernolle@gmail.com> wrote: > > > >> you might check out http://talkbank.org/ > >> > >> there?s a lot of stuff there - not sure about consecutive lessons in > math though. > >> > >> adam > >> > >> > >> R?mi A. van Compernolle > >> Assistant Professor of Second Language Acquisition & French and > Francophone Studies > >> Department of Modern Languages > >> Carnegie Mellon University > >> Baker Hall A60M > >> 412-268-1122 > >> > >> > >> > >> On Dec 4, 2014, at 4:22 PM, Huw Lloyd > wrote: > >> > >>> Folks, > >>> > >>> I'm searching for classroom videos that record consecutive lessons > >>> (preferably maths) for the same class (or group). > >>> > >>> Searching databases and online for videos with this kind of specificity > >>> seems to be rather problematic. > >>> > >>> So far, I've uncovered this link, which has numerous videos of single > >>> lessons. > >>> > >>> https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/teachers-tv/teachers-tv > >>> > >>> If anyone here has some leads, it'd be good to hear them. > >>> > >>> Thanks, > >>> Huw > >> > >> > > > > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Thu Dec 4 15:57:38 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 05 Dec 2014 10:57:38 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: labour and signs In-Reply-To: References: <548002C6.5030907@mira.net> <1638274843.445412.1417699651665.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11124.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> <548068A0.4080203@mira.net> <66B9A63B-0FDB-44AF-9A3D-07BC658C2277@gmail.com> Message-ID: <5480F4F2.4050000@mira.net> What an excellent reference, Mike! https://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/words/ch07.htm#deed (the 4th last paragraph of Thinking and Speech): "The connection between thought and word is not a primal connection that is given once and forever. It arises in development and itself develops. ?In the beginning was the word.""? Goethe answered this Biblical phrase through Faust: ?In the beginning was the deed."? Through this statement, Goethe wished to counteract the word?s over-valuation. Gutsman has noted, however, that we can agree with Goethe that the word as such should not be overvaluated and can concur in his transformation of the Biblical line to, ?In the beginning was the //deed/.? /Nonetheless, if we consider the history of development, we can still read this line with a different emphasis: ?In the //beginning/ /was the deed.? Gutsman?s argument is that the word is a higher stage in man?s development than the highest manifestation of action. He is right. The word did not exist in the beginning. In the beginning was the deed. The formation of the word occurs nearer the end than the beginning of development. The word is the end that crowns the deed." Surely the last word on the matter. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ mike cole wrote: > What if word is used in the context "in the beginning was the word"? > It seems that in different contexts, LSV use of the term, word, varies > in meaning. So being careful about the topic/context of usage may help us. > > (You don't have to take my word for it). :-) > > mike > > > On Thu, Dec 4, 2014 at 10:35 AM, HENRY SHONERD > wrote: > > Andy and Haydi, > Does it make any difference to this discussion that in the link to > ?Word and Action?, word is equated with speech? What if word is > equated with gesture, as in sign language? > Henry > > > On Dec 4, 2014, at 6:58 AM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > > > Haydi, exactly what Vygotsky's idea was about this or that, at > this or that time, is something beyond my powers to know. I just > try to make sense as best I can of what I find in his writings. So > I can only say what conclusions this has led me to. Participation > in the labour process obviously conditions our activity and our > thinking. But I take it that *true concepts* appear only through > the use of signs. It will still be the case that such concept > formation rests on tool-use - you can't eat words. Participation > in the labour process (however broadly understood) necessarily > entails using tools. I think the relation between tool and sign in > concept formation is found in those two passages to which you drew > our attention on "Word and Action": > > > > > http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1934/tool-symbol.htm#s25 > > > > I don't think these two lines of development are separate - they > are *distinct*, but not separate. > > > > I tend think that "historically" tool use was "prior" but it may > not be the case, and I don't really think it matters. For example, > according to Marx, the first phase of development of capital > entailed gathering workers together in a workshop as wage workers, > without making any change whatsoever in the labour process itself, > and all the revolutionising of machinery only happened later. > > > > > http://marxists.catbull.com/archive/marx/works/1864/economic/ch02a.htm > > > > So if that was how it worked in the dawn of humanity, that is, > that the form of cooperation preceded the revolutionising of the > means of labour, this would support the claim for sign use to > pre-date tool-use in the formation of intellect. But I don't know > and I doubt that anyone knows. The point is just that these two > lines of development have their distinct bases and develop side by > side in connection with one another. > > > > Hope that helps, Haydi. > > Andy > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > Haydi Zulfei wrote: > >> > >> > >> I'm no authority to say things act this way or that way but I'm > allowed to display my understanding . In this very piece , V > challenges "instrumental method" . In "Crisis" , he does the same > . I wonder what you might take by encountering so much talk about > the "New Psychology" or the "New Methodology" with lots of > evidence he showers on us to document his sayings . Shortly , was > he a Marxist of the Day or Not ? This could help us with many > things . What seems to be ambiguous for me is the last three lines > of the paragraph . Is that what you mean by pre-linguistic stage > that after this stage , no use of tools is to be observed ? I'm > sure you won't . Mike is all right with the term 'rudimentary' > because the to-be MAN (primitive) acts on the instant , is > interested in THROWING bones or dice not in their physical or > chemical properties as is the case with later stages . Hence use > of stimulus-device not sign-device . But with full use of tools > and their sophistication we approach the appearance of language > which converts the NATURAL functions . V even locates their due > places , one the stem of the brain , the other the different > layers of the cortex . We know about ANL saying a day might be > reached when scientists become full workers and workers full > scientists or quasi-scientists but that day has not yet arrived . > Not to become lengthy , I refer to the important point that we do > not internalize tools but we do internalize signs , speech and > this is where V warns us against . > >> The reason that Vygotsky gives us this story about the knot in the > >> handkerchief and the coin-toss is that he wants to suggest a > genesis of > >> the semiotic use of artefacts which does *not* originate from > the use of > >> tools for working on matter. > >> > >> > >> Yes , yes , Vygotsky says , I parrot it many times . Then , I > put the question where does it come from (before rudiments) . Let > me once again stress on the fact that V asserts the two lines of > development are separate one from the other in phylogenesis . > >> > >> > >> His claim is of course entirely speculative > >> and I take it to be a rhetorical move. So far as I know, > Vygotsky is in > >> agreement with the idea that collaboration creates the situation in > >> which people need to share generalisations and thus "invent" speech > >> properly so called. Here is in agreement with Engels, but I > think he > >> wants to assign only a very early (pre-linguistic) role to the > tool, > >> holding that the tool can only give rise to the *potential > concept* and > >> not a *true concept* as such. This idea is consistent with what the > >> distributed cognition people want to do and also with the > phylogenetic > >> story told in the labour paradigm. In our own day, the role of > tools in > >> the formation of mind is really unmistakable. But I think we > need to be > >> just as flexible as I think Vygotsky was on these questions. > >> > >> > >> > >> What V says is use of tools finds its meaning within 'work > activity' of which you are a master . But these lines smack of > historic precedence of speech and co-constructing of speech over > working activity . Where have I got wrong ? > >> > >> > >> Haydi > >> > >> > > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Thu Dec 4 16:07:04 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2014 16:07:04 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: labour and signs In-Reply-To: <5480F4F2.4050000@mira.net> References: <548002C6.5030907@mira.net> <1638274843.445412.1417699651665.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11124.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> <548068A0.4080203@mira.net> <66B9A63B-0FDB-44AF-9A3D-07BC658C2277@gmail.com> <5480F4F2.4050000@mira.net> Message-ID: Which still leaves us with the question of how language developed out of other forms of action -- in phylogeny and ontogeny-- as Haydi emphasized recently. mike On Thu, Dec 4, 2014 at 3:57 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > What an excellent reference, Mike! > https://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/words/ch07.htm#deed (the > 4th last paragraph of Thinking and Speech): > > "The connection between thought and word is not a primal connection > that is given once and forever. It arises in development and itself > develops. ?In the beginning was the word.""? Goethe answered this > Biblical phrase through Faust: ?In the beginning was the deed."? > Through this statement, Goethe wished to counteract the word?s > over-valuation. Gutsman has noted, however, that we can agree with > Goethe that the word as such should not be overvaluated and can > concur in his transformation of the Biblical line to, ?In the > beginning was the //deed/.? /Nonetheless, if we consider the history > of development, we can still read this line with a different > emphasis: ?In the //beginning/ /was the deed.? Gutsman?s argument is > that the word is a higher stage in man?s development than the > highest manifestation of action. He is right. The word did not exist > in the beginning. In the beginning was the deed. The formation of > the word occurs nearer the end than the beginning of development. > The word is the end that crowns the deed." > > Surely the last word on the matter. > > Andy > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > mike cole wrote: > >> What if word is used in the context "in the beginning was the word"? It >> seems that in different contexts, LSV use of the term, word, varies in >> meaning. So being careful about the topic/context of usage may help us. >> >> (You don't have to take my word for it). :-) >> >> mike >> >> >> On Thu, Dec 4, 2014 at 10:35 AM, HENRY SHONERD > > wrote: >> >> Andy and Haydi, >> Does it make any difference to this discussion that in the link to >> ?Word and Action?, word is equated with speech? What if word is >> equated with gesture, as in sign language? >> Henry >> >> > On Dec 4, 2014, at 6:58 AM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: >> > >> > Haydi, exactly what Vygotsky's idea was about this or that, at >> this or that time, is something beyond my powers to know. I just >> try to make sense as best I can of what I find in his writings. So >> I can only say what conclusions this has led me to. Participation >> in the labour process obviously conditions our activity and our >> thinking. But I take it that *true concepts* appear only through >> the use of signs. It will still be the case that such concept >> formation rests on tool-use - you can't eat words. Participation >> in the labour process (however broadly understood) necessarily >> entails using tools. I think the relation between tool and sign in >> concept formation is found in those two passages to which you drew >> our attention on "Word and Action": >> > >> > >> http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1934/ >> tool-symbol.htm#s25 >> > >> > I don't think these two lines of development are separate - they >> are *distinct*, but not separate. >> > >> > I tend think that "historically" tool use was "prior" but it may >> not be the case, and I don't really think it matters. For example, >> according to Marx, the first phase of development of capital >> entailed gathering workers together in a workshop as wage workers, >> without making any change whatsoever in the labour process itself, >> and all the revolutionising of machinery only happened later. >> > >> > >> http://marxists.catbull.com/archive/marx/works/1864/ >> economic/ch02a.htm >> > >> > So if that was how it worked in the dawn of humanity, that is, >> that the form of cooperation preceded the revolutionising of the >> means of labour, this would support the claim for sign use to >> pre-date tool-use in the formation of intellect. But I don't know >> and I doubt that anyone knows. The point is just that these two >> lines of development have their distinct bases and develop side by >> side in connection with one another. >> > >> > Hope that helps, Haydi. >> > Andy >> > >> > >> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> ------------ >> > *Andy Blunden* >> > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> > >> > >> > Haydi Zulfei wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> I'm no authority to say things act this way or that way but I'm >> allowed to display my understanding . In this very piece , V >> challenges "instrumental method" . In "Crisis" , he does the same >> . I wonder what you might take by encountering so much talk about >> the "New Psychology" or the "New Methodology" with lots of >> evidence he showers on us to document his sayings . Shortly , was >> he a Marxist of the Day or Not ? This could help us with many >> things . What seems to be ambiguous for me is the last three lines >> of the paragraph . Is that what you mean by pre-linguistic stage >> that after this stage , no use of tools is to be observed ? I'm >> sure you won't . Mike is all right with the term 'rudimentary' >> because the to-be MAN (primitive) acts on the instant , is >> interested in THROWING bones or dice not in their physical or >> chemical properties as is the case with later stages . Hence use >> of stimulus-device not sign-device . But with full use of tools >> and their sophistication we approach the appearance of language >> which converts the NATURAL functions . V even locates their due >> places , one the stem of the brain , the other the different >> layers of the cortex . We know about ANL saying a day might be >> reached when scientists become full workers and workers full >> scientists or quasi-scientists but that day has not yet arrived . >> Not to become lengthy , I refer to the important point that we do >> not internalize tools but we do internalize signs , speech and >> this is where V warns us against . >> >> The reason that Vygotsky gives us this story about the knot in the >> >> handkerchief and the coin-toss is that he wants to suggest a >> genesis of >> >> the semiotic use of artefacts which does *not* originate from >> the use of >> >> tools for working on matter. >> >> >> >> >> >> Yes , yes , Vygotsky says , I parrot it many times . Then , I >> put the question where does it come from (before rudiments) . Let >> me once again stress on the fact that V asserts the two lines of >> development are separate one from the other in phylogenesis . >> >> >> >> >> >> His claim is of course entirely speculative >> >> and I take it to be a rhetorical move. So far as I know, >> Vygotsky is in >> >> agreement with the idea that collaboration creates the situation in >> >> which people need to share generalisations and thus "invent" speech >> >> properly so called. Here is in agreement with Engels, but I >> think he >> >> wants to assign only a very early (pre-linguistic) role to the >> tool, >> >> holding that the tool can only give rise to the *potential >> concept* and >> >> not a *true concept* as such. This idea is consistent with what the >> >> distributed cognition people want to do and also with the >> phylogenetic >> >> story told in the labour paradigm. In our own day, the role of >> tools in >> >> the formation of mind is really unmistakable. But I think we >> need to be >> >> just as flexible as I think Vygotsky was on these questions. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> What V says is use of tools finds its meaning within 'work >> activity' of which you are a master . But these lines smack of >> historic precedence of speech and co-constructing of speech over >> working activity . Where have I got wrong ? >> >> >> >> >> >> Haydi >> >> >> >> >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> >> >> > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From ablunden@mira.net Thu Dec 4 16:16:56 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 05 Dec 2014 11:16:56 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: labour and signs In-Reply-To: References: <548002C6.5030907@mira.net> <1638274843.445412.1417699651665.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11124.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> <548068A0.4080203@mira.net> <66B9A63B-0FDB-44AF-9A3D-07BC658C2277@gmail.com> <5480F4F2.4050000@mira.net> Message-ID: <5480F978.7000805@mira.net> can you explain, Mike? andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ mike cole wrote: > Which still leaves us with the question of how language developed out > of other forms of action -- in phylogeny and ontogeny-- as Haydi > emphasized recently. > mike > > On Thu, Dec 4, 2014 at 3:57 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > What an excellent reference, Mike! > https://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/words/ch07.htm#deed > (the 4th last paragraph of Thinking and Speech): > > "The connection between thought and word is not a primal connection > that is given once and forever. It arises in development and itself > develops. ?In the beginning was the word.""? Goethe answered this > Biblical phrase through Faust: ?In the beginning was the deed."? > Through this statement, Goethe wished to counteract the word?s > over-valuation. Gutsman has noted, however, that we can agree with > Goethe that the word as such should not be overvaluated and can > concur in his transformation of the Biblical line to, ?In the > beginning was the //deed/.? /Nonetheless, if we consider the > history > of development, we can still read this line with a different > emphasis: ?In the //beginning/ /was the deed.? Gutsman?s > argument is > that the word is a higher stage in man?s development than the > highest manifestation of action. He is right. The word did not > exist > in the beginning. In the beginning was the deed. The formation of > the word occurs nearer the end than the beginning of development. > The word is the end that crowns the deed." > > Surely the last word on the matter. > > Andy > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > mike cole wrote: > > What if word is used in the context "in the beginning was the > word"? It seems that in different contexts, LSV use of the > term, word, varies in meaning. So being careful about the > topic/context of usage may help us. > > (You don't have to take my word for it). :-) > > mike > > > On Thu, Dec 4, 2014 at 10:35 AM, HENRY SHONERD > > >> wrote: > > Andy and Haydi, > Does it make any difference to this discussion that in the > link to > ?Word and Action?, word is equated with speech? What if > word is > equated with gesture, as in sign language? > Henry > > > On Dec 4, 2014, at 6:58 AM, Andy Blunden > > >> wrote: > > > > Haydi, exactly what Vygotsky's idea was about this or > that, at > this or that time, is something beyond my powers to know. > I just > try to make sense as best I can of what I find in his > writings. So > I can only say what conclusions this has led me to. > Participation > in the labour process obviously conditions our activity > and our > thinking. But I take it that *true concepts* appear only > through > the use of signs. It will still be the case that such concept > formation rests on tool-use - you can't eat words. > Participation > in the labour process (however broadly understood) necessarily > entails using tools. I think the relation between tool and > sign in > concept formation is found in those two passages to which > you drew > our attention on "Word and Action": > > > > > > http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1934/tool-symbol.htm#s25 > > > > I don't think these two lines of development are > separate - they > are *distinct*, but not separate. > > > > I tend think that "historically" tool use was "prior" > but it may > not be the case, and I don't really think it matters. For > example, > according to Marx, the first phase of development of capital > entailed gathering workers together in a workshop as wage > workers, > without making any change whatsoever in the labour process > itself, > and all the revolutionising of machinery only happened later. > > > > > > http://marxists.catbull.com/archive/marx/works/1864/economic/ch02a.htm > > > > So if that was how it worked in the dawn of humanity, > that is, > that the form of cooperation preceded the revolutionising > of the > means of labour, this would support the claim for sign use to > pre-date tool-use in the formation of intellect. But I > don't know > and I doubt that anyone knows. The point is just that > these two > lines of development have their distinct bases and develop > side by > side in connection with one another. > > > > Hope that helps, Haydi. > > Andy > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > > Haydi Zulfei wrote: > >> > >> > >> I'm no authority to say things act this way or that way > but I'm > allowed to display my understanding . In this very piece , V > challenges "instrumental method" . In "Crisis" , he does > the same > . I wonder what you might take by encountering so much > talk about > the "New Psychology" or the "New Methodology" with lots of > evidence he showers on us to document his sayings . > Shortly , was > he a Marxist of the Day or Not ? This could help us with many > things . What seems to be ambiguous for me is the last > three lines > of the paragraph . Is that what you mean by pre-linguistic > stage > that after this stage , no use of tools is to be observed > ? I'm > sure you won't . Mike is all right with the term 'rudimentary' > because the to-be MAN (primitive) acts on the instant , is > interested in THROWING bones or dice not in their physical or > chemical properties as is the case with later stages . > Hence use > of stimulus-device not sign-device . But with full use of > tools > and their sophistication we approach the appearance of > language > which converts the NATURAL functions . V even locates > their due > places , one the stem of the brain , the other the different > layers of the cortex . We know about ANL saying a day might be > reached when scientists become full workers and workers full > scientists or quasi-scientists but that day has not yet > arrived . > Not to become lengthy , I refer to the important point > that we do > not internalize tools but we do internalize signs , speech and > this is where V warns us against . > >> The reason that Vygotsky gives us this story about the > knot in the > >> handkerchief and the coin-toss is that he wants to > suggest a > genesis of > >> the semiotic use of artefacts which does *not* > originate from > the use of > >> tools for working on matter. > >> > >> > >> Yes , yes , Vygotsky says , I parrot it many times . > Then , I > put the question where does it come from (before > rudiments) . Let > me once again stress on the fact that V asserts the two > lines of > development are separate one from the other in phylogenesis . > >> > >> > >> His claim is of course entirely speculative > >> and I take it to be a rhetorical move. So far as I know, > Vygotsky is in > >> agreement with the idea that collaboration creates the > situation in > >> which people need to share generalisations and thus > "invent" speech > >> properly so called. Here is in agreement with Engels, but I > think he > >> wants to assign only a very early (pre-linguistic) role > to the > tool, > >> holding that the tool can only give rise to the *potential > concept* and > >> not a *true concept* as such. This idea is consistent > with what the > >> distributed cognition people want to do and also with the > phylogenetic > >> story told in the labour paradigm. In our own day, the > role of > tools in > >> the formation of mind is really unmistakable. But I > think we > need to be > >> just as flexible as I think Vygotsky was on these > questions. > >> > >> > >> > >> What V says is use of tools finds its meaning within 'work > activity' of which you are a master . But these lines smack of > historic precedence of speech and co-constructing of > speech over > working activity . Where have I got wrong ? > >> > >> > >> Haydi > >> > >> > > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > From ablunden@mira.net Thu Dec 4 16:21:01 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 05 Dec 2014 11:21:01 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: labour and signs In-Reply-To: <66B9A63B-0FDB-44AF-9A3D-07BC658C2277@gmail.com> References: <548002C6.5030907@mira.net> <1638274843.445412.1417699651665.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11124.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> <548068A0.4080203@mira.net> <66B9A63B-0FDB-44AF-9A3D-07BC658C2277@gmail.com> Message-ID: <5480FA6D.4030705@mira.net> Henry, As I see it, Vygotsky takes speech as the archetype of language-use; understanding Sign Language and gesture as well as written speech and internal speech, is derivative from understanding the spoken word. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ HENRY SHONERD wrote: > Andy and Haydi, > Does it make any difference to this discussion that in the link to ?Word and Action?, word is equated with speech? What if word is equated with gesture, as in sign language? > Henry > > >> On Dec 4, 2014, at 6:58 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> Haydi, exactly what Vygotsky's idea was about this or that, at this or that time, is something beyond my powers to know. I just try to make sense as best I can of what I find in his writings. So I can only say what conclusions this has led me to. Participation in the labour process obviously conditions our activity and our thinking. But I take it that *true concepts* appear only through the use of signs. It will still be the case that such concept formation rests on tool-use - you can't eat words. Participation in the labour process (however broadly understood) necessarily entails using tools. I think the relation between tool and sign in concept formation is found in those two passages to which you drew our attention on "Word and Action": >> >> http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1934/tool-symbol.htm#s25 >> >> I don't think these two lines of development are separate - they are *distinct*, but not separate. >> >> I tend think that "historically" tool use was "prior" but it may not be the case, and I don't really think it matters. For example, according to Marx, the first phase of development of capital entailed gathering workers together in a workshop as wage workers, without making any change whatsoever in the labour process itself, and all the revolutionising of machinery only happened later. >> >> http://marxists.catbull.com/archive/marx/works/1864/economic/ch02a.htm >> >> So if that was how it worked in the dawn of humanity, that is, that the form of cooperation preceded the revolutionising of the means of labour, this would support the claim for sign use to pre-date tool-use in the formation of intellect. But I don't know and I doubt that anyone knows. The point is just that these two lines of development have their distinct bases and develop side by side in connection with one another. >> >> Hope that helps, Haydi. >> Andy >> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Haydi Zulfei wrote: >> >>> I'm no authority to say things act this way or that way but I'm allowed to display my understanding . In this very piece , V challenges "instrumental method" . In "Crisis" , he does the same . I wonder what you might take by encountering so much talk about the "New Psychology" or the "New Methodology" with lots of evidence he showers on us to document his sayings . Shortly , was he a Marxist of the Day or Not ? This could help us with many things . What seems to be ambiguous for me is the last three lines of the paragraph . Is that what you mean by pre-linguistic stage that after this stage , no use of tools is to be observed ? I'm sure you won't . Mike is all right with the term 'rudimentary' because the to-be MAN (primitive) acts on the instant , is interested in THROWING bones or dice not in their physical or chemical properties as is the case with later stages . Hence use of stimulus-device not sign-device . But with full use of tools and their sophistication we approach the appearance of language which converts the NATURAL functions . V even locates their due places , one the stem of the brain , the other the different layers of the cortex . We know about ANL saying a day might be reached when scientists become full workers and workers full scientists or quasi-scientists but that day has not yet arrived . Not to become lengthy , I refer to the important point that we do not internalize tools but we do internalize signs , speech and this is where V warns us against . >>> The reason that Vygotsky gives us this story about the knot in the >>> handkerchief and the coin-toss is that he wants to suggest a genesis of >>> the semiotic use of artefacts which does *not* originate from the use of >>> tools for working on matter. >>> >>> >>> Yes , yes , Vygotsky says , I parrot it many times . Then , I put the question where does it come from (before rudiments) . Let me once again stress on the fact that V asserts the two lines of development are separate one from the other in phylogenesis . >>> >>> >>> His claim is of course entirely speculative >>> and I take it to be a rhetorical move. So far as I know, Vygotsky is in >>> agreement with the idea that collaboration creates the situation in >>> which people need to share generalisations and thus "invent" speech >>> properly so called. Here is in agreement with Engels, but I think he >>> wants to assign only a very early (pre-linguistic) role to the tool, >>> holding that the tool can only give rise to the *potential concept* and >>> not a *true concept* as such. This idea is consistent with what the >>> distributed cognition people want to do and also with the phylogenetic >>> story told in the labour paradigm. In our own day, the role of tools in >>> the formation of mind is really unmistakable. But I think we need to be >>> just as flexible as I think Vygotsky was on these questions. >>> >>> >>> >>> What V says is use of tools finds its meaning within 'work activity' of which you are a master . But these lines smack of historic precedence of speech and co-constructing of speech over working activity . Where have I got wrong ? >>> >>> >>> Haydi >>> >>> >>> > > > From annalisa@unm.edu Thu Dec 4 19:21:20 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2014 03:21:20 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: labour and signs In-Reply-To: <5480F4F2.4050000@mira.net> References: <548002C6.5030907@mira.net> <1638274843.445412.1417699651665.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11124.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> <548068A0.4080203@mira.net> <66B9A63B-0FDB-44AF-9A3D-07BC658C2277@gmail.com> , <5480F4F2.4050000@mira.net> Message-ID: <1417749679238.67424@unm.edu> Hello, It certainly quells the argument for those who believe that word comes before deed. If I am interpreting this correctly. However, I'd like to ask a few questions. 1. Where is the locii of _meaning_ in this construct? Is it in between the deed and the word? or is does it arise during the deed? or is it after the word? 2. Where is the locii of _intention_ in this construct? and if intention is before the deed, then where is meaning? I would suggest that intention and meaning are closely coupled. I'd like to know your take on how they are related. 3. Who is it who is doing the deed? And who is it who speaks the word? Doesn't someone need to be present to do the deed? Or is this deed disembodied and mechanical in nature? 4. Vygotsky was studying child development, so he is talking about children forming words out of actions, right? This is ontogenetic not phylogenetic, isn't it? At T&C I happened to watch one of the kids drawing, and she was drawing flowers, as she drew dots in the air, she said "buzz. buzz. buzz." at the moment she drew them. One dot for each "buzz." I definitely agree that it was as if the word were the crowning the deed. But it also seemed to me the meaning and intention were present in the room before the deed and the words manifested. The flowers were there before the intention to draw bees (as dots). The meaning was in the word, "buzz." Almost like an incantation to give the dots "bee-ness." So it's my opinion (and you are free to disagree, I won't stand in your way to do that) that we require a little more context of what Vygotsky's text means, rather than lifting this text and perhaps giving it cast of a biblical or literary critique as the ending words on a phylogenetic law. I don't know if that is what is being done here, but it seems prudent to be sure what the context was. Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden Sent: Thursday, December 4, 2014 4:57 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: labour and signs What an excellent reference, Mike! https://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/words/ch07.htm#deed (the 4th last paragraph of Thinking and Speech): "The connection between thought and word is not a primal connection that is given once and forever. It arises in development and itself develops. ?In the beginning was the word.""? Goethe answered this Biblical phrase through Faust: ?In the beginning was the deed."? Through this statement, Goethe wished to counteract the word?s over-valuation. Gutsman has noted, however, that we can agree with Goethe that the word as such should not be overvaluated and can concur in his transformation of the Biblical line to, ?In the beginning was the //deed/.? /Nonetheless, if we consider the history of development, we can still read this line with a different emphasis: ?In the //beginning/ /was the deed.? Gutsman?s argument is that the word is a higher stage in man?s development than the highest manifestation of action. He is right. The word did not exist in the beginning. In the beginning was the deed. The formation of the word occurs nearer the end than the beginning of development. The word is the end that crowns the deed." Surely the last word on the matter. Andy From mcole@ucsd.edu Thu Dec 4 19:49:13 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2014 19:49:13 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: labour and signs In-Reply-To: <5480F978.7000805@mira.net> References: <548002C6.5030907@mira.net> <1638274843.445412.1417699651665.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11124.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> <548068A0.4080203@mira.net> <66B9A63B-0FDB-44AF-9A3D-07BC658C2277@gmail.com> <5480F4F2.4050000@mira.net> <5480F978.7000805@mira.net> Message-ID: Here is the quotation, Andy: Gutsman has noted, however, that we can agree with Goethe that the word as such should not be overvaluated and can concur in his transformation of the Biblical line to, ?In the beginning was the //deed/.? /Nonetheless, if we consider the history of development, we can still read this line with a different emphasis: ?In the //beginning/ /was the deed.? Gutsman?s argument is that the word is a higher stage in man?s development than the highest manifestation of action. He is right. The word did not exist in the beginning. In the beginning was the deed. The formation of the word occurs nearer the end than the beginning of development. How should i be thinking about this passage if not to ask, "if the formation of the word occurs nearer the end than the beginning of development" what transformations of action are implicated in the appearance and development of the word? I take it that in one sense, all of developmental studies of language acquisition are attempts to answer the question. But there it is. mike On Thu, Dec 4, 2014 at 4:16 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > can you explain, Mike? > andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > mike cole wrote: > >> Which still leaves us with the question of how language developed out of >> other forms of action -- in phylogeny and ontogeny-- as Haydi emphasized >> recently. >> mike >> >> On Thu, Dec 4, 2014 at 3:57 PM, Andy Blunden > ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >> >> What an excellent reference, Mike! >> https://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/words/ch07.htm#deed >> (the 4th last paragraph of Thinking and Speech): >> >> "The connection between thought and word is not a primal connection >> that is given once and forever. It arises in development and itself >> develops. ?In the beginning was the word.""? Goethe answered this >> Biblical phrase through Faust: ?In the beginning was the deed."? >> Through this statement, Goethe wished to counteract the word?s >> over-valuation. Gutsman has noted, however, that we can agree with >> Goethe that the word as such should not be overvaluated and can >> concur in his transformation of the Biblical line to, ?In the >> beginning was the //deed/.? /Nonetheless, if we consider the >> history >> of development, we can still read this line with a different >> emphasis: ?In the //beginning/ /was the deed.? Gutsman?s >> argument is >> that the word is a higher stage in man?s development than the >> highest manifestation of action. He is right. The word did not >> exist >> in the beginning. In the beginning was the deed. The formation of >> the word occurs nearer the end than the beginning of development. >> The word is the end that crowns the deed." >> >> Surely the last word on the matter. >> >> Andy >> >> >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> ------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> mike cole wrote: >> >> What if word is used in the context "in the beginning was the >> word"? It seems that in different contexts, LSV use of the >> term, word, varies in meaning. So being careful about the >> topic/context of usage may help us. >> >> (You don't have to take my word for it). :-) >> >> mike >> >> >> On Thu, Dec 4, 2014 at 10:35 AM, HENRY SHONERD >> >> >> wrote: >> >> Andy and Haydi, >> Does it make any difference to this discussion that in the >> link to >> ?Word and Action?, word is equated with speech? What if >> word is >> equated with gesture, as in sign language? >> Henry >> >> > On Dec 4, 2014, at 6:58 AM, Andy Blunden >> >> >> wrote: >> > >> > Haydi, exactly what Vygotsky's idea was about this or >> that, at >> this or that time, is something beyond my powers to know. >> I just >> try to make sense as best I can of what I find in his >> writings. So >> I can only say what conclusions this has led me to. >> Participation >> in the labour process obviously conditions our activity >> and our >> thinking. But I take it that *true concepts* appear only >> through >> the use of signs. It will still be the case that such concept >> formation rests on tool-use - you can't eat words. >> Participation >> in the labour process (however broadly understood) necessarily >> entails using tools. I think the relation between tool and >> sign in >> concept formation is found in those two passages to which >> you drew >> our attention on "Word and Action": >> > >> > >> http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1934/ >> tool-symbol.htm#s25 >> > >> > I don't think these two lines of development are >> separate - they >> are *distinct*, but not separate. >> > >> > I tend think that "historically" tool use was "prior" >> but it may >> not be the case, and I don't really think it matters. For >> example, >> according to Marx, the first phase of development of capital >> entailed gathering workers together in a workshop as wage >> workers, >> without making any change whatsoever in the labour process >> itself, >> and all the revolutionising of machinery only happened later. >> > >> > >> http://marxists.catbull.com/archive/marx/works/1864/ >> economic/ch02a.htm >> > >> > So if that was how it worked in the dawn of humanity, >> that is, >> that the form of cooperation preceded the revolutionising >> of the >> means of labour, this would support the claim for sign use to >> pre-date tool-use in the formation of intellect. But I >> don't know >> and I doubt that anyone knows. The point is just that >> these two >> lines of development have their distinct bases and develop >> side by >> side in connection with one another. >> > >> > Hope that helps, Haydi. >> > Andy >> > >> > >> > >> ------------------------------ >> ------------------------------------------ >> > *Andy Blunden* >> > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> > >> > >> > Haydi Zulfei wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> I'm no authority to say things act this way or that way >> but I'm >> allowed to display my understanding . In this very piece , V >> challenges "instrumental method" . In "Crisis" , he does >> the same >> . I wonder what you might take by encountering so much >> talk about >> the "New Psychology" or the "New Methodology" with lots of >> evidence he showers on us to document his sayings . >> Shortly , was >> he a Marxist of the Day or Not ? This could help us with many >> things . What seems to be ambiguous for me is the last >> three lines >> of the paragraph . Is that what you mean by pre-linguistic >> stage >> that after this stage , no use of tools is to be observed >> ? I'm >> sure you won't . Mike is all right with the term 'rudimentary' >> because the to-be MAN (primitive) acts on the instant , is >> interested in THROWING bones or dice not in their physical or >> chemical properties as is the case with later stages . >> Hence use >> of stimulus-device not sign-device . But with full use of >> tools >> and their sophistication we approach the appearance of >> language >> which converts the NATURAL functions . V even locates >> their due >> places , one the stem of the brain , the other the different >> layers of the cortex . We know about ANL saying a day might be >> reached when scientists become full workers and workers full >> scientists or quasi-scientists but that day has not yet >> arrived . >> Not to become lengthy , I refer to the important point >> that we do >> not internalize tools but we do internalize signs , speech and >> this is where V warns us against . >> >> The reason that Vygotsky gives us this story about the >> knot in the >> >> handkerchief and the coin-toss is that he wants to >> suggest a >> genesis of >> >> the semiotic use of artefacts which does *not* >> originate from >> the use of >> >> tools for working on matter. >> >> >> >> >> >> Yes , yes , Vygotsky says , I parrot it many times . >> Then , I >> put the question where does it come from (before >> rudiments) . Let >> me once again stress on the fact that V asserts the two >> lines of >> development are separate one from the other in phylogenesis . >> >> >> >> >> >> His claim is of course entirely speculative >> >> and I take it to be a rhetorical move. So far as I know, >> Vygotsky is in >> >> agreement with the idea that collaboration creates the >> situation in >> >> which people need to share generalisations and thus >> "invent" speech >> >> properly so called. Here is in agreement with Engels, but I >> think he >> >> wants to assign only a very early (pre-linguistic) role >> to the >> tool, >> >> holding that the tool can only give rise to the *potential >> concept* and >> >> not a *true concept* as such. This idea is consistent >> with what the >> >> distributed cognition people want to do and also with the >> phylogenetic >> >> story told in the labour paradigm. In our own day, the >> role of >> tools in >> >> the formation of mind is really unmistakable. But I >> think we >> need to be >> >> just as flexible as I think Vygotsky was on these >> questions. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> What V says is use of tools finds its meaning within 'work >> activity' of which you are a master . But these lines smack of >> historic precedence of speech and co-constructing of >> speech over >> working activity . Where have I got wrong ? >> >> >> >> >> >> Haydi >> >> >> >> >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural >> science >> with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> >> >> > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mcole@ucsd.edu Thu Dec 4 19:56:41 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2014 19:56:41 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: labour and signs In-Reply-To: References: <548002C6.5030907@mira.net> <1638274843.445412.1417699651665.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11124.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> <548068A0.4080203@mira.net> <66B9A63B-0FDB-44AF-9A3D-07BC658C2277@gmail.com> <5480F4F2.4050000@mira.net> <5480F978.7000805@mira.net> Message-ID: Yes, Annalisa, that same Goethe warned of the dangers of putting one step in development ahead of another to get a cause/effect conclusion regarding living matter. Then the question becomes how does your explanation of the 'word' -action relationship develop, with a focus on ontogeny as the phenomenon of central concern (We only have one life to live, some say, so might as well focus on something you know first hand) change if you adopt a non-linear cultural-temporal perspective? Still thinking on the question. mike On Thu, Dec 4, 2014 at 7:49 PM, mike cole wrote: > Here is the quotation, Andy: > > Gutsman has noted, however, that we can agree with > Goethe that the word as such should not be overvaluated and can > concur in his transformation of the Biblical line to, ?In the > beginning was the //deed/.? /Nonetheless, if we consider the > history of development, we can still read this line with a different > emphasis: ?In the //beginning/ /was the deed.? Gutsman?s > argument is that the word is a higher stage in man?s development than > the > highest manifestation of action. He is right. The word did not > exist in the beginning. In the beginning was the deed. The formation > of > the word occurs nearer the end than the beginning of development. > > How should i be thinking about this passage if not to ask, "if the > formation of the word occurs nearer the end than the beginning of > development" what transformations of action are implicated in the > appearance and development of the word? I take it that in one sense, all of > developmental studies of language acquisition are attempts to answer the > question. But there it is. > mike > > On Thu, Dec 4, 2014 at 4:16 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> can you explain, Mike? >> andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> mike cole wrote: >> >>> Which still leaves us with the question of how language developed out of >>> other forms of action -- in phylogeny and ontogeny-- as Haydi emphasized >>> recently. >>> mike >>> >>> On Thu, Dec 4, 2014 at 3:57 PM, Andy Blunden >> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>> >>> What an excellent reference, Mike! >>> https://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/words/ch07.htm#deed >>> (the 4th last paragraph of Thinking and Speech): >>> >>> "The connection between thought and word is not a primal >>> connection >>> that is given once and forever. It arises in development and >>> itself >>> develops. ?In the beginning was the word.""? Goethe answered this >>> Biblical phrase through Faust: ?In the beginning was the deed."? >>> Through this statement, Goethe wished to counteract the word?s >>> over-valuation. Gutsman has noted, however, that we can agree with >>> Goethe that the word as such should not be overvaluated and can >>> concur in his transformation of the Biblical line to, ?In the >>> beginning was the //deed/.? /Nonetheless, if we consider the >>> history >>> of development, we can still read this line with a different >>> emphasis: ?In the //beginning/ /was the deed.? Gutsman?s >>> argument is >>> that the word is a higher stage in man?s development than the >>> highest manifestation of action. He is right. The word did not >>> exist >>> in the beginning. In the beginning was the deed. The formation of >>> the word occurs nearer the end than the beginning of development. >>> The word is the end that crowns the deed." >>> >>> Surely the last word on the matter. >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> ------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >>> mike cole wrote: >>> >>> What if word is used in the context "in the beginning was the >>> word"? It seems that in different contexts, LSV use of the >>> term, word, varies in meaning. So being careful about the >>> topic/context of usage may help us. >>> >>> (You don't have to take my word for it). :-) >>> >>> mike >>> >>> >>> On Thu, Dec 4, 2014 at 10:35 AM, HENRY SHONERD >>> >>> >> wrote: >>> >>> Andy and Haydi, >>> Does it make any difference to this discussion that in the >>> link to >>> ?Word and Action?, word is equated with speech? What if >>> word is >>> equated with gesture, as in sign language? >>> Henry >>> >>> > On Dec 4, 2014, at 6:58 AM, Andy Blunden >>> >>> >> >>> wrote: >>> > >>> > Haydi, exactly what Vygotsky's idea was about this or >>> that, at >>> this or that time, is something beyond my powers to know. >>> I just >>> try to make sense as best I can of what I find in his >>> writings. So >>> I can only say what conclusions this has led me to. >>> Participation >>> in the labour process obviously conditions our activity >>> and our >>> thinking. But I take it that *true concepts* appear only >>> through >>> the use of signs. It will still be the case that such concept >>> formation rests on tool-use - you can't eat words. >>> Participation >>> in the labour process (however broadly understood) >>> necessarily >>> entails using tools. I think the relation between tool and >>> sign in >>> concept formation is found in those two passages to which >>> you drew >>> our attention on "Word and Action": >>> > >>> > >>> http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1934/ >>> tool-symbol.htm#s25 >>> > >>> > I don't think these two lines of development are >>> separate - they >>> are *distinct*, but not separate. >>> > >>> > I tend think that "historically" tool use was "prior" >>> but it may >>> not be the case, and I don't really think it matters. For >>> example, >>> according to Marx, the first phase of development of capital >>> entailed gathering workers together in a workshop as wage >>> workers, >>> without making any change whatsoever in the labour process >>> itself, >>> and all the revolutionising of machinery only happened later. >>> > >>> > >>> http://marxists.catbull.com/archive/marx/works/1864/ >>> economic/ch02a.htm >>> > >>> > So if that was how it worked in the dawn of humanity, >>> that is, >>> that the form of cooperation preceded the revolutionising >>> of the >>> means of labour, this would support the claim for sign use to >>> pre-date tool-use in the formation of intellect. But I >>> don't know >>> and I doubt that anyone knows. The point is just that >>> these two >>> lines of development have their distinct bases and develop >>> side by >>> side in connection with one another. >>> > >>> > Hope that helps, Haydi. >>> > Andy >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> ------------------------------ >>> ------------------------------------------ >>> > *Andy Blunden* >>> > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >>> > >>> > >>> > Haydi Zulfei wrote: >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> I'm no authority to say things act this way or that way >>> but I'm >>> allowed to display my understanding . In this very piece , V >>> challenges "instrumental method" . In "Crisis" , he does >>> the same >>> . I wonder what you might take by encountering so much >>> talk about >>> the "New Psychology" or the "New Methodology" with lots of >>> evidence he showers on us to document his sayings . >>> Shortly , was >>> he a Marxist of the Day or Not ? This could help us with many >>> things . What seems to be ambiguous for me is the last >>> three lines >>> of the paragraph . Is that what you mean by pre-linguistic >>> stage >>> that after this stage , no use of tools is to be observed >>> ? I'm >>> sure you won't . Mike is all right with the term >>> 'rudimentary' >>> because the to-be MAN (primitive) acts on the instant , is >>> interested in THROWING bones or dice not in their physical or >>> chemical properties as is the case with later stages . >>> Hence use >>> of stimulus-device not sign-device . But with full use of >>> tools >>> and their sophistication we approach the appearance of >>> language >>> which converts the NATURAL functions . V even locates >>> their due >>> places , one the stem of the brain , the other the different >>> layers of the cortex . We know about ANL saying a day might >>> be >>> reached when scientists become full workers and workers full >>> scientists or quasi-scientists but that day has not yet >>> arrived . >>> Not to become lengthy , I refer to the important point >>> that we do >>> not internalize tools but we do internalize signs , speech >>> and >>> this is where V warns us against . >>> >> The reason that Vygotsky gives us this story about the >>> knot in the >>> >> handkerchief and the coin-toss is that he wants to >>> suggest a >>> genesis of >>> >> the semiotic use of artefacts which does *not* >>> originate from >>> the use of >>> >> tools for working on matter. >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> Yes , yes , Vygotsky says , I parrot it many times . >>> Then , I >>> put the question where does it come from (before >>> rudiments) . Let >>> me once again stress on the fact that V asserts the two >>> lines of >>> development are separate one from the other in phylogenesis . >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> His claim is of course entirely speculative >>> >> and I take it to be a rhetorical move. So far as I know, >>> Vygotsky is in >>> >> agreement with the idea that collaboration creates the >>> situation in >>> >> which people need to share generalisations and thus >>> "invent" speech >>> >> properly so called. Here is in agreement with Engels, but >>> I >>> think he >>> >> wants to assign only a very early (pre-linguistic) role >>> to the >>> tool, >>> >> holding that the tool can only give rise to the *potential >>> concept* and >>> >> not a *true concept* as such. This idea is consistent >>> with what the >>> >> distributed cognition people want to do and also with the >>> phylogenetic >>> >> story told in the labour paradigm. In our own day, the >>> role of >>> tools in >>> >> the formation of mind is really unmistakable. But I >>> think we >>> need to be >>> >> just as flexible as I think Vygotsky was on these >>> questions. >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> What V says is use of tools finds its meaning within 'work >>> activity' of which you are a master . But these lines smack >>> of >>> historic precedence of speech and co-constructing of >>> speech over >>> working activity . Where have I got wrong ? >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> Haydi >>> >> >>> >> >>> > >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a >>> natural science >>> with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>> >>> >>> >> > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From hshonerd@gmail.com Thu Dec 4 20:41:14 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2014 21:41:14 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: labour and signs In-Reply-To: <5480FA6D.4030705@mira.net> References: <548002C6.5030907@mira.net> <1638274843.445412.1417699651665.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11124.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> <548068A0.4080203@mira.net> <66B9A63B-0FDB-44AF-9A3D-07BC658C2277@gmail.com> <5480FA6D.4030705@mira.net> Message-ID: <299005F6-2AB3-4E3E-B8D6-DB76EA26EBC5@gmail.com> Andy, Exactly what I was getting at. I have a friend who works with signed language (ASL is one signed language). He takes issue with the assumption that language developed first as speech and signed languages are derivative. Suppose the first signs of language were derived from recurrent gestures inherent in (collaborative) work activity, I am assuming others have conjectured as much, or it wouldn?t have come to me. Research shows us that children learn sign earlier and faster than spoken language. (Have you seen ?Meet the Folkers??) Is that saying anything about ontogeny and phylogeny? This issue relates, I think, to the power/diversity thread which is developing, since it would be of interest to the Deaf community. Henry > On Dec 4, 2014, at 5:21 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > Henry, > As I see it, Vygotsky takes speech as the archetype of language-use; understanding Sign Language and gesture as well as written speech and internal speech, is derivative from understanding the spoken word. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > HENRY SHONERD wrote: >> Andy and Haydi, >> Does it make any difference to this discussion that in the link to ?Word and Action?, word is equated with speech? What if word is equated with gesture, as in sign language? Henry >> >>> On Dec 4, 2014, at 6:58 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>> Haydi, exactly what Vygotsky's idea was about this or that, at this or that time, is something beyond my powers to know. I just try to make sense as best I can of what I find in his writings. So I can only say what conclusions this has led me to. Participation in the labour process obviously conditions our activity and our thinking. But I take it that *true concepts* appear only through the use of signs. It will still be the case that such concept formation rests on tool-use - you can't eat words. Participation in the labour process (however broadly understood) necessarily entails using tools. I think the relation between tool and sign in concept formation is found in those two passages to which you drew our attention on "Word and Action": >>> >>> http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1934/tool-symbol.htm#s25 >>> >>> I don't think these two lines of development are separate - they are *distinct*, but not separate. >>> >>> I tend think that "historically" tool use was "prior" but it may not be the case, and I don't really think it matters. For example, according to Marx, the first phase of development of capital entailed gathering workers together in a workshop as wage workers, without making any change whatsoever in the labour process itself, and all the revolutionising of machinery only happened later. >>> >>> http://marxists.catbull.com/archive/marx/works/1864/economic/ch02a.htm >>> >>> So if that was how it worked in the dawn of humanity, that is, that the form of cooperation preceded the revolutionising of the means of labour, this would support the claim for sign use to pre-date tool-use in the formation of intellect. But I don't know and I doubt that anyone knows. The point is just that these two lines of development have their distinct bases and develop side by side in connection with one another. >>> >>> Hope that helps, Haydi. >>> Andy >>> >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> Haydi Zulfei wrote: >>> >>>> I'm no authority to say things act this way or that way but I'm allowed to display my understanding . In this very piece , V challenges "instrumental method" . In "Crisis" , he does the same . I wonder what you might take by encountering so much talk about the "New Psychology" or the "New Methodology" with lots of evidence he showers on us to document his sayings . Shortly , was he a Marxist of the Day or Not ? This could help us with many things . What seems to be ambiguous for me is the last three lines of the paragraph . Is that what you mean by pre-linguistic stage that after this stage , no use of tools is to be observed ? I'm sure you won't . Mike is all right with the term 'rudimentary' because the to-be MAN (primitive) acts on the instant , is interested in THROWING bones or dice not in their physical or chemical properties as is the case with later stages . Hence use of stimulus-device not sign-device . But with full use of tools and their sophistication we approach the appearance of language which converts the NATURAL functions . V even locates their due places , one the stem of the brain , the other the different layers of the cortex . We know about ANL saying a day might be reached when scientists become full workers and workers full scientists or quasi-scientists but that day has not yet arrived . Not to become lengthy , I refer to the important point that we do not internalize tools but we do internalize signs , speech and this is where V warns us against . The reason that Vygotsky gives us this story about the knot in the >>>> handkerchief and the coin-toss is that he wants to suggest a genesis of >>>> the semiotic use of artefacts which does *not* originate from the use of >>>> tools for working on matter. >>>> >>>> >>>> Yes , yes , Vygotsky says , I parrot it many times . Then , I put the question where does it come from (before rudiments) . Let me once again stress on the fact that V asserts the two lines of development are separate one from the other in phylogenesis . >>>> >>>> His claim is of course entirely speculative >>>> and I take it to be a rhetorical move. So far as I know, Vygotsky is in >>>> agreement with the idea that collaboration creates the situation in >>>> which people need to share generalisations and thus "invent" speech >>>> properly so called. Here is in agreement with Engels, but I think he >>>> wants to assign only a very early (pre-linguistic) role to the tool, >>>> holding that the tool can only give rise to the *potential concept* and >>>> not a *true concept* as such. This idea is consistent with what the >>>> distributed cognition people want to do and also with the phylogenetic >>>> story told in the labour paradigm. In our own day, the role of tools in >>>> the formation of mind is really unmistakable. But I think we need to be >>>> just as flexible as I think Vygotsky was on these questions. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> What V says is use of tools finds its meaning within 'work activity' of which you are a master . But these lines smack of historic precedence of speech and co-constructing of speech over working activity . Where have I got wrong ? >>>> >>>> >>>> Haydi >>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> >> > > > From ablunden@mira.net Thu Dec 4 20:55:40 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 05 Dec 2014 15:55:40 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: labour and signs In-Reply-To: References: <548002C6.5030907@mira.net> <1638274843.445412.1417699651665.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11124.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> <548068A0.4080203@mira.net> <66B9A63B-0FDB-44AF-9A3D-07BC658C2277@gmail.com> <5480F4F2.4050000@mira.net> <5480F978.7000805@mira.net> Message-ID: <54813ACC.4000909@mira.net> Well, Mike, while we are always interested in any information that comes to light about the ancient formation of language, I find that theories about that are invariably reifications (or exptrapolations if you like) of theories based (as you remark to Annalisa) on actual observations of (1) ontogeny, (2) the cultural-historical origin and development of the particular concepts themselves and the words indicating them. Re (1) Vygotsky has lots to say about this and of course you psychologists continue to investigate this in your own lifetime; from Chapter 5 of T&S, for example: * "The tasks that are posed for the maturing adolescent by the social environment - tasks that are associated with his entry into the cultural, professional, and social life of the adult world - are an essential functional factor in the formation of concepts. Repeatedly, this factor points to the mutually conditioned nature, the organic integration, and the internal unity of content and form in the development of thinking." * "It would be a mistake to ignore or fail to recognize the significance of the life-task as a factor that nourishes and directs intellectual development in the transitional age. However, it would also be a mistake to view this aspect of causal-dynamic development as the basic mechanism of the problem of concept development or as the key to this problem." Re (2) Engestrom has done work on this. I stand by the analysis in my paper on the formation of the concept of Collaborative Learning Space which differs only in detail in comparison with Engestrom's 7-step process, but I think the most decisive and spectacular evidence of all is the research done on the emergence of the word for the various colours in all the languages of the world and how this correlated with the ability to manufacture materials in the respective colour. In general, new concepts and the words for them arise when solutions are proposed for problems which have arisen in the course of regular, i.e., in some way rule-governed or institutionalised, practice (i.e., activity). A problem in practice is solved in practice and then named. Marx points out how the solution is found and practised before theorists can describe it and give a name to it, but I would hesitate to make this a general rule, though it may be appropriate in the case of broad social change. In relation to the word-tool business, sometimes the word naming a new concept names a new tool (e.g. Collaborative Learning Space), but not always. It may name the solution (e.g. "regulation") to a problem ("contradiction" in Engestrom's vocab) which is not necessarily a tool, sometimes the problem itself (e.g. "sexism") but in essence always indicates the solution not the problem, sometimes a new concept comes in the form of two words being a new distinction. The selection of the word itself is a whole other matter of course. Personally, my interest is in (2) above. Does that answer your question, Mike? Andy https://www.academia.edu/2758945/The_Formation_of_the_Concept_of_Collaborative_Learning_Space_ http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1857/grundrisse/ch01.htm#3 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ mike cole wrote: > Here is the quotation, Andy: > > Gutsman has noted, however, that we can agree with > Goethe that the word as such should not be overvaluated and can > concur in his transformation of the Biblical line to, ?In the > beginning was the //deed/.? /Nonetheless, if we consider the > history of development, we can still read this line with a different > emphasis: ?In the //beginning/ /was the deed.? Gutsman?s > argument is that the word is a higher stage in man?s development > than the > highest manifestation of action. He is right. The word did not > exist in the beginning. In the beginning was the deed. The > formation of > the word occurs nearer the end than the beginning of development. > > How should i be thinking about this passage if not to ask, "if the > formation of the word occurs nearer the end than the beginning of > development" what transformations of action are implicated in the > appearance and development of the word? I take it that in one sense, > all of developmental studies of language acquisition are attempts to > answer the question. But there it is. > mike > > On Thu, Dec 4, 2014 at 4:16 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > can you explain, Mike? > andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > mike cole wrote: > > Which still leaves us with the question of how language > developed out of other forms of action -- in phylogeny and > ontogeny-- as Haydi emphasized recently. > mike > > From ablunden@mira.net Thu Dec 4 20:57:54 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 05 Dec 2014 15:57:54 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: labour and signs In-Reply-To: <299005F6-2AB3-4E3E-B8D6-DB76EA26EBC5@gmail.com> References: <548002C6.5030907@mira.net> <1638274843.445412.1417699651665.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11124.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> <548068A0.4080203@mira.net> <66B9A63B-0FDB-44AF-9A3D-07BC658C2277@gmail.com> <5480FA6D.4030705@mira.net> <299005F6-2AB3-4E3E-B8D6-DB76EA26EBC5@gmail.com> Message-ID: <54813B52.1000902@mira.net> Henry, I did not say that sign language is derivative of spoken language! I said that "*understanding* of sign language is derivative from understanding the spoken word". These are two entirely different, even opposite, questions. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ HENRY SHONERD wrote: > Andy, > Exactly what I was getting at. I have a friend who works with signed language (ASL is one signed language). He takes issue with the assumption that language developed first as speech and signed languages are derivative. Suppose the first signs of language were derived from recurrent gestures inherent in (collaborative) work activity, I am assuming others have conjectured as much, or it wouldn?t have come to me. Research shows us that children learn sign earlier and faster than spoken language. (Have you seen ?Meet the Folkers??) Is that saying anything about ontogeny and phylogeny? This issue relates, I think, to the power/diversity thread which is developing, since it would be of interest to the Deaf community. > Henry > > > >> On Dec 4, 2014, at 5:21 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> Henry, >> As I see it, Vygotsky takes speech as the archetype of language-use; understanding Sign Language and gesture as well as written speech and internal speech, is derivative from understanding the spoken word. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> HENRY SHONERD wrote: >> >>> Andy and Haydi, >>> Does it make any difference to this discussion that in the link to ?Word and Action?, word is equated with speech? What if word is equated with gesture, as in sign language? Henry >>> >>> >>>> On Dec 4, 2014, at 6:58 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>> Haydi, exactly what Vygotsky's idea was about this or that, at this or that time, is something beyond my powers to know. I just try to make sense as best I can of what I find in his writings. So I can only say what conclusions this has led me to. Participation in the labour process obviously conditions our activity and our thinking. But I take it that *true concepts* appear only through the use of signs. It will still be the case that such concept formation rests on tool-use - you can't eat words. Participation in the labour process (however broadly understood) necessarily entails using tools. I think the relation between tool and sign in concept formation is found in those two passages to which you drew our attention on "Word and Action": >>>> >>>> http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1934/tool-symbol.htm#s25 >>>> >>>> I don't think these two lines of development are separate - they are *distinct*, but not separate. >>>> >>>> I tend think that "historically" tool use was "prior" but it may not be the case, and I don't really think it matters. For example, according to Marx, the first phase of development of capital entailed gathering workers together in a workshop as wage workers, without making any change whatsoever in the labour process itself, and all the revolutionising of machinery only happened later. >>>> >>>> http://marxists.catbull.com/archive/marx/works/1864/economic/ch02a.htm >>>> >>>> So if that was how it worked in the dawn of humanity, that is, that the form of cooperation preceded the revolutionising of the means of labour, this would support the claim for sign use to pre-date tool-use in the formation of intellect. But I don't know and I doubt that anyone knows. The point is just that these two lines of development have their distinct bases and develop side by side in connection with one another. >>>> >>>> Hope that helps, Haydi. >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> Haydi Zulfei wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> I'm no authority to say things act this way or that way but I'm allowed to display my understanding . In this very piece , V challenges "instrumental method" . In "Crisis" , he does the same . I wonder what you might take by encountering so much talk about the "New Psychology" or the "New Methodology" with lots of evidence he showers on us to document his sayings . Shortly , was he a Marxist of the Day or Not ? This could help us with many things . What seems to be ambiguous for me is the last three lines of the paragraph . Is that what you mean by pre-linguistic stage that after this stage , no use of tools is to be observed ? I'm sure you won't . Mike is all right with the term 'rudimentary' because the to-be MAN (primitive) acts on the instant , is interested in THROWING bones or dice not in their physical or chemical properties as is the case with later stages . Hence use of stimulus-device not sign-device . But with full use of tools and their sophistication we approach the appearance of language which converts the NATURAL functions . V even locates their due places , one the stem of the brain , the other the different layers of the cortex . We know about ANL saying a day might be reached when scientists become full workers and workers full scientists or quasi-scientists but that day has not yet arrived . Not to become lengthy , I refer to the important point that we do not internalize tools but we do internalize signs , speech and this is where V warns us against . The reason that Vygotsky gives us this story about the knot in the >>>>> handkerchief and the coin-toss is that he wants to suggest a genesis of >>>>> the semiotic use of artefacts which does *not* originate from the use of >>>>> tools for working on matter. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Yes , yes , Vygotsky says , I parrot it many times . Then , I put the question where does it come from (before rudiments) . Let me once again stress on the fact that V asserts the two lines of development are separate one from the other in phylogenesis . >>>>> >>>>> His claim is of course entirely speculative >>>>> and I take it to be a rhetorical move. So far as I know, Vygotsky is in >>>>> agreement with the idea that collaboration creates the situation in >>>>> which people need to share generalisations and thus "invent" speech >>>>> properly so called. Here is in agreement with Engels, but I think he >>>>> wants to assign only a very early (pre-linguistic) role to the tool, >>>>> holding that the tool can only give rise to the *potential concept* and >>>>> not a *true concept* as such. This idea is consistent with what the >>>>> distributed cognition people want to do and also with the phylogenetic >>>>> story told in the labour paradigm. In our own day, the role of tools in >>>>> the formation of mind is really unmistakable. But I think we need to be >>>>> just as flexible as I think Vygotsky was on these questions. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> What V says is use of tools finds its meaning within 'work activity' of which you are a master . But these lines smack of historic precedence of speech and co-constructing of speech over working activity . Where have I got wrong ? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Haydi >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>> >>> >> >> > > > > From annalisa@unm.edu Thu Dec 4 21:01:34 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2014 05:01:34 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: labour and signs In-Reply-To: References: <548002C6.5030907@mira.net> <1638274843.445412.1417699651665.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11124.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> <548068A0.4080203@mira.net> <66B9A63B-0FDB-44AF-9A3D-07BC658C2277@gmail.com> <5480F4F2.4050000@mira.net> <5480F978.7000805@mira.net> , Message-ID: <1417755694189.64694@unm.edu> Hi Mike, I am reflecting back a little what you wrote for my learning, here... I apologize if I did not get this. When you say Goethe warned of dangers, I am sensing you mean, say, that if A always arises before B and B before C in a "normal" flow of development, it may not be that A causes B which causes C and/or therefore A causes C. In the sense that chronology may not explain cause. Is this what you mean by putting one step of development ahead of another? Sorry, just I'm trying to unpack this. Since I don't understand clearly the first part I'm not sure I can understand the second part. I don't know for certain where meaning or intention are, I was just asking where does anyone think it is. Certainly these could overlap deed and word in time and need not be sequential. I presented something that I witnessed in a child "crowning an action with a word" (which was very cool indeed to see) and I offered some ideas, but I'm not sure that this is the case or not, and I in no way mean to represent that I am making an assertion. Just using the example as a teaching tool for my understanding by grounding it in my experience. My thinking about the phrase "word crowns the deed" was to sort out whether Vygotsky referred to the individual child or to a more evolutionary stance of humans overall, which "in the beginning it was the word" vs. "in the beginning it was the deed," imply, having something of biblical tone, hence they seem to suggest phylogenesis, and this seems an opportunity for confusion over clarity. I offer that to this stone soup. Another question: Might it be possible that ontogenesis and phylogenesis differ in their genesis with regard to word-deed/deed-word? Or is this a chicken and egg conundrum? Kind regards, Annalisa From annalisa@unm.edu Thu Dec 4 21:19:14 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2014 05:19:14 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Reading for Novices Message-ID: <1417756753782.22685@unm.edu> Hello all, I have a friend who has a background in anthropology and she is interested in reading Vygotsky. With this in mind, which introductory texts do you think would be best to cut one's teeth on our patron genius? Also how about readings that describe sociocultural theory (rather than actual Vygotsky texts)? It seems a good combo of both may provide a nice context. Kind regards, Annalisa From lpscholar2@gmail.com Thu Dec 4 22:17:25 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2014 22:17:25 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Reading for Novices In-Reply-To: <1417756753782.22685@unm.edu> References: <1417756753782.22685@unm.edu> Message-ID: Annalisa, A *general* book "The Sociocultural Turn in Psychology" by Jack Martin and Suzanne Kirschner explores five sociocultural "approaches". I] Discursive approaches 2] constructionist approaches 3] Hermeneutical approaches 4] Dialogical approaches 5] Neo-Vygotskian approaches In the fifth section there iare two articles. The first by by Anna Stetsenko and Igor Arievitch: "Cultural-Historical Activity Theory: Foundational Worldview, Major Principles, and the Relevance of Sociocultural Context" The second article is written by Mike Cole and Natalia Gajdamashko: Vygotsky and Context: Toward a Resolution" If you google this book it will lead you to the publisher - Columbia University Press - where you can download an excerpt which is the introductory chapter by Jack Martin and Suzanne Kirschner:: "The Sociocultural Turn in Psychology: An Introduction and an Invitation". This chapter is a clear introduction to the topics covered by the book This book is an excellent orientation to scholars who have taken a "full turn" toward constitutive sociocultural psychology. 3] On Thu, Dec 4, 2014 at 9:19 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hello all, > > > I have a friend who has a background in anthropology and she is interested > in reading Vygotsky. With this in mind, which introductory texts do you > think would be best to cut one's teeth on our patron genius? > > > Also how about readings that describe sociocultural theory (rather than > actual Vygotsky texts)? > > > It seems a good combo of both may provide a nice context. > > > Kind regards, > > > Annalisa > From mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu Thu Dec 4 23:22:22 2014 From: mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu (Zavala, Miguel) Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2014 07:22:22 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Pyrodiversity Fire Management - Native Americans of the California Area Message-ID: XMCA, Have you heard of pyrodiversity fire management by Native Americans in the California area? I found a book written by a UC Berkeley archaeologist that caught my attention and I found a great synthesis of the theory. What find most striking and fascinating is that, according to this theory, Native Americans of what is today California did not follow the same developmental line as is assumed: hunter-gatherer -> agriculture-settler. Typically, when people think of California Native Americans, they characterize them as hunter-gatherer (as if "stuck" in the Pleistocene period). Yet, what some scientists are finding is perhaps a competing theory or revision of this narrative; Native Americans developed a distinct type of food management system mediated primarily by pyro-fire practices. Some argue that these were collective, conducted on a large scale among different groups, perhaps covering 10 ? 16% of what today is the geographic area of California. A nice chapter can be found below; I'm really digging this because in a way it diversifies development?that even large-scale development is not linear (or that "progress" is marked temporally without looking at the geographies of difference). Perhaps Eurocentric research and theories perpetuate master-narratives about how peoples develop across space-time. To note, I did find some scientists arguing or challenging this theory, so it's important to see the evidence scientists use to support their theory. Access the Chapter here: https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CCMQFjAA&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.firescience.gov%2Fprojects%2F10-1-09-3%2Fproject%2F10-1-09-3_JONES_CH_09.pdf&ei=S1mBVLm4MMmNyATkvIKIBw&usg=AFQjCNE-TQ4ARzJf1Gbtmd2Vqz1cVwtu7A&bvm=bv.80642063,d.aWw Miguel Zavala From lpscholar2@gmail.com Thu Dec 4 23:22:33 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2014 23:22:33 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Barsalou's Grounded Cognition Theory In-Reply-To: References: <67F07A73-F9F6-408E-B45E-FFF20B5A64E2@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Martin, Thanks for your clear explanation of locating the symbolic in the material as multimodal systems. Reading this article alongside the article Natalia sent "L. Vygotsky, A. Luria and Developmental Neuropsychology" is a fascinating exploration of relating Vygotsky and Luria to grounded cognition. XMCA has been discussing *word* and *deed* as multimodal systems but another key process is perceptual *attention* as explored in Barsalou's Perceptual Symbol Systems Theory. Akhutina and Pylaeva, on page 158 offer an evocative statement of the centrality of attention to remediating disturbed functions. They write: The stages of transition from external actions to speech and finally internal action, identified by Vygotsky, are very similar to the stages of voluntary action development described by P. Ya. Galperin [Galperin 1969] These stages form the main path of developing of remedial interventions. We follow Vygotsky's idea that OBJECTIFICATION of a disturbed function, i.e., taking it outside and changing it into an external activity, is one of the BASIC ways to compensate for the deficiencies" Akhutina and Pylaeva say this basic method guided their remedial approach when they published the book "School of Attention" [4th edition 2008]. *Word* *deed* and *attention* are all basic to the developmental process and share resemblances [simulations??] with Barsalou's Perceptual Symbolic Systems. The notion of this reciprocal movement back and forth [returning a function outside, changing it into an external function] as a basic intentional simulation in reverse. I'm leaving my other question aside for now to draw attention to the function of attention On Wed, Dec 3, 2014 at 12:30 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > Larry, > > Almost every developmental theorist sees "the semiotic function" as a > crucial aspect of a child's development, one that occurs at about 24 to 30 > months of age. They differ, however, in what this 'function' consists in. > For Piaget, it was the ability construct 'mental representations,' on which > the child could carry out 'mental actions' and so move to a brand new level > over and above the physical actions of the sensorimotor stage. > > As I read it, LSV was proposing that the semiotic function is the ability > to understand that we live in a world full of *material* representations. > Pictures, maps, signs, gestures, clothing... the list is endless. Central > among these is language: the strings of sound vibrations that we generate > with lungs, vocal cords, mouth, tongue and lips are material, and for a > specific community they are representations. (Of the Peircian rather than > the Saussurian kind, I would argue, but that's another matter). > > So I would locate the symbolic, once again, in the material. In what > humans do with the material. Material representations are things that > humans specialize in creating, and they open up possibilities beyond the > here-&-now of concrete situations. > > But I'm not certain this really addresses your question!? > > Martin > > On Dec 3, 2014, at 10:52 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > Martin, > > The example comes from an article he wrote, "The Hermeneutics of Symbols > > and Philosophical Reflection" > > I was actually using the imaginal symbol of *captivity* to point to the > > more general relationship of the *literal* and the *beyond* which comes > > into *being through the symbolic. > > > > The way these cultural historical symbols guide or orient *interpretive > > communities* > > Suzanne Kirschner wrote a book "the Religious and Romantic Roots of > > Psychanalysis" which outlines the symbolic imaginal of "falling away AND > > return" which she traces through Neo-Platonism, the Protestant mystical > > tradition and moves through or in to psychoanalysis. > > > > It was Ricouer's general exploration of symbol [at this level or time > scale > > of situations the level that guides zeitgeists] that I was attempting to > > weave together with *grounded cognition*. > > If Ricouer and Kirschner are pointing to a *real* phenomena then the > > relation of the *literal* and the *metaphorical* exploring *trans* > > positioning opens up stituations or *events* to what Merleau Ponty calls > > *excess* [the beyond] > > It is this realm which I'm suggesting is a *gap* which metaphorical > power > > or force assists in coming into being through the imaginal. > > I am speculating that to understand *cognition* as multimodal then this > > time scale as a mode or path also guides our *quests* or questions. > > In other words the questions as grounded in the literal but calling us > > beyond the literal is the realm Ricouer and Kirschner are exploring. > > > > To situate Suzanne Kirscher, she co-authored the book "The sociocultural > > Turn in Psychology* with Jack Martin. > > Larry > > > > On Wed, Dec 3, 2014 at 5:09 AM, Martin John Packer < > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > wrote: > > > >> Hi Larry, > >> > >> I've read a lot of Ricoeur, but he wrote faster than I can read so I > >> haven't covered it all. This sounds like his book Symbolism and Evil? > If > >> so, it's one I didn't read... > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> On Dec 3, 2014, at 1:25 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > >> > >>> Martin, > >>> Thank You for the article on Grounded theory that is exploring the > >>> multimodal synthesis of perceptual, action, linguistic, and conceptual > >>> phenomena. [his Perceptual Symbol System's or PSS theory]. On page 623 > >>> Barsalou explores *memory theories* and says his Perceptual Symbol > System > >>> Theory shares similarities with Rubin's *Basic Systems Theory* > >>> In Barsalou's words, > >>> "Basic Systems Theory proposes that a complex memory contains many > >>> multimodal components from vision, audition, action, space, affect, > >>> language, etc., and that retrieving a memory involves simulating its > >>> multimodal components together. > >>> Rubin was articulating a more complex and richer form of memory which > >>> includes autobiographical memory and oral history. > >>> > >>> On page 622 Barsalou articulates his PSS theory and indicates how > >> grounded > >>> cognition can implement symbolic functions naturally. He states, > >>> > >>> "Through the construct of simulators - corresponding roughly to > concepts > >>> and types in standard theories - PSS implements the standard symbolic > >>> functions of type-token, binding, inference, productivity, recursion > and > >>> propositions." > >>> > >>> I am curious how you understand the relation of Barsalou's Perceptual > >>> Symbol System theory of grounded cognition as it engages with another > >>> complex aspect of the symbolic memory system which points to more > >> expansive > >>> notions of memory through historical time. Ricoeur has engaged deeply > >> with > >>> this more expansive symbolic memory. which he describes as a schema of > >>> existence. As a concrete example he refers to the symbol of *captivity* > >>> which trans*forms* an actual historical event such as the Jewish > Egyptian > >>> captivity and then the Babylonian captivity into a *schema of > existence* > >>> Ricouer conjectures that symbolism such as the schema of captivity > >> precedes > >>> reflection as a *guiding metaphor*. > >>> It is this complex, multimodal aspect of memory that I was pointing to. > >>> > >>> Ricouer posits a relation between the *literal* and the *metaphoric* in > >> the > >>> power or force of the living symbol. He says in the analogous relation > [A > >>> is to B as C is to D] and these terms can be objective. BUT in > symbolic > >>> metaphor I cannot *objectivize* the analogous relation. By living in > the > >>> first *literal* meaning in this literal act I am drawn or carried > >> *beyond* > >>> this literal understanding [i.e. captivity] The symbolic *meaning* is > >>> *constituted* IN AND THROUGH the literal *meaning*. > >>> > >>> I am not sure where to situate Ricouer's exploration of the symbolic > >>> relation that *binds* literal *meaning* and symbolic *meaning*. As > >>> another aspects of multimodal cognition can Ricouer's extension of > >> *memory > >>> systems* beyond autobiography and oral history be included in > Barsalou's > >>> PASS theory of grounded cognition? Would Barsalou situate Ricouer's > >>> metaphorical understanding of symbolism as a simulation? > >> > >> > >> > > > From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Fri Dec 5 01:13:42 2014 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (Haydi Zulfei) Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2014 09:13:42 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: labour and signs In-Reply-To: <548068A0.4080203@mira.net> References: <548068A0.4080203@mira.net> Message-ID: <2020652693.5886090.1417770822746.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11150.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> Thank you , Andy ! These are very good points to discuss and read about and we agree that dogmas are not the solution . With the idea that consciousness is !! immaterial or mostly (opinions) immaterial , one move of googling on the Net was enough but we , here , ascended to 100+plus posts to see what Vygotsky's text meant and for what reasons . This is the way one learns . I worried about Folks' tolerance ; now I see many posts . Good to hear others' words . ? Things are really very complex and at times very confusing and the appetite for learning is unlimited . Thanks again ! "Since the principle of signification leads us into the area of artificial devices,?the question arises as to its relation to other forms of artificial devices, of its place?in the general system of man's adaptation. , the use of?signs shows a certain analogy to the use of tools. ?Like all other analogies, this?analogy cannot be carried to the bitter end, to a full or partial coincidence of the?major essential characteristics of the concepts being compared. For this reason, we?must not anticipate finding much similarity to working tools in these devices that?we call signs. Moreover, together with similar and common characteristics in one?activity or another, we must ascertain the essential characteristics of the difference?in a certain relation-contrast." "The second point whose presence explains the possibility of the appearance of?a new regulatory principle of behavior consists of the fact of social life and interaction of people. In the process of social life, ?man created and developed more?complex systems of psychological connections without which work activity and all?social life would be impossible. The devices of psychological connection in their?very nature and in their essential function are signs, that is, stimuli artificially created to affect behavior by the development of new conditioned connections in the?human brain.?Both points taken together lead us to understanding the possibility of the development of a new regulatory principle. Social life creates the need to subject the?behavior of the individual to social requirements and together with this, ?creates?complex signalization systems, means of communication that guide and regulate?the development of conditioned connections in the brain of each person. The organization of higher nervous activity creates the necessary prerequisites, creates the?possibility of external regulation of behavior."??? From: Andy Blunden To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Thursday, 4 December 2014, 5:58:56 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: labour and signs Haydi, exactly what Vygotsky's idea was about this or that, at this or that time, is something beyond my powers to know. I just try to make sense as best I can of what I find in his writings. So I can only say what conclusions this has led me to. Participation in the labour process obviously conditions our activity and our thinking. But I take it that *true concepts* appear only through the use of signs. It will still be the case that such concept formation rests on tool-use - you can't eat words. Participation in the labour process (however broadly understood) necessarily entails using tools. I think the relation between tool and sign in concept formation is found in those two passages to which you drew our attention on "Word and Action": http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1934/tool-symbol.htm#s25 I don't think these two lines of development are separate - they are *distinct*, but not separate. I tend think that "historically" tool use was "prior" but it may not be the case, and I don't really think it matters. For example, according to Marx, the first phase of development of capital entailed gathering workers together in a workshop as wage workers, without making any change whatsoever in the labour process itself, and all the revolutionising of machinery only happened later. http://marxists.catbull.com/archive/marx/works/1864/economic/ch02a.htm So if that was how it worked in the dawn of humanity, that is, that the form of cooperation preceded the revolutionising of the means of labour, this would support the claim for sign use to pre-date tool-use in the formation of intellect. But I don't know and I doubt that anyone knows. The point is just that these two lines of development have their distinct bases and develop side by side in connection with one another. Hope that helps, Haydi. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Haydi Zulfei wrote: > > > I'm no authority to say things act this way or that way but I'm > allowed to display my understanding . In this very piece , V > challenges "instrumental method" . In "Crisis" , he does the same . I > wonder what you might take by encountering so much talk about the "New > Psychology" or the "New Methodology" with lots of evidence he showers > on us to document his sayings . Shortly , was he a Marxist of the Day > or Not ? This could help us with many things . What seems to be > ambiguous for me is the last three lines of the paragraph . Is that > what you mean by pre-linguistic stage that after this stage , no use > of tools is to be observed ? I'm sure you won't . Mike is all right > with the term 'rudimentary' because the to-be MAN (primitive) acts on > the instant , is interested in THROWING bones or dice not in their > physical or chemical properties as is the case with later stages . > Hence use of stimulus-device not sign-device . But with full use of > tools and their sophistication we approach the appearance of language > which converts the NATURAL functions . V even locates their due places > , one the stem of the brain , the other the different layers of the > cortex . We know about ANL saying a day might be reached when > scientists become full workers and workers full scientists or > quasi-scientists but that day has not yet arrived . Not to become > lengthy , I refer to the important point that we do not internalize > tools but we do internalize signs , speech and this is where V warns > us against .? > > The reason that Vygotsky gives us this story about the knot in the > handkerchief and the coin-toss is that he wants to suggest a genesis of > the semiotic use of artefacts which does *not* originate from the use of > tools for working on matter. > > > Yes , yes , Vygotsky says , I parrot it many times . Then , I put the > question where does it come from (before rudiments) . Let me once > again stress on the fact that V asserts the two lines of development > are separate one from the other in phylogenesis . > > > > His claim is of course entirely speculative > and I take it to be a rhetorical move. So far as I know, Vygotsky is in > agreement with the idea that collaboration creates the situation in > which people need to share generalisations and thus "invent" speech > properly so called. Here is in agreement with Engels, but I think he > wants to assign only a very early (pre-linguistic) role to the tool, > holding that the tool can only give rise to the *potential concept* and > not a *true concept* as such. This idea is consistent with what the > distributed cognition people want to do and also with the phylogenetic > story told in the labour paradigm. In our own day, the role of tools in > the formation of mind is really unmistakable. But I think we need to be > just as flexible as I think Vygotsky was on these questions. > > > > What V says is use of tools finds its meaning within 'work activity' > of which you are a master . But these lines smack of historic > precedence of speech and co-constructing of speech over working > activity . Where have I got wrong ? > > > Haydi > > From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Fri Dec 5 01:13:42 2014 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (Haydi Zulfei) Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2014 09:13:42 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: labour and signs In-Reply-To: <548068A0.4080203@mira.net> References: <548068A0.4080203@mira.net> Message-ID: <2020652693.5886090.1417770822746.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11150.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> Thank you , Andy ! These are very good points to discuss and read about and we agree that dogmas are not the solution . With the idea that consciousness is !! immaterial or mostly (opinions) immaterial , one move of googling on the Net was enough but we , here , ascended to 100+plus posts to see what Vygotsky's text meant and for what reasons . This is the way one learns . I worried about Folks' tolerance ; now I see many posts . Good to hear others' words . ? Things are really very complex and at times very confusing and the appetite for learning is unlimited . Thanks again ! "Since the principle of signification leads us into the area of artificial devices,?the question arises as to its relation to other forms of artificial devices, of its place?in the general system of man's adaptation. , the use of?signs shows a certain analogy to the use of tools. ?Like all other analogies, this?analogy cannot be carried to the bitter end, to a full or partial coincidence of the?major essential characteristics of the concepts being compared. For this reason, we?must not anticipate finding much similarity to working tools in these devices that?we call signs. Moreover, together with similar and common characteristics in one?activity or another, we must ascertain the essential characteristics of the difference?in a certain relation-contrast." "The second point whose presence explains the possibility of the appearance of?a new regulatory principle of behavior consists of the fact of social life and interaction of people. In the process of social life, ?man created and developed more?complex systems of psychological connections without which work activity and all?social life would be impossible. The devices of psychological connection in their?very nature and in their essential function are signs, that is, stimuli artificially created to affect behavior by the development of new conditioned connections in the?human brain.?Both points taken together lead us to understanding the possibility of the development of a new regulatory principle. Social life creates the need to subject the?behavior of the individual to social requirements and together with this, ?creates?complex signalization systems, means of communication that guide and regulate?the development of conditioned connections in the brain of each person. The organization of higher nervous activity creates the necessary prerequisites, creates the?possibility of external regulation of behavior."??? From: Andy Blunden To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Thursday, 4 December 2014, 5:58:56 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: labour and signs Haydi, exactly what Vygotsky's idea was about this or that, at this or that time, is something beyond my powers to know. I just try to make sense as best I can of what I find in his writings. So I can only say what conclusions this has led me to. Participation in the labour process obviously conditions our activity and our thinking. But I take it that *true concepts* appear only through the use of signs. It will still be the case that such concept formation rests on tool-use - you can't eat words. Participation in the labour process (however broadly understood) necessarily entails using tools. I think the relation between tool and sign in concept formation is found in those two passages to which you drew our attention on "Word and Action": http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1934/tool-symbol.htm#s25 I don't think these two lines of development are separate - they are *distinct*, but not separate. I tend think that "historically" tool use was "prior" but it may not be the case, and I don't really think it matters. For example, according to Marx, the first phase of development of capital entailed gathering workers together in a workshop as wage workers, without making any change whatsoever in the labour process itself, and all the revolutionising of machinery only happened later. http://marxists.catbull.com/archive/marx/works/1864/economic/ch02a.htm So if that was how it worked in the dawn of humanity, that is, that the form of cooperation preceded the revolutionising of the means of labour, this would support the claim for sign use to pre-date tool-use in the formation of intellect. But I don't know and I doubt that anyone knows. The point is just that these two lines of development have their distinct bases and develop side by side in connection with one another. Hope that helps, Haydi. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Haydi Zulfei wrote: > > > I'm no authority to say things act this way or that way but I'm > allowed to display my understanding . In this very piece , V > challenges "instrumental method" . In "Crisis" , he does the same . I > wonder what you might take by encountering so much talk about the "New > Psychology" or the "New Methodology" with lots of evidence he showers > on us to document his sayings . Shortly , was he a Marxist of the Day > or Not ? This could help us with many things . What seems to be > ambiguous for me is the last three lines of the paragraph . Is that > what you mean by pre-linguistic stage that after this stage , no use > of tools is to be observed ? I'm sure you won't . Mike is all right > with the term 'rudimentary' because the to-be MAN (primitive) acts on > the instant , is interested in THROWING bones or dice not in their > physical or chemical properties as is the case with later stages . > Hence use of stimulus-device not sign-device . But with full use of > tools and their sophistication we approach the appearance of language > which converts the NATURAL functions . V even locates their due places > , one the stem of the brain , the other the different layers of the > cortex . We know about ANL saying a day might be reached when > scientists become full workers and workers full scientists or > quasi-scientists but that day has not yet arrived . Not to become > lengthy , I refer to the important point that we do not internalize > tools but we do internalize signs , speech and this is where V warns > us against .? > > The reason that Vygotsky gives us this story about the knot in the > handkerchief and the coin-toss is that he wants to suggest a genesis of > the semiotic use of artefacts which does *not* originate from the use of > tools for working on matter. > > > Yes , yes , Vygotsky says , I parrot it many times . Then , I put the > question where does it come from (before rudiments) . Let me once > again stress on the fact that V asserts the two lines of development > are separate one from the other in phylogenesis . > > > > His claim is of course entirely speculative > and I take it to be a rhetorical move. So far as I know, Vygotsky is in > agreement with the idea that collaboration creates the situation in > which people need to share generalisations and thus "invent" speech > properly so called. Here is in agreement with Engels, but I think he > wants to assign only a very early (pre-linguistic) role to the tool, > holding that the tool can only give rise to the *potential concept* and > not a *true concept* as such. This idea is consistent with what the > distributed cognition people want to do and also with the phylogenetic > story told in the labour paradigm. In our own day, the role of tools in > the formation of mind is really unmistakable. But I think we need to be > just as flexible as I think Vygotsky was on these questions. > > > > What V says is use of tools finds its meaning within 'work activity' > of which you are a master . But these lines smack of historic > precedence of speech and co-constructing of speech over working > activity . Where have I got wrong ? > > > Haydi > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Fri Dec 5 04:37:12 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2014 21:37:12 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: labour and signs In-Reply-To: <299005F6-2AB3-4E3E-B8D6-DB76EA26EBC5@gmail.com> References: <548002C6.5030907@mira.net> <1638274843.445412.1417699651665.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11124.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> <548068A0.4080203@mira.net> <66B9A63B-0FDB-44AF-9A3D-07BC658C2277@gmail.com> <5480FA6D.4030705@mira.net> <299005F6-2AB3-4E3E-B8D6-DB76EA26EBC5@gmail.com> Message-ID: Henry: William C. Stokoe ("Sign and Culture", and also the brilliant volume "Gesture and the Nature of Language") makes a very convincing case that the first true languages were sign languages, and this is another reason why I assume that languages are undergoing convergent rather than divergent evolution. Gesture, then, is a kind of fossil of the pre-linguistic origins of sign and non-sign languages. Annalisa: The reason I resist reducing word meanings to "affordances" is really the same reason that I resist collapsing the distinction between tool and sign in "artifact" or even "mediating activity". Of course, it is always possible to find a more abstract and general term for any phenomenon you want to analyze, and of course there is a high premium on using abstract and general terms in academia. Some of the premium that we collect from abstraction is actually valuable: we can make the important links between disciplines that I've been calling "Thematic" only by the use of abstract and general terms. But there is a certain trade off. One of the key problems Vygotsky set out to solve was to describe the difference between human beings and animals, and within humans, to describe the difference between higher psychological functions and lower ones. Some people claim that he abandoned this distinction utterly before he died (and in fact there is no mention of it in Thinking and Speech), but we have been translating the lectures he was working in the very last months of his life, and sure enough, the distinction is still very much there. The way that Gibson describes the affordance erases this distinction; an "affordance" applies to the tiger in the jungle as well as to the two year old looking for his favorite brand of cereal in the supermarket. To tell you the truth, even the term "sign" is too abstract and general for me when it comes to language: it applies equally well to the size and color of the box as to the lettering on it, and while one of them is perfectly manageable usig lower psychological functions, that is not true of the the other. So I am no longer convinced that a general theory of meaning (as opposed to a genetic account of meaning) needs to include signs at all; it seems to me that at a certain point the term "mental representation" is actually more useful, because it helps me understand what actually happens in the process of internalization. We sometimes talk as if culture just kind of rubs off on children in the process of using tools and signs, like a layer of dirt or a film of oil, or perhaps a splinter that goes into your hand when you grasp a stick, or a set of automatized mental skills that you unfold when you grasp a word. This simply can't be true; if it were, then Piaget's discovery learning would actually work and there would be nothing more to understanding words than going through familiar mental routines. Nor do I think that the acts of empathy that are undoubtedly part of recognizing the intentional nature of signs is enough for a child to internalize the culture that must go with them, because that reduces the social to the purely interpersonal. Just as the child learns to ignore the size and shape of the cereal box and read the label instead, at a particular point we stop reading labels and go about creating small cultures that exist, in the end, in rather than for a larger culture, but for rather than in ourselves. So I think we need different words, and I am not surprised the the word "affordance" will wear out when you try to use it to describe a phoneme. If something works okay to describe a plank, then it is should not surprise us at all that it doesn't work so well to describe a thought. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 5 December 2014 at 13:41, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > Andy, > Exactly what I was getting at. I have a friend who works with signed language (ASL is one signed language). He takes issue with the assumption that language developed first as speech and signed languages are derivative. Suppose the first signs of language were derived from recurrent gestures inherent in (collaborative) work activity, I am assuming others have conjectured as much, or it wouldn?t have come to me. Research shows us that children learn sign earlier and faster than spoken language. (Have you seen ?Meet the Folkers??) Is that saying anything about ontogeny and phylogeny? This issue relates, I think, to the power/diversity thread which is developing, since it would be of interest to the Deaf community. > Henry > > >> On Dec 4, 2014, at 5:21 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> Henry, >> As I see it, Vygotsky takes speech as the archetype of language-use; understanding Sign Language and gesture as well as written speech and internal speech, is derivative from understanding the spoken word. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>> Andy and Haydi, >>> Does it make any difference to this discussion that in the link to ?Word and Action?, word is equated with speech? What if word is equated with gesture, as in sign language? Henry >>> >>>> On Dec 4, 2014, at 6:58 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>> Haydi, exactly what Vygotsky's idea was about this or that, at this or that time, is something beyond my powers to know. I just try to make sense as best I can of what I find in his writings. So I can only say what conclusions this has led me to. Participation in the labour process obviously conditions our activity and our thinking. But I take it that *true concepts* appear only through the use of signs. It will still be the case that such concept formation rests on tool-use - you can't eat words. Participation in the labour process (however broadly understood) necessarily entails using tools. I think the relation between tool and sign in concept formation is found in those two passages to which you drew our attention on "Word and Action": >>>> >>>> http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1934/tool-symbol.htm#s25 >>>> >>>> I don't think these two lines of development are separate - they are *distinct*, but not separate. >>>> >>>> I tend think that "historically" tool use was "prior" but it may not be the case, and I don't really think it matters. For example, according to Marx, the first phase of development of capital entailed gathering workers together in a workshop as wage workers, without making any change whatsoever in the labour process itself, and all the revolutionising of machinery only happened later. >>>> >>>> http://marxists.catbull.com/archive/marx/works/1864/economic/ch02a.htm >>>> >>>> So if that was how it worked in the dawn of humanity, that is, that the form of cooperation preceded the revolutionising of the means of labour, this would support the claim for sign use to pre-date tool-use in the formation of intellect. But I don't know and I doubt that anyone knows. The point is just that these two lines of development have their distinct bases and develop side by side in connection with one another. >>>> >>>> Hope that helps, Haydi. >>>> Andy >>>> >>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> Haydi Zulfei wrote: >>>> >>>>> I'm no authority to say things act this way or that way but I'm allowed to display my understanding . In this very piece , V challenges "instrumental method" . In "Crisis" , he does the same . I wonder what you might take by encountering so much talk about the "New Psychology" or the "New Methodology" with lots of evidence he showers on us to document his sayings . Shortly , was he a Marxist of the Day or Not ? This could help us with many things . What seems to be ambiguous for me is the last three lines of the paragraph . Is that what you mean by pre-linguistic stage that after this stage , no use of tools is to be observed ? I'm sure you won't . Mike is all right with the term 'rudimentary' because the to-be MAN (primitive) acts on the instant , is interested in THROWING bones or dice not in their physical or chemical properties as is the case with later stages . Hence use of stimulus-device not sign-device . But with full use of tools and their sophistication we approach the appearance of language which converts the NATURAL functions . V even locates their due places , one the stem of the brain , the other the different layers of the cortex . We know about ANL saying a day might be reached when scientists become full workers and workers full scientists or quasi-scientists but that day has not yet arrived . Not to become lengthy , I refer to the important point that we do not internalize tools but we do internalize signs , speech and this is where V warns us against . The reason that Vygotsky gives us this story about the knot in the >>>>> handkerchief and the coin-toss is that he wants to suggest a genesis of >>>>> the semiotic use of artefacts which does *not* originate from the use of >>>>> tools for working on matter. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Yes , yes , Vygotsky says , I parrot it many times . Then , I put the question where does it come from (before rudiments) . Let me once again stress on the fact that V asserts the two lines of development are separate one from the other in phylogenesis . >>>>> >>>>> His claim is of course entirely speculative >>>>> and I take it to be a rhetorical move. So far as I know, Vygotsky is in >>>>> agreement with the idea that collaboration creates the situation in >>>>> which people need to share generalisations and thus "invent" speech >>>>> properly so called. Here is in agreement with Engels, but I think he >>>>> wants to assign only a very early (pre-linguistic) role to the tool, >>>>> holding that the tool can only give rise to the *potential concept* and >>>>> not a *true concept* as such. This idea is consistent with what the >>>>> distributed cognition people want to do and also with the phylogenetic >>>>> story told in the labour paradigm. In our own day, the role of tools in >>>>> the formation of mind is really unmistakable. But I think we need to be >>>>> just as flexible as I think Vygotsky was on these questions. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> What V says is use of tools finds its meaning within 'work activity' of which you are a master . But these lines smack of historic precedence of speech and co-constructing of speech over working activity . Where have I got wrong ? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Haydi >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> > > From shannonbrincat@yahoo.com.au Fri Dec 5 04:53:41 2014 From: shannonbrincat@yahoo.com.au (Shannon Brincat) Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2014 12:53:41 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Pyrodiversity Fire Management - Native Americans of the California Area In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <667496807.5524716.1417784021658.JavaMail.yahoo@jws10622.mail.bf1.yahoo.com> By way of comparison, similar findings have been made in Australia in Bruce Pascoe's Dark Emu: Black seeds, agriculture or accident? and Bill Gammage's The Biggest Estate on Earth. The latter discusses at length how targeted burnings were used for agricultural purposes. Dr. Shannon K. Brincat Griffith University Research FellowRoom -1.09 | Building N72 | Centre for Governance and Public Policy |?School of Government and International RelationsNathan Campus | Griffith University | 170 Kessels Road | Nathan | Brisbane | Queensland | 4111 | Australia Global Discourse, Co-Editorhttp://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rgld20#.Ua53eCsd7pM New edited series available through PraegerCommunism in the 21st Century?(3 Vols.)http://www.abc-clio.com/product.aspx?isbn=9781440801259 From: "Zavala, Miguel" To: "xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu" Sent: Friday, 5 December 2014, 18:22 Subject: [Xmca-l] Pyrodiversity Fire Management - Native Americans of the California Area XMCA, Have you heard of pyrodiversity fire management by Native Americans in the California area?? I found a book written by a UC Berkeley archaeologist that caught my attention and I found a great synthesis of the theory. What find most striking and fascinating is that, according to this theory, Native Americans of what is today California did not follow the same developmental line as is assumed: hunter-gatherer -> agriculture-settler. Typically, when people think of California Native Americans, they characterize them as hunter-gatherer (as if "stuck" in the Pleistocene period). Yet, what some scientists are finding is perhaps a competing theory or revision of this narrative; Native Americans developed a distinct type of food management system mediated primarily by pyro-fire practices.? Some argue that these were collective, conducted on a large scale among different groups, perhaps covering 10 ? 16% of what today is the geographic area of California. A nice chapter can be found below; I'm really digging this because in a way it diversifies development?that even large-scale development is not linear (or that "progress" is marked temporally without looking at the geographies of difference). Perhaps Eurocentric research and theories perpetuate master-narratives about how peoples develop across space-time.? To note, I did find some scientists arguing or challenging this theory, so it's important to see the evidence scientists use to support their theory. Access the Chapter here: https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CCMQFjAA&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.firescience.gov%2Fprojects%2F10-1-09-3%2Fproject%2F10-1-09-3_JONES_CH_09.pdf&ei=S1mBVLm4MMmNyATkvIKIBw&usg=AFQjCNE-TQ4ARzJf1Gbtmd2Vqz1cVwtu7A&bvm=bv.80642063,d.aWw Miguel Zavala From bella.kotik@gmail.com Fri Dec 5 05:19:27 2014 From: bella.kotik@gmail.com (Bella Kotik-Friedgut) Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2014 15:19:27 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Reading for Novices In-Reply-To: <1417756753782.22685@unm.edu> References: <1417756753782.22685@unm.edu> Message-ID: This is a new handbook [image: The Cambridge Handbook of Cultural-Historical Psychology] http://ebooks.cambridge.org/ebook.jsf?bid=CBO9781139028097 Sincerely yours Bella Kotik-Friedgut On Fri, Dec 5, 2014 at 7:19 AM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hello all, > > > I have a friend who has a background in anthropology and she is interested > in reading Vygotsky. With this in mind, which introductory texts do you > think would be best to cut one's teeth on our patron genius? > > > Also how about readings that describe sociocultural theory (rather than > actual Vygotsky texts)? > > > It seems a good combo of both may provide a nice context. > > > Kind regards, > > > Annalisa > From ablunden@mira.net Fri Dec 5 07:08:07 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sat, 06 Dec 2014 02:08:07 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: labour and signs In-Reply-To: References: <548002C6.5030907@mira.net> <1638274843.445412.1417699651665.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11124.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> <548068A0.4080203@mira.net> <66B9A63B-0FDB-44AF-9A3D-07BC658C2277@gmail.com> <5480FA6D.4030705@mira.net> <299005F6-2AB3-4E3E-B8D6-DB76EA26EBC5@gmail.com> Message-ID: <5481CA57.1050403@mira.net> David Kellogg wrote: > .... > > To tell you the truth, even the term "sign" is too abstract and > general for me when it comes to language: it applies equally well to > the size and color of the box as to the lettering on it, and while one > of them is perfectly manageable using lower psychological functions, > that is not true of the the other. So I am no longer convinced that a > general theory of meaning (as opposed to a genetic account of meaning) > needs to include signs at all; it seems to me that at a certain point > the term "mental representation" is actually more useful, because it > helps me understand what actually happens in the process of > internalization. "word" perhaps? andy From hshonerd@gmail.com Fri Dec 5 10:58:07 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2014 11:58:07 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Reading for Novices In-Reply-To: <1417756753782.22685@unm.edu> References: <1417756753782.22685@unm.edu> Message-ID: <1C3F787A-BFC0-4FE5-B884-08540D310241@gmail.com> Annalisa, I?m coming late to this, but really Mind in Society is very good. Thought and Language (Speaking and Thinking) are tough. Henry > On Dec 4, 2014, at 10:19 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > Hello all, > > > I have a friend who has a background in anthropology and she is interested in reading Vygotsky. With this in mind, which introductory texts do you think would be best to cut one's teeth on our patron genius? > > > Also how about readings that describe sociocultural theory (rather than actual Vygotsky texts)? > > > It seems a good combo of both may provide a nice context. > > > Kind regards, > > > Annalisa From helenaworthen@gmail.com Fri Dec 5 11:12:17 2014 From: helenaworthen@gmail.com (Helena Worthen) Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2014 11:12:17 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances In-Reply-To: <3A40602C-44A1-45C7-A7D1-36E1A842E92B@gmail.com> References: <1682996975.4827904.1417607429293.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11144.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> <3A40602C-44A1-45C7-A7D1-36E1A842E92B@gmail.com> Message-ID: <8FDB5B35-D645-496F-93CB-077884244184@gmail.com> A voice from the margins, here: I learn a lot from this list, all the time, and would hate to have it go quiet or self-destruct. But my role in the world outside this list, out there in the synchronous landscape, involves trying to make ideas intelligible to working people who may not have more than a couple of years of community college. For this purpose, there is a whole roster of terms that are a problem. When I say these terms to regular people, they make a face as if they'd tasted something bad. Examples of terms like this are: affordance mediate activity CHAT (cultural-historical activity theory) and: development For my purposes, Annalisa's Dec 2 post on Gibson's invention of the term "affordance" is very useful. He explained clearly why he made it up. I can use that. Knud Illeris' book "Contemporary Theories of Learning: Learning theorists...in their own words" is a breath of fresh air for the same reason. You got to hear a whole collection of different people saying very different things about learning, all grouped together as learning theorists. theoristshttp://www.pgce.soton.ac.uk/IT/Learning/Theories/ContemporaryTheoriesofLearning%20Learning%20theorists%20in%20their%20own%20words%20-%20Knud%20Illeris.pdf Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com On Dec 3, 2014, at 11:26 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > Haydi, > Thank you so much! Here?s how it is for me: > I too have been waiting for Andy to come back. He is the reason I am in the chat. I have known about Vygotsky through Vera since the early 80s. But I, after my dissertation on L2 fluency in 1986, I worked as a teacher educator where research and publication wasn?t necessary for tenure and promotion. The college where I was working closed (bankruptcy) five years back and, like any working stiff, I am having to reinvent myself. So, in thrashing about I came to read Andy?s articles on "collaborative project" as a unit of analysis a few years back, started emailing with him one-on-one (and he was so generous with his time and patience in answering my questions about activity theory and Vygotsky), until he said it was time for me to join the chat. Andy mentored me until I had the courage to pipe up. Andy just edited a book on collaborative projects; Vera has written one of the papers for the book. I love them both. That?s how it is for me. > > Let me say that I consider myself a rank learner, always beginning. Mike has wisely rejected the role of Caesar on the chat. But we go to him asking him to sort out things amongst the unruly class. As a teacher, the hardest thing for me ever to do was to deal with disrespect between students. I have finally come to realize and accept that I want to be in a school where the students are nice to each other. Where respect and trust abound. Where human flourishing is possible. There is no father god to rescue us. We have to do it for ourselves. Well, like the song goes, ?I?m still willin?? Let?s make this a creative project, which means no unethical use of power. We can?t afford it. In my humble opinion. > > In gratitude and hope, > Henry > >> On Dec 3, 2014, at 11:00 AM, mike cole wrote: >> >> Haydi-- >> >> Like anyone on xmca, you can demand whatever you like. Getting people to >> implement your demands may be more >> difficult. In general, I have not experienced demands and resentment as >> particularly helpful on xmca, but thing are changing, >> so who knows. >> >> I am not putting ANL aside because of the concerns expressed in MCA in the >> past year or so. The concerns are real, at least to me. >> But there are many productive programs of research that use his ideas, >> along with those of LSV and many others, both Russian and non-Russian. >> >> I believe it would be helpful in receiving answers to your various comments >> and suggestions if some of them were constrained to particular threads. For >> example, the discussion of plank versus a piece of electronic equipment vis >> a vis the notion of artifact and mediation through artifacts, etc., might >> be be placed in that thread. >> >> etc. >> >> I clearly can be wrong in all of these judgments! >> mike >> >> >> >> On Wed, Dec 3, 2014 at 3:50 AM, Haydi Zulfei >> wrote: >> >>> Hi >>> >>> First of all , so resentfully I wonder If I can demand Andy's return to >>> the discussions !! No one can deny his great contributions to this Forum . >>> >>> Second , I might have been lost completely in your words , terms , >>> premises , and compositional nuances and colourings of your script as >>> native speakers , etc. >>> >>> >>> Third , because of obvious sensitivities towards ANL , I've altogether put >>> him to one side ; otherwise , in this concrete example of Michael , the >>> triad , activity , action , operation are boldly in view . >>> >>> >>> Fourth , I suppose LSV himself in two or three chapters of the "History of >>> Higher Mental Functions" has provided full response to our inquiries . Andy >>> , in time , sent the first two chapters to all . >>> >>> 1. He , after preliminary remarks , puts heavy emphasis on use of tools >>> and work activity in the parentheses and in italic characters . He >>> emphasizes that use of tool very naturally gets significant just within the >>> work activity process . Without the work activity we cannot expect much of >>> it . Then , as most of the time , he time and again references Marx and >>> Engels so as to prove his claims . >>> >>> >>> 2. Mike is so and for good reasons enchanted in "rudiments" of culture >>> phenomena (throwing dice and bones , knots , notches in the wood to >>> remember speech) . Good for him and us all . Yes , Buridan's ass gets >>> spoilt in its indecision But man through inventing stimulus-device gets to >>> salvation . But the problem is how many times has Mike , our Boss and >>> confirmed global figure no need for it to be documented , asked himself >>> what went before that juncture of time for the man to become 'MAN' ?? At >>> this moment we are with LSV and at a very critical point of time . No more >>> return to 'culture' to prove 'culture' . LSV says the error for some is to >>> recount the story of mental through mental while they should know that >>> mental processes go parallel with 'social' processes . What I gather at >>> this very point is that he expects us to infer that the 'our present man of >>> some will' owes his man/ness and decisiveness to his previous work activity >>> necessitating use of tools . It seems we cannot take the idea to the >>> uterine because V focuses on use of tools for a baby of 6 or of 10-12 >>> months of age . It seems , both phylogenetically and ontogenetically , that >>> it's not the case that 'gestures' ' eye contacts' come of their own and >>> because of the man/ness and for the tuning-up with the universe through >>> sounds and hymns and angels , etc. Man worked for life , performed ups and >>> downs , shook his extremeties (one pair of hand) , consumed ! collective >>> yellings and gesturing (as concomitant of work) . V says we can distinguish >>> independent history of natural processes and independent history of >>> cultural development separately 'phylogenetically' but not ontogenetically >>> . In ontology , nature and culture work simultaneously contrary to >>> phylogenesis . One cannot with ease and comfort say whichone goes with >>> whichone . >>> >>> >>> 3. Andy who is well aware of both CH and AT , on his sending of the four >>> pages and then the said two chapters , disclosed a very important point >>> neglected so far at the forum and that was the idea of the distinction >>> between tool and sign so fruitfully and enormously discussed by V and the >>> deep meaning that the simple diagram denoted . V says 'artifact' could be >>> cheating and deceitful but no one cares ! They invariably use artifacts and >>> through this , they ultimately remove 'material activity' from the domain >>> altogether . V is everywhere clear with both 'cultural , ideal activity' >>> and 'material activity' . Here is where quotes don't work . The one more >>> return to the plus-thousand previous reflections . No loss really ! V , if >>> necessary , prefers just 'mediation' . >>> >>> 4. With these in mind , I say for certain that here the plank is a tool >>> not an 'artifact' because it is not a sign signaling any other genuine >>> thing . It's all to itself . Also the light switch . And the whole activity >>> is a material one . Life put it in the way . According to V sign activity >>> affects one's own societal individual behaviour . We cannot generalize its >>> effect to the border of transforming Nature . Man through speech , dialogue >>> , discourse , talk , genre , etc. decides for the change in personal >>> behaviour ; if this potential preparedness for individual behavioral change >>> gets fossilized or ossified , then man will not reach the threshhold of the >>> bigger act and the vast field of the Mother Universe with its motley rich >>> material phenomena out of which each time he can select an object for a >>> circle of activity : starting an activity with a probable cryptic 'motive' >>> (what we don't yet know about which took him to the point of crossing) , >>> with a conscious goal (reaching the other side) through a concrete action >>> (crossing) operating according to the conditions at hand and on the ground >>> (light switching , wrestling between the ideal and the material (object , >>> subject , that is , thinking ideally about what to do with the whole thing >>> and the plank , then observing with the help of the light acting on the >>> object , again back to thinking if flaws are observed , etc. etc. no >>> blending of objective and subjective whatsoever . And I wonder why taking >>> affordance for a tool . >>> >>> >>> Soooooooooo much for one post . >>> >>> I considered spaces but wonder if it works . >>> I'll also be very quiet and slow in replying ! >>> >>> Best >>> >>> Haydi >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> From: mike cole >>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>> Sent: Tuesday, 2 December 2014, 11:26:46 >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances >>> >>> My view? >>> The plank is for certain an artifact, no less than the light bulb. On what >>> grounds, or under what circumstances, would you classify it otherwise? >>> What's gained, what's lost? >>> mike >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Glassman, Michael >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Hi Annalisa, Mike, Huw >>>> >>>> I tend to be somebody who reacts better to concrete examples than >>>> definitions. I believe this also comes from Gibson's 1977 book, >>>> >>>> You are walking across a field and come to a stream which you can to get >>>> across. You notice a plank across the stream. It is wide enough for you >>>> to keep your balance and thick enough to hold your weight, in using it >>> you >>>> recognize its affordance as a crossing point. It is the intersection of >>>> the movement, the perception of the plank, short term goal of the >>> activity >>>> (getting across the stream) - the recognition of the affordance comes in >>>> the subjective use of the object (which is why it is neither subjective >>> or >>>> objective). It is also important that you have the abilities (the >>> correct >>>> weight, the balance) to recognize the affordance, otherwise you pass the >>>> plank by. >>>> >>>> As far as perceived affordance. I think I have this right - the >>> perceived >>>> is not in the person who recognizes the affordance (otherwise you are >>>> right, that is wet water) it is whether there is an intention in the >>> design >>>> of the object. So I create a light switch with the intention of >>> designing >>>> it as having a perceived affordance for somebody who wants to switch on a >>>> light. As you can see different from the relationship to the plank, >>> where >>>> there is no prior design. >>>> >>>> Here is my question (perhaps answered in the Engestrom paper) >>>> >>>> The light switch is certainly an artifact, but is the plank? >>>> >>>> Michael >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 1:19 PM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances >>>> >>>> Those definitions help a lot Annalisa and touch on the fact that gibson >>>> seemed to empty the organism (if one were so inclined to interpret him) >>> and >>>> he dismissed culutral mediation as secondary at best. Still, they share >>> the >>>> idea that a part of the structure that psychologist theorize as a located >>>> inside of individual crania is in fact "our there" in the phylgenetically >>>> and cultural-historically constitued environment. And that drove >>> cognitive >>>> psychologists, our co discussants, nuts. Until, "they got it" and then >>>> sought to mold it to their own ends and pre-existing means. >>>> mike >>>> >>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 9:59 AM, Annalisa Aguilar >>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> I thought I'd do the honors and start a new thread on affordances, >>> which >>>>> isn't related to Larry's discussion of basic images. >>>>> >>>>> I figured as well to offer Gibson's words on affordances since it is a >>>>> word he invented to describe something he saw in the world. Of course >>> the >>>>> life of affordances has been full of controversy, especially with >>> regard >>>> to >>>>> understanding what they are. >>>>> >>>>> Gibson's Affordances is a theory I find instrumental to connecting >>>> outside >>>>> to inside experiences and I intuit that it is related to perezhivanie >>> in >>>>> some fashion. >>>>> >>>>> After reading the wikipage more closely, I regret offering a link to >>> the >>>>> text there because it isn't very clear what Gibson means or what Norman >>>>> means. To me, a "perceived affordance" is like saying "wet water." >>>>> >>>>> In any case, here are 3 quotes of Gibson in his own words, that I could >>>>> find: >>>>> >>>>> The affordances of the environment are what it _offers_ the animal, >>> what >>>>> it _provides_ or _furnishes_, either for good or ill. The verb "to >>>> afford" >>>>> is found in the dictionary, the noun "affordance" is not. I have made >>> it >>>>> up. I mean by it something that refers both to the environment and the >>>>> animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies the >>>> complementarity >>>>> of the animal and the environment (Gibson, 1977/1986). >>>>> >>>>> and >>>>> >>>>> What is meant by an _affordance_? ?Subject to revision, I suggest that >>>> the >>>>> affordance of anything is a specific combination of the properties of >>> its >>>>> substance and its surfaces taken with reference to an animal. The >>>> reference >>>>> may be to an animal as distinguished from other species (Gibson, >>>> 1977/1986). >>>>> >>>>> and >>>>> >>>>> An important fact about affordances of the environment is that they are >>>> in >>>>> a sense objective, real, and physical, unlike values and meanings, >>> which >>>>> are often supposed to be subjective, phenomenal, and mental. But >>>> actually, >>>>> an affordance is neither an objective property nor a subjective >>> property; >>>>> or it is both if you like. An affordance cuts across the dichotomy of >>>>> subjective-objective and helps us to understand its inadequacy. It is >>>>> equally a fact of the environment and a fact of behavior. It is both >>>>> physical and psychical, yet neither. An affordance points both ways, to >>>> the >>>>> environment and to the observer (Gibson, 1977/1986). >>>>> >>>>> These quotes are important to keep in mind, I hope they help. >>>>> >>>>> I might also suggest looking at Mace(1977) who described very carefully >>>>> how Gibson got from stimuli to affordance, given that people on this >>> list >>>>> value history, learning, and development. >>>>> >>>>> Kind regards, >>>>> >>>>> Annalisa >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>>>> on behalf of Huw Lloyd >>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 2, 2014 10:35 AM >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>> >>>>> I'd take a look. >>>>> >>>>> Michael, utility or technical affordance might fit. My equivalent of >>>> your >>>>> perceived/discovered distinction is one of planned and technically >>>>> manifest. >>>>> >>>>> Huw >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 2 December 2014 at 16:44, Glassman, Michael >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> I'd be interested in anybody else is. >>>>>> >>>>>> Michael >>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ >>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> ] >>>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 11:39 AM >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>> >>>>>> Interloper, Michael? >>>>>> >>>>>> The discussions at UCSD preceeding Don's use of affordances and >>>> cognitive >>>>>> artifacts were accompanied by other, related papers. One by Engestrom >>>> on >>>>>> "when is an artifact" and one or more by Ed Hutchins. If people are >>>>>> interested in pursuing this thread/topic the materials could be >>>> gathered >>>>>> up. >>>>>> >>>>>> mike >>>>>> >>>>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Glassman, Michael < >>> glassman.13@osu.edu >>>>> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea). >>> He >>>>>>> actually cops to both of them. The first was not to distinguish >>>>> between >>>>>>> affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which >>> are >>>>>>> designed. I think this is related to the issue of artifacts. >>>> Meaning >>>>>> are >>>>>>> artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to >>> be >>>>>>> discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong >>> word, >>>> if >>>>>>> anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances. It is a >>>>>> complex >>>>>>> question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes >>> based >>>> on >>>>>>> context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one >>>> context >>>>>> may >>>>>>> result in organic affordances in another context. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is that >>>> he >>>>>> was >>>>>>> not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and >>>>>> constraints. >>>>>>> Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived affordances >>> or >>>>> are >>>>>>> they designed to create constraints. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the >>>>> mention >>>>>>> just spurred me to throw this up. Hope I'm not being too much of >>> an >>>>>>> interloper. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Michael >>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ >>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> ] >>>>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM >>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Annalisa- >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation >>>> not >>>>>>> discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of >>>>>>> affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set >>> against >>>>>>> Gibson's ideas. The change of views coincided with the advent of >>> the >>>>>> d-cog >>>>>>> idea which also has deep roots in chat. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> No hidden history i know of, but interesting connections among the >>>>>> notion >>>>>>> of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion of >>>>> these >>>>>>> connections can be found, among other places, in >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Cole, M. & Engestr?m, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach >>> to >>>>>>> distributed* >>>>>>> *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition: >>>> Psychological >>>>>> and >>>>>>> educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> mike >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar >>> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Hi Mike, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied >>>> that >>>>>>> wish! >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important >>> connections. >>>> I >>>>>> was >>>>>>>> not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I >>> learned >>>>>> about >>>>>>>> Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science >>>> (1985). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Is there some history that is not part of the common story? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I looked here for clarity: >>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to >>>>>> cognitive >>>>>>>> artifacts? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in >>>> play, >>>>>> and >>>>>>>> even joy! >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however >>>> until >>>>>> then >>>>>>>> I will remain with the ineffable. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> on behalf of mike cole >>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM >>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And, >>>>>>>> co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive >>>>>> artifacts >>>>>>>> right about that time at UCSD. If it were possible to find a >>>> source >>>>>> that >>>>>>>> makes these connections visible and available to read about it >>>> might >>>>>> be a >>>>>>>> step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of >>>>> intro >>>>>>> for >>>>>>>> newcomers to the discussion. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a >>>>>> newcomer's >>>>>>>> introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is >>> seeking >>>>> to >>>>>>> sort >>>>>>>> out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am >>>>>>> insuficiently >>>>>>>> read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted! >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many >>>>> rocks, >>>>>> so >>>>>>>> little time"! >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Mike >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> A >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Martin! >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental >>>>> representation" >>>>>> is >>>>>>>>> coming closer! >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's >>>>> theory >>>>>> of >>>>>>>>> affordances. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed >>>> article. >>>>>> But >>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>> wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is >>>>>>> important >>>>>>>>> not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a >>>>>> grenade >>>>>>>>> pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the >>>> list. >>>>>> If >>>>>>>> you >>>>>>>>> can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look >>>> forward >>>>> to >>>>>>>> your >>>>>>>>> reply, Martin. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that >>> being >>>>> at >>>>>>> UCSD >>>>>>>>> and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that >>>>> influences >>>>>>> your >>>>>>>>> position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find >>>>>>> community >>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>> it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more >>> voluntary >>>>>>> phrased >>>>>>>>> that way). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of >>>>> Martin >>>>>>> John >>>>>>>>> Packer > >>>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM >>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> An interesting article, David. One way in which it is >>>> interesting, >>>>> to >>>>>>> me >>>>>>>>> at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not >>> used, >>>>>> even >>>>>>>>> once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" >>> images >>>> in >>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> world around us - material representations - and he tries to >>>> define >>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg < >>> dkellogg60@gmail.com >>>>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Larry, Annalisa: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" >>>> when >>>>>> we >>>>>>>>>> met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of >>>>>>> anything >>>>>>>>>> except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe >>>>> available >>>>>>>>>> for a standard price all over China) She does not even >>> remember >>>>>>>>>> whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was >>> the >>>>>>>>>> beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as >>> a >>>>>>>>>> non-image based mental representation. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental >>> representations >>>>> are >>>>>>>>>> images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth >>> century. >>>>> In >>>>>>>>>> fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against >>>>>>> Titchener >>>>>>>>>> and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, >>>>>>>>>> everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated >>>> that >>>>>>>>>> many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically >>>>>> anterior >>>>>>>>>> to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would >>>> not >>>>>> have >>>>>>>>>> time or ability to process complex problems in real time. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that >>> are >>>>>>>>>> genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more >>>>>> reading >>>>>>>>>> to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read >>> than >>>> I >>>>> am >>>>>>>>>> (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels >>>> like >>>>>>>>>> she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do >>>> NOT >>>>>> read >>>>>>>>>> this article--instead, look at Figure 11. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color >>> structure >>>> of >>>>>>>>>> Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any >>>>> actual >>>>>>>>>> images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural >>>>>>> experience >>>>>>>>>> associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then >>>>> deliberately >>>>>>>>>> frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any >>>>>>>>>> recognizable figures upon which to focus. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine >>> Chapel >>>>>> fresco >>>>>>>>>> for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. >>> He >>>> or >>>>>> she >>>>>>>>>> can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the >>> painting >>>>> and >>>>>>>>>> wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not >>>>> notice >>>>>>>>>> the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful >>> in >>>>> it. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar < >>>> annalisa@unm.edu >>>>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Hi Larry and David, >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are >>>> at >>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> root of all thinking. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, >>>> based >>>>>> upon >>>>>>>>> previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, >>> in >>>>>>>>> combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a >>>>> phrase >>>>>> I >>>>>>>> like >>>>>>>>> a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on >>> it >>>>> by >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know >>> it. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think >>> as >>>>>>> Hackett >>>>>>>>> describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have >>>> you >>>>>>>> already >>>>>>>>> given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be >>>>> willing >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> take a look. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is >>>>>>> controversial. >>>>>>>>> It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone >>>>> says >>>>>>>> "this >>>>>>>>> is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble >>>>>>> observation. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and >>> whatever >>>>>> that >>>>>>>>> process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at >>>>> hand? >>>>>>>> Just a >>>>>>>>> thought. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> What is it that appeals to you about this model, >>>> metaphoricity? >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of >>>> Larry >>>>>>>> Purss < >>>>>>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com > >>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM >>>>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity >>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> David K >>>>>>>>>>> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. >>>> My >>>>>>> reason >>>>>>>>> for >>>>>>>>>>> exploring these authors is I have been following a path >>>>> pursuing a >>>>>>>> basic >>>>>>>>>>> question. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic >>>>>> guiding >>>>>>>>> images >>>>>>>>>>> upon which thinking rests" >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring >>>>> appearances >>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>> illusions was also exploring this theme. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new >>>>> phenomenological >>>>>>>> path >>>>>>>>>>> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names >>>>> this >>>>>>>>> process >>>>>>>>>>> *metaphoricity*. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible >>>>>> image-character >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> *spontaneous event* of meaning. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which >>> he >>>>>>>> brackets - >>>>>>>>>>> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> AND >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* >>>> finds >>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> meaning of its very self. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this >>>>>>>>>>> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion >>> of >>>>>>>> metaphor >>>>>>>>> can >>>>>>>>>>> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is >>> implicated >>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>> *objectivity* >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of >>>>> itself >>>>>>>> *in* >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> mode [path] of the concept >>>>>>>>>>> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding >>>>> images >>>>>>> has >>>>>>>>> been >>>>>>>>>>> established. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the >>>> path >>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is >>> derived >>>>>> from >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> image-character of the guiding image. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial >>>> this >>>>>>> topic >>>>>>>>> may >>>>>>>>>>> become [again] >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by >>> this >>>>>> basic >>>>>>>>>>> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these >>>>> images >>>>>> as >>>>>>>>>>> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images >>>> emerge >>>>>>>>>>> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is >>>>> transcendental] >>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>>> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. >>>> It >>>>>>> seems >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I also realize this question may already be answered in >>>>> Vygotsky's >>>>>>>>> writings >>>>>>>>>>> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of >>>>> XMCA. I >>>>>>>>>>> personally am following this path for now. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >>> with >>>>> an >>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>>> an >>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>> an >>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > From glassman.13@osu.edu Fri Dec 5 11:46:15 2014 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2014 19:46:15 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances In-Reply-To: <8FDB5B35-D645-496F-93CB-077884244184@gmail.com> References: <1682996975.4827904.1417607429293.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11144.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> <3A40602C-44A1-45C7-A7D1-36E1A842E92B@gmail.com>, <8FDB5B35-D645-496F-93CB-077884244184@gmail.com> Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F907548F@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Hi Helena, I'm not so sure if its the words or the way the thinking behind those words match up or don't match up with the systems of the individuals were are teaching live and think within. A little while ago I was reading Bateson and his idea that Western philosophy/thinking often precluded the idea of a supreme cybernetic system - the idea that we could and would be self-corrected through exploration of the universe rather than any conscious human design. We are a society obsessed with local control and the idea that we can manipulate the universe around us (which we can in small doses, but Bateson claim is destructive in the long run). Many of the words you mention such as affordances, mediators, activity often fall into the exploration perspective I think - and they become difficult to relate. A little while ago I wrote a sentence based on the idea that education should be based on open exploration because something akin to a supreme cybernetics will offer self-correcting feedback, and a big trouble is many educators don't trust that. And then I stared at the sentence for a while and realized the majority of people reading it (if anybody does ever read it) would just pass it right over. So what do we do? Hard to know. A side question for Mike - in those early meetings on distributed cognition that Don Norman was a part of did cybernetics and/or Bateson every some up? Michael ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Helena Worthen [helenaworthen@gmail.com] Sent: Friday, December 05, 2014 2:12 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances A voice from the margins, here: I learn a lot from this list, all the time, and would hate to have it go quiet or self-destruct. But my role in the world outside this list, out there in the synchronous landscape, involves trying to make ideas intelligible to working people who may not have more than a couple of years of community college. For this purpose, there is a whole roster of terms that are a problem. When I say these terms to regular people, they make a face as if they'd tasted something bad. Examples of terms like this are: affordance mediate activity CHAT (cultural-historical activity theory) and: development For my purposes, Annalisa's Dec 2 post on Gibson's invention of the term "affordance" is very useful. He explained clearly why he made it up. I can use that. Knud Illeris' book "Contemporary Theories of Learning: Learning theorists...in their own words" is a breath of fresh air for the same reason. You got to hear a whole collection of different people saying very different things about learning, all grouped together as learning theorists. theoristshttp://www.pgce.soton.ac.uk/IT/Learning/Theories/ContemporaryTheoriesofLearning%20Learning%20theorists%20in%20their%20own%20words%20-%20Knud%20Illeris.pdf Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com On Dec 3, 2014, at 11:26 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > Haydi, > Thank you so much! Here?s how it is for me: > I too have been waiting for Andy to come back. He is the reason I am in the chat. I have known about Vygotsky through Vera since the early 80s. But I, after my dissertation on L2 fluency in 1986, I worked as a teacher educator where research and publication wasn?t necessary for tenure and promotion. The college where I was working closed (bankruptcy) five years back and, like any working stiff, I am having to reinvent myself. So, in thrashing about I came to read Andy?s articles on "collaborative project" as a unit of analysis a few years back, started emailing with him one-on-one (and he was so generous with his time and patience in answering my questions about activity theory and Vygotsky), until he said it was time for me to join the chat. Andy mentored me until I had the courage to pipe up. Andy just edited a book on collaborative projects; Vera has written one of the papers for the book. I love them both. That?s how it is for me. > > Let me say that I consider myself a rank learner, always beginning. Mike has wisely rejected the role of Caesar on the chat. But we go to him asking him to sort out things amongst the unruly class. As a teacher, the hardest thing for me ever to do was to deal with disrespect between students. I have finally come to realize and accept that I want to be in a school where the students are nice to each other. Where respect and trust abound. Where human flourishing is possible. There is no father god to rescue us. We have to do it for ourselves. Well, like the song goes, ?I?m still willin?? Let?s make this a creative project, which means no unethical use of power. We can?t afford it. In my humble opinion. > > In gratitude and hope, > Henry > >> On Dec 3, 2014, at 11:00 AM, mike cole wrote: >> >> Haydi-- >> >> Like anyone on xmca, you can demand whatever you like. Getting people to >> implement your demands may be more >> difficult. In general, I have not experienced demands and resentment as >> particularly helpful on xmca, but thing are changing, >> so who knows. >> >> I am not putting ANL aside because of the concerns expressed in MCA in the >> past year or so. The concerns are real, at least to me. >> But there are many productive programs of research that use his ideas, >> along with those of LSV and many others, both Russian and non-Russian. >> >> I believe it would be helpful in receiving answers to your various comments >> and suggestions if some of them were constrained to particular threads. For >> example, the discussion of plank versus a piece of electronic equipment vis >> a vis the notion of artifact and mediation through artifacts, etc., might >> be be placed in that thread. >> >> etc. >> >> I clearly can be wrong in all of these judgments! >> mike >> >> >> >> On Wed, Dec 3, 2014 at 3:50 AM, Haydi Zulfei >> wrote: >> >>> Hi >>> >>> First of all , so resentfully I wonder If I can demand Andy's return to >>> the discussions !! No one can deny his great contributions to this Forum . >>> >>> Second , I might have been lost completely in your words , terms , >>> premises , and compositional nuances and colourings of your script as >>> native speakers , etc. >>> >>> >>> Third , because of obvious sensitivities towards ANL , I've altogether put >>> him to one side ; otherwise , in this concrete example of Michael , the >>> triad , activity , action , operation are boldly in view . >>> >>> >>> Fourth , I suppose LSV himself in two or three chapters of the "History of >>> Higher Mental Functions" has provided full response to our inquiries . Andy >>> , in time , sent the first two chapters to all . >>> >>> 1. He , after preliminary remarks , puts heavy emphasis on use of tools >>> and work activity in the parentheses and in italic characters . He >>> emphasizes that use of tool very naturally gets significant just within the >>> work activity process . Without the work activity we cannot expect much of >>> it . Then , as most of the time , he time and again references Marx and >>> Engels so as to prove his claims . >>> >>> >>> 2. Mike is so and for good reasons enchanted in "rudiments" of culture >>> phenomena (throwing dice and bones , knots , notches in the wood to >>> remember speech) . Good for him and us all . Yes , Buridan's ass gets >>> spoilt in its indecision But man through inventing stimulus-device gets to >>> salvation . But the problem is how many times has Mike , our Boss and >>> confirmed global figure no need for it to be documented , asked himself >>> what went before that juncture of time for the man to become 'MAN' ?? At >>> this moment we are with LSV and at a very critical point of time . No more >>> return to 'culture' to prove 'culture' . LSV says the error for some is to >>> recount the story of mental through mental while they should know that >>> mental processes go parallel with 'social' processes . What I gather at >>> this very point is that he expects us to infer that the 'our present man of >>> some will' owes his man/ness and decisiveness to his previous work activity >>> necessitating use of tools . It seems we cannot take the idea to the >>> uterine because V focuses on use of tools for a baby of 6 or of 10-12 >>> months of age . It seems , both phylogenetically and ontogenetically , that >>> it's not the case that 'gestures' ' eye contacts' come of their own and >>> because of the man/ness and for the tuning-up with the universe through >>> sounds and hymns and angels , etc. Man worked for life , performed ups and >>> downs , shook his extremeties (one pair of hand) , consumed ! collective >>> yellings and gesturing (as concomitant of work) . V says we can distinguish >>> independent history of natural processes and independent history of >>> cultural development separately 'phylogenetically' but not ontogenetically >>> . In ontology , nature and culture work simultaneously contrary to >>> phylogenesis . One cannot with ease and comfort say whichone goes with >>> whichone . >>> >>> >>> 3. Andy who is well aware of both CH and AT , on his sending of the four >>> pages and then the said two chapters , disclosed a very important point >>> neglected so far at the forum and that was the idea of the distinction >>> between tool and sign so fruitfully and enormously discussed by V and the >>> deep meaning that the simple diagram denoted . V says 'artifact' could be >>> cheating and deceitful but no one cares ! They invariably use artifacts and >>> through this , they ultimately remove 'material activity' from the domain >>> altogether . V is everywhere clear with both 'cultural , ideal activity' >>> and 'material activity' . Here is where quotes don't work . The one more >>> return to the plus-thousand previous reflections . No loss really ! V , if >>> necessary , prefers just 'mediation' . >>> >>> 4. With these in mind , I say for certain that here the plank is a tool >>> not an 'artifact' because it is not a sign signaling any other genuine >>> thing . It's all to itself . Also the light switch . And the whole activity >>> is a material one . Life put it in the way . According to V sign activity >>> affects one's own societal individual behaviour . We cannot generalize its >>> effect to the border of transforming Nature . Man through speech , dialogue >>> , discourse , talk , genre , etc. decides for the change in personal >>> behaviour ; if this potential preparedness for individual behavioral change >>> gets fossilized or ossified , then man will not reach the threshhold of the >>> bigger act and the vast field of the Mother Universe with its motley rich >>> material phenomena out of which each time he can select an object for a >>> circle of activity : starting an activity with a probable cryptic 'motive' >>> (what we don't yet know about which took him to the point of crossing) , >>> with a conscious goal (reaching the other side) through a concrete action >>> (crossing) operating according to the conditions at hand and on the ground >>> (light switching , wrestling between the ideal and the material (object , >>> subject , that is , thinking ideally about what to do with the whole thing >>> and the plank , then observing with the help of the light acting on the >>> object , again back to thinking if flaws are observed , etc. etc. no >>> blending of objective and subjective whatsoever . And I wonder why taking >>> affordance for a tool . >>> >>> >>> Soooooooooo much for one post . >>> >>> I considered spaces but wonder if it works . >>> I'll also be very quiet and slow in replying ! >>> >>> Best >>> >>> Haydi >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> From: mike cole >>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>> Sent: Tuesday, 2 December 2014, 11:26:46 >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances >>> >>> My view? >>> The plank is for certain an artifact, no less than the light bulb. On what >>> grounds, or under what circumstances, would you classify it otherwise? >>> What's gained, what's lost? >>> mike >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Glassman, Michael >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Hi Annalisa, Mike, Huw >>>> >>>> I tend to be somebody who reacts better to concrete examples than >>>> definitions. I believe this also comes from Gibson's 1977 book, >>>> >>>> You are walking across a field and come to a stream which you can to get >>>> across. You notice a plank across the stream. It is wide enough for you >>>> to keep your balance and thick enough to hold your weight, in using it >>> you >>>> recognize its affordance as a crossing point. It is the intersection of >>>> the movement, the perception of the plank, short term goal of the >>> activity >>>> (getting across the stream) - the recognition of the affordance comes in >>>> the subjective use of the object (which is why it is neither subjective >>> or >>>> objective). It is also important that you have the abilities (the >>> correct >>>> weight, the balance) to recognize the affordance, otherwise you pass the >>>> plank by. >>>> >>>> As far as perceived affordance. I think I have this right - the >>> perceived >>>> is not in the person who recognizes the affordance (otherwise you are >>>> right, that is wet water) it is whether there is an intention in the >>> design >>>> of the object. So I create a light switch with the intention of >>> designing >>>> it as having a perceived affordance for somebody who wants to switch on a >>>> light. As you can see different from the relationship to the plank, >>> where >>>> there is no prior design. >>>> >>>> Here is my question (perhaps answered in the Engestrom paper) >>>> >>>> The light switch is certainly an artifact, but is the plank? >>>> >>>> Michael >>>> ________________________________________ >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 1:19 PM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances >>>> >>>> Those definitions help a lot Annalisa and touch on the fact that gibson >>>> seemed to empty the organism (if one were so inclined to interpret him) >>> and >>>> he dismissed culutral mediation as secondary at best. Still, they share >>> the >>>> idea that a part of the structure that psychologist theorize as a located >>>> inside of individual crania is in fact "our there" in the phylgenetically >>>> and cultural-historically constitued environment. And that drove >>> cognitive >>>> psychologists, our co discussants, nuts. Until, "they got it" and then >>>> sought to mold it to their own ends and pre-existing means. >>>> mike >>>> >>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 9:59 AM, Annalisa Aguilar >>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> I thought I'd do the honors and start a new thread on affordances, >>> which >>>>> isn't related to Larry's discussion of basic images. >>>>> >>>>> I figured as well to offer Gibson's words on affordances since it is a >>>>> word he invented to describe something he saw in the world. Of course >>> the >>>>> life of affordances has been full of controversy, especially with >>> regard >>>> to >>>>> understanding what they are. >>>>> >>>>> Gibson's Affordances is a theory I find instrumental to connecting >>>> outside >>>>> to inside experiences and I intuit that it is related to perezhivanie >>> in >>>>> some fashion. >>>>> >>>>> After reading the wikipage more closely, I regret offering a link to >>> the >>>>> text there because it isn't very clear what Gibson means or what Norman >>>>> means. To me, a "perceived affordance" is like saying "wet water." >>>>> >>>>> In any case, here are 3 quotes of Gibson in his own words, that I could >>>>> find: >>>>> >>>>> The affordances of the environment are what it _offers_ the animal, >>> what >>>>> it _provides_ or _furnishes_, either for good or ill. The verb "to >>>> afford" >>>>> is found in the dictionary, the noun "affordance" is not. I have made >>> it >>>>> up. I mean by it something that refers both to the environment and the >>>>> animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies the >>>> complementarity >>>>> of the animal and the environment (Gibson, 1977/1986). >>>>> >>>>> and >>>>> >>>>> What is meant by an _affordance_? ?Subject to revision, I suggest that >>>> the >>>>> affordance of anything is a specific combination of the properties of >>> its >>>>> substance and its surfaces taken with reference to an animal. The >>>> reference >>>>> may be to an animal as distinguished from other species (Gibson, >>>> 1977/1986). >>>>> >>>>> and >>>>> >>>>> An important fact about affordances of the environment is that they are >>>> in >>>>> a sense objective, real, and physical, unlike values and meanings, >>> which >>>>> are often supposed to be subjective, phenomenal, and mental. But >>>> actually, >>>>> an affordance is neither an objective property nor a subjective >>> property; >>>>> or it is both if you like. An affordance cuts across the dichotomy of >>>>> subjective-objective and helps us to understand its inadequacy. It is >>>>> equally a fact of the environment and a fact of behavior. It is both >>>>> physical and psychical, yet neither. An affordance points both ways, to >>>> the >>>>> environment and to the observer (Gibson, 1977/1986). >>>>> >>>>> These quotes are important to keep in mind, I hope they help. >>>>> >>>>> I might also suggest looking at Mace(1977) who described very carefully >>>>> how Gibson got from stimuli to affordance, given that people on this >>> list >>>>> value history, learning, and development. >>>>> >>>>> Kind regards, >>>>> >>>>> Annalisa >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> >>>>> on behalf of Huw Lloyd >>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 2, 2014 10:35 AM >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>> >>>>> I'd take a look. >>>>> >>>>> Michael, utility or technical affordance might fit. My equivalent of >>>> your >>>>> perceived/discovered distinction is one of planned and technically >>>>> manifest. >>>>> >>>>> Huw >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 2 December 2014 at 16:44, Glassman, Michael >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> I'd be interested in anybody else is. >>>>>> >>>>>> Michael >>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ >>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> ] >>>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 11:39 AM >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>> >>>>>> Interloper, Michael? >>>>>> >>>>>> The discussions at UCSD preceeding Don's use of affordances and >>>> cognitive >>>>>> artifacts were accompanied by other, related papers. One by Engestrom >>>> on >>>>>> "when is an artifact" and one or more by Ed Hutchins. If people are >>>>>> interested in pursuing this thread/topic the materials could be >>>> gathered >>>>>> up. >>>>>> >>>>>> mike >>>>>> >>>>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Glassman, Michael < >>> glassman.13@osu.edu >>>>> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea). >>> He >>>>>>> actually cops to both of them. The first was not to distinguish >>>>> between >>>>>>> affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which >>> are >>>>>>> designed. I think this is related to the issue of artifacts. >>>> Meaning >>>>>> are >>>>>>> artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to >>> be >>>>>>> discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong >>> word, >>>> if >>>>>>> anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances. It is a >>>>>> complex >>>>>>> question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes >>> based >>>> on >>>>>>> context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one >>>> context >>>>>> may >>>>>>> result in organic affordances in another context. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is that >>>> he >>>>>> was >>>>>>> not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and >>>>>> constraints. >>>>>>> Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived affordances >>> or >>>>> are >>>>>>> they designed to create constraints. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the >>>>> mention >>>>>>> just spurred me to throw this up. Hope I'm not being too much of >>> an >>>>>>> interloper. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Michael >>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ >>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> ] >>>>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM >>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Annalisa- >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation >>>> not >>>>>>> discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of >>>>>>> affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set >>> against >>>>>>> Gibson's ideas. The change of views coincided with the advent of >>> the >>>>>> d-cog >>>>>>> idea which also has deep roots in chat. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> No hidden history i know of, but interesting connections among the >>>>>> notion >>>>>>> of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion of >>>>> these >>>>>>> connections can be found, among other places, in >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Cole, M. & Engestr?m, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach >>> to >>>>>>> distributed* >>>>>>> *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition: >>>> Psychological >>>>>> and >>>>>>> educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> mike >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar >>> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Hi Mike, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied >>>> that >>>>>>> wish! >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important >>> connections. >>>> I >>>>>> was >>>>>>>> not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I >>> learned >>>>>> about >>>>>>>> Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science >>>> (1985). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Is there some history that is not part of the common story? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I looked here for clarity: >>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to >>>>>> cognitive >>>>>>>> artifacts? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in >>>> play, >>>>>> and >>>>>>>> even joy! >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however >>>> until >>>>>> then >>>>>>>> I will remain with the ineffable. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> on behalf of mike cole >>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM >>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And, >>>>>>>> co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive >>>>>> artifacts >>>>>>>> right about that time at UCSD. If it were possible to find a >>>> source >>>>>> that >>>>>>>> makes these connections visible and available to read about it >>>> might >>>>>> be a >>>>>>>> step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of >>>>> intro >>>>>>> for >>>>>>>> newcomers to the discussion. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a >>>>>> newcomer's >>>>>>>> introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is >>> seeking >>>>> to >>>>>>> sort >>>>>>>> out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am >>>>>>> insuficiently >>>>>>>> read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted! >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many >>>>> rocks, >>>>>> so >>>>>>>> little time"! >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Mike >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> A >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Martin! >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental >>>>> representation" >>>>>> is >>>>>>>>> coming closer! >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's >>>>> theory >>>>>> of >>>>>>>>> affordances. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed >>>> article. >>>>>> But >>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>> wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is >>>>>>> important >>>>>>>>> not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a >>>>>> grenade >>>>>>>>> pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the >>>> list. >>>>>> If >>>>>>>> you >>>>>>>>> can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look >>>> forward >>>>> to >>>>>>>> your >>>>>>>>> reply, Martin. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that >>> being >>>>> at >>>>>>> UCSD >>>>>>>>> and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that >>>>> influences >>>>>>> your >>>>>>>>> position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find >>>>>>> community >>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>> it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more >>> voluntary >>>>>>> phrased >>>>>>>>> that way). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of >>>>> Martin >>>>>>> John >>>>>>>>> Packer > >>>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM >>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> An interesting article, David. One way in which it is >>>> interesting, >>>>> to >>>>>>> me >>>>>>>>> at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not >>> used, >>>>>> even >>>>>>>>> once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" >>> images >>>> in >>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> world around us - material representations - and he tries to >>>> define >>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg < >>> dkellogg60@gmail.com >>>>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Larry, Annalisa: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" >>>> when >>>>>> we >>>>>>>>>> met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of >>>>>>> anything >>>>>>>>>> except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe >>>>> available >>>>>>>>>> for a standard price all over China) She does not even >>> remember >>>>>>>>>> whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was >>> the >>>>>>>>>> beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as >>> a >>>>>>>>>> non-image based mental representation. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental >>> representations >>>>> are >>>>>>>>>> images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth >>> century. >>>>> In >>>>>>>>>> fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against >>>>>>> Titchener >>>>>>>>>> and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, >>>>>>>>>> everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated >>>> that >>>>>>>>>> many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically >>>>>> anterior >>>>>>>>>> to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would >>>> not >>>>>> have >>>>>>>>>> time or ability to process complex problems in real time. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that >>> are >>>>>>>>>> genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more >>>>>> reading >>>>>>>>>> to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read >>> than >>>> I >>>>> am >>>>>>>>>> (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels >>>> like >>>>>>>>>> she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do >>>> NOT >>>>>> read >>>>>>>>>> this article--instead, look at Figure 11. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color >>> structure >>>> of >>>>>>>>>> Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any >>>>> actual >>>>>>>>>> images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural >>>>>>> experience >>>>>>>>>> associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then >>>>> deliberately >>>>>>>>>> frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any >>>>>>>>>> recognizable figures upon which to focus. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine >>> Chapel >>>>>> fresco >>>>>>>>>> for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. >>> He >>>> or >>>>>> she >>>>>>>>>> can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the >>> painting >>>>> and >>>>>>>>>> wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not >>>>> notice >>>>>>>>>> the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful >>> in >>>>> it. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar < >>>> annalisa@unm.edu >>>>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Hi Larry and David, >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are >>>> at >>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> root of all thinking. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, >>>> based >>>>>> upon >>>>>>>>> previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, >>> in >>>>>>>>> combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a >>>>> phrase >>>>>> I >>>>>>>> like >>>>>>>>> a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on >>> it >>>>> by >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know >>> it. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think >>> as >>>>>>> Hackett >>>>>>>>> describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have >>>> you >>>>>>>> already >>>>>>>>> given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be >>>>> willing >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> take a look. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is >>>>>>> controversial. >>>>>>>>> It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone >>>>> says >>>>>>>> "this >>>>>>>>> is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble >>>>>>> observation. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and >>> whatever >>>>>> that >>>>>>>>> process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at >>>>> hand? >>>>>>>> Just a >>>>>>>>> thought. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> What is it that appeals to you about this model, >>>> metaphoricity? >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of >>>> Larry >>>>>>>> Purss < >>>>>>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com > >>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM >>>>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity >>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> David K >>>>>>>>>>> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. >>>> My >>>>>>> reason >>>>>>>>> for >>>>>>>>>>> exploring these authors is I have been following a path >>>>> pursuing a >>>>>>>> basic >>>>>>>>>>> question. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic >>>>>> guiding >>>>>>>>> images >>>>>>>>>>> upon which thinking rests" >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring >>>>> appearances >>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>> illusions was also exploring this theme. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new >>>>> phenomenological >>>>>>>> path >>>>>>>>>>> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names >>>>> this >>>>>>>>> process >>>>>>>>>>> *metaphoricity*. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible >>>>>> image-character >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> *spontaneous event* of meaning. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which >>> he >>>>>>>> brackets - >>>>>>>>>>> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> AND >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* >>>> finds >>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> meaning of its very self. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this >>>>>>>>>>> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion >>> of >>>>>>>> metaphor >>>>>>>>> can >>>>>>>>>>> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is >>> implicated >>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>> *objectivity* >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of >>>>> itself >>>>>>>> *in* >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> mode [path] of the concept >>>>>>>>>>> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding >>>>> images >>>>>>> has >>>>>>>>> been >>>>>>>>>>> established. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the >>>> path >>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is >>> derived >>>>>> from >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> image-character of the guiding image. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial >>>> this >>>>>>> topic >>>>>>>>> may >>>>>>>>>>> become [again] >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by >>> this >>>>>> basic >>>>>>>>>>> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these >>>>> images >>>>>> as >>>>>>>>>>> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images >>>> emerge >>>>>>>>>>> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is >>>>> transcendental] >>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>>> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. >>>> It >>>>>>> seems >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I also realize this question may already be answered in >>>>> Vygotsky's >>>>>>>>> writings >>>>>>>>>>> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of >>>>> XMCA. I >>>>>>>>>>> personally am following this path for now. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >>> with >>>>> an >>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>>> an >>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>> an >>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > From hshonerd@gmail.com Fri Dec 5 11:54:07 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2014 12:54:07 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Pyrodiversity Fire Management - Native Americans of the California Area In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Miguel, My wife and I will be visiting family and friends in California between San Luis Obispo and Sacramento. The area in the map of the article you linked us with appears to center on the western slope of the coastal range between San Francisco and Santa Cruz. I?ll be using the article to enrich our appreciation of that areas in real time and place. Have you heard N. Scott Momaday talk about the importance of place? I can hear his deep baritone intoning now. Thank you! Henry > On Dec 5, 2014, at 12:22 AM, Zavala, Miguel wrote: > > XMCA, > > Have you heard of pyrodiversity fire management by Native Americans in the California area? I found a book written by a UC Berkeley archaeologist that caught my attention and I found a great synthesis of the theory. > > What find most striking and fascinating is that, according to this theory, Native Americans of what is today California did not follow the same developmental line as is assumed: hunter-gatherer -> agriculture-settler. Typically, when people think of California Native Americans, they characterize them as hunter-gatherer (as if "stuck" in the Pleistocene period). > > Yet, what some scientists are finding is perhaps a competing theory or revision of this narrative; Native Americans developed a distinct type of food management system mediated primarily by pyro-fire practices. Some argue that these were collective, conducted on a large scale among different groups, perhaps covering 10 ? 16% of what today is the geographic area of California. > > A nice chapter can be found below; I'm really digging this because in a way it diversifies development?that even large-scale development is not linear (or that "progress" is marked temporally without looking at the geographies of difference). Perhaps Eurocentric research and theories perpetuate master-narratives about how peoples develop across space-time. To note, I did find some scientists arguing or challenging this theory, so it's important to see the evidence scientists use to support their theory. > > Access the Chapter here: https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CCMQFjAA&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.firescience.gov%2Fprojects%2F10-1-09-3%2Fproject%2F10-1-09-3_JONES_CH_09.pdf&ei=S1mBVLm4MMmNyATkvIKIBw&usg=AFQjCNE-TQ4ARzJf1Gbtmd2Vqz1cVwtu7A&bvm=bv.80642063,d.aWw > > > Miguel Zavala From mcole@ucsd.edu Fri Dec 5 12:17:15 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2014 12:17:15 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F907548F@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> References: <1682996975.4827904.1417607429293.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11144.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> <3A40602C-44A1-45C7-A7D1-36E1A842E92B@gmail.com> <8FDB5B35-D645-496F-93CB-077884244184@gmail.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F907548F@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: Helena--- A while back Andy and Huw started a wiki with key terms that is still accessible. IF xmca participants used that structure as part of the broader discussion it might fulfill the functions you imagine for it. And putting in Gibson's own statements, as well as Norman's appropriation of the idea, and where possible, original texts for those who wanted to go deeper would all seem to have promise... subject to the limitations that Michael points to. Michael G. Ed Hutchins and people at LCHC read Bateson and interacted with the info processing folks who were in to parallel processing systems and schema theory at the time. Not sure if Don and colleagues did or did not attend to his ideas. Perhaps Andy and Huw can fill people in on where the wiki project stands and people can figure out if its something we should get linked into the xmca discussion. Ways to stabilize discussions of threads a little more (while warding off modularization) seems another useful way to go. Michael Z . It seems to me that all sorts of non-linearities in historical processes, especially (for me at least) processes of human life development, seem important to bring to the discussion. Looking at the chapter quickly that you sent I am not sure what the claim is. Were the people, or some of the people, who walked eastward over the Bering Straights agricuturalists who subsequently acquired practices of hunting and gathering? Also, re master European narratives of human origins and early history, there are people like Gellner who argue that agriculture was a step backward in terms of human welfare. The conflation of "development" with "progress" is all over our attempts to discuss these issues. mike On Fri, Dec 5, 2014 at 11:46 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > Hi Helena, > > I'm not so sure if its the words or the way the thinking behind those > words match up or don't match up with the systems of the individuals were > are teaching live and think within. A little while ago I was reading > Bateson and his idea that Western philosophy/thinking often precluded the > idea of a supreme cybernetic system - the idea that we could and would be > self-corrected through exploration of the universe rather than any > conscious human design. We are a society obsessed with local control and > the idea that we can manipulate the universe around us (which we can in > small doses, but Bateson claim is destructive in the long run). > > Many of the words you mention such as affordances, mediators, activity > often fall into the exploration perspective I think - and they become > difficult to relate. > > A little while ago I wrote a sentence based on the idea that education > should be based on open exploration because something akin to a supreme > cybernetics will offer self-correcting feedback, and a big trouble is many > educators don't trust that. And then I stared at the sentence for a while > and realized the majority of people reading it (if anybody does ever read > it) would just pass it right over. > > So what do we do? Hard to know. > > A side question for Mike - in those early meetings on distributed > cognition that Don Norman was a part of did cybernetics and/or Bateson > every some up? > > Michael > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > on behalf of Helena Worthen [helenaworthen@gmail.com] > Sent: Friday, December 05, 2014 2:12 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances > > A voice from the margins, here: > > I learn a lot from this list, all the time, and would hate to have it go > quiet or self-destruct. But my role in the world outside this list, out > there in the synchronous landscape, involves trying to make ideas > intelligible to working people who may not have more than a couple of years > of community college. For this purpose, there is a whole roster of terms > that are a problem. When I say these terms to regular people, they make a > face as if they'd tasted something bad. > > Examples of terms like this are: > > affordance > mediate > activity > CHAT (cultural-historical activity theory) > > and: > > development > > For my purposes, Annalisa's Dec 2 post on Gibson's invention of the term > "affordance" is very useful. He explained clearly why he made it up. I can > use that. > > Knud Illeris' book "Contemporary Theories of Learning: Learning > theorists...in their own words" is a breath of fresh air for the same > reason. You got to hear a whole collection of different people saying very > different things about learning, all grouped together as learning theorists. > > theoristshttp:// > www.pgce.soton.ac.uk/IT/Learning/Theories/ContemporaryTheoriesofLearning%20Learning%20theorists%20in%20their%20own%20words%20-%20Knud%20Illeris.pdf > > > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > On Dec 3, 2014, at 11:26 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > > Haydi, > > Thank you so much! Here?s how it is for me: > > I too have been waiting for Andy to come back. He is the reason I am in > the chat. I have known about Vygotsky through Vera since the early 80s. But > I, after my dissertation on L2 fluency in 1986, I worked as a teacher > educator where research and publication wasn?t necessary for tenure and > promotion. The college where I was working closed (bankruptcy) five years > back and, like any working stiff, I am having to reinvent myself. So, in > thrashing about I came to read Andy?s articles on "collaborative project" > as a unit of analysis a few years back, started emailing with him > one-on-one (and he was so generous with his time and patience in answering > my questions about activity theory and Vygotsky), until he said it was time > for me to join the chat. Andy mentored me until I had the courage to pipe > up. Andy just edited a book on collaborative projects; Vera has written one > of the papers for the book. I love them both. That?s how it is for me. > > > > Let me say that I consider myself a rank learner, always beginning. Mike > has wisely rejected the role of Caesar on the chat. But we go to him asking > him to sort out things amongst the unruly class. As a teacher, the hardest > thing for me ever to do was to deal with disrespect between students. I > have finally come to realize and accept that I want to be in a school where > the students are nice to each other. Where respect and trust abound. Where > human flourishing is possible. There is no father god to rescue us. We have > to do it for ourselves. Well, like the song goes, ?I?m still willin?? Let?s > make this a creative project, which means no unethical use of power. We > can?t afford it. In my humble opinion. > > > > In gratitude and hope, > > Henry > > > >> On Dec 3, 2014, at 11:00 AM, mike cole wrote: > >> > >> Haydi-- > >> > >> Like anyone on xmca, you can demand whatever you like. Getting people to > >> implement your demands may be more > >> difficult. In general, I have not experienced demands and resentment as > >> particularly helpful on xmca, but thing are changing, > >> so who knows. > >> > >> I am not putting ANL aside because of the concerns expressed in MCA in > the > >> past year or so. The concerns are real, at least to me. > >> But there are many productive programs of research that use his ideas, > >> along with those of LSV and many others, both Russian and non-Russian. > >> > >> I believe it would be helpful in receiving answers to your various > comments > >> and suggestions if some of them were constrained to particular threads. > For > >> example, the discussion of plank versus a piece of electronic equipment > vis > >> a vis the notion of artifact and mediation through artifacts, etc., > might > >> be be placed in that thread. > >> > >> etc. > >> > >> I clearly can be wrong in all of these judgments! > >> mike > >> > >> > >> > >> On Wed, Dec 3, 2014 at 3:50 AM, Haydi Zulfei < > haydizulfei@rocketmail.com> > >> wrote: > >> > >>> Hi > >>> > >>> First of all , so resentfully I wonder If I can demand Andy's return to > >>> the discussions !! No one can deny his great contributions to this > Forum . > >>> > >>> Second , I might have been lost completely in your words , terms , > >>> premises , and compositional nuances and colourings of your script as > >>> native speakers , etc. > >>> > >>> > >>> Third , because of obvious sensitivities towards ANL , I've altogether > put > >>> him to one side ; otherwise , in this concrete example of Michael , the > >>> triad , activity , action , operation are boldly in view . > >>> > >>> > >>> Fourth , I suppose LSV himself in two or three chapters of the > "History of > >>> Higher Mental Functions" has provided full response to our inquiries . > Andy > >>> , in time , sent the first two chapters to all . > >>> > >>> 1. He , after preliminary remarks , puts heavy emphasis on use of tools > >>> and work activity in the parentheses and in italic characters . He > >>> emphasizes that use of tool very naturally gets significant just > within the > >>> work activity process . Without the work activity we cannot expect > much of > >>> it . Then , as most of the time , he time and again references Marx and > >>> Engels so as to prove his claims . > >>> > >>> > >>> 2. Mike is so and for good reasons enchanted in "rudiments" of culture > >>> phenomena (throwing dice and bones , knots , notches in the wood to > >>> remember speech) . Good for him and us all . Yes , Buridan's ass gets > >>> spoilt in its indecision But man through inventing stimulus-device > gets to > >>> salvation . But the problem is how many times has Mike , our Boss and > >>> confirmed global figure no need for it to be documented , asked himself > >>> what went before that juncture of time for the man to become 'MAN' ?? > At > >>> this moment we are with LSV and at a very critical point of time . No > more > >>> return to 'culture' to prove 'culture' . LSV says the error for some > is to > >>> recount the story of mental through mental while they should know that > >>> mental processes go parallel with 'social' processes . What I gather at > >>> this very point is that he expects us to infer that the 'our present > man of > >>> some will' owes his man/ness and decisiveness to his previous work > activity > >>> necessitating use of tools . It seems we cannot take the idea to the > >>> uterine because V focuses on use of tools for a baby of 6 or of 10-12 > >>> months of age . It seems , both phylogenetically and ontogenetically , > that > >>> it's not the case that 'gestures' ' eye contacts' come of their own and > >>> because of the man/ness and for the tuning-up with the universe through > >>> sounds and hymns and angels , etc. Man worked for life , performed ups > and > >>> downs , shook his extremeties (one pair of hand) , consumed ! > collective > >>> yellings and gesturing (as concomitant of work) . V says we can > distinguish > >>> independent history of natural processes and independent history of > >>> cultural development separately 'phylogenetically' but not > ontogenetically > >>> . In ontology , nature and culture work simultaneously contrary to > >>> phylogenesis . One cannot with ease and comfort say whichone goes with > >>> whichone . > >>> > >>> > >>> 3. Andy who is well aware of both CH and AT , on his sending of the > four > >>> pages and then the said two chapters , disclosed a very important point > >>> neglected so far at the forum and that was the idea of the distinction > >>> between tool and sign so fruitfully and enormously discussed by V and > the > >>> deep meaning that the simple diagram denoted . V says 'artifact' could > be > >>> cheating and deceitful but no one cares ! They invariably use > artifacts and > >>> through this , they ultimately remove 'material activity' from the > domain > >>> altogether . V is everywhere clear with both 'cultural , ideal > activity' > >>> and 'material activity' . Here is where quotes don't work . The one > more > >>> return to the plus-thousand previous reflections . No loss really ! V > , if > >>> necessary , prefers just 'mediation' . > >>> > >>> 4. With these in mind , I say for certain that here the plank is a tool > >>> not an 'artifact' because it is not a sign signaling any other genuine > >>> thing . It's all to itself . Also the light switch . And the whole > activity > >>> is a material one . Life put it in the way . According to V sign > activity > >>> affects one's own societal individual behaviour . We cannot generalize > its > >>> effect to the border of transforming Nature . Man through speech , > dialogue > >>> , discourse , talk , genre , etc. decides for the change in personal > >>> behaviour ; if this potential preparedness for individual behavioral > change > >>> gets fossilized or ossified , then man will not reach the threshhold > of the > >>> bigger act and the vast field of the Mother Universe with its motley > rich > >>> material phenomena out of which each time he can select an object for a > >>> circle of activity : starting an activity with a probable cryptic > 'motive' > >>> (what we don't yet know about which took him to the point of crossing) > , > >>> with a conscious goal (reaching the other side) through a concrete > action > >>> (crossing) operating according to the conditions at hand and on the > ground > >>> (light switching , wrestling between the ideal and the material > (object , > >>> subject , that is , thinking ideally about what to do with the whole > thing > >>> and the plank , then observing with the help of the light acting on the > >>> object , again back to thinking if flaws are observed , etc. etc. no > >>> blending of objective and subjective whatsoever . And I wonder why > taking > >>> affordance for a tool . > >>> > >>> > >>> Soooooooooo much for one post . > >>> > >>> I considered spaces but wonder if it works . > >>> I'll also be very quiet and slow in replying ! > >>> > >>> Best > >>> > >>> Haydi > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> From: mike cole > >>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > >>> Sent: Tuesday, 2 December 2014, 11:26:46 > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances > >>> > >>> My view? > >>> The plank is for certain an artifact, no less than the light bulb. On > what > >>> grounds, or under what circumstances, would you classify it otherwise? > >>> What's gained, what's lost? > >>> mike > >>> > >>> > >>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Glassman, Michael < > glassman.13@osu.edu> > >>> wrote: > >>> > >>>> Hi Annalisa, Mike, Huw > >>>> > >>>> I tend to be somebody who reacts better to concrete examples than > >>>> definitions. I believe this also comes from Gibson's 1977 book, > >>>> > >>>> You are walking across a field and come to a stream which you can to > get > >>>> across. You notice a plank across the stream. It is wide enough for > you > >>>> to keep your balance and thick enough to hold your weight, in using it > >>> you > >>>> recognize its affordance as a crossing point. It is the intersection > of > >>>> the movement, the perception of the plank, short term goal of the > >>> activity > >>>> (getting across the stream) - the recognition of the affordance comes > in > >>>> the subjective use of the object (which is why it is neither > subjective > >>> or > >>>> objective). It is also important that you have the abilities (the > >>> correct > >>>> weight, the balance) to recognize the affordance, otherwise you pass > the > >>>> plank by. > >>>> > >>>> As far as perceived affordance. I think I have this right - the > >>> perceived > >>>> is not in the person who recognizes the affordance (otherwise you are > >>>> right, that is wet water) it is whether there is an intention in the > >>> design > >>>> of the object. So I create a light switch with the intention of > >>> designing > >>>> it as having a perceived affordance for somebody who wants to switch > on a > >>>> light. As you can see different from the relationship to the plank, > >>> where > >>>> there is no prior design. > >>>> > >>>> Here is my question (perhaps answered in the Engestrom paper) > >>>> > >>>> The light switch is certainly an artifact, but is the plank? > >>>> > >>>> Michael > >>>> ________________________________________ > >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > >>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > >>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 1:19 PM > >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances > >>>> > >>>> Those definitions help a lot Annalisa and touch on the fact that > gibson > >>>> seemed to empty the organism (if one were so inclined to interpret > him) > >>> and > >>>> he dismissed culutral mediation as secondary at best. Still, they > share > >>> the > >>>> idea that a part of the structure that psychologist theorize as a > located > >>>> inside of individual crania is in fact "our there" in the > phylgenetically > >>>> and cultural-historically constitued environment. And that drove > >>> cognitive > >>>> psychologists, our co discussants, nuts. Until, "they got it" and then > >>>> sought to mold it to their own ends and pre-existing means. > >>>> mike > >>>> > >>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 9:59 AM, Annalisa Aguilar > >>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> I thought I'd do the honors and start a new thread on affordances, > >>> which > >>>>> isn't related to Larry's discussion of basic images. > >>>>> > >>>>> I figured as well to offer Gibson's words on affordances since it is > a > >>>>> word he invented to describe something he saw in the world. Of course > >>> the > >>>>> life of affordances has been full of controversy, especially with > >>> regard > >>>> to > >>>>> understanding what they are. > >>>>> > >>>>> Gibson's Affordances is a theory I find instrumental to connecting > >>>> outside > >>>>> to inside experiences and I intuit that it is related to perezhivanie > >>> in > >>>>> some fashion. > >>>>> > >>>>> After reading the wikipage more closely, I regret offering a link to > >>> the > >>>>> text there because it isn't very clear what Gibson means or what > Norman > >>>>> means. To me, a "perceived affordance" is like saying "wet water." > >>>>> > >>>>> In any case, here are 3 quotes of Gibson in his own words, that I > could > >>>>> find: > >>>>> > >>>>> The affordances of the environment are what it _offers_ the animal, > >>> what > >>>>> it _provides_ or _furnishes_, either for good or ill. The verb "to > >>>> afford" > >>>>> is found in the dictionary, the noun "affordance" is not. I have made > >>> it > >>>>> up. I mean by it something that refers both to the environment and > the > >>>>> animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies the > >>>> complementarity > >>>>> of the animal and the environment (Gibson, 1977/1986). > >>>>> > >>>>> and > >>>>> > >>>>> What is meant by an _affordance_? ?Subject to revision, I suggest > that > >>>> the > >>>>> affordance of anything is a specific combination of the properties of > >>> its > >>>>> substance and its surfaces taken with reference to an animal. The > >>>> reference > >>>>> may be to an animal as distinguished from other species (Gibson, > >>>> 1977/1986). > >>>>> > >>>>> and > >>>>> > >>>>> An important fact about affordances of the environment is that they > are > >>>> in > >>>>> a sense objective, real, and physical, unlike values and meanings, > >>> which > >>>>> are often supposed to be subjective, phenomenal, and mental. But > >>>> actually, > >>>>> an affordance is neither an objective property nor a subjective > >>> property; > >>>>> or it is both if you like. An affordance cuts across the dichotomy of > >>>>> subjective-objective and helps us to understand its inadequacy. It is > >>>>> equally a fact of the environment and a fact of behavior. It is both > >>>>> physical and psychical, yet neither. An affordance points both ways, > to > >>>> the > >>>>> environment and to the observer (Gibson, 1977/1986). > >>>>> > >>>>> These quotes are important to keep in mind, I hope they help. > >>>>> > >>>>> I might also suggest looking at Mace(1977) who described very > carefully > >>>>> how Gibson got from stimuli to affordance, given that people on this > >>> list > >>>>> value history, learning, and development. > >>>>> > >>>>> Kind regards, > >>>>> > >>>>> Annalisa > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> ________________________________________ > >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>> > >>>>> on behalf of Huw Lloyd > >>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 2, 2014 10:35 AM > >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > >>>>> > >>>>> I'd take a look. > >>>>> > >>>>> Michael, utility or technical affordance might fit. My equivalent of > >>>> your > >>>>> perceived/discovered distinction is one of planned and technically > >>>>> manifest. > >>>>> > >>>>> Huw > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> On 2 December 2014 at 16:44, Glassman, Michael > >>>>> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> I'd be interested in anybody else is. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Michael > >>>>>> ________________________________________ > >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ > >>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>> ] > >>>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > >>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 11:39 AM > >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Interloper, Michael? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> The discussions at UCSD preceeding Don's use of affordances and > >>>> cognitive > >>>>>> artifacts were accompanied by other, related papers. One by > Engestrom > >>>> on > >>>>>> "when is an artifact" and one or more by Ed Hutchins. If people are > >>>>>> interested in pursuing this thread/topic the materials could be > >>>> gathered > >>>>>> up. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> mike > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Glassman, Michael < > >>> glassman.13@osu.edu > >>>>> > >>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea). > >>> He > >>>>>>> actually cops to both of them. The first was not to distinguish > >>>>> between > >>>>>>> affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which > >>> are > >>>>>>> designed. I think this is related to the issue of artifacts. > >>>> Meaning > >>>>>> are > >>>>>>> artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to > >>> be > >>>>>>> discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong > >>> word, > >>>> if > >>>>>>> anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances. It is a > >>>>>> complex > >>>>>>> question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes > >>> based > >>>> on > >>>>>>> context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one > >>>> context > >>>>>> may > >>>>>>> result in organic affordances in another context. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is that > >>>> he > >>>>>> was > >>>>>>> not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and > >>>>>> constraints. > >>>>>>> Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived affordances > >>> or > >>>>> are > >>>>>>> they designed to create constraints. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the > >>>>> mention > >>>>>>> just spurred me to throw this up. Hope I'm not being too much of > >>> an > >>>>>>> interloper. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Michael > >>>>>>> ________________________________________ > >>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ > >>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>>> ] > >>>>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > >>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM > >>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Annalisa- > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation > >>>> not > >>>>>>> discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of > >>>>>>> affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set > >>> against > >>>>>>> Gibson's ideas. The change of views coincided with the advent of > >>> the > >>>>>> d-cog > >>>>>>> idea which also has deep roots in chat. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> No hidden history i know of, but interesting connections among the > >>>>>> notion > >>>>>>> of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion of > >>>>> these > >>>>>>> connections can be found, among other places, in > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Cole, M. & Engestr?m, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach > >>> to > >>>>>>> distributed* > >>>>>>> *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition: > >>>> Psychological > >>>>>> and > >>>>>>> educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar >>>> > >>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Hi Mike, > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied > >>>> that > >>>>>>> wish! > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important > >>> connections. > >>>> I > >>>>>> was > >>>>>>>> not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I > >>> learned > >>>>>> about > >>>>>>>> Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science > >>>> (1985). > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Is there some history that is not part of the common story? > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> I looked here for clarity: > >>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to > >>>>>> cognitive > >>>>>>>> artifacts? > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in > >>>> play, > >>>>>> and > >>>>>>>> even joy! > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however > >>>> until > >>>>>> then > >>>>>>>> I will remain with the ineffable. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Kind regards, > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Annalisa > >>>>>>>> ________________________________________ > >>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > >>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> on behalf of mike cole > >>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM > >>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And, > >>>>>>>> co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive > >>>>>> artifacts > >>>>>>>> right about that time at UCSD. If it were possible to find a > >>>> source > >>>>>> that > >>>>>>>> makes these connections visible and available to read about it > >>>> might > >>>>>> be a > >>>>>>>> step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of > >>>>> intro > >>>>>>> for > >>>>>>>> newcomers to the discussion. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a > >>>>>> newcomer's > >>>>>>>> introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is > >>> seeking > >>>>> to > >>>>>>> sort > >>>>>>>> out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am > >>>>>>> insuficiently > >>>>>>>> read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted! > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many > >>>>> rocks, > >>>>>> so > >>>>>>>> little time"! > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Mike > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> A > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar > >>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Martin! > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental > >>>>> representation" > >>>>>> is > >>>>>>>>> coming closer! > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's > >>>>> theory > >>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>> affordances. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed > >>>> article. > >>>>>> But > >>>>>>> I > >>>>>>>>> wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is > >>>>>>> important > >>>>>>>>> not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a > >>>>>> grenade > >>>>>>>>> pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the > >>>> list. > >>>>>> If > >>>>>>>> you > >>>>>>>>> can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look > >>>> forward > >>>>> to > >>>>>>>> your > >>>>>>>>> reply, Martin. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that > >>> being > >>>>> at > >>>>>>> UCSD > >>>>>>>>> and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that > >>>>> influences > >>>>>>> your > >>>>>>>>> position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find > >>>>>>> community > >>>>>>>> in > >>>>>>>>> it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more > >>> voluntary > >>>>>>> phrased > >>>>>>>>> that way). > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Kind regards, > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Annalisa > >>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ > >>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > >>>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > >>>>> Martin > >>>>>>> John > >>>>>>>>> Packer > > >>>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM > >>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> An interesting article, David. One way in which it is > >>>> interesting, > >>>>> to > >>>>>>> me > >>>>>>>>> at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not > >>> used, > >>>>>> even > >>>>>>>>> once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" > >>> images > >>>> in > >>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>> world around us - material representations - and he tries to > >>>> define > >>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>> "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Martin > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg < > >>> dkellogg60@gmail.com > >>>>>>>>> > wrote: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Larry, Annalisa: > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" > >>>> when > >>>>>> we > >>>>>>>>>> met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of > >>>>>>> anything > >>>>>>>>>> except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe > >>>>> available > >>>>>>>>>> for a standard price all over China) She does not even > >>> remember > >>>>>>>>>> whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was > >>> the > >>>>>>>>>> beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as > >>> a > >>>>>>>>>> non-image based mental representation. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental > >>> representations > >>>>> are > >>>>>>>>>> images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth > >>> century. > >>>>> In > >>>>>>>>>> fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against > >>>>>>> Titchener > >>>>>>>>>> and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, > >>>>>>>>>> everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated > >>>> that > >>>>>>>>>> many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically > >>>>>> anterior > >>>>>>>>>> to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would > >>>> not > >>>>>> have > >>>>>>>>>> time or ability to process complex problems in real time. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that > >>> are > >>>>>>>>>> genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more > >>>>>> reading > >>>>>>>>>> to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read > >>> than > >>>> I > >>>>> am > >>>>>>>>>> (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels > >>>> like > >>>>>>>>>> she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do > >>>> NOT > >>>>>> read > >>>>>>>>>> this article--instead, look at Figure 11. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color > >>> structure > >>>> of > >>>>>>>>>> Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any > >>>>> actual > >>>>>>>>>> images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural > >>>>>>> experience > >>>>>>>>>> associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then > >>>>> deliberately > >>>>>>>>>> frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any > >>>>>>>>>> recognizable figures upon which to focus. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine > >>> Chapel > >>>>>> fresco > >>>>>>>>>> for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. > >>> He > >>>> or > >>>>>> she > >>>>>>>>>> can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the > >>> painting > >>>>> and > >>>>>>>>>> wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not > >>>>> notice > >>>>>>>>>> the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful > >>> in > >>>>> it. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar < > >>>> annalisa@unm.edu > >>>>>>>>> > wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Hi Larry and David, > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are > >>>> at > >>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>> root of all thinking. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, > >>>> based > >>>>>> upon > >>>>>>>>> previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, > >>> in > >>>>>>>>> combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a > >>>>> phrase > >>>>>> I > >>>>>>>> like > >>>>>>>>> a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on > >>> it > >>>>> by > >>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>> same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know > >>> it. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think > >>> as > >>>>>>> Hackett > >>>>>>>>> describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have > >>>> you > >>>>>>>> already > >>>>>>>>> given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be > >>>>> willing > >>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>> take a look. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is > >>>>>>> controversial. > >>>>>>>>> It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone > >>>>> says > >>>>>>>> "this > >>>>>>>>> is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble > >>>>>>> observation. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and > >>> whatever > >>>>>> that > >>>>>>>>> process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at > >>>>> hand? > >>>>>>>> Just a > >>>>>>>>> thought. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> What is it that appeals to you about this model, > >>>> metaphoricity? > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Kind regards, > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Annalisa > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ > >>>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > >>>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > >>>> Larry > >>>>>>>> Purss < > >>>>>>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com > > >>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM > >>>>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity > >>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> David K > >>>>>>>>>>> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. > >>>> My > >>>>>>> reason > >>>>>>>>> for > >>>>>>>>>>> exploring these authors is I have been following a path > >>>>> pursuing a > >>>>>>>> basic > >>>>>>>>>>> question. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic > >>>>>> guiding > >>>>>>>>> images > >>>>>>>>>>> upon which thinking rests" > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring > >>>>> appearances > >>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>>>>> illusions was also exploring this theme. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new > >>>>> phenomenological > >>>>>>>> path > >>>>>>>>>>> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names > >>>>> this > >>>>>>>>> process > >>>>>>>>>>> *metaphoricity*. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible > >>>>>> image-character > >>>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>> *spontaneous event* of meaning. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which > >>> he > >>>>>>>> brackets - > >>>>>>>>>>> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> AND > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* > >>>> finds > >>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>> meaning of its very self. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this > >>>>>>>>>>> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion > >>> of > >>>>>>>> metaphor > >>>>>>>>> can > >>>>>>>>>>> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is > >>> implicated > >>>>> in > >>>>>>>>>>> *objectivity* > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of > >>>>> itself > >>>>>>>> *in* > >>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>> mode [path] of the concept > >>>>>>>>>>> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding > >>>>> images > >>>>>>> has > >>>>>>>>> been > >>>>>>>>>>> established. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the > >>>> path > >>>>> of > >>>>>>>>>>> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is > >>> derived > >>>>>> from > >>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>> image-character of the guiding image. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial > >>>> this > >>>>>>> topic > >>>>>>>>> may > >>>>>>>>>>> become [again] > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by > >>> this > >>>>>> basic > >>>>>>>>>>> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these > >>>>> images > >>>>>> as > >>>>>>>>>>> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images > >>>> emerge > >>>>>>>>>>> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is > >>>>> transcendental] > >>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>>> is > >>>>>>>>>>> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. > >>>> It > >>>>>>> seems > >>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>>> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> I also realize this question may already be answered in > >>>>> Vygotsky's > >>>>>>>>> writings > >>>>>>>>>>> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of > >>>>> XMCA. I > >>>>>>>>>>> personally am following this path for now. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Larry > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > >>> with > >>>>> an > >>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > >>>> an > >>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> -- > >>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > >>> an > >>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> -- > >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> -- > >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> -- > >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mcole@ucsd.edu Fri Dec 5 12:26:50 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2014 12:26:50 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: labour and signs In-Reply-To: <54813ACC.4000909@mira.net> References: <548002C6.5030907@mira.net> <1638274843.445412.1417699651665.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11124.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> <548068A0.4080203@mira.net> <66B9A63B-0FDB-44AF-9A3D-07BC658C2277@gmail.com> <5480F4F2.4050000@mira.net> <5480F978.7000805@mira.net> <54813ACC.4000909@mira.net> Message-ID: Hi Andy-- I personally would not start with a study of adolescents in order to understand how language emerges from action-in-activity in ontogeny. I take Luria's early work with the combined motor method to be directed exactly at that problem. But the work has proven difficult to replicate. Perhaps others have other suggestions of favorite places to look. The idea of studying cultural historical change in the deed/word relations over time using contemporary examples seems like a good way to go, but it seems to me that circumstances such as those made visible in the study of Nicaraguan sign over generations of newcomers to the community provide a promising model. I need time to re-think your examples which I have not read for a while and many xmca members probably need to given references to so that if they want to follow the thread, they can check the fuller accounts. mike On Thu, Dec 4, 2014 at 8:55 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Well, Mike, while we are always interested in any information that comes > to light about the ancient formation of language, I find that theories > about that are invariably reifications (or exptrapolations if you like) of > theories based (as you remark to Annalisa) on actual observations of (1) > ontogeny, (2) the cultural-historical origin and development of the > particular concepts themselves and the words indicating them. > > Re (1) Vygotsky has lots to say about this and of course you psychologists > continue to investigate this in your own lifetime; from Chapter 5 of T&S, > for example: > > * "The tasks that are posed for the maturing adolescent by the > social environment - tasks that are associated with his entry into > the cultural, professional, and social life of the adult world - > are an essential functional factor in the formation of concepts. > Repeatedly, this factor points to the mutually conditioned nature, > the organic integration, and the internal unity of content and > form in the development of thinking." > > * "It would be a mistake to ignore or fail to recognize the > significance of the life-task as a factor that nourishes and > directs intellectual development in the transitional age. However, > it would also be a mistake to view this aspect of causal-dynamic > development as the basic mechanism of the problem of concept > development or as the key to this problem." > > Re (2) Engestrom has done work on this. I stand by the analysis in my > paper on the formation of the concept of Collaborative Learning Space which > differs only in detail in comparison with Engestrom's 7-step process, but I > think the most decisive and spectacular evidence of all is the research > done on the emergence of the word for the various colours in all the > languages of the world and how this correlated with the ability to > manufacture materials in the respective colour. In general, new concepts > and the words for them arise when solutions are proposed for problems which > have arisen in the course of regular, i.e., in some way rule-governed or > institutionalised, practice (i.e., activity). A problem in practice is > solved in practice and then named. Marx points out how the solution is > found and practised before theorists can describe it and give a name to it, > but I would hesitate to make this a general rule, though it may be > appropriate in the case of broad social change. > > In relation to the word-tool business, sometimes the word naming a new > concept names a new tool (e.g. Collaborative Learning Space), but not > always. It may name the solution (e.g. "regulation") to a problem > ("contradiction" in Engestrom's vocab) which is not necessarily a tool, > sometimes the problem itself (e.g. "sexism") but in essence always > indicates the solution not the problem, sometimes a new concept comes in > the form of two words being a new distinction. The selection of the word > itself is a whole other matter of course. > > Personally, my interest is in (2) above. > > Does that answer your question, Mike? > > Andy > https://www.academia.edu/2758945/The_Formation_of_the_ > Concept_of_Collaborative_Learning_Space_ > http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1857/grundrisse/ch01.htm#3 > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > mike cole wrote: > >> Here is the quotation, Andy: >> >> Gutsman has noted, however, that we can agree with >> Goethe that the word as such should not be overvaluated and can >> concur in his transformation of the Biblical line to, ?In the >> beginning was the //deed/.? /Nonetheless, if we consider the >> history of development, we can still read this line with a different >> emphasis: ?In the //beginning/ /was the deed.? Gutsman?s >> argument is that the word is a higher stage in man?s development than >> the >> highest manifestation of action. He is right. The word did not >> exist in the beginning. In the beginning was the deed. The formation >> of >> the word occurs nearer the end than the beginning of development. >> >> How should i be thinking about this passage if not to ask, "if the >> formation of the word occurs nearer the end than the beginning of >> development" what transformations of action are implicated in the >> appearance and development of the word? I take it that in one sense, all of >> developmental studies of language acquisition are attempts to answer the >> question. But there it is. >> mike >> >> On Thu, Dec 4, 2014 at 4:16 PM, Andy Blunden > ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >> >> can you explain, Mike? >> andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> ------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> mike cole wrote: >> >> Which still leaves us with the question of how language >> developed out of other forms of action -- in phylogeny and >> ontogeny-- as Haydi emphasized recently. >> mike >> >> >> > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From lpscholar2@gmail.com Fri Dec 5 12:47:36 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2014 12:47:36 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F907548F@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> References: <1682996975.4827904.1417607429293.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11144.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> <3A40602C-44A1-45C7-A7D1-36E1A842E92B@gmail.com> <8FDB5B35-D645-496F-93CB-077884244184@gmail.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F907548F@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: Helena, Thank you for this ebook. A wonderful resource which can be offered to others working in learning environments. [in my case public school systems] On the notion of using complex words. I find I have introduced simple metaphors such as "shared brains" which can be imagined easily and can be understood. when I lend my brain to the child we do *it* together and when they are ready they can do *it* all by their self. Bella, also thank you for introducing the new Cambridge book on Cultural Historical Psychology. A wonderful resource on the complexity of this theoretical approach or path. Mike, the paper Natalia sent on the Luria-Vygotsky approach to *neuro-psychology* also is a wonderful foundation for extending the Western understanding of Vygotsky to a deeper understanding [and extension in the West] of the *principle "of dynamic organization and localization of the Higher Mental Functions" I do wonder if this paper should be on the archive list. Martin's paper on Barsalou and Mike's paper on Kosslyn making the case for *mental imagery* also are resources that are gesturing to a rich *cascade* of understandings. I am like a kid in the candy store deciding which delight to try first as they all seem to be sharing a *similar* perspective. CHAT is a marvelous *interpretive community* David K's caution that as we generalize we can also loose focus is a struggle I encounter when responding. Do I try to stay within the *cultural-historical* approach [path] or take a more general *sociocultural approach*?? It all seems to lead back to *shared brain* which is what I bring to public school settings. The format of CHAT is unique. Larry On Fri, Dec 5, 2014 at 11:46 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > Hi Helena, > > I'm not so sure if its the words or the way the thinking behind those > words match up or don't match up with the systems of the individuals were > are teaching live and think within. A little while ago I was reading > Bateson and his idea that Western philosophy/thinking often precluded the > idea of a supreme cybernetic system - the idea that we could and would be > self-corrected through exploration of the universe rather than any > conscious human design. We are a society obsessed with local control and > the idea that we can manipulate the universe around us (which we can in > small doses, but Bateson claim is destructive in the long run). > > Many of the words you mention such as affordances, mediators, activity > often fall into the exploration perspective I think - and they become > difficult to relate. > > A little while ago I wrote a sentence based on the idea that education > should be based on open exploration because something akin to a supreme > cybernetics will offer self-correcting feedback, and a big trouble is many > educators don't trust that. And then I stared at the sentence for a while > and realized the majority of people reading it (if anybody does ever read > it) would just pass it right over. > > So what do we do? Hard to know. > > A side question for Mike - in those early meetings on distributed > cognition that Don Norman was a part of did cybernetics and/or Bateson > every some up? > > Michael > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > on behalf of Helena Worthen [helenaworthen@gmail.com] > Sent: Friday, December 05, 2014 2:12 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances > > A voice from the margins, here: > > I learn a lot from this list, all the time, and would hate to have it go > quiet or self-destruct. But my role in the world outside this list, out > there in the synchronous landscape, involves trying to make ideas > intelligible to working people who may not have more than a couple of years > of community college. For this purpose, there is a whole roster of terms > that are a problem. When I say these terms to regular people, they make a > face as if they'd tasted something bad. > > Examples of terms like this are: > > affordance > mediate > activity > CHAT (cultural-historical activity theory) > > and: > > development > > For my purposes, Annalisa's Dec 2 post on Gibson's invention of the term > "affordance" is very useful. He explained clearly why he made it up. I can > use that. > > Knud Illeris' book "Contemporary Theories of Learning: Learning > theorists...in their own words" is a breath of fresh air for the same > reason. You got to hear a whole collection of different people saying very > different things about learning, all grouped together as learning theorists. > > theoristshttp:// > www.pgce.soton.ac.uk/IT/Learning/Theories/ContemporaryTheoriesofLearning%20Learning%20theorists%20in%20their%20own%20words%20-%20Knud%20Illeris.pdf > > > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > On Dec 3, 2014, at 11:26 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > > Haydi, > > Thank you so much! Here?s how it is for me: > > I too have been waiting for Andy to come back. He is the reason I am in > the chat. I have known about Vygotsky through Vera since the early 80s. But > I, after my dissertation on L2 fluency in 1986, I worked as a teacher > educator where research and publication wasn?t necessary for tenure and > promotion. The college where I was working closed (bankruptcy) five years > back and, like any working stiff, I am having to reinvent myself. So, in > thrashing about I came to read Andy?s articles on "collaborative project" > as a unit of analysis a few years back, started emailing with him > one-on-one (and he was so generous with his time and patience in answering > my questions about activity theory and Vygotsky), until he said it was time > for me to join the chat. Andy mentored me until I had the courage to pipe > up. Andy just edited a book on collaborative projects; Vera has written one > of the papers for the book. I love them both. That?s how it is for me. > > > > Let me say that I consider myself a rank learner, always beginning. Mike > has wisely rejected the role of Caesar on the chat. But we go to him asking > him to sort out things amongst the unruly class. As a teacher, the hardest > thing for me ever to do was to deal with disrespect between students. I > have finally come to realize and accept that I want to be in a school where > the students are nice to each other. Where respect and trust abound. Where > human flourishing is possible. There is no father god to rescue us. We have > to do it for ourselves. Well, like the song goes, ?I?m still willin?? Let?s > make this a creative project, which means no unethical use of power. We > can?t afford it. In my humble opinion. > > > > In gratitude and hope, > > Henry > > > >> On Dec 3, 2014, at 11:00 AM, mike cole wrote: > >> > >> Haydi-- > >> > >> Like anyone on xmca, you can demand whatever you like. Getting people to > >> implement your demands may be more > >> difficult. In general, I have not experienced demands and resentment as > >> particularly helpful on xmca, but thing are changing, > >> so who knows. > >> > >> I am not putting ANL aside because of the concerns expressed in MCA in > the > >> past year or so. The concerns are real, at least to me. > >> But there are many productive programs of research that use his ideas, > >> along with those of LSV and many others, both Russian and non-Russian. > >> > >> I believe it would be helpful in receiving answers to your various > comments > >> and suggestions if some of them were constrained to particular threads. > For > >> example, the discussion of plank versus a piece of electronic equipment > vis > >> a vis the notion of artifact and mediation through artifacts, etc., > might > >> be be placed in that thread. > >> > >> etc. > >> > >> I clearly can be wrong in all of these judgments! > >> mike > >> > >> > >> > >> On Wed, Dec 3, 2014 at 3:50 AM, Haydi Zulfei < > haydizulfei@rocketmail.com> > >> wrote: > >> > >>> Hi > >>> > >>> First of all , so resentfully I wonder If I can demand Andy's return to > >>> the discussions !! No one can deny his great contributions to this > Forum . > >>> > >>> Second , I might have been lost completely in your words , terms , > >>> premises , and compositional nuances and colourings of your script as > >>> native speakers , etc. > >>> > >>> > >>> Third , because of obvious sensitivities towards ANL , I've altogether > put > >>> him to one side ; otherwise , in this concrete example of Michael , the > >>> triad , activity , action , operation are boldly in view . > >>> > >>> > >>> Fourth , I suppose LSV himself in two or three chapters of the > "History of > >>> Higher Mental Functions" has provided full response to our inquiries . > Andy > >>> , in time , sent the first two chapters to all . > >>> > >>> 1. He , after preliminary remarks , puts heavy emphasis on use of tools > >>> and work activity in the parentheses and in italic characters . He > >>> emphasizes that use of tool very naturally gets significant just > within the > >>> work activity process . Without the work activity we cannot expect > much of > >>> it . Then , as most of the time , he time and again references Marx and > >>> Engels so as to prove his claims . > >>> > >>> > >>> 2. Mike is so and for good reasons enchanted in "rudiments" of culture > >>> phenomena (throwing dice and bones , knots , notches in the wood to > >>> remember speech) . Good for him and us all . Yes , Buridan's ass gets > >>> spoilt in its indecision But man through inventing stimulus-device > gets to > >>> salvation . But the problem is how many times has Mike , our Boss and > >>> confirmed global figure no need for it to be documented , asked himself > >>> what went before that juncture of time for the man to become 'MAN' ?? > At > >>> this moment we are with LSV and at a very critical point of time . No > more > >>> return to 'culture' to prove 'culture' . LSV says the error for some > is to > >>> recount the story of mental through mental while they should know that > >>> mental processes go parallel with 'social' processes . What I gather at > >>> this very point is that he expects us to infer that the 'our present > man of > >>> some will' owes his man/ness and decisiveness to his previous work > activity > >>> necessitating use of tools . It seems we cannot take the idea to the > >>> uterine because V focuses on use of tools for a baby of 6 or of 10-12 > >>> months of age . It seems , both phylogenetically and ontogenetically , > that > >>> it's not the case that 'gestures' ' eye contacts' come of their own and > >>> because of the man/ness and for the tuning-up with the universe through > >>> sounds and hymns and angels , etc. Man worked for life , performed ups > and > >>> downs , shook his extremeties (one pair of hand) , consumed ! > collective > >>> yellings and gesturing (as concomitant of work) . V says we can > distinguish > >>> independent history of natural processes and independent history of > >>> cultural development separately 'phylogenetically' but not > ontogenetically > >>> . In ontology , nature and culture work simultaneously contrary to > >>> phylogenesis . One cannot with ease and comfort say whichone goes with > >>> whichone . > >>> > >>> > >>> 3. Andy who is well aware of both CH and AT , on his sending of the > four > >>> pages and then the said two chapters , disclosed a very important point > >>> neglected so far at the forum and that was the idea of the distinction > >>> between tool and sign so fruitfully and enormously discussed by V and > the > >>> deep meaning that the simple diagram denoted . V says 'artifact' could > be > >>> cheating and deceitful but no one cares ! They invariably use > artifacts and > >>> through this , they ultimately remove 'material activity' from the > domain > >>> altogether . V is everywhere clear with both 'cultural , ideal > activity' > >>> and 'material activity' . Here is where quotes don't work . The one > more > >>> return to the plus-thousand previous reflections . No loss really ! V > , if > >>> necessary , prefers just 'mediation' . > >>> > >>> 4. With these in mind , I say for certain that here the plank is a tool > >>> not an 'artifact' because it is not a sign signaling any other genuine > >>> thing . It's all to itself . Also the light switch . And the whole > activity > >>> is a material one . Life put it in the way . According to V sign > activity > >>> affects one's own societal individual behaviour . We cannot generalize > its > >>> effect to the border of transforming Nature . Man through speech , > dialogue > >>> , discourse , talk , genre , etc. decides for the change in personal > >>> behaviour ; if this potential preparedness for individual behavioral > change > >>> gets fossilized or ossified , then man will not reach the threshhold > of the > >>> bigger act and the vast field of the Mother Universe with its motley > rich > >>> material phenomena out of which each time he can select an object for a > >>> circle of activity : starting an activity with a probable cryptic > 'motive' > >>> (what we don't yet know about which took him to the point of crossing) > , > >>> with a conscious goal (reaching the other side) through a concrete > action > >>> (crossing) operating according to the conditions at hand and on the > ground > >>> (light switching , wrestling between the ideal and the material > (object , > >>> subject , that is , thinking ideally about what to do with the whole > thing > >>> and the plank , then observing with the help of the light acting on the > >>> object , again back to thinking if flaws are observed , etc. etc. no > >>> blending of objective and subjective whatsoever . And I wonder why > taking > >>> affordance for a tool . > >>> > >>> > >>> Soooooooooo much for one post . > >>> > >>> I considered spaces but wonder if it works . > >>> I'll also be very quiet and slow in replying ! > >>> > >>> Best > >>> > >>> Haydi > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> From: mike cole > >>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > >>> Sent: Tuesday, 2 December 2014, 11:26:46 > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances > >>> > >>> My view? > >>> The plank is for certain an artifact, no less than the light bulb. On > what > >>> grounds, or under what circumstances, would you classify it otherwise? > >>> What's gained, what's lost? > >>> mike > >>> > >>> > >>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Glassman, Michael < > glassman.13@osu.edu> > >>> wrote: > >>> > >>>> Hi Annalisa, Mike, Huw > >>>> > >>>> I tend to be somebody who reacts better to concrete examples than > >>>> definitions. I believe this also comes from Gibson's 1977 book, > >>>> > >>>> You are walking across a field and come to a stream which you can to > get > >>>> across. You notice a plank across the stream. It is wide enough for > you > >>>> to keep your balance and thick enough to hold your weight, in using it > >>> you > >>>> recognize its affordance as a crossing point. It is the intersection > of > >>>> the movement, the perception of the plank, short term goal of the > >>> activity > >>>> (getting across the stream) - the recognition of the affordance comes > in > >>>> the subjective use of the object (which is why it is neither > subjective > >>> or > >>>> objective). It is also important that you have the abilities (the > >>> correct > >>>> weight, the balance) to recognize the affordance, otherwise you pass > the > >>>> plank by. > >>>> > >>>> As far as perceived affordance. I think I have this right - the > >>> perceived > >>>> is not in the person who recognizes the affordance (otherwise you are > >>>> right, that is wet water) it is whether there is an intention in the > >>> design > >>>> of the object. So I create a light switch with the intention of > >>> designing > >>>> it as having a perceived affordance for somebody who wants to switch > on a > >>>> light. As you can see different from the relationship to the plank, > >>> where > >>>> there is no prior design. > >>>> > >>>> Here is my question (perhaps answered in the Engestrom paper) > >>>> > >>>> The light switch is certainly an artifact, but is the plank? > >>>> > >>>> Michael > >>>> ________________________________________ > >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > >>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > >>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 1:19 PM > >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances > >>>> > >>>> Those definitions help a lot Annalisa and touch on the fact that > gibson > >>>> seemed to empty the organism (if one were so inclined to interpret > him) > >>> and > >>>> he dismissed culutral mediation as secondary at best. Still, they > share > >>> the > >>>> idea that a part of the structure that psychologist theorize as a > located > >>>> inside of individual crania is in fact "our there" in the > phylgenetically > >>>> and cultural-historically constitued environment. And that drove > >>> cognitive > >>>> psychologists, our co discussants, nuts. Until, "they got it" and then > >>>> sought to mold it to their own ends and pre-existing means. > >>>> mike > >>>> > >>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 9:59 AM, Annalisa Aguilar > >>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> I thought I'd do the honors and start a new thread on affordances, > >>> which > >>>>> isn't related to Larry's discussion of basic images. > >>>>> > >>>>> I figured as well to offer Gibson's words on affordances since it is > a > >>>>> word he invented to describe something he saw in the world. Of course > >>> the > >>>>> life of affordances has been full of controversy, especially with > >>> regard > >>>> to > >>>>> understanding what they are. > >>>>> > >>>>> Gibson's Affordances is a theory I find instrumental to connecting > >>>> outside > >>>>> to inside experiences and I intuit that it is related to perezhivanie > >>> in > >>>>> some fashion. > >>>>> > >>>>> After reading the wikipage more closely, I regret offering a link to > >>> the > >>>>> text there because it isn't very clear what Gibson means or what > Norman > >>>>> means. To me, a "perceived affordance" is like saying "wet water." > >>>>> > >>>>> In any case, here are 3 quotes of Gibson in his own words, that I > could > >>>>> find: > >>>>> > >>>>> The affordances of the environment are what it _offers_ the animal, > >>> what > >>>>> it _provides_ or _furnishes_, either for good or ill. The verb "to > >>>> afford" > >>>>> is found in the dictionary, the noun "affordance" is not. I have made > >>> it > >>>>> up. I mean by it something that refers both to the environment and > the > >>>>> animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies the > >>>> complementarity > >>>>> of the animal and the environment (Gibson, 1977/1986). > >>>>> > >>>>> and > >>>>> > >>>>> What is meant by an _affordance_? ?Subject to revision, I suggest > that > >>>> the > >>>>> affordance of anything is a specific combination of the properties of > >>> its > >>>>> substance and its surfaces taken with reference to an animal. The > >>>> reference > >>>>> may be to an animal as distinguished from other species (Gibson, > >>>> 1977/1986). > >>>>> > >>>>> and > >>>>> > >>>>> An important fact about affordances of the environment is that they > are > >>>> in > >>>>> a sense objective, real, and physical, unlike values and meanings, > >>> which > >>>>> are often supposed to be subjective, phenomenal, and mental. But > >>>> actually, > >>>>> an affordance is neither an objective property nor a subjective > >>> property; > >>>>> or it is both if you like. An affordance cuts across the dichotomy of > >>>>> subjective-objective and helps us to understand its inadequacy. It is > >>>>> equally a fact of the environment and a fact of behavior. It is both > >>>>> physical and psychical, yet neither. An affordance points both ways, > to > >>>> the > >>>>> environment and to the observer (Gibson, 1977/1986). > >>>>> > >>>>> These quotes are important to keep in mind, I hope they help. > >>>>> > >>>>> I might also suggest looking at Mace(1977) who described very > carefully > >>>>> how Gibson got from stimuli to affordance, given that people on this > >>> list > >>>>> value history, learning, and development. > >>>>> > >>>>> Kind regards, > >>>>> > >>>>> Annalisa > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> ________________________________________ > >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>> > >>>>> on behalf of Huw Lloyd > >>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 2, 2014 10:35 AM > >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > >>>>> > >>>>> I'd take a look. > >>>>> > >>>>> Michael, utility or technical affordance might fit. My equivalent of > >>>> your > >>>>> perceived/discovered distinction is one of planned and technically > >>>>> manifest. > >>>>> > >>>>> Huw > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> On 2 December 2014 at 16:44, Glassman, Michael > >>>>> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> I'd be interested in anybody else is. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Michael > >>>>>> ________________________________________ > >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ > >>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>> ] > >>>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > >>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 11:39 AM > >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Interloper, Michael? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> The discussions at UCSD preceeding Don's use of affordances and > >>>> cognitive > >>>>>> artifacts were accompanied by other, related papers. One by > Engestrom > >>>> on > >>>>>> "when is an artifact" and one or more by Ed Hutchins. If people are > >>>>>> interested in pursuing this thread/topic the materials could be > >>>> gathered > >>>>>> up. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> mike > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Glassman, Michael < > >>> glassman.13@osu.edu > >>>>> > >>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea). > >>> He > >>>>>>> actually cops to both of them. The first was not to distinguish > >>>>> between > >>>>>>> affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which > >>> are > >>>>>>> designed. I think this is related to the issue of artifacts. > >>>> Meaning > >>>>>> are > >>>>>>> artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to > >>> be > >>>>>>> discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong > >>> word, > >>>> if > >>>>>>> anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances. It is a > >>>>>> complex > >>>>>>> question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes > >>> based > >>>> on > >>>>>>> context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one > >>>> context > >>>>>> may > >>>>>>> result in organic affordances in another context. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is that > >>>> he > >>>>>> was > >>>>>>> not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and > >>>>>> constraints. > >>>>>>> Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived affordances > >>> or > >>>>> are > >>>>>>> they designed to create constraints. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the > >>>>> mention > >>>>>>> just spurred me to throw this up. Hope I'm not being too much of > >>> an > >>>>>>> interloper. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Michael > >>>>>>> ________________________________________ > >>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ > >>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>>> ] > >>>>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > >>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM > >>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Annalisa- > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation > >>>> not > >>>>>>> discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of > >>>>>>> affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set > >>> against > >>>>>>> Gibson's ideas. The change of views coincided with the advent of > >>> the > >>>>>> d-cog > >>>>>>> idea which also has deep roots in chat. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> No hidden history i know of, but interesting connections among the > >>>>>> notion > >>>>>>> of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion of > >>>>> these > >>>>>>> connections can be found, among other places, in > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Cole, M. & Engestr?m, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach > >>> to > >>>>>>> distributed* > >>>>>>> *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition: > >>>> Psychological > >>>>>> and > >>>>>>> educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar >>>> > >>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Hi Mike, > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied > >>>> that > >>>>>>> wish! > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important > >>> connections. > >>>> I > >>>>>> was > >>>>>>>> not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I > >>> learned > >>>>>> about > >>>>>>>> Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science > >>>> (1985). > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Is there some history that is not part of the common story? > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> I looked here for clarity: > >>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to > >>>>>> cognitive > >>>>>>>> artifacts? > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in > >>>> play, > >>>>>> and > >>>>>>>> even joy! > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however > >>>> until > >>>>>> then > >>>>>>>> I will remain with the ineffable. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Kind regards, > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Annalisa > >>>>>>>> ________________________________________ > >>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > >>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> on behalf of mike cole > >>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM > >>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And, > >>>>>>>> co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive > >>>>>> artifacts > >>>>>>>> right about that time at UCSD. If it were possible to find a > >>>> source > >>>>>> that > >>>>>>>> makes these connections visible and available to read about it > >>>> might > >>>>>> be a > >>>>>>>> step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of > >>>>> intro > >>>>>>> for > >>>>>>>> newcomers to the discussion. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a > >>>>>> newcomer's > >>>>>>>> introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is > >>> seeking > >>>>> to > >>>>>>> sort > >>>>>>>> out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am > >>>>>>> insuficiently > >>>>>>>> read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted! > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many > >>>>> rocks, > >>>>>> so > >>>>>>>> little time"! > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Mike > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> A > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar > >>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Martin! > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental > >>>>> representation" > >>>>>> is > >>>>>>>>> coming closer! > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's > >>>>> theory > >>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>> affordances. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed > >>>> article. > >>>>>> But > >>>>>>> I > >>>>>>>>> wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is > >>>>>>> important > >>>>>>>>> not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a > >>>>>> grenade > >>>>>>>>> pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the > >>>> list. > >>>>>> If > >>>>>>>> you > >>>>>>>>> can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look > >>>> forward > >>>>> to > >>>>>>>> your > >>>>>>>>> reply, Martin. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that > >>> being > >>>>> at > >>>>>>> UCSD > >>>>>>>>> and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that > >>>>> influences > >>>>>>> your > >>>>>>>>> position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find > >>>>>>> community > >>>>>>>> in > >>>>>>>>> it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more > >>> voluntary > >>>>>>> phrased > >>>>>>>>> that way). > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Kind regards, > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Annalisa > >>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ > >>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > >>>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > >>>>> Martin > >>>>>>> John > >>>>>>>>> Packer > > >>>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM > >>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> An interesting article, David. One way in which it is > >>>> interesting, > >>>>> to > >>>>>>> me > >>>>>>>>> at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not > >>> used, > >>>>>> even > >>>>>>>>> once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" > >>> images > >>>> in > >>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>> world around us - material representations - and he tries to > >>>> define > >>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>> "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Martin > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg < > >>> dkellogg60@gmail.com > >>>>>>>>> > wrote: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Larry, Annalisa: > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" > >>>> when > >>>>>> we > >>>>>>>>>> met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of > >>>>>>> anything > >>>>>>>>>> except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe > >>>>> available > >>>>>>>>>> for a standard price all over China) She does not even > >>> remember > >>>>>>>>>> whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was > >>> the > >>>>>>>>>> beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as > >>> a > >>>>>>>>>> non-image based mental representation. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental > >>> representations > >>>>> are > >>>>>>>>>> images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth > >>> century. > >>>>> In > >>>>>>>>>> fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against > >>>>>>> Titchener > >>>>>>>>>> and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, > >>>>>>>>>> everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated > >>>> that > >>>>>>>>>> many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically > >>>>>> anterior > >>>>>>>>>> to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would > >>>> not > >>>>>> have > >>>>>>>>>> time or ability to process complex problems in real time. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that > >>> are > >>>>>>>>>> genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more > >>>>>> reading > >>>>>>>>>> to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read > >>> than > >>>> I > >>>>> am > >>>>>>>>>> (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels > >>>> like > >>>>>>>>>> she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do > >>>> NOT > >>>>>> read > >>>>>>>>>> this article--instead, look at Figure 11. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color > >>> structure > >>>> of > >>>>>>>>>> Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any > >>>>> actual > >>>>>>>>>> images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural > >>>>>>> experience > >>>>>>>>>> associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then > >>>>> deliberately > >>>>>>>>>> frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any > >>>>>>>>>> recognizable figures upon which to focus. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine > >>> Chapel > >>>>>> fresco > >>>>>>>>>> for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. > >>> He > >>>> or > >>>>>> she > >>>>>>>>>> can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the > >>> painting > >>>>> and > >>>>>>>>>> wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not > >>>>> notice > >>>>>>>>>> the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful > >>> in > >>>>> it. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar < > >>>> annalisa@unm.edu > >>>>>>>>> > wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Hi Larry and David, > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are > >>>> at > >>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>> root of all thinking. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, > >>>> based > >>>>>> upon > >>>>>>>>> previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, > >>> in > >>>>>>>>> combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a > >>>>> phrase > >>>>>> I > >>>>>>>> like > >>>>>>>>> a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on > >>> it > >>>>> by > >>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>> same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know > >>> it. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think > >>> as > >>>>>>> Hackett > >>>>>>>>> describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have > >>>> you > >>>>>>>> already > >>>>>>>>> given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be > >>>>> willing > >>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>> take a look. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is > >>>>>>> controversial. > >>>>>>>>> It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone > >>>>> says > >>>>>>>> "this > >>>>>>>>> is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble > >>>>>>> observation. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and > >>> whatever > >>>>>> that > >>>>>>>>> process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at > >>>>> hand? > >>>>>>>> Just a > >>>>>>>>> thought. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> What is it that appeals to you about this model, > >>>> metaphoricity? > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Kind regards, > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Annalisa > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ > >>>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > >>>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > >>>> Larry > >>>>>>>> Purss < > >>>>>>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com > > >>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM > >>>>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity > >>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> David K > >>>>>>>>>>> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. > >>>> My > >>>>>>> reason > >>>>>>>>> for > >>>>>>>>>>> exploring these authors is I have been following a path > >>>>> pursuing a > >>>>>>>> basic > >>>>>>>>>>> question. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic > >>>>>> guiding > >>>>>>>>> images > >>>>>>>>>>> upon which thinking rests" > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring > >>>>> appearances > >>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>>>>> illusions was also exploring this theme. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new > >>>>> phenomenological > >>>>>>>> path > >>>>>>>>>>> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names > >>>>> this > >>>>>>>>> process > >>>>>>>>>>> *metaphoricity*. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible > >>>>>> image-character > >>>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>> *spontaneous event* of meaning. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which > >>> he > >>>>>>>> brackets - > >>>>>>>>>>> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> AND > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* > >>>> finds > >>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>> meaning of its very self. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this > >>>>>>>>>>> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion > >>> of > >>>>>>>> metaphor > >>>>>>>>> can > >>>>>>>>>>> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is > >>> implicated > >>>>> in > >>>>>>>>>>> *objectivity* > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of > >>>>> itself > >>>>>>>> *in* > >>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>> mode [path] of the concept > >>>>>>>>>>> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding > >>>>> images > >>>>>>> has > >>>>>>>>> been > >>>>>>>>>>> established. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the > >>>> path > >>>>> of > >>>>>>>>>>> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is > >>> derived > >>>>>> from > >>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>> image-character of the guiding image. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial > >>>> this > >>>>>>> topic > >>>>>>>>> may > >>>>>>>>>>> become [again] > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by > >>> this > >>>>>> basic > >>>>>>>>>>> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these > >>>>> images > >>>>>> as > >>>>>>>>>>> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images > >>>> emerge > >>>>>>>>>>> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is > >>>>> transcendental] > >>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>>> is > >>>>>>>>>>> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. > >>>> It > >>>>>>> seems > >>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>>> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> I also realize this question may already be answered in > >>>>> Vygotsky's > >>>>>>>>> writings > >>>>>>>>>>> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of > >>>>> XMCA. I > >>>>>>>>>>> personally am following this path for now. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Larry > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > >>> with > >>>>> an > >>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > >>>> an > >>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> -- > >>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > >>> an > >>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> -- > >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> -- > >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> -- > >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > From helenaworthen@gmail.com Fri Dec 5 12:52:31 2014 From: helenaworthen@gmail.com (Helena Worthen) Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2014 12:52:31 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F907548F@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> References: <1682996975.4827904.1417607429293.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11144.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> <3A40602C-44A1-45C7-A7D1-36E1A842E92B@gmail.com>, <8FDB5B35-D645-496F-93CB-077884244184@gmail.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F907548F@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: <4E148FDE-8090-43ED-9F4F-FAD731D8853C@gmail.com> Michael: Here is how I read your message: There are two (at least) ways of thinking about the world (meaning life, the universe, etc). One is the "exploration" perspective and the other is some overarching cybernetic (mathematical, engineering? designed?) perspective. The difference between the two that you want to draw attention to is that Bateson, who you name as someone associated with the second perspective, anticipated that any such system would self-correct eventually. Then you say that many educators do not trust a cybernetic system to self-correct. Is that right? I'm sure sure how what you call the "exploration" perspective differs from the cybernetic perspective. I think it's pretty obvious that whatever system us Westerners have trusted is about to self-correct in a pretty violent way, leaving few of us behind, including our grandchildren. Capitalism (I'm think of Picketty, here) doesn't self-correct, but the climate does and it is gearing up to pull a whopper on us. All of this is to say that while we toss ideas around there are real-world facts out there moving right along. I want to see people making use of these ideas. I want to know, "How is this word actually used in real life?" Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com On Dec 5, 2014, at 11:46 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > Hi Helena, > > I'm not so sure if its the words or the way the thinking behind those words match up or don't match up with the systems of the individuals were are teaching live and think within. A little while ago I was reading Bateson and his idea that Western philosophy/thinking often precluded the idea of a supreme cybernetic system - the idea that we could and would be self-corrected through exploration of the universe rather than any conscious human design. We are a society obsessed with local control and the idea that we can manipulate the universe around us (which we can in small doses, but Bateson claim is destructive in the long run). > > Many of the words you mention such as affordances, mediators, activity often fall into the exploration perspective I think - and they become difficult to relate. > > A little while ago I wrote a sentence based on the idea that education should be based on open exploration because something akin to a supreme cybernetics will offer self-correcting feedback, and a big trouble is many educators don't trust that. And then I stared at the sentence for a while and realized the majority of people reading it (if anybody does ever read it) would just pass it right over. > > So what do we do? Hard to know. > > A side question for Mike - in those early meetings on distributed cognition that Don Norman was a part of did cybernetics and/or Bateson every some up? > > Michael > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Helena Worthen [helenaworthen@gmail.com] > Sent: Friday, December 05, 2014 2:12 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances > > A voice from the margins, here: > > I learn a lot from this list, all the time, and would hate to have it go quiet or self-destruct. But my role in the world outside this list, out there in the synchronous landscape, involves trying to make ideas intelligible to working people who may not have more than a couple of years of community college. For this purpose, there is a whole roster of terms that are a problem. When I say these terms to regular people, they make a face as if they'd tasted something bad. > > Examples of terms like this are: > > affordance > mediate > activity > CHAT (cultural-historical activity theory) > > and: > > development > > For my purposes, Annalisa's Dec 2 post on Gibson's invention of the term "affordance" is very useful. He explained clearly why he made it up. I can use that. > > Knud Illeris' book "Contemporary Theories of Learning: Learning theorists...in their own words" is a breath of fresh air for the same reason. You got to hear a whole collection of different people saying very different things about learning, all grouped together as learning theorists. > > theoristshttp://www.pgce.soton.ac.uk/IT/Learning/Theories/ContemporaryTheoriesofLearning%20Learning%20theorists%20in%20their%20own%20words%20-%20Knud%20Illeris.pdf > > > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > On Dec 3, 2014, at 11:26 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >> Haydi, >> Thank you so much! Here?s how it is for me: >> I too have been waiting for Andy to come back. He is the reason I am in the chat. I have known about Vygotsky through Vera since the early 80s. But I, after my dissertation on L2 fluency in 1986, I worked as a teacher educator where research and publication wasn?t necessary for tenure and promotion. The college where I was working closed (bankruptcy) five years back and, like any working stiff, I am having to reinvent myself. So, in thrashing about I came to read Andy?s articles on "collaborative project" as a unit of analysis a few years back, started emailing with him one-on-one (and he was so generous with his time and patience in answering my questions about activity theory and Vygotsky), until he said it was time for me to join the chat. Andy mentored me until I had the courage to pipe up. Andy just edited a book on collaborative projects; Vera has written one of the papers for the book. I love them both. That?s how it is for me. >> >> Let me say that I consider myself a rank learner, always beginning. Mike has wisely rejected the role of Caesar on the chat. But we go to him asking him to sort out things amongst the unruly class. As a teacher, the hardest thing for me ever to do was to deal with disrespect between students. I have finally come to realize and accept that I want to be in a school where the students are nice to each other. Where respect and trust abound. Where human flourishing is possible. There is no father god to rescue us. We have to do it for ourselves. Well, like the song goes, ?I?m still willin?? Let?s make this a creative project, which means no unethical use of power. We can?t afford it. In my humble opinion. >> >> In gratitude and hope, >> Henry >> >>> On Dec 3, 2014, at 11:00 AM, mike cole wrote: >>> >>> Haydi-- >>> >>> Like anyone on xmca, you can demand whatever you like. Getting people to >>> implement your demands may be more >>> difficult. In general, I have not experienced demands and resentment as >>> particularly helpful on xmca, but thing are changing, >>> so who knows. >>> >>> I am not putting ANL aside because of the concerns expressed in MCA in the >>> past year or so. The concerns are real, at least to me. >>> But there are many productive programs of research that use his ideas, >>> along with those of LSV and many others, both Russian and non-Russian. >>> >>> I believe it would be helpful in receiving answers to your various comments >>> and suggestions if some of them were constrained to particular threads. For >>> example, the discussion of plank versus a piece of electronic equipment vis >>> a vis the notion of artifact and mediation through artifacts, etc., might >>> be be placed in that thread. >>> >>> etc. >>> >>> I clearly can be wrong in all of these judgments! >>> mike >>> >>> >>> >>> On Wed, Dec 3, 2014 at 3:50 AM, Haydi Zulfei >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Hi >>>> >>>> First of all , so resentfully I wonder If I can demand Andy's return to >>>> the discussions !! No one can deny his great contributions to this Forum . >>>> >>>> Second , I might have been lost completely in your words , terms , >>>> premises , and compositional nuances and colourings of your script as >>>> native speakers , etc. >>>> >>>> >>>> Third , because of obvious sensitivities towards ANL , I've altogether put >>>> him to one side ; otherwise , in this concrete example of Michael , the >>>> triad , activity , action , operation are boldly in view . >>>> >>>> >>>> Fourth , I suppose LSV himself in two or three chapters of the "History of >>>> Higher Mental Functions" has provided full response to our inquiries . Andy >>>> , in time , sent the first two chapters to all . >>>> >>>> 1. He , after preliminary remarks , puts heavy emphasis on use of tools >>>> and work activity in the parentheses and in italic characters . He >>>> emphasizes that use of tool very naturally gets significant just within the >>>> work activity process . Without the work activity we cannot expect much of >>>> it . Then , as most of the time , he time and again references Marx and >>>> Engels so as to prove his claims . >>>> >>>> >>>> 2. Mike is so and for good reasons enchanted in "rudiments" of culture >>>> phenomena (throwing dice and bones , knots , notches in the wood to >>>> remember speech) . Good for him and us all . Yes , Buridan's ass gets >>>> spoilt in its indecision But man through inventing stimulus-device gets to >>>> salvation . But the problem is how many times has Mike , our Boss and >>>> confirmed global figure no need for it to be documented , asked himself >>>> what went before that juncture of time for the man to become 'MAN' ?? At >>>> this moment we are with LSV and at a very critical point of time . No more >>>> return to 'culture' to prove 'culture' . LSV says the error for some is to >>>> recount the story of mental through mental while they should know that >>>> mental processes go parallel with 'social' processes . What I gather at >>>> this very point is that he expects us to infer that the 'our present man of >>>> some will' owes his man/ness and decisiveness to his previous work activity >>>> necessitating use of tools . It seems we cannot take the idea to the >>>> uterine because V focuses on use of tools for a baby of 6 or of 10-12 >>>> months of age . It seems , both phylogenetically and ontogenetically , that >>>> it's not the case that 'gestures' ' eye contacts' come of their own and >>>> because of the man/ness and for the tuning-up with the universe through >>>> sounds and hymns and angels , etc. Man worked for life , performed ups and >>>> downs , shook his extremeties (one pair of hand) , consumed ! collective >>>> yellings and gesturing (as concomitant of work) . V says we can distinguish >>>> independent history of natural processes and independent history of >>>> cultural development separately 'phylogenetically' but not ontogenetically >>>> . In ontology , nature and culture work simultaneously contrary to >>>> phylogenesis . One cannot with ease and comfort say whichone goes with >>>> whichone . >>>> >>>> >>>> 3. Andy who is well aware of both CH and AT , on his sending of the four >>>> pages and then the said two chapters , disclosed a very important point >>>> neglected so far at the forum and that was the idea of the distinction >>>> between tool and sign so fruitfully and enormously discussed by V and the >>>> deep meaning that the simple diagram denoted . V says 'artifact' could be >>>> cheating and deceitful but no one cares ! They invariably use artifacts and >>>> through this , they ultimately remove 'material activity' from the domain >>>> altogether . V is everywhere clear with both 'cultural , ideal activity' >>>> and 'material activity' . Here is where quotes don't work . The one more >>>> return to the plus-thousand previous reflections . No loss really ! V , if >>>> necessary , prefers just 'mediation' . >>>> >>>> 4. With these in mind , I say for certain that here the plank is a tool >>>> not an 'artifact' because it is not a sign signaling any other genuine >>>> thing . It's all to itself . Also the light switch . And the whole activity >>>> is a material one . Life put it in the way . According to V sign activity >>>> affects one's own societal individual behaviour . We cannot generalize its >>>> effect to the border of transforming Nature . Man through speech , dialogue >>>> , discourse , talk , genre , etc. decides for the change in personal >>>> behaviour ; if this potential preparedness for individual behavioral change >>>> gets fossilized or ossified , then man will not reach the threshhold of the >>>> bigger act and the vast field of the Mother Universe with its motley rich >>>> material phenomena out of which each time he can select an object for a >>>> circle of activity : starting an activity with a probable cryptic 'motive' >>>> (what we don't yet know about which took him to the point of crossing) , >>>> with a conscious goal (reaching the other side) through a concrete action >>>> (crossing) operating according to the conditions at hand and on the ground >>>> (light switching , wrestling between the ideal and the material (object , >>>> subject , that is , thinking ideally about what to do with the whole thing >>>> and the plank , then observing with the help of the light acting on the >>>> object , again back to thinking if flaws are observed , etc. etc. no >>>> blending of objective and subjective whatsoever . And I wonder why taking >>>> affordance for a tool . >>>> >>>> >>>> Soooooooooo much for one post . >>>> >>>> I considered spaces but wonder if it works . >>>> I'll also be very quiet and slow in replying ! >>>> >>>> Best >>>> >>>> Haydi >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> From: mike cole >>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>>> Sent: Tuesday, 2 December 2014, 11:26:46 >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances >>>> >>>> My view? >>>> The plank is for certain an artifact, no less than the light bulb. On what >>>> grounds, or under what circumstances, would you classify it otherwise? >>>> What's gained, what's lost? >>>> mike >>>> >>>> >>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Glassman, Michael >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Hi Annalisa, Mike, Huw >>>>> >>>>> I tend to be somebody who reacts better to concrete examples than >>>>> definitions. I believe this also comes from Gibson's 1977 book, >>>>> >>>>> You are walking across a field and come to a stream which you can to get >>>>> across. You notice a plank across the stream. It is wide enough for you >>>>> to keep your balance and thick enough to hold your weight, in using it >>>> you >>>>> recognize its affordance as a crossing point. It is the intersection of >>>>> the movement, the perception of the plank, short term goal of the >>>> activity >>>>> (getting across the stream) - the recognition of the affordance comes in >>>>> the subjective use of the object (which is why it is neither subjective >>>> or >>>>> objective). It is also important that you have the abilities (the >>>> correct >>>>> weight, the balance) to recognize the affordance, otherwise you pass the >>>>> plank by. >>>>> >>>>> As far as perceived affordance. I think I have this right - the >>>> perceived >>>>> is not in the person who recognizes the affordance (otherwise you are >>>>> right, that is wet water) it is whether there is an intention in the >>>> design >>>>> of the object. So I create a light switch with the intention of >>>> designing >>>>> it as having a perceived affordance for somebody who wants to switch on a >>>>> light. As you can see different from the relationship to the plank, >>>> where >>>>> there is no prior design. >>>>> >>>>> Here is my question (perhaps answered in the Engestrom paper) >>>>> >>>>> The light switch is certainly an artifact, but is the plank? >>>>> >>>>> Michael >>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 1:19 PM >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances >>>>> >>>>> Those definitions help a lot Annalisa and touch on the fact that gibson >>>>> seemed to empty the organism (if one were so inclined to interpret him) >>>> and >>>>> he dismissed culutral mediation as secondary at best. Still, they share >>>> the >>>>> idea that a part of the structure that psychologist theorize as a located >>>>> inside of individual crania is in fact "our there" in the phylgenetically >>>>> and cultural-historically constitued environment. And that drove >>>> cognitive >>>>> psychologists, our co discussants, nuts. Until, "they got it" and then >>>>> sought to mold it to their own ends and pre-existing means. >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 9:59 AM, Annalisa Aguilar >>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> I thought I'd do the honors and start a new thread on affordances, >>>> which >>>>>> isn't related to Larry's discussion of basic images. >>>>>> >>>>>> I figured as well to offer Gibson's words on affordances since it is a >>>>>> word he invented to describe something he saw in the world. Of course >>>> the >>>>>> life of affordances has been full of controversy, especially with >>>> regard >>>>> to >>>>>> understanding what they are. >>>>>> >>>>>> Gibson's Affordances is a theory I find instrumental to connecting >>>>> outside >>>>>> to inside experiences and I intuit that it is related to perezhivanie >>>> in >>>>>> some fashion. >>>>>> >>>>>> After reading the wikipage more closely, I regret offering a link to >>>> the >>>>>> text there because it isn't very clear what Gibson means or what Norman >>>>>> means. To me, a "perceived affordance" is like saying "wet water." >>>>>> >>>>>> In any case, here are 3 quotes of Gibson in his own words, that I could >>>>>> find: >>>>>> >>>>>> The affordances of the environment are what it _offers_ the animal, >>>> what >>>>>> it _provides_ or _furnishes_, either for good or ill. The verb "to >>>>> afford" >>>>>> is found in the dictionary, the noun "affordance" is not. I have made >>>> it >>>>>> up. I mean by it something that refers both to the environment and the >>>>>> animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies the >>>>> complementarity >>>>>> of the animal and the environment (Gibson, 1977/1986). >>>>>> >>>>>> and >>>>>> >>>>>> What is meant by an _affordance_? ?Subject to revision, I suggest that >>>>> the >>>>>> affordance of anything is a specific combination of the properties of >>>> its >>>>>> substance and its surfaces taken with reference to an animal. The >>>>> reference >>>>>> may be to an animal as distinguished from other species (Gibson, >>>>> 1977/1986). >>>>>> >>>>>> and >>>>>> >>>>>> An important fact about affordances of the environment is that they are >>>>> in >>>>>> a sense objective, real, and physical, unlike values and meanings, >>>> which >>>>>> are often supposed to be subjective, phenomenal, and mental. But >>>>> actually, >>>>>> an affordance is neither an objective property nor a subjective >>>> property; >>>>>> or it is both if you like. An affordance cuts across the dichotomy of >>>>>> subjective-objective and helps us to understand its inadequacy. It is >>>>>> equally a fact of the environment and a fact of behavior. It is both >>>>>> physical and psychical, yet neither. An affordance points both ways, to >>>>> the >>>>>> environment and to the observer (Gibson, 1977/1986). >>>>>> >>>>>> These quotes are important to keep in mind, I hope they help. >>>>>> >>>>>> I might also suggest looking at Mace(1977) who described very carefully >>>>>> how Gibson got from stimuli to affordance, given that people on this >>>> list >>>>>> value history, learning, and development. >>>>>> >>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>> >>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >>>>>> on behalf of Huw Lloyd >>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 2, 2014 10:35 AM >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>> >>>>>> I'd take a look. >>>>>> >>>>>> Michael, utility or technical affordance might fit. My equivalent of >>>>> your >>>>>> perceived/discovered distinction is one of planned and technically >>>>>> manifest. >>>>>> >>>>>> Huw >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 2 December 2014 at 16:44, Glassman, Michael >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> I'd be interested in anybody else is. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Michael >>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ >>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> ] >>>>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 11:39 AM >>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Interloper, Michael? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The discussions at UCSD preceeding Don's use of affordances and >>>>> cognitive >>>>>>> artifacts were accompanied by other, related papers. One by Engestrom >>>>> on >>>>>>> "when is an artifact" and one or more by Ed Hutchins. If people are >>>>>>> interested in pursuing this thread/topic the materials could be >>>>> gathered >>>>>>> up. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> mike >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Glassman, Michael < >>>> glassman.13@osu.edu >>>>>> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea). >>>> He >>>>>>>> actually cops to both of them. The first was not to distinguish >>>>>> between >>>>>>>> affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which >>>> are >>>>>>>> designed. I think this is related to the issue of artifacts. >>>>> Meaning >>>>>>> are >>>>>>>> artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to >>>> be >>>>>>>> discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong >>>> word, >>>>> if >>>>>>>> anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances. It is a >>>>>>> complex >>>>>>>> question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes >>>> based >>>>> on >>>>>>>> context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one >>>>> context >>>>>>> may >>>>>>>> result in organic affordances in another context. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is that >>>>> he >>>>>>> was >>>>>>>> not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and >>>>>>> constraints. >>>>>>>> Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived affordances >>>> or >>>>>> are >>>>>>>> they designed to create constraints. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the >>>>>> mention >>>>>>>> just spurred me to throw this up. Hope I'm not being too much of >>>> an >>>>>>>> interloper. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Michael >>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ >>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>> ] >>>>>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM >>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Annalisa- >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation >>>>> not >>>>>>>> discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of >>>>>>>> affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set >>>> against >>>>>>>> Gibson's ideas. The change of views coincided with the advent of >>>> the >>>>>>> d-cog >>>>>>>> idea which also has deep roots in chat. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> No hidden history i know of, but interesting connections among the >>>>>>> notion >>>>>>>> of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion of >>>>>> these >>>>>>>> connections can be found, among other places, in >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Cole, M. & Engestr?m, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach >>>> to >>>>>>>> distributed* >>>>>>>> *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition: >>>>> Psychological >>>>>>> and >>>>>>>> educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar >>>> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Hi Mike, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied >>>>> that >>>>>>>> wish! >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important >>>> connections. >>>>> I >>>>>>> was >>>>>>>>> not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I >>>> learned >>>>>>> about >>>>>>>>> Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science >>>>> (1985). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Is there some history that is not part of the common story? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I looked here for clarity: >>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to >>>>>>> cognitive >>>>>>>>> artifacts? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in >>>>> play, >>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>> even joy! >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however >>>>> until >>>>>>> then >>>>>>>>> I will remain with the ineffable. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> on behalf of mike cole >>>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM >>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And, >>>>>>>>> co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive >>>>>>> artifacts >>>>>>>>> right about that time at UCSD. If it were possible to find a >>>>> source >>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>> makes these connections visible and available to read about it >>>>> might >>>>>>> be a >>>>>>>>> step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of >>>>>> intro >>>>>>>> for >>>>>>>>> newcomers to the discussion. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a >>>>>>> newcomer's >>>>>>>>> introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is >>>> seeking >>>>>> to >>>>>>>> sort >>>>>>>>> out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am >>>>>>>> insuficiently >>>>>>>>> read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted! >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many >>>>>> rocks, >>>>>>> so >>>>>>>>> little time"! >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Mike >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> A >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Martin! >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental >>>>>> representation" >>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>> coming closer! >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's >>>>>> theory >>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>> affordances. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed >>>>> article. >>>>>>> But >>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>> wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is >>>>>>>> important >>>>>>>>>> not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a >>>>>>> grenade >>>>>>>>>> pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the >>>>> list. >>>>>>> If >>>>>>>>> you >>>>>>>>>> can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look >>>>> forward >>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> your >>>>>>>>>> reply, Martin. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that >>>> being >>>>>> at >>>>>>>> UCSD >>>>>>>>>> and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that >>>>>> influences >>>>>>>> your >>>>>>>>>> position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find >>>>>>>> community >>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>> it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more >>>> voluntary >>>>>>>> phrased >>>>>>>>>> that way). >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of >>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>> John >>>>>>>>>> Packer > >>>>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM >>>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> An interesting article, David. One way in which it is >>>>> interesting, >>>>>> to >>>>>>>> me >>>>>>>>>> at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not >>>> used, >>>>>>> even >>>>>>>>>> once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" >>>> images >>>>> in >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> world around us - material representations - and he tries to >>>>> define >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg < >>>> dkellogg60@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Larry, Annalisa: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" >>>>> when >>>>>>> we >>>>>>>>>>> met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of >>>>>>>> anything >>>>>>>>>>> except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe >>>>>> available >>>>>>>>>>> for a standard price all over China) She does not even >>>> remember >>>>>>>>>>> whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was >>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as >>>> a >>>>>>>>>>> non-image based mental representation. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental >>>> representations >>>>>> are >>>>>>>>>>> images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth >>>> century. >>>>>> In >>>>>>>>>>> fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against >>>>>>>> Titchener >>>>>>>>>>> and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, >>>>>>>>>>> everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated >>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>> many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically >>>>>>> anterior >>>>>>>>>>> to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would >>>>> not >>>>>>> have >>>>>>>>>>> time or ability to process complex problems in real time. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that >>>> are >>>>>>>>>>> genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more >>>>>>> reading >>>>>>>>>>> to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read >>>> than >>>>> I >>>>>> am >>>>>>>>>>> (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels >>>>> like >>>>>>>>>>> she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do >>>>> NOT >>>>>>> read >>>>>>>>>>> this article--instead, look at Figure 11. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color >>>> structure >>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>> Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any >>>>>> actual >>>>>>>>>>> images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural >>>>>>>> experience >>>>>>>>>>> associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then >>>>>> deliberately >>>>>>>>>>> frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any >>>>>>>>>>> recognizable figures upon which to focus. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine >>>> Chapel >>>>>>> fresco >>>>>>>>>>> for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. >>>> He >>>>> or >>>>>>> she >>>>>>>>>>> can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the >>>> painting >>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>> wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not >>>>>> notice >>>>>>>>>>> the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful >>>> in >>>>>> it. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar < >>>>> annalisa@unm.edu >>>>>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Larry and David, >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are >>>>> at >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> root of all thinking. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, >>>>> based >>>>>>> upon >>>>>>>>>> previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, >>>> in >>>>>>>>>> combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a >>>>>> phrase >>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>> like >>>>>>>>>> a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on >>>> it >>>>>> by >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know >>>> it. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think >>>> as >>>>>>>> Hackett >>>>>>>>>> describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have >>>>> you >>>>>>>>> already >>>>>>>>>> given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be >>>>>> willing >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>> take a look. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is >>>>>>>> controversial. >>>>>>>>>> It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone >>>>>> says >>>>>>>>> "this >>>>>>>>>> is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble >>>>>>>> observation. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and >>>> whatever >>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>> process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at >>>>>> hand? >>>>>>>>> Just a >>>>>>>>>> thought. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> What is it that appeals to you about this model, >>>>> metaphoricity? >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of >>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>> Purss < >>>>>>>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com > >>>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM >>>>>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity >>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> David K >>>>>>>>>>>> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. >>>>> My >>>>>>>> reason >>>>>>>>>> for >>>>>>>>>>>> exploring these authors is I have been following a path >>>>>> pursuing a >>>>>>>>> basic >>>>>>>>>>>> question. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic >>>>>>> guiding >>>>>>>>>> images >>>>>>>>>>>> upon which thinking rests" >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring >>>>>> appearances >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>> illusions was also exploring this theme. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new >>>>>> phenomenological >>>>>>>>> path >>>>>>>>>>>> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names >>>>>> this >>>>>>>>>> process >>>>>>>>>>>> *metaphoricity*. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible >>>>>>> image-character >>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> *spontaneous event* of meaning. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which >>>> he >>>>>>>>> brackets - >>>>>>>>>>>> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> AND >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* >>>>> finds >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> meaning of its very self. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this >>>>>>>>>>>> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion >>>> of >>>>>>>>> metaphor >>>>>>>>>> can >>>>>>>>>>>> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is >>>> implicated >>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>> *objectivity* >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of >>>>>> itself >>>>>>>>> *in* >>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> mode [path] of the concept >>>>>>>>>>>> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding >>>>>> images >>>>>>>> has >>>>>>>>>> been >>>>>>>>>>>> established. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the >>>>> path >>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is >>>> derived >>>>>>> from >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> image-character of the guiding image. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial >>>>> this >>>>>>>> topic >>>>>>>>>> may >>>>>>>>>>>> become [again] >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by >>>> this >>>>>>> basic >>>>>>>>>>>> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these >>>>>> images >>>>>>> as >>>>>>>>>>>> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images >>>>> emerge >>>>>>>>>>>> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is >>>>>> transcendental] >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>>>> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. >>>>> It >>>>>>>> seems >>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I also realize this question may already be answered in >>>>>> Vygotsky's >>>>>>>>>> writings >>>>>>>>>>>> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of >>>>>> XMCA. I >>>>>>>>>>>> personally am following this path for now. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >>>> with >>>>>> an >>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>>>> an >>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>>> an >>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> >> > > > From helenaworthen@gmail.com Fri Dec 5 12:55:57 2014 From: helenaworthen@gmail.com (Helena Worthen) Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2014 12:55:57 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances In-Reply-To: References: <1682996975.4827904.1417607429293.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11144.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> <3A40602C-44A1-45C7-A7D1-36E1A842E92B@gmail.com> <8FDB5B35-D645-496F-93CB-077884244184@gmail.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F907548F@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: Key terms with the original texts would be good to have. That's what I liked about Illeris' book. I now see the link didn't work: [PDF] Contemporary Theories of Learning: Learning theorists ? in ... - PGCE www.pgce.soton.ac.uk/.../Learning/Theories/ But the meaning of the term still has to be negotiated in use, especially when talking with people who are not on xmca. Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com On Dec 5, 2014, at 12:17 PM, mike cole wrote: > Helena--- A while back Andy and Huw started a wiki with key terms that is > still accessible. > IF xmca participants used that structure as part of the broader discussion > it might fulfill the functions you imagine for it. And putting in Gibson's > own statements, as well as Norman's appropriation of the idea, and where > possible, original texts for those who wanted to go deeper would all seem > to have promise... subject to the limitations that Michael points to. > > Michael G. Ed Hutchins and people at LCHC read Bateson and interacted with > the info processing folks who were in to parallel processing systems and > schema theory at the time. Not sure if Don and colleagues did or did not > attend to his ideas. > > Perhaps Andy and Huw can fill people in on where the wiki project stands > and people can figure out if its something we should get linked into the > xmca discussion. > > Ways to stabilize discussions of threads a little more (while warding off > modularization) seems another useful way to go. > > Michael Z . It seems to me that all sorts of non-linearities in historical > processes, especially (for me at least) processes of human life > development, seem important to bring to the discussion. Looking at the > chapter quickly that you sent I am not sure what the claim is. > > Were the people, or some of the people, who walked eastward over the Bering > Straights agricuturalists who subsequently acquired practices of hunting > and gathering? > > Also, re master European narratives of human origins and early history, > there are people > like Gellner who argue that agriculture was a step backward in terms of > human welfare. > > The conflation of "development" with "progress" is all over our attempts to > discuss these issues. > > mike > > > > > > > On Fri, Dec 5, 2014 at 11:46 AM, Glassman, Michael > wrote: > >> Hi Helena, >> >> I'm not so sure if its the words or the way the thinking behind those >> words match up or don't match up with the systems of the individuals were >> are teaching live and think within. A little while ago I was reading >> Bateson and his idea that Western philosophy/thinking often precluded the >> idea of a supreme cybernetic system - the idea that we could and would be >> self-corrected through exploration of the universe rather than any >> conscious human design. We are a society obsessed with local control and >> the idea that we can manipulate the universe around us (which we can in >> small doses, but Bateson claim is destructive in the long run). >> >> Many of the words you mention such as affordances, mediators, activity >> often fall into the exploration perspective I think - and they become >> difficult to relate. >> >> A little while ago I wrote a sentence based on the idea that education >> should be based on open exploration because something akin to a supreme >> cybernetics will offer self-correcting feedback, and a big trouble is many >> educators don't trust that. And then I stared at the sentence for a while >> and realized the majority of people reading it (if anybody does ever read >> it) would just pass it right over. >> >> So what do we do? Hard to know. >> >> A side question for Mike - in those early meetings on distributed >> cognition that Don Norman was a part of did cybernetics and/or Bateson >> every some up? >> >> Michael >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >> on behalf of Helena Worthen [helenaworthen@gmail.com] >> Sent: Friday, December 05, 2014 2:12 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances >> >> A voice from the margins, here: >> >> I learn a lot from this list, all the time, and would hate to have it go >> quiet or self-destruct. But my role in the world outside this list, out >> there in the synchronous landscape, involves trying to make ideas >> intelligible to working people who may not have more than a couple of years >> of community college. For this purpose, there is a whole roster of terms >> that are a problem. When I say these terms to regular people, they make a >> face as if they'd tasted something bad. >> >> Examples of terms like this are: >> >> affordance >> mediate >> activity >> CHAT (cultural-historical activity theory) >> >> and: >> >> development >> >> For my purposes, Annalisa's Dec 2 post on Gibson's invention of the term >> "affordance" is very useful. He explained clearly why he made it up. I can >> use that. >> >> Knud Illeris' book "Contemporary Theories of Learning: Learning >> theorists...in their own words" is a breath of fresh air for the same >> reason. You got to hear a whole collection of different people saying very >> different things about learning, all grouped together as learning theorists. >> >> theoristshttp:// >> www.pgce.soton.ac.uk/IT/Learning/Theories/ContemporaryTheoriesofLearning%20Learning%20theorists%20in%20their%20own%20words%20-%20Knud%20Illeris.pdf >> >> >> Helena Worthen >> helenaworthen@gmail.com >> >> On Dec 3, 2014, at 11:26 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >> >>> Haydi, >>> Thank you so much! Here?s how it is for me: >>> I too have been waiting for Andy to come back. He is the reason I am in >> the chat. I have known about Vygotsky through Vera since the early 80s. But >> I, after my dissertation on L2 fluency in 1986, I worked as a teacher >> educator where research and publication wasn?t necessary for tenure and >> promotion. The college where I was working closed (bankruptcy) five years >> back and, like any working stiff, I am having to reinvent myself. So, in >> thrashing about I came to read Andy?s articles on "collaborative project" >> as a unit of analysis a few years back, started emailing with him >> one-on-one (and he was so generous with his time and patience in answering >> my questions about activity theory and Vygotsky), until he said it was time >> for me to join the chat. Andy mentored me until I had the courage to pipe >> up. Andy just edited a book on collaborative projects; Vera has written one >> of the papers for the book. I love them both. That?s how it is for me. >>> >>> Let me say that I consider myself a rank learner, always beginning. Mike >> has wisely rejected the role of Caesar on the chat. But we go to him asking >> him to sort out things amongst the unruly class. As a teacher, the hardest >> thing for me ever to do was to deal with disrespect between students. I >> have finally come to realize and accept that I want to be in a school where >> the students are nice to each other. Where respect and trust abound. Where >> human flourishing is possible. There is no father god to rescue us. We have >> to do it for ourselves. Well, like the song goes, ?I?m still willin?? Let?s >> make this a creative project, which means no unethical use of power. We >> can?t afford it. In my humble opinion. >>> >>> In gratitude and hope, >>> Henry >>> >>>> On Dec 3, 2014, at 11:00 AM, mike cole wrote: >>>> >>>> Haydi-- >>>> >>>> Like anyone on xmca, you can demand whatever you like. Getting people to >>>> implement your demands may be more >>>> difficult. In general, I have not experienced demands and resentment as >>>> particularly helpful on xmca, but thing are changing, >>>> so who knows. >>>> >>>> I am not putting ANL aside because of the concerns expressed in MCA in >> the >>>> past year or so. The concerns are real, at least to me. >>>> But there are many productive programs of research that use his ideas, >>>> along with those of LSV and many others, both Russian and non-Russian. >>>> >>>> I believe it would be helpful in receiving answers to your various >> comments >>>> and suggestions if some of them were constrained to particular threads. >> For >>>> example, the discussion of plank versus a piece of electronic equipment >> vis >>>> a vis the notion of artifact and mediation through artifacts, etc., >> might >>>> be be placed in that thread. >>>> >>>> etc. >>>> >>>> I clearly can be wrong in all of these judgments! >>>> mike >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wed, Dec 3, 2014 at 3:50 AM, Haydi Zulfei < >> haydizulfei@rocketmail.com> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Hi >>>>> >>>>> First of all , so resentfully I wonder If I can demand Andy's return to >>>>> the discussions !! No one can deny his great contributions to this >> Forum . >>>>> >>>>> Second , I might have been lost completely in your words , terms , >>>>> premises , and compositional nuances and colourings of your script as >>>>> native speakers , etc. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Third , because of obvious sensitivities towards ANL , I've altogether >> put >>>>> him to one side ; otherwise , in this concrete example of Michael , the >>>>> triad , activity , action , operation are boldly in view . >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Fourth , I suppose LSV himself in two or three chapters of the >> "History of >>>>> Higher Mental Functions" has provided full response to our inquiries . >> Andy >>>>> , in time , sent the first two chapters to all . >>>>> >>>>> 1. He , after preliminary remarks , puts heavy emphasis on use of tools >>>>> and work activity in the parentheses and in italic characters . He >>>>> emphasizes that use of tool very naturally gets significant just >> within the >>>>> work activity process . Without the work activity we cannot expect >> much of >>>>> it . Then , as most of the time , he time and again references Marx and >>>>> Engels so as to prove his claims . >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> 2. Mike is so and for good reasons enchanted in "rudiments" of culture >>>>> phenomena (throwing dice and bones , knots , notches in the wood to >>>>> remember speech) . Good for him and us all . Yes , Buridan's ass gets >>>>> spoilt in its indecision But man through inventing stimulus-device >> gets to >>>>> salvation . But the problem is how many times has Mike , our Boss and >>>>> confirmed global figure no need for it to be documented , asked himself >>>>> what went before that juncture of time for the man to become 'MAN' ?? >> At >>>>> this moment we are with LSV and at a very critical point of time . No >> more >>>>> return to 'culture' to prove 'culture' . LSV says the error for some >> is to >>>>> recount the story of mental through mental while they should know that >>>>> mental processes go parallel with 'social' processes . What I gather at >>>>> this very point is that he expects us to infer that the 'our present >> man of >>>>> some will' owes his man/ness and decisiveness to his previous work >> activity >>>>> necessitating use of tools . It seems we cannot take the idea to the >>>>> uterine because V focuses on use of tools for a baby of 6 or of 10-12 >>>>> months of age . It seems , both phylogenetically and ontogenetically , >> that >>>>> it's not the case that 'gestures' ' eye contacts' come of their own and >>>>> because of the man/ness and for the tuning-up with the universe through >>>>> sounds and hymns and angels , etc. Man worked for life , performed ups >> and >>>>> downs , shook his extremeties (one pair of hand) , consumed ! >> collective >>>>> yellings and gesturing (as concomitant of work) . V says we can >> distinguish >>>>> independent history of natural processes and independent history of >>>>> cultural development separately 'phylogenetically' but not >> ontogenetically >>>>> . In ontology , nature and culture work simultaneously contrary to >>>>> phylogenesis . One cannot with ease and comfort say whichone goes with >>>>> whichone . >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> 3. Andy who is well aware of both CH and AT , on his sending of the >> four >>>>> pages and then the said two chapters , disclosed a very important point >>>>> neglected so far at the forum and that was the idea of the distinction >>>>> between tool and sign so fruitfully and enormously discussed by V and >> the >>>>> deep meaning that the simple diagram denoted . V says 'artifact' could >> be >>>>> cheating and deceitful but no one cares ! They invariably use >> artifacts and >>>>> through this , they ultimately remove 'material activity' from the >> domain >>>>> altogether . V is everywhere clear with both 'cultural , ideal >> activity' >>>>> and 'material activity' . Here is where quotes don't work . The one >> more >>>>> return to the plus-thousand previous reflections . No loss really ! V >> , if >>>>> necessary , prefers just 'mediation' . >>>>> >>>>> 4. With these in mind , I say for certain that here the plank is a tool >>>>> not an 'artifact' because it is not a sign signaling any other genuine >>>>> thing . It's all to itself . Also the light switch . And the whole >> activity >>>>> is a material one . Life put it in the way . According to V sign >> activity >>>>> affects one's own societal individual behaviour . We cannot generalize >> its >>>>> effect to the border of transforming Nature . Man through speech , >> dialogue >>>>> , discourse , talk , genre , etc. decides for the change in personal >>>>> behaviour ; if this potential preparedness for individual behavioral >> change >>>>> gets fossilized or ossified , then man will not reach the threshhold >> of the >>>>> bigger act and the vast field of the Mother Universe with its motley >> rich >>>>> material phenomena out of which each time he can select an object for a >>>>> circle of activity : starting an activity with a probable cryptic >> 'motive' >>>>> (what we don't yet know about which took him to the point of crossing) >> , >>>>> with a conscious goal (reaching the other side) through a concrete >> action >>>>> (crossing) operating according to the conditions at hand and on the >> ground >>>>> (light switching , wrestling between the ideal and the material >> (object , >>>>> subject , that is , thinking ideally about what to do with the whole >> thing >>>>> and the plank , then observing with the help of the light acting on the >>>>> object , again back to thinking if flaws are observed , etc. etc. no >>>>> blending of objective and subjective whatsoever . And I wonder why >> taking >>>>> affordance for a tool . >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Soooooooooo much for one post . >>>>> >>>>> I considered spaces but wonder if it works . >>>>> I'll also be very quiet and slow in replying ! >>>>> >>>>> Best >>>>> >>>>> Haydi >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> From: mike cole >>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>>>> Sent: Tuesday, 2 December 2014, 11:26:46 >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances >>>>> >>>>> My view? >>>>> The plank is for certain an artifact, no less than the light bulb. On >> what >>>>> grounds, or under what circumstances, would you classify it otherwise? >>>>> What's gained, what's lost? >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Glassman, Michael < >> glassman.13@osu.edu> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Hi Annalisa, Mike, Huw >>>>>> >>>>>> I tend to be somebody who reacts better to concrete examples than >>>>>> definitions. I believe this also comes from Gibson's 1977 book, >>>>>> >>>>>> You are walking across a field and come to a stream which you can to >> get >>>>>> across. You notice a plank across the stream. It is wide enough for >> you >>>>>> to keep your balance and thick enough to hold your weight, in using it >>>>> you >>>>>> recognize its affordance as a crossing point. It is the intersection >> of >>>>>> the movement, the perception of the plank, short term goal of the >>>>> activity >>>>>> (getting across the stream) - the recognition of the affordance comes >> in >>>>>> the subjective use of the object (which is why it is neither >> subjective >>>>> or >>>>>> objective). It is also important that you have the abilities (the >>>>> correct >>>>>> weight, the balance) to recognize the affordance, otherwise you pass >> the >>>>>> plank by. >>>>>> >>>>>> As far as perceived affordance. I think I have this right - the >>>>> perceived >>>>>> is not in the person who recognizes the affordance (otherwise you are >>>>>> right, that is wet water) it is whether there is an intention in the >>>>> design >>>>>> of the object. So I create a light switch with the intention of >>>>> designing >>>>>> it as having a perceived affordance for somebody who wants to switch >> on a >>>>>> light. As you can see different from the relationship to the plank, >>>>> where >>>>>> there is no prior design. >>>>>> >>>>>> Here is my question (perhaps answered in the Engestrom paper) >>>>>> >>>>>> The light switch is certainly an artifact, but is the plank? >>>>>> >>>>>> Michael >>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 1:19 PM >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances >>>>>> >>>>>> Those definitions help a lot Annalisa and touch on the fact that >> gibson >>>>>> seemed to empty the organism (if one were so inclined to interpret >> him) >>>>> and >>>>>> he dismissed culutral mediation as secondary at best. Still, they >> share >>>>> the >>>>>> idea that a part of the structure that psychologist theorize as a >> located >>>>>> inside of individual crania is in fact "our there" in the >> phylgenetically >>>>>> and cultural-historically constitued environment. And that drove >>>>> cognitive >>>>>> psychologists, our co discussants, nuts. Until, "they got it" and then >>>>>> sought to mold it to their own ends and pre-existing means. >>>>>> mike >>>>>> >>>>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 9:59 AM, Annalisa Aguilar >>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> I thought I'd do the honors and start a new thread on affordances, >>>>> which >>>>>>> isn't related to Larry's discussion of basic images. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I figured as well to offer Gibson's words on affordances since it is >> a >>>>>>> word he invented to describe something he saw in the world. Of course >>>>> the >>>>>>> life of affordances has been full of controversy, especially with >>>>> regard >>>>>> to >>>>>>> understanding what they are. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Gibson's Affordances is a theory I find instrumental to connecting >>>>>> outside >>>>>>> to inside experiences and I intuit that it is related to perezhivanie >>>>> in >>>>>>> some fashion. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> After reading the wikipage more closely, I regret offering a link to >>>>> the >>>>>>> text there because it isn't very clear what Gibson means or what >> Norman >>>>>>> means. To me, a "perceived affordance" is like saying "wet water." >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In any case, here are 3 quotes of Gibson in his own words, that I >> could >>>>>>> find: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The affordances of the environment are what it _offers_ the animal, >>>>> what >>>>>>> it _provides_ or _furnishes_, either for good or ill. The verb "to >>>>>> afford" >>>>>>> is found in the dictionary, the noun "affordance" is not. I have made >>>>> it >>>>>>> up. I mean by it something that refers both to the environment and >> the >>>>>>> animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies the >>>>>> complementarity >>>>>>> of the animal and the environment (Gibson, 1977/1986). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> and >>>>>>> >>>>>>> What is meant by an _affordance_? ?Subject to revision, I suggest >> that >>>>>> the >>>>>>> affordance of anything is a specific combination of the properties of >>>>> its >>>>>>> substance and its surfaces taken with reference to an animal. The >>>>>> reference >>>>>>> may be to an animal as distinguished from other species (Gibson, >>>>>> 1977/1986). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> and >>>>>>> >>>>>>> An important fact about affordances of the environment is that they >> are >>>>>> in >>>>>>> a sense objective, real, and physical, unlike values and meanings, >>>>> which >>>>>>> are often supposed to be subjective, phenomenal, and mental. But >>>>>> actually, >>>>>>> an affordance is neither an objective property nor a subjective >>>>> property; >>>>>>> or it is both if you like. An affordance cuts across the dichotomy of >>>>>>> subjective-objective and helps us to understand its inadequacy. It is >>>>>>> equally a fact of the environment and a fact of behavior. It is both >>>>>>> physical and psychical, yet neither. An affordance points both ways, >> to >>>>>> the >>>>>>> environment and to the observer (Gibson, 1977/1986). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> These quotes are important to keep in mind, I hope they help. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I might also suggest looking at Mace(1977) who described very >> carefully >>>>>>> how Gibson got from stimuli to affordance, given that people on this >>>>> list >>>>>>> value history, learning, and development. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>> >>>>>>> on behalf of Huw Lloyd >>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 2, 2014 10:35 AM >>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I'd take a look. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Michael, utility or technical affordance might fit. My equivalent of >>>>>> your >>>>>>> perceived/discovered distinction is one of planned and technically >>>>>>> manifest. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 2 December 2014 at 16:44, Glassman, Michael >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I'd be interested in anybody else is. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Michael >>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ >>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>> ] >>>>>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 11:39 AM >>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Interloper, Michael? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The discussions at UCSD preceeding Don's use of affordances and >>>>>> cognitive >>>>>>>> artifacts were accompanied by other, related papers. One by >> Engestrom >>>>>> on >>>>>>>> "when is an artifact" and one or more by Ed Hutchins. If people are >>>>>>>> interested in pursuing this thread/topic the materials could be >>>>>> gathered >>>>>>>> up. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Glassman, Michael < >>>>> glassman.13@osu.edu >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea). >>>>> He >>>>>>>>> actually cops to both of them. The first was not to distinguish >>>>>>> between >>>>>>>>> affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which >>>>> are >>>>>>>>> designed. I think this is related to the issue of artifacts. >>>>>> Meaning >>>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>> artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to >>>>> be >>>>>>>>> discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong >>>>> word, >>>>>> if >>>>>>>>> anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances. It is a >>>>>>>> complex >>>>>>>>> question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes >>>>> based >>>>>> on >>>>>>>>> context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one >>>>>> context >>>>>>>> may >>>>>>>>> result in organic affordances in another context. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is that >>>>>> he >>>>>>>> was >>>>>>>>> not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and >>>>>>>> constraints. >>>>>>>>> Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived affordances >>>>> or >>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>> they designed to create constraints. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the >>>>>>> mention >>>>>>>>> just spurred me to throw this up. Hope I'm not being too much of >>>>> an >>>>>>>>> interloper. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Michael >>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ >>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>> ] >>>>>>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>>>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM >>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Annalisa- >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation >>>>>> not >>>>>>>>> discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of >>>>>>>>> affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set >>>>> against >>>>>>>>> Gibson's ideas. The change of views coincided with the advent of >>>>> the >>>>>>>> d-cog >>>>>>>>> idea which also has deep roots in chat. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> No hidden history i know of, but interesting connections among the >>>>>>>> notion >>>>>>>>> of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion of >>>>>>> these >>>>>>>>> connections can be found, among other places, in >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Cole, M. & Engestr?m, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach >>>>> to >>>>>>>>> distributed* >>>>>>>>> *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition: >>>>>> Psychological >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>> educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar >>>>> >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Hi Mike, >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied >>>>>> that >>>>>>>>> wish! >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important >>>>> connections. >>>>>> I >>>>>>>> was >>>>>>>>>> not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I >>>>> learned >>>>>>>> about >>>>>>>>>> Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science >>>>>> (1985). >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Is there some history that is not part of the common story? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I looked here for clarity: >>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to >>>>>>>> cognitive >>>>>>>>>> artifacts? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in >>>>>> play, >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>> even joy! >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however >>>>>> until >>>>>>>> then >>>>>>>>>> I will remain with the ineffable. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> on behalf of mike cole >>>>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM >>>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And, >>>>>>>>>> co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive >>>>>>>> artifacts >>>>>>>>>> right about that time at UCSD. If it were possible to find a >>>>>> source >>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>> makes these connections visible and available to read about it >>>>>> might >>>>>>>> be a >>>>>>>>>> step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of >>>>>>> intro >>>>>>>>> for >>>>>>>>>> newcomers to the discussion. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a >>>>>>>> newcomer's >>>>>>>>>> introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is >>>>> seeking >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> sort >>>>>>>>>> out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am >>>>>>>>> insuficiently >>>>>>>>>> read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted! >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many >>>>>>> rocks, >>>>>>>> so >>>>>>>>>> little time"! >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Mike >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> A >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Martin! >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental >>>>>>> representation" >>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>>> coming closer! >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's >>>>>>> theory >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>> affordances. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed >>>>>> article. >>>>>>>> But >>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>>> wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is >>>>>>>>> important >>>>>>>>>>> not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a >>>>>>>> grenade >>>>>>>>>>> pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the >>>>>> list. >>>>>>>> If >>>>>>>>>> you >>>>>>>>>>> can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look >>>>>> forward >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>> your >>>>>>>>>>> reply, Martin. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that >>>>> being >>>>>>> at >>>>>>>>> UCSD >>>>>>>>>>> and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that >>>>>>> influences >>>>>>>>> your >>>>>>>>>>> position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find >>>>>>>>> community >>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>> it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more >>>>> voluntary >>>>>>>>> phrased >>>>>>>>>>> that way). >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of >>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>> John >>>>>>>>>>> Packer > >>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM >>>>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> An interesting article, David. One way in which it is >>>>>> interesting, >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> me >>>>>>>>>>> at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not >>>>> used, >>>>>>>> even >>>>>>>>>>> once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" >>>>> images >>>>>> in >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> world around us - material representations - and he tries to >>>>>> define >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg < >>>>> dkellogg60@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Larry, Annalisa: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" >>>>>> when >>>>>>>> we >>>>>>>>>>>> met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of >>>>>>>>> anything >>>>>>>>>>>> except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe >>>>>>> available >>>>>>>>>>>> for a standard price all over China) She does not even >>>>> remember >>>>>>>>>>>> whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was >>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as >>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>> non-image based mental representation. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental >>>>> representations >>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>>>>> images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth >>>>> century. >>>>>>> In >>>>>>>>>>>> fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against >>>>>>>>> Titchener >>>>>>>>>>>> and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, >>>>>>>>>>>> everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated >>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>> many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically >>>>>>>> anterior >>>>>>>>>>>> to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would >>>>>> not >>>>>>>> have >>>>>>>>>>>> time or ability to process complex problems in real time. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that >>>>> are >>>>>>>>>>>> genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more >>>>>>>> reading >>>>>>>>>>>> to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read >>>>> than >>>>>> I >>>>>>> am >>>>>>>>>>>> (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels >>>>>> like >>>>>>>>>>>> she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do >>>>>> NOT >>>>>>>> read >>>>>>>>>>>> this article--instead, look at Figure 11. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color >>>>> structure >>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>> Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any >>>>>>> actual >>>>>>>>>>>> images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural >>>>>>>>> experience >>>>>>>>>>>> associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then >>>>>>> deliberately >>>>>>>>>>>> frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any >>>>>>>>>>>> recognizable figures upon which to focus. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine >>>>> Chapel >>>>>>>> fresco >>>>>>>>>>>> for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. >>>>> He >>>>>> or >>>>>>>> she >>>>>>>>>>>> can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the >>>>> painting >>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>> wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not >>>>>>> notice >>>>>>>>>>>> the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful >>>>> in >>>>>>> it. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar < >>>>>> annalisa@unm.edu >>>>>>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Larry and David, >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are >>>>>> at >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> root of all thinking. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, >>>>>> based >>>>>>>> upon >>>>>>>>>>> previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, >>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>> combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a >>>>>>> phrase >>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>> like >>>>>>>>>>> a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on >>>>> it >>>>>>> by >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know >>>>> it. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think >>>>> as >>>>>>>>> Hackett >>>>>>>>>>> describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have >>>>>> you >>>>>>>>>> already >>>>>>>>>>> given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be >>>>>>> willing >>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>> take a look. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is >>>>>>>>> controversial. >>>>>>>>>>> It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone >>>>>>> says >>>>>>>>>> "this >>>>>>>>>>> is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble >>>>>>>>> observation. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and >>>>> whatever >>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>> process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at >>>>>>> hand? >>>>>>>>>> Just a >>>>>>>>>>> thought. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> What is it that appeals to you about this model, >>>>>> metaphoricity? >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of >>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>> Purss < >>>>>>>>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM >>>>>>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity >>>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> David K >>>>>>>>>>>>> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. >>>>>> My >>>>>>>>> reason >>>>>>>>>>> for >>>>>>>>>>>>> exploring these authors is I have been following a path >>>>>>> pursuing a >>>>>>>>>> basic >>>>>>>>>>>>> question. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic >>>>>>>> guiding >>>>>>>>>>> images >>>>>>>>>>>>> upon which thinking rests" >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring >>>>>>> appearances >>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>> illusions was also exploring this theme. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new >>>>>>> phenomenological >>>>>>>>>> path >>>>>>>>>>>>> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names >>>>>>> this >>>>>>>>>>> process >>>>>>>>>>>>> *metaphoricity*. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible >>>>>>>> image-character >>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>> *spontaneous event* of meaning. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which >>>>> he >>>>>>>>>> brackets - >>>>>>>>>>>>> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> AND >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* >>>>>> finds >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning of its very self. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this >>>>>>>>>>>>> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion >>>>> of >>>>>>>>>> metaphor >>>>>>>>>>> can >>>>>>>>>>>>> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is >>>>> implicated >>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>> *objectivity* >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of >>>>>>> itself >>>>>>>>>> *in* >>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>> mode [path] of the concept >>>>>>>>>>>>> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding >>>>>>> images >>>>>>>>> has >>>>>>>>>>> been >>>>>>>>>>>>> established. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the >>>>>> path >>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is >>>>> derived >>>>>>>> from >>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>> image-character of the guiding image. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial >>>>>> this >>>>>>>>> topic >>>>>>>>>>> may >>>>>>>>>>>>> become [again] >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by >>>>> this >>>>>>>> basic >>>>>>>>>>>>> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these >>>>>>> images >>>>>>>> as >>>>>>>>>>>>> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images >>>>>> emerge >>>>>>>>>>>>> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is >>>>>>> transcendental] >>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>>>>> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. >>>>>> It >>>>>>>>> seems >>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I also realize this question may already be answered in >>>>>>> Vygotsky's >>>>>>>>>>> writings >>>>>>>>>>>>> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of >>>>>>> XMCA. I >>>>>>>>>>>>> personally am following this path for now. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >>>>> with >>>>>>> an >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>>>>> an >>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>>>> an >>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>> >>> >> >> >> >> > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From glassman.13@osu.edu Fri Dec 5 13:03:50 2014 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2014 21:03:50 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances In-Reply-To: <4E148FDE-8090-43ED-9F4F-FAD731D8853C@gmail.com> References: <1682996975.4827904.1417607429293.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11144.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> <3A40602C-44A1-45C7-A7D1-36E1A842E92B@gmail.com>, <8FDB5B35-D645-496F-93CB-077884244184@gmail.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F907548F@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu>, <4E148FDE-8090-43ED-9F4F-FAD731D8853C@gmail.com> Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F90754DA@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Hi Helena, Perhaps I am just too deep into this to make sense. The issue is there are two types of cybernetics (did I say anything about mathematical, engineering - people who subscribe to cybernetics do engage in these vocations I think it is more philosophical). One type is first order cybernetics which involves controlled closed systems. People can have autocratic control of the systems developing the feedback loops they are looking for. The second type is second order cybernetics in which feed back loops are not human controlled but still exist as natural self-correcting mechanisms. What I recently read of Bateson (and I may have this wrong) is that Western philosophy has trouble with this. We are addicted to human control and certainty. This is not a new idea. Dewey wrote a whole book about it - the quest for certainty. The issue is it is very difficult for people to trust this idea that I guess the universe itself is self-correcting in a more productive way than human systems are. So the question becomes, do we want people to make sense of words, or do we want them to question what they do make sense of - in this case that we can control the universe around us and that there is a way to be certain about things because as humans we can manipulate them. I don't know, just one of the many things I struggle with. Michael ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Helena Worthen [helenaworthen@gmail.com] Sent: Friday, December 05, 2014 3:52 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances Michael: Here is how I read your message: There are two (at least) ways of thinking about the world (meaning life, the universe, etc). One is the "exploration" perspective and the other is some overarching cybernetic (mathematical, engineering? designed?) perspective. The difference between the two that you want to draw attention to is that Bateson, who you name as someone associated with the second perspective, anticipated that any such system would self-correct eventually. Then you say that many educators do not trust a cybernetic system to self-correct. Is that right? I'm sure sure how what you call the "exploration" perspective differs from the cybernetic perspective. I think it's pretty obvious that whatever system us Westerners have trusted is about to self-correct in a pretty violent way, leaving few of us behind, including our grandchildren. Capitalism (I'm think of Picketty, here) doesn't self-correct, but the climate does and it is gearing up to pull a whopper on us. All of this is to say that while we toss ideas around there are real-world facts out there moving right along. I want to see people making use of these ideas. I want to know, "How is this word actually used in real life?" Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com On Dec 5, 2014, at 11:46 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > Hi Helena, > > I'm not so sure if its the words or the way the thinking behind those words match up or don't match up with the systems of the individuals were are teaching live and think within. A little while ago I was reading Bateson and his idea that Western philosophy/thinking often precluded the idea of a supreme cybernetic system - the idea that we could and would be self-corrected through exploration of the universe rather than any conscious human design. We are a society obsessed with local control and the idea that we can manipulate the universe around us (which we can in small doses, but Bateson claim is destructive in the long run). > > Many of the words you mention such as affordances, mediators, activity often fall into the exploration perspective I think - and they become difficult to relate. > > A little while ago I wrote a sentence based on the idea that education should be based on open exploration because something akin to a supreme cybernetics will offer self-correcting feedback, and a big trouble is many educators don't trust that. And then I stared at the sentence for a while and realized the majority of people reading it (if anybody does ever read it) would just pass it right over. > > So what do we do? Hard to know. > > A side question for Mike - in those early meetings on distributed cognition that Don Norman was a part of did cybernetics and/or Bateson every some up? > > Michael > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Helena Worthen [helenaworthen@gmail.com] > Sent: Friday, December 05, 2014 2:12 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances > > A voice from the margins, here: > > I learn a lot from this list, all the time, and would hate to have it go quiet or self-destruct. But my role in the world outside this list, out there in the synchronous landscape, involves trying to make ideas intelligible to working people who may not have more than a couple of years of community college. For this purpose, there is a whole roster of terms that are a problem. When I say these terms to regular people, they make a face as if they'd tasted something bad. > > Examples of terms like this are: > > affordance > mediate > activity > CHAT (cultural-historical activity theory) > > and: > > development > > For my purposes, Annalisa's Dec 2 post on Gibson's invention of the term "affordance" is very useful. He explained clearly why he made it up. I can use that. > > Knud Illeris' book "Contemporary Theories of Learning: Learning theorists...in their own words" is a breath of fresh air for the same reason. You got to hear a whole collection of different people saying very different things about learning, all grouped together as learning theorists. > > theoristshttp://www.pgce.soton.ac.uk/IT/Learning/Theories/ContemporaryTheoriesofLearning%20Learning%20theorists%20in%20their%20own%20words%20-%20Knud%20Illeris.pdf > > > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > On Dec 3, 2014, at 11:26 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >> Haydi, >> Thank you so much! Here?s how it is for me: >> I too have been waiting for Andy to come back. He is the reason I am in the chat. I have known about Vygotsky through Vera since the early 80s. But I, after my dissertation on L2 fluency in 1986, I worked as a teacher educator where research and publication wasn?t necessary for tenure and promotion. The college where I was working closed (bankruptcy) five years back and, like any working stiff, I am having to reinvent myself. So, in thrashing about I came to read Andy?s articles on "collaborative project" as a unit of analysis a few years back, started emailing with him one-on-one (and he was so generous with his time and patience in answering my questions about activity theory and Vygotsky), until he said it was time for me to join the chat. Andy mentored me until I had the courage to pipe up. Andy just edited a book on collaborative projects; Vera has written one of the papers for the book. I love them both. That?s how it is for me. >> >> Let me say that I consider myself a rank learner, always beginning. Mike has wisely rejected the role of Caesar on the chat. But we go to him asking him to sort out things amongst the unruly class. As a teacher, the hardest thing for me ever to do was to deal with disrespect between students. I have finally come to realize and accept that I want to be in a school where the students are nice to each other. Where respect and trust abound. Where human flourishing is possible. There is no father god to rescue us. We have to do it for ourselves. Well, like the song goes, ?I?m still willin?? Let?s make this a creative project, which means no unethical use of power. We can?t afford it. In my humble opinion. >> >> In gratitude and hope, >> Henry >> >>> On Dec 3, 2014, at 11:00 AM, mike cole wrote: >>> >>> Haydi-- >>> >>> Like anyone on xmca, you can demand whatever you like. Getting people to >>> implement your demands may be more >>> difficult. In general, I have not experienced demands and resentment as >>> particularly helpful on xmca, but thing are changing, >>> so who knows. >>> >>> I am not putting ANL aside because of the concerns expressed in MCA in the >>> past year or so. The concerns are real, at least to me. >>> But there are many productive programs of research that use his ideas, >>> along with those of LSV and many others, both Russian and non-Russian. >>> >>> I believe it would be helpful in receiving answers to your various comments >>> and suggestions if some of them were constrained to particular threads. For >>> example, the discussion of plank versus a piece of electronic equipment vis >>> a vis the notion of artifact and mediation through artifacts, etc., might >>> be be placed in that thread. >>> >>> etc. >>> >>> I clearly can be wrong in all of these judgments! >>> mike >>> >>> >>> >>> On Wed, Dec 3, 2014 at 3:50 AM, Haydi Zulfei >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Hi >>>> >>>> First of all , so resentfully I wonder If I can demand Andy's return to >>>> the discussions !! No one can deny his great contributions to this Forum . >>>> >>>> Second , I might have been lost completely in your words , terms , >>>> premises , and compositional nuances and colourings of your script as >>>> native speakers , etc. >>>> >>>> >>>> Third , because of obvious sensitivities towards ANL , I've altogether put >>>> him to one side ; otherwise , in this concrete example of Michael , the >>>> triad , activity , action , operation are boldly in view . >>>> >>>> >>>> Fourth , I suppose LSV himself in two or three chapters of the "History of >>>> Higher Mental Functions" has provided full response to our inquiries . Andy >>>> , in time , sent the first two chapters to all . >>>> >>>> 1. He , after preliminary remarks , puts heavy emphasis on use of tools >>>> and work activity in the parentheses and in italic characters . He >>>> emphasizes that use of tool very naturally gets significant just within the >>>> work activity process . Without the work activity we cannot expect much of >>>> it . Then , as most of the time , he time and again references Marx and >>>> Engels so as to prove his claims . >>>> >>>> >>>> 2. Mike is so and for good reasons enchanted in "rudiments" of culture >>>> phenomena (throwing dice and bones , knots , notches in the wood to >>>> remember speech) . Good for him and us all . Yes , Buridan's ass gets >>>> spoilt in its indecision But man through inventing stimulus-device gets to >>>> salvation . But the problem is how many times has Mike , our Boss and >>>> confirmed global figure no need for it to be documented , asked himself >>>> what went before that juncture of time for the man to become 'MAN' ?? At >>>> this moment we are with LSV and at a very critical point of time . No more >>>> return to 'culture' to prove 'culture' . LSV says the error for some is to >>>> recount the story of mental through mental while they should know that >>>> mental processes go parallel with 'social' processes . What I gather at >>>> this very point is that he expects us to infer that the 'our present man of >>>> some will' owes his man/ness and decisiveness to his previous work activity >>>> necessitating use of tools . It seems we cannot take the idea to the >>>> uterine because V focuses on use of tools for a baby of 6 or of 10-12 >>>> months of age . It seems , both phylogenetically and ontogenetically , that >>>> it's not the case that 'gestures' ' eye contacts' come of their own and >>>> because of the man/ness and for the tuning-up with the universe through >>>> sounds and hymns and angels , etc. Man worked for life , performed ups and >>>> downs , shook his extremeties (one pair of hand) , consumed ! collective >>>> yellings and gesturing (as concomitant of work) . V says we can distinguish >>>> independent history of natural processes and independent history of >>>> cultural development separately 'phylogenetically' but not ontogenetically >>>> . In ontology , nature and culture work simultaneously contrary to >>>> phylogenesis . One cannot with ease and comfort say whichone goes with >>>> whichone . >>>> >>>> >>>> 3. Andy who is well aware of both CH and AT , on his sending of the four >>>> pages and then the said two chapters , disclosed a very important point >>>> neglected so far at the forum and that was the idea of the distinction >>>> between tool and sign so fruitfully and enormously discussed by V and the >>>> deep meaning that the simple diagram denoted . V says 'artifact' could be >>>> cheating and deceitful but no one cares ! They invariably use artifacts and >>>> through this , they ultimately remove 'material activity' from the domain >>>> altogether . V is everywhere clear with both 'cultural , ideal activity' >>>> and 'material activity' . Here is where quotes don't work . The one more >>>> return to the plus-thousand previous reflections . No loss really ! V , if >>>> necessary , prefers just 'mediation' . >>>> >>>> 4. With these in mind , I say for certain that here the plank is a tool >>>> not an 'artifact' because it is not a sign signaling any other genuine >>>> thing . It's all to itself . Also the light switch . And the whole activity >>>> is a material one . Life put it in the way . According to V sign activity >>>> affects one's own societal individual behaviour . We cannot generalize its >>>> effect to the border of transforming Nature . Man through speech , dialogue >>>> , discourse , talk , genre , etc. decides for the change in personal >>>> behaviour ; if this potential preparedness for individual behavioral change >>>> gets fossilized or ossified , then man will not reach the threshhold of the >>>> bigger act and the vast field of the Mother Universe with its motley rich >>>> material phenomena out of which each time he can select an object for a >>>> circle of activity : starting an activity with a probable cryptic 'motive' >>>> (what we don't yet know about which took him to the point of crossing) , >>>> with a conscious goal (reaching the other side) through a concrete action >>>> (crossing) operating according to the conditions at hand and on the ground >>>> (light switching , wrestling between the ideal and the material (object , >>>> subject , that is , thinking ideally about what to do with the whole thing >>>> and the plank , then observing with the help of the light acting on the >>>> object , again back to thinking if flaws are observed , etc. etc. no >>>> blending of objective and subjective whatsoever . And I wonder why taking >>>> affordance for a tool . >>>> >>>> >>>> Soooooooooo much for one post . >>>> >>>> I considered spaces but wonder if it works . >>>> I'll also be very quiet and slow in replying ! >>>> >>>> Best >>>> >>>> Haydi >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> From: mike cole >>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>>> Sent: Tuesday, 2 December 2014, 11:26:46 >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances >>>> >>>> My view? >>>> The plank is for certain an artifact, no less than the light bulb. On what >>>> grounds, or under what circumstances, would you classify it otherwise? >>>> What's gained, what's lost? >>>> mike >>>> >>>> >>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Glassman, Michael >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Hi Annalisa, Mike, Huw >>>>> >>>>> I tend to be somebody who reacts better to concrete examples than >>>>> definitions. I believe this also comes from Gibson's 1977 book, >>>>> >>>>> You are walking across a field and come to a stream which you can to get >>>>> across. You notice a plank across the stream. It is wide enough for you >>>>> to keep your balance and thick enough to hold your weight, in using it >>>> you >>>>> recognize its affordance as a crossing point. It is the intersection of >>>>> the movement, the perception of the plank, short term goal of the >>>> activity >>>>> (getting across the stream) - the recognition of the affordance comes in >>>>> the subjective use of the object (which is why it is neither subjective >>>> or >>>>> objective). It is also important that you have the abilities (the >>>> correct >>>>> weight, the balance) to recognize the affordance, otherwise you pass the >>>>> plank by. >>>>> >>>>> As far as perceived affordance. I think I have this right - the >>>> perceived >>>>> is not in the person who recognizes the affordance (otherwise you are >>>>> right, that is wet water) it is whether there is an intention in the >>>> design >>>>> of the object. So I create a light switch with the intention of >>>> designing >>>>> it as having a perceived affordance for somebody who wants to switch on a >>>>> light. As you can see different from the relationship to the plank, >>>> where >>>>> there is no prior design. >>>>> >>>>> Here is my question (perhaps answered in the Engestrom paper) >>>>> >>>>> The light switch is certainly an artifact, but is the plank? >>>>> >>>>> Michael >>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 1:19 PM >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances >>>>> >>>>> Those definitions help a lot Annalisa and touch on the fact that gibson >>>>> seemed to empty the organism (if one were so inclined to interpret him) >>>> and >>>>> he dismissed culutral mediation as secondary at best. Still, they share >>>> the >>>>> idea that a part of the structure that psychologist theorize as a located >>>>> inside of individual crania is in fact "our there" in the phylgenetically >>>>> and cultural-historically constitued environment. And that drove >>>> cognitive >>>>> psychologists, our co discussants, nuts. Until, "they got it" and then >>>>> sought to mold it to their own ends and pre-existing means. >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 9:59 AM, Annalisa Aguilar >>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> I thought I'd do the honors and start a new thread on affordances, >>>> which >>>>>> isn't related to Larry's discussion of basic images. >>>>>> >>>>>> I figured as well to offer Gibson's words on affordances since it is a >>>>>> word he invented to describe something he saw in the world. Of course >>>> the >>>>>> life of affordances has been full of controversy, especially with >>>> regard >>>>> to >>>>>> understanding what they are. >>>>>> >>>>>> Gibson's Affordances is a theory I find instrumental to connecting >>>>> outside >>>>>> to inside experiences and I intuit that it is related to perezhivanie >>>> in >>>>>> some fashion. >>>>>> >>>>>> After reading the wikipage more closely, I regret offering a link to >>>> the >>>>>> text there because it isn't very clear what Gibson means or what Norman >>>>>> means. To me, a "perceived affordance" is like saying "wet water." >>>>>> >>>>>> In any case, here are 3 quotes of Gibson in his own words, that I could >>>>>> find: >>>>>> >>>>>> The affordances of the environment are what it _offers_ the animal, >>>> what >>>>>> it _provides_ or _furnishes_, either for good or ill. The verb "to >>>>> afford" >>>>>> is found in the dictionary, the noun "affordance" is not. I have made >>>> it >>>>>> up. I mean by it something that refers both to the environment and the >>>>>> animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies the >>>>> complementarity >>>>>> of the animal and the environment (Gibson, 1977/1986). >>>>>> >>>>>> and >>>>>> >>>>>> What is meant by an _affordance_? ?Subject to revision, I suggest that >>>>> the >>>>>> affordance of anything is a specific combination of the properties of >>>> its >>>>>> substance and its surfaces taken with reference to an animal. The >>>>> reference >>>>>> may be to an animal as distinguished from other species (Gibson, >>>>> 1977/1986). >>>>>> >>>>>> and >>>>>> >>>>>> An important fact about affordances of the environment is that they are >>>>> in >>>>>> a sense objective, real, and physical, unlike values and meanings, >>>> which >>>>>> are often supposed to be subjective, phenomenal, and mental. But >>>>> actually, >>>>>> an affordance is neither an objective property nor a subjective >>>> property; >>>>>> or it is both if you like. An affordance cuts across the dichotomy of >>>>>> subjective-objective and helps us to understand its inadequacy. It is >>>>>> equally a fact of the environment and a fact of behavior. It is both >>>>>> physical and psychical, yet neither. An affordance points both ways, to >>>>> the >>>>>> environment and to the observer (Gibson, 1977/1986). >>>>>> >>>>>> These quotes are important to keep in mind, I hope they help. >>>>>> >>>>>> I might also suggest looking at Mace(1977) who described very carefully >>>>>> how Gibson got from stimuli to affordance, given that people on this >>>> list >>>>>> value history, learning, and development. >>>>>> >>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>> >>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> >>>>>> on behalf of Huw Lloyd >>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 2, 2014 10:35 AM >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>> >>>>>> I'd take a look. >>>>>> >>>>>> Michael, utility or technical affordance might fit. My equivalent of >>>>> your >>>>>> perceived/discovered distinction is one of planned and technically >>>>>> manifest. >>>>>> >>>>>> Huw >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 2 December 2014 at 16:44, Glassman, Michael >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> I'd be interested in anybody else is. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Michael >>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ >>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> ] >>>>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 11:39 AM >>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Interloper, Michael? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The discussions at UCSD preceeding Don's use of affordances and >>>>> cognitive >>>>>>> artifacts were accompanied by other, related papers. One by Engestrom >>>>> on >>>>>>> "when is an artifact" and one or more by Ed Hutchins. If people are >>>>>>> interested in pursuing this thread/topic the materials could be >>>>> gathered >>>>>>> up. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> mike >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Glassman, Michael < >>>> glassman.13@osu.edu >>>>>> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea). >>>> He >>>>>>>> actually cops to both of them. The first was not to distinguish >>>>>> between >>>>>>>> affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which >>>> are >>>>>>>> designed. I think this is related to the issue of artifacts. >>>>> Meaning >>>>>>> are >>>>>>>> artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to >>>> be >>>>>>>> discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong >>>> word, >>>>> if >>>>>>>> anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances. It is a >>>>>>> complex >>>>>>>> question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes >>>> based >>>>> on >>>>>>>> context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one >>>>> context >>>>>>> may >>>>>>>> result in organic affordances in another context. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is that >>>>> he >>>>>>> was >>>>>>>> not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and >>>>>>> constraints. >>>>>>>> Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived affordances >>>> or >>>>>> are >>>>>>>> they designed to create constraints. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the >>>>>> mention >>>>>>>> just spurred me to throw this up. Hope I'm not being too much of >>>> an >>>>>>>> interloper. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Michael >>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ >>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>> ] >>>>>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM >>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Annalisa- >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation >>>>> not >>>>>>>> discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of >>>>>>>> affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set >>>> against >>>>>>>> Gibson's ideas. The change of views coincided with the advent of >>>> the >>>>>>> d-cog >>>>>>>> idea which also has deep roots in chat. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> No hidden history i know of, but interesting connections among the >>>>>>> notion >>>>>>>> of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion of >>>>>> these >>>>>>>> connections can be found, among other places, in >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Cole, M. & Engestr?m, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach >>>> to >>>>>>>> distributed* >>>>>>>> *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition: >>>>> Psychological >>>>>>> and >>>>>>>> educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar >>>> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Hi Mike, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied >>>>> that >>>>>>>> wish! >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important >>>> connections. >>>>> I >>>>>>> was >>>>>>>>> not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I >>>> learned >>>>>>> about >>>>>>>>> Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science >>>>> (1985). >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Is there some history that is not part of the common story? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I looked here for clarity: >>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to >>>>>>> cognitive >>>>>>>>> artifacts? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in >>>>> play, >>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>> even joy! >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however >>>>> until >>>>>>> then >>>>>>>>> I will remain with the ineffable. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> on behalf of mike cole >>>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM >>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And, >>>>>>>>> co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive >>>>>>> artifacts >>>>>>>>> right about that time at UCSD. If it were possible to find a >>>>> source >>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>> makes these connections visible and available to read about it >>>>> might >>>>>>> be a >>>>>>>>> step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of >>>>>> intro >>>>>>>> for >>>>>>>>> newcomers to the discussion. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a >>>>>>> newcomer's >>>>>>>>> introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is >>>> seeking >>>>>> to >>>>>>>> sort >>>>>>>>> out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am >>>>>>>> insuficiently >>>>>>>>> read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted! >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many >>>>>> rocks, >>>>>>> so >>>>>>>>> little time"! >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Mike >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> A >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Martin! >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental >>>>>> representation" >>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>> coming closer! >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's >>>>>> theory >>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>> affordances. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed >>>>> article. >>>>>>> But >>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>> wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is >>>>>>>> important >>>>>>>>>> not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a >>>>>>> grenade >>>>>>>>>> pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the >>>>> list. >>>>>>> If >>>>>>>>> you >>>>>>>>>> can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look >>>>> forward >>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> your >>>>>>>>>> reply, Martin. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that >>>> being >>>>>> at >>>>>>>> UCSD >>>>>>>>>> and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that >>>>>> influences >>>>>>>> your >>>>>>>>>> position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find >>>>>>>> community >>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>> it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more >>>> voluntary >>>>>>>> phrased >>>>>>>>>> that way). >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of >>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>> John >>>>>>>>>> Packer > >>>>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM >>>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> An interesting article, David. One way in which it is >>>>> interesting, >>>>>> to >>>>>>>> me >>>>>>>>>> at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not >>>> used, >>>>>>> even >>>>>>>>>> once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" >>>> images >>>>> in >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> world around us - material representations - and he tries to >>>>> define >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg < >>>> dkellogg60@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Larry, Annalisa: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" >>>>> when >>>>>>> we >>>>>>>>>>> met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of >>>>>>>> anything >>>>>>>>>>> except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe >>>>>> available >>>>>>>>>>> for a standard price all over China) She does not even >>>> remember >>>>>>>>>>> whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was >>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as >>>> a >>>>>>>>>>> non-image based mental representation. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental >>>> representations >>>>>> are >>>>>>>>>>> images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth >>>> century. >>>>>> In >>>>>>>>>>> fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against >>>>>>>> Titchener >>>>>>>>>>> and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, >>>>>>>>>>> everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated >>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>> many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically >>>>>>> anterior >>>>>>>>>>> to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would >>>>> not >>>>>>> have >>>>>>>>>>> time or ability to process complex problems in real time. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that >>>> are >>>>>>>>>>> genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more >>>>>>> reading >>>>>>>>>>> to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read >>>> than >>>>> I >>>>>> am >>>>>>>>>>> (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels >>>>> like >>>>>>>>>>> she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do >>>>> NOT >>>>>>> read >>>>>>>>>>> this article--instead, look at Figure 11. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color >>>> structure >>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>> Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any >>>>>> actual >>>>>>>>>>> images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural >>>>>>>> experience >>>>>>>>>>> associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then >>>>>> deliberately >>>>>>>>>>> frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any >>>>>>>>>>> recognizable figures upon which to focus. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine >>>> Chapel >>>>>>> fresco >>>>>>>>>>> for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. >>>> He >>>>> or >>>>>>> she >>>>>>>>>>> can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the >>>> painting >>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>> wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not >>>>>> notice >>>>>>>>>>> the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful >>>> in >>>>>> it. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar < >>>>> annalisa@unm.edu >>>>>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Larry and David, >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are >>>>> at >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> root of all thinking. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, >>>>> based >>>>>>> upon >>>>>>>>>> previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, >>>> in >>>>>>>>>> combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a >>>>>> phrase >>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>> like >>>>>>>>>> a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on >>>> it >>>>>> by >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know >>>> it. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think >>>> as >>>>>>>> Hackett >>>>>>>>>> describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have >>>>> you >>>>>>>>> already >>>>>>>>>> given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be >>>>>> willing >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>> take a look. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is >>>>>>>> controversial. >>>>>>>>>> It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone >>>>>> says >>>>>>>>> "this >>>>>>>>>> is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble >>>>>>>> observation. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and >>>> whatever >>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>> process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at >>>>>> hand? >>>>>>>>> Just a >>>>>>>>>> thought. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> What is it that appeals to you about this model, >>>>> metaphoricity? >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of >>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>> Purss < >>>>>>>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com > >>>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM >>>>>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity >>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> David K >>>>>>>>>>>> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. >>>>> My >>>>>>>> reason >>>>>>>>>> for >>>>>>>>>>>> exploring these authors is I have been following a path >>>>>> pursuing a >>>>>>>>> basic >>>>>>>>>>>> question. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic >>>>>>> guiding >>>>>>>>>> images >>>>>>>>>>>> upon which thinking rests" >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring >>>>>> appearances >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>> illusions was also exploring this theme. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new >>>>>> phenomenological >>>>>>>>> path >>>>>>>>>>>> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names >>>>>> this >>>>>>>>>> process >>>>>>>>>>>> *metaphoricity*. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible >>>>>>> image-character >>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> *spontaneous event* of meaning. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which >>>> he >>>>>>>>> brackets - >>>>>>>>>>>> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> AND >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* >>>>> finds >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> meaning of its very self. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this >>>>>>>>>>>> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion >>>> of >>>>>>>>> metaphor >>>>>>>>>> can >>>>>>>>>>>> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is >>>> implicated >>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>> *objectivity* >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of >>>>>> itself >>>>>>>>> *in* >>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> mode [path] of the concept >>>>>>>>>>>> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding >>>>>> images >>>>>>>> has >>>>>>>>>> been >>>>>>>>>>>> established. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the >>>>> path >>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is >>>> derived >>>>>>> from >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> image-character of the guiding image. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial >>>>> this >>>>>>>> topic >>>>>>>>>> may >>>>>>>>>>>> become [again] >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by >>>> this >>>>>>> basic >>>>>>>>>>>> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these >>>>>> images >>>>>>> as >>>>>>>>>>>> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images >>>>> emerge >>>>>>>>>>>> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is >>>>>> transcendental] >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>>>> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. >>>>> It >>>>>>>> seems >>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I also realize this question may already be answered in >>>>>> Vygotsky's >>>>>>>>>> writings >>>>>>>>>>>> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of >>>>>> XMCA. I >>>>>>>>>>>> personally am following this path for now. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >>>> with >>>>>> an >>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>>>> an >>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>>> an >>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> >> > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Fri Dec 5 13:53:28 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2014 13:53:28 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances In-Reply-To: <4E148FDE-8090-43ED-9F4F-FAD731D8853C@gmail.com> References: <1682996975.4827904.1417607429293.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11144.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> <3A40602C-44A1-45C7-A7D1-36E1A842E92B@gmail.com> <8FDB5B35-D645-496F-93CB-077884244184@gmail.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F907548F@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <4E148FDE-8090-43ED-9F4F-FAD731D8853C@gmail.com> Message-ID: Helena, Your comment: "I think it's pretty obvious that whatever system us Westerners have trusted is about to self-correct in a pretty violent way, leaving few of us behind, including our grandchildren" may be a central guiding *image* which gets to the *heart* of the subject and object *matter* Do we need a *new* guiding metaphor such as what am *I* or what are *we* doing for our grandchildren. You are pointing to the need for a new *guiding metaphor* that replaces the now dominant metaphor in the West of the sovereign individual. I do wonder if *knowledge* or *reason* alone will get us to a new metaphor. Michael's question of not trusting *control* [first order cybernetics] can be included here. I do believe our preoccupation in the West with the individuated *self* is implicated in the need for control [and certainty. Holding on to the image of our common responsibility for all our grandchildren within *interpretive communities* is a "theme" [or some would say a mytheme] *trust* [which is closely related to FAITH] extends beyond first order cybernetics and *controlling systems* There is a dynamic beyond "self-control" that points to the *heart* of the matter. To take the perspective that we are *here* for our *grandchildren* is for me a *generative* imaginal space to attempt to occupy and from which to guide my actions and activities in the world. Learning seems to be central to orienting to the *heart* of the matter. But do we also need to hold an image of our grandchildren's needs at the forefront of our attention [and shared metaphors]?? Larry On Fri, Dec 5, 2014 at 12:52 PM, Helena Worthen wrote: > Michael: > > Here is how I read your message: > > There are two (at least) ways of thinking about the world (meaning life, > the universe, etc). One is the "exploration" perspective and the other is > some overarching cybernetic (mathematical, engineering? designed?) > perspective. The difference between the two that you want to draw attention > to is that Bateson, who you name as someone associated with the second > perspective, anticipated that any such system would self-correct eventually. > > Then you say that many educators do not trust a cybernetic system to > self-correct. Is that right? > > I'm sure sure how what you call the "exploration" perspective differs from > the cybernetic perspective. > > I think it's pretty obvious that whatever system us Westerners have > trusted is about to self-correct in a pretty violent way, leaving few of us > behind, including our grandchildren. Capitalism (I'm think of Picketty, > here) doesn't self-correct, but the climate does and it is gearing up to > pull a whopper on us. > > All of this is to say that while we toss ideas around there are real-world > facts out there moving right along. I want to see people making use of > these ideas. I want to know, "How is this word actually used in real life?" > > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > On Dec 5, 2014, at 11:46 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > > > Hi Helena, > > > > I'm not so sure if its the words or the way the thinking behind those > words match up or don't match up with the systems of the individuals were > are teaching live and think within. A little while ago I was reading > Bateson and his idea that Western philosophy/thinking often precluded the > idea of a supreme cybernetic system - the idea that we could and would be > self-corrected through exploration of the universe rather than any > conscious human design. We are a society obsessed with local control and > the idea that we can manipulate the universe around us (which we can in > small doses, but Bateson claim is destructive in the long run). > > > > Many of the words you mention such as affordances, mediators, activity > often fall into the exploration perspective I think - and they become > difficult to relate. > > > > A little while ago I wrote a sentence based on the idea that education > should be based on open exploration because something akin to a supreme > cybernetics will offer self-correcting feedback, and a big trouble is many > educators don't trust that. And then I stared at the sentence for a while > and realized the majority of people reading it (if anybody does ever read > it) would just pass it right over. > > > > So what do we do? Hard to know. > > > > A side question for Mike - in those early meetings on distributed > cognition that Don Norman was a part of did cybernetics and/or Bateson > every some up? > > > > Michael > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > on behalf of Helena Worthen [helenaworthen@gmail.com] > > Sent: Friday, December 05, 2014 2:12 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances > > > > A voice from the margins, here: > > > > I learn a lot from this list, all the time, and would hate to have it go > quiet or self-destruct. But my role in the world outside this list, out > there in the synchronous landscape, involves trying to make ideas > intelligible to working people who may not have more than a couple of years > of community college. For this purpose, there is a whole roster of terms > that are a problem. When I say these terms to regular people, they make a > face as if they'd tasted something bad. > > > > Examples of terms like this are: > > > > affordance > > mediate > > activity > > CHAT (cultural-historical activity theory) > > > > and: > > > > development > > > > For my purposes, Annalisa's Dec 2 post on Gibson's invention of the term > "affordance" is very useful. He explained clearly why he made it up. I can > use that. > > > > Knud Illeris' book "Contemporary Theories of Learning: Learning > theorists...in their own words" is a breath of fresh air for the same > reason. You got to hear a whole collection of different people saying very > different things about learning, all grouped together as learning theorists. > > > > theoristshttp:// > www.pgce.soton.ac.uk/IT/Learning/Theories/ContemporaryTheoriesofLearning%20Learning%20theorists%20in%20their%20own%20words%20-%20Knud%20Illeris.pdf > > > > > > Helena Worthen > > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > > On Dec 3, 2014, at 11:26 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > > >> Haydi, > >> Thank you so much! Here?s how it is for me: > >> I too have been waiting for Andy to come back. He is the reason I am in > the chat. I have known about Vygotsky through Vera since the early 80s. But > I, after my dissertation on L2 fluency in 1986, I worked as a teacher > educator where research and publication wasn?t necessary for tenure and > promotion. The college where I was working closed (bankruptcy) five years > back and, like any working stiff, I am having to reinvent myself. So, in > thrashing about I came to read Andy?s articles on "collaborative project" > as a unit of analysis a few years back, started emailing with him > one-on-one (and he was so generous with his time and patience in answering > my questions about activity theory and Vygotsky), until he said it was time > for me to join the chat. Andy mentored me until I had the courage to pipe > up. Andy just edited a book on collaborative projects; Vera has written one > of the papers for the book. I love them both. That?s how it is for me. > >> > >> Let me say that I consider myself a rank learner, always beginning. > Mike has wisely rejected the role of Caesar on the chat. But we go to him > asking him to sort out things amongst the unruly class. As a teacher, the > hardest thing for me ever to do was to deal with disrespect between > students. I have finally come to realize and accept that I want to be in a > school where the students are nice to each other. Where respect and trust > abound. Where human flourishing is possible. There is no father god to > rescue us. We have to do it for ourselves. Well, like the song goes, ?I?m > still willin?? Let?s make this a creative project, which means no unethical > use of power. We can?t afford it. In my humble opinion. > >> > >> In gratitude and hope, > >> Henry > >> > >>> On Dec 3, 2014, at 11:00 AM, mike cole wrote: > >>> > >>> Haydi-- > >>> > >>> Like anyone on xmca, you can demand whatever you like. Getting people > to > >>> implement your demands may be more > >>> difficult. In general, I have not experienced demands and resentment as > >>> particularly helpful on xmca, but thing are changing, > >>> so who knows. > >>> > >>> I am not putting ANL aside because of the concerns expressed in MCA in > the > >>> past year or so. The concerns are real, at least to me. > >>> But there are many productive programs of research that use his ideas, > >>> along with those of LSV and many others, both Russian and non-Russian. > >>> > >>> I believe it would be helpful in receiving answers to your various > comments > >>> and suggestions if some of them were constrained to particular > threads. For > >>> example, the discussion of plank versus a piece of electronic > equipment vis > >>> a vis the notion of artifact and mediation through artifacts, etc., > might > >>> be be placed in that thread. > >>> > >>> etc. > >>> > >>> I clearly can be wrong in all of these judgments! > >>> mike > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> On Wed, Dec 3, 2014 at 3:50 AM, Haydi Zulfei < > haydizulfei@rocketmail.com> > >>> wrote: > >>> > >>>> Hi > >>>> > >>>> First of all , so resentfully I wonder If I can demand Andy's return > to > >>>> the discussions !! No one can deny his great contributions to this > Forum . > >>>> > >>>> Second , I might have been lost completely in your words , terms , > >>>> premises , and compositional nuances and colourings of your script as > >>>> native speakers , etc. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> Third , because of obvious sensitivities towards ANL , I've > altogether put > >>>> him to one side ; otherwise , in this concrete example of Michael , > the > >>>> triad , activity , action , operation are boldly in view . > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> Fourth , I suppose LSV himself in two or three chapters of the > "History of > >>>> Higher Mental Functions" has provided full response to our inquiries > . Andy > >>>> , in time , sent the first two chapters to all . > >>>> > >>>> 1. He , after preliminary remarks , puts heavy emphasis on use of > tools > >>>> and work activity in the parentheses and in italic characters . He > >>>> emphasizes that use of tool very naturally gets significant just > within the > >>>> work activity process . Without the work activity we cannot expect > much of > >>>> it . Then , as most of the time , he time and again references Marx > and > >>>> Engels so as to prove his claims . > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> 2. Mike is so and for good reasons enchanted in "rudiments" of culture > >>>> phenomena (throwing dice and bones , knots , notches in the wood to > >>>> remember speech) . Good for him and us all . Yes , Buridan's ass gets > >>>> spoilt in its indecision But man through inventing stimulus-device > gets to > >>>> salvation . But the problem is how many times has Mike , our Boss and > >>>> confirmed global figure no need for it to be documented , asked > himself > >>>> what went before that juncture of time for the man to become 'MAN' ?? > At > >>>> this moment we are with LSV and at a very critical point of time . No > more > >>>> return to 'culture' to prove 'culture' . LSV says the error for some > is to > >>>> recount the story of mental through mental while they should know that > >>>> mental processes go parallel with 'social' processes . What I gather > at > >>>> this very point is that he expects us to infer that the 'our present > man of > >>>> some will' owes his man/ness and decisiveness to his previous work > activity > >>>> necessitating use of tools . It seems we cannot take the idea to the > >>>> uterine because V focuses on use of tools for a baby of 6 or of 10-12 > >>>> months of age . It seems , both phylogenetically and ontogenetically > , that > >>>> it's not the case that 'gestures' ' eye contacts' come of their own > and > >>>> because of the man/ness and for the tuning-up with the universe > through > >>>> sounds and hymns and angels , etc. Man worked for life , performed > ups and > >>>> downs , shook his extremeties (one pair of hand) , consumed ! > collective > >>>> yellings and gesturing (as concomitant of work) . V says we can > distinguish > >>>> independent history of natural processes and independent history of > >>>> cultural development separately 'phylogenetically' but not > ontogenetically > >>>> . In ontology , nature and culture work simultaneously contrary to > >>>> phylogenesis . One cannot with ease and comfort say whichone goes with > >>>> whichone . > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> 3. Andy who is well aware of both CH and AT , on his sending of the > four > >>>> pages and then the said two chapters , disclosed a very important > point > >>>> neglected so far at the forum and that was the idea of the distinction > >>>> between tool and sign so fruitfully and enormously discussed by V and > the > >>>> deep meaning that the simple diagram denoted . V says 'artifact' > could be > >>>> cheating and deceitful but no one cares ! They invariably use > artifacts and > >>>> through this , they ultimately remove 'material activity' from the > domain > >>>> altogether . V is everywhere clear with both 'cultural , ideal > activity' > >>>> and 'material activity' . Here is where quotes don't work . The one > more > >>>> return to the plus-thousand previous reflections . No loss really ! V > , if > >>>> necessary , prefers just 'mediation' . > >>>> > >>>> 4. With these in mind , I say for certain that here the plank is a > tool > >>>> not an 'artifact' because it is not a sign signaling any other genuine > >>>> thing . It's all to itself . Also the light switch . And the whole > activity > >>>> is a material one . Life put it in the way . According to V sign > activity > >>>> affects one's own societal individual behaviour . We cannot > generalize its > >>>> effect to the border of transforming Nature . Man through speech , > dialogue > >>>> , discourse , talk , genre , etc. decides for the change in personal > >>>> behaviour ; if this potential preparedness for individual behavioral > change > >>>> gets fossilized or ossified , then man will not reach the threshhold > of the > >>>> bigger act and the vast field of the Mother Universe with its motley > rich > >>>> material phenomena out of which each time he can select an object for > a > >>>> circle of activity : starting an activity with a probable cryptic > 'motive' > >>>> (what we don't yet know about which took him to the point of > crossing) , > >>>> with a conscious goal (reaching the other side) through a concrete > action > >>>> (crossing) operating according to the conditions at hand and on the > ground > >>>> (light switching , wrestling between the ideal and the material > (object , > >>>> subject , that is , thinking ideally about what to do with the whole > thing > >>>> and the plank , then observing with the help of the light acting on > the > >>>> object , again back to thinking if flaws are observed , etc. etc. no > >>>> blending of objective and subjective whatsoever . And I wonder why > taking > >>>> affordance for a tool . > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> Soooooooooo much for one post . > >>>> > >>>> I considered spaces but wonder if it works . > >>>> I'll also be very quiet and slow in replying ! > >>>> > >>>> Best > >>>> > >>>> Haydi > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> From: mike cole > >>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > >>>> Sent: Tuesday, 2 December 2014, 11:26:46 > >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances > >>>> > >>>> My view? > >>>> The plank is for certain an artifact, no less than the light bulb. On > what > >>>> grounds, or under what circumstances, would you classify it > otherwise? > >>>> What's gained, what's lost? > >>>> mike > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Glassman, Michael < > glassman.13@osu.edu> > >>>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> Hi Annalisa, Mike, Huw > >>>>> > >>>>> I tend to be somebody who reacts better to concrete examples than > >>>>> definitions. I believe this also comes from Gibson's 1977 book, > >>>>> > >>>>> You are walking across a field and come to a stream which you can to > get > >>>>> across. You notice a plank across the stream. It is wide enough > for you > >>>>> to keep your balance and thick enough to hold your weight, in using > it > >>>> you > >>>>> recognize its affordance as a crossing point. It is the > intersection of > >>>>> the movement, the perception of the plank, short term goal of the > >>>> activity > >>>>> (getting across the stream) - the recognition of the affordance > comes in > >>>>> the subjective use of the object (which is why it is neither > subjective > >>>> or > >>>>> objective). It is also important that you have the abilities (the > >>>> correct > >>>>> weight, the balance) to recognize the affordance, otherwise you pass > the > >>>>> plank by. > >>>>> > >>>>> As far as perceived affordance. I think I have this right - the > >>>> perceived > >>>>> is not in the person who recognizes the affordance (otherwise you are > >>>>> right, that is wet water) it is whether there is an intention in the > >>>> design > >>>>> of the object. So I create a light switch with the intention of > >>>> designing > >>>>> it as having a perceived affordance for somebody who wants to switch > on a > >>>>> light. As you can see different from the relationship to the plank, > >>>> where > >>>>> there is no prior design. > >>>>> > >>>>> Here is my question (perhaps answered in the Engestrom paper) > >>>>> > >>>>> The light switch is certainly an artifact, but is the plank? > >>>>> > >>>>> Michael > >>>>> ________________________________________ > >>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > >>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > >>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 1:19 PM > >>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances > >>>>> > >>>>> Those definitions help a lot Annalisa and touch on the fact that > gibson > >>>>> seemed to empty the organism (if one were so inclined to interpret > him) > >>>> and > >>>>> he dismissed culutral mediation as secondary at best. Still, they > share > >>>> the > >>>>> idea that a part of the structure that psychologist theorize as a > located > >>>>> inside of individual crania is in fact "our there" in the > phylgenetically > >>>>> and cultural-historically constitued environment. And that drove > >>>> cognitive > >>>>> psychologists, our co discussants, nuts. Until, "they got it" and > then > >>>>> sought to mold it to their own ends and pre-existing means. > >>>>> mike > >>>>> > >>>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 9:59 AM, Annalisa Aguilar > >>>> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> I thought I'd do the honors and start a new thread on affordances, > >>>> which > >>>>>> isn't related to Larry's discussion of basic images. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I figured as well to offer Gibson's words on affordances since it > is a > >>>>>> word he invented to describe something he saw in the world. Of > course > >>>> the > >>>>>> life of affordances has been full of controversy, especially with > >>>> regard > >>>>> to > >>>>>> understanding what they are. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Gibson's Affordances is a theory I find instrumental to connecting > >>>>> outside > >>>>>> to inside experiences and I intuit that it is related to > perezhivanie > >>>> in > >>>>>> some fashion. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> After reading the wikipage more closely, I regret offering a link to > >>>> the > >>>>>> text there because it isn't very clear what Gibson means or what > Norman > >>>>>> means. To me, a "perceived affordance" is like saying "wet water." > >>>>>> > >>>>>> In any case, here are 3 quotes of Gibson in his own words, that I > could > >>>>>> find: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> The affordances of the environment are what it _offers_ the animal, > >>>> what > >>>>>> it _provides_ or _furnishes_, either for good or ill. The verb "to > >>>>> afford" > >>>>>> is found in the dictionary, the noun "affordance" is not. I have > made > >>>> it > >>>>>> up. I mean by it something that refers both to the environment and > the > >>>>>> animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies the > >>>>> complementarity > >>>>>> of the animal and the environment (Gibson, 1977/1986). > >>>>>> > >>>>>> and > >>>>>> > >>>>>> What is meant by an _affordance_? ?Subject to revision, I suggest > that > >>>>> the > >>>>>> affordance of anything is a specific combination of the properties > of > >>>> its > >>>>>> substance and its surfaces taken with reference to an animal. The > >>>>> reference > >>>>>> may be to an animal as distinguished from other species (Gibson, > >>>>> 1977/1986). > >>>>>> > >>>>>> and > >>>>>> > >>>>>> An important fact about affordances of the environment is that they > are > >>>>> in > >>>>>> a sense objective, real, and physical, unlike values and meanings, > >>>> which > >>>>>> are often supposed to be subjective, phenomenal, and mental. But > >>>>> actually, > >>>>>> an affordance is neither an objective property nor a subjective > >>>> property; > >>>>>> or it is both if you like. An affordance cuts across the dichotomy > of > >>>>>> subjective-objective and helps us to understand its inadequacy. It > is > >>>>>> equally a fact of the environment and a fact of behavior. It is both > >>>>>> physical and psychical, yet neither. An affordance points both > ways, to > >>>>> the > >>>>>> environment and to the observer (Gibson, 1977/1986). > >>>>>> > >>>>>> These quotes are important to keep in mind, I hope they help. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I might also suggest looking at Mace(1977) who described very > carefully > >>>>>> how Gibson got from stimuli to affordance, given that people on this > >>>> list > >>>>>> value history, learning, and development. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Kind regards, > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Annalisa > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> ________________________________________ > >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>>> > >>>>>> on behalf of Huw Lloyd > >>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 2, 2014 10:35 AM > >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I'd take a look. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Michael, utility or technical affordance might fit. My equivalent > of > >>>>> your > >>>>>> perceived/discovered distinction is one of planned and technically > >>>>>> manifest. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Huw > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On 2 December 2014 at 16:44, Glassman, Michael > > >>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> I'd be interested in anybody else is. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Michael > >>>>>>> ________________________________________ > >>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ > >>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>>> ] > >>>>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > >>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 11:39 AM > >>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Interloper, Michael? > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> The discussions at UCSD preceeding Don's use of affordances and > >>>>> cognitive > >>>>>>> artifacts were accompanied by other, related papers. One by > Engestrom > >>>>> on > >>>>>>> "when is an artifact" and one or more by Ed Hutchins. If people are > >>>>>>> interested in pursuing this thread/topic the materials could be > >>>>> gathered > >>>>>>> up. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Glassman, Michael < > >>>> glassman.13@osu.edu > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea). > >>>> He > >>>>>>>> actually cops to both of them. The first was not to distinguish > >>>>>> between > >>>>>>>> affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which > >>>> are > >>>>>>>> designed. I think this is related to the issue of artifacts. > >>>>> Meaning > >>>>>>> are > >>>>>>>> artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to > >>>> be > >>>>>>>> discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong > >>>> word, > >>>>> if > >>>>>>>> anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances. It is a > >>>>>>> complex > >>>>>>>> question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes > >>>> based > >>>>> on > >>>>>>>> context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one > >>>>> context > >>>>>>> may > >>>>>>>> result in organic affordances in another context. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is > that > >>>>> he > >>>>>>> was > >>>>>>>> not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and > >>>>>>> constraints. > >>>>>>>> Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived affordances > >>>> or > >>>>>> are > >>>>>>>> they designed to create constraints. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the > >>>>>> mention > >>>>>>>> just spurred me to throw this up. Hope I'm not being too much of > >>>> an > >>>>>>>> interloper. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Michael > >>>>>>>> ________________________________________ > >>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ > >>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>>>> ] > >>>>>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > >>>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM > >>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Annalisa- > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation > >>>>> not > >>>>>>>> discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of > >>>>>>>> affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set > >>>> against > >>>>>>>> Gibson's ideas. The change of views coincided with the advent of > >>>> the > >>>>>>> d-cog > >>>>>>>> idea which also has deep roots in chat. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> No hidden history i know of, but interesting connections among > the > >>>>>>> notion > >>>>>>>> of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion > of > >>>>>> these > >>>>>>>> connections can be found, among other places, in > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Cole, M. & Engestr?m, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach > >>>> to > >>>>>>>> distributed* > >>>>>>>> *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition: > >>>>> Psychological > >>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>> educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar < > annalisa@unm.edu > >>>>> > >>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Hi Mike, > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied > >>>>> that > >>>>>>>> wish! > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important > >>>> connections. > >>>>> I > >>>>>>> was > >>>>>>>>> not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I > >>>> learned > >>>>>>> about > >>>>>>>>> Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science > >>>>> (1985). > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Is there some history that is not part of the common story? > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> I looked here for clarity: > >>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to > >>>>>>> cognitive > >>>>>>>>> artifacts? > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in > >>>>> play, > >>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>>> even joy! > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however > >>>>> until > >>>>>>> then > >>>>>>>>> I will remain with the ineffable. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Kind regards, > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Annalisa > >>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ > >>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > >>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> on behalf of mike cole > >>>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM > >>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And, > >>>>>>>>> co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive > >>>>>>> artifacts > >>>>>>>>> right about that time at UCSD. If it were possible to find a > >>>>> source > >>>>>>> that > >>>>>>>>> makes these connections visible and available to read about it > >>>>> might > >>>>>>> be a > >>>>>>>>> step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of > >>>>>> intro > >>>>>>>> for > >>>>>>>>> newcomers to the discussion. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a > >>>>>>> newcomer's > >>>>>>>>> introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is > >>>> seeking > >>>>>> to > >>>>>>>> sort > >>>>>>>>> out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am > >>>>>>>> insuficiently > >>>>>>>>> read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted! > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many > >>>>>> rocks, > >>>>>>> so > >>>>>>>>> little time"! > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Mike > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> A > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar > >>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Martin! > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental > >>>>>> representation" > >>>>>>> is > >>>>>>>>>> coming closer! > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's > >>>>>> theory > >>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>>> affordances. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed > >>>>> article. > >>>>>>> But > >>>>>>>> I > >>>>>>>>>> wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is > >>>>>>>> important > >>>>>>>>>> not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a > >>>>>>> grenade > >>>>>>>>>> pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the > >>>>> list. > >>>>>>> If > >>>>>>>>> you > >>>>>>>>>> can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look > >>>>> forward > >>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>> your > >>>>>>>>>> reply, Martin. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that > >>>> being > >>>>>> at > >>>>>>>> UCSD > >>>>>>>>>> and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that > >>>>>> influences > >>>>>>>> your > >>>>>>>>>> position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find > >>>>>>>> community > >>>>>>>>> in > >>>>>>>>>> it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more > >>>> voluntary > >>>>>>>> phrased > >>>>>>>>>> that way). > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Kind regards, > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Annalisa > >>>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ > >>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > >>>>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > >>>>>> Martin > >>>>>>>> John > >>>>>>>>>> Packer > > >>>>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM > >>>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> An interesting article, David. One way in which it is > >>>>> interesting, > >>>>>> to > >>>>>>>> me > >>>>>>>>>> at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not > >>>> used, > >>>>>>> even > >>>>>>>>>> once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" > >>>> images > >>>>> in > >>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>> world around us - material representations - and he tries to > >>>>> define > >>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>> "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Martin > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg < > >>>> dkellogg60@gmail.com > >>>>>>>>>> > wrote: > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Larry, Annalisa: > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" > >>>>> when > >>>>>>> we > >>>>>>>>>>> met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of > >>>>>>>> anything > >>>>>>>>>>> except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe > >>>>>> available > >>>>>>>>>>> for a standard price all over China) She does not even > >>>> remember > >>>>>>>>>>> whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was > >>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>> beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as > >>>> a > >>>>>>>>>>> non-image based mental representation. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental > >>>> representations > >>>>>> are > >>>>>>>>>>> images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth > >>>> century. > >>>>>> In > >>>>>>>>>>> fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against > >>>>>>>> Titchener > >>>>>>>>>>> and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, > >>>>>>>>>>> everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated > >>>>> that > >>>>>>>>>>> many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically > >>>>>>> anterior > >>>>>>>>>>> to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would > >>>>> not > >>>>>>> have > >>>>>>>>>>> time or ability to process complex problems in real time. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that > >>>> are > >>>>>>>>>>> genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more > >>>>>>> reading > >>>>>>>>>>> to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read > >>>> than > >>>>> I > >>>>>> am > >>>>>>>>>>> (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels > >>>>> like > >>>>>>>>>>> she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do > >>>>> NOT > >>>>>>> read > >>>>>>>>>>> this article--instead, look at Figure 11. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color > >>>> structure > >>>>> of > >>>>>>>>>>> Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any > >>>>>> actual > >>>>>>>>>>> images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural > >>>>>>>> experience > >>>>>>>>>>> associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then > >>>>>> deliberately > >>>>>>>>>>> frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any > >>>>>>>>>>> recognizable figures upon which to focus. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine > >>>> Chapel > >>>>>>> fresco > >>>>>>>>>>> for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. > >>>> He > >>>>> or > >>>>>>> she > >>>>>>>>>>> can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the > >>>> painting > >>>>>> and > >>>>>>>>>>> wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not > >>>>>> notice > >>>>>>>>>>> the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful > >>>> in > >>>>>> it. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar < > >>>>> annalisa@unm.edu > >>>>>>>>>> > wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Larry and David, > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are > >>>>> at > >>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>> root of all thinking. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, > >>>>> based > >>>>>>> upon > >>>>>>>>>> previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, > >>>> in > >>>>>>>>>> combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a > >>>>>> phrase > >>>>>>> I > >>>>>>>>> like > >>>>>>>>>> a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on > >>>> it > >>>>>> by > >>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>> same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know > >>>> it. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think > >>>> as > >>>>>>>> Hackett > >>>>>>>>>> describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have > >>>>> you > >>>>>>>>> already > >>>>>>>>>> given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be > >>>>>> willing > >>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>> take a look. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is > >>>>>>>> controversial. > >>>>>>>>>> It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone > >>>>>> says > >>>>>>>>> "this > >>>>>>>>>> is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble > >>>>>>>> observation. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and > >>>> whatever > >>>>>>> that > >>>>>>>>>> process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at > >>>>>> hand? > >>>>>>>>> Just a > >>>>>>>>>> thought. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> What is it that appeals to you about this model, > >>>>> metaphoricity? > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Kind regards, > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Annalisa > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ > >>>>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > >>>>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > >>>>> Larry > >>>>>>>>> Purss < > >>>>>>>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM > >>>>>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity > >>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> David K > >>>>>>>>>>>> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. > >>>>> My > >>>>>>>> reason > >>>>>>>>>> for > >>>>>>>>>>>> exploring these authors is I have been following a path > >>>>>> pursuing a > >>>>>>>>> basic > >>>>>>>>>>>> question. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic > >>>>>>> guiding > >>>>>>>>>> images > >>>>>>>>>>>> upon which thinking rests" > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring > >>>>>> appearances > >>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>>>>>> illusions was also exploring this theme. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new > >>>>>> phenomenological > >>>>>>>>> path > >>>>>>>>>>>> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names > >>>>>> this > >>>>>>>>>> process > >>>>>>>>>>>> *metaphoricity*. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible > >>>>>>> image-character > >>>>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>> *spontaneous event* of meaning. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which > >>>> he > >>>>>>>>> brackets - > >>>>>>>>>>>> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> AND > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* > >>>>> finds > >>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>> meaning of its very self. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this > >>>>>>>>>>>> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion > >>>> of > >>>>>>>>> metaphor > >>>>>>>>>> can > >>>>>>>>>>>> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is > >>>> implicated > >>>>>> in > >>>>>>>>>>>> *objectivity* > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of > >>>>>> itself > >>>>>>>>> *in* > >>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>> mode [path] of the concept > >>>>>>>>>>>> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding > >>>>>> images > >>>>>>>> has > >>>>>>>>>> been > >>>>>>>>>>>> established. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the > >>>>> path > >>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>>>>> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is > >>>> derived > >>>>>>> from > >>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>> image-character of the guiding image. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial > >>>>> this > >>>>>>>> topic > >>>>>>>>>> may > >>>>>>>>>>>> become [again] > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by > >>>> this > >>>>>>> basic > >>>>>>>>>>>> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these > >>>>>> images > >>>>>>> as > >>>>>>>>>>>> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images > >>>>> emerge > >>>>>>>>>>>> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is > >>>>>> transcendental] > >>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>>>> is > >>>>>>>>>>>> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. > >>>>> It > >>>>>>>> seems > >>>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>>>> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> I also realize this question may already be answered in > >>>>>> Vygotsky's > >>>>>>>>>> writings > >>>>>>>>>>>> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of > >>>>>> XMCA. I > >>>>>>>>>>>> personally am following this path for now. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Larry > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > >>>> with > >>>>>> an > >>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > with > >>>>> an > >>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > >>>> an > >>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> -- > >>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > an > >>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> -- > >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> -- > >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >> > >> > > > > > > > > > From helenaworthen@gmail.com Fri Dec 5 14:40:54 2014 From: helenaworthen@gmail.com (Helena Worthen) Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2014 14:40:54 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F90754DA@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> References: <1682996975.4827904.1417607429293.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11144.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> <3A40602C-44A1-45C7-A7D1-36E1A842E92B@gmail.com>, <8FDB5B35-D645-496F-93CB-077884244184@gmail.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F907548F@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu>, <4E148FDE-8090-43ED-9F4F-FAD731D8853C@gmail.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F90754DA@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: <2FDF9A0E-64D7-4131-8715-4B668B313EA4@gmail.com> Michael - Still trying to understand what you're saying. What I hear is something about the relationship between how we think about the world and how much we can control it, and a fear that human control will not help us survive. At the same time, I'm trying to see how to link up the present multiple conversations with the two historical documents that MIke sent out. One is the 1992 report by Gack and Finkelstein, explaining the history of LCHC and how it became XMCA. The other is Eva Eckblad's 1998 paper, Contact, Community and Multilogue. The reason why this has something to do with your message is because I think you are raising the topic of what is going to happen in the near future, to all of us. I want to ground this topic in how we got here, which means looking at whatever historical documents we've got.We're in a crisis now, right? Well, Vygotskian psychology was created in a period of crisis. That's one reason why it rings true. Take a look at the nature of the problem that the list serve was originally intended to solve. It was the problem of diversity. The Lab had lost funding, lost minority faculty and graduate students, and then lost more funding. The listserve was a way to get across geographic space. This was during the Reagan years, when "the Russians" were Soviets and we in the US were in the Cold war with them. The hostilities were serious. Linking up with colleagues in Moscow via satellite or phone or whatever other technology existed (this is pre-Internet!) was a defiance of the reigning political regime. I am going to pause here and see if anyone else wants to talk about the realities of our present world, this tool -- xmca -- that we have to share our words with, its history as a solution to a problem that still dogs us, and the history of this tradition of thinking that also has its roots in crisis. If anyone else picks up on this with me, I'll change the subject line and we can proceed. Helena Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com On Dec 5, 2014, at 1:03 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > Hi Helena, > > Perhaps I am just too deep into this to make sense. > > The issue is there are two types of cybernetics (did I say anything about mathematical, engineering - people who subscribe to cybernetics do engage in these vocations I think it is more philosophical). > > One type is first order cybernetics which involves controlled closed systems. People can have autocratic control of the systems developing the feedback loops they are looking for. > > The second type is second order cybernetics in which feed back loops are not human controlled but still exist as natural self-correcting mechanisms. What I recently read of Bateson (and I may have this wrong) is that Western philosophy has trouble with this. We are addicted to human control and certainty. > > This is not a new idea. Dewey wrote a whole book about it - the quest for certainty. > > The issue is it is very difficult for people to trust this idea that I guess the universe itself is self-correcting in a more productive way than human systems are. > > So the question becomes, do we want people to make sense of words, or do we want them to question what they do make sense of - in this case that we can control the universe around us and that there is a way to be certain about things because as humans we can manipulate them. I don't know, just one of the many things I struggle with. > > Michael > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Helena Worthen [helenaworthen@gmail.com] > Sent: Friday, December 05, 2014 3:52 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances > > Michael: > > Here is how I read your message: > > There are two (at least) ways of thinking about the world (meaning life, the universe, etc). One is the "exploration" perspective and the other is some overarching cybernetic (mathematical, engineering? designed?) perspective. The difference between the two that you want to draw attention to is that Bateson, who you name as someone associated with the second perspective, anticipated that any such system would self-correct eventually. > > Then you say that many educators do not trust a cybernetic system to self-correct. Is that right? > > I'm sure sure how what you call the "exploration" perspective differs from the cybernetic perspective. > > I think it's pretty obvious that whatever system us Westerners have trusted is about to self-correct in a pretty violent way, leaving few of us behind, including our grandchildren. Capitalism (I'm think of Picketty, here) doesn't self-correct, but the climate does and it is gearing up to pull a whopper on us. > > All of this is to say that while we toss ideas around there are real-world facts out there moving right along. I want to see people making use of these ideas. I want to know, "How is this word actually used in real life?" > > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > On Dec 5, 2014, at 11:46 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > >> Hi Helena, >> >> I'm not so sure if its the words or the way the thinking behind those words match up or don't match up with the systems of the individuals were are teaching live and think within. A little while ago I was reading Bateson and his idea that Western philosophy/thinking often precluded the idea of a supreme cybernetic system - the idea that we could and would be self-corrected through exploration of the universe rather than any conscious human design. We are a society obsessed with local control and the idea that we can manipulate the universe around us (which we can in small doses, but Bateson claim is destructive in the long run). >> >> Many of the words you mention such as affordances, mediators, activity often fall into the exploration perspective I think - and they become difficult to relate. >> >> A little while ago I wrote a sentence based on the idea that education should be based on open exploration because something akin to a supreme cybernetics will offer self-correcting feedback, and a big trouble is many educators don't trust that. And then I stared at the sentence for a while and realized the majority of people reading it (if anybody does ever read it) would just pass it right over. >> >> So what do we do? Hard to know. >> >> A side question for Mike - in those early meetings on distributed cognition that Don Norman was a part of did cybernetics and/or Bateson every some up? >> >> Michael >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Helena Worthen [helenaworthen@gmail.com] >> Sent: Friday, December 05, 2014 2:12 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances >> >> A voice from the margins, here: >> >> I learn a lot from this list, all the time, and would hate to have it go quiet or self-destruct. But my role in the world outside this list, out there in the synchronous landscape, involves trying to make ideas intelligible to working people who may not have more than a couple of years of community college. For this purpose, there is a whole roster of terms that are a problem. When I say these terms to regular people, they make a face as if they'd tasted something bad. >> >> Examples of terms like this are: >> >> affordance >> mediate >> activity >> CHAT (cultural-historical activity theory) >> >> and: >> >> development >> >> For my purposes, Annalisa's Dec 2 post on Gibson's invention of the term "affordance" is very useful. He explained clearly why he made it up. I can use that. >> >> Knud Illeris' book "Contemporary Theories of Learning: Learning theorists...in their own words" is a breath of fresh air for the same reason. You got to hear a whole collection of different people saying very different things about learning, all grouped together as learning theorists. >> >> theoristshttp://www.pgce.soton.ac.uk/IT/Learning/Theories/ContemporaryTheoriesofLearning%20Learning%20theorists%20in%20their%20own%20words%20-%20Knud%20Illeris.pdf >> >> >> Helena Worthen >> helenaworthen@gmail.com >> >> On Dec 3, 2014, at 11:26 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >> >>> Haydi, >>> Thank you so much! Here?s how it is for me: >>> I too have been waiting for Andy to come back. He is the reason I am in the chat. I have known about Vygotsky through Vera since the early 80s. But I, after my dissertation on L2 fluency in 1986, I worked as a teacher educator where research and publication wasn?t necessary for tenure and promotion. The college where I was working closed (bankruptcy) five years back and, like any working stiff, I am having to reinvent myself. So, in thrashing about I came to read Andy?s articles on "collaborative project" as a unit of analysis a few years back, started emailing with him one-on-one (and he was so generous with his time and patience in answering my questions about activity theory and Vygotsky), until he said it was time for me to join the chat. Andy mentored me until I had the courage to pipe up. Andy just edited a book on collaborative projects; Vera has written one of the papers for the book. I love them both. That?s how it is for me. >>> >>> Let me say that I consider myself a rank learner, always beginning. Mike has wisely rejected the role of Caesar on the chat. But we go to him asking him to sort out things amongst the unruly class. As a teacher, the hardest thing for me ever to do was to deal with disrespect between students. I have finally come to realize and accept that I want to be in a school where the students are nice to each other. Where respect and trust abound. Where human flourishing is possible. There is no father god to rescue us. We have to do it for ourselves. Well, like the song goes, ?I?m still willin?? Let?s make this a creative project, which means no unethical use of power. We can?t afford it. In my humble opinion. >>> >>> In gratitude and hope, >>> Henry >>> >>>> On Dec 3, 2014, at 11:00 AM, mike cole wrote: >>>> >>>> Haydi-- >>>> >>>> Like anyone on xmca, you can demand whatever you like. Getting people to >>>> implement your demands may be more >>>> difficult. In general, I have not experienced demands and resentment as >>>> particularly helpful on xmca, but thing are changing, >>>> so who knows. >>>> >>>> I am not putting ANL aside because of the concerns expressed in MCA in the >>>> past year or so. The concerns are real, at least to me. >>>> But there are many productive programs of research that use his ideas, >>>> along with those of LSV and many others, both Russian and non-Russian. >>>> >>>> I believe it would be helpful in receiving answers to your various comments >>>> and suggestions if some of them were constrained to particular threads. For >>>> example, the discussion of plank versus a piece of electronic equipment vis >>>> a vis the notion of artifact and mediation through artifacts, etc., might >>>> be be placed in that thread. >>>> >>>> etc. >>>> >>>> I clearly can be wrong in all of these judgments! >>>> mike >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wed, Dec 3, 2014 at 3:50 AM, Haydi Zulfei >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Hi >>>>> >>>>> First of all , so resentfully I wonder If I can demand Andy's return to >>>>> the discussions !! No one can deny his great contributions to this Forum . >>>>> >>>>> Second , I might have been lost completely in your words , terms , >>>>> premises , and compositional nuances and colourings of your script as >>>>> native speakers , etc. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Third , because of obvious sensitivities towards ANL , I've altogether put >>>>> him to one side ; otherwise , in this concrete example of Michael , the >>>>> triad , activity , action , operation are boldly in view . >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Fourth , I suppose LSV himself in two or three chapters of the "History of >>>>> Higher Mental Functions" has provided full response to our inquiries . Andy >>>>> , in time , sent the first two chapters to all . >>>>> >>>>> 1. He , after preliminary remarks , puts heavy emphasis on use of tools >>>>> and work activity in the parentheses and in italic characters . He >>>>> emphasizes that use of tool very naturally gets significant just within the >>>>> work activity process . Without the work activity we cannot expect much of >>>>> it . Then , as most of the time , he time and again references Marx and >>>>> Engels so as to prove his claims . >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> 2. Mike is so and for good reasons enchanted in "rudiments" of culture >>>>> phenomena (throwing dice and bones , knots , notches in the wood to >>>>> remember speech) . Good for him and us all . Yes , Buridan's ass gets >>>>> spoilt in its indecision But man through inventing stimulus-device gets to >>>>> salvation . But the problem is how many times has Mike , our Boss and >>>>> confirmed global figure no need for it to be documented , asked himself >>>>> what went before that juncture of time for the man to become 'MAN' ?? At >>>>> this moment we are with LSV and at a very critical point of time . No more >>>>> return to 'culture' to prove 'culture' . LSV says the error for some is to >>>>> recount the story of mental through mental while they should know that >>>>> mental processes go parallel with 'social' processes . What I gather at >>>>> this very point is that he expects us to infer that the 'our present man of >>>>> some will' owes his man/ness and decisiveness to his previous work activity >>>>> necessitating use of tools . It seems we cannot take the idea to the >>>>> uterine because V focuses on use of tools for a baby of 6 or of 10-12 >>>>> months of age . It seems , both phylogenetically and ontogenetically , that >>>>> it's not the case that 'gestures' ' eye contacts' come of their own and >>>>> because of the man/ness and for the tuning-up with the universe through >>>>> sounds and hymns and angels , etc. Man worked for life , performed ups and >>>>> downs , shook his extremeties (one pair of hand) , consumed ! collective >>>>> yellings and gesturing (as concomitant of work) . V says we can distinguish >>>>> independent history of natural processes and independent history of >>>>> cultural development separately 'phylogenetically' but not ontogenetically >>>>> . In ontology , nature and culture work simultaneously contrary to >>>>> phylogenesis . One cannot with ease and comfort say whichone goes with >>>>> whichone . >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> 3. Andy who is well aware of both CH and AT , on his sending of the four >>>>> pages and then the said two chapters , disclosed a very important point >>>>> neglected so far at the forum and that was the idea of the distinction >>>>> between tool and sign so fruitfully and enormously discussed by V and the >>>>> deep meaning that the simple diagram denoted . V says 'artifact' could be >>>>> cheating and deceitful but no one cares ! They invariably use artifacts and >>>>> through this , they ultimately remove 'material activity' from the domain >>>>> altogether . V is everywhere clear with both 'cultural , ideal activity' >>>>> and 'material activity' . Here is where quotes don't work . The one more >>>>> return to the plus-thousand previous reflections . No loss really ! V , if >>>>> necessary , prefers just 'mediation' . >>>>> >>>>> 4. With these in mind , I say for certain that here the plank is a tool >>>>> not an 'artifact' because it is not a sign signaling any other genuine >>>>> thing . It's all to itself . Also the light switch . And the whole activity >>>>> is a material one . Life put it in the way . According to V sign activity >>>>> affects one's own societal individual behaviour . We cannot generalize its >>>>> effect to the border of transforming Nature . Man through speech , dialogue >>>>> , discourse , talk , genre , etc. decides for the change in personal >>>>> behaviour ; if this potential preparedness for individual behavioral change >>>>> gets fossilized or ossified , then man will not reach the threshhold of the >>>>> bigger act and the vast field of the Mother Universe with its motley rich >>>>> material phenomena out of which each time he can select an object for a >>>>> circle of activity : starting an activity with a probable cryptic 'motive' >>>>> (what we don't yet know about which took him to the point of crossing) , >>>>> with a conscious goal (reaching the other side) through a concrete action >>>>> (crossing) operating according to the conditions at hand and on the ground >>>>> (light switching , wrestling between the ideal and the material (object , >>>>> subject , that is , thinking ideally about what to do with the whole thing >>>>> and the plank , then observing with the help of the light acting on the >>>>> object , again back to thinking if flaws are observed , etc. etc. no >>>>> blending of objective and subjective whatsoever . And I wonder why taking >>>>> affordance for a tool . >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Soooooooooo much for one post . >>>>> >>>>> I considered spaces but wonder if it works . >>>>> I'll also be very quiet and slow in replying ! >>>>> >>>>> Best >>>>> >>>>> Haydi >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> From: mike cole >>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>>>> Sent: Tuesday, 2 December 2014, 11:26:46 >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances >>>>> >>>>> My view? >>>>> The plank is for certain an artifact, no less than the light bulb. On what >>>>> grounds, or under what circumstances, would you classify it otherwise? >>>>> What's gained, what's lost? >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Glassman, Michael >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Hi Annalisa, Mike, Huw >>>>>> >>>>>> I tend to be somebody who reacts better to concrete examples than >>>>>> definitions. I believe this also comes from Gibson's 1977 book, >>>>>> >>>>>> You are walking across a field and come to a stream which you can to get >>>>>> across. You notice a plank across the stream. It is wide enough for you >>>>>> to keep your balance and thick enough to hold your weight, in using it >>>>> you >>>>>> recognize its affordance as a crossing point. It is the intersection of >>>>>> the movement, the perception of the plank, short term goal of the >>>>> activity >>>>>> (getting across the stream) - the recognition of the affordance comes in >>>>>> the subjective use of the object (which is why it is neither subjective >>>>> or >>>>>> objective). It is also important that you have the abilities (the >>>>> correct >>>>>> weight, the balance) to recognize the affordance, otherwise you pass the >>>>>> plank by. >>>>>> >>>>>> As far as perceived affordance. I think I have this right - the >>>>> perceived >>>>>> is not in the person who recognizes the affordance (otherwise you are >>>>>> right, that is wet water) it is whether there is an intention in the >>>>> design >>>>>> of the object. So I create a light switch with the intention of >>>>> designing >>>>>> it as having a perceived affordance for somebody who wants to switch on a >>>>>> light. As you can see different from the relationship to the plank, >>>>> where >>>>>> there is no prior design. >>>>>> >>>>>> Here is my question (perhaps answered in the Engestrom paper) >>>>>> >>>>>> The light switch is certainly an artifact, but is the plank? >>>>>> >>>>>> Michael >>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 1:19 PM >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances >>>>>> >>>>>> Those definitions help a lot Annalisa and touch on the fact that gibson >>>>>> seemed to empty the organism (if one were so inclined to interpret him) >>>>> and >>>>>> he dismissed culutral mediation as secondary at best. Still, they share >>>>> the >>>>>> idea that a part of the structure that psychologist theorize as a located >>>>>> inside of individual crania is in fact "our there" in the phylgenetically >>>>>> and cultural-historically constitued environment. And that drove >>>>> cognitive >>>>>> psychologists, our co discussants, nuts. Until, "they got it" and then >>>>>> sought to mold it to their own ends and pre-existing means. >>>>>> mike >>>>>> >>>>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 9:59 AM, Annalisa Aguilar >>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> I thought I'd do the honors and start a new thread on affordances, >>>>> which >>>>>>> isn't related to Larry's discussion of basic images. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I figured as well to offer Gibson's words on affordances since it is a >>>>>>> word he invented to describe something he saw in the world. Of course >>>>> the >>>>>>> life of affordances has been full of controversy, especially with >>>>> regard >>>>>> to >>>>>>> understanding what they are. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Gibson's Affordances is a theory I find instrumental to connecting >>>>>> outside >>>>>>> to inside experiences and I intuit that it is related to perezhivanie >>>>> in >>>>>>> some fashion. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> After reading the wikipage more closely, I regret offering a link to >>>>> the >>>>>>> text there because it isn't very clear what Gibson means or what Norman >>>>>>> means. To me, a "perceived affordance" is like saying "wet water." >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In any case, here are 3 quotes of Gibson in his own words, that I could >>>>>>> find: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The affordances of the environment are what it _offers_ the animal, >>>>> what >>>>>>> it _provides_ or _furnishes_, either for good or ill. The verb "to >>>>>> afford" >>>>>>> is found in the dictionary, the noun "affordance" is not. I have made >>>>> it >>>>>>> up. I mean by it something that refers both to the environment and the >>>>>>> animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies the >>>>>> complementarity >>>>>>> of the animal and the environment (Gibson, 1977/1986). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> and >>>>>>> >>>>>>> What is meant by an _affordance_? ?Subject to revision, I suggest that >>>>>> the >>>>>>> affordance of anything is a specific combination of the properties of >>>>> its >>>>>>> substance and its surfaces taken with reference to an animal. The >>>>>> reference >>>>>>> may be to an animal as distinguished from other species (Gibson, >>>>>> 1977/1986). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> and >>>>>>> >>>>>>> An important fact about affordances of the environment is that they are >>>>>> in >>>>>>> a sense objective, real, and physical, unlike values and meanings, >>>>> which >>>>>>> are often supposed to be subjective, phenomenal, and mental. But >>>>>> actually, >>>>>>> an affordance is neither an objective property nor a subjective >>>>> property; >>>>>>> or it is both if you like. An affordance cuts across the dichotomy of >>>>>>> subjective-objective and helps us to understand its inadequacy. It is >>>>>>> equally a fact of the environment and a fact of behavior. It is both >>>>>>> physical and psychical, yet neither. An affordance points both ways, to >>>>>> the >>>>>>> environment and to the observer (Gibson, 1977/1986). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> These quotes are important to keep in mind, I hope they help. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I might also suggest looking at Mace(1977) who described very carefully >>>>>>> how Gibson got from stimuli to affordance, given that people on this >>>>> list >>>>>>> value history, learning, and development. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> >>>>>>> on behalf of Huw Lloyd >>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 2, 2014 10:35 AM >>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I'd take a look. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Michael, utility or technical affordance might fit. My equivalent of >>>>>> your >>>>>>> perceived/discovered distinction is one of planned and technically >>>>>>> manifest. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 2 December 2014 at 16:44, Glassman, Michael >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I'd be interested in anybody else is. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Michael >>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ >>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>> ] >>>>>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 11:39 AM >>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Interloper, Michael? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The discussions at UCSD preceeding Don's use of affordances and >>>>>> cognitive >>>>>>>> artifacts were accompanied by other, related papers. One by Engestrom >>>>>> on >>>>>>>> "when is an artifact" and one or more by Ed Hutchins. If people are >>>>>>>> interested in pursuing this thread/topic the materials could be >>>>>> gathered >>>>>>>> up. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Glassman, Michael < >>>>> glassman.13@osu.edu >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea). >>>>> He >>>>>>>>> actually cops to both of them. The first was not to distinguish >>>>>>> between >>>>>>>>> affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which >>>>> are >>>>>>>>> designed. I think this is related to the issue of artifacts. >>>>>> Meaning >>>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>> artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to >>>>> be >>>>>>>>> discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong >>>>> word, >>>>>> if >>>>>>>>> anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances. It is a >>>>>>>> complex >>>>>>>>> question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes >>>>> based >>>>>> on >>>>>>>>> context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one >>>>>> context >>>>>>>> may >>>>>>>>> result in organic affordances in another context. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is that >>>>>> he >>>>>>>> was >>>>>>>>> not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and >>>>>>>> constraints. >>>>>>>>> Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived affordances >>>>> or >>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>> they designed to create constraints. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the >>>>>>> mention >>>>>>>>> just spurred me to throw this up. Hope I'm not being too much of >>>>> an >>>>>>>>> interloper. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Michael >>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ >>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>> ] >>>>>>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>>>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM >>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Annalisa- >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation >>>>>> not >>>>>>>>> discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of >>>>>>>>> affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set >>>>> against >>>>>>>>> Gibson's ideas. The change of views coincided with the advent of >>>>> the >>>>>>>> d-cog >>>>>>>>> idea which also has deep roots in chat. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> No hidden history i know of, but interesting connections among the >>>>>>>> notion >>>>>>>>> of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion of >>>>>>> these >>>>>>>>> connections can be found, among other places, in >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Cole, M. & Engestr?m, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach >>>>> to >>>>>>>>> distributed* >>>>>>>>> *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition: >>>>>> Psychological >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>> educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar >>>>> >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Hi Mike, >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied >>>>>> that >>>>>>>>> wish! >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important >>>>> connections. >>>>>> I >>>>>>>> was >>>>>>>>>> not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I >>>>> learned >>>>>>>> about >>>>>>>>>> Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science >>>>>> (1985). >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Is there some history that is not part of the common story? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I looked here for clarity: >>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to >>>>>>>> cognitive >>>>>>>>>> artifacts? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in >>>>>> play, >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>> even joy! >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however >>>>>> until >>>>>>>> then >>>>>>>>>> I will remain with the ineffable. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> on behalf of mike cole >>>>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM >>>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And, >>>>>>>>>> co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive >>>>>>>> artifacts >>>>>>>>>> right about that time at UCSD. If it were possible to find a >>>>>> source >>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>> makes these connections visible and available to read about it >>>>>> might >>>>>>>> be a >>>>>>>>>> step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of >>>>>>> intro >>>>>>>>> for >>>>>>>>>> newcomers to the discussion. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a >>>>>>>> newcomer's >>>>>>>>>> introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is >>>>> seeking >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> sort >>>>>>>>>> out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am >>>>>>>>> insuficiently >>>>>>>>>> read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted! >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many >>>>>>> rocks, >>>>>>>> so >>>>>>>>>> little time"! >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Mike >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> A >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Martin! >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental >>>>>>> representation" >>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>>> coming closer! >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's >>>>>>> theory >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>> affordances. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed >>>>>> article. >>>>>>>> But >>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>>> wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is >>>>>>>>> important >>>>>>>>>>> not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a >>>>>>>> grenade >>>>>>>>>>> pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the >>>>>> list. >>>>>>>> If >>>>>>>>>> you >>>>>>>>>>> can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look >>>>>> forward >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>> your >>>>>>>>>>> reply, Martin. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that >>>>> being >>>>>>> at >>>>>>>>> UCSD >>>>>>>>>>> and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that >>>>>>> influences >>>>>>>>> your >>>>>>>>>>> position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find >>>>>>>>> community >>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>> it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more >>>>> voluntary >>>>>>>>> phrased >>>>>>>>>>> that way). >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of >>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>> John >>>>>>>>>>> Packer > >>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM >>>>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> An interesting article, David. One way in which it is >>>>>> interesting, >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> me >>>>>>>>>>> at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not >>>>> used, >>>>>>>> even >>>>>>>>>>> once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" >>>>> images >>>>>> in >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> world around us - material representations - and he tries to >>>>>> define >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg < >>>>> dkellogg60@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Larry, Annalisa: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" >>>>>> when >>>>>>>> we >>>>>>>>>>>> met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of >>>>>>>>> anything >>>>>>>>>>>> except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe >>>>>>> available >>>>>>>>>>>> for a standard price all over China) She does not even >>>>> remember >>>>>>>>>>>> whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was >>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as >>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>> non-image based mental representation. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental >>>>> representations >>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>>>>> images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth >>>>> century. >>>>>>> In >>>>>>>>>>>> fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against >>>>>>>>> Titchener >>>>>>>>>>>> and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, >>>>>>>>>>>> everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated >>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>> many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically >>>>>>>> anterior >>>>>>>>>>>> to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would >>>>>> not >>>>>>>> have >>>>>>>>>>>> time or ability to process complex problems in real time. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that >>>>> are >>>>>>>>>>>> genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more >>>>>>>> reading >>>>>>>>>>>> to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read >>>>> than >>>>>> I >>>>>>> am >>>>>>>>>>>> (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels >>>>>> like >>>>>>>>>>>> she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do >>>>>> NOT >>>>>>>> read >>>>>>>>>>>> this article--instead, look at Figure 11. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color >>>>> structure >>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>> Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any >>>>>>> actual >>>>>>>>>>>> images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural >>>>>>>>> experience >>>>>>>>>>>> associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then >>>>>>> deliberately >>>>>>>>>>>> frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any >>>>>>>>>>>> recognizable figures upon which to focus. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine >>>>> Chapel >>>>>>>> fresco >>>>>>>>>>>> for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. >>>>> He >>>>>> or >>>>>>>> she >>>>>>>>>>>> can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the >>>>> painting >>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>> wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not >>>>>>> notice >>>>>>>>>>>> the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful >>>>> in >>>>>>> it. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar < >>>>>> annalisa@unm.edu >>>>>>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Larry and David, >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are >>>>>> at >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> root of all thinking. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, >>>>>> based >>>>>>>> upon >>>>>>>>>>> previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, >>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>> combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a >>>>>>> phrase >>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>> like >>>>>>>>>>> a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on >>>>> it >>>>>>> by >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know >>>>> it. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think >>>>> as >>>>>>>>> Hackett >>>>>>>>>>> describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have >>>>>> you >>>>>>>>>> already >>>>>>>>>>> given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be >>>>>>> willing >>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>> take a look. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is >>>>>>>>> controversial. >>>>>>>>>>> It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone >>>>>>> says >>>>>>>>>> "this >>>>>>>>>>> is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble >>>>>>>>> observation. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and >>>>> whatever >>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>> process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at >>>>>>> hand? >>>>>>>>>> Just a >>>>>>>>>>> thought. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> What is it that appeals to you about this model, >>>>>> metaphoricity? >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of >>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>> Purss < >>>>>>>>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM >>>>>>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity >>>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> David K >>>>>>>>>>>>> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. >>>>>> My >>>>>>>>> reason >>>>>>>>>>> for >>>>>>>>>>>>> exploring these authors is I have been following a path >>>>>>> pursuing a >>>>>>>>>> basic >>>>>>>>>>>>> question. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic >>>>>>>> guiding >>>>>>>>>>> images >>>>>>>>>>>>> upon which thinking rests" >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring >>>>>>> appearances >>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>> illusions was also exploring this theme. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new >>>>>>> phenomenological >>>>>>>>>> path >>>>>>>>>>>>> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names >>>>>>> this >>>>>>>>>>> process >>>>>>>>>>>>> *metaphoricity*. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible >>>>>>>> image-character >>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>> *spontaneous event* of meaning. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which >>>>> he >>>>>>>>>> brackets - >>>>>>>>>>>>> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> AND >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* >>>>>> finds >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning of its very self. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this >>>>>>>>>>>>> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion >>>>> of >>>>>>>>>> metaphor >>>>>>>>>>> can >>>>>>>>>>>>> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is >>>>> implicated >>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>> *objectivity* >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of >>>>>>> itself >>>>>>>>>> *in* >>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>> mode [path] of the concept >>>>>>>>>>>>> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding >>>>>>> images >>>>>>>>> has >>>>>>>>>>> been >>>>>>>>>>>>> established. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the >>>>>> path >>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is >>>>> derived >>>>>>>> from >>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>> image-character of the guiding image. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial >>>>>> this >>>>>>>>> topic >>>>>>>>>>> may >>>>>>>>>>>>> become [again] >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by >>>>> this >>>>>>>> basic >>>>>>>>>>>>> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these >>>>>>> images >>>>>>>> as >>>>>>>>>>>>> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images >>>>>> emerge >>>>>>>>>>>>> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is >>>>>>> transcendental] >>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>>>>> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. >>>>>> It >>>>>>>>> seems >>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I also realize this question may already be answered in >>>>>>> Vygotsky's >>>>>>>>>>> writings >>>>>>>>>>>>> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of >>>>>>> XMCA. I >>>>>>>>>>>>> personally am following this path for now. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >>>>> with >>>>>>> an >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>>>>> an >>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>>>> an >>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>> >>> >> >> >> > > > From glassman.13@osu.edu Fri Dec 5 15:01:05 2014 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2014 23:01:05 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances In-Reply-To: <2FDF9A0E-64D7-4131-8715-4B668B313EA4@gmail.com> References: <1682996975.4827904.1417607429293.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11144.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> <3A40602C-44A1-45C7-A7D1-36E1A842E92B@gmail.com>, <8FDB5B35-D645-496F-93CB-077884244184@gmail.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F907548F@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu>, <4E148FDE-8090-43ED-9F4F-FAD731D8853C@gmail.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F90754DA@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu>, <2FDF9A0E-64D7-4131-8715-4B668B313EA4@gmail.com> Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9075523@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Great post Helena (and Larry too0, What a great conversation it would be. We are certainly in a crisis with clouds growing darker by the moment. I hope others join the conversation. Michael ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Helena Worthen [helenaworthen@gmail.com] Sent: Friday, December 05, 2014 5:40 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances Michael - Still trying to understand what you're saying. What I hear is something about the relationship between how we think about the world and how much we can control it, and a fear that human control will not help us survive. At the same time, I'm trying to see how to link up the present multiple conversations with the two historical documents that MIke sent out. One is the 1992 report by Gack and Finkelstein, explaining the history of LCHC and how it became XMCA. The other is Eva Eckblad's 1998 paper, Contact, Community and Multilogue. The reason why this has something to do with your message is because I think you are raising the topic of what is going to happen in the near future, to all of us. I want to ground this topic in how we got here, which means looking at whatever historical documents we've got.We're in a crisis now, right? Well, Vygotskian psychology was created in a period of crisis. That's one reason why it rings true. Take a look at the nature of the problem that the list serve was originally intended to solve. It was the problem of diversity. The Lab had lost funding, lost minority faculty and graduate students, and then lost more funding. The listserve was a way to get across geographic space. This was during the Reagan years, when "the Russians" were Soviets and we in the US were in the Cold war with them. The hostilities were serious. Linking up with colleagues in Moscow via satellite or phone or whatever other technology existed (this is pre-Internet!) was a defiance of the reigning political regime. I am going to pause here and see if anyone else wants to talk about the realities of our present world, this tool -- xmca -- that we have to share our words with, its history as a solution to a problem that still dogs us, and the history of this tradition of thinking that also has its roots in crisis. If anyone else picks up on this with me, I'll change the subject line and we can proceed. Helena Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com On Dec 5, 2014, at 1:03 PM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > Hi Helena, > > Perhaps I am just too deep into this to make sense. > > The issue is there are two types of cybernetics (did I say anything about mathematical, engineering - people who subscribe to cybernetics do engage in these vocations I think it is more philosophical). > > One type is first order cybernetics which involves controlled closed systems. People can have autocratic control of the systems developing the feedback loops they are looking for. > > The second type is second order cybernetics in which feed back loops are not human controlled but still exist as natural self-correcting mechanisms. What I recently read of Bateson (and I may have this wrong) is that Western philosophy has trouble with this. We are addicted to human control and certainty. > > This is not a new idea. Dewey wrote a whole book about it - the quest for certainty. > > The issue is it is very difficult for people to trust this idea that I guess the universe itself is self-correcting in a more productive way than human systems are. > > So the question becomes, do we want people to make sense of words, or do we want them to question what they do make sense of - in this case that we can control the universe around us and that there is a way to be certain about things because as humans we can manipulate them. I don't know, just one of the many things I struggle with. > > Michael > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Helena Worthen [helenaworthen@gmail.com] > Sent: Friday, December 05, 2014 3:52 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances > > Michael: > > Here is how I read your message: > > There are two (at least) ways of thinking about the world (meaning life, the universe, etc). One is the "exploration" perspective and the other is some overarching cybernetic (mathematical, engineering? designed?) perspective. The difference between the two that you want to draw attention to is that Bateson, who you name as someone associated with the second perspective, anticipated that any such system would self-correct eventually. > > Then you say that many educators do not trust a cybernetic system to self-correct. Is that right? > > I'm sure sure how what you call the "exploration" perspective differs from the cybernetic perspective. > > I think it's pretty obvious that whatever system us Westerners have trusted is about to self-correct in a pretty violent way, leaving few of us behind, including our grandchildren. Capitalism (I'm think of Picketty, here) doesn't self-correct, but the climate does and it is gearing up to pull a whopper on us. > > All of this is to say that while we toss ideas around there are real-world facts out there moving right along. I want to see people making use of these ideas. I want to know, "How is this word actually used in real life?" > > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > On Dec 5, 2014, at 11:46 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > >> Hi Helena, >> >> I'm not so sure if its the words or the way the thinking behind those words match up or don't match up with the systems of the individuals were are teaching live and think within. A little while ago I was reading Bateson and his idea that Western philosophy/thinking often precluded the idea of a supreme cybernetic system - the idea that we could and would be self-corrected through exploration of the universe rather than any conscious human design. We are a society obsessed with local control and the idea that we can manipulate the universe around us (which we can in small doses, but Bateson claim is destructive in the long run). >> >> Many of the words you mention such as affordances, mediators, activity often fall into the exploration perspective I think - and they become difficult to relate. >> >> A little while ago I wrote a sentence based on the idea that education should be based on open exploration because something akin to a supreme cybernetics will offer self-correcting feedback, and a big trouble is many educators don't trust that. And then I stared at the sentence for a while and realized the majority of people reading it (if anybody does ever read it) would just pass it right over. >> >> So what do we do? Hard to know. >> >> A side question for Mike - in those early meetings on distributed cognition that Don Norman was a part of did cybernetics and/or Bateson every some up? >> >> Michael >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Helena Worthen [helenaworthen@gmail.com] >> Sent: Friday, December 05, 2014 2:12 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances >> >> A voice from the margins, here: >> >> I learn a lot from this list, all the time, and would hate to have it go quiet or self-destruct. But my role in the world outside this list, out there in the synchronous landscape, involves trying to make ideas intelligible to working people who may not have more than a couple of years of community college. For this purpose, there is a whole roster of terms that are a problem. When I say these terms to regular people, they make a face as if they'd tasted something bad. >> >> Examples of terms like this are: >> >> affordance >> mediate >> activity >> CHAT (cultural-historical activity theory) >> >> and: >> >> development >> >> For my purposes, Annalisa's Dec 2 post on Gibson's invention of the term "affordance" is very useful. He explained clearly why he made it up. I can use that. >> >> Knud Illeris' book "Contemporary Theories of Learning: Learning theorists...in their own words" is a breath of fresh air for the same reason. You got to hear a whole collection of different people saying very different things about learning, all grouped together as learning theorists. >> >> theoristshttp://www.pgce.soton.ac.uk/IT/Learning/Theories/ContemporaryTheoriesofLearning%20Learning%20theorists%20in%20their%20own%20words%20-%20Knud%20Illeris.pdf >> >> >> Helena Worthen >> helenaworthen@gmail.com >> >> On Dec 3, 2014, at 11:26 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >> >>> Haydi, >>> Thank you so much! Here?s how it is for me: >>> I too have been waiting for Andy to come back. He is the reason I am in the chat. I have known about Vygotsky through Vera since the early 80s. But I, after my dissertation on L2 fluency in 1986, I worked as a teacher educator where research and publication wasn?t necessary for tenure and promotion. The college where I was working closed (bankruptcy) five years back and, like any working stiff, I am having to reinvent myself. So, in thrashing about I came to read Andy?s articles on "collaborative project" as a unit of analysis a few years back, started emailing with him one-on-one (and he was so generous with his time and patience in answering my questions about activity theory and Vygotsky), until he said it was time for me to join the chat. Andy mentored me until I had the courage to pipe up. Andy just edited a book on collaborative projects; Vera has written one of the papers for the book. I love them both. That?s how it is for me. >>> >>> Let me say that I consider myself a rank learner, always beginning. Mike has wisely rejected the role of Caesar on the chat. But we go to him asking him to sort out things amongst the unruly class. As a teacher, the hardest thing for me ever to do was to deal with disrespect between students. I have finally come to realize and accept that I want to be in a school where the students are nice to each other. Where respect and trust abound. Where human flourishing is possible. There is no father god to rescue us. We have to do it for ourselves. Well, like the song goes, ?I?m still willin?? Let?s make this a creative project, which means no unethical use of power. We can?t afford it. In my humble opinion. >>> >>> In gratitude and hope, >>> Henry >>> >>>> On Dec 3, 2014, at 11:00 AM, mike cole wrote: >>>> >>>> Haydi-- >>>> >>>> Like anyone on xmca, you can demand whatever you like. Getting people to >>>> implement your demands may be more >>>> difficult. In general, I have not experienced demands and resentment as >>>> particularly helpful on xmca, but thing are changing, >>>> so who knows. >>>> >>>> I am not putting ANL aside because of the concerns expressed in MCA in the >>>> past year or so. The concerns are real, at least to me. >>>> But there are many productive programs of research that use his ideas, >>>> along with those of LSV and many others, both Russian and non-Russian. >>>> >>>> I believe it would be helpful in receiving answers to your various comments >>>> and suggestions if some of them were constrained to particular threads. For >>>> example, the discussion of plank versus a piece of electronic equipment vis >>>> a vis the notion of artifact and mediation through artifacts, etc., might >>>> be be placed in that thread. >>>> >>>> etc. >>>> >>>> I clearly can be wrong in all of these judgments! >>>> mike >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wed, Dec 3, 2014 at 3:50 AM, Haydi Zulfei >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Hi >>>>> >>>>> First of all , so resentfully I wonder If I can demand Andy's return to >>>>> the discussions !! No one can deny his great contributions to this Forum . >>>>> >>>>> Second , I might have been lost completely in your words , terms , >>>>> premises , and compositional nuances and colourings of your script as >>>>> native speakers , etc. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Third , because of obvious sensitivities towards ANL , I've altogether put >>>>> him to one side ; otherwise , in this concrete example of Michael , the >>>>> triad , activity , action , operation are boldly in view . >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Fourth , I suppose LSV himself in two or three chapters of the "History of >>>>> Higher Mental Functions" has provided full response to our inquiries . Andy >>>>> , in time , sent the first two chapters to all . >>>>> >>>>> 1. He , after preliminary remarks , puts heavy emphasis on use of tools >>>>> and work activity in the parentheses and in italic characters . He >>>>> emphasizes that use of tool very naturally gets significant just within the >>>>> work activity process . Without the work activity we cannot expect much of >>>>> it . Then , as most of the time , he time and again references Marx and >>>>> Engels so as to prove his claims . >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> 2. Mike is so and for good reasons enchanted in "rudiments" of culture >>>>> phenomena (throwing dice and bones , knots , notches in the wood to >>>>> remember speech) . Good for him and us all . Yes , Buridan's ass gets >>>>> spoilt in its indecision But man through inventing stimulus-device gets to >>>>> salvation . But the problem is how many times has Mike , our Boss and >>>>> confirmed global figure no need for it to be documented , asked himself >>>>> what went before that juncture of time for the man to become 'MAN' ?? At >>>>> this moment we are with LSV and at a very critical point of time . No more >>>>> return to 'culture' to prove 'culture' . LSV says the error for some is to >>>>> recount the story of mental through mental while they should know that >>>>> mental processes go parallel with 'social' processes . What I gather at >>>>> this very point is that he expects us to infer that the 'our present man of >>>>> some will' owes his man/ness and decisiveness to his previous work activity >>>>> necessitating use of tools . It seems we cannot take the idea to the >>>>> uterine because V focuses on use of tools for a baby of 6 or of 10-12 >>>>> months of age . It seems , both phylogenetically and ontogenetically , that >>>>> it's not the case that 'gestures' ' eye contacts' come of their own and >>>>> because of the man/ness and for the tuning-up with the universe through >>>>> sounds and hymns and angels , etc. Man worked for life , performed ups and >>>>> downs , shook his extremeties (one pair of hand) , consumed ! collective >>>>> yellings and gesturing (as concomitant of work) . V says we can distinguish >>>>> independent history of natural processes and independent history of >>>>> cultural development separately 'phylogenetically' but not ontogenetically >>>>> . In ontology , nature and culture work simultaneously contrary to >>>>> phylogenesis . One cannot with ease and comfort say whichone goes with >>>>> whichone . >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> 3. Andy who is well aware of both CH and AT , on his sending of the four >>>>> pages and then the said two chapters , disclosed a very important point >>>>> neglected so far at the forum and that was the idea of the distinction >>>>> between tool and sign so fruitfully and enormously discussed by V and the >>>>> deep meaning that the simple diagram denoted . V says 'artifact' could be >>>>> cheating and deceitful but no one cares ! They invariably use artifacts and >>>>> through this , they ultimately remove 'material activity' from the domain >>>>> altogether . V is everywhere clear with both 'cultural , ideal activity' >>>>> and 'material activity' . Here is where quotes don't work . The one more >>>>> return to the plus-thousand previous reflections . No loss really ! V , if >>>>> necessary , prefers just 'mediation' . >>>>> >>>>> 4. With these in mind , I say for certain that here the plank is a tool >>>>> not an 'artifact' because it is not a sign signaling any other genuine >>>>> thing . It's all to itself . Also the light switch . And the whole activity >>>>> is a material one . Life put it in the way . According to V sign activity >>>>> affects one's own societal individual behaviour . We cannot generalize its >>>>> effect to the border of transforming Nature . Man through speech , dialogue >>>>> , discourse , talk , genre , etc. decides for the change in personal >>>>> behaviour ; if this potential preparedness for individual behavioral change >>>>> gets fossilized or ossified , then man will not reach the threshhold of the >>>>> bigger act and the vast field of the Mother Universe with its motley rich >>>>> material phenomena out of which each time he can select an object for a >>>>> circle of activity : starting an activity with a probable cryptic 'motive' >>>>> (what we don't yet know about which took him to the point of crossing) , >>>>> with a conscious goal (reaching the other side) through a concrete action >>>>> (crossing) operating according to the conditions at hand and on the ground >>>>> (light switching , wrestling between the ideal and the material (object , >>>>> subject , that is , thinking ideally about what to do with the whole thing >>>>> and the plank , then observing with the help of the light acting on the >>>>> object , again back to thinking if flaws are observed , etc. etc. no >>>>> blending of objective and subjective whatsoever . And I wonder why taking >>>>> affordance for a tool . >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Soooooooooo much for one post . >>>>> >>>>> I considered spaces but wonder if it works . >>>>> I'll also be very quiet and slow in replying ! >>>>> >>>>> Best >>>>> >>>>> Haydi >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> From: mike cole >>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>>>> Sent: Tuesday, 2 December 2014, 11:26:46 >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances >>>>> >>>>> My view? >>>>> The plank is for certain an artifact, no less than the light bulb. On what >>>>> grounds, or under what circumstances, would you classify it otherwise? >>>>> What's gained, what's lost? >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Glassman, Michael >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Hi Annalisa, Mike, Huw >>>>>> >>>>>> I tend to be somebody who reacts better to concrete examples than >>>>>> definitions. I believe this also comes from Gibson's 1977 book, >>>>>> >>>>>> You are walking across a field and come to a stream which you can to get >>>>>> across. You notice a plank across the stream. It is wide enough for you >>>>>> to keep your balance and thick enough to hold your weight, in using it >>>>> you >>>>>> recognize its affordance as a crossing point. It is the intersection of >>>>>> the movement, the perception of the plank, short term goal of the >>>>> activity >>>>>> (getting across the stream) - the recognition of the affordance comes in >>>>>> the subjective use of the object (which is why it is neither subjective >>>>> or >>>>>> objective). It is also important that you have the abilities (the >>>>> correct >>>>>> weight, the balance) to recognize the affordance, otherwise you pass the >>>>>> plank by. >>>>>> >>>>>> As far as perceived affordance. I think I have this right - the >>>>> perceived >>>>>> is not in the person who recognizes the affordance (otherwise you are >>>>>> right, that is wet water) it is whether there is an intention in the >>>>> design >>>>>> of the object. So I create a light switch with the intention of >>>>> designing >>>>>> it as having a perceived affordance for somebody who wants to switch on a >>>>>> light. As you can see different from the relationship to the plank, >>>>> where >>>>>> there is no prior design. >>>>>> >>>>>> Here is my question (perhaps answered in the Engestrom paper) >>>>>> >>>>>> The light switch is certainly an artifact, but is the plank? >>>>>> >>>>>> Michael >>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 1:19 PM >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances >>>>>> >>>>>> Those definitions help a lot Annalisa and touch on the fact that gibson >>>>>> seemed to empty the organism (if one were so inclined to interpret him) >>>>> and >>>>>> he dismissed culutral mediation as secondary at best. Still, they share >>>>> the >>>>>> idea that a part of the structure that psychologist theorize as a located >>>>>> inside of individual crania is in fact "our there" in the phylgenetically >>>>>> and cultural-historically constitued environment. And that drove >>>>> cognitive >>>>>> psychologists, our co discussants, nuts. Until, "they got it" and then >>>>>> sought to mold it to their own ends and pre-existing means. >>>>>> mike >>>>>> >>>>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 9:59 AM, Annalisa Aguilar >>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> I thought I'd do the honors and start a new thread on affordances, >>>>> which >>>>>>> isn't related to Larry's discussion of basic images. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I figured as well to offer Gibson's words on affordances since it is a >>>>>>> word he invented to describe something he saw in the world. Of course >>>>> the >>>>>>> life of affordances has been full of controversy, especially with >>>>> regard >>>>>> to >>>>>>> understanding what they are. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Gibson's Affordances is a theory I find instrumental to connecting >>>>>> outside >>>>>>> to inside experiences and I intuit that it is related to perezhivanie >>>>> in >>>>>>> some fashion. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> After reading the wikipage more closely, I regret offering a link to >>>>> the >>>>>>> text there because it isn't very clear what Gibson means or what Norman >>>>>>> means. To me, a "perceived affordance" is like saying "wet water." >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In any case, here are 3 quotes of Gibson in his own words, that I could >>>>>>> find: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The affordances of the environment are what it _offers_ the animal, >>>>> what >>>>>>> it _provides_ or _furnishes_, either for good or ill. The verb "to >>>>>> afford" >>>>>>> is found in the dictionary, the noun "affordance" is not. I have made >>>>> it >>>>>>> up. I mean by it something that refers both to the environment and the >>>>>>> animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies the >>>>>> complementarity >>>>>>> of the animal and the environment (Gibson, 1977/1986). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> and >>>>>>> >>>>>>> What is meant by an _affordance_? ?Subject to revision, I suggest that >>>>>> the >>>>>>> affordance of anything is a specific combination of the properties of >>>>> its >>>>>>> substance and its surfaces taken with reference to an animal. The >>>>>> reference >>>>>>> may be to an animal as distinguished from other species (Gibson, >>>>>> 1977/1986). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> and >>>>>>> >>>>>>> An important fact about affordances of the environment is that they are >>>>>> in >>>>>>> a sense objective, real, and physical, unlike values and meanings, >>>>> which >>>>>>> are often supposed to be subjective, phenomenal, and mental. But >>>>>> actually, >>>>>>> an affordance is neither an objective property nor a subjective >>>>> property; >>>>>>> or it is both if you like. An affordance cuts across the dichotomy of >>>>>>> subjective-objective and helps us to understand its inadequacy. It is >>>>>>> equally a fact of the environment and a fact of behavior. It is both >>>>>>> physical and psychical, yet neither. An affordance points both ways, to >>>>>> the >>>>>>> environment and to the observer (Gibson, 1977/1986). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> These quotes are important to keep in mind, I hope they help. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I might also suggest looking at Mace(1977) who described very carefully >>>>>>> how Gibson got from stimuli to affordance, given that people on this >>>>> list >>>>>>> value history, learning, and development. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> >>>>>>> on behalf of Huw Lloyd >>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 2, 2014 10:35 AM >>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I'd take a look. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Michael, utility or technical affordance might fit. My equivalent of >>>>>> your >>>>>>> perceived/discovered distinction is one of planned and technically >>>>>>> manifest. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 2 December 2014 at 16:44, Glassman, Michael >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I'd be interested in anybody else is. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Michael >>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ >>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>> ] >>>>>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 11:39 AM >>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Interloper, Michael? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The discussions at UCSD preceeding Don's use of affordances and >>>>>> cognitive >>>>>>>> artifacts were accompanied by other, related papers. One by Engestrom >>>>>> on >>>>>>>> "when is an artifact" and one or more by Ed Hutchins. If people are >>>>>>>> interested in pursuing this thread/topic the materials could be >>>>>> gathered >>>>>>>> up. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Glassman, Michael < >>>>> glassman.13@osu.edu >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea). >>>>> He >>>>>>>>> actually cops to both of them. The first was not to distinguish >>>>>>> between >>>>>>>>> affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which >>>>> are >>>>>>>>> designed. I think this is related to the issue of artifacts. >>>>>> Meaning >>>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>> artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to >>>>> be >>>>>>>>> discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong >>>>> word, >>>>>> if >>>>>>>>> anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances. It is a >>>>>>>> complex >>>>>>>>> question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes >>>>> based >>>>>> on >>>>>>>>> context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one >>>>>> context >>>>>>>> may >>>>>>>>> result in organic affordances in another context. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is that >>>>>> he >>>>>>>> was >>>>>>>>> not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and >>>>>>>> constraints. >>>>>>>>> Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived affordances >>>>> or >>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>> they designed to create constraints. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the >>>>>>> mention >>>>>>>>> just spurred me to throw this up. Hope I'm not being too much of >>>>> an >>>>>>>>> interloper. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Michael >>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ >>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>> ] >>>>>>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>>>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM >>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Annalisa- >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation >>>>>> not >>>>>>>>> discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of >>>>>>>>> affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set >>>>> against >>>>>>>>> Gibson's ideas. The change of views coincided with the advent of >>>>> the >>>>>>>> d-cog >>>>>>>>> idea which also has deep roots in chat. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> No hidden history i know of, but interesting connections among the >>>>>>>> notion >>>>>>>>> of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion of >>>>>>> these >>>>>>>>> connections can be found, among other places, in >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Cole, M. & Engestr?m, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach >>>>> to >>>>>>>>> distributed* >>>>>>>>> *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition: >>>>>> Psychological >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>> educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar >>>>> >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Hi Mike, >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied >>>>>> that >>>>>>>>> wish! >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important >>>>> connections. >>>>>> I >>>>>>>> was >>>>>>>>>> not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I >>>>> learned >>>>>>>> about >>>>>>>>>> Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science >>>>>> (1985). >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Is there some history that is not part of the common story? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I looked here for clarity: >>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to >>>>>>>> cognitive >>>>>>>>>> artifacts? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in >>>>>> play, >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>> even joy! >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however >>>>>> until >>>>>>>> then >>>>>>>>>> I will remain with the ineffable. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> on behalf of mike cole >>>>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM >>>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And, >>>>>>>>>> co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive >>>>>>>> artifacts >>>>>>>>>> right about that time at UCSD. If it were possible to find a >>>>>> source >>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>> makes these connections visible and available to read about it >>>>>> might >>>>>>>> be a >>>>>>>>>> step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of >>>>>>> intro >>>>>>>>> for >>>>>>>>>> newcomers to the discussion. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a >>>>>>>> newcomer's >>>>>>>>>> introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is >>>>> seeking >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> sort >>>>>>>>>> out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am >>>>>>>>> insuficiently >>>>>>>>>> read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted! >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many >>>>>>> rocks, >>>>>>>> so >>>>>>>>>> little time"! >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Mike >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> A >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Martin! >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental >>>>>>> representation" >>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>>> coming closer! >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's >>>>>>> theory >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>> affordances. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed >>>>>> article. >>>>>>>> But >>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>>> wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is >>>>>>>>> important >>>>>>>>>>> not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a >>>>>>>> grenade >>>>>>>>>>> pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the >>>>>> list. >>>>>>>> If >>>>>>>>>> you >>>>>>>>>>> can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look >>>>>> forward >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>> your >>>>>>>>>>> reply, Martin. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that >>>>> being >>>>>>> at >>>>>>>>> UCSD >>>>>>>>>>> and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that >>>>>>> influences >>>>>>>>> your >>>>>>>>>>> position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find >>>>>>>>> community >>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>> it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more >>>>> voluntary >>>>>>>>> phrased >>>>>>>>>>> that way). >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of >>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>> John >>>>>>>>>>> Packer > >>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM >>>>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> An interesting article, David. One way in which it is >>>>>> interesting, >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> me >>>>>>>>>>> at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not >>>>> used, >>>>>>>> even >>>>>>>>>>> once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" >>>>> images >>>>>> in >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> world around us - material representations - and he tries to >>>>>> define >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg < >>>>> dkellogg60@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Larry, Annalisa: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" >>>>>> when >>>>>>>> we >>>>>>>>>>>> met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of >>>>>>>>> anything >>>>>>>>>>>> except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe >>>>>>> available >>>>>>>>>>>> for a standard price all over China) She does not even >>>>> remember >>>>>>>>>>>> whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was >>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as >>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>> non-image based mental representation. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental >>>>> representations >>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>>>>> images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth >>>>> century. >>>>>>> In >>>>>>>>>>>> fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against >>>>>>>>> Titchener >>>>>>>>>>>> and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, >>>>>>>>>>>> everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated >>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>> many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically >>>>>>>> anterior >>>>>>>>>>>> to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would >>>>>> not >>>>>>>> have >>>>>>>>>>>> time or ability to process complex problems in real time. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that >>>>> are >>>>>>>>>>>> genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more >>>>>>>> reading >>>>>>>>>>>> to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read >>>>> than >>>>>> I >>>>>>> am >>>>>>>>>>>> (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels >>>>>> like >>>>>>>>>>>> she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do >>>>>> NOT >>>>>>>> read >>>>>>>>>>>> this article--instead, look at Figure 11. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color >>>>> structure >>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>> Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any >>>>>>> actual >>>>>>>>>>>> images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural >>>>>>>>> experience >>>>>>>>>>>> associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then >>>>>>> deliberately >>>>>>>>>>>> frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any >>>>>>>>>>>> recognizable figures upon which to focus. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine >>>>> Chapel >>>>>>>> fresco >>>>>>>>>>>> for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. >>>>> He >>>>>> or >>>>>>>> she >>>>>>>>>>>> can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the >>>>> painting >>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>> wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not >>>>>>> notice >>>>>>>>>>>> the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful >>>>> in >>>>>>> it. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar < >>>>>> annalisa@unm.edu >>>>>>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Larry and David, >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are >>>>>> at >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> root of all thinking. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, >>>>>> based >>>>>>>> upon >>>>>>>>>>> previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, >>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>> combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a >>>>>>> phrase >>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>> like >>>>>>>>>>> a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on >>>>> it >>>>>>> by >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know >>>>> it. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think >>>>> as >>>>>>>>> Hackett >>>>>>>>>>> describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have >>>>>> you >>>>>>>>>> already >>>>>>>>>>> given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be >>>>>>> willing >>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>> take a look. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is >>>>>>>>> controversial. >>>>>>>>>>> It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone >>>>>>> says >>>>>>>>>> "this >>>>>>>>>>> is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble >>>>>>>>> observation. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and >>>>> whatever >>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>> process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at >>>>>>> hand? >>>>>>>>>> Just a >>>>>>>>>>> thought. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> What is it that appeals to you about this model, >>>>>> metaphoricity? >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of >>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>> Purss < >>>>>>>>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM >>>>>>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity >>>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> David K >>>>>>>>>>>>> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. >>>>>> My >>>>>>>>> reason >>>>>>>>>>> for >>>>>>>>>>>>> exploring these authors is I have been following a path >>>>>>> pursuing a >>>>>>>>>> basic >>>>>>>>>>>>> question. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic >>>>>>>> guiding >>>>>>>>>>> images >>>>>>>>>>>>> upon which thinking rests" >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring >>>>>>> appearances >>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>> illusions was also exploring this theme. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new >>>>>>> phenomenological >>>>>>>>>> path >>>>>>>>>>>>> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names >>>>>>> this >>>>>>>>>>> process >>>>>>>>>>>>> *metaphoricity*. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible >>>>>>>> image-character >>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>> *spontaneous event* of meaning. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which >>>>> he >>>>>>>>>> brackets - >>>>>>>>>>>>> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> AND >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* >>>>>> finds >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning of its very self. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this >>>>>>>>>>>>> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion >>>>> of >>>>>>>>>> metaphor >>>>>>>>>>> can >>>>>>>>>>>>> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is >>>>> implicated >>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>> *objectivity* >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of >>>>>>> itself >>>>>>>>>> *in* >>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>> mode [path] of the concept >>>>>>>>>>>>> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding >>>>>>> images >>>>>>>>> has >>>>>>>>>>> been >>>>>>>>>>>>> established. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the >>>>>> path >>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is >>>>> derived >>>>>>>> from >>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>> image-character of the guiding image. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial >>>>>> this >>>>>>>>> topic >>>>>>>>>>> may >>>>>>>>>>>>> become [again] >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by >>>>> this >>>>>>>> basic >>>>>>>>>>>>> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these >>>>>>> images >>>>>>>> as >>>>>>>>>>>>> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images >>>>>> emerge >>>>>>>>>>>>> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is >>>>>>> transcendental] >>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>>>>> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. >>>>>> It >>>>>>>>> seems >>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I also realize this question may already be answered in >>>>>>> Vygotsky's >>>>>>>>>>> writings >>>>>>>>>>>>> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of >>>>>>> XMCA. I >>>>>>>>>>>>> personally am following this path for now. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >>>>> with >>>>>>> an >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>>>>> an >>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>>>> an >>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>> >>> >> >> >> > > > From ablunden@mira.net Fri Dec 5 15:46:11 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sat, 06 Dec 2014 10:46:11 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances In-Reply-To: <2FDF9A0E-64D7-4131-8715-4B668B313EA4@gmail.com> References: <1682996975.4827904.1417607429293.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11144.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> <3A40602C-44A1-45C7-A7D1-36E1A842E92B@gmail.com>, <8FDB5B35-D645-496F-93CB-077884244184@gmail.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F907548F@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu>, <4E148FDE-8090-43ED-9F4F-FAD731D8853C@gmail.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F90754DA@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <2FDF9A0E-64D7-4131-8715-4B668B313EA4@gmail.com> Message-ID: <548243C3.5060302@mira.net> I'd certainly be interested in talking about xmca itself, Helena. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Helena Worthen wrote: > ... > > I am going to pause here and see if anyone else wants to talk about the realities of our present world, this tool -- xmca -- that we have to share our words with, its history as a solution to a problem that still dogs us, and the history of this tradition of thinking that also has its roots in crisis. > > If anyone else picks up on this with me, I'll change the subject line and we can proceed. > > Helena > > > From hshonerd@gmail.com Fri Dec 5 16:41:39 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2014 17:41:39 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances In-Reply-To: References: <1682996975.4827904.1417607429293.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11144.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> <3A40602C-44A1-45C7-A7D1-36E1A842E92B@gmail.com> <8FDB5B35-D645-496F-93CB-077884244184@gmail.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F907548F@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: <0EE97B5B-9C77-406B-B5E5-B9691152F320@gmail.com> Larry, I?m late to this: Cognitive Pluralism is a term Vera uses in her work in creativity. Does that resonate? Henry > On Dec 5, 2014, at 1:47 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > > Helena, > Thank you for this ebook. A wonderful resource which can be offered to > others working in learning environments. [in my case public school systems] > > On the notion of using complex words. I find I have introduced simple > metaphors such as "shared brains" which can be imagined easily and can be > understood. when I lend my brain to the child we do *it* together and when > they are ready they can do *it* all by their self. > > Bella, also thank you for introducing the new Cambridge book on Cultural > Historical Psychology. A wonderful resource on the complexity of this > theoretical approach or path. > > Mike, the paper Natalia sent on the Luria-Vygotsky approach to > *neuro-psychology* also is a wonderful foundation for extending the Western > understanding of Vygotsky to a deeper understanding [and extension in the > West] of the *principle "of dynamic organization and localization of the > Higher Mental Functions" I do wonder if this paper should be on the > archive list. > > Martin's paper on Barsalou and Mike's paper on Kosslyn making the case for > *mental imagery* also are resources that are gesturing to a rich *cascade* > of understandings. > > I am like a kid in the candy store deciding which delight to try first as > they all seem to be sharing a *similar* perspective. > > CHAT is a marvelous *interpretive community* David K's caution that as we > generalize we can also loose focus is a struggle I encounter when > responding. Do I try to stay within the *cultural-historical* approach > [path] or take a more general *sociocultural approach*?? > > It all seems to lead back to *shared brain* which is what I bring to public > school settings. > > The format of CHAT is unique. > > Larry > > On Fri, Dec 5, 2014 at 11:46 AM, Glassman, Michael > wrote: > >> Hi Helena, >> >> I'm not so sure if its the words or the way the thinking behind those >> words match up or don't match up with the systems of the individuals were >> are teaching live and think within. A little while ago I was reading >> Bateson and his idea that Western philosophy/thinking often precluded the >> idea of a supreme cybernetic system - the idea that we could and would be >> self-corrected through exploration of the universe rather than any >> conscious human design. We are a society obsessed with local control and >> the idea that we can manipulate the universe around us (which we can in >> small doses, but Bateson claim is destructive in the long run). >> >> Many of the words you mention such as affordances, mediators, activity >> often fall into the exploration perspective I think - and they become >> difficult to relate. >> >> A little while ago I wrote a sentence based on the idea that education >> should be based on open exploration because something akin to a supreme >> cybernetics will offer self-correcting feedback, and a big trouble is many >> educators don't trust that. And then I stared at the sentence for a while >> and realized the majority of people reading it (if anybody does ever read >> it) would just pass it right over. >> >> So what do we do? Hard to know. >> >> A side question for Mike - in those early meetings on distributed >> cognition that Don Norman was a part of did cybernetics and/or Bateson >> every some up? >> >> Michael >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >> on behalf of Helena Worthen [helenaworthen@gmail.com] >> Sent: Friday, December 05, 2014 2:12 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances >> >> A voice from the margins, here: >> >> I learn a lot from this list, all the time, and would hate to have it go >> quiet or self-destruct. But my role in the world outside this list, out >> there in the synchronous landscape, involves trying to make ideas >> intelligible to working people who may not have more than a couple of years >> of community college. For this purpose, there is a whole roster of terms >> that are a problem. When I say these terms to regular people, they make a >> face as if they'd tasted something bad. >> >> Examples of terms like this are: >> >> affordance >> mediate >> activity >> CHAT (cultural-historical activity theory) >> >> and: >> >> development >> >> For my purposes, Annalisa's Dec 2 post on Gibson's invention of the term >> "affordance" is very useful. He explained clearly why he made it up. I can >> use that. >> >> Knud Illeris' book "Contemporary Theories of Learning: Learning >> theorists...in their own words" is a breath of fresh air for the same >> reason. You got to hear a whole collection of different people saying very >> different things about learning, all grouped together as learning theorists. >> >> theoristshttp:// >> www.pgce.soton.ac.uk/IT/Learning/Theories/ContemporaryTheoriesofLearning%20Learning%20theorists%20in%20their%20own%20words%20-%20Knud%20Illeris.pdf >> >> >> Helena Worthen >> helenaworthen@gmail.com >> >> On Dec 3, 2014, at 11:26 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >> >>> Haydi, >>> Thank you so much! Here?s how it is for me: >>> I too have been waiting for Andy to come back. He is the reason I am in >> the chat. I have known about Vygotsky through Vera since the early 80s. But >> I, after my dissertation on L2 fluency in 1986, I worked as a teacher >> educator where research and publication wasn?t necessary for tenure and >> promotion. The college where I was working closed (bankruptcy) five years >> back and, like any working stiff, I am having to reinvent myself. So, in >> thrashing about I came to read Andy?s articles on "collaborative project" >> as a unit of analysis a few years back, started emailing with him >> one-on-one (and he was so generous with his time and patience in answering >> my questions about activity theory and Vygotsky), until he said it was time >> for me to join the chat. Andy mentored me until I had the courage to pipe >> up. Andy just edited a book on collaborative projects; Vera has written one >> of the papers for the book. I love them both. That?s how it is for me. >>> >>> Let me say that I consider myself a rank learner, always beginning. Mike >> has wisely rejected the role of Caesar on the chat. But we go to him asking >> him to sort out things amongst the unruly class. As a teacher, the hardest >> thing for me ever to do was to deal with disrespect between students. I >> have finally come to realize and accept that I want to be in a school where >> the students are nice to each other. Where respect and trust abound. Where >> human flourishing is possible. There is no father god to rescue us. We have >> to do it for ourselves. Well, like the song goes, ?I?m still willin?? Let?s >> make this a creative project, which means no unethical use of power. We >> can?t afford it. In my humble opinion. >>> >>> In gratitude and hope, >>> Henry >>> >>>> On Dec 3, 2014, at 11:00 AM, mike cole wrote: >>>> >>>> Haydi-- >>>> >>>> Like anyone on xmca, you can demand whatever you like. Getting people to >>>> implement your demands may be more >>>> difficult. In general, I have not experienced demands and resentment as >>>> particularly helpful on xmca, but thing are changing, >>>> so who knows. >>>> >>>> I am not putting ANL aside because of the concerns expressed in MCA in >> the >>>> past year or so. The concerns are real, at least to me. >>>> But there are many productive programs of research that use his ideas, >>>> along with those of LSV and many others, both Russian and non-Russian. >>>> >>>> I believe it would be helpful in receiving answers to your various >> comments >>>> and suggestions if some of them were constrained to particular threads. >> For >>>> example, the discussion of plank versus a piece of electronic equipment >> vis >>>> a vis the notion of artifact and mediation through artifacts, etc., >> might >>>> be be placed in that thread. >>>> >>>> etc. >>>> >>>> I clearly can be wrong in all of these judgments! >>>> mike >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wed, Dec 3, 2014 at 3:50 AM, Haydi Zulfei < >> haydizulfei@rocketmail.com> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Hi >>>>> >>>>> First of all , so resentfully I wonder If I can demand Andy's return to >>>>> the discussions !! No one can deny his great contributions to this >> Forum . >>>>> >>>>> Second , I might have been lost completely in your words , terms , >>>>> premises , and compositional nuances and colourings of your script as >>>>> native speakers , etc. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Third , because of obvious sensitivities towards ANL , I've altogether >> put >>>>> him to one side ; otherwise , in this concrete example of Michael , the >>>>> triad , activity , action , operation are boldly in view . >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Fourth , I suppose LSV himself in two or three chapters of the >> "History of >>>>> Higher Mental Functions" has provided full response to our inquiries . >> Andy >>>>> , in time , sent the first two chapters to all . >>>>> >>>>> 1. He , after preliminary remarks , puts heavy emphasis on use of tools >>>>> and work activity in the parentheses and in italic characters . He >>>>> emphasizes that use of tool very naturally gets significant just >> within the >>>>> work activity process . Without the work activity we cannot expect >> much of >>>>> it . Then , as most of the time , he time and again references Marx and >>>>> Engels so as to prove his claims . >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> 2. Mike is so and for good reasons enchanted in "rudiments" of culture >>>>> phenomena (throwing dice and bones , knots , notches in the wood to >>>>> remember speech) . Good for him and us all . Yes , Buridan's ass gets >>>>> spoilt in its indecision But man through inventing stimulus-device >> gets to >>>>> salvation . But the problem is how many times has Mike , our Boss and >>>>> confirmed global figure no need for it to be documented , asked himself >>>>> what went before that juncture of time for the man to become 'MAN' ?? >> At >>>>> this moment we are with LSV and at a very critical point of time . No >> more >>>>> return to 'culture' to prove 'culture' . LSV says the error for some >> is to >>>>> recount the story of mental through mental while they should know that >>>>> mental processes go parallel with 'social' processes . What I gather at >>>>> this very point is that he expects us to infer that the 'our present >> man of >>>>> some will' owes his man/ness and decisiveness to his previous work >> activity >>>>> necessitating use of tools . It seems we cannot take the idea to the >>>>> uterine because V focuses on use of tools for a baby of 6 or of 10-12 >>>>> months of age . It seems , both phylogenetically and ontogenetically , >> that >>>>> it's not the case that 'gestures' ' eye contacts' come of their own and >>>>> because of the man/ness and for the tuning-up with the universe through >>>>> sounds and hymns and angels , etc. Man worked for life , performed ups >> and >>>>> downs , shook his extremeties (one pair of hand) , consumed ! >> collective >>>>> yellings and gesturing (as concomitant of work) . V says we can >> distinguish >>>>> independent history of natural processes and independent history of >>>>> cultural development separately 'phylogenetically' but not >> ontogenetically >>>>> . In ontology , nature and culture work simultaneously contrary to >>>>> phylogenesis . One cannot with ease and comfort say whichone goes with >>>>> whichone . >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> 3. Andy who is well aware of both CH and AT , on his sending of the >> four >>>>> pages and then the said two chapters , disclosed a very important point >>>>> neglected so far at the forum and that was the idea of the distinction >>>>> between tool and sign so fruitfully and enormously discussed by V and >> the >>>>> deep meaning that the simple diagram denoted . V says 'artifact' could >> be >>>>> cheating and deceitful but no one cares ! They invariably use >> artifacts and >>>>> through this , they ultimately remove 'material activity' from the >> domain >>>>> altogether . V is everywhere clear with both 'cultural , ideal >> activity' >>>>> and 'material activity' . Here is where quotes don't work . The one >> more >>>>> return to the plus-thousand previous reflections . No loss really ! V >> , if >>>>> necessary , prefers just 'mediation' . >>>>> >>>>> 4. With these in mind , I say for certain that here the plank is a tool >>>>> not an 'artifact' because it is not a sign signaling any other genuine >>>>> thing . It's all to itself . Also the light switch . And the whole >> activity >>>>> is a material one . Life put it in the way . According to V sign >> activity >>>>> affects one's own societal individual behaviour . We cannot generalize >> its >>>>> effect to the border of transforming Nature . Man through speech , >> dialogue >>>>> , discourse , talk , genre , etc. decides for the change in personal >>>>> behaviour ; if this potential preparedness for individual behavioral >> change >>>>> gets fossilized or ossified , then man will not reach the threshhold >> of the >>>>> bigger act and the vast field of the Mother Universe with its motley >> rich >>>>> material phenomena out of which each time he can select an object for a >>>>> circle of activity : starting an activity with a probable cryptic >> 'motive' >>>>> (what we don't yet know about which took him to the point of crossing) >> , >>>>> with a conscious goal (reaching the other side) through a concrete >> action >>>>> (crossing) operating according to the conditions at hand and on the >> ground >>>>> (light switching , wrestling between the ideal and the material >> (object , >>>>> subject , that is , thinking ideally about what to do with the whole >> thing >>>>> and the plank , then observing with the help of the light acting on the >>>>> object , again back to thinking if flaws are observed , etc. etc. no >>>>> blending of objective and subjective whatsoever . And I wonder why >> taking >>>>> affordance for a tool . >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Soooooooooo much for one post . >>>>> >>>>> I considered spaces but wonder if it works . >>>>> I'll also be very quiet and slow in replying ! >>>>> >>>>> Best >>>>> >>>>> Haydi >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> From: mike cole >>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>>>> Sent: Tuesday, 2 December 2014, 11:26:46 >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances >>>>> >>>>> My view? >>>>> The plank is for certain an artifact, no less than the light bulb. On >> what >>>>> grounds, or under what circumstances, would you classify it otherwise? >>>>> What's gained, what's lost? >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Glassman, Michael < >> glassman.13@osu.edu> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Hi Annalisa, Mike, Huw >>>>>> >>>>>> I tend to be somebody who reacts better to concrete examples than >>>>>> definitions. I believe this also comes from Gibson's 1977 book, >>>>>> >>>>>> You are walking across a field and come to a stream which you can to >> get >>>>>> across. You notice a plank across the stream. It is wide enough for >> you >>>>>> to keep your balance and thick enough to hold your weight, in using it >>>>> you >>>>>> recognize its affordance as a crossing point. It is the intersection >> of >>>>>> the movement, the perception of the plank, short term goal of the >>>>> activity >>>>>> (getting across the stream) - the recognition of the affordance comes >> in >>>>>> the subjective use of the object (which is why it is neither >> subjective >>>>> or >>>>>> objective). It is also important that you have the abilities (the >>>>> correct >>>>>> weight, the balance) to recognize the affordance, otherwise you pass >> the >>>>>> plank by. >>>>>> >>>>>> As far as perceived affordance. I think I have this right - the >>>>> perceived >>>>>> is not in the person who recognizes the affordance (otherwise you are >>>>>> right, that is wet water) it is whether there is an intention in the >>>>> design >>>>>> of the object. So I create a light switch with the intention of >>>>> designing >>>>>> it as having a perceived affordance for somebody who wants to switch >> on a >>>>>> light. As you can see different from the relationship to the plank, >>>>> where >>>>>> there is no prior design. >>>>>> >>>>>> Here is my question (perhaps answered in the Engestrom paper) >>>>>> >>>>>> The light switch is certainly an artifact, but is the plank? >>>>>> >>>>>> Michael >>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] >>>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 1:19 PM >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances >>>>>> >>>>>> Those definitions help a lot Annalisa and touch on the fact that >> gibson >>>>>> seemed to empty the organism (if one were so inclined to interpret >> him) >>>>> and >>>>>> he dismissed culutral mediation as secondary at best. Still, they >> share >>>>> the >>>>>> idea that a part of the structure that psychologist theorize as a >> located >>>>>> inside of individual crania is in fact "our there" in the >> phylgenetically >>>>>> and cultural-historically constitued environment. And that drove >>>>> cognitive >>>>>> psychologists, our co discussants, nuts. Until, "they got it" and then >>>>>> sought to mold it to their own ends and pre-existing means. >>>>>> mike >>>>>> >>>>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 9:59 AM, Annalisa Aguilar >>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> I thought I'd do the honors and start a new thread on affordances, >>>>> which >>>>>>> isn't related to Larry's discussion of basic images. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I figured as well to offer Gibson's words on affordances since it is >> a >>>>>>> word he invented to describe something he saw in the world. Of course >>>>> the >>>>>>> life of affordances has been full of controversy, especially with >>>>> regard >>>>>> to >>>>>>> understanding what they are. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Gibson's Affordances is a theory I find instrumental to connecting >>>>>> outside >>>>>>> to inside experiences and I intuit that it is related to perezhivanie >>>>> in >>>>>>> some fashion. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> After reading the wikipage more closely, I regret offering a link to >>>>> the >>>>>>> text there because it isn't very clear what Gibson means or what >> Norman >>>>>>> means. To me, a "perceived affordance" is like saying "wet water." >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In any case, here are 3 quotes of Gibson in his own words, that I >> could >>>>>>> find: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The affordances of the environment are what it _offers_ the animal, >>>>> what >>>>>>> it _provides_ or _furnishes_, either for good or ill. The verb "to >>>>>> afford" >>>>>>> is found in the dictionary, the noun "affordance" is not. I have made >>>>> it >>>>>>> up. I mean by it something that refers both to the environment and >> the >>>>>>> animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies the >>>>>> complementarity >>>>>>> of the animal and the environment (Gibson, 1977/1986). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> and >>>>>>> >>>>>>> What is meant by an _affordance_? ?Subject to revision, I suggest >> that >>>>>> the >>>>>>> affordance of anything is a specific combination of the properties of >>>>> its >>>>>>> substance and its surfaces taken with reference to an animal. The >>>>>> reference >>>>>>> may be to an animal as distinguished from other species (Gibson, >>>>>> 1977/1986). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> and >>>>>>> >>>>>>> An important fact about affordances of the environment is that they >> are >>>>>> in >>>>>>> a sense objective, real, and physical, unlike values and meanings, >>>>> which >>>>>>> are often supposed to be subjective, phenomenal, and mental. But >>>>>> actually, >>>>>>> an affordance is neither an objective property nor a subjective >>>>> property; >>>>>>> or it is both if you like. An affordance cuts across the dichotomy of >>>>>>> subjective-objective and helps us to understand its inadequacy. It is >>>>>>> equally a fact of the environment and a fact of behavior. It is both >>>>>>> physical and psychical, yet neither. An affordance points both ways, >> to >>>>>> the >>>>>>> environment and to the observer (Gibson, 1977/1986). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> These quotes are important to keep in mind, I hope they help. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I might also suggest looking at Mace(1977) who described very >> carefully >>>>>>> how Gibson got from stimuli to affordance, given that people on this >>>>> list >>>>>>> value history, learning, and development. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>> >>>>>>> on behalf of Huw Lloyd >>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 2, 2014 10:35 AM >>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I'd take a look. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Michael, utility or technical affordance might fit. My equivalent of >>>>>> your >>>>>>> perceived/discovered distinction is one of planned and technically >>>>>>> manifest. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Huw >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 2 December 2014 at 16:44, Glassman, Michael >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I'd be interested in anybody else is. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Michael >>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ >>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>> ] >>>>>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 11:39 AM >>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Interloper, Michael? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The discussions at UCSD preceeding Don's use of affordances and >>>>>> cognitive >>>>>>>> artifacts were accompanied by other, related papers. One by >> Engestrom >>>>>> on >>>>>>>> "when is an artifact" and one or more by Ed Hutchins. If people are >>>>>>>> interested in pursuing this thread/topic the materials could be >>>>>> gathered >>>>>>>> up. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Glassman, Michael < >>>>> glassman.13@osu.edu >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea). >>>>> He >>>>>>>>> actually cops to both of them. The first was not to distinguish >>>>>>> between >>>>>>>>> affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which >>>>> are >>>>>>>>> designed. I think this is related to the issue of artifacts. >>>>>> Meaning >>>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>> artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to >>>>> be >>>>>>>>> discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong >>>>> word, >>>>>> if >>>>>>>>> anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances. It is a >>>>>>>> complex >>>>>>>>> question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes >>>>> based >>>>>> on >>>>>>>>> context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one >>>>>> context >>>>>>>> may >>>>>>>>> result in organic affordances in another context. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is that >>>>>> he >>>>>>>> was >>>>>>>>> not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and >>>>>>>> constraints. >>>>>>>>> Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived affordances >>>>> or >>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>> they designed to create constraints. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the >>>>>>> mention >>>>>>>>> just spurred me to throw this up. Hope I'm not being too much of >>>>> an >>>>>>>>> interloper. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Michael >>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ >>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>> ] >>>>>>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] >>>>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM >>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Annalisa- >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, appropriation >>>>>> not >>>>>>>>> discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of >>>>>>>>> affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set >>>>> against >>>>>>>>> Gibson's ideas. The change of views coincided with the advent of >>>>> the >>>>>>>> d-cog >>>>>>>>> idea which also has deep roots in chat. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> No hidden history i know of, but interesting connections among the >>>>>>>> notion >>>>>>>>> of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion of >>>>>>> these >>>>>>>>> connections can be found, among other places, in >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Cole, M. & Engestr?m, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach >>>>> to >>>>>>>>> distributed* >>>>>>>>> *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition: >>>>>> Psychological >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>> educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar >>>>> >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Hi Mike, >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied >>>>>> that >>>>>>>>> wish! >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important >>>>> connections. >>>>>> I >>>>>>>> was >>>>>>>>>> not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I >>>>> learned >>>>>>>> about >>>>>>>>>> Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science >>>>>> (1985). >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Is there some history that is not part of the common story? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I looked here for clarity: >>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to >>>>>>>> cognitive >>>>>>>>>> artifacts? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in >>>>>> play, >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>> even joy! >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however >>>>>> until >>>>>>>> then >>>>>>>>>> I will remain with the ineffable. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> on behalf of mike cole >>>>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM >>>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And, >>>>>>>>>> co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive >>>>>>>> artifacts >>>>>>>>>> right about that time at UCSD. If it were possible to find a >>>>>> source >>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>> makes these connections visible and available to read about it >>>>>> might >>>>>>>> be a >>>>>>>>>> step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of >>>>>>> intro >>>>>>>>> for >>>>>>>>>> newcomers to the discussion. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a >>>>>>>> newcomer's >>>>>>>>>> introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is >>>>> seeking >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> sort >>>>>>>>>> out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am >>>>>>>>> insuficiently >>>>>>>>>> read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted! >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many >>>>>>> rocks, >>>>>>>> so >>>>>>>>>> little time"! >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Mike >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> A >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Martin! >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental >>>>>>> representation" >>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>>> coming closer! >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's >>>>>>> theory >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>> affordances. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed >>>>>> article. >>>>>>>> But >>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>>> wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is >>>>>>>>> important >>>>>>>>>>> not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a >>>>>>>> grenade >>>>>>>>>>> pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the >>>>>> list. >>>>>>>> If >>>>>>>>>> you >>>>>>>>>>> can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look >>>>>> forward >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>> your >>>>>>>>>>> reply, Martin. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that >>>>> being >>>>>>> at >>>>>>>>> UCSD >>>>>>>>>>> and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that >>>>>>> influences >>>>>>>>> your >>>>>>>>>>> position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find >>>>>>>>> community >>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>> it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more >>>>> voluntary >>>>>>>>> phrased >>>>>>>>>>> that way). >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of >>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>> John >>>>>>>>>>> Packer > >>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM >>>>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> An interesting article, David. One way in which it is >>>>>> interesting, >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> me >>>>>>>>>>> at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not >>>>> used, >>>>>>>> even >>>>>>>>>>> once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" >>>>> images >>>>>> in >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> world around us - material representations - and he tries to >>>>>> define >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg < >>>>> dkellogg60@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Larry, Annalisa: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" >>>>>> when >>>>>>>> we >>>>>>>>>>>> met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of >>>>>>>>> anything >>>>>>>>>>>> except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe >>>>>>> available >>>>>>>>>>>> for a standard price all over China) She does not even >>>>> remember >>>>>>>>>>>> whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was >>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as >>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>> non-image based mental representation. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental >>>>> representations >>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>>>>> images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth >>>>> century. >>>>>>> In >>>>>>>>>>>> fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against >>>>>>>>> Titchener >>>>>>>>>>>> and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, >>>>>>>>>>>> everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated >>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>> many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically >>>>>>>> anterior >>>>>>>>>>>> to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would >>>>>> not >>>>>>>> have >>>>>>>>>>>> time or ability to process complex problems in real time. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that >>>>> are >>>>>>>>>>>> genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more >>>>>>>> reading >>>>>>>>>>>> to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read >>>>> than >>>>>> I >>>>>>> am >>>>>>>>>>>> (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels >>>>>> like >>>>>>>>>>>> she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do >>>>>> NOT >>>>>>>> read >>>>>>>>>>>> this article--instead, look at Figure 11. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color >>>>> structure >>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>> Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any >>>>>>> actual >>>>>>>>>>>> images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural >>>>>>>>> experience >>>>>>>>>>>> associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then >>>>>>> deliberately >>>>>>>>>>>> frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any >>>>>>>>>>>> recognizable figures upon which to focus. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine >>>>> Chapel >>>>>>>> fresco >>>>>>>>>>>> for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. >>>>> He >>>>>> or >>>>>>>> she >>>>>>>>>>>> can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the >>>>> painting >>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>> wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not >>>>>>> notice >>>>>>>>>>>> the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful >>>>> in >>>>>>> it. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar < >>>>>> annalisa@unm.edu >>>>>>>>>>> > wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Larry and David, >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are >>>>>> at >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> root of all thinking. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, >>>>>> based >>>>>>>> upon >>>>>>>>>>> previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, >>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>> combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a >>>>>>> phrase >>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>> like >>>>>>>>>>> a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on >>>>> it >>>>>>> by >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know >>>>> it. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think >>>>> as >>>>>>>>> Hackett >>>>>>>>>>> describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have >>>>>> you >>>>>>>>>> already >>>>>>>>>>> given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be >>>>>>> willing >>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>> take a look. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is >>>>>>>>> controversial. >>>>>>>>>>> It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone >>>>>>> says >>>>>>>>>> "this >>>>>>>>>>> is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble >>>>>>>>> observation. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and >>>>> whatever >>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>> process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at >>>>>>> hand? >>>>>>>>>> Just a >>>>>>>>>>> thought. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> What is it that appeals to you about this model, >>>>>> metaphoricity? >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Kind regards, >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Annalisa >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < >>>>>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of >>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>> Purss < >>>>>>>>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM >>>>>>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity >>>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> David K >>>>>>>>>>>>> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. >>>>>> My >>>>>>>>> reason >>>>>>>>>>> for >>>>>>>>>>>>> exploring these authors is I have been following a path >>>>>>> pursuing a >>>>>>>>>> basic >>>>>>>>>>>>> question. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic >>>>>>>> guiding >>>>>>>>>>> images >>>>>>>>>>>>> upon which thinking rests" >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring >>>>>>> appearances >>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>> illusions was also exploring this theme. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new >>>>>>> phenomenological >>>>>>>>>> path >>>>>>>>>>>>> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names >>>>>>> this >>>>>>>>>>> process >>>>>>>>>>>>> *metaphoricity*. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible >>>>>>>> image-character >>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>> *spontaneous event* of meaning. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which >>>>> he >>>>>>>>>> brackets - >>>>>>>>>>>>> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> AND >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* >>>>>> finds >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning of its very self. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this >>>>>>>>>>>>> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion >>>>> of >>>>>>>>>> metaphor >>>>>>>>>>> can >>>>>>>>>>>>> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is >>>>> implicated >>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>> *objectivity* >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of >>>>>>> itself >>>>>>>>>> *in* >>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>> mode [path] of the concept >>>>>>>>>>>>> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding >>>>>>> images >>>>>>>>> has >>>>>>>>>>> been >>>>>>>>>>>>> established. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the >>>>>> path >>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is >>>>> derived >>>>>>>> from >>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>> image-character of the guiding image. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial >>>>>> this >>>>>>>>> topic >>>>>>>>>>> may >>>>>>>>>>>>> become [again] >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by >>>>> this >>>>>>>> basic >>>>>>>>>>>>> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these >>>>>>> images >>>>>>>> as >>>>>>>>>>>>> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images >>>>>> emerge >>>>>>>>>>>>> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is >>>>>>> transcendental] >>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>>>>> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. >>>>>> It >>>>>>>>> seems >>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I also realize this question may already be answered in >>>>>>> Vygotsky's >>>>>>>>>>> writings >>>>>>>>>>>>> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of >>>>>>> XMCA. I >>>>>>>>>>>>> personally am following this path for now. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >>>>> with >>>>>>> an >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>>>>> an >>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>>>> an >>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>> >>> >> >> >> >> From hshonerd@gmail.com Fri Dec 5 16:50:27 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2014 17:50:27 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances In-Reply-To: <548243C3.5060302@mira.net> References: <1682996975.4827904.1417607429293.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11144.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> <3A40602C-44A1-45C7-A7D1-36E1A842E92B@gmail.com> <, > <8FDB5B35-D645-496F-93CB-077884244184@gmail.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F907548F@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <, > <4E148FDE-8090-43ED-9F4F-FAD731D8853C@gmail.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F90754DA@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <2FDF9A0E-64D7-4131-8715-4B668B313EA4@gmail.com> <548243C3.5060302@mira.net> Message-ID: <60D47070-F137-4168-A20D-602937EA8F63@gmail.com> This dialog is really second order cybernetics, isn?t it peeps?! > On Dec 5, 2014, at 4:46 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > I'd certainly be interested in talking about xmca itself, Helena. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Helena Worthen wrote: >> ... >> I am going to pause here and see if anyone else wants to talk about the realities of our present world, this tool -- xmca -- that we have to share our words with, its history as a solution to a problem that still dogs us, and the history of this tradition of thinking that also has its roots in crisis. >> >> If anyone else picks up on this with me, I'll change the subject line and we can proceed. >> >> Helena >> >> > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Fri Dec 5 16:59:26 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2014 16:59:26 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances In-Reply-To: <0EE97B5B-9C77-406B-B5E5-B9691152F320@gmail.com> References: <1682996975.4827904.1417607429293.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11144.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> <3A40602C-44A1-45C7-A7D1-36E1A842E92B@gmail.com> <8FDB5B35-D645-496F-93CB-077884244184@gmail.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F907548F@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <0EE97B5B-9C77-406B-B5E5-B9691152F320@gmail.com> Message-ID: Helena, After your post I went to the WIKI site and have been reading about the interactions of the Laboratory and the Communications Department at UCSD This section is relevant: *Acknowledging that information and knowledge can also be located in the world beyond the individual, be that a physical or social environment, certainly shifts the balance of the analysis away from a "single minded" and "egocentric" cognitivism but it begs the question of just what mediates the relationship between the two.(p. 2).* David then linked the issue of collective memory to the fundamental problematic of the lab, the relation between culture and cognitive development. *Consideration of the notion of collective memory and the activity of collective remembering provides a link between culture and mind in the following sense. The properties of a culture,embodied in its artifacts,tools,social customs and institutions,language and terms of reference,provide a historical dimension to everyday living that enables knowledge of what has already happened or been achieved to be used in the service of present and future activity.Our modes of being and doing are cultural products that constitute a guiding constraint concerning what form our present and future actions should or could take.* The concerns expressed in the papers, and the methods that different scholars were bringing to the problem almost thirty years ago remain central areas of concern as this text is being written. [comment from LP] And this text is continuing to be written here and now. The WIKI is an excellent place to *start* Larry On Fri, Dec 5, 2014 at 4:41 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > Larry, > I?m late to this: Cognitive Pluralism is a term Vera uses in her work in > creativity. Does that resonate? > Henry > > > On Dec 5, 2014, at 1:47 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > > Helena, > > Thank you for this ebook. A wonderful resource which can be offered to > > others working in learning environments. [in my case public school > systems] > > > > On the notion of using complex words. I find I have introduced simple > > metaphors such as "shared brains" which can be imagined easily and can be > > understood. when I lend my brain to the child we do *it* together and > when > > they are ready they can do *it* all by their self. > > > > Bella, also thank you for introducing the new Cambridge book on Cultural > > Historical Psychology. A wonderful resource on the complexity of this > > theoretical approach or path. > > > > Mike, the paper Natalia sent on the Luria-Vygotsky approach to > > *neuro-psychology* also is a wonderful foundation for extending the > Western > > understanding of Vygotsky to a deeper understanding [and extension in the > > West] of the *principle "of dynamic organization and localization of the > > Higher Mental Functions" I do wonder if this paper should be on the > > archive list. > > > > Martin's paper on Barsalou and Mike's paper on Kosslyn making the case > for > > *mental imagery* also are resources that are gesturing to a rich > *cascade* > > of understandings. > > > > I am like a kid in the candy store deciding which delight to try first as > > they all seem to be sharing a *similar* perspective. > > > > CHAT is a marvelous *interpretive community* David K's caution that as > we > > generalize we can also loose focus is a struggle I encounter when > > responding. Do I try to stay within the *cultural-historical* approach > > [path] or take a more general *sociocultural approach*?? > > > > It all seems to lead back to *shared brain* which is what I bring to > public > > school settings. > > > > The format of CHAT is unique. > > > > Larry > > > > On Fri, Dec 5, 2014 at 11:46 AM, Glassman, Michael > > wrote: > > > >> Hi Helena, > >> > >> I'm not so sure if its the words or the way the thinking behind those > >> words match up or don't match up with the systems of the individuals > were > >> are teaching live and think within. A little while ago I was reading > >> Bateson and his idea that Western philosophy/thinking often precluded > the > >> idea of a supreme cybernetic system - the idea that we could and would > be > >> self-corrected through exploration of the universe rather than any > >> conscious human design. We are a society obsessed with local control > and > >> the idea that we can manipulate the universe around us (which we can in > >> small doses, but Bateson claim is destructive in the long run). > >> > >> Many of the words you mention such as affordances, mediators, activity > >> often fall into the exploration perspective I think - and they become > >> difficult to relate. > >> > >> A little while ago I wrote a sentence based on the idea that education > >> should be based on open exploration because something akin to a supreme > >> cybernetics will offer self-correcting feedback, and a big trouble is > many > >> educators don't trust that. And then I stared at the sentence for a > while > >> and realized the majority of people reading it (if anybody does ever > read > >> it) would just pass it right over. > >> > >> So what do we do? Hard to know. > >> > >> A side question for Mike - in those early meetings on distributed > >> cognition that Don Norman was a part of did cybernetics and/or Bateson > >> every some up? > >> > >> Michael > >> ________________________________________ > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > >> on behalf of Helena Worthen [helenaworthen@gmail.com] > >> Sent: Friday, December 05, 2014 2:12 PM > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances > >> > >> A voice from the margins, here: > >> > >> I learn a lot from this list, all the time, and would hate to have it go > >> quiet or self-destruct. But my role in the world outside this list, out > >> there in the synchronous landscape, involves trying to make ideas > >> intelligible to working people who may not have more than a couple of > years > >> of community college. For this purpose, there is a whole roster of terms > >> that are a problem. When I say these terms to regular people, they make > a > >> face as if they'd tasted something bad. > >> > >> Examples of terms like this are: > >> > >> affordance > >> mediate > >> activity > >> CHAT (cultural-historical activity theory) > >> > >> and: > >> > >> development > >> > >> For my purposes, Annalisa's Dec 2 post on Gibson's invention of the term > >> "affordance" is very useful. He explained clearly why he made it up. I > can > >> use that. > >> > >> Knud Illeris' book "Contemporary Theories of Learning: Learning > >> theorists...in their own words" is a breath of fresh air for the same > >> reason. You got to hear a whole collection of different people saying > very > >> different things about learning, all grouped together as learning > theorists. > >> > >> theoristshttp:// > >> > www.pgce.soton.ac.uk/IT/Learning/Theories/ContemporaryTheoriesofLearning%20Learning%20theorists%20in%20their%20own%20words%20-%20Knud%20Illeris.pdf > >> > >> > >> Helena Worthen > >> helenaworthen@gmail.com > >> > >> On Dec 3, 2014, at 11:26 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >> > >>> Haydi, > >>> Thank you so much! Here?s how it is for me: > >>> I too have been waiting for Andy to come back. He is the reason I am in > >> the chat. I have known about Vygotsky through Vera since the early 80s. > But > >> I, after my dissertation on L2 fluency in 1986, I worked as a teacher > >> educator where research and publication wasn?t necessary for tenure and > >> promotion. The college where I was working closed (bankruptcy) five > years > >> back and, like any working stiff, I am having to reinvent myself. So, in > >> thrashing about I came to read Andy?s articles on "collaborative > project" > >> as a unit of analysis a few years back, started emailing with him > >> one-on-one (and he was so generous with his time and patience in > answering > >> my questions about activity theory and Vygotsky), until he said it was > time > >> for me to join the chat. Andy mentored me until I had the courage to > pipe > >> up. Andy just edited a book on collaborative projects; Vera has written > one > >> of the papers for the book. I love them both. That?s how it is for me. > >>> > >>> Let me say that I consider myself a rank learner, always beginning. > Mike > >> has wisely rejected the role of Caesar on the chat. But we go to him > asking > >> him to sort out things amongst the unruly class. As a teacher, the > hardest > >> thing for me ever to do was to deal with disrespect between students. I > >> have finally come to realize and accept that I want to be in a school > where > >> the students are nice to each other. Where respect and trust abound. > Where > >> human flourishing is possible. There is no father god to rescue us. We > have > >> to do it for ourselves. Well, like the song goes, ?I?m still willin?? > Let?s > >> make this a creative project, which means no unethical use of power. We > >> can?t afford it. In my humble opinion. > >>> > >>> In gratitude and hope, > >>> Henry > >>> > >>>> On Dec 3, 2014, at 11:00 AM, mike cole wrote: > >>>> > >>>> Haydi-- > >>>> > >>>> Like anyone on xmca, you can demand whatever you like. Getting people > to > >>>> implement your demands may be more > >>>> difficult. In general, I have not experienced demands and resentment > as > >>>> particularly helpful on xmca, but thing are changing, > >>>> so who knows. > >>>> > >>>> I am not putting ANL aside because of the concerns expressed in MCA in > >> the > >>>> past year or so. The concerns are real, at least to me. > >>>> But there are many productive programs of research that use his ideas, > >>>> along with those of LSV and many others, both Russian and non-Russian. > >>>> > >>>> I believe it would be helpful in receiving answers to your various > >> comments > >>>> and suggestions if some of them were constrained to particular > threads. > >> For > >>>> example, the discussion of plank versus a piece of electronic > equipment > >> vis > >>>> a vis the notion of artifact and mediation through artifacts, etc., > >> might > >>>> be be placed in that thread. > >>>> > >>>> etc. > >>>> > >>>> I clearly can be wrong in all of these judgments! > >>>> mike > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> On Wed, Dec 3, 2014 at 3:50 AM, Haydi Zulfei < > >> haydizulfei@rocketmail.com> > >>>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> Hi > >>>>> > >>>>> First of all , so resentfully I wonder If I can demand Andy's return > to > >>>>> the discussions !! No one can deny his great contributions to this > >> Forum . > >>>>> > >>>>> Second , I might have been lost completely in your words , terms , > >>>>> premises , and compositional nuances and colourings of your script as > >>>>> native speakers , etc. > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> Third , because of obvious sensitivities towards ANL , I've > altogether > >> put > >>>>> him to one side ; otherwise , in this concrete example of Michael , > the > >>>>> triad , activity , action , operation are boldly in view . > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> Fourth , I suppose LSV himself in two or three chapters of the > >> "History of > >>>>> Higher Mental Functions" has provided full response to our inquiries > . > >> Andy > >>>>> , in time , sent the first two chapters to all . > >>>>> > >>>>> 1. He , after preliminary remarks , puts heavy emphasis on use of > tools > >>>>> and work activity in the parentheses and in italic characters . He > >>>>> emphasizes that use of tool very naturally gets significant just > >> within the > >>>>> work activity process . Without the work activity we cannot expect > >> much of > >>>>> it . Then , as most of the time , he time and again references Marx > and > >>>>> Engels so as to prove his claims . > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> 2. Mike is so and for good reasons enchanted in "rudiments" of > culture > >>>>> phenomena (throwing dice and bones , knots , notches in the wood to > >>>>> remember speech) . Good for him and us all . Yes , Buridan's ass gets > >>>>> spoilt in its indecision But man through inventing stimulus-device > >> gets to > >>>>> salvation . But the problem is how many times has Mike , our Boss and > >>>>> confirmed global figure no need for it to be documented , asked > himself > >>>>> what went before that juncture of time for the man to become 'MAN' ?? > >> At > >>>>> this moment we are with LSV and at a very critical point of time . No > >> more > >>>>> return to 'culture' to prove 'culture' . LSV says the error for some > >> is to > >>>>> recount the story of mental through mental while they should know > that > >>>>> mental processes go parallel with 'social' processes . What I gather > at > >>>>> this very point is that he expects us to infer that the 'our present > >> man of > >>>>> some will' owes his man/ness and decisiveness to his previous work > >> activity > >>>>> necessitating use of tools . It seems we cannot take the idea to the > >>>>> uterine because V focuses on use of tools for a baby of 6 or of 10-12 > >>>>> months of age . It seems , both phylogenetically and ontogenetically > , > >> that > >>>>> it's not the case that 'gestures' ' eye contacts' come of their own > and > >>>>> because of the man/ness and for the tuning-up with the universe > through > >>>>> sounds and hymns and angels , etc. Man worked for life , performed > ups > >> and > >>>>> downs , shook his extremeties (one pair of hand) , consumed ! > >> collective > >>>>> yellings and gesturing (as concomitant of work) . V says we can > >> distinguish > >>>>> independent history of natural processes and independent history of > >>>>> cultural development separately 'phylogenetically' but not > >> ontogenetically > >>>>> . In ontology , nature and culture work simultaneously contrary to > >>>>> phylogenesis . One cannot with ease and comfort say whichone goes > with > >>>>> whichone . > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> 3. Andy who is well aware of both CH and AT , on his sending of the > >> four > >>>>> pages and then the said two chapters , disclosed a very important > point > >>>>> neglected so far at the forum and that was the idea of the > distinction > >>>>> between tool and sign so fruitfully and enormously discussed by V and > >> the > >>>>> deep meaning that the simple diagram denoted . V says 'artifact' > could > >> be > >>>>> cheating and deceitful but no one cares ! They invariably use > >> artifacts and > >>>>> through this , they ultimately remove 'material activity' from the > >> domain > >>>>> altogether . V is everywhere clear with both 'cultural , ideal > >> activity' > >>>>> and 'material activity' . Here is where quotes don't work . The one > >> more > >>>>> return to the plus-thousand previous reflections . No loss really ! V > >> , if > >>>>> necessary , prefers just 'mediation' . > >>>>> > >>>>> 4. With these in mind , I say for certain that here the plank is a > tool > >>>>> not an 'artifact' because it is not a sign signaling any other > genuine > >>>>> thing . It's all to itself . Also the light switch . And the whole > >> activity > >>>>> is a material one . Life put it in the way . According to V sign > >> activity > >>>>> affects one's own societal individual behaviour . We cannot > generalize > >> its > >>>>> effect to the border of transforming Nature . Man through speech , > >> dialogue > >>>>> , discourse , talk , genre , etc. decides for the change in personal > >>>>> behaviour ; if this potential preparedness for individual behavioral > >> change > >>>>> gets fossilized or ossified , then man will not reach the threshhold > >> of the > >>>>> bigger act and the vast field of the Mother Universe with its motley > >> rich > >>>>> material phenomena out of which each time he can select an object > for a > >>>>> circle of activity : starting an activity with a probable cryptic > >> 'motive' > >>>>> (what we don't yet know about which took him to the point of > crossing) > >> , > >>>>> with a conscious goal (reaching the other side) through a concrete > >> action > >>>>> (crossing) operating according to the conditions at hand and on the > >> ground > >>>>> (light switching , wrestling between the ideal and the material > >> (object , > >>>>> subject , that is , thinking ideally about what to do with the whole > >> thing > >>>>> and the plank , then observing with the help of the light acting on > the > >>>>> object , again back to thinking if flaws are observed , etc. etc. no > >>>>> blending of objective and subjective whatsoever . And I wonder why > >> taking > >>>>> affordance for a tool . > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> Soooooooooo much for one post . > >>>>> > >>>>> I considered spaces but wonder if it works . > >>>>> I'll also be very quiet and slow in replying ! > >>>>> > >>>>> Best > >>>>> > >>>>> Haydi > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> From: mike cole > >>>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > >>>>> Sent: Tuesday, 2 December 2014, 11:26:46 > >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances > >>>>> > >>>>> My view? > >>>>> The plank is for certain an artifact, no less than the light bulb. On > >> what > >>>>> grounds, or under what circumstances, would you classify it > otherwise? > >>>>> What's gained, what's lost? > >>>>> mike > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 10:45 AM, Glassman, Michael < > >> glassman.13@osu.edu> > >>>>> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> Hi Annalisa, Mike, Huw > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I tend to be somebody who reacts better to concrete examples than > >>>>>> definitions. I believe this also comes from Gibson's 1977 book, > >>>>>> > >>>>>> You are walking across a field and come to a stream which you can to > >> get > >>>>>> across. You notice a plank across the stream. It is wide enough > for > >> you > >>>>>> to keep your balance and thick enough to hold your weight, in using > it > >>>>> you > >>>>>> recognize its affordance as a crossing point. It is the > intersection > >> of > >>>>>> the movement, the perception of the plank, short term goal of the > >>>>> activity > >>>>>> (getting across the stream) - the recognition of the affordance > comes > >> in > >>>>>> the subjective use of the object (which is why it is neither > >> subjective > >>>>> or > >>>>>> objective). It is also important that you have the abilities (the > >>>>> correct > >>>>>> weight, the balance) to recognize the affordance, otherwise you pass > >> the > >>>>>> plank by. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> As far as perceived affordance. I think I have this right - the > >>>>> perceived > >>>>>> is not in the person who recognizes the affordance (otherwise you > are > >>>>>> right, that is wet water) it is whether there is an intention in the > >>>>> design > >>>>>> of the object. So I create a light switch with the intention of > >>>>> designing > >>>>>> it as having a perceived affordance for somebody who wants to switch > >> on a > >>>>>> light. As you can see different from the relationship to the plank, > >>>>> where > >>>>>> there is no prior design. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Here is my question (perhaps answered in the Engestrom paper) > >>>>>> > >>>>>> The light switch is certainly an artifact, but is the plank? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Michael > >>>>>> ________________________________________ > >>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ > >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > >>>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > >>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 1:19 PM > >>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Those definitions help a lot Annalisa and touch on the fact that > >> gibson > >>>>>> seemed to empty the organism (if one were so inclined to interpret > >> him) > >>>>> and > >>>>>> he dismissed culutral mediation as secondary at best. Still, they > >> share > >>>>> the > >>>>>> idea that a part of the structure that psychologist theorize as a > >> located > >>>>>> inside of individual crania is in fact "our there" in the > >> phylgenetically > >>>>>> and cultural-historically constitued environment. And that drove > >>>>> cognitive > >>>>>> psychologists, our co discussants, nuts. Until, "they got it" and > then > >>>>>> sought to mold it to their own ends and pre-existing means. > >>>>>> mike > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 9:59 AM, Annalisa Aguilar > >>>>> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> I thought I'd do the honors and start a new thread on affordances, > >>>>> which > >>>>>>> isn't related to Larry's discussion of basic images. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> I figured as well to offer Gibson's words on affordances since it > is > >> a > >>>>>>> word he invented to describe something he saw in the world. Of > course > >>>>> the > >>>>>>> life of affordances has been full of controversy, especially with > >>>>> regard > >>>>>> to > >>>>>>> understanding what they are. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Gibson's Affordances is a theory I find instrumental to connecting > >>>>>> outside > >>>>>>> to inside experiences and I intuit that it is related to > perezhivanie > >>>>> in > >>>>>>> some fashion. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> After reading the wikipage more closely, I regret offering a link > to > >>>>> the > >>>>>>> text there because it isn't very clear what Gibson means or what > >> Norman > >>>>>>> means. To me, a "perceived affordance" is like saying "wet water." > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> In any case, here are 3 quotes of Gibson in his own words, that I > >> could > >>>>>>> find: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> The affordances of the environment are what it _offers_ the animal, > >>>>> what > >>>>>>> it _provides_ or _furnishes_, either for good or ill. The verb "to > >>>>>> afford" > >>>>>>> is found in the dictionary, the noun "affordance" is not. I have > made > >>>>> it > >>>>>>> up. I mean by it something that refers both to the environment and > >> the > >>>>>>> animal in a way that no existing term does. It implies the > >>>>>> complementarity > >>>>>>> of the animal and the environment (Gibson, 1977/1986). > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> and > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> What is meant by an _affordance_? ?Subject to revision, I suggest > >> that > >>>>>> the > >>>>>>> affordance of anything is a specific combination of the properties > of > >>>>> its > >>>>>>> substance and its surfaces taken with reference to an animal. The > >>>>>> reference > >>>>>>> may be to an animal as distinguished from other species (Gibson, > >>>>>> 1977/1986). > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> and > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> An important fact about affordances of the environment is that they > >> are > >>>>>> in > >>>>>>> a sense objective, real, and physical, unlike values and meanings, > >>>>> which > >>>>>>> are often supposed to be subjective, phenomenal, and mental. But > >>>>>> actually, > >>>>>>> an affordance is neither an objective property nor a subjective > >>>>> property; > >>>>>>> or it is both if you like. An affordance cuts across the dichotomy > of > >>>>>>> subjective-objective and helps us to understand its inadequacy. It > is > >>>>>>> equally a fact of the environment and a fact of behavior. It is > both > >>>>>>> physical and psychical, yet neither. An affordance points both > ways, > >> to > >>>>>> the > >>>>>>> environment and to the observer (Gibson, 1977/1986). > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> These quotes are important to keep in mind, I hope they help. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> I might also suggest looking at Mace(1977) who described very > >> carefully > >>>>>>> how Gibson got from stimuli to affordance, given that people on > this > >>>>> list > >>>>>>> value history, learning, and development. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Kind regards, > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Annalisa > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> ________________________________________ > >>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> on behalf of Huw Lloyd > >>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 2, 2014 10:35 AM > >>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> I'd take a look. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Michael, utility or technical affordance might fit. My equivalent > of > >>>>>> your > >>>>>>> perceived/discovered distinction is one of planned and technically > >>>>>>> manifest. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Huw > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> On 2 December 2014 at 16:44, Glassman, Michael < > glassman.13@osu.edu> > >>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> I'd be interested in anybody else is. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Michael > >>>>>>>> ________________________________________ > >>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ > >>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>>>> ] > >>>>>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > >>>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 11:39 AM > >>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Interloper, Michael? > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> The discussions at UCSD preceeding Don's use of affordances and > >>>>>> cognitive > >>>>>>>> artifacts were accompanied by other, related papers. One by > >> Engestrom > >>>>>> on > >>>>>>>> "when is an artifact" and one or more by Ed Hutchins. If people > are > >>>>>>>> interested in pursuing this thread/topic the materials could be > >>>>>> gathered > >>>>>>>> up. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On Tue, Dec 2, 2014 at 8:09 AM, Glassman, Michael < > >>>>> glassman.13@osu.edu > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> But it seems that Norman made two mistakes (and I like his idea). > >>>>> He > >>>>>>>>> actually cops to both of them. The first was not to distinguish > >>>>>>> between > >>>>>>>>> affordances which are discovered and perceived affordances which > >>>>> are > >>>>>>>>> designed. I think this is related to the issue of artifacts. > >>>>>> Meaning > >>>>>>>> are > >>>>>>>>> artifacts designed for perceived affordances or are they there to > >>>>> be > >>>>>>>>> discovered through movement as (and this is probably the wrong > >>>>> word, > >>>>>> if > >>>>>>>>> anybody knows the right one, help!!) organic affordances. It is > a > >>>>>>>> complex > >>>>>>>>> question about artifacts I think because their meaning changes > >>>>> based > >>>>>> on > >>>>>>>>> context, so something designed for perceived affordances in one > >>>>>> context > >>>>>>>> may > >>>>>>>>> result in organic affordances in another context. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> The second mistake he made, which turned out to be bigger - is > that > >>>>>> he > >>>>>>>> was > >>>>>>>>> not careful enough in differentiating between affordances and > >>>>>>>> constraints. > >>>>>>>>> Again artifacts, are they designed to create perceived > affordances > >>>>> or > >>>>>>> are > >>>>>>>>> they designed to create constraints. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Anyway, just something I have been thinking about lately, but the > >>>>>>> mention > >>>>>>>>> just spurred me to throw this up. Hope I'm not being too much of > >>>>> an > >>>>>>>>> interloper. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Michael > >>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ > >>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [ > >>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>>>>> ] > >>>>>>>>> on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > >>>>>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 10:58 AM > >>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Annalisa- > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> I like the Wikipedia phraseology better than my own, > appropriation > >>>>>> not > >>>>>>>>> discovery. For several years before he appropriated the notion of > >>>>>>>>> affordances, Don Norman and colleagues at UCSD were dead set > >>>>> against > >>>>>>>>> Gibson's ideas. The change of views coincided with the advent of > >>>>> the > >>>>>>>> d-cog > >>>>>>>>> idea which also has deep roots in chat. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> No hidden history i know of, but interesting connections among > the > >>>>>>>> notion > >>>>>>>>> of affordance and artifact seem worth considering. A discussion > of > >>>>>>> these > >>>>>>>>> connections can be found, among other places, in > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Cole, M. & Engestr?m, Y. (1993). *A cultural-historical approach > >>>>> to > >>>>>>>>> distributed* > >>>>>>>>> *cognition*. In G. Salomon (Ed.), Distributed cognition: > >>>>>> Psychological > >>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>>> educational considerations. New York: Cambridge University Press. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> On Mon, Dec 1, 2014 at 9:53 PM, Annalisa Aguilar < > annalisa@unm.edu > >>>>>> > >>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Hi Mike, > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> It was my hope to not post more today, but I I have been denied > >>>>>> that > >>>>>>>>> wish! > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Yes, I am aware that "dcog" and "chat" have important > >>>>> connections. > >>>>>> I > >>>>>>>> was > >>>>>>>>>> not aware however that Don Norman discovered affordances. I > >>>>> learned > >>>>>>>> about > >>>>>>>>>> Gibson's affordances in Gardner's book The Minds New Science > >>>>>> (1985). > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Is there some history that is not part of the common story? > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> I looked here for clarity: > >>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Affordance > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Is it possible that you mean affordances and how they relate to > >>>>>>>> cognitive > >>>>>>>>>> artifacts? > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> There are no rocks here, maybe only Nerf footballs, as done in > >>>>>> play, > >>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>>>> even joy! > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> When I am done with Paul's paper I do intend to speak, however > >>>>>> until > >>>>>>>> then > >>>>>>>>>> I will remain with the ineffable. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Kind regards, > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Annalisa > >>>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ > >>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > >>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> on behalf of mike cole > >>>>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 10:39 PM > >>>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> The histories of dcog and chat are intertwined, Annalisa. And, > >>>>>>>>>> co-incidently, Don Norman discovered affordances and cognitive > >>>>>>>> artifacts > >>>>>>>>>> right about that time at UCSD. If it were possible to find a > >>>>>> source > >>>>>>>> that > >>>>>>>>>> makes these connections visible and available to read about it > >>>>>> might > >>>>>>>> be a > >>>>>>>>>> step in the direction of your earlier suggestion of some sort of > >>>>>>> intro > >>>>>>>>> for > >>>>>>>>>> newcomers to the discussion. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> I have been reading The paper that Paul sent. I fear I need a > >>>>>>>> newcomer's > >>>>>>>>>> introduction to many of the dense cluster of thinkers he is > >>>>> seeking > >>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>> sort > >>>>>>>>>> out! The centrality of class comes through clearly, but I am > >>>>>>>>> insuficiently > >>>>>>>>>> read in too many places to feel I understand well. Help wanted! > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> A sculptor friend has a t shirt that nails our dilemma "so many > >>>>>>> rocks, > >>>>>>>> so > >>>>>>>>>> little time"! > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Mike > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> A > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> On Monday, December 1, 2014, Annalisa Aguilar > > >>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Martin! > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Perhaps the day we stop employing the phrase "mental > >>>>>>> representation" > >>>>>>>> is > >>>>>>>>>>> coming closer! > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> For me, this brings us closer to truly understanding Gibson's > >>>>>>> theory > >>>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>>>> affordances. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> This is what it's like for me to read David's contributed > >>>>>> article. > >>>>>>>> But > >>>>>>>>> I > >>>>>>>>>>> wonder if it is possible for you, Martin, to explain why it is > >>>>>>>>> important > >>>>>>>>>>> not to use the phrase,"mental representation" in the article. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> I suspect there is a history here, and I do not mean to pull a > >>>>>>>> grenade > >>>>>>>>>>> pin, I just want to understand because I am a newcomer to the > >>>>>> list. > >>>>>>>> If > >>>>>>>>>> you > >>>>>>>>>>> can trust that that is my intention by asking, I will look > >>>>>> forward > >>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>> your > >>>>>>>>>>> reply, Martin. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Let me just add that I am putting two and two together that > >>>>> being > >>>>>>> at > >>>>>>>>> UCSD > >>>>>>>>>>> and it being the home to Distributed Cognition, that that > >>>>>>> influences > >>>>>>>>> your > >>>>>>>>>>> position, not that it necessarily shapes it, but that you find > >>>>>>>>> community > >>>>>>>>>> in > >>>>>>>>>>> it (which I suppose can still shape, but it seems more > >>>>> voluntary > >>>>>>>>> phrased > >>>>>>>>>>> that way). > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Kind regards, > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Annalisa > >>>>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ > >>>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > >>>>>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > >>>>>>> Martin > >>>>>>>>> John > >>>>>>>>>>> Packer > > >>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Monday, December 1, 2014 4:28 AM > >>>>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> An interesting article, David. One way in which it is > >>>>>> interesting, > >>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>> me > >>>>>>>>>>> at least, is that the phrase "mental representation" is not > >>>>> used, > >>>>>>>> even > >>>>>>>>>>> once. Instead the author writes of the way that we "read" > >>>>> images > >>>>>> in > >>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>> world around us - material representations - and he tries to > >>>>>> define > >>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>> "interpretational space" within which this reading takes place. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Martin > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 1, 2014, at 1:53 AM, David Kellogg < > >>>>> dkellogg60@gmail.com > >>>>>>>>>>> > wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Larry, Annalisa: > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" > >>>>>> when > >>>>>>>> we > >>>>>>>>>>>> met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of > >>>>>>>>> anything > >>>>>>>>>>>> except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe > >>>>>>> available > >>>>>>>>>>>> for a standard price all over China) She does not even > >>>>> remember > >>>>>>>>>>>> whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was > >>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>> beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as > >>>>> a > >>>>>>>>>>>> non-image based mental representation. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental > >>>>> representations > >>>>>>> are > >>>>>>>>>>>> images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth > >>>>> century. > >>>>>>> In > >>>>>>>>>>>> fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against > >>>>>>>>> Titchener > >>>>>>>>>>>> and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, > >>>>>>>>>>>> everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated > >>>>>> that > >>>>>>>>>>>> many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically > >>>>>>>> anterior > >>>>>>>>>>>> to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would > >>>>>> not > >>>>>>>> have > >>>>>>>>>>>> time or ability to process complex problems in real time. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that > >>>>> are > >>>>>>>>>>>> genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more > >>>>>>>> reading > >>>>>>>>>>>> to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read > >>>>> than > >>>>>> I > >>>>>>> am > >>>>>>>>>>>> (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels > >>>>>> like > >>>>>>>>>>>> she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do > >>>>>> NOT > >>>>>>>> read > >>>>>>>>>>>> this article--instead, look at Figure 11. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color > >>>>> structure > >>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>>>>> Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any > >>>>>>> actual > >>>>>>>>>>>> images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural > >>>>>>>>> experience > >>>>>>>>>>>> associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then > >>>>>>> deliberately > >>>>>>>>>>>> frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any > >>>>>>>>>>>> recognizable figures upon which to focus. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine > >>>>> Chapel > >>>>>>>> fresco > >>>>>>>>>>>> for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. > >>>>> He > >>>>>> or > >>>>>>>> she > >>>>>>>>>>>> can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the > >>>>> painting > >>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>>>>>> wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not > >>>>>>> notice > >>>>>>>>>>>> the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful > >>>>> in > >>>>>>> it. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar < > >>>>>> annalisa@unm.edu > >>>>>>>>>>> > wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Larry and David, > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are > >>>>>> at > >>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>> root of all thinking. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, > >>>>>> based > >>>>>>>> upon > >>>>>>>>>>> previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, > >>>>> in > >>>>>>>>>>> combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a > >>>>>>> phrase > >>>>>>>> I > >>>>>>>>>> like > >>>>>>>>>>> a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on > >>>>> it > >>>>>>> by > >>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>> same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know > >>>>> it. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think > >>>>> as > >>>>>>>>> Hackett > >>>>>>>>>>> describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have > >>>>>> you > >>>>>>>>>> already > >>>>>>>>>>> given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be > >>>>>>> willing > >>>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>>> take a look. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> As I understand, the topic of mental representations is > >>>>>>>>> controversial. > >>>>>>>>>>> It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone > >>>>>>> says > >>>>>>>>>> "this > >>>>>>>>>>> is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble > >>>>>>>>> observation. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and > >>>>> whatever > >>>>>>>> that > >>>>>>>>>>> process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at > >>>>>>> hand? > >>>>>>>>>> Just a > >>>>>>>>>>> thought. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> What is it that appeals to you about this model, > >>>>>> metaphoricity? > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Kind regards, > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Annalisa > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> ________________________________________ > >>>>>>>>>>>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu < > >>>>>>>>>>> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of > >>>>>> Larry > >>>>>>>>>> Purss < > >>>>>>>>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM > >>>>>>>>>>>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> David K > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. > >>>>>> My > >>>>>>>>> reason > >>>>>>>>>>> for > >>>>>>>>>>>>> exploring these authors is I have been following a path > >>>>>>> pursuing a > >>>>>>>>>> basic > >>>>>>>>>>>>> question. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic > >>>>>>>> guiding > >>>>>>>>>>> images > >>>>>>>>>>>>> upon which thinking rests" > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring > >>>>>>> appearances > >>>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>>>>>>> illusions was also exploring this theme. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new > >>>>>>> phenomenological > >>>>>>>>>> path > >>>>>>>>>>>>> that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names > >>>>>>> this > >>>>>>>>>>> process > >>>>>>>>>>>>> *metaphoricity*. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible > >>>>>>>> image-character > >>>>>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>> *spontaneous event* of meaning. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which > >>>>> he > >>>>>>>>>> brackets - > >>>>>>>>>>>>> finds itself implicated in this guiding image. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> AND > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* > >>>>>> finds > >>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning of its very self. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this > >>>>>>>>>>>>> image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion > >>>>> of > >>>>>>>>>> metaphor > >>>>>>>>>>> can > >>>>>>>>>>>>> invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is > >>>>> implicated > >>>>>>> in > >>>>>>>>>>>>> *objectivity* > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of > >>>>>>> itself > >>>>>>>>>> *in* > >>>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>> mode [path] of the concept > >>>>>>>>>>>>> occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding > >>>>>>> images > >>>>>>>>> has > >>>>>>>>>>> been > >>>>>>>>>>>>> established. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the > >>>>>> path > >>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>>>>>> conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is > >>>>> derived > >>>>>>>> from > >>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>> image-character of the guiding image. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial > >>>>>> this > >>>>>>>>> topic > >>>>>>>>>>> may > >>>>>>>>>>>>> become [again] > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by > >>>>> this > >>>>>>>> basic > >>>>>>>>>>>>> question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these > >>>>>>> images > >>>>>>>> as > >>>>>>>>>>>>> occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images > >>>>>> emerge > >>>>>>>>>>>>> spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is > >>>>>>> transcendental] > >>>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>>>>> is > >>>>>>>>>>>>> not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. > >>>>>> It > >>>>>>>>> seems > >>>>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>>>>> have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I also realize this question may already be answered in > >>>>>>> Vygotsky's > >>>>>>>>>>> writings > >>>>>>>>>>>>> and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of > >>>>>>> XMCA. I > >>>>>>>>>>>>> personally am following this path for now. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > >>>>> with > >>>>>>> an > >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > with > >>>>>> an > >>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > with > >>>>> an > >>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> -- > >>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > an > >>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> -- > >>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > an > >>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> -- > >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Fri Dec 5 17:11:21 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Fri, 5 Dec 2014 17:11:21 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances In-Reply-To: <60D47070-F137-4168-A20D-602937EA8F63@gmail.com> References: <1682996975.4827904.1417607429293.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11144.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> <3A40602C-44A1-45C7-A7D1-36E1A842E92B@gmail.com> <8FDB5B35-D645-496F-93CB-077884244184@gmail.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F907548F@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <4E148FDE-8090-43ED-9F4F-FAD731D8853C@gmail.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F90754DA@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <2FDF9A0E-64D7-4131-8715-4B668B313EA4@gmail.com> <548243C3.5060302@mira.net> <60D47070-F137-4168-A20D-602937EA8F63@gmail.com> Message-ID: Henry, To answer your question we would have to ask if it is a difference that makes a difference for our grandchildren. On Fri, Dec 5, 2014 at 4:50 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > This dialog is really second order cybernetics, isn?t it peeps?! > > > On Dec 5, 2014, at 4:46 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > > I'd certainly be interested in talking about xmca itself, Helena. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > Helena Worthen wrote: > >> ... > >> I am going to pause here and see if anyone else wants to talk about the > realities of our present world, this tool -- xmca -- that we have to share > our words with, its history as a solution to a problem that still dogs us, > and the history of this tradition of thinking that also has its roots in > crisis. > >> > >> If anyone else picks up on this with me, I'll change the subject line > and we can proceed. > >> > >> Helena > >> > >> > > > > > From Peg.Griffin@att.net Sat Dec 6 09:32:47 2014 From: Peg.Griffin@att.net (Peg Griffin) Date: Sat, 6 Dec 2014 12:32:47 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Word, deed, so-called, indeed! A small bit of field-note data Message-ID: <002c01d0117a$a79cd560$f6d68020$@att.net> Recently in urban US settings, "die-in" arose as a common word (clear lineage from sit-in of the civil rights lunch counters and teach-in of the anti-war movement universities) during spontaneous discussions and collaborative planning for mass activities responding to fatal police acts resulting in deaths of young unarmed men in communities of color. The word became routine as "a die-in," "the die-in," and "our first die-in," and "each die-in" and so on, used not only in talk but also in written agendas and time-tables (called "tick-tocks" by some). People were advised to carry large trash bags to spread over wet and oil-slick ground used for the die-in. At certain times in the protest marches, street organizers using bullhorns called for people to split into two groups: one to act as the dead in the die-in and one to enact observers of the fatal acts. A national TV newscaster soon used "so-called die-in" when describing one of the massive actions. The next day, a local and witty young street organizer directed activists at an intersection to form into three groups: those enacting observers in the middle, those in the die-in on the left and those in the so-called-die-in on the right. From mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu Sat Dec 6 11:14:31 2014 From: mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu (Zavala, Miguel) Date: Sat, 6 Dec 2014 19:14:31 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Word, deed, so-called, indeed! A small bit of field-note data In-Reply-To: <002c01d0117a$a79cd560$f6d68020$@att.net> Message-ID: The diffusion of words, their take-up will be highly contested. In organizing spaces words are indeed deeds but there are also fine distinctions between words (as explicit political strategy, as when activists talk to the media and deliberately engage in the politics of language and framing) and deed (or as some organizers say, 'Talk is talk and that may not change the realities of my community'). The complex set of words 'we are the 99%' acquired a particular meaning recently: perhaps hope for some, perhaps discursive evidence of an emergent class consciousness in the US... Yet, who gets to take-up words/expressions? And how is that take-up mediated by a pervasive politics of race? In the case of a 'die-in' in the present context of community responses to police violence, how is the meaning of a 'die-in' encircled by the racialization of place and the ways participants' bodies are marked (racialized)? White privileged participants, for instance, occupy a particular social space that enables them to participate in 'die-ins' yet this may look differently in Black communities, where performing a protest carries with it both symbolic and material risk of a different kind. At a conference recently, the Mexican American Studies teachers who were banned from teaching Chicana/o texts and histories (see Arizona's HB, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/11/arizona-mexican-american-studies-c urriculum-constitutional_n_2851034.html) spoke about the violence of the state and how it was directed at them at a very personal level. Two of the former teachers spoke about not reproducing violence and violent language as a way for their own healing. During the Q & A of the session, one white female scholar spoke up and stated clearly, 'You should be able to say, F*&K You, you should be angry and fight?" While I, too felt, what the scholar said, upon reflection the politics of race and voice is ever present: as outsider to the struggle in Tucson and as a White female, indeed the word precedes deed. 'It's easier said by you' someone might retort. I recommend looking at Judith Butler's "Endangered/Endangering: Schematic Racism and White Paranoia" in Mike Davis's (Ed), Reading Rodney King: Reading Urban Uprising. -Miguel On 12/6/14 9:32 AM, "Peg Griffin" wrote: 2281 >Recently in urban US settings, "die-in" arose as a common word (clear >lineage from sit-in of the civil rights lunch counters and teach-in of the >anti-war movement universities) during spontaneous discussions and >collaborative planning for mass activities responding to fatal police acts >resulting in deaths of young unarmed men in communities of color. The >word >became routine as "a die-in," "the die-in," and "our first die-in," and >"each die-in" and so on, used not only in talk but also in written agendas >and time-tables (called "tick-tocks" by some). People were advised to >carry >large trash bags to spread over wet and oil-slick ground used for the >die-in. At certain times in the protest marches, street organizers using >bullhorns called for people to split into two groups: one to act as the >dead >in the die-in and one to enact observers of the fatal acts. > >A national TV newscaster soon used "so-called die-in" when describing one >of >the massive actions. > >The next day, a local and witty young street organizer directed activists >at >an intersection to form into three groups: those enacting observers in the >middle, those in the die-in on the left and those in the so-called-die-in >on >the right. > > > From annalisa@unm.edu Sun Dec 7 14:40:59 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Sun, 7 Dec 2014 22:40:59 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Reading for Novices In-Reply-To: <1C3F787A-BFC0-4FE5-B884-08540D310241@gmail.com> References: <1417756753782.22685@unm.edu>, <1C3F787A-BFC0-4FE5-B884-08540D310241@gmail.com> Message-ID: <1417992061188.95156@unm.edu> Hello Henry, Bella, Larry, and Miguel! Thanks one and all for your recommendations! I should have asked for articles that are easily to find online too. There are a few in the texts offered, but if there are others, I am patiently hoping for others to point me to some articles if there are any you can think of. I decided to list these out in one post for anyone who would like to see a list in one place of introductory texts: ********************************************* Introductory Texts for CHAT Novices ********************************************* ***** - Martin, J. & Kirschner S., (2010), The Sociocultural Turn in Psychology The following articles appear in the title above: - Cole, M. & Gajdamashko, N., (2010), "Vygotsky and Context: Toward a Resolution" - Martin, J. & Kirschner, S., (2010), "The Sociocultural Turn in Psychology: An Introduction and an Invitation" - Stetsenko, A., & Arievitch, I. (2010), "Cultural-Historical Activity Theory: Foundational Worldview, Major Principles, and the Relevance of Sociocultural Context" ***** - Rogoff, B., (2013) Cultural Nature of Human Development ***** - Vygotsky, L.S., (1978), Mind in Society ***** - Wertsch, J., (1988), Vygotsky and the Social Formation of Mind ***** - Yasnitsky, A., van der Veer, R., & Ferrari, M., (2014) The Cambridge Handbook of Cultural-Historical Psychology ***** --end From nataliag@sfu.ca Sun Dec 7 15:53:40 2014 From: nataliag@sfu.ca (Natalia Gajdamaschko) Date: Sun, 7 Dec 2014 15:53:40 -0800 (PST) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Reading for Novices In-Reply-To: <1417992061188.95156@unm.edu> References: <1417756753782.22685@unm.edu> <1C3F787A-BFC0-4FE5-B884-08540D310241@gmail.com> <1417992061188.95156@unm.edu> Message-ID: <195075409.9382622.1417996420926.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> Hi Annalisa, In my Vygotsky intro seminar I use the combination of the following two texts: 1) The Cambridge Companion to Vygotsky Paperback ? April 30, 2007 by Harry Daniels (Editor), Michael Cole (Editor), James V. Wertsch (Editor) http://www.amazon.com/Cambridge-Companion-Vygotsky-Harry-Daniels/dp/0521537878/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1417996005&sr=8-1&keywords=The+Cambridge+Companion+of+Vygotsky 2) Vygotsky's Educational Theory in Cultural Context (Learning in Doing: Social, Cognitive and Computational Perspectives) Paperback ? September 15, 2003 by Alex Kozulin (Editor), Boris Gindis (Editor), Vladimir S. Ageyev (Editor), Suzanne M. Miller (Editor) http://www.amazon.com/Vygotskys-Educational-Cultural-Context-Learning/dp/0521528836/ref=pd_bxgy_b_img_y And, of course, for those articles that are easy to find on-line, we should thank Andy and his Vygotsky archive --http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/index.htm Combination of those seem to work very well for my students. Best wishes, Natalia. ----- Original Message ----- From: "Annalisa Aguilar" Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Sunday, December 7, 2014 2:40:59 PM Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Reading for Novices Hello Henry, Bella, Larry, and Miguel! Thanks one and all for your recommendations! I should have asked for articles that are easily to find online too. There are a few in the texts offered, but if there are others, I am patiently hoping for others to point me to some articles if there are any you can think of. I decided to list these out in one post for anyone who would like to see a list in one place of introductory texts: ********************************************* Introductory Texts for CHAT Novices ********************************************* ***** - Martin, J. & Kirschner S., (2010), The Sociocultural Turn in Psychology The following articles appear in the title above: - Cole, M. & Gajdamashko, N., (2010), "Vygotsky and Context: Toward a Resolution" - Martin, J. & Kirschner, S., (2010), "The Sociocultural Turn in Psychology: An Introduction and an Invitation" - Stetsenko, A., & Arievitch, I. (2010), "Cultural-Historical Activity Theory: Foundational Worldview, Major Principles, and the Relevance of Sociocultural Context" ***** - Rogoff, B., (2013) Cultural Nature of Human Development ***** - Vygotsky, L.S., (1978), Mind in Society ***** - Wertsch, J., (1988), Vygotsky and the Social Formation of Mind ***** - Yasnitsky, A., van der Veer, R., & Ferrari, M., (2014) The Cambridge Handbook of Cultural-Historical Psychology ***** --end From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sun Dec 7 16:48:48 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Mon, 8 Dec 2014 09:48:48 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Reading for Novices In-Reply-To: <195075409.9382622.1417996420926.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> References: <1417756753782.22685@unm.edu> <1C3F787A-BFC0-4FE5-B884-08540D310241@gmail.com> <1417992061188.95156@unm.edu> <195075409.9382622.1417996420926.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> Message-ID: Among other things, Vygotsky was a prolific and brilliant writer of prefaces to other people's books: yesterday I noticed that one of the more poetic tropes he uses, citing the art historian J.W. Richter and Tolstoy about how the step from being a five year old to being Isaac Newton is nothing compared to the step from being a one year old to being a five year old, is lifted straight from a preface he wrote to a book on teachiing the severely mentally retarded by "Auntie Katie", a popular columnist in Soviet newspapers. The problem is, of course, that he doesn't write these nice long prefaces to his OWN books (and in fact often doesn't even have time to finish them). So we've been publishing a "Collected Works" series of Vygotsky's works here in Korea. The books themselves are in Korean, but I put up English versions of the Prefaces on my academia.edu site: https://www.academia.edu/8382956/Biography_of_a_Text_Thinking_and_Speech_at_Seventy-eight https://www.academia.edu/5196245/Untangling_a_genetic_root_of_Thinking_and_Speech_A_textology_of_Tool_and_Sign https://www.academia.edu/8493475/Foreword_to_Volume_One_of_Vygotskys_History_of_the_Development_of_the_Higher_Mental_Functions_Korean_Edition_ https://www.academia.edu/8493490/Foreword_to_Volume_Two_of_Vygotskys_History_of_the_Development_of_the_Higher_Mental_Functions_Korean_Edition_ https://www.academia.edu/9643101/Dilemmas_Into_Aporias The first two (Preface to "Thinking and Speech" and Preface to "Tool and Sign") have been published elsewhere, but all the others are an xmca exclusive! David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 8 December 2014 at 08:53, Natalia Gajdamaschko wrote: > Hi Annalisa, > In my Vygotsky intro seminar I use the combination of the following two > texts: > > 1) The Cambridge Companion to Vygotsky Paperback ? April 30, 2007 > by Harry Daniels (Editor), Michael Cole (Editor), James V. Wertsch > (Editor) > http://www.amazon.com/Cambridge-Companion-Vygotsky-Harry-Daniels/dp/0521537878/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1417996005&sr=8-1&keywords=The+Cambridge+Companion+of+Vygotsky > > 2) Vygotsky's Educational Theory in Cultural Context (Learning in Doing: > Social, Cognitive and Computational Perspectives) Paperback ? September 15, > 2003 > by Alex Kozulin (Editor), Boris Gindis (Editor), Vladimir S. Ageyev > (Editor), Suzanne M. Miller (Editor) > http://www.amazon.com/Vygotskys-Educational-Cultural-Context-Learning/dp/0521528836/ref=pd_bxgy_b_img_y > > And, of course, for those articles that are easy to find on-line, we > should thank Andy and his Vygotsky archive -- > http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/index.htm > > Combination of those seem to work very well for my students. > Best wishes, > Natalia. > > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Annalisa Aguilar" > Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Sent: Sunday, December 7, 2014 2:40:59 PM > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Reading for Novices > > Hello Henry, Bella, Larry, and Miguel! > > Thanks one and all for your recommendations! > > I should have asked for articles that are easily to find online too. There > are a few in the texts offered, but if there are others, I am patiently > hoping for others to point me to some articles if there are any you can > think of. > > I decided to list these out in one post for anyone who would like to see a > list in one place of introductory texts: > > ********************************************* > Introductory Texts for CHAT Novices > ********************************************* > > ***** > - Martin, J. & Kirschner S., (2010), The Sociocultural Turn in Psychology > > The following articles appear in the title above: > > - Cole, M. & Gajdamashko, N., (2010), "Vygotsky and Context: Toward a > Resolution" > > - Martin, J. & Kirschner, S., (2010), "The Sociocultural Turn in > Psychology: An Introduction and an Invitation" > > - Stetsenko, A., & Arievitch, I. (2010), "Cultural-Historical > Activity Theory: Foundational Worldview, Major Principles, and the > Relevance of Sociocultural Context" > > ***** > - Rogoff, B., (2013) Cultural Nature of Human Development > > ***** > - Vygotsky, L.S., (1978), Mind in Society > > ***** > - Wertsch, J., (1988), Vygotsky and the Social Formation of Mind > > ***** > - Yasnitsky, A., van der Veer, R., & Ferrari, M., (2014) The Cambridge > Handbook of Cultural-Historical Psychology > > ***** > > --end > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sun Dec 7 19:49:42 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Sun, 7 Dec 2014 19:49:42 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Further Reflections on Imagination Message-ID: I am posting a note from an article co-written by David Bakhurst and Carol Padden, which I have accessed from the WIKI on the history of XMCA. The article is "The Meshcheryakov Experiment: Soviet Work on the Education of Blind-Deaf Children. The article is fascinating [especially read in the context of the Wiki] and the current discussion on Nicaraguan sign language. However, the quote I'm presenting is drawing attention to the role of *imagination* The note concludes with the observation that the blind-deaf individual's conception of the world is NOT qualitatively distinct from that of sighted and hearing persons in virtue of its RELIANCE ON THE IMAGINATION. The article elaborates this position 1 See Suvorov (1983 (trans. 1983-I), 1988) and Sirotkin (1979). (Note that the translation of Suvorov 1983, which is devoted to the concept of imagination, is eccentric. Throughout, the Russian ?voobruzzhenie? is translated not as ?imagination? but as ?representation?. Although this helps convey the richness of the Russian word not shared by its usual English equivalent, it obscures an important polemical point. One of Surovov?s aims is to argue that the formation of any image or representation of reality involves the creative exercise of imagination, and hence that the blind-deaf individual?s conception of the world is not *qualitatively* distinct from that of the sighted and hearing person in virtue of its reliance on the imagination. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: DECEMBER 5 2014 Bakhurst_and_Padden_-_The_Meshcheryakov_Experiment with the deaf and blind.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 2251914 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141207/247cff16/attachment-0001.pdf From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon Dec 8 09:00:28 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 8 Dec 2014 09:00:28 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Further Reflections on Imagination In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Thanks, Larry. A fuller account of the discussion about Suvorov's ideas concerninging imagination and thought can be found in the attached. I am continuing with colleagues to explore these issues and all input is welcomed. Suvorov and the entire topic of education of the blind-deaf have become controversial topics in Russia. mike PS-- Anyone who would like work on the wiki and build their own narratives, for example, around xmca, should contact me at mcole@ucsd.edu. We have a tad of technical help for anyone so inclined and there is more than enough work to be done! For at least the immediate future, improving the discursive infrastructure of xmca is a priority, but I personally will be spending time on the wiki welcome collaboration. On Sun, Dec 7, 2014 at 7:49 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > I am posting a note from an article co-written by David Bakhurst and Carol > Padden, which I have accessed from the WIKI on the history of XMCA. The > article is "The Meshcheryakov Experiment: Soviet Work on the Education of > Blind-Deaf Children. > The article is fascinating [especially read in the context of the Wiki] > and the current discussion on Nicaraguan sign language. > However, the quote I'm presenting is drawing attention to the role of > *imagination* > The note concludes with the observation that the blind-deaf individual's > conception of the world is NOT qualitatively distinct from that of sighted > and hearing persons in virtue of its RELIANCE ON THE IMAGINATION. The > article elaborates this position > > 1 See Suvorov (1983 (trans. 1983-I), 1988) and Sirotkin (1979). (Note that > the translation of Suvorov 1983, > > which is devoted to the concept of imagination, is eccentric. Throughout, > the Russian ?voobruzzhenie? is > > translated not as ?imagination? but as ?representation?. Although this > helps convey the richness of the > > Russian word not shared by its usual English equivalent, it obscures an > important polemical point. One of > > Surovov?s aims is to argue that the formation of any image or > representation of reality involves the creative > > exercise of imagination, and hence that the blind-deaf individual?s > conception of the world is not *qualitatively* > > distinct from that of the sighted and hearing person in virtue of its > reliance on the imagination. > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon Dec 8 09:00:28 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 8 Dec 2014 09:00:28 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Further Reflections on Imagination In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Thanks, Larry. A fuller account of the discussion about Suvorov's ideas concerninging imagination and thought can be found in the attached. I am continuing with colleagues to explore these issues and all input is welcomed. Suvorov and the entire topic of education of the blind-deaf have become controversial topics in Russia. mike PS-- Anyone who would like work on the wiki and build their own narratives, for example, around xmca, should contact me at mcole@ucsd.edu. We have a tad of technical help for anyone so inclined and there is more than enough work to be done! For at least the immediate future, improving the discursive infrastructure of xmca is a priority, but I personally will be spending time on the wiki welcome collaboration. On Sun, Dec 7, 2014 at 7:49 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > I am posting a note from an article co-written by David Bakhurst and Carol > Padden, which I have accessed from the WIKI on the history of XMCA. The > article is "The Meshcheryakov Experiment: Soviet Work on the Education of > Blind-Deaf Children. > The article is fascinating [especially read in the context of the Wiki] > and the current discussion on Nicaraguan sign language. > However, the quote I'm presenting is drawing attention to the role of > *imagination* > The note concludes with the observation that the blind-deaf individual's > conception of the world is NOT qualitatively distinct from that of sighted > and hearing persons in virtue of its RELIANCE ON THE IMAGINATION. The > article elaborates this position > > 1 See Suvorov (1983 (trans. 1983-I), 1988) and Sirotkin (1979). (Note that > the translation of Suvorov 1983, > > which is devoted to the concept of imagination, is eccentric. Throughout, > the Russian ?voobruzzhenie? is > > translated not as ?imagination? but as ?representation?. Although this > helps convey the richness of the > > Russian word not shared by its usual English equivalent, it obscures an > important polemical point. One of > > Surovov?s aims is to argue that the formation of any image or > representation of reality involves the creative > > exercise of imagination, and hence that the blind-deaf individual?s > conception of the world is not *qualitatively* > > distinct from that of the sighted and hearing person in virtue of its > reliance on the imagination. > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon Dec 8 09:00:52 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 8 Dec 2014 09:00:52 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Lecturer in Developmental Psychology In-Reply-To: <8FEDBC7B4FF2DB4D86292F6CD01E378C5CDC31ADA4@waylon> References: <8FEDBC7B4FF2DB4D86292F6CD01E378C5CDC31ADA4@waylon> Message-ID: ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Julia Campbell Date: Thu, Dec 4, 2014 at 7:19 PM Subject: [COGDEVSOC] Lecturer in Developmental Psychology To: "cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org" *Lecturer in Developmental Psychology* *School of PsychologyVictoria University of Wellington, New Zealand* The School of Psychology is inviting applications for a permanent (equivalent to tenured) appointment at the level of Lecturer (equivalent to USA Assistant Professor). The successful applicant will possess a PhD in Developmental Psychology with a strong research and publication record in the area of Developmental Psychology. The successful applicant will actively conduct research in Developmental Psychology and participate in productive collaborations that complement our existing developmental expertise (e.g., theory-of-mind development, autobiographical memory development, gender and youth, positive youth development, and developmental psychopathology). Consideration will also be given to applicants whose research in Developmental Psychology complements the School?s strengths in other research areas. The successful applicant will demonstrate a proven ability to engage in teaching in a relevant field at University level. The appointee will be expected to direct and teach an undergraduate course in Lifespan Developmental Psychology, to provide teaching at postgraduate courses in his or her area of expertise, to supervise research students, and demonstrate a willingness to contribute to the administrative functioning of the School and the University. The School of Psychology is home to a dynamic and international staff, and was ranked the top overall school or department of psychology in New Zealand in terms of research quality in the last two national quality assessment rounds. Further details may be found at: http://www.vuw.ac.nz/psyc/. For further information, please contact Dr Jason Low, School of Psychology, at: Jason.Low@vuw.ac.nz *Applications close 30 January 2015* Victoria University of Wellington is an EEO employer and actively seeks to meet its obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi. For more information and to apply online visit http://www.victoria.ac.nz/about/careers/ **Please do not respond to this email, please apply via http://www.victoria.ac.nz/about/careers/** _______________________________________________ To post to the CDS listserv, send your message to: cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org (If you belong to the listserv and have not included any large attachments, your message will be posted without moderation--so be careful!) To subscribe or unsubscribe from the listserv, visit: http://lists.cogdevsoc.org/listinfo.cgi/cogdevsoc-cogdevsoc.org -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon Dec 8 10:20:11 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 8 Dec 2014 10:20:11 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: January 29: Next Operation Conversation: Cops & Kids, A Demonstration Workshop In-Reply-To: <1119416370998.1102100306453.46231.0.121239JL.1002@scheduler.constantcontact.com> References: <1119416370998.1102100306453.46231.0.121239JL.1002@scheduler.constantcontact.com> Message-ID: For those seeking to explore the links between contemporary events in the US and xmca discouse, the following should be of interest. mike ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: All Stars Project, Inc. Date: Mon, Dec 8, 2014 at 9:41 AM Subject: January 29: Next Operation Conversation: Cops & Kids, A Demonstration Workshop To: lchcmike@gmail.com * SAVE THE DATE: Operation Conversation: Cops & Kids * *to be held at the Apollo Theater**Thursday, January 29, 2015* *7:00 p.m.* FEATURING: *Dr. Lenora Fulani, NYPD officers and New York City youth * *Operation Conversation: Cops and Kids, A Demonstration Workshop *is an original production produced by the All Stars Project's Castillo Theatre. The demonstration features All Stars Project co-founder, Lenora Fulani, Ph.D.; police officers of the New York City Police Department (NYPD); and youth from New York's inner city communities and will be performed to an audience of 1000, made up of NYPD probationary police officers and hundreds of members of the community. *Operation Conversation: Cops and Kids* is a program of the All Stars Project, Inc., designed to foster positive interactions between the police and inner-city youth. It consists of a series of workshops that use performance, improvisation and conversation to help teenagers and police officers to develop and improve their relationship. *For more info on Operation Conversation: Cops and Kids click here . * * Reservation required. For more information call 212-941-1234 or: email boxoffice@allstars.org * [image: Like us on Facebook] [image: Follow us on Twitter] Forward this email This email was sent to lchcmike@gmail.com by boxoffice@allstars.org | Update Profile/Email Address | Rapid removal with SafeUnsubscribe ? | Privacy Policy . All Stars Project | 543 West 42nd Street | New York | NY | 10036 -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon Dec 8 11:27:29 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 8 Dec 2014 11:27:29 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] CHAT and DCOG Message-ID: A while back there was a query about CHAT and DCOG historical connections. Here is one distributed biased account. mike -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: DCOG.CHAT.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 16267653 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141208/659e7bd2/attachment-0001.pdf From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Mon Dec 8 13:26:37 2014 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (Haydi Zulfei) Date: Mon, 8 Dec 2014 21:26:37 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Further Reflections on Imagination In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1610639845.7373147.1418073997967.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11118.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> I have two similar messages but no attached ! From: mike cole To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture Activity" Sent: Monday, 8 December 2014, 9:00:28 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Further Reflections on Imagination Thanks, Larry. A fuller account of the discussion about Suvorov's ideas concerninging imagination and thought can be found in the attached. I am continuing with colleagues to explore these issues and all input is welcomed. Suvorov and the entire topic of education of the blind-deaf have become controversial topics in Russia. mike PS-- Anyone who would like work on the wiki and build their own narratives, for example, around xmca, should contact me at mcole@ucsd.edu. We have a tad of technical help for anyone so inclined and there is more than enough work to be done!? For at least the immediate future, improving the discursive infrastructure of xmca is a priority, but I personally will be spending time on the wiki welcome collaboration. On Sun, Dec 7, 2014 at 7:49 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > I am posting a note from an article co-written by David Bakhurst and Carol > Padden, which I have accessed from the WIKI on the history of XMCA. The > article is "The Meshcheryakov Experiment: Soviet Work on the Education of > Blind-Deaf Children. > The article is fascinating [especially read in the context of the Wiki] >? and the current discussion on Nicaraguan sign language. > However, the quote I'm presenting is drawing attention to the role of > *imagination* > The note concludes with the observation that the blind-deaf individual's > conception of the world is NOT qualitatively distinct from that of sighted > and hearing persons in virtue of its RELIANCE ON THE IMAGINATION.? The > article elaborates this position > > 1 See Suvorov (1983 (trans. 1983-I), 1988) and Sirotkin (1979). (Note that > the translation of Suvorov 1983, > > which is devoted to the concept of imagination, is eccentric. Throughout, > the Russian ?voobruzzhenie? is > > translated not as ?imagination? but as ?representation?. Although this > helps convey the richness of the > > Russian word not shared by its usual English equivalent, it obscures an > important polemical point. One of > > Surovov?s aims is to argue that the formation of any image or > representation of reality involves the creative > > exercise of imagination, and hence that the blind-deaf individual?s > conception of the world is not *qualitatively* > > distinct from that of the sighted and hearing person in virtue of its > reliance on the imagination. > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Mon Dec 8 13:26:37 2014 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (Haydi Zulfei) Date: Mon, 8 Dec 2014 21:26:37 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Further Reflections on Imagination In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1610639845.7373147.1418073997967.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11118.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> I have two similar messages but no attached ! From: mike cole To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture Activity" Sent: Monday, 8 December 2014, 9:00:28 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Further Reflections on Imagination Thanks, Larry. A fuller account of the discussion about Suvorov's ideas concerninging imagination and thought can be found in the attached. I am continuing with colleagues to explore these issues and all input is welcomed. Suvorov and the entire topic of education of the blind-deaf have become controversial topics in Russia. mike PS-- Anyone who would like work on the wiki and build their own narratives, for example, around xmca, should contact me at mcole@ucsd.edu. We have a tad of technical help for anyone so inclined and there is more than enough work to be done!? For at least the immediate future, improving the discursive infrastructure of xmca is a priority, but I personally will be spending time on the wiki welcome collaboration. On Sun, Dec 7, 2014 at 7:49 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > I am posting a note from an article co-written by David Bakhurst and Carol > Padden, which I have accessed from the WIKI on the history of XMCA. The > article is "The Meshcheryakov Experiment: Soviet Work on the Education of > Blind-Deaf Children. > The article is fascinating [especially read in the context of the Wiki] >? and the current discussion on Nicaraguan sign language. > However, the quote I'm presenting is drawing attention to the role of > *imagination* > The note concludes with the observation that the blind-deaf individual's > conception of the world is NOT qualitatively distinct from that of sighted > and hearing persons in virtue of its RELIANCE ON THE IMAGINATION.? The > article elaborates this position > > 1 See Suvorov (1983 (trans. 1983-I), 1988) and Sirotkin (1979). (Note that > the translation of Suvorov 1983, > > which is devoted to the concept of imagination, is eccentric. Throughout, > the Russian ?voobruzzhenie? is > > translated not as ?imagination? but as ?representation?. Although this > helps convey the richness of the > > Russian word not shared by its usual English equivalent, it obscures an > important polemical point. One of > > Surovov?s aims is to argue that the formation of any image or > representation of reality involves the creative > > exercise of imagination, and hence that the blind-deaf individual?s > conception of the world is not *qualitatively* > > distinct from that of the sighted and hearing person in virtue of its > reliance on the imagination. > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Dec 8 17:50:44 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 9 Dec 2014 01:50:44 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent Message-ID: <1418089844446.50077@unm.edu> Hello esteemed discussants, I am not normally a fan of David Brooks of the New York Times, but sometimes he really surprises me. This is one of those times: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/02/opinion/david-brooks-class-prejudice-resurgent.html It has been my sense that we (as a culture, i.e., my American culture to which he refers) are more afraid to discuss class then we are to discuss race, and now it has become even harder, apparently. I particularly took to this paragraph: "Widening class distances produce class prejudice, classism. This is a prejudice based on visceral attitudes about competence. People in the "respectable" class have meritocratic virtues: executive function, grit, a capacity for delayed gratification. The view about those in the untouchable world is that they are short on these things. They are disorganized. They are violent and scary. This belief has some grains of truth because of childhood trauma, the stress of poverty and other things. But this view metastasizes into a vicious, intellectually lazy stereotype. Before long, animalistic imagery is used to describe these human beings." Kind regards, Annalisa From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Mon Dec 8 18:11:51 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Mon, 08 Dec 2014 21:11:51 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent Message-ID: Class is an unspoken topic in America's protestant social structure of class inequality. ?William Julius Wilson caught hell for his 1970s book, "the declining significance of race," for making the argument that race is becoming less important vis-a-vis class in determining the life chances of black folk. Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: Annalisa Aguilar
Date:12/08/2014 8:50 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent
Hello esteemed discussants, I am not normally a fan of David Brooks of the New York Times, but sometimes he really surprises me. This is one of those times: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/02/opinion/david-brooks-class-prejudice-resurgent.html It has been my sense that we (as a culture, i.e., my American culture to which he refers) are more afraid to discuss class then we are to discuss race, and now it has become even harder, apparently. I particularly took to this paragraph: "Widening class distances produce class prejudice, classism. This is a prejudice based on visceral attitudes about competence. People in the "respectable" class have meritocratic virtues: executive function, grit, a capacity for delayed gratification. The view about those in the untouchable world is that they are short on these things. They are disorganized. They are violent and scary. This belief has some grains of truth because of childhood trauma, the stress of poverty and other things. But this view metastasizes into a vicious, intellectually lazy stereotype. Before long, animalistic imagery is used to describe these human beings." Kind regards, Annalisa From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon Dec 8 19:42:21 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 8 Dec 2014 19:42:21 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: The centrality of class in human relations and psychological development is a topic that cannot get enough attention, Paul and Annalisa. Its one lesson of the 1930's in the US (at least) that appears non-appropriatable by later generations. Or to quote Greg, people have an awfully hard time groking it. mike On Mon, Dec 8, 2014 at 6:11 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > Class is an unspoken topic in America's protestant social structure of > class inequality. William Julius Wilson caught hell for his 1970s book, > "the declining significance of race," for making the argument that race is > becoming less important vis-a-vis class in determining the life chances of > black folk. > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > >
-------- Original message --------
From: Annalisa Aguilar < > annalisa@unm.edu>
Date:12/08/2014 8:50 PM (GMT-05:00) >
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >
Subject: [Xmca-l] NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent >
>
Hello esteemed discussants, > > > I am not normally a fan of David Brooks of the New York Times, but > sometimes he really surprises me. This is one of those times: > > > > http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/02/opinion/david-brooks-class-prejudice-resurgent.html > < > http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/02/opinion/david-brooks-class-prejudice-resurgent.html?rref=collection%2Fcolumn%2Fdavid-brooks&contentCollection=opinion&action=click&module=NextInCollection®ion=Footer&pgtype=article > > > > > It has been my sense that we (as a culture, i.e., my American culture to > which he refers) are more afraid to discuss class then we are to discuss > race, and now it has become even harder, apparently. > > > I particularly took to this paragraph: > > > "Widening class distances produce class prejudice, classism. This is a > prejudice based on visceral attitudes about competence. People in the > "respectable" class have meritocratic virtues: executive function, grit, a > capacity for delayed gratification. The view about those in the untouchable > world is that they are short on these things. They are disorganized. They > are violent and scary. This belief has some grains of truth because of > childhood trauma, the stress of poverty and other things. But this view > metastasizes into a vicious, intellectually lazy stereotype. Before long, > animalistic imagery is used to describe these human beings." > > > Kind regards, > > > Annalisa > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Dec 8 19:50:37 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 9 Dec 2014 03:50:37 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: <1418097037128.14324@unm.edu> Hi Mike, Why is this the case that 1930s is "non-appropriatable" by later generations? Is it because the stories are not told and shared? McCarthyism? I'm not understanding. I have a hard time accepting the difficulty groking of it. There are people who are at a gross disadvantage because of a lack of opportunities and lack of advantages. What is there to grok? It is a sincere question, and not meant to be inflammatory in any way. Perhaps it is not knowing HOW to discuss it. That is my guess. But there has to be a way to discuss it. Where there is a will there is a way. Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of mike cole Sent: Monday, December 8, 2014 8:42 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent The centrality of class in human relations and psychological development is a topic that cannot get enough attention, Paul and Annalisa. Its one lesson of the 1930's in the US (at least) that appears non-appropriatable by later generations. Or to quote Greg, people have an awfully hard time groking it. mike On Mon, Dec 8, 2014 at 6:11 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > Class is an unspoken topic in America's protestant social structure of > class inequality. William Julius Wilson caught hell for his 1970s book, > "the declining significance of race," for making the argument that race is > becoming less important vis-a-vis class in determining the life chances of > black folk. > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > >
-------- Original message --------
From: Annalisa Aguilar < > annalisa@unm.edu>
Date:12/08/2014 8:50 PM (GMT-05:00) >
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >
Subject: [Xmca-l] NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent >
>
Hello esteemed discussants, > > > I am not normally a fan of David Brooks of the New York Times, but > sometimes he really surprises me. This is one of those times: > > > > http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/02/opinion/david-brooks-class-prejudice-resurgent.html > < > http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/02/opinion/david-brooks-class-prejudice-resurgent.html?rref=collection%2Fcolumn%2Fdavid-brooks&contentCollection=opinion&action=click&module=NextInCollection®ion=Footer&pgtype=article > > > > > It has been my sense that we (as a culture, i.e., my American culture to > which he refers) are more afraid to discuss class then we are to discuss > race, and now it has become even harder, apparently. > > > I particularly took to this paragraph: > > > "Widening class distances produce class prejudice, classism. This is a > prejudice based on visceral attitudes about competence. People in the > "respectable" class have meritocratic virtues: executive function, grit, a > capacity for delayed gratification. The view about those in the untouchable > world is that they are short on these things. They are disorganized. They > are violent and scary. This belief has some grains of truth because of > childhood trauma, the stress of poverty and other things. But this view > metastasizes into a vicious, intellectually lazy stereotype. Before long, > animalistic imagery is used to describe these human beings." > > > Kind regards, > > > Annalisa > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From ablunden@mira.net Mon Dec 8 20:01:38 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 09 Dec 2014 15:01:38 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent In-Reply-To: <1418097037128.14324@unm.edu> References: , <1418097037128.14324@unm.edu> Message-ID: <54867422.1060502@mira.net> It was the post-World War Two Settlement between the Allies and the Soviet Union which included huge concessions to the organised working class in Europe and America (and Australia) in exchange for Peaceful Co-existence. This for a time gave a degree of prosperity for the organised working class (which Americans have ever since called "the middle class") and this pacified the class struggle. All those sections of the world's population, beginning with the masses of the colonial world, followed by Blacks in the US and then Women, felt that they had been betrayed by this historic compromise, and raised their own demands for emancipation, and the next 50 years was dominated by this new configuration. Somewhere around the 1990s, this began to open up and it became possible to again see class. Which was always there of course, Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hi Mike, > > Why is this the case that 1930s is "non-appropriatable" by later generations? Is it because the stories are not told and shared? McCarthyism? I'm not understanding. > > I have a hard time accepting the difficulty groking of it. There are people who are at a gross disadvantage because of a lack of opportunities and lack of advantages. > > What is there to grok? It is a sincere question, and not meant to be inflammatory in any way. > > Perhaps it is not knowing HOW to discuss it. That is my guess. But there has to be a way to discuss it. Where there is a will there is a way. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of mike cole > Sent: Monday, December 8, 2014 8:42 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent > > The centrality of class in human relations and psychological development is > a topic that cannot get enough attention, Paul and Annalisa. Its one lesson > of the 1930's in the US (at least) that appears non-appropriatable by later > generations. Or to quote Greg, people have an awfully hard time groking it. > mike > > On Mon, Dec 8, 2014 at 6:11 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >> wrote: >> > > >> Class is an unspoken topic in America's protestant social structure of >> class inequality. William Julius Wilson caught hell for his 1970s book, >> "the declining significance of race," for making the argument that race is >> becoming less important vis-a-vis class in determining the life chances of >> black folk. >> >> >> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >> President >> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >> www.mocombeian.com >> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >> www.paulcmocombe.info >> >>
-------- Original message --------
From: Annalisa Aguilar < >> annalisa@unm.edu>
Date:12/08/2014 8:50 PM (GMT-05:00) >>
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>
Subject: [Xmca-l] NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent >>
>>
Hello esteemed discussants, >> >> >> I am not normally a fan of David Brooks of the New York Times, but >> sometimes he really surprises me. This is one of those times: >> >> >> >> http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/02/opinion/david-brooks-class-prejudice-resurgent.html >> < >> http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/02/opinion/david-brooks-class-prejudice-resurgent.html?rref=collection%2Fcolumn%2Fdavid-brooks&contentCollection=opinion&action=click&module=NextInCollection®ion=Footer&pgtype=article >> >> It has been my sense that we (as a culture, i.e., my American culture to >> which he refers) are more afraid to discuss class then we are to discuss >> race, and now it has become even harder, apparently. >> >> >> I particularly took to this paragraph: >> >> >> "Widening class distances produce class prejudice, classism. This is a >> prejudice based on visceral attitudes about competence. People in the >> "respectable" class have meritocratic virtues: executive function, grit, a >> capacity for delayed gratification. The view about those in the untouchable >> world is that they are short on these things. They are disorganized. They >> are violent and scary. This belief has some grains of truth because of >> childhood trauma, the stress of poverty and other things. But this view >> metastasizes into a vicious, intellectually lazy stereotype. Before long, >> animalistic imagery is used to describe these human beings." >> >> >> Kind regards, >> >> >> Annalisa >> >> >> >> > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Mon Dec 8 20:01:19 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Mon, 08 Dec 2014 23:01:19 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent Message-ID: Mike, I have a question for you...the problem I see in bourgeois sociology is the fact that capitalist relations of organizing society is taken to be the nature of reality as such. ?As a result, sociology theory and analysis is framed in terms of understanding what is the appropriate way of organizing society and human relations vis-a-vis the organization of work amidst class structural differentiation. ?Treating behavior associated with the latter as dysfunctional...it seems as though that is the emerging trend in mainstream bourgeois psychology as well. ?I attribute this phenomenon to the revisionism in marxism, especially as highlighted in the work of Bernstein. ..is there a parallel revisionist movement among?Vygotsky scholars? Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: mike cole
Date:12/08/2014 10:42 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent
The centrality of class in human relations and psychological development is a topic that cannot get enough attention, Paul and Annalisa. Its one lesson of the 1930's in the US (at least) that appears non-appropriatable by later generations. Or to quote Greg, people have an awfully hard time groking it. mike On Mon, Dec 8, 2014 at 6:11 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > Class is an unspoken topic in America's protestant social structure of > class inequality. William Julius Wilson caught hell for his 1970s book, > "the declining significance of race," for making the argument that race is > becoming less important vis-a-vis class in determining the life chances of > black folk. > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > >
-------- Original message --------
From: Annalisa Aguilar < > annalisa@unm.edu>
Date:12/08/2014 8:50 PM (GMT-05:00) >
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >
Subject: [Xmca-l] NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent >
>
Hello esteemed discussants, > > > I am not normally a fan of David Brooks of the New York Times, but > sometimes he really surprises me. This is one of those times: > > > > http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/02/opinion/david-brooks-class-prejudice-resurgent.html > < > http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/02/opinion/david-brooks-class-prejudice-resurgent.html?rref=collection%2Fcolumn%2Fdavid-brooks&contentCollection=opinion&action=click&module=NextInCollection®ion=Footer&pgtype=article > > > > > It has been my sense that we (as a culture, i.e., my American culture to > which he refers) are more afraid to discuss class then we are to discuss > race, and now it has become even harder, apparently. > > > I particularly took to this paragraph: > > > "Widening class distances produce class prejudice, classism. This is a > prejudice based on visceral attitudes about competence. People in the > "respectable" class have meritocratic virtues: executive function, grit, a > capacity for delayed gratification. The view about those in the untouchable > world is that they are short on these things. They are disorganized. They > are violent and scary. This belief has some grains of truth because of > childhood trauma, the stress of poverty and other things. But this view > metastasizes into a vicious, intellectually lazy stereotype. Before long, > animalistic imagery is used to describe these human beings." > > > Kind regards, > > > Annalisa > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Mon Dec 8 20:07:11 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Mon, 08 Dec 2014 23:07:11 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent Message-ID: <0saowar5j64foucshqankrp0.1418098031100@email.android.com> Annalisa, The problem as I see it is this emphasis by liberals on equality of opportunity, recognition, and distribution...if we are to survive, on this planet that is, we need a new rallying cry against capitalism and class differentiation. ? Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: Annalisa Aguilar
Date:12/08/2014 10:50 PM (GMT-05:00)
To:
Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent
Hi Mike, Why is this the case that 1930s is "non-appropriatable" by later generations? Is it because the stories are not told and shared? McCarthyism? I'm not understanding. I have a hard time accepting the difficulty groking of it. There are people who are at a gross disadvantage because of a lack of opportunities and lack of advantages. What is there to grok? It is a sincere question, and not meant to be inflammatory in any way. Perhaps it is not knowing HOW to discuss it. That is my guess. But there has to be a way to discuss it. Where there is a will there is a way. Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of mike cole Sent: Monday, December 8, 2014 8:42 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent The centrality of class in human relations and psychological development is a topic that cannot get enough attention, Paul and Annalisa. Its one lesson of the 1930's in the US (at least) that appears non-appropriatable by later generations. Or to quote Greg, people have an awfully hard time groking it. mike On Mon, Dec 8, 2014 at 6:11 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > Class is an unspoken topic in America's protestant social structure of > class inequality. William Julius Wilson caught hell for his 1970s book, > "the declining significance of race," for making the argument that race is > becoming less important vis-a-vis class in determining the life chances of > black folk. > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > >
-------- Original message --------
From: Annalisa Aguilar < > annalisa@unm.edu>
Date:12/08/2014 8:50 PM (GMT-05:00) >
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >
Subject: [Xmca-l] NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent >
>
Hello esteemed discussants, > > > I am not normally a fan of David Brooks of the New York Times, but > sometimes he really surprises me. This is one of those times: > > > > http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/02/opinion/david-brooks-class-prejudice-resurgent.html > < > http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/02/opinion/david-brooks-class-prejudice-resurgent.html?rref=collection%2Fcolumn%2Fdavid-brooks&contentCollection=opinion&action=click&module=NextInCollection®ion=Footer&pgtype=article > > > > > It has been my sense that we (as a culture, i.e., my American culture to > which he refers) are more afraid to discuss class then we are to discuss > race, and now it has become even harder, apparently. > > > I particularly took to this paragraph: > > > "Widening class distances produce class prejudice, classism. This is a > prejudice based on visceral attitudes about competence. People in the > "respectable" class have meritocratic virtues: executive function, grit, a > capacity for delayed gratification. The view about those in the untouchable > world is that they are short on these things. They are disorganized. They > are violent and scary. This belief has some grains of truth because of > childhood trauma, the stress of poverty and other things. But this view > metastasizes into a vicious, intellectually lazy stereotype. Before long, > animalistic imagery is used to describe these human beings." > > > Kind regards, > > > Annalisa > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Dec 8 20:19:53 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 9 Dec 2014 04:19:53 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent In-Reply-To: <54867422.1060502@mira.net> References: , <1418097037128.14324@unm.edu>,<54867422.1060502@mira.net> Message-ID: <1418098793033.84267@unm.edu> Andy, Interesting. I'm having a hard time connecting this to the ground. It is a story, which perhaps has meaning, but I don't see how it connects to American experience. This is not to say that it does or doesn't (in reality), I mean I don't see it. It feels too conspiratorial and planned, and I don't think any single minority group has that much power over others. Who knows? Maybe I'm wrong. I do believe that there was a disconnect in the continuity in historical experience due to the WW II and this is for many reasons, not a single reason. So that's one reason I find it hard to accept a "settlement" as The Explanation for this. My way of thinking about it is that it was a horrific war beyond anything anyone could imagine. There was no way to process this, and the thing most people wanted to do was be happy and get on with life and living. It is understandable. For me it has more to do with our humanity and incapacity to deal with horror and the abject than it has to do with suppressing the reality of class distinctions. It still doesn't explain to me why class is harder to discuss than race. So I offer that to the soup. Kind regards, Annalisa From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Mon Dec 8 20:34:37 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Mon, 08 Dec 2014 23:34:37 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent Message-ID: Annalisa, Andy is right. ?There was a conscious effort by the US government, beginning with the Kennedy administration, to turn the civil rights movement into more opportunities for the black bourgeoisie and emerging middle class. ?There is a debate between malcolm-x and MLK over this precise issue as it pertains to the decolonization efforts in africa. ?Malcolm argued that america will grant civil rights and opportunities to the American negro, not bcuz it is the moral thing to do. ?But to avert the communist turn in africa. ?He concluded that there will be a backlash to these efforts, however, if the negro does not develop a pan african communist orientation. ?MLK, as Tavis smiley highlights in his new book, became public number 1 when he took a class orientation to the civil rights movement. He was attacked by the leaders of the black bourgeoisie. Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: Annalisa Aguilar
Date:12/08/2014 11:19 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent
Andy, Interesting. I'm having a hard time connecting this to the ground. It is a story, which perhaps has meaning, but I don't see how it connects to American experience. This is not to say that it does or doesn't (in reality), I mean I don't see it. It feels too conspiratorial and planned, and I don't think any single minority group has that much power over others. Who knows? Maybe I'm wrong. I do believe that there was a disconnect in the continuity in historical experience due to the WW II and this is for many reasons, not a single reason. So that's one reason I find it hard to accept a "settlement" as The Explanation for this. My way of thinking about it is that it was a horrific war beyond anything anyone could imagine. There was no way to process this, and the thing most people wanted to do was be happy and get on with life and living. It is understandable. For me it has more to do with our humanity and incapacity to deal with horror and the abject than it has to do with suppressing the reality of class distinctions. It still doesn't explain to me why class is harder to discuss than race. So I offer that to the soup. Kind regards, Annalisa From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Mon Dec 8 21:23:49 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Mon, 8 Dec 2014 22:23:49 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Annalisa, My favorite line was: "In a friendship, people don?t sit around talking about their friendship. They do things together. Through common endeavor people overcome difference to become friends." But how to build friendships across the grand canyon known as (or, perhaps, not known as) social class in the U.S.? -greg On Mon, Dec 8, 2014 at 9:34 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > Annalisa, > > Andy is right. There was a conscious effort by the US government, > beginning with the Kennedy administration, to turn the civil rights > movement into more opportunities for the black bourgeoisie and emerging > middle class. There is a debate between malcolm-x and MLK over this > precise issue as it pertains to the decolonization efforts in africa. > Malcolm argued that america will grant civil rights and opportunities to > the American negro, not bcuz it is the moral thing to do. But to avert the > communist turn in africa. He concluded that there will be a backlash to > these efforts, however, if the negro does not develop a pan african > communist orientation. MLK, as Tavis smiley highlights in his new book, > became public number 1 when he took a class orientation to the civil rights > movement. He was attacked by the leaders of the black bourgeoisie. > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > >
-------- Original message --------
From: Annalisa Aguilar < > annalisa@unm.edu>
Date:12/08/2014 11:19 PM (GMT-05:00) >
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent >
>
Andy, > > Interesting. > > I'm having a hard time connecting this to the ground. It is a story, which > perhaps has meaning, but I don't see how it connects to American > experience. This is not to say that it does or doesn't (in reality), I mean > I don't see it. It feels too conspiratorial and planned, and I don't think > any single minority group has that much power over others. Who knows? Maybe > I'm wrong. > > I do believe that there was a disconnect in the continuity in historical > experience due to the WW II and this is for many reasons, not a single > reason. So that's one reason I find it hard to accept a "settlement" as The > Explanation for this. > > My way of thinking about it is that it was a horrific war beyond anything > anyone could imagine. There was no way to process this, and the thing most > people wanted to do was be happy and get on with life and living. It is > understandable. > > For me it has more to do with our humanity and incapacity to deal with > horror and the abject than it has to do with suppressing the reality of > class distinctions. It still doesn't explain to me why class is harder to > discuss than race. > > So I offer that to the soup. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu Mon Dec 8 21:35:30 2014 From: mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu (Zavala, Miguel) Date: Tue, 9 Dec 2014 05:35:30 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent In-Reply-To: <1418098793033.84267@unm.edu> Message-ID: Annalisa, You raise a good question. My sense is that "race" is rendered (in)visible because it is visually marked primarily at the level of the body and inter-personal relations (both conceptualized as distinct spatial scales). In classroom dialogues on institutional racism, it is so difficult for my students to come up with a working definition; yet when I ask what is race, I get lots of answers akin to what Critical Race Theorists term 'micro-aggressions', answers such as racial slurs, racist jokes, and in some instances everyday practices that begin to resemble some form of institutionalized racism as in police profiling. I say 'begin to resemble' because most (but some do) students don't quite have a working definition of these practice as systemic and institutionalized (much less as manifestations of a racial state [David Theo Goldberg, Charles Mill]). So, we work our way through a series of readings and dialogue in trying to understand the complexities and invisible dimensions of race (which operates at other spatial scales, some so large--historically and spatially--that it basically disappears from sight and our naming). But I think there is also something in the concrete reality of everyday life that renders "class" (in)visible in the U.S. It is not so much the issue of our bodies marked as classed beings (although in Latin America, I have seen this awareness, how the body, its clothing, use of gold, etc. becomes a marker for a particular class location) but of the reality of a 'middle class' or the stratification of 'class' in the U.S. People DO see differences along 'social class' marked by where people live, what they are able to consume, their professions, etc. -- I am not arguing for some Weberian model of social class, but am arguing that that is what we perceive, the phenomenon. And these differences may not be associated with "social class" concept as articulated by Marx. I am currently conducting dialogues with teachers on the neoliberal privatization of public education. There is yet another challenge, as I try to make sense of neoliberalism philosophically and historically: how we name "social class" and the discourses that operate in and through social class difference. Perhaps what needs to be unpacked is our view of the State and its relation to "social class." How we conceptualize the State (the working models or metaphors) will shape/color how we see "social class". The Liberal model of the state, with rational actors and the Individual as its central construct carries with it a kind of metaphor where social structures and structural relations tend to disappear (they are a type of landscape or spatial container of sorts, in the background, with individuals as the active agents foregrounded in this image). And there is of course the role of ideology in rendering "social class" invisible. What I find more challenging is teaching how race and class intersect and interlock, creating what Fanon termed a 'compound standpoint', a double-articulation, a race-class dialectic. But 'social class' while an objective reality, is inseparable from its historical geographies of difference. How we see 'social class' will look different from the vantage point of people living in abject poverty to folks like many of us, living as academics, to those who comprise the 1%. The same goes for "race"; it will be experienced and viewed differently based on one's geographic and social location. I would argue that Colonialism, from the standpoint of Indigenous, Mesitizo, Raza peoples from Latin America needs to be a part of our language and register; it needs to be unpacked and made central in any cogent understanding of "social class." Miguel On 12/8/14 8:19 PM, "Annalisa Aguilar" wrote: >Andy, > >Interesting. > >I'm having a hard time connecting this to the ground. It is a story, >which perhaps has meaning, but I don't see how it connects to American >experience. This is not to say that it does or doesn't (in reality), I >mean I don't see it. It feels too conspiratorial and planned, and I don't >think any single minority group has that much power over others. Who >knows? Maybe I'm wrong. > >I do believe that there was a disconnect in the continuity in historical >experience due to the WW II and this is for many reasons, not a single >reason. So that's one reason I find it hard to accept a "settlement" as >The Explanation for this. > >My way of thinking about it is that it was a horrific war beyond anything >anyone could imagine. There was no way to process this, and the thing >most people wanted to do was be happy and get on with life and living. It >is understandable. > >For me it has more to do with our humanity and incapacity to deal with >horror and the abject than it has to do with suppressing the reality of >class distinctions. It still doesn't explain to me why class is harder to >discuss than race. > >So I offer that to the soup. > >Kind regards, > >Annalisa > > > > > From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Dec 8 21:40:35 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 9 Dec 2014 05:40:35 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent In-Reply-To: <0saowar5j64foucshqankrp0.1418098031100@email.android.com> References: <0saowar5j64foucshqankrp0.1418098031100@email.android.com> Message-ID: <1418103635262.48431@unm.edu> Esteemed discussants, I accept that there is a tired way of looking at the status quo that isn't productive. What the new cry is, is to be determined. I liked Occupy's manifestation while it lasted, if it is still viable, but only the peaceful manifestations. Rather than get caught deep in the history, which is not to be dismissive of it, I wonder if it is possible to find new words and new meanings. My belief is that non-violence is the only viable approach. Of course may I refer to Gandhi and how he could wrangle liberation from an existing and very hardened class system. He did not rid the system, but it was a start. So for me such an enterprise would involve examining our discourse about class and where it becomes inflammatory, and then earnestly deciding (in collaboration) how to frame that in more peaceful and constructive forms. It's not to control speech, but to be mindful how our speech informs our thinking about it, which may also reveal how our thinking may be revealed in our speech. This seems very Vygotskian. That is my perty novice take on it. Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+annalisa=unm.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Dr. Paul C. Mocombe Sent: Monday, December 8, 2014 9:07 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent Annalisa, The problem as I see it is this emphasis by liberals on equality of opportunity, recognition, and distribution...if we are to survive, on this planet that is, we need a new rallying cry against capitalism and class differentiation. Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com www.readingroomcurriculum.com www.paulcmocombe.info
-------- Original message --------
From: Annalisa Aguilar
Date:12/08/2014 10:50 PM (GMT-05:00)
To:
Cc: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent
Hi Mike, Why is this the case that 1930s is "non-appropriatable" by later generations? Is it because the stories are not told and shared? McCarthyism? I'm not understanding. I have a hard time accepting the difficulty groking of it. There are people who are at a gross disadvantage because of a lack of opportunities and lack of advantages. What is there to grok? It is a sincere question, and not meant to be inflammatory in any way. Perhaps it is not knowing HOW to discuss it. That is my guess. But there has to be a way to discuss it. Where there is a will there is a way. Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of mike cole Sent: Monday, December 8, 2014 8:42 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent The centrality of class in human relations and psychological development is a topic that cannot get enough attention, Paul and Annalisa. Its one lesson of the 1930's in the US (at least) that appears non-appropriatable by later generations. Or to quote Greg, people have an awfully hard time groking it. mike On Mon, Dec 8, 2014 at 6:11 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > Class is an unspoken topic in America's protestant social structure of > class inequality. William Julius Wilson caught hell for his 1970s book, > "the declining significance of race," for making the argument that race is > becoming less important vis-a-vis class in determining the life chances of > black folk. > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > >
-------- Original message --------
From: Annalisa Aguilar < > annalisa@unm.edu>
Date:12/08/2014 8:50 PM (GMT-05:00) >
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >
Subject: [Xmca-l] NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent >
>
Hello esteemed discussants, > > > I am not normally a fan of David Brooks of the New York Times, but > sometimes he really surprises me. This is one of those times: > > > > http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/02/opinion/david-brooks-class-prejudice-resurgent.html > < > http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/02/opinion/david-brooks-class-prejudice-resurgent.html?rref=collection%2Fcolumn%2Fdavid-brooks&contentCollection=opinion&action=click&module=NextInCollection®ion=Footer&pgtype=article > > > > > It has been my sense that we (as a culture, i.e., my American culture to > which he refers) are more afraid to discuss class then we are to discuss > race, and now it has become even harder, apparently. > > > I particularly took to this paragraph: > > > "Widening class distances produce class prejudice, classism. This is a > prejudice based on visceral attitudes about competence. People in the > "respectable" class have meritocratic virtues: executive function, grit, a > capacity for delayed gratification. The view about those in the untouchable > world is that they are short on these things. They are disorganized. They > are violent and scary. This belief has some grains of truth because of > childhood trauma, the stress of poverty and other things. But this view > metastasizes into a vicious, intellectually lazy stereotype. Before long, > animalistic imagery is used to describe these human beings." > > > Kind regards, > > > Annalisa > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Dec 8 21:54:03 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 9 Dec 2014 05:54:03 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: <1418104442832.88529@unm.edu> Hi Greg! WRT to your favorite line: I am waiting for the ATers to pick up and run with that! :) Maybe we are building friendships here by interacting on this list? Now ! :) But then, even though we are "speaking" we are not talking about "our friendship," but then maybe we are. I'm not sure. Perhaps I disagree here with Brooks. Perhaps reminding ourselves of the meaning of friendship (our friendship) can be a method for disentanglement. It is just a thought. It is certainly not easy to have meta-conversations. But this might be a way to catch the moments of inflammation and to untangle V's word-meanings and even perezhivanie. I don't think it's just about the language of poverties, but also the language of wealths, and then discovering, or rather uncovering, what is there and how these relate, if they do at all. But Greg, perhaps my last post was my best pitch on "the how" as a first step. I'm just thinking out loud here. As I consider it, the first step also seems to be understanding (and agreement) that there is a problem. Am I wrong? Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Greg Thompson Sent: Monday, December 8, 2014 10:23 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent Annalisa, My favorite line was: "In a friendship, people don?t sit around talking about their friendship. They do things together. Through common endeavor people overcome difference to become friends." But how to build friendships across the grand canyon known as (or, perhaps, not known as) social class in the U.S.? -greg From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Mon Dec 8 22:12:12 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Mon, 8 Dec 2014 23:12:12 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent In-Reply-To: <1418104442832.88529@unm.edu> References: <1418104442832.88529@unm.edu> Message-ID: Andy, That quote was from the Brooks piece that Annalisa had mentioned. Annalisa, My sense was that what Brooks was talking about was cross-class friendships. I kinda doubt that there is much of that here on XMCA. Friends, surely. But cross-class, maybe less so. If you look at cities across the U.S. across time, you'll find an increasing polarization of neighborhood by class. These are seen in our common sense notions of "the rich part of town" and the "poor parts of town" (yes, there are always more of the latter than the former!). Many different structural forces are aligned to make these even worse (e.g., the way schools are funded). With that in mind, I think Brooks' idea of friendship across class lines is a lovely one. But my question is: what can we do to make these kinds of arrangements happen? And, more cynically, can these arrangements amount to anything more than a Sisyphean hill of beans (there's an evocative string of words!) if the structural basis of class-based segregation is not addressed? And speaking of the 30's, Myles Horton's Highlander School seems exemplary to all that we are discussing here. Certainly more than a hill of beans that was made by that radical hillbilly... -greg On Mon, Dec 8, 2014 at 10:54 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hi Greg! > > WRT to your favorite line: I am waiting for the ATers to pick up and run > with that! :) > > Maybe we are building friendships here by interacting on this list? Now ! > :) > > But then, even though we are "speaking" we are not talking about "our > friendship," but then maybe we are. I'm not sure. Perhaps I disagree here > with Brooks. Perhaps reminding ourselves of the meaning of friendship (our > friendship) can be a method for disentanglement. It is just a thought. > > It is certainly not easy to have meta-conversations. But this might be a > way to catch the moments of inflammation and to untangle V's word-meanings > and even perezhivanie. I don't think it's just about the language of > poverties, but also the language of wealths, and then discovering, or > rather uncovering, what is there and how these relate, if they do at all. > > But Greg, perhaps my last post was my best pitch on "the how" as a first > step. I'm just thinking out loud here. > > As I consider it, the first step also seems to be understanding (and > agreement) that there is a problem. Am I wrong? > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Greg Thompson > Sent: Monday, December 8, 2014 10:23 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent > > Annalisa, > > My favorite line was: > > "In a friendship, people don?t sit around talking about their friendship. > They do things together. Through common endeavor people overcome difference > to become friends." > > But how to build friendships across the grand canyon known as (or, perhaps, > not known as) social class in the U.S.? > > -greg > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Dec 8 22:53:57 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 9 Dec 2014 06:53:57 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent In-Reply-To: References: <1418098793033.84267@unm.edu>, Message-ID: <1418108036368.89826@unm.edu> Hi Miguel, This is a great discussion! Thanks to you and everyone else, and even you lurkers out there wherever you are! :) I responded most to your discussion of how the State is seen as a container when you say: "The Liberal model of the state, with rational actors and the Individual as its central construct carries with it a kind of metaphor where social structures and structural relations tend to disappear (they are a type of landscape or spatial container of sorts, in the background, with individuals as the active agents foregrounded in this image)." I certainly experience this in the mythology of "one person, one vote." I'd like to share in the spirit of this discussion that when I was in art school (yes *another* art school story, egads!), there was nothing but talk of post-modernism and multiculturalism. There was the speech of LGBTs, the speech of feminisms, the speech of people of color, etc. When I tried to consider what was the speech of whiteness? of maleness? I experienced something of a nothingness. I couldn't come up with anything so easily. That isn't that it's not there, but to show that I had this experience about it, in terms of art and a vis-a-vis comparison to multiculturalism (Miguel, I find this is very meaningful about invisibility that you mentioned, somehow). That was about the time of the first Gulf War, and all I could come up with in my mind after that pause, was speech on war and dominance. I don't think that that is "true," or that it has to be true. I mean, the best alternative I could come up with at the time was the voice of Beat writers, only because they responded to the culture coming out of the war, and that seems poignant (to me). The writers like Kerouac and Burroughs are examples I could come up with and these voices are not exactly a good fit. Their voices are not problematic in some ways, and are in others, but just to say that was the best I could do at that moment in my limited mental space. So without AT ALL meaning to speak for white men, I can only share that these thoughts troubled me, that if it is the case that the only way to speak comfortably as a white man is to speak in reference to war and to dominance, that that must be a horrible existence. I found this, if it is so, to be a kind of male imprisonment that I'm not sure has been looked at clearly and honestly. There were male essentialists (aka Iron John), but I find that trite and superficial, but I say that because I find essentialism problematic in general. I can acknowledge it, however, as the beginning of meaningful search, but it can't be the end of the search. Before I get thwacked for not knowing what I'm talking about, I'm not trying to be an authority here. I am only trying to transparently explain a search I conducted employing my empathy about a problem I saw a long time ago, if one might see that I was empathetic, I hope. It was from this empathetic standpoint, I considered how war and dominance are played out and communicated in the everyday experience. How, if a white man (or perhaps any man) "talks wrong" or "walks wrong," how that could be in some contexts life-threatening. I asked myself, do I have an equivalent? I mean as a woman, there are plenty of things for me to fear, however one of them is not that another woman will beat me up because I'm not wearing fingerpolish or because I'm wearing the wrong things in my hair or because I'm not tall enough or because of the quality of my voice. Even though crying in public is a difficult and uncomfortable thing to do, my "femininity" is not challenged if I were to do that. (Fast forward to today: I mean, how DOES Boehner get away with crying in public, when other white men don't?) So last I wondered, what is the purpose of this? I don't know the answer, except that it is to keep the status quo I suppose. That is as far as I could go with these thoughts. So I'm only sharing with you some questions I've had. I'm certainly not the authority. Just offering some honest considerations I've had and how I came across them and I offer them in a spirit of sharing. Kind regards, Annalisa From annalisa@unm.edu Tue Dec 9 09:50:30 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 9 Dec 2014 17:50:30 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent In-Reply-To: References: <1418104442832.88529@unm.edu>, Message-ID: <1418147430876.99474@unm.edu> Greg! Just reading the wikipage on Myles Horton and I am very inspired! Thanks for turning me on to him! Though how the school could be called communist floors me. Segregation does strange things to brains. I found the most important thought in the page was: "Horton was influenced early on by his work with poor mountain people in Ozone, Tennessee. From them, he learned that a free discussion of problems, without indoctrination to any preconceived ideas, generated vitality and brought out ideas from within the group." What this means to me is a picture of the ways in which people, with their own common sense, when free to speak together in a community, each from one's own vantage point, can, when speaking in the present moment for what is at hand in the present moment, manifest ideas and solutions together. I assume that what can come out of this kind of speaking are movements for action, such as sitting at the front of a bus! :) Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Greg Thompson Sent: Monday, December 8, 2014 11:12 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent Andy, That quote was from the Brooks piece that Annalisa had mentioned. Annalisa, My sense was that what Brooks was talking about was cross-class friendships. I kinda doubt that there is much of that here on XMCA. Friends, surely. But cross-class, maybe less so. If you look at cities across the U.S. across time, you'll find an increasing polarization of neighborhood by class. These are seen in our common sense notions of "the rich part of town" and the "poor parts of town" (yes, there are always more of the latter than the former!). Many different structural forces are aligned to make these even worse (e.g., the way schools are funded). With that in mind, I think Brooks' idea of friendship across class lines is a lovely one. But my question is: what can we do to make these kinds of arrangements happen? And, more cynically, can these arrangements amount to anything more than a Sisyphean hill of beans (there's an evocative string of words!) if the structural basis of class-based segregation is not addressed? And speaking of the 30's, Myles Horton's Highlander School seems exemplary to all that we are discussing here. Certainly more than a hill of beans that was made by that radical hillbilly... -greg On Mon, Dec 8, 2014 at 10:54 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hi Greg! > > WRT to your favorite line: I am waiting for the ATers to pick up and run > with that! :) > > Maybe we are building friendships here by interacting on this list? Now ! > :) > > But then, even though we are "speaking" we are not talking about "our > friendship," but then maybe we are. I'm not sure. Perhaps I disagree here > with Brooks. Perhaps reminding ourselves of the meaning of friendship (our > friendship) can be a method for disentanglement. It is just a thought. > > It is certainly not easy to have meta-conversations. But this might be a > way to catch the moments of inflammation and to untangle V's word-meanings > and even perezhivanie. I don't think it's just about the language of > poverties, but also the language of wealths, and then discovering, or > rather uncovering, what is there and how these relate, if they do at all. > > But Greg, perhaps my last post was my best pitch on "the how" as a first > step. I'm just thinking out loud here. > > As I consider it, the first step also seems to be understanding (and > agreement) that there is a problem. Am I wrong? > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Greg Thompson > Sent: Monday, December 8, 2014 10:23 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent > > Annalisa, > > My favorite line was: > > "In a friendship, people don?t sit around talking about their friendship. > They do things together. Through common endeavor people overcome difference > to become friends." > > But how to build friendships across the grand canyon known as (or, perhaps, > not known as) social class in the U.S.? > > -greg > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Tue Dec 9 11:22:35 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Tue, 9 Dec 2014 12:22:35 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent In-Reply-To: <1418147430876.99474@unm.edu> References: <1418104442832.88529@unm.edu> <1418147430876.99474@unm.edu> Message-ID: Annalisa, I think I circulated this to the list before you, but this is a great video on Myles Horton if you have some time (I listened to it on my commute). it is an interview conducted by Bill Moyers: http://vimeo.com/30650519 The earlier work of the Highlander School was focused on workers and the early labor movement in the U.S. Very much about class. It changed focus a bit during the late 40's and 50's and 60's and became much more associated with civil rights movement. Myles explains it well in his interview with Bill Moyers. But communist associations with the school probably weren't too far off the mark, esp. in the early days. Great stuff indeed! -greg On Tue, Dec 9, 2014 at 10:50 AM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Greg! > > Just reading the wikipage on Myles Horton and I am very inspired! Thanks > for turning me on to him! Though how the school could be called communist > floors me. Segregation does strange things to brains. > > I found the most important thought in the page was: > > "Horton was influenced early on by his work with poor mountain people in > Ozone, Tennessee. From them, he learned that a free discussion of problems, > without indoctrination to any preconceived ideas, generated vitality and > brought out ideas from within the group." > > What this means to me is a picture of the ways in which people, with their > own common sense, when free to speak together in a community, each from > one's own vantage point, can, when speaking in the present moment for what > is at hand in the present moment, manifest ideas and solutions together. I > assume that what can come out of this kind of speaking are movements for > action, such as sitting at the front of a bus! :) > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Greg Thompson > Sent: Monday, December 8, 2014 11:12 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent > > Andy, > That quote was from the Brooks piece that Annalisa had mentioned. > > Annalisa, > > My sense was that what Brooks was talking about was cross-class > friendships. I kinda doubt that there is much of that here on XMCA. > Friends, surely. But cross-class, maybe less so. > > If you look at cities across the U.S. across time, you'll find an > increasing polarization of neighborhood by class. These are seen in our > common sense notions of "the rich part of town" and the "poor parts of > town" (yes, there are always more of the latter than the former!). Many > different structural forces are aligned to make these even worse (e.g., the > way schools are funded). With that in mind, I think Brooks' idea of > friendship across class lines is a lovely one. But my question is: what can > we do to make these kinds of arrangements happen? > > And, more cynically, can these arrangements amount to anything more than a > Sisyphean hill of beans (there's an evocative string of words!) if the > structural basis of class-based segregation is not addressed? > > And speaking of the 30's, Myles Horton's Highlander School seems exemplary > to all that we are discussing here. Certainly more than a hill of beans > that was made by that radical hillbilly... > > -greg > > > > On Mon, Dec 8, 2014 at 10:54 PM, Annalisa Aguilar > wrote: > > > Hi Greg! > > > > WRT to your favorite line: I am waiting for the ATers to pick up and run > > with that! :) > > > > Maybe we are building friendships here by interacting on this list? Now ! > > :) > > > > But then, even though we are "speaking" we are not talking about "our > > friendship," but then maybe we are. I'm not sure. Perhaps I disagree here > > with Brooks. Perhaps reminding ourselves of the meaning of friendship > (our > > friendship) can be a method for disentanglement. It is just a thought. > > > > It is certainly not easy to have meta-conversations. But this might be a > > way to catch the moments of inflammation and to untangle V's > word-meanings > > and even perezhivanie. I don't think it's just about the language of > > poverties, but also the language of wealths, and then discovering, or > > rather uncovering, what is there and how these relate, if they do at all. > > > > But Greg, perhaps my last post was my best pitch on "the how" as a first > > step. I'm just thinking out loud here. > > > > As I consider it, the first step also seems to be understanding (and > > agreement) that there is a problem. Am I wrong? > > > > Kind regards, > > > > Annalisa > > > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > on behalf of Greg Thompson > > Sent: Monday, December 8, 2014 10:23 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent > > > > Annalisa, > > > > My favorite line was: > > > > "In a friendship, people don?t sit around talking about their friendship. > > They do things together. Through common endeavor people overcome > difference > > to become friends." > > > > But how to build friendships across the grand canyon known as (or, > perhaps, > > not known as) social class in the U.S.? > > > > -greg > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From smago@uga.edu Tue Dec 9 10:56:37 2014 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Tue, 9 Dec 2014 18:56:37 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] article on play Message-ID: This new article in AERJ might be of interested to the playful set in XMCA: Toward More Joyful Learning Integrating Play Into Frameworks of Middle Grades Teaching Hilary G. Conklin DePaul University Abstract Recent efforts to define qualities of effective teaching practice have done little to capture the role of play, imagination, and creativity in classroom teaching. Drawing on theories of play and data from a two-year case study that included classroom observations, interviews, artifact collection, and surveys, the author examines the ways in which elements of play were present across the practice of eight novice middle grades teachers. Building on examples of play in these classrooms, the author proposes adding the dimension of play to frameworks of middle grades teaching-a dimension that encompasses young adolescents' engagement in classroom work that involves choice and self-direction, imaginative creations, and a nonstressed state of interest and joy. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Am Educ Res J-2014-Conklin-1227-55 (1).pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 200145 bytes Desc: Am Educ Res J-2014-Conklin-1227-55 (1).pdf Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141209/82e7c589/attachment.pdf From ablunden@mira.net Tue Dec 9 18:05:35 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Wed, 10 Dec 2014 13:05:35 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent In-Reply-To: References: <1418104442832.88529@unm.edu> <1418147430876.99474@unm.edu> Message-ID: <5487AA6F.4090803@mira.net> As Horton says, in the end the Communist Party decided they didn't want him as a member, rather than the other way around. He was such an independent and uncompromising spirit. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Greg Thompson wrote: > Annalisa, > I think I circulated this to the list before you, but this is a great video > on Myles Horton if you have some time (I listened to it on my commute). it > is an interview conducted by Bill Moyers: > http://vimeo.com/30650519 > > The earlier work of the Highlander School was focused on workers and the > early labor movement in the U.S. Very much about class. It changed focus a > bit during the late 40's and 50's and 60's and became much more associated > with civil rights movement. Myles explains it well in his interview with > Bill Moyers. But communist associations with the school probably weren't > too far off the mark, esp. in the early days. > > Great stuff indeed! > -greg > > > On Tue, Dec 9, 2014 at 10:50 AM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > >> Greg! >> >> Just reading the wikipage on Myles Horton and I am very inspired! Thanks >> for turning me on to him! Though how the school could be called communist >> floors me. Segregation does strange things to brains. >> >> I found the most important thought in the page was: >> >> "Horton was influenced early on by his work with poor mountain people in >> Ozone, Tennessee. From them, he learned that a free discussion of problems, >> without indoctrination to any preconceived ideas, generated vitality and >> brought out ideas from within the group." >> >> What this means to me is a picture of the ways in which people, with their >> own common sense, when free to speak together in a community, each from >> one's own vantage point, can, when speaking in the present moment for what >> is at hand in the present moment, manifest ideas and solutions together. I >> assume that what can come out of this kind of speaking are movements for >> action, such as sitting at the front of a bus! :) >> >> Kind regards, >> >> Annalisa >> >> >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> on behalf of Greg Thompson >> Sent: Monday, December 8, 2014 11:12 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent >> >> Andy, >> That quote was from the Brooks piece that Annalisa had mentioned. >> >> Annalisa, >> >> My sense was that what Brooks was talking about was cross-class >> friendships. I kinda doubt that there is much of that here on XMCA. >> Friends, surely. But cross-class, maybe less so. >> >> If you look at cities across the U.S. across time, you'll find an >> increasing polarization of neighborhood by class. These are seen in our >> common sense notions of "the rich part of town" and the "poor parts of >> town" (yes, there are always more of the latter than the former!). Many >> different structural forces are aligned to make these even worse (e.g., the >> way schools are funded). With that in mind, I think Brooks' idea of >> friendship across class lines is a lovely one. But my question is: what can >> we do to make these kinds of arrangements happen? >> >> And, more cynically, can these arrangements amount to anything more than a >> Sisyphean hill of beans (there's an evocative string of words!) if the >> structural basis of class-based segregation is not addressed? >> >> And speaking of the 30's, Myles Horton's Highlander School seems exemplary >> to all that we are discussing here. Certainly more than a hill of beans >> that was made by that radical hillbilly... >> >> -greg >> >> >> >> On Mon, Dec 8, 2014 at 10:54 PM, Annalisa Aguilar >> wrote: >> >> >>> Hi Greg! >>> >>> WRT to your favorite line: I am waiting for the ATers to pick up and run >>> with that! :) >>> >>> Maybe we are building friendships here by interacting on this list? Now ! >>> :) >>> >>> But then, even though we are "speaking" we are not talking about "our >>> friendship," but then maybe we are. I'm not sure. Perhaps I disagree here >>> with Brooks. Perhaps reminding ourselves of the meaning of friendship >>> >> (our >> >>> friendship) can be a method for disentanglement. It is just a thought. >>> >>> It is certainly not easy to have meta-conversations. But this might be a >>> way to catch the moments of inflammation and to untangle V's >>> >> word-meanings >> >>> and even perezhivanie. I don't think it's just about the language of >>> poverties, but also the language of wealths, and then discovering, or >>> rather uncovering, what is there and how these relate, if they do at all. >>> >>> But Greg, perhaps my last post was my best pitch on "the how" as a first >>> step. I'm just thinking out loud here. >>> >>> As I consider it, the first step also seems to be understanding (and >>> agreement) that there is a problem. Am I wrong? >>> >>> Kind regards, >>> >>> Annalisa >>> >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> on behalf of Greg Thompson >>> Sent: Monday, December 8, 2014 10:23 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent >>> >>> Annalisa, >>> >>> My favorite line was: >>> >>> "In a friendship, people don?t sit around talking about their friendship. >>> They do things together. Through common endeavor people overcome >>> >> difference >> >>> to become friends." >>> >>> But how to build friendships across the grand canyon known as (or, >>> >> perhaps, >> >>> not known as) social class in the U.S.? >>> >>> -greg >>> >>> >>> >> -- >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Anthropology >> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> Brigham Young University >> Provo, UT 84602 >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> >> >> > > > From annalisa@unm.edu Tue Dec 9 18:37:52 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Wed, 10 Dec 2014 02:37:52 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent In-Reply-To: <5487AA6F.4090803@mira.net> References: <1418104442832.88529@unm.edu> <1418147430876.99474@unm.edu> , <5487AA6F.4090803@mira.net> Message-ID: <1418179073697.62886@unm.edu> Greg & Andy, As I read it, the wikipedia page used the word communist in the sense it was an uninformed slur, which was how it was unfortunately used back then. I assumed this, and thanks for the correction. Here's the text in question: "The term 'communist' was applied to Horton?s teachings and the Highlander School because of the school?s philosophy of bringing whites and blacks together, in violation of segregation laws." It is the only place the term is used in the entire biography. The wikipage indicates Horton was a socialist and there isn't mention of communist associations. I don't think just getting white and black adults together to learn together makes a communist school. So that is how I meant it... sorry for brushing against any sensitivities there. It sounds like he had great parents. Kind regards, Annalisa From ablunden@mira.net Tue Dec 9 18:46:31 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Wed, 10 Dec 2014 13:46:31 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent In-Reply-To: <1418179073697.62886@unm.edu> References: <1418104442832.88529@unm.edu> <1418147430876.99474@unm.edu> , <5487AA6F.4090803@mira.net> <1418179073697.62886@unm.edu> Message-ID: <5487B407.8010503@mira.net> No worries, Annalisa. Horton responded in the same sense you did: "I am not a communist (in the sense you are calling me a communist)." But it is worth knowing that he was no wishy-washy socialist. He was clear that his aim was social revolution. But he wasn't very impressed with the USSR or the CPUSA either. He saw education as the aim instrument for social revolution. But his concept of education was very different from anything he could find anywhere else. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Greg & Andy, > > As I read it, the wikipedia page used the word communist in the sense it was an uninformed slur, which was how it was unfortunately used back then. I assumed this, and thanks for the correction. > > Here's the text in question: > > "The term 'communist' was applied to Horton?s teachings and the Highlander School because of the school?s philosophy of bringing whites and blacks together, in violation of segregation laws." > > It is the only place the term is used in the entire biography. The wikipage indicates Horton was a socialist and there isn't mention of communist associations. > > I don't think just getting white and black adults together to learn together makes a communist school. So that is how I meant it... sorry for brushing against any sensitivities there. > > It sounds like he had great parents. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > > From annalisa@unm.edu Tue Dec 9 18:58:43 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Wed, 10 Dec 2014 02:58:43 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent In-Reply-To: <5487B407.8010503@mira.net> References: <1418104442832.88529@unm.edu> <1418147430876.99474@unm.edu> , <5487AA6F.4090803@mira.net> <1418179073697.62886@unm.edu>,<5487B407.8010503@mira.net> Message-ID: <1418180324765.761@unm.edu> Why Andy, I am thrilled that we could come together under the spirit of Myles. I wouldn't know a wishy-washy socialist if you threw one at me. Kind regards, Annalisa From annalisa@unm.edu Tue Dec 9 22:31:43 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Wed, 10 Dec 2014 06:31:43 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances In-Reply-To: References: <1417659964000.86913@unm.edu> <1643869288.5362833.1417689029773.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11109.mail.ir2.yahoo.com>, Message-ID: <1418193105026.85499@unm.edu> Hi Esther, Sorry for being a little late in a reply! I am a fan of "cultural" affordances. Thanks the reference to your chapter. I will try to find that! It is my sense that Gibson was heading in the direction of what he called "social affordances," but just didn't live long enough to make the research complete. Perhaps social affordances are an avenue (and a form) of understanding culture as it is perceived? I seem recall his discussion about mailboxes and their affordances, which are very much cultural objects. Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Esther Goody Sent: Thursday, December 4, 2014 4:25 AM To: 'Haydi Zulfei'; 'eXtended Mind, Culture,Activity' Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The meaning of affordances I found using 'affordance' helpful in thinking about how individuals' actions shape, and are shaped by detailed 'things' in socio-cultural worlds. Here these are shared realities. See my chapter in Mike Cole's and David Olson's Festschrift for Jack Goody. This is how I see 'culture' as effecting how we interact. .....................? Esther Goody From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Dec 10 10:38:44 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 10 Dec 2014 10:38:44 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Sociocritical theory a la Kris G Message-ID: I would like to pick up on Dana's call for continued discussion of politics and power in relation to theorizing the role of culture in human development. To this end, Kris says its ok to publish her Scribner lecture on this topic (and warnst that she has a new and better version of her thinking waiting in the wings). So, attached is Kris's paper as a common grounding for a discussion. If you-all would stick to the subject line, or when you feel the urge, create a new, related, subject line, if you would so label it, such measure might stabilize an always heterochronous discussion. If others have alternative suggestions, speak up! mike -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: kris sociocritical.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 137112 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141210/b727aaa4/attachment.pdf From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Dec 10 10:48:23 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 10 Dec 2014 10:48:23 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Suvorov and Imagination Message-ID: Greatly respected Haydi!! My apologies for failing to attach this paper which was initially part of a response to Larry's important note about the Bakhurst-Padden paper in the lchc history archives. Attribute it to old age and lack of attention to detail. There is a LOT of video stuff about Survorov on this on youtube, and his notion of imagination is the center of attention here. Suvorov's is a fascinating if upsetting story, yet to be written. It would be great if someone on xmca had time to bring these materials together for critical analysis. Plenty of power and politics in his scientific case!! Our paper includes a discussion of precisely how the issue of translation of key concepts influences understanding how at least some Russians appropriated LSV's legacy. There is an English translation of the Suvorov paper discussed in the attached paper in JREEP and probably online somewhere. Our paper takes using into some connections that people might find interesting. The topic of imagination seems worth a lot of attention at present. mike -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: IMAGINATION-FINAL.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 435139 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141210/774eb5c1/attachment-0001.pdf From laires11@gmail.com Wed Dec 10 12:50:11 2014 From: laires11@gmail.com (Luisa Aires) Date: Wed, 10 Dec 2014 20:50:11 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical theory a la Kris G In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Dear Mike and ALL Thank you for sharing Kris? thoughts about culture, education, literacy, development... This text evokes me the foundations of xmca - to deconstruct the origins of the historical-cultural theory and expand it with scientific, social, cultural, historical contemporary thoughts and movements. Kris shares with us a huge and rich lecture, a pedagogical framework that could mediate very rich xmca discussions. Let me mention some powerful constructs that we could discuss: - Third space - Nondominant communities - ZPD - Zo ?ped (a ?wonderful? construct) - Literacy - sociocritical literacy - Grounding theoretical concepts - Sincretic testimonios - Reframing learning, teaching, education, development What do you think? All the best, Lu?sa 2014-12-10 18:38 GMT+00:00 mike cole : > I would like to pick up on Dana's call for continued discussion of politics > and power in relation to theorizing the role of culture in human > development. > > To this end, Kris says its ok to publish her Scribner lecture on this topic > (and warnst that she has a new and better version of her thinking waiting > in the wings). > > So, attached is Kris's paper as a common grounding for a discussion. If > you-all would stick to the subject line, or when you feel the urge, > create a new, related, subject line, if you would so label it, such measure > might stabilize an always heterochronous discussion. > > If others have alternative suggestions, speak up! > > mike > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > -- Department of Education and Distance Learning, Universidade Aberta Centre of Studies on Migrations and Intercultural Relations (CEMRI) R. Amial, n? 752, 4200-055 Porto, Portugal laires@uab.pt www.uab.pt From billkerr@gmail.com Wed Dec 10 14:02:38 2014 From: billkerr@gmail.com (Bill Kerr) Date: Thu, 11 Dec 2014 09:02:38 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent In-Reply-To: <1418089844446.50077@unm.edu> References: <1418089844446.50077@unm.edu> Message-ID: The David Brooks article doesn't connect very well with the known facts of the killing of Michael Brown, namely: It is now clear 12 shots were fired by Officer Wilson, the last of which struck Mr Brown in the top of the head. He was hit 7 times. The deadly encounter started while Officer Wilson was seated in his police cruiser. The first two shots were fired by the officer while still in the car. Most witnesses said that at that time, Mr Brown was leaning through the driver?s side window. The victim?s blood was found inside and outside the car and on the officer?s clothing. A bullet was lodged in the armrest. ... Ten of the twelve shots were fired after Officer Wilson got out of his cruiser. Mr Brown?s body was found 153 feet away. All the fatal shots were fired when Mr Brown was away from the police car. While some witnesses said he was fleeing the car when they were fired, a greater number of witnesses said they came as the victim was moving towards the officer, McCulloch said http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/michael-brown-shooting-ten-things-we-know--or-know-better-now-the-ferguson-grand-jurys-work-is-over-9881046.html The claim that there is a shift in our understanding of race and class does not seem all that relevant to the particularity of this case IMO. On Tue, Dec 9, 2014 at 12:50 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hello esteemed discussants, > > > I am not normally a fan of David Brooks of the New York Times, but > sometimes he really surprises me. This is one of those times: > > > > http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/02/opinion/david-brooks-class-prejudice-resurgent.html > < > http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/02/opinion/david-brooks-class-prejudice-resurgent.html?rref=collection%2Fcolumn%2Fdavid-brooks&contentCollection=opinion&action=click&module=NextInCollection®ion=Footer&pgtype=article > > > > > It has been my sense that we (as a culture, i.e., my American culture to > which he refers) are more afraid to discuss class then we are to discuss > race, and now it has become even harder, apparently. > > > I particularly took to this paragraph: > > > "Widening class distances produce class prejudice, classism. This is a > prejudice based on visceral attitudes about competence. People in the > "respectable" class have meritocratic virtues: executive function, grit, a > capacity for delayed gratification. The view about those in the untouchable > world is that they are short on these things. They are disorganized. They > are violent and scary. This belief has some grains of truth because of > childhood trauma, the stress of poverty and other things. But this view > metastasizes into a vicious, intellectually lazy stereotype. Before long, > animalistic imagery is used to describe these human beings." > > > Kind regards, > > > Annalisa > > From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed Dec 10 15:15:52 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Wed, 10 Dec 2014 16:15:52 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical theory a la Kris G In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <4B33D5D3-7B32-47DB-A64E-934D4DB0FA61@gmail.com> Luisa and Mike, My depth of knowledge in the xmca chat, its foundations, is much shallower than yours, so the articles by Pelaprat and Cole and Gutierrez don?t evoke nearly the connections for me, I am sure, but enough that I think it worth sharing. In reading the Pelaprat&Cole article (Gap and Imagination) AND Gutierrez I came across Engstrom in the bibliography. I found his article on Expansive Learning on the internet. It brings to my mind the idea of ?mashing up? that David K., I believe, likes to use. As well it brings to my mind Langacker?s notion of symbolic assemblies, which brings together grammar and discourse (i.e., usage-based grammar) unshackled by grammar as static constituency. Furthermore, I work with urban Indians in a charter school here in Albuquerque. I am convinced that dialog a al Bakhtin, Freire, and Horton are the key to what I am trying to do, perhaps as much as many of you are trying to do with this chat. In light of the ferment in the country over the killings of unarmed Black men, there is hope now for the kind of flourishing that Andy?s article talks about in the article that he has sent to us recently on a number of occasions. I hope this email does not seem ungrounded, rather that it adds one more voice to a call for relevance and relationship, without a loss of rigor. Henry > On Dec 10, 2014, at 1:50 PM, Luisa Aires wrote: > > Dear Mike and ALL > > Thank you for sharing Kris? thoughts about culture, education, literacy, > development... > This text evokes me the foundations of xmca - to deconstruct the origins of > the historical-cultural theory and expand it with scientific, social, > cultural, historical contemporary thoughts and movements. > > Kris shares with us a huge and rich lecture, a pedagogical framework that > could mediate very rich xmca discussions. Let me mention some powerful > constructs that we could discuss: > - Third space > - Nondominant communities > - ZPD > - Zo ?ped (a ?wonderful? construct) > - Literacy - sociocritical literacy > - Grounding theoretical concepts > - Sincretic testimonios > - Reframing learning, teaching, education, development > > What do you think? > > All the best, > Lu?sa > > 2014-12-10 18:38 GMT+00:00 mike cole : > >> I would like to pick up on Dana's call for continued discussion of politics >> and power in relation to theorizing the role of culture in human >> development. >> >> To this end, Kris says its ok to publish her Scribner lecture on this topic >> (and warnst that she has a new and better version of her thinking waiting >> in the wings). >> >> So, attached is Kris's paper as a common grounding for a discussion. If >> you-all would stick to the subject line, or when you feel the urge, >> create a new, related, subject line, if you would so label it, such measure >> might stabilize an always heterochronous discussion. >> >> If others have alternative suggestions, speak up! >> >> mike >> >> >> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> > > > > -- > Department of Education and Distance Learning, Universidade Aberta > Centre of Studies on Migrations and Intercultural Relations (CEMRI) > R. Amial, n? 752, 4200-055 Porto, Portugal > laires@uab.pt > www.uab.pt From annalisa@unm.edu Wed Dec 10 16:23:45 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Thu, 11 Dec 2014 00:23:45 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent In-Reply-To: References: <1418089844446.50077@unm.edu>, Message-ID: <1418257424871.89589@unm.edu> Hi Bill, I do not take the Brooks article as the definitive voice on the aftermath of Ferguson. I would have never guessed I'd be in defense of Brooks, however I don't think he intends to be the voice of authority on this. He opens with this text: "One of the features of all the Ferguson discussion over the past few months is how tinny the comparisons to the civil-rights era have sounded. People have tried to link Ferguson to Selma and Jim Crow, but something is off. "That?s, in part, because we?ve moved from simplicity to ambiguity. The civil rights struggle was about as clear a conflict between right and wrong as we get in national life. The debate about Ferguson elicited complex reactions among most sensible people." Then: "But the other reason that the civil-rights era comparisons were inapt is because the nature of racism has changed. There has been a migration away from prejudice based on genetics to prejudice based on class." This is why I'm not sure if you are saying that his commentary is a distraction from the "real" issue, or if you are saying that there can only be "real" issues discussed when discussing Fergusen, and Brooks's isn't one of them. Or maybe you are saying something else? I'd say that the nature of racism _has_ changed, and not necessarily for the better. There are class elements involved in Ferguson's tragedy. This is not saying that race issues are removed or displaced by class, but that they have combined, and this is what Brooks is pointing out. Or am I wrong? I'm not sure what the function of reproducing the graphic nature of the violence against the victim is meant to do in the context of this post. It certainly has a drive-by quality. Clearly you are outraged as many of us are. What are you saying? I'm just trying to make sense of it. Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+annalisa=unm.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Bill Kerr Sent: Wednesday, December 10, 2014 3:02 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent The David Brooks article doesn't connect very well with the known facts of the killing of Michael Brown, namely: It is now clear 12 shots were fired by Officer Wilson, the last of which struck Mr Brown in the top of the head. He was hit 7 times. The deadly encounter started while Officer Wilson was seated in his police cruiser. The first two shots were fired by the officer while still in the car. Most witnesses said that at that time, Mr Brown was leaning through the driver?s side window. The victim?s blood was found inside and outside the car and on the officer?s clothing. A bullet was lodged in the armrest. ... Ten of the twelve shots were fired after Officer Wilson got out of his cruiser. Mr Brown?s body was found 153 feet away. All the fatal shots were fired when Mr Brown was away from the police car. While some witnesses said he was fleeing the car when they were fired, a greater number of witnesses said they came as the victim was moving towards the officer, McCulloch said http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/michael-brown-shooting-ten-things-we-know--or-know-better-now-the-ferguson-grand-jurys-work-is-over-9881046.html The claim that there is a shift in our understanding of race and class does not seem all that relevant to the particularity of this case IMO. On Tue, Dec 9, 2014 at 12:50 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hello esteemed discussants, > > > I am not normally a fan of David Brooks of the New York Times, but > sometimes he really surprises me. This is one of those times: > > > > http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/02/opinion/david-brooks-class-prejudice-resurgent.html > < > http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/02/opinion/david-brooks-class-prejudice-resurgent.html?rref=collection%2Fcolumn%2Fdavid-brooks&contentCollection=opinion&action=click&module=NextInCollection®ion=Footer&pgtype=article > > > > > It has been my sense that we (as a culture, i.e., my American culture to > which he refers) are more afraid to discuss class then we are to discuss > race, and now it has become even harder, apparently. > > > I particularly took to this paragraph: > > > "Widening class distances produce class prejudice, classism. This is a > prejudice based on visceral attitudes about competence. People in the > "respectable" class have meritocratic virtues: executive function, grit, a > capacity for delayed gratification. The view about those in the untouchable > world is that they are short on these things. They are disorganized. They > are violent and scary. This belief has some grains of truth because of > childhood trauma, the stress of poverty and other things. But this view > metastasizes into a vicious, intellectually lazy stereotype. Before long, > animalistic imagery is used to describe these human beings." > > > Kind regards, > > > Annalisa > > From billkerr@gmail.com Wed Dec 10 17:42:14 2014 From: billkerr@gmail.com (Bill Kerr) Date: Thu, 11 Dec 2014 12:42:14 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent In-Reply-To: <1418257424871.89589@unm.edu> References: <1418089844446.50077@unm.edu> <1418257424871.89589@unm.edu> Message-ID: Annalisa, As you say David Brooks wrote: "That?s, in part, because we?ve moved from simplicity to ambiguity. The civil rights struggle was about as clear a conflict between right and wrong as we get in national life. The debate about Ferguson elicited complex reactions among most sensible people." >From the known facts (12 shots fired) I don't see the shooting of Michael Brown as an illustration of "ambiguity", unclear or "complex" as Brooks argues. His general thesis, of a shift from race hatred to class / race hatred, is one I have some sympathy for but in this particular case the known facts get in the way of a nice narrative. On Thu, Dec 11, 2014 at 11:23 AM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hi Bill, > > I do not take the Brooks article as the definitive voice on the aftermath > of Ferguson. I would have never guessed I'd be in defense of Brooks, > however I don't think he intends to be the voice of authority on this. He > opens with this text: > > "One of the features of all the Ferguson discussion over the past few > months is how tinny the comparisons to the civil-rights era have sounded. > People have tried to link Ferguson to Selma and Jim Crow, but something is > off. > > "That?s, in part, because we?ve moved from simplicity to ambiguity. The > civil rights struggle was about as clear a conflict between right and wrong > as we get in national life. The debate about Ferguson elicited complex > reactions among most sensible people." > > Then: > > "But the other reason that the civil-rights era comparisons were inapt is > because the nature of racism has changed. There has been a migration away > from prejudice based on genetics to prejudice based on class." > > This is why I'm not sure if you are saying that his commentary is a > distraction from the "real" issue, or if you are saying that there can only > be "real" issues discussed when discussing Fergusen, and Brooks's isn't one > of them. Or maybe you are saying something else? > > I'd say that the nature of racism _has_ changed, and not necessarily for > the better. There are class elements involved in Ferguson's tragedy. This > is not saying that race issues are removed or displaced by class, but that > they have combined, and this is what Brooks is pointing out. Or am I wrong? > > I'm not sure what the function of reproducing the graphic nature of the > violence against the victim is meant to do in the context of this post. It > certainly has a drive-by quality. Clearly you are outraged as many of us > are. > > What are you saying? I'm just trying to make sense of it. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+annalisa=unm.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Bill Kerr > > Sent: Wednesday, December 10, 2014 3:02 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent > > The David Brooks article doesn't connect very well with the known facts of > the killing of Michael Brown, namely: > > It is now clear 12 shots were fired by Officer Wilson, the last of which > struck Mr Brown in the top of the head. He was hit 7 times. The deadly > encounter started while Officer Wilson was seated in his police cruiser. > The first two shots were fired by the officer while still in the car. Most > witnesses said that at that time, Mr Brown was leaning through the driver?s > side window. The victim?s blood was found inside and outside the car and on > the officer?s clothing. A bullet was lodged in the armrest. ... > > Ten of the twelve shots were fired after Officer Wilson got out of his > cruiser. Mr Brown?s body was found 153 feet away. All the fatal shots were > fired when Mr Brown was away from the police car. While some witnesses said > he was fleeing the car when they were fired, a greater number of witnesses > said they came as the victim was moving towards the officer, McCulloch said > > http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/michael-brown-shooting-ten-things-we-know--or-know-better-now-the-ferguson-grand-jurys-work-is-over-9881046.html > > The claim that there is a shift in our understanding of race and class does > not seem all that relevant to the particularity of this case IMO. > > On Tue, Dec 9, 2014 at 12:50 PM, Annalisa Aguilar > wrote: > > > Hello esteemed discussants, > > > > > > I am not normally a fan of David Brooks of the New York Times, but > > sometimes he really surprises me. This is one of those times: > > > > > > > > > http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/02/opinion/david-brooks-class-prejudice-resurgent.html > > < > > > http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/02/opinion/david-brooks-class-prejudice-resurgent.html?rref=collection%2Fcolumn%2Fdavid-brooks&contentCollection=opinion&action=click&module=NextInCollection®ion=Footer&pgtype=article > > > > > > > > > It has been my sense that we (as a culture, i.e., my American culture to > > which he refers) are more afraid to discuss class then we are to discuss > > race, and now it has become even harder, apparently. > > > > > > I particularly took to this paragraph: > > > > > > "Widening class distances produce class prejudice, classism. This is a > > prejudice based on visceral attitudes about competence. People in the > > "respectable" class have meritocratic virtues: executive function, grit, > a > > capacity for delayed gratification. The view about those in the > untouchable > > world is that they are short on these things. They are disorganized. They > > are violent and scary. This belief has some grains of truth because of > > childhood trauma, the stress of poverty and other things. But this view > > metastasizes into a vicious, intellectually lazy stereotype. Before long, > > animalistic imagery is used to describe these human beings." > > > > > > Kind regards, > > > > > > Annalisa > > > > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Dec 10 20:26:11 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 10 Dec 2014 20:26:11 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical theory a la Kris G In-Reply-To: <4B33D5D3-7B32-47DB-A64E-934D4DB0FA61@gmail.com> References: <4B33D5D3-7B32-47DB-A64E-934D4DB0FA61@gmail.com> Message-ID: That covers a lot of territory not to connect with, Henry! :-) But it is interesting and relevant that you found Engestrom useful because both Kris and I have worked with him over the years, so there must be something in common there. So what if i said that imagination is always a mashup? Would that help make connections? Check out the article that Engestrom and i wrote together on approaches to intervention research and the approach called "design experimentation." That would be a bridge to what Kris is talking about. This is a time when a lot can change, for sure. mike On Wed, Dec 10, 2014 at 3:15 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > Luisa and Mike, > My depth of knowledge in the xmca chat, its foundations, is much shallower > than yours, so the articles by Pelaprat and Cole and Gutierrez don?t evoke > nearly the connections for me, I am sure, but enough that I think it worth > sharing. In reading the Pelaprat&Cole article (Gap and Imagination) AND > Gutierrez I came across Engstrom in the bibliography. I found his article > on Expansive Learning on the internet. It brings to my mind the idea of > ?mashing up? that David K., I believe, likes to use. As well it brings to > my mind Langacker?s notion of symbolic assemblies, which brings together > grammar and discourse (i.e., usage-based grammar) unshackled by grammar as > static constituency. Furthermore, I work with urban Indians in a charter > school here in Albuquerque. I am convinced that dialog a al Bakhtin, > Freire, and Horton are the key to what I am trying to do, perhaps as much > as many of you are trying to do with this chat. In light of the ferment in > the country over the killings of unarmed Black men, there is hope now for > the kind of flourishing that Andy?s article talks about in the article that > he has sent to us recently on a number of occasions. I hope this email does > not seem ungrounded, rather that it adds one more voice to a call for > relevance and relationship, without a loss of rigor. > Henry > > > On Dec 10, 2014, at 1:50 PM, Luisa Aires wrote: > > > > Dear Mike and ALL > > > > Thank you for sharing Kris? thoughts about culture, education, literacy, > > development... > > This text evokes me the foundations of xmca - to deconstruct the origins > of > > the historical-cultural theory and expand it with scientific, social, > > cultural, historical contemporary thoughts and movements. > > > > Kris shares with us a huge and rich lecture, a pedagogical framework that > > could mediate very rich xmca discussions. Let me mention some powerful > > constructs that we could discuss: > > - Third space > > - Nondominant communities > > - ZPD > > - Zo ?ped (a ?wonderful? construct) > > - Literacy - sociocritical literacy > > - Grounding theoretical concepts > > - Sincretic testimonios > > - Reframing learning, teaching, education, development > > > > What do you think? > > > > All the best, > > Lu?sa > > > > 2014-12-10 18:38 GMT+00:00 mike cole : > > > >> I would like to pick up on Dana's call for continued discussion of > politics > >> and power in relation to theorizing the role of culture in human > >> development. > >> > >> To this end, Kris says its ok to publish her Scribner lecture on this > topic > >> (and warnst that she has a new and better version of her thinking > waiting > >> in the wings). > >> > >> So, attached is Kris's paper as a common grounding for a discussion. If > >> you-all would stick to the subject line, or when you feel the urge, > >> create a new, related, subject line, if you would so label it, such > measure > >> might stabilize an always heterochronous discussion. > >> > >> If others have alternative suggestions, speak up! > >> > >> mike > >> > >> > >> > >> -- > >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >> > > > > > > > > -- > > Department of Education and Distance Learning, Universidade Aberta > > Centre of Studies on Migrations and Intercultural Relations (CEMRI) > > R. Amial, n? 752, 4200-055 Porto, Portugal > > laires@uab.pt > > www.uab.pt > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Dec 10 20:45:55 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 10 Dec 2014 20:45:55 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent In-Reply-To: References: <1418098793033.84267@unm.edu> Message-ID: I resonated to your argument for a race/class ?"? compound standpoint, ?"? Miguel. standpoint ?. When I was growing up, people who argued about the social injustice of? class inequalities and against the rich becoming richer while the poor became poorer were at the very minimum ostrascized and in some cases locked up. There was the triumpheralism of being an "affluent society." ?Today the notion of the 1-99 percent gets lots of attention --- and the congress agrees to make the situation worse. Little wonder that those whose compound standpoint is from the perspective of the less power?ful seek out third spaces in which to embody alternatives to vicious inequalities. mike On Monday, December 8, 2014, Zavala, Miguel wrote: > Annalisa, > > You raise a good question. My sense is that "race" is rendered (in)visible > because it is visually marked primarily at the level of the body and > interi-personal relations (both conceptualized as distinct spatial scales). > In classroom dialogues on institutional racism, it is so difficult for my > students to come up with a working definition; yet when I ask what is > race, I get lots of answers akin to what Critical Race Theorists term > 'micro-aggressions', answers such as racial slurs, racist jokes, and in > some instances everyday practices that begin to resemble some form of > institutionalized racism as in police profiling. I say 'begin to > resemble' because most (but some do) students don't quite have a working > definition of these practice as systemic and institutionalized (much less > as manifestations of a racial state [David Theo Goldberg, Charles Mill]). > So, we work our way through a series of readings and dialogue in trying to > understand the complexities and invisible dimensions of race (which > operates at other spatial scales, some so large--historically and > spatially--that it basically disappears from sight and our naming). > > But I think there is also something in the concrete reality of everyday > life that renders "class" (in)visible in the U.S. It is not so much the > issue of our bodies marked as classed beings (although in Latin America, I > have seen this awareness, how the body, its clothing, use of gold, etc. > becomes a marker for a particular class location) but of the reality of a > 'middle class' or the stratification of 'class' in the U.S. People DO see > differences along 'social class' marked by where people live, what they > are able to consume, their professions, etc. -- I am not arguing for some > Weberian model of social class, but am arguing that that is what we > perceive, the phenomenon. And these differences may not be associated with > "social class" concept as articulated by Marx. > > I am currently conducting dialogues with teachers on the neoliberal > privatization of public education. There is yet another challenge, as I > try to make sense of neoliberalism philosophically and historically: how > we name "social class" and the discourses that operate in and through > social class difference. Perhaps what needs to be unpacked is our view of > the State and its relation to "social class." How we conceptualize the > State (the working models or metaphors) will shape/color how we see > "social class". The Liberal model of the state, with rational actors and > the Individual as its central construct carries with it a kind of metaphor > where social structures and structural relations tend to disappear (they > are a type of landscape or spatial container of sorts, in the background, > with individuals as the active agents foregrounded in this image). And > there is of course the role of ideology in rendering "social class" > invisible. > > What I find more challenging is teaching how race and class intersect and > interlock, creating what Fanon termed a 'compound standpoint', a > double-articulation, a race-class dialectic. But 'social class' while an > objective reality, is inseparable from its historical geographies of > difference. How we see 'social class' will look different from the vantage > point of people living in abject poverty to folks like many of us, living > as academics, to those who comprise the 1%. The same goes for "race"; it > will be experienced and viewed differently based on one's geographic and > social location. I would argue that Colonialism, from the standpoint of > Indigenous, Mesitizo, Raza peoples from Latin America needs to be a part > of our language and register; it needs to be unpacked and made central in > any cogent understanding of "social class." > > > Miguel > > > > > On 12/8/14 8:19 PM, "Annalisa Aguilar" wrote: > > >Andy, > > > >Interesting. > > > >I'm having a hard time connecting this to the ground. It is a story, > >which perhaps has meaning, but I don't see how it connects to American > >experience. This is not to say that it does or doesn't (in reality), I > >mean I don't see it. It feels too conspiratorial and planned, and I don't > >think any single minority group has that much power over others. Who > >knows? Maybe I'm wrong. > > > >I do believe that there was a disconnect in the continuity in historical > >experience due to the WW II and this is for many reasons, not a single > >reason. So that's one reason I find it hard to accept a "settlement" as > >The Explanation for this. > > > >My way of thinking about it is that it was a horrific war beyond anything > >anyone could imagine. There was no way to process this, and the thing > >most people wanted to do was be happy and get on with life and living. It > >is understandable. > > > >For me it has more to do with our humanity and incapacity to deal with > >horror and the abject than it has to do with suppressing the reality of > >class distinctions. It still doesn't explain to me why class is harder to > >discuss than race. > > > >So I offer that to the soup. > > > >Kind regards, > > > >Annalisa > > > > > > > > > > > > > From annalisa@unm.edu Wed Dec 10 20:51:29 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Thu, 11 Dec 2014 04:51:29 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent In-Reply-To: References: <1418089844446.50077@unm.edu> <1418257424871.89589@unm.edu>, Message-ID: <1418273488805.20286@unm.edu> Hi Bill, Well if it were only just the isolated incident, then maybe you would be right. Unless you haven't noticed (and I really don't mean to be snide here), there have been many things going on that have rippled outward since the death of Michael Brown. Including the unfolding of events with the death of Eric Garner. I consider the militarization of police presence to be a frightening co-incident with NSA data trawling and how all these narratives overlap with Fear of the Other, as might be considered with our War on Terror. Police militarization and the NSA are not tied to racial control, but class control, specifically the political class and everyone else. I see interconnections in all this that are not class on the one side and race on the other. They intermingle. If it *were* just a single "fluke" death, gee, that would be easy. "It's a racial issue; It's profiling." OK...But then all these other things have happened. Including the protests. But also how we are talking about the event, including how you are talking about the event on this list by reducing the Death of Michael Brown to the graphic details of his victimization, as doing that will prove this is a racial issue and only a racial issue? No one is saying that race is absent. So...what happened when Holder went out to check things out? How come nothing happened there? Why does the kimosabe of all attornies general and all prosecutors visit the city that is essentially falling apart in protest not make an impact??? Is it because Michael Brown wasn't of the elite, political class? Or is it because he's black? Why isn't anything being reported on that civil rights investigation? If it is because the investigation is still pending, OK, but it's December and they started the investigation mid-August. So what's going on? By the way, do you happen to remember the profiling of Henry Louis Gates, Jr. in 2009? What happens there? The police officer and Gates go have a beer with Obama in the White House and sing kumbayah. Now if that isn't class, then tell me, please, what it is? Kind regards, Annalisa From annalisa@unm.edu Wed Dec 10 21:13:20 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Thu, 11 Dec 2014 05:13:20 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent In-Reply-To: References: <1418098793033.84267@unm.edu> , Message-ID: <1418274799915.16503@unm.edu> Hi Mike, What does it mean then, that David Brooks is evoking this compound standpoint? Do you think he'll be ostracized and locked up? Does this mean that the 4th estate is feigning concern only to reproduce (and thus affirm) the same problems of inequality? Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of mike cole Sent: Wednesday, December 10, 2014 9:45 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent I resonated to your argument for a race/class "?compound standpoint,"? Miguel. ? When I was growing up, people who argued about the social injustice of? class inequalities and against the rich becoming richer while the poor became poorer were at the very minimum ostrascized and in some cases locked up. There was the triumpheralism of being an "affluent society." ?Today the notion of the 1-99 percent gets lots of attention --- and the congress agrees to make the situation worse. Little wonder that those whose compound standpoint is from the perspective of the less power?ful seek out third spaces in which to embody alternatives to vicious inequalities. mike On Monday, December 8, 2014, Zavala, Miguel wrote: > Annalisa, > > You raise a good question. My sense is that "race" is rendered (in)visible > because it is visually marked primarily at the level of the body and > interi-personal relations (both conceptualized as distinct spatial scales). > In classroom dialogues on institutional racism, it is so difficult for my > students to come up with a working definition; yet when I ask what is > race, I get lots of answers akin to what Critical Race Theorists term > 'micro-aggressions', answers such as racial slurs, racist jokes, and in > some instances everyday practices that begin to resemble some form of > institutionalized racism as in police profiling. I say 'begin to > resemble' because most (but some do) students don't quite have a working > definition of these practice as systemic and institutionalized (much less > as manifestations of a racial state [David Theo Goldberg, Charles Mill]). > So, we work our way through a series of readings and dialogue in trying to > understand the complexities and invisible dimensions of race (which > operates at other spatial scales, some so large--historically and > spatially--that it basically disappears from sight and our naming). > > But I think there is also something in the concrete reality of everyday > life that renders "class" (in)visible in the U.S. It is not so much the > issue of our bodies marked as classed beings (although in Latin America, I > have seen this awareness, how the body, its clothing, use of gold, etc. > becomes a marker for a particular class location) but of the reality of a > 'middle class' or the stratification of 'class' in the U.S. People DO see > differences along 'social class' marked by where people live, what they > are able to consume, their professions, etc. -- I am not arguing for some > Weberian model of social class, but am arguing that that is what we > perceive, the phenomenon. And these differences may not be associated with > "social class" concept as articulated by Marx. > > I am currently conducting dialogues with teachers on the neoliberal > privatization of public education. There is yet another challenge, as I > try to make sense of neoliberalism philosophically and historically: how > we name "social class" and the discourses that operate in and through > social class difference. Perhaps what needs to be unpacked is our view of > the State and its relation to "social class." How we conceptualize the > State (the working models or metaphors) will shape/color how we see > "social class". The Liberal model of the state, with rational actors and > the Individual as its central construct carries with it a kind of metaphor > where social structures and structural relations tend to disappear (they > are a type of landscape or spatial container of sorts, in the background, > with individuals as the active agents foregrounded in this image). And > there is of course the role of ideology in rendering "social class" > invisible. > > What I find more challenging is teaching how race and class intersect and > interlock, creating what Fanon termed a 'compound standpoint', a > double-articulation, a race-class dialectic. But 'social class' while an > objective reality, is inseparable from its historical geographies of > difference. How we see 'social class' will look different from the vantage > point of people living in abject poverty to folks like many of us, living > as academics, to those who comprise the 1%. The same goes for "race"; it > will be experienced and viewed differently based on one's geographic and > social location. I would argue that Colonialism, from the standpoint of > Indigenous, Mesitizo, Raza peoples from Latin America needs to be a part > of our language and register; it needs to be unpacked and made central in > any cogent understanding of "social class." > > > Miguel > > > > > On 12/8/14 8:19 PM, "Annalisa Aguilar" wrote: > > >Andy, > > > >Interesting. > > > >I'm having a hard time connecting this to the ground. It is a story, > >which perhaps has meaning, but I don't see how it connects to American > >experience. This is not to say that it does or doesn't (in reality), I > >mean I don't see it. It feels too conspiratorial and planned, and I don't > >think any single minority group has that much power over others. Who > >knows? Maybe I'm wrong. > > > >I do believe that there was a disconnect in the continuity in historical > >experience due to the WW II and this is for many reasons, not a single > >reason. So that's one reason I find it hard to accept a "settlement" as > >The Explanation for this. > > > >My way of thinking about it is that it was a horrific war beyond anything > >anyone could imagine. There was no way to process this, and the thing > >most people wanted to do was be happy and get on with life and living. It > >is understandable. > > > >For me it has more to do with our humanity and incapacity to deal with > >horror and the abject than it has to do with suppressing the reality of > >class distinctions. It still doesn't explain to me why class is harder to > >discuss than race. > > > >So I offer that to the soup. > > > >Kind regards, > > > >Annalisa > > > > > > > > > > > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed Dec 10 21:47:39 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Wed, 10 Dec 2014 21:47:39 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent In-Reply-To: <1418274799915.16503@unm.edu> References: <1418098793033.84267@unm.edu> <1418274799915.16503@unm.edu> Message-ID: Annalisa, I hear David Brooks speaking as a conservative but I also accept his sincerity when he brings to our attention how the privileged in their "imaginal" musings see "others" as lacking resolve and this form of identity formation is a vicious form of class consciousness. In his own way he is acting "ethically" from his standpoint Larry On Wed, Dec 10, 2014 at 9:13 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hi Mike, > > What does it mean then, that David Brooks is evoking this compound > standpoint? Do you think he'll be ostracized and locked up? > > Does this mean that the 4th estate is feigning concern only to reproduce > (and thus affirm) the same problems of inequality? > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of mike cole > Sent: Wednesday, December 10, 2014 9:45 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: NYT Op-Ed: Class Prejudice Resurgent > > I resonated to your argument for a race/class "?compound standpoint,"? > Miguel. > ? > When I was growing up, people who argued about the social injustice of? > class inequalities and against the rich becoming richer while the poor > became poorer were at the very minimum ostrascized and in some cases locked > up. There was the triumpheralism of being an "affluent society." > > ?Today the notion of the 1-99 percent gets lots of attention --- and the > congress agrees to make the situation worse. > > Little wonder that those whose compound standpoint is from the perspective > of the less power?ful seek out third spaces in which to embody alternatives > to vicious inequalities. > > mike > > On Monday, December 8, 2014, Zavala, Miguel < > mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu> > wrote: > > > Annalisa, > > > > You raise a good question. My sense is that "race" is rendered > (in)visible > > because it is visually marked primarily at the level of the body and > > interi-personal relations (both conceptualized as distinct spatial > scales). > > In classroom dialogues on institutional racism, it is so difficult for > my > > students to come up with a working definition; yet when I ask what is > > race, I get lots of answers akin to what Critical Race Theorists term > > 'micro-aggressions', answers such as racial slurs, racist jokes, and in > > some instances everyday practices that begin to resemble some form of > > institutionalized racism as in police profiling. I say 'begin to > > resemble' because most (but some do) students don't quite have a working > > definition of these practice as systemic and institutionalized (much less > > as manifestations of a racial state [David Theo Goldberg, Charles Mill]). > > So, we work our way through a series of readings and dialogue in trying > to > > understand the complexities and invisible dimensions of race (which > > operates at other spatial scales, some so large--historically and > > spatially--that it basically disappears from sight and our naming). > > > > But I think there is also something in the concrete reality of everyday > > life that renders "class" (in)visible in the U.S. It is not so much the > > issue of our bodies marked as classed beings (although in Latin America, > I > > have seen this awareness, how the body, its clothing, use of gold, etc. > > becomes a marker for a particular class location) but of the reality of a > > 'middle class' or the stratification of 'class' in the U.S. People DO see > > differences along 'social class' marked by where people live, what they > > are able to consume, their professions, etc. -- I am not arguing for some > > Weberian model of social class, but am arguing that that is what we > > perceive, the phenomenon. And these differences may not be associated > with > > "social class" concept as articulated by Marx. > > > > I am currently conducting dialogues with teachers on the neoliberal > > privatization of public education. There is yet another challenge, as I > > try to make sense of neoliberalism philosophically and historically: how > > we name "social class" and the discourses that operate in and through > > social class difference. Perhaps what needs to be unpacked is our view of > > the State and its relation to "social class." How we conceptualize the > > State (the working models or metaphors) will shape/color how we see > > "social class". The Liberal model of the state, with rational actors and > > the Individual as its central construct carries with it a kind of > metaphor > > where social structures and structural relations tend to disappear (they > > are a type of landscape or spatial container of sorts, in the background, > > with individuals as the active agents foregrounded in this image). And > > there is of course the role of ideology in rendering "social class" > > invisible. > > > > What I find more challenging is teaching how race and class intersect and > > interlock, creating what Fanon termed a 'compound standpoint', a > > double-articulation, a race-class dialectic. But 'social class' while an > > objective reality, is inseparable from its historical geographies of > > difference. How we see 'social class' will look different from the > vantage > > point of people living in abject poverty to folks like many of us, living > > as academics, to those who comprise the 1%. The same goes for "race"; it > > will be experienced and viewed differently based on one's geographic and > > social location. I would argue that Colonialism, from the standpoint of > > Indigenous, Mesitizo, Raza peoples from Latin America needs to be a part > > of our language and register; it needs to be unpacked and made central in > > any cogent understanding of "social class." > > > > > > Miguel > > > > > > > > > > On 12/8/14 8:19 PM, "Annalisa Aguilar" wrote: > > > > >Andy, > > > > > >Interesting. > > > > > >I'm having a hard time connecting this to the ground. It is a story, > > >which perhaps has meaning, but I don't see how it connects to American > > >experience. This is not to say that it does or doesn't (in reality), I > > >mean I don't see it. It feels too conspiratorial and planned, and I > don't > > >think any single minority group has that much power over others. Who > > >knows? Maybe I'm wrong. > > > > > >I do believe that there was a disconnect in the continuity in historical > > >experience due to the WW II and this is for many reasons, not a single > > >reason. So that's one reason I find it hard to accept a "settlement" as > > >The Explanation for this. > > > > > >My way of thinking about it is that it was a horrific war beyond > anything > > >anyone could imagine. There was no way to process this, and the thing > > >most people wanted to do was be happy and get on with life and living. > It > > >is understandable. > > > > > >For me it has more to do with our humanity and incapacity to deal with > > >horror and the abject than it has to do with suppressing the reality of > > >class distinctions. It still doesn't explain to me why class is harder > to > > >discuss than race. > > > > > >So I offer that to the soup. > > > > > >Kind regards, > > > > > >Annalisa > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu Wed Dec 10 22:14:51 2014 From: mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu (Zavala, Miguel) Date: Thu, 11 Dec 2014 06:14:51 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] =?iso-8859-1?q?Call_for_Manuscripts=2C_Regeneraci=F3n=2C_Issue_o?= =?iso-8859-1?q?n_the_Neoliberal_Privatization_of_Public_Education?= Message-ID: XMCA List Family, I am relaying a call for manuscripts on a pressing issue impacting education everywhere. We conceptualized the idea of a grassroots journal in 2007 and it has grown, albeit slowly. Here's the latest call. Thanks! ------------------- Regeneraci?n, the Association of Raza Educators Journal Volume 6, Issue 1 (Spring 2015) CALL FOR SUBMISSIONS Deadline: February 15, 2015 The theme for our next issue: "Resisting The Neoliberal Privatization of Education: Reclaiming Teachers' Unions, Education, and Epistemologies" Undeniably, ever since the World Bank declared education a trade-able service--trumping the idea that education is a basic human right--education and teachers have been increasingly under attack by corporations, venture philanthropists, and a growing managerial middle class, who function within a neoliberal ideology that places insurmountable faith in markets and the expansion of capitalism globally into all facets of everyday life. We believe that the neoliberal project to de-fund and privatize public education interlocks with the idea of a racial-colonial State. Thus, it is no coincidence that neoliberal experiments to privatize public education have materialized in large urban districts, such as Chicago, New York, Los Angeles, etc., where we find a significant number of Raza, Black, and other historically marginalized peoples. In this issue of Regeneraci?n we seek both analysis and praxis, that is texts that help us understand more deeply how neoliberalism is manifest in particular geographic, social, and cultural spaces. As well, we are looking for texts that provide examples of resistance to the corporate takeover of public education. How are urban and other communities responding to the attacks on education and teachers? What grassroots and strategic spaces are created that provide alternatives to neoliberalism and capitalism? How are teachers' unions being reinvented? What role does the fight for Ethnic Studies present as a counter to the neoliberal attack? FORMAT: Submissions may come from students, educators, parents, community organizers, or organizations; we also welcome scholarly submissions that are written for a general audience. Formats may include testimonios, essays, poetry, art, personal narrative, as well as analytic and empirical studies. LENGTH: 700-3000 words SUBMISSION DEADLINE: February 15, 2015 PUBLICATION DATE: April 15, 2015 If you have any questions please contact: razaeducators@yahoo.com To access past issues of Regeneraci?n: http://www.razaeducators.org/archives_newsletter.html The Association of Raza Educators www.razaeducators.org From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Dec 10 22:24:02 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 10 Dec 2014 22:24:02 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?q?Call_for_Manuscripts=2C_Regeneraci=C3=B3n=2C_Issue_?= =?utf-8?q?on_the_Neoliberal_Privatization_of_Public_Education?= In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: How broad is your mandates, Miguel? Does it extend to after school? Seems like it would help to know the kinds of efforts you consider exemplary classics. Does this topic fit in with sociocritical studies? Mike On Wednesday, December 10, 2014, Zavala, Miguel < mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu> wrote: > XMCA List Family, > > I am relaying a call for manuscripts on a pressing issue impacting > education everywhere. We conceptualized the idea of a grassroots journal in > 2007 and it has grown, albeit slowly. Here's the latest call. > > Thanks! > > ------------------- > > Regeneraci?n, the Association of Raza Educators Journal > Volume 6, Issue 1 (Spring 2015) > > CALL FOR SUBMISSIONS > Deadline: February 15, 2015 > > The theme for our next issue: > "Resisting The Neoliberal Privatization of Education: Reclaiming Teachers' > Unions, Education, and Epistemologies" > > Undeniably, ever since the World Bank declared education a trade-able > service--trumping the idea that education is a basic human right--education > and teachers have been increasingly under attack by corporations, venture > philanthropists, and a growing managerial middle class, who function within > a neoliberal ideology that places insurmountable faith in markets and the > expansion of capitalism globally into all facets of everyday life. We > believe that the neoliberal project to de-fund and privatize public > education interlocks with the idea of a racial-colonial State. Thus, it is > no coincidence that neoliberal experiments to privatize public education > have materialized in large urban districts, such as Chicago, New York, Los > Angeles, etc., where we find a significant number of Raza, Black, and other > historically marginalized peoples. > > In this issue of Regeneraci?n we seek both analysis and praxis, that is > texts that help us understand more deeply how neoliberalism is manifest in > particular geographic, social, and cultural spaces. As well, we are looking > for texts that provide examples of resistance to the corporate takeover of > public education. How are urban and other communities responding to the > attacks on education and teachers? What grassroots and strategic spaces are > created that provide alternatives to neoliberalism and capitalism? How are > teachers' unions being reinvented? What role does the fight for Ethnic > Studies present as a counter to the neoliberal attack? > > FORMAT: Submissions may come from students, educators, parents, community > organizers, or organizations; we also welcome scholarly submissions that > are written for a general audience. Formats may include testimonios, > essays, poetry, art, personal narrative, as well as analytic and empirical > studies. > > LENGTH: 700-3000 words > > SUBMISSION DEADLINE: February 15, 2015 > PUBLICATION DATE: April 15, 2015 > > If you have any questions please contact: razaeducators@yahoo.com > > > > To access past issues of Regeneraci?n: > http://www.razaeducators.org/archives_newsletter.html > > The Association of Raza Educators > www.razaeducators.org > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu Wed Dec 10 22:45:00 2014 From: mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu (Zavala, Miguel) Date: Thu, 11 Dec 2014 06:45:00 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?iso-8859-1?q?Call_for_Manuscripts=2C_Regeneraci=F3n=2C_Issu?= =?iso-8859-1?q?e_on_the_Neoliberal_Privatization_of_Public_Education?= In-Reply-To: Message-ID: While the focus is on public education, any space is amenable for analysis. We sometimes get issues from parent organizers, student organizations, interviews of students fighting for social justice in college campuses. Formal, non-formal, institutional, non-institutional, etc. will work. If the submission focuses on 'praxis', on responses and resistance to the neoliberal privatization of education, any space and sustained activity, etc. is worth looking at-- but a connection should be drawn to how it deliberately responds to neoliberalism and its messy tentacles, perhaps highlighting possible worlds and social dreams. A connection can definitely be drawn between sociocritical studies and this topic, certainly. I believe the work we did in MSLI (I was an integral member of MSLI for 3 years) was in many ways creating alternative spaces and social dreams; in a way it was a bottom-up approach of building consciousness and I think Freire would have been proud of our work. As lead instructor, Carlos Tejeda's decolonizing pedagogies framework lead to some beautiful, creative activity in that space, for many years. As an instantiation of sociocritical literacies, I would say the work Kris outlines is definitely a great example of "responses to neoliberalism" and was here and there a part of our talk/framing as we moved pedagogically. As an editor of the journal, the 'constraint' we do have is that submissions be written for a general audience; I know that is ambiguous. Keep in mind that the articles get read by our members in ARE, their students, they are sometimes used as political education in conferences, in some instances reading circles in non-formal community settings. -Miguel On 12/10/14 10:24 PM, "mike cole" wrote: >How broad is your mandates, Miguel? Does it extend to after school? Seems >like it would help to know the kinds of efforts you consider exemplary >classics. > >Does this topic fit in with sociocritical studies? >Mike > >On Wednesday, December 10, 2014, Zavala, Miguel < >mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu> wrote: > >> XMCA List Family, >> >> I am relaying a call for manuscripts on a pressing issue impacting >> education everywhere. We conceptualized the idea of a grassroots >>journal in >> 2007 and it has grown, albeit slowly. Here's the latest call. >> >> Thanks! >> >> ------------------- >> >> Regeneraci?n, the Association of Raza Educators Journal >> Volume 6, Issue 1 (Spring 2015) >> >> CALL FOR SUBMISSIONS >> Deadline: February 15, 2015 >> >> The theme for our next issue: >> "Resisting The Neoliberal Privatization of Education: Reclaiming >>Teachers' >> Unions, Education, and Epistemologies" >> >> Undeniably, ever since the World Bank declared education a trade-able >> service--trumping the idea that education is a basic human >>right--education >> and teachers have been increasingly under attack by corporations, >>venture >> philanthropists, and a growing managerial middle class, who function >>within >> a neoliberal ideology that places insurmountable faith in markets and >>the >> expansion of capitalism globally into all facets of everyday life. We >> believe that the neoliberal project to de-fund and privatize public >> education interlocks with the idea of a racial-colonial State. Thus, >>it is >> no coincidence that neoliberal experiments to privatize public education >> have materialized in large urban districts, such as Chicago, New York, >>Los >> Angeles, etc., where we find a significant number of Raza, Black, and >>other >> historically marginalized peoples. >> >> In this issue of Regeneraci?n we seek both analysis and praxis, that is >> texts that help us understand more deeply how neoliberalism is manifest >>in >> particular geographic, social, and cultural spaces. As well, we are >>looking >> for texts that provide examples of resistance to the corporate takeover >>of >> public education. How are urban and other communities responding to the >> attacks on education and teachers? What grassroots and strategic spaces >>are >> created that provide alternatives to neoliberalism and capitalism? How >>are >> teachers' unions being reinvented? What role does the fight for Ethnic >> Studies present as a counter to the neoliberal attack? >> >> FORMAT: Submissions may come from students, educators, parents, >>community >> organizers, or organizations; we also welcome scholarly submissions that >> are written for a general audience. Formats may include testimonios, >> essays, poetry, art, personal narrative, as well as analytic and >>empirical >> studies. >> >> LENGTH: 700-3000 words >> >> SUBMISSION DEADLINE: February 15, 2015 >> PUBLICATION DATE: April 15, 2015 >> >> If you have any questions please contact: razaeducators@yahoo.com >> > >> >> To access past issues of Regeneraci?n: >> http://www.razaeducators.org/archives_newsletter.html >> >> The Association of Raza Educators >> www.razaeducators.org >> > > >-- >It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Thu Dec 11 01:25:08 2014 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (Haydi Zulfei) Date: Thu, 11 Dec 2014 09:25:08 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Suvorov and Imagination In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <394101517.398623.1418289908580.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11101g.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> Thank you , Mike , for both the attachment and the clarifications . Haydi From: mike cole To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Wednesday, 10 December 2014, 10:48:23 Subject: [Xmca-l] Suvorov and Imagination Greatly respected Haydi!! My apologies for failing to attach this paper which was initially part of a response to Larry's important note about the Bakhurst-Padden paper in the lchc history archives.? Attribute it to old age and lack of attention to detail. There is a LOT of video stuff about Survorov on this on youtube, and his notion of imagination is the center of attention here. Suvorov's is a fascinating if upsetting story, yet to be written.? It would be great if someone on xmca had time to bring these materials together for critical analysis. Plenty of power and politics in his scientific case!! Our paper includes a discussion of precisely how the issue of translation of key concepts influences understanding how at least some Russians appropriated LSV's legacy. There is an English translation of the Suvorov paper discussed in the attached paper in JREEP and probably online somewhere. Our paper takes using into some connections that people might find interesting. The topic of imagination seems worth a lot of attention at present. mike -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mcole@ucsd.edu Thu Dec 11 06:40:55 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Thu, 11 Dec 2014 06:40:55 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: Department of Social Psychology@LSE: Assistant Professorship Vacancies (Deadline date for receipt of applications 31st December 2014) In-Reply-To: <90AB3518C3B600448DFE10F60ECEF6F518CD5594@EXMBOXA2.lse.ac.uk> References: <90AB3518C3B600448DFE10F60ECEF6F518CCFE97@EXMBOXA2.lse.ac.uk> <90AB3518C3B600448DFE10F60ECEF6F518CD5594@EXMBOXA2.lse.ac.uk> Message-ID: ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Date: Thursday, December 11, 2014 Subject: Department of Social Psychology@LSE: Assistant Professorship Vacancies (Deadline date for receipt of applications 31st December 2014) To: Apologies for the blind copy email: Dear Colleagues, The Department of Social Psychology at the London School of Economics and Political Science is currently recruiting to two assistant professorship positions: Assistant Professor in Social Psychology/Economic Psychology Assistant Professor in Social Psychology/Community Psychology Full information on these posts can be found by click on the links below: Assistant Professor in Social Psychology/Economic Psychology Assistant Professor in Social Psychology/Community Psychology The deadline date for both posts is 31st December 2014. We would be grateful if you would circulate information on these opportunities to your local networks. Regards, Daniel Linehan. Daniel Linehan Department Manager Department of Social Psychology London School of Economics and Political Science Houghton Street London WC2A 2AE Tel.: +44(0)2079557712 http://www2.lse.ac.uk/socialPsychology/Home.aspx Follow us on twitter @PsychologyLSE Please access the attached hyperlink for an important electronic communications disclaimer: http://lse.ac.uk/emailDisclaimer -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mcole@ucsd.edu Thu Dec 11 06:49:41 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Thu, 11 Dec 2014 06:49:41 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?q?Call_for_Manuscripts=2C_Regeneraci=C3=B3n=2C_Issue_?= =?utf-8?q?on_the_Neoliberal_Privatization_of_Public_Education?= In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Thanks for the additional info. All makes sense to me. Mike On Wednesday, December 10, 2014, Zavala, Miguel < mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu> wrote: > While the focus is on public education, any space is amenable for > analysis. We sometimes get issues from parent organizers, student > organizations, interviews of students fighting for social justice in > college campuses. Formal, non-formal, institutional, non-institutional, > etc. will work. > > If the submission focuses on 'praxis', on responses and resistance to the > neoliberal privatization of education, any space and sustained activity, > etc. is worth looking at-- but a connection should be drawn to how it > deliberately responds to neoliberalism and its messy tentacles, perhaps > highlighting possible worlds and social dreams. > > A connection can definitely be drawn between sociocritical studies and > this topic, certainly. I believe the work we did in MSLI (I was an > integral member of MSLI for 3 years) was in many ways creating alternative > spaces and social dreams; in a way it was a bottom-up approach of building > consciousness and I think Freire would have been proud of our work. As > lead instructor, Carlos Tejeda's decolonizing pedagogies framework lead to > some beautiful, creative activity in that space, for many years. As an > instantiation of sociocritical literacies, I would say the work Kris > outlines is definitely a great example of "responses to neoliberalism" and > was here and there a part of our talk/framing as we moved pedagogically. > > As an editor of the journal, the 'constraint' we do have is that > submissions be written for a general audience; I know that is ambiguous. > Keep in mind that the articles get read by our members in ARE, their > students, they are sometimes used as political education in conferences, > in some instances reading circles in non-formal community settings. > > -Miguel > > > On 12/10/14 10:24 PM, "mike cole" > wrote: > > >How broad is your mandates, Miguel? Does it extend to after school? Seems > >like it would help to know the kinds of efforts you consider exemplary > >classics. > > > >Does this topic fit in with sociocritical studies? > >Mike > > > >On Wednesday, December 10, 2014, Zavala, Miguel < > >mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu > wrote: > > > >> XMCA List Family, > >> > >> I am relaying a call for manuscripts on a pressing issue impacting > >> education everywhere. We conceptualized the idea of a grassroots > >>journal in > >> 2007 and it has grown, albeit slowly. Here's the latest call. > >> > >> Thanks! > >> > >> ------------------- > >> > >> Regeneraci?n, the Association of Raza Educators Journal > >> Volume 6, Issue 1 (Spring 2015) > >> > >> CALL FOR SUBMISSIONS > >> Deadline: February 15, 2015 > >> > >> The theme for our next issue: > >> "Resisting The Neoliberal Privatization of Education: Reclaiming > >>Teachers' > >> Unions, Education, and Epistemologies" > >> > >> Undeniably, ever since the World Bank declared education a trade-able > >> service--trumping the idea that education is a basic human > >>right--education > >> and teachers have been increasingly under attack by corporations, > >>venture > >> philanthropists, and a growing managerial middle class, who function > >>within > >> a neoliberal ideology that places insurmountable faith in markets and > >>the > >> expansion of capitalism globally into all facets of everyday life. We > >> believe that the neoliberal project to de-fund and privatize public > >> education interlocks with the idea of a racial-colonial State. Thus, > >>it is > >> no coincidence that neoliberal experiments to privatize public education > >> have materialized in large urban districts, such as Chicago, New York, > >>Los > >> Angeles, etc., where we find a significant number of Raza, Black, and > >>other > >> historically marginalized peoples. > >> > >> In this issue of Regeneraci?n we seek both analysis and praxis, that is > >> texts that help us understand more deeply how neoliberalism is manifest > >>in > >> particular geographic, social, and cultural spaces. As well, we are > >>looking > >> for texts that provide examples of resistance to the corporate takeover > >>of > >> public education. How are urban and other communities responding to the > >> attacks on education and teachers? What grassroots and strategic spaces > >>are > >> created that provide alternatives to neoliberalism and capitalism? How > >>are > >> teachers' unions being reinvented? What role does the fight for Ethnic > >> Studies present as a counter to the neoliberal attack? > >> > >> FORMAT: Submissions may come from students, educators, parents, > >>community > >> organizers, or organizations; we also welcome scholarly submissions that > >> are written for a general audience. Formats may include testimonios, > >> essays, poetry, art, personal narrative, as well as analytic and > >>empirical > >> studies. > >> > >> LENGTH: 700-3000 words > >> > >> SUBMISSION DEADLINE: February 15, 2015 > >> PUBLICATION DATE: April 15, 2015 > >> > >> If you have any questions please contact: razaeducators@yahoo.com > > >> > > > >> > >> To access past issues of Regeneraci?n: > >> http://www.razaeducators.org/archives_newsletter.html > >> > >> The Association of Raza Educators > >> www.razaeducators.org > >> > > > > > >-- > >It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > >object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Thu Dec 11 07:42:01 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Thu, 11 Dec 2014 08:42:01 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical theory a la Kris G In-Reply-To: References: <4B33D5D3-7B32-47DB-A64E-934D4DB0FA61@gmail.com> Message-ID: Mike, Could you share the citation of your article with Engestrom on design experimentation? Not sure I have it. -greg On Wed, Dec 10, 2014 at 9:26 PM, mike cole wrote: > That covers a lot of territory not to connect with, Henry! :-) > But it is interesting and relevant that you found Engestrom useful because > both Kris and I have worked with him over the years, so there must be > something in common there. > > So what if i said that imagination is always a mashup? Would that help make > connections? > Check out the article that Engestrom and i wrote together on approaches to > intervention research and the approach called "design experimentation." > That would be a bridge to what Kris is talking about. > > This is a time when a lot can change, for sure. > > mike > > > > On Wed, Dec 10, 2014 at 3:15 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > > Luisa and Mike, > > My depth of knowledge in the xmca chat, its foundations, is much > shallower > > than yours, so the articles by Pelaprat and Cole and Gutierrez don?t > evoke > > nearly the connections for me, I am sure, but enough that I think it > worth > > sharing. In reading the Pelaprat&Cole article (Gap and Imagination) AND > > Gutierrez I came across Engstrom in the bibliography. I found his article > > on Expansive Learning on the internet. It brings to my mind the idea of > > ?mashing up? that David K., I believe, likes to use. As well it brings to > > my mind Langacker?s notion of symbolic assemblies, which brings together > > grammar and discourse (i.e., usage-based grammar) unshackled by grammar > as > > static constituency. Furthermore, I work with urban Indians in a charter > > school here in Albuquerque. I am convinced that dialog a al Bakhtin, > > Freire, and Horton are the key to what I am trying to do, perhaps as much > > as many of you are trying to do with this chat. In light of the ferment > in > > the country over the killings of unarmed Black men, there is hope now for > > the kind of flourishing that Andy?s article talks about in the article > that > > he has sent to us recently on a number of occasions. I hope this email > does > > not seem ungrounded, rather that it adds one more voice to a call for > > relevance and relationship, without a loss of rigor. > > Henry > > > > > On Dec 10, 2014, at 1:50 PM, Luisa Aires wrote: > > > > > > Dear Mike and ALL > > > > > > Thank you for sharing Kris? thoughts about culture, education, > literacy, > > > development... > > > This text evokes me the foundations of xmca - to deconstruct the > origins > > of > > > the historical-cultural theory and expand it with scientific, social, > > > cultural, historical contemporary thoughts and movements. > > > > > > Kris shares with us a huge and rich lecture, a pedagogical framework > that > > > could mediate very rich xmca discussions. Let me mention some powerful > > > constructs that we could discuss: > > > - Third space > > > - Nondominant communities > > > - ZPD > > > - Zo ?ped (a ?wonderful? construct) > > > - Literacy - sociocritical literacy > > > - Grounding theoretical concepts > > > - Sincretic testimonios > > > - Reframing learning, teaching, education, development > > > > > > What do you think? > > > > > > All the best, > > > Lu?sa > > > > > > 2014-12-10 18:38 GMT+00:00 mike cole : > > > > > >> I would like to pick up on Dana's call for continued discussion of > > politics > > >> and power in relation to theorizing the role of culture in human > > >> development. > > >> > > >> To this end, Kris says its ok to publish her Scribner lecture on this > > topic > > >> (and warnst that she has a new and better version of her thinking > > waiting > > >> in the wings). > > >> > > >> So, attached is Kris's paper as a common grounding for a discussion. > If > > >> you-all would stick to the subject line, or when you feel the urge, > > >> create a new, related, subject line, if you would so label it, such > > measure > > >> might stabilize an always heterochronous discussion. > > >> > > >> If others have alternative suggestions, speak up! > > >> > > >> mike > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> -- > > >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > Department of Education and Distance Learning, Universidade Aberta > > > Centre of Studies on Migrations and Intercultural Relations (CEMRI) > > > R. Amial, n? 752, 4200-055 Porto, Portugal > > > laires@uab.pt > > > www.uab.pt > > > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From lpscholar2@gmail.com Thu Dec 11 09:24:04 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Thu, 11 Dec 2014 09:24:04 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical theory a la Kris G In-Reply-To: References: <4B33D5D3-7B32-47DB-A64E-934D4DB0FA61@gmail.com> Message-ID: For others following this thread, here is a link to a powerful presentation of the undermining of *public* education. Nothing New to this list but a clear document to share with teachers and others in Public arenas: http://zinnedproject.org/2014/11/the-koch-brothers-bill-of-rights-institute/?utm_source=ZEP+-+Kick+Out+the+Koch+Bros+%28Appeal+I%29&utm_campaign=ZEP%3A+Koch+Brothers%2C+NCSS%2C+TCE%2C+Ferguson&utm_medium=email On Thu, Dec 11, 2014 at 7:42 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Mike, > Could you share the citation of your article with Engestrom on design > experimentation? > Not sure I have it. > -greg > > On Wed, Dec 10, 2014 at 9:26 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > That covers a lot of territory not to connect with, Henry! :-) > > But it is interesting and relevant that you found Engestrom useful > because > > both Kris and I have worked with him over the years, so there must be > > something in common there. > > > > So what if i said that imagination is always a mashup? Would that help > make > > connections? > > Check out the article that Engestrom and i wrote together on approaches > to > > intervention research and the approach called "design experimentation." > > That would be a bridge to what Kris is talking about. > > > > This is a time when a lot can change, for sure. > > > > mike > > > > > > > > On Wed, Dec 10, 2014 at 3:15 PM, HENRY SHONERD > wrote: > > > > > Luisa and Mike, > > > My depth of knowledge in the xmca chat, its foundations, is much > > shallower > > > than yours, so the articles by Pelaprat and Cole and Gutierrez don?t > > evoke > > > nearly the connections for me, I am sure, but enough that I think it > > worth > > > sharing. In reading the Pelaprat&Cole article (Gap and Imagination) AND > > > Gutierrez I came across Engstrom in the bibliography. I found his > article > > > on Expansive Learning on the internet. It brings to my mind the idea of > > > ?mashing up? that David K., I believe, likes to use. As well it brings > to > > > my mind Langacker?s notion of symbolic assemblies, which brings > together > > > grammar and discourse (i.e., usage-based grammar) unshackled by grammar > > as > > > static constituency. Furthermore, I work with urban Indians in a > charter > > > school here in Albuquerque. I am convinced that dialog a al Bakhtin, > > > Freire, and Horton are the key to what I am trying to do, perhaps as > much > > > as many of you are trying to do with this chat. In light of the ferment > > in > > > the country over the killings of unarmed Black men, there is hope now > for > > > the kind of flourishing that Andy?s article talks about in the article > > that > > > he has sent to us recently on a number of occasions. I hope this email > > does > > > not seem ungrounded, rather that it adds one more voice to a call for > > > relevance and relationship, without a loss of rigor. > > > Henry > > > > > > > On Dec 10, 2014, at 1:50 PM, Luisa Aires wrote: > > > > > > > > Dear Mike and ALL > > > > > > > > Thank you for sharing Kris? thoughts about culture, education, > > literacy, > > > > development... > > > > This text evokes me the foundations of xmca - to deconstruct the > > origins > > > of > > > > the historical-cultural theory and expand it with scientific, social, > > > > cultural, historical contemporary thoughts and movements. > > > > > > > > Kris shares with us a huge and rich lecture, a pedagogical framework > > that > > > > could mediate very rich xmca discussions. Let me mention some > powerful > > > > constructs that we could discuss: > > > > - Third space > > > > - Nondominant communities > > > > - ZPD > > > > - Zo ?ped (a ?wonderful? construct) > > > > - Literacy - sociocritical literacy > > > > - Grounding theoretical concepts > > > > - Sincretic testimonios > > > > - Reframing learning, teaching, education, development > > > > > > > > What do you think? > > > > > > > > All the best, > > > > Lu?sa > > > > > > > > 2014-12-10 18:38 GMT+00:00 mike cole : > > > > > > > >> I would like to pick up on Dana's call for continued discussion of > > > politics > > > >> and power in relation to theorizing the role of culture in human > > > >> development. > > > >> > > > >> To this end, Kris says its ok to publish her Scribner lecture on > this > > > topic > > > >> (and warnst that she has a new and better version of her thinking > > > waiting > > > >> in the wings). > > > >> > > > >> So, attached is Kris's paper as a common grounding for a discussion. > > If > > > >> you-all would stick to the subject line, or when you feel the urge, > > > >> create a new, related, subject line, if you would so label it, such > > > measure > > > >> might stabilize an always heterochronous discussion. > > > >> > > > >> If others have alternative suggestions, speak up! > > > >> > > > >> mike > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> -- > > > >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > an > > > >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > Department of Education and Distance Learning, Universidade Aberta > > > > Centre of Studies on Migrations and Intercultural Relations (CEMRI) > > > > R. Amial, n? 752, 4200-055 Porto, Portugal > > > > laires@uab.pt > > > > www.uab.pt > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed Dec 10 21:36:12 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Wed, 10 Dec 2014 21:36:12 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] ASPECTS OF image formation as gap filling Message-ID: Mike, I am choosing to open a new thread so the other thread can focus on power relations. I want to align with your wish "to draw attention to several aspects of the 'gap' where the mediational triangle is not fully connected" [page 7] The first aspect is that the right of the triangle where the phylogenetic and the cultural meet IN the "object" is replaced by a "space". To move from an object as "material product" to an understanding of the phylogenetic and cultural meeting WITHIN "space" opens up perpetual gaps that need to be "closed" through imagination. A never ending process that indicates the objects AS "products" are "partially an ILLUSION, an "imagined" state" [page 8] and it IS this imaginal process that IS mind. "Mind, here, IS imagination - the process of filling in the gaps that, AT THE SAME TIME, constitute mind." [page 7.] Mike, You then outline 3 aspects of what this imaginal process of "formation" entails. 1] The gap represents a set of "differences" that exist at "a next moment in time". [LP comment: These differences represent an "other" that is partially an illusion but necessary to bring something new into existence]. These differences open up a "space" [an opening] as a result of the intermingling of the phylogenetically constrained AND the culturally mediated constraints creating the "fact" of the gap within experience, thought and perception. THIS is the relation of the subject to the object. This discoordination between the phylogenetic and the cultural constantly opens a "space" that is "necessary" to existence. 2] The differences that necessarily exist must be resolved "cognitively" by the individual. The work of "imagination fills in the differences sufficiently to form a single "image" of the world. This process IS "mind". At this point Bartlett is referenced who says, "Thinking" refers to thought AS a process of gap filling. 3] Time is central to this triangular model with the "space" opening a FUTURE-ORIENTED [time n+1]. Any "doing in the present" needs to "reduce uncertainty" as a condition of coordinated action. However, to partake in this "reduction" of uncertainty is partially an "illusion", an imagined, anticipated state of future stability oriented to the future. This reduction of uncertainty is necessary SO THAT one can act and think. In other words, "to imagine IS to imagine a future in which thought and action ARE meaningful, which is to say that it is by drawing on the past [LP comment - drawing on tradition] that the imagination is able to work out a future WITHIN which to think or act in the present" page 8] I wanted to participate in exploring the imaginal by summarizing the aspects which Mike and Etienne Pelaprat draw to our attention. Notions such as "space" and "gap" as facts to be considered when examining "objects". I also "perceive" [read] the acknowledgement of differences and discoordination as exploring the "other" and alterity through historical time. That may lead back to the other thread on power differences. David Brook pointing out that "meritocracy" is the invisible "imaginal" of the "middle class" consciousness. The question of a class "identity" as David Brooks suggests, may be partially an "illusion" but the illusion of meritocracy, does create a "space" where identities form and others are othered. Larry From lpscholar2@gmail.com Thu Dec 11 07:50:22 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Thu, 11 Dec 2014 07:50:22 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: ASPECTS OF image formation as gap filling In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: I wanted to add to my first post a comment on 'montage" [section 4.3]. The phrase "every word has been PERMEATED as every image has been TRANSMUTED, through the imaginative intensity of one creative act." I wanted to draw attention to the *reciprocal* relation of "permeated" and "transmuted". I will now put this phrase in a larger context to acquire some "distance" [both spatially and temporally as you "read" these words. Hopefully it will "transmute" the words in the phrase above. Peleprat & Cole in the article use section 4.3 to hightlight the movement of permeating and transmuting. They say: Every word has been permeated, as every image has been transmuted, through the imaginative intensity of one compelling creative act. ?Consider it well,? says Abt Vogler of the musician?s analogous miracle: *Consider it well; each tone of our scale in itself is nought; It is said everywhere in the world -- loud, soft and all is said: Give it me to use! I mix it with two in my thought: And there! Ye have heard and seen: consider and bow your head! * Give Coleridge one vivid word from an old narrative; let him mix it with two in his thought; and then (translating terms of music into terms of words) ?out of three sounds he [will] frame, not a fourth sound, but a star.? [LP - comment: Now in "other words" Peleprat & Cole move to a more formal language to point to or gesture at THIS same phenomena indicated above to show how we "evoke" in the "perception and feeling" the most complete IMAGE OF THE THEME "itself"] To continue in Peleprat and Cole's words: "In explicating his theory of montage, Eisenstein invoked precisely this idea in more formal language: ?Representation A and representation B must be so selected from all the possible features within the theme that is being developed [so that their juxtaposition] shall evoke in the perception and feelings of the spectator the most complete image of the theme itself.? (Eisenstein 1942, 69)." [LP comment: Mike, I found this section inspiring as you explore the notion of *grokking* expressing a meaning using a made up word. Juxtaposing poetic language and formal language BOTH gesturing at the same phenomena as *sayings*. ] Larry On Wed, Dec 10, 2014 at 9:36 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > Mike, > I am choosing to open a new thread so the other thread can focus on power > relations. > > I want to align with your wish "to draw attention to several aspects of > the 'gap' where the mediational triangle is not fully connected" [page 7] > > The first aspect is that the right of the triangle where the phylogenetic > and the cultural meet IN the "object" is replaced by a "space". > > To move from an object as "material product" to an understanding of the > phylogenetic and cultural meeting WITHIN "space" opens up perpetual gaps > that need to be "closed" through imagination. A never ending process that > indicates the objects AS "products" are "partially an ILLUSION, an > "imagined" state" [page 8] and it IS this imaginal process that IS mind. > "Mind, here, IS imagination - the process of filling in the gaps that, AT > THE SAME TIME, constitute mind." [page 7.] > > Mike, > You then outline 3 aspects of what this imaginal process of "formation" > entails. > > 1] The gap represents a set of "differences" that exist at "a next moment > in time". [LP comment: These differences represent an "other" that is > partially an illusion but necessary to bring something new into > existence]. These differences open up a "space" [an opening] as a result > of the intermingling of the phylogenetically constrained AND the culturally > mediated constraints creating the "fact" of the gap within experience, > thought and perception. THIS is the relation of the subject to the object. > This discoordination between the phylogenetic and the cultural constantly > opens a "space" that is "necessary" to existence. > > 2] The differences that necessarily exist must be resolved "cognitively" > by the individual. The work of "imagination fills in the differences > sufficiently to form a single "image" of the world. This process IS "mind". > At this point Bartlett is referenced who says, "Thinking" refers to > thought AS a process of gap filling. > > 3] Time is central to this triangular model with the "space" opening a > FUTURE-ORIENTED [time n+1]. Any "doing in the present" needs to "reduce > uncertainty" as a condition of coordinated action. However, to partake in > this "reduction" of uncertainty is partially an "illusion", an imagined, > anticipated state of future stability oriented to the future. This > reduction of uncertainty is necessary SO THAT one can act and think. In > other words, > "to imagine IS to imagine a future in which thought and action ARE > meaningful, which is to say that it is by drawing on the past [LP comment - > drawing on tradition] that the imagination is able to work out a future > WITHIN which to think or act in the present" page 8] > > I wanted to participate in exploring the imaginal by summarizing the > aspects which Mike and Etienne Pelaprat draw to our attention. Notions > such as "space" and "gap" as facts to be considered when examining > "objects". > I also "perceive" [read] the acknowledgement of differences and > discoordination as exploring the "other" and alterity through historical > time. That may lead back to the other thread on power differences. David > Brook pointing out that "meritocracy" is the invisible "imaginal" of the > "middle class" consciousness. The question of a class "identity" as David > Brooks suggests, may be partially an "illusion" but the illusion of > meritocracy, does create a "space" where identities form and others are > othered. > > Larry > From smago@uga.edu Fri Dec 12 06:39:05 2014 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Fri, 12 Dec 2014 14:39:05 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] fall issue of JoLLE now available! Message-ID: http://jolle.coe.uga.edu/current-issue/ The Fall issue of the Journal of Language and Literacy Education is now available! Congratulations to Principal Editor Michelle Falter and the dynamic editorial board for producing another fabulous issue. Peter Smagorinsky Distinguished Research Professor of English Education Department of Language and Literacy Education The University of Georgia 315 Aderhold Hall Athens, GA 30602 Advisor, Journal of Language and Literacy Education Follow JoLLE on twitter @Jolle_uga [cid:image001.jpg@01CEA4AC.71367E90] Personal twitter account: @psmagorinsky -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: image001.jpg Type: image/jpeg Size: 2929 bytes Desc: image001.jpg Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141212/5273f159/attachment.jpg From gutierkd@gmail.com Fri Dec 12 09:55:52 2014 From: gutierkd@gmail.com (Kris Gutierrez) Date: Fri, 12 Dec 2014 09:55:52 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context In-Reply-To: <2E5441F3-C50E-478B-BCCA-EA180B2591A3@ucla.edu> References: <2E5441F3-C50E-478B-BCCA-EA180B2591A3@ucla.edu> Message-ID: <70AEA66B-2185-4863-A4A8-FE86A87FCB43@gmail.com> I don?t know if this went through last night.; so I?m reposting. apologies if you get it twice > On Dec 12, 2014, at 12:45 AM, Kris Gutierrez wrote: > > Re: Mike/Miguel, (Mike, XMCA has a weird email address for me and I am unable to post; would you post if it doesn?t come through?) > > Miguel, who has deep knowledge of an important time in the Migrant Program (MSLI), rightly points out that the development of sociocritical > > literacies/ syncretic approaches to learning must be understood in the context of the larger designed ecology and its history. And I can?t begin to do > it justice here. But here are some reflections. > > Building on a decade of earlier designs that brought together Freire and cultural historical theoretical perspectives, and Chicano/a and ethnic studies > > to create new forms of teaching and learning, and theorizations of the Third Space that preceded the development of the month long migrant > program, MSLI was designed as a hybrid space organized around an historicizing pedagogy, informed, deepened, and augmented by > > Tejeda?s robust decolonizing framework and pedagogies, and Manuel Espinoza?s notions of social dreaming and the importance of students > becoming historical actors who could "who invoke the past in order to re-mediate it so that it becomes a resource for current and future action.? Their > work is key to understanding the MSLI ecology. Our long-term 5th Dimension work (UC Links), its theoretical underpinnings, and the pedagogical > approaches to undergraduate education and learning in informal contexts were also a part of the mix, as most of the MSLI instructional team also > was involved in 5th D work. Of significance, all MSLI staff had extensive knowledge of CHAT, critical pedagogies, social theories, disciplinary > learning, as well as direct experience with and in immigrant, migrant, and non dominant communities, their histories, repertoires, lived experiences, > and possibilities. > > There are many other important contributions of others I could elaborate here that contributed to the iterative design, re-mediation, and > > implementation and sustainability of this program, including Miguel's. Consider Shirin Vossoughi?s recent MCA article, Social Analytic Artifacts > Made Concrete,? in which she beautifully elaborates the ways social analytic artifacts served as tools ?that deepened and propelled the collective > analysis of social problems? for migrant students and the instructional teams. > > Our collective efforts and design were oriented toward transformation and change and had multiple aims: sociopolitical, cultural, educational, > > including reframing education and learning in ways that brought the everyday and scientific (school-based) concepts into conversation with one > > another (a different kind of conversation to be sure). The goal in this regard was to put scientific and everyday concepts on a more level playing field > > such that scientific concepts were not placed in an hierarchical relationship with the everyday. Disciplinary learning and critical forms of literacy were > > placed in conversation, their tensions made the object of analysis ?all toward the production of more meaningful and expansive forms of learning. > > Mike and Yrjo have written important work on this, and, Carol Lee?s work is another robust example. > > And, of course, there is a history of work among researchers in the sociocultural tradition who have attended to the consequential nature of everyday > > knowledge and practices in expansive ways (e.g., Scribner & Cole, 1973; Lave, 1988; 2012; Lave & Rogoff, 1984; Rogoff, 2003, as key examples of > > work that informs this thinking, including ongoing conversations and collaborations with and weekly meetings at LCHC with Mike, Yrjo, Olga,Vasquez > > and others). > > > Our approach to consequential learning involved the development of syncretic approaches to literacy and social scientific thinking. The design > > involved intentional moves that 1) brought together and reorganized different discourses, cultural practices, histories, and genres that were generally considered incompatible or in tension with one another; 2) preserved and foregrounded their tension; and 3) sought to maintain the value, history, and integrity of the everyday vis-?-vis the dominant form, especially in light of historical power relations. The syncretic testimonio is such an example. A nod here to Cindy Cruz?s powerful and informing work on testimonio. > (I have a new piece in press which you read, Mike, that attempts to elaborate the syncretic approach). > > A footnote on the sociocritical article. The RRQ Sociocritical Literacy article was the publication of my AERA Scribner Lecture (2005 for the 2004 Scribner Award for my work on the Third Space; the lecture and its published piece were my attempt to further theorize the Third Space, using MSLI as a robust example. > > Hope this provides more context and food for thought. excuse typos and lapses, it?s late. Kris > > > Kris D. Guti?rrez > Professor > Graduate School of Education > 5629 Tolman Hall #1670 > University of California, Berkeley > Berkeley CA 94720-1670 > > Distinguished Professor > Learning Sciences and Literacy > School of Education > University of Colorado, Boulder > > > >> On Dec 11, 2014, at 6:49 AM, mike cole > wrote: >> >> Thanks for the additional info. >> All makes sense to me. >> Mike >> >> On Wednesday, December 10, 2014, Zavala, Miguel < >> mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu > wrote: >> >>> While the focus is on public education, any space is amenable for >>> analysis. We sometimes get issues from parent organizers, student >>> organizations, interviews of students fighting for social justice in >>> college campuses. Formal, non-formal, institutional, non-institutional, >>> etc. will work. >>> >>> If the submission focuses on 'praxis', on responses and resistance to the >>> neoliberal privatization of education, any space and sustained activity, >>> etc. is worth looking at-- but a connection should be drawn to how it >>> deliberately responds to neoliberalism and its messy tentacles, perhaps >>> highlighting possible worlds and social dreams. >>> >>> A connection can definitely be drawn between sociocritical studies and >>> this topic, certainly. I believe the work we did in MSLI (I was an >>> integral member of MSLI for 3 years) was in many ways creating alternative >>> spaces and social dreams; in a way it was a bottom-up approach of building >>> consciousness and I think Freire would have been proud of our work. As >>> lead instructor, Carlos Tejeda's decolonizing pedagogies framework lead to >>> some beautiful, creative activity in that space, for many years. As an >>> instantiation of sociocritical literacies, I would say the work Kris >>> outlines is definitely a great example of "responses to neoliberalism" and >>> was here and there a part of our talk/framing as we moved pedagogically. >>> >>> As an editor of the journal, the 'constraint' we do have is that >>> submissions be written for a general audience; I know that is ambiguous. >>> Keep in mind that the articles get read by our members in ARE, their >>> students, they are sometimes used as political education in conferences, >>> in some instances reading circles in non-formal community settings. >>> >>> -Miguel >>> >>> >>> On 12/10/14 10:24 PM, "mike cole" > wrote: >>> >>>> How broad is your mandates, Miguel? Does it extend to after school? Seems >>>> like it would help to know the kinds of efforts you consider exemplary >>>> classics. >>>> >>>> Does this topic fit in with sociocritical studies? >>>> Mike >>>> >>>> On Wednesday, December 10, 2014, Zavala, Miguel < >>>> mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu > wrote: >>>> >>>>> XMCA List Family, >>>>> >>>>> I am relaying a call for manuscripts on a pressing issue impacting >>>>> education everywhere. We conceptualized the idea of a grassroots >>>>> journal in >>>>> 2007 and it has grown, albeit slowly. Here's the latest call. >>>>> >>>>> Thanks! >>>>> >>>>> ------------------- >>>>> >>>>> Regeneraci?n, the Association of Raza Educators Journal >>>>> Volume 6, Issue 1 (Spring 2015) >>>>> >>>>> CALL FOR SUBMISSIONS >>>>> Deadline: February 15, 2015 >>>>> >>>>> The theme for our next issue: >>>>> "Resisting The Neoliberal Privatization of Education: Reclaiming >>>>> Teachers' >>>>> Unions, Education, and Epistemologies" >>>>> >>>>> Undeniably, ever since the World Bank declared education a trade-able >>>>> service--trumping the idea that education is a basic human >>>>> right--education >>>>> and teachers have been increasingly under attack by corporations, >>>>> venture >>>>> philanthropists, and a growing managerial middle class, who function >>>>> within >>>>> a neoliberal ideology that places insurmountable faith in markets and >>>>> the >>>>> expansion of capitalism globally into all facets of everyday life. We >>>>> believe that the neoliberal project to de-fund and privatize public >>>>> education interlocks with the idea of a racial-colonial State. Thus, >>>>> it is >>>>> no coincidence that neoliberal experiments to privatize public education >>>>> have materialized in large urban districts, such as Chicago, New York, >>>>> Los >>>>> Angeles, etc., where we find a significant number of Raza, Black, and >>>>> other >>>>> historically marginalized peoples. >>>>> >>>>> In this issue of Regeneraci?n we seek both analysis and praxis, that is >>>>> texts that help us understand more deeply how neoliberalism is manifest >>>>> in >>>>> particular geographic, social, and cultural spaces. As well, we are >>>>> looking >>>>> for texts that provide examples of resistance to the corporate takeover >>>>> of >>>>> public education. How are urban and other communities responding to the >>>>> attacks on education and teachers? What grassroots and strategic spaces >>>>> are >>>>> created that provide alternatives to neoliberalism and capitalism? How >>>>> are >>>>> teachers' unions being reinvented? What role does the fight for Ethnic >>>>> Studies present as a counter to the neoliberal attack? >>>>> >>>>> FORMAT: Submissions may come from students, educators, parents, >>>>> community >>>>> organizers, or organizations; we also welcome scholarly submissions that >>>>> are written for a general audience. Formats may include testimonios, >>>>> essays, poetry, art, personal narrative, as well as analytic and >>>>> empirical >>>>> studies. >>>>> >>>>> LENGTH: 700-3000 words >>>>> >>>>> SUBMISSION DEADLINE: February 15, 2015 >>>>> PUBLICATION DATE: April 15, 2015 >>>>> >>>>> If you have any questions please contact: razaeducators@yahoo.com >>> >>>>> >>> > >>>>> >>>>> To access past issues of Regeneraci?n: >>>>> http://www.razaeducators.org/archives_newsletter.html >>>>> >>>>> The Association of Raza Educators >>>>> www.razaeducators.org > >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>> >>> >>> >> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > Kris Gutierrez > k.gutierrez@me.com > > > > > > Kris D. Guti?rrez > Professor > Graduate School of Education > 5629 Tolman Hall #1670 > University of California, Berkeley > Berkeley CA 94720-1670 > > Distinguished Professor > Learning Sciences and Literacy > School of Education > University of Colorado, Boulder > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Fri Dec 12 11:18:01 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Fri, 12 Dec 2014 11:18:01 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context In-Reply-To: <70AEA66B-2185-4863-A4A8-FE86A87FCB43@gmail.com> References: <2E5441F3-C50E-478B-BCCA-EA180B2591A3@ucla.edu> <70AEA66B-2185-4863-A4A8-FE86A87FCB43@gmail.com> Message-ID: Your are coming through loud and clear, Kris. I think we need to give people a few days to read the article. Not all of us take Reading Research Quarterly, and not all of us know coming into the discussion. Luisa has posted some suggested topics to focus on. I would like to discuss the ubiquitous "future oriented" organization of the activities which is so powerfully illustrated, in my mind, with the practice of having students carry each other up a flight of steep, sharp, stairs and linking it explicitly to a larger, self-emancipating, "image of the future." Would anyone posting a next post on the topic please use KrisRRQ as the header? mike On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 9:55 AM, Kris Gutierrez wrote: > > > I don?t know if this went through last night.; so I?m reposting. apologies > if you get it twice > > > On Dec 12, 2014, at 12:45 AM, Kris Gutierrez wrote: > > Re: Mike/Miguel, (Mike, XMCA has a weird email address for me and I am > unable to post; would you post if it doesn?t come through?) > > Miguel, who has deep knowledge of an important time in the > Migrant Program (MSLI), rightly points out that the development of > sociocritical > > literacies/ syncretic approaches to learning must be understood in the > context of the larger designed ecology and its history. And I can?t begin > to do > > > it justice here. But here are some reflections. > > Building on a decade of earlier designs that brought together Freire and > cultural historical theoretical perspectives, and Chicano/a and ethnic > studies > > to create new forms of teaching and learning, and theorizations of the > Third Space that preceded the development of the month long migrant > > > program, MSLI was designed as a hybrid space organized around an > historicizing pedagogy, informed, deepened, and augmented by > > Tejeda?s robust decolonizing framework and pedagogies, and Manuel > Espinoza?s notions of social dreaming and the importance of students > > > becoming historical actors who could "who invoke the past in order to > re-mediate it so that it becomes a resource for current and future action.? > Their > > > work is key to understanding the MSLI ecology. Our long-term 5th > Dimension work (UC Links), its theoretical underpinnings, and the > pedagogical > > > approaches to undergraduate education and learning in informal contexts > were also a part of the mix, as most of the MSLI instructional team also > > > was involved in 5th D work. Of significance, all MSLI staff had extensive > knowledge of CHAT, critical pedagogies, social theories, disciplinary > > > learning, as well as direct experience with and in immigrant, migrant, > and non dominant communities, their histories, repertoires, lived > experiences, > > > and possibilities. > > There are many other important contributions of others I could elaborate > here that contributed to the iterative design, re-mediation, and > > implementation and sustainability of this program, including Miguel's. > Consider Shirin Vossoughi?s recent MCA article, Social Analytic Artifacts > > > Made Concrete,? in which she beautifully elaborates the ways social > analytic artifacts served as tools ?that deepened and propelled the > collective > > > analysis of social problems? for migrant students and the instructional > teams. > > Our collective efforts and design were oriented toward transformation and > change and had multiple aims: sociopolitical, cultural, educational, > > including reframing education and learning in ways that brought the > everyday and scientific (school-based) concepts into conversation with one > > another (a different kind of conversation to be sure). The goal in this > regard was to put scientific and everyday concepts on a more level playing > field > > such that scientific concepts were not placed in an hierarchical > relationship with the everyday. Disciplinary learning and critical forms > of literacy were > > placed in conversation, their tensions made the object of analysis ?all > toward the production of more meaningful and expansive forms of learning. > > Mike and Yrjo have written important work on this, and, Carol Lee?s work > is another robust example. > > And, of course, there is a history of work among researchers in the > sociocultural tradition who have attended to the consequential nature of > everyday > > knowledge and practices in expansive ways (e.g., Scribner & Cole, 1973; > Lave, 1988; 2012; Lave & Rogoff, 1984; Rogoff, 2003, as key examples of > > work that informs this thinking, including ongoing conversations and > collaborations with and weekly meetings at LCHC with Mike, Yrjo, > Olga,Vasquez > > and others). > > > Our approach to consequential learning involved the development of > syncretic approaches to literacy and social scientific thinking. The design > > involved intentional moves that 1) brought together and reorganized > different discourses, cultural practices, histories, and genres that were > generally considered incompatible or in tension with one another; 2) preserved > and foregrounded their tension; and 3) sought to maintain the value, > history, and integrity of the everyday vis-?-vis the dominant form, > especially in light of historical power relations. The syncretic > testimonio is such an example. A nod here to Cindy Cruz?s powerful and > informing work on testimonio. > (I have a new piece in press which you read, Mike, that attempts to > elaborate the syncretic approach). > > A footnote on the sociocritical article. The *RRQ Sociocritical * > *Literacy* article was the publication of my AERA Scribner Lecture (2005 > for the 2004 Scribner Award for my work on the Third Space; the lecture and > its published piece were my attempt to further theorize the Third Space, > using MSLI as a robust example. > > Hope this provides more context and food for thought. excuse typos and > lapses, it?s late. Kris > > > Kris D. Guti?rrez > Professor > Graduate School of Education > 5629 Tolman Hall #1670 > University of California, Berkeley > Berkeley CA 94720-1670 > > Distinguished Professor > Learning Sciences and Literacy > School of Education > University of Colorado, Boulder > > > > On Dec 11, 2014, at 6:49 AM, mike cole wrote: > > Thanks for the additional info. > All makes sense to me. > Mike > > On Wednesday, December 10, 2014, Zavala, Miguel < > mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu> wrote: > > While the focus is on public education, any space is amenable for > analysis. We sometimes get issues from parent organizers, student > organizations, interviews of students fighting for social justice in > college campuses. Formal, non-formal, institutional, non-institutional, > etc. will work. > > If the submission focuses on 'praxis', on responses and resistance to the > neoliberal privatization of education, any space and sustained activity, > etc. is worth looking at-- but a connection should be drawn to how it > deliberately responds to neoliberalism and its messy tentacles, perhaps > highlighting possible worlds and social dreams. > > A connection can definitely be drawn between sociocritical studies and > this topic, certainly. I believe the work we did in MSLI (I was an > integral member of MSLI for 3 years) was in many ways creating alternative > spaces and social dreams; in a way it was a bottom-up approach of building > consciousness and I think Freire would have been proud of our work. As > lead instructor, Carlos Tejeda's decolonizing pedagogies framework lead to > some beautiful, creative activity in that space, for many years. As an > instantiation of sociocritical literacies, I would say the work Kris > outlines is definitely a great example of "responses to neoliberalism" and > was here and there a part of our talk/framing as we moved pedagogically. > > As an editor of the journal, the 'constraint' we do have is that > submissions be written for a general audience; I know that is ambiguous. > Keep in mind that the articles get read by our members in ARE, their > students, they are sometimes used as political education in conferences, > in some instances reading circles in non-formal community settings. > > -Miguel > > > On 12/10/14 10:24 PM, "mike cole" > wrote: > > How broad is your mandates, Miguel? Does it extend to after school? Seems > like it would help to know the kinds of efforts you consider exemplary > classics. > > Does this topic fit in with sociocritical studies? > Mike > > On Wednesday, December 10, 2014, Zavala, Miguel < > mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu > wrote: > > XMCA List Family, > > I am relaying a call for manuscripts on a pressing issue impacting > education everywhere. We conceptualized the idea of a grassroots > journal in > 2007 and it has grown, albeit slowly. Here's the latest call. > > Thanks! > > ------------------- > > Regeneraci?n, the Association of Raza Educators Journal > Volume 6, Issue 1 (Spring 2015) > > CALL FOR SUBMISSIONS > Deadline: February 15, 2015 > > The theme for our next issue: > "Resisting The Neoliberal Privatization of Education: Reclaiming > Teachers' > Unions, Education, and Epistemologies" > > Undeniably, ever since the World Bank declared education a trade-able > service--trumping the idea that education is a basic human > right--education > and teachers have been increasingly under attack by corporations, > venture > philanthropists, and a growing managerial middle class, who function > within > a neoliberal ideology that places insurmountable faith in markets and > the > expansion of capitalism globally into all facets of everyday life. We > believe that the neoliberal project to de-fund and privatize public > education interlocks with the idea of a racial-colonial State. Thus, > it is > no coincidence that neoliberal experiments to privatize public education > have materialized in large urban districts, such as Chicago, New York, > Los > Angeles, etc., where we find a significant number of Raza, Black, and > other > historically marginalized peoples. > > In this issue of Regeneraci?n we seek both analysis and praxis, that is > texts that help us understand more deeply how neoliberalism is manifest > in > particular geographic, social, and cultural spaces. As well, we are > looking > for texts that provide examples of resistance to the corporate takeover > of > public education. How are urban and other communities responding to the > attacks on education and teachers? What grassroots and strategic spaces > are > created that provide alternatives to neoliberalism and capitalism? How > are > teachers' unions being reinvented? What role does the fight for Ethnic > Studies present as a counter to the neoliberal attack? > > FORMAT: Submissions may come from students, educators, parents, > community > organizers, or organizations; we also welcome scholarly submissions that > are written for a general audience. Formats may include testimonios, > essays, poetry, art, personal narrative, as well as analytic and > empirical > studies. > > LENGTH: 700-3000 words > > SUBMISSION DEADLINE: February 15, 2015 > PUBLICATION DATE: April 15, 2015 > > If you have any questions please contact: razaeducators@yahoo.com > > > > > > > > > > > To access past issues of Regeneraci?n: > http://www.razaeducators.org/archives_newsletter.html > > The Association of Raza Educators > www.razaeducators.org > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > Kris Gutierrez > k.gutierrez@me.com > > > > > > Kris D. Guti?rrez > Professor > Graduate School of Education > 5629 Tolman Hall #1670 > University of California, Berkeley > Berkeley CA 94720-1670 > > Distinguished Professor > Learning Sciences and Literacy > School of Education > University of Colorado, Boulder > > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From laires11@gmail.com Fri Dec 12 11:25:21 2014 From: laires11@gmail.com (Luisa Aires) Date: Fri, 12 Dec 2014 19:25:21 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context In-Reply-To: <70AEA66B-2185-4863-A4A8-FE86A87FCB43@gmail.com> References: <2E5441F3-C50E-478B-BCCA-EA180B2591A3@ucla.edu> <70AEA66B-2185-4863-A4A8-FE86A87FCB43@gmail.com> Message-ID: Dear Professor Kris Gutierrez It is delightful to see you here in XMCA :-) I must confess that after reading your post, I am going to read your text again because you added so much interesting information about MSLI program (for example, I didn?t know that MSLI had strong links with 5th dimension). I would like to learn about Chicano/a and ethnic studies, Tejeda?s decolonizing framework and pedagogies, and Manuel Espinoza?s notions of social dreaming. How can we access the most important references of those theories? One more question (we need to take advantage of your presence here ;-): when and how can we access your new piece about syncretic approach? Best wishes, Lu?sa A. -- Department of Education and Distance Learning, Universidade Aberta Centre of Studies on Migrations and Intercultural Relations (CEMRI) R. Amial, n? 752, 4200-055 Porto, Portugal laires@uab.pt www.uab.pt 2014-12-12 17:55 GMT+00:00 Kris Gutierrez : > > > I don?t know if this went through last night.; so I?m reposting. apologies > if you get it twice > > > > On Dec 12, 2014, at 12:45 AM, Kris Gutierrez wrote: > > > > Re: Mike/Miguel, (Mike, XMCA has a weird email address for me and I am > unable to post; would you post if it doesn?t come through?) > > > > Miguel, who has deep knowledge of an important time in the > Migrant Program (MSLI), rightly points out that the development of > sociocritical > > > > literacies/ syncretic approaches to learning must be understood in the > context of the larger designed ecology and its history. And I can?t begin > to do > > > it justice here. But here are some reflections. > > > > Building on a decade of earlier designs that brought together Freire > and cultural historical theoretical perspectives, and Chicano/a and ethnic > studies > > > > to create new forms of teaching and learning, and theorizations of the > Third Space that preceded the development of the month long migrant > > > program, MSLI was designed as a hybrid space organized around an > historicizing pedagogy, informed, deepened, and augmented by > > > > Tejeda?s robust decolonizing framework and pedagogies, and Manuel > Espinoza?s notions of social dreaming and the importance of students > > > becoming historical actors who could "who invoke the past in order to > re-mediate it so that it becomes a resource for current and future > action.? Their > > > work is key to understanding the MSLI ecology. Our long-term 5th > Dimension work (UC Links), its theoretical underpinnings, and the > pedagogical > > > approaches to undergraduate education and learning in informal contexts > were also a part of the mix, as most of the MSLI instructional team also > > > was involved in 5th D work. Of significance, all MSLI staff had > extensive knowledge of CHAT, critical pedagogies, social theories, > disciplinary > > > learning, as well as direct experience with and in immigrant, migrant, > and non dominant communities, their histories, repertoires, lived > experiences, > > > and possibilities. > > > > There are many other important contributions of others I could elaborate > here that contributed to the iterative design, re-mediation, and > > > > implementation and sustainability of this program, including Miguel's. > Consider Shirin Vossoughi?s recent MCA article, Social Analytic Artifacts > > > Made Concrete,? in which she beautifully elaborates the ways social > analytic artifacts served as tools ?that deepened and propelled the > collective > > > analysis of social problems? for migrant students and the > instructional teams. > > > > Our collective efforts and design were oriented toward > transformation and change and had multiple aims: sociopolitical, cultural, > educational, > > > > including reframing education and learning in ways that brought the > everyday and scientific (school-based) concepts into conversation with one > > > > another (a different kind of conversation to be sure). The goal in this > regard was to put scientific and everyday concepts on a more level playing > field > > > > such that scientific concepts were not placed in an hierarchical > relationship with the everyday. Disciplinary learning and critical forms > of literacy were > > > > placed in conversation, their tensions made the object of analysis ?all > toward the production of more meaningful and expansive forms of learning. > > > > Mike and Yrjo have written important work on this, and, Carol Lee?s work > is another robust example. > > > > And, of course, there is a history of work among researchers in the > sociocultural tradition who have attended to the consequential nature of > everyday > > > > knowledge and practices in expansive ways (e.g., Scribner & Cole, 1973; > Lave, 1988; 2012; Lave & Rogoff, 1984; Rogoff, 2003, as key examples of > > > > work that informs this thinking, including ongoing conversations and > collaborations with and weekly meetings at LCHC with Mike, Yrjo, > Olga,Vasquez > > > > and others). > > > > > > Our approach to consequential learning involved the development of > syncretic approaches to literacy and social scientific thinking. The design > > > > involved intentional moves that 1) brought together and reorganized > different discourses, cultural practices, histories, and genres that were > generally considered incompatible or in tension with one another; 2) > preserved and foregrounded their tension; and 3) sought to maintain the > value, history, and integrity of the everyday vis-?-vis the dominant form, > especially in light of historical power relations. The syncretic > testimonio is such an example. A nod here to Cindy Cruz?s powerful and > informing work on testimonio. > > (I have a new piece in press which you read, Mike, that attempts to > elaborate the syncretic approach). > > > > A footnote on the sociocritical article. The RRQ Sociocritical Literacy > article was the publication of my AERA Scribner Lecture (2005 for the 2004 > Scribner Award for my work on the Third Space; the lecture and its > published piece were my attempt to further theorize the Third Space, using > MSLI as a robust example. > > > > Hope this provides more context and food for thought. excuse typos and > lapses, it?s late. Kris > > > > > > Kris D. Guti?rrez > > Professor > > Graduate School of Education > > 5629 Tolman Hall #1670 > > University of California, Berkeley > > Berkeley CA 94720-1670 > > > > Distinguished Professor > > Learning Sciences and Literacy > > School of Education > > University of Colorado, Boulder > > > > > > > >> On Dec 11, 2014, at 6:49 AM, mike cole mcole@ucsd.edu>> wrote: > >> > >> Thanks for the additional info. > >> All makes sense to me. > >> Mike > >> > >> On Wednesday, December 10, 2014, Zavala, Miguel < > >> mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu > > wrote: > >> > >>> While the focus is on public education, any space is amenable for > >>> analysis. We sometimes get issues from parent organizers, student > >>> organizations, interviews of students fighting for social justice in > >>> college campuses. Formal, non-formal, institutional, > non-institutional, > >>> etc. will work. > >>> > >>> If the submission focuses on 'praxis', on responses and resistance to > the > >>> neoliberal privatization of education, any space and sustained > activity, > >>> etc. is worth looking at-- but a connection should be drawn to how it > >>> deliberately responds to neoliberalism and its messy tentacles, perhaps > >>> highlighting possible worlds and social dreams. > >>> > >>> A connection can definitely be drawn between sociocritical studies and > >>> this topic, certainly. I believe the work we did in MSLI (I was an > >>> integral member of MSLI for 3 years) was in many ways creating > alternative > >>> spaces and social dreams; in a way it was a bottom-up approach of > building > >>> consciousness and I think Freire would have been proud of our work. As > >>> lead instructor, Carlos Tejeda's decolonizing pedagogies framework > lead to > >>> some beautiful, creative activity in that space, for many years. As an > >>> instantiation of sociocritical literacies, I would say the work Kris > >>> outlines is definitely a great example of "responses to neoliberalism" > and > >>> was here and there a part of our talk/framing as we moved > pedagogically. > >>> > >>> As an editor of the journal, the 'constraint' we do have is that > >>> submissions be written for a general audience; I know that is > ambiguous. > >>> Keep in mind that the articles get read by our members in ARE, their > >>> students, they are sometimes used as political education in > conferences, > >>> in some instances reading circles in non-formal community settings. > >>> > >>> -Miguel > >>> > >>> > >>> On 12/10/14 10:24 PM, "mike cole" mcole@ucsd.edu> > wrote: > >>> > >>>> How broad is your mandates, Miguel? Does it extend to after school? > Seems > >>>> like it would help to know the kinds of efforts you consider exemplary > >>>> classics. > >>>> > >>>> Does this topic fit in with sociocritical studies? > >>>> Mike > >>>> > >>>> On Wednesday, December 10, 2014, Zavala, Miguel < > >>>> mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu> > wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> XMCA List Family, > >>>>> > >>>>> I am relaying a call for manuscripts on a pressing issue impacting > >>>>> education everywhere. We conceptualized the idea of a grassroots > >>>>> journal in > >>>>> 2007 and it has grown, albeit slowly. Here's the latest call. > >>>>> > >>>>> Thanks! > >>>>> > >>>>> ------------------- > >>>>> > >>>>> Regeneraci?n, the Association of Raza Educators Journal > >>>>> Volume 6, Issue 1 (Spring 2015) > >>>>> > >>>>> CALL FOR SUBMISSIONS > >>>>> Deadline: February 15, 2015 > >>>>> > >>>>> The theme for our next issue: > >>>>> "Resisting The Neoliberal Privatization of Education: Reclaiming > >>>>> Teachers' > >>>>> Unions, Education, and Epistemologies" > >>>>> > >>>>> Undeniably, ever since the World Bank declared education a trade-able > >>>>> service--trumping the idea that education is a basic human > >>>>> right--education > >>>>> and teachers have been increasingly under attack by corporations, > >>>>> venture > >>>>> philanthropists, and a growing managerial middle class, who function > >>>>> within > >>>>> a neoliberal ideology that places insurmountable faith in markets and > >>>>> the > >>>>> expansion of capitalism globally into all facets of everyday life. We > >>>>> believe that the neoliberal project to de-fund and privatize public > >>>>> education interlocks with the idea of a racial-colonial State. Thus, > >>>>> it is > >>>>> no coincidence that neoliberal experiments to privatize public > education > >>>>> have materialized in large urban districts, such as Chicago, New > York, > >>>>> Los > >>>>> Angeles, etc., where we find a significant number of Raza, Black, and > >>>>> other > >>>>> historically marginalized peoples. > >>>>> > >>>>> In this issue of Regeneraci?n we seek both analysis and praxis, that > is > >>>>> texts that help us understand more deeply how neoliberalism is > manifest > >>>>> in > >>>>> particular geographic, social, and cultural spaces. As well, we are > >>>>> looking > >>>>> for texts that provide examples of resistance to the corporate > takeover > >>>>> of > >>>>> public education. How are urban and other communities responding to > the > >>>>> attacks on education and teachers? What grassroots and strategic > spaces > >>>>> are > >>>>> created that provide alternatives to neoliberalism and capitalism? > How > >>>>> are > >>>>> teachers' unions being reinvented? What role does the fight for > Ethnic > >>>>> Studies present as a counter to the neoliberal attack? > >>>>> > >>>>> FORMAT: Submissions may come from students, educators, parents, > >>>>> community > >>>>> organizers, or organizations; we also welcome scholarly submissions > that > >>>>> are written for a general audience. Formats may include testimonios, > >>>>> essays, poetry, art, personal narrative, as well as analytic and > >>>>> empirical > >>>>> studies. > >>>>> > >>>>> LENGTH: 700-3000 words > >>>>> > >>>>> SUBMISSION DEADLINE: February 15, 2015 > >>>>> PUBLICATION DATE: April 15, 2015 > >>>>> > >>>>> If you have any questions please contact: razaeducators@yahoo.com > > >>> > >>>>> razaeducators@yahoo.com> > >>> > > >>>>> > >>>>> To access past issues of Regeneraci?n: > >>>>> http://www.razaeducators.org/archives_newsletter.html < > http://www.razaeducators.org/archives_newsletter.html> > >>>>> > >>>>> The Association of Raza Educators > >>>>> www.razaeducators.org < > http://www.razaeducators.org > > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> -- > >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> -- > >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > Kris Gutierrez > > k.gutierrez@me.com > > > > > > > > > > > > Kris D. Guti?rrez > > Professor > > Graduate School of Education > > 5629 Tolman Hall #1670 > > University of California, Berkeley > > Berkeley CA 94720-1670 > > > > Distinguished Professor > > Learning Sciences and Literacy > > School of Education > > University of Colorado, Boulder > > > > > > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Fri Dec 12 11:43:09 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Fri, 12 Dec 2014 11:43:09 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Changing Practices at XMCA Message-ID: Dear xmca0philes My most recent note, regarding discussion of sociocritical theory via Kris's RRQ paper, ?indicates part of my effort to implement modest changes in the organization of xmca discourse aimed at improving its usefulness and attractiveness to people (the two being mixed). At the most minimum level, ?we can reduce some sources of misunderstanding and discoordination by declaring a distinct header for any topic anyone wants to discuss concerning culture and development in their broadest contexts. No guarantee ever that anyone will respond, let alone set off a stream of responses. But at least we can keep sequence in the threads consistent, and they will be easy to retrieve as a set from the archiving web page should one want to. There are no policepersons in this process. (But so far as I can tell, no harm in nagging). Other modifications in the structure of the discourse are possible. It would be nice to know, for example, how many people actually read xmca from time to time in some form, and how many of our 800+ subscribers have xmca in their span filters. About 200 people people have posted in the past year. Bruce and I are working on a non-obtrusive way of checking to see how many silent folks are lurking out of interest and how many are zombies. Early on Annalisa suggested a sort of "Beginner's Manual" which seemed like a good idea, but it requires some coordinated person power. A group to create such a facility is in the process of formation, and I figure there should be more about that appearing. A year or more ago Andy and Huw put together a wiki that I think of (perhaps inappropriately) as a kind of "key word wiki" for CHAT. It exists, although it is in quarantine at present to insure that it will never carry any viruses into the UCSD campus. This seems like a natural part of the xmca pool of resources, and may be useful to the newbiies' materials. We have looked into forums and other media for xmca, but so far as I can tell, there is no general purpose utility that would not require the involvement of significantly more coordinated person power, and probably customizing, et that LCHC can manage. Perhaps I am wrong about this and the new, great, effortless substitute is at your nearest supermarket. However, for the moment, we will continue working within the fungible, but perhaps not entirely elastic, structure of xmca. Now, back to the thread I want to address, Imagination mike -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From gutierkd@gmail.com Fri Dec 12 11:42:33 2014 From: gutierkd@gmail.com (Kris Gutierrez) Date: Fri, 12 Dec 2014 11:42:33 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context In-Reply-To: References: <2E5441F3-C50E-478B-BCCA-EA180B2591A3@ucla.edu> <70AEA66B-2185-4863-A4A8-FE86A87FCB43@gmail.com> Message-ID: Luisa, thanks. I have always been a lurker on XMCA but can never keep with all the discussions. I?m hoping the discussions will get us into the questions you raise and I?m happy to post references and pdfs too (e.g., Tejeda?s decolonizing and Espinoza?s article on Educational Sanctuaries). Espinoza?s social dreaming is discussed in the RRQ article and I?ll look to see where else he might have written about it. I don?t know when the syncretic piece will be out but will check. Thanks for your interest. In particular, I hope we can also discuss the ways the social imagination (embodied and realized through Boal's teatro del oprimido, historicizing pedagogies, and syncretic texts, etc.) were central to the ubiquitous "future oriented" organization of the activities that Mike points out?that is, the process of becoming historical actors. Kris Kris Gutierrez gutierkd@gmail.com Kris D. Guti?rrez Professor Graduate School of Education 5629 Tolman Hall #1670 University of California, Berkeley Berkeley CA 94720-1670 Distinguished Professor Learning Sciences and Literacy School of Education University of Colorado, Boulder > On Dec 12, 2014, at 11:25 AM, Luisa Aires wrote: > > Dear Professor Kris Gutierrez > > It is delightful to see you here in XMCA :-) > > > > I must confess that after reading your post, I am going to read your text again because you added so much interesting information about MSLI program (for example, I didn?t know that MSLI had strong links with 5th dimension). > > I would like to learn about Chicano/a and ethnic studies, Tejeda?s decolonizing framework and pedagogies, and Manuel Espinoza?s notions of social dreaming. How can we access the most important references of those theories? > > One more question (we need to take advantage of your presence here ;-): when and how can we access your new piece about syncretic approach? > > > > Best wishes, > > Lu?sa A. > > > > > -- > Department of Education and Distance Learning, Universidade Aberta > Centre of Studies on Migrations and Intercultural Relations (CEMRI) > R. Amial, n? 752, 4200-055 Porto, Portugal > laires@uab.pt > www.uab.pt > > > 2014-12-12 17:55 GMT+00:00 Kris Gutierrez >: > > I don?t know if this went through last night.; so I?m reposting. apologies if you get it twice > > > > On Dec 12, 2014, at 12:45 AM, Kris Gutierrez > wrote: > > > > Re: Mike/Miguel, (Mike, XMCA has a weird email address for me and I am unable to post; would you post if it doesn?t come through?) > > > > Miguel, who has deep knowledge of an important time in the Migrant Program (MSLI), rightly points out that the development of sociocritical > > > > literacies/ syncretic approaches to learning must be understood in the context of the larger designed ecology and its history. And I can?t begin to do > > > it justice here. But here are some reflections. > > > > Building on a decade of earlier designs that brought together Freire and cultural historical theoretical perspectives, and Chicano/a and ethnic studies > > > > to create new forms of teaching and learning, and theorizations of the Third Space that preceded the development of the month long migrant > > > program, MSLI was designed as a hybrid space organized around an historicizing pedagogy, informed, deepened, and augmented by > > > > Tejeda?s robust decolonizing framework and pedagogies, and Manuel Espinoza?s notions of social dreaming and the importance of students > > > becoming historical actors who could "who invoke the past in order to re-mediate it so that it becomes a resource for current and future action.? Their > > > work is key to understanding the MSLI ecology. Our long-term 5th Dimension work (UC Links), its theoretical underpinnings, and the pedagogical > > > approaches to undergraduate education and learning in informal contexts were also a part of the mix, as most of the MSLI instructional team also > > > was involved in 5th D work. Of significance, all MSLI staff had extensive knowledge of CHAT, critical pedagogies, social theories, disciplinary > > > learning, as well as direct experience with and in immigrant, migrant, and non dominant communities, their histories, repertoires, lived experiences, > > > and possibilities. > > > > There are many other important contributions of others I could elaborate here that contributed to the iterative design, re-mediation, and > > > > implementation and sustainability of this program, including Miguel's. Consider Shirin Vossoughi?s recent MCA article, Social Analytic Artifacts > > > Made Concrete,? in which she beautifully elaborates the ways social analytic artifacts served as tools ?that deepened and propelled the collective > > > analysis of social problems? for migrant students and the instructional teams. > > > > Our collective efforts and design were oriented toward transformation and change and had multiple aims: sociopolitical, cultural, educational, > > > > including reframing education and learning in ways that brought the everyday and scientific (school-based) concepts into conversation with one > > > > another (a different kind of conversation to be sure). The goal in this regard was to put scientific and everyday concepts on a more level playing field > > > > such that scientific concepts were not placed in an hierarchical relationship with the everyday. Disciplinary learning and critical forms of literacy were > > > > placed in conversation, their tensions made the object of analysis ?all toward the production of more meaningful and expansive forms of learning. > > > > Mike and Yrjo have written important work on this, and, Carol Lee?s work is another robust example. > > > > And, of course, there is a history of work among researchers in the sociocultural tradition who have attended to the consequential nature of everyday > > > > knowledge and practices in expansive ways (e.g., Scribner & Cole, 1973; Lave, 1988; 2012; Lave & Rogoff, 1984; Rogoff, 2003, as key examples of > > > > work that informs this thinking, including ongoing conversations and collaborations with and weekly meetings at LCHC with Mike, Yrjo, Olga,Vasquez > > > > and others). > > > > > > Our approach to consequential learning involved the development of syncretic approaches to literacy and social scientific thinking. The design > > > > involved intentional moves that 1) brought together and reorganized different discourses, cultural practices, histories, and genres that were generally considered incompatible or in tension with one another; 2) preserved and foregrounded their tension; and 3) sought to maintain the value, history, and integrity of the everyday vis-?-vis the dominant form, especially in light of historical power relations. The syncretic testimonio is such an example. A nod here to Cindy Cruz?s powerful and informing work on testimonio. > > (I have a new piece in press which you read, Mike, that attempts to elaborate the syncretic approach). > > > > A footnote on the sociocritical article. The RRQ Sociocritical Literacy article was the publication of my AERA Scribner Lecture (2005 for the 2004 Scribner Award for my work on the Third Space; the lecture and its published piece were my attempt to further theorize the Third Space, using MSLI as a robust example. > > > > Hope this provides more context and food for thought. excuse typos and lapses, it?s late. Kris > > > > > > Kris D. Guti?rrez > > Professor > > Graduate School of Education > > 5629 Tolman Hall #1670 > > University of California, Berkeley > > Berkeley CA 94720-1670 > > > > Distinguished Professor > > Learning Sciences and Literacy > > School of Education > > University of Colorado, Boulder > > > > > > > >> On Dec 11, 2014, at 6:49 AM, mike cole >> wrote: > >> > >> Thanks for the additional info. > >> All makes sense to me. > >> Mike > >> > >> On Wednesday, December 10, 2014, Zavala, Miguel < > >> mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu >> wrote: > >> > >>> While the focus is on public education, any space is amenable for > >>> analysis. We sometimes get issues from parent organizers, student > >>> organizations, interviews of students fighting for social justice in > >>> college campuses. Formal, non-formal, institutional, non-institutional, > >>> etc. will work. > >>> > >>> If the submission focuses on 'praxis', on responses and resistance to the > >>> neoliberal privatization of education, any space and sustained activity, > >>> etc. is worth looking at-- but a connection should be drawn to how it > >>> deliberately responds to neoliberalism and its messy tentacles, perhaps > >>> highlighting possible worlds and social dreams. > >>> > >>> A connection can definitely be drawn between sociocritical studies and > >>> this topic, certainly. I believe the work we did in MSLI (I was an > >>> integral member of MSLI for 3 years) was in many ways creating alternative > >>> spaces and social dreams; in a way it was a bottom-up approach of building > >>> consciousness and I think Freire would have been proud of our work. As > >>> lead instructor, Carlos Tejeda's decolonizing pedagogies framework lead to > >>> some beautiful, creative activity in that space, for many years. As an > >>> instantiation of sociocritical literacies, I would say the work Kris > >>> outlines is definitely a great example of "responses to neoliberalism" and > >>> was here and there a part of our talk/framing as we moved pedagogically. > >>> > >>> As an editor of the journal, the 'constraint' we do have is that > >>> submissions be written for a general audience; I know that is ambiguous. > >>> Keep in mind that the articles get read by our members in ARE, their > >>> students, they are sometimes used as political education in conferences, > >>> in some instances reading circles in non-formal community settings. > >>> > >>> -Miguel > >>> > >>> > >>> On 12/10/14 10:24 PM, "mike cole" > > wrote: > >>> > >>>> How broad is your mandates, Miguel? Does it extend to after school? Seems > >>>> like it would help to know the kinds of efforts you consider exemplary > >>>> classics. > >>>> > >>>> Does this topic fit in with sociocritical studies? > >>>> Mike > >>>> > >>>> On Wednesday, December 10, 2014, Zavala, Miguel < > >>>> mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu > > wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> XMCA List Family, > >>>>> > >>>>> I am relaying a call for manuscripts on a pressing issue impacting > >>>>> education everywhere. We conceptualized the idea of a grassroots > >>>>> journal in > >>>>> 2007 and it has grown, albeit slowly. Here's the latest call. > >>>>> > >>>>> Thanks! > >>>>> > >>>>> ------------------- > >>>>> > >>>>> Regeneraci?n, the Association of Raza Educators Journal > >>>>> Volume 6, Issue 1 (Spring 2015) > >>>>> > >>>>> CALL FOR SUBMISSIONS > >>>>> Deadline: February 15, 2015 > >>>>> > >>>>> The theme for our next issue: > >>>>> "Resisting The Neoliberal Privatization of Education: Reclaiming > >>>>> Teachers' > >>>>> Unions, Education, and Epistemologies" > >>>>> > >>>>> Undeniably, ever since the World Bank declared education a trade-able > >>>>> service--trumping the idea that education is a basic human > >>>>> right--education > >>>>> and teachers have been increasingly under attack by corporations, > >>>>> venture > >>>>> philanthropists, and a growing managerial middle class, who function > >>>>> within > >>>>> a neoliberal ideology that places insurmountable faith in markets and > >>>>> the > >>>>> expansion of capitalism globally into all facets of everyday life. We > >>>>> believe that the neoliberal project to de-fund and privatize public > >>>>> education interlocks with the idea of a racial-colonial State. Thus, > >>>>> it is > >>>>> no coincidence that neoliberal experiments to privatize public education > >>>>> have materialized in large urban districts, such as Chicago, New York, > >>>>> Los > >>>>> Angeles, etc., where we find a significant number of Raza, Black, and > >>>>> other > >>>>> historically marginalized peoples. > >>>>> > >>>>> In this issue of Regeneraci?n we seek both analysis and praxis, that is > >>>>> texts that help us understand more deeply how neoliberalism is manifest > >>>>> in > >>>>> particular geographic, social, and cultural spaces. As well, we are > >>>>> looking > >>>>> for texts that provide examples of resistance to the corporate takeover > >>>>> of > >>>>> public education. How are urban and other communities responding to the > >>>>> attacks on education and teachers? What grassroots and strategic spaces > >>>>> are > >>>>> created that provide alternatives to neoliberalism and capitalism? How > >>>>> are > >>>>> teachers' unions being reinvented? What role does the fight for Ethnic > >>>>> Studies present as a counter to the neoliberal attack? > >>>>> > >>>>> FORMAT: Submissions may come from students, educators, parents, > >>>>> community > >>>>> organizers, or organizations; we also welcome scholarly submissions that > >>>>> are written for a general audience. Formats may include testimonios, > >>>>> essays, poetry, art, personal narrative, as well as analytic and > >>>>> empirical > >>>>> studies. > >>>>> > >>>>> LENGTH: 700-3000 words > >>>>> > >>>>> SUBMISSION DEADLINE: February 15, 2015 > >>>>> PUBLICATION DATE: April 15, 2015 > >>>>> > >>>>> If you have any questions please contact: razaeducators@yahoo.com > > >>> > >>>>> > > >>> > > >>>>> > >>>>> To access past issues of Regeneraci?n: > >>>>> http://www.razaeducators.org/archives_newsletter.html > > >>>>> > >>>>> The Association of Raza Educators > >>>>> www.razaeducators.org > >> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> -- > >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> -- > >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > Kris Gutierrez > > k.gutierrez@me.com > > > > > > > > > > > > > Kris D. Guti?rrez > > Professor > > Graduate School of Education > > 5629 Tolman Hall #1670 > > University of California, Berkeley > > Berkeley CA 94720-1670 > > > > Distinguished Professor > > Learning Sciences and Literacy > > School of Education > > University of Colorado, Boulder > > > > > > > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Fri Dec 12 11:50:49 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Fri, 12 Dec 2014 11:50:49 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] KrisRRQ Message-ID: Luisa Aires has responded to Kris's note just as I sent my last message on organization of threads. This note pair can be considered the first note on the Kris thread, suggested by Dana. The first is Kris's original note. The second is Luisa's note. mike your turn :-) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *From Kris* Re: Mike/Miguel, (Mike, XMCA has a weird email address for me and I am unable to post; would you post if it doesn?t come through?) Miguel, who has deep knowledge of an important time in the Migrant Program (MSLI), rightly points out that the development of sociocritical literacies/ syncretic approaches to learning must be understood in the context of the larger designed ecology and its history. And I can?t begin to do it justice here. But here are some reflections. Building on a decade of earlier designs that brought together Freire and cultural historical theoretical perspectives, and Chicano/a and ethnic studies to create new forms of teaching and learning, and theorizations of the Third Space that preceded the development of the month long migrant program, MSLI was designed as a hybrid space organized around an historicizing pedagogy, informed, deepened, and augmented by Tejeda?s robust decolonizing framework and pedagogies, and Manuel Espinoza?s notions of social dreaming and the importance of students becoming historical actors who could "who invoke the past in order to re-mediate it so that it becomes a resource for current and future action.? Their work is key to understanding the MSLI ecology. Our long-term 5th Dimension work (UC Links), its theoretical underpinnings, and the pedagogical approaches to undergraduate education and learning in informal contexts were also a part of the mix, as most of the MSLI instructional team also was involved in 5th D work. Of significance, all MSLI staff had extensive knowledge of CHAT, critical pedagogies, social theories, disciplinary learning, as well as direct experience with and in immigrant, migrant, and non dominant communities, their histories, repertoires, lived experiences, and possibilities. There are many other important contributions of others I could elaborate here that contributed to the iterative design, re-mediation, and implementation and sustainability of this program, including Miguel's. Consider Shirin Vossoughi?s recent MCA article, Social Analytic Artifacts Made Concrete,? in which she beautifully elaborates the ways social analytic artifacts served as tools ?that deepened and propelled the collective analysis of social problems? for migrant students and the instructional teams. Our collective efforts and design were oriented toward transformation and change and had multiple aims: sociopolitical, cultural, educational, including reframing education and learning in ways that brought the everyday and scientific (school-based) concepts into conversation with one another (a different kind of conversation to be sure). The goal in this regard was to put scientific and everyday concepts on a more level playing field such that scientific concepts were not placed in an hierarchical relationship with the everyday. Disciplinary learning and critical forms of literacy were placed in conversation, their tensions made the object of analysis ?all toward the production of more meaningful and expansive forms of learning. Mike and Yrjo have written important work on this, and, Carol Lee?s work is another robust example. And, of course, there is a history of work among researchers in the sociocultural tradition who have attended to the consequential nature of everyday knowledge and practices in expansive ways (e.g., Scribner & Cole, 1973; Lave, 1988; 2012; Lave & Rogoff, 1984; Rogoff, 2003, as key examples of work that informs this thinking, including ongoing conversations and collaborations with and weekly meetings at LCHC with Mike, Yrjo, Olga,Vasquez and others ). Our approach to consequential learning involved the development of syncretic approaches to literacy and social scientific thinking. The design involved intentional moves that 1) brought together and reorganized different discourses, cultural practices, histories, and genres that were generally considered incompatible or in tension with one another; 2) preserved and foregrounded their tension; and 3) sought to maintain the value, history, and integrity of the everyday vis-?-vis the dominant form, especially in light of historical power relations. The syncretic testimonio is such an example. A nod here to Cindy Cruz?s powerful and informing work on testimonio. (I have a new piece in press which you read, Mike, that attempts to elaborate the syncretic approach). A footnote on the sociocritical article. The RRQ Sociocritical Literacy article was the publication of my AERA Scribner Lecture (2005 for the 2004 Scribner Award for my work on the Third Space; the lecture and its published piece were my attempt to further theorize the Third Space, using MSLI as a robust example. Hope this provides more context and food for thought. excuse typos and lapses, it?s late. Kris Kris D. Guti?rrez Professor Graduate School of Education 5629 Tolman Hall #1670 University of California, Berkeley Berkeley CA 94720-1670 Distinguished Professor Learning Sciences and Literacy School of Education University of Colorado, Boulder \ *From Luisa* ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Luisa Aires Date: Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 11:25 AM Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" , gutierkd@gmail.com Dear Professor Kris Gutierrez It is delightful to see you here in XMCA :-) I must confess that after reading your post, I am going to read your text again because you added so much interesting information about MSLI program (for example, I didn?t know that MSLI had strong links with 5th dimension). I would like to learn about Chicano/a and ethnic studies, Tejeda?s decolonizing framework and pedagogies, and Manuel Espinoza?s notions of social dreaming. How can we access the most important references of those theories? One more question (we need to take advantage of your presence here ;-): when and how can we access your new piece about syncretic approach? Best wishes, Lu?sa A. -- Department of Education and Distance Learning, Universidade Aberta Centre of Studies on Migrations and Intercultural Relations (CEMRI) R. Amial, n? 752, 4200-055 Porto, Portugal laires@uab.pt -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From boblake@georgiasouthern.edu Fri Dec 12 11:55:12 2014 From: boblake@georgiasouthern.edu (Robert Lake) Date: Fri, 12 Dec 2014 14:55:12 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Changing Practices at XMCA In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hi Professor Cole , Thank you for suggested improvements. I read XCMA continuously. Thank you for all you do. Robert Lake On Dec 12, 2014 2:47 PM, "mike cole" wrote: > Dear xmca0philes > My most recent note, regarding discussion of sociocritical theory via > Kris's RRQ paper, ?indicates part of my effort to implement modest changes > in the organization of xmca discourse aimed at improving its usefulness and > attractiveness to people (the two being mixed). > > At the most minimum level, ?we can reduce some sources of misunderstanding > and discoordination by declaring a distinct header for any topic anyone > wants to discuss concerning culture and development in their broadest > contexts. No guarantee ever that anyone will respond, let alone set off a > stream of responses. But at least we can keep sequence in the threads > consistent, and they will be easy to retrieve as a set from the archiving > web page should one want to. > > There are no policepersons in this process. (But so far as I can tell, no > harm in nagging). > > Other modifications in the structure of the discourse are possible. It > would be nice to know, for example, how many people actually read xmca from > time to time in some form, and how many of our 800+ subscribers have xmca > in their span filters. About 200 people people have posted in the past > year. Bruce and I are working on a non-obtrusive way of checking to see how > many silent folks are lurking out of interest and how many are zombies. > > Early on Annalisa suggested a sort of "Beginner's Manual" which seemed like > a good idea, but it requires some coordinated person power. A group to > create such a facility is in the process of formation, and I figure there > should be more about that appearing. > > A year or more ago Andy and Huw put together a wiki that I think of > (perhaps inappropriately) as a kind of "key word wiki" for CHAT. > It exists, although it is in quarantine at present to insure that it will > never carry any viruses into the UCSD campus. This seems like > a natural part of the xmca pool of resources, and may be useful to the > newbiies' materials. > > We have looked into forums and other media for xmca, but so far as I can > tell, there is no general purpose utility that would not require the > involvement of significantly more coordinated person power, and probably > customizing, et that LCHC can manage. Perhaps I am wrong about this and the > new, great, effortless substitute is at your nearest supermarket. However, > for the moment, we will continue working within the fungible, but perhaps > not entirely elastic, structure of xmca. > > Now, back to the thread I want to address, > Imagination > mike > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > From drrussel@iastate.edu Fri Dec 12 12:06:45 2014 From: drrussel@iastate.edu (David Russell) Date: Fri, 12 Dec 2014 14:06:45 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Changing Practices at XMCA In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Mike and all, I appreciate very much the suggestions for streamlining the threads/reading process. They might even lure longtime lurkers like me, out of our lairs. David -- David R. Russell, Professor English Department Iowa State University Ames, IA 50011 USA (515) 294-4724 Fax (515) 294-6814 drrussel@iastate.edu http://www.public.iastate.edu/~drrussel/drresume.html From mcole@ucsd.edu Fri Dec 12 12:51:31 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Fri, 12 Dec 2014 12:51:31 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context In-Reply-To: References: <2E5441F3-C50E-478B-BCCA-EA180B2591A3@ucla.edu> <70AEA66B-2185-4863-A4A8-FE86A87FCB43@gmail.com> Message-ID: [?] [?][?][?] So much for trying to organized xmca discussion by threads! It hard to keep track of the jumble of the email flow! I assume those who are following the KrisRRQ thread will see this. reveling in the rain mike On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 11:42 AM, Kris Gutierrez wrote: > > Luisa, thanks. I have always been a lurker on XMCA but can never keep > with all the discussions. I?m hoping the discussions will get us into > the questions you raise and I?m happy to post references and pdfs too > (e.g., Tejeda?s decolonizing and Espinoza?s article on Educational > Sanctuaries). Espinoza?s social dreaming is discussed in the RRQ article > and I?ll look to see where else he might have written about it. I don?t > know when the syncretic piece will be out but will check. Thanks for your > interest. > > > In particular, I hope we can also discuss the ways the social imagination > (embodied and realized through Boal's teatro del oprimido, historicizing > pedagogies, and syncretic texts, etc.) were central to the ubiquitous > "future oriented" organization of the activities that Mike points out?that > is, the process of becoming historical actors. > > > > Kris > > > > Kris Gutierrez > gutierkd@gmail.com > > Kris D. Guti?rrez > Professor > Graduate School of Education > 5629 Tolman Hall #1670 > University of California, Berkeley > Berkeley CA 94720-1670 > > Distinguished Professor > Learning Sciences and Literacy > School of Education > University of Colorado, Boulder > > > > On Dec 12, 2014, at 11:25 AM, Luisa Aires wrote: > > > > Dear Professor Kris Gutierrez > > > > It is delightful to see you here in XMCA :-) > > > > > > > > I must confess that after reading your post, I am going to read your > text again because you added so much interesting information about MSLI > program (for example, I didn?t know that MSLI had strong links with 5th > dimension). > > > > I would like to learn about Chicano/a and ethnic studies, Tejeda?s > decolonizing framework and pedagogies, and Manuel Espinoza?s notions of > social dreaming. How can we access the most important references of those > theories? > > > > One more question (we need to take advantage of your presence here ;-): > when and how can we access your new piece about syncretic approach? > > > > > > > > Best wishes, > > > > Lu?sa A. > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Department of Education and Distance Learning, Universidade Aberta > > Centre of Studies on Migrations and Intercultural Relations (CEMRI) > > R. Amial, n? 752, 4200-055 Porto, Portugal > > laires@uab.pt > > www.uab.pt > > > > > > 2014-12-12 17:55 GMT+00:00 Kris Gutierrez gutierkd@gmail.com>>: > > > > I don?t know if this went through last night.; so I?m reposting. > apologies if you get it twice > > > > > > > On Dec 12, 2014, at 12:45 AM, Kris Gutierrez > wrote: > > > > > > Re: Mike/Miguel, (Mike, XMCA has a weird email address for me and I > am unable to post; would you post if it doesn?t come through?) > > > > > > Miguel, who has deep knowledge of an important time in the > Migrant Program (MSLI), rightly points out that the development of > sociocritical > > > > > > literacies/ syncretic approaches to learning must be understood in > the context of the larger designed ecology and its history. And I can?t > begin to do > > > > > it justice here. But here are some reflections. > > > > > > Building on a decade of earlier designs that brought together Freire > and cultural historical theoretical perspectives, and Chicano/a and ethnic > studies > > > > > > to create new forms of teaching and learning, and theorizations of > the Third Space that preceded the development of the month long migrant > > > > > program, MSLI was designed as a hybrid space organized around an > historicizing pedagogy, informed, deepened, and augmented by > > > > > > Tejeda?s robust decolonizing framework and pedagogies, and Manuel > Espinoza?s notions of social dreaming and the importance of students > > > > > becoming historical actors who could "who invoke the past in order to > re-mediate it so that it becomes a resource for current and future > action.? Their > > > > > work is key to understanding the MSLI ecology. Our long-term 5th > Dimension work (UC Links), its theoretical underpinnings, and the > pedagogical > > > > > approaches to undergraduate education and learning in informal > contexts were also a part of the mix, as most of the MSLI instructional > team also > > > > > was involved in 5th D work. Of significance, all MSLI staff had > extensive knowledge of CHAT, critical pedagogies, social theories, > disciplinary > > > > > learning, as well as direct experience with and in immigrant, migrant, > and non dominant communities, their histories, repertoires, lived > experiences, > > > > > and possibilities. > > > > > > There are many other important contributions of others I could > elaborate here that contributed to the iterative design, re-mediation, and > > > > > > implementation and sustainability of this program, including > Miguel's. Consider Shirin Vossoughi?s recent MCA article, Social > Analytic Artifacts > > > > > Made Concrete,? in which she beautifully elaborates the ways > social analytic artifacts served as tools ?that deepened and propelled the > collective > > > > > analysis of social problems? for migrant students and the > instructional teams. > > > > > > Our collective efforts and design were oriented toward > transformation and change and had multiple aims: sociopolitical, cultural, > educational, > > > > > > including reframing education and learning in ways that brought the > everyday and scientific (school-based) concepts into conversation with one > > > > > > another (a different kind of conversation to be sure). The goal in > this regard was to put scientific and everyday concepts on a more level > playing field > > > > > > such that scientific concepts were not placed in an hierarchical > relationship with the everyday. Disciplinary learning and critical forms > of literacy were > > > > > > placed in conversation, their tensions made the object of analysis > ?all toward the production of more meaningful and expansive forms of > learning. > > > > > > Mike and Yrjo have written important work on this, and, Carol Lee?s > work is another robust example. > > > > > > And, of course, there is a history of work among researchers in the > sociocultural tradition who have attended to the consequential nature of > everyday > > > > > > knowledge and practices in expansive ways (e.g., Scribner & Cole, > 1973; Lave, 1988; 2012; Lave & Rogoff, 1984; Rogoff, 2003, as key examples > of > > > > > > work that informs this thinking, including ongoing conversations and > collaborations with and weekly meetings at LCHC with Mike, Yrjo, > Olga,Vasquez > > > > > > and others). > > > > > > > > > Our approach to consequential learning involved the development > of syncretic approaches to literacy and social scientific thinking. The > design > > > > > > involved intentional moves that 1) brought together and reorganized > different discourses, cultural practices, histories, and genres that were > generally considered incompatible or in tension with one another; 2) > preserved and foregrounded their tension; and 3) sought to maintain the > value, history, and integrity of the everyday vis-?-vis the dominant form, > especially in light of historical power relations. The syncretic > testimonio is such an example. A nod here to Cindy Cruz?s powerful and > informing work on testimonio. > > > (I have a new piece in press which you read, Mike, that attempts to > elaborate the syncretic approach). > > > > > > A footnote on the sociocritical article. The RRQ Sociocritical > Literacy article was the publication of my AERA Scribner Lecture (2005 for > the 2004 Scribner Award for my work on the Third Space; the lecture and its > published piece were my attempt to further theorize the Third Space, using > MSLI as a robust example. > > > > > > Hope this provides more context and food for thought. excuse typos > and lapses, it?s late. Kris > > > > > > > > > Kris D. Guti?rrez > > > Professor > > > Graduate School of Education > > > 5629 Tolman Hall #1670 > > > University of California, Berkeley > > > Berkeley CA 94720-1670 > > > > > > Distinguished Professor > > > Learning Sciences and Literacy > > > School of Education > > > University of Colorado, Boulder > > > > > > > > > > > >> On Dec 11, 2014, at 6:49 AM, mike cole mcole@ucsd.edu> >> wrote: > > >> > > >> Thanks for the additional info. > > >> All makes sense to me. > > >> Mike > > >> > > >> On Wednesday, December 10, 2014, Zavala, Miguel < > > >> mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu> >> wrote: > > >> > > >>> While the focus is on public education, any space is amenable for > > >>> analysis. We sometimes get issues from parent organizers, student > > >>> organizations, interviews of students fighting for social justice in > > >>> college campuses. Formal, non-formal, institutional, > non-institutional, > > >>> etc. will work. > > >>> > > >>> If the submission focuses on 'praxis', on responses and resistance > to the > > >>> neoliberal privatization of education, any space and sustained > activity, > > >>> etc. is worth looking at-- but a connection should be drawn to how it > > >>> deliberately responds to neoliberalism and its messy tentacles, > perhaps > > >>> highlighting possible worlds and social dreams. > > >>> > > >>> A connection can definitely be drawn between sociocritical studies > and > > >>> this topic, certainly. I believe the work we did in MSLI (I was an > > >>> integral member of MSLI for 3 years) was in many ways creating > alternative > > >>> spaces and social dreams; in a way it was a bottom-up approach of > building > > >>> consciousness and I think Freire would have been proud of our work. > As > > >>> lead instructor, Carlos Tejeda's decolonizing pedagogies framework > lead to > > >>> some beautiful, creative activity in that space, for many years. As > an > > >>> instantiation of sociocritical literacies, I would say the work Kris > > >>> outlines is definitely a great example of "responses to > neoliberalism" and > > >>> was here and there a part of our talk/framing as we moved > pedagogically. > > >>> > > >>> As an editor of the journal, the 'constraint' we do have is that > > >>> submissions be written for a general audience; I know that is > ambiguous. > > >>> Keep in mind that the articles get read by our members in ARE, their > > >>> students, they are sometimes used as political education in > conferences, > > >>> in some instances reading circles in non-formal community settings. > > >>> > > >>> -Miguel > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> On 12/10/14 10:24 PM, "mike cole" mcole@ucsd.edu> > > > wrote: > > >>> > > >>>> How broad is your mandates, Miguel? Does it extend to after school? > Seems > > >>>> like it would help to know the kinds of efforts you consider > exemplary > > >>>> classics. > > >>>> > > >>>> Does this topic fit in with sociocritical studies? > > >>>> Mike > > >>>> > > >>>> On Wednesday, December 10, 2014, Zavala, Miguel < > > >>>> mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu> > > wrote: > > >>>> > > >>>>> XMCA List Family, > > >>>>> > > >>>>> I am relaying a call for manuscripts on a pressing issue impacting > > >>>>> education everywhere. We conceptualized the idea of a grassroots > > >>>>> journal in > > >>>>> 2007 and it has grown, albeit slowly. Here's the latest call. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Thanks! > > >>>>> > > >>>>> ------------------- > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Regeneraci?n, the Association of Raza Educators Journal > > >>>>> Volume 6, Issue 1 (Spring 2015) > > >>>>> > > >>>>> CALL FOR SUBMISSIONS > > >>>>> Deadline: February 15, 2015 > > >>>>> > > >>>>> The theme for our next issue: > > >>>>> "Resisting The Neoliberal Privatization of Education: Reclaiming > > >>>>> Teachers' > > >>>>> Unions, Education, and Epistemologies" > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Undeniably, ever since the World Bank declared education a > trade-able > > >>>>> service--trumping the idea that education is a basic human > > >>>>> right--education > > >>>>> and teachers have been increasingly under attack by corporations, > > >>>>> venture > > >>>>> philanthropists, and a growing managerial middle class, who > function > > >>>>> within > > >>>>> a neoliberal ideology that places insurmountable faith in markets > and > > >>>>> the > > >>>>> expansion of capitalism globally into all facets of everyday life. > We > > >>>>> believe that the neoliberal project to de-fund and privatize public > > >>>>> education interlocks with the idea of a racial-colonial State. > Thus, > > >>>>> it is > > >>>>> no coincidence that neoliberal experiments to privatize public > education > > >>>>> have materialized in large urban districts, such as Chicago, New > York, > > >>>>> Los > > >>>>> Angeles, etc., where we find a significant number of Raza, Black, > and > > >>>>> other > > >>>>> historically marginalized peoples. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> In this issue of Regeneraci?n we seek both analysis and praxis, > that is > > >>>>> texts that help us understand more deeply how neoliberalism is > manifest > > >>>>> in > > >>>>> particular geographic, social, and cultural spaces. As well, we are > > >>>>> looking > > >>>>> for texts that provide examples of resistance to the corporate > takeover > > >>>>> of > > >>>>> public education. How are urban and other communities responding > to the > > >>>>> attacks on education and teachers? What grassroots and strategic > spaces > > >>>>> are > > >>>>> created that provide alternatives to neoliberalism and > capitalism? How > > >>>>> are > > >>>>> teachers' unions being reinvented? What role does the fight for > Ethnic > > >>>>> Studies present as a counter to the neoliberal attack? > > >>>>> > > >>>>> FORMAT: Submissions may come from students, educators, parents, > > >>>>> community > > >>>>> organizers, or organizations; we also welcome scholarly > submissions that > > >>>>> are written for a general audience. Formats may include > testimonios, > > >>>>> essays, poetry, art, personal narrative, as well as analytic and > > >>>>> empirical > > >>>>> studies. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> LENGTH: 700-3000 words > > >>>>> > > >>>>> SUBMISSION DEADLINE: February 15, 2015 > > >>>>> PUBLICATION DATE: April 15, 2015 > > >>>>> > > >>>>> If you have any questions please contact: razaeducators@yahoo.com > razaeducators@yahoo.com>> > > >>> > > >>>>> razaeducators@yahoo.com> razaeducators@yahoo.com>> > > >>> > > > >>>>> > > >>>>> To access past issues of Regeneraci?n: > > >>>>> http://www.razaeducators.org/archives_newsletter.html < > http://www.razaeducators.org/archives_newsletter.html> < > http://www.razaeducators.org/archives_newsletter.html < > http://www.razaeducators.org/archives_newsletter.html>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> The Association of Raza Educators > > >>>>> www.razaeducators.org < > http://www.razaeducators.org/ >< > http://www.razaeducators.org < > http://www.razaeducators.org/ >> > > >>>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> -- > > >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > an > > >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >> > > >> -- > > >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > > Kris Gutierrez > > > k.gutierrez@me.com k.gutierrez@me.com > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Kris D. Guti?rrez > > > Professor > > > Graduate School of Education > > > 5629 Tolman Hall #1670 > > > University of California, Berkeley > > > Berkeley CA 94720-1670 > > > > > > Distinguished Professor > > > Learning Sciences and Literacy > > > School of Education > > > University of Colorado, Boulder > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 4F4.gif Type: image/gif Size: 1053 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141212/72ba89bd/attachment.gif -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 360.gif Type: image/gif Size: 453 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141212/72ba89bd/attachment-0001.gif From helenaworthen@gmail.com Fri Dec 12 13:49:04 2014 From: helenaworthen@gmail.com (Helena Worthen) Date: Fri, 12 Dec 2014 13:49:04 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Changing Practices at XMCA In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <06FAB3D3-DE6F-4D0B-96E5-84BF35335F60@gmail.com> I have two suggestions for changing practices, along with subject lines that accurately track a thread. 1. Messages no more than two screens long. One is preferred. 2. No more individually addressed messages. As in, "Tom, you said X" or "Melissa, you have misunderstood my point." Refer to an individual by quoting or citing, but speak to the list. Both of these may not qualify as "modest." I can defend each one, but will first wait for the *&^&*storm, if one is coming. Thanks -- Helena :) Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com On Dec 12, 2014, at 11:43 AM, mike cole wrote: > Dear xmca0philes > My most recent note, regarding discussion of sociocritical theory via > Kris's RRQ paper, ?indicates part of my effort to implement modest changes > in the organization of xmca discourse aimed at improving its usefulness and > attractiveness to people (the two being mixed). > > At the most minimum level, ?we can reduce some sources of misunderstanding > and discoordination by declaring a distinct header for any topic anyone > wants to discuss concerning culture and development in their broadest > contexts. No guarantee ever that anyone will respond, let alone set off a > stream of responses. But at least we can keep sequence in the threads > consistent, and they will be easy to retrieve as a set from the archiving > web page should one want to. > > There are no policepersons in this process. (But so far as I can tell, no > harm in nagging). > > Other modifications in the structure of the discourse are possible. It > would be nice to know, for example, how many people actually read xmca from > time to time in some form, and how many of our 800+ subscribers have xmca > in their span filters. About 200 people people have posted in the past > year. Bruce and I are working on a non-obtrusive way of checking to see how > many silent folks are lurking out of interest and how many are zombies. > > Early on Annalisa suggested a sort of "Beginner's Manual" which seemed like > a good idea, but it requires some coordinated person power. A group to > create such a facility is in the process of formation, and I figure there > should be more about that appearing. > > A year or more ago Andy and Huw put together a wiki that I think of > (perhaps inappropriately) as a kind of "key word wiki" for CHAT. > It exists, although it is in quarantine at present to insure that it will > never carry any viruses into the UCSD campus. This seems like > a natural part of the xmca pool of resources, and may be useful to the > newbiies' materials. > > We have looked into forums and other media for xmca, but so far as I can > tell, there is no general purpose utility that would not require the > involvement of significantly more coordinated person power, and probably > customizing, et that LCHC can manage. Perhaps I am wrong about this and the > new, great, effortless substitute is at your nearest supermarket. However, > for the moment, we will continue working within the fungible, but perhaps > not entirely elastic, structure of xmca. > > Now, back to the thread I want to address, > Imagination > mike > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From daviddpreiss@gmail.com Fri Dec 12 14:05:14 2014 From: daviddpreiss@gmail.com (David Preiss) Date: Fri, 12 Dec 2014 19:05:14 -0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Changing Practices at XMCA In-Reply-To: <06FAB3D3-DE6F-4D0B-96E5-84BF35335F60@gmail.com> References: <06FAB3D3-DE6F-4D0B-96E5-84BF35335F60@gmail.com> Message-ID: I strongly support these two. Current use makes even lurking a hard task. If one wants personal exchanges better go off list. Just a thought. Enviado desde mi iPhone > El 12-12-2014, a las 18:49, Helena Worthen escribi?: > > I have two suggestions for changing practices, along with subject lines that accurately track a thread. > > 1. Messages no more than two screens long. One is preferred. > > 2. No more individually addressed messages. As in, "Tom, you said X" or "Melissa, you have misunderstood my point." Refer to an individual by quoting or citing, but speak to the list. > > Both of these may not qualify as "modest." I can defend each one, but will first wait for the *&^&*storm, if one is coming. > > Thanks -- > > Helena > :) > > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > >> On Dec 12, 2014, at 11:43 AM, mike cole wrote: >> >> Dear xmca0philes >> My most recent note, regarding discussion of sociocritical theory via >> Kris's RRQ paper, ?indicates part of my effort to implement modest changes >> in the organization of xmca discourse aimed at improving its usefulness and >> attractiveness to people (the two being mixed). >> >> At the most minimum level, ?we can reduce some sources of misunderstanding >> and discoordination by declaring a distinct header for any topic anyone >> wants to discuss concerning culture and development in their broadest >> contexts. No guarantee ever that anyone will respond, let alone set off a >> stream of responses. But at least we can keep sequence in the threads >> consistent, and they will be easy to retrieve as a set from the archiving >> web page should one want to. >> >> There are no policepersons in this process. (But so far as I can tell, no >> harm in nagging). >> >> Other modifications in the structure of the discourse are possible. It >> would be nice to know, for example, how many people actually read xmca from >> time to time in some form, and how many of our 800+ subscribers have xmca >> in their span filters. About 200 people people have posted in the past >> year. Bruce and I are working on a non-obtrusive way of checking to see how >> many silent folks are lurking out of interest and how many are zombies. >> >> Early on Annalisa suggested a sort of "Beginner's Manual" which seemed like >> a good idea, but it requires some coordinated person power. A group to >> create such a facility is in the process of formation, and I figure there >> should be more about that appearing. >> >> A year or more ago Andy and Huw put together a wiki that I think of >> (perhaps inappropriately) as a kind of "key word wiki" for CHAT. >> It exists, although it is in quarantine at present to insure that it will >> never carry any viruses into the UCSD campus. This seems like >> a natural part of the xmca pool of resources, and may be useful to the >> newbiies' materials. >> >> We have looked into forums and other media for xmca, but so far as I can >> tell, there is no general purpose utility that would not require the >> involvement of significantly more coordinated person power, and probably >> customizing, et that LCHC can manage. Perhaps I am wrong about this and the >> new, great, effortless substitute is at your nearest supermarket. However, >> for the moment, we will continue working within the fungible, but perhaps >> not entirely elastic, structure of xmca. >> >> Now, back to the thread I want to address, >> Imagination >> mike >> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > From brucerob1953@googlemail.com Fri Dec 12 15:28:26 2014 From: brucerob1953@googlemail.com (Bruce Robinson) Date: Fri, 12 Dec 2014 23:28:26 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Changing Practices at XMCA In-Reply-To: References: <06FAB3D3-DE6F-4D0B-96E5-84BF35335F60@gmail.com> Message-ID: <548B7A1A.3010207@brucerob.eu> I too support both of Helena's suggestions. As a long term lurker, I find the overheads in terms of time and effort of following and mailbox space of many of the threads too great, particularly where they become personal exchanges. (This may also be because my interests are perhaps somewhat different from the mainstream ones of xmca, I acknowledge). A length limit might also encourage more people to contribute - I also feel, perhaps wrongly, that the threshold effort to raise and discuss things is quite high here as discussions tend to be long and require a lot of input. Either that or alternatively posts get little or no response. I don't see how Helena's proposals can be enforced other than either formal moderation for which nobody has the time or else self-restraint combined with a degree of social pressure from others on the list. These are not new issues. They have affected elists since the pre-historic days of the Internet all of 20 years ago. I appreciate Mike raising the whole issue for an open discussion as I have recently detected an undercurrent of dissatisfaction, discontent, unrest - call it what you like - about the way things have been going with xmca. I have myself considered leaving but stayed because I value the project and get something from xmca, though I feel that has diminished over time. I appreciate this is subjective but I doubt I am the only one of the mysterious 800 who feels this way. Bruce Robinson On 12/12/2014 22:05, David Preiss wrote: > I strongly support these two. Current use makes even lurking a hard task. If one wants personal exchanges better go off list. Just a thought. > > Enviado desde mi iPhone > >> El 12-12-2014, a las 18:49, Helena Worthen escribi?: >> >> I have two suggestions for changing practices, along with subject lines that accurately track a thread. >> >> 1. Messages no more than two screens long. One is preferred. >> >> 2. No more individually addressed messages. As in, "Tom, you said X" or "Melissa, you have misunderstood my point." Refer to an individual by quoting or citing, but speak to the list. >> >> Both of these may not qualify as "modest." I can defend each one, but will first wait for the *&^&*storm, if one is coming. >> >> Thanks -- >> >> Helena >> :) >> >> Helena Worthen >> helenaworthen@gmail.com >> >>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 11:43 AM, mike cole wrote: >>> >>> Dear xmca0philes >>> My most recent note, regarding discussion of sociocritical theory via >>> Kris's RRQ paper, ?indicates part of my effort to implement modest changes >>> in the organization of xmca discourse aimed at improving its usefulness and >>> attractiveness to people (the two being mixed). >>> >>> At the most minimum level, ?we can reduce some sources of misunderstanding >>> and discoordination by declaring a distinct header for any topic anyone >>> wants to discuss concerning culture and development in their broadest >>> contexts. No guarantee ever that anyone will respond, let alone set off a >>> stream of responses. But at least we can keep sequence in the threads >>> consistent, and they will be easy to retrieve as a set from the archiving >>> web page should one want to. >>> >>> There are no policepersons in this process. (But so far as I can tell, no >>> harm in nagging). >>> >>> Other modifications in the structure of the discourse are possible. It >>> would be nice to know, for example, how many people actually read xmca from >>> time to time in some form, and how many of our 800+ subscribers have xmca >>> in their span filters. About 200 people people have posted in the past >>> year. Bruce and I are working on a non-obtrusive way of checking to see how >>> many silent folks are lurking out of interest and how many are zombies. >>> >>> Early on Annalisa suggested a sort of "Beginner's Manual" which seemed like >>> a good idea, but it requires some coordinated person power. A group to >>> create such a facility is in the process of formation, and I figure there >>> should be more about that appearing. >>> >>> A year or more ago Andy and Huw put together a wiki that I think of >>> (perhaps inappropriately) as a kind of "key word wiki" for CHAT. >>> It exists, although it is in quarantine at present to insure that it will >>> never carry any viruses into the UCSD campus. This seems like >>> a natural part of the xmca pool of resources, and may be useful to the >>> newbiies' materials. >>> >>> We have looked into forums and other media for xmca, but so far as I can >>> tell, there is no general purpose utility that would not require the >>> involvement of significantly more coordinated person power, and probably >>> customizing, et that LCHC can manage. Perhaps I am wrong about this and the >>> new, great, effortless substitute is at your nearest supermarket. However, >>> for the moment, we will continue working within the fungible, but perhaps >>> not entirely elastic, structure of xmca. >>> >>> Now, back to the thread I want to address, >>> Imagination >>> mike >>> >>> -- >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> From bazerman@education.ucsb.edu Fri Dec 12 15:54:41 2014 From: bazerman@education.ucsb.edu (Charles Bazerman) Date: Sat, 13 Dec 2014 07:54:41 +0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Changing Practices at XMCA In-Reply-To: References: <06FAB3D3-DE6F-4D0B-96E5-84BF35335F60@gmail.com> Message-ID: Yes, this is a public list and posters should keep in mind there are 800 potential readers for each post. Be considerate. Chuck ----- Original Message ----- From: David Preiss Date: Saturday, December 13, 2014 6:07 am Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Changing Practices at XMCA To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > I strongly support these two. Current use makes even lurking a hard > task. If one wants personal exchanges better go off list. Just a > thought. > > Enviado desde mi iPhone > > > El 12-12-2014, a las 18:49, Helena Worthen > escribi?: > > > > I have two suggestions for changing practices, along with subject > lines that accurately track a thread. > > > > 1. Messages no more than two screens long. One is preferred. > > > > 2. No more individually addressed messages. As in, "Tom, you said X" > or "Melissa, you have misunderstood my point." Refer to an > individual by quoting or citing, but speak to the list. > > > > Both of these may not qualify as "modest." I can defend each one, > but will first wait for the *&^&*storm, if one is coming. > > > > Thanks -- > > > > Helena > > :) > > > > Helena Worthen > > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > >> On Dec 12, 2014, at 11:43 AM, mike cole wrote: > >> > >> Dear xmca0philes > >> My most recent note, regarding discussion of sociocritical theory via > >> Kris's RRQ paper, ?indicates part of my effort to implement modest > changes > >> in the organization of xmca discourse aimed at improving its > usefulness and > >> attractiveness to people (the two being mixed). > >> > >> At the most minimum level, ?we can reduce some sources of misunderstanding > >> and discoordination by declaring a distinct header for any topic anyone > >> wants to discuss concerning culture and development in their broadest > >> contexts. No guarantee ever that anyone will respond, let alone set > off a > >> stream of responses. But at least we can keep sequence in the threads > >> consistent, and they will be easy to retrieve as a set from the archiving > >> web page should one want to. > >> > >> There are no policepersons in this process. (But so far as I can > tell, no > >> harm in nagging). > >> > >> Other modifications in the structure of the discourse are possible. > It > >> would be nice to know, for example, how many people actually read > xmca from > >> time to time in some form, and how many of our 800+ subscribers > have xmca > >> in their span filters. About 200 people people have posted in the past > >> year. Bruce and I are working on a non-obtrusive way of checking to > see how > >> many silent folks are lurking out of interest and how many are zombies. > >> > >> Early on Annalisa suggested a sort of "Beginner's Manual" which > seemed like > >> a good idea, but it requires some coordinated person power. A group > to > >> create such a facility is in the process of formation, and I figure > there > >> should be more about that appearing. > >> > >> A year or more ago Andy and Huw put together a wiki that I think of > >> (perhaps inappropriately) as a kind of "key word wiki" for CHAT. > >> It exists, although it is in quarantine at present to insure that > it will > >> never carry any viruses into the UCSD campus. This seems like > >> a natural part of the xmca pool of resources, and may be useful to > the > >> newbiies' materials. > >> > >> We have looked into forums and other media for xmca, but so far as > I can > >> tell, there is no general purpose utility that would not require the > >> involvement of significantly more coordinated person power, and probably > >> customizing, et that LCHC can manage. Perhaps I am wrong about this > and the > >> new, great, effortless substitute is at your nearest supermarket. However, > >> for the moment, we will continue working within the fungible, but perhaps > >> not entirely elastic, structure of xmca. > >> > >> Now, back to the thread I want to address, > >> Imagination > >> mike > >> > >> -- > >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > an > >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Fri Dec 12 15:57:15 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Fri, 12 Dec 2014 15:57:15 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Changing Practices at XMCA In-Reply-To: <548B7A1A.3010207@brucerob.eu> References: <06FAB3D3-DE6F-4D0B-96E5-84BF35335F60@gmail.com> <548B7A1A.3010207@brucerob.eu> Message-ID: Helena, Bruce R et al-- So we put self organization to the test with a dollop of reflexivity, prodded by several symptoms of discussion that either gets too narrowly personal, or appears to lack interest in topics of central interest to those who signed on for whatever reasons whenever. I have a lot of sympathy for this comment, Bruce: "I have myself considered leaving but stayed because I value the project and get something from xmca, though I feel that has diminished over time." The issue from my perspective is what are current subscribers, who are overwhelmingly not multi-decade participants, willing to contribute to un-diminishing what you get out of xmca? Right now there are threads that interest me. Lets see what sort of sturdier twine may be spun from it. mike On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 3:28 PM, Bruce Robinson wrote: > > I too support both of Helena's suggestions. As a long term lurker, I find > the overheads in terms of time and effort of following and mailbox space > of many of the threads too great, particularly where they become personal > exchanges. (This may also be because my interests are perhaps somewhat > different from the mainstream ones of xmca, I acknowledge). A length limit > might also encourage more people to contribute - I also feel, perhaps > wrongly, that the threshold effort to raise and discuss things is quite > high here as discussions tend to be long and require a lot of input. Either > that or alternatively posts get little or no response. > > I don't see how Helena's proposals can be enforced other than either > formal moderation for which nobody has the time or else self-restraint > combined with a degree of social pressure from others on the list. These > are not new issues. They have affected elists since the pre-historic days > of the Internet all of 20 years ago. > > I appreciate Mike raising the whole issue for an open discussion as I have > recently detected an undercurrent of dissatisfaction, discontent, unrest - > call it what you like - about the way things have been going with xmca. I > have myself considered leaving but stayed because I value the project and > get something from xmca, though I feel that has diminished over time. > > I appreciate this is subjective but I doubt I am the only one of the > mysterious 800 who feels this way. > > Bruce Robinson > > > On 12/12/2014 22:05, David Preiss wrote: > >> I strongly support these two. Current use makes even lurking a hard task. >> If one wants personal exchanges better go off list. Just a thought. >> >> Enviado desde mi iPhone >> >> El 12-12-2014, a las 18:49, Helena Worthen >>> escribi?: >>> >>> I have two suggestions for changing practices, along with subject lines >>> that accurately track a thread. >>> >>> 1. Messages no more than two screens long. One is preferred. >>> >>> 2. No more individually addressed messages. As in, "Tom, you said X" or >>> "Melissa, you have misunderstood my point." Refer to an individual by >>> quoting or citing, but speak to the list. >>> >>> Both of these may not qualify as "modest." I can defend each one, but >>> will first wait for the *&^&*storm, if one is coming. >>> >>> Thanks -- >>> >>> Helena >>> :) >>> >>> Helena Worthen >>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>> >>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 11:43 AM, mike cole wrote: >>>> >>>> Dear xmca0philes >>>> My most recent note, regarding discussion of sociocritical theory via >>>> Kris's RRQ paper, ?indicates part of my effort to implement modest >>>> changes >>>> in the organization of xmca discourse aimed at improving its usefulness >>>> and >>>> attractiveness to people (the two being mixed). >>>> >>>> At the most minimum level, ?we can reduce some sources of >>>> misunderstanding >>>> and discoordination by declaring a distinct header for any topic anyone >>>> wants to discuss concerning culture and development in their broadest >>>> contexts. No guarantee ever that anyone will respond, let alone set off >>>> a >>>> stream of responses. But at least we can keep sequence in the threads >>>> consistent, and they will be easy to retrieve as a set from the >>>> archiving >>>> web page should one want to. >>>> >>>> There are no policepersons in this process. (But so far as I can tell, >>>> no >>>> harm in nagging). >>>> >>>> Other modifications in the structure of the discourse are possible. It >>>> would be nice to know, for example, how many people actually read xmca >>>> from >>>> time to time in some form, and how many of our 800+ subscribers have >>>> xmca >>>> in their span filters. About 200 people people have posted in the past >>>> year. Bruce and I are working on a non-obtrusive way of checking to see >>>> how >>>> many silent folks are lurking out of interest and how many are zombies. >>>> >>>> Early on Annalisa suggested a sort of "Beginner's Manual" which seemed >>>> like >>>> a good idea, but it requires some coordinated person power. A group to >>>> create such a facility is in the process of formation, and I figure >>>> there >>>> should be more about that appearing. >>>> >>>> A year or more ago Andy and Huw put together a wiki that I think of >>>> (perhaps inappropriately) as a kind of "key word wiki" for CHAT. >>>> It exists, although it is in quarantine at present to insure that it >>>> will >>>> never carry any viruses into the UCSD campus. This seems like >>>> a natural part of the xmca pool of resources, and may be useful to the >>>> newbiies' materials. >>>> >>>> We have looked into forums and other media for xmca, but so far as I can >>>> tell, there is no general purpose utility that would not require the >>>> involvement of significantly more coordinated person power, and probably >>>> customizing, et that LCHC can manage. Perhaps I am wrong about this and >>>> the >>>> new, great, effortless substitute is at your nearest supermarket. >>>> However, >>>> for the moment, we will continue working within the fungible, but >>>> perhaps >>>> not entirely elastic, structure of xmca. >>>> >>>> Now, back to the thread I want to address, >>>> Imagination >>>> mike >>>> >>>> -- >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>> >>> >>> > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mcole@ucsd.edu Fri Dec 12 16:09:36 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Fri, 12 Dec 2014 16:09:36 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Imagination Message-ID: For those interested in the imagination thread, attached are two articles by philosophers who have worried about the issue. My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists like Zaporozhets and his students who studied the development of imagination in a manner that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of productive imagination. I am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no intention of doing so. But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the attached texts. Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I came upon the idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked at several levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne and I argued in our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of access to the work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. Moreover, such views emphasize the future orientation of the perception/imagination process. I believe that these views have direct relevance to Kris's paper to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns about the role of different forms of symbolic play in development. So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps they will prove useful for those interested. mike -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Imagination and Perception by P.F. Strawson.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 6608692 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141212/96b1149e/attachment-0001.pdf From hshonerd@gmail.com Fri Dec 12 16:38:24 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Fri, 12 Dec 2014 17:38:24 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Mike and Larry, I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how jazzed up I am now about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as Larry construes it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various triads, finally found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of the mind, as Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa? fuera. Fractally yours, Henry > On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole wrote: > > For those interested in the imagination thread, attached are two articles > by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > > My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists like Zaporozhets > and his students who studied the development of imagination in a manner > that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of productive imagination. I > am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no intention of doing so. > But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the attached texts. > > Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I came upon the > idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked at several > levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne and I argued in > our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of access to the > work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. Moreover, such > views emphasize the future orientation of the perception/imagination > process. I believe that these views have direct relevance to Kris's paper > to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns about the > role of different forms of symbolic play in development. > > So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps they will prove > useful for those interested. > mike > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > From mdonohoe@sfu.ca Fri Dec 12 21:40:12 2014 From: mdonohoe@sfu.ca (Elaine Donohoe) Date: Fri, 12 Dec 2014 21:40:12 -0800 (PST) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Changing Practices at XMCA In-Reply-To: References: <06FAB3D3-DE6F-4D0B-96E5-84BF35335F60@gmail.com> Message-ID: <14008600-FBAB-4B87-9E14-DB820868FBF8@sfu.ca> Being both a "newbie" to Vygotsky theory and this discussion, I am grateful for a nod in my direction as a voyeur. I listen in on these discussions for several reasons. One, because the Vygotskian notion of mediated human activity and development (my rudimentary understanding) has transformed my way of thinking, having grown up believing in the North American concept that individual growth and development exist apart from culture and context. Also, I enjoy trying to decipher and digest the thoughtful and contentious dialogue presented by esteemed and knowledgeable Xmca participants, although it seems to be limited to a small core group. I stay silent because I am by no means qualified to respond or share in these discussions. However, I do wish that other voyeurs and newbies like me would contribute more often because I also think that Vygotskian ideals promote inclusivity and continuous learning through language, no matter where one is in their ZPD. ED Sent from my iPhone > On Dec 12, 2014, at 4:04 PM, Charles Bazerman wrote: > > Yes, this is a public list and posters should keep in mind there are 800 potential readers for each post. Be considerate. > Chuck > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: David Preiss > Date: Saturday, December 13, 2014 6:07 am > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Changing Practices at XMCA > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > >> I strongly support these two. Current use makes even lurking a hard >> task. If one wants personal exchanges better go off list. Just a >> thought. >> >> Enviado desde mi iPhone >> >>>> El 12-12-2014, a las 18:49, Helena Worthen >>> escribi?: >>> >>> I have two suggestions for changing practices, along with subject >> lines that accurately track a thread. >>> >>> 1. Messages no more than two screens long. One is preferred. >>> >>> 2. No more individually addressed messages. As in, "Tom, you said X" >> or "Melissa, you have misunderstood my point." Refer to an >> individual by quoting or citing, but speak to the list. >>> >>> Both of these may not qualify as "modest." I can defend each one, >> but will first wait for the *&^&*storm, if one is coming. >>> >>> Thanks -- >>> >>> Helena >>> :) >>> >>> Helena Worthen >>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>> >>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 11:43 AM, mike cole wrote: >>>> >>>> Dear xmca0philes >>>> My most recent note, regarding discussion of sociocritical theory via >>>> Kris's RRQ paper, ?indicates part of my effort to implement modest >> changes >>>> in the organization of xmca discourse aimed at improving its >> usefulness and >>>> attractiveness to people (the two being mixed). >>>> >>>> At the most minimum level, ?we can reduce some sources of misunderstanding >>>> and discoordination by declaring a distinct header for any topic anyone >>>> wants to discuss concerning culture and development in their broadest >>>> contexts. No guarantee ever that anyone will respond, let alone set >> off a >>>> stream of responses. But at least we can keep sequence in the threads >>>> consistent, and they will be easy to retrieve as a set from the archiving >>>> web page should one want to. >>>> >>>> There are no policepersons in this process. (But so far as I can >> tell, no >>>> harm in nagging). >>>> >>>> Other modifications in the structure of the discourse are possible. >> It >>>> would be nice to know, for example, how many people actually read >> xmca from >>>> time to time in some form, and how many of our 800+ subscribers >> have xmca >>>> in their span filters. About 200 people people have posted in the past >>>> year. Bruce and I are working on a non-obtrusive way of checking to >> see how >>>> many silent folks are lurking out of interest and how many are zombies. >>>> >>>> Early on Annalisa suggested a sort of "Beginner's Manual" which >> seemed like >>>> a good idea, but it requires some coordinated person power. A group >> to >>>> create such a facility is in the process of formation, and I figure >> there >>>> should be more about that appearing. >>>> >>>> A year or more ago Andy and Huw put together a wiki that I think of >>>> (perhaps inappropriately) as a kind of "key word wiki" for CHAT. >>>> It exists, although it is in quarantine at present to insure that >> it will >>>> never carry any viruses into the UCSD campus. This seems like >>>> a natural part of the xmca pool of resources, and may be useful to >> the >>>> newbiies' materials. >>>> >>>> We have looked into forums and other media for xmca, but so far as >> I can >>>> tell, there is no general purpose utility that would not require the >>>> involvement of significantly more coordinated person power, and probably >>>> customizing, et that LCHC can manage. Perhaps I am wrong about this >> and the >>>> new, great, effortless substitute is at your nearest supermarket. However, >>>> for the moment, we will continue working within the fungible, but perhaps >>>> not entirely elastic, structure of xmca. >>>> >>>> Now, back to the thread I want to address, >>>> Imagination >>>> mike >>>> >>>> -- >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >> an >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > From annalisa@unm.edu Fri Dec 12 22:06:48 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Sat, 13 Dec 2014 06:06:48 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Changing Practices at XMCA In-Reply-To: References: <06FAB3D3-DE6F-4D0B-96E5-84BF35335F60@gmail.com> <548B7A1A.3010207@brucerob.eu>, Message-ID: <1418450808436.66025@unm.edu> Hi Mike, et al, I believe for all these cases (of transgressing time-honored conventions), this will be taken care of by having a newcomer's page! I am sure of this! It was something I proposed upon joining. :) Might I also add that I too have a lot of sympathy for Bruce's comment: "I have myself considered leaving but stayed because I value the project and get something from xmca, though I feel that has diminished over time." Though I cannot say that I feel that it has diminished over time, because I am a newcomer! :) (Though maybe having an Old-Timer's page is also required!) I cannot really say what the list _is_ or what it _should be_, I can only offer what I'd like to see it be and hope people share my same desires. If people are against that, I'm sure I'll learn about it right quick, or maybe I'll learn from a boomerang hitting me backside the head. :) I would kindly offer that it may be difficult for people to indicate what they are willing to contribute without having an idea what kind of help is needed. With this in mind, I'd like to suggest perhaps coming up with A List of Ideals (aka Final Forms), of what we would like the list to become (since it is always going to be an unfinished project), and use Our Ideals as a constellation to guide us (Perhaps we can make a page called Our North Star where this list is maintained). >From these agreed-upon ideals, we might generate a scratchpad list of actions, written in a brainstormy way for people to offer up loose projects that might create more value and interest (based upon Our North Star). Of course this might be _the opportunity_ for dusting off old ideas for old projects people have left to collect dust in their closets. In keeping with the season, these snowflakey-projects will thus start to coalesce into balls! As these snowy balls start to snowball, it seems that these projects might generate BOF's (birds of a feather), and people will flock (and I mean flock like crows!) to where their interests reside. These BOFs can start to make their own snowstructures accordingly (igloos, snowmen, or snowball fights, take your pick), breaking down said project into tasks, and tasks into actions among each other, zoped-sledding it as they go! How's that for a strategy broken down into tactical maneuverings? Kind regards, Annalisa From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Sat Dec 13 06:16:45 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Sat, 13 Dec 2014 09:16:45 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: Watch "MINUSTAH VS LES MANIFESTANTS" on YouTube Message-ID: The third world policing the world for the world's oligarchs. ?The haitian constitution allows peaceful demonstrations. ?With the arrival of john Kerry on the island yesterday, minustah, the ?occupying force in haiti under the command of brazil, opened fire on the demonstrators. ?I know this is an academic blog, but we academics have to also standup against tryanny or else we become part of the problem! MINUSTAH VS LES MANIFESTANTS: http://youtu.be/38owUZrNHzA Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe"
Date:12/13/2014 9:15 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: pmocombe@mocombeian.com
Subject: Watch "MINUSTAH VS LES MANIFESTANTS" on YouTube
The third world policing the world for the world's oligarchs. The haitian constitution allows peaceful demonstrations. With the arrival of john Kerry on the island yesterday, minustah, the occupying force in haiti under the command of brazil, opened fire on the demonstrators. I know this is an academic blog, but we academics have to also standup against tryanny or else we become part of the problem! MINUSTAH VS LES MANIFESTANTS: http://youtu.be/38owUZrNHzA Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com www.readingroomcurriculum.com www.paulcmocombe.info Race and Class Distinctions within Black Communities www.routledge.com/9780415714372 From hshonerd@gmail.com Sat Dec 13 10:36:20 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Sat, 13 Dec 2014 11:36:20 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Changing Practices at XMCA In-Reply-To: <06FAB3D3-DE6F-4D0B-96E5-84BF35335F60@gmail.com> References: <06FAB3D3-DE6F-4D0B-96E5-84BF35335F60@gmail.com> Message-ID: <2EBAFFF6-E3AA-44B4-9427-D58DEEBD3534@gmail.com> I especially like Helena?s first suggestion on streamlining the chat: Keep it short. When someone has something longer to say, could that be an attachment? I mean something short of a full-blown, peer-juried publication, but still coherent and well thought out. Henry > On Dec 12, 2014, at 2:49 PM, Helena Worthen wrote: > > I have two suggestions for changing practices, along with subject lines that accurately track a thread. > > 1. Messages no more than two screens long. One is preferred. > > 2. No more individually addressed messages. As in, "Tom, you said X" or "Melissa, you have misunderstood my point." Refer to an individual by quoting or citing, but speak to the list. > > Both of these may not qualify as "modest." I can defend each one, but will first wait for the *&^&*storm, if one is coming. > > Thanks -- > > Helena > :) > > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > On Dec 12, 2014, at 11:43 AM, mike cole wrote: > >> Dear xmca0philes >> My most recent note, regarding discussion of sociocritical theory via >> Kris's RRQ paper, ?indicates part of my effort to implement modest changes >> in the organization of xmca discourse aimed at improving its usefulness and >> attractiveness to people (the two being mixed). >> >> At the most minimum level, ?we can reduce some sources of misunderstanding >> and discoordination by declaring a distinct header for any topic anyone >> wants to discuss concerning culture and development in their broadest >> contexts. No guarantee ever that anyone will respond, let alone set off a >> stream of responses. But at least we can keep sequence in the threads >> consistent, and they will be easy to retrieve as a set from the archiving >> web page should one want to. >> >> There are no policepersons in this process. (But so far as I can tell, no >> harm in nagging). >> >> Other modifications in the structure of the discourse are possible. It >> would be nice to know, for example, how many people actually read xmca from >> time to time in some form, and how many of our 800+ subscribers have xmca >> in their span filters. About 200 people people have posted in the past >> year. Bruce and I are working on a non-obtrusive way of checking to see how >> many silent folks are lurking out of interest and how many are zombies. >> >> Early on Annalisa suggested a sort of "Beginner's Manual" which seemed like >> a good idea, but it requires some coordinated person power. A group to >> create such a facility is in the process of formation, and I figure there >> should be more about that appearing. >> >> A year or more ago Andy and Huw put together a wiki that I think of >> (perhaps inappropriately) as a kind of "key word wiki" for CHAT. >> It exists, although it is in quarantine at present to insure that it will >> never carry any viruses into the UCSD campus. This seems like >> a natural part of the xmca pool of resources, and may be useful to the >> newbiies' materials. >> >> We have looked into forums and other media for xmca, but so far as I can >> tell, there is no general purpose utility that would not require the >> involvement of significantly more coordinated person power, and probably >> customizing, et that LCHC can manage. Perhaps I am wrong about this and the >> new, great, effortless substitute is at your nearest supermarket. However, >> for the moment, we will continue working within the fungible, but perhaps >> not entirely elastic, structure of xmca. >> >> Now, back to the thread I want to address, >> Imagination >> mike >> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Sat Dec 13 10:41:27 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sat, 13 Dec 2014 10:41:27 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: NYTimes.com: Minorities Fall Further Behind Whites in Wealth During Economic Recovery In-Reply-To: <548c8510.811de50a.69d6.1e66SMTPIN_ADDED_MISSING@mx.google.com> References: <548c8510.811de50a.69d6.1e66SMTPIN_ADDED_MISSING@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Apropos of Paul's you tube movie about Brazilian UN troops shooting Haitians and the imperative for people to be engaged as citizen-academics, here is the second of two NY times stories that take us back to his earlier post on the race/class nexus. The first, which I have been unable to retrieve, was about two teenage girls who were accused of graffiti drawing on a school wall. Friends. One Black on Anglo. The Anglo girl's parents paid a 100$ fine and the incident was forgotten. The Black girl's parents did not have the 100$ so their daughter was under court ordered restrictions for a summer (as I remember the story). Not a coincidence. The same non-coincidence is present in the story herewith forwarded. mike Minorities Fall Further Behind Whites in Wealth During Economic Recovery By TANZINA VEGA According to a report by the Pew Research Center, the median net worth of white households in 2013 was about 13 times that of black households. Or, copy and paste this URL into your browser: http://nyti.ms/1zHzQnQ To get unlimited access to all New York Times articles, subscribe today. See Subscription Options. To ensure delivery to your inbox, please add nytdirect@nytimes.com to your address book. Advertisement Copyright 2014 | The New York Times Company | NYTimes.com 620 Eighth Avenue New York, NY 10018 -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sat Dec 13 11:01:47 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Sat, 13 Dec 2014 11:01:47 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* and the analogy to *gap-filling* I am on holiday so limited access to internet. However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion of "structures of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored under the notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of modalities that hang together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing that is forming but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we think imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* Larry On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > Mike and Larry, > I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how jazzed up I am now > about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as Larry construes > it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various triads, finally > found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of the mind, as > Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa? fuera. > Fractally yours, > Henry > > > On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > > For those interested in the imagination thread, attached are two articles > > by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > > > > My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists like > Zaporozhets > > and his students who studied the development of imagination in a manner > > that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of productive > imagination. I > > am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no intention of doing so. > > But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the attached texts. > > > > Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I came upon the > > idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked at several > > levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne and I argued > in > > our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of access to the > > work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. Moreover, such > > views emphasize the future orientation of the perception/imagination > > process. I believe that these views have direct relevance to Kris's paper > > to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns about the > > role of different forms of symbolic play in development. > > > > So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps they will prove > > useful for those interested. > > mike > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > From helenaworthen@gmail.com Sat Dec 13 11:10:27 2014 From: helenaworthen@gmail.com (Helena Worthen) Date: Sat, 13 Dec 2014 11:10:27 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: NYTimes.com: Minorities Fall Further Behind Whites in Wealth During Economic Recovery In-Reply-To: References: <548c8510.811de50a.69d6.1e66SMTPIN_ADDED_MISSING@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <8A85605B-C731-4C1E-95BE-4D04777F62C0@gmail.com> The "non-coincidence" can be understood as part of the price of loss of public goods, in this case, public schools. As we have become more accustomed to creeping privatization of public goods, we allow more fee-based or privately funded tactics to preserve amenities -- art classes, sports, field trips, theater clubs, charter schools themselves -- and in this case, the amenity of a clean school wall. The practice of collecting money for the school was so habitual that a fee-based punishment raised no eyebrows, apparently. Setting both girls to scrubbing the walls would have made sense, but that was before we got used to solving public problems with private money. Does anyone else see this as an issue of how a solid floor of public goods reduces inequality and how seemingly petty ($100) cracks in that floor can send a family plunging through? Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com On Dec 13, 2014, at 10:41 AM, mike cole wrote: > Apropos of Paul's you tube movie about Brazilian UN troops shooting > Haitians and the imperative for people to be engaged as citizen-academics, > here is the second of two NY times stories that take us back to his earlier > post on the race/class nexus. > > The first, which I have been unable to retrieve, was about two teenage > girls who were accused of graffiti drawing on a school wall. Friends. One > Black on Anglo. The Anglo girl's parents paid a 100$ fine and the incident > was forgotten. The Black girl's parents did not have the 100$ so their > daughter was under court ordered restrictions for a summer (as I remember > the story). Not a coincidence. > > The same non-coincidence is present in the story herewith forwarded. > > mike > > Minorities Fall Further Behind Whites in Wealth During Economic > Recovery > > By > TANZINA VEGA > > According to a report by the Pew Research Center, the median net worth of > white households in 2013 was about 13 times that of black households. > Or, copy and paste this URL into your browser: http://nyti.ms/1zHzQnQ > > To > get unlimited access to all New York Times articles, subscribe today. See > Subscription Options. > > To > ensure delivery to your inbox, please add nytdirect@nytimes.com to your > address book. Advertisement > > > Copyright 2014 > > | The New York Times Company > > | NYTimes.com 620 Eighth Avenue New York, NY 10018 > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From helenaworthen@gmail.com Sat Dec 13 11:07:20 2014 From: helenaworthen@gmail.com (Helena Worthen) Date: Sat, 13 Dec 2014 11:07:20 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: NYTimes.com: Minorities Fall Further Behind Whites in Wealth During Economic Recovery In-Reply-To: References: <548c8510.811de50a.69d6.1e66SMTPIN_ADDED_MISSING@mx.google.com> Message-ID: The "non-coincidence" can be understood as part of the price of loss of public goods, in this case, public schools. As we have become more accustomed to creeping privatization of public goods, we allow more fee-based or privately funded tactics to preserve amenities -- art classes, sports, field trips, theater clubs, charter schools themselves -- and in this case, the amenity of a clean school wall. The practice of collecting money for the school was so habitual that a fee-based punishment raised no eyebrows, apparently. Setting both girls to scrubbing the walls would have made sense, but that was before we got used to solving public problems with private money. Does anyone else see this as an issue of how a solid floor of public goods reduces inequality and how seemingly petty ($100) cracks in that floor can send a family plunging through? Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com On Dec 13, 2014, at 10:41 AM, mike cole wrote: > Apropos of Paul's you tube movie about Brazilian UN troops shooting > Haitians and the imperative for people to be engaged as citizen-academics, > here is the second of two NY times stories that take us back to his earlier > post on the race/class nexus. > > The first, which I have been unable to retrieve, was about two teenage > girls who were accused of graffiti drawing on a school wall. Friends. One > Black on Anglo. The Anglo girl's parents paid a 100$ fine and the incident > was forgotten. The Black girl's parents did not have the 100$ so their > daughter was under court ordered restrictions for a summer (as I remember > the story). Not a coincidence. > > The same non-coincidence is present in the story herewith forwarded. > > mike > > Minorities Fall Further Behind Whites in Wealth During Economic > Recovery > > By > TANZINA VEGA > > According to a report by the Pew Research Center, the median net worth of > white households in 2013 was about 13 times that of black households. > Or, copy and paste this URL into your browser: http://nyti.ms/1zHzQnQ > > To > get unlimited access to all New York Times articles, subscribe today. See > Subscription Options. > > To > ensure delivery to your inbox, please add nytdirect@nytimes.com to your > address book. Advertisement > > > Copyright 2014 > > | The New York Times Company > > | NYTimes.com 620 Eighth Avenue New York, NY 10018 > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Sat Dec 13 11:12:38 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Sat, 13 Dec 2014 12:12:38 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] [#Listserve Issues] - Suggestions for Changing Practices at XMCA Message-ID: If I may naysay just a bit (Mike knows I can be an insufferable naysayer!), I suspect that the greatest problem with the list is how successful it has been. Over the past 20 years, the list, as well as the interest in Vygotsky, CHAT, SCT, etc, has hugely expanded. The interests of XMCA-ites include: first language learning, second language learning, language in the classroom, literacy, diversity issues, culture and education, workplace learning and activity, organizing (both community AND labor), philosophy, and that's not to mention the split between those new to Vygotsky vs. those who have been around for longer. That introduces a dizzying diversity of interests. My sense is that this great diversity, while an asset in so many ways, makes it difficult to find the common ground necessary to engage in this particular type of activity and make for the kind of shared motive that can smoothly propel us forward together (we are certainly moving forward, but in fits and starts and in a manner that seems alienating to the many while barely sustaining for the few). This lack of common ground means that posts often have to be very long in order to establish the necessary common ground. And I agree with Helena that this is a big problem. But I think the problem stems from a lack of common ground and the constant need to establish one's bases for even asking a question in the first place. WHAT IS TO BE DONE? In light of this concern, I wonder if there might be some way to divide up the list into subgroups so that people with already established common ground can work together without having to explain the basic assumptions of their area of interest. Some options come to mind; 1. Break the listserve up into multiple listserves. This would streamline things but it would also mean that there wouldn't be as much cross-talk between people working in different areas. 2. Alternatively, we could say that at the beginning of the subject line the poster should indicate the subset of concerns that are addressed in the post as I have done in this email, using the sub-topic "Listserve Issues". Two ways to do this: 2a. Provide a list of possible topics to always indicate first in the subject line. We could collectively "police" this by asking/reminding posters to indicate the sub-topic in their heading (as I have done here, with the subtopic marked with a hashtag since it seems like those are cool these days - and no, I'm not a tweeter). 2b. Let the categories emerge organically as people make them up as they go along. (this can get messy quickly). I'm partial to 2a, but can see the sense in 2b. (and I'm not much of a fan of option 1). 2a or 2b would allow the group to continue with its large size and provide individuals with the choice to focus on certain topics while ignoring others (and more groups would also provide more people with the opportunity to participate). The hope would be that small communities within communities would form that would be more focused and directed while at the same time maintaining the community as a whole as a kind of meta-community. My two cents. greg On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 11:06 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hi Mike, et al, > > I believe for all these cases (of transgressing time-honored conventions), > this will be taken care of by having a newcomer's page! I am sure of this! > It was something I proposed upon joining. :) > > Might I also add that I too have a lot of sympathy for Bruce's comment: > > "I have myself considered leaving but stayed because I value the project > and get something from xmca, though I feel that has diminished over time." > > Though I cannot say that I feel that it has diminished over time, because > I am a newcomer! :) (Though maybe having an Old-Timer's page is also > required!) I cannot really say what the list _is_ or what it _should be_, I > can only offer what I'd like to see it be and hope people share my same > desires. If people are against that, I'm sure I'll learn about it right > quick, or maybe I'll learn from a boomerang hitting me backside the head. :) > > I would kindly offer that it may be difficult for people to indicate what > they are willing to contribute without having an idea what kind of help is > needed. With this in mind, I'd like to suggest perhaps coming up with A > List of Ideals (aka Final Forms), of what we would like the list to become > (since it is always going to be an unfinished project), and use Our Ideals > as a constellation to guide us (Perhaps we can make a page called Our North > Star where this list is maintained). > > >From these agreed-upon ideals, we might generate a scratchpad list of > actions, written in a brainstormy way for people to offer up loose projects > that might create more value and interest (based upon Our North Star). Of > course this might be _the opportunity_ for dusting off old ideas for old > projects people have left to collect dust in their closets. > > In keeping with the season, these snowflakey-projects will thus start to > coalesce into balls! > > As these snowy balls start to snowball, it seems that these projects might > generate BOF's (birds of a feather), and people will flock (and I mean > flock like crows!) to where their interests reside. These BOFs can start to > make their own snowstructures accordingly (igloos, snowmen, or snowball > fights, take your pick), breaking down said project into tasks, and tasks > into actions among each other, zoped-sledding it as they go! > > How's that for a strategy broken down into tactical maneuverings? > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From blantonwe@gmail.com Sat Dec 13 11:48:17 2014 From: blantonwe@gmail.com (William Blanton) Date: Sat, 13 Dec 2014 11:48:17 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [#Listserve Issues] - Suggestions for Changing Practices at XMCA In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Mike, send out the lists that were used by in 1980. We can see how many might work for current topics and add new ones if needed. BB On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 11:12 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > If I may naysay just a bit (Mike knows I can be an insufferable naysayer!), > I suspect that the greatest problem with the list is how successful it has > been. Over the past 20 years, the list, as well as the interest in > Vygotsky, CHAT, SCT, etc, has hugely expanded. The interests of XMCA-ites > include: first language learning, second language learning, language in the > classroom, literacy, diversity issues, culture and education, workplace > learning and activity, organizing (both community AND labor), philosophy, > and that's not to mention the split between those new to Vygotsky vs. those > who have been around for longer. That introduces a dizzying diversity of > interests. > > My sense is that this great diversity, while an asset in so many ways, > makes it difficult to find the common ground necessary to engage in this > particular type of activity and make for the kind of shared motive that can > smoothly propel us forward together (we are certainly moving forward, but > in fits and starts and in a manner that seems alienating to the many while > barely sustaining for the few). This lack of common ground means that posts > often have to be very long in order to establish the necessary common > ground. And I agree with Helena that this is a big problem. But I think the > problem stems from a lack of common ground and the constant need to > establish one's bases for even asking a question in the first place. > > WHAT IS TO BE DONE? > In light of this concern, I wonder if there might be some way to divide up > the list into subgroups so that people with already established common > ground can work together without having to explain the basic assumptions of > their area of interest. Some options come to mind; > > 1. Break the listserve up into multiple listserves. This would > streamline things but it would also mean that there wouldn't be as much > cross-talk between people working in different areas. > > 2. Alternatively, we could say that at the beginning of the subject line > the poster should indicate the subset of concerns that are addressed in the > post as I have done in this email, using the sub-topic "Listserve Issues". > Two ways to do this: > > 2a. Provide a list of possible topics to always indicate first in the > subject line. We could collectively "police" this by asking/reminding > posters to indicate the sub-topic in their heading (as I have done here, > with the subtopic marked with a hashtag since it seems like those are cool > these days - and no, I'm not a tweeter). > > 2b. Let the categories emerge organically as people make them up as they go > along. (this can get messy quickly). > > I'm partial to 2a, but can see the sense in 2b. (and I'm not much of a fan > of option 1). > > 2a or 2b would allow the group to continue with its large size and provide > individuals with the choice to focus on certain topics while ignoring > others (and more groups would also provide more people with the opportunity > to participate). The hope would be that small communities within > communities would form that would be more focused and directed while at the > same time maintaining the community as a whole as a kind of meta-community. > > My two cents. > greg > > > > On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 11:06 PM, Annalisa Aguilar > wrote: > > > Hi Mike, et al, > > > > I believe for all these cases (of transgressing time-honored > conventions), > > this will be taken care of by having a newcomer's page! I am sure of > this! > > It was something I proposed upon joining. :) > > > > Might I also add that I too have a lot of sympathy for Bruce's comment: > > > > "I have myself considered leaving but stayed because I value the project > > and get something from xmca, though I feel that has diminished over > time." > > > > Though I cannot say that I feel that it has diminished over time, because > > I am a newcomer! :) (Though maybe having an Old-Timer's page is also > > required!) I cannot really say what the list _is_ or what it _should > be_, I > > can only offer what I'd like to see it be and hope people share my same > > desires. If people are against that, I'm sure I'll learn about it right > > quick, or maybe I'll learn from a boomerang hitting me backside the > head. :) > > > > I would kindly offer that it may be difficult for people to indicate what > > they are willing to contribute without having an idea what kind of help > is > > needed. With this in mind, I'd like to suggest perhaps coming up with A > > List of Ideals (aka Final Forms), of what we would like the list to > become > > (since it is always going to be an unfinished project), and use Our > Ideals > > as a constellation to guide us (Perhaps we can make a page called Our > North > > Star where this list is maintained). > > > > >From these agreed-upon ideals, we might generate a scratchpad list of > > actions, written in a brainstormy way for people to offer up loose > projects > > that might create more value and interest (based upon Our North Star). Of > > course this might be _the opportunity_ for dusting off old ideas for old > > projects people have left to collect dust in their closets. > > > > In keeping with the season, these snowflakey-projects will thus start to > > coalesce into balls! > > > > As these snowy balls start to snowball, it seems that these projects > might > > generate BOF's (birds of a feather), and people will flock (and I mean > > flock like crows!) to where their interests reside. These BOFs can start > to > > make their own snowstructures accordingly (igloos, snowmen, or snowball > > fights, take your pick), breaking down said project into tasks, and tasks > > into actions among each other, zoped-sledding it as they go! > > > > How's that for a strategy broken down into tactical maneuverings? > > > > Kind regards, > > > > Annalisa > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > From hshonerd@gmail.com Sat Dec 13 12:16:29 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Sat, 13 Dec 2014 13:16:29 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination (starting with Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and provides a space for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. This, coupled with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground to take part in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with preconceptions: Vera on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian Langacker on symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, particularly the temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of imagination and creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of temporality: sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure), which I think must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both individual and distributed construals of cognition and feeling. Henry > On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > > Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > > I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* and the analogy > to *gap-filling* > I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion of "structures > of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored under the > notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of modalities that hang > together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing that is forming > but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we think > imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* > Larry > On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >> >> Mike and Larry, >> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how jazzed up I am now >> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as Larry construes >> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various triads, finally >> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of the mind, as >> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa? fuera. >> Fractally yours, >> Henry >> >>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole wrote: >>> >>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached are two articles >>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. >>> >>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists like >> Zaporozhets >>> and his students who studied the development of imagination in a manner >>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of productive >> imagination. I >>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no intention of doing so. >>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the attached texts. >>> >>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I came upon the >>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked at several >>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne and I argued >> in >>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of access to the >>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. Moreover, such >>> views emphasize the future orientation of the perception/imagination >>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance to Kris's paper >>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns about the >>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. >>> >>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps they will prove >>> useful for those interested. >>> mike >>> >>> -- >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>> >> >> >> From tom.richardson3@googlemail.com Sat Dec 13 12:53:26 2014 From: tom.richardson3@googlemail.com (Tom Richardson) Date: Sat, 13 Dec 2014 20:53:26 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Watch "MINUSTAH VS LES MANIFESTANTS" on YouTube In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Thank you Paul - Struggle is the most essential part of the Academy IMO Solidarity Tom On 13 December 2014 at 14:16, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > > The third world policing the world for the world's oligarchs. The haitian > constitution allows peaceful demonstrations. With the arrival of john > Kerry on the island yesterday, minustah, the occupying force in haiti > under the command of brazil, opened fire on the demonstrators. I know this > is an academic blog, but we academics have to also standup against tryanny > or else we become part of the problem! > > MINUSTAH VS LES MANIFESTANTS: http://youtu.be/38owUZrNHzA > > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > >
-------- Original message --------
From: "Dr. Paul C. > Mocombe"
Date:12/13/2014 9:15 AM > (GMT-05:00)
To: pmocombe@mocombeian.com
Subject: > Watch "MINUSTAH VS LES MANIFESTANTS" on YouTube
>
The third world policing the world for the world's oligarchs. The > haitian constitution allows peaceful demonstrations. With the arrival of > john Kerry on the island yesterday, minustah, the occupying force in haiti > under the command of brazil, opened fire on the demonstrators. I know this > is an academic blog, but we academics have to also standup against tryanny > or else we become part of the problem! > > MINUSTAH VS LES MANIFESTANTS: http://youtu.be/38owUZrNHzA > > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > > Race and Class Distinctions within Black Communities > www.routledge.com/9780415714372 > From mcole@ucsd.edu Sat Dec 13 13:02:50 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sat, 13 Dec 2014 13:02:50 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and Williams. Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am trying to mine for empirical strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination develops. At first I thought that the use of productive implies that there must be a kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I learned that instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is linked to memory. So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of anticipation and memory. Imagine that! mike On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination (starting with > Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and provides a space > for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. This, coupled > with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground to take part > in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with preconceptions: Vera > on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian Langacker on > symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, particularly the > temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of imagination and > creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of temporality: > sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure), which I think > must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both individual and > distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > Henry > > > On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > > Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > > > > I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* and the > analogy > > to *gap-filling* > > I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > > However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion of > "structures > > of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored under the > > notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of modalities that > hang > > together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing that is > forming > > but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we think > > imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* > > Larry > > On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD > wrote: > >> > >> Mike and Larry, > >> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how jazzed up I am > now > >> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as Larry > construes > >> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various triads, finally > >> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of the mind, as > >> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa? fuera. > >> Fractally yours, > >> Henry > >> > >>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole wrote: > >>> > >>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached are two > articles > >>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > >>> > >>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists like > >> Zaporozhets > >>> and his students who studied the development of imagination in a manner > >>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of productive > >> imagination. I > >>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no intention of doing > so. > >>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the attached > texts. > >>> > >>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I came upon > the > >>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked at several > >>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne and I argued > >> in > >>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of access to > the > >>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. Moreover, such > >>> views emphasize the future orientation of the perception/imagination > >>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance to Kris's > paper > >>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns about the > >>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. > >>> > >>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps they will > prove > >>> useful for those interested. > >>> mike > >>> > >>> -- > >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>> > >> > >> > >> > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From annalisa@unm.edu Sat Dec 13 13:12:33 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Sat, 13 Dec 2014 21:12:33 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fwd: Watch "MINUSTAH VS LES MANIFESTANTS" on YouTube In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: <1418505155384.20856@unm.edu> It is clear from the video that these UN Peacekeepers are not well-trained. From annalisa@unm.edu Sat Dec 13 13:54:46 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Sat, 13 Dec 2014 21:54:46 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: <1418507688834.18546@unm.edu> >So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of anticipation and memory. "The mind looks further than what immediately appears to it." Juxtaposing the Hume quote (and Mike's above that), I have always found it poignant how we can never dream of anything unless we know of it, even if an dream-object is imagined, these imagined objects are constructed from that which we know in the waking world. We cannot dream about what we do not already know. Kind regards, Annalisa From ablunden@mira.net Sat Dec 13 16:39:25 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sun, 14 Dec 2014 11:39:25 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it may be worth noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to Imagination in the section on Representation, mediating between Recollection and Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive Imagination, (2) Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he says leads to the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other words, the transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is accomplished through these three grades of Imagination. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ mike cole wrote: > Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and Williams. > > Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am trying to > mine for empirical > strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive > imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination develops. > > At first I thought that the use of productive implies that there must be a > kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I learned that > instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is linked to > memory. > > So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of anticipation and > memory. > Imagine that! > mike > > On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination (starting with >> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and provides a space >> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. This, coupled >> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground to take part >> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with preconceptions: Vera >> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian Langacker on >> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, particularly the >> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of imagination and >> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of temporality: >> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure), which I think >> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both individual and >> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. >> Henry >> >> >>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss wrote: >>> >>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. >>> >>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* and the >>> >> analogy >> >>> to *gap-filling* >>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. >>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion of >>> >> "structures >> >>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored under the >>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of modalities that >>> >> hang >> >>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing that is >>> >> forming >> >>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we think >>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* >>> Larry >>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD >>> >> wrote: >> >>>> Mike and Larry, >>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how jazzed up I am >>>> >> now >> >>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as Larry >>>> >> construes >> >>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various triads, finally >>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of the mind, as >>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa? fuera. >>>> Fractally yours, >>>> Henry >>>> >>>> >>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>> >>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached are two >>>>> >> articles >> >>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. >>>>> >>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists like >>>>> >>>> Zaporozhets >>>> >>>>> and his students who studied the development of imagination in a manner >>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of productive >>>>> >>>> imagination. I >>>> >>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no intention of doing >>>>> >> so. >> >>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the attached >>>>> >> texts. >> >>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I came upon >>>>> >> the >> >>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked at several >>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne and I argued >>>>> >>>> in >>>> >>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of access to >>>>> >> the >> >>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. Moreover, such >>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the perception/imagination >>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance to Kris's >>>>> >> paper >> >>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns about the >>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. >>>>> >>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps they will >>>>> >> prove >> >>>>> useful for those interested. >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> > > From annalisa@unm.edu Sat Dec 13 16:54:01 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Sun, 14 Dec 2014 00:54:01 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: <1418518440890.80489@unm.edu> Esteemed discussants, Having finished the paper, and considering Mike's comments, I might suggest that metaphorical reasoning is an essential engine to imagination, and I wonder if I say that because impressions taken of the perceived object as it presents itself to me (the Big Dipper) is the identical to taking the object as a product of seeing-as (a star constellation as a Big Dipper), is the identical to taking the object to represent something else entirely (such as Wittgenstein's triangle as a mountain, as an arrow, etc., or a flag to represent a nation). In other words, that imagination begins as a perceptual process which then develops into metaphorical reasoning and perhaps continues on to more complex forms of imagining and conceptual renderings. There is definitely a dynamic relationship to perception and imagination. If metaphor isn't THE essential engine, it must serve as a priming process (arising from embodied experience in the world), possibly in the same way the gesture manifests into the word and its meaning. At least that's how I see it at the moment...even though I'm only looking at pixels on my screen as I write this... (Thinking out loud, but I hope not too loud). Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of mike cole Sent: Saturday, December 13, 2014 2:02 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and Williams. Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am trying to mine for empirical strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination develops. At first I thought that the use of productive implies that there must be a kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I learned that instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is linked to memory. So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of anticipation and memory. Imagine that! mike On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination (starting with > Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and provides a space > for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. This, coupled > with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground to take part > in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with preconceptions: Vera > on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian Langacker on > symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, particularly the > temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of imagination and > creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of temporality: > sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure), which I think > must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both individual and > distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > Henry > > > On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > > Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > > > > I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* and the > analogy > > to *gap-filling* > > I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > > However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion of > "structures > > of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored under the > > notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of modalities that > hang > > together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing that is > forming > > but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we think > > imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* > > Larry > > On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD > wrote: > >> > >> Mike and Larry, > >> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how jazzed up I am > now > >> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as Larry > construes > >> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various triads, finally > >> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of the mind, as > >> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa? fuera. > >> Fractally yours, > >> Henry > >> > >>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole wrote: > >>> > >>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached are two > articles > >>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > >>> > >>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists like > >> Zaporozhets > >>> and his students who studied the development of imagination in a manner > >>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of productive > >> imagination. I > >>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no intention of doing > so. > >>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the attached > texts. > >>> > >>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I came upon > the > >>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked at several > >>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne and I argued > >> in > >>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of access to > the > >>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. Moreover, such > >>> views emphasize the future orientation of the perception/imagination > >>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance to Kris's > paper > >>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns about the > >>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. > >>> > >>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps they will > prove > >>> useful for those interested. > >>> mike > >>> > >>> -- > >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>> > >> > >> > >> > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From hshonerd@gmail.com Sun Dec 14 04:02:38 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Sun, 14 Dec 2014 05:02:38 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: <1418507688834.18546@unm.edu> References: <, > <1418507688834.18546@unm.edu> Message-ID: In response to Annalisa on we dream only about what we know, can we imagine anything that is not embodied? As in embodied cognition. This touches, undoubtedly, on subject and object, terminology that I have not used until this chat. Henry > On Dec 13, 2014, at 2:54 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of anticipation and memory. > > "The mind looks further than what immediately appears to it." > > Juxtaposing the Hume quote (and Mike's above that), I have always found it poignant how we can never dream of anything unless we know of it, even if an dream-object is imagined, these imagined objects are constructed from that which we know in the waking world. > > We cannot dream about what we do not already know. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > From R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk Sun Dec 14 04:09:10 2014 From: R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk (Rod Parker-Rees) Date: Sun, 14 Dec 2014 12:09:10 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: <1418518440890.80489@unm.edu> References: , <1418518440890.80489@unm.edu> Message-ID: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC311022631C3@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Apologies, as ever, for tiptoeing into a river already in spate - I recently ruptured an Achilles tendon and am having to get used to life on crutches but this means I have not been able to keep up with the flow on imagination as much as I would have liked. I have read the Strawson chapter, though and found in this echoes of studies I dimly recall (reproductive imagination) which suggested that only about 10% of what we 'see' comes from optical information - sensation from our retinae with the rest coming from our active, situated and embodied interpretation of this information. Strawson's account of Wittgenstein's section on ambiguous images (the duck-rabbit) reminded me of the important difference between seeing THINGS and seeing PICTURES of things. A difference which resembles, in some ways, that between hearing oral stories and reading written ones. In all of these cases an experience which was once intensely relational is 'reduced' to some degree in ways which significantly alter the nature of the relations. The 'duck-rabbit' picture is not resolved by turning one's head, looking at it from another angle or waiting for it to move so one's visual relationship with it is very different. A written story is not affected by one's response to it in the way a spoken story might be so again the relationship is altered. Third shift seems particularly relevant in discussions about thinking and imagining because it reminds us that these are ACTIONS - we DO thinking and we DO perceiving and because we DO them we have embodied memory traces of what it felt like to be doing them. If we shift our thinking onto a more categorical level, to think in terms of 'thoughts', 'images' and 'memories' rather than 'thinkings', 'imaginings' and 'rememberings' we move from thinking about experiences to thinking about 'pictures' of experiences and our relationships with the activities is shifted. An earlier post (sorry, I can't remember whose) looked at the important distinction between the 'structure' of visual (or other sensory) information and the structure of the world perception we are able to construct or imagine. I read many years ago about studies which sought to restore 'sight' to blind people, one by placing an array of electrical contacts on the tongue another by placing an array of micro vibrators (tactons) on the back. In both cases these arrays were connected to a computer which received input from a video camera, converting it into a pattern of 'ons' and 'offs' which could be felt by the blind person using the equipment. What really interested me, however, was the observation that it was ONLY when the camera was mounted to the operator's head, so that it could be turned and 'aimed' at will that, in a remarkably short space of time, operators were able to 'sense' objects in their environment. Merely feeding a signal to the tongue or back was not enough to allow someone to 'see' - what was needed was the relationship between MOVING the camera and FEELING the associated changes in sensation. And of course when the operator 'clicked' with the system any awareness of tingling on the tongue or vibrations on the back were replaced by an awareness of things 'out there' in the environment. Just as we routinely 'project' our re-membered re-assembly of visual information out into our perception of the world around us (with no awareness of what is going on in our eyes and brains) so these blind people were able to project an imagined external world which allowed them to move around, avoiding obstacles and finding objects. Which is a long-winded way of saying that it is, surely, all in the felt experience of relationships with acts of seeing/thinking/imagining. Exploring the ways in which babies 'learn to see' is one fascinating way into the quintessentially human journey from unmediated, immediate sensory experience (seeing it like it is but without any ideas about what it is like or what might be interesting about it) to a socially constructed, culturally filtered way of relating with the world, not just through our own senses but also through (accounts of) the sensory experiences of others as well. While this is often felt as a loss (the gates of perception have been corrupted) it is also recognised as a unique feature of what it means to be human - that we are not left to think and imagine on our own. Not only are we able to share our experience but also we are able to experience sharing. Imagine! All the best, Rod -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Annalisa Aguilar Sent: 14 December 2014 00:54 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination Esteemed discussants, Having finished the paper, and considering Mike's comments, I might suggest that metaphorical reasoning is an essential engine to imagination, and I wonder if I say that because impressions taken of the perceived object as it presents itself to me (the Big Dipper) is the identical to taking the object as a product of seeing-as (a star constellation as a Big Dipper), is the identical to taking the object to represent something else entirely (such as Wittgenstein's triangle as a mountain, as an arrow, etc., or a flag to represent a nation). In other words, that imagination begins as a perceptual process which then develops into metaphorical reasoning and perhaps continues on to more complex forms of imagining and conceptual renderings. There is definitely a dynamic relationship to perception and imagination. If metaphor isn't THE essential engine, it must serve as a priming process (arising from embodied experience in the world), possibly in the same way the gesture manifests into the word and its meaning. At least that's how I see it at the moment...even though I'm only looking at pixels on my screen as I write this... (Thinking out loud, but I hope not too loud). Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of mike cole Sent: Saturday, December 13, 2014 2:02 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and Williams. Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am trying to mine for empirical strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination develops. At first I thought that the use of productive implies that there must be a kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I learned that instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is linked to memory. So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of anticipation and memory. Imagine that! mike On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination (starting with > Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and provides a space > for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. This, coupled > with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground to take part > in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with preconceptions: Vera > on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian Langacker on > symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, particularly the > temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of imagination and > creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of temporality: > sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure), which I think > must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both individual and > distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > Henry > > > On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > > Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > > > > I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* and the > analogy > > to *gap-filling* > > I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > > However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion of > "structures > > of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored under the > > notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of modalities that > hang > > together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing that is > forming > > but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we think > > imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* > > Larry > > On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD > wrote: > >> > >> Mike and Larry, > >> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how jazzed up I am > now > >> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as Larry > construes > >> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various triads, finally > >> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of the mind, as > >> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa? fuera. > >> Fractally yours, > >> Henry > >> > >>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole wrote: > >>> > >>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached are two > articles > >>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > >>> > >>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists like > >> Zaporozhets > >>> and his students who studied the development of imagination in a manner > >>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of productive > >> imagination. I > >>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no intention of doing > so. > >>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the attached > texts. > >>> > >>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I came upon > the > >>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked at several > >>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne and I argued > >> in > >>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of access to > the > >>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. Moreover, such > >>> views emphasize the future orientation of the perception/imagination > >>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance to Kris's > paper > >>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns about the > >>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. > >>> > >>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps they will > prove > >>> useful for those interested. > >>> mike > >>> > >>> -- > >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>> > >> > >> > >> > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From hshonerd@gmail.com Sun Dec 14 04:47:50 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Sun, 14 Dec 2014 05:47:50 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> Message-ID: <6E5116A0-DC34-415F-B7F4-4F37FC02C540@gmail.com> It is helpful to me to know that Hegel said this, brings out for me the temporal/distributive extension of imagination. It ?reinforces? the idea of the embodied source of imagination, but the need to work it to make it coherent to myself and to others. This tempo of the thread has picked up, both in my mind and on the web. I woke up a little while ago, too early, I thought to get up, but my mind raced, so I thought: get productive with my imagination. In my mind, this thread on imagination has become creative. Shared. Complementary across time and space. A project whose time has come. IMHO. The insufferable excitable boy here. :) Henry > On Dec 13, 2014, at 5:39 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it may be worth noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to Imagination in the section on Representation, mediating between Recollection and Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive Imagination, (2) Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he says leads to the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other words, the transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is accomplished through these three grades of Imagination. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > mike cole wrote: >> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and Williams. >> >> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am trying to >> mine for empirical >> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive >> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination develops. >> >> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that there must be a >> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I learned that >> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is linked to >> memory. >> >> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of anticipation and >> memory. >> Imagine that! >> mike >> >> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >> >>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination (starting with >>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and provides a space >>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. This, coupled >>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground to take part >>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with preconceptions: Vera >>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian Langacker on >>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, particularly the >>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of imagination and >>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of temporality: >>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure), which I think >>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both individual and >>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. >>> Henry >>> >>> >>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss wrote: >>>> >>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. >>>> >>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* and the >>>> >>> analogy >>> >>>> to *gap-filling* >>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. >>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion of >>>> >>> "structures >>> >>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored under the >>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of modalities that >>>> >>> hang >>> >>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing that is >>>> >>> forming >>> >>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we think >>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* >>>> Larry >>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD >>>> >>> wrote: >>> >>>>> Mike and Larry, >>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how jazzed up I am >>>>> >>> now >>> >>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as Larry >>>>> >>> construes >>> >>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various triads, finally >>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of the mind, as >>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa? fuera. >>>>> Fractally yours, >>>>> Henry >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached are two >>>>>> >>> articles >>> >>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. >>>>>> >>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists like >>>>>> >>>>> Zaporozhets >>>>> >>>>>> and his students who studied the development of imagination in a manner >>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of productive >>>>>> >>>>> imagination. I >>>>> >>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no intention of doing >>>>>> >>> so. >>> >>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the attached >>>>>> >>> texts. >>> >>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I came upon >>>>>> >>> the >>> >>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked at several >>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne and I argued >>>>>> >>>>> in >>>>> >>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of access to >>>>>> >>> the >>> >>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. Moreover, such >>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the perception/imagination >>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance to Kris's >>>>>> >>> paper >>> >>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns about the >>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. >>>>>> >>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps they will >>>>>> >>> prove >>> >>>>>> useful for those interested. >>>>>> mike >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>> >>> >> >> > From hshonerd@gmail.com Sun Dec 14 05:24:36 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Sun, 14 Dec 2014 06:24:36 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: <1418518440890.80489@unm.edu> References: <, > <1418518440890.80489@unm.edu> Message-ID: <43F376E8-644F-4774-A920-AB96049C9059@gmail.com> I am totally with Annalisa on the generatively of metaphor. Metaphor as an essential engine of imagination is itself a metaphor, right? One might argue that all scientific models are themselves metaphors, rooted in sensation, embodied. I was struck not long ago by Vygotsky?s use of the stage metaphor (as in being on stage) in explicating dialog. I can?t remember the publication, but I am sure it is there. Langacker uses the same" on stage" metaphor in his efforts to use Cognitive Grammar in analyzing discourse. Henry > On Dec 13, 2014, at 5:54 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > Esteemed discussants, > > Having finished the paper, and considering Mike's comments, I might suggest that metaphorical reasoning is an essential engine to imagination, and I wonder if I say that because impressions taken of the perceived object as it presents itself to me (the Big Dipper) is the identical to taking the object as a product of seeing-as (a star constellation as a Big Dipper), is the identical to taking the object to represent something else entirely (such as Wittgenstein's triangle as a mountain, as an arrow, etc., or a flag to represent a nation). > > In other words, that imagination begins as a perceptual process which then develops into metaphorical reasoning and perhaps continues on to more complex forms of imagining and conceptual renderings. There is definitely a dynamic relationship to perception and imagination. > > If metaphor isn't THE essential engine, it must serve as a priming process (arising from embodied experience in the world), possibly in the same way the gesture manifests into the word and its meaning. At least that's how I see it at the moment...even though I'm only looking at pixels on my screen as I write this... > > (Thinking out loud, but I hope not too loud). > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of mike cole > Sent: Saturday, December 13, 2014 2:02 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and Williams. > > Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am trying to > mine for empirical > strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive > imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination develops. > > At first I thought that the use of productive implies that there must be a > kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I learned that > instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is linked to > memory. > > So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of anticipation and > memory. > Imagine that! > mike > > On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >> >> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination (starting with >> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and provides a space >> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. This, coupled >> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground to take part >> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with preconceptions: Vera >> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian Langacker on >> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, particularly the >> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of imagination and >> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of temporality: >> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure), which I think >> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both individual and >> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. >> Henry >> >>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss wrote: >>> >>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. >>> >>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* and the >> analogy >>> to *gap-filling* >>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. >>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion of >> "structures >>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored under the >>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of modalities that >> hang >>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing that is >> forming >>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we think >>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* >>> Larry >>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD >> wrote: >>>> >>>> Mike and Larry, >>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how jazzed up I am >> now >>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as Larry >> construes >>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various triads, finally >>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of the mind, as >>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa? fuera. >>>> Fractally yours, >>>> Henry >>>> >>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>> >>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached are two >> articles >>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. >>>>> >>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists like >>>> Zaporozhets >>>>> and his students who studied the development of imagination in a manner >>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of productive >>>> imagination. I >>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no intention of doing >> so. >>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the attached >> texts. >>>>> >>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I came upon >> the >>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked at several >>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne and I argued >>>> in >>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of access to >> the >>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. Moreover, such >>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the perception/imagination >>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance to Kris's >> paper >>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns about the >>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. >>>>> >>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps they will >> prove >>>>> useful for those interested. >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> >> > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun Dec 14 09:57:18 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 14 Dec 2014 09:57:18 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they are doing contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his followers as an inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so its of course interesting to see those additional categories emerge. 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in translation, seems awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in this passage, for example, is not a currently used term in counter distinction to "memory." Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary discourse across languages as our explorations with out Russian colleagues have illustrated. That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists who clearly influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still possible to include culture in it. Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, interestingly links imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" act. Parts of it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that was also "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of creativity and imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see that the two concepts are linked. Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself writing. mike Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old approaches to a pesum On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it may be worth > noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to Imagination > in the section on Representation, mediating between Recollection and > Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive Imagination, (2) > Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he says leads to > the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other words, the > transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is accomplished through > these three grades of Imagination. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > mike cole wrote: > >> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and Williams. >> >> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am trying to >> mine for empirical >> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive >> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination develops. >> >> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that there must be a >> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I learned that >> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is linked to >> memory. >> >> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of anticipation and >> memory. >> Imagine that! >> mike >> >> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD >> wrote: >> >> >>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination (starting with >>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and provides a >>> space >>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. This, >>> coupled >>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground to take part >>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with preconceptions: >>> Vera >>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian Langacker on >>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, particularly the >>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of imagination and >>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of temporality: >>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure), which I >>> think >>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both individual and >>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. >>> Henry >>> >>> >>> >>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss wrote: >>>> >>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. >>>> >>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* and the >>>> >>>> >>> analogy >>> >>> >>>> to *gap-filling* >>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. >>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion of >>>> >>>> >>> "structures >>> >>> >>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored under the >>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of modalities that >>>> >>>> >>> hang >>> >>> >>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing that is >>>> >>>> >>> forming >>> >>> >>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we think >>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* >>>> Larry >>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD >>>> >>>> >>> wrote: >>> >>> >>>> Mike and Larry, >>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how jazzed up I am >>>>> >>>>> >>>> now >>> >>> >>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as Larry >>>>> >>>>> >>>> construes >>> >>> >>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various triads, finally >>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of the mind, as >>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa? fuera. >>>>> Fractally yours, >>>>> Henry >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached are two >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> articles >>> >>> >>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. >>>>>> >>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists like >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> Zaporozhets >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> and his students who studied the development of imagination in a >>>>>> manner >>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of productive >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> imagination. I >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no intention of doing >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> so. >>> >>> >>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the attached >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> texts. >>> >>> >>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I came upon >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> the >>> >>> >>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked at several >>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne and I >>>>>> argued >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> in >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of access to >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> the >>> >>> >>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. Moreover, such >>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the perception/imagination >>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance to Kris's >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> paper >>> >>> >>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns about the >>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. >>>>>> >>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps they will >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> prove >>> >>> >>>> useful for those interested. >>>>>> mike >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> >> >> > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From annalisa@unm.edu Sun Dec 14 12:37:49 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Sun, 14 Dec 2014 20:37:49 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC311022631C3@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> References: , <1418518440890.80489@unm.edu>, <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC311022631C3@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Message-ID: <1418589470595.5298@unm.edu> Hi Rod! You are absolutely right that there is a difference between seeing things and seeing pictures of things. Just consider seeing a tree and seeing a photo of a tree. The difference is that there is a world on one hand and a frame on the other. Situating the object in the world is a part of seeing it, yes, yes, yes! But then... we are seeing the framed tree in the world, too. Perhaps this offers a clue on "cultural seeing" as well, since framing is socioculturally manifested. What I had hoped to capture in what I'd said about metaphor arising from perception, and subsequently metaphor leading to imagination is that the _impressions_ are the same, but the processes of seeing are a little different. Still, the acts of seeing as we described are not completely separate processes. In other words: that I have a "seeing engine" for looking at pictures and that I have a different seeing engine for looking at the world, and still a different seeing engine for looking at duck-rabbits! Perhaps the difference has more to do with a kind of resolution, that there are deeper impressions made from embodied seeing than seeing duck-rabbits. The story of helping the blind to see with the device you described was a short feature at Radiolab last month, a link Mike had posted. The title if the entire was "Translation," which is likely one of the BEST shows I've heard, by they way, as ears go to hear. But yes, perception requires bodies. What I liked about what you posted is that it wasn't until the camera was about where the eyes were that the virtual seeing manifested for the subject. I wonder if that is an important feature for the brain's ability to field the act of seeing, that it is expecting the eyes to be where eyes typically go in a human, where eyes evolved to be. I also did not intend to exclude the feeling or affective aspects of imagining either. The emotional content of imagination is one aspect in the Strawson paper that was absent. Poignancy is integral, though perhaps to differing volumes. I don't know how much we imagine things that we don't care about. Moreover, I do not know whether Kant explored affect, but it wouldn't surprise me if Hume didn't. Gee whiz, what would a book on affect be like written by Hume, anyway? Imagine that. Actually, in a Humian (?) act, I just walked over to my philosophy encyclopedia to see if he had written anything on affect. Ends up he wrote a treatise on his theory on the passions, which in the end he grew to doubt. So no surprises there! Ha! Wittgenstein having been on the battlefield and having taught children didn't neglect to address affect in his work: When I read him, I see that it is there; it is embedded in meaning. I recognize it also in his puzzled writer's voice, as a subject investigating the world. He doesn't leave himself out. It's my act of enjoyment to share these different philosopher's points of view, imagining readers of this thread also enjoying, as I am now. Kind regards, Annalisa From vygotsky@unm.edu Sun Dec 14 12:45:34 2014 From: vygotsky@unm.edu (Vera John-Steiner) Date: Sun, 14 Dec 2014 13:45:34 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: <43F376E8-644F-4774-A920-AB96049C9059@gmail.com> References: <, > <1418518440890.80489@unm.edu> <43F376E8-644F-4774-A920-AB96049C9059@gmail.com> Message-ID: <000c01d017de$eb81b830$c2852890$@edu> What I find particularly interesting about metaphor is that it combines a source and a target domain. While perception is rooted in one domain, metaphor, as so many aspects of imagination, is a synthesis. Vygotsky reminds us that creative imagination is a synthesis of emotion and thinking. It is this feature of imagination that helps to lead us to something new. Children often make up a story relying on past experiences, current wishes, unexpected combinations of the known, metaphors, analogies and fantasy. I see imagination as a complex process,although we all have flashes of imagination at times. My main point is the emphasis on synthesis embedded in social and cultural domains with all the resources they have to offer to the individual. Vera -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of HENRY SHONERD Sent: Sunday, December 14, 2014 6:25 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination I am totally with Annalisa on the generatively of metaphor. Metaphor as an essential engine of imagination is itself a metaphor, right? One might argue that all scientific models are themselves metaphors, rooted in sensation, embodied. I was struck not long ago by Vygotsky?s use of the stage metaphor (as in being on stage) in explicating dialog. I can?t remember the publication, but I am sure it is there. Langacker uses the same" on stage" metaphor in his efforts to use Cognitive Grammar in analyzing discourse. Henry > On Dec 13, 2014, at 5:54 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > Esteemed discussants, > > Having finished the paper, and considering Mike's comments, I might suggest that metaphorical reasoning is an essential engine to imagination, and I wonder if I say that because impressions taken of the perceived object as it presents itself to me (the Big Dipper) is the identical to taking the object as a product of seeing-as (a star constellation as a Big Dipper), is the identical to taking the object to represent something else entirely (such as Wittgenstein's triangle as a mountain, as an arrow, etc., or a flag to represent a nation). > > In other words, that imagination begins as a perceptual process which then develops into metaphorical reasoning and perhaps continues on to more complex forms of imagining and conceptual renderings. There is definitely a dynamic relationship to perception and imagination. > > If metaphor isn't THE essential engine, it must serve as a priming process (arising from embodied experience in the world), possibly in the same way the gesture manifests into the word and its meaning. At least that's how I see it at the moment...even though I'm only looking at pixels on my screen as I write this... > > (Thinking out loud, but I hope not too loud). > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of mike cole > > Sent: Saturday, December 13, 2014 2:02 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and Williams. > > Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am trying > to mine for empirical strategies and already-accumulated results) > speak of productive imagination. The Russians write that productive > imagination develops. > > At first I thought that the use of productive implies that there must > be a kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I > learned that instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and > is linked to memory. > > So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of anticipation > and memory. > Imagine that! > mike > > On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >> >> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination (starting >> with Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and >> provides a space for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural >> as fixed. This, coupled with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, >> gives me a ground to take part in the thread on imagination. Of >> course, I start with preconceptions: Vera on creative collaboration >> and the cognitive grammarian Langacker on symbolic assemblies in >> discourse and cognitive domains, particularly the temporal. Everyday >> discourse, it seems to me, is full of imagination and creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of temporality: >> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure), which I >> think must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both >> individual and distributed construals of cognition and feeling. >> Henry >> >>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss wrote: >>> >>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. >>> >>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* and the >> analogy >>> to *gap-filling* >>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. >>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion of >> "structures >>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored under >>> the notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of >>> modalities that >> hang >>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing that is >> forming >>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we think >>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* Larry On >>> Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD >> wrote: >>>> >>>> Mike and Larry, >>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how jazzed up I >>>> am >> now >>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as Larry >> construes >>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various triads, >>>> finally found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of >>>> the mind, as Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa? fuera. >>>> Fractally yours, >>>> Henry >>>> >>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>> >>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached are two >> articles >>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. >>>>> >>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists like >>>> Zaporozhets >>>>> and his students who studied the development of imagination in a >>>>> manner that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of >>>>> productive >>>> imagination. I >>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no intention of >>>>> doing >> so. >>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the attached >> texts. >>>>> >>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I came >>>>> upon >> the >>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked at >>>>> several levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne >>>>> and I argued >>>> in >>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of access >>>>> to >> the >>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. Moreover, >>>>> such views emphasize the future orientation of the >>>>> perception/imagination process. I believe that these views have >>>>> direct relevance to Kris's >> paper >>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns >>>>> about the role of different forms of symbolic play in development. >>>>> >>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps they >>>>> will >> prove >>>>> useful for those interested. >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >>>>> with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> >> > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > From annalisa@unm.edu Sun Dec 14 12:49:43 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Sun, 14 Dec 2014 20:49:43 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: <43F376E8-644F-4774-A920-AB96049C9059@gmail.com> References: <, > <1418518440890.80489@unm.edu>, <43F376E8-644F-4774-A920-AB96049C9059@gmail.com> Message-ID: <1418590183040.88736@unm.edu> Hi Henry! YES, the engine is a metaphor, my metaphor, to aid in constructing my meaning. What is poignant is that when I used it I was not at all aware that I was employing a metaphor. So you pointing that out truly tickled me! I have written a little bit on the way scientific metaphors are used to consider ourselves. I don't think we can help it. As science evolves and we throw out the old science to bring in the new, along with that will be our use of their corresponding metaphors. What I find important is that metaphors are not global (in that they will construct meaning for every aspect intended for description or modeling) and they are not universal (in that everyone will understanding them, since many times they are cultural). I think they work best when metaphors are embodied because all humans have bodies, and environmental, because all humans can conceivably be put in the theater of an environment and understand what is meant. Of course this depends upon if a person can stand in a theater to know what that is like, to stand on a stage, for example, or to stand in the wings, or to be an audience. One metaphor I would not at all mind to retire is the mindbrain metaphor. Kind regards, Annalisa From annalisa@unm.edu Sun Dec 14 13:08:54 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Sun, 14 Dec 2014 21:08:54 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: <000c01d017de$eb81b830$c2852890$@edu> References: <, > <1418518440890.80489@unm.edu> <43F376E8-644F-4774-A920-AB96049C9059@gmail.com>, <000c01d017de$eb81b830$c2852890$@edu> Message-ID: <1418591333523.11315@unm.edu> Hi Vera, With regard to perception's relationship to metaphor, perhaps this is why the word "metaphor" means "to transfer, carry over"? Where does the metaphor generate from? Is it reasonable to think it is perception? If we cannot perceive something it won't make an impression into memory. I don't mean perception as void of emotional, embodied, and sociocultural influences, by the way. I looked up "synthesis" and this has a close root "to put, place." Metaphor is a synthesis! Kind regards, Annalisa From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sun Dec 14 15:56:38 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Sun, 14 Dec 2014 15:56:38 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: <1418591333523.11315@unm.edu> References: <1418518440890.80489@unm.edu> <43F376E8-644F-4774-A920-AB96049C9059@gmail.com> <000c01d017de$eb81b830$c2852890$@edu> <1418591333523.11315@unm.edu> Message-ID: I am fascinated with the *empty* spaces, the *gaps* that must *open* for there to be any pictures or objects or things or essences. I particulary like Mike's metaphor of the mind existing in the *gutter* between the frames of comic strips. There is frame one then [a gutter] frame two then [a gutter] frame three then [a gutter]. On example of the need for the open spaces for gap filling. When intersubjectively engaging with others if we *mark* the others movement too closely [mirrored marking] the other feels oppressed. A mother who cannot sense or read the baby's needs and imitates or mirrors the baby's movement is experienced as oppressive. There must be space in the dance. I also would like to draw attention to Raymond Williams exploring our notions of the IMAGINAL as understood as a particular historical *style* [the fact/fiction as object/subject relation.] When I read about the *third space* and *hybrid* testimonials that are BOTH autobiographical and intersubjectively composed [hybrid formings as structures of feeling that are not yet pictures or clear perceptions], I hear echos of a new relation to fact/fiction emerging. I sense this novel creative movement as *playing with* [as Gadamer uses the term to indicate being *carried* or *drawing out*] The notion of *experience* in English collapses two distinct meanings in German. 1] the personal subjective Romantic type experience and 2] experience as moving within the *play* and being carried by the *play* and in this reciprocal movement *experiencing* a developmental *shift*. Experience as intersubjective not subjective. A different meaning of *experience* This is enough for my turn in our play Larry On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 1:08 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > Hi Vera, > > With regard to perception's relationship to metaphor, perhaps this is why > the word "metaphor" means "to transfer, carry over"? > > Where does the metaphor generate from? > > Is it reasonable to think it is perception? If we cannot perceive > something it won't make an impression into memory. I don't mean perception > as void of emotional, embodied, and sociocultural influences, by the way. > > I looked up "synthesis" and this has a close root "to put, place." > Metaphor is a synthesis! > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > From h2cmng@yahoo.co.uk Sun Dec 14 16:23:58 2014 From: h2cmng@yahoo.co.uk (peter jones) Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2014 00:23:58 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <2106765411.27917.1418603038903.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11163.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> Hi Larry I often wonder what exactly the axes are within Hodges' model and other 2 X 2 frameworks? The axes, provide structure and with that the care (knowledge) domains. The bare model then provides 'conceptual spaces'? Interesting your description of gutters, frames... Hodges' Model: Welcome to the QUAD: two cultures? physical care-mental health care : healthcare-social care : Hodges' model axes | ? | | ? | | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? | | Hodges' Model: Welcome to the QUAD: two cultures? phys...Welcome to the QUAD provides a space for reflections on a HEALTH, SOCIAL CARE and INFORMATICS model with universal potential in terms of application and... | | | | View on hodges-model.blogsp... | Preview by Yahoo | | | | ? | ?Peter Jones Lancashire, UK Blogging at "Welcome to the QUAD" http://hodges-model.blogspot.com/ Hodges Health Career - Care Domains - Model http://www.p-jones.demon.co.uk/ h2cm: help 2C more - help 2 listen - help 2 care http://twitter.com/h2cm From: Larry Purss To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Sunday, 14 December 2014, 23:56 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination I am fascinated with the *empty* spaces, the *gaps* that must *open* for there to be any pictures or objects or things or essences.? I particulary like Mike's metaphor of the mind existing in the *gutter* between the frames of comic strips.? There is frame one then [a gutter] frame two then [a gutter] frame three then [a gutter]. On example of the need for the open spaces for gap filling. When intersubjectively engaging with others if we *mark* the others movement too closely [mirrored marking]? the other feels oppressed. A mother who cannot sense or read the baby's needs and imitates or mirrors the baby's movement is experienced as oppressive. There must be space in the dance. I also would like to draw attention to Raymond Williams exploring our notions of the IMAGINAL as understood as a particular historical *style* [the fact/fiction as object/subject relation.] When I read about the *third space* and *hybrid* testimonials that are BOTH autobiographical and intersubjectively composed [hybrid formings as structures of feeling that are not yet pictures or clear perceptions], I hear echos of a new relation to fact/fiction emerging. I sense this novel creative movement as *playing with* [as Gadamer uses the term to indicate being *carried* or *drawing out*] The notion of *experience* in English collapses two distinct meanings in German.? 1] the personal subjective Romantic type experience and 2] experience as moving within the *play* and being carried by the *play* and in this reciprocal movement *experiencing* a developmental? *shift*. Experience as intersubjective not subjective. A different meaning of *experience* This is enough for my turn in our play Larry On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 1:08 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > Hi Vera, > > With regard to perception's relationship to metaphor, perhaps this is why > the word "metaphor" means "to transfer, carry over"? > > Where does the metaphor generate from? > > Is it reasonable to think it is perception? If we cannot perceive > something it won't make an impression into memory. I don't mean perception > as void of emotional, embodied, and sociocultural influences, by the way. > > I looked up "synthesis" and this has a close root "to put, place." > Metaphor is a synthesis! > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > From annalisa@unm.edu Sun Dec 14 16:41:52 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2014 00:41:52 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: <1418591333523.11315@unm.edu> References: <, > <1418518440890.80489@unm.edu> <43F376E8-644F-4774-A920-AB96049C9059@gmail.com>, <000c01d017de$eb81b830$c2852890$@edu>,<1418591333523.11315@unm.edu> Message-ID: <1418604111232.29693@unm.edu> Esteemed discussants! In consideration of metaphor as synthesis and considering the word _synthesis_ itself, I looked further into the etymology of synthesis, I missed the "syn-" prefix which means "with" So it is really "with putting, with placing" or better, "putting with, placing with." I wondered, is it possible that _synthesis_ itself is a metaphor (an older metaphor so that it no longer feels to be a metaphor) from an embodied action of placing or putting something somewhere with something from somewhere else? "Putting with" doesn't seem so different than "carrying over." Yet there are subtle differences! "Putting with" seems to be taking two or more things and putting them together (smash up, anyone?), while "carrying over" seems to me taking one thing and transferring it from one domain to a new one, while still maintaining the memory of how it was once used. In other words, a synthesis may not reveal its generative properties, while a metaphor maintains its utility in its newer application (meaning, anyone?). And yet, a metaphor's original use (its original domain), may be lost (as in the case _synthesis_ as a word was transferred from the domain of an embodied act, as is done with a metaphor). There's more! A synthesis could also be the blending of an object with a domain (a thing in a place, a thing *with* a place), not just blending of objects, and this is why a metaphor _can be_ a synthesis. Hence, could it be that a synthesis is a metaphor and a metaphor is a synthesis? I like the infinite loopiness of that, with an emphasis on the loopiness! :) Kind regards, Annalisa From ablunden@mira.net Sun Dec 14 16:57:24 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2014 11:57:24 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> Message-ID: <548E31F4.5060707@mira.net> "Recollection" is a translation of Erinnerung, and "Memory" is Gedaechtnis. The whole piece on Representation (Vorstellung) and Imagination (Einbildungskraft) is at http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sp/suspirit.htm#SU451 Attached is a couple of pages from Michael Inwood's excellent Hegel Dictionary explaining the differences between what these terms mean. I take it that Erinnerung is to be reminded of something, whereas Gedaechtnis is "thinking about something" and as you can read, is closely connected to the word. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ mike cole wrote: > Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they are > doing contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his followers > as an inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so its > of course interesting to see those additional categories emerge. > > 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in translation, > seems awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in > this passage, for example, is not a currently used term in counter > distinction to "memory." > Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary discourse > across languages as our explorations with out Russian colleagues have > illustrated. > > That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists who > clearly influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still > possible to include culture in it. > > Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, interestingly > links imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" > act. Parts of it are offputting, primitives thinking like children > stuff that was also "in the air" for example. But at present the > concepts of creativity and imagination are thoroughly entangled, so > its curious to see that the two concepts are linked. > > Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself writing. > mike > > > Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old > approaches to a pesum > > On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it may be > worth noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place > to Imagination in the section on Representation, mediating between > Recollection and Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) > Reproductive Imagination, (2) Associative Imagination (3) > Productive Imagination, which he says leads to the Sign, which he > describes as Productive Memory. In other words, the transition > from immediate sensation to Intellect is accomplished through > these three grades of Imagination. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > mike cole wrote: > > Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and > Williams. > > Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i > am trying to > mine for empirical > strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive > imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination > develops. > > At first I thought that the use of productive implies that > there must be a > kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I > learned that > instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is > linked to > memory. > > So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of > anticipation and > memory. > Imagine that! > mike > > On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD > > wrote: > > > Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination > (starting with > Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and > provides a space > for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as > fixed. This, coupled > with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a > ground to take part > in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with > preconceptions: Vera > on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian > Langacker on > symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, > particularly the > temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of > imagination and > creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of > temporality: > sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic > structure), which I think > must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both > individual and > distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > Henry > > > > On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss > > > wrote: > > Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > > I too see the affinities with notions of the third > *space* and the > > > analogy > > > to *gap-filling* > I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his > notion of > > > "structures > > > of feeling" that David K references. This notion is > explored under the > notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of > modalities that > > > hang > > > together. This notion suggests there is a form of > knowing that is > > > forming > > > but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" > [perceived??] if we think > imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* > Larry > On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD > > > > > wrote: > > > Mike and Larry, > I promise to read your profer, but just want to > say how jazzed up I am > > > now > > > about this thread. My mind has been going wild, > the mind as Larry > > > construes > > > it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually > various triads, finally > found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my > notebooks of the mind, as > Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, > luega pa? fuera. > Fractally yours, > Henry > > > > On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole > > wrote: > > For those interested in the imagination > thread, attached are two > > > articles > > > by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > > My current interest stems from the work of > CHAT theorists like > > > Zaporozhets > > > and his students who studied the development > of imagination in a manner > that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion > of productive > > > imagination. I > > > am not advocating going back to Kant, and have > no intention of doing > > > so. > > > But these ideas seem worth pursuing as > explicated in the attached > > > texts. > > > Through reading the Russians and then these > philosophers, I came upon > > > the > > > idea that perception and imagination are very > closely linked at several > levels of analysis. This is what, in our > naivete, Ettienne and I argued > > > in > > > our paper on imagination sent around earlier > as a means of access to > > > the > > > work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander > Suvorov. Moreover, such > views emphasize the future orientation of the > perception/imagination > process. I believe that these views have > direct relevance to Kris's > > > paper > > > to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also > speak to concerns about the > role of different forms of symbolic play in > development. > > So here are the papers on the imagination > thread. Perhaps they will > > > prove > > > useful for those interested. > mike > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a > natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Erinnerung.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 1935789 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141215/08b68868/attachment-0001.pdf From boblake@georgiasouthern.edu Sun Dec 14 17:41:50 2014 From: boblake@georgiasouthern.edu (Robert Lake) Date: Sun, 14 Dec 2014 20:41:50 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: <1418518440890.80489@unm.edu> References: <1418518440890.80489@unm.edu> Message-ID: Hi Annalisa, You are not alone in suggesting the role of metaphoric process in generative imagination (which can take us beyond reflective imagination). To illustrate the difference between these two aspects, I think about how the early Bob Dylan sounded and looked like Woody Guthrie, but after he wrote songs like* Blowin in the Wind* and* Positively 4th Street he was "in his own house" *to quote Neil Young describing Jimi Hendrix. Consider the origin of the word metaphor itself: Late 15th century: from French *m?taphore*, via Latin from Greek *metaphora*, from* metapherein* ?to transfer.? As Vera stated, metaphor unites disparate images, bridges old concepts in ways that create newly fashioned ones. I have not posted anything since I posed a question about the role of subconscious or even unconscious processes in higher levels of consciousness. I know that Henry S. might have been worried that I was a follower of Jungian collective racial memory or some such thing. Not really but I do think that imagination and creative problem solving can occur at times in subconscious metaphoric processes. Consider the chapter linked here from Arnold Modell's *Imagination and the Meaningful Brain.* He quotes from the Einstein and his colleague Hadamard and a few others to support his suggestions. http://www.bostonneuropsa.net/PDF%20Files/Imagination%20and%20the%20Meaningful%20Brain%20-%20A.%20Modell%20-%20Chapter%202.pdf *Robert Lake* On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 7:54 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > Esteemed discussants, > > Having finished the paper, and considering Mike's comments, I might > suggest that metaphorical reasoning is an essential engine to imagination, > and I wonder if I say that because impressions taken of the perceived > object as it presents itself to me (the Big Dipper) is the identical to > taking the object as a product of seeing-as (a star constellation as a Big > Dipper), is the identical to taking the object to represent something else > entirely (such as Wittgenstein's triangle as a mountain, as an arrow, etc., > or a flag to represent a nation). > > In other words, that imagination begins as a perceptual process which then > develops into metaphorical reasoning and perhaps continues on to more > complex forms of imagining and conceptual renderings. There is definitely a > dynamic relationship to perception and imagination. > > If metaphor isn't THE essential engine, it must serve as a priming process > (arising from embodied experience in the world), possibly in the same way > the gesture manifests into the word and its meaning. At least that's how I > see it at the moment...even though I'm only looking at pixels on my screen > as I write this... > > (Thinking out loud, but I hope not too loud). > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of mike cole > Sent: Saturday, December 13, 2014 2:02 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and Williams. > > Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am trying to > mine for empirical > strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive > imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination develops. > > At first I thought that the use of productive implies that there must be a > kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I learned that > instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is linked to > memory. > > So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of anticipation and > memory. > Imagine that! > mike > > On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD > wrote: > > > > Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination (starting with > > Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and provides a > space > > for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. This, > coupled > > with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground to take part > > in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with preconceptions: > Vera > > on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian Langacker on > > symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, particularly the > > temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of imagination and > > creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of temporality: > > sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure), which I > think > > must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both individual and > > distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > > Henry > > > > > On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss > wrote: > > > > > > Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > > > > > > I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* and the > > analogy > > > to *gap-filling* > > > I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > > > However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion of > > "structures > > > of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored under the > > > notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of modalities that > > hang > > > together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing that is > > forming > > > but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we think > > > imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* > > > Larry > > > On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD > > wrote: > > >> > > >> Mike and Larry, > > >> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how jazzed up I am > > now > > >> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as Larry > > construes > > >> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various triads, finally > > >> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of the mind, > as > > >> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa? fuera. > > >> Fractally yours, > > >> Henry > > >> > > >>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole wrote: > > >>> > > >>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached are two > > articles > > >>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > > >>> > > >>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists like > > >> Zaporozhets > > >>> and his students who studied the development of imagination in a > manner > > >>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of productive > > >> imagination. I > > >>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no intention of doing > > so. > > >>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the attached > > texts. > > >>> > > >>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I came upon > > the > > >>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked at > several > > >>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne and I > argued > > >> in > > >>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of access to > > the > > >>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. Moreover, > such > > >>> views emphasize the future orientation of the perception/imagination > > >>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance to Kris's > > paper > > >>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns about > the > > >>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. > > >>> > > >>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps they will > > prove > > >>> useful for those interested. > > >>> mike > > >>> > > >>> -- > > >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > an > > >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > >>> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > -- *Robert Lake Ed.D.*Associate Professor Social Foundations of Education Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading Georgia Southern University Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group P. O. Box 8144 Phone: (912) 478-0355 Fax: (912) 478-5382 Statesboro, GA 30460 From annalisa@unm.edu Sun Dec 14 18:12:36 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2014 02:12:36 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] The Annotated Bibliography Project (ABP) Message-ID: <1418609555710.2387@unm.edu> Esteemed discussants! The Annotated Bibliography Project Helena and I have decided as a part of the Newcomer's Project to compile a list of important sociocultural texts and incorporate annotations to these entries (ideally to host in the wiki??). So I'm initiating a request: Would you kindly offer up texts (APA format is gratefully accepted). This project is deemed The Annotated Bibliography Project or possibly The ABP, or just The AB, or perhaps affectionately "the alpha-beta"!! Then in addition, if you please, submit with your entry(ies) a small comment explaining the text(s) and why it(they) is(are) important (We'll keep your name attached, but if this is problematic, email your list privately to me and your name will be removed from the entry). Any comment should be 100 words or less, this will be adhered to as strictly as possible. Helena and I will be working together to edit these entries and their comments (initially anyway) just to be certain there is some cohesion. Designations for Reading Level Please provide a designation for the text as to whether it is a beginning or advanced text. We might use a grading system of 1 through 5 along these lines: ================================================= 1. Introductory (no previous exposure to texts by Vygotsky, et al is expected) 2. Beginning (some familiarity with introductory texts and themes). 3. Intermediate (quite familiar with introductory and beginning texts and themes). 4. Advanced (quite familiar with intro, beginning, and intermediate texts and themes). 5. Master (requires mastery of full gamut of texts and themes). More About Comments The idea beyond a compiled list, is also to create a comment context (how, TBD) with each text possessing a cluster of comments. List members visiting the wiki page may post comments concerning the text (100 words or less). This would be a space in which controversial aspects of the text might be noted, or other histories to consider. Comments are to provide sense to novices and experts alike; they are a means for setting context for any given text-item. Further, by having pluralities of comments (again, each comment 100 words or less), deeper contexts will likely emerge and provide a different quality of access to novices, by revealing deeper understandings usually lost to novices, who can only note surface features. "Expansions" Thinking out loud, it is entirely possible that substantial debates might ensue about contexts of a text. This would entail a requirement to "take it outside." In that case, this should (ideally) manifest in a separate wikipage and that could be linked to from the ABP wikipage. So anyone who has to air something out will have the space to do so. What Goes In Since this list will be authored by the community, it is assumed that this list will be sanctioned by the community as important texts to the community here. Helena thought we could do a top 100, which is a good large number. However, I have a sense that spots will fill quickly, so I'd prefer to see what happens. Regardless, 100 is a good number to shoot for! I don't think debating over what should be put in or taken off the list would be fruitful, so if it grows beyond 100, the more the merrier. And, in that case of a large and long list, annotations (comments) will enable a visitor to decide for oneself after evaluating said comments what is worth reading. Reading as a Community Effort One aspect of being a member of xmca is the READING involved!!! It is my experience that academics are faced with little time to read, though this is not restricted to academics. :) Annotations can assist in breaking down the chore of reading by providing some "pre-reading" content, which might save time over all for everyone. Of course, those who are retired have more free time and can annotate away! Thusly: from each according to his ability, to each according to his need. :) With this in mind, who knows, the annotated bibliography may become as valued by experts as it would by novices!!! Imagine that! To The Task; Take Action: The Takeaway So if you would like to send (or post to the list) your choices and the accompanying (1-5) reading level designation, with your comment (100 words or less), I will start collecting entries and post to the list as it grows by 10s. If you don't have time to submit comments, we will try to farm out the comments to someone else, but at least the text will make the list, so don't restrain yourself from making a submission because you don't want to comment. The inversion of this is feel free to submit if you already see a text on the list, just submit your comment and indicate its text, and your comment will be added to the entry. The Final Form Once the list is launched, there will the text in APA, the abstract, page length or word count (if that makes sense), and links pointing where to find these texts (such as marxists.org or perhaps a storage bin at XMCA, but also perhaps to the publisher's pages). This will be hosted at the wiki, I anticipate. Kind regards, Annalisa From ablunden@mira.net Sun Dec 14 18:56:17 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2014 13:56:17 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Second edition of Learning by Expanding Message-ID: <548E4DD1.8060007@mira.net> 27 years since its first edition and after many years of being unobtainable even secondhand, Engestrom's seminal "Learning by Expanding" a second edition is being published by Cambridge University Press, see http://www.helsinki.fi/cradle/ Andy -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Sun Dec 14 19:26:45 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2014 03:26:45 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Second edition of Learning by Expanding In-Reply-To: <548E4DD1.8060007@mira.net> References: <548E4DD1.8060007@mira.net> Message-ID: "The second edition of this seminal text features a substantive new introduction that illustrates the development and implementation of Engestr?m's theory since its inception" "Illustrates" suggests a somewhat frustrating experience, though maybe a fruitful one. For a silver anniversary, one could hope for reasons and explication of what was previously obscure or problematic. Nice to see it back in print. Huw On 15 December 2014 at 02:56, Andy Blunden wrote: > 27 years since its first edition and after many years of being > unobtainable even secondhand, Engestrom's seminal "Learning by Expanding" > a second edition is being published by Cambridge University Press, see > http://www.helsinki.fi/cradle/ > > Andy > -- > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Sun Dec 14 20:01:44 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2014 04:01:44 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Annotated Bibliography Project (ABP) In-Reply-To: <1418609555710.2387@unm.edu> References: <1418609555710.2387@unm.edu> Message-ID: Uhm, what I suspect to be a problem here is that familiarity with these texts (i.e. with the problems that the texts are about) would lead to a different way to organise this effort than the way you're proposing... Familiarity with a problem, or set of problems, determines the relevance of the text. My belated answer to the request about intro texts is that it depends upon the problems that your colleague is interested in. If they don't have any interesting problems, they're not going to get much out of it. Huw On 15 December 2014 at 02:12, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Esteemed discussants! > > > The Annotated Bibliography Project > > Helena and I have decided as a part of the Newcomer's Project to compile a > list of important sociocultural texts and incorporate annotations to these > entries (ideally to host in the wiki??). > > > So I'm initiating a request: Would you kindly offer up texts (APA format > is gratefully accepted). This project is deemed The Annotated Bibliography > Project or possibly The ABP, or just The AB, or perhaps affectionately "the > alpha-beta"!! > > > Then in addition, if you please, submit with your entry(ies) a small > comment explaining the text(s) and why it(they) is(are) important (We'll > keep your name attached, but if this is problematic, email your list > privately to me and your name will be removed from the entry). Any comment > should be 100 words or less, this will be adhered to as strictly as > possible. > > > Helena and I will be working together to edit these entries and their > comments (initially anyway) just to be certain there is some cohesion. > > > Designations for Reading Level > > Please provide a designation for the text as to whether it is a beginning > or advanced text. > > > We might use a grading system of 1 through 5 along these lines: > > ================================================= > > 1. Introductory (no previous exposure to texts by Vygotsky, et al is > expected) > > 2. Beginning (some familiarity with introductory texts and themes). > > 3. Intermediate (quite familiar with introductory and beginning texts and > themes). > > 4. Advanced (quite familiar with intro, beginning, and intermediate texts > and themes). > > 5. Master (requires mastery of full gamut of texts and themes). > > > More About Comments > > The idea beyond a compiled list, is also to create a comment context (how, > TBD) with each text possessing a cluster of comments. List members visiting > the wiki page may post comments concerning the text (100 words or less). > This would be a space in which controversial aspects of the text might be > noted, or other histories to consider. > > > Comments are to provide sense to novices and experts alike; they are a > means for setting context for any given text-item. Further, by having > pluralities of comments (again, each comment 100 words or less), deeper > contexts will likely emerge and provide a different quality of access to > novices, by revealing deeper understandings usually lost to novices, who > can only note surface features. > > > "Expansions" > > Thinking out loud, it is entirely possible that substantial debates might > ensue about contexts of a text. This would entail a requirement to "take it > outside." In that case, this should (ideally) manifest in a separate > wikipage and that could be linked to from the ABP wikipage. So anyone who > has to air something out will have the space to do so. > > > What Goes In > > Since this list will be authored by the community, it is assumed that this > list will be sanctioned by the community as important texts to the > community here. > > > Helena thought we could do a top 100, which is a good large number. > However, I have a sense that spots will fill quickly, so I'd prefer to see > what happens. Regardless, 100 is a good number to shoot for! I don't think > debating over what should be put in or taken off the list would be > fruitful, so if it grows beyond 100, the more the merrier. And, in that > case of a large and long list, annotations (comments) will enable a visitor > to decide for oneself after evaluating said comments what is worth reading. > > > Reading as a Community Effort > > One aspect of being a member of xmca is the READING involved!!! It is my > experience that academics are faced with little time to read, though this > is not restricted to academics. :) Annotations can assist in breaking down > the chore of reading by providing some "pre-reading" content, which might > save time over all for everyone. Of course, those who are retired have more > free time and can annotate away! > > > Thusly: from each according to his ability, to each according to his need. > :) > > > With this in mind, who knows, the annotated bibliography may become as > valued by experts as it would by novices!!! Imagine that! > > > To The Task; Take Action: The Takeaway > > So if you would like to send (or post to the list) your choices and the > accompanying (1-5) reading level designation, with your comment (100 words > or less), I will start collecting entries and post to the list as it grows > by 10s. > > > If you don't have time to submit comments, we will try to farm out the > comments to someone else, but at least the text will make the list, so > don't restrain yourself from making a submission because you don't want to > comment. The inversion of this is feel free to submit if you already see a > text on the list, just submit your comment and indicate its text, and your > comment will be added to the entry. > > > The Final Form > > Once the list is launched, there will the text in APA, the abstract, page > length or word count (if that makes sense), and links pointing where to > find these texts (such as marxists.org or perhaps a storage bin at XMCA, > but also perhaps to the publisher's pages). This will be hosted at the > wiki, I anticipate. > > > > Kind regards, > > > Annalisa > > > > > > > From helenaworthen@gmail.com Sun Dec 14 20:55:18 2014 From: helenaworthen@gmail.com (Helena Worthen) Date: Sun, 14 Dec 2014 20:55:18 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Annotated Bibliography Project (ABP) In-Reply-To: <1418609555710.2387@unm.edu> References: <1418609555710.2387@unm.edu> Message-ID: <4B3241AC-33FA-4CCE-B9F3-B41BA510E9BA@gmail.com> I like the idea of ranking them 1-5, from intro to very complex. H Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com On Dec 14, 2014, at 6:12 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Esteemed discussants! > > > The Annotated Bibliography Project > > Helena and I have decided as a part of the Newcomer's Project to compile a list of important sociocultural texts and incorporate annotations to these entries (ideally to host in the wiki??). > > > So I'm initiating a request: Would you kindly offer up texts (APA format is gratefully accepted). This project is deemed The Annotated Bibliography Project or possibly The ABP, or just The AB, or perhaps affectionately "the alpha-beta"!! > > > Then in addition, if you please, submit with your entry(ies) a small comment explaining the text(s) and why it(they) is(are) important (We'll keep your name attached, but if this is problematic, email your list privately to me and your name will be removed from the entry). Any comment should be 100 words or less, this will be adhered to as strictly as possible. > > > Helena and I will be working together to edit these entries and their comments (initially anyway) just to be certain there is some cohesion. > > > Designations for Reading Level > > Please provide a designation for the text as to whether it is a beginning or advanced text. > > > We might use a grading system of 1 through 5 along these lines: > > ================================================= > > 1. Introductory (no previous exposure to texts by Vygotsky, et al is expected) > > 2. Beginning (some familiarity with introductory texts and themes). > > 3. Intermediate (quite familiar with introductory and beginning texts and themes). > > 4. Advanced (quite familiar with intro, beginning, and intermediate texts and themes). > > 5. Master (requires mastery of full gamut of texts and themes). > > > More About Comments > > The idea beyond a compiled list, is also to create a comment context (how, TBD) with each text possessing a cluster of comments. List members visiting the wiki page may post comments concerning the text (100 words or less). This would be a space in which controversial aspects of the text might be noted, or other histories to consider. > > > Comments are to provide sense to novices and experts alike; they are a means for setting context for any given text-item. Further, by having pluralities of comments (again, each comment 100 words or less), deeper contexts will likely emerge and provide a different quality of access to novices, by revealing deeper understandings usually lost to novices, who can only note surface features. > > > "Expansions" > > Thinking out loud, it is entirely possible that substantial debates might ensue about contexts of a text. This would entail a requirement to "take it outside." In that case, this should (ideally) manifest in a separate wikipage and that could be linked to from the ABP wikipage. So anyone who has to air something out will have the space to do so. > > > What Goes In > > Since this list will be authored by the community, it is assumed that this list will be sanctioned by the community as important texts to the community here. > > > Helena thought we could do a top 100, which is a good large number. However, I have a sense that spots will fill quickly, so I'd prefer to see what happens. Regardless, 100 is a good number to shoot for! I don't think debating over what should be put in or taken off the list would be fruitful, so if it grows beyond 100, the more the merrier. And, in that case of a large and long list, annotations (comments) will enable a visitor to decide for oneself after evaluating said comments what is worth reading. > > > Reading as a Community Effort > > One aspect of being a member of xmca is the READING involved!!! It is my experience that academics are faced with little time to read, though this is not restricted to academics. :) Annotations can assist in breaking down the chore of reading by providing some "pre-reading" content, which might save time over all for everyone. Of course, those who are retired have more free time and can annotate away! > > > Thusly: from each according to his ability, to each according to his need. :) > > > With this in mind, who knows, the annotated bibliography may become as valued by experts as it would by novices!!! Imagine that! > > > To The Task; Take Action: The Takeaway > > So if you would like to send (or post to the list) your choices and the accompanying (1-5) reading level designation, with your comment (100 words or less), I will start collecting entries and post to the list as it grows by 10s. > > > If you don't have time to submit comments, we will try to farm out the comments to someone else, but at least the text will make the list, so don't restrain yourself from making a submission because you don't want to comment. The inversion of this is feel free to submit if you already see a text on the list, just submit your comment and indicate its text, and your comment will be added to the entry. > > > The Final Form > > Once the list is launched, there will the text in APA, the abstract, page length or word count (if that makes sense), and links pointing where to find these texts (such as marxists.org or perhaps a storage bin at XMCA, but also perhaps to the publisher's pages). This will be hosted at the wiki, I anticipate. > > > > Kind regards, > > > Annalisa > > > > > > From annalisa@unm.edu Sun Dec 14 21:41:11 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2014 05:41:11 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Annotated Bibliography Project (ABP) In-Reply-To: References: <1418609555710.2387@unm.edu>, Message-ID: <1418622071354.57240@unm.edu> Huw! Thanks for your comment regarding the APB! I didn't think there should be a comment attached to the entire project, but I suppose yours could be it! It is precious. :) I'm not sure what you mean about interesting problems. Who decides what is an interesting problem? I've never approached reading to solve problems, but to learn something that interests me. This orientation you suggest is unfamiliar to me. The problem we are attempting to solve here is to make texts available to those who are not familiar with the texts, and to provide a context by designating a reading level and attaching comments to each entry. When I took Vera's Vygotsky Seminar, for example, I wasn't looking for a problem to solve, but I was willing to read the texts in her reader. That was my point of entry. She decided those texts were relevant for novices to the topic in the context of a semester seminar. However, not everyone who joins the list may come to Sociocultural Theory (and other aspects of Cultural Psychology) through a class and with a teacher. So this is an attempt to fill that gap. The comments should aid by providing an entrance to a given text. Because of the vast array of voices here, there will be just as many interpretations and problems and biases and concerns. All of this ideally will be captured in the comments and allow the reader a means to chose. This kind of transparency I think will be fantastic because one of the valuable things to know about this community is that there are so many voices, so many minds, so many different approaches. That should be represented, and this could be one way to do that, but geared for the novice in this instance. Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+annalisa=unm.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Huw Lloyd Sent: Sunday, December 14, 2014 9:01 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Annotated Bibliography Project (ABP) Uhm, what I suspect to be a problem here is that familiarity with these texts (i.e. with the problems that the texts are about) would lead to a different way to organise this effort than the way you're proposing... Familiarity with a problem, or set of problems, determines the relevance of the text. My belated answer to the request about intro texts is that it depends upon the problems that your colleague is interested in. If they don't have any interesting problems, they're not going to get much out of it. Huw From annalisa@unm.edu Sun Dec 14 21:48:11 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2014 05:48:11 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <1418518440890.80489@unm.edu>, Message-ID: <1418622491257.33972@unm.edu> Hi Robert, Modell's paper on imagination and the brain is a great chapter! Whatever the model is for imagination, it should connect biology with the sociocultural. That objective may not be all that clear to some folks. I found this text a contribution to that effort. Kind regards, Annalisa From hshonerd@gmail.com Sun Dec 14 22:19:11 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Sun, 14 Dec 2014 23:19:11 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> Message-ID: Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. This business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some weeks in our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that segmented the last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. Puns, according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) Henry > On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole wrote: > > Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they are doing > contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his followers as an > inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so its of course > interesting to see those additional categories emerge. > > 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in translation, seems > awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in this passage, > for example, is not a currently used term in counter distinction to > "memory." > Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary discourse > across languages as our explorations with out Russian colleagues have > illustrated. > > That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists who clearly > influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still possible to > include culture in it. > > Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, interestingly links > imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" act. Parts of > it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that was also > "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of creativity and > imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see that the two > concepts are linked. > > Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself writing. > mike > > > Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old approaches > to a pesum > > On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it may be worth >> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to Imagination >> in the section on Representation, mediating between Recollection and >> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive Imagination, (2) >> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he says leads to >> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other words, the >> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is accomplished through >> these three grades of Imagination. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> mike cole wrote: >> >>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and Williams. >>> >>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am trying to >>> mine for empirical >>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive >>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination develops. >>> >>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that there must be a >>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I learned that >>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is linked to >>> memory. >>> >>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of anticipation and >>> memory. >>> Imagine that! >>> mike >>> >>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD >>> wrote: >>> >>> >>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination (starting with >>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and provides a >>>> space >>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. This, >>>> coupled >>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground to take part >>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with preconceptions: >>>> Vera >>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian Langacker on >>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, particularly the >>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of imagination and >>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of temporality: >>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure), which I >>>> think >>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both individual and >>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. >>>> Henry >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. >>>>> >>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* and the >>>>> >>>>> >>>> analogy >>>> >>>> >>>>> to *gap-filling* >>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. >>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion of >>>>> >>>>> >>>> "structures >>>> >>>> >>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored under the >>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of modalities that >>>>> >>>>> >>>> hang >>>> >>>> >>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing that is >>>>> >>>>> >>>> forming >>>> >>>> >>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we think >>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* >>>>> Larry >>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD >>>>> >>>>> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> Mike and Larry, >>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how jazzed up I am >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> now >>>> >>>> >>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as Larry >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> construes >>>> >>>> >>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various triads, finally >>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of the mind, as >>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa? fuera. >>>>>> Fractally yours, >>>>>> Henry >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached are two >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> articles >>>> >>>> >>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists like >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> Zaporozhets >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of imagination in a >>>>>>> manner >>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of productive >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> imagination. I >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no intention of doing >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> so. >>>> >>>> >>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the attached >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> texts. >>>> >>>> >>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I came upon >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> the >>>> >>>> >>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked at several >>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne and I >>>>>>> argued >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> in >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of access to >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> the >>>> >>>> >>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. Moreover, such >>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the perception/imagination >>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance to Kris's >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> paper >>>> >>>> >>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns about the >>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps they will >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> prove >>>> >>>> >>>>> useful for those interested. >>>>>>> mike >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From hshonerd@gmail.com Sun Dec 14 22:38:57 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Sun, 14 Dec 2014 23:38:57 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: <1418589470595.5298@unm.edu> References: <, > <1418518440890.80489@unm.edu> <, > <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC311022631C3@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <1418589470595.5298@unm.edu> Message-ID: <1E5BEAE7-2D02-4D4E-BFE0-D97C74B09C93@gmail.com> Late again to the ball. I would like to connect the Ribot/movement aspect of imagination and creativity to Rod?s assistive technology for the blind: the technology is proprioceptive, absolutely dynamic. Henry > On Dec 14, 2014, at 1:37 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > Hi Rod! > > You are absolutely right that there is a difference between seeing things and seeing pictures of things. Just consider seeing a tree and seeing a photo of a tree. The difference is that there is a world on one hand and a frame on the other. Situating the object in the world is a part of seeing it, yes, yes, yes! But then... we are seeing the framed tree in the world, too. Perhaps this offers a clue on "cultural seeing" as well, since framing is socioculturally manifested. > > What I had hoped to capture in what I'd said about metaphor arising from perception, and subsequently metaphor leading to imagination is that the _impressions_ are the same, but the processes of seeing are a little different. Still, the acts of seeing as we described are not completely separate processes. In other words: that I have a "seeing engine" for looking at pictures and that I have a different seeing engine for looking at the world, and still a different seeing engine for looking at duck-rabbits! Perhaps the difference has more to do with a kind of resolution, that there are deeper impressions made from embodied seeing than seeing duck-rabbits. > > The story of helping the blind to see with the device you described was a short feature at Radiolab last month, a link Mike had posted. The title if the entire was "Translation," which is likely one of the BEST shows I've heard, by they way, as ears go to hear. But yes, perception requires bodies. What I liked about what you posted is that it wasn't until the camera was about where the eyes were that the virtual seeing manifested for the subject. I wonder if that is an important feature for the brain's ability to field the act of seeing, that it is expecting the eyes to be where eyes typically go in a human, where eyes evolved to be. > > I also did not intend to exclude the feeling or affective aspects of imagining either. The emotional content of imagination is one aspect in the Strawson paper that was absent. Poignancy is integral, though perhaps to differing volumes. I don't know how much we imagine things that we don't care about. > > Moreover, I do not know whether Kant explored affect, but it wouldn't surprise me if Hume didn't. Gee whiz, what would a book on affect be like written by Hume, anyway? Imagine that. Actually, in a Humian (?) act, I just walked over to my philosophy encyclopedia to see if he had written anything on affect. Ends up he wrote a treatise on his theory on the passions, which in the end he grew to doubt. So no surprises there! Ha! > > Wittgenstein having been on the battlefield and having taught children didn't neglect to address affect in his work: When I read him, I see that it is there; it is embedded in meaning. I recognize it also in his puzzled writer's voice, as a subject investigating the world. He doesn't leave himself out. > > It's my act of enjoyment to share these different philosopher's points of view, imagining readers of this thread also enjoying, as I am now. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > From hshonerd@gmail.com Sun Dec 14 23:18:57 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2014 00:18:57 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <1418518440890.80489@unm.edu> Message-ID: <674B27F0-8DD3-46BE-BFB7-DBE1F868BF59@gmail.com> Touche. Bob is totally on the money! Right down to my suspicion of naive Jungianism. Hey, nobody?s perfect.I see his his link makes for great reading. I can?t read it all now, but I can tell it?s juicy throughout. Henry > On Dec 14, 2014, at 6:41 PM, Robert Lake wrote: > > Hi Annalisa, > You are not alone in suggesting the role of metaphoric process in > generative imagination (which can take us > beyond reflective imagination). To illustrate the difference between these > two aspects, I think about how the early Bob Dylan sounded and looked like > Woody Guthrie, but after he wrote songs like* Blowin in the Wind* and* > Positively 4th Street he was "in his own house" *to quote Neil Young > describing Jimi Hendrix. Consider the origin of the word metaphor itself: > Late 15th century: from French *m?taphore*, via Latin from Greek *metaphora*, > from* metapherein* ?to transfer.? > As Vera stated, metaphor unites disparate images, bridges old concepts in > ways that create newly fashioned ones. > > > I have not posted anything since I posed a question about the role of > subconscious or even unconscious processes in higher levels of > consciousness. I know that Henry S. might have been worried that I was a > follower of Jungian collective racial memory or some such thing. Not really > but I do think that imagination and creative problem solving can occur at > times in subconscious metaphoric processes. Consider the chapter linked > here from Arnold Modell's *Imagination and the Meaningful Brain.* He quotes > from the Einstein and his colleague Hadamard and a few others to support > his suggestions. > > http://www.bostonneuropsa.net/PDF%20Files/Imagination%20and%20the%20Meaningful%20Brain%20-%20A.%20Modell%20-%20Chapter%202.pdf > > > *Robert Lake* > > On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 7:54 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >> Esteemed discussants, >> >> Having finished the paper, and considering Mike's comments, I might >> suggest that metaphorical reasoning is an essential engine to imagination, >> and I wonder if I say that because impressions taken of the perceived >> object as it presents itself to me (the Big Dipper) is the identical to >> taking the object as a product of seeing-as (a star constellation as a Big >> Dipper), is the identical to taking the object to represent something else >> entirely (such as Wittgenstein's triangle as a mountain, as an arrow, etc., >> or a flag to represent a nation). >> >> In other words, that imagination begins as a perceptual process which then >> develops into metaphorical reasoning and perhaps continues on to more >> complex forms of imagining and conceptual renderings. There is definitely a >> dynamic relationship to perception and imagination. >> >> If metaphor isn't THE essential engine, it must serve as a priming process >> (arising from embodied experience in the world), possibly in the same way >> the gesture manifests into the word and its meaning. At least that's how I >> see it at the moment...even though I'm only looking at pixels on my screen >> as I write this... >> >> (Thinking out loud, but I hope not too loud). >> >> Kind regards, >> >> Annalisa >> >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> on behalf of mike cole >> Sent: Saturday, December 13, 2014 2:02 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >> >> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and Williams. >> >> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am trying to >> mine for empirical >> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive >> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination develops. >> >> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that there must be a >> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I learned that >> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is linked to >> memory. >> >> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of anticipation and >> memory. >> Imagine that! >> mike >> >> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD >> wrote: >>> >>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination (starting with >>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and provides a >> space >>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. This, >> coupled >>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground to take part >>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with preconceptions: >> Vera >>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian Langacker on >>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, particularly the >>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of imagination and >>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of temporality: >>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure), which I >> think >>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both individual and >>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. >>> Henry >>> >>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss >> wrote: >>>> >>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. >>>> >>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* and the >>> analogy >>>> to *gap-filling* >>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. >>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion of >>> "structures >>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored under the >>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of modalities that >>> hang >>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing that is >>> forming >>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we think >>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* >>>> Larry >>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD >>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Mike and Larry, >>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how jazzed up I am >>> now >>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as Larry >>> construes >>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various triads, finally >>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of the mind, >> as >>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa? fuera. >>>>> Fractally yours, >>>>> Henry >>>>> >>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached are two >>> articles >>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. >>>>>> >>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists like >>>>> Zaporozhets >>>>>> and his students who studied the development of imagination in a >> manner >>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of productive >>>>> imagination. I >>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no intention of doing >>> so. >>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the attached >>> texts. >>>>>> >>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I came upon >>> the >>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked at >> several >>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne and I >> argued >>>>> in >>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of access to >>> the >>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. Moreover, >> such >>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the perception/imagination >>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance to Kris's >>> paper >>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns about >> the >>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. >>>>>> >>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps they will >>> prove >>>>>> useful for those interested. >>>>>> mike >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >> an >>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> >> > > -- > > *Robert Lake Ed.D.*Associate Professor > Social Foundations of Education > Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading > Georgia Southern University > Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group > P. O. Box 8144 > Phone: (912) 478-0355 > Fax: (912) 478-5382 > Statesboro, GA 30460 From R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk Mon Dec 15 01:07:20 2014 From: R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk (Rod Parker-Rees) Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2014 09:07:20 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: <1418604111232.29693@unm.edu> References: <, > <1418518440890.80489@unm.edu> <43F376E8-644F-4774-A920-AB96049C9059@gmail.com>, <000c01d017de$eb81b830$c2852890$@edu>,<1418591333523.11315@unm.edu> <1418604111232.29693@unm.edu> Message-ID: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102264486@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Hi Annalisa, yes, language is full of dead, dying or dormant metaphors, especially among words imported from other languages. But a metaphor which is unnoticed by most may still be vivid in the minds of some, just as every word will carry a mix of private and known-to-be-public (cultural) associations. To some extent it may be possible to assume that a particular audience will be alert to particular associations (if we know, for example that they have shared a particular experience - reading a book, watching a film, being at tan event) so that we can imagine what they will be likely to imagine when they hear what we say but it is always important to remember that this is far from being a precise science! A special feature of metaphor, I think, is that it actively invites hearers to draw from their own experiences to flesh out an idea with a more direct, embodied and felt response. If I say that something is 'like' something else I am inviting others to work out what resemblances I have in mind but if I say something IS something else I am inviting others to feel what that might mean. If I say, for example, 'so-and-so is a pig' I can leave it to you to draw from your own personal associations with so-and-so and with pigs to find your own associations. Of course this is all richly enrobed with garments of cultural meaning (pigs have special significance for followers of different religions and how we think of them may depend more on stories like 'the three little pigs' than on first hand experience) but using metaphors still, I think, helps to hold open a (metaphorical) door to let others' experiences wash over our ideas. When the metaphor is a leap from one crusty 'mindy' notion to another - 'metaphor is synthesis' the associations with embodied experience may be more difficult to follow but I think there is still a sense of openness to personal forms of understanding. All the best, Rod -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Annalisa Aguilar Sent: 15 December 2014 00:42 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination Esteemed discussants! In consideration of metaphor as synthesis and considering the word _synthesis_ itself, I looked further into the etymology of synthesis, I missed the "syn-" prefix which means "with" So it is really "with putting, with placing" or better, "putting with, placing with." I wondered, is it possible that _synthesis_ itself is a metaphor (an older metaphor so that it no longer feels to be a metaphor) from an embodied action of placing or putting something somewhere with something from somewhere else? "Putting with" doesn't seem so different than "carrying over." Yet there are subtle differences! "Putting with" seems to be taking two or more things and putting them together (smash up, anyone?), while "carrying over" seems to me taking one thing and transferring it from one domain to a new one, while still maintaining the memory of how it was once used. In other words, a synthesis may not reveal its generative properties, while a metaphor maintains its utility in its newer application (meaning, anyone?). And yet, a metaphor's original use (its original domain), may be lost (as in the case _synthesis_ as a word was transferred from the domain of an embodied act, as is done with a metaphor). There's more! A synthesis could also be the blending of an object with a domain (a thing in a place, a thing *with* a place), not just blending of objects, and this is why a metaphor _can be_ a synthesis. Hence, could it be that a synthesis is a metaphor and a metaphor is a synthesis? I like the infinite loopiness of that, with an emphasis on the loopiness! :) Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From jgregmcverry@gmail.com Mon Dec 15 06:35:02 2014 From: jgregmcverry@gmail.com (Greg Mcverry) Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2014 14:35:02 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Annotated Bibliography Project (ABP) References: <1418609555710.2387@unm.edu> <1418622071354.57240@unm.edu> Message-ID: I support this effort but I agree on the concernse raised by others: -Choosing the texts for the onboarding process -Determining whose values get upvoted by picking the texts. -Creating enough groundswell for the project to be meaningful. Then there is the issue of copyright and what tool to use. -A wiki is great but folks will need to learn shortcode or markdown to annotate. -I love annotating on genius.com (and in XMCA group could be set) but you are siloing your work. -There is Diigo... and the lsit goes on Basically what it sounds like yoy are trying to do is two things (public annotation of texts) and create learning pathways into the XMCA community. Maybe it is best to separate the two. 1. Get as many texts that can be legally published and shared on the open web. Invite folks to start annotating. 2. For the n00b project create a set of learning modules (maybe on your 1-5 scales) that folks can step in and out of at will...who knows maybe one day even facilitate a little community discussions around this class. Right when I first discovered XMCA I tried to work with folks to set up a Vygotsky study group on Evernote for us that were new. We had all the commitment but lacked anyone with expertise. On the flip side If we dropped n00bs into an annotated documents where folks spend days arguing over the translation of one Russian word (important work but not for an onboarding effort) people may leave as well. On Mon Dec 15 2014 at 12:43:58 AM Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Huw! > > Thanks for your comment regarding the APB! I didn't think there should be > a comment attached to the entire project, but I suppose yours could be it! > It is precious. :) > > I'm not sure what you mean about interesting problems. Who decides what is > an interesting problem? I've never approached reading to solve problems, > but to learn something that interests me. This orientation you suggest is > unfamiliar to me. > > The problem we are attempting to solve here is to make texts available to > those who are not familiar with the texts, and to provide a context by > designating a reading level and attaching comments to each entry. > > When I took Vera's Vygotsky Seminar, for example, I wasn't looking for a > problem to solve, but I was willing to read the texts in her reader. That > was my point of entry. She decided those texts were relevant for novices to > the topic in the context of a semester seminar. > > However, not everyone who joins the list may come to Sociocultural Theory > (and other aspects of Cultural Psychology) through a class and with a > teacher. So this is an attempt to fill that gap. The comments should aid by > providing an entrance to a given text. > > Because of the vast array of voices here, there will be just as many > interpretations and problems and biases and concerns. All of this ideally > will be captured in the comments and allow the reader a means to chose. > This kind of transparency I think will be fantastic because one of the > valuable things to know about this community is that there are so many > voices, so many minds, so many different approaches. That should be > represented, and this could be one way to do that, but geared for the > novice in this instance. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+annalisa=unm.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Huw Lloyd > > Sent: Sunday, December 14, 2014 9:01 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Annotated Bibliography Project (ABP) > > > Uhm, what I suspect to be a problem here is that familiarity with these > texts (i.e. with the problems that the texts are about) would lead to a > different way to organise this effort than the way you're proposing... > > Familiarity with a problem, or set of problems, determines the relevance of > the text. My belated answer to the request about intro texts is that it > depends upon the problems that your colleague is interested in. If they > don't have any interesting problems, they're not going to get much out of > it. > > Huw > > > > From jgregmcverry@gmail.com Mon Dec 15 06:47:45 2014 From: jgregmcverry@gmail.com (Greg Mcverry) Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2014 14:47:45 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Changing Practices at XMCA References: <06FAB3D3-DE6F-4D0B-96E5-84BF35335F60@gmail.com> <2EBAFFF6-E3AA-44B4-9427-D58DEEBD3534@gmail.com> Message-ID: The problem is (any many of my professional organizations) these listserves work. Yet all of the naming conventions folks are suggesting, the addition of newcomer pages, the CHAT wiki, sounds like XMCA outgrew the affordances of listserves quite some time ago....yet it works so well. I just completed (well parts of) connectedcourses.net and they used a wordpress site (which would be for the newcomer page and the wiki) and rss feed (we should encourage longer posts on our own publishing platform) and discourse ( a stackable email like discussion board that will push to social media or email). It might be an interesting model to examine. I especially like the idea of encouraging the longer form writing to happen on personal blogs and then everyone pushing their content into the different XMCA channels. On Sat Dec 13 2014 at 1:39:30 PM HENRY SHONERD wrote: > I especially like Helena?s first suggestion on streamlining the chat: Keep > it short. When someone has something longer to say, could that be an > attachment? I mean something short of a full-blown, peer-juried > publication, but still coherent and well thought out. > Henry > > > On Dec 12, 2014, at 2:49 PM, Helena Worthen > wrote: > > > > I have two suggestions for changing practices, along with subject lines > that accurately track a thread. > > > > 1. Messages no more than two screens long. One is preferred. > > > > 2. No more individually addressed messages. As in, "Tom, you said X" or > "Melissa, you have misunderstood my point." Refer to an individual by > quoting or citing, but speak to the list. > > > > Both of these may not qualify as "modest." I can defend each one, but > will first wait for the *&^&*storm, if one is coming. > > > > Thanks -- > > > > Helena > > :) > > > > Helena Worthen > > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > > On Dec 12, 2014, at 11:43 AM, mike cole wrote: > > > >> Dear xmca0philes > >> My most recent note, regarding discussion of sociocritical theory via > >> Kris's RRQ paper, ?indicates part of my effort to implement modest > changes > >> in the organization of xmca discourse aimed at improving its usefulness > and > >> attractiveness to people (the two being mixed). > >> > >> At the most minimum level, ?we can reduce some sources of > misunderstanding > >> and discoordination by declaring a distinct header for any topic anyone > >> wants to discuss concerning culture and development in their broadest > >> contexts. No guarantee ever that anyone will respond, let alone set off > a > >> stream of responses. But at least we can keep sequence in the threads > >> consistent, and they will be easy to retrieve as a set from the > archiving > >> web page should one want to. > >> > >> There are no policepersons in this process. (But so far as I can tell, > no > >> harm in nagging). > >> > >> Other modifications in the structure of the discourse are possible. It > >> would be nice to know, for example, how many people actually read xmca > from > >> time to time in some form, and how many of our 800+ subscribers have > xmca > >> in their span filters. About 200 people people have posted in the past > >> year. Bruce and I are working on a non-obtrusive way of checking to see > how > >> many silent folks are lurking out of interest and how many are zombies. > >> > >> Early on Annalisa suggested a sort of "Beginner's Manual" which seemed > like > >> a good idea, but it requires some coordinated person power. A group to > >> create such a facility is in the process of formation, and I figure > there > >> should be more about that appearing. > >> > >> A year or more ago Andy and Huw put together a wiki that I think of > >> (perhaps inappropriately) as a kind of "key word wiki" for CHAT. > >> It exists, although it is in quarantine at present to insure that it > will > >> never carry any viruses into the UCSD campus. This seems like > >> a natural part of the xmca pool of resources, and may be useful to the > >> newbiies' materials. > >> > >> We have looked into forums and other media for xmca, but so far as I can > >> tell, there is no general purpose utility that would not require the > >> involvement of significantly more coordinated person power, and probably > >> customizing, et that LCHC can manage. Perhaps I am wrong about this and > the > >> new, great, effortless substitute is at your nearest supermarket. > However, > >> for the moment, we will continue working within the fungible, but > perhaps > >> not entirely elastic, structure of xmca. > >> > >> Now, back to the thread I want to address, > >> Imagination > >> mike > >> > >> -- > >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon Dec 15 08:02:55 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2014 08:02:55 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> Message-ID: Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, thanks to all for the food for thought. Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential around the time emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had seen work on memory before, but not imagination. Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal reproductive? Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of development of imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a relative newcomer to the topic. mike On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. This > business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some weeks in > our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that segmented the > last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. Puns, > according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) > Henry > > > On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole wrote: > > > > Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they are doing > > contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his followers as an > > inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so its of > course > > interesting to see those additional categories emerge. > > > > 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in translation, seems > > awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in this > passage, > > for example, is not a currently used term in counter distinction to > > "memory." > > Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary discourse > > across languages as our explorations with out Russian colleagues have > > illustrated. > > > > That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists who > clearly > > influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still possible to > > include culture in it. > > > > Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, interestingly links > > imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" act. Parts > of > > it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that was also > > "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of creativity and > > imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see that the two > > concepts are linked. > > > > Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself writing. > > mike > > > > > > Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old > approaches > > to a pesum > > > > On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> > >> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it may be worth > >> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to > Imagination > >> in the section on Representation, mediating between Recollection and > >> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive Imagination, (2) > >> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he says leads > to > >> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other words, the > >> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is accomplished through > >> these three grades of Imagination. > >> > >> Andy > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> > >> mike cole wrote: > >> > >>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and Williams. > >>> > >>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am trying > to > >>> mine for empirical > >>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive > >>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination develops. > >>> > >>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that there must > be a > >>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I learned > that > >>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is linked to > >>> memory. > >>> > >>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of anticipation > and > >>> memory. > >>> Imagine that! > >>> mike > >>> > >>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD > >>> wrote: > >>> > >>> > >>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination (starting > with > >>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and provides a > >>>> space > >>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. This, > >>>> coupled > >>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground to take > part > >>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with preconceptions: > >>>> Vera > >>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian Langacker on > >>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, particularly > the > >>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of imagination > and > >>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of temporality: > >>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure), which I > >>>> think > >>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both individual > and > >>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > >>>> Henry > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss > wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > >>>>> > >>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* and the > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> analogy > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> to *gap-filling* > >>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > >>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion of > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> "structures > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored under > the > >>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of modalities > that > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> hang > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing that is > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> forming > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we think > >>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* > >>>>> Larry > >>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> Mike and Larry, > >>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how jazzed up I > am > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> now > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as Larry > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> construes > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various triads, > finally > >>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of the > mind, as > >>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa? fuera. > >>>>>> Fractally yours, > >>>>>> Henry > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached are two > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> articles > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists like > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> Zaporozhets > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of imagination in a > >>>>>>> manner > >>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of productive > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> imagination. I > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no intention of > doing > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> so. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the attached > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> texts. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I came upon > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> the > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked at > several > >>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne and I > >>>>>>> argued > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> in > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of access > to > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> the > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. Moreover, > such > >>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the > perception/imagination > >>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance to Kris's > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> paper > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns about > the > >>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps they will > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> prove > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> useful for those interested. > >>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > with an > >>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From kbrown@csusm.edu Mon Dec 15 11:29:48 2014 From: kbrown@csusm.edu (Katherine Brown) Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2014 19:29:48 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Annotated Bibliography Project (ABP) In-Reply-To: <4B3241AC-33FA-4CCE-B9F3-B41BA510E9BA@gmail.com> References: <1418609555710.2387@unm.edu>, <4B3241AC-33FA-4CCE-B9F3-B41BA510E9BA@gmail.com> Message-ID: <1418671787075.64299@csusm.edu> Greetings to all I?m typically more involved in conversations about lchc and its many forms of distributed collaboration than xmca per se, and in any case post very infrequently to any list. I think there are many of us lurkers and infrequent posters, even with many years of being on this or other list(s) who enjoy many of the threads and this way of being. I hope that this continues to be an ok way to be in the community because for me its a matter of too little time and too many other email-based tasks to manage. But I enjoy hearing others? voices and learning from the conversations. Recent suggestions for xmca have me reflecting on the labor of the multi-year effort to create lchcwiki (which several of us spent many years on from 2008 9-ish and continue to tinker with where we have time.) Even with all that was existing to pull from and how helpful many generations of people, alumni and friends of lchc were then and continue to be we are continually surprised by how much work it requires to keep such an effort alive, even at minimal maintenance mode, with all the various demands on people?s time. Anyway, what drew my attention was familiarity in the kinds of suggestions for invigorating communities and creating new resources, wikis, archives and discussion spaces. Thought it was worth noting the relevance of a lot of history on the lchc website archive and lchc wiki pages and possibly elsewhere others have mentioned that I?ve missed, when searching for key texts. I appreciate prior suggestions from members of the community to read around and look at such sources, (and perhaps add to them where indicated) as a way to help any person learn, look at models of others' efforts, and save time as they go about creating something new, (given the work entailed by any number of the suggestions made for enhancing xmca). Thanks for your time, Katherine Brown Associate Professor, Communication CSU San Marcos (UCSD and LCHC alumna and one of several co-editors of lchcwiki) ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Helena Worthen Sent: Sunday, December 14, 2014 8:55 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Annotated Bibliography Project (ABP) I like the idea of ranking them 1-5, from intro to very complex. H Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com On Dec 14, 2014, at 6:12 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Esteemed discussants! > > > The Annotated Bibliography Project > > Helena and I have decided as a part of the Newcomer's Project to compile a list of important sociocultural texts and incorporate annotations to these entries (ideally to host in the wiki??). > > > So I'm initiating a request: Would you kindly offer up texts (APA format is gratefully accepted). This project is deemed The Annotated Bibliography Project or possibly The ABP, or just The AB, or perhaps affectionately "the alpha-beta"!! > > > Then in addition, if you please, submit with your entry(ies) a small comment explaining the text(s) and why it(they) is(are) important (We'll keep your name attached, but if this is problematic, email your list privately to me and your name will be removed from the entry). Any comment should be 100 words or less, this will be adhered to as strictly as possible. > > > Helena and I will be working together to edit these entries and their comments (initially anyway) just to be certain there is some cohesion. > > > Designations for Reading Level > > Please provide a designation for the text as to whether it is a beginning or advanced text. > > > We might use a grading system of 1 through 5 along these lines: > > ================================================= > > 1. Introductory (no previous exposure to texts by Vygotsky, et al is expected) > > 2. Beginning (some familiarity with introductory texts and themes). > > 3. Intermediate (quite familiar with introductory and beginning texts and themes). > > 4. Advanced (quite familiar with intro, beginning, and intermediate texts and themes). > > 5. Master (requires mastery of full gamut of texts and themes). > > > More About Comments > > The idea beyond a compiled list, is also to create a comment context (how, TBD) with each text possessing a cluster of comments. List members visiting the wiki page may post comments concerning the text (100 words or less). This would be a space in which controversial aspects of the text might be noted, or other histories to consider. > > > Comments are to provide sense to novices and experts alike; they are a means for setting context for any given text-item. Further, by having pluralities of comments (again, each comment 100 words or less), deeper contexts will likely emerge and provide a different quality of access to novices, by revealing deeper understandings usually lost to novices, who can only note surface features. > > > "Expansions" > > Thinking out loud, it is entirely possible that substantial debates might ensue about contexts of a text. This would entail a requirement to "take it outside." In that case, this should (ideally) manifest in a separate wikipage and that could be linked to from the ABP wikipage. So anyone who has to air something out will have the space to do so. > > > What Goes In > > Since this list will be authored by the community, it is assumed that this list will be sanctioned by the community as important texts to the community here. > > > Helena thought we could do a top 100, which is a good large number. However, I have a sense that spots will fill quickly, so I'd prefer to see what happens. Regardless, 100 is a good number to shoot for! I don't think debating over what should be put in or taken off the list would be fruitful, so if it grows beyond 100, the more the merrier. And, in that case of a large and long list, annotations (comments) will enable a visitor to decide for oneself after evaluating said comments what is worth reading. > > > Reading as a Community Effort > > One aspect of being a member of xmca is the READING involved!!! It is my experience that academics are faced with little time to read, though this is not restricted to academics. :) Annotations can assist in breaking down the chore of reading by providing some "pre-reading" content, which might save time over all for everyone. Of course, those who are retired have more free time and can annotate away! > > > Thusly: from each according to his ability, to each according to his need. :) > > > With this in mind, who knows, the annotated bibliography may become as valued by experts as it would by novices!!! Imagine that! > > > To The Task; Take Action: The Takeaway > > So if you would like to send (or post to the list) your choices and the accompanying (1-5) reading level designation, with your comment (100 words or less), I will start collecting entries and post to the list as it grows by 10s. > > > If you don't have time to submit comments, we will try to farm out the comments to someone else, but at least the text will make the list, so don't restrain yourself from making a submission because you don't want to comment. The inversion of this is feel free to submit if you already see a text on the list, just submit your comment and indicate its text, and your comment will be added to the entry. > > > The Final Form > > Once the list is launched, there will the text in APA, the abstract, page length or word count (if that makes sense), and links pointing where to find these texts (such as marxists.org or perhaps a storage bin at XMCA, but also perhaps to the publisher's pages). This will be hosted at the wiki, I anticipate. > > > > Kind regards, > > > Annalisa > > > > > > From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Dec 15 12:07:20 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2014 20:07:20 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Annotated Bibliography Project (ABP) In-Reply-To: References: <1418609555710.2387@unm.edu> <1418622071354.57240@unm.edu>, Message-ID: <1418674039953.79220@unm.edu> Hi Greg, Thanks for your message and suggestions therein! There is no need to fear that texts will get left out, because texts aren't going to be voted upon. This is why I'd indicated that if the 100 count goes larger, then it goes larger. The idea is to create a space for novices to pick their own way through the forest of texts and to provide some cues by a (1-5) reading level designation (RLD) and deeper contextual references with the comments, so novices can pick their way through. The only groundswell required is to offer texts you believe germane and your comments! Helena and I will do the rest! When the list is ready for prime time, there is nothing that says it cannot be shaped and edited according to the communities needs, we are only writing in pixels, not pen and ink, and certainly not cement! :) As far as copyright, this won't be an issue because if there is a copyright issue, the list item will only be listed as a citation. I don't think listing a citation is against copyright, nor listing an abstract. So we got you covered! The ABP is one part of the Newcomer's Project that Helena and I are doing as a first step in a larger project. So if you wanted to create learning modules for novices, I don't see why we couldn't incorporate that in this cluster of texts intended to create access for novices. These modules you suggest could link to different areas of the Newcomer's pages, no problem! No one is going to argue over definitions of words in the comments for the texts. The comments are to help with reading, not to argue controversies, and this is what the "take it outside" pages can be for. "Taking it outside" is not because we want to stop debate, but to frame them contextually and allow newcomers to view and decide for themselves. THAT there is a controversy is a good thing for a novice to be aware of while reading. These controversies will likely never settle, so I had no intention of trying to do that here. I hope my thoughts on this concern provides some relaxation! I'm glad to hear everyone's comments and concerns. This shows how much you all care. None of this is falling on deaf ears! Thank you for coming forward and speaking up! Kind regards, Annalisa From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Dec 15 12:30:15 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2014 20:30:15 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Annotated Bibliography Project (ABP) In-Reply-To: <1418671787075.64299@csusm.edu> References: <1418609555710.2387@unm.edu>, <4B3241AC-33FA-4CCE-B9F3-B41BA510E9BA@gmail.com>, <1418671787075.64299@csusm.edu> Message-ID: <1418675415023.80428@unm.edu> Hi Katherine! My sense is that there will be a best of breed the more people make known their preferences. I think it's great to know the efforts made concerning the history of the list. Helena and I intend to create a summary of the historical texts so newcomers have an easy access to understanding how the list came to be what it is today. Everything helps! One thing Helena and I hope to accomplish for the Newcomer's Project is to capture preferences and conventions so newcomers can be cued to the culture, which is sometimes hard to understand because this is a list, not a picnic, nor a conference, nor a dinner party, where those contexts have their own scripts and are fairly well-known. :) I myself seem to have crossed the grain, unintentionally, as a newcomer, but I certainly don't mean to walk on anyone's toes. The thing about cyberspace is that it has no space, which I'd imagine means there's room for a lot of everything! It's the "navigation through everything" that is tricky, and so we're just trying to help by setting up some possible structure that enable and empower newcomers. I hope I'm not being condescending at all, I only want to be transparent. If you have some page links to share of places to look at the lchc wiki, Helena and I would be pleased to look at these other resources you clearly do not believe should be overlooked. Then she and I can discuss how to integrate this into what we've got going. Thanks for your care and attention! Kind regards, Annalisa From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Mon Dec 15 13:12:16 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2014 14:12:16 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Annotated Bibliography Project (ABP) In-Reply-To: <1418674039953.79220@unm.edu> References: <1418609555710.2387@unm.edu> <1418622071354.57240@unm.edu> <1418674039953.79220@unm.edu> Message-ID: Annalisa, Might be worth considering Greg M's suggestion about "upvoting". It could be intimidating for a newbie to confront 100+ text citations with annotations. I fear that would prove an overwhelming choice for a newbie. Instead, it seems like it would be nice for the newbie to have the list sorted based on which ones the XMCA community sees as the most important. Alternatively, you and Helena could come up with some kind of sorting into "essential" texts to start with (note that however you do it, this category would not be coterminous with the difficulty category - there may be an "essential" text that is not an easy read). But I'm thinking that maybe you have already addressed this issue. Apologies if so. -greg On Mon, Dec 15, 2014 at 1:07 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hi Greg, > > Thanks for your message and suggestions therein! > > There is no need to fear that texts will get left out, because texts > aren't going to be voted upon. This is why I'd indicated that if the 100 > count goes larger, then it goes larger. The idea is to create a space for > novices to pick their own way through the forest of texts and to provide > some cues by a (1-5) reading level designation (RLD) and deeper contextual > references with the comments, so novices can pick their way through. > > The only groundswell required is to offer texts you believe germane and > your comments! Helena and I will do the rest! When the list is ready for > prime time, there is nothing that says it cannot be shaped and edited > according to the communities needs, we are only writing in pixels, not pen > and ink, and certainly not cement! :) > > As far as copyright, this won't be an issue because if there is a > copyright issue, the list item will only be listed as a citation. I don't > think listing a citation is against copyright, nor listing an abstract. So > we got you covered! > > The ABP is one part of the Newcomer's Project that Helena and I are doing > as a first step in a larger project. So if you wanted to create learning > modules for novices, I don't see why we couldn't incorporate that in this > cluster of texts intended to create access for novices. These modules you > suggest could link to different areas of the Newcomer's pages, no problem! > > No one is going to argue over definitions of words in the comments for the > texts. The comments are to help with reading, not to argue controversies, > and this is what the "take it outside" pages can be for. "Taking it > outside" is not because we want to stop debate, but to frame them > contextually and allow newcomers to view and decide for themselves. THAT > there is a controversy is a good thing for a novice to be aware of while > reading. These controversies will likely never settle, so I had no > intention of trying to do that here. I hope my thoughts on this concern > provides some relaxation! > > I'm glad to hear everyone's comments and concerns. This shows how much you > all care. None of this is falling on deaf ears! Thank you for coming > forward and speaking up! > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From dkellogg60@gmail.com Mon Dec 15 16:19:04 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2014 09:19:04 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> Message-ID: On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division between higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because Ribot is an associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of attention. And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from forest to farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between the two great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical world of the forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses in life and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" (that is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the farm,where written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter months are wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter talking animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has to be more voluntary. Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that underpins Ribot here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out the LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices really are the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, there isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and animal imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of volitional attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without a theory of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at all. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole wrote: > > Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, thanks to all > for the food for thought. > > Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential around the time > emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had seen work on > memory before, but not imagination. > > Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal reproductive? > Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of development of > imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a relative > newcomer to the topic. > mike > > On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD > wrote: > > > > Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. This > > business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some weeks in > > our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that segmented the > > last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. Puns, > > according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) > > Henry > > > > > On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they are doing > > > contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his followers as an > > > inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so its of > > course > > > interesting to see those additional categories emerge. > > > > > > 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in translation, seems > > > awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in this > > passage, > > > for example, is not a currently used term in counter distinction to > > > "memory." > > > Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary discourse > > > across languages as our explorations with out Russian colleagues have > > > illustrated. > > > > > > That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists who > > clearly > > > influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still possible > to > > > include culture in it. > > > > > > Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, interestingly > links > > > imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" act. > Parts > > of > > > it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that was > also > > > "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of creativity and > > > imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see that the > two > > > concepts are linked. > > > > > > Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself writing. > > > mike > > > > > > > > > Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old > > approaches > > > to a pesum > > > > > > On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > >> > > >> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it may be > worth > > >> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to > > Imagination > > >> in the section on Representation, mediating between Recollection and > > >> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive Imagination, (2) > > >> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he says > leads > > to > > >> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other words, the > > >> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is accomplished > through > > >> these three grades of Imagination. > > >> > > >> Andy > > >> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > >> *Andy Blunden* > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >> > > >> > > >> mike cole wrote: > > >> > > >>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and Williams. > > >>> > > >>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am > trying > > to > > >>> mine for empirical > > >>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive > > >>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination develops. > > >>> > > >>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that there must > > be a > > >>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I learned > > that > > >>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is linked > to > > >>> memory. > > >>> > > >>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of anticipation > > and > > >>> memory. > > >>> Imagine that! > > >>> mike > > >>> > > >>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD > > >>> wrote: > > >>> > > >>> > > >>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination (starting > > with > > >>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and provides a > > >>>> space > > >>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. This, > > >>>> coupled > > >>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground to take > > part > > >>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with > preconceptions: > > >>>> Vera > > >>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian Langacker on > > >>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, particularly > > the > > >>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of imagination > > and > > >>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of temporality: > > >>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure), which > I > > >>>> think > > >>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both individual > > and > > >>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > > >>>> Henry > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss > > wrote: > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* and the > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>> analogy > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>>> to *gap-filling* > > >>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > > >>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion of > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>> "structures > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored under > > the > > >>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of modalities > > that > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>> hang > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing that is > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>> forming > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we think > > >>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* > > >>>>> Larry > > >>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD > > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>> wrote: > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>>> Mike and Larry, > > >>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how jazzed up > I > > am > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>> now > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as Larry > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>> construes > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various triads, > > finally > > >>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of the > > mind, as > > >>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa? > fuera. > > >>>>>> Fractally yours, > > >>>>>> Henry > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole wrote: > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached are two > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>> articles > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists like > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>> Zaporozhets > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of imagination in a > > >>>>>>> manner > > >>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of productive > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>> imagination. I > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no intention of > > doing > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>> so. > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the attached > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>> texts. > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I came > upon > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>> the > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked at > > several > > >>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne and I > > >>>>>>> argued > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>> in > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of access > > to > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>> the > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. Moreover, > > such > > >>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the > > perception/imagination > > >>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance to > Kris's > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>> paper > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns about > > the > > >>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps they > will > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>> prove > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>>> useful for those interested. > > >>>>>>> mike > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> -- > > >>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > > with an > > >>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >> > > >> > > > > > > -- > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > From hshonerd@gmail.com Mon Dec 15 16:21:41 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2014 17:21:41 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <1418518440890.80489@unm.edu> Message-ID: I have been reading Modell (Thank you, Bob Lake!) and Ribot (I can?t remember or find who proferred Ribot, but thank you!). -Modell is a psychoanalyst who talks only, as far as I can tell, about individual trauma. Could that be extended to collective trauma? -Ribot (NOT ROBOT!) finds creative imagination to be rooted in movement. How felicitous is that for activity theory? Henry > On Dec 14, 2014, at 6:41 PM, Robert Lake wrote: > > Hi Annalisa, > You are not alone in suggesting the role of metaphoric process in > generative imagination (which can take us > beyond reflective imagination). To illustrate the difference between these > two aspects, I think about how the early Bob Dylan sounded and looked like > Woody Guthrie, but after he wrote songs like* Blowin in the Wind* and* > Positively 4th Street he was "in his own house" *to quote Neil Young > describing Jimi Hendrix. Consider the origin of the word metaphor itself: > Late 15th century: from French *m?taphore*, via Latin from Greek *metaphora*, > from* metapherein* ?to transfer.? > As Vera stated, metaphor unites disparate images, bridges old concepts in > ways that create newly fashioned ones. > > > I have not posted anything since I posed a question about the role of > subconscious or even unconscious processes in higher levels of > consciousness. I know that Henry S. might have been worried that I was a > follower of Jungian collective racial memory or some such thing. Not really > but I do think that imagination and creative problem solving can occur at > times in subconscious metaphoric processes. Consider the chapter linked > here from Arnold Modell's *Imagination and the Meaningful Brain.* He quotes > from the Einstein and his colleague Hadamard and a few others to support > his suggestions. > > http://www.bostonneuropsa.net/PDF%20Files/Imagination%20and%20the%20Meaningful%20Brain%20-%20A.%20Modell%20-%20Chapter%202.pdf > > > *Robert Lake* > > On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 7:54 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >> Esteemed discussants, >> >> Having finished the paper, and considering Mike's comments, I might >> suggest that metaphorical reasoning is an essential engine to imagination, >> and I wonder if I say that because impressions taken of the perceived >> object as it presents itself to me (the Big Dipper) is the identical to >> taking the object as a product of seeing-as (a star constellation as a Big >> Dipper), is the identical to taking the object to represent something else >> entirely (such as Wittgenstein's triangle as a mountain, as an arrow, etc., >> or a flag to represent a nation). >> >> In other words, that imagination begins as a perceptual process which then >> develops into metaphorical reasoning and perhaps continues on to more >> complex forms of imagining and conceptual renderings. There is definitely a >> dynamic relationship to perception and imagination. >> >> If metaphor isn't THE essential engine, it must serve as a priming process >> (arising from embodied experience in the world), possibly in the same way >> the gesture manifests into the word and its meaning. At least that's how I >> see it at the moment...even though I'm only looking at pixels on my screen >> as I write this... >> >> (Thinking out loud, but I hope not too loud). >> >> Kind regards, >> >> Annalisa >> >> >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> on behalf of mike cole >> Sent: Saturday, December 13, 2014 2:02 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >> >> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and Williams. >> >> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am trying to >> mine for empirical >> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive >> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination develops. >> >> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that there must be a >> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I learned that >> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is linked to >> memory. >> >> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of anticipation and >> memory. >> Imagine that! >> mike >> >> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD >> wrote: >>> >>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination (starting with >>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and provides a >> space >>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. This, >> coupled >>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground to take part >>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with preconceptions: >> Vera >>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian Langacker on >>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, particularly the >>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of imagination and >>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of temporality: >>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure), which I >> think >>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both individual and >>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. >>> Henry >>> >>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss >> wrote: >>>> >>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. >>>> >>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* and the >>> analogy >>>> to *gap-filling* >>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. >>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion of >>> "structures >>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored under the >>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of modalities that >>> hang >>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing that is >>> forming >>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we think >>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* >>>> Larry >>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD >>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Mike and Larry, >>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how jazzed up I am >>> now >>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as Larry >>> construes >>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various triads, finally >>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of the mind, >> as >>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa? fuera. >>>>> Fractally yours, >>>>> Henry >>>>> >>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached are two >>> articles >>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. >>>>>> >>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists like >>>>> Zaporozhets >>>>>> and his students who studied the development of imagination in a >> manner >>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of productive >>>>> imagination. I >>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no intention of doing >>> so. >>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the attached >>> texts. >>>>>> >>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I came upon >>> the >>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked at >> several >>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne and I >> argued >>>>> in >>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of access to >>> the >>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. Moreover, >> such >>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the perception/imagination >>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance to Kris's >>> paper >>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns about >> the >>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. >>>>>> >>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps they will >>> prove >>>>>> useful for those interested. >>>>>> mike >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >> an >>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> >> > > -- > > *Robert Lake Ed.D.*Associate Professor > Social Foundations of Education > Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading > Georgia Southern University > Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group > P. O. Box 8144 > Phone: (912) 478-0355 > Fax: (912) 478-5382 > Statesboro, GA 30460 From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon Dec 15 17:18:22 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2014 17:18:22 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Annotated Bibliography Project (ABP) In-Reply-To: References: <1418609555710.2387@unm.edu> <1418622071354.57240@unm.edu> <1418674039953.79220@unm.edu> Message-ID: Seems like things are cooking on the xmca infrastructure work. A note. Whichever directions the "Newcomer Facility" takes, it seems two issues are worth keeping in mind. First, XMCA archives contain a very large collection of core materials, as does the lchc wiki. Second, to the extent that xmca is a scholarly educational undertaking, we have felt justified in sharing key texts. I assume we are on thin ice according to the letter of the American system of information distribution, which is of course being more and more privatized. In so far as XMCA contributes to the educational mission of the University of California, I assume that LCHC, a research unit that studies the cultural organization of social diversity, is engaged in its legitimate activities. In thinking about the future, it seems worthwhile to give thought to the institutional foundations you anticipate. The thing about institutions is that, they are not fated to disappear within 100 or less years. Built as they are from human labor, they can sometimes endure for quite a while. Consider formal schooling as a non-random example. So with XMCA. Linking it to an official state educational institution puts it in what is left of the public sector, and legitimates the exchange of ideas for the public good. Perhaps developing additional facilities such as the newcomers information center will further legitimate its educational function. Hard to tell. mike On Mon, Dec 15, 2014 at 1:12 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > Annalisa, > Might be worth considering Greg M's suggestion about "upvoting". It could > be intimidating for a newbie to confront 100+ text citations with > annotations. I fear that would prove an overwhelming choice for a newbie. > Instead, it seems like it would be nice for the newbie to have the list > sorted based on which ones the XMCA community sees as the most important. > Alternatively, you and Helena could come up with some kind of sorting into > "essential" texts to start with (note that however you do it, this category > would not be coterminous with the difficulty category - there may be an > "essential" text that is not an easy read). > But I'm thinking that maybe you have already addressed this issue. > Apologies if so. > -greg > > On Mon, Dec 15, 2014 at 1:07 PM, Annalisa Aguilar > wrote: > > > Hi Greg, > > > > Thanks for your message and suggestions therein! > > > > There is no need to fear that texts will get left out, because texts > > aren't going to be voted upon. This is why I'd indicated that if the 100 > > count goes larger, then it goes larger. The idea is to create a space for > > novices to pick their own way through the forest of texts and to provide > > some cues by a (1-5) reading level designation (RLD) and deeper > contextual > > references with the comments, so novices can pick their way through. > > > > The only groundswell required is to offer texts you believe germane and > > your comments! Helena and I will do the rest! When the list is ready for > > prime time, there is nothing that says it cannot be shaped and edited > > according to the communities needs, we are only writing in pixels, not > pen > > and ink, and certainly not cement! :) > > > > As far as copyright, this won't be an issue because if there is a > > copyright issue, the list item will only be listed as a citation. I don't > > think listing a citation is against copyright, nor listing an abstract. > So > > we got you covered! > > > > The ABP is one part of the Newcomer's Project that Helena and I are doing > > as a first step in a larger project. So if you wanted to create learning > > modules for novices, I don't see why we couldn't incorporate that in this > > cluster of texts intended to create access for novices. These modules you > > suggest could link to different areas of the Newcomer's pages, no > problem! > > > > No one is going to argue over definitions of words in the comments for > the > > texts. The comments are to help with reading, not to argue controversies, > > and this is what the "take it outside" pages can be for. "Taking it > > outside" is not because we want to stop debate, but to frame them > > contextually and allow newcomers to view and decide for themselves. THAT > > there is a controversy is a good thing for a novice to be aware of while > > reading. These controversies will likely never settle, so I had no > > intention of trying to do that here. I hope my thoughts on this concern > > provides some relaxation! > > > > I'm glad to hear everyone's comments and concerns. This shows how much > you > > all care. None of this is falling on deaf ears! Thank you for coming > > forward and speaking up! > > > > Kind regards, > > > > Annalisa > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From lpscholar2@gmail.com Mon Dec 15 18:08:46 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2014 18:08:46 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context In-Reply-To: References: <2E5441F3-C50E-478B-BCCA-EA180B2591A3@ucla.edu> <70AEA66B-2185-4863-A4A8-FE86A87FCB43@gmail.com> Message-ID: Kris, I have been engaged with your explorations of new ways or paths of creating *hybrid third spaces*. Your comment that forming third spaces: "involved intentional moves that 1) brought together and reorganized different discourses, cultural practices, histories, and genres that were generally considered incompatible or in tension with one another; 2) preserved and foregrounded their tension; and 3) sought to maintain the value, history, and integrity of the everyday vis-?-vis the dominant form, especially in light of historical power relations. The syncretic testimonio is such an example. A nod here to Cindy Cruz?s powerful and informing work on testimonio. > (I have a new piece in press which you read, Mike, that attempts to elaborate the syncretic approach." Kris, I hope we can organize THIS thread to stay with your attempts to "elaborate the syncretic approach". Your section of the paper on page 149, 150 *Rising to the Concrete* gives a clear example of the hybrid nature of your playing with academic and everyday language and not privileging the scientific language. I believe your work is returning to a time when our language games were not so divided into fact/fiction modes. Your elaborating "ecologically valid" genres "DEVELOPED IN THE COGNITIVE, SOCIAL, AND HISTORICAL PRACTICES OF ALL THE PARTICIPANTS" captures the radical mashing together of the young and the old as "syncretic testimonio" Honouring the everyday language on an equal footing with the scientific *styles* of writing. THIS mashing up as "hybrid text" including BOTH autobiography and intersubjectively developed texts. I read this *new* way or path as a return to rhetorical, persausive ways of composing meaning. Raymond Williams describes epochal *styles* of orienting to the world that begin in structures of feeling [he considered the term *structures of experience* but preferred *structures of feelings* to capture their felt *structure* as a set of elements that are mashed together]. Our current dominant *style* structures the scientific genres as *factual* while the imaginal [social dreaming etc] are *merely* subjective and personal and idiosyncretic. Kris, your "syncretic testimonio" is seeing through the impoverishment of THAT dominant genre and playing with forms that are BOTH subjective [autobiography] AND intersubjective as historically effected consciousness. You are working within a nondominant ecology but you are gesturing toward a much more radical turn that the dominant culture must take. Raymond Williams within the Marxism and Literature tradition is working also for these radical turns. I personally also see the hermeneutical turn as compatible with your stated goal to develop a program oriented towards a form of "cosmopolitanism" [see page 148 of Kris' article] This paper is a wonderful example of "rising to the concrete" or imaginatively "rising off the ground and returning to the ground" [an imaginal path of social intersubjective dreaming] Larry On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 12:51 PM, mike cole [?] [?][?][?] So much for trying to organized xmca discussion by threads! It hard to keep track of the jumble of the email flow! I assume those who are following the KrisRRQ thread will see this. reveling in the rain mike > > On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 11:42 AM, Kris Gutierrez > wrote: > > > > Luisa, thanks. I have always been a lurker on XMCA but can never keep > > with all the discussions. I?m hoping the discussions will get us into > > the questions you raise and I?m happy to post references and pdfs too > > (e.g., Tejeda?s decolonizing and Espinoza?s article on Educational > > Sanctuaries). Espinoza?s social dreaming is discussed in the RRQ article > > and I?ll look to see where else he might have written about it. I don?t > > know when the syncretic piece will be out but will check. Thanks for > your > > interest. > > > > > > In particular, I hope we can also discuss the ways the social imagination > > (embodied and realized through Boal's teatro del oprimido, historicizing > > pedagogies, and syncretic texts, etc.) were central to the ubiquitous > > "future oriented" organization of the activities that Mike points > out?that > > is, the process of becoming historical actors. > > > > > > > > Kris > > > > > > > > Kris Gutierrez > > gutierkd@gmail.com > > > > Kris D. Guti?rrez > > Professor > > Graduate School of Education > > 5629 Tolman Hall #1670 > > University of California, Berkeley > > Berkeley CA 94720-1670 > > > > Distinguished Professor > > Learning Sciences and Literacy > > School of Education > > University of Colorado, Boulder > > > > > > > On Dec 12, 2014, at 11:25 AM, Luisa Aires wrote: > > > > > > Dear Professor Kris Gutierrez > > > > > > It is delightful to see you here in XMCA :-) > > > > > > > > > > > > I must confess that after reading your post, I am going to read your > > text again because you added so much interesting information about MSLI > > program (for example, I didn?t know that MSLI had strong links with 5th > > dimension). > > > > > > I would like to learn about Chicano/a and ethnic studies, Tejeda?s > > decolonizing framework and pedagogies, and Manuel Espinoza?s notions of > > social dreaming. How can we access the most important references of those > > theories? > > > > > > One more question (we need to take advantage of your presence here ;-): > > when and how can we access your new piece about syncretic approach? > > > > > > > > > > > > Best wishes, > > > > > > Lu?sa A. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > Department of Education and Distance Learning, Universidade Aberta > > > Centre of Studies on Migrations and Intercultural Relations (CEMRI) > > > R. Amial, n? 752, 4200-055 Porto, Portugal > > > laires@uab.pt > > > www.uab.pt > > > > > > > > > 2014-12-12 17:55 GMT+00:00 Kris Gutierrez > gutierkd@gmail.com>>: > > > > > > I don?t know if this went through last night.; so I?m reposting. > > apologies if you get it twice > > > > > > > > > > On Dec 12, 2014, at 12:45 AM, Kris Gutierrez > > wrote: > > > > > > > > Re: Mike/Miguel, (Mike, XMCA has a weird email address for me and I > > am unable to post; would you post if it doesn?t come through?) > > > > > > > > Miguel, who has deep knowledge of an important time in the > > Migrant Program (MSLI), rightly points out that the development of > > sociocritical > > > > > > > > literacies/ syncretic approaches to learning must be understood in > > the context of the larger designed ecology and its history. And I can?t > > begin to do > > > > > > > it justice here. But here are some reflections. > > > > > > > > Building on a decade of earlier designs that brought together Freire > > and cultural historical theoretical perspectives, and Chicano/a and > ethnic > > studies > > > > > > > > to create new forms of teaching and learning, and theorizations of > > the Third Space that preceded the development of the month long migrant > > > > > > > program, MSLI was designed as a hybrid space organized around an > > historicizing pedagogy, informed, deepened, and augmented by > > > > > > > > Tejeda?s robust decolonizing framework and pedagogies, and Manuel > > Espinoza?s notions of social dreaming and the importance of students > > > > > > > becoming historical actors who could "who invoke the past in order to > > re-mediate it so that it becomes a resource for current and future > > action.? Their > > > > > > > work is key to understanding the MSLI ecology. Our long-term 5th > > Dimension work (UC Links), its theoretical underpinnings, and the > > pedagogical > > > > > > > approaches to undergraduate education and learning in informal > > contexts were also a part of the mix, as most of the MSLI instructional > > team also > > > > > > > was involved in 5th D work. Of significance, all MSLI staff had > > extensive knowledge of CHAT, critical pedagogies, social theories, > > disciplinary > > > > > > > learning, as well as direct experience with and in immigrant, > migrant, > > and non dominant communities, their histories, repertoires, lived > > experiences, > > > > > > > and possibilities. > > > > > > > > There are many other important contributions of others I could > > elaborate here that contributed to the iterative design, re-mediation, > and > > > > > > > > implementation and sustainability of this program, including > > Miguel's. Consider Shirin Vossoughi?s recent MCA article, Social > > Analytic Artifacts > > > > > > > Made Concrete,? in which she beautifully elaborates the ways > > social analytic artifacts served as tools ?that deepened and propelled > the > > collective > > > > > > > analysis of social problems? for migrant students and the > > instructional teams. > > > > > > > > Our collective efforts and design were oriented toward > > transformation and change and had multiple aims: sociopolitical, > cultural, > > educational, > > > > > > > > including reframing education and learning in ways that brought the > > everyday and scientific (school-based) concepts into conversation with > one > > > > > > > > another (a different kind of conversation to be sure). The goal in > > this regard was to put scientific and everyday concepts on a more level > > playing field > > > > > > > > such that scientific concepts were not placed in an hierarchical > > relationship with the everyday. Disciplinary learning and critical forms > > of literacy were > > > > > > > > placed in conversation, their tensions made the object of analysis > > ?all toward the production of more meaningful and expansive forms of > > learning. > > > > > > > > Mike and Yrjo have written important work on this, and, Carol Lee?s > > work is another robust example. > > > > > > > > And, of course, there is a history of work among researchers in the > > sociocultural tradition who have attended to the consequential nature of > > everyday > > > > > > > > knowledge and practices in expansive ways (e.g., Scribner & Cole, > > 1973; Lave, 1988; 2012; Lave & Rogoff, 1984; Rogoff, 2003, as key > examples > > of > > > > > > > > work that informs this thinking, including ongoing conversations and > > collaborations with and weekly meetings at LCHC with Mike, Yrjo, > > Olga,Vasquez > > > > > > > > and others). > > > > > > > > > > > > Our approach to consequential learning involved the development > > of syncretic approaches to literacy and social scientific thinking. The > > design > > > > > > > > involved intentional moves that 1) brought together and reorganized > > different discourses, cultural practices, histories, and genres that were > > generally considered incompatible or in tension with one another; 2) > > preserved and foregrounded their tension; and 3) sought to maintain the > > value, history, and integrity of the everyday vis-?-vis the dominant > form, > > especially in light of historical power relations. The syncretic > > testimonio is such an example. A nod here to Cindy Cruz?s powerful and > > informing work on testimonio. > > > > (I have a new piece in press which you read, Mike, that attempts to > > elaborate the syncretic approach). > > > > > > > > A footnote on the sociocritical article. The RRQ Sociocritical > > Literacy article was the publication of my AERA Scribner Lecture (2005 > for > > the 2004 Scribner Award for my work on the Third Space; the lecture and > its > > published piece were my attempt to further theorize the Third Space, > using > > MSLI as a robust example. > > > > > > > > Hope this provides more context and food for thought. excuse typos > > and lapses, it?s late. Kris > > > > > > > > > > > > Kris D. Guti?rrez > > > > Professor > > > > Graduate School of Education > > > > 5629 Tolman Hall #1670 > > > > University of California, Berkeley > > > > Berkeley CA 94720-1670 > > > > > > > > Distinguished Professor > > > > Learning Sciences and Literacy > > > > School of Education > > > > University of Colorado, Boulder > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >> On Dec 11, 2014, at 6:49 AM, mike cole > mcole@ucsd.edu> >> wrote: > > > >> > > > >> Thanks for the additional info. > > > >> All makes sense to me. > > > >> Mike > > > >> > > > >> On Wednesday, December 10, 2014, Zavala, Miguel < > > > >> mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu > mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu> > >> wrote: > > > >> > > > >>> While the focus is on public education, any space is amenable for > > > >>> analysis. We sometimes get issues from parent organizers, student > > > >>> organizations, interviews of students fighting for social justice > in > > > >>> college campuses. Formal, non-formal, institutional, > > non-institutional, > > > >>> etc. will work. > > > >>> > > > >>> If the submission focuses on 'praxis', on responses and resistance > > to the > > > >>> neoliberal privatization of education, any space and sustained > > activity, > > > >>> etc. is worth looking at-- but a connection should be drawn to how > it > > > >>> deliberately responds to neoliberalism and its messy tentacles, > > perhaps > > > >>> highlighting possible worlds and social dreams. > > > >>> > > > >>> A connection can definitely be drawn between sociocritical studies > > and > > > >>> this topic, certainly. I believe the work we did in MSLI (I was an > > > >>> integral member of MSLI for 3 years) was in many ways creating > > alternative > > > >>> spaces and social dreams; in a way it was a bottom-up approach of > > building > > > >>> consciousness and I think Freire would have been proud of our work. > > As > > > >>> lead instructor, Carlos Tejeda's decolonizing pedagogies framework > > lead to > > > >>> some beautiful, creative activity in that space, for many years. > As > > an > > > >>> instantiation of sociocritical literacies, I would say the work > Kris > > > >>> outlines is definitely a great example of "responses to > > neoliberalism" and > > > >>> was here and there a part of our talk/framing as we moved > > pedagogically. > > > >>> > > > >>> As an editor of the journal, the 'constraint' we do have is that > > > >>> submissions be written for a general audience; I know that is > > ambiguous. > > > >>> Keep in mind that the articles get read by our members in ARE, > their > > > >>> students, they are sometimes used as political education in > > conferences, > > > >>> in some instances reading circles in non-formal community settings. > > > >>> > > > >>> -Miguel > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >>> On 12/10/14 10:24 PM, "mike cole" > mcole@ucsd.edu> > > > > wrote: > > > >>> > > > >>>> How broad is your mandates, Miguel? Does it extend to after > school? > > Seems > > > >>>> like it would help to know the kinds of efforts you consider > > exemplary > > > >>>> classics. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> Does this topic fit in with sociocritical studies? > > > >>>> Mike > > > >>>> > > > >>>> On Wednesday, December 10, 2014, Zavala, Miguel < > > > >>>> mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu > mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu> > > > wrote: > > > >>>> > > > >>>>> XMCA List Family, > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> I am relaying a call for manuscripts on a pressing issue > impacting > > > >>>>> education everywhere. We conceptualized the idea of a grassroots > > > >>>>> journal in > > > >>>>> 2007 and it has grown, albeit slowly. Here's the latest call. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Thanks! > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> ------------------- > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Regeneraci?n, the Association of Raza Educators Journal > > > >>>>> Volume 6, Issue 1 (Spring 2015) > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> CALL FOR SUBMISSIONS > > > >>>>> Deadline: February 15, 2015 > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> The theme for our next issue: > > > >>>>> "Resisting The Neoliberal Privatization of Education: Reclaiming > > > >>>>> Teachers' > > > >>>>> Unions, Education, and Epistemologies" > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Undeniably, ever since the World Bank declared education a > > trade-able > > > >>>>> service--trumping the idea that education is a basic human > > > >>>>> right--education > > > >>>>> and teachers have been increasingly under attack by corporations, > > > >>>>> venture > > > >>>>> philanthropists, and a growing managerial middle class, who > > function > > > >>>>> within > > > >>>>> a neoliberal ideology that places insurmountable faith in markets > > and > > > >>>>> the > > > >>>>> expansion of capitalism globally into all facets of everyday > life. > > We > > > >>>>> believe that the neoliberal project to de-fund and privatize > public > > > >>>>> education interlocks with the idea of a racial-colonial State. > > Thus, > > > >>>>> it is > > > >>>>> no coincidence that neoliberal experiments to privatize public > > education > > > >>>>> have materialized in large urban districts, such as Chicago, New > > York, > > > >>>>> Los > > > >>>>> Angeles, etc., where we find a significant number of Raza, Black, > > and > > > >>>>> other > > > >>>>> historically marginalized peoples. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> In this issue of Regeneraci?n we seek both analysis and praxis, > > that is > > > >>>>> texts that help us understand more deeply how neoliberalism is > > manifest > > > >>>>> in > > > >>>>> particular geographic, social, and cultural spaces. As well, we > are > > > >>>>> looking > > > >>>>> for texts that provide examples of resistance to the corporate > > takeover > > > >>>>> of > > > >>>>> public education. How are urban and other communities responding > > to the > > > >>>>> attacks on education and teachers? What grassroots and strategic > > spaces > > > >>>>> are > > > >>>>> created that provide alternatives to neoliberalism and > > capitalism? How > > > >>>>> are > > > >>>>> teachers' unions being reinvented? What role does the fight for > > Ethnic > > > >>>>> Studies present as a counter to the neoliberal attack? > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> FORMAT: Submissions may come from students, educators, parents, > > > >>>>> community > > > >>>>> organizers, or organizations; we also welcome scholarly > > submissions that > > > >>>>> are written for a general audience. Formats may include > > testimonios, > > > >>>>> essays, poetry, art, personal narrative, as well as analytic and > > > >>>>> empirical > > > >>>>> studies. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> LENGTH: 700-3000 words > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> SUBMISSION DEADLINE: February 15, 2015 > > > >>>>> PUBLICATION DATE: April 15, 2015 > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> If you have any questions please contact: > razaeducators@yahoo.com > > > razaeducators@yahoo.com>> > > > >>> > > > >>>>> > razaeducators@yahoo.com> > razaeducators@yahoo.com>> > > > >>> > > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> To access past issues of Regeneraci?n: > > > >>>>> http://www.razaeducators.org/archives_newsletter.html < > > http://www.razaeducators.org/archives_newsletter.html> < > > http://www.razaeducators.org/archives_newsletter.html < > > http://www.razaeducators.org/archives_newsletter.html>> > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> The Association of Raza Educators > > > >>>>> www.razaeducators.org < > > http://www.razaeducators.org/ >< > > http://www.razaeducators.org < > > http://www.razaeducators.org/ >> > > > >>>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>> -- > > > >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > with > > an > > > >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >> > > > >> -- > > > >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > an > > > >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Kris Gutierrez > > > > k.gutierrez@me.com > k.gutierrez@me.com > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Kris D. Guti?rrez > > > > Professor > > > > Graduate School of Education > > > > 5629 Tolman Hall #1670 > > > > University of California, Berkeley > > > > Berkeley CA 94720-1670 > > > > > > > > Distinguished Professor > > > > Learning Sciences and Literacy > > > > School of Education > > > > University of Colorado, Boulder > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon Dec 15 19:42:05 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2014 19:42:05 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> Message-ID: Makes perfect sense to me concerning Ribot, David. Where does LSV write about Ribot on imagination? I lost the forest for the trees and am lost back in memory land! And who do we turn to for the evidence that animals other than humans engage in volitional attention? I was under the impression that it is through subordinating oneself to a external/cultural mediator one learned to control oneself from the outside. These seem like important issues to be straight about, even if one disagrees about their implications/interpretation (if that is possible!) mike On Mon, Dec 15, 2014 at 4:19 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division between > higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because Ribot is an > associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of attention. > And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from forest to > farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between the two > great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical world of the > forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses in life > and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" (that > is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the farm,where > written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter months are > wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter talking > animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has to be > more voluntary. > > Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear > understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that underpins Ribot > here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out the > LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices really are > the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, there > isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and animal > imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of volitional > attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without a theory > of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's > distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at all. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole wrote: > > > > Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, thanks to > all > > for the food for thought. > > > > Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential around the > time > > emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had seen work > on > > memory before, but not imagination. > > > > Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal reproductive? > > Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of development of > > imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a relative > > newcomer to the topic. > > mike > > > > On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD > > wrote: > > > > > > Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. This > > > business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some weeks > in > > > our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that segmented the > > > last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. Puns, > > > according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) > > > Henry > > > > > > > On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > > > Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they are > doing > > > > contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his followers as > an > > > > inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so its of > > > course > > > > interesting to see those additional categories emerge. > > > > > > > > 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in translation, > seems > > > > awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in this > > > passage, > > > > for example, is not a currently used term in counter distinction to > > > > "memory." > > > > Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary discourse > > > > across languages as our explorations with out Russian colleagues have > > > > illustrated. > > > > > > > > That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists who > > > clearly > > > > influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still > possible > > to > > > > include culture in it. > > > > > > > > Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, interestingly > > links > > > > imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" act. > > Parts > > > of > > > > it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that was > > also > > > > "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of creativity > and > > > > imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see that the > > two > > > > concepts are linked. > > > > > > > > Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself > writing. > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old > > > approaches > > > > to a pesum > > > > > > > > On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > > >> > > > >> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it may be > > worth > > > >> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to > > > Imagination > > > >> in the section on Representation, mediating between Recollection and > > > >> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive Imagination, > (2) > > > >> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he says > > leads > > > to > > > >> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other words, > the > > > >> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is accomplished > > through > > > >> these three grades of Imagination. > > > >> > > > >> Andy > > > >> > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > >> *Andy Blunden* > > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> mike cole wrote: > > > >> > > > >>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and Williams. > > > >>> > > > >>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am > > trying > > > to > > > >>> mine for empirical > > > >>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive > > > >>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination > develops. > > > >>> > > > >>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that there > must > > > be a > > > >>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I learned > > > that > > > >>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is linked > > to > > > >>> memory. > > > >>> > > > >>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of > anticipation > > > and > > > >>> memory. > > > >>> Imagine that! > > > >>> mike > > > >>> > > > >>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > hshonerd@gmail.com> > > > >>> wrote: > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination > (starting > > > with > > > >>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and > provides a > > > >>>> space > > > >>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. This, > > > >>>> coupled > > > >>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground to > take > > > part > > > >>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with > > preconceptions: > > > >>>> Vera > > > >>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian Langacker > on > > > >>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, > particularly > > > the > > > >>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of > imagination > > > and > > > >>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of > temporality: > > > >>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure), > which > > I > > > >>>> think > > > >>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both > individual > > > and > > > >>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > > > >>>> Henry > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss > > > wrote: > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* and > the > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> > > > >>>> analogy > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>>> to *gap-filling* > > > >>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > > > >>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion of > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> > > > >>>> "structures > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored > under > > > the > > > >>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of modalities > > > that > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> > > > >>>> hang > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing that > is > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> > > > >>>> forming > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we > think > > > >>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* > > > >>>>> Larry > > > >>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > hshonerd@gmail.com > > > > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> > > > >>>> wrote: > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>>> Mike and Larry, > > > >>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how jazzed > up > > I > > > am > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>> now > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as Larry > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>> construes > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various triads, > > > finally > > > >>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of the > > > mind, as > > > >>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa? > > fuera. > > > >>>>>> Fractally yours, > > > >>>>>> Henry > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached are > two > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>> articles > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists like > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Zaporozhets > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of imagination in > a > > > >>>>>>> manner > > > >>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of productive > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>> imagination. I > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no intention of > > > doing > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>> so. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the attached > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>> texts. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I came > > upon > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>> the > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked at > > > several > > > >>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne and > I > > > >>>>>>> argued > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>> in > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of > access > > > to > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>> the > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. Moreover, > > > such > > > >>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the > > > perception/imagination > > > >>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance to > > Kris's > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>> paper > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns > about > > > the > > > >>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps they > > will > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>> prove > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>>> useful for those interested. > > > >>>>>>> mike > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> -- > > > >>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > > > with an > > > >>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >> > > > >> > > > > > > > > -- > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > an > > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Dec 15 20:06:36 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2014 04:06:36 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> , Message-ID: <1418702795665.54419@unm.edu> Hi David and Henry, I did a search on associationism and it is interesting how it came into being. It's a little digression perhaps from our quest on imagination, but it seems a little digression that may be germane! if not somewhat interesting. In a web display of the book, A History Of The Association Psychology (1921) by Warren at archive.org I found the genesis of the concept of associationism, which evidently came from Locke's "association of ideas," a phrase he used in an added chapter to a later edition of "Essay concerning Human Understanding." Below I'm pasting in the first (and short) section of Chapter One, just to keep the conversation rolling here! The reason I'm interested in this is because Locke in his search for understanding Human Understanding was looking at this from an epistemological standpoint, not psychological. I thought this relevant to our recent considerations of perception and its link to imagination (in light of the Strawson paper). In other words, the lift (or burial, depending on how one views it) that the Associationists gave the term, in context of English psychology, perhaps has a different meaning than what we are exploring here, if we are exploring this from an epistemological angle, that is. In other words, from Locke's POV. Seeing as genesis is important to us, I thought I'd throw this into the soup! Kind regards, Annalisa ===================================== >From Chapter One: Origins of the Term "Association of Ideas" (p 3-6) ===================================== The phrase _association of ideas_ was first used by John Locke. In the fourth edition (1700) of his 'Essay concerning Human Understanding' he inserted a new chapter, entitled "Of the Association of Ideas," in which he discusses the connections between experiences. "Some of our ideas," he says, "have a natural correspondence and connection with one another: it is the office and excellency of our reason to trace these and hold them together in that union and correspondence which is founded in their peculiar beings. Besides this, there is another connection of ideas that in themselves are not at all of kin come to be so united in some men's minds that it is very hard to separate them; they always keep in company, and the one no sooner at any time comes into the understanding, but its associate appears with it; and if they are more than two which are thus united, the whole gang, always inseparable, show themselves together. This strong combination of ideas not allied by nature the mind makes in itself either voluntarily or by chance, and hence it comes in different men to be very different, according to their different inclinations, education, interests, etc." We are indebted to Locke for a term which later gained currency as applied to a doctrine of peculiar prominence in English psychology; of such prominence, indeed, that the system of psychology which these writers worked out came to be known as _Associationism_. Furthermore, the exposition of mental association in various parts of Locke's 'Essay' furnished important data to the theory subsequently developed. But it should be noted at the outset that the epoch-making character of Locke's work in this field consists only in in his introduction of the term 'association of ideas.' He neither founded the doctrine of association nor did he fix the historical significance of the name which he coined. First, the laws of the association of remembered images according to similarity, contrast, and contiguity were originally formulated by Aristotle, who furnished hints of an association of _sensations_ as well. These suggestions long escaped notice owing to the lack of interest in such problems. In modern times also, the notion of an associated sequence of thought was worked out in some detail, prior to Locke, by Thomas Hobbes, and his treatment furnished the model for later discussions of the subject. Locke emphasizes the _fact_, but does not work out the _manner_ of association. This latter problem, one of the most notable features of the association psychology, rests historically on Aristotle's classification, which has been taken up and modified in various ways by writers of the association school; Hobbe's view of association as the mode of succession of ideational experiences is generally adopted as a starting-point in the analysis. Again, the term _idea_ was used by Locke in a broader sense than that fixed by later usage. Thus, When Locke speaks of the association of ideas he has reference to possible connections between _all sorts of mental content_; whereas from the time of David Hume onward the phrase refers to connections between _representative_ data only. Locke's term has been retained, but its application is narrowed to a portion of the field to which he assigned it. This permanent fixing of the expression _association of ideas_ with an altered meaning given to the term _idea_, has exerted some influence on the development of the doctrine itself. The connection between sensations, as for example in perception, has been ignored by some writers, while others have treated it as another sort of union, distinct from association. Where the union of sensations has been classed under the same general principles as associations between representative elements, the exposition has been weakened by the inappropriateness of the accepted phrase. Finally, it should be borne in mind that the problem of association as Locke conceived it was an ethical and pedagogical one, not a problem of psychological analysis. He nowhere seeks to determine the different modes of connection between experiences as Hobbes has done. His real aim is to trace the rise of _wrong_ associations and suggest practical remedies for the errors of judgment and action to which they lead. In the passage quoted Locke grants that a natural connection between ideas exists as well as chance association; but it is the associations of chance or custom, their origin, and the means of preventing and overcoming them, that constitute the material of his inquiry. The chapter on association was an afterthought, not an essential part of the 'Essay'; and although in harmony with the doctrine formulated in the rest of his book, it appears more in the light of a practical application of his theory that (typo? --> than?) an investigation of the laws of association. In short, while the 'Essay concerning Human Understanding' furnished the name under which the principle has since become known, and has also afforded considerable material to assist later writers in developing the psychology of association, the two contributions stand apart; Locke's association doctrine is not worked out from the psychological standpoint, and it is not definitely attached to the phrase which he devised. The aim of his 'Essay.' it must be remembered, is essentially epistemological, and the psychological analysis which it undertakes is carried out only so far as necessary to demonstrate the empirical derivation of all knowledge. ================================= The book may be found here: https://archive.org/details/historyoftheasso007979mbp One can download the PDF of the book here: https://archive.org/download/historyoftheasso007979mbp/historyoftheasso007979mbp.pdf From dkellogg60@gmail.com Mon Dec 15 20:17:47 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2014 13:17:47 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> Message-ID: "Imagination and Creativity in Childhood" (in JREEP 42, 1, 7-97) is all about Ribot on imagination. But two things to keep in mind when reading it: a) This is "early Vygotsky". The publication date is 1930, but it reads like something from at least a year or two earlier. b) This is also "legal Vygotsky", that is, stuff that Vygotsky's writing for a mass audience, to popularize ideas he doesn't necessarily agree with. If you compare what Vygotsky says about Ribot in "Imagiination and Creativity" (fairly positive, but thoroughly associationist) with what he says about Ribot in HDHMF (esp. p. 157-158 of English Collected Works, Vol. 4) you'll see what I mean right away. Vygotsky's quite merciless. But Vygotsky's misreading of Ribot's little graph about the divorce between imagination and realistic orientation on p. 33 of "Imagination and Creativity" is also quite telling--one suspects it is deliberate. Either way, the gloomy Gaul doesn't stand a chance! David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 16 December 2014 at 12:42, mike cole wrote: > > Makes perfect sense to me concerning Ribot, David. Where does LSV write > about Ribot on imagination? I lost the forest for the trees and am lost > back in memory land! > > And who do we turn to for the evidence that animals other than humans > engage in volitional attention? I was under the impression that it is > through subordinating oneself to a external/cultural mediator one learned > to control oneself from the outside. > > These seem like important issues to be straight about, even if one > disagrees about their implications/interpretation (if that is possible!) > mike > > > On Mon, Dec 15, 2014 at 4:19 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > > > > On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division between > > higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because Ribot is > an > > associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of attention. > > And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from forest > to > > farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between the two > > great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical world of > the > > forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses in life > > and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" (that > > is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the > farm,where > > written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter months are > > wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter talking > > animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has to be > > more voluntary. > > > > Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear > > understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that underpins > Ribot > > here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out the > > LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices really > are > > the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, there > > isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and animal > > imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of > volitional > > attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without a > theory > > of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's > > distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at all. > > > > David Kellogg > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, thanks to > > all > > > for the food for thought. > > > > > > Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential around the > > time > > > emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had seen work > > on > > > memory before, but not imagination. > > > > > > Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal > reproductive? > > > Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of development > of > > > imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a > relative > > > newcomer to the topic. > > > mike > > > > > > On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. This > > > > business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some weeks > > in > > > > our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that segmented > the > > > > last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. Puns, > > > > according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) > > > > Henry > > > > > > > > > On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > > > > > Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they are > > doing > > > > > contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his followers as > > an > > > > > inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so its of > > > > course > > > > > interesting to see those additional categories emerge. > > > > > > > > > > 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in translation, > > seems > > > > > awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in this > > > > passage, > > > > > for example, is not a currently used term in counter distinction to > > > > > "memory." > > > > > Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary > discourse > > > > > across languages as our explorations with out Russian colleagues > have > > > > > illustrated. > > > > > > > > > > That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists who > > > > clearly > > > > > influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still > > possible > > > to > > > > > include culture in it. > > > > > > > > > > Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, interestingly > > > links > > > > > imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" act. > > > Parts > > > > of > > > > > it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that was > > > also > > > > > "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of creativity > > and > > > > > imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see that > the > > > two > > > > > concepts are linked. > > > > > > > > > > Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself > > writing. > > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old > > > > approaches > > > > > to a pesum > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden > > > wrote: > > > > >> > > > > >> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it may be > > > worth > > > > >> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to > > > > Imagination > > > > >> in the section on Representation, mediating between Recollection > and > > > > >> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive Imagination, > > (2) > > > > >> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he says > > > leads > > > > to > > > > >> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other words, > > the > > > > >> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is accomplished > > > through > > > > >> these three grades of Imagination. > > > > >> > > > > >> Andy > > > > >> > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > >> *Andy Blunden* > > > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> mike cole wrote: > > > > >> > > > > >>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and > Williams. > > > > >>> > > > > >>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am > > > trying > > > > to > > > > >>> mine for empirical > > > > >>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive > > > > >>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination > > develops. > > > > >>> > > > > >>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that there > > must > > > > be a > > > > >>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I > learned > > > > that > > > > >>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is > linked > > > to > > > > >>> memory. > > > > >>> > > > > >>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of > > anticipation > > > > and > > > > >>> memory. > > > > >>> Imagine that! > > > > >>> mike > > > > >>> > > > > >>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > hshonerd@gmail.com> > > > > >>> wrote: > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination > > (starting > > > > with > > > > >>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and > > provides a > > > > >>>> space > > > > >>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. > This, > > > > >>>> coupled > > > > >>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground to > > take > > > > part > > > > >>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with > > > preconceptions: > > > > >>>> Vera > > > > >>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian Langacker > > on > > > > >>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, > > particularly > > > > the > > > > >>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of > > imagination > > > > and > > > > >>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of > > temporality: > > > > >>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure), > > which > > > I > > > > >>>> think > > > > >>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both > > individual > > > > and > > > > >>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > > > > >>>> Henry > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < > lpscholar2@gmail.com> > > > > wrote: > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* and > > the > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>> analogy > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>>> to *gap-filling* > > > > >>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > > > > >>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion of > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>> "structures > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored > > under > > > > the > > > > >>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of > modalities > > > > that > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>> hang > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing that > > is > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>> forming > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we > > think > > > > >>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* > > > > >>>>> Larry > > > > >>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > hshonerd@gmail.com > > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>> wrote: > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>>> Mike and Larry, > > > > >>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how jazzed > > up > > > I > > > > am > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>> now > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as > Larry > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>> construes > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various triads, > > > > finally > > > > >>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of the > > > > mind, as > > > > >>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa? > > > fuera. > > > > >>>>>> Fractally yours, > > > > >>>>>> Henry > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole > wrote: > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached are > > two > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> articles > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists > like > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> Zaporozhets > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of imagination > in > > a > > > > >>>>>>> manner > > > > >>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of productive > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> imagination. I > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no intention > of > > > > doing > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> so. > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the > attached > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> texts. > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I > came > > > upon > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> the > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked at > > > > several > > > > >>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne > and > > I > > > > >>>>>>> argued > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> in > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of > > access > > > > to > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> the > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. > Moreover, > > > > such > > > > >>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the > > > > perception/imagination > > > > >>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance to > > > Kris's > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> paper > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns > > about > > > > the > > > > >>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps > they > > > will > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> prove > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>>> useful for those interested. > > > > >>>>>>> mike > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> -- > > > > >>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > science > > > > with an > > > > >>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > > an > > > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > From hshonerd@gmail.com Mon Dec 15 20:28:56 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2014 21:28:56 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> Message-ID: I am wondering if, despite V?s rejection of Ribot on logical grounds, a more generous reading of Ribot might be possible, especially in the context of the imagination thread. In the same way we can do an expansive reading of James. Both James and Ribot, it seems to me, can add to the dialog. As an associationist, I take it that he is not a ?mediationist?. But in his descriptions of all kinds of creativity, he got a lot of things right, didn?t he? In the same way, one might reject Modell for being a Freudian, yet I like that he relates thinking and feeling in discussing trauma and how being locked in the past short circuits the everyday creativity of looking to the future. Can missing the trees for the forest not be counterproductive where imagination and creativity are concerned? Can we mash up pieces of a framework without mashing up the whole thing? Just wondering. Henry > On Dec 15, 2014, at 8:42 PM, mike cole wrote: > > Makes perfect sense to me concerning Ribot, David. Where does LSV write > about Ribot on imagination? I lost the forest for the trees and am lost > back in memory land! > > And who do we turn to for the evidence that animals other than humans > engage in volitional attention? I was under the impression that it is > through subordinating oneself to a external/cultural mediator one learned > to control oneself from the outside. > > These seem like important issues to be straight about, even if one > disagrees about their implications/interpretation (if that is possible!) > mike > > > On Mon, Dec 15, 2014 at 4:19 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >> >> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division between >> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because Ribot is an >> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of attention. >> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from forest to >> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between the two >> great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical world of the >> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses in life >> and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" (that >> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the farm,where >> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter months are >> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter talking >> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has to be >> more voluntary. >> >> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear >> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that underpins Ribot >> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out the >> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices really are >> the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, there >> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and animal >> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of volitional >> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without a theory >> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's >> distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at all. >> >> David Kellogg >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole wrote: >>> >>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, thanks to >> all >>> for the food for thought. >>> >>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential around the >> time >>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had seen work >> on >>> memory before, but not imagination. >>> >>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal reproductive? >>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of development of >>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a relative >>> newcomer to the topic. >>> mike >>> >>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD >>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. This >>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some weeks >> in >>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that segmented the >>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. Puns, >>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) >>>> Henry >>>> >>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they are >> doing >>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his followers as >> an >>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so its of >>>> course >>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. >>>>> >>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in translation, >> seems >>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in this >>>> passage, >>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter distinction to >>>>> "memory." >>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary discourse >>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian colleagues have >>>>> illustrated. >>>>> >>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists who >>>> clearly >>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still >> possible >>> to >>>>> include culture in it. >>>>> >>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, interestingly >>> links >>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" act. >>> Parts >>>> of >>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that was >>> also >>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of creativity >> and >>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see that the >>> two >>>>> concepts are linked. >>>>> >>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself >> writing. >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old >>>> approaches >>>>> to a pesum >>>>> >>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden >>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it may be >>> worth >>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to >>>> Imagination >>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between Recollection and >>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive Imagination, >> (2) >>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he says >>> leads >>>> to >>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other words, >> the >>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is accomplished >>> through >>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and Williams. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am >>> trying >>>> to >>>>>>> mine for empirical >>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive >>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination >> develops. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that there >> must >>>> be a >>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I learned >>>> that >>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is linked >>> to >>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of >> anticipation >>>> and >>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>> Imagine that! >>>>>>> mike >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >> hshonerd@gmail.com> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination >> (starting >>>> with >>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and >> provides a >>>>>>>> space >>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. This, >>>>>>>> coupled >>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground to >> take >>>> part >>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with >>> preconceptions: >>>>>>>> Vera >>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian Langacker >> on >>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, >> particularly >>>> the >>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of >> imagination >>>> and >>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of >> temporality: >>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure), >> which >>> I >>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both >> individual >>>> and >>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. >>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss >>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* and >> the >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> analogy >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* >>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. >>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion of >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> "structures >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored >> under >>>> the >>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of modalities >>>> that >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> hang >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing that >> is >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> forming >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we >> think >>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* >>>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, >>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how jazzed >> up >>> I >>>> am >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> now >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as Larry >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> construes >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various triads, >>>> finally >>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of the >>>> mind, as >>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa? >>> fuera. >>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, >>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached are >> two >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> articles >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists like >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of imagination in >> a >>>>>>>>>>> manner >>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of productive >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> imagination. I >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no intention of >>>> doing >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> so. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the attached >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> texts. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I came >>> upon >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked at >>>> several >>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne and >> I >>>>>>>>>>> argued >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of >> access >>>> to >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. Moreover, >>>> such >>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the >>>> perception/imagination >>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance to >>> Kris's >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> paper >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns >> about >>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps they >>> will >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> prove >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. >>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >>>> with an >>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >> an >>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> -- >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>> >> > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From hshonerd@gmail.com Mon Dec 15 21:24:39 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2014 22:24:39 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> Message-ID: <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an associationist, ?sees imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? Henry > On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division between > higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because Ribot is an > associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of attention. > And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from forest to > farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between the two > great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical world of the > forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses in life > and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" (that > is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the farm,where > written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter months are > wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter talking > animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has to be > more voluntary. > > Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear > understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that underpins Ribot > here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out the > LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices really are > the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, there > isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and animal > imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of volitional > attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without a theory > of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's > distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at all. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole wrote: >> >> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, thanks to all >> for the food for thought. >> >> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential around the time >> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had seen work on >> memory before, but not imagination. >> >> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal reproductive? >> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of development of >> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a relative >> newcomer to the topic. >> mike >> >> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD >> wrote: >>> >>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. This >>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some weeks in >>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that segmented the >>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. Puns, >>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) >>> Henry >>> >>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole wrote: >>>> >>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they are doing >>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his followers as an >>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so its of >>> course >>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. >>>> >>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in translation, seems >>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in this >>> passage, >>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter distinction to >>>> "memory." >>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary discourse >>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian colleagues have >>>> illustrated. >>>> >>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists who >>> clearly >>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still possible >> to >>>> include culture in it. >>>> >>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, interestingly >> links >>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" act. >> Parts >>> of >>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that was >> also >>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of creativity and >>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see that the >> two >>>> concepts are linked. >>>> >>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself writing. >>>> mike >>>> >>>> >>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old >>> approaches >>>> to a pesum >>>> >>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden >> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it may be >> worth >>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to >>> Imagination >>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between Recollection and >>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive Imagination, (2) >>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he says >> leads >>> to >>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other words, the >>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is accomplished >> through >>>>> these three grades of Imagination. >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and Williams. >>>>>> >>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am >> trying >>> to >>>>>> mine for empirical >>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive >>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination develops. >>>>>> >>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that there must >>> be a >>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I learned >>> that >>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is linked >> to >>>>>> memory. >>>>>> >>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of anticipation >>> and >>>>>> memory. >>>>>> Imagine that! >>>>>> mike >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination (starting >>> with >>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and provides a >>>>>>> space >>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. This, >>>>>>> coupled >>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground to take >>> part >>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with >> preconceptions: >>>>>>> Vera >>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian Langacker on >>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, particularly >>> the >>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of imagination >>> and >>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of temporality: >>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure), which >> I >>>>>>> think >>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both individual >>> and >>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. >>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss >>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* and the >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> analogy >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* >>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. >>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion of >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> "structures >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored under >>> the >>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of modalities >>> that >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> hang >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing that is >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> forming >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we think >>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* >>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD >> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, >>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how jazzed up >> I >>> am >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> now >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as Larry >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> construes >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various triads, >>> finally >>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of the >>> mind, as >>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa? >> fuera. >>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, >>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached are two >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> articles >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists like >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of imagination in a >>>>>>>>>> manner >>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of productive >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> imagination. I >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no intention of >>> doing >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> so. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the attached >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> texts. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I came >> upon >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked at >>> several >>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne and I >>>>>>>>>> argued >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of access >>> to >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. Moreover, >>> such >>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the >>> perception/imagination >>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance to >> Kris's >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> paper >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns about >>> the >>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps they >> will >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> prove >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> useful for those interested. >>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >>> with an >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>> >>> >>> >> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Tue Dec 16 02:37:33 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2014 05:37:33 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Genetics, internalization, biology, and Vygotsky Message-ID: <9byxw2d5ytycfg0cyocyvodw.1418726253298@email.android.com> I have an important question for vygotsky scholars...According to the haitian sociologist, Daniel Supplice, as people of African descent, whose societies and governments have been based on theocracy prior to their contacts with Europeans, democracy is not for haitians. ?He argues that as haitians and people of african descent, we have to reconsider how we constitute our societies, and stop adopting the ideologies and practices of whites, which are aligned with their biology and experiences of the world. This debate is not new. ?There is an argument in afrocentric circles, which highlight the impact that melanin has in making people of color religious and determining their worldview. ?So that in the internalization of social processes by blacks melanin is a determing factor in constituting their worldview. ?Is this the sought of biological/genetic factor that Vygotsky scholars are taking into account when they speak of the internalization process? I am aware of the fact that alcohol and certain high blood pressure medications adversely affect people of african descent because of melanin. ?Should we look at the internalization of social processes along the same lines as the ingestion of medicine and alcohol? ?Is this Vygotskyian or more in line with Kantian form of understanding and sensibilities as it applies to people of african descent? Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info? From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Tue Dec 16 03:28:48 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2014 11:28:48 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] "Routledge welcomes M.E. Sharpe" Message-ID: http://www.routledge.com/articles/routledge_welcomes_m.e._sharpe/ The end-user impact seems to be that online access is restricted to subscribing institutions. http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/mrpo20#.VJAQdHFybPQ The UK institutions that I've had contact with don't actually have a direct subscription. They use EBSCOHost, which provides a more limited form of access. Presumably, some institutions must be using the full access otherwise there wouldn't be any point to the restriction. Huw From leifstrandberg.ab@telia.com Tue Dec 16 04:35:08 2014 From: leifstrandberg.ab@telia.com (Leif Strandberg) Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2014 13:35:08 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Genetics, internalization, biology, and Vygotsky In-Reply-To: <9byxw2d5ytycfg0cyocyvodw.1418726253298@email.android.com> References: <9byxw2d5ytycfg0cyocyvodw.1418726253298@email.android.com> Message-ID: Oh my God! Melanin and religion?? I prefer re-reading ?The Wretched of the Earth? and ?Black Skin, White Masks? by dr Frantz Fanon. Leif in the North of Sweden :-) 16 dec 2014 kl. 11:37 skrev Dr. Paul C. Mocombe : > I have an important question for vygotsky scholars...According to the haitian sociologist, Daniel Supplice, as people of African descent, whose societies and governments have been based on theocracy prior to their contacts with Europeans, democracy is not for haitians. He argues that as haitians and people of african descent, we have to reconsider how we constitute our societies, and stop adopting the ideologies and practices of whites, which are aligned with their biology and experiences of the world. > > This debate is not new. There is an argument in afrocentric circles, which highlight the impact that melanin has in making people of color religious and determining their worldview. So that in the internalization of social processes by blacks melanin is a determing factor in constituting their worldview. Is this the sought of biological/genetic factor that Vygotsky scholars are taking into account when they speak of the internalization process? > > I am aware of the fact that alcohol and certain high blood pressure medications adversely affect people of african descent because of melanin. Should we look at the internalization of social processes along the same lines as the ingestion of medicine and alcohol? Is this Vygotskyian or more in line with Kantian form of understanding and sensibilities as it applies to people of african descent? > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info From boblake@georgiasouthern.edu Tue Dec 16 05:44:19 2014 From: boblake@georgiasouthern.edu (Robert Lake) Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2014 08:44:19 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Genetics, internalization, biology, and Vygotsky In-Reply-To: <9byxw2d5ytycfg0cyocyvodw.1418726253298@email.android.com> References: <9byxw2d5ytycfg0cyocyvodw.1418726253298@email.android.com> Message-ID: Dear Paul, While I cannot address the theocratic aspect of vital question, I do not believe that democracy is only for Eurocentric societies but where ever it is a viable reality, it must come from within. Dewey was certainly thinking about this when he said that "*democracy must be born anew in every generation, and education is its midwife*". One has only to remember Gandhi's work (By they way, could the cottage industry movement he spawned be considered an aspect of CHAT work with the spinning wheel as an artefact and the movement itself a ZPD with many interlocking circles?) There are many points of convergence between between Vygotsky's work of higher consciousness and Freire's notion of conscientiza??o. I know you are aware of Freire's connection to Cabral and the work of adult literacy in Guinea Bissau, West Africa. I do not have time for anything more but you might want read this short book review in light of your powerful questions. http://fcis.oise.utoronto.ca/~daniel_sc/freire/vr.html *Robert* On Tue, Dec 16, 2014 at 5:37 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: > > I have an important question for vygotsky scholars...According to the > haitian sociologist, Daniel Supplice, as people of African descent, whose > societies and governments have been based on theocracy prior to their > contacts with Europeans, democracy is not for haitians. He argues that as > haitians and people of african descent, we have to reconsider how we > constitute our societies, and stop adopting the ideologies and practices of > whites, which are aligned with their biology and experiences of the world. > > This debate is not new. There is an argument in afrocentric circles, > which highlight the impact that melanin has in making people of color > religious and determining their worldview. So that in the internalization > of social processes by blacks melanin is a determing factor in constituting > their worldview. Is this the sought of biological/genetic factor that > Vygotsky scholars are taking into account when they speak of the > internalization process? > > I am aware of the fact that alcohol and certain high blood pressure > medications adversely affect people of african descent because of melanin. > Should we look at the internalization of social processes along the same > lines as the ingestion of medicine and alcohol? Is this Vygotskyian or > more in line with Kantian form of understanding and sensibilities as it > applies to people of african descent? > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info -- *Robert Lake Ed.D.*Associate Professor Social Foundations of Education Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading Georgia Southern University Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group P. O. Box 8144 Phone: (912) 478-0355 Fax: (912) 478-5382 Statesboro, GA 30460 From carolmacdon@gmail.com Tue Dec 16 05:47:13 2014 From: carolmacdon@gmail.com (Carol Macdonald) Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2014 15:47:13 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Genetics, internalization, biology, and Vygotsky In-Reply-To: <9byxw2d5ytycfg0cyocyvodw.1418726253298@email.android.com> References: <9byxw2d5ytycfg0cyocyvodw.1418726253298@email.android.com> Message-ID: Hello I am truli horrified. I know Haitian people were not subject to the force of Christian evangelism in the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries, and therefore their relationship to their traditional of culture and worship are more visible than in other situations. But I really feel that you can't tar the whole of Africa with the same brush. I am an African, and know a great deal about the peoples of Southern Africa, and really what you are suggesting makes no sense at all. The closest I might come is to talk about the ZCC, the Zionist Church, which combines elements of traditional beliefs and practices with Christian elements. What counts as occult here is the belief that ancestors can help or hinder as while we live; we have to pay homage to them. Humanity is profoundly important - acceptance and inclusion of people - an acceptance of differences as well as wanting not to stand our. I am sorry but I just get get my head around what Paul is saying. I have to say this sounds suspicious. I cannot see how I could contribute in any other way to this discussion. I really don't think I need melatonin to be African. Carol On 16 December 2014 at 12:37, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > > I have an important question for vygotsky scholars...According to the > haitian sociologist, Daniel Supplice, as people of African descent, whose > societies and governments have been based on theocracy prior to their > contacts with Europeans, democracy is not for haitians. He argues that as > haitians and people of african descent, we have to reconsider how we > constitute our societies, and stop adopting the ideologies and practices of > whites, which are aligned with their biology and experiences of the world. > > This debate is not new. There is an argument in afrocentric circles, > which highlight the impact that melanin has in making people of color > religious and determining their worldview. So that in the internalization > of social processes by blacks melanin is a determing factor in constituting > their worldview. Is this the sought of biological/genetic factor that > Vygotsky scholars are taking into account when they speak of the > internalization process? > > I am aware of the fact that alcohol and certain high blood pressure > medications adversely affect people of african descent because of melanin. > Should we look at the internalization of social processes along the same > lines as the ingestion of medicine and alcohol? Is this Vygotskyian or > more in line with Kantian form of understanding and sensibilities as it > applies to people of african descent? > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From glassman.13@osu.edu Tue Dec 16 06:05:58 2014 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2014 14:05:58 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> , <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9076ACA@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> I'm not sure there is such a bright line between mediationalists and associationalists. At least some of the associationists I have read don't deny mediation, they simply don 't prioritize it. Any mediation artefact is couched within the associations people make from it. An interesting view where history is contained within the act rather than the act being a product of history. An extremely interesting thing happened in the United States as a football game. I think others have mentioned the "hands up don't shoot" behavior/artefact that emerged after the Ferguson shooting and took on greater urgency after the failure to indict the police officer who shot an unarmed teenager who (according to witnesses) had his hand up in the don't shoot position. Anyway, four players entered the field of play with their hands up. If you watched football games over the years you would realize there is nothing new in players entering the field with their hands raised above their heads - often meant to signal coming domination of the opponent - a mediating artifact for competitiveness and battle within the arena - at least I think that is the association thousands of wildly screaming fans would make. Except this time the hands above the head gesture was associated with something completely different - the injustice towards and mistreatment of young men of color by the criminal justice system. Almost every American who watched the gesture, whether in real time or on delay immediately made this association, and from there made further associations based on their histories and belief systems (you only had to listen to sports call in shows to see the different trails of association). So which is more important the mediating artifact of the gesture or the associations you make from its transactional relaitonships to other things? Or perhaps it is not important to even consider which is more important - development of ideas is not a competitive arena sport (well sometimes we associate it with that maybe). Michael ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of HENRY SHONERD [hshonerd@gmail.com] Sent: Tuesday, December 16, 2014 12:24 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an associationist, ?sees imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? Henry > On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division between > higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because Ribot is an > associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of attention. > And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from forest to > farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between the two > great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical world of the > forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses in life > and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" (that > is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the farm,where > written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter months are > wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter talking > animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has to be > more voluntary. > > Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear > understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that underpins Ribot > here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out the > LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices really are > the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, there > isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and animal > imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of volitional > attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without a theory > of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's > distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at all. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole wrote: >> >> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, thanks to all >> for the food for thought. >> >> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential around the time >> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had seen work on >> memory before, but not imagination. >> >> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal reproductive? >> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of development of >> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a relative >> newcomer to the topic. >> mike >> >> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD >> wrote: >>> >>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. This >>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some weeks in >>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that segmented the >>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. Puns, >>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) >>> Henry >>> >>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole wrote: >>>> >>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they are doing >>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his followers as an >>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so its of >>> course >>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. >>>> >>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in translation, seems >>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in this >>> passage, >>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter distinction to >>>> "memory." >>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary discourse >>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian colleagues have >>>> illustrated. >>>> >>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists who >>> clearly >>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still possible >> to >>>> include culture in it. >>>> >>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, interestingly >> links >>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" act. >> Parts >>> of >>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that was >> also >>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of creativity and >>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see that the >> two >>>> concepts are linked. >>>> >>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself writing. >>>> mike >>>> >>>> >>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old >>> approaches >>>> to a pesum >>>> >>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden >> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it may be >> worth >>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to >>> Imagination >>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between Recollection and >>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive Imagination, (2) >>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he says >> leads >>> to >>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other words, the >>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is accomplished >> through >>>>> these three grades of Imagination. >>>>> >>>>> Andy >>>>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and Williams. >>>>>> >>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am >> trying >>> to >>>>>> mine for empirical >>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive >>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination develops. >>>>>> >>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that there must >>> be a >>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I learned >>> that >>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is linked >> to >>>>>> memory. >>>>>> >>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of anticipation >>> and >>>>>> memory. >>>>>> Imagine that! >>>>>> mike >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination (starting >>> with >>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and provides a >>>>>>> space >>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. This, >>>>>>> coupled >>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground to take >>> part >>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with >> preconceptions: >>>>>>> Vera >>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian Langacker on >>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, particularly >>> the >>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of imagination >>> and >>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of temporality: >>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure), which >> I >>>>>>> think >>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both individual >>> and >>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. >>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss >>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* and the >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> analogy >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* >>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. >>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion of >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> "structures >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored under >>> the >>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of modalities >>> that >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> hang >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing that is >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> forming >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we think >>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* >>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD >> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, >>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how jazzed up >> I >>> am >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> now >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as Larry >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> construes >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various triads, >>> finally >>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of the >>> mind, as >>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa? >> fuera. >>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, >>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached are two >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> articles >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists like >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of imagination in a >>>>>>>>>> manner >>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of productive >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> imagination. I >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no intention of >>> doing >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> so. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the attached >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> texts. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I came >> upon >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked at >>> several >>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne and I >>>>>>>>>> argued >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of access >>> to >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. Moreover, >>> such >>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the >>> perception/imagination >>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance to >> Kris's >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> paper >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns about >>> the >>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps they >> will >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> prove >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> useful for those interested. >>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >>> with an >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>> >>> >>> >> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> From ablunden@mira.net Tue Dec 16 06:10:47 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 01:10:47 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9076ACA@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> , <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9076ACA@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: <54903D67.2080600@mira.net> Context? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Glassman, Michael wrote: > I'm not sure there is such a bright line between mediationalists and associationalists. At least some of the associationists I have read don't deny mediation, they simply don 't prioritize it. Any mediation artefact is couched within the associations people make from it. An interesting view where history is contained within the act rather than the act being a product of history. An extremely interesting thing happened in the United States as a football game. I think others have mentioned the "hands up don't shoot" behavior/artefact that emerged after the Ferguson shooting and took on greater urgency after the failure to indict the police officer who shot an unarmed teenager who (according to witnesses) had his hand up in the don't shoot position. Anyway, four players entered the field of play with their hands up. If you watched football games over the years you would realize there is nothing new in players entering the field with their hands raised above their heads - > often meant to signal coming domination of the opponent - a mediating artifact for competitiveness and battle within the arena - at least I think that is the association thousands of wildly screaming fans would make. Except this time the hands above the head gesture was associated with something completely different - the injustice towards and mistreatment of young men of color by the criminal justice system. Almost every American who watched the gesture, whether in real time or on delay immediately made this association, and from there made further associations based on their histories and belief systems (you only had to listen to sports call in shows to see the different trails of association). So which is more important the mediating artifact of the gesture or the associations you make from its transactional relaitonships to other things? Or perhaps it is not important to even consider which is more important - development of ideas is not a competitive arena sport (w > ell sometimes we associate it with that maybe). > > Michael > > From glassman.13@osu.edu Tue Dec 16 06:13:56 2014 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2014 14:13:56 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: <54903D67.2080600@mira.net> References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> , <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9076ACA@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu>, <54903D67.2080600@mira.net> Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9076B04@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Context causes us to make certain types of associations. At least that's Pepper's point in his chapter on context in World Hypotheses. Michael ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Andy Blunden [ablunden@mira.net] Sent: Tuesday, December 16, 2014 9:10 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination Context? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Glassman, Michael wrote: > I'm not sure there is such a bright line between mediationalists and associationalists. At least some of the associationists I have read don't deny mediation, they simply don 't prioritize it. Any mediation artefact is couched within the associations people make from it. An interesting view where history is contained within the act rather than the act being a product of history. An extremely interesting thing happened in the United States as a football game. I think others have mentioned the "hands up don't shoot" behavior/artefact that emerged after the Ferguson shooting and took on greater urgency after the failure to indict the police officer who shot an unarmed teenager who (according to witnesses) had his hand up in the don't shoot position. Anyway, four players entered the field of play with their hands up. If you watched football games over the years you would realize there is nothing new in players entering the field with their hands raised above their heads - > often meant to signal coming domination of the opponent - a mediating artifact for competitiveness and battle within the arena - at least I think that is the association thousands of wildly screaming fans would make. Except this time the hands above the head gesture was associated with something completely different - the injustice towards and mistreatment of young men of color by the criminal justice system. Almost every American who watched the gesture, whether in real time or on delay immediately made this association, and from there made further associations based on their histories and belief systems (you only had to listen to sports call in shows to see the different trails of association). So which is more important the mediating artifact of the gesture or the associations you make from its transactional relaitonships to other things? Or perhaps it is not important to even consider which is more important - development of ideas is not a competitive arena sport (w > ell sometimes we associate it with that maybe). > > Michael > > From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Tue Dec 16 07:33:42 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2014 10:33:42 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Genetics, internalization, biology, and Vygotsky Message-ID: <108bq94bl5jhr3y6pgdkwg66.1418744022324@email.android.com> Carol, I found his argument problematic as well. ?He said it in an interview as he commented on the political crisis in haiti. ?Sounds like eugenics all over again. ?But I did my best to try to make it sound intelligent. ?I respect the brother, and yes he used a general brush to paint all of africa. ?I do not know how well versed you are in french I will send you the video. Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol Macdonald
Date:12/16/2014 8:47 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Genetics, internalization, biology, and Vygotsky
Hello I am truli horrified. I know Haitian people were not subject to the force of Christian evangelism in the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries, and therefore their relationship to their traditional of culture and worship are more visible than in other situations. But I really feel that you can't tar the whole of Africa with the same brush. I am an African, and know a great deal about the peoples of Southern Africa, and really what you are suggesting makes no sense at all. The closest I might come is to talk about the ZCC, the Zionist Church, which combines elements of traditional beliefs and practices with Christian elements. What counts as occult here is the belief that ancestors can help or hinder as while we live; we have to pay homage to them. Humanity is profoundly important - acceptance and inclusion of people - an acceptance of differences as well as wanting not to stand our. I am sorry but I just get get my head around what Paul is saying. I have to say this sounds suspicious. I cannot see how I could contribute in any other way to this discussion. I really don't think I need melatonin to be African. Carol On 16 December 2014 at 12:37, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > > I have an important question for vygotsky scholars...According to the > haitian sociologist, Daniel Supplice, as people of African descent, whose > societies and governments have been based on theocracy prior to their > contacts with Europeans, democracy is not for haitians. He argues that as > haitians and people of african descent, we have to reconsider how we > constitute our societies, and stop adopting the ideologies and practices of > whites, which are aligned with their biology and experiences of the world. > > This debate is not new. There is an argument in afrocentric circles, > which highlight the impact that melanin has in making people of color > religious and determining their worldview. So that in the internalization > of social processes by blacks melanin is a determing factor in constituting > their worldview. Is this the sought of biological/genetic factor that > Vygotsky scholars are taking into account when they speak of the > internalization process? > > I am aware of the fact that alcohol and certain high blood pressure > medications adversely affect people of african descent because of melanin. > Should we look at the internalization of social processes along the same > lines as the ingestion of medicine and alcohol? Is this Vygotskyian or > more in line with Kantian form of understanding and sensibilities as it > applies to people of african descent? > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Tue Dec 16 07:43:03 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2014 10:43:03 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Genetics, internalization, biology, and Vygotsky Message-ID: <30ma0no8x3i91tj2j43ybyjd.1418744583750@email.android.com> Leif, It is funny that you should mention Fanon, bcuz he was very critical of haiti and vodou. ?He suggested that haitians need to drop vodou as it would contribute to the underdeveloped of the island. Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: Leif Strandberg
Date:12/16/2014 7:35 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Genetics, internalization, biology, and Vygotsky
Oh my God! Melanin and religion?? I prefer re-reading ?The Wretched of the Earth? and ?Black Skin, White Masks? by dr Frantz Fanon. Leif in the North of Sweden :-) 16 dec 2014 kl. 11:37 skrev Dr. Paul C. Mocombe : > I have an important question for vygotsky scholars...According to the haitian sociologist, Daniel Supplice, as people of African descent, whose societies and governments have been based on theocracy prior to their contacts with Europeans, democracy is not for haitians. He argues that as haitians and people of african descent, we have to reconsider how we constitute our societies, and stop adopting the ideologies and practices of whites, which are aligned with their biology and experiences of the world. > > This debate is not new. There is an argument in afrocentric circles, which highlight the impact that melanin has in making people of color religious and determining their worldview. So that in the internalization of social processes by blacks melanin is a determing factor in constituting their worldview. Is this the sought of biological/genetic factor that Vygotsky scholars are taking into account when they speak of the internalization process? > > I am aware of the fact that alcohol and certain high blood pressure medications adversely affect people of african descent because of melanin. Should we look at the internalization of social processes along the same lines as the ingestion of medicine and alcohol? Is this Vygotskyian or more in line with Kantian form of understanding and sensibilities as it applies to people of african descent? > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info From lsmolucha@hotmail.com Tue Dec 16 07:49:52 2014 From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com (larry smolucha) Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2014 09:49:52 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: , , , , , <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net>, , , , , Message-ID: Message from Francine Smolucha: To the old-timers on XMCA I have to say HELLO!!!!!! To the Newcomers read on. In Vygotsky's three papers on the development of imagination and creativity in childhood and adolescence, Vygotsky specifically defined memory as reproductive imagination and creativity as combinatory imagination (1930 paper published in 1990 in Soviet Psychology p. 85 - F. Smolucha translator). All three of Vygotsky's papers on the development of imagination and creativity cited Ribot's book Essay on the Creative Imagination (1900). In these three papers and in his writings on play, Vygotsky also mentioned that imagination and creativity emerge from children's pretend play involving analogical/metaphorical/figurative thinking in which one object is substituted for another (using a stick as a horse). Newcomers to XMCA will forgive me if I seem a bit short tempered when dealing with the veteram XMCAR's on these topics - but Michael Cole and others are certainly familiar with my pioneering work in this area. I even emailed Michael a copy of my 2012 publication on these topics to post for discussion on XMCA - that paper not only reviews these topics but provides the formal bibliography including the reference to Ribot's book Essay on Creative Imagination that was first published in English in 2006 (I discovered the 2006 translation while writing my 2012 publication). For a review of all of this, and the past 25 years of research on these topics, read my 2012 publication "Vygotsky's Theory of Creative Imagination: Figurative thinking Allied with Literal Thinking" (authors: Larry and Francine Smolucha) published in Contemporary Readings on Research in Creativity in Early Childhood (O. Saracho editor) Information Age Publishing 2012 pp. 63 - 85. I applaud those interested in pursuing these ideas in new directions, and an important part of that effort requires a understanding of where these ideas came from so you are not just reinventing the wheel. > From: mcole@ucsd.edu > Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2014 19:42:05 -0800 > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > Makes perfect sense to me concerning Ribot, David. Where does LSV write > about Ribot on imagination? I lost the forest for the trees and am lost > back in memory land! > > And who do we turn to for the evidence that animals other than humans > engage in volitional attention? I was under the impression that it is > through subordinating oneself to a external/cultural mediator one learned > to control oneself from the outside. > > These seem like important issues to be straight about, even if one > disagrees about their implications/interpretation (if that is possible!) > mike > > > On Mon, Dec 15, 2014 at 4:19 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division between > > higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because Ribot is an > > associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of attention. > > And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from forest to > > farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between the two > > great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical world of the > > forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses in life > > and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" (that > > is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the farm,where > > written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter months are > > wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter talking > > animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has to be > > more voluntary. > > > > Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear > > understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that underpins Ribot > > here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out the > > LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices really are > > the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, there > > isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and animal > > imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of volitional > > attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without a theory > > of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's > > distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at all. > > > > David Kellogg > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, thanks to > > all > > > for the food for thought. > > > > > > Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential around the > > time > > > emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had seen work > > on > > > memory before, but not imagination. > > > > > > Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal reproductive? > > > Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of development of > > > imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a relative > > > newcomer to the topic. > > > mike > > > > > > On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. This > > > > business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some weeks > > in > > > > our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that segmented the > > > > last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. Puns, > > > > according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) > > > > Henry > > > > > > > > > On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > > > > > Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they are > > doing > > > > > contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his followers as > > an > > > > > inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so its of > > > > course > > > > > interesting to see those additional categories emerge. > > > > > > > > > > 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in translation, > > seems > > > > > awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in this > > > > passage, > > > > > for example, is not a currently used term in counter distinction to > > > > > "memory." > > > > > Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary discourse > > > > > across languages as our explorations with out Russian colleagues have > > > > > illustrated. > > > > > > > > > > That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists who > > > > clearly > > > > > influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still > > possible > > > to > > > > > include culture in it. > > > > > > > > > > Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, interestingly > > > links > > > > > imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" act. > > > Parts > > > > of > > > > > it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that was > > > also > > > > > "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of creativity > > and > > > > > imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see that the > > > two > > > > > concepts are linked. > > > > > > > > > > Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself > > writing. > > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old > > > > approaches > > > > > to a pesum > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden > > > wrote: > > > > >> > > > > >> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it may be > > > worth > > > > >> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to > > > > Imagination > > > > >> in the section on Representation, mediating between Recollection and > > > > >> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive Imagination, > > (2) > > > > >> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he says > > > leads > > > > to > > > > >> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other words, > > the > > > > >> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is accomplished > > > through > > > > >> these three grades of Imagination. > > > > >> > > > > >> Andy > > > > >> > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > >> *Andy Blunden* > > > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> mike cole wrote: > > > > >> > > > > >>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and Williams. > > > > >>> > > > > >>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am > > > trying > > > > to > > > > >>> mine for empirical > > > > >>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive > > > > >>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination > > develops. > > > > >>> > > > > >>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that there > > must > > > > be a > > > > >>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I learned > > > > that > > > > >>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is linked > > > to > > > > >>> memory. > > > > >>> > > > > >>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of > > anticipation > > > > and > > > > >>> memory. > > > > >>> Imagine that! > > > > >>> mike > > > > >>> > > > > >>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > hshonerd@gmail.com> > > > > >>> wrote: > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination > > (starting > > > > with > > > > >>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and > > provides a > > > > >>>> space > > > > >>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. This, > > > > >>>> coupled > > > > >>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground to > > take > > > > part > > > > >>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with > > > preconceptions: > > > > >>>> Vera > > > > >>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian Langacker > > on > > > > >>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, > > particularly > > > > the > > > > >>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of > > imagination > > > > and > > > > >>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of > > temporality: > > > > >>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure), > > which > > > I > > > > >>>> think > > > > >>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both > > individual > > > > and > > > > >>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > > > > >>>> Henry > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss > > > > wrote: > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* and > > the > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>> analogy > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>>> to *gap-filling* > > > > >>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > > > > >>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion of > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>> "structures > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored > > under > > > > the > > > > >>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of modalities > > > > that > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>> hang > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing that > > is > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>> forming > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we > > think > > > > >>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* > > > > >>>>> Larry > > > > >>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > hshonerd@gmail.com > > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>> wrote: > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>>> Mike and Larry, > > > > >>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how jazzed > > up > > > I > > > > am > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>> now > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as Larry > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>> construes > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various triads, > > > > finally > > > > >>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of the > > > > mind, as > > > > >>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa? > > > fuera. > > > > >>>>>> Fractally yours, > > > > >>>>>> Henry > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached are > > two > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> articles > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists like > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> Zaporozhets > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of imagination in > > a > > > > >>>>>>> manner > > > > >>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of productive > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> imagination. I > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no intention of > > > > doing > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> so. > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the attached > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> texts. > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I came > > > upon > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> the > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked at > > > > several > > > > >>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne and > > I > > > > >>>>>>> argued > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> in > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of > > access > > > > to > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> the > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. Moreover, > > > > such > > > > >>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the > > > > perception/imagination > > > > >>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance to > > > Kris's > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> paper > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns > > about > > > > the > > > > >>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps they > > > will > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> prove > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>>> useful for those interested. > > > > >>>>>>> mike > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> -- > > > > >>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > > > > with an > > > > >>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > > an > > > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Tue Dec 16 07:50:46 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2014 10:50:46 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Genetics, internalization, biology, and Vygotsky Message-ID: Carol, as you watch the video, please keep in mind in haiti there is no pc... Watch "LE POINT Daniel Supplice 15 Decembre 2014.metropo?" on YouTube LE POINT Daniel Supplice 15 Decembre 2014.metropo?: http://youtu.be/Q3m80-JUmNA Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol Macdonald
Date:12/16/2014 8:47 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Genetics, internalization, biology, and Vygotsky
Hello I am truli horrified. I know Haitian people were not subject to the force of Christian evangelism in the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries, and therefore their relationship to their traditional of culture and worship are more visible than in other situations. But I really feel that you can't tar the whole of Africa with the same brush. I am an African, and know a great deal about the peoples of Southern Africa, and really what you are suggesting makes no sense at all. The closest I might come is to talk about the ZCC, the Zionist Church, which combines elements of traditional beliefs and practices with Christian elements. What counts as occult here is the belief that ancestors can help or hinder as while we live; we have to pay homage to them. Humanity is profoundly important - acceptance and inclusion of people - an acceptance of differences as well as wanting not to stand our. I am sorry but I just get get my head around what Paul is saying. I have to say this sounds suspicious. I cannot see how I could contribute in any other way to this discussion. I really don't think I need melatonin to be African. Carol On 16 December 2014 at 12:37, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > > I have an important question for vygotsky scholars...According to the > haitian sociologist, Daniel Supplice, as people of African descent, whose > societies and governments have been based on theocracy prior to their > contacts with Europeans, democracy is not for haitians. He argues that as > haitians and people of african descent, we have to reconsider how we > constitute our societies, and stop adopting the ideologies and practices of > whites, which are aligned with their biology and experiences of the world. > > This debate is not new. There is an argument in afrocentric circles, > which highlight the impact that melanin has in making people of color > religious and determining their worldview. So that in the internalization > of social processes by blacks melanin is a determing factor in constituting > their worldview. Is this the sought of biological/genetic factor that > Vygotsky scholars are taking into account when they speak of the > internalization process? > > I am aware of the fact that alcohol and certain high blood pressure > medications adversely affect people of african descent because of melanin. > Should we look at the internalization of social processes along the same > lines as the ingestion of medicine and alcohol? Is this Vygotskyian or > more in line with Kantian form of understanding and sensibilities as it > applies to people of african descent? > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Tue Dec 16 08:00:38 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2014 11:00:38 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Genetics, internalization, biology, and Vygotsky Message-ID: I want to be fair to Dr. Supplice...i think his argument is, deductively speaking, if you look at black africa historically all of their civilizations have been theocratic...is it biology/Dna/chemical or historical? ?I am trying to understand his statements within Vygotskyian processes. ?When Vygotsky speaks of internalization is this the type of biological factors, I.e., dna, chemical, etc. he is speaking about? I am not interested in the validity of dr. Supplice ' s statements. ?Trust me, had dr. Supplice been white and non-haitian I would probably be screaming racism. ?Albeit in haiti given his mix ancestry he is considered white. Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol Macdonald
Date:12/16/2014 8:47 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Genetics, internalization, biology, and Vygotsky
Hello I am truli horrified. I know Haitian people were not subject to the force of Christian evangelism in the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries, and therefore their relationship to their traditional of culture and worship are more visible than in other situations. But I really feel that you can't tar the whole of Africa with the same brush. I am an African, and know a great deal about the peoples of Southern Africa, and really what you are suggesting makes no sense at all. The closest I might come is to talk about the ZCC, the Zionist Church, which combines elements of traditional beliefs and practices with Christian elements. What counts as occult here is the belief that ancestors can help or hinder as while we live; we have to pay homage to them. Humanity is profoundly important - acceptance and inclusion of people - an acceptance of differences as well as wanting not to stand our. I am sorry but I just get get my head around what Paul is saying. I have to say this sounds suspicious. I cannot see how I could contribute in any other way to this discussion. I really don't think I need melatonin to be African. Carol On 16 December 2014 at 12:37, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > > I have an important question for vygotsky scholars...According to the > haitian sociologist, Daniel Supplice, as people of African descent, whose > societies and governments have been based on theocracy prior to their > contacts with Europeans, democracy is not for haitians. He argues that as > haitians and people of african descent, we have to reconsider how we > constitute our societies, and stop adopting the ideologies and practices of > whites, which are aligned with their biology and experiences of the world. > > This debate is not new. There is an argument in afrocentric circles, > which highlight the impact that melanin has in making people of color > religious and determining their worldview. So that in the internalization > of social processes by blacks melanin is a determing factor in constituting > their worldview. Is this the sought of biological/genetic factor that > Vygotsky scholars are taking into account when they speak of the > internalization process? > > I am aware of the fact that alcohol and certain high blood pressure > medications adversely affect people of african descent because of melanin. > Should we look at the internalization of social processes along the same > lines as the ingestion of medicine and alcohol? Is this Vygotskyian or > more in line with Kantian form of understanding and sensibilities as it > applies to people of african descent? > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Dec 16 09:10:47 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2014 09:10:47 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> Message-ID: Colleagues-- The Vygotsky text that contains the material on Ribot and an introduction to the set of public lectures it was part of are attached in order to further this educational disussion. A number of ideas that were perplexing me and I was stumbling around thinking about are laid out very well in these two documents. They may perhaps help to ground this part of the discussion of imagination. I am certainly benefiting from reading them. My last reading was very narrowly focused and I was totally ignorant of the links between what LSV was writing about imagination and Kant or Hegel. And most amazingly, I ignored the discussion of Ribot. And, naturally, I have the attached pdf in my file on imagination (!). There must be some lesson here about the social, culturally mediated nature of individual memory out there somewhere. :-)) mike On Tue, Dec 16, 2014 at 7:49 AM, larry smolucha wrote: > > Message from Francine Smolucha: > > To the old-timers on XMCA I have to say HELLO!!!!!! > To the Newcomers read on. > > In Vygotsky's three papers on the development of imagination and > creativity in childhood and adolescence, Vygotsky specifically defined > memory as > reproductive imagination and creativity as combinatory imagination > (1930 paper published in 1990 in Soviet Psychology > p. 85 - F. Smolucha translator). All three of Vygotsky's papers on the > development > of imagination and creativity cited Ribot's book Essay on the Creative > Imagination (1900). > In these three papers and in his writings on play, Vygotsky also mentioned > that > imagination and creativity emerge from children's pretend play involving > analogical/metaphorical/figurative thinking in which one object is > substituted for another > (using a stick as a horse). > Newcomers to XMCA will forgive me if I seem a bit short tempered > when dealing with > the veteram XMCAR's on these topics - but Michael Cole and others are > certainly > familiar with my pioneering work in this area. I even emailed Michael a > copy > of my 2012 publication on these topics to post for discussion on XMCA - > that paper not > only reviews these topics but provides the formal bibliography including > the > reference to Ribot's book Essay on Creative Imagination that was first > published in > English in 2006 (I discovered the 2006 translation while writing my 2012 > publication). > For a review of all of this, and the past 25 years of research on > these topics, > read my 2012 publication "Vygotsky's Theory of Creative Imagination: > Figurative thinking Allied with Literal Thinking" (authors: Larry and > Francine Smolucha) published in Contemporary > Readings on Research in Creativity in Early Childhood (O. Saracho editor) > Information Age Publishing 2012 pp. 63 - 85. > I applaud those interested in pursuing these ideas in new > directions, and an important > part of that effort requires a understanding of where these ideas came > from so you are not > just reinventing the wheel. > > > > > > > > > > From: mcole@ucsd.edu > > Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2014 19:42:05 -0800 > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > Makes perfect sense to me concerning Ribot, David. Where does LSV write > > about Ribot on imagination? I lost the forest for the trees and am lost > > back in memory land! > > > > And who do we turn to for the evidence that animals other than humans > > engage in volitional attention? I was under the impression that it is > > through subordinating oneself to a external/cultural mediator one learned > > to control oneself from the outside. > > > > These seem like important issues to be straight about, even if one > > disagrees about their implications/interpretation (if that is possible!) > > mike > > > > > > On Mon, Dec 15, 2014 at 4:19 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > > > > > > On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division between > > > higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because Ribot > is an > > > associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of > attention. > > > And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from > forest to > > > farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between the > two > > > great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical world > of the > > > forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses in > life > > > and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" > (that > > > is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the > farm,where > > > written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter months > are > > > wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter > talking > > > animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has to > be > > > more voluntary. > > > > > > Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear > > > understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that underpins > Ribot > > > here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out the > > > LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices > really are > > > the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, there > > > isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and > animal > > > imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of > volitional > > > attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without a > theory > > > of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's > > > distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at all. > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > > > Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, thanks > to > > > all > > > > for the food for thought. > > > > > > > > Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential around > the > > > time > > > > emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had seen > work > > > on > > > > memory before, but not imagination. > > > > > > > > Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal > reproductive? > > > > Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of > development of > > > > imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a > relative > > > > newcomer to the topic. > > > > mike > > > > > > > > On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. > This > > > > > business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some > weeks > > > in > > > > > our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that > segmented the > > > > > last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. Puns, > > > > > according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) > > > > > Henry > > > > > > > > > > > On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they are > > > doing > > > > > > contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his followers > as > > > an > > > > > > inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so its > of > > > > > course > > > > > > interesting to see those additional categories emerge. > > > > > > > > > > > > 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in translation, > > > seems > > > > > > awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in > this > > > > > passage, > > > > > > for example, is not a currently used term in counter distinction > to > > > > > > "memory." > > > > > > Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary > discourse > > > > > > across languages as our explorations with out Russian colleagues > have > > > > > > illustrated. > > > > > > > > > > > > That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists > who > > > > > clearly > > > > > > influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still > > > possible > > > > to > > > > > > include culture in it. > > > > > > > > > > > > Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, > interestingly > > > > links > > > > > > imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" > act. > > > > Parts > > > > > of > > > > > > it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that > was > > > > also > > > > > > "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of > creativity > > > and > > > > > > imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see that > the > > > > two > > > > > > concepts are linked. > > > > > > > > > > > > Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself > > > writing. > > > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old > > > > > approaches > > > > > > to a pesum > > > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden > > > > > wrote: > > > > > >> > > > > > >> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it may > be > > > > worth > > > > > >> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to > > > > > Imagination > > > > > >> in the section on Representation, mediating between > Recollection and > > > > > >> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive > Imagination, > > > (2) > > > > > >> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he > says > > > > leads > > > > > to > > > > > >> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other > words, > > > the > > > > > >> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is accomplished > > > > through > > > > > >> these three grades of Imagination. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Andy > > > > > >> > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > > >> *Andy Blunden* > > > > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> mike cole wrote: > > > > > >> > > > > > >>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and > Williams. > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am > > > > trying > > > > > to > > > > > >>> mine for empirical > > > > > >>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive > > > > > >>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination > > > develops. > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that > there > > > must > > > > > be a > > > > > >>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I > learned > > > > > that > > > > > >>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is > linked > > > > to > > > > > >>> memory. > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of > > > anticipation > > > > > and > > > > > >>> memory. > > > > > >>> Imagine that! > > > > > >>> mike > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > hshonerd@gmail.com> > > > > > >>> wrote: > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination > > > (starting > > > > > with > > > > > >>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and > > > provides a > > > > > >>>> space > > > > > >>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. > This, > > > > > >>>> coupled > > > > > >>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground > to > > > take > > > > > part > > > > > >>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with > > > > preconceptions: > > > > > >>>> Vera > > > > > >>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian > Langacker > > > on > > > > > >>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, > > > particularly > > > > > the > > > > > >>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of > > > imagination > > > > > and > > > > > >>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of > > > temporality: > > > > > >>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure), > > > which > > > > I > > > > > >>>> think > > > > > >>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both > > > individual > > > > > and > > > > > >>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > > > > > >>>> Henry > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < > lpscholar2@gmail.com> > > > > > wrote: > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* > and > > > the > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>> analogy > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>>> to *gap-filling* > > > > > >>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > > > > > >>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion > of > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>> "structures > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored > > > under > > > > > the > > > > > >>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of > modalities > > > > > that > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>> hang > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing > that > > > is > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>> forming > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we > > > think > > > > > >>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* > > > > > >>>>> Larry > > > > > >>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > hshonerd@gmail.com > > > > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>> wrote: > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>>> Mike and Larry, > > > > > >>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how > jazzed > > > up > > > > I > > > > > am > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>> now > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as > Larry > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>> construes > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various > triads, > > > > > finally > > > > > >>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of > the > > > > > mind, as > > > > > >>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa? > > > > fuera. > > > > > >>>>>> Fractally yours, > > > > > >>>>>> Henry > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole > wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached > are > > > two > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> articles > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists > like > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> Zaporozhets > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of > imagination in > > > a > > > > > >>>>>>> manner > > > > > >>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of > productive > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> imagination. I > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no > intention of > > > > > doing > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> so. > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the > attached > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> texts. > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I > came > > > > upon > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> the > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked > at > > > > > several > > > > > >>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne > and > > > I > > > > > >>>>>>> argued > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> in > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of > > > access > > > > > to > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> the > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. > Moreover, > > > > > such > > > > > >>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the > > > > > perception/imagination > > > > > >>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance > to > > > > Kris's > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> paper > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns > > > about > > > > > the > > > > > >>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps > they > > > > will > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> prove > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>>> useful for those interested. > > > > > >>>>>>> mike > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> -- > > > > > >>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > science > > > > > with an > > > > > >>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > with > > > an > > > > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > an > > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: LSV.Imagination.Childhood.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 28398 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141216/4f078aba/attachment.pdf -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: LSV.Imagination.Childhood2.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 296707 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141216/4f078aba/attachment-0001.pdf From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Tue Dec 16 09:26:54 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2014 17:26:54 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Genetics, internalization, biology, and Vygotsky In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hi Paul, In my reading, when LSV wrote of internalization he distinguished a psychological and a physiological component. He wrote of speech becoming "internal psychologically" when it moves from being social to being individual. That is, talk with other people becomes talk to oneself, out loud. Then, he wrote of speech subsequently becoming "internal physiologically" when this talk to oneself becomes "inner speech" - that is to say, when only I can hear myself speaking. That aspect of internalization requires neurological changes that we still don't fully understand: presumably the brain region that handles speech production becomes capable of direct communication with the brain region that handles speech perception. But I don't think LSV considered internalization to involve genetic changes, nor to depend on factors such as melanin. Martin On Dec 16, 2014, at 11:00 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > I want to be fair to Dr. Supplice...i think his argument is, deductively speaking, if you look at black africa historically all of their civilizations have been theocratic...is it biology/Dna/chemical or historical? I am trying to understand his statements within Vygotskyian processes. When Vygotsky speaks of internalization is this the type of biological factors, I.e., dna, chemical, etc. he is speaking about? I am not interested in the validity of dr. Supplice ' s statements. Trust me, had dr. Supplice been white and non-haitian I would probably be screaming racism. Albeit in haiti given his mix ancestry he is considered white. > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > >
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol Macdonald
Date:12/16/2014 8:47 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Genetics, internalization, biology, and Vygotsky
>
Hello > > I am truli horrified. I know Haitian people were not subject to the force > of Christian evangelism in the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries, and therefore > their relationship to their traditional of culture and worship are more > visible than in other situations. > > But I really feel that you can't tar the whole of Africa with the same > brush. I am an African, and know a great deal about the peoples of > Southern Africa, and really what you are suggesting makes no sense at all. > > The closest I might come is to talk about the ZCC, the Zionist Church, > which combines elements of traditional beliefs and practices with Christian > elements. What counts as occult here is the belief that ancestors can help > or hinder as while we live; we have to pay homage to them. > > Humanity is profoundly important - acceptance and inclusion of people - an > acceptance of differences as well as wanting not to stand our. > > I am sorry but I just get get my head around what Paul is saying. I have to > say this sounds suspicious. I cannot see how I could contribute in any > other way to this discussion. > > I really don't think I need melatonin to be African. > > Carol > > On 16 December 2014 at 12:37, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > wrote: >> >> I have an important question for vygotsky scholars...According to the >> haitian sociologist, Daniel Supplice, as people of African descent, whose >> societies and governments have been based on theocracy prior to their >> contacts with Europeans, democracy is not for haitians. He argues that as >> haitians and people of african descent, we have to reconsider how we >> constitute our societies, and stop adopting the ideologies and practices of >> whites, which are aligned with their biology and experiences of the world. >> >> This debate is not new. There is an argument in afrocentric circles, >> which highlight the impact that melanin has in making people of color >> religious and determining their worldview. So that in the internalization >> of social processes by blacks melanin is a determing factor in constituting >> their worldview. Is this the sought of biological/genetic factor that >> Vygotsky scholars are taking into account when they speak of the >> internalization process? >> >> I am aware of the fact that alcohol and certain high blood pressure >> medications adversely affect people of african descent because of melanin. >> Should we look at the internalization of social processes along the same >> lines as the ingestion of medicine and alcohol? Is this Vygotskyian or >> more in line with Kantian form of understanding and sensibilities as it >> applies to people of african descent? >> >> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >> President >> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >> www.mocombeian.com >> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >> www.paulcmocombe.info > > > > -- > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > From hshonerd@gmail.com Tue Dec 16 09:41:16 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2014 10:41:16 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Genetics, internalization, biology, and Vygotsky In-Reply-To: References: <9byxw2d5ytycfg0cyocyvodw.1418726253298@email.android.com> Message-ID: I am late to this, but I just read the letter about Freire and two views on concentizacao proffered by Robert. I have been wondering about how indigeneity plays into this thread that Paul initiated. I live in New Mexico, where there are a lot of Native Americans. Henry > On Dec 16, 2014, at 6:44 AM, Robert Lake wrote: > > Dear Paul, > While I cannot address the theocratic aspect of vital question, I do not > believe that democracy is only for Eurocentric societies but where ever it > is a viable reality, it must come from within. Dewey was certainly > thinking about this when he said that "*democracy must be born anew in > every generation, and education is its midwife*". One has only to remember > Gandhi's work (By they way, could the cottage industry movement he spawned > be considered an aspect of CHAT work with the spinning wheel as an artefact > and the movement itself a ZPD with many interlocking circles?) There are > many points of convergence between between Vygotsky's work of higher > consciousness and Freire's notion of conscientiza??o. I know you are aware > of Freire's connection to Cabral and the work of adult literacy in Guinea > Bissau, West Africa. > I do not have time for anything more but you might want read this short > book review in light of your powerful questions. > > http://fcis.oise.utoronto.ca/~daniel_sc/freire/vr.html > > *Robert* > > On Tue, Dec 16, 2014 at 5:37 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe < > pmocombe@mocombeian.com> wrote: >> >> I have an important question for vygotsky scholars...According to the >> haitian sociologist, Daniel Supplice, as people of African descent, whose >> societies and governments have been based on theocracy prior to their >> contacts with Europeans, democracy is not for haitians. He argues that as >> haitians and people of african descent, we have to reconsider how we >> constitute our societies, and stop adopting the ideologies and practices of >> whites, which are aligned with their biology and experiences of the world. >> >> This debate is not new. There is an argument in afrocentric circles, >> which highlight the impact that melanin has in making people of color >> religious and determining their worldview. So that in the internalization >> of social processes by blacks melanin is a determing factor in constituting >> their worldview. Is this the sought of biological/genetic factor that >> Vygotsky scholars are taking into account when they speak of the >> internalization process? >> >> I am aware of the fact that alcohol and certain high blood pressure >> medications adversely affect people of african descent because of melanin. >> Should we look at the internalization of social processes along the same >> lines as the ingestion of medicine and alcohol? Is this Vygotskyian or >> more in line with Kantian form of understanding and sensibilities as it >> applies to people of african descent? >> >> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >> President >> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >> www.mocombeian.com >> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >> www.paulcmocombe.info > > > > -- > > *Robert Lake Ed.D.*Associate Professor > Social Foundations of Education > Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading > Georgia Southern University > Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group > P. O. Box 8144 > Phone: (912) 478-0355 > Fax: (912) 478-5382 > Statesboro, GA 30460 From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Tue Dec 16 09:42:27 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2014 12:42:27 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Genetics, internalization, biology, and Vygotsky Message-ID: Thank you Martin, It seems as though I was reading LSV through the my chomskyian lens. Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John Packer
Date:12/16/2014 12:26 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Genetics, internalization, biology, and Vygotsky
Hi Paul, In my reading, when LSV wrote of internalization he distinguished a psychological and a physiological component. He wrote of speech becoming "internal psychologically" when it moves from being social to being individual. That is, talk with other people becomes talk to oneself, out loud. Then, he wrote of speech subsequently becoming "internal physiologically" when this talk to oneself becomes "inner speech" - that is to say, when only I can hear myself speaking. That aspect of internalization requires neurological changes that we still don't fully understand: presumably the brain region that handles speech production becomes capable of direct communication with the brain region that handles speech perception. But I don't think LSV considered internalization to involve genetic changes, nor to depend on factors such as melanin. Martin On Dec 16, 2014, at 11:00 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > I want to be fair to Dr. Supplice...i think his argument is, deductively speaking, if you look at black africa historically all of their civilizations have been theocratic...is it biology/Dna/chemical or historical? I am trying to understand his statements within Vygotskyian processes. When Vygotsky speaks of internalization is this the type of biological factors, I.e., dna, chemical, etc. he is speaking about? I am not interested in the validity of dr. Supplice ' s statements. Trust me, had dr. Supplice been white and non-haitian I would probably be screaming racism. Albeit in haiti given his mix ancestry he is considered white. > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > >
-------- Original message --------
From: Carol Macdonald
Date:12/16/2014 8:47 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Genetics, internalization, biology, and Vygotsky
>
Hello > > I am truli horrified. I know Haitian people were not subject to the force > of Christian evangelism in the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries, and therefore > their relationship to their traditional of culture and worship are more > visible than in other situations. > > But I really feel that you can't tar the whole of Africa with the same > brush. I am an African, and know a great deal about the peoples of > Southern Africa, and really what you are suggesting makes no sense at all. > > The closest I might come is to talk about the ZCC, the Zionist Church, > which combines elements of traditional beliefs and practices with Christian > elements. What counts as occult here is the belief that ancestors can help > or hinder as while we live; we have to pay homage to them. > > Humanity is profoundly important - acceptance and inclusion of people - an > acceptance of differences as well as wanting not to stand our. > > I am sorry but I just get get my head around what Paul is saying. I have to > say this sounds suspicious. I cannot see how I could contribute in any > other way to this discussion. > > I really don't think I need melatonin to be African. > > Carol > > On 16 December 2014 at 12:37, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > wrote: >> >> I have an important question for vygotsky scholars...According to the >> haitian sociologist, Daniel Supplice, as people of African descent, whose >> societies and governments have been based on theocracy prior to their >> contacts with Europeans, democracy is not for haitians. He argues that as >> haitians and people of african descent, we have to reconsider how we >> constitute our societies, and stop adopting the ideologies and practices of >> whites, which are aligned with their biology and experiences of the world. >> >> This debate is not new. There is an argument in afrocentric circles, >> which highlight the impact that melanin has in making people of color >> religious and determining their worldview. So that in the internalization >> of social processes by blacks melanin is a determing factor in constituting >> their worldview. Is this the sought of biological/genetic factor that >> Vygotsky scholars are taking into account when they speak of the >> internalization process? >> >> I am aware of the fact that alcohol and certain high blood pressure >> medications adversely affect people of african descent because of melanin. >> Should we look at the internalization of social processes along the same >> lines as the ingestion of medicine and alcohol? Is this Vygotskyian or >> more in line with Kantian form of understanding and sensibilities as it >> applies to people of african descent? >> >> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >> President >> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >> www.mocombeian.com >> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >> www.paulcmocombe.info > > > > -- > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Tue Dec 16 10:00:11 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2014 11:00:11 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: <1418702795665.54419@unm.edu> References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <1418702795665.54419@unm.edu> Message-ID: Annalisa, Can you say more about what you mean by "seeing as genesis"? -greg On Mon, Dec 15, 2014 at 9:06 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Hi David and Henry, > > I did a search on associationism and it is interesting how it came into > being. It's a little digression perhaps from our quest on imagination, but > it seems a little digression that may be germane! if not somewhat > interesting. > > In a web display of the book, A History Of The Association Psychology > (1921) by Warren at archive.org I found the genesis of the concept of > associationism, which evidently came from Locke's "association of ideas," a > phrase he used in an added chapter to a later edition of "Essay concerning > Human Understanding." > > Below I'm pasting in the first (and short) section of Chapter One, just to > keep the conversation rolling here! > > The reason I'm interested in this is because Locke in his search for > understanding Human Understanding was looking at this from an > epistemological standpoint, not psychological. I thought this relevant to > our recent considerations of perception and its link to imagination (in > light of the Strawson paper). > > In other words, the lift (or burial, depending on how one views it) that > the Associationists gave the term, in context of English psychology, > perhaps has a different meaning than what we are exploring here, if we are > exploring this from an epistemological angle, that is. In other words, from > Locke's POV. > > Seeing as genesis is important to us, I thought I'd throw this into the > soup! > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > ===================================== > > >From Chapter One: > Origins of the Term "Association of Ideas" (p 3-6) > > ===================================== > > The phrase _association of ideas_ was first used by John Locke. In the > fourth edition (1700) of his 'Essay concerning Human Understanding' he > inserted a new chapter, entitled "Of the Association of Ideas," in which he > discusses the connections between experiences. > > "Some of our ideas," he says, "have a natural correspondence and > connection with one another: it is the office and excellency of our reason > to trace these and hold them together in that union and correspondence > which is founded in their peculiar beings. Besides this, there is another > connection of ideas that in themselves are not at all of kin come to be so > united in some men's minds that it is very hard to separate them; they > always keep in company, and the one no sooner at any time comes into the > understanding, but its associate appears with it; and if they are more than > two which are thus united, the whole gang, always inseparable, show > themselves together. This strong combination of ideas not allied by nature > the mind makes in itself either voluntarily or by chance, and hence it > comes in different men to be very different, according to their different > inclinations, education, interests, etc." > > We are indebted to Locke for a term which later gained currency as applied > to a doctrine of peculiar prominence in English psychology; of such > prominence, indeed, that the system of psychology which these writers > worked out came to be known as _Associationism_. Furthermore, the > exposition of mental association in various parts of Locke's 'Essay' > furnished important data to the theory subsequently developed. But it > should be noted at the outset that the epoch-making character of Locke's > work in this field consists only in in his introduction of the term > 'association of ideas.' He neither founded the doctrine of association nor > did he fix the historical significance of the name which he coined. > > First, the laws of the association of remembered images according to > similarity, contrast, and contiguity were originally formulated by > Aristotle, who furnished hints of an association of _sensations_ as well. > These suggestions long escaped notice owing to the lack of interest in such > problems. In modern times also, the notion of an associated sequence of > thought was worked out in some detail, prior to Locke, by Thomas Hobbes, > and his treatment furnished the model for later discussions of the subject. > Locke emphasizes the _fact_, but does not work out the _manner_ of > association. This latter problem, one of the most notable features of the > association psychology, rests historically on Aristotle's classification, > which has been taken up and modified in various ways by writers of the > association school; Hobbe's view of association as the mode of succession > of ideational experiences is generally adopted as a starting-point in the > analysis. > > Again, the term _idea_ was used by Locke in a broader sense than that > fixed by later usage. Thus, When Locke speaks of the association of ideas > he has reference to possible connections between _all sorts of mental > content_; whereas from the time of David Hume onward the phrase refers to > connections between _representative_ data only. Locke's term has been > retained, but its application is narrowed to a portion of the field to > which he assigned it. This permanent fixing of the expression _association > of ideas_ with an altered meaning given to the term _idea_, has exerted > some influence on the development of the doctrine itself. The connection > between sensations, as for example in perception, has been ignored by some > writers, while others have treated it as another sort of union, distinct > from association. Where the union of sensations has been classed under the > same general principles as associations between representative elements, > the exposition has been weakened by the inappropriateness of the accepted > phrase. > > Finally, it should be borne in mind that the problem of association as > Locke conceived it was an ethical and pedagogical one, not a problem of > psychological analysis. He nowhere seeks to determine the different modes > of connection between experiences as Hobbes has done. His real aim is to > trace the rise of _wrong_ associations and suggest practical remedies for > the errors of judgment and action to which they lead. In the passage quoted > Locke grants that a natural connection between ideas exists as well as > chance association; but it is the associations of chance or custom, their > origin, and the means of preventing and overcoming them, that constitute > the material of his inquiry. The chapter on association was an > afterthought, not an essential part of the 'Essay'; and although in harmony > with the doctrine formulated in the rest of his book, it appears more in > the light of a practical application of his theory that (typo? --> than?) > an investigation of the laws of association. > > In short, while the 'Essay concerning Human Understanding' furnished the > name under which the principle has since become known, and has also > afforded considerable material to assist later writers in developing the > psychology of association, the two contributions stand apart; Locke's > association doctrine is not worked out from the psychological standpoint, > and it is not definitely attached to the phrase which he devised. The aim > of his 'Essay.' it must be remembered, is essentially epistemological, and > the psychological analysis which it undertakes is carried out only so far > as necessary to demonstrate the empirical derivation of all knowledge. > > ================================= > > The book may be found here: > https://archive.org/details/historyoftheasso007979mbp > > One can download the PDF of the book here: > > https://archive.org/download/historyoftheasso007979mbp/historyoftheasso007979mbp.pdf > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From hshonerd@gmail.com Tue Dec 16 10:16:07 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2014 11:16:07 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Genetics, internalization, biology, and Vygotsky In-Reply-To: <30ma0no8x3i91tj2j43ybyjd.1418744583750@email.android.com> References: <30ma0no8x3i91tj2j43ybyjd.1418744583750@email.android.com> Message-ID: <657E0B98-60BB-4E8E-9800-6E42D9DA56E5@gmail.com> I am late here, but I have just finished a book by Suki John, Vera?s daughter, on Cuban dance since the revolution. She is a dance prof and dancer and has immersed herself in the dance culture of Cuba. She talks of the blend of ?cubanidad? and other dance forms. Cubanidad has religious elements undoubtedly related to those of Haiti. What I find interesting is how cultural elements which have been ?desprestigiados? overtly, like those brought to the ?New? world by Africans as slaves now enjoy so much covert prestige, as evidenced by the adoption of African-American religious forms in White churches. Shake it up, baby. Twist and shout. African Americans gave us jazz, hip-hop. Young people get it. We are ALL Africans. Henry > On Dec 16, 2014, at 8:43 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > > Leif, > > It is funny that you should mention Fanon, bcuz he was very critical of haiti and vodou. He suggested that haitians need to drop vodou as it would contribute to the underdeveloped of the island. > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > >
-------- Original message --------
From: Leif Strandberg
Date:12/16/2014 7:35 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Genetics, internalization, biology, and Vygotsky
>
Oh my God! Melanin and religion?? > > I prefer re-reading ?The Wretched of the Earth? and ?Black Skin, White Masks? by dr Frantz Fanon. > > Leif > > in the North of Sweden > > :-) > 16 dec 2014 kl. 11:37 skrev Dr. Paul C. Mocombe : > >> I have an important question for vygotsky scholars...According to the haitian sociologist, Daniel Supplice, as people of African descent, whose societies and governments have been based on theocracy prior to their contacts with Europeans, democracy is not for haitians. He argues that as haitians and people of african descent, we have to reconsider how we constitute our societies, and stop adopting the ideologies and practices of whites, which are aligned with their biology and experiences of the world. >> >> This debate is not new. There is an argument in afrocentric circles, which highlight the impact that melanin has in making people of color religious and determining their worldview. So that in the internalization of social processes by blacks melanin is a determing factor in constituting their worldview. Is this the sought of biological/genetic factor that Vygotsky scholars are taking into account when they speak of the internalization process? >> >> I am aware of the fact that alcohol and certain high blood pressure medications adversely affect people of african descent because of melanin. Should we look at the internalization of social processes along the same lines as the ingestion of medicine and alcohol? Is this Vygotskyian or more in line with Kantian form of understanding and sensibilities as it applies to people of african descent? >> >> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >> President >> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >> www.mocombeian.com >> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >> www.paulcmocombe.info > > From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Tue Dec 16 10:49:08 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2014 13:49:08 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Genetics, internalization, biology, and Vygotsky Message-ID: <2w0xw10faa432ct30hvsy4iq.1418755748374@email.android.com> Yes Henry we are all africans. ?But there is a fundamental question we have failed to ask since decolonization, "how do we reafricanize africa?" ?fanon, theoretically, raised the issue in "the wretched of the earth," and Thomas sankara attempted to do so pragmatically. ? No one will deny, like haiti, africa is a mess contemporarily. ?Why? ?My Marxist training wants to attribute it to capitalist relations of production, but the problem seems more complicated than that. Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: HENRY SHONERD
Date:12/16/2014 1:16 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Genetics, internalization, biology, and Vygotsky
I am late here, but I have just finished a book by Suki John, Vera?s daughter, on Cuban dance since the revolution. She is a dance prof and dancer and has immersed herself in the dance culture of Cuba. She talks of the blend of ?cubanidad? and other dance forms. Cubanidad has religious elements undoubtedly related to those of Haiti. What I find interesting is how cultural elements which have been ?desprestigiados? overtly, like those brought to the ?New? world by Africans as slaves now enjoy so much covert prestige, as evidenced by the adoption of African-American religious forms in White churches. Shake it up, baby. Twist and shout. African Americans gave us jazz, hip-hop. Young people get it. We are ALL Africans. Henry > On Dec 16, 2014, at 8:43 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > > Leif, > > It is funny that you should mention Fanon, bcuz he was very critical of haiti and vodou. He suggested that haitians need to drop vodou as it would contribute to the underdeveloped of the island. > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > >
-------- Original message --------
From: Leif Strandberg
Date:12/16/2014 7:35 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Genetics, internalization, biology, and Vygotsky
>
Oh my God! Melanin and religion?? > > I prefer re-reading ?The Wretched of the Earth? and ?Black Skin, White Masks? by dr Frantz Fanon. > > Leif > > in the North of Sweden > > :-) > 16 dec 2014 kl. 11:37 skrev Dr. Paul C. Mocombe : > >> I have an important question for vygotsky scholars...According to the haitian sociologist, Daniel Supplice, as people of African descent, whose societies and governments have been based on theocracy prior to their contacts with Europeans, democracy is not for haitians. He argues that as haitians and people of african descent, we have to reconsider how we constitute our societies, and stop adopting the ideologies and practices of whites, which are aligned with their biology and experiences of the world. >> >> This debate is not new. There is an argument in afrocentric circles, which highlight the impact that melanin has in making people of color religious and determining their worldview. So that in the internalization of social processes by blacks melanin is a determing factor in constituting their worldview. Is this the sought of biological/genetic factor that Vygotsky scholars are taking into account when they speak of the internalization process? >> >> I am aware of the fact that alcohol and certain high blood pressure medications adversely affect people of african descent because of melanin. Should we look at the internalization of social processes along the same lines as the ingestion of medicine and alcohol? Is this Vygotskyian or more in line with Kantian form of understanding and sensibilities as it applies to people of african descent? >> >> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >> President >> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >> www.mocombeian.com >> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >> www.paulcmocombe.info > > From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Tue Dec 16 11:01:53 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2014 14:01:53 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology Message-ID: Is it really the case thay chomsky and Vygotsky diametrically oppose one another? ?As I read Vygotsky it appears as if something is missing. ?That something for me was the internalization process. ?I was reading his concept of internalization as though he was suggesting that it took place among an empiricist view of the human being as a "blank slate." ?hence my questions in the previous thread. ?If chomsky is right, which I think he is to some extent, does that change Vygotsky or can we synthesize the two? I am working on a paper to attempt to do just that through phenomenology.... Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info? From annalisa@unm.edu Tue Dec 16 11:14:35 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2014 19:14:35 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <1418702795665.54419@unm.edu>, Message-ID: <1418757275127.14299@unm.edu> Greg, I did not mean it as you might think. But it is spooky the association that you made! Or was it mediated, I don't know! The way I meant it was in our community the concept of genesis is important. I posted the section because I thought it captured something interesting about the concept "association of ideas." Not because I am pro-association, but because here is a phrase that was lifted and then applied to psychology and then an assortment of meanings were historically associated with that phrase that have a psychological coloring. So I meant it like that. However, I don't think I mind that "seeing as genesis" is interpreted in the way I think you may have read it. This is not to say that I think that seeing is the prime (as in only) sense that mediates thought, as we have 4 other senses, and I would say that in reality all these senses are intertwined and contribute to higher resolutions when internalized, and how they impress depends on the saliency of the situation in embodied experience. Affect too is relevant here. I'd say affect is the historical component rather than memory of facts, say. This is why I like the Locke quote that starts: "Some of our ideas have a natural correspondence and connection with one another..." as well as his inquiry was motivated by ethical and pedagogical reasons, not psychological. But perhaps seeing is a good first step to model *what happens*, (a la Gibson) always being cognizant that it is united with the other sense organs and with feelings, and also with the environment. In many ways sight is our first encounter with the distant world, in terms of meeting the day (I don't mean as infants, just everyday experience, for infants it is different of course). Vision as a first step may be difficult to assert because my intelligence has a lot of vision in it, that is, I depend a lot upon my visual ability to think and to consider; I understand it may not be that way for others. Still, it works for me. Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Greg Thompson Sent: Tuesday, December 16, 2014 11:00 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination Annalisa, Can you say more about what you mean by "seeing as genesis"? -greg From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Tue Dec 16 11:38:14 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2014 14:38:14 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology Message-ID: I do not want people to come down on...thinking out loud about another way to resolve the controversy between chomskyianites and vygotskyites...i think it can be done through phenomenology (arrogance of youth maybe, but I am going to try it).... Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe"
Date:12/16/2014 2:01 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology
Is it really the case thay chomsky and Vygotsky diametrically oppose one another? As I read Vygotsky it appears as if something is missing. That something for me was the internalization process. I was reading his concept of internalization as though he was suggesting that it took place among an empiricist view of the human being as a "blank slate." hence my questions in the previous thread. If chomsky is right, which I think he is to some extent, does that change Vygotsky or can we synthesize the two? I am working on a paper to attempt to do just that through phenomenology.... Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com www.readingroomcurriculum.com www.paulcmocombe.info From lsmolucha@hotmail.com Tue Dec 16 11:44:47 2014 From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com (larry smolucha) Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2014 13:44:47 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: , , , , , <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net>, , , , , , , Message-ID: Message from Francine Smolucha: Vygotsky referenced Ribot in the three papers that Vygotsky wrote on the development of imagination and creativity. Michael attached a copy of one translation of Imagination and Creativity in Childhood (original 1930). But there are two other papers Imagination and Creativity of the Adolescent (1931) and The Development of Imagination in Childhood (1932). I translated these three papers into English in the mid-1980's and presented a summary at the APA convention in 1986 which was published in a German journal in 1986. The Newsletter of the Laboratory for Comparative Human Cognition accepted that same paper for publication in 1986 but has never published it. In 1990 and 1991 my translations of two of the papers were published in Soviet Psychology. The connections with Ribot's theory were explicitly discussed in my 1992 publication "A Reconstruction of Vygotsky's Theory of Creativity" along with excerpts from my translations of the three Vygotsky papers on imagination and creativity (Creativity Research Journal 1992 Vol 5 No 1). It was not until 2011, that I was able to find an English translation of Ribot's book Essay on the Creative Imagination (published in French in 1900, English translation 2006). In my 2012 publication the Vygotsky-Ribot connection is further elaborated on (see Smolucha, L. and Smolucha, F. Vygotsky's Theory of Creativity: Figurative Thinking Allied with Literal Thinking in O. Saracho (Ed). Contemporary Perspectives on research in Creativity in Early Childhood. Information Age Publishing pp. 63-85). I am glad a new generation of scholars has taken an interest in these topics. By the way, my new paper on Vygotsky's Theory of Creativity and Cultural Synergy, builds on all this, and will be presented in Europe next year. > From: mcole@ucsd.edu > Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2014 09:10:47 -0800 > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > Colleagues-- The Vygotsky text that contains the material on Ribot and an > introduction to the set of public lectures it was part of are attached in > order to further this educational disussion. > > A number of ideas that were perplexing me and I was stumbling around > thinking about are laid out very well in these two documents. They may > perhaps help to ground this part of the discussion of imagination. > > I am certainly benefiting from reading them. My last reading was very > narrowly focused and I was totally ignorant of the links between what LSV > was writing about imagination and Kant or Hegel. And most amazingly, I > ignored the discussion of Ribot. And, naturally, I have the attached pdf > in my file on imagination (!). > > There must be some lesson here about the social, culturally mediated nature > of individual memory out there somewhere. :-)) > > mike > > On Tue, Dec 16, 2014 at 7:49 AM, larry smolucha > wrote: > > > > Message from Francine Smolucha: > > > > To the old-timers on XMCA I have to say HELLO!!!!!! > > To the Newcomers read on. > > > > In Vygotsky's three papers on the development of imagination and > > creativity in childhood and adolescence, Vygotsky specifically defined > > memory as > > reproductive imagination and creativity as combinatory imagination > > (1930 paper published in 1990 in Soviet Psychology > > p. 85 - F. Smolucha translator). All three of Vygotsky's papers on the > > development > > of imagination and creativity cited Ribot's book Essay on the Creative > > Imagination (1900). > > In these three papers and in his writings on play, Vygotsky also mentioned > > that > > imagination and creativity emerge from children's pretend play involving > > analogical/metaphorical/figurative thinking in which one object is > > substituted for another > > (using a stick as a horse). > > Newcomers to XMCA will forgive me if I seem a bit short tempered > > when dealing with > > the veteram XMCAR's on these topics - but Michael Cole and others are > > certainly > > familiar with my pioneering work in this area. I even emailed Michael a > > copy > > of my 2012 publication on these topics to post for discussion on XMCA - > > that paper not > > only reviews these topics but provides the formal bibliography including > > the > > reference to Ribot's book Essay on Creative Imagination that was first > > published in > > English in 2006 (I discovered the 2006 translation while writing my 2012 > > publication). > > For a review of all of this, and the past 25 years of research on > > these topics, > > read my 2012 publication "Vygotsky's Theory of Creative Imagination: > > Figurative thinking Allied with Literal Thinking" (authors: Larry and > > Francine Smolucha) published in Contemporary > > Readings on Research in Creativity in Early Childhood (O. Saracho editor) > > Information Age Publishing 2012 pp. 63 - 85. > > I applaud those interested in pursuing these ideas in new > > directions, and an important > > part of that effort requires a understanding of where these ideas came > > from so you are not > > just reinventing the wheel. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From: mcole@ucsd.edu > > > Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2014 19:42:05 -0800 > > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > > > Makes perfect sense to me concerning Ribot, David. Where does LSV write > > > about Ribot on imagination? I lost the forest for the trees and am lost > > > back in memory land! > > > > > > And who do we turn to for the evidence that animals other than humans > > > engage in volitional attention? I was under the impression that it is > > > through subordinating oneself to a external/cultural mediator one learned > > > to control oneself from the outside. > > > > > > These seem like important issues to be straight about, even if one > > > disagrees about their implications/interpretation (if that is possible!) > > > mike > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Dec 15, 2014 at 4:19 PM, David Kellogg > > wrote: > > > > > > > > On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division between > > > > higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because Ribot > > is an > > > > associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of > > attention. > > > > And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from > > forest to > > > > farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between the > > two > > > > great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical world > > of the > > > > forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses in > > life > > > > and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" > > (that > > > > is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the > > farm,where > > > > written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter months > > are > > > > wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter > > talking > > > > animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has to > > be > > > > more voluntary. > > > > > > > > Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear > > > > understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that underpins > > Ribot > > > > here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out the > > > > LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices > > really are > > > > the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, there > > > > isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and > > animal > > > > imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of > > volitional > > > > attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without a > > theory > > > > of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's > > > > distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at all. > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > > > > > Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, thanks > > to > > > > all > > > > > for the food for thought. > > > > > > > > > > Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential around > > the > > > > time > > > > > emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had seen > > work > > > > on > > > > > memory before, but not imagination. > > > > > > > > > > Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal > > reproductive? > > > > > Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of > > development of > > > > > imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a > > relative > > > > > newcomer to the topic. > > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. > > This > > > > > > business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some > > weeks > > > > in > > > > > > our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that > > segmented the > > > > > > last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. Puns, > > > > > > according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) > > > > > > Henry > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they are > > > > doing > > > > > > > contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his followers > > as > > > > an > > > > > > > inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so its > > of > > > > > > course > > > > > > > interesting to see those additional categories emerge. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in translation, > > > > seems > > > > > > > awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in > > this > > > > > > passage, > > > > > > > for example, is not a currently used term in counter distinction > > to > > > > > > > "memory." > > > > > > > Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary > > discourse > > > > > > > across languages as our explorations with out Russian colleagues > > have > > > > > > > illustrated. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists > > who > > > > > > clearly > > > > > > > influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still > > > > possible > > > > > to > > > > > > > include culture in it. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, > > interestingly > > > > > links > > > > > > > imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" > > act. > > > > > Parts > > > > > > of > > > > > > > it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that > > was > > > > > also > > > > > > > "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of > > creativity > > > > and > > > > > > > imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see that > > the > > > > > two > > > > > > > concepts are linked. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself > > > > writing. > > > > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old > > > > > > approaches > > > > > > > to a pesum > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it may > > be > > > > > worth > > > > > > >> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to > > > > > > Imagination > > > > > > >> in the section on Representation, mediating between > > Recollection and > > > > > > >> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive > > Imagination, > > > > (2) > > > > > > >> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he > > says > > > > > leads > > > > > > to > > > > > > >> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other > > words, > > > > the > > > > > > >> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is accomplished > > > > > through > > > > > > >> these three grades of Imagination. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> Andy > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > > > >> *Andy Blunden* > > > > > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> mike cole wrote: > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and > > Williams. > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > >>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am > > > > > trying > > > > > > to > > > > > > >>> mine for empirical > > > > > > >>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive > > > > > > >>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination > > > > develops. > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > >>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that > > there > > > > must > > > > > > be a > > > > > > >>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I > > learned > > > > > > that > > > > > > >>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is > > linked > > > > > to > > > > > > >>> memory. > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > >>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of > > > > anticipation > > > > > > and > > > > > > >>> memory. > > > > > > >>> Imagine that! > > > > > > >>> mike > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > >>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > > hshonerd@gmail.com> > > > > > > >>> wrote: > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > >>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination > > > > (starting > > > > > > with > > > > > > >>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and > > > > provides a > > > > > > >>>> space > > > > > > >>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. > > This, > > > > > > >>>> coupled > > > > > > >>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground > > to > > > > take > > > > > > part > > > > > > >>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with > > > > > preconceptions: > > > > > > >>>> Vera > > > > > > >>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian > > Langacker > > > > on > > > > > > >>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, > > > > particularly > > > > > > the > > > > > > >>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of > > > > imagination > > > > > > and > > > > > > >>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of > > > > temporality: > > > > > > >>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure), > > > > which > > > > > I > > > > > > >>>> think > > > > > > >>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both > > > > individual > > > > > > and > > > > > > >>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > > > > > > >>>> Henry > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > >>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < > > lpscholar2@gmail.com> > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > >>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > >>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* > > and > > > > the > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > >>>> analogy > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > >>>>> to *gap-filling* > > > > > > >>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > > > > > > >>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion > > of > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > >>>> "structures > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > >>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored > > > > under > > > > > > the > > > > > > >>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of > > modalities > > > > > > that > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > >>>> hang > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > >>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing > > that > > > > is > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > >>>> forming > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > >>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we > > > > think > > > > > > >>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* > > > > > > >>>>> Larry > > > > > > >>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > > hshonerd@gmail.com > > > > > > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > >>>> wrote: > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > >>>>> Mike and Larry, > > > > > > >>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how > > jazzed > > > > up > > > > > I > > > > > > am > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>> now > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > >>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as > > Larry > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>> construes > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > >>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various > > triads, > > > > > > finally > > > > > > >>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of > > the > > > > > > mind, as > > > > > > >>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa? > > > > > fuera. > > > > > > >>>>>> Fractally yours, > > > > > > >>>>>> Henry > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole > > wrote: > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached > > are > > > > two > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> articles > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > >>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists > > like > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> Zaporozhets > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of > > imagination in > > > > a > > > > > > >>>>>>> manner > > > > > > >>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of > > productive > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> imagination. I > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no > > intention of > > > > > > doing > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> so. > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > >>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the > > attached > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> texts. > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > >>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I > > came > > > > > upon > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> the > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > >>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked > > at > > > > > > several > > > > > > >>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne > > and > > > > I > > > > > > >>>>>>> argued > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> in > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of > > > > access > > > > > > to > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> the > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > >>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. > > Moreover, > > > > > > such > > > > > > >>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the > > > > > > perception/imagination > > > > > > >>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance > > to > > > > > Kris's > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> paper > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > >>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns > > > > about > > > > > > the > > > > > > >>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps > > they > > > > > will > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> prove > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > >>>>> useful for those interested. > > > > > > >>>>>>> mike > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> -- > > > > > > >>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > > science > > > > > > with an > > > > > > >>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > > with > > > > an > > > > > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > > an > > > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Tue Dec 16 11:50:20 2014 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (Haydi Zulfei) Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2014 19:50:20 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <924535265.1128254.1418759420318.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11136.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> Dear all , Maybe worth reading , History of Higher Mental Functions , Volume 3 , page 127 English Version : How does the third stage differ from the second??Very briefly we might say that the essential difference is, on the one hand, in?the method by which the reactions arise, and on the other hand, in the character?of the function, that is, the biological function of the reaction, in contrast to habit,?that arises as a result of trial and error or as a result of stimuli acting in Olle direction. In intellectual reactions, a response arises as an expression of a certain?image obtained, obviously, as a result of a kind of short circuit, that is, of a complex?internal process formed on the basis of excitation of a series of cooperating centers,?which creates a new path. Consequently, we are speaking of a reaction of an explosive type, exceptionally complex in the nature of its arising, the mechanisms of?which are thus far unknown since our knowledge of brain processes is still at the?beginning stage of development.?If the function of the instinctive reaction differs from the function of habit,?then the latter differs ?from the intellectual function. Of course, if the biological?function of habit is ?adaptation to individual conditions of existence that are more?or less clear and simple, then the function of intellectual behavior is adaptation to?changing conditions of the environment and to changing circumstances under new?conditions. An argument has developed among psychologists specifically on this?ground: authors who reject the consideration of intellect as a special level in nature?say that it is ?only a special subclass within the same class as acquisition of habit.?It seems to me that it is the responsibility of scientific caution that we speak here?actually of only two classes of development in child behavior: inherited and acquired?through experience, and within the latter-that acquired through experience?-we?will be able to establish not just two stages, but perhaps even more as our knowledge increases.?Consequently, it would be proper, it seems to us at the contemporary state of?knowledge, to adopt the point of view of Thorndike, the American psychologist,?who differentiates two ?stages: inherited and individual, or internal and acquired,?and in behavior, he differentiates two stages or two groups of reaction: on the one?hand, habits inherited for adaptation to more or less long-term conditions of mdividual existence, and on the other hand, a whole hierarchy of habits directed toward?solving new problems that confront the organism, in ?other words, that order of?reactions of which we have spoken.?In order to understand the connection between the levels of development that?are of interest to us in child psychology, we must briefly take into account the kind?of relation that exists among them. The relations are of a dialectical character. Just thinking : Even acquired habits are considered "cultural" and it remains for the "intellectual" , as knowledge increases , to be classified as "higher" .? Regards Haydi From: mike cole To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Tuesday, 16 December 2014, 9:10:47 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination Colleagues-- The Vygotsky text that contains the material on Ribot and an introduction to the set of public lectures it was part of are attached in order to further this educational disussion. A number of ideas that were perplexing me and I was stumbling around thinking about are laid out very well in these two documents. They may perhaps help to ground this part of the discussion of imagination. I am certainly benefiting from reading them. My last reading was very narrowly focused and I was totally ignorant of the links between what LSV was writing about imagination and Kant or Hegel. And most amazingly, I ignored the discussion of Ribot. And, naturally, I have the attached pdf in my file on imagination (!). There must be some lesson here about the social, culturally mediated nature of individual memory out there somewhere.? :-)) mike On Tue, Dec 16, 2014 at 7:49 AM, larry smolucha wrote: > > Message from Francine Smolucha: > > To the old-timers on XMCA I have to say HELLO!!!!!! > To the Newcomers read on. > > In Vygotsky's three papers on the development of imagination and > creativity in childhood and adolescence, Vygotsky specifically defined > memory as > reproductive imagination? and creativity as combinatory imagination > (1930 paper published in 1990 in Soviet Psychology > p. 85 - F. Smolucha translator). All three of Vygotsky's papers on the > development > of imagination and creativity cited Ribot's book Essay on the Creative > Imagination (1900). > In these three papers and in his writings on play, Vygotsky also mentioned > that > imagination and creativity emerge from children's pretend play involving > analogical/metaphorical/figurative thinking in which one object is > substituted for another > (using a stick as a horse). >? ? ? ? Newcomers to XMCA will forgive me if I seem a bit short tempered > when dealing with > the veteram XMCAR's on these topics - but Michael Cole and others are > certainly > familiar with my pioneering work in this area. I even emailed Michael a > copy > of my 2012 publication on these topics to post for discussion on XMCA - > that paper not > only reviews these topics but provides the formal bibliography including > the > reference to Ribot's book Essay on Creative Imagination that was first > published in > English in 2006 (I discovered the 2006 translation while writing my 2012 > publication). >? ? ? ? For a review of all of this, and the past 25 years of research on > these topics, > read my 2012 publication "Vygotsky's Theory of Creative Imagination: > Figurative thinking Allied with Literal Thinking" (authors: Larry and > Francine Smolucha) published in Contemporary > Readings on Research in Creativity in Early Childhood (O. Saracho editor) > Information Age Publishing 2012 pp. 63 - 85. >? ? ? ? I applaud those interested in pursuing these ideas in new > directions, and an important > part of that effort requires a understanding of where these ideas came > from so you are not > just reinventing the wheel. > > > > > > > > > > From: mcole@ucsd.edu > > Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2014 19:42:05 -0800 > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > Makes perfect sense to me concerning Ribot, David. Where does LSV write > > about Ribot on imagination? I lost the forest for the trees and am lost > > back in memory land! > > > > And who do we turn to for the evidence that animals other than humans > > engage in volitional attention? I was under the impression that it is > > through subordinating oneself to a external/cultural mediator one learned > > to control oneself from the outside. > > > > These seem like important issues to be straight about, even if one > > disagrees about their implications/interpretation (if that is possible!) > > mike > > > > > > On Mon, Dec 15, 2014 at 4:19 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > > > > > > On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division between > > > higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because Ribot > is an > > > associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of > attention. > > > And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from > forest to > > > farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between the > two > > > great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical world > of the > > > forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses in > life > > > and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" > (that > > > is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the > farm,where > > > written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter months > are > > > wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter > talking > > > animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has to > be > > > more voluntary. > > > > > > Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear > > > understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that underpins > Ribot > > > here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out the > > > LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices > really are > > > the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, there > > > isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and > animal > > > imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of > volitional > > > attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without a > theory > > > of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's > > > distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at all. > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > > > Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, thanks > to > > > all > > > > for the food for thought. > > > > > > > > Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential around > the > > > time > > > > emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had seen > work > > > on > > > > memory before, but not imagination. > > > > > > > > Robert-? Does generative = productive and reflective equal > reproductive? > > > > Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of > development of > > > > imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a > relative > > > > newcomer to the topic. > > > > mike > > > > > > > > On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. > This > > > > > business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some > weeks > > > in > > > > > our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that > segmented the > > > > > last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. Puns, > > > > > according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) > > > > > Henry > > > > > > > > > > > On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they are > > > doing > > > > > > contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his followers > as > > > an > > > > > > inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so its > of > > > > > course > > > > > > interesting to see those additional categories emerge. > > > > > > > > > > > > 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in translation, > > > seems > > > > > > awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in > this > > > > > passage, > > > > > > for example, is not a currently used term in counter distinction > to > > > > > > "memory." > > > > > > Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary > discourse > > > > > > across languages as our explorations with out Russian colleagues > have > > > > > > illustrated. > > > > > > > > > > > > That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists > who > > > > > clearly > > > > > > influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still > > > possible > > > > to > > > > > > include culture in it. > > > > > > > > > > > > Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, > interestingly > > > > links > > > > > > imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" > act. > > > > Parts > > > > > of > > > > > > it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that > was > > > > also > > > > > > "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of > creativity > > > and > > > > > > imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see that > the > > > > two > > > > > > concepts are linked. > > > > > > > > > > > > Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself > > > writing. > > > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old > > > > > approaches > > > > > > to a pesum > > > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden > > > > > wrote: > > > > > >> > > > > > >> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it may > be > > > > worth > > > > > >> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to > > > > > Imagination > > > > > >> in the section on Representation, mediating between > Recollection and > > > > > >> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive > Imagination, > > > (2) > > > > > >> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he > says > > > > leads > > > > > to > > > > > >> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other > words, > > > the > > > > > >> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is accomplished > > > > through > > > > > >> these three grades of Imagination. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Andy > > > > > >> > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > > >> *Andy Blunden* > > > > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> mike cole wrote: > > > > > >> > > > > > >>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and > Williams. > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am > > > > trying > > > > > to > > > > > >>> mine for empirical > > > > > >>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive > > > > > >>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination > > > develops. > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that > there > > > must > > > > > be a > > > > > >>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I > learned > > > > > that > > > > > >>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is > linked > > > > to > > > > > >>> memory. > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of > > > anticipation > > > > > and > > > > > >>> memory. > > > > > >>> Imagine that! > > > > > >>> mike > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > hshonerd@gmail.com> > > > > > >>> wrote: > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination > > > (starting > > > > > with > > > > > >>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and > > > provides a > > > > > >>>> space > > > > > >>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. > This, > > > > > >>>> coupled > > > > > >>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground > to > > > take > > > > > part > > > > > >>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with > > > > preconceptions: > > > > > >>>> Vera > > > > > >>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian > Langacker > > > on > > > > > >>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, > > > particularly > > > > > the > > > > > >>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of > > > imagination > > > > > and > > > > > >>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of > > > temporality: > > > > > >>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure), > > > which > > > > I > > > > > >>>> think > > > > > >>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both > > > individual > > > > > and > > > > > >>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > > > > > >>>> Henry > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < > lpscholar2@gmail.com> > > > > > wrote: > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* > and > > > the > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>> analogy > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>>> to *gap-filling* > > > > > >>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > > > > > >>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion > of > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>> "structures > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored > > > under > > > > > the > > > > > >>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of > modalities > > > > > that > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>> hang > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>>> together.? This notion suggests there is a form of knowing > that > > > is > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>> forming > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we > > > think > > > > > >>>>> imaginatively.? Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* > > > > > >>>>> Larry > > > > > >>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > hshonerd@gmail.com > > > > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>> wrote: > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>>> Mike and Larry, > > > > > >>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how > jazzed > > > up > > > > I > > > > > am > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>> now > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as > Larry > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>> construes > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various > triads, > > > > > finally > > > > > >>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of > the > > > > > mind, as > > > > > >>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa? > > > > fuera. > > > > > >>>>>> Fractally yours, > > > > > >>>>>> Henry > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole > wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached > are > > > two > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> articles > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists > like > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> Zaporozhets > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of > imagination in > > > a > > > > > >>>>>>> manner > > > > > >>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of > productive > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> imagination. I > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no > intention of > > > > > doing > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> so. > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the > attached > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> texts. > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I > came > > > > upon > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> the > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked > at > > > > > several > > > > > >>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne > and > > > I > > > > > >>>>>>> argued > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> in > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of > > > access > > > > > to > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> the > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. > Moreover, > > > > > such > > > > > >>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the > > > > > perception/imagination > > > > > >>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance > to > > > > Kris's > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> paper > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns > > > about > > > > > the > > > > > >>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps > they > > > > will > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> prove > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>>> useful for those interested. > > > > > >>>>>>> mike > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> -- > > > > > >>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > science > > > > > with an > > > > > >>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > with > > > an > > > > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > an > > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From hshonerd@gmail.com Tue Dec 16 12:39:46 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2014 13:39:46 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > Message-ID: <028B0445-5AC6-4624-9433-21242FFFA6BD@gmail.com> I?m old but consider myself a late bloomer. Thanks to the chat, especially the latest ferment and fermenters, I am sensing we?re all getting a new lease on life as Vygotskians. Vera introduced me to him over thirty years ago. Finally, I?m starting to get it. Or so I think. Hey, if Ribot looked as generative to Vygotsky and Larry as he does to me, I must be on to something right, right? Henry P.S. > On Dec 16, 2014, at 12:44 PM, larry smolucha wrote: > > > Message from Francine Smolucha: > > Vygotsky referenced Ribot in the three papers that Vygotsky wrote > on the development of imagination and creativity. Michael attached a copy of one > translation of Imagination and Creativity in Childhood (original 1930). > But there are two other papers Imagination and Creativity of the Adolescent > (1931) and The Development of Imagination in Childhood (1932). > > I translated these three papers into English in the mid-1980's and presented a summary > at the APA convention in 1986 which was published in a German journal in 1986. > The Newsletter of the Laboratory for Comparative Human Cognition accepted that > same paper for publication in 1986 but has never published it. In 1990 and 1991 my > translations of two of the papers were published in Soviet Psychology. The connections > with Ribot's theory were explicitly discussed in my 1992 publication "A Reconstruction of Vygotsky's Theory of Creativity" along with excerpts from my translations of the three > Vygotsky papers on imagination and creativity (Creativity Research Journal 1992 Vol 5 No 1). > > It was not until 2011, that I was able to find an English translation of Ribot's > book Essay on the Creative Imagination (published in French in 1900, English > translation 2006). In my 2012 publication the Vygotsky-Ribot connection is > further elaborated on (see Smolucha, L. and Smolucha, F. Vygotsky's Theory of Creativity: > Figurative Thinking Allied with Literal Thinking in O. Saracho (Ed). Contemporary > Perspectives on research in Creativity in Early Childhood. Information Age Publishing > pp. 63-85). > > I am glad a new generation of scholars has taken an interest in these topics. > By the way, my new paper on Vygotsky's Theory of Creativity and Cultural > Synergy, builds on all this, and will be presented in Europe next year. > >> From: mcole@ucsd.edu >> Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2014 09:10:47 -0800 >> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >> >> Colleagues-- The Vygotsky text that contains the material on Ribot and an >> introduction to the set of public lectures it was part of are attached in >> order to further this educational disussion. >> >> A number of ideas that were perplexing me and I was stumbling around >> thinking about are laid out very well in these two documents. They may >> perhaps help to ground this part of the discussion of imagination. >> >> I am certainly benefiting from reading them. My last reading was very >> narrowly focused and I was totally ignorant of the links between what LSV >> was writing about imagination and Kant or Hegel. And most amazingly, I >> ignored the discussion of Ribot. And, naturally, I have the attached pdf >> in my file on imagination (!). >> >> There must be some lesson here about the social, culturally mediated nature >> of individual memory out there somewhere. :-)) >> >> mike >> >> On Tue, Dec 16, 2014 at 7:49 AM, larry smolucha >> wrote: >>> >>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >>> >>> To the old-timers on XMCA I have to say HELLO!!!!!! >>> To the Newcomers read on. >>> >>> In Vygotsky's three papers on the development of imagination and >>> creativity in childhood and adolescence, Vygotsky specifically defined >>> memory as >>> reproductive imagination and creativity as combinatory imagination >>> (1930 paper published in 1990 in Soviet Psychology >>> p. 85 - F. Smolucha translator). All three of Vygotsky's papers on the >>> development >>> of imagination and creativity cited Ribot's book Essay on the Creative >>> Imagination (1900). >>> In these three papers and in his writings on play, Vygotsky also mentioned >>> that >>> imagination and creativity emerge from children's pretend play involving >>> analogical/metaphorical/figurative thinking in which one object is >>> substituted for another >>> (using a stick as a horse). >>> Newcomers to XMCA will forgive me if I seem a bit short tempered >>> when dealing with >>> the veteram XMCAR's on these topics - but Michael Cole and others are >>> certainly >>> familiar with my pioneering work in this area. I even emailed Michael a >>> copy >>> of my 2012 publication on these topics to post for discussion on XMCA - >>> that paper not >>> only reviews these topics but provides the formal bibliography including >>> the >>> reference to Ribot's book Essay on Creative Imagination that was first >>> published in >>> English in 2006 (I discovered the 2006 translation while writing my 2012 >>> publication). >>> For a review of all of this, and the past 25 years of research on >>> these topics, >>> read my 2012 publication "Vygotsky's Theory of Creative Imagination: >>> Figurative thinking Allied with Literal Thinking" (authors: Larry and >>> Francine Smolucha) published in Contemporary >>> Readings on Research in Creativity in Early Childhood (O. Saracho editor) >>> Information Age Publishing 2012 pp. 63 - 85. >>> I applaud those interested in pursuing these ideas in new >>> directions, and an important >>> part of that effort requires a understanding of where these ideas came >>> from so you are not >>> just reinventing the wheel. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> From: mcole@ucsd.edu >>>> Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2014 19:42:05 -0800 >>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>> >>>> Makes perfect sense to me concerning Ribot, David. Where does LSV write >>>> about Ribot on imagination? I lost the forest for the trees and am lost >>>> back in memory land! >>>> >>>> And who do we turn to for the evidence that animals other than humans >>>> engage in volitional attention? I was under the impression that it is >>>> through subordinating oneself to a external/cultural mediator one learned >>>> to control oneself from the outside. >>>> >>>> These seem like important issues to be straight about, even if one >>>> disagrees about their implications/interpretation (if that is possible!) >>>> mike >>>> >>>> >>>> On Mon, Dec 15, 2014 at 4:19 PM, David Kellogg >>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division between >>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because Ribot >>> is an >>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of >>> attention. >>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from >>> forest to >>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between the >>> two >>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical world >>> of the >>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses in >>> life >>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" >>> (that >>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the >>> farm,where >>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter months >>> are >>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter >>> talking >>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has to >>> be >>>>> more voluntary. >>>>> >>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear >>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that underpins >>> Ribot >>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out the >>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices >>> really are >>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, there >>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and >>> animal >>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of >>> volitional >>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without a >>> theory >>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's >>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at all. >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>> >>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, thanks >>> to >>>>> all >>>>>> for the food for thought. >>>>>> >>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential around >>> the >>>>> time >>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had seen >>> work >>>>> on >>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. >>>>>> >>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal >>> reproductive? >>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of >>> development of >>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a >>> relative >>>>>> newcomer to the topic. >>>>>> mike >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. >>> This >>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some >>> weeks >>>>> in >>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that >>> segmented the >>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. Puns, >>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) >>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they are >>>>> doing >>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his followers >>> as >>>>> an >>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so its >>> of >>>>>>> course >>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in translation, >>>>> seems >>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in >>> this >>>>>>> passage, >>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter distinction >>> to >>>>>>>> "memory." >>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary >>> discourse >>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian colleagues >>> have >>>>>>>> illustrated. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists >>> who >>>>>>> clearly >>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still >>>>> possible >>>>>> to >>>>>>>> include culture in it. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, >>> interestingly >>>>>> links >>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" >>> act. >>>>>> Parts >>>>>>> of >>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that >>> was >>>>>> also >>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of >>> creativity >>>>> and >>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see that >>> the >>>>>> two >>>>>>>> concepts are linked. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself >>>>> writing. >>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old >>>>>>> approaches >>>>>>>> to a pesum >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden >>> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it may >>> be >>>>>> worth >>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to >>>>>>> Imagination >>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between >>> Recollection and >>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive >>> Imagination, >>>>> (2) >>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he >>> says >>>>>> leads >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other >>> words, >>>>> the >>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is accomplished >>>>>> through >>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and >>> Williams. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am >>>>>> trying >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical >>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive >>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination >>>>> develops. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that >>> there >>>>> must >>>>>>> be a >>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I >>> learned >>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is >>> linked >>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of >>>>> anticipation >>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! >>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination >>>>> (starting >>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and >>>>> provides a >>>>>>>>>>> space >>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. >>> This, >>>>>>>>>>> coupled >>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground >>> to >>>>> take >>>>>>> part >>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with >>>>>> preconceptions: >>>>>>>>>>> Vera >>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian >>> Langacker >>>>> on >>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, >>>>> particularly >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of >>>>> imagination >>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of >>>>> temporality: >>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure), >>>>> which >>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both >>>>> individual >>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. >>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < >>> lpscholar2@gmail.com> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* >>> and >>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> analogy >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* >>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. >>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion >>> of >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> "structures >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored >>>>> under >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of >>> modalities >>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> hang >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing >>> that >>>>> is >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> forming >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we >>>>> think >>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* >>>>>>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, >>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how >>> jazzed >>>>> up >>>>>> I >>>>>>> am >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> now >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as >>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> construes >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various >>> triads, >>>>>>> finally >>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of >>> the >>>>>>> mind, as >>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa? >>>>>> fuera. >>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, >>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole >>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached >>> are >>>>> two >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> articles >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists >>> like >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of >>> imagination in >>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of >>> productive >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no >>> intention of >>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> so. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the >>> attached >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I >>> came >>>>>> upon >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked >>> at >>>>>>> several >>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne >>> and >>>>> I >>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of >>>>> access >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. >>> Moreover, >>>>>>> such >>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the >>>>>>> perception/imagination >>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance >>> to >>>>>> Kris's >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> paper >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns >>>>> about >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps >>> they >>>>>> will >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> prove >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural >>> science >>>>>>> with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >>> with >>>>> an >>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>> an >>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>> >>> >> >> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > From hshonerd@gmail.com Tue Dec 16 12:58:03 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2014 13:58:03 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: <924535265.1128254.1418759420318.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11136.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> References: <924535265.1128254.1418759420318.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11136.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> Message-ID: I was wondering if Vygotsky on crisis in ZPD and Peirce?s triadic categories are of help. David K. has tutored me on ZPD, and turned me on to Seth Chaiklin?s article on ZPD. Natalia Gajdamaschko actually alerted me to the complexities of the ZPD earlier on, but I needed two tutorials. Who is the Peircian out there to smack me down? Henry > On Dec 16, 2014, at 12:50 PM, Haydi Zulfei wrote: > > Dear all , > > Maybe worth reading , History of Higher Mental Functions , Volume 3 , page 127 English Version : > > How does the third stage differ from the second? Very briefly we might say that the essential difference is, on the one hand, in the method by which the reactions arise, and on the other hand, in the character of the function, that is, the biological function of the reaction, in contrast to habit, that arises as a result of trial and error or as a result of stimuli acting in Olle direction. In intellectual reactions, a response arises as an expression of a certain image obtained, obviously, as a result of a kind of short circuit, that is, of a complex internal process formed on the basis of excitation of a series of cooperating centers, which creates a new path. Consequently, we are speaking of a reaction of an explosive type, exceptionally complex in the nature of its arising, the mechanisms of which are thus far unknown since our knowledge of brain processes is still at the beginning stage of development. If the function of the instinctive reaction differs from the function of habit, then the latter differs from the intellectual function. Of course, if the biological function of habit is adaptation to individual conditions of existence that are more or less clear and simple, then the function of intellectual behavior is adaptation to changing conditions of the environment and to changing circumstances under new conditions. An argument has developed among psychologists specifically on this ground: authors who reject the consideration of intellect as a special level in nature say that it is only a special subclass within the same class as acquisition of habit. It seems to me that it is the responsibility of scientific caution that we speak here actually of only two classes of development in child behavior: inherited and acquired through experience, and within the latter-that acquired through experience?-we will be able to establish not just two stages, but perhaps even more as our knowledge increases. Consequently, it would be proper, it seems to us at the contemporary state of knowledge, to adopt the point of view of Thorndike, the American psychologist, who differentiates two stages: inherited and individual, or internal and acquired, and in behavior, he differentiates two stages or two groups of reaction: on the one hand, habits inherited for adaptation to more or less long-term conditions of mdividual existence, and on the other hand, a whole hierarchy of habits directed toward solving new problems that confront the organism, in other words, that order of reactions of which we have spoken. In order to understand the connection between the levels of development that are of interest to us in child psychology, we must briefly take into account the kind of relation that exists among them. The relations are of a dialectical character. > > > > Just thinking : Even acquired habits are considered "cultural" and it remains for the "intellectual" , as knowledge increases , to be classified as "higher" . > > Regards > > Haydi > From: mike cole > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Sent: Tuesday, 16 December 2014, 9:10:47 > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > Colleagues-- The Vygotsky text that contains the material on Ribot and an > introduction to the set of public lectures it was part of are attached in > order to further this educational disussion. > > A number of ideas that were perplexing me and I was stumbling around > thinking about are laid out very well in these two documents. They may > perhaps help to ground this part of the discussion of imagination. > > I am certainly benefiting from reading them. My last reading was very > narrowly focused and I was totally ignorant of the links between what LSV > was writing about imagination and Kant or Hegel. And most amazingly, I > ignored the discussion of Ribot. And, naturally, I have the attached pdf > in my file on imagination (!). > > There must be some lesson here about the social, culturally mediated nature > of individual memory out there somewhere. :-)) > > mike > > On Tue, Dec 16, 2014 at 7:49 AM, larry smolucha > wrote: >> >> Message from Francine Smolucha: >> >> To the old-timers on XMCA I have to say HELLO!!!!!! >> To the Newcomers read on. >> >> In Vygotsky's three papers on the development of imagination and >> creativity in childhood and adolescence, Vygotsky specifically defined >> memory as >> reproductive imagination and creativity as combinatory imagination >> (1930 paper published in 1990 in Soviet Psychology >> p. 85 - F. Smolucha translator). All three of Vygotsky's papers on the >> development >> of imagination and creativity cited Ribot's book Essay on the Creative >> Imagination (1900). >> In these three papers and in his writings on play, Vygotsky also mentioned >> that >> imagination and creativity emerge from children's pretend play involving >> analogical/metaphorical/figurative thinking in which one object is >> substituted for another >> (using a stick as a horse). >> Newcomers to XMCA will forgive me if I seem a bit short tempered >> when dealing with >> the veteram XMCAR's on these topics - but Michael Cole and others are >> certainly >> familiar with my pioneering work in this area. I even emailed Michael a >> copy >> of my 2012 publication on these topics to post for discussion on XMCA - >> that paper not >> only reviews these topics but provides the formal bibliography including >> the >> reference to Ribot's book Essay on Creative Imagination that was first >> published in >> English in 2006 (I discovered the 2006 translation while writing my 2012 >> publication). >> For a review of all of this, and the past 25 years of research on >> these topics, >> read my 2012 publication "Vygotsky's Theory of Creative Imagination: >> Figurative thinking Allied with Literal Thinking" (authors: Larry and >> Francine Smolucha) published in Contemporary >> Readings on Research in Creativity in Early Childhood (O. Saracho editor) >> Information Age Publishing 2012 pp. 63 - 85. >> I applaud those interested in pursuing these ideas in new >> directions, and an important >> part of that effort requires a understanding of where these ideas came >> from so you are not >> just reinventing the wheel. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> From: mcole@ucsd.edu >>> Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2014 19:42:05 -0800 >>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>> >>> Makes perfect sense to me concerning Ribot, David. Where does LSV write >>> about Ribot on imagination? I lost the forest for the trees and am lost >>> back in memory land! >>> >>> And who do we turn to for the evidence that animals other than humans >>> engage in volitional attention? I was under the impression that it is >>> through subordinating oneself to a external/cultural mediator one learned >>> to control oneself from the outside. >>> >>> These seem like important issues to be straight about, even if one >>> disagrees about their implications/interpretation (if that is possible!) >>> mike >>> >>> >>> On Mon, Dec 15, 2014 at 4:19 PM, David Kellogg >> wrote: >>>> >>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division between >>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because Ribot >> is an >>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of >> attention. >>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from >> forest to >>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between the >> two >>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical world >> of the >>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses in >> life >>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" >> (that >>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the >> farm,where >>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter months >> are >>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter >> talking >>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has to >> be >>>> more voluntary. >>>> >>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear >>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that underpins >> Ribot >>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out the >>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices >> really are >>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, there >>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and >> animal >>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of >> volitional >>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without a >> theory >>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's >>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at all. >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>> >>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, thanks >> to >>>> all >>>>> for the food for thought. >>>>> >>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential around >> the >>>> time >>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had seen >> work >>>> on >>>>> memory before, but not imagination. >>>>> >>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal >> reproductive? >>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of >> development of >>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a >> relative >>>>> newcomer to the topic. >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD >>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. >> This >>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some >> weeks >>>> in >>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that >> segmented the >>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. Puns, >>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) >>>>>> Henry >>>>>> >>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they are >>>> doing >>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his followers >> as >>>> an >>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so its >> of >>>>>> course >>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in translation, >>>> seems >>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in >> this >>>>>> passage, >>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter distinction >> to >>>>>>> "memory." >>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary >> discourse >>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian colleagues >> have >>>>>>> illustrated. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists >> who >>>>>> clearly >>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still >>>> possible >>>>> to >>>>>>> include culture in it. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, >> interestingly >>>>> links >>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" >> act. >>>>> Parts >>>>>> of >>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that >> was >>>>> also >>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of >> creativity >>>> and >>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see that >> the >>>>> two >>>>>>> concepts are linked. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself >>>> writing. >>>>>>> mike >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old >>>>>> approaches >>>>>>> to a pesum >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden >> >>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it may >> be >>>>> worth >>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to >>>>>> Imagination >>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between >> Recollection and >>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive >> Imagination, >>>> (2) >>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he >> says >>>>> leads >>>>>> to >>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other >> words, >>>> the >>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is accomplished >>>>> through >>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> >>>>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and >> Williams. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am >>>>> trying >>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> mine for empirical >>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive >>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination >>>> develops. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that >> there >>>> must >>>>>> be a >>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I >> learned >>>>>> that >>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is >> linked >>>>> to >>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of >>>> anticipation >>>>>> and >>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>> Imagine that! >>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>> hshonerd@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination >>>> (starting >>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and >>>> provides a >>>>>>>>>> space >>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. >> This, >>>>>>>>>> coupled >>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground >> to >>>> take >>>>>> part >>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with >>>>> preconceptions: >>>>>>>>>> Vera >>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian >> Langacker >>>> on >>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, >>>> particularly >>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of >>>> imagination >>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of >>>> temporality: >>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure), >>>> which >>>>> I >>>>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both >>>> individual >>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. >>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < >> lpscholar2@gmail.com> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* >> and >>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> analogy >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* >>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. >>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion >> of >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> "structures >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored >>>> under >>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of >> modalities >>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> hang >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing >> that >>>> is >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> forming >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we >>>> think >>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* >>>>>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, >>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how >> jazzed >>>> up >>>>> I >>>>>> am >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> now >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as >> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> construes >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various >> triads, >>>>>> finally >>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of >> the >>>>>> mind, as >>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa? >>>>> fuera. >>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, >>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole >> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached >> are >>>> two >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> articles >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists >> like >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of >> imagination in >>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>>> manner >>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of >> productive >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no >> intention of >>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> so. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the >> attached >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> texts. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I >> came >>>>> upon >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked >> at >>>>>> several >>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne >> and >>>> I >>>>>>>>>>>>> argued >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of >>>> access >>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. >> Moreover, >>>>>> such >>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the >>>>>> perception/imagination >>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance >> to >>>>> Kris's >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> paper >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns >>>> about >>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps >> they >>>>> will >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> prove >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural >> science >>>>>> with an >>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >> with >>>> an >>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >> an >>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> >> > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Dec 16 14:06:26 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2014 14:06:26 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> Message-ID: For Francine via Larry Hi Francine. I am sorry that your paper(s) did not make it into the lchcnewsletter. Clearly a result of the bad judgment of youth, or maybe it was the lousy organization of LCHC! As you can see, in old age I come slowly around to understanding imagination in a manner that reveals it to be central to a lot of what I have worried about in my trying to teach about "mediational theories of mind." It seems that your first paper and your upcoming paper as well as everything in between should be a part of the Bibliography being compiled at present and be general knowledge among the participants. The thread/topic of Imagination on xmca appears to be solidifying. It sure would be great to have an authentic expert in the topic curate the discussion. Might you volunteer for the role? When did Minerva's owl take off? mike So far it has been wonderfully educational for me. mk On Tue, Dec 16, 2014 at 11:44 AM, larry smolucha wrote: > > > Message from Francine Smolucha: > > Vygotsky referenced Ribot in the three papers that Vygotsky wrote > on the development of imagination and creativity. Michael attached a copy > of one > translation of Imagination and Creativity in Childhood (original 1930). > But there are two other papers Imagination and Creativity of the Adolescent > (1931) and The Development of Imagination in Childhood (1932). > > I translated these three papers into English in the mid-1980's and > presented a summary > at the APA convention in 1986 which was published in a German journal in > 1986. > The Newsletter of the Laboratory for Comparative Human Cognition accepted > that > same paper for publication in 1986 but has never published it. In 1990 and > 1991 my > translations of two of the papers were published in Soviet Psychology. The > connections > with Ribot's theory were explicitly discussed in my 1992 publication "A > Reconstruction of Vygotsky's Theory of Creativity" along with excerpts from > my translations of the three > Vygotsky papers on imagination and creativity (Creativity Research Journal > 1992 Vol 5 No 1). > > It was not until 2011, that I was able to find an English translation of > Ribot's > book Essay on the Creative Imagination (published in French in 1900, > English > translation 2006). In my 2012 publication the Vygotsky-Ribot connection is > further elaborated on (see Smolucha, L. and Smolucha, F. Vygotsky's Theory > of Creativity: > Figurative Thinking Allied with Literal Thinking in O. Saracho (Ed). > Contemporary > Perspectives on research in Creativity in Early Childhood. Information Age > Publishing > pp. 63-85). > > I am glad a new generation of scholars has taken an interest in these > topics. > By the way, my new paper on Vygotsky's Theory of Creativity and Cultural > Synergy, builds on all this, and will be presented in Europe next year. > > > From: mcole@ucsd.edu > > Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2014 09:10:47 -0800 > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > Colleagues-- The Vygotsky text that contains the material on Ribot and an > > introduction to the set of public lectures it was part of are attached in > > order to further this educational disussion. > > > > A number of ideas that were perplexing me and I was stumbling around > > thinking about are laid out very well in these two documents. They may > > perhaps help to ground this part of the discussion of imagination. > > > > I am certainly benefiting from reading them. My last reading was very > > narrowly focused and I was totally ignorant of the links between what LSV > > was writing about imagination and Kant or Hegel. And most amazingly, I > > ignored the discussion of Ribot. And, naturally, I have the attached pdf > > in my file on imagination (!). > > > > There must be some lesson here about the social, culturally mediated > nature > > of individual memory out there somewhere. :-)) > > > > mike > > > > On Tue, Dec 16, 2014 at 7:49 AM, larry smolucha > > wrote: > > > > > > Message from Francine Smolucha: > > > > > > To the old-timers on XMCA I have to say HELLO!!!!!! > > > To the Newcomers read on. > > > > > > In Vygotsky's three papers on the development of imagination and > > > creativity in childhood and adolescence, Vygotsky specifically defined > > > memory as > > > reproductive imagination and creativity as combinatory imagination > > > (1930 paper published in 1990 in Soviet Psychology > > > p. 85 - F. Smolucha translator). All three of Vygotsky's papers on the > > > development > > > of imagination and creativity cited Ribot's book Essay on the Creative > > > Imagination (1900). > > > In these three papers and in his writings on play, Vygotsky also > mentioned > > > that > > > imagination and creativity emerge from children's pretend play > involving > > > analogical/metaphorical/figurative thinking in which one object is > > > substituted for another > > > (using a stick as a horse). > > > Newcomers to XMCA will forgive me if I seem a bit short > tempered > > > when dealing with > > > the veteram XMCAR's on these topics - but Michael Cole and others are > > > certainly > > > familiar with my pioneering work in this area. I even emailed Michael a > > > copy > > > of my 2012 publication on these topics to post for discussion on XMCA - > > > that paper not > > > only reviews these topics but provides the formal bibliography > including > > > the > > > reference to Ribot's book Essay on Creative Imagination that was first > > > published in > > > English in 2006 (I discovered the 2006 translation while writing my > 2012 > > > publication). > > > For a review of all of this, and the past 25 years of research > on > > > these topics, > > > read my 2012 publication "Vygotsky's Theory of Creative Imagination: > > > Figurative thinking Allied with Literal Thinking" (authors: Larry and > > > Francine Smolucha) published in Contemporary > > > Readings on Research in Creativity in Early Childhood (O. Saracho > editor) > > > Information Age Publishing 2012 pp. 63 - 85. > > > I applaud those interested in pursuing these ideas in new > > > directions, and an important > > > part of that effort requires a understanding of where these ideas came > > > from so you are not > > > just reinventing the wheel. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From: mcole@ucsd.edu > > > > Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2014 19:42:05 -0800 > > > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > > > > > Makes perfect sense to me concerning Ribot, David. Where does LSV > write > > > > about Ribot on imagination? I lost the forest for the trees and am > lost > > > > back in memory land! > > > > > > > > And who do we turn to for the evidence that animals other than humans > > > > engage in volitional attention? I was under the impression that it is > > > > through subordinating oneself to a external/cultural mediator one > learned > > > > to control oneself from the outside. > > > > > > > > These seem like important issues to be straight about, even if one > > > > disagrees about their implications/interpretation (if that is > possible!) > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Dec 15, 2014 at 4:19 PM, David Kellogg > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division > between > > > > > higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because > Ribot > > > is an > > > > > associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of > > > attention. > > > > > And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from > > > forest to > > > > > farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between > the > > > two > > > > > great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical > world > > > of the > > > > > forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses > in > > > life > > > > > and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" > > > (that > > > > > is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the > > > farm,where > > > > > written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter > months > > > are > > > > > wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter > > > talking > > > > > animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has > to > > > be > > > > > more voluntary. > > > > > > > > > > Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear > > > > > understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that > underpins > > > Ribot > > > > > here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out > the > > > > > LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices > > > really are > > > > > the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, > there > > > > > isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and > > > animal > > > > > imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of > > > volitional > > > > > attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without > a > > > theory > > > > > of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's > > > > > distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at > all. > > > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > > > On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, > thanks > > > to > > > > > all > > > > > > for the food for thought. > > > > > > > > > > > > Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential > around > > > the > > > > > time > > > > > > emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had > seen > > > work > > > > > on > > > > > > memory before, but not imagination. > > > > > > > > > > > > Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal > > > reproductive? > > > > > > Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of > > > development of > > > > > > imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a > > > relative > > > > > > newcomer to the topic. > > > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > hshonerd@gmail.com> > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. > > > This > > > > > > > business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some > > > weeks > > > > > in > > > > > > > our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that > > > segmented the > > > > > > > last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. > Puns, > > > > > > > according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) > > > > > > > Henry > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and > they are > > > > > doing > > > > > > > > contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his > followers > > > as > > > > > an > > > > > > > > inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so > its > > > of > > > > > > > course > > > > > > > > interesting to see those additional categories emerge. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in > translation, > > > > > seems > > > > > > > > awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in > > > this > > > > > > > passage, > > > > > > > > for example, is not a currently used term in counter > distinction > > > to > > > > > > > > "memory." > > > > > > > > Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary > > > discourse > > > > > > > > across languages as our explorations with out Russian > colleagues > > > have > > > > > > > > illustrated. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > That said, I feel as if I am learning something from > theorists > > > who > > > > > > > clearly > > > > > > > > influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still > > > > > possible > > > > > > to > > > > > > > > include culture in it. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, > > > interestingly > > > > > > links > > > > > > > > imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" > > > act. > > > > > > Parts > > > > > > > of > > > > > > > > it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff > that > > > was > > > > > > also > > > > > > > > "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of > > > creativity > > > > > and > > > > > > > > imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see > that > > > the > > > > > > two > > > > > > > > concepts are linked. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself > > > > > writing. > > > > > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty > old > > > > > > > approaches > > > > > > > > to a pesum > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < > ablunden@mira.net > > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it > may > > > be > > > > > > worth > > > > > > > >> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place > to > > > > > > > Imagination > > > > > > > >> in the section on Representation, mediating between > > > Recollection and > > > > > > > >> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive > > > Imagination, > > > > > (2) > > > > > > > >> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he > > > says > > > > > > leads > > > > > > > to > > > > > > > >> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other > > > words, > > > > > the > > > > > > > >> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is > accomplished > > > > > > through > > > > > > > >> these three grades of Imagination. > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> Andy > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > > > > >> *Andy Blunden* > > > > > > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> mike cole wrote: > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and > > > Williams. > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > >>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work > i am > > > > > > trying > > > > > > > to > > > > > > > >>> mine for empirical > > > > > > > >>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of > productive > > > > > > > >>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination > > > > > develops. > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > >>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that > > > there > > > > > must > > > > > > > be a > > > > > > > >>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I > > > learned > > > > > > > that > > > > > > > >>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and > is > > > linked > > > > > > to > > > > > > > >>> memory. > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > >>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of > > > > > anticipation > > > > > > > and > > > > > > > >>> memory. > > > > > > > >>> Imagine that! > > > > > > > >>> mike > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > >>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > > > hshonerd@gmail.com> > > > > > > > >>> wrote: > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > >>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination > > > > > (starting > > > > > > > with > > > > > > > >>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and > > > > > provides a > > > > > > > >>>> space > > > > > > > >>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as > fixed. > > > This, > > > > > > > >>>> coupled > > > > > > > >>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a > ground > > > to > > > > > take > > > > > > > part > > > > > > > >>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with > > > > > > preconceptions: > > > > > > > >>>> Vera > > > > > > > >>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian > > > Langacker > > > > > on > > > > > > > >>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, > > > > > particularly > > > > > > > the > > > > > > > >>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of > > > > > imagination > > > > > > > and > > > > > > > >>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of > > > > > temporality: > > > > > > > >>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic > structure), > > > > > which > > > > > > I > > > > > > > >>>> think > > > > > > > >>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both > > > > > individual > > > > > > > and > > > > > > > >>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > > > > > > > >>>> Henry > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > >>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < > > > lpscholar2@gmail.com> > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third > *space* > > > and > > > > > the > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > >>>> analogy > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > >>>>> to *gap-filling* > > > > > > > >>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > > > > > > > >>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his > notion > > > of > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > >>>> "structures > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > >>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is > explored > > > > > under > > > > > > > the > > > > > > > >>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of > > > modalities > > > > > > > that > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > >>>> hang > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > >>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of > knowing > > > that > > > > > is > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > >>>> forming > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > >>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] > if we > > > > > think > > > > > > > >>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* > > > > > > > >>>>> Larry > > > > > > > >>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > > > hshonerd@gmail.com > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > >>>> wrote: > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > >>>>> Mike and Larry, > > > > > > > >>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how > > > jazzed > > > > > up > > > > > > I > > > > > > > am > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>> now > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > >>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind > as > > > Larry > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>> construes > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > >>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various > > > triads, > > > > > > > finally > > > > > > > >>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks > of > > > the > > > > > > > mind, as > > > > > > > >>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, > luega pa? > > > > > > fuera. > > > > > > > >>>>>> Fractally yours, > > > > > > > >>>>>> Henry > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, > attached > > > are > > > > > two > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>> articles > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > >>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT > theorists > > > like > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>> Zaporozhets > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of > > > imagination in > > > > > a > > > > > > > >>>>>>> manner > > > > > > > >>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of > > > productive > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>> imagination. I > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no > > > intention of > > > > > > > doing > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>> so. > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > >>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the > > > attached > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>> texts. > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > >>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these > philosophers, I > > > came > > > > > > upon > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>> the > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > >>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely > linked > > > at > > > > > > > several > > > > > > > >>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, > Ettienne > > > and > > > > > I > > > > > > > >>>>>>> argued > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>> in > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a > means of > > > > > access > > > > > > > to > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>> the > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > >>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. > > > Moreover, > > > > > > > such > > > > > > > >>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the > > > > > > > perception/imagination > > > > > > > >>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct > relevance > > > to > > > > > > Kris's > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>> paper > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > >>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to > concerns > > > > > about > > > > > > > the > > > > > > > >>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in > development. > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. > Perhaps > > > they > > > > > > will > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>> prove > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > >>>>> useful for those interested. > > > > > > > >>>>>>> mike > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>> -- > > > > > > > >>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > > > science > > > > > > > with an > > > > > > > >>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > science > > > with > > > > > an > > > > > > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > with > > > an > > > > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > an > > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From lsmolucha@hotmail.com Tue Dec 16 16:32:20 2014 From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com (larry smolucha) Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2014 18:32:20 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: , , , , , <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net>, , , , , , , , , Message-ID: Message from Francine, Michael, I would gladly curate the discussion. Would that change anything as far as the manner of discourse goes? Do I need an introduction? Do you still have the e-mail copy of my 2012 publication? (I no longer have it on my computer) It has been published. Perhaps, Merlin's owl can shed some light since he like Merlin must have lived backwards in time (being prescient about the future). To all XMCARs - let me say that I think the study of imagination and creativity is what gives us hope for the future - at a time when lack of imagination, stagnation, and 'acting act' cast a shadow over the world. Vygotsky did say that creativity is like electricity - it brings light to dark places. > From: mcole@ucsd.edu > Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2014 14:06:26 -0800 > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > For Francine via Larry > > Hi Francine. I am sorry that your paper(s) did not make it into the > lchcnewsletter. Clearly a result of the bad judgment of youth, or maybe it > was the lousy organization of LCHC! > > As you can see, in old age I come slowly around to understanding > imagination in a manner that reveals it to be central to a lot of what I > have > worried about in my trying to teach about "mediational theories of mind." > > It seems that your first paper and your upcoming paper as well as > everything in between should be a part of the Bibliography being compiled > at present and be general knowledge among the participants. > > The thread/topic of Imagination on xmca appears to be solidifying. It sure > would be great to have an authentic expert in the topic curate the > discussion. > > Might you volunteer for the role? > When did Minerva's owl take off? > > mike > > So far it has been wonderfully educational for me. > mk > > On Tue, Dec 16, 2014 at 11:44 AM, larry smolucha > wrote: > > > > > > Message from Francine Smolucha: > > > > Vygotsky referenced Ribot in the three papers that Vygotsky wrote > > on the development of imagination and creativity. Michael attached a copy > > of one > > translation of Imagination and Creativity in Childhood (original 1930). > > But there are two other papers Imagination and Creativity of the Adolescent > > (1931) and The Development of Imagination in Childhood (1932). > > > > I translated these three papers into English in the mid-1980's and > > presented a summary > > at the APA convention in 1986 which was published in a German journal in > > 1986. > > The Newsletter of the Laboratory for Comparative Human Cognition accepted > > that > > same paper for publication in 1986 but has never published it. In 1990 and > > 1991 my > > translations of two of the papers were published in Soviet Psychology. The > > connections > > with Ribot's theory were explicitly discussed in my 1992 publication "A > > Reconstruction of Vygotsky's Theory of Creativity" along with excerpts from > > my translations of the three > > Vygotsky papers on imagination and creativity (Creativity Research Journal > > 1992 Vol 5 No 1). > > > > It was not until 2011, that I was able to find an English translation of > > Ribot's > > book Essay on the Creative Imagination (published in French in 1900, > > English > > translation 2006). In my 2012 publication the Vygotsky-Ribot connection is > > further elaborated on (see Smolucha, L. and Smolucha, F. Vygotsky's Theory > > of Creativity: > > Figurative Thinking Allied with Literal Thinking in O. Saracho (Ed). > > Contemporary > > Perspectives on research in Creativity in Early Childhood. Information Age > > Publishing > > pp. 63-85). > > > > I am glad a new generation of scholars has taken an interest in these > > topics. > > By the way, my new paper on Vygotsky's Theory of Creativity and Cultural > > Synergy, builds on all this, and will be presented in Europe next year. > > > > > From: mcole@ucsd.edu > > > Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2014 09:10:47 -0800 > > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > > > Colleagues-- The Vygotsky text that contains the material on Ribot and an > > > introduction to the set of public lectures it was part of are attached in > > > order to further this educational disussion. > > > > > > A number of ideas that were perplexing me and I was stumbling around > > > thinking about are laid out very well in these two documents. They may > > > perhaps help to ground this part of the discussion of imagination. > > > > > > I am certainly benefiting from reading them. My last reading was very > > > narrowly focused and I was totally ignorant of the links between what LSV > > > was writing about imagination and Kant or Hegel. And most amazingly, I > > > ignored the discussion of Ribot. And, naturally, I have the attached pdf > > > in my file on imagination (!). > > > > > > There must be some lesson here about the social, culturally mediated > > nature > > > of individual memory out there somewhere. :-)) > > > > > > mike > > > > > > On Tue, Dec 16, 2014 at 7:49 AM, larry smolucha > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > Message from Francine Smolucha: > > > > > > > > To the old-timers on XMCA I have to say HELLO!!!!!! > > > > To the Newcomers read on. > > > > > > > > In Vygotsky's three papers on the development of imagination and > > > > creativity in childhood and adolescence, Vygotsky specifically defined > > > > memory as > > > > reproductive imagination and creativity as combinatory imagination > > > > (1930 paper published in 1990 in Soviet Psychology > > > > p. 85 - F. Smolucha translator). All three of Vygotsky's papers on the > > > > development > > > > of imagination and creativity cited Ribot's book Essay on the Creative > > > > Imagination (1900). > > > > In these three papers and in his writings on play, Vygotsky also > > mentioned > > > > that > > > > imagination and creativity emerge from children's pretend play > > involving > > > > analogical/metaphorical/figurative thinking in which one object is > > > > substituted for another > > > > (using a stick as a horse). > > > > Newcomers to XMCA will forgive me if I seem a bit short > > tempered > > > > when dealing with > > > > the veteram XMCAR's on these topics - but Michael Cole and others are > > > > certainly > > > > familiar with my pioneering work in this area. I even emailed Michael a > > > > copy > > > > of my 2012 publication on these topics to post for discussion on XMCA - > > > > that paper not > > > > only reviews these topics but provides the formal bibliography > > including > > > > the > > > > reference to Ribot's book Essay on Creative Imagination that was first > > > > published in > > > > English in 2006 (I discovered the 2006 translation while writing my > > 2012 > > > > publication). > > > > For a review of all of this, and the past 25 years of research > > on > > > > these topics, > > > > read my 2012 publication "Vygotsky's Theory of Creative Imagination: > > > > Figurative thinking Allied with Literal Thinking" (authors: Larry and > > > > Francine Smolucha) published in Contemporary > > > > Readings on Research in Creativity in Early Childhood (O. Saracho > > editor) > > > > Information Age Publishing 2012 pp. 63 - 85. > > > > I applaud those interested in pursuing these ideas in new > > > > directions, and an important > > > > part of that effort requires a understanding of where these ideas came > > > > from so you are not > > > > just reinventing the wheel. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From: mcole@ucsd.edu > > > > > Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2014 19:42:05 -0800 > > > > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > > > > > > > Makes perfect sense to me concerning Ribot, David. Where does LSV > > write > > > > > about Ribot on imagination? I lost the forest for the trees and am > > lost > > > > > back in memory land! > > > > > > > > > > And who do we turn to for the evidence that animals other than humans > > > > > engage in volitional attention? I was under the impression that it is > > > > > through subordinating oneself to a external/cultural mediator one > > learned > > > > > to control oneself from the outside. > > > > > > > > > > These seem like important issues to be straight about, even if one > > > > > disagrees about their implications/interpretation (if that is > > possible!) > > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Dec 15, 2014 at 4:19 PM, David Kellogg > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division > > between > > > > > > higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because > > Ribot > > > > is an > > > > > > associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of > > > > attention. > > > > > > And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from > > > > forest to > > > > > > farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between > > the > > > > two > > > > > > great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical > > world > > > > of the > > > > > > forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses > > in > > > > life > > > > > > and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" > > > > (that > > > > > > is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the > > > > farm,where > > > > > > written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter > > months > > > > are > > > > > > wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter > > > > talking > > > > > > animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has > > to > > > > be > > > > > > more voluntary. > > > > > > > > > > > > Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear > > > > > > understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that > > underpins > > > > Ribot > > > > > > here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out > > the > > > > > > LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices > > > > really are > > > > > > the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, > > there > > > > > > isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and > > > > animal > > > > > > imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of > > > > volitional > > > > > > attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without > > a > > > > theory > > > > > > of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's > > > > > > distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at > > all. > > > > > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > > > > > On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, > > thanks > > > > to > > > > > > all > > > > > > > for the food for thought. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential > > around > > > > the > > > > > > time > > > > > > > emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had > > seen > > > > work > > > > > > on > > > > > > > memory before, but not imagination. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal > > > > reproductive? > > > > > > > Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of > > > > development of > > > > > > > imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a > > > > relative > > > > > > > newcomer to the topic. > > > > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > hshonerd@gmail.com> > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. > > > > This > > > > > > > > business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some > > > > weeks > > > > > > in > > > > > > > > our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that > > > > segmented the > > > > > > > > last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. > > Puns, > > > > > > > > according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) > > > > > > > > Henry > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and > > they are > > > > > > doing > > > > > > > > > contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his > > followers > > > > as > > > > > > an > > > > > > > > > inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so > > its > > > > of > > > > > > > > course > > > > > > > > > interesting to see those additional categories emerge. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in > > translation, > > > > > > seems > > > > > > > > > awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in > > > > this > > > > > > > > passage, > > > > > > > > > for example, is not a currently used term in counter > > distinction > > > > to > > > > > > > > > "memory." > > > > > > > > > Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary > > > > discourse > > > > > > > > > across languages as our explorations with out Russian > > colleagues > > > > have > > > > > > > > > illustrated. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > That said, I feel as if I am learning something from > > theorists > > > > who > > > > > > > > clearly > > > > > > > > > influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still > > > > > > possible > > > > > > > to > > > > > > > > > include culture in it. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, > > > > interestingly > > > > > > > links > > > > > > > > > imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" > > > > act. > > > > > > > Parts > > > > > > > > of > > > > > > > > > it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff > > that > > > > was > > > > > > > also > > > > > > > > > "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of > > > > creativity > > > > > > and > > > > > > > > > imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see > > that > > > > the > > > > > > > two > > > > > > > > > concepts are linked. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself > > > > > > writing. > > > > > > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty > > old > > > > > > > > approaches > > > > > > > > > to a pesum > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < > > ablunden@mira.net > > > > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > >> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it > > may > > > > be > > > > > > > worth > > > > > > > > >> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place > > to > > > > > > > > Imagination > > > > > > > > >> in the section on Representation, mediating between > > > > Recollection and > > > > > > > > >> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive > > > > Imagination, > > > > > > (2) > > > > > > > > >> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he > > > > says > > > > > > > leads > > > > > > > > to > > > > > > > > >> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other > > > > words, > > > > > > the > > > > > > > > >> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is > > accomplished > > > > > > > through > > > > > > > > >> these three grades of Imagination. > > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > >> Andy > > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > > > > > >> *Andy Blunden* > > > > > > > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > >> mike cole wrote: > > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > >>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and > > > > Williams. > > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > > >>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work > > i am > > > > > > > trying > > > > > > > > to > > > > > > > > >>> mine for empirical > > > > > > > > >>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of > > productive > > > > > > > > >>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination > > > > > > develops. > > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > > >>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that > > > > there > > > > > > must > > > > > > > > be a > > > > > > > > >>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I > > > > learned > > > > > > > > that > > > > > > > > >>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and > > is > > > > linked > > > > > > > to > > > > > > > > >>> memory. > > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > > >>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of > > > > > > anticipation > > > > > > > > and > > > > > > > > >>> memory. > > > > > > > > >>> Imagine that! > > > > > > > > >>> mike > > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > > >>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > > > > hshonerd@gmail.com> > > > > > > > > >>> wrote: > > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > > >>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination > > > > > > (starting > > > > > > > > with > > > > > > > > >>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and > > > > > > provides a > > > > > > > > >>>> space > > > > > > > > >>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as > > fixed. > > > > This, > > > > > > > > >>>> coupled > > > > > > > > >>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a > > ground > > > > to > > > > > > take > > > > > > > > part > > > > > > > > >>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with > > > > > > > preconceptions: > > > > > > > > >>>> Vera > > > > > > > > >>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian > > > > Langacker > > > > > > on > > > > > > > > >>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, > > > > > > particularly > > > > > > > > the > > > > > > > > >>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of > > > > > > imagination > > > > > > > > and > > > > > > > > >>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of > > > > > > temporality: > > > > > > > > >>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic > > structure), > > > > > > which > > > > > > > I > > > > > > > > >>>> think > > > > > > > > >>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both > > > > > > individual > > > > > > > > and > > > > > > > > >>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > > > > > > > > >>>> Henry > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < > > > > lpscholar2@gmail.com> > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third > > *space* > > > > and > > > > > > the > > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>> analogy > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>> to *gap-filling* > > > > > > > > >>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > > > > > > > > >>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his > > notion > > > > of > > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>> "structures > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is > > explored > > > > > > under > > > > > > > > the > > > > > > > > >>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of > > > > modalities > > > > > > > > that > > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>> hang > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of > > knowing > > > > that > > > > > > is > > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>> forming > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] > > if we > > > > > > think > > > > > > > > >>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* > > > > > > > > >>>>> Larry > > > > > > > > >>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > > > > hshonerd@gmail.com > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>> wrote: > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>> Mike and Larry, > > > > > > > > >>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how > > > > jazzed > > > > > > up > > > > > > > I > > > > > > > > am > > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>> now > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind > > as > > > > Larry > > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>> construes > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various > > > > triads, > > > > > > > > finally > > > > > > > > >>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks > > of > > > > the > > > > > > > > mind, as > > > > > > > > >>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, > > luega pa? > > > > > > > fuera. > > > > > > > > >>>>>> Fractally yours, > > > > > > > > >>>>>> Henry > > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, > > attached > > > > are > > > > > > two > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>>> articles > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT > > theorists > > > > like > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>>> Zaporozhets > > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of > > > > imagination in > > > > > > a > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> manner > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of > > > > productive > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>>> imagination. I > > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no > > > > intention of > > > > > > > > doing > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>>> so. > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the > > > > attached > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>>> texts. > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these > > philosophers, I > > > > came > > > > > > > upon > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>>> the > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely > > linked > > > > at > > > > > > > > several > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, > > Ettienne > > > > and > > > > > > I > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> argued > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>>> in > > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a > > means of > > > > > > access > > > > > > > > to > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>>> the > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. > > > > Moreover, > > > > > > > > such > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the > > > > > > > > perception/imagination > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct > > relevance > > > > to > > > > > > > Kris's > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>>> paper > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to > > concerns > > > > > > about > > > > > > > > the > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in > > development. > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. > > Perhaps > > > > they > > > > > > > will > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>>> prove > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>> useful for those interested. > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> mike > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> -- > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > > > > science > > > > > > > > with an > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > > science > > > > with > > > > > > an > > > > > > > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > > with > > > > an > > > > > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > > an > > > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From hshonerd@gmail.com Tue Dec 16 16:41:56 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2014 17:41:56 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> Message-ID: For Francine via Larry, Dear Professor Smolucha, I didn?t notice your name until after I sent an email extolling Larry for published work that I realize you and your husband co-authored. You must be one of those creative married couples (like the Pasteurs) that my mentor Vera John-Steiner writes about in her book, Creative Collaboration. In another paper of Vera, Road to Competence in an Alien Land?all about L2 acquisition--translators and interpreters represent la creme of L2 learners. I wouldn?t know, because I don?t know Russian, but I understand Vygotsky is devilishly hard, and not just because he?s Russian. So glad you are back in the chat! I?m a newbie. And I am so grateful to Mike for his initiative in getting your publications out. Couldn?t be better timed IMHO, given the tide of the current chat. I will be in Europe this summer. Where are you presenting your paper? With respect, Henry Shonerd > On Dec 16, 2014, at 3:06 PM, mike cole wrote: > > For Francine via Larry > > Hi Francine. I am sorry that your paper(s) did not make it into the > lchcnewsletter. Clearly a result of the bad judgment of youth, or maybe it > was the lousy organization of LCHC! > > As you can see, in old age I come slowly around to understanding > imagination in a manner that reveals it to be central to a lot of what I > have > worried about in my trying to teach about "mediational theories of mind." > > It seems that your first paper and your upcoming paper as well as > everything in between should be a part of the Bibliography being compiled > at present and be general knowledge among the participants. > > The thread/topic of Imagination on xmca appears to be solidifying. It sure > would be great to have an authentic expert in the topic curate the > discussion. > > Might you volunteer for the role? > When did Minerva's owl take off? > > mike > > So far it has been wonderfully educational for me. > mk > > On Tue, Dec 16, 2014 at 11:44 AM, larry smolucha > wrote: >> >> >> Message from Francine Smolucha: >> >> Vygotsky referenced Ribot in the three papers that Vygotsky wrote >> on the development of imagination and creativity. Michael attached a copy >> of one >> translation of Imagination and Creativity in Childhood (original 1930). >> But there are two other papers Imagination and Creativity of the Adolescent >> (1931) and The Development of Imagination in Childhood (1932). >> >> I translated these three papers into English in the mid-1980's and >> presented a summary >> at the APA convention in 1986 which was published in a German journal in >> 1986. >> The Newsletter of the Laboratory for Comparative Human Cognition accepted >> that >> same paper for publication in 1986 but has never published it. In 1990 and >> 1991 my >> translations of two of the papers were published in Soviet Psychology. The >> connections >> with Ribot's theory were explicitly discussed in my 1992 publication "A >> Reconstruction of Vygotsky's Theory of Creativity" along with excerpts from >> my translations of the three >> Vygotsky papers on imagination and creativity (Creativity Research Journal >> 1992 Vol 5 No 1). >> >> It was not until 2011, that I was able to find an English translation of >> Ribot's >> book Essay on the Creative Imagination (published in French in 1900, >> English >> translation 2006). In my 2012 publication the Vygotsky-Ribot connection is >> further elaborated on (see Smolucha, L. and Smolucha, F. Vygotsky's Theory >> of Creativity: >> Figurative Thinking Allied with Literal Thinking in O. Saracho (Ed). >> Contemporary >> Perspectives on research in Creativity in Early Childhood. Information Age >> Publishing >> pp. 63-85). >> >> I am glad a new generation of scholars has taken an interest in these >> topics. >> By the way, my new paper on Vygotsky's Theory of Creativity and Cultural >> Synergy, builds on all this, and will be presented in Europe next year. >> >>> From: mcole@ucsd.edu >>> Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2014 09:10:47 -0800 >>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>> >>> Colleagues-- The Vygotsky text that contains the material on Ribot and an >>> introduction to the set of public lectures it was part of are attached in >>> order to further this educational disussion. >>> >>> A number of ideas that were perplexing me and I was stumbling around >>> thinking about are laid out very well in these two documents. They may >>> perhaps help to ground this part of the discussion of imagination. >>> >>> I am certainly benefiting from reading them. My last reading was very >>> narrowly focused and I was totally ignorant of the links between what LSV >>> was writing about imagination and Kant or Hegel. And most amazingly, I >>> ignored the discussion of Ribot. And, naturally, I have the attached pdf >>> in my file on imagination (!). >>> >>> There must be some lesson here about the social, culturally mediated >> nature >>> of individual memory out there somewhere. :-)) >>> >>> mike >>> >>> On Tue, Dec 16, 2014 at 7:49 AM, larry smolucha >>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >>>> >>>> To the old-timers on XMCA I have to say HELLO!!!!!! >>>> To the Newcomers read on. >>>> >>>> In Vygotsky's three papers on the development of imagination and >>>> creativity in childhood and adolescence, Vygotsky specifically defined >>>> memory as >>>> reproductive imagination and creativity as combinatory imagination >>>> (1930 paper published in 1990 in Soviet Psychology >>>> p. 85 - F. Smolucha translator). All three of Vygotsky's papers on the >>>> development >>>> of imagination and creativity cited Ribot's book Essay on the Creative >>>> Imagination (1900). >>>> In these three papers and in his writings on play, Vygotsky also >> mentioned >>>> that >>>> imagination and creativity emerge from children's pretend play >> involving >>>> analogical/metaphorical/figurative thinking in which one object is >>>> substituted for another >>>> (using a stick as a horse). >>>> Newcomers to XMCA will forgive me if I seem a bit short >> tempered >>>> when dealing with >>>> the veteram XMCAR's on these topics - but Michael Cole and others are >>>> certainly >>>> familiar with my pioneering work in this area. I even emailed Michael a >>>> copy >>>> of my 2012 publication on these topics to post for discussion on XMCA - >>>> that paper not >>>> only reviews these topics but provides the formal bibliography >> including >>>> the >>>> reference to Ribot's book Essay on Creative Imagination that was first >>>> published in >>>> English in 2006 (I discovered the 2006 translation while writing my >> 2012 >>>> publication). >>>> For a review of all of this, and the past 25 years of research >> on >>>> these topics, >>>> read my 2012 publication "Vygotsky's Theory of Creative Imagination: >>>> Figurative thinking Allied with Literal Thinking" (authors: Larry and >>>> Francine Smolucha) published in Contemporary >>>> Readings on Research in Creativity in Early Childhood (O. Saracho >> editor) >>>> Information Age Publishing 2012 pp. 63 - 85. >>>> I applaud those interested in pursuing these ideas in new >>>> directions, and an important >>>> part of that effort requires a understanding of where these ideas came >>>> from so you are not >>>> just reinventing the wheel. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> From: mcole@ucsd.edu >>>>> Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2014 19:42:05 -0800 >>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>>> >>>>> Makes perfect sense to me concerning Ribot, David. Where does LSV >> write >>>>> about Ribot on imagination? I lost the forest for the trees and am >> lost >>>>> back in memory land! >>>>> >>>>> And who do we turn to for the evidence that animals other than humans >>>>> engage in volitional attention? I was under the impression that it is >>>>> through subordinating oneself to a external/cultural mediator one >> learned >>>>> to control oneself from the outside. >>>>> >>>>> These seem like important issues to be straight about, even if one >>>>> disagrees about their implications/interpretation (if that is >> possible!) >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Mon, Dec 15, 2014 at 4:19 PM, David Kellogg >> >>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division >> between >>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because >> Ribot >>>> is an >>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of >>>> attention. >>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from >>>> forest to >>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between >> the >>>> two >>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical >> world >>>> of the >>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses >> in >>>> life >>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" >>>> (that >>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the >>>> farm,where >>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter >> months >>>> are >>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter >>>> talking >>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has >> to >>>> be >>>>>> more voluntary. >>>>>> >>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear >>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that >> underpins >>>> Ribot >>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out >> the >>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices >>>> really are >>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, >> there >>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and >>>> animal >>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of >>>> volitional >>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without >> a >>>> theory >>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's >>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at >> all. >>>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>> >>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, >> thanks >>>> to >>>>>> all >>>>>>> for the food for thought. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential >> around >>>> the >>>>>> time >>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had >> seen >>>> work >>>>>> on >>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal >>>> reproductive? >>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of >>>> development of >>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a >>>> relative >>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. >>>>>>> mike >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >> hshonerd@gmail.com> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. >>>> This >>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some >>>> weeks >>>>>> in >>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that >>>> segmented the >>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. >> Puns, >>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) >>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole >> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and >> they are >>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his >> followers >>>> as >>>>>> an >>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so >> its >>>> of >>>>>>>> course >>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in >> translation, >>>>>> seems >>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in >>>> this >>>>>>>> passage, >>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter >> distinction >>>> to >>>>>>>>> "memory." >>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary >>>> discourse >>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian >> colleagues >>>> have >>>>>>>>> illustrated. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from >> theorists >>>> who >>>>>>>> clearly >>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still >>>>>> possible >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> include culture in it. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, >>>> interestingly >>>>>>> links >>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" >>>> act. >>>>>>> Parts >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff >> that >>>> was >>>>>>> also >>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of >>>> creativity >>>>>> and >>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see >> that >>>> the >>>>>>> two >>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself >>>>>> writing. >>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty >> old >>>>>>>> approaches >>>>>>>>> to a pesum >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < >> ablunden@mira.net >>>>> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it >> may >>>> be >>>>>>> worth >>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place >> to >>>>>>>> Imagination >>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between >>>> Recollection and >>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive >>>> Imagination, >>>>>> (2) >>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he >>>> says >>>>>>> leads >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other >>>> words, >>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is >> accomplished >>>>>>> through >>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and >>>> Williams. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work >> i am >>>>>>> trying >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical >>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of >> productive >>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination >>>>>> develops. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that >>>> there >>>>>> must >>>>>>>> be a >>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I >>>> learned >>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and >> is >>>> linked >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of >>>>>> anticipation >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! >>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination >>>>>> (starting >>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and >>>>>> provides a >>>>>>>>>>>> space >>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as >> fixed. >>>> This, >>>>>>>>>>>> coupled >>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a >> ground >>>> to >>>>>> take >>>>>>>> part >>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with >>>>>>> preconceptions: >>>>>>>>>>>> Vera >>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian >>>> Langacker >>>>>> on >>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, >>>>>> particularly >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of >>>>>> imagination >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of >>>>>> temporality: >>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic >> structure), >>>>>> which >>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both >>>>>> individual >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. >>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < >>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com> >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third >> *space* >>>> and >>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> analogy >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* >>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. >>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his >> notion >>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> "structures >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is >> explored >>>>>> under >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of >>>> modalities >>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> hang >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of >> knowing >>>> that >>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> forming >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] >> if we >>>>>> think >>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* >>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how >>>> jazzed >>>>>> up >>>>>>> I >>>>>>>> am >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> now >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind >> as >>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> construes >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various >>>> triads, >>>>>>>> finally >>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks >> of >>>> the >>>>>>>> mind, as >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, >> luega pa? >>>>>>> fuera. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole >> >>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, >> attached >>>> are >>>>>> two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT >> theorists >>>> like >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of >>>> imagination in >>>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of >>>> productive >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no >>>> intention of >>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the >>>> attached >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these >> philosophers, I >>>> came >>>>>>> upon >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely >> linked >>>> at >>>>>>>> several >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, >> Ettienne >>>> and >>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a >> means of >>>>>> access >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. >>>> Moreover, >>>>>>>> such >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the >>>>>>>> perception/imagination >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct >> relevance >>>> to >>>>>>> Kris's >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to >> concerns >>>>>> about >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in >> development. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. >> Perhaps >>>> they >>>>>>> will >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural >>>> science >>>>>>>> with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural >> science >>>> with >>>>>> an >>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >> with >>>> an >>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >> an >>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Dec 16 16:58:56 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2014 16:58:56 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> Message-ID: Well, Francine, there are no precedents regarding curatorship since this would be the first of its kind. And you need no introduction as a long time participant in xmca meanderings. Hopefully your example will encourage others with similar expertise to offer their time. I attach the paper you sent me back in 2010. "A reconstruction of Vygotsky;s theory of creativity." Along with Ribot all of xmca and I get to read and discuss it now. The question of the relation of imagination and creativity has to come up more explicitly as the conversation progresses but I have, because my starting point is around micro-analysis of perception of stabilized images and Suvorov's intuitive characterization of voobrazhenie as "rising off of the world and returning to it again" I have not dared to cross the fuzzy zone into creativity. If you feel they must be discussed together, the thread/theme could be changed to Imagination and Creativity, but i fear all hell might break loose when our varied common sense intuitions of the meanings of these words clash with our imperfect understandings of their usages in theoretical discourse. Your call. :-) Great that you can engage this way!!! mike On Tue, Dec 16, 2014 at 4:32 PM, larry smolucha wrote: > > Message from Francine, > > Michael, > > I would gladly curate the discussion. Would that change anything as far as > the manner of discourse goes? Do I need an introduction? > > Do you still have the e-mail copy of my 2012 publication? (I no longer > have it on my computer) It has been published. > > Perhaps, Merlin's owl can shed some light since he like Merlin must have > lived backwards in time (being prescient about the future). > > To all XMCARs - let me say that I think the study of imagination and > creativity > is what gives us hope for the future - at a time when lack of imagination, > stagnation, and 'acting act' cast a shadow over the world. Vygotsky did say > that creativity is like electricity - it brings light to dark places. > > > > > > > From: mcole@ucsd.edu > > Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2014 14:06:26 -0800 > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > For Francine via Larry > > > > Hi Francine. I am sorry that your paper(s) did not make it into the > > lchcnewsletter. Clearly a result of the bad judgment of youth, or maybe > it > > was the lousy organization of LCHC! > > > > As you can see, in old age I come slowly around to understanding > > imagination in a manner that reveals it to be central to a lot of what I > > have > > worried about in my trying to teach about "mediational theories of mind." > > > > It seems that your first paper and your upcoming paper as well as > > everything in between should be a part of the Bibliography being compiled > > at present and be general knowledge among the participants. > > > > The thread/topic of Imagination on xmca appears to be solidifying. It > sure > > would be great to have an authentic expert in the topic curate the > > discussion. > > > > Might you volunteer for the role? > > When did Minerva's owl take off? > > > > mike > > > > So far it has been wonderfully educational for me. > > mk > > > > On Tue, Dec 16, 2014 at 11:44 AM, larry smolucha > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > Message from Francine Smolucha: > > > > > > Vygotsky referenced Ribot in the three papers that Vygotsky wrote > > > on the development of imagination and creativity. Michael attached a > copy > > > of one > > > translation of Imagination and Creativity in Childhood (original 1930). > > > But there are two other papers Imagination and Creativity of the > Adolescent > > > (1931) and The Development of Imagination in Childhood (1932). > > > > > > I translated these three papers into English in the mid-1980's and > > > presented a summary > > > at the APA convention in 1986 which was published in a German journal > in > > > 1986. > > > The Newsletter of the Laboratory for Comparative Human Cognition > accepted > > > that > > > same paper for publication in 1986 but has never published it. In 1990 > and > > > 1991 my > > > translations of two of the papers were published in Soviet Psychology. > The > > > connections > > > with Ribot's theory were explicitly discussed in my 1992 publication "A > > > Reconstruction of Vygotsky's Theory of Creativity" along with excerpts > from > > > my translations of the three > > > Vygotsky papers on imagination and creativity (Creativity Research > Journal > > > 1992 Vol 5 No 1). > > > > > > It was not until 2011, that I was able to find an English translation > of > > > Ribot's > > > book Essay on the Creative Imagination (published in French in 1900, > > > English > > > translation 2006). In my 2012 publication the Vygotsky-Ribot > connection is > > > further elaborated on (see Smolucha, L. and Smolucha, F. Vygotsky's > Theory > > > of Creativity: > > > Figurative Thinking Allied with Literal Thinking in O. Saracho (Ed). > > > Contemporary > > > Perspectives on research in Creativity in Early Childhood. Information > Age > > > Publishing > > > pp. 63-85). > > > > > > I am glad a new generation of scholars has taken an interest in these > > > topics. > > > By the way, my new paper on Vygotsky's Theory of Creativity and > Cultural > > > Synergy, builds on all this, and will be presented in Europe next year. > > > > > > > From: mcole@ucsd.edu > > > > Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2014 09:10:47 -0800 > > > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > > > > > Colleagues-- The Vygotsky text that contains the material on Ribot > and an > > > > introduction to the set of public lectures it was part of are > attached in > > > > order to further this educational disussion. > > > > > > > > A number of ideas that were perplexing me and I was stumbling around > > > > thinking about are laid out very well in these two documents. They > may > > > > perhaps help to ground this part of the discussion of imagination. > > > > > > > > I am certainly benefiting from reading them. My last reading was very > > > > narrowly focused and I was totally ignorant of the links between > what LSV > > > > was writing about imagination and Kant or Hegel. And most amazingly, > I > > > > ignored the discussion of Ribot. And, naturally, I have the attached > pdf > > > > in my file on imagination (!). > > > > > > > > There must be some lesson here about the social, culturally mediated > > > nature > > > > of individual memory out there somewhere. :-)) > > > > > > > > mike > > > > > > > > On Tue, Dec 16, 2014 at 7:49 AM, larry smolucha < > lsmolucha@hotmail.com> > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > Message from Francine Smolucha: > > > > > > > > > > To the old-timers on XMCA I have to say HELLO!!!!!! > > > > > To the Newcomers read on. > > > > > > > > > > In Vygotsky's three papers on the development of imagination and > > > > > creativity in childhood and adolescence, Vygotsky specifically > defined > > > > > memory as > > > > > reproductive imagination and creativity as combinatory imagination > > > > > (1930 paper published in 1990 in Soviet Psychology > > > > > p. 85 - F. Smolucha translator). All three of Vygotsky's papers on > the > > > > > development > > > > > of imagination and creativity cited Ribot's book Essay on the > Creative > > > > > Imagination (1900). > > > > > In these three papers and in his writings on play, Vygotsky also > > > mentioned > > > > > that > > > > > imagination and creativity emerge from children's pretend play > > > involving > > > > > analogical/metaphorical/figurative thinking in which one object is > > > > > substituted for another > > > > > (using a stick as a horse). > > > > > Newcomers to XMCA will forgive me if I seem a bit short > > > tempered > > > > > when dealing with > > > > > the veteram XMCAR's on these topics - but Michael Cole and others > are > > > > > certainly > > > > > familiar with my pioneering work in this area. I even emailed > Michael a > > > > > copy > > > > > of my 2012 publication on these topics to post for discussion on > XMCA - > > > > > that paper not > > > > > only reviews these topics but provides the formal bibliography > > > including > > > > > the > > > > > reference to Ribot's book Essay on Creative Imagination that was > first > > > > > published in > > > > > English in 2006 (I discovered the 2006 translation while writing my > > > 2012 > > > > > publication). > > > > > For a review of all of this, and the past 25 years of > research > > > on > > > > > these topics, > > > > > read my 2012 publication "Vygotsky's Theory of Creative > Imagination: > > > > > Figurative thinking Allied with Literal Thinking" (authors: Larry > and > > > > > Francine Smolucha) published in Contemporary > > > > > Readings on Research in Creativity in Early Childhood (O. Saracho > > > editor) > > > > > Information Age Publishing 2012 pp. 63 - 85. > > > > > I applaud those interested in pursuing these ideas in new > > > > > directions, and an important > > > > > part of that effort requires a understanding of where these ideas > came > > > > > from so you are not > > > > > just reinventing the wheel. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From: mcole@ucsd.edu > > > > > > Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2014 19:42:05 -0800 > > > > > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > > > > > > > > > Makes perfect sense to me concerning Ribot, David. Where does LSV > > > write > > > > > > about Ribot on imagination? I lost the forest for the trees and > am > > > lost > > > > > > back in memory land! > > > > > > > > > > > > And who do we turn to for the evidence that animals other than > humans > > > > > > engage in volitional attention? I was under the impression that > it is > > > > > > through subordinating oneself to a external/cultural mediator one > > > learned > > > > > > to control oneself from the outside. > > > > > > > > > > > > These seem like important issues to be straight about, even if > one > > > > > > disagrees about their implications/interpretation (if that is > > > possible!) > > > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Dec 15, 2014 at 4:19 PM, David Kellogg < > dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division > > > between > > > > > > > higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because > > > Ribot > > > > > is an > > > > > > > associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of > > > > > attention. > > > > > > > And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition > from > > > > > forest to > > > > > > > farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division > between > > > the > > > > > two > > > > > > > great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical > > > world > > > > > of the > > > > > > > forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic > uses > > > in > > > > > life > > > > > > > and death struggles for existence, and the much more > "imaginative" > > > > > (that > > > > > > > is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the > > > > > farm,where > > > > > > > written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter > > > months > > > > > are > > > > > > > wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to > encounter > > > > > talking > > > > > > > animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention > has > > > to > > > > > be > > > > > > > more voluntary. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very > clear > > > > > > > understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that > > > underpins > > > > > Ribot > > > > > > > here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points > out > > > the > > > > > > > LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices > > > > > really are > > > > > > > the true source of volitional attention and thus of > imagination, > > > there > > > > > > > isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human > and > > > > > animal > > > > > > > imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of > > > > > volitional > > > > > > > attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). > Without > > > a > > > > > theory > > > > > > > of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for > Ribot's > > > > > > > distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at > > > all. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, > > > thanks > > > > > to > > > > > > > all > > > > > > > > for the food for thought. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential > > > around > > > > > the > > > > > > > time > > > > > > > > emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had > > > seen > > > > > work > > > > > > > on > > > > > > > > memory before, but not imagination. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal > > > > > reproductive? > > > > > > > > Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of > > > > > development of > > > > > > > > imagination to these various categories --- The cost of > being a > > > > > relative > > > > > > > > newcomer to the topic. > > > > > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > hshonerd@gmail.com> > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket > list. > > > > > This > > > > > > > > > business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from > some > > > > > weeks > > > > > > > in > > > > > > > > > our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that > > > > > segmented the > > > > > > > > > last two words of the previous sentence as ?met > aphorizing?. > > > Puns, > > > > > > > > > according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) > > > > > > > > > Henry > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and > > > they are > > > > > > > doing > > > > > > > > > > contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his > > > followers > > > > > as > > > > > > > an > > > > > > > > > > inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by > Hegel, so > > > its > > > > > of > > > > > > > > > course > > > > > > > > > > interesting to see those additional categories emerge. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in > > > translation, > > > > > > > seems > > > > > > > > > > awfully slippery territory to me. The word, > "recollection" in > > > > > this > > > > > > > > > passage, > > > > > > > > > > for example, is not a currently used term in counter > > > distinction > > > > > to > > > > > > > > > > "memory." > > > > > > > > > > Normal problems. There are serious problems in > contemporary > > > > > discourse > > > > > > > > > > across languages as our explorations with out Russian > > > colleagues > > > > > have > > > > > > > > > > illustrated. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > That said, I feel as if I am learning something from > > > theorists > > > > > who > > > > > > > > > clearly > > > > > > > > > > influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was > still > > > > > > > possible > > > > > > > > to > > > > > > > > > > include culture in it. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, > > > > > interestingly > > > > > > > > links > > > > > > > > > > imagination to both movement and the meaning of a > "voluntary" > > > > > act. > > > > > > > > Parts > > > > > > > > > of > > > > > > > > > > it are offputting, primitives thinking like children > stuff > > > that > > > > > was > > > > > > > > also > > > > > > > > > > "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of > > > > > creativity > > > > > > > and > > > > > > > > > > imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to > see > > > that > > > > > the > > > > > > > > two > > > > > > > > > > concepts are linked. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found > himself > > > > > > > writing. > > > > > > > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which > pretty > > > old > > > > > > > > > approaches > > > > > > > > > > to a pesum > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < > > > ablunden@mira.net > > > > > > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > >> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, > but it > > > may > > > > > be > > > > > > > > worth > > > > > > > > > >> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent > place > > > to > > > > > > > > > Imagination > > > > > > > > > >> in the section on Representation, mediating between > > > > > Recollection and > > > > > > > > > >> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive > > > > > Imagination, > > > > > > > (2) > > > > > > > > > >> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, > which he > > > > > says > > > > > > > > leads > > > > > > > > > to > > > > > > > > > >> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In > other > > > > > words, > > > > > > > the > > > > > > > > > >> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is > > > accomplished > > > > > > > > through > > > > > > > > > >> these three grades of Imagination. > > > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > >> Andy > > > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > > > > > > >> *Andy Blunden* > > > > > > > > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > >> mike cole wrote: > > > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > >>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson > and > > > > > Williams. > > > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > > > >>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose > work > > > i am > > > > > > > > trying > > > > > > > > > to > > > > > > > > > >>> mine for empirical > > > > > > > > > >>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of > > > productive > > > > > > > > > >>> imagination. The Russians write that productive > imagination > > > > > > > develops. > > > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > > > >>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies > that > > > > > there > > > > > > > must > > > > > > > > > be a > > > > > > > > > >>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. > But I > > > > > learned > > > > > > > > > that > > > > > > > > > >>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears > and > > > is > > > > > linked > > > > > > > > to > > > > > > > > > >>> memory. > > > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > > > >>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of > > > > > > > anticipation > > > > > > > > > and > > > > > > > > > >>> memory. > > > > > > > > > >>> Imagine that! > > > > > > > > > >>> mike > > > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > > > >>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > > > > > hshonerd@gmail.com> > > > > > > > > > >>> wrote: > > > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > > > >>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on > imagination > > > > > > > (starting > > > > > > > > > with > > > > > > > > > >>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, > and > > > > > > > provides a > > > > > > > > > >>>> space > > > > > > > > > >>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as > > > fixed. > > > > > This, > > > > > > > > > >>>> coupled > > > > > > > > > >>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a > > > ground > > > > > to > > > > > > > take > > > > > > > > > part > > > > > > > > > >>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with > > > > > > > > preconceptions: > > > > > > > > > >>>> Vera > > > > > > > > > >>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian > > > > > Langacker > > > > > > > on > > > > > > > > > >>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive > domains, > > > > > > > particularly > > > > > > > > > the > > > > > > > > > >>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full > of > > > > > > > imagination > > > > > > > > > and > > > > > > > > > >>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of > > > > > > > temporality: > > > > > > > > > >>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic > > > structure), > > > > > > > which > > > > > > > > I > > > > > > > > > >>>> think > > > > > > > > > >>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for > both > > > > > > > individual > > > > > > > > > and > > > > > > > > > >>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > > > > > > > > > >>>> Henry > > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < > > > > > lpscholar2@gmail.com> > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > > > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third > > > *space* > > > > > and > > > > > > > the > > > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>> analogy > > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>> to *gap-filling* > > > > > > > > > >>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > > > > > > > > > >>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his > > > notion > > > > > of > > > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>> "structures > > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is > > > explored > > > > > > > under > > > > > > > > > the > > > > > > > > > >>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* > of > > > > > modalities > > > > > > > > > that > > > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>> hang > > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of > > > knowing > > > > > that > > > > > > > is > > > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>> forming > > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" > [perceived??] > > > if we > > > > > > > think > > > > > > > > > >>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as > *style* > > > > > > > > > >>>>> Larry > > > > > > > > > >>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > > > > > hshonerd@gmail.com > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>> wrote: > > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>> Mike and Larry, > > > > > > > > > >>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say > how > > > > > jazzed > > > > > > > up > > > > > > > > I > > > > > > > > > am > > > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>> now > > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the > mind > > > as > > > > > Larry > > > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>> construes > > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually > various > > > > > triads, > > > > > > > > > finally > > > > > > > > > >>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my > notebooks > > > of > > > > > the > > > > > > > > > mind, as > > > > > > > > > >>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, > > > luega pa? > > > > > > > > fuera. > > > > > > > > > >>>>>> Fractally yours, > > > > > > > > > >>>>>> Henry > > > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole < > mcole@ucsd.edu > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, > > > attached > > > > > are > > > > > > > two > > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>>> articles > > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT > > > theorists > > > > > like > > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>>> Zaporozhets > > > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of > > > > > imagination in > > > > > > > a > > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> manner > > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of > > > > > productive > > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>>> imagination. I > > > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no > > > > > intention of > > > > > > > > > doing > > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>>> so. > > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in > the > > > > > attached > > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>>> texts. > > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these > > > philosophers, I > > > > > came > > > > > > > > upon > > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>>> the > > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely > > > linked > > > > > at > > > > > > > > > several > > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, > > > Ettienne > > > > > and > > > > > > > I > > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> argued > > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>>> in > > > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a > > > means of > > > > > > > access > > > > > > > > > to > > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>>> the > > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander > Suvorov. > > > > > Moreover, > > > > > > > > > such > > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the > > > > > > > > > perception/imagination > > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct > > > relevance > > > > > to > > > > > > > > Kris's > > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>>> paper > > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to > > > concerns > > > > > > > about > > > > > > > > > the > > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in > > > development. > > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. > > > Perhaps > > > > > they > > > > > > > > will > > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>>> prove > > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>> useful for those interested. > > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> mike > > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> -- > > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a > natural > > > > > science > > > > > > > > > with an > > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > > > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > > > science > > > > > with > > > > > > > an > > > > > > > > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > science > > > with > > > > > an > > > > > > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > with > > > an > > > > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > an > > > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: smolucha.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 1649667 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141216/4f203a62/attachment-0001.pdf From hshonerd@gmail.com Tue Dec 16 20:15:39 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2014 21:15:39 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> Message-ID: <05D77352-9679-4A6B-AE5D-25015650946C@gmail.com> Francine and Mike! This is so exciting that you are sharing this dialog between the two of you. Better than any conference panel discussion I have attended. So much hope here. I take it you are talking about the bibliography initiative of Helena and Annalisa? If so, I hope Vera and Andy and Anna Stetsenko weigh in soon on imagination and creativity in a Vygotskian vein. Andy has just edited a book on collaborative projects which includes an article by Vera, as well as one by Anna Stetenko, both articles on creative projects. In an article he wrote last year entitled ?Power, Activity and Human Flourishing he quoted Shakespeare: ?There is a tide in the affairs of men. Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune; Omitted, all the voyage of their life Is bound in shallows and in miseries.? There are no guarantees. But there is hope. Let?s party! Henry > On Dec 16, 2014, at 5:58 PM, mike cole wrote: > > Well, Francine, there are no precedents regarding curatorship since this > would be the first of its kind. And you need no introduction as a long time > participant in xmca meanderings. Hopefully your example will encourage > others with similar expertise to offer their time. > > I attach the paper you sent me back in 2010. "A reconstruction of > Vygotsky;s theory of creativity." Along with Ribot all of xmca and I get to > read and discuss it now. > > The question of the relation of imagination and creativity has to come up > more explicitly as the conversation progresses but I have, because my > starting point is around micro-analysis of perception of stabilized images > and Suvorov's intuitive characterization of voobrazhenie as "rising off of > the world and returning to it again" I have not dared to cross the fuzzy > zone into creativity. If you feel they must be discussed together, the > thread/theme could be changed to Imagination and Creativity, but i fear all > hell might break loose when our varied common sense intuitions of the > meanings of these words clash with our imperfect understandings of their > usages in theoretical discourse. Your call. :-) > > Great that you can engage this way!!! > mike > > On Tue, Dec 16, 2014 at 4:32 PM, larry smolucha > wrote: >> >> Message from Francine, >> >> Michael, >> >> I would gladly curate the discussion. Would that change anything as far as >> the manner of discourse goes? Do I need an introduction? >> >> Do you still have the e-mail copy of my 2012 publication? (I no longer >> have it on my computer) It has been published. >> >> Perhaps, Merlin's owl can shed some light since he like Merlin must have >> lived backwards in time (being prescient about the future). >> >> To all XMCARs - let me say that I think the study of imagination and >> creativity >> is what gives us hope for the future - at a time when lack of imagination, >> stagnation, and 'acting act' cast a shadow over the world. Vygotsky did say >> that creativity is like electricity - it brings light to dark places. >> >> >> >> >> >>> From: mcole@ucsd.edu >>> Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2014 14:06:26 -0800 >>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>> >>> For Francine via Larry >>> >>> Hi Francine. I am sorry that your paper(s) did not make it into the >>> lchcnewsletter. Clearly a result of the bad judgment of youth, or maybe >> it >>> was the lousy organization of LCHC! >>> >>> As you can see, in old age I come slowly around to understanding >>> imagination in a manner that reveals it to be central to a lot of what I >>> have >>> worried about in my trying to teach about "mediational theories of mind." >>> >>> It seems that your first paper and your upcoming paper as well as >>> everything in between should be a part of the Bibliography being compiled >>> at present and be general knowledge among the participants. >>> >>> The thread/topic of Imagination on xmca appears to be solidifying. It >> sure >>> would be great to have an authentic expert in the topic curate the >>> discussion. >>> >>> Might you volunteer for the role? >>> When did Minerva's owl take off? >>> >>> mike >>> >>> So far it has been wonderfully educational for me. >>> mk >>> >>> On Tue, Dec 16, 2014 at 11:44 AM, larry smolucha >>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >>>> >>>> Vygotsky referenced Ribot in the three papers that Vygotsky wrote >>>> on the development of imagination and creativity. Michael attached a >> copy >>>> of one >>>> translation of Imagination and Creativity in Childhood (original 1930). >>>> But there are two other papers Imagination and Creativity of the >> Adolescent >>>> (1931) and The Development of Imagination in Childhood (1932). >>>> >>>> I translated these three papers into English in the mid-1980's and >>>> presented a summary >>>> at the APA convention in 1986 which was published in a German journal >> in >>>> 1986. >>>> The Newsletter of the Laboratory for Comparative Human Cognition >> accepted >>>> that >>>> same paper for publication in 1986 but has never published it. In 1990 >> and >>>> 1991 my >>>> translations of two of the papers were published in Soviet Psychology. >> The >>>> connections >>>> with Ribot's theory were explicitly discussed in my 1992 publication "A >>>> Reconstruction of Vygotsky's Theory of Creativity" along with excerpts >> from >>>> my translations of the three >>>> Vygotsky papers on imagination and creativity (Creativity Research >> Journal >>>> 1992 Vol 5 No 1). >>>> >>>> It was not until 2011, that I was able to find an English translation >> of >>>> Ribot's >>>> book Essay on the Creative Imagination (published in French in 1900, >>>> English >>>> translation 2006). In my 2012 publication the Vygotsky-Ribot >> connection is >>>> further elaborated on (see Smolucha, L. and Smolucha, F. Vygotsky's >> Theory >>>> of Creativity: >>>> Figurative Thinking Allied with Literal Thinking in O. Saracho (Ed). >>>> Contemporary >>>> Perspectives on research in Creativity in Early Childhood. Information >> Age >>>> Publishing >>>> pp. 63-85). >>>> >>>> I am glad a new generation of scholars has taken an interest in these >>>> topics. >>>> By the way, my new paper on Vygotsky's Theory of Creativity and >> Cultural >>>> Synergy, builds on all this, and will be presented in Europe next year. >>>> >>>>> From: mcole@ucsd.edu >>>>> Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2014 09:10:47 -0800 >>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>>> >>>>> Colleagues-- The Vygotsky text that contains the material on Ribot >> and an >>>>> introduction to the set of public lectures it was part of are >> attached in >>>>> order to further this educational disussion. >>>>> >>>>> A number of ideas that were perplexing me and I was stumbling around >>>>> thinking about are laid out very well in these two documents. They >> may >>>>> perhaps help to ground this part of the discussion of imagination. >>>>> >>>>> I am certainly benefiting from reading them. My last reading was very >>>>> narrowly focused and I was totally ignorant of the links between >> what LSV >>>>> was writing about imagination and Kant or Hegel. And most amazingly, >> I >>>>> ignored the discussion of Ribot. And, naturally, I have the attached >> pdf >>>>> in my file on imagination (!). >>>>> >>>>> There must be some lesson here about the social, culturally mediated >>>> nature >>>>> of individual memory out there somewhere. :-)) >>>>> >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> On Tue, Dec 16, 2014 at 7:49 AM, larry smolucha < >> lsmolucha@hotmail.com> >>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >>>>>> >>>>>> To the old-timers on XMCA I have to say HELLO!!!!!! >>>>>> To the Newcomers read on. >>>>>> >>>>>> In Vygotsky's three papers on the development of imagination and >>>>>> creativity in childhood and adolescence, Vygotsky specifically >> defined >>>>>> memory as >>>>>> reproductive imagination and creativity as combinatory imagination >>>>>> (1930 paper published in 1990 in Soviet Psychology >>>>>> p. 85 - F. Smolucha translator). All three of Vygotsky's papers on >> the >>>>>> development >>>>>> of imagination and creativity cited Ribot's book Essay on the >> Creative >>>>>> Imagination (1900). >>>>>> In these three papers and in his writings on play, Vygotsky also >>>> mentioned >>>>>> that >>>>>> imagination and creativity emerge from children's pretend play >>>> involving >>>>>> analogical/metaphorical/figurative thinking in which one object is >>>>>> substituted for another >>>>>> (using a stick as a horse). >>>>>> Newcomers to XMCA will forgive me if I seem a bit short >>>> tempered >>>>>> when dealing with >>>>>> the veteram XMCAR's on these topics - but Michael Cole and others >> are >>>>>> certainly >>>>>> familiar with my pioneering work in this area. I even emailed >> Michael a >>>>>> copy >>>>>> of my 2012 publication on these topics to post for discussion on >> XMCA - >>>>>> that paper not >>>>>> only reviews these topics but provides the formal bibliography >>>> including >>>>>> the >>>>>> reference to Ribot's book Essay on Creative Imagination that was >> first >>>>>> published in >>>>>> English in 2006 (I discovered the 2006 translation while writing my >>>> 2012 >>>>>> publication). >>>>>> For a review of all of this, and the past 25 years of >> research >>>> on >>>>>> these topics, >>>>>> read my 2012 publication "Vygotsky's Theory of Creative >> Imagination: >>>>>> Figurative thinking Allied with Literal Thinking" (authors: Larry >> and >>>>>> Francine Smolucha) published in Contemporary >>>>>> Readings on Research in Creativity in Early Childhood (O. Saracho >>>> editor) >>>>>> Information Age Publishing 2012 pp. 63 - 85. >>>>>> I applaud those interested in pursuing these ideas in new >>>>>> directions, and an important >>>>>> part of that effort requires a understanding of where these ideas >> came >>>>>> from so you are not >>>>>> just reinventing the wheel. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> From: mcole@ucsd.edu >>>>>>> Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2014 19:42:05 -0800 >>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Makes perfect sense to me concerning Ribot, David. Where does LSV >>>> write >>>>>>> about Ribot on imagination? I lost the forest for the trees and >> am >>>> lost >>>>>>> back in memory land! >>>>>>> >>>>>>> And who do we turn to for the evidence that animals other than >> humans >>>>>>> engage in volitional attention? I was under the impression that >> it is >>>>>>> through subordinating oneself to a external/cultural mediator one >>>> learned >>>>>>> to control oneself from the outside. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> These seem like important issues to be straight about, even if >> one >>>>>>> disagrees about their implications/interpretation (if that is >>>> possible!) >>>>>>> mike >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Mon, Dec 15, 2014 at 4:19 PM, David Kellogg < >> dkellogg60@gmail.com >>>>> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division >>>> between >>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because >>>> Ribot >>>>>> is an >>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of >>>>>> attention. >>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition >> from >>>>>> forest to >>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division >> between >>>> the >>>>>> two >>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical >>>> world >>>>>> of the >>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic >> uses >>>> in >>>>>> life >>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more >> "imaginative" >>>>>> (that >>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the >>>>>> farm,where >>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter >>>> months >>>>>> are >>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to >> encounter >>>>>> talking >>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention >> has >>>> to >>>>>> be >>>>>>>> more voluntary. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very >> clear >>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that >>>> underpins >>>>>> Ribot >>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points >> out >>>> the >>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices >>>>>> really are >>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of >> imagination, >>>> there >>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human >> and >>>>>> animal >>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of >>>>>> volitional >>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). >> Without >>>> a >>>>>> theory >>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for >> Ribot's >>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at >>>> all. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole >> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, >>>> thanks >>>>>> to >>>>>>>> all >>>>>>>>> for the food for thought. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential >>>> around >>>>>> the >>>>>>>> time >>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had >>>> seen >>>>>> work >>>>>>>> on >>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal >>>>>> reproductive? >>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of >>>>>> development of >>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of >> being a >>>>>> relative >>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. >>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>> hshonerd@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket >> list. >>>>>> This >>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from >> some >>>>>> weeks >>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that >>>>>> segmented the >>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met >> aphorizing?. >>>> Puns, >>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) >>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole >>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and >>>> they are >>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his >>>> followers >>>>>> as >>>>>>>> an >>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by >> Hegel, so >>>> its >>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>> course >>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in >>>> translation, >>>>>>>> seems >>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, >> "recollection" in >>>>>> this >>>>>>>>>> passage, >>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter >>>> distinction >>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>> "memory." >>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in >> contemporary >>>>>> discourse >>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian >>>> colleagues >>>>>> have >>>>>>>>>>> illustrated. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from >>>> theorists >>>>>> who >>>>>>>>>> clearly >>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was >> still >>>>>>>> possible >>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, >>>>>> interestingly >>>>>>>>> links >>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a >> "voluntary" >>>>>> act. >>>>>>>>> Parts >>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children >> stuff >>>> that >>>>>> was >>>>>>>>> also >>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of >>>>>> creativity >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to >> see >>>> that >>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> two >>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found >> himself >>>>>>>> writing. >>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which >> pretty >>>> old >>>>>>>>>> approaches >>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < >>>> ablunden@mira.net >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, >> but it >>>> may >>>>>> be >>>>>>>>> worth >>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent >> place >>>> to >>>>>>>>>> Imagination >>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between >>>>>> Recollection and >>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive >>>>>> Imagination, >>>>>>>> (2) >>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, >> which he >>>>>> says >>>>>>>>> leads >>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In >> other >>>>>> words, >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is >>>> accomplished >>>>>>>>> through >>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson >> and >>>>>> Williams. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose >> work >>>> i am >>>>>>>>> trying >>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical >>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of >>>> productive >>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive >> imagination >>>>>>>> develops. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies >> that >>>>>> there >>>>>>>> must >>>>>>>>>> be a >>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. >> But I >>>>>> learned >>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears >> and >>>> is >>>>>> linked >>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of >>>>>>>> anticipation >>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on >> imagination >>>>>>>> (starting >>>>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, >> and >>>>>>>> provides a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> space >>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as >>>> fixed. >>>>>> This, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled >>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a >>>> ground >>>>>> to >>>>>>>> take >>>>>>>>>> part >>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with >>>>>>>>> preconceptions: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera >>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian >>>>>> Langacker >>>>>>>> on >>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive >> domains, >>>>>>>> particularly >>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full >> of >>>>>>>> imagination >>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of >>>>>>>> temporality: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic >>>> structure), >>>>>>>> which >>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for >> both >>>>>>>> individual >>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < >>>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third >>>> *space* >>>>>> and >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his >>>> notion >>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is >>>> explored >>>>>>>> under >>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* >> of >>>>>> modalities >>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of >>>> knowing >>>>>> that >>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" >> [perceived??] >>>> if we >>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as >> *style* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say >> how >>>>>> jazzed >>>>>>>> up >>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>> am >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the >> mind >>>> as >>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually >> various >>>>>> triads, >>>>>>>>>> finally >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my >> notebooks >>>> of >>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> mind, as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, >>>> luega pa? >>>>>>>>> fuera. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole < >> mcole@ucsd.edu >>>>> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, >>>> attached >>>>>> are >>>>>>>> two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT >>>> theorists >>>>>> like >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of >>>>>> imagination in >>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of >>>>>> productive >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no >>>>>> intention of >>>>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in >> the >>>>>> attached >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these >>>> philosophers, I >>>>>> came >>>>>>>>> upon >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely >>>> linked >>>>>> at >>>>>>>>>> several >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, >>>> Ettienne >>>>>> and >>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a >>>> means of >>>>>>>> access >>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander >> Suvorov. >>>>>> Moreover, >>>>>>>>>> such >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the >>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct >>>> relevance >>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> Kris's >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to >>>> concerns >>>>>>>> about >>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in >>>> development. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. >>>> Perhaps >>>>>> they >>>>>>>>> will >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a >> natural >>>>>> science >>>>>>>>>> with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural >>>> science >>>>>> with >>>>>>>> an >>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural >> science >>>> with >>>>>> an >>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >> with >>>> an >>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >> an >>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> >> > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > From ablunden@mira.net Tue Dec 16 21:03:22 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:03:22 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: <05D77352-9679-4A6B-AE5D-25015650946C@gmail.com> References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <05D77352-9679-4A6B-AE5D-25015650946C@gmail.com> Message-ID: <54910E9A.60203@mira.net> The part played by memory in perception via imagination can be seen as another version of the well-known rising from the abstract to the concrete. In Hegel's Logic, what mediates between immediate perception (Being=Sein) and Thinking (Begriff) is Essence (Wesen, in German the past tense of Sein, i.e. "was"). Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ HENRY SHONERD wrote: > Francine and Mike! > This is so exciting that you are sharing this dialog between the two of you. Better than any conference panel discussion I have attended. So much hope here. I take it you are talking about the bibliography initiative of Helena and Annalisa? If so, I hope Vera and Andy and Anna Stetsenko weigh in soon on imagination and creativity in a Vygotskian vein. Andy has just edited a book on collaborative projects which includes an article by Vera, as well as one by Anna Stetenko, both articles on creative projects. In an article he wrote last year entitled ?Power, Activity and Human Flourishing he quoted Shakespeare: > > ?There is a tide in the affairs of men. > Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune; > Omitted, all the voyage of their life > Is bound in shallows and in miseries.? > > There are no guarantees. But there is hope. Let?s party! > Henry > > > > >> On Dec 16, 2014, at 5:58 PM, mike cole wrote: >> >> Well, Francine, there are no precedents regarding curatorship since this >> would be the first of its kind. And you need no introduction as a long time >> participant in xmca meanderings. Hopefully your example will encourage >> others with similar expertise to offer their time. >> >> I attach the paper you sent me back in 2010. "A reconstruction of >> Vygotsky;s theory of creativity." Along with Ribot all of xmca and I get to >> read and discuss it now. >> >> The question of the relation of imagination and creativity has to come up >> more explicitly as the conversation progresses but I have, because my >> starting point is around micro-analysis of perception of stabilized images >> and Suvorov's intuitive characterization of voobrazhenie as "rising off of >> the world and returning to it again" I have not dared to cross the fuzzy >> zone into creativity. If you feel they must be discussed together, the >> thread/theme could be changed to Imagination and Creativity, but i fear all >> hell might break loose when our varied common sense intuitions of the >> meanings of these words clash with our imperfect understandings of their >> usages in theoretical discourse. Your call. :-) >> >> Great that you can engage this way!!! >> mike >> >> On Tue, Dec 16, 2014 at 4:32 PM, larry smolucha >> wrote: >> >>> Message from Francine, >>> >>> Michael, >>> >>> I would gladly curate the discussion. Would that change anything as far as >>> the manner of discourse goes? Do I need an introduction? >>> >>> Do you still have the e-mail copy of my 2012 publication? (I no longer >>> have it on my computer) It has been published. >>> >>> Perhaps, Merlin's owl can shed some light since he like Merlin must have >>> lived backwards in time (being prescient about the future). >>> >>> To all XMCARs - let me say that I think the study of imagination and >>> creativity >>> is what gives us hope for the future - at a time when lack of imagination, >>> stagnation, and 'acting act' cast a shadow over the world. Vygotsky did say >>> that creativity is like electricity - it brings light to dark places. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> From: mcole@ucsd.edu >>>> Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2014 14:06:26 -0800 >>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>> >>>> For Francine via Larry >>>> >>>> Hi Francine. I am sorry that your paper(s) did not make it into the >>>> lchcnewsletter. Clearly a result of the bad judgment of youth, or maybe >>>> >>> it >>> >>>> was the lousy organization of LCHC! >>>> >>>> As you can see, in old age I come slowly around to understanding >>>> imagination in a manner that reveals it to be central to a lot of what I >>>> have >>>> worried about in my trying to teach about "mediational theories of mind." >>>> >>>> It seems that your first paper and your upcoming paper as well as >>>> everything in between should be a part of the Bibliography being compiled >>>> at present and be general knowledge among the participants. >>>> >>>> The thread/topic of Imagination on xmca appears to be solidifying. It >>>> >>> sure >>> >>>> would be great to have an authentic expert in the topic curate the >>>> discussion. >>>> >>>> Might you volunteer for the role? >>>> When did Minerva's owl take off? >>>> >>>> mike >>>> >>>> So far it has been wonderfully educational for me. >>>> mk >>>> >>>> On Tue, Dec 16, 2014 at 11:44 AM, larry smolucha >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >>>>> >>>>> Vygotsky referenced Ribot in the three papers that Vygotsky wrote >>>>> on the development of imagination and creativity. Michael attached a >>>>> >>> copy >>> >>>>> of one >>>>> translation of Imagination and Creativity in Childhood (original 1930). >>>>> But there are two other papers Imagination and Creativity of the >>>>> >>> Adolescent >>> >>>>> (1931) and The Development of Imagination in Childhood (1932). >>>>> >>>>> I translated these three papers into English in the mid-1980's and >>>>> presented a summary >>>>> at the APA convention in 1986 which was published in a German journal >>>>> >>> in >>> >>>>> 1986. >>>>> The Newsletter of the Laboratory for Comparative Human Cognition >>>>> >>> accepted >>> >>>>> that >>>>> same paper for publication in 1986 but has never published it. In 1990 >>>>> >>> and >>> >>>>> 1991 my >>>>> translations of two of the papers were published in Soviet Psychology. >>>>> >>> The >>> >>>>> connections >>>>> with Ribot's theory were explicitly discussed in my 1992 publication "A >>>>> Reconstruction of Vygotsky's Theory of Creativity" along with excerpts >>>>> >>> from >>> >>>>> my translations of the three >>>>> Vygotsky papers on imagination and creativity (Creativity Research >>>>> >>> Journal >>> >>>>> 1992 Vol 5 No 1). >>>>> >>>>> It was not until 2011, that I was able to find an English translation >>>>> >>> of >>> >>>>> Ribot's >>>>> book Essay on the Creative Imagination (published in French in 1900, >>>>> English >>>>> translation 2006). In my 2012 publication the Vygotsky-Ribot >>>>> >>> connection is >>> >>>>> further elaborated on (see Smolucha, L. and Smolucha, F. Vygotsky's >>>>> >>> Theory >>> >>>>> of Creativity: >>>>> Figurative Thinking Allied with Literal Thinking in O. Saracho (Ed). >>>>> Contemporary >>>>> Perspectives on research in Creativity in Early Childhood. Information >>>>> >>> Age >>> >>>>> Publishing >>>>> pp. 63-85). >>>>> >>>>> I am glad a new generation of scholars has taken an interest in these >>>>> topics. >>>>> By the way, my new paper on Vygotsky's Theory of Creativity and >>>>> >>> Cultural >>> >>>>> Synergy, builds on all this, and will be presented in Europe next year. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> From: mcole@ucsd.edu >>>>>> Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2014 09:10:47 -0800 >>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>>>> >>>>>> Colleagues-- The Vygotsky text that contains the material on Ribot >>>>>> >>> and an >>> >>>>>> introduction to the set of public lectures it was part of are >>>>>> >>> attached in >>> >>>>>> order to further this educational disussion. >>>>>> >>>>>> A number of ideas that were perplexing me and I was stumbling around >>>>>> thinking about are laid out very well in these two documents. They >>>>>> >>> may >>> >>>>>> perhaps help to ground this part of the discussion of imagination. >>>>>> >>>>>> I am certainly benefiting from reading them. My last reading was very >>>>>> narrowly focused and I was totally ignorant of the links between >>>>>> >>> what LSV >>> >>>>>> was writing about imagination and Kant or Hegel. And most amazingly, >>>>>> >>> I >>> >>>>>> ignored the discussion of Ribot. And, naturally, I have the attached >>>>>> >>> pdf >>> >>>>>> in my file on imagination (!). >>>>>> >>>>>> There must be some lesson here about the social, culturally mediated >>>>>> >>>>> nature >>>>> >>>>>> of individual memory out there somewhere. :-)) >>>>>> >>>>>> mike >>>>>> >>>>>> On Tue, Dec 16, 2014 at 7:49 AM, larry smolucha < >>>>>> >>> lsmolucha@hotmail.com> >>> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> To the old-timers on XMCA I have to say HELLO!!!!!! >>>>>>> To the Newcomers read on. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In Vygotsky's three papers on the development of imagination and >>>>>>> creativity in childhood and adolescence, Vygotsky specifically >>>>>>> >>> defined >>> >>>>>>> memory as >>>>>>> reproductive imagination and creativity as combinatory imagination >>>>>>> (1930 paper published in 1990 in Soviet Psychology >>>>>>> p. 85 - F. Smolucha translator). All three of Vygotsky's papers on >>>>>>> >>> the >>> >>>>>>> development >>>>>>> of imagination and creativity cited Ribot's book Essay on the >>>>>>> >>> Creative >>> >>>>>>> Imagination (1900). >>>>>>> In these three papers and in his writings on play, Vygotsky also >>>>>>> >>>>> mentioned >>>>> >>>>>>> that >>>>>>> imagination and creativity emerge from children's pretend play >>>>>>> >>>>> involving >>>>> >>>>>>> analogical/metaphorical/figurative thinking in which one object is >>>>>>> substituted for another >>>>>>> (using a stick as a horse). >>>>>>> Newcomers to XMCA will forgive me if I seem a bit short >>>>>>> >>>>> tempered >>>>> >>>>>>> when dealing with >>>>>>> the veteram XMCAR's on these topics - but Michael Cole and others >>>>>>> >>> are >>> >>>>>>> certainly >>>>>>> familiar with my pioneering work in this area. I even emailed >>>>>>> >>> Michael a >>> >>>>>>> copy >>>>>>> of my 2012 publication on these topics to post for discussion on >>>>>>> >>> XMCA - >>> >>>>>>> that paper not >>>>>>> only reviews these topics but provides the formal bibliography >>>>>>> >>>>> including >>>>> >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> reference to Ribot's book Essay on Creative Imagination that was >>>>>>> >>> first >>> >>>>>>> published in >>>>>>> English in 2006 (I discovered the 2006 translation while writing my >>>>>>> >>>>> 2012 >>>>> >>>>>>> publication). >>>>>>> For a review of all of this, and the past 25 years of >>>>>>> >>> research >>> >>>>> on >>>>> >>>>>>> these topics, >>>>>>> read my 2012 publication "Vygotsky's Theory of Creative >>>>>>> >>> Imagination: >>> >>>>>>> Figurative thinking Allied with Literal Thinking" (authors: Larry >>>>>>> >>> and >>> >>>>>>> Francine Smolucha) published in Contemporary >>>>>>> Readings on Research in Creativity in Early Childhood (O. Saracho >>>>>>> >>>>> editor) >>>>> >>>>>>> Information Age Publishing 2012 pp. 63 - 85. >>>>>>> I applaud those interested in pursuing these ideas in new >>>>>>> directions, and an important >>>>>>> part of that effort requires a understanding of where these ideas >>>>>>> >>> came >>> >>>>>>> from so you are not >>>>>>> just reinventing the wheel. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> From: mcole@ucsd.edu >>>>>>>> Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2014 19:42:05 -0800 >>>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Makes perfect sense to me concerning Ribot, David. Where does LSV >>>>>>>> >>>>> write >>>>> >>>>>>>> about Ribot on imagination? I lost the forest for the trees and >>>>>>>> >>> am >>> >>>>> lost >>>>> >>>>>>>> back in memory land! >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> And who do we turn to for the evidence that animals other than >>>>>>>> >>> humans >>> >>>>>>>> engage in volitional attention? I was under the impression that >>>>>>>> >>> it is >>> >>>>>>>> through subordinating oneself to a external/cultural mediator one >>>>>>>> >>>>> learned >>>>> >>>>>>>> to control oneself from the outside. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> These seem like important issues to be straight about, even if >>>>>>>> >>> one >>> >>>>>>>> disagrees about their implications/interpretation (if that is >>>>>>>> >>>>> possible!) >>>>> >>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Mon, Dec 15, 2014 at 4:19 PM, David Kellogg < >>>>>>>> >>> dkellogg60@gmail.com >>> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division >>>>>>>>> >>>>> between >>>>> >>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because >>>>>>>>> >>>>> Ribot >>>>> >>>>>>> is an >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> attention. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition >>>>>>>>> >>> from >>> >>>>>>> forest to >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division >>>>>>>>> >>> between >>> >>>>> the >>>>> >>>>>>> two >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical >>>>>>>>> >>>>> world >>>>> >>>>>>> of the >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic >>>>>>>>> >>> uses >>> >>>>> in >>>>> >>>>>>> life >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more >>>>>>>>> >>> "imaginative" >>> >>>>>>> (that >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> farm,where >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter >>>>>>>>> >>>>> months >>>>> >>>>>>> are >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to >>>>>>>>> >>> encounter >>> >>>>>>> talking >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention >>>>>>>>> >>> has >>> >>>>> to >>>>> >>>>>>> be >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> more voluntary. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very >>>>>>>>> >>> clear >>> >>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that >>>>>>>>> >>>>> underpins >>>>> >>>>>>> Ribot >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points >>>>>>>>> >>> out >>> >>>>> the >>>>> >>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> really are >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of >>>>>>>>> >>> imagination, >>> >>>>> there >>>>> >>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human >>>>>>>>> >>> and >>> >>>>>>> animal >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> volitional >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). >>>>>>>>> >>> Without >>> >>>>> a >>>>> >>>>>>> theory >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for >>>>>>>>> >>> Ribot's >>> >>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at >>>>>>>>> >>>>> all. >>>>> >>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole >>>>>>>>> >>> wrote: >>> >>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, >>>>>>>>>> >>>>> thanks >>>>> >>>>>>> to >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> all >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential >>>>>>>>>> >>>>> around >>>>> >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> time >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had >>>>>>>>>> >>>>> seen >>>>> >>>>>>> work >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> on >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> reproductive? >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> development of >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of >>>>>>>>>> >>> being a >>> >>>>>>> relative >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. >>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>>>>>>>> >>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com> >>>>> >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket >>>>>>>>>>> >>> list. >>> >>>>>>> This >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from >>>>>>>>>>> >>> some >>> >>>>>>> weeks >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> segmented the >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met >>>>>>>>>>> >>> aphorizing?. >>> >>>>> Puns, >>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) >>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> they are >>>>> >>>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> followers >>>>> >>>>>>> as >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> an >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> Hegel, so >>> >>>>> its >>>>> >>>>>>> of >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> course >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> translation, >>>>> >>>>>>>>> seems >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> "recollection" in >>> >>>>>>> this >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> passage, >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> distinction >>>>> >>>>>>> to >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> "memory." >>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> contemporary >>> >>>>>>> discourse >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> colleagues >>>>> >>>>>>> have >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> theorists >>>>> >>>>>>> who >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> clearly >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> still >>> >>>>>>>>> possible >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> interestingly >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> links >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> "voluntary" >>> >>>>>>> act. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Parts >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> stuff >>> >>>>> that >>>>> >>>>>>> was >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> also >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> creativity >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> see >>> >>>>> that >>>>> >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> two >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> himself >>> >>>>>>>>> writing. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> pretty >>> >>>>> old >>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> approaches >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> ablunden@mira.net >>>>> >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> but it >>> >>>>> may >>>>> >>>>>>> be >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> worth >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> place >>> >>>>> to >>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Imagination >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> Recollection and >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> Imagination, >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> (2) >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> which he >>> >>>>>>> says >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> leads >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> other >>> >>>>>>> words, >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> accomplished >>>>> >>>>>>>>>> through >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> and >>> >>>>>>> Williams. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> work >>> >>>>> i am >>>>> >>>>>>>>>> trying >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical >>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> productive >>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> imagination >>> >>>>>>>>> develops. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> that >>> >>>>>>> there >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> must >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> be a >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> But I >>> >>>>>>> learned >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> and >>> >>>>> is >>>>> >>>>>>> linked >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> anticipation >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> imagination >>> >>>>>>>>> (starting >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> and >>> >>>>>>>>> provides a >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> fixed. >>>>> >>>>>>> This, >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> ground >>>>> >>>>>>> to >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> take >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> part >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> preconceptions: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> Langacker >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> on >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> domains, >>> >>>>>>>>> particularly >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> of >>> >>>>>>>>> imagination >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> temporality: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> structure), >>>>> >>>>>>>>> which >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> both >>> >>>>>>>>> individual >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> *space* >>>>> >>>>>>> and >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> notion >>>>> >>>>>>> of >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> explored >>>>> >>>>>>>>> under >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> of >>> >>>>>>> modalities >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> knowing >>>>> >>>>>>> that >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> is >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> [perceived??] >>> >>>>> if we >>>>> >>>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> *style* >>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> how >>> >>>>>>> jazzed >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> up >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> am >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> mind >>> >>>>> as >>>>> >>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> various >>> >>>>>>> triads, >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> finally >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> notebooks >>> >>>>> of >>>>> >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> mind, as >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> luega pa? >>>>> >>>>>>>>>> fuera. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole < >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> mcole@ucsd.edu >>> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> attached >>>>> >>>>>>> are >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> two >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> theorists >>>>> >>>>>>> like >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> imagination in >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> productive >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> intention of >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> the >>> >>>>>>> attached >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> philosophers, I >>>>> >>>>>>> came >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> upon >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> linked >>>>> >>>>>>> at >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> several >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> Ettienne >>>>> >>>>>>> and >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> means of >>>>> >>>>>>>>> access >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> Suvorov. >>> >>>>>>> Moreover, >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> such >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> relevance >>>>> >>>>>>> to >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Kris's >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> concerns >>>>> >>>>>>>>> about >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> development. >>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> Perhaps >>>>> >>>>>>> they >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> will >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> natural >>> >>>>>>> science >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> with an >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> science >>>>> >>>>>>> with >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> an >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural >>>>>>>>>> >>> science >>> >>>>> with >>>>> >>>>>>> an >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >>>>>>>> >>> with >>> >>>>> an >>>>> >>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>>>>> >>> an >>> >>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>> >>> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> >> > > > > > From gutierkd@gmail.com Tue Dec 16 22:36:09 2014 From: gutierkd@gmail.com (Kris Gutierrez) Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2014 22:36:09 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context In-Reply-To: References: <2E5441F3-C50E-478B-BCCA-EA180B2591A3@ucla.edu> <70AEA66B-2185-4863-A4A8-FE86A87FCB43@gmail.com> Message-ID: Larry, thank you; you raise so many important things to think about. I will read your post again more carefully and respond and ask you more, as you push the thinking here. Kris Kris Gutierrez gutierkd@gmail.com Kris D. Guti?rrez Professor Graduate School of Education 5629 Tolman Hall #1670 University of California, Berkeley Berkeley CA 94720-1670 Distinguished Professor Learning Sciences and Literacy School of Education University of Colorado, Boulder > On Dec 15, 2014, at 6:08 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > > Kris, > I have been engaged with your explorations of new ways or paths of creating > *hybrid third spaces*. Your comment that forming third spaces: > > "involved intentional moves that 1) brought together and reorganized > different discourses, cultural practices, histories, and genres that were > generally considered incompatible or in tension with one another; 2) > preserved and foregrounded their tension; and 3) sought to maintain the > value, history, and integrity of the everyday vis-?-vis the dominant form, > especially in light of historical power relations. The syncretic > testimonio is such an example. A nod here to Cindy Cruz?s powerful and > informing work on testimonio. >> (I have a new piece in press which you read, Mike, that attempts to > elaborate the syncretic approach." > > Kris, I hope we can organize THIS thread to stay with your attempts to > "elaborate the syncretic approach". Your section of the paper on page 149, > 150 *Rising to the Concrete* gives a clear example of the hybrid nature of > your playing with academic and everyday language and not privileging the > scientific language. > > I believe your work is returning to a time when our language games were not > so divided into fact/fiction modes. Your elaborating "ecologically valid" > genres "DEVELOPED IN THE COGNITIVE, SOCIAL, AND HISTORICAL PRACTICES OF ALL > THE PARTICIPANTS" captures the radical mashing together of the young and > the old as "syncretic testimonio" Honouring the everyday language on an > equal footing with the scientific *styles* of writing. THIS mashing up as > "hybrid text" including BOTH autobiography and intersubjectively developed > texts. > > I read this *new* way or path as a return to rhetorical, persausive ways of > composing meaning. Raymond Williams describes epochal *styles* of orienting > to the world that begin in structures of feeling [he considered the term > *structures of experience* but preferred *structures of feelings* to > capture their felt *structure* as a set of elements that are mashed > together]. > > Our current dominant *style* structures the scientific genres as *factual* > while the imaginal [social dreaming etc] are *merely* subjective and > personal and idiosyncretic. > Kris, your "syncretic testimonio" is seeing through the impoverishment of > THAT dominant genre and playing with forms that are BOTH subjective > [autobiography] AND intersubjective as historically effected consciousness. > You are working within a nondominant ecology but you are gesturing toward a > much more radical turn that the dominant culture must take. Raymond > Williams within the Marxism and Literature tradition is working also for > these radical turns. I personally also see the hermeneutical turn as > compatible with your stated goal to develop a program oriented towards a > form of "cosmopolitanism" [see page 148 of Kris' article] > > This paper is a wonderful example of "rising to the concrete" or > imaginatively "rising off the ground and returning to the ground" [an > imaginal path of social intersubjective dreaming] > > Larry > On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 12:51 PM, mike cole [?] [?][?][?] > > So much for trying to organized xmca discussion by threads! It hard to keep > track of the jumble of the email flow! I assume those who are following the > KrisRRQ thread will see this. > reveling in the rain > mike > >> >> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 11:42 AM, Kris Gutierrez >> wrote: >>> >>> Luisa, thanks. I have always been a lurker on XMCA but can never keep >>> with all the discussions. I?m hoping the discussions will get us into >>> the questions you raise and I?m happy to post references and pdfs too >>> (e.g., Tejeda?s decolonizing and Espinoza?s article on Educational >>> Sanctuaries). Espinoza?s social dreaming is discussed in the RRQ article >>> and I?ll look to see where else he might have written about it. I don?t >>> know when the syncretic piece will be out but will check. Thanks for >> your >>> interest. >>> >>> >>> In particular, I hope we can also discuss the ways the social imagination >>> (embodied and realized through Boal's teatro del oprimido, historicizing >>> pedagogies, and syncretic texts, etc.) were central to the ubiquitous >>> "future oriented" organization of the activities that Mike points >> out?that >>> is, the process of becoming historical actors. >>> >>> >>> >>> Kris >>> >>> >>> >>> Kris Gutierrez >>> gutierkd@gmail.com >>> >>> Kris D. Guti?rrez >>> Professor >>> Graduate School of Education >>> 5629 Tolman Hall #1670 >>> University of California, Berkeley >>> Berkeley CA 94720-1670 >>> >>> Distinguished Professor >>> Learning Sciences and Literacy >>> School of Education >>> University of Colorado, Boulder >>> >>> >>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 11:25 AM, Luisa Aires wrote: >>>> >>>> Dear Professor Kris Gutierrez >>>> >>>> It is delightful to see you here in XMCA :-) >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I must confess that after reading your post, I am going to read your >>> text again because you added so much interesting information about MSLI >>> program (for example, I didn?t know that MSLI had strong links with 5th >>> dimension). >>>> >>>> I would like to learn about Chicano/a and ethnic studies, Tejeda?s >>> decolonizing framework and pedagogies, and Manuel Espinoza?s notions of >>> social dreaming. How can we access the most important references of those >>> theories? >>>> >>>> One more question (we need to take advantage of your presence here ;-): >>> when and how can we access your new piece about syncretic approach? >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Best wishes, >>>> >>>> Lu?sa A. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Department of Education and Distance Learning, Universidade Aberta >>>> Centre of Studies on Migrations and Intercultural Relations (CEMRI) >>>> R. Amial, n? 752, 4200-055 Porto, Portugal >>>> laires@uab.pt >>>> www.uab.pt >>>> >>>> >>>> 2014-12-12 17:55 GMT+00:00 Kris Gutierrez >> gutierkd@gmail.com>>: >>>> >>>> I don?t know if this went through last night.; so I?m reposting. >>> apologies if you get it twice >>>> >>>> >>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 12:45 AM, Kris Gutierrez >> > wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Re: Mike/Miguel, (Mike, XMCA has a weird email address for me and I >>> am unable to post; would you post if it doesn?t come through?) >>>>> >>>>> Miguel, who has deep knowledge of an important time in the >>> Migrant Program (MSLI), rightly points out that the development of >>> sociocritical >>>>> >>>>> literacies/ syncretic approaches to learning must be understood in >>> the context of the larger designed ecology and its history. And I can?t >>> begin to do >>>> >>>>> it justice here. But here are some reflections. >>>>> >>>>> Building on a decade of earlier designs that brought together Freire >>> and cultural historical theoretical perspectives, and Chicano/a and >> ethnic >>> studies >>>>> >>>>> to create new forms of teaching and learning, and theorizations of >>> the Third Space that preceded the development of the month long migrant >>>> >>>>> program, MSLI was designed as a hybrid space organized around an >>> historicizing pedagogy, informed, deepened, and augmented by >>>>> >>>>> Tejeda?s robust decolonizing framework and pedagogies, and Manuel >>> Espinoza?s notions of social dreaming and the importance of students >>>> >>>>> becoming historical actors who could "who invoke the past in order to >>> re-mediate it so that it becomes a resource for current and future >>> action.? Their >>>> >>>>> work is key to understanding the MSLI ecology. Our long-term 5th >>> Dimension work (UC Links), its theoretical underpinnings, and the >>> pedagogical >>>> >>>>> approaches to undergraduate education and learning in informal >>> contexts were also a part of the mix, as most of the MSLI instructional >>> team also >>>> >>>>> was involved in 5th D work. Of significance, all MSLI staff had >>> extensive knowledge of CHAT, critical pedagogies, social theories, >>> disciplinary >>>> >>>>> learning, as well as direct experience with and in immigrant, >> migrant, >>> and non dominant communities, their histories, repertoires, lived >>> experiences, >>>> >>>>> and possibilities. >>>>> >>>>> There are many other important contributions of others I could >>> elaborate here that contributed to the iterative design, re-mediation, >> and >>>>> >>>>> implementation and sustainability of this program, including >>> Miguel's. Consider Shirin Vossoughi?s recent MCA article, Social >>> Analytic Artifacts >>>> >>>>> Made Concrete,? in which she beautifully elaborates the ways >>> social analytic artifacts served as tools ?that deepened and propelled >> the >>> collective >>>> >>>>> analysis of social problems? for migrant students and the >>> instructional teams. >>>>> >>>>> Our collective efforts and design were oriented toward >>> transformation and change and had multiple aims: sociopolitical, >> cultural, >>> educational, >>>>> >>>>> including reframing education and learning in ways that brought the >>> everyday and scientific (school-based) concepts into conversation with >> one >>>>> >>>>> another (a different kind of conversation to be sure). The goal in >>> this regard was to put scientific and everyday concepts on a more level >>> playing field >>>>> >>>>> such that scientific concepts were not placed in an hierarchical >>> relationship with the everyday. Disciplinary learning and critical forms >>> of literacy were >>>>> >>>>> placed in conversation, their tensions made the object of analysis >>> ?all toward the production of more meaningful and expansive forms of >>> learning. >>>>> >>>>> Mike and Yrjo have written important work on this, and, Carol Lee?s >>> work is another robust example. >>>>> >>>>> And, of course, there is a history of work among researchers in the >>> sociocultural tradition who have attended to the consequential nature of >>> everyday >>>>> >>>>> knowledge and practices in expansive ways (e.g., Scribner & Cole, >>> 1973; Lave, 1988; 2012; Lave & Rogoff, 1984; Rogoff, 2003, as key >> examples >>> of >>>>> >>>>> work that informs this thinking, including ongoing conversations and >>> collaborations with and weekly meetings at LCHC with Mike, Yrjo, >>> Olga,Vasquez >>>>> >>>>> and others). >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Our approach to consequential learning involved the development >>> of syncretic approaches to literacy and social scientific thinking. The >>> design >>>>> >>>>> involved intentional moves that 1) brought together and reorganized >>> different discourses, cultural practices, histories, and genres that were >>> generally considered incompatible or in tension with one another; 2) >>> preserved and foregrounded their tension; and 3) sought to maintain the >>> value, history, and integrity of the everyday vis-?-vis the dominant >> form, >>> especially in light of historical power relations. The syncretic >>> testimonio is such an example. A nod here to Cindy Cruz?s powerful and >>> informing work on testimonio. >>>>> (I have a new piece in press which you read, Mike, that attempts to >>> elaborate the syncretic approach). >>>>> >>>>> A footnote on the sociocritical article. The RRQ Sociocritical >>> Literacy article was the publication of my AERA Scribner Lecture (2005 >> for >>> the 2004 Scribner Award for my work on the Third Space; the lecture and >> its >>> published piece were my attempt to further theorize the Third Space, >> using >>> MSLI as a robust example. >>>>> >>>>> Hope this provides more context and food for thought. excuse typos >>> and lapses, it?s late. Kris >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Kris D. Guti?rrez >>>>> Professor >>>>> Graduate School of Education >>>>> 5629 Tolman Hall #1670 >>>>> University of California, Berkeley >>>>> Berkeley CA 94720-1670 >>>>> >>>>> Distinguished Professor >>>>> Learning Sciences and Literacy >>>>> School of Education >>>>> University of Colorado, Boulder >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> On Dec 11, 2014, at 6:49 AM, mike cole >> mcole@ucsd.edu> >> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Thanks for the additional info. >>>>>> All makes sense to me. >>>>>> Mike >>>>>> >>>>>> On Wednesday, December 10, 2014, Zavala, Miguel < >>>>>> mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu >> mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu> >> >> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> While the focus is on public education, any space is amenable for >>>>>>> analysis. We sometimes get issues from parent organizers, student >>>>>>> organizations, interviews of students fighting for social justice >> in >>>>>>> college campuses. Formal, non-formal, institutional, >>> non-institutional, >>>>>>> etc. will work. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> If the submission focuses on 'praxis', on responses and resistance >>> to the >>>>>>> neoliberal privatization of education, any space and sustained >>> activity, >>>>>>> etc. is worth looking at-- but a connection should be drawn to how >> it >>>>>>> deliberately responds to neoliberalism and its messy tentacles, >>> perhaps >>>>>>> highlighting possible worlds and social dreams. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> A connection can definitely be drawn between sociocritical studies >>> and >>>>>>> this topic, certainly. I believe the work we did in MSLI (I was an >>>>>>> integral member of MSLI for 3 years) was in many ways creating >>> alternative >>>>>>> spaces and social dreams; in a way it was a bottom-up approach of >>> building >>>>>>> consciousness and I think Freire would have been proud of our work. >>> As >>>>>>> lead instructor, Carlos Tejeda's decolonizing pedagogies framework >>> lead to >>>>>>> some beautiful, creative activity in that space, for many years. >> As >>> an >>>>>>> instantiation of sociocritical literacies, I would say the work >> Kris >>>>>>> outlines is definitely a great example of "responses to >>> neoliberalism" and >>>>>>> was here and there a part of our talk/framing as we moved >>> pedagogically. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> As an editor of the journal, the 'constraint' we do have is that >>>>>>> submissions be written for a general audience; I know that is >>> ambiguous. >>>>>>> Keep in mind that the articles get read by our members in ARE, >> their >>>>>>> students, they are sometimes used as political education in >>> conferences, >>>>>>> in some instances reading circles in non-formal community settings. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -Miguel >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 12/10/14 10:24 PM, "mike cole" >> mcole@ucsd.edu> > >>> > wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> How broad is your mandates, Miguel? Does it extend to after >> school? >>> Seems >>>>>>>> like it would help to know the kinds of efforts you consider >>> exemplary >>>>>>>> classics. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Does this topic fit in with sociocritical studies? >>>>>>>> Mike >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Wednesday, December 10, 2014, Zavala, Miguel < >>>>>>>> mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu >> mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu> >> > > wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> XMCA List Family, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I am relaying a call for manuscripts on a pressing issue >> impacting >>>>>>>>> education everywhere. We conceptualized the idea of a grassroots >>>>>>>>> journal in >>>>>>>>> 2007 and it has grown, albeit slowly. Here's the latest call. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Thanks! >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> ------------------- >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Regeneraci?n, the Association of Raza Educators Journal >>>>>>>>> Volume 6, Issue 1 (Spring 2015) >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> CALL FOR SUBMISSIONS >>>>>>>>> Deadline: February 15, 2015 >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The theme for our next issue: >>>>>>>>> "Resisting The Neoliberal Privatization of Education: Reclaiming >>>>>>>>> Teachers' >>>>>>>>> Unions, Education, and Epistemologies" >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Undeniably, ever since the World Bank declared education a >>> trade-able >>>>>>>>> service--trumping the idea that education is a basic human >>>>>>>>> right--education >>>>>>>>> and teachers have been increasingly under attack by corporations, >>>>>>>>> venture >>>>>>>>> philanthropists, and a growing managerial middle class, who >>> function >>>>>>>>> within >>>>>>>>> a neoliberal ideology that places insurmountable faith in markets >>> and >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> expansion of capitalism globally into all facets of everyday >> life. >>> We >>>>>>>>> believe that the neoliberal project to de-fund and privatize >> public >>>>>>>>> education interlocks with the idea of a racial-colonial State. >>> Thus, >>>>>>>>> it is >>>>>>>>> no coincidence that neoliberal experiments to privatize public >>> education >>>>>>>>> have materialized in large urban districts, such as Chicago, New >>> York, >>>>>>>>> Los >>>>>>>>> Angeles, etc., where we find a significant number of Raza, Black, >>> and >>>>>>>>> other >>>>>>>>> historically marginalized peoples. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> In this issue of Regeneraci?n we seek both analysis and praxis, >>> that is >>>>>>>>> texts that help us understand more deeply how neoliberalism is >>> manifest >>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>> particular geographic, social, and cultural spaces. As well, we >> are >>>>>>>>> looking >>>>>>>>> for texts that provide examples of resistance to the corporate >>> takeover >>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>> public education. How are urban and other communities responding >>> to the >>>>>>>>> attacks on education and teachers? What grassroots and strategic >>> spaces >>>>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>> created that provide alternatives to neoliberalism and >>> capitalism? How >>>>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>> teachers' unions being reinvented? What role does the fight for >>> Ethnic >>>>>>>>> Studies present as a counter to the neoliberal attack? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> FORMAT: Submissions may come from students, educators, parents, >>>>>>>>> community >>>>>>>>> organizers, or organizations; we also welcome scholarly >>> submissions that >>>>>>>>> are written for a general audience. Formats may include >>> testimonios, >>>>>>>>> essays, poetry, art, personal narrative, as well as analytic and >>>>>>>>> empirical >>>>>>>>> studies. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> LENGTH: 700-3000 words >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> SUBMISSION DEADLINE: February 15, 2015 >>>>>>>>> PUBLICATION DATE: April 15, 2015 >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> If you have any questions please contact: >> razaeducators@yahoo.com >>> > >> razaeducators@yahoo.com>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >> razaeducators@yahoo.com> >> razaeducators@yahoo.com>> >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> To access past issues of Regeneraci?n: >>>>>>>>> http://www.razaeducators.org/archives_newsletter.html < >>> http://www.razaeducators.org/archives_newsletter.html> < >>> http://www.razaeducators.org/archives_newsletter.html < >>> http://www.razaeducators.org/archives_newsletter.html>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> The Association of Raza Educators >>>>>>>>> www.razaeducators.org < >>> http://www.razaeducators.org/ >< >>> http://www.razaeducators.org < >>> http://www.razaeducators.org/ >> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >> with >>> an >>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >> an >>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Kris Gutierrez >>>>> k.gutierrez@me.com >> k.gutierrez@me.com > >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Kris D. Guti?rrez >>>>> Professor >>>>> Graduate School of Education >>>>> 5629 Tolman Hall #1670 >>>>> University of California, Berkeley >>>>> Berkeley CA 94720-1670 >>>>> >>>>> Distinguished Professor >>>>> Learning Sciences and Literacy >>>>> School of Education >>>>> University of Colorado, Boulder >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> From haydizulfei@rocketmail.com Tue Dec 16 22:35:54 2014 From: haydizulfei@rocketmail.com (Haydi Zulfei) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 06:35:54 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Fw: Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1309351078.33184.1418798154160.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11115.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> Henry, The quote should connect to the other thread , my fault . But aside from that , is there anything wrong with me , with the quote . If so , please say it direct and clear to me . Thanks ! Haydi ----- Forwarded Message ----- From: HENRY SHONERD To: Haydi Zulfei ; "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Wednesday, 17 December 2014, 0:28:03 Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination I was wondering if Vygotsky on crisis in ZPD and Peirce?s triadic categories are of help. David K. has tutored me on ZPD, and turned me on to Seth Chaiklin?s article on ZPD. Natalia Gajdamaschko actually alerted me to the complexities of the ZPD earlier on, but I needed two tutorials. Who is the Peircian out there to smack me down? Henry > On Dec 16, 2014, at 12:50 PM, Haydi Zulfei wrote: > > Dear all , > > Maybe worth reading , History of Higher Mental Functions , Volume 3 , page 127 English Version : > > How does the third stage differ from the second? Very briefly we might say that the essential difference is, on the one hand, in the method by which the reactions arise, and on the other hand, in the character of the function, that is, the biological function of the reaction, in contrast to habit, that arises as a result of trial and error or as a result of stimuli acting in Olle direction. In intellectual reactions, a response arises as an expression of a certain image obtained, obviously, as a result of a kind of short circuit, that is, of a complex internal process formed on the basis of excitation of a series of cooperating centers, which creates a new path. Consequently, we are speaking of a reaction of an explosive type, exceptionally complex in the nature of its arising, the mechanisms of which are thus far unknown since our knowledge of brain processes is still at the beginning stage of development. If the function of the instinctive reaction differs from the function of habit, then the latter differs? from the intellectual function. Of course, if the biological function of habit is? adaptation to individual conditions of existence that are more or less clear and simple, then the function of intellectual behavior is adaptation to changing conditions of the environment and to changing circumstances under new conditions. An argument has developed among psychologists specifically on this ground: authors who reject the consideration of intellect as a special level in nature say that it is? only a special subclass within the same class as acquisition of habit. It seems to me that it is the responsibility of scientific caution that we speak here actually of only two classes of development in child behavior: inherited and acquired through experience, and within the latter-that acquired through experience?-we will be able to establish not just two stages, but perhaps even more as our knowledge increases. Consequently, it would be proper, it seems to us at the contemporary state of knowledge, to adopt the point of view of Thorndike, the American psychologist, who differentiates two? stages: inherited and individual, or internal and acquired, and in behavior, he differentiates two stages or two groups of reaction: on the one hand, habits inherited for adaptation to more or less long-term conditions of mdividual existence, and on the other hand, a whole hierarchy of habits directed toward solving new problems that confront the organism, in? other words, that order of reactions of which we have spoken. In order to understand the connection between the levels of development that are of interest to us in child psychology, we must briefly take into account the kind of relation that exists among them. The relations are of a dialectical character. > > > > Just thinking : Even acquired habits are considered "cultural" and it remains for the "intellectual" , as knowledge increases , to be classified as "higher" . > > Regards > > Haydi >? ? ? From: mike cole > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Sent: Tuesday, 16 December 2014, 9:10:47 > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > Colleagues-- The Vygotsky text that contains the material on Ribot and an > introduction to the set of public lectures it was part of are attached in > order to further this educational disussion. > > A number of ideas that were perplexing me and I was stumbling around > thinking about are laid out very well in these two documents. They may > perhaps help to ground this part of the discussion of imagination. > > I am certainly benefiting from reading them. My last reading was very > narrowly focused and I was totally ignorant of the links between what LSV > was writing about imagination and Kant or Hegel. And most amazingly, I > ignored the discussion of Ribot. And, naturally, I have the attached pdf > in my file on imagination (!). > > There must be some lesson here about the social, culturally mediated nature > of individual memory out there somewhere.? :-)) > > mike > > On Tue, Dec 16, 2014 at 7:49 AM, larry smolucha > wrote: >> >> Message from Francine Smolucha: >> >> To the old-timers on XMCA I have to say HELLO!!!!!! >> To the Newcomers read on. >> >> In Vygotsky's three papers on the development of imagination and >> creativity in childhood and adolescence, Vygotsky specifically defined >> memory as >> reproductive imagination? and creativity as combinatory imagination >> (1930 paper published in 1990 in Soviet Psychology >> p. 85 - F. Smolucha translator). All three of Vygotsky's papers on the >> development >> of imagination and creativity cited Ribot's book Essay on the Creative >> Imagination (1900). >> In these three papers and in his writings on play, Vygotsky also mentioned >> that >> imagination and creativity emerge from children's pretend play involving >> analogical/metaphorical/figurative thinking in which one object is >> substituted for another >> (using a stick as a horse). >>? ? ? ? Newcomers to XMCA will forgive me if I seem a bit short tempered >> when dealing with >> the veteram XMCAR's on these topics - but Michael Cole and others are >> certainly >> familiar with my pioneering work in this area. I even emailed Michael a >> copy >> of my 2012 publication on these topics to post for discussion on XMCA - >> that paper not >> only reviews these topics but provides the formal bibliography including >> the >> reference to Ribot's book Essay on Creative Imagination that was first >> published in >> English in 2006 (I discovered the 2006 translation while writing my 2012 >> publication). >>? ? ? ? For a review of all of this, and the past 25 years of research on >> these topics, >> read my 2012 publication "Vygotsky's Theory of Creative Imagination: >> Figurative thinking Allied with Literal Thinking" (authors: Larry and >> Francine Smolucha) published in Contemporary >> Readings on Research in Creativity in Early Childhood (O. Saracho editor) >> Information Age Publishing 2012 pp. 63 - 85. >>? ? ? ? I applaud those interested in pursuing these ideas in new >> directions, and an important >> part of that effort requires a understanding of where these ideas came >> from so you are not >> just reinventing the wheel. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> From: mcole@ucsd.edu >>> Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2014 19:42:05 -0800 >>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>> >>> Makes perfect sense to me concerning Ribot, David. Where does LSV write >>> about Ribot on imagination? I lost the forest for the trees and am lost >>> back in memory land! >>> >>> And who do we turn to for the evidence that animals other than humans >>> engage in volitional attention? I was under the impression that it is >>> through subordinating oneself to a external/cultural mediator one learned >>> to control oneself from the outside. >>> >>> These seem like important issues to be straight about, even if one >>> disagrees about their implications/interpretation (if that is possible!) >>> mike >>> >>> >>> On Mon, Dec 15, 2014 at 4:19 PM, David Kellogg >> wrote: >>>> >>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division between >>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because Ribot >> is an >>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of >> attention. >>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from >> forest to >>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between the >> two >>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical world >> of the >>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses in >> life >>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" >> (that >>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the >> farm,where >>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter months >> are >>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter >> talking >>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has to >> be >>>> more voluntary. >>>> >>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear >>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that underpins >> Ribot >>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out the >>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices >> really are >>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, there >>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and >> animal >>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of >> volitional >>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without a >> theory >>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's >>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at all. >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>> >>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, thanks >> to >>>> all >>>>> for the food for thought. >>>>> >>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential around >> the >>>> time >>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had seen >> work >>>> on >>>>> memory before, but not imagination. >>>>> >>>>> Robert-? Does generative = productive and reflective equal >> reproductive? >>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of >> development of >>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a >> relative >>>>> newcomer to the topic. >>>>> mike >>>>> >>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD >>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. >> This >>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some >> weeks >>>> in >>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that >> segmented the >>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. Puns, >>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) >>>>>> Henry >>>>>> >>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they are >>>> doing >>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his followers >> as >>>> an >>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so its >> of >>>>>> course >>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in translation, >>>> seems >>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in >> this >>>>>> passage, >>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter distinction >> to >>>>>>> "memory." >>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary >> discourse >>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian colleagues >> have >>>>>>> illustrated. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists >> who >>>>>> clearly >>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still >>>> possible >>>>> to >>>>>>> include culture in it. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, >> interestingly >>>>> links >>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" >> act. >>>>> Parts >>>>>> of >>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that >> was >>>>> also >>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of >> creativity >>>> and >>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see that >> the >>>>> two >>>>>>> concepts are linked. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself >>>> writing. >>>>>>> mike >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old >>>>>> approaches >>>>>>> to a pesum >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden >> >>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it may >> be >>>>> worth >>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to >>>>>> Imagination >>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between >> Recollection and >>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive >> Imagination, >>>> (2) >>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he >> says >>>>> leads >>>>>> to >>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other >> words, >>>> the >>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is accomplished >>>>> through >>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> >>>>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and >> Williams. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am >>>>> trying >>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> mine for empirical >>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive >>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination >>>> develops. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that >> there >>>> must >>>>>> be a >>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I >> learned >>>>>> that >>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is >> linked >>>>> to >>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of >>>> anticipation >>>>>> and >>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>> Imagine that! >>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>> hshonerd@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination >>>> (starting >>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and >>>> provides a >>>>>>>>>> space >>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. >> This, >>>>>>>>>> coupled >>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground >> to >>>> take >>>>>> part >>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with >>>>> preconceptions: >>>>>>>>>> Vera >>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian >> Langacker >>>> on >>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, >>>> particularly >>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of >>>> imagination >>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of >>>> temporality: >>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure), >>>> which >>>>> I >>>>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both >>>> individual >>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. >>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < >> lpscholar2@gmail.com> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* >> and >>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> analogy >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* >>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. >>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion >> of >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> "structures >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored >>>> under >>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of >> modalities >>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> hang >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> together.? This notion suggests there is a form of knowing >> that >>>> is >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> forming >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we >>>> think >>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively.? Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* >>>>>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, >>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how >> jazzed >>>> up >>>>> I >>>>>> am >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> now >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as >> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> construes >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various >> triads, >>>>>> finally >>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of >> the >>>>>> mind, as >>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa? >>>>> fuera. >>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, >>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole >> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached >> are >>>> two >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> articles >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists >> like >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of >> imagination in >>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>>> manner >>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of >> productive >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no >> intention of >>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> so. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the >> attached >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> texts. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I >> came >>>>> upon >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked >> at >>>>>> several >>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne >> and >>>> I >>>>>>>>>>>>> argued >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of >>>> access >>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. >> Moreover, >>>>>> such >>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the >>>>>> perception/imagination >>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance >> to >>>>> Kris's >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> paper >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns >>>> about >>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps >> they >>>>> will >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> prove >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural >> science >>>>>> with an >>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >> with >>>> an >>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >> an >>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> >> > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > From carolmacdon@gmail.com Wed Dec 17 02:49:18 2014 From: carolmacdon@gmail.com (Carol Macdonald) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 12:49:18 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hi I do know that Chomsky and Piaget are diametrically opposed (I wrote a lot about that long ago). But Vygotsky vs Chomsky I have given less thought to. The real sticking point is the specificity of the language that Chomsky posits. But remember Chomsky was working with a narrow palette. He knew nothing about psychology at all in the 60's. And he probably thought he didn't have to. As for our symbolic capacities, it seems he didn't give it any thought. He was also working in a vacuum when he talked about the development of language - he thought we had a very impoverished input from others. And we know now that that is absolutely not the case: Children get a very rich input from their caregivers. So perhaps we should not really be giving Chomsky much of a platform on XMCA. Carol On 16 December 2014 at 21:38, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > > I do not want people to come down on...thinking out loud about another way > to resolve the controversy between chomskyianites and vygotskyites...i > think it can be done through phenomenology (arrogance of youth maybe, but I > am going to try it).... > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > >
-------- Original message --------
From: "Dr. Paul C. > Mocombe"
Date:12/16/2014 2:01 PM > (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
Subject: [Xmca-l] Chomsky, > Vygotsky, and phenomenology
>
Is it really the case thay chomsky and Vygotsky diametrically oppose > one another? As I read Vygotsky it appears as if something is missing. > That something for me was the internalization process. I was reading his > concept of internalization as though he was suggesting that it took place > among an empiricist view of the human being as a "blank slate." hence my > questions in the previous thread. If chomsky is right, which I think he is > to some extent, does that change Vygotsky or can we synthesize the two? > I am working on a paper to attempt to do just that through > phenomenology.... > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From dkellogg60@gmail.com Wed Dec 17 03:05:49 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> Message-ID: Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the case for Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I think it's not just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are associationists who are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary associationism exists and some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. Vygotsky has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, explain the uniqueness of our species? Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels for its own kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a Piagetian perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true maturity as a species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more to it than that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of primate, and our solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon rocks in order to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged the same way as any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. Making the case for the higher psychological functions and for language is not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human exceptionalism. It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for the vanguard role of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, prolonging childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after the sick and the elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial organs (tools) and even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for our species, it is in the societies and the sectors of society where these "circuitous, compensatory means of development" are most advanced that lead our development as a species. The wretched of the earth always been short on rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for material culture generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: verily, here the first shall be last and the last shall be first. I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of attention is simply the logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says there are only two kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So imagination is nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, and nothing really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when you hear the name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there to be able to imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work in word meaning. You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who was given a crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been mixed with silver by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold. Well, we now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not possible to measure the differences in water displacement that precisely. The method that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the "principal of buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes palimpsest, a velum on which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. Because parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and written over every century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, the pressure of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones when the old text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only known Greek copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their relationship to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they are related to each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite similar to the way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an associationist, ?sees > imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? > Henry > > > On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division between > > higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because Ribot is > an > > associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of attention. > > And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from forest > to > > farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between the two > > great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical world of > the > > forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses in life > > and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" (that > > is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the > farm,where > > written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter months are > > wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter talking > > animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has to be > > more voluntary. > > > > Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear > > understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that underpins > Ribot > > here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out the > > LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices really > are > > the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, there > > isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and animal > > imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of > volitional > > attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without a > theory > > of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's > > distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at all. > > > > David Kellogg > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole wrote: > >> > >> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, thanks to > all > >> for the food for thought. > >> > >> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential around the > time > >> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had seen work > on > >> memory before, but not imagination. > >> > >> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal reproductive? > >> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of development > of > >> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a relative > >> newcomer to the topic. > >> mike > >> > >> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD > >> wrote: > >>> > >>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. This > >>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some weeks > in > >>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that segmented the > >>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. Puns, > >>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) > >>> Henry > >>> > >>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole wrote: > >>>> > >>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they are > doing > >>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his followers as an > >>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so its of > >>> course > >>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. > >>>> > >>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in translation, > seems > >>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in this > >>> passage, > >>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter distinction to > >>>> "memory." > >>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary discourse > >>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian colleagues have > >>>> illustrated. > >>>> > >>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists who > >>> clearly > >>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still possible > >> to > >>>> include culture in it. > >>>> > >>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, interestingly > >> links > >>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" act. > >> Parts > >>> of > >>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that was > >> also > >>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of creativity > and > >>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see that the > >> two > >>>> concepts are linked. > >>>> > >>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself writing. > >>>> mike > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old > >>> approaches > >>>> to a pesum > >>>> > >>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden > >> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it may be > >> worth > >>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to > >>> Imagination > >>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between Recollection and > >>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive Imagination, > (2) > >>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he says > >> leads > >>> to > >>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other words, > the > >>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is accomplished > >> through > >>>>> these three grades of Imagination. > >>>>> > >>>>> Andy > >>>>> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> mike cole wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and Williams. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am > >> trying > >>> to > >>>>>> mine for empirical > >>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive > >>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination > develops. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that there > must > >>> be a > >>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I learned > >>> that > >>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is linked > >> to > >>>>>> memory. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of anticipation > >>> and > >>>>>> memory. > >>>>>> Imagine that! > >>>>>> mike > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD > > >>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination (starting > >>> with > >>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and provides > a > >>>>>>> space > >>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. This, > >>>>>>> coupled > >>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground to > take > >>> part > >>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with > >> preconceptions: > >>>>>>> Vera > >>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian Langacker on > >>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, > particularly > >>> the > >>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of > imagination > >>> and > >>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of temporality: > >>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure), which > >> I > >>>>>>> think > >>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both individual > >>> and > >>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > >>>>>>> Henry > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss > >>> wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* and the > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> analogy > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* > >>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > >>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion of > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> "structures > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored under > >>> the > >>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of modalities > >>> that > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> hang > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing that is > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> forming > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we > think > >>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* > >>>>>>>> Larry > >>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > hshonerd@gmail.com > >>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, > >>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how jazzed up > >> I > >>> am > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> now > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as Larry > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> construes > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various triads, > >>> finally > >>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of the > >>> mind, as > >>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa? > >> fuera. > >>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, > >>>>>>>>> Henry > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole wrote: > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached are two > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> articles > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists like > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of imagination in a > >>>>>>>>>> manner > >>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of productive > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> imagination. I > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no intention of > >>> doing > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> so. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the attached > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> texts. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I came > >> upon > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked at > >>> several > >>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne and I > >>>>>>>>>> argued > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> in > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of > access > >>> to > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. Moreover, > >>> such > >>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the > >>> perception/imagination > >>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance to > >> Kris's > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> paper > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns > about > >>> the > >>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps they > >> will > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> prove > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> useful for those interested. > >>>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > >>> with an > >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> -- > >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> -- > >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >> > > > From ablunden@mira.net Wed Dec 17 03:27:58 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 22:27:58 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Association and Mediation In-Reply-To: References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> Message-ID: <549168BE.40800@mira.net> I agree. At the level of *psychology*, there is no substantial difference between association and mediation, either concept can be used to arrive at the same conclusions and explain the same data. But what marks out the mediation approach is that it highlights one particular range of entities - the tools and signs which are cultural products, produced by earlier generations of human beings and passed down for us, bringing with them the wisdom of our forebears. That is, the difference is only in the *historical* perspective. Yes? ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ David Kellogg wrote: > Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the case for > Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I think it's not > just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are associationists who > are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary associationism exists and > some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. Vygotsky > has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, explain the > uniqueness of our species? > > Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels for its own > kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a Piagetian > perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true maturity as a > species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more to it than > that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of primate, and our > solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon rocks in order > to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged the same way as > any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. > > Making the case for the higher psychological functions and for language is > not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human exceptionalism. > It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for the vanguard role > of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, prolonging > childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after the sick and the > elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial organs (tools) and > even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for our species, it > is in the societies and the sectors of society where these "circuitous, > compensatory means of development" are most advanced that lead our > development as a species. The wretched of the earth always been short on > rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for material culture > generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: verily, here > the first shall be last and the last shall be first. > > I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of attention is simply the > logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says there are only two > kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So imagination is > nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, and nothing > really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when you hear the > name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there to be able to > imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work in word meaning. > > You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who was given a > crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been mixed with silver > by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold. Well, we > now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not possible to > measure the differences in water displacement that precisely. The method > that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the "principal of > buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. > > And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes palimpsest, a velum on > which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. Because > parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and written over every > century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, the pressure > of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones when the old > text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only known Greek > copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". > > Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their relationship > to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they are related to > each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite similar to the > way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. > > (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Wed Dec 17 03:58:29 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 06:58:29 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology Message-ID: Carol, For my own research i am more concerned with chomsky's kantian starting point and fusing that with vygotsky, heidegger's phenomenology (his analytics of dasein), wittgenstein's theory of language games, contemporary theoretical physics, and althusserian structural marxism as outlined in "ideology and ideological state apparatuses." Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com www.paulcmocombe.info? Race and Class Distinctions within Black Communities? www.routledge.com/9780415714372 -------- Original message -------- From: Carol Macdonald Date: 12/17/2014 5:49 AM (GMT-05:00) To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology Hi I do know that Chomsky and Piaget are diametrically opposed (I wrote a lot about that long ago). But Vygotsky vs Chomsky I have given less thought to. The real sticking point is the specificity of the language that Chomsky posits. But remember Chomsky was working with a narrow palette. He knew nothing about psychology at all in the 60's. And he probably thought he didn't have to. As for our symbolic capacities, it seems he didn't give it any thought. He was also working in a vacuum when he talked about the development of language - he thought we had a very impoverished input from others. And we know now that that is absolutely not the case: Children get a very rich input from their caregivers. So perhaps we should not really be giving Chomsky much of a platform on XMCA. Carol On 16 December 2014 at 21:38, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > > I do not want people to come down on...thinking out loud about another way > to resolve the controversy between chomskyianites and vygotskyites...i > think it can be done through phenomenology (arrogance of youth maybe, but I > am going to try it).... > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > >
-------- Original message --------
From: "Dr. Paul C. > Mocombe"
Date:12/16/2014 2:01 PM > (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu>
Subject: [Xmca-l] Chomsky, > Vygotsky, and phenomenology
>
Is it really the case thay chomsky and Vygotsky diametrically oppose > one another? As I read Vygotsky it appears as if something is missing. > That something for me was the internalization process. I was reading his > concept of internalization as though he was suggesting that it took place > among an empiricist view of the human being as a "blank slate." hence my > questions in the previous thread. If chomsky is right, which I think he is > to some extent, does that change Vygotsky or can we synthesize the two? > I am working on a paper to attempt to do just that through > phenomenology.... > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Wed Dec 17 04:49:34 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 12:49:34 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <91989634-0898-4DE6-B5AB-35A1EA175A7A@uniandes.edu.co> Chomsky knew enough about psychology to write a devastating review of B. F. Skinner's book 'Verbal behavior,' which still makes very interesting reading. And Chomsky's own book 'Syntactic Structures' was one of the key components in the emergence of cognitive psychology in the late 1950s, as Howard Gardner's book makes clear. Martin -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Chomsky 1959 Review of Verbal behavior by B. F.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 8367226 bytes Desc: Chomsky 1959 Review of Verbal behavior by B. F.pdf Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141217/8054e4b9/attachment-0001.pdf -------------- next part -------------- An embedded and charset-unspecified text was scrubbed... Name: ATT00001.txt Url: https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141217/8054e4b9/attachment-0001.txt From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Wed Dec 17 05:07:32 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 08:07:32 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology Message-ID: Without a doubt Martin... Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John Packer
Date:12/17/2014 7:49 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology
Chomsky knew enough about psychology to write a devastating review of B. F. Skinner's book 'Verbal behavior,' which still makes very interesting reading. And Chomsky's own book 'Syntactic Structures' was one of the key components in the emergence of cognitive psychology in the late 1950s, as Howard Gardner's book makes clear. Martin From carolmacdon@gmail.com Wed Dec 17 05:54:50 2014 From: carolmacdon@gmail.com (Carol Macdonald) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 15:54:50 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology In-Reply-To: <91989634-0898-4DE6-B5AB-35A1EA175A7A@uniandes.edu.co> References: <91989634-0898-4DE6-B5AB-35A1EA175A7A@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Well yes, and as linguistic and psychology student I was very proud of him for his review, it made me laugh and laugh. But Chomsky never read Piaget or Vygotsky. He would have been interested in Vygotsky's interpretation of Behaviousrism. As to cognitive psychology - well I suppose we should be pleased, but Chomsky had no direct hand in that. Carol. On 17 December 2014 at 14:49, Martin John Packer wrote: > > Chomsky knew enough about psychology to write a devastating review of B. > F. Skinner's book 'Verbal behavior,' which still makes very interesting > reading. And Chomsky's own book 'Syntactic Structures' was one of the key > components in the emergence of cognitive psychology in the late 1950s, as > Howard Gardner's book makes clear. > > Martin > > -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Wed Dec 17 06:24:59 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 14:24:59 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology In-Reply-To: References: <91989634-0898-4DE6-B5AB-35A1EA175A7A@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <0622A57A-DD44-448C-9044-5EDDB37AC41A@uniandes.edu.co> Old codger that I am, Carol, I am going to take issue with you here too! In 1975 Piaget and Chomsky had a public debate. I assume that each did their homework beforehand and read at least something of the other's work! :) Martin Piattelli-Palmarini, M. (1980). Language and learning: The debate between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Piattelli-Palmarini, M. (1994). Ever since language and learning: Afterthoughts on the Piaget-Chomsky debate. Cognition, 50(1), 315-346. On Dec 17, 2014, at 8:54 AM, Carol Macdonald wrote: > Well yes, and as linguistic and psychology student I was very proud of him > for his review, it made me laugh and laugh. But Chomsky never read Piaget > or Vygotsky. He would have been interested in Vygotsky's interpretation of > Behaviousrism. > > As to cognitive psychology - well I suppose we should be pleased, but > Chomsky had no direct hand in that. > > Carol. > > On 17 December 2014 at 14:49, Martin John Packer > wrote: >> >> Chomsky knew enough about psychology to write a devastating review of B. >> F. Skinner's book 'Verbal behavior,' which still makes very interesting >> reading. And Chomsky's own book 'Syntactic Structures' was one of the key >> components in the emergence of cognitive psychology in the late 1950s, as >> Howard Gardner's book makes clear. >> >> Martin >> >> > > -- > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Wed Dec 17 06:28:27 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 14:28:27 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology In-Reply-To: References: <91989634-0898-4DE6-B5AB-35A1EA175A7A@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: oh, I just read your second paragraph... Howard Gardner lists Noam Chomsky as one of the ?founders of cognitive science,? along with Jerome Bruner, John McCarthy, George Miller, and Allen Newell (1985, p. 23). Gardner, H. (1985). The mind?s new science: A history of the cognitive revolution. New York: Basic Books. Martin On Dec 17, 2014, at 8:54 AM, Carol Macdonald wrote: > Well yes, and as linguistic and psychology student I was very proud of him > for his review, it made me laugh and laugh. But Chomsky never read Piaget > or Vygotsky. He would have been interested in Vygotsky's interpretation of > Behaviousrism. > > As to cognitive psychology - well I suppose we should be pleased, but > Chomsky had no direct hand in that. > > Carol. > > On 17 December 2014 at 14:49, Martin John Packer > wrote: >> >> Chomsky knew enough about psychology to write a devastating review of B. >> F. Skinner's book 'Verbal behavior,' which still makes very interesting >> reading. And Chomsky's own book 'Syntactic Structures' was one of the key >> components in the emergence of cognitive psychology in the late 1950s, as >> Howard Gardner's book makes clear. >> >> Martin >> >> > > -- > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From carolmacdon@gmail.com Wed Dec 17 06:34:56 2014 From: carolmacdon@gmail.com (Carol Macdonald) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:34:56 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology In-Reply-To: <0622A57A-DD44-448C-9044-5EDDB37AC41A@uniandes.edu.co> References: <91989634-0898-4DE6-B5AB-35A1EA175A7A@uniandes.edu.co> <0622A57A-DD44-448C-9044-5EDDB37AC41A@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Martin I stand corrected: those passed me by completely. One after my MA was completed and one after I stated teaching psychology and pedagogy. If you have copies, please let us have them. Carol On 17 December 2014 at 16:24, Martin John Packer wrote: > > Old codger that I am, Carol, I am going to take issue with you here too! > In 1975 Piaget and Chomsky had a public debate. I assume that each did > their homework beforehand and read at least something of the other's work! > :) > > Martin > > Piattelli-Palmarini, M. (1980). Language and learning: The debate between > Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. > > Piattelli-Palmarini, M. (1994). Ever since language and learning: > Afterthoughts on the Piaget-Chomsky debate. Cognition, 50(1), 315-346. > > > > > On Dec 17, 2014, at 8:54 AM, Carol Macdonald > wrote: > > > Well yes, and as linguistic and psychology student I was very proud of > him > > for his review, it made me laugh and laugh. But Chomsky never read > Piaget > > or Vygotsky. He would have been interested in Vygotsky's interpretation > of > > Behaviousrism. > > > > As to cognitive psychology - well I suppose we should be pleased, but > > Chomsky had no direct hand in that. > > > > Carol. > > > > On 17 December 2014 at 14:49, Martin John Packer < > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > wrote: > >> > >> Chomsky knew enough about psychology to write a devastating review of B. > >> F. Skinner's book 'Verbal behavior,' which still makes very interesting > >> reading. And Chomsky's own book 'Syntactic Structures' was one of the > key > >> components in the emergence of cognitive psychology in the late 1950s, > as > >> Howard Gardner's book makes clear. > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> > > > > -- > > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > > Developmental psycholinguist > > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > > -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From carolmacdon@gmail.com Wed Dec 17 06:36:31 2014 From: carolmacdon@gmail.com (Carol Macdonald) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:36:31 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology In-Reply-To: References: <91989634-0898-4DE6-B5AB-35A1EA175A7A@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Do you think Chomsky knows he is? Howard Gardner is a very generous fellow. On 17 December 2014 at 16:28, Martin John Packer wrote: > > oh, I just read your second paragraph... > > Howard Gardner lists Noam Chomsky as one of the "founders of cognitive > science," along with Jerome Bruner, John McCarthy, George Miller, and Allen > Newell (1985, p. 23). > > Gardner, H. (1985). The mind's new science: A history of the cognitive > revolution. New York: Basic Books. > > Martin > > On Dec 17, 2014, at 8:54 AM, Carol Macdonald > wrote: > > > Well yes, and as linguistic and psychology student I was very proud of > him > > for his review, it made me laugh and laugh. But Chomsky never read > Piaget > > or Vygotsky. He would have been interested in Vygotsky's interpretation > of > > Behaviousrism. > > > > As to cognitive psychology - well I suppose we should be pleased, but > > Chomsky had no direct hand in that. > > > > Carol. > > > > On 17 December 2014 at 14:49, Martin John Packer < > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > wrote: > >> > >> Chomsky knew enough about psychology to write a devastating review of B. > >> F. Skinner's book 'Verbal behavior,' which still makes very interesting > >> reading. And Chomsky's own book 'Syntactic Structures' was one of the > key > >> components in the emergence of cognitive psychology in the late 1950s, > as > >> Howard Gardner's book makes clear. > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> > > > > -- > > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > > Developmental psycholinguist > > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > > -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Wed Dec 17 07:25:27 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 15:25:27 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology In-Reply-To: References: <91989634-0898-4DE6-B5AB-35A1EA175A7A@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: I think Chomsky's work added credibility to the efforts at the end of the 1950s to change the character of psychology. Computers were just becoming available, and they seemed to offer a model, or a metaphor, for psychology: a machine, made of transistors and wires, could be programmed to process information, using an internal language that followed formal rules for manipulating abstract elements that represented (at least for the programmer and user!) some aspect of the world. Chomsky's approach to language was to formalize it: he viewed language as a collection of grammatical rules that operated (with no attention to semantics) on abstract elements (Sentence, Noun, Verb...), to generate strings of sentences that a linguist would consider grammatical. Chomskian linguistics was considered a kind of test case of the feasibility of a cognitive psychology, one that could challenge the claim by behaviorists that science must study only what is observable, so a scientific psychology must study behavior. Chomsky's work seemed to show that science could also reconstruct an underlying competence that was not directly observable. That is what cognitive psychology has been doing ever since. Martin On Dec 17, 2014, at 9:36 AM, Carol Macdonald wrote: > Do you think Chomsky knows he is? Howard Gardner is a very generous fellow. > > On 17 December 2014 at 16:28, Martin John Packer > wrote: >> >> oh, I just read your second paragraph... >> >> Howard Gardner lists Noam Chomsky as one of the "founders of cognitive >> science," along with Jerome Bruner, John McCarthy, George Miller, and Allen >> Newell (1985, p. 23). >> >> Gardner, H. (1985). The mind's new science: A history of the cognitive >> revolution. New York: Basic Books. >> >> Martin >> >> On Dec 17, 2014, at 8:54 AM, Carol Macdonald >> wrote: >> >>> Well yes, and as linguistic and psychology student I was very proud of >> him >>> for his review, it made me laugh and laugh. But Chomsky never read >> Piaget >>> or Vygotsky. He would have been interested in Vygotsky's interpretation >> of >>> Behaviousrism. >>> >>> As to cognitive psychology - well I suppose we should be pleased, but >>> Chomsky had no direct hand in that. >>> >>> Carol. >>> >>> On 17 December 2014 at 14:49, Martin John Packer < >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> >>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Chomsky knew enough about psychology to write a devastating review of B. >>>> F. Skinner's book 'Verbal behavior,' which still makes very interesting >>>> reading. And Chomsky's own book 'Syntactic Structures' was one of the >> key >>>> components in the emergence of cognitive psychology in the late 1950s, >> as >>>> Howard Gardner's book makes clear. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> >>> >>> -- >>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>> Developmental psycholinguist >>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >> >> >> > > -- > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Dec 17 07:31:44 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 07:31:44 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology In-Reply-To: References: <91989634-0898-4DE6-B5AB-35A1EA175A7A@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: ?et al-- Attached is a paper by ANL and ARL on Fodor. Relevant to the chomsky/LSV discussion? There is material on this subject aplenty on the topic at lchc.ucsd.edu if you google chomsky vygotsky luria leontiev as key words. IN GENERAL, a quick search of xmca through the lchc google search is a quick way to learn about prior discussions of current topics. mike On Wed, Dec 17, 2014 at 6:36 AM, Carol Macdonald wrote: > > Do you think Chomsky knows he is? Howard Gardner is a very generous fellow. > > On 17 December 2014 at 16:28, Martin John Packer > wrote: > > > > oh, I just read your second paragraph... > > > > Howard Gardner lists Noam Chomsky as one of the "founders of cognitive > > science," along with Jerome Bruner, John McCarthy, George Miller, and > Allen > > Newell (1985, p. 23). > > > > Gardner, H. (1985). The mind's new science: A history of the cognitive > > revolution. New York: Basic Books. > > > > Martin > > > > On Dec 17, 2014, at 8:54 AM, Carol Macdonald > > wrote: > > > > > Well yes, and as linguistic and psychology student I was very proud of > > him > > > for his review, it made me laugh and laugh. But Chomsky never read > > Piaget > > > or Vygotsky. He would have been interested in Vygotsky's > interpretation > > of > > > Behaviousrism. > > > > > > As to cognitive psychology - well I suppose we should be pleased, but > > > Chomsky had no direct hand in that. > > > > > > Carol. > > > > > > On 17 December 2014 at 14:49, Martin John Packer < > > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > > wrote: > > >> > > >> Chomsky knew enough about psychology to write a devastating review of > B. > > >> F. Skinner's book 'Verbal behavior,' which still makes very > interesting > > >> reading. And Chomsky's own book 'Syntactic Structures' was one of the > > key > > >> components in the emergence of cognitive psychology in the late 1950s, > > as > > >> Howard Gardner's book makes clear. > > >> > > >> Martin > > >> > > >> > > > > > > -- > > > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > > > Developmental psycholinguist > > > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > > > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > > > > > > > -- > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: ANL.ARL.FODOR.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 434983 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141217/5f42078d/attachment.pdf From glassman.13@osu.edu Wed Dec 17 07:50:30 2014 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 15:50:30 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology In-Reply-To: References: <91989634-0898-4DE6-B5AB-35A1EA175A7A@uniandes.edu.co> , Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9076F5E@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Reading the response by ANL and ARL it comes back to the same damn argument about the learning paradox, which of course doubles back to the conversation on imagination (I keeps thinking my last realization will be that we were always just having a single conversation). Fodor seems to be taking Chomsky's point that you can't recognize a word meaning unless that word meaning already existed. I think that is central to his second critique that children can't understand words different than adults because then how would they understand each other - but implicit in this is what then suggests that children ever will become adults. It is really, really hard to argue with when working from a closed logical system - the reason I think Fodor says Vygotsky makes a priori assumption. But then the Leontiev's fall to their knees, hands stretched to the heaven just as Vygotsky, Dewey, Piaget, Bateson and so many others have done and say, your logic is unassailable but it does not explain humanity - in the end it is little more than clever idiocy (in the Deweyan sense). We are going through exactly the same thing I think once again with all the discussions about learning analytics and Big Data. In the end it is unassailable and it explains nothing. Michael ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 10:31 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology ?et al-- Attached is a paper by ANL and ARL on Fodor. Relevant to the chomsky/LSV discussion? There is material on this subject aplenty on the topic at lchc.ucsd.edu if you google chomsky vygotsky luria leontiev as key words. IN GENERAL, a quick search of xmca through the lchc google search is a quick way to learn about prior discussions of current topics. mike On Wed, Dec 17, 2014 at 6:36 AM, Carol Macdonald wrote: > > Do you think Chomsky knows he is? Howard Gardner is a very generous fellow. > > On 17 December 2014 at 16:28, Martin John Packer > wrote: > > > > oh, I just read your second paragraph... > > > > Howard Gardner lists Noam Chomsky as one of the "founders of cognitive > > science," along with Jerome Bruner, John McCarthy, George Miller, and > Allen > > Newell (1985, p. 23). > > > > Gardner, H. (1985). The mind's new science: A history of the cognitive > > revolution. New York: Basic Books. > > > > Martin > > > > On Dec 17, 2014, at 8:54 AM, Carol Macdonald > > wrote: > > > > > Well yes, and as linguistic and psychology student I was very proud of > > him > > > for his review, it made me laugh and laugh. But Chomsky never read > > Piaget > > > or Vygotsky. He would have been interested in Vygotsky's > interpretation > > of > > > Behaviousrism. > > > > > > As to cognitive psychology - well I suppose we should be pleased, but > > > Chomsky had no direct hand in that. > > > > > > Carol. > > > > > > On 17 December 2014 at 14:49, Martin John Packer < > > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > > wrote: > > >> > > >> Chomsky knew enough about psychology to write a devastating review of > B. > > >> F. Skinner's book 'Verbal behavior,' which still makes very > interesting > > >> reading. And Chomsky's own book 'Syntactic Structures' was one of the > > key > > >> components in the emergence of cognitive psychology in the late 1950s, > > as > > >> Howard Gardner's book makes clear. > > >> > > >> Martin > > >> > > >> > > > > > > -- > > > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > > > Developmental psycholinguist > > > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > > > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > > > > > > > -- > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Wed Dec 17 08:20:54 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 11:20:54 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology Message-ID: Thanks mike... Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: mike cole
Date:12/17/2014 10:31 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology
?et al-- Attached is a paper by ANL and ARL on Fodor. Relevant to the chomsky/LSV discussion? There is material on this subject aplenty on the topic at lchc.ucsd.edu if you google chomsky vygotsky luria leontiev as key words. IN GENERAL, a quick search of xmca through the lchc google search is a quick way to learn about prior discussions of current topics. mike On Wed, Dec 17, 2014 at 6:36 AM, Carol Macdonald wrote: > > Do you think Chomsky knows he is? Howard Gardner is a very generous fellow. > > On 17 December 2014 at 16:28, Martin John Packer > wrote: > > > > oh, I just read your second paragraph... > > > > Howard Gardner lists Noam Chomsky as one of the "founders of cognitive > > science," along with Jerome Bruner, John McCarthy, George Miller, and > Allen > > Newell (1985, p. 23). > > > > Gardner, H. (1985). The mind's new science: A history of the cognitive > > revolution. New York: Basic Books. > > > > Martin > > > > On Dec 17, 2014, at 8:54 AM, Carol Macdonald > > wrote: > > > > > Well yes, and as linguistic and psychology student I was very proud of > > him > > > for his review, it made me laugh and laugh. But Chomsky never read > > Piaget > > > or Vygotsky. He would have been interested in Vygotsky's > interpretation > > of > > > Behaviousrism. > > > > > > As to cognitive psychology - well I suppose we should be pleased, but > > > Chomsky had no direct hand in that. > > > > > > Carol. > > > > > > On 17 December 2014 at 14:49, Martin John Packer < > > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > > wrote: > > >> > > >> Chomsky knew enough about psychology to write a devastating review of > B. > > >> F. Skinner's book 'Verbal behavior,' which still makes very > interesting > > >> reading. And Chomsky's own book 'Syntactic Structures' was one of the > > key > > >> components in the emergence of cognitive psychology in the late 1950s, > > as > > >> Howard Gardner's book makes clear. > > >> > > >> Martin > > >> > > >> > > > > > > -- > > > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > > > Developmental psycholinguist > > > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > > > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > > > > > > > -- > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From dkirsh@lsu.edu Wed Dec 17 08:32:45 2014 From: dkirsh@lsu.edu (David H Kirshner) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:32:45 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology In-Reply-To: References: <91989634-0898-4DE6-B5AB-35A1EA175A7A@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: This is very true, Martin. But Chomsky's innateness thesis--that the deep structure of human grammar is hard-wired as part of our genetic endowment--has no resonance with assumptions of cognitive science. The reason there was not a more active contesting of innateness by cognitive scientists is twofold. First, cognitive science, fashioned at that time around the metaphor of the serial digital computer, is a theory of information processing, not of learning. The early models of learning (e.g., Anderson's initial ACT Theory) were very brittle, positing that new production rules (the basic elements of mental processing) could be created mechanically in ways that (a) meshed into the existing structure of production rules, and (b) improved the performance and capabilities of the system--very questionable claims. So cognitive science did not have a secure foundation for learning that they would want to defend against the quite outlandish thesis that the basic structures of language don't have to be learned because we come equipped with them. Second, it was politically opportune to have Chomsky to join forces with the emerging cognitive science as a way to slay the dragon of behaviorism--looking at Chomsky's critique of Skinner's Verbal Learning, who WOULDN'T want Chomsky on their side! David -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 9:25 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology I think Chomsky's work added credibility to the efforts at the end of the 1950s to change the character of psychology. Computers were just becoming available, and they seemed to offer a model, or a metaphor, for psychology: a machine, made of transistors and wires, could be programmed to process information, using an internal language that followed formal rules for manipulating abstract elements that represented (at least for the programmer and user!) some aspect of the world. Chomsky's approach to language was to formalize it: he viewed language as a collection of grammatical rules that operated (with no attention to semantics) on abstract elements (Sentence, Noun, Verb...), to generate strings of sentences that a linguist would consider grammatical. Chomskian linguistics was considered a kind of test case of the feasibility of a cognitive psychology, one that could challenge the claim by behaviorists that science must study only what is observable, so a scientific psychology must study behavior. Chomsky's work seemed to show that science could also reconstruct an underlying competence that was not directly observable. That is what cognitive psychology has been doing ever since. Martin On Dec 17, 2014, at 9:36 AM, Carol Macdonald wrote: > Do you think Chomsky knows he is? Howard Gardner is a very generous fellow. > > On 17 December 2014 at 16:28, Martin John Packer > > wrote: >> >> oh, I just read your second paragraph... >> >> Howard Gardner lists Noam Chomsky as one of the "founders of >> cognitive science," along with Jerome Bruner, John McCarthy, George >> Miller, and Allen Newell (1985, p. 23). >> >> Gardner, H. (1985). The mind's new science: A history of the >> cognitive revolution. New York: Basic Books. >> >> Martin >> >> On Dec 17, 2014, at 8:54 AM, Carol Macdonald >> wrote: >> >>> Well yes, and as linguistic and psychology student I was very proud >>> of >> him >>> for his review, it made me laugh and laugh. But Chomsky never read >> Piaget >>> or Vygotsky. He would have been interested in Vygotsky's >>> interpretation >> of >>> Behaviousrism. >>> >>> As to cognitive psychology - well I suppose we should be pleased, >>> but Chomsky had no direct hand in that. >>> >>> Carol. >>> >>> On 17 December 2014 at 14:49, Martin John Packer < >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> >>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Chomsky knew enough about psychology to write a devastating review of B. >>>> F. Skinner's book 'Verbal behavior,' which still makes very >>>> interesting reading. And Chomsky's own book 'Syntactic Structures' >>>> was one of the >> key >>>> components in the emergence of cognitive psychology in the late >>>> 1950s, >> as >>>> Howard Gardner's book makes clear. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> >>> >>> -- >>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>> Developmental psycholinguist >>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >> >> >> > > -- > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Dec 17 08:37:23 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 08:37:23 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9076F5E@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> References: <91989634-0898-4DE6-B5AB-35A1EA175A7A@uniandes.edu.co> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9076F5E@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: If it all comes down to the learning paradox, Michael, which is not a bad place to arrive at, then might it be useful to gather together the various attempts by socio-cultural-historical-activity folks to resolve or supercede the problem. Right away several such critical discussions suggest themselves: Fodor original Bereiter Newman, Griffin, & Cole "bootstrappers" in general ..... It should be encouraging to realize that one has arrived back at the same place, and know it again in a fresh (and perhaps more powerful?) way. mike On Wed, Dec 17, 2014 at 7:50 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > > Reading the response by ANL and ARL it comes back to the same damn > argument about the learning paradox, which of course doubles back to the > conversation on imagination (I keeps thinking my last realization will be > that we were always just having a single conversation). Fodor seems to be > taking Chomsky's point that you can't recognize a word meaning unless that > word meaning already existed. I think that is central to his second > critique that children can't understand words different than adults because > then how would they understand each other - but implicit in this is what > then suggests that children ever will become adults. It is really, really > hard to argue with when working from a closed logical system - the reason I > think Fodor says Vygotsky makes a priori assumption. But then the > Leontiev's fall to their knees, hands stretched to the heaven just as > Vygotsky, Dewey, Piaget, Bateson and so many others have done and say, your > logic is unassailable but it does not explain humanity - in the end it is > little more than clever idiocy (in the Deweyan sense). We are going > through exactly the same thing I think once again with all the discussions > about learning analytics and Big Data. In the end it is unassailable and > it explains nothing. > > Michael > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > on behalf of mike cole [mcole@ucsd.edu] > Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 10:31 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology > > ?et al-- > > Attached is a paper by ANL and ARL on Fodor. Relevant to the chomsky/LSV > discussion? > > > There is material on this subject aplenty on the topic at lchc.ucsd.edu > if > you google chomsky vygotsky luria leontiev as key words. > > IN GENERAL, a quick search of xmca through the lchc google search is a > quick way to learn about prior discussions of current topics. > > mike > > > > On Wed, Dec 17, 2014 at 6:36 AM, Carol Macdonald > wrote: > > > > Do you think Chomsky knows he is? Howard Gardner is a very generous > fellow. > > > > On 17 December 2014 at 16:28, Martin John Packer < > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > wrote: > > > > > > oh, I just read your second paragraph... > > > > > > Howard Gardner lists Noam Chomsky as one of the "founders of cognitive > > > science," along with Jerome Bruner, John McCarthy, George Miller, and > > Allen > > > Newell (1985, p. 23). > > > > > > Gardner, H. (1985). The mind's new science: A history of the cognitive > > > revolution. New York: Basic Books. > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > On Dec 17, 2014, at 8:54 AM, Carol Macdonald > > > wrote: > > > > > > > Well yes, and as linguistic and psychology student I was very proud > of > > > him > > > > for his review, it made me laugh and laugh. But Chomsky never read > > > Piaget > > > > or Vygotsky. He would have been interested in Vygotsky's > > interpretation > > > of > > > > Behaviousrism. > > > > > > > > As to cognitive psychology - well I suppose we should be pleased, but > > > > Chomsky had no direct hand in that. > > > > > > > > Carol. > > > > > > > > On 17 December 2014 at 14:49, Martin John Packer < > > > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > > > wrote: > > > >> > > > >> Chomsky knew enough about psychology to write a devastating review > of > > B. > > > >> F. Skinner's book 'Verbal behavior,' which still makes very > > interesting > > > >> reading. And Chomsky's own book 'Syntactic Structures' was one of > the > > > key > > > >> components in the emergence of cognitive psychology in the late > 1950s, > > > as > > > >> Howard Gardner's book makes clear. > > > >> > > > >> Martin > > > >> > > > >> > > > > > > > > -- > > > > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > > > > Developmental psycholinguist > > > > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > > > > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > > Developmental psycholinguist > > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Dec 17 08:48:12 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 08:48:12 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology In-Reply-To: References: <91989634-0898-4DE6-B5AB-35A1EA175A7A@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Fodor and Cogsci did, however, directly Butt heads. He specifically claims the impossibility of cognitive of science in the form of (now) parallel distributed processing systems. The discussion of that claim produced at lot of fireworks at the local CHIP seminar when I got folks to read Fodor and present their own, presumably relevent work. If the issue has been consensually resolved, i have failed to hear about it. mike PS--- An excellent discussion of the learning paradox is in Yrjo's Learning by Expanding, which can be found at http://lchc.ucsd.edu/mca/Paper/Engestrom/Learning-by-Expanding.pdf On Wed, Dec 17, 2014 at 8:32 AM, David H Kirshner wrote: > > This is very true, Martin. > > But Chomsky's innateness thesis--that the deep structure of human grammar > is hard-wired as part of our genetic endowment--has no resonance with > assumptions of cognitive science. The reason there was not a more active > contesting of innateness by cognitive scientists is twofold. > > First, cognitive science, fashioned at that time around the metaphor of > the serial digital computer, is a theory of information processing, not of > learning. The early models of learning (e.g., Anderson's initial ACT > Theory) were very brittle, positing that new production rules (the basic > elements of mental processing) could be created mechanically in ways that > (a) meshed into the existing structure of production rules, and (b) > improved the performance and capabilities of the system--very questionable > claims. So cognitive science did not have a secure foundation for learning > that they would want to defend against the quite outlandish thesis that the > basic structures of language don't have to be learned because we come > equipped with them. > > Second, it was politically opportune to have Chomsky to join forces with > the emerging cognitive science as a way to slay the dragon of > behaviorism--looking at Chomsky's critique of Skinner's Verbal Learning, > who WOULDN'T want Chomsky on their side! > > David > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John > Packer > Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 9:25 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology > > I think Chomsky's work added credibility to the efforts at the end of the > 1950s to change the character of psychology. Computers were just becoming > available, and they seemed to offer a model, or a metaphor, for psychology: > a machine, made of transistors and wires, could be programmed to process > information, using an internal language that followed formal rules for > manipulating abstract elements that represented (at least for the > programmer and user!) some aspect of the world. > > Chomsky's approach to language was to formalize it: he viewed language as > a collection of grammatical rules that operated (with no attention to > semantics) on abstract elements (Sentence, Noun, Verb...), to generate > strings of sentences that a linguist would consider grammatical. > > Chomskian linguistics was considered a kind of test case of the > feasibility of a cognitive psychology, one that could challenge the claim > by behaviorists that science must study only what is observable, so a > scientific psychology must study behavior. Chomsky's work seemed to show > that science could also reconstruct an underlying competence that was not > directly observable. That is what cognitive psychology has been doing ever > since. > > Martin > > On Dec 17, 2014, at 9:36 AM, Carol Macdonald > wrote: > > > Do you think Chomsky knows he is? Howard Gardner is a very generous > fellow. > > > > On 17 December 2014 at 16:28, Martin John Packer > > > > wrote: > >> > >> oh, I just read your second paragraph... > >> > >> Howard Gardner lists Noam Chomsky as one of the "founders of > >> cognitive science," along with Jerome Bruner, John McCarthy, George > >> Miller, and Allen Newell (1985, p. 23). > >> > >> Gardner, H. (1985). The mind's new science: A history of the > >> cognitive revolution. New York: Basic Books. > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> On Dec 17, 2014, at 8:54 AM, Carol Macdonald > >> wrote: > >> > >>> Well yes, and as linguistic and psychology student I was very proud > >>> of > >> him > >>> for his review, it made me laugh and laugh. But Chomsky never read > >> Piaget > >>> or Vygotsky. He would have been interested in Vygotsky's > >>> interpretation > >> of > >>> Behaviousrism. > >>> > >>> As to cognitive psychology - well I suppose we should be pleased, > >>> but Chomsky had no direct hand in that. > >>> > >>> Carol. > >>> > >>> On 17 December 2014 at 14:49, Martin John Packer < > >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > >>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>> Chomsky knew enough about psychology to write a devastating review of > B. > >>>> F. Skinner's book 'Verbal behavior,' which still makes very > >>>> interesting reading. And Chomsky's own book 'Syntactic Structures' > >>>> was one of the > >> key > >>>> components in the emergence of cognitive psychology in the late > >>>> 1950s, > >> as > >>>> Howard Gardner's book makes clear. > >>>> > >>>> Martin > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> -- > >>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > >>> Developmental psycholinguist > >>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor > >>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > >> > >> > >> > > > > -- > > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > > Developmental psycholinguist > > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed Dec 17 09:07:15 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 10:07:15 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Fw: Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: <1309351078.33184.1418798154160.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11115.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> References: <1309351078.33184.1418798154160.JavaMail.yahoo@jws11115.mail.ir2.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <27068847-56C2-4796-BDD2-BCAB4352F0D2@gmail.com> Haydi, Sorry, I realized after I sent my email to you that it wasn?t all that coherent, and certainly not meant to imply there was anything wrong with anything you quoted. I was attracted by your image: ?reaction of an explosive type?, which reminded me of crisis in ZPD. I am operating at a very low level of understanding of psychology in general, not just Vygotskian takes. I want to learn! Henry > On Dec 16, 2014, at 11:35 PM, Haydi Zulfei wrote: > > Henry, > > The quote should connect to the other thread , my fault . But aside from that , is there anything wrong with me , with the quote . If so , please say it direct and clear to me . Thanks ! > Haydi > > ----- Forwarded Message ----- > From: HENRY SHONERD > To: Haydi Zulfei ; "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Sent: Wednesday, 17 December 2014, 0:28:03 > Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > I was wondering if Vygotsky on crisis in ZPD and Peirce?s triadic categories are of help. David K. has tutored me on ZPD, and turned me on to Seth Chaiklin?s article on ZPD. Natalia Gajdamaschko actually alerted me to the complexities of the ZPD earlier on, but I needed two tutorials. Who is the Peircian out there to smack me down? > Henry > >> On Dec 16, 2014, at 12:50 PM, Haydi Zulfei wrote: >> >> Dear all , >> >> Maybe worth reading , History of Higher Mental Functions , Volume 3 , page 127 English Version : >> >> How does the third stage differ from the second? Very briefly we might say that the essential difference is, on the one hand, in the method by which the reactions arise, and on the other hand, in the character of the function, that is, the biological function of the reaction, in contrast to habit, that arises as a result of trial and error or as a result of stimuli acting in Olle direction. In intellectual reactions, a response arises as an expression of a certain image obtained, obviously, as a result of a kind of short circuit, that is, of a complex internal process formed on the basis of excitation of a series of cooperating centers, which creates a new path. Consequently, we are speaking of a reaction of an explosive type, exceptionally complex in the nature of its arising, the mechanisms of which are thus far unknown since our knowledge of brain processes is still at the beginning stage of development. If the function of the instinctive reaction differs from the function of habit, then the latter differs from the intellectual function. Of course, if the biological function of habit is adaptation to individual conditions of existence that are more or less clear and simple, then the function of intellectual behavior is adaptation to changing conditions of the environment and to changing circumstances under new conditions. An argument has developed among psychologists specifically on this ground: authors who reject the consideration of intellect as a special level in nature say that it is only a special subclass within the same class as acquisition of habit. It seems to me that it is the responsibility of scientific caution that we speak here actually of only two classes of development in child behavior: inherited and acquired through experience, and within the latter-that acquired through experience?-we will be able to establish not just two stages, but perhaps even more as our knowledge increases. Consequently, it would be proper, it seems to us at the contemporary state of knowledge, to adopt the point of view of Thorndike, the American psychologist, who differentiates two stages: inherited and individual, or internal and acquired, and in behavior, he differentiates two stages or two groups of reaction: on the one hand, habits inherited for adaptation to more or less long-term conditions of mdividual existence, and on the other hand, a whole hierarchy of habits directed toward solving new problems that confront the organism, in other words, that order of reactions of which we have spoken. In order to understand the connection between the levels of development that are of interest to us in child psychology, we must briefly take into account the kind of relation that exists among them. The relations are of a dialectical character. >> >> >> >> Just thinking : Even acquired habits are considered "cultural" and it remains for the "intellectual" , as knowledge increases , to be classified as "higher" . >> >> Regards >> >> Haydi >> From: mike cole >> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >> Sent: Tuesday, 16 December 2014, 9:10:47 >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >> >> Colleagues-- The Vygotsky text that contains the material on Ribot and an >> introduction to the set of public lectures it was part of are attached in >> order to further this educational disussion. >> >> A number of ideas that were perplexing me and I was stumbling around >> thinking about are laid out very well in these two documents. They may >> perhaps help to ground this part of the discussion of imagination. >> >> I am certainly benefiting from reading them. My last reading was very >> narrowly focused and I was totally ignorant of the links between what LSV >> was writing about imagination and Kant or Hegel. And most amazingly, I >> ignored the discussion of Ribot. And, naturally, I have the attached pdf >> in my file on imagination (!). >> >> There must be some lesson here about the social, culturally mediated nature >> of individual memory out there somewhere. :-)) >> >> mike >> >> On Tue, Dec 16, 2014 at 7:49 AM, larry smolucha >> wrote: >>> >>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >>> >>> To the old-timers on XMCA I have to say HELLO!!!!!! >>> To the Newcomers read on. >>> >>> In Vygotsky's three papers on the development of imagination and >>> creativity in childhood and adolescence, Vygotsky specifically defined >>> memory as >>> reproductive imagination and creativity as combinatory imagination >>> (1930 paper published in 1990 in Soviet Psychology >>> p. 85 - F. Smolucha translator). All three of Vygotsky's papers on the >>> development >>> of imagination and creativity cited Ribot's book Essay on the Creative >>> Imagination (1900). >>> In these three papers and in his writings on play, Vygotsky also mentioned >>> that >>> imagination and creativity emerge from children's pretend play involving >>> analogical/metaphorical/figurative thinking in which one object is >>> substituted for another >>> (using a stick as a horse). >>> Newcomers to XMCA will forgive me if I seem a bit short tempered >>> when dealing with >>> the veteram XMCAR's on these topics - but Michael Cole and others are >>> certainly >>> familiar with my pioneering work in this area. I even emailed Michael a >>> copy >>> of my 2012 publication on these topics to post for discussion on XMCA - >>> that paper not >>> only reviews these topics but provides the formal bibliography including >>> the >>> reference to Ribot's book Essay on Creative Imagination that was first >>> published in >>> English in 2006 (I discovered the 2006 translation while writing my 2012 >>> publication). >>> For a review of all of this, and the past 25 years of research on >>> these topics, >>> read my 2012 publication "Vygotsky's Theory of Creative Imagination: >>> Figurative thinking Allied with Literal Thinking" (authors: Larry and >>> Francine Smolucha) published in Contemporary >>> Readings on Research in Creativity in Early Childhood (O. Saracho editor) >>> Information Age Publishing 2012 pp. 63 - 85. >>> I applaud those interested in pursuing these ideas in new >>> directions, and an important >>> part of that effort requires a understanding of where these ideas came >>> from so you are not >>> just reinventing the wheel. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> From: mcole@ucsd.edu >>>> Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2014 19:42:05 -0800 >>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>> >>>> Makes perfect sense to me concerning Ribot, David. Where does LSV write >>>> about Ribot on imagination? I lost the forest for the trees and am lost >>>> back in memory land! >>>> >>>> And who do we turn to for the evidence that animals other than humans >>>> engage in volitional attention? I was under the impression that it is >>>> through subordinating oneself to a external/cultural mediator one learned >>>> to control oneself from the outside. >>>> >>>> These seem like important issues to be straight about, even if one >>>> disagrees about their implications/interpretation (if that is possible!) >>>> mike >>>> >>>> >>>> On Mon, Dec 15, 2014 at 4:19 PM, David Kellogg >>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division between >>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because Ribot >>> is an >>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of >>> attention. >>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from >>> forest to >>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between the >>> two >>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical world >>> of the >>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses in >>> life >>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" >>> (that >>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the >>> farm,where >>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter months >>> are >>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter >>> talking >>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has to >>> be >>>>> more voluntary. >>>>> >>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear >>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that underpins >>> Ribot >>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out the >>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices >>> really are >>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, there >>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and >>> animal >>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of >>> volitional >>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without a >>> theory >>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's >>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at all. >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>> >>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, thanks >>> to >>>>> all >>>>>> for the food for thought. >>>>>> >>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential around >>> the >>>>> time >>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had seen >>> work >>>>> on >>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. >>>>>> >>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal >>> reproductive? >>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of >>> development of >>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a >>> relative >>>>>> newcomer to the topic. >>>>>> mike >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. >>> This >>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some >>> weeks >>>>> in >>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that >>> segmented the >>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. Puns, >>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) >>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they are >>>>> doing >>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his followers >>> as >>>>> an >>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so its >>> of >>>>>>> course >>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in translation, >>>>> seems >>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in >>> this >>>>>>> passage, >>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter distinction >>> to >>>>>>>> "memory." >>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary >>> discourse >>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian colleagues >>> have >>>>>>>> illustrated. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists >>> who >>>>>>> clearly >>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still >>>>> possible >>>>>> to >>>>>>>> include culture in it. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, >>> interestingly >>>>>> links >>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" >>> act. >>>>>> Parts >>>>>>> of >>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that >>> was >>>>>> also >>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of >>> creativity >>>>> and >>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see that >>> the >>>>>> two >>>>>>>> concepts are linked. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself >>>>> writing. >>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old >>>>>>> approaches >>>>>>>> to a pesum >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden >>> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it may >>> be >>>>>> worth >>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to >>>>>>> Imagination >>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between >>> Recollection and >>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive >>> Imagination, >>>>> (2) >>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he >>> says >>>>>> leads >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other >>> words, >>>>> the >>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is accomplished >>>>>> through >>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and >>> Williams. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am >>>>>> trying >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical >>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive >>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination >>>>> develops. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that >>> there >>>>> must >>>>>>> be a >>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I >>> learned >>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is >>> linked >>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of >>>>> anticipation >>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! >>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination >>>>> (starting >>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and >>>>> provides a >>>>>>>>>>> space >>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. >>> This, >>>>>>>>>>> coupled >>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground >>> to >>>>> take >>>>>>> part >>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with >>>>>> preconceptions: >>>>>>>>>>> Vera >>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian >>> Langacker >>>>> on >>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, >>>>> particularly >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of >>>>> imagination >>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of >>>>> temporality: >>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure), >>>>> which >>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both >>>>> individual >>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. >>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < >>> lpscholar2@gmail.com> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* >>> and >>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> analogy >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* >>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. >>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion >>> of >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> "structures >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored >>>>> under >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of >>> modalities >>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> hang >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing >>> that >>>>> is >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> forming >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we >>>>> think >>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* >>>>>>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, >>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how >>> jazzed >>>>> up >>>>>> I >>>>>>> am >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> now >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as >>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> construes >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various >>> triads, >>>>>>> finally >>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of >>> the >>>>>>> mind, as >>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa? >>>>>> fuera. >>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, >>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole >>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached >>> are >>>>> two >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> articles >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists >>> like >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of >>> imagination in >>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of >>> productive >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no >>> intention of >>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> so. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the >>> attached >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I >>> came >>>>>> upon >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked >>> at >>>>>>> several >>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne >>> and >>>>> I >>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of >>>>> access >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. >>> Moreover, >>>>>>> such >>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the >>>>>>> perception/imagination >>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance >>> to >>>>>> Kris's >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> paper >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns >>>>> about >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps >>> they >>>>>> will >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> prove >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural >>> science >>>>>>> with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >>> with >>>>> an >>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with >>> an >>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>> >>> >> >> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> >> > > > From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Wed Dec 17 09:37:08 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 12:37:08 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology Message-ID: Aside from being a theorist. ?I am also a political activist...so hats off to Obama on this cuba move...all power to the people!!!!!! Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: David H Kirshner
Date:12/17/2014 11:32 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology
This is very true, Martin. But Chomsky's innateness thesis--that the deep structure of human grammar is hard-wired as part of our genetic endowment--has no resonance with assumptions of cognitive science. The reason there was not a more active contesting of innateness by cognitive scientists is twofold. First, cognitive science, fashioned at that time around the metaphor of the serial digital computer, is a theory of information processing, not of learning. The early models of learning (e.g., Anderson's initial ACT Theory) were very brittle, positing that new production rules (the basic elements of mental processing) could be created mechanically in ways that (a) meshed into the existing structure of production rules, and (b) improved the performance and capabilities of the system--very questionable claims. So cognitive science did not have a secure foundation for learning that they would want to defend against the quite outlandish thesis that the basic structures of language don't have to be learned because we come equipped with them. Second, it was politically opportune to have Chomsky to join forces with the emerging cognitive science as a way to slay the dragon of behaviorism--looking at Chomsky's critique of Skinner's Verbal Learning, who WOULDN'T want Chomsky on their side! David -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 9:25 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology I think Chomsky's work added credibility to the efforts at the end of the 1950s to change the character of psychology. Computers were just becoming available, and they seemed to offer a model, or a metaphor, for psychology: a machine, made of transistors and wires, could be programmed to process information, using an internal language that followed formal rules for manipulating abstract elements that represented (at least for the programmer and user!) some aspect of the world. Chomsky's approach to language was to formalize it: he viewed language as a collection of grammatical rules that operated (with no attention to semantics) on abstract elements (Sentence, Noun, Verb...), to generate strings of sentences that a linguist would consider grammatical. Chomskian linguistics was considered a kind of test case of the feasibility of a cognitive psychology, one that could challenge the claim by behaviorists that science must study only what is observable, so a scientific psychology must study behavior. Chomsky's work seemed to show that science could also reconstruct an underlying competence that was not directly observable. That is what cognitive psychology has been doing ever since. Martin On Dec 17, 2014, at 9:36 AM, Carol Macdonald wrote: > Do you think Chomsky knows he is? Howard Gardner is a very generous fellow. > > On 17 December 2014 at 16:28, Martin John Packer > > wrote: >> >> oh, I just read your second paragraph... >> >> Howard Gardner lists Noam Chomsky as one of the "founders of >> cognitive science," along with Jerome Bruner, John McCarthy, George >> Miller, and Allen Newell (1985, p. 23). >> >> Gardner, H. (1985). The mind's new science: A history of the >> cognitive revolution. New York: Basic Books. >> >> Martin >> >> On Dec 17, 2014, at 8:54 AM, Carol Macdonald >> wrote: >> >>> Well yes, and as linguistic and psychology student I was very proud >>> of >> him >>> for his review, it made me laugh and laugh. But Chomsky never read >> Piaget >>> or Vygotsky. He would have been interested in Vygotsky's >>> interpretation >> of >>> Behaviousrism. >>> >>> As to cognitive psychology - well I suppose we should be pleased, >>> but Chomsky had no direct hand in that. >>> >>> Carol. >>> >>> On 17 December 2014 at 14:49, Martin John Packer < >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> >>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Chomsky knew enough about psychology to write a devastating review of B. >>>> F. Skinner's book 'Verbal behavior,' which still makes very >>>> interesting reading. And Chomsky's own book 'Syntactic Structures' >>>> was one of the >> key >>>> components in the emergence of cognitive psychology in the late >>>> 1950s, >> as >>>> Howard Gardner's book makes clear. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> >>> >>> -- >>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>> Developmental psycholinguist >>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >> >> >> > > -- > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From dkirsh@lsu.edu Wed Dec 17 09:40:08 2014 From: dkirsh@lsu.edu (David H Kirshner) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 17:40:08 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology In-Reply-To: References: <91989634-0898-4DE6-B5AB-35A1EA175A7A@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: I'd not heard about the run-in of Fodor with PDP advocates, but it's not surprising because parallel distributed processing really is a theory of learning, what's more a theory that has been applied to demonstrate how grammatical competencies can be learned in a way that does not require instantiating rules into the cognitive system. Thus PDP makes a strong claim to accounting for grammar without the need for rules--innate, or otherwise. This is a real threat to the Chomskyan legacy, as Chomsky's major argument for innate grammar was that (1) grammar is a really complicated rule system, and (2) young children who routinely come to master the grammar of their native language could not possibly acquire this rule system through learning. David -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 10:48 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology Fodor and Cogsci did, however, directly Butt heads. He specifically claims the impossibility of cognitive of science in the form of (now) parallel distributed processing systems. The discussion of that claim produced at lot of fireworks at the local CHIP seminar when I got folks to read Fodor and present their own, presumably relevent work. If the issue has been consensually resolved, i have failed to hear about it. mike PS--- An excellent discussion of the learning paradox is in Yrjo's Learning by Expanding, which can be found at http://lchc.ucsd.edu/mca/Paper/Engestrom/Learning-by-Expanding.pdf On Wed, Dec 17, 2014 at 8:32 AM, David H Kirshner wrote: > > This is very true, Martin. > > But Chomsky's innateness thesis--that the deep structure of human > grammar is hard-wired as part of our genetic endowment--has no > resonance with assumptions of cognitive science. The reason there was > not a more active contesting of innateness by cognitive scientists is twofold. > > First, cognitive science, fashioned at that time around the metaphor > of the serial digital computer, is a theory of information processing, > not of learning. The early models of learning (e.g., Anderson's > initial ACT > Theory) were very brittle, positing that new production rules (the > basic elements of mental processing) could be created mechanically in > ways that > (a) meshed into the existing structure of production rules, and (b) > improved the performance and capabilities of the system--very > questionable claims. So cognitive science did not have a secure > foundation for learning that they would want to defend against the > quite outlandish thesis that the basic structures of language don't > have to be learned because we come equipped with them. > > Second, it was politically opportune to have Chomsky to join forces > with the emerging cognitive science as a way to slay the dragon of > behaviorism--looking at Chomsky's critique of Skinner's Verbal > Learning, who WOULDN'T want Chomsky on their side! > > David > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin > xmca-l-bounces+John > Packer > Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 9:25 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology > > I think Chomsky's work added credibility to the efforts at the end of > the 1950s to change the character of psychology. Computers were just > becoming available, and they seemed to offer a model, or a metaphor, for psychology: > a machine, made of transistors and wires, could be programmed to > process information, using an internal language that followed formal > rules for manipulating abstract elements that represented (at least > for the programmer and user!) some aspect of the world. > > Chomsky's approach to language was to formalize it: he viewed language > as a collection of grammatical rules that operated (with no attention > to > semantics) on abstract elements (Sentence, Noun, Verb...), to generate > strings of sentences that a linguist would consider grammatical. > > Chomskian linguistics was considered a kind of test case of the > feasibility of a cognitive psychology, one that could challenge the > claim by behaviorists that science must study only what is observable, > so a scientific psychology must study behavior. Chomsky's work seemed > to show that science could also reconstruct an underlying competence > that was not directly observable. That is what cognitive psychology > has been doing ever since. > > Martin > > On Dec 17, 2014, at 9:36 AM, Carol Macdonald > wrote: > > > Do you think Chomsky knows he is? Howard Gardner is a very generous > fellow. > > > > On 17 December 2014 at 16:28, Martin John Packer > > > > wrote: > >> > >> oh, I just read your second paragraph... > >> > >> Howard Gardner lists Noam Chomsky as one of the "founders of > >> cognitive science," along with Jerome Bruner, John McCarthy, George > >> Miller, and Allen Newell (1985, p. 23). > >> > >> Gardner, H. (1985). The mind's new science: A history of the > >> cognitive revolution. New York: Basic Books. > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> On Dec 17, 2014, at 8:54 AM, Carol Macdonald > >> > >> wrote: > >> > >>> Well yes, and as linguistic and psychology student I was very > >>> proud of > >> him > >>> for his review, it made me laugh and laugh. But Chomsky never > >>> read > >> Piaget > >>> or Vygotsky. He would have been interested in Vygotsky's > >>> interpretation > >> of > >>> Behaviousrism. > >>> > >>> As to cognitive psychology - well I suppose we should be pleased, > >>> but Chomsky had no direct hand in that. > >>> > >>> Carol. > >>> > >>> On 17 December 2014 at 14:49, Martin John Packer < > >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > >>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>> Chomsky knew enough about psychology to write a devastating > >>>> review of > B. > >>>> F. Skinner's book 'Verbal behavior,' which still makes very > >>>> interesting reading. And Chomsky's own book 'Syntactic Structures' > >>>> was one of the > >> key > >>>> components in the emergence of cognitive psychology in the late > >>>> 1950s, > >> as > >>>> Howard Gardner's book makes clear. > >>>> > >>>> Martin > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> -- > >>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > >>> Developmental psycholinguist > >>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor > >>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > >> > >> > >> > > > > -- > > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > > Developmental psycholinguist > > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From vygotsky@unm.edu Wed Dec 17 09:53:13 2014 From: vygotsky@unm.edu (Vera John-Steiner) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 10:53:13 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology In-Reply-To: References: <91989634-0898-4DE6-B5AB-35A1EA175A7A@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <000c01d01a22$56712410$03536c30$@edu> While Chomsky is indeed very influential his approach to language and its acquisition is opposite to that of Vygotsky. He focuses on syntax while Vygotsky focuses on semantics. He proposes an innate language acquisition device while Vygotsky approaches language developmentally. (I am repeating some of Carol's points.) He is a Cartesian,while Vygotsky Opposed mind/body dualism. And the list goes on. I don't think he can be integrated into CHAT. Vera -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Carol Macdonald Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 7:37 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology Do you think Chomsky knows he is? Howard Gardner is a very generous fellow. On 17 December 2014 at 16:28, Martin John Packer wrote: > > oh, I just read your second paragraph... > > Howard Gardner lists Noam Chomsky as one of the "founders of cognitive > science," along with Jerome Bruner, John McCarthy, George Miller, and > Allen Newell (1985, p. 23). > > Gardner, H. (1985). The mind's new science: A history of the cognitive > revolution. New York: Basic Books. > > Martin > > On Dec 17, 2014, at 8:54 AM, Carol Macdonald > wrote: > > > Well yes, and as linguistic and psychology student I was very proud > > of > him > > for his review, it made me laugh and laugh. But Chomsky never read > Piaget > > or Vygotsky. He would have been interested in Vygotsky's > > interpretation > of > > Behaviousrism. > > > > As to cognitive psychology - well I suppose we should be pleased, > > but Chomsky had no direct hand in that. > > > > Carol. > > > > On 17 December 2014 at 14:49, Martin John Packer < > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > wrote: > >> > >> Chomsky knew enough about psychology to write a devastating review of B. > >> F. Skinner's book 'Verbal behavior,' which still makes very > >> interesting reading. And Chomsky's own book 'Syntactic Structures' > >> was one of the > key > >> components in the emergence of cognitive psychology in the late > >> 1950s, > as > >> Howard Gardner's book makes clear. > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> > > > > -- > > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > > Developmental psycholinguist > > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > > -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From glassman.13@osu.edu Wed Dec 17 10:07:09 2014 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 18:07:09 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology In-Reply-To: <000c01d01a22$56712410$03536c30$@edu> References: <91989634-0898-4DE6-B5AB-35A1EA175A7A@uniandes.edu.co> , <000c01d01a22$56712410$03536c30$@edu> Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9076FEC@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> I think Engestrom makes a strong rejoinder to Bereiter that the learning paradox relies to a certain extent the development of complexities inside the individual head - but perhaps there is no reason to have to make this argument. I am getting this right (not sure because I concentrated on his section on Mead - well because my thinking of the subject stops in 1933 or thereabouts). That increased complexity occurs through symbol enabled collaboration (I tend to take a more Deweyan read of Mead, seeing symbols more as secondary vehicles than primary motivators for collaboration). The Pragmatists would say there's no reason to go inside the head, and obviously when we collaborate using symbols who can create new, more complex ways of thinking about things. One thing I realized reading some of the chapter was that Chomsky never took on Mead or Dewey. Perhaps it was because they were not considered part of the cognitive revolution - or perhaps because his arguments break down - as they might with a more Pragmatic reading of Vygotsky. Michael ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Vera John-Steiner [vygotsky@unm.edu] Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 12:53 PM To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology While Chomsky is indeed very influential his approach to language and its acquisition is opposite to that of Vygotsky. He focuses on syntax while Vygotsky focuses on semantics. He proposes an innate language acquisition device while Vygotsky approaches language developmentally. (I am repeating some of Carol's points.) He is a Cartesian,while Vygotsky Opposed mind/body dualism. And the list goes on. I don't think he can be integrated into CHAT. Vera -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Carol Macdonald Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 7:37 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology Do you think Chomsky knows he is? Howard Gardner is a very generous fellow. On 17 December 2014 at 16:28, Martin John Packer wrote: > > oh, I just read your second paragraph... > > Howard Gardner lists Noam Chomsky as one of the "founders of cognitive > science," along with Jerome Bruner, John McCarthy, George Miller, and > Allen Newell (1985, p. 23). > > Gardner, H. (1985). The mind's new science: A history of the cognitive > revolution. New York: Basic Books. > > Martin > > On Dec 17, 2014, at 8:54 AM, Carol Macdonald > wrote: > > > Well yes, and as linguistic and psychology student I was very proud > > of > him > > for his review, it made me laugh and laugh. But Chomsky never read > Piaget > > or Vygotsky. He would have been interested in Vygotsky's > > interpretation > of > > Behaviousrism. > > > > As to cognitive psychology - well I suppose we should be pleased, > > but Chomsky had no direct hand in that. > > > > Carol. > > > > On 17 December 2014 at 14:49, Martin John Packer < > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > wrote: > >> > >> Chomsky knew enough about psychology to write a devastating review of B. > >> F. Skinner's book 'Verbal behavior,' which still makes very > >> interesting reading. And Chomsky's own book 'Syntactic Structures' > >> was one of the > key > >> components in the emergence of cognitive psychology in the late > >> 1950s, > as > >> Howard Gardner's book makes clear. > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> > > > > -- > > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > > Developmental psycholinguist > > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > > -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Wed Dec 17 10:18:29 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 13:18:29 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology Message-ID: Vera, When you say chomsky is a Cartesian are you saying he is a rationalist in the kantian camp? ?Chomsky refers to himself and his efforts as kantian. ?By no means would i call kant a Cartesian. ?I would call Husserl a Cartesian? But not Kant and Chomsky. ..see the video below: Watch "Noam Chomsky - Ideas of Chomsky BBC Interview (fu?" on YouTube Noam Chomsky - Ideas of Chomsky BBC Interview (fu?: http://youtu.be/3LqUA7W9wfg? Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: Vera John-Steiner
Date:12/17/2014 12:53 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology
While Chomsky is indeed very influential his approach to language and its acquisition is opposite to that of Vygotsky. He focuses on syntax while Vygotsky focuses on semantics. He proposes an innate language acquisition device while Vygotsky approaches language developmentally. (I am repeating some of Carol's points.) He is a Cartesian,while Vygotsky Opposed mind/body dualism. And the list goes on. I don't think he can be integrated into CHAT. Vera -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Carol Macdonald Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 7:37 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology Do you think Chomsky knows he is? Howard Gardner is a very generous fellow. On 17 December 2014 at 16:28, Martin John Packer wrote: > > oh, I just read your second paragraph... > > Howard Gardner lists Noam Chomsky as one of the "founders of cognitive > science," along with Jerome Bruner, John McCarthy, George Miller, and > Allen Newell (1985, p. 23). > > Gardner, H. (1985). The mind's new science: A history of the cognitive > revolution. New York: Basic Books. > > Martin > > On Dec 17, 2014, at 8:54 AM, Carol Macdonald > wrote: > > > Well yes, and as linguistic and psychology student I was very proud > > of > him > > for his review, it made me laugh and laugh. But Chomsky never read > Piaget > > or Vygotsky. He would have been interested in Vygotsky's > > interpretation > of > > Behaviousrism. > > > > As to cognitive psychology - well I suppose we should be pleased, > > but Chomsky had no direct hand in that. > > > > Carol. > > > > On 17 December 2014 at 14:49, Martin John Packer < > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > wrote: > >> > >> Chomsky knew enough about psychology to write a devastating review of B. > >> F. Skinner's book 'Verbal behavior,' which still makes very > >> interesting reading. And Chomsky's own book 'Syntactic Structures' > >> was one of the > key > >> components in the emergence of cognitive psychology in the late > >> 1950s, > as > >> Howard Gardner's book makes clear. > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> > > > > -- > > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > > Developmental psycholinguist > > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > > -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Wed Dec 17 10:24:23 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 13:24:23 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology Message-ID: Michael, He attacked WV quine ' s empirical (behavioral and symbolic) assumptions, which parallel the views of mead and dewey...see attached. Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: "Glassman, Michael"
Date:12/17/2014 1:07 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: vygotsky@unm.edu, "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology
I think Engestrom makes a strong rejoinder to Bereiter that the learning paradox relies to a certain extent the development of complexities inside the individual head - but perhaps there is no reason to have to make this argument. I am getting this right (not sure because I concentrated on his section on Mead - well because my thinking of the subject stops in 1933 or thereabouts). That increased complexity occurs through symbol enabled collaboration (I tend to take a more Deweyan read of Mead, seeing symbols more as secondary vehicles than primary motivators for collaboration). The Pragmatists would say there's no reason to go inside the head, and obviously when we collaborate using symbols who can create new, more complex ways of thinking about things. One thing I realized reading some of the chapter was that Chomsky never took on Mead or Dewey. Perhaps it was because they were not considered part of the cognitive revolution - or perhaps because his arguments break down - as they might with a more Pragmatic reading of Vygotsky. Michael ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces+mglassman=ehe.ohio-state.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Vera John-Steiner [vygotsky@unm.edu] Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 12:53 PM To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology While Chomsky is indeed very influential his approach to language and its acquisition is opposite to that of Vygotsky. He focuses on syntax while Vygotsky focuses on semantics. He proposes an innate language acquisition device while Vygotsky approaches language developmentally. (I am repeating some of Carol's points.) He is a Cartesian,while Vygotsky Opposed mind/body dualism. And the list goes on. I don't think he can be integrated into CHAT. Vera -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Carol Macdonald Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 7:37 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology Do you think Chomsky knows he is? Howard Gardner is a very generous fellow. On 17 December 2014 at 16:28, Martin John Packer wrote: > > oh, I just read your second paragraph... > > Howard Gardner lists Noam Chomsky as one of the "founders of cognitive > science," along with Jerome Bruner, John McCarthy, George Miller, and > Allen Newell (1985, p. 23). > > Gardner, H. (1985). The mind's new science: A history of the cognitive > revolution. New York: Basic Books. > > Martin > > On Dec 17, 2014, at 8:54 AM, Carol Macdonald > wrote: > > > Well yes, and as linguistic and psychology student I was very proud > > of > him > > for his review, it made me laugh and laugh. But Chomsky never read > Piaget > > or Vygotsky. He would have been interested in Vygotsky's > > interpretation > of > > Behaviousrism. > > > > As to cognitive psychology - well I suppose we should be pleased, > > but Chomsky had no direct hand in that. > > > > Carol. > > > > On 17 December 2014 at 14:49, Martin John Packer < > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > wrote: > >> > >> Chomsky knew enough about psychology to write a devastating review of B. > >> F. Skinner's book 'Verbal behavior,' which still makes very > >> interesting reading. And Chomsky's own book 'Syntactic Structures' > >> was one of the > key > >> components in the emergence of cognitive psychology in the late > >> 1950s, > as > >> Howard Gardner's book makes clear. > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> > > > > -- > > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > > Developmental psycholinguist > > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > > -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Chomsky.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 1438475 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141217/e567422c/attachment-0001.pdf From glassman.13@osu.edu Wed Dec 17 10:29:06 2014 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 18:29:06 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F907706C@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> That's an interesting question Paul. Would you consider generations of people trying to solve an impossible to solve a Rubric's cube those who agreed with the puzzle or those who disagreed with the puzzle. I think we have a similar problem with philosophers who followed Des Cartes. Michael ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Dr. Paul C. Mocombe [pmocombe@mocombeian.com] Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 1:18 PM To: vygotsky@unm.edu; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology Vera, When you say chomsky is a Cartesian are you saying he is a rationalist in the kantian camp? Chomsky refers to himself and his efforts as kantian. By no means would i call kant a Cartesian. I would call Husserl a Cartesian? But not Kant and Chomsky. ..see the video below: Watch "Noam Chomsky - Ideas of Chomsky BBC Interview (fu?" on YouTube Noam Chomsky - Ideas of Chomsky BBC Interview (fu?: http://youtu.be/3LqUA7W9wfg Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com www.readingroomcurriculum.com www.paulcmocombe.info
-------- Original message --------
From: Vera John-Steiner
Date:12/17/2014 12:53 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology
While Chomsky is indeed very influential his approach to language and its acquisition is opposite to that of Vygotsky. He focuses on syntax while Vygotsky focuses on semantics. He proposes an innate language acquisition device while Vygotsky approaches language developmentally. (I am repeating some of Carol's points.) He is a Cartesian,while Vygotsky Opposed mind/body dualism. And the list goes on. I don't think he can be integrated into CHAT. Vera -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Carol Macdonald Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 7:37 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology Do you think Chomsky knows he is? Howard Gardner is a very generous fellow. On 17 December 2014 at 16:28, Martin John Packer wrote: > > oh, I just read your second paragraph... > > Howard Gardner lists Noam Chomsky as one of the "founders of cognitive > science," along with Jerome Bruner, John McCarthy, George Miller, and > Allen Newell (1985, p. 23). > > Gardner, H. (1985). The mind's new science: A history of the cognitive > revolution. New York: Basic Books. > > Martin > > On Dec 17, 2014, at 8:54 AM, Carol Macdonald > wrote: > > > Well yes, and as linguistic and psychology student I was very proud > > of > him > > for his review, it made me laugh and laugh. But Chomsky never read > Piaget > > or Vygotsky. He would have been interested in Vygotsky's > > interpretation > of > > Behaviousrism. > > > > As to cognitive psychology - well I suppose we should be pleased, > > but Chomsky had no direct hand in that. > > > > Carol. > > > > On 17 December 2014 at 14:49, Martin John Packer < > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > wrote: > >> > >> Chomsky knew enough about psychology to write a devastating review of B. > >> F. Skinner's book 'Verbal behavior,' which still makes very > >> interesting reading. And Chomsky's own book 'Syntactic Structures' > >> was one of the > key > >> components in the emergence of cognitive psychology in the late > >> 1950s, > as > >> Howard Gardner's book makes clear. > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> > > > > -- > > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > > Developmental psycholinguist > > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > > -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Wed Dec 17 10:39:06 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 18:39:06 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <99EB3359-B183-4ECC-A74C-56A1C267D7DA@uniandes.edu.co> Chomsky wrote a book called 'Cartesian Linguistics.' Husserl wrote one called 'Cartesian Meditations'! Martin On Dec 17, 2014, at 1:18 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > Vera, > > When you say chomsky is a Cartesian are you saying he is a rationalist in the kantian camp? Chomsky refers to himself and his efforts as kantian. By no means would i call kant a Cartesian. I would call Husserl a Cartesian? But not Kant and Chomsky. ..see the video below: > > Watch "Noam Chomsky - Ideas of Chomsky BBC Interview (fu?" on YouTube > Noam Chomsky - Ideas of Chomsky BBC Interview (fu?: http://youtu.be/3LqUA7W9wfg > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > >
-------- Original message --------
From: Vera John-Steiner
Date:12/17/2014 12:53 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology
>
While Chomsky is indeed very influential his approach to language and its > acquisition is opposite to that of Vygotsky. He focuses on syntax while > Vygotsky focuses on semantics. > He proposes an innate language acquisition device while Vygotsky approaches > language developmentally. (I am repeating some of Carol's points.) He is a > Cartesian,while Vygotsky > Opposed mind/body dualism. And the list goes on. > I don't think he can be integrated into CHAT. > Vera > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Carol Macdonald > Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 7:37 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology > > Do you think Chomsky knows he is? Howard Gardner is a very generous fellow. > > On 17 December 2014 at 16:28, Martin John Packer > wrote: >> >> oh, I just read your second paragraph... >> >> Howard Gardner lists Noam Chomsky as one of the "founders of cognitive >> science," along with Jerome Bruner, John McCarthy, George Miller, and >> Allen Newell (1985, p. 23). >> >> Gardner, H. (1985). The mind's new science: A history of the cognitive >> revolution. New York: Basic Books. >> >> Martin >> >> On Dec 17, 2014, at 8:54 AM, Carol Macdonald >> wrote: >> >>> Well yes, and as linguistic and psychology student I was very proud >>> of >> him >>> for his review, it made me laugh and laugh. But Chomsky never read >> Piaget >>> or Vygotsky. He would have been interested in Vygotsky's >>> interpretation >> of >>> Behaviousrism. >>> >>> As to cognitive psychology - well I suppose we should be pleased, >>> but Chomsky had no direct hand in that. >>> >>> Carol. >>> >>> On 17 December 2014 at 14:49, Martin John Packer < >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> >>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Chomsky knew enough about psychology to write a devastating review of > B. >>>> F. Skinner's book 'Verbal behavior,' which still makes very >>>> interesting reading. And Chomsky's own book 'Syntactic Structures' >>>> was one of the >> key >>>> components in the emergence of cognitive psychology in the late >>>> 1950s, >> as >>>> Howard Gardner's book makes clear. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> >>> >>> -- >>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>> Developmental psycholinguist >>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >> >> >> > > -- > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Wed Dec 17 10:46:23 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 13:46:23 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology Message-ID: <5axu9x2hftmo8a27marifnei.1418841983376@email.android.com> Yes to follow descartes is problematic...(just because you can think something apart does not mean it is apart in reality)...descartes' error, he assumed his ability to think has ontological status...But kant ' s introduction of the synthetic a prior fixes descartes, refutes Hume ' s skepticism, ?and reinvents locke. ?I read Chomsky as searching, empirically, for the embodied forms of understanding and sensibilities by which we experience being in the world. He stops there. ?Vygotsky completes chomsky...my reading...i maybe wrong. Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: "Glassman, Michael"
Date:12/17/2014 1:29 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology
That's an interesting question Paul. Would you consider generations of people trying to solve an impossible to solve a Rubric's cube those who agreed with the puzzle or those who disagreed with the puzzle. I think we have a similar problem with philosophers who followed Des Cartes. Michael ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Dr. Paul C. Mocombe [pmocombe@mocombeian.com] Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 1:18 PM To: vygotsky@unm.edu; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology Vera, When you say chomsky is a Cartesian are you saying he is a rationalist in the kantian camp? Chomsky refers to himself and his efforts as kantian. By no means would i call kant a Cartesian. I would call Husserl a Cartesian? But not Kant and Chomsky. ..see the video below: Watch "Noam Chomsky - Ideas of Chomsky BBC Interview (fu?" on YouTube Noam Chomsky - Ideas of Chomsky BBC Interview (fu?: http://youtu.be/3LqUA7W9wfg Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com www.readingroomcurriculum.com www.paulcmocombe.info
-------- Original message --------
From: Vera John-Steiner
Date:12/17/2014 12:53 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology
While Chomsky is indeed very influential his approach to language and its acquisition is opposite to that of Vygotsky. He focuses on syntax while Vygotsky focuses on semantics. He proposes an innate language acquisition device while Vygotsky approaches language developmentally. (I am repeating some of Carol's points.) He is a Cartesian,while Vygotsky Opposed mind/body dualism. And the list goes on. I don't think he can be integrated into CHAT. Vera -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Carol Macdonald Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 7:37 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology Do you think Chomsky knows he is? Howard Gardner is a very generous fellow. On 17 December 2014 at 16:28, Martin John Packer wrote: > > oh, I just read your second paragraph... > > Howard Gardner lists Noam Chomsky as one of the "founders of cognitive > science," along with Jerome Bruner, John McCarthy, George Miller, and > Allen Newell (1985, p. 23). > > Gardner, H. (1985). The mind's new science: A history of the cognitive > revolution. New York: Basic Books. > > Martin > > On Dec 17, 2014, at 8:54 AM, Carol Macdonald > wrote: > > > Well yes, and as linguistic and psychology student I was very proud > > of > him > > for his review, it made me laugh and laugh. But Chomsky never read > Piaget > > or Vygotsky. He would have been interested in Vygotsky's > > interpretation > of > > Behaviousrism. > > > > As to cognitive psychology - well I suppose we should be pleased, > > but Chomsky had no direct hand in that. > > > > Carol. > > > > On 17 December 2014 at 14:49, Martin John Packer < > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> > > wrote: > >> > >> Chomsky knew enough about psychology to write a devastating review of B. > >> F. Skinner's book 'Verbal behavior,' which still makes very > >> interesting reading. And Chomsky's own book 'Syntactic Structures' > >> was one of the > key > >> components in the emergence of cognitive psychology in the late > >> 1950s, > as > >> Howard Gardner's book makes clear. > >> > >> Martin > >> > >> > > > > -- > > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > > Developmental psycholinguist > > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > > -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Wed Dec 17 10:49:16 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 13:49:16 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology Message-ID: Martin, For clarity. ..I am aware of that book. ?I am saying that chomsky is not a strict Cartesian like husserl is... Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John Packer
Date:12/17/2014 1:39 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology
Chomsky wrote a book called 'Cartesian Linguistics.' Husserl wrote one called 'Cartesian Meditations'! Martin On Dec 17, 2014, at 1:18 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > Vera, > > When you say chomsky is a Cartesian are you saying he is a rationalist in the kantian camp? Chomsky refers to himself and his efforts as kantian. By no means would i call kant a Cartesian. I would call Husserl a Cartesian? But not Kant and Chomsky. ..see the video below: > > Watch "Noam Chomsky - Ideas of Chomsky BBC Interview (fu?" on YouTube > Noam Chomsky - Ideas of Chomsky BBC Interview (fu?: http://youtu.be/3LqUA7W9wfg > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > >
-------- Original message --------
From: Vera John-Steiner
Date:12/17/2014 12:53 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology
>
While Chomsky is indeed very influential his approach to language and its > acquisition is opposite to that of Vygotsky. He focuses on syntax while > Vygotsky focuses on semantics. > He proposes an innate language acquisition device while Vygotsky approaches > language developmentally. (I am repeating some of Carol's points.) He is a > Cartesian,while Vygotsky > Opposed mind/body dualism. And the list goes on. > I don't think he can be integrated into CHAT. > Vera > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Carol Macdonald > Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 7:37 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology > > Do you think Chomsky knows he is? Howard Gardner is a very generous fellow. > > On 17 December 2014 at 16:28, Martin John Packer > wrote: >> >> oh, I just read your second paragraph... >> >> Howard Gardner lists Noam Chomsky as one of the "founders of cognitive >> science," along with Jerome Bruner, John McCarthy, George Miller, and >> Allen Newell (1985, p. 23). >> >> Gardner, H. (1985). The mind's new science: A history of the cognitive >> revolution. New York: Basic Books. >> >> Martin >> >> On Dec 17, 2014, at 8:54 AM, Carol Macdonald >> wrote: >> >>> Well yes, and as linguistic and psychology student I was very proud >>> of >> him >>> for his review, it made me laugh and laugh. But Chomsky never read >> Piaget >>> or Vygotsky. He would have been interested in Vygotsky's >>> interpretation >> of >>> Behaviousrism. >>> >>> As to cognitive psychology - well I suppose we should be pleased, >>> but Chomsky had no direct hand in that. >>> >>> Carol. >>> >>> On 17 December 2014 at 14:49, Martin John Packer < >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> >>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Chomsky knew enough about psychology to write a devastating review of > B. >>>> F. Skinner's book 'Verbal behavior,' which still makes very >>>> interesting reading. And Chomsky's own book 'Syntactic Structures' >>>> was one of the >> key >>>> components in the emergence of cognitive psychology in the late >>>> 1950s, >> as >>>> Howard Gardner's book makes clear. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> >>> >>> -- >>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>> Developmental psycholinguist >>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >> >> >> > > -- > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Wed Dec 17 10:51:30 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 13:51:30 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology Message-ID: Essentially, I want to build an epistemological system beginning with chomsky and ending with Vygotsky. .. Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe"
Date:12/17/2014 1:46 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology
Yes to follow descartes is problematic...(just because you can think something apart does not mean it is apart in reality)...descartes' error, he assumed his ability to think has ontological status...But kant ' s introduction of the synthetic a prior fixes descartes, refutes Hume ' s skepticism, and reinvents locke. I read Chomsky as searching, empirically, for the embodied forms of understanding and sensibilities by which we experience being in the world. He stops there. Vygotsky completes chomsky...my reading...i maybe wrong. Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com www.readingroomcurriculum.com www.paulcmocombe.info From arazfar@uic.edu Wed Dec 17 11:10:08 2014 From: arazfar@uic.edu (Aria Razfar) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 13:10:08 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology In-Reply-To: <99EB3359-B183-4ECC-A74C-56A1C267D7DA@uniandes.edu.co> References: <99EB3359-B183-4ECC-A74C-56A1C267D7DA@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <034b01d01a2d$1393d3d0$3abb7b70$@uic.edu> "Cartesian Linguistics" was written in 1966. I believe Chomsky used it as a "metaphor" tracing the history of language studies since the Enlightenment. He basically used it to argue that language studies (in the West at least) suggests that some grammatical structures are fundamental properties of the mind. In 1977, "Language and Responsibility" he argued against mind-body dualism and this false binary of modern empiricism. While many of his Chomsky's assertions about the nature language have been debunked, he played an important historical role and his thoughts have continued to evolve. Given the historicity of development, Chomsky has moved quite a bit since the fifties and sixties. More recently, he has argued that "body" as fixed and unchanging is as problematic as static notions of mind. He further rejects the Cartesian concept of "body" citing "seventeenth century Newtonian physics." So I'm not sure if I would characterize Chomsky as Cartesian. Aria Aria Razfar, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Literacy, Language, and Culture Director of Graduate Studies, Curriculum and Instruction University of Illinois at Chicago 1040 W. Harrison St. M/C 147 Chicago, IL, 60607 Director of English Learning through Mathematics, Science and Action Research (ELMSA) www.elmsa.org Webpage: http://education.uic.edu/personnel/faculty/aria-razfar-phd Tel: 312-413-8373 Fax: 312-996-8134 -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 12:39 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology Chomsky wrote a book called 'Cartesian Linguistics.' Husserl wrote one called 'Cartesian Meditations'! Martin On Dec 17, 2014, at 1:18 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > Vera, > > When you say chomsky is a Cartesian are you saying he is a rationalist in the kantian camp? Chomsky refers to himself and his efforts as kantian. By no means would i call kant a Cartesian. I would call Husserl a Cartesian? But not Kant and Chomsky. ..see the video below: > > Watch "Noam Chomsky - Ideas of Chomsky BBC Interview (fu." on YouTube > Noam Chomsky - Ideas of Chomsky BBC Interview (fu.: > http://youtu.be/3LqUA7W9wfg > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > >
-------- Original message --------
From: Vera > John-Steiner
Date:12/17/2014 12:53 PM > (GMT-05:00)
To: "'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'" >
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology
While Chomsky is indeed very influential his approach to language and its acquisition is opposite to that of Vygotsky. He focuses on syntax while Vygotsky focuses on semantics. > He proposes an innate language acquisition device while Vygotsky > approaches language developmentally. (I am repeating some of Carol's > points.) He is a Cartesian,while Vygotsky Opposed mind/body dualism. > And the list goes on. > I don't think he can be integrated into CHAT. > Vera > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Carol Macdonald > Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 7:37 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology > > Do you think Chomsky knows he is? Howard Gardner is a very generous fellow. > > On 17 December 2014 at 16:28, Martin John Packer > > wrote: >> >> oh, I just read your second paragraph... >> >> Howard Gardner lists Noam Chomsky as one of the "founders of >> cognitive science," along with Jerome Bruner, John McCarthy, George >> Miller, and Allen Newell (1985, p. 23). >> >> Gardner, H. (1985). The mind's new science: A history of the >> cognitive revolution. New York: Basic Books. >> >> Martin >> >> On Dec 17, 2014, at 8:54 AM, Carol Macdonald >> wrote: >> >>> Well yes, and as linguistic and psychology student I was very proud >>> of >> him >>> for his review, it made me laugh and laugh. But Chomsky never read >> Piaget >>> or Vygotsky. He would have been interested in Vygotsky's >>> interpretation >> of >>> Behaviousrism. >>> >>> As to cognitive psychology - well I suppose we should be pleased, >>> but Chomsky had no direct hand in that. >>> >>> Carol. >>> >>> On 17 December 2014 at 14:49, Martin John Packer < >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> >>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Chomsky knew enough about psychology to write a devastating review >>>> of > B. >>>> F. Skinner's book 'Verbal behavior,' which still makes very >>>> interesting reading. And Chomsky's own book 'Syntactic Structures' >>>> was one of the >> key >>>> components in the emergence of cognitive psychology in the late >>>> 1950s, >> as >>>> Howard Gardner's book makes clear. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> >>> >>> -- >>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>> Developmental psycholinguist >>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >> >> >> > > -- > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Wed Dec 17 11:26:24 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 14:26:24 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology Message-ID: I want to use Heideggerian phenomenology to synthesize or bridge chomsky with Vygotsky. ..to synthesize or bridge what Vera calls the syntax with the semantics...when we choose one or the other as a starting point for argumentation, ?I believe we are thinking them apart, as descartes did with mind and body. ?But, for me, they (syntax and semantics) are not apart in reality! ?This might be a fruitless attempt, but it does not hurt to try! Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe"
Date:12/17/2014 1:51 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology
Essentially, I want to build an epistemological system beginning with chomsky and ending with Vygotsky. .. Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com www.readingroomcurriculum.com www.paulcmocombe.info
-------- Original message --------
From: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe"
Date:12/17/2014 1:46 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology
Yes to follow descartes is problematic...(just because you can think something apart does not mean it is apart in reality)...descartes' error, he assumed his ability to think has ontological status...But kant ' s introduction of the synthetic a prior fixes descartes, refutes Hume ' s skepticism, and reinvents locke. I read Chomsky as searching, empirically, for the embodied forms of understanding and sensibilities by which we experience being in the world. He stops there. Vygotsky completes chomsky...my reading...i maybe wrong. Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com www.readingroomcurriculum.com www.paulcmocombe.info From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Wed Dec 17 11:29:58 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 14:29:58 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology Message-ID: Thank you aria, I just deleted my post i was about to send on the evolution of chomsky ' s work. Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: Aria Razfar
Date:12/17/2014 2:10 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology
"Cartesian Linguistics" was written in 1966. I believe Chomsky used it as a "metaphor" tracing the history of language studies since the Enlightenment. He basically used it to argue that language studies (in the West at least) suggests that some grammatical structures are fundamental properties of the mind. In 1977, "Language and Responsibility" he argued against mind-body dualism and this false binary of modern empiricism. While many of his Chomsky's assertions about the nature language have been debunked, he played an important historical role and his thoughts have continued to evolve. Given the historicity of development, Chomsky has moved quite a bit since the fifties and sixties. More recently, he has argued that "body" as fixed and unchanging is as problematic as static notions of mind. He further rejects the Cartesian concept of "body" citing "seventeenth century Newtonian physics." So I'm not sure if I would characterize Chomsky as Cartesian. Aria Aria Razfar, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Literacy, Language, and Culture Director of Graduate Studies, Curriculum and Instruction University of Illinois at Chicago 1040 W. Harrison St. M/C 147 Chicago, IL, 60607 Director of English Learning through Mathematics, Science and Action Research (ELMSA) www.elmsa.org Webpage: http://education.uic.edu/personnel/faculty/aria-razfar-phd Tel: 312-413-8373 Fax: 312-996-8134 -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 12:39 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology Chomsky wrote a book called 'Cartesian Linguistics.' Husserl wrote one called 'Cartesian Meditations'! Martin On Dec 17, 2014, at 1:18 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > Vera, > > When you say chomsky is a Cartesian are you saying he is a rationalist in the kantian camp? Chomsky refers to himself and his efforts as kantian. By no means would i call kant a Cartesian. I would call Husserl a Cartesian? But not Kant and Chomsky. ..see the video below: > > Watch "Noam Chomsky - Ideas of Chomsky BBC Interview (fu." on YouTube > Noam Chomsky - Ideas of Chomsky BBC Interview (fu.: > http://youtu.be/3LqUA7W9wfg > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > >
-------- Original message --------
From: Vera > John-Steiner
Date:12/17/2014 12:53 PM > (GMT-05:00)
To: "'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'" >
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology
While Chomsky is indeed very influential his approach to language and its acquisition is opposite to that of Vygotsky. He focuses on syntax while Vygotsky focuses on semantics. > He proposes an innate language acquisition device while Vygotsky > approaches language developmentally. (I am repeating some of Carol's > points.) He is a Cartesian,while Vygotsky Opposed mind/body dualism. > And the list goes on. > I don't think he can be integrated into CHAT. > Vera > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Carol Macdonald > Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 7:37 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology > > Do you think Chomsky knows he is? Howard Gardner is a very generous fellow. > > On 17 December 2014 at 16:28, Martin John Packer > > wrote: >> >> oh, I just read your second paragraph... >> >> Howard Gardner lists Noam Chomsky as one of the "founders of >> cognitive science," along with Jerome Bruner, John McCarthy, George >> Miller, and Allen Newell (1985, p. 23). >> >> Gardner, H. (1985). The mind's new science: A history of the >> cognitive revolution. New York: Basic Books. >> >> Martin >> >> On Dec 17, 2014, at 8:54 AM, Carol Macdonald >> wrote: >> >>> Well yes, and as linguistic and psychology student I was very proud >>> of >> him >>> for his review, it made me laugh and laugh. But Chomsky never read >> Piaget >>> or Vygotsky. He would have been interested in Vygotsky's >>> interpretation >> of >>> Behaviousrism. >>> >>> As to cognitive psychology - well I suppose we should be pleased, >>> but Chomsky had no direct hand in that. >>> >>> Carol. >>> >>> On 17 December 2014 at 14:49, Martin John Packer < >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> >>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Chomsky knew enough about psychology to write a devastating review >>>> of > B. >>>> F. Skinner's book 'Verbal behavior,' which still makes very >>>> interesting reading. And Chomsky's own book 'Syntactic Structures' >>>> was one of the >> key >>>> components in the emergence of cognitive psychology in the late >>>> 1950s, >> as >>>> Howard Gardner's book makes clear. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> >>> >>> -- >>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>> Developmental psycholinguist >>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >> >> >> > > -- > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > From hshonerd@gmail.com Wed Dec 17 11:48:35 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 12:48:35 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology In-Reply-To: <034b01d01a2d$1393d3d0$3abb7b70$@uic.edu> References: <99EB3359-B183-4ECC-A74C-56A1C267D7DA@uniandes.edu.co> <034b01d01a2d$1393d3d0$3abb7b70$@uic.edu> Message-ID: I am wondering if we can rehabilitate Chomsky, we can rehabilitate the behaviorists. To some extent you find what you look for. Personally, I lean to Vygotsky and cognitive linguistics, because I want to find a way to help development, to teach. What appears to be a purely philosophical question of epistemology is existential for me. I want hope, which I find in teaching and learning. Chomsky depresses me, because he seems to say that all efforts to teach are illusions. Okay, then, let?s have useful illusions, as, I believe are all scientific models. Pure science, absent art/imagination, is depressing, lacks hope. Even in his politics, I find Chomsky?s ?delivery? to be dismissive of any views but his own. In the end, I sense that history will, if it hasn?t already, find his dismissal of behaviorism to be a blip, an attack on a narrowly-construed straw man that he evoked for his purposes. In the same way, I find his delivery of political views as dismissive, as if dialog was for the little people. Though soft spoken, I don?t think his political views or delivery invite real dialog. Which is where I end, since this chat is, for me, real dialog, warts and all. IMHO Henry > On Dec 17, 2014, at 12:10 PM, Aria Razfar wrote: > > "Cartesian Linguistics" was written in 1966. I believe Chomsky used it as a > "metaphor" tracing the history of language studies since the Enlightenment. > He basically used it to argue that language studies (in the West at least) > suggests that some grammatical structures are fundamental properties of the > mind. In 1977, "Language and Responsibility" he argued against mind-body > dualism and this false binary of modern empiricism. While many of his > Chomsky's assertions about the nature language have been debunked, he played > an important historical role and his thoughts have continued to evolve. > Given the historicity of development, Chomsky has moved quite a bit since > the fifties and sixties. More recently, he has argued that "body" as fixed > and unchanging is as problematic as static notions of mind. He further > rejects the Cartesian concept of "body" citing "seventeenth century > Newtonian physics." So I'm not sure if I would characterize Chomsky as > Cartesian. > > Aria > > > Aria Razfar, Ph.D. > Associate Professor of Literacy, Language, and Culture > Director of Graduate Studies, Curriculum and Instruction > University of Illinois at Chicago > 1040 W. Harrison St. M/C 147 > Chicago, IL, 60607 > > Director of English Learning through Mathematics, Science and Action > Research (ELMSA) > www.elmsa.org > > Webpage: http://education.uic.edu/personnel/faculty/aria-razfar-phd > Tel: 312-413-8373 > Fax: 312-996-8134 > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer > Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 12:39 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology > > Chomsky wrote a book called 'Cartesian Linguistics.' > > Husserl wrote one called 'Cartesian Meditations'! > > Martin > > On Dec 17, 2014, at 1:18 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > wrote: > >> Vera, >> >> When you say chomsky is a Cartesian are you saying he is a rationalist in > the kantian camp? Chomsky refers to himself and his efforts as kantian. By > no means would i call kant a Cartesian. I would call Husserl a Cartesian? > But not Kant and Chomsky. ..see the video below: >> >> Watch "Noam Chomsky - Ideas of Chomsky BBC Interview (fu." on YouTube >> Noam Chomsky - Ideas of Chomsky BBC Interview (fu.: >> http://youtu.be/3LqUA7W9wfg >> >> >> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >> President >> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >> www.mocombeian.com >> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >> www.paulcmocombe.info >> >>
-------- Original message --------
From: Vera >> John-Steiner
Date:12/17/2014 12:53 PM >> (GMT-05:00)
To: "'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'" >>
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, > Vygotsky, and phenomenology
While Chomsky is indeed very > influential his approach to language and its acquisition is opposite to that > of Vygotsky. He focuses on syntax while Vygotsky focuses on semantics. >> He proposes an innate language acquisition device while Vygotsky >> approaches language developmentally. (I am repeating some of Carol's >> points.) He is a Cartesian,while Vygotsky Opposed mind/body dualism. >> And the list goes on. >> I don't think he can be integrated into CHAT. >> Vera >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Carol Macdonald >> Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 7:37 AM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology >> >> Do you think Chomsky knows he is? Howard Gardner is a very generous > fellow. >> >> On 17 December 2014 at 16:28, Martin John Packer >> >> wrote: >>> >>> oh, I just read your second paragraph... >>> >>> Howard Gardner lists Noam Chomsky as one of the "founders of >>> cognitive science," along with Jerome Bruner, John McCarthy, George >>> Miller, and Allen Newell (1985, p. 23). >>> >>> Gardner, H. (1985). The mind's new science: A history of the >>> cognitive revolution. New York: Basic Books. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Dec 17, 2014, at 8:54 AM, Carol Macdonald >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Well yes, and as linguistic and psychology student I was very proud >>>> of >>> him >>>> for his review, it made me laugh and laugh. But Chomsky never read >>> Piaget >>>> or Vygotsky. He would have been interested in Vygotsky's >>>> interpretation >>> of >>>> Behaviousrism. >>>> >>>> As to cognitive psychology - well I suppose we should be pleased, >>>> but Chomsky had no direct hand in that. >>>> >>>> Carol. >>>> >>>> On 17 December 2014 at 14:49, Martin John Packer < >>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> >>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Chomsky knew enough about psychology to write a devastating review >>>>> of >> B. >>>>> F. Skinner's book 'Verbal behavior,' which still makes very >>>>> interesting reading. And Chomsky's own book 'Syntactic Structures' >>>>> was one of the >>> key >>>>> components in the emergence of cognitive psychology in the late >>>>> 1950s, >>> as >>>>> Howard Gardner's book makes clear. >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>> >>> >>> >> >> -- >> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >> Developmental psycholinguist >> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >> >> > > > From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Wed Dec 17 12:02:03 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 15:02:03 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology Message-ID: <65rg60k1qpqfrbw82mbp1bc9.1418846523821@email.android.com> Henry, I am with you on chomsky ' s pessimism. ? It's like reading marcuse or adorno... Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: HENRY SHONERD
Date:12/17/2014 2:48 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology
I am wondering if we can rehabilitate Chomsky, we can rehabilitate the behaviorists. To some extent you find what you look for. Personally, I lean to Vygotsky and cognitive linguistics, because I want to find a way to help development, to teach. What appears to be a purely philosophical question of epistemology is existential for me. I want hope, which I find in teaching and learning. Chomsky depresses me, because he seems to say that all efforts to teach are illusions. Okay, then, let?s have useful illusions, as, I believe are all scientific models. Pure science, absent art/imagination, is depressing, lacks hope. Even in his politics, I find Chomsky?s ?delivery? to be dismissive of any views but his own. In the end, I sense that history will, if it hasn?t already, find his dismissal of behaviorism to be a blip, an attack on a narrowly-construed straw man that he evoked for his purposes. In the same way, I find his delivery of political views as dismissive, as if dialog was for the little people. Though soft spoken, I don?t think his political views or delivery invite real dialog. Which is where I end, since this chat is, for me, real dialog, warts and all. IMHO Henry > On Dec 17, 2014, at 12:10 PM, Aria Razfar wrote: > > "Cartesian Linguistics" was written in 1966. I believe Chomsky used it as a > "metaphor" tracing the history of language studies since the Enlightenment. > He basically used it to argue that language studies (in the West at least) > suggests that some grammatical structures are fundamental properties of the > mind. In 1977, "Language and Responsibility" he argued against mind-body > dualism and this false binary of modern empiricism. While many of his > Chomsky's assertions about the nature language have been debunked, he played > an important historical role and his thoughts have continued to evolve. > Given the historicity of development, Chomsky has moved quite a bit since > the fifties and sixties. More recently, he has argued that "body" as fixed > and unchanging is as problematic as static notions of mind. He further > rejects the Cartesian concept of "body" citing "seventeenth century > Newtonian physics." So I'm not sure if I would characterize Chomsky as > Cartesian. > > Aria > > > Aria Razfar, Ph.D. > Associate Professor of Literacy, Language, and Culture > Director of Graduate Studies, Curriculum and Instruction > University of Illinois at Chicago > 1040 W. Harrison St. M/C 147 > Chicago, IL, 60607 > > Director of English Learning through Mathematics, Science and Action > Research (ELMSA) > www.elmsa.org > > Webpage: http://education.uic.edu/personnel/faculty/aria-razfar-phd > Tel: 312-413-8373 > Fax: 312-996-8134 > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer > Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 12:39 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology > > Chomsky wrote a book called 'Cartesian Linguistics.' > > Husserl wrote one called 'Cartesian Meditations'! > > Martin > > On Dec 17, 2014, at 1:18 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > wrote: > >> Vera, >> >> When you say chomsky is a Cartesian are you saying he is a rationalist in > the kantian camp? Chomsky refers to himself and his efforts as kantian. By > no means would i call kant a Cartesian. I would call Husserl a Cartesian? > But not Kant and Chomsky. ..see the video below: >> >> Watch "Noam Chomsky - Ideas of Chomsky BBC Interview (fu." on YouTube >> Noam Chomsky - Ideas of Chomsky BBC Interview (fu.: >> http://youtu.be/3LqUA7W9wfg >> >> >> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >> President >> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >> www.mocombeian.com >> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >> www.paulcmocombe.info >> >>
-------- Original message --------
From: Vera >> John-Steiner
Date:12/17/2014 12:53 PM >> (GMT-05:00)
To: "'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'" >>
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, > Vygotsky, and phenomenology
While Chomsky is indeed very > influential his approach to language and its acquisition is opposite to that > of Vygotsky. He focuses on syntax while Vygotsky focuses on semantics. >> He proposes an innate language acquisition device while Vygotsky >> approaches language developmentally. (I am repeating some of Carol's >> points.) He is a Cartesian,while Vygotsky Opposed mind/body dualism. >> And the list goes on. >> I don't think he can be integrated into CHAT. >> Vera >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Carol Macdonald >> Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 7:37 AM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology >> >> Do you think Chomsky knows he is? Howard Gardner is a very generous > fellow. >> >> On 17 December 2014 at 16:28, Martin John Packer >> >> wrote: >>> >>> oh, I just read your second paragraph... >>> >>> Howard Gardner lists Noam Chomsky as one of the "founders of >>> cognitive science," along with Jerome Bruner, John McCarthy, George >>> Miller, and Allen Newell (1985, p. 23). >>> >>> Gardner, H. (1985). The mind's new science: A history of the >>> cognitive revolution. New York: Basic Books. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Dec 17, 2014, at 8:54 AM, Carol Macdonald >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Well yes, and as linguistic and psychology student I was very proud >>>> of >>> him >>>> for his review, it made me laugh and laugh. But Chomsky never read >>> Piaget >>>> or Vygotsky. He would have been interested in Vygotsky's >>>> interpretation >>> of >>>> Behaviousrism. >>>> >>>> As to cognitive psychology - well I suppose we should be pleased, >>>> but Chomsky had no direct hand in that. >>>> >>>> Carol. >>>> >>>> On 17 December 2014 at 14:49, Martin John Packer < >>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> >>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Chomsky knew enough about psychology to write a devastating review >>>>> of >> B. >>>>> F. Skinner's book 'Verbal behavior,' which still makes very >>>>> interesting reading. And Chomsky's own book 'Syntactic Structures' >>>>> was one of the >>> key >>>>> components in the emergence of cognitive psychology in the late >>>>> 1950s, >>> as >>>>> Howard Gardner's book makes clear. >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>> >>> >>> >> >> -- >> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >> Developmental psycholinguist >> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >> >> > > > From helenaworthen@gmail.com Wed Dec 17 12:06:00 2014 From: helenaworthen@gmail.com (Helena Worthen) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 12:06:00 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <751B6B41-2FB6-40B2-975E-11F6BC178DDA@gmail.com> Wow, this is an idea, for sure. Beginning with Chomsky and ending with Vygotsky? I am trying to get my head around this. Chomsky would have been a little boy when Vygotsky died. So you're talking about a system. Not a chronology, but the reverse of a chronology. A system -- that means moving parts that do something. What are you going to use to hook the system together and move it along? What will be the track, the signposts, the guardrails or the rungs along which the changes take place? What will this system do? I can accept the idea that history is not the only track along which change runs. But what are you going to use in its place? I'm sure Vygotsky and Chomsky would have had some friendly conversations and found a lot to agree on, especially with regard to politics (once they got the 20th century out of the way) but I want to know what you have in mind. Thanks -- Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com On Dec 17, 2014, at 10:51 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > Essentially, I want to build an epistemological system beginning with chomsky and ending with Vygotsky. .. > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > >
-------- Original message --------
From: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe"
Date:12/17/2014 1:46 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology
>
Yes to follow descartes is problematic...(just because you can think something apart does not mean it is apart in reality)...descartes' error, he assumed his ability to think has ontological status...But kant ' s introduction of the synthetic a prior fixes descartes, refutes Hume ' s skepticism, and reinvents locke. I read Chomsky as searching, empirically, for the embodied forms of understanding and sensibilities by which we experience being in the world. He stops there. Vygotsky completes chomsky...my reading...i maybe wrong. > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info From helenaworthen@gmail.com Wed Dec 17 12:09:10 2014 From: helenaworthen@gmail.com (Helena Worthen) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 12:09:10 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <93A02E10-3E33-4426-81B4-4FC4E59B2789@gmail.com> This partly answers my question of a few minutes ago. But I would like to see how you do it! Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com On Dec 17, 2014, at 11:26 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > I want to use Heideggerian phenomenology to synthesize or bridge chomsky with Vygotsky. ..to synthesize or bridge what Vera calls the syntax with the semantics...when we choose one or the other as a starting point for argumentation, I believe we are thinking them apart, as descartes did with mind and body. But, for me, they (syntax and semantics) are not apart in reality! This might be a fruitless attempt, but it does not hurt to try! > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > >
-------- Original message --------
From: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe"
Date:12/17/2014 1:51 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology
>
Essentially, I want to build an epistemological system beginning with chomsky and ending with Vygotsky. .. > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > >
-------- Original message --------
From: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe"
Date:12/17/2014 1:46 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology
>
Yes to follow descartes is problematic...(just because you can think something apart does not mean it is apart in reality)...descartes' error, he assumed his ability to think has ontological status...But kant ' s introduction of the synthetic a prior fixes descartes, refutes Hume ' s skepticism, and reinvents locke. I read Chomsky as searching, empirically, for the embodied forms of understanding and sensibilities by which we experience being in the world. He stops there. Vygotsky completes chomsky...my reading...i maybe wrong. > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed Dec 17 12:10:58 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 10:10:58 -1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context In-Reply-To: References: <2E5441F3-C50E-478B-BCCA-EA180B2591A3@ucla.edu> <70AEA66B-2185-4863-A4A8-FE86A87FCB43@gmail.com> Message-ID: Kris, with the caution that I may be going too far off course I am going to situate the theory of "the Third Space" within a larger notion of "genre theory" [see section III: "Literacy" Chapter 6: "Genres" in Raymond Williams book *Marxism and Literature* Williams wrote: "Genre has in fact, until recently, been a term of classification which has brought together, and then often confused, several different kinds of generic description. Renaissance Theory, defining 'species' and 'modes' within a general theory of 'kinds', was much more particular but was, on the other hand, insufficiently historical. It was indeed to cope with historical combinations of different LEVELS of organization, that the looser concept of 'genre' was adopted. But, in its later stages especially, this single advantage was surrendered and genre-theory was left with largely abstract and diverse collocations." [page 183] As I read your section on *rising to the concrete* THROUGH the hybrid *testimonio* I experienced a "felt structure" of entering a new, novel, SPACE which opened up an imaginal place of social dreaming that I am relating back to "renaissance theory" and "genre theory" but honouring the imaginal enacting of particular specific concrete social AND subjective spaces/places which *carry us" across thresholds [both metaphorical AND literal]. I am attempting to situate your "creative" development of third spaces as a hypothetical "theory" as both imaginal and concrete SIMULTANEOUSLY. At this point we can bring in Mike Cole's exploration of the *imaginal* as *gap-filling* as existing at and across the thresholds [boundaries, borders]. I also can imagine "third spaces" as this place of the "gaps" or the "gutters". Always historically moving processes, within particular social situations of development. However, I do wonder if your exploration of "nondominant" hybrid genres of testimonio [BOTH auto biography AND intersubjective] as specific examples or cases of particular risings to imaginal social dreaming and returning to ground IS IN FACT an aspect of a much larger and vaster "turn". A turn [and re-turn] to historically honouring "hybrid" forms of sociocritical literacy emerging as responses to the contradictions of the dream of the self-regulated [and self-contained] person. In other words, I am suggesting your movement into "third spaces" IS RADICAL [going to the root or the founding ofour notions of human nature. Larry On Tue, Dec 16, 2014 at 10:36 PM, Kris Gutierrez wrote: > > Larry, thank you; you raise so many important things to think about. I > will read your post again more carefully and respond and ask you more, as > you push the thinking here. Kris > > > Kris Gutierrez > gutierkd@gmail.com > > Kris D. Guti?rrez > Professor > Graduate School of Education > 5629 Tolman Hall #1670 > University of California, Berkeley > Berkeley CA 94720-1670 > > Distinguished Professor > Learning Sciences and Literacy > School of Education > University of Colorado, Boulder > > > On Dec 15, 2014, at 6:08 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > > Kris, > I have been engaged with your explorations of new ways or paths of creating > *hybrid third spaces*. Your comment that forming third spaces: > > "involved intentional moves that 1) brought together and reorganized > different discourses, cultural practices, histories, and genres that were > generally considered incompatible or in tension with one another; 2) > preserved and foregrounded their tension; and 3) sought to maintain the > value, history, and integrity of the everyday vis-?-vis the dominant form, > especially in light of historical power relations. The syncretic > testimonio is such an example. A nod here to Cindy Cruz?s powerful and > informing work on testimonio. > > (I have a new piece in press which you read, Mike, that attempts to > > elaborate the syncretic approach." > > Kris, I hope we can organize THIS thread to stay with your attempts to > "elaborate the syncretic approach". Your section of the paper on page 149, > 150 *Rising to the Concrete* gives a clear example of the hybrid nature of > your playing with academic and everyday language and not privileging the > scientific language. > > I believe your work is returning to a time when our language games were not > so divided into fact/fiction modes. Your elaborating "ecologically valid" > genres "DEVELOPED IN THE COGNITIVE, SOCIAL, AND HISTORICAL PRACTICES OF ALL > THE PARTICIPANTS" captures the radical mashing together of the young and > the old as "syncretic testimonio" Honouring the everyday language on an > equal footing with the scientific *styles* of writing. THIS mashing up as > "hybrid text" including BOTH autobiography and intersubjectively developed > texts. > > I read this *new* way or path as a return to rhetorical, persausive ways of > composing meaning. Raymond Williams describes epochal *styles* of orienting > to the world that begin in structures of feeling [he considered the term > *structures of experience* but preferred *structures of feelings* to > capture their felt *structure* as a set of elements that are mashed > together]. > > Our current dominant *style* structures the scientific genres as *factual* > while the imaginal [social dreaming etc] are *merely* subjective and > personal and idiosyncretic. > Kris, your "syncretic testimonio" is seeing through the impoverishment of > THAT dominant genre and playing with forms that are BOTH subjective > [autobiography] AND intersubjective as historically effected consciousness. > You are working within a nondominant ecology but you are gesturing toward a > much more radical turn that the dominant culture must take. Raymond > Williams within the Marxism and Literature tradition is working also for > these radical turns. I personally also see the hermeneutical turn as > compatible with your stated goal to develop a program oriented towards a > form of "cosmopolitanism" [see page 148 of Kris' article] > > This paper is a wonderful example of "rising to the concrete" or > imaginatively "rising off the ground and returning to the ground" [an > imaginal path of social intersubjective dreaming] > > Larry > On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 12:51 PM, mike cole [?] [?][?][?] > > So much for trying to organized xmca discussion by threads! It hard to keep > track of the jumble of the email flow! I assume those who are following the > KrisRRQ thread will see this. > reveling in the rain > mike > > > On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 11:42 AM, Kris Gutierrez > wrote: > > > Luisa, thanks. I have always been a lurker on XMCA but can never keep > with all the discussions. I?m hoping the discussions will get us into > the questions you raise and I?m happy to post references and pdfs too > (e.g., Tejeda?s decolonizing and Espinoza?s article on Educational > Sanctuaries). Espinoza?s social dreaming is discussed in the RRQ article > and I?ll look to see where else he might have written about it. I don?t > know when the syncretic piece will be out but will check. Thanks for > > your > > interest. > > > In particular, I hope we can also discuss the ways the social imagination > (embodied and realized through Boal's teatro del oprimido, historicizing > pedagogies, and syncretic texts, etc.) were central to the ubiquitous > "future oriented" organization of the activities that Mike points > > out?that > > is, the process of becoming historical actors. > > > > Kris > > > > Kris Gutierrez > gutierkd@gmail.com > > Kris D. Guti?rrez > Professor > Graduate School of Education > 5629 Tolman Hall #1670 > University of California, Berkeley > Berkeley CA 94720-1670 > > Distinguished Professor > Learning Sciences and Literacy > School of Education > University of Colorado, Boulder > > > On Dec 12, 2014, at 11:25 AM, Luisa Aires wrote: > > Dear Professor Kris Gutierrez > > It is delightful to see you here in XMCA :-) > > > > I must confess that after reading your post, I am going to read your > > text again because you added so much interesting information about MSLI > program (for example, I didn?t know that MSLI had strong links with 5th > dimension). > > > I would like to learn about Chicano/a and ethnic studies, Tejeda?s > > decolonizing framework and pedagogies, and Manuel Espinoza?s notions of > social dreaming. How can we access the most important references of those > theories? > > > One more question (we need to take advantage of your presence here ;-): > > when and how can we access your new piece about syncretic approach? > > > > > Best wishes, > > Lu?sa A. > > > > > -- > Department of Education and Distance Learning, Universidade Aberta > Centre of Studies on Migrations and Intercultural Relations (CEMRI) > R. Amial, n? 752, 4200-055 Porto, Portugal > laires@uab.pt > www.uab.pt > > > 2014-12-12 17:55 GMT+00:00 Kris Gutierrez > gutierkd@gmail.com>>: > > > I don?t know if this went through last night.; so I?m reposting. > > apologies if you get it twice > > > > On Dec 12, 2014, at 12:45 AM, Kris Gutierrez > > wrote: > > > Re: Mike/Miguel, (Mike, XMCA has a weird email address for me and I > > am unable to post; would you post if it doesn?t come through?) > > > Miguel, who has deep knowledge of an important time in the > > Migrant Program (MSLI), rightly points out that the development of > sociocritical > > > literacies/ syncretic approaches to learning must be understood in > > the context of the larger designed ecology and its history. And I can?t > begin to do > > > it justice here. But here are some reflections. > > Building on a decade of earlier designs that brought together Freire > > and cultural historical theoretical perspectives, and Chicano/a and > > ethnic > > studies > > > to create new forms of teaching and learning, and theorizations of > > the Third Space that preceded the development of the month long migrant > > > program, MSLI was designed as a hybrid space organized around an > > historicizing pedagogy, informed, deepened, and augmented by > > > Tejeda?s robust decolonizing framework and pedagogies, and Manuel > > Espinoza?s notions of social dreaming and the importance of students > > > becoming historical actors who could "who invoke the past in order to > > re-mediate it so that it becomes a resource for current and future > action.? Their > > > work is key to understanding the MSLI ecology. Our long-term 5th > > Dimension work (UC Links), its theoretical underpinnings, and the > pedagogical > > > approaches to undergraduate education and learning in informal > > contexts were also a part of the mix, as most of the MSLI instructional > team also > > > was involved in 5th D work. Of significance, all MSLI staff had > > extensive knowledge of CHAT, critical pedagogies, social theories, > disciplinary > > > learning, as well as direct experience with and in immigrant, > > migrant, > > and non dominant communities, their histories, repertoires, lived > experiences, > > > and possibilities. > > There are many other important contributions of others I could > > elaborate here that contributed to the iterative design, re-mediation, > > and > > > implementation and sustainability of this program, including > > Miguel's. Consider Shirin Vossoughi?s recent MCA article, Social > Analytic Artifacts > > > Made Concrete,? in which she beautifully elaborates the ways > > social analytic artifacts served as tools ?that deepened and propelled > > the > > collective > > > analysis of social problems? for migrant students and the > > instructional teams. > > > Our collective efforts and design were oriented toward > > transformation and change and had multiple aims: sociopolitical, > > cultural, > > educational, > > > including reframing education and learning in ways that brought the > > everyday and scientific (school-based) concepts into conversation with > > one > > > another (a different kind of conversation to be sure). The goal in > > this regard was to put scientific and everyday concepts on a more level > playing field > > > such that scientific concepts were not placed in an hierarchical > > relationship with the everyday. Disciplinary learning and critical forms > of literacy were > > > placed in conversation, their tensions made the object of analysis > > ?all toward the production of more meaningful and expansive forms of > learning. > > > Mike and Yrjo have written important work on this, and, Carol Lee?s > > work is another robust example. > > > And, of course, there is a history of work among researchers in the > > sociocultural tradition who have attended to the consequential nature of > everyday > > > knowledge and practices in expansive ways (e.g., Scribner & Cole, > > 1973; Lave, 1988; 2012; Lave & Rogoff, 1984; Rogoff, 2003, as key > > examples > > of > > > work that informs this thinking, including ongoing conversations and > > collaborations with and weekly meetings at LCHC with Mike, Yrjo, > Olga,Vasquez > > > and others). > > > Our approach to consequential learning involved the development > > of syncretic approaches to literacy and social scientific thinking. The > design > > > involved intentional moves that 1) brought together and reorganized > > different discourses, cultural practices, histories, and genres that were > generally considered incompatible or in tension with one another; 2) > preserved and foregrounded their tension; and 3) sought to maintain the > value, history, and integrity of the everyday vis-?-vis the dominant > > form, > > especially in light of historical power relations. The syncretic > testimonio is such an example. A nod here to Cindy Cruz?s powerful and > informing work on testimonio. > > (I have a new piece in press which you read, Mike, that attempts to > > elaborate the syncretic approach). > > > A footnote on the sociocritical article. The RRQ Sociocritical > > Literacy article was the publication of my AERA Scribner Lecture (2005 > > for > > the 2004 Scribner Award for my work on the Third Space; the lecture and > > its > > published piece were my attempt to further theorize the Third Space, > > using > > MSLI as a robust example. > > > Hope this provides more context and food for thought. excuse typos > > and lapses, it?s late. Kris > > > > Kris D. Guti?rrez > Professor > Graduate School of Education > 5629 Tolman Hall #1670 > University of California, Berkeley > Berkeley CA 94720-1670 > > Distinguished Professor > Learning Sciences and Literacy > School of Education > University of Colorado, Boulder > > > > On Dec 11, 2014, at 6:49 AM, mike cole > mcole@ucsd.edu> < > mailto:mcole@ucsd.edu >>> wrote: > > > Thanks for the additional info. > All makes sense to me. > Mike > > On Wednesday, December 10, 2014, Zavala, Miguel < > mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu > mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu> > >>> > wrote: > > > While the focus is on public education, any space is amenable for > analysis. We sometimes get issues from parent organizers, student > organizations, interviews of students fighting for social justice > > in > > college campuses. Formal, non-formal, institutional, > > non-institutional, > > etc. will work. > > If the submission focuses on 'praxis', on responses and resistance > > to the > > neoliberal privatization of education, any space and sustained > > activity, > > etc. is worth looking at-- but a connection should be drawn to how > > it > > deliberately responds to neoliberalism and its messy tentacles, > > perhaps > > highlighting possible worlds and social dreams. > > A connection can definitely be drawn between sociocritical studies > > and > > this topic, certainly. I believe the work we did in MSLI (I was an > integral member of MSLI for 3 years) was in many ways creating > > alternative > > spaces and social dreams; in a way it was a bottom-up approach of > > building > > consciousness and I think Freire would have been proud of our work. > > As > > lead instructor, Carlos Tejeda's decolonizing pedagogies framework > > lead to > > some beautiful, creative activity in that space, for many years. > > As > > an > > instantiation of sociocritical literacies, I would say the work > > Kris > > outlines is definitely a great example of "responses to > > neoliberalism" and > > was here and there a part of our talk/framing as we moved > > pedagogically. > > > As an editor of the journal, the 'constraint' we do have is that > submissions be written for a general audience; I know that is > > ambiguous. > > Keep in mind that the articles get read by our members in ARE, > > their > > students, they are sometimes used as political education in > > conferences, > > in some instances reading circles in non-formal community settings. > > -Miguel > > > On 12/10/14 10:24 PM, "mike cole" > mcole@ucsd.edu> < > mailto:mcole@ucsd.edu >> > > wrote: > > > How broad is your mandates, Miguel? Does it extend to after > > school? > > Seems > > like it would help to know the kinds of efforts you consider > > exemplary > > classics. > > Does this topic fit in with sociocritical studies? > Mike > > On Wednesday, December 10, 2014, Zavala, Miguel < > mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu > mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu> > >> > > wrote: > > > XMCA List Family, > > I am relaying a call for manuscripts on a pressing issue > > impacting > > education everywhere. We conceptualized the idea of a grassroots > journal in > 2007 and it has grown, albeit slowly. Here's the latest call. > > Thanks! > > ------------------- > > Regeneraci?n, the Association of Raza Educators Journal > Volume 6, Issue 1 (Spring 2015) > > CALL FOR SUBMISSIONS > Deadline: February 15, 2015 > > The theme for our next issue: > "Resisting The Neoliberal Privatization of Education: Reclaiming > Teachers' > Unions, Education, and Epistemologies" > > Undeniably, ever since the World Bank declared education a > > trade-able > > service--trumping the idea that education is a basic human > right--education > and teachers have been increasingly under attack by corporations, > venture > philanthropists, and a growing managerial middle class, who > > function > > within > a neoliberal ideology that places insurmountable faith in markets > > and > > the > expansion of capitalism globally into all facets of everyday > > life. > > We > > believe that the neoliberal project to de-fund and privatize > > public > > education interlocks with the idea of a racial-colonial State. > > Thus, > > it is > no coincidence that neoliberal experiments to privatize public > > education > > have materialized in large urban districts, such as Chicago, New > > York, > > Los > Angeles, etc., where we find a significant number of Raza, Black, > > and > > other > historically marginalized peoples. > > In this issue of Regeneraci?n we seek both analysis and praxis, > > that is > > texts that help us understand more deeply how neoliberalism is > > manifest > > in > particular geographic, social, and cultural spaces. As well, we > > are > > looking > for texts that provide examples of resistance to the corporate > > takeover > > of > public education. How are urban and other communities responding > > to the > > attacks on education and teachers? What grassroots and strategic > > spaces > > are > created that provide alternatives to neoliberalism and > > capitalism? How > > are > teachers' unions being reinvented? What role does the fight for > > Ethnic > > Studies present as a counter to the neoliberal attack? > > FORMAT: Submissions may come from students, educators, parents, > community > organizers, or organizations; we also welcome scholarly > > submissions that > > are written for a general audience. Formats may include > > testimonios, > > essays, poetry, art, personal narrative, as well as analytic and > empirical > studies. > > LENGTH: 700-3000 words > > SUBMISSION DEADLINE: February 15, 2015 > PUBLICATION DATE: April 15, 2015 > > If you have any questions please contact: > > razaeducators@yahoo.com > > > > razaeducators@yahoo.com>> > > > > > razaeducators@yahoo.com> razaeducators@yahoo.com>> > > > > > > To access past issues of Regeneraci?n: > http://www.razaeducators.org/archives_newsletter.html < > > http://www.razaeducators.org/archives_newsletter.html> < > http://www.razaeducators.org/archives_newsletter.html < > http://www.razaeducators.org/archives_newsletter.html>> > > > The Association of Raza Educators > www.razaeducators.org < > > http://www.razaeducators.org/ >< > http://www.razaeducators.org < > http://www.razaeducators.org/ >> > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > > with > > an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > > an > > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > Kris Gutierrez > k.gutierrez@me.com > k.gutierrez@me.com > > > > > > > > Kris D. Guti?rrez > Professor > Graduate School of Education > 5629 Tolman Hall #1670 > University of California, Berkeley > Berkeley CA 94720-1670 > > Distinguished Professor > Learning Sciences and Literacy > School of Education > University of Colorado, Boulder > > > > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Wed Dec 17 12:20:17 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 15:20:17 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology Message-ID: I am working on it helena...hopefully I can get it published in the journal when I am done. Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: Helena Worthen
Date:12/17/2014 3:06 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology
Wow, this is an idea, for sure. Beginning with Chomsky and ending with Vygotsky? I am trying to get my head around this. Chomsky would have been a little boy when Vygotsky died. So you're talking about a system. Not a chronology, but the reverse of a chronology. A system -- that means moving parts that do something. What are you going to use to hook the system together and move it along? What will be the track, the signposts, the guardrails or the rungs along which the changes take place? What will this system do? I can accept the idea that history is not the only track along which change runs. But what are you going to use in its place? I'm sure Vygotsky and Chomsky would have had some friendly conversations and found a lot to agree on, especially with regard to politics (once they got the 20th century out of the way) but I want to know what you have in mind. Thanks -- Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com On Dec 17, 2014, at 10:51 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > Essentially, I want to build an epistemological system beginning with chomsky and ending with Vygotsky. .. > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > >
-------- Original message --------
From: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe"
Date:12/17/2014 1:46 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology
>
Yes to follow descartes is problematic...(just because you can think something apart does not mean it is apart in reality)...descartes' error, he assumed his ability to think has ontological status...But kant ' s introduction of the synthetic a prior fixes descartes, refutes Hume ' s skepticism, and reinvents locke. I read Chomsky as searching, empirically, for the embodied forms of understanding and sensibilities by which we experience being in the world. He stops there. Vygotsky completes chomsky...my reading...i maybe wrong. > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Wed Dec 17 12:33:59 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:33:59 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: You've piqued my interest, Paul! A portion of my youth was (miss?)spent reading and studying Heidegger. Politics aside (yes, that's a big push) I see many connections between Heidegger and LSV (the escape from dualism, the importance of ontology, the emphasis on temporality, the role of culture, the foundation as practical activity...). But I think that Heidegger would have considered Chomsky's approach to language an example of giving priority to what he called the "present-at-hand" instead of the "ready-to-hand." In simpler terms, Chomsky studies language as a disinterested observer, and that approach always distorts whatever we are trying to understand. Heidegger's phenomenology, as I understand it, was an approach to investigation based on getting one's hands dirty. You have mentioned syntax and semantics. I think LSV would have argued - *was* arguing - that *pragmatics* comes first, and that to a greater or lesser degree the other two are always abstractions from language as it is used. So like Helena I am very interested to see where you will go with this! Martin On Dec 17, 2014, at 3:20 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > I am working on it helena...hopefully I can get it published in the journal when I am done. > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > >
-------- Original message --------
From: Helena Worthen
Date:12/17/2014 3:06 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology
>
Wow, this is an idea, for sure. Beginning with Chomsky and ending with Vygotsky? I am trying to get my head around this. Chomsky would have been a little boy when Vygotsky died. > > So you're talking about a system. Not a chronology, but the reverse of a chronology. A system -- that means moving parts that do something. What are you going to use to hook the system together and move it along? What will be the track, the signposts, the guardrails or the rungs along which the changes take place? What will this system do? > > I can accept the idea that history is not the only track along which change runs. But what are you going to use in its place? > > I'm sure Vygotsky and Chomsky would have had some friendly conversations and found a lot to agree on, especially with regard to politics (once they got the 20th century out of the way) but I want to know what you have in mind. > > Thanks -- > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > On Dec 17, 2014, at 10:51 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > >> Essentially, I want to build an epistemological system beginning with chomsky and ending with Vygotsky. .. >> >> >> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >> President >> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >> www.mocombeian.com >> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >> www.paulcmocombe.info >> >>
-------- Original message --------
From: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe"
Date:12/17/2014 1:46 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology
>>
Yes to follow descartes is problematic...(just because you can think something apart does not mean it is apart in reality)...descartes' error, he assumed his ability to think has ontological status...But kant ' s introduction of the synthetic a prior fixes descartes, refutes Hume ' s skepticism, and reinvents locke. I read Chomsky as searching, empirically, for the embodied forms of understanding and sensibilities by which we experience being in the world. He stops there. Vygotsky completes chomsky...my reading...i maybe wrong. >> >> >> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >> President >> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >> www.mocombeian.com >> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >> www.paulcmocombe.info > > > From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Wed Dec 17 12:51:01 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 15:51:01 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology Message-ID: Yes...yes...yes, martin...yes...that is where I am going with this. ?I am on holiday, but I hope to be done with the paper by the beginning of the spring semester. Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John Packer
Date:12/17/2014 3:33 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology
You've piqued my interest, Paul! A portion of my youth was (miss?)spent reading and studying Heidegger. Politics aside (yes, that's a big push) I see many connections between Heidegger and LSV (the escape from dualism, the importance of ontology, the emphasis on temporality, the role of culture, the foundation as practical activity...). But I think that Heidegger would have considered Chomsky's approach to language an example of giving priority to what he called the "present-at-hand" instead of the "ready-to-hand." In simpler terms, Chomsky studies language as a disinterested observer, and that approach always distorts whatever we are trying to understand. Heidegger's phenomenology, as I understand it, was an approach to investigation based on getting one's hands dirty. You have mentioned syntax and semantics. I think LSV would have argued - *was* arguing - that *pragmatics* comes first, and that to a greater or lesser degree the other two are always abstractions from language as it is used. So like Helena I am very interested to see where you will go with this! Martin On Dec 17, 2014, at 3:20 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > I am working on it helena...hopefully I can get it published in the journal when I am done. > > > Dr. Paul C. Mocombe > President > The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. > www.mocombeian.com > www.readingroomcurriculum.com > www.paulcmocombe.info > >
-------- Original message --------
From: Helena Worthen
Date:12/17/2014 3:06 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology
>
Wow, this is an idea, for sure. Beginning with Chomsky and ending with Vygotsky? I am trying to get my head around this. Chomsky would have been a little boy when Vygotsky died. > > So you're talking about a system. Not a chronology, but the reverse of a chronology. A system -- that means moving parts that do something. What are you going to use to hook the system together and move it along? What will be the track, the signposts, the guardrails or the rungs along which the changes take place? What will this system do? > > I can accept the idea that history is not the only track along which change runs. But what are you going to use in its place? > > I'm sure Vygotsky and Chomsky would have had some friendly conversations and found a lot to agree on, especially with regard to politics (once they got the 20th century out of the way) but I want to know what you have in mind. > > Thanks -- > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > On Dec 17, 2014, at 10:51 AM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > >> Essentially, I want to build an epistemological system beginning with chomsky and ending with Vygotsky. .. >> >> >> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >> President >> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >> www.mocombeian.com >> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >> www.paulcmocombe.info >> >>
-------- Original message --------
From: "Dr. Paul C. Mocombe"
Date:12/17/2014 1:46 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology
>>
Yes to follow descartes is problematic...(just because you can think something apart does not mean it is apart in reality)...descartes' error, he assumed his ability to think has ontological status...But kant ' s introduction of the synthetic a prior fixes descartes, refutes Hume ' s skepticism, and reinvents locke. I read Chomsky as searching, empirically, for the embodied forms of understanding and sensibilities by which we experience being in the world. He stops there. Vygotsky completes chomsky...my reading...i maybe wrong. >> >> >> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >> President >> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >> www.mocombeian.com >> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >> www.paulcmocombe.info > > > From ewall@umich.edu Wed Dec 17 13:12:52 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 15:12:52 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology In-Reply-To: <99EB3359-B183-4ECC-A74C-56A1C267D7DA@uniandes.edu.co> References: <99EB3359-B183-4ECC-A74C-56A1C267D7DA@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Russell & Whitehead (and Wittgensten) wrote Principia Mathematica and Newton wrote Principia Mathematica. That there is a resemblance, in many ways, doesn't necessarily follow. Ed On Dec 17, 2014, at 12:39 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > Chomsky wrote a book called 'Cartesian Linguistics.' > > Husserl wrote one called 'Cartesian Meditations'! > > Martin > > On Dec 17, 2014, at 1:18 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: > >> Vera, >> >> When you say chomsky is a Cartesian are you saying he is a rationalist in the kantian camp? Chomsky refers to himself and his efforts as kantian. By no means would i call kant a Cartesian. I would call Husserl a Cartesian? But not Kant and Chomsky. ..see the video below: >> >> Watch "Noam Chomsky - Ideas of Chomsky BBC Interview (fu?" on YouTube >> Noam Chomsky - Ideas of Chomsky BBC Interview (fu?: http://youtu.be/3LqUA7W9wfg >> >> >> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >> President >> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >> www.mocombeian.com >> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >> www.paulcmocombe.info >> >>
-------- Original message --------
From: Vera John-Steiner
Date:12/17/2014 12:53 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology
>>
While Chomsky is indeed very influential his approach to language and its >> acquisition is opposite to that of Vygotsky. He focuses on syntax while >> Vygotsky focuses on semantics. >> He proposes an innate language acquisition device while Vygotsky approaches >> language developmentally. (I am repeating some of Carol's points.) He is a >> Cartesian,while Vygotsky >> Opposed mind/body dualism. And the list goes on. >> I don't think he can be integrated into CHAT. >> Vera >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Carol Macdonald >> Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 7:37 AM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology >> >> Do you think Chomsky knows he is? Howard Gardner is a very generous fellow. >> >> On 17 December 2014 at 16:28, Martin John Packer >> wrote: >>> >>> oh, I just read your second paragraph... >>> >>> Howard Gardner lists Noam Chomsky as one of the "founders of cognitive >>> science," along with Jerome Bruner, John McCarthy, George Miller, and >>> Allen Newell (1985, p. 23). >>> >>> Gardner, H. (1985). The mind's new science: A history of the cognitive >>> revolution. New York: Basic Books. >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Dec 17, 2014, at 8:54 AM, Carol Macdonald >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Well yes, and as linguistic and psychology student I was very proud >>>> of >>> him >>>> for his review, it made me laugh and laugh. But Chomsky never read >>> Piaget >>>> or Vygotsky. He would have been interested in Vygotsky's >>>> interpretation >>> of >>>> Behaviousrism. >>>> >>>> As to cognitive psychology - well I suppose we should be pleased, >>>> but Chomsky had no direct hand in that. >>>> >>>> Carol. >>>> >>>> On 17 December 2014 at 14:49, Martin John Packer < >>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> >>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Chomsky knew enough about psychology to write a devastating review of >> B. >>>>> F. Skinner's book 'Verbal behavior,' which still makes very >>>>> interesting reading. And Chomsky's own book 'Syntactic Structures' >>>>> was one of the >>> key >>>>> components in the emergence of cognitive psychology in the late >>>>> 1950s, >>> as >>>>> Howard Gardner's book makes clear. >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>> >>> >>> >> >> -- >> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >> Developmental psycholinguist >> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >> >> > > From arazfar@uic.edu Wed Dec 17 13:34:52 2014 From: arazfar@uic.edu (Aria Razfar) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 15:34:52 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] FW: Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology In-Reply-To: <38C43AE248831048B6AF57F364680D3C72A23DDA@OC11EXPO32.exchange.mit.edu> References: <039801d01a33$3db3c430$b91b4c90$@uic.edu> <38C43AE248831048B6AF57F364680D3C72A23DDA@OC11EXPO32.exchange.mit.edu> Message-ID: <040801d01a41$4b69dd90$e23d98b0$@uic.edu> Here is Chomsky's response to whether or not he is a Cartesian. Not surprisingly, he categorically rejects the idea of "metaphor" as well. At least he's open to change. Now whether our subject is dead or alive that is a different question. Aria -----Original Message----- From: Noam Chomsky [mailto:chomsky@mit.edu] Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 3:16 PM To: Aria Razfar Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology The reason for the phrase "Cartesian linguistics" was explained very clearly in the opening pages of the book. No one who read at least that far could believe that I am "a Cartesian," let alone anyone who read farther. I can't account for the illiteracy of "notable folks." It's also not a metaphor. Rather, exactly as I described it, which I would repeat verbatim today. There's no need to argue against "mind-body dualism." As I've discussed repeatedly, Newton's discoveries terminated the thesis, at least in its classical form, through Descartes and beyond. Of course I've changed my views since the '50s and '60s, in fact in the past few months. That's normal in subjects that are not dead. Noam Chomsky From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Wed Dec 17 13:35:28 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 21:35:28 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology In-Reply-To: References: <99EB3359-B183-4ECC-A74C-56A1C267D7DA@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <90D44882-7263-4841-A5E7-62766B60B6DA@uniandes.edu.co> Well, in both cases they were trying to identify the basic principles in a specific area of knowledge: physics in one case, math the other. And both Chomsky and Husserl were trying to locate their respective projects in a history of rationalist thinking about the nature of mind. But I take your point. There's not much similarity between 'Lord of the Rings' and 'Lord of the Flies.' Or is there...? :) Martin On Dec 17, 2014, at 4:12 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > Russell & Whitehead (and Wittgensten) wrote Principia Mathematica and Newton wrote Principia Mathematica. That there is a resemblance, in many ways, doesn't necessarily follow. > > Ed > > On Dec 17, 2014, at 12:39 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > >> Chomsky wrote a book called 'Cartesian Linguistics.' >> >> Husserl wrote one called 'Cartesian Meditations'! >> >> Martin >> >> On Dec 17, 2014, at 1:18 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >> >>> Vera, >>> >>> When you say chomsky is a Cartesian are you saying he is a rationalist in the kantian camp? Chomsky refers to himself and his efforts as kantian. By no means would i call kant a Cartesian. I would call Husserl a Cartesian? But not Kant and Chomsky. ..see the video below: >>> >>> Watch "Noam Chomsky - Ideas of Chomsky BBC Interview (fu?" on YouTube >>> Noam Chomsky - Ideas of Chomsky BBC Interview (fu?: http://youtu.be/3LqUA7W9wfg >>> >>> >>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>> President >>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>> www.mocombeian.com >>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>> >>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Vera John-Steiner
Date:12/17/2014 12:53 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology
>>>
While Chomsky is indeed very influential his approach to language and its >>> acquisition is opposite to that of Vygotsky. He focuses on syntax while >>> Vygotsky focuses on semantics. >>> He proposes an innate language acquisition device while Vygotsky approaches >>> language developmentally. (I am repeating some of Carol's points.) He is a >>> Cartesian,while Vygotsky >>> Opposed mind/body dualism. And the list goes on. >>> I don't think he can be integrated into CHAT. >>> Vera >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Carol Macdonald >>> Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 7:37 AM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology >>> >>> Do you think Chomsky knows he is? Howard Gardner is a very generous fellow. >>> >>> On 17 December 2014 at 16:28, Martin John Packer >>> wrote: >>>> >>>> oh, I just read your second paragraph... >>>> >>>> Howard Gardner lists Noam Chomsky as one of the "founders of cognitive >>>> science," along with Jerome Bruner, John McCarthy, George Miller, and >>>> Allen Newell (1985, p. 23). >>>> >>>> Gardner, H. (1985). The mind's new science: A history of the cognitive >>>> revolution. New York: Basic Books. >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> On Dec 17, 2014, at 8:54 AM, Carol Macdonald >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Well yes, and as linguistic and psychology student I was very proud >>>>> of >>>> him >>>>> for his review, it made me laugh and laugh. But Chomsky never read >>>> Piaget >>>>> or Vygotsky. He would have been interested in Vygotsky's >>>>> interpretation >>>> of >>>>> Behaviousrism. >>>>> >>>>> As to cognitive psychology - well I suppose we should be pleased, >>>>> but Chomsky had no direct hand in that. >>>>> >>>>> Carol. >>>>> >>>>> On 17 December 2014 at 14:49, Martin John Packer < >>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> >>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Chomsky knew enough about psychology to write a devastating review of >>> B. >>>>>> F. Skinner's book 'Verbal behavior,' which still makes very >>>>>> interesting reading. And Chomsky's own book 'Syntactic Structures' >>>>>> was one of the >>>> key >>>>>> components in the emergence of cognitive psychology in the late >>>>>> 1950s, >>>> as >>>>>> Howard Gardner's book makes clear. >>>>>> >>>>>> Martin >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> -- >>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>> Developmental psycholinguist >>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>> >>> >> >> > > From ewall@umich.edu Wed Dec 17 13:39:49 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 15:39:49 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology In-Reply-To: <90D44882-7263-4841-A5E7-62766B60B6DA@uniandes.edu.co> References: <99EB3359-B183-4ECC-A74C-56A1C267D7DA@uniandes.edu.co> <90D44882-7263-4841-A5E7-62766B60B6DA@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <70578519-1468-4F04-8BE1-9420F303DE7D@umich.edu> Well, flies often fly in rings (smile). Ed On Dec 17, 2014, at 3:35 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > Well, in both cases they were trying to identify the basic principles in a specific area of knowledge: physics in one case, math the other. > > And both Chomsky and Husserl were trying to locate their respective projects in a history of rationalist thinking about the nature of mind. > > But I take your point. There's not much similarity between 'Lord of the Rings' and 'Lord of the Flies.' > > Or is there...? > > :) > > Martin > > On Dec 17, 2014, at 4:12 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > >> Russell & Whitehead (and Wittgensten) wrote Principia Mathematica and Newton wrote Principia Mathematica. That there is a resemblance, in many ways, doesn't necessarily follow. >> >> Ed >> >> On Dec 17, 2014, at 12:39 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: >> >>> Chomsky wrote a book called 'Cartesian Linguistics.' >>> >>> Husserl wrote one called 'Cartesian Meditations'! >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Dec 17, 2014, at 1:18 PM, Dr. Paul C. Mocombe wrote: >>> >>>> Vera, >>>> >>>> When you say chomsky is a Cartesian are you saying he is a rationalist in the kantian camp? Chomsky refers to himself and his efforts as kantian. By no means would i call kant a Cartesian. I would call Husserl a Cartesian? But not Kant and Chomsky. ..see the video below: >>>> >>>> Watch "Noam Chomsky - Ideas of Chomsky BBC Interview (fu?" on YouTube >>>> Noam Chomsky - Ideas of Chomsky BBC Interview (fu?: http://youtu.be/3LqUA7W9wfg >>>> >>>> >>>> Dr. Paul C. Mocombe >>>> President >>>> The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. >>>> www.mocombeian.com >>>> www.readingroomcurriculum.com >>>> www.paulcmocombe.info >>>> >>>>
-------- Original message --------
From: Vera John-Steiner
Date:12/17/2014 12:53 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity'"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology
>>>>
While Chomsky is indeed very influential his approach to language and its >>>> acquisition is opposite to that of Vygotsky. He focuses on syntax while >>>> Vygotsky focuses on semantics. >>>> He proposes an innate language acquisition device while Vygotsky approaches >>>> language developmentally. (I am repeating some of Carol's points.) He is a >>>> Cartesian,while Vygotsky >>>> Opposed mind/body dualism. And the list goes on. >>>> I don't think he can be integrated into CHAT. >>>> Vera >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Carol Macdonald >>>> Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 7:37 AM >>>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology >>>> >>>> Do you think Chomsky knows he is? Howard Gardner is a very generous fellow. >>>> >>>> On 17 December 2014 at 16:28, Martin John Packer >>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> oh, I just read your second paragraph... >>>>> >>>>> Howard Gardner lists Noam Chomsky as one of the "founders of cognitive >>>>> science," along with Jerome Bruner, John McCarthy, George Miller, and >>>>> Allen Newell (1985, p. 23). >>>>> >>>>> Gardner, H. (1985). The mind's new science: A history of the cognitive >>>>> revolution. New York: Basic Books. >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>> On Dec 17, 2014, at 8:54 AM, Carol Macdonald >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Well yes, and as linguistic and psychology student I was very proud >>>>>> of >>>>> him >>>>>> for his review, it made me laugh and laugh. But Chomsky never read >>>>> Piaget >>>>>> or Vygotsky. He would have been interested in Vygotsky's >>>>>> interpretation >>>>> of >>>>>> Behaviousrism. >>>>>> >>>>>> As to cognitive psychology - well I suppose we should be pleased, >>>>>> but Chomsky had no direct hand in that. >>>>>> >>>>>> Carol. >>>>>> >>>>>> On 17 December 2014 at 14:49, Martin John Packer < >>>>> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Chomsky knew enough about psychology to write a devastating review of >>>> B. >>>>>>> F. Skinner's book 'Verbal behavior,' which still makes very >>>>>>> interesting reading. And Chomsky's own book 'Syntactic Structures' >>>>>>> was one of the >>>>> key >>>>>>> components in the emergence of cognitive psychology in the late >>>>>>> 1950s, >>>>> as >>>>>>> Howard Gardner's book makes clear. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Martin >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>>>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor >>>> Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >> >> > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Wed Dec 17 13:46:30 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 21:46:30 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology In-Reply-To: <040801d01a41$4b69dd90$e23d98b0$@uic.edu> References: <039801d01a33$3db3c430$b91b4c90$@uic.edu> <38C43AE248831048B6AF57F364680D3C72A23DDA@OC11EXPO32.exchange.mit.edu> <040801d01a41$4b69dd90$e23d98b0$@uic.edu> Message-ID: <0CBE4C26-68FE-49F7-BE9F-00A0121B4CD8@uniandes.edu.co> Hi Aria, It would help to see the message that Noam is responding to! I don't see, for example, how metaphor crept into this discussion. (Actually, looking back through the thread, I see that this was your proposal.) I suppose a lot depends on what one means by being "a Cartesian." As I just wrote in another message, Chomsky was, I think, positioning his approach to linguistics in a tradition in which Descartes was prominent: in which one tries to figure out what makes possible a specific characteristic or ability of the mind. Chomsky asked what universal competence would be necessary to make language possible - any language. I'm not trying to attach a label to the man; but he give the book its title for a reason, and a very respectable one. Martin On Dec 17, 2014, at 4:34 PM, Aria Razfar wrote: > Here is Chomsky's response to whether or not he is a Cartesian. Not surprisingly, he categorically rejects the idea of "metaphor" as well. At least he's open to change. Now whether our subject is dead or alive that is a different question. > > Aria > > -----Original Message----- > From: Noam Chomsky [mailto:chomsky@mit.edu] > Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 3:16 PM > To: Aria Razfar > Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology > > The reason for the phrase "Cartesian linguistics" was explained very clearly in the opening pages of the book. No one who read at least that far could believe that I am "a Cartesian," let alone anyone who read farther. I can't account for the illiteracy of "notable folks." > > It's also not a metaphor. Rather, exactly as I described it, which I would repeat verbatim today. > > There's no need to argue against "mind-body dualism." As I've discussed repeatedly, Newton's discoveries terminated the thesis, at least in its classical form, through Descartes and beyond. > > Of course I've changed my views since the '50s and '60s, in fact in the past few months. That's normal in subjects that are not dead. > > Noam Chomsky > > > From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Wed Dec 17 13:51:23 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:51:23 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology Message-ID: Thank you! Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: Aria Razfar
Date:12/17/2014 4:34 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] FW: Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology
Here is Chomsky's response to whether or not he is a Cartesian. Not surprisingly, he categorically rejects the idea of "metaphor" as well. At least he's open to change. Now whether our subject is dead or alive that is a different question. Aria -----Original Message----- From: Noam Chomsky [mailto:chomsky@mit.edu] Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 3:16 PM To: Aria Razfar Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology The reason for the phrase "Cartesian linguistics" was explained very clearly in the opening pages of the book. No one who read at least that far could believe that I am "a Cartesian," let alone anyone who read farther. I can't account for the illiteracy of "notable folks." It's also not a metaphor. Rather, exactly as I described it, which I would repeat verbatim today. There's no need to argue against "mind-body dualism." As I've discussed repeatedly, Newton's discoveries terminated the thesis, at least in its classical form, through Descartes and beyond. Of course I've changed my views since the '50s and '60s, in fact in the past few months. That's normal in subjects that are not dead. Noam Chomsky From arazfar@uic.edu Wed Dec 17 13:59:12 2014 From: arazfar@uic.edu (Aria Razfar) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 15:59:12 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology In-Reply-To: <0CBE4C26-68FE-49F7-BE9F-00A0121B4CD8@uniandes.edu.co> References: <039801d01a33$3db3c430$b91b4c90$@uic.edu> <38C43AE248831048B6AF57F364680D3C72A23DDA@OC11EXPO32.exchange.mit.edu> <040801d01a41$4b69dd90$e23d98b0$@uic.edu> <0CBE4C26-68FE-49F7-BE9F-00A0121B4CD8@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <043e01d01a44$b15fac80$141f0580$@uic.edu> Hi Martin, Metaphor was my take and other cognitive linguist's take (i.e. Lakoff). I believe his rejection of "Metaphor" at least in the embodied cognition sense is rooted in the "Linguistics Wars." Several people in this thread as well others in the field of cognitive linguistics made the claim that he was and remains a Cartesian dualist. He definitely does not consider himself as such. In order to establish the field of linguistics, he had to position it within the broader arch of western enlightenment and romanticism. Hence, the title of the book. Aria Aria Razfar, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Literacy, Language, and Culture Director of Graduate Studies, Curriculum and Instruction University of Illinois at Chicago 1040 W. Harrison St. M/C 147 Chicago, IL, 60607 Director of English Learning through Mathematics, Science and Action Research (ELMSA) www.elmsa.org Webpage: http://education.uic.edu/personnel/faculty/aria-razfar-phd Tel: 312-413-8373 Fax: 312-996-8134 -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 3:47 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology Hi Aria, It would help to see the message that Noam is responding to! I don't see, for example, how metaphor crept into this discussion. (Actually, looking back through the thread, I see that this was your proposal.) I suppose a lot depends on what one means by being "a Cartesian." As I just wrote in another message, Chomsky was, I think, positioning his approach to linguistics in a tradition in which Descartes was prominent: in which one tries to figure out what makes possible a specific characteristic or ability of the mind. Chomsky asked what universal competence would be necessary to make language possible - any language. I'm not trying to attach a label to the man; but he give the book its title for a reason, and a very respectable one. Martin On Dec 17, 2014, at 4:34 PM, Aria Razfar wrote: > Here is Chomsky's response to whether or not he is a Cartesian. Not surprisingly, he categorically rejects the idea of "metaphor" as well. At least he's open to change. Now whether our subject is dead or alive that is a different question. > > Aria > > -----Original Message----- > From: Noam Chomsky [mailto:chomsky@mit.edu] > Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 3:16 PM > To: Aria Razfar > Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology > > The reason for the phrase "Cartesian linguistics" was explained very clearly in the opening pages of the book. No one who read at least that far could believe that I am "a Cartesian," let alone anyone who read farther. I can't account for the illiteracy of "notable folks." > > It's also not a metaphor. Rather, exactly as I described it, which I would repeat verbatim today. > > There's no need to argue against "mind-body dualism." As I've discussed repeatedly, Newton's discoveries terminated the thesis, at least in its classical form, through Descartes and beyond. > > Of course I've changed my views since the '50s and '60s, in fact in the past few months. That's normal in subjects that are not dead. > > Noam Chomsky > > > From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Wed Dec 17 14:17:40 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 17:17:40 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology Message-ID: <0l8204dq76xq5gp3qrko7pv8.1418854660851@email.android.com> Martin, Chomsky in cartesian linguistics is critiquing the rational linguistics of descartes' time via the lens of port royal linguistics...sorry driving right now can not go in depth with the anaylsis. Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: Martin John Packer
Date:12/17/2014 4:46 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology
Hi Aria, It would help to see the message that Noam is responding to! I don't see, for example, how metaphor crept into this discussion. (Actually, looking back through the thread, I see that this was your proposal.) I suppose a lot depends on what one means by being "a Cartesian." As I just wrote in another message, Chomsky was, I think, positioning his approach to linguistics in a tradition in which Descartes was prominent: in which one tries to figure out what makes possible a specific characteristic or ability of the mind. Chomsky asked what universal competence would be necessary to make language possible - any language. I'm not trying to attach a label to the man; but he give the book its title for a reason, and a very respectable one. Martin On Dec 17, 2014, at 4:34 PM, Aria Razfar wrote: > Here is Chomsky's response to whether or not he is a Cartesian. Not surprisingly, he categorically rejects the idea of "metaphor" as well. At least he's open to change. Now whether our subject is dead or alive that is a different question. > > Aria > > -----Original Message----- > From: Noam Chomsky [mailto:chomsky@mit.edu] > Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 3:16 PM > To: Aria Razfar > Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology > > The reason for the phrase "Cartesian linguistics" was explained very clearly in the opening pages of the book. No one who read at least that far could believe that I am "a Cartesian," let alone anyone who read farther. I can't account for the illiteracy of "notable folks." > > It's also not a metaphor. Rather, exactly as I described it, which I would repeat verbatim today. > > There's no need to argue against "mind-body dualism." As I've discussed repeatedly, Newton's discoveries terminated the thesis, at least in its classical form, through Descartes and beyond. > > Of course I've changed my views since the '50s and '60s, in fact in the past few months. That's normal in subjects that are not dead. > > Noam Chomsky > > > From lsmolucha@hotmail.com Wed Dec 17 14:18:07 2014 From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com (larry smolucha) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: , , , , , <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net>, , , , , <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com>, Message-ID: Message from Francine Smolucha: Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic and produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts. It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more than the recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can ever be imagined" (David Kellogg's most recent email.) A couple things to consider: (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination as the brain has to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the simplest level of the Gestalt Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just photographic. (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try to accurately reproduce the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, the goal of combinatory imagination is to create something new out of memories, dreams, musings, and even sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of objects and symbols. (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways that things and concepts can be combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar and flour. I can add water and it dissolves a bit But adding heat changes the combination into a pancake. [Is this synergistic?] Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more examples to put the discussion in the metaphysical realm. > Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 > From: dkellogg60@gmail.com > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the case for > Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I think it's not > just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are associationists who > are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary associationism exists and > some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. Vygotsky > has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, explain the > uniqueness of our species? > > Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels for its own > kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a Piagetian > perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true maturity as a > species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more to it than > that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of primate, and our > solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon rocks in order > to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged the same way as > any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. > > Making the case for the higher psychological functions and for language is > not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human exceptionalism. > It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for the vanguard role > of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, prolonging > childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after the sick and the > elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial organs (tools) and > even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for our species, it > is in the societies and the sectors of society where these "circuitous, > compensatory means of development" are most advanced that lead our > development as a species. The wretched of the earth always been short on > rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for material culture > generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: verily, here > the first shall be last and the last shall be first. > > I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of attention is simply the > logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says there are only two > kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So imagination is > nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, and nothing > really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when you hear the > name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there to be able to > imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work in word meaning. > > You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who was given a > crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been mixed with silver > by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold. Well, we > now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not possible to > measure the differences in water displacement that precisely. The method > that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the "principal of > buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. > > And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes palimpsest, a velum on > which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. Because > parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and written over every > century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, the pressure > of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones when the old > text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only known Greek > copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". > > Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their relationship > to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they are related to > each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite similar to the > way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. > > (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > > > I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an associationist, ?sees > > imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? > > Henry > > > > > On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > > > On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division between > > > higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because Ribot is > > an > > > associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of attention. > > > And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from forest > > to > > > farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between the two > > > great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical world of > > the > > > forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses in life > > > and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" (that > > > is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the > > farm,where > > > written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter months are > > > wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter talking > > > animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has to be > > > more voluntary. > > > > > > Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear > > > understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that underpins > > Ribot > > > here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out the > > > LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices really > > are > > > the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, there > > > isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and animal > > > imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of > > volitional > > > attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without a > > theory > > > of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's > > > distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at all. > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole wrote: > > >> > > >> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, thanks to > > all > > >> for the food for thought. > > >> > > >> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential around the > > time > > >> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had seen work > > on > > >> memory before, but not imagination. > > >> > > >> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal reproductive? > > >> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of development > > of > > >> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a relative > > >> newcomer to the topic. > > >> mike > > >> > > >> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD > > >> wrote: > > >>> > > >>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. This > > >>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some weeks > > in > > >>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that segmented the > > >>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. Puns, > > >>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) > > >>> Henry > > >>> > > >>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole wrote: > > >>>> > > >>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they are > > doing > > >>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his followers as an > > >>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so its of > > >>> course > > >>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. > > >>>> > > >>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in translation, > > seems > > >>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in this > > >>> passage, > > >>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter distinction to > > >>>> "memory." > > >>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary discourse > > >>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian colleagues have > > >>>> illustrated. > > >>>> > > >>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists who > > >>> clearly > > >>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still possible > > >> to > > >>>> include culture in it. > > >>>> > > >>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, interestingly > > >> links > > >>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" act. > > >> Parts > > >>> of > > >>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that was > > >> also > > >>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of creativity > > and > > >>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see that the > > >> two > > >>>> concepts are linked. > > >>>> > > >>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself writing. > > >>>> mike > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old > > >>> approaches > > >>>> to a pesum > > >>>> > > >>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden > > >> wrote: > > >>>>> > > >>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it may be > > >> worth > > >>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to > > >>> Imagination > > >>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between Recollection and > > >>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive Imagination, > > (2) > > >>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he says > > >> leads > > >>> to > > >>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other words, > > the > > >>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is accomplished > > >> through > > >>>>> these three grades of Imagination. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Andy > > >>>>> > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > >>>>> *Andy Blunden* > > >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> mike cole wrote: > > >>>>> > > >>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and Williams. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am > > >> trying > > >>> to > > >>>>>> mine for empirical > > >>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive > > >>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination > > develops. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that there > > must > > >>> be a > > >>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I learned > > >>> that > > >>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is linked > > >> to > > >>>>>> memory. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of anticipation > > >>> and > > >>>>>> memory. > > >>>>>> Imagine that! > > >>>>>> mike > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD > > > > >>>>>> wrote: > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination (starting > > >>> with > > >>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and provides > > a > > >>>>>>> space > > >>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. This, > > >>>>>>> coupled > > >>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground to > > take > > >>> part > > >>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with > > >> preconceptions: > > >>>>>>> Vera > > >>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian Langacker on > > >>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, > > particularly > > >>> the > > >>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of > > imagination > > >>> and > > >>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of temporality: > > >>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure), which > > >> I > > >>>>>>> think > > >>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both individual > > >>> and > > >>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > > >>>>>>> Henry > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss > > >>> wrote: > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* and the > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> analogy > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* > > >>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > > >>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion of > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> "structures > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored under > > >>> the > > >>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of modalities > > >>> that > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> hang > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing that is > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> forming > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we > > think > > >>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* > > >>>>>>>> Larry > > >>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > hshonerd@gmail.com > > >>> > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> wrote: > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, > > >>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how jazzed up > > >> I > > >>> am > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> now > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as Larry > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> construes > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various triads, > > >>> finally > > >>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of the > > >>> mind, as > > >>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa? > > >> fuera. > > >>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, > > >>>>>>>>> Henry > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole wrote: > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached are two > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> articles > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists like > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of imagination in a > > >>>>>>>>>> manner > > >>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of productive > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> imagination. I > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no intention of > > >>> doing > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> so. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the attached > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> texts. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I came > > >> upon > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> the > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked at > > >>> several > > >>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne and I > > >>>>>>>>>> argued > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> in > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of > > access > > >>> to > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> the > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. Moreover, > > >>> such > > >>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the > > >>> perception/imagination > > >>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance to > > >> Kris's > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> paper > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns > > about > > >>> the > > >>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps they > > >> will > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> prove > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> useful for those interested. > > >>>>>>>>>> mike > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> -- > > >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > > >>> with an > > >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> -- > > >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >> > > >> -- > > >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > >> > > > > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Wed Dec 17 15:11:50 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 23:11:50 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology In-Reply-To: <043e01d01a44$b15fac80$141f0580$@uic.edu> References: <039801d01a33$3db3c430$b91b4c90$@uic.edu> <38C43AE248831048B6AF57F364680D3C72A23DDA@OC11EXPO32.exchange.mit.edu> <040801d01a41$4b69dd90$e23d98b0$@uic.edu> <0CBE4C26-68FE-49F7-BE9F-00A0121B4CD8@uniandes.edu.co> <043e01d01a44$b15fac80$141f0580$@uic.edu> Message-ID: <1D18C3B0-9EA5-42E6-8764-A6973960B8B5@uniandes.edu.co> Since we have Professor Chomsky online, might we be able to ask him his opinion of Vygotsky? Martin On Dec 17, 2014, at 4:59 PM, Aria Razfar wrote: > Hi Martin, > > Metaphor was my take and other cognitive linguist's take (i.e. Lakoff). I > believe his rejection of "Metaphor" at least in the embodied cognition sense > is rooted in the "Linguistics Wars." Several people in this thread as well > others in the field of cognitive linguistics made the claim that he was and > remains a Cartesian dualist. He definitely does not consider himself as > such. In order to establish the field of linguistics, he had to position it > within the broader arch of western enlightenment and romanticism. Hence, the > title of the book. > > Aria > > Aria Razfar, Ph.D. > Associate Professor of Literacy, Language, and Culture > Director of Graduate Studies, Curriculum and Instruction > University of Illinois at Chicago > 1040 W. Harrison St. M/C 147 > Chicago, IL, 60607 > > Director of English Learning through Mathematics, Science and Action > Research (ELMSA) > www.elmsa.org > > Webpage: http://education.uic.edu/personnel/faculty/aria-razfar-phd > Tel: 312-413-8373 > Fax: 312-996-8134 > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer > Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 3:47 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology > > Hi Aria, > > It would help to see the message that Noam is responding to! I don't see, > for example, how metaphor crept into this discussion. (Actually, looking > back through the thread, I see that this was your proposal.) > > I suppose a lot depends on what one means by being "a Cartesian." As I just > wrote in another message, Chomsky was, I think, positioning his approach to > linguistics in a tradition in which Descartes was prominent: in which one > tries to figure out what makes possible a specific characteristic or ability > of the mind. Chomsky asked what universal competence would be necessary to > make language possible - any language. > > I'm not trying to attach a label to the man; but he give the book its title > for a reason, and a very respectable one. > > Martin > > On Dec 17, 2014, at 4:34 PM, Aria Razfar wrote: > >> Here is Chomsky's response to whether or not he is a Cartesian. Not > surprisingly, he categorically rejects the idea of "metaphor" as well. At > least he's open to change. Now whether our subject is dead or alive that is > a different question. >> >> Aria >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Noam Chomsky [mailto:chomsky@mit.edu] >> Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 3:16 PM >> To: Aria Razfar >> Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology >> >> The reason for the phrase "Cartesian linguistics" was explained very > clearly in the opening pages of the book. No one who read at least that far > could believe that I am "a Cartesian," let alone anyone who read farther. I > can't account for the illiteracy of "notable folks." >> >> It's also not a metaphor. Rather, exactly as I described it, which I > would repeat verbatim today. >> >> There's no need to argue against "mind-body dualism." As I've discussed > repeatedly, Newton's discoveries terminated the thesis, at least in its > classical form, through Descartes and beyond. >> >> Of course I've changed my views since the '50s and '60s, in fact in the > past few months. That's normal in subjects that are not dead. >> >> Noam Chomsky >> >> >> > > > From smago@uga.edu Wed Dec 17 15:16:04 2014 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 23:16:04 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] FW: Poetry and Art Call for Submissions Spring 2015 In-Reply-To: <1418853311048.56802@uga.edu> References: <1418853311048.56802@uga.edu> Message-ID: ?Hello JoLLE friends, Please see the updated call for submissions for the JoLLE Poetry and Arts section, tailored to fit the theme of Embodied and/or Participatory Literacies for the Winter Conference. Please share the call with listservs, colleagues, and students. Thanks! Journal of Language and Literacy Education Follow JoLLE on twitter @Jolle_uga [cid:image001.jpg@01CEA4AC.71367E90] -------------- next part -------------- -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... 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Name: JoLLE Poetry and Art Call S15.docx Type: application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document Size: 39740 bytes Desc: JoLLE Poetry and Art Call S15.docx Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141217/d35a91f9/attachment.bin From arazfar@uic.edu Wed Dec 17 16:59:13 2014 From: arazfar@uic.edu (Aria Razfar) Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 18:59:13 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] FW: Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology In-Reply-To: <38C43AE248831048B6AF57F364680D3C72A23F69@OC11EXPO32.exchange.mit.edu> References: <039801d01a33$3db3c430$b91b4c90$@uic.edu> <38C43AE248831048B6AF57F364680D3C72A23DDA@OC11EXPO32.exchange.mit.edu> <040801d01a41$4b69dd90$e23d98b0$@uic.edu> <0CBE4C26-68FE-49F7-BE9F-00A0121B4CD8@uniandes.edu.co> <043e01d01a44$b15fac80$141f0580$@uic.edu> <1D18C3B0-9EA5-42E6-8764-A6973960B8B5@uniandes.edu.co> <050701d01a51$084de460$18e9ad20$@uic.edu> <38C43AE248831048B6AF57F364680D3C72A23F69@OC11EXPO32.exchange.mit.edu> Message-ID: <057001d01a5d$d743a640$85caf2c0$@uic.edu> Hi Martin, See below. He finds Vygotsky's work "quite interesting." Let's see if he elaborates. I find his persepctive on the "Linguistic Wars" also interesting. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistics_Wars Aria -----Original Message----- From: Noam Chomsky [mailto:chomsky@mit.edu] Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 6:09 PM To: Aria Razfar Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology The "linguistic wars" are largely an invention of overheated imaginations of those who thought they were fighting them. If you check the record you'll discover that I barely participated, and didn't consider them any different from interchanges within what's claimed to be "my side" of the non-existent wars. Vygotsky did quite interesting work. -----Original Message----- From: Aria Razfar [mailto:arazfar@uic.edu] Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 6:28 PM To: Noam Chomsky Cc: arazfar@uic.edu Subject: FW: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology See question below re: "opinion on Vygotsky"? -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 5:12 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology Since we have Professor Chomsky online, might we be able to ask him his opinion of Vygotsky? Martin On Dec 17, 2014, at 4:59 PM, Aria Razfar wrote: > Hi Martin, > > Metaphor was my take and other cognitive linguist's take (i.e. > Lakoff). I believe his rejection of "Metaphor" at least in the > embodied cognition sense is rooted in the "Linguistics Wars." Several > people in this thread as well others in the field of cognitive > linguistics made the claim that he was and remains a Cartesian > dualist. He definitely does not consider himself as such. In order to > establish the field of linguistics, he had to position it within the > broader arch of western enlightenment and romanticism. Hence, the > title of the book. > > Aria > > Aria Razfar, Ph.D. > Associate Professor of Literacy, Language, and Culture Director of > Graduate Studies, Curriculum and Instruction University of Illinois at > Chicago > 1040 W. Harrison St. M/C 147 > Chicago, IL, 60607 > > Director of English Learning through Mathematics, Science and Action > Research (ELMSA) www.elmsa.org > > Webpage: http://education.uic.edu/personnel/faculty/aria-razfar-phd > Tel: 312-413-8373 > Fax: 312-996-8134 > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John > Packer > Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 3:47 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology > > Hi Aria, > > It would help to see the message that Noam is responding to! I don't > see, for example, how metaphor crept into this discussion. (Actually, > looking back through the thread, I see that this was your proposal.) > > I suppose a lot depends on what one means by being "a Cartesian." As I > just wrote in another message, Chomsky was, I think, positioning his > approach to linguistics in a tradition in which Descartes was > prominent: in which one tries to figure out what makes possible a > specific characteristic or ability of the mind. Chomsky asked what > universal competence would be necessary to make language possible - > any language. > > I'm not trying to attach a label to the man; but he give the book its > title for a reason, and a very respectable one. > > Martin > > On Dec 17, 2014, at 4:34 PM, Aria Razfar wrote: > >> Here is Chomsky's response to whether or not he is a Cartesian. Not > surprisingly, he categorically rejects the idea of "metaphor" as well. > At least he's open to change. Now whether our subject is dead or alive > that is a different question. >> >> Aria >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Noam Chomsky [mailto:chomsky@mit.edu] >> Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 3:16 PM >> To: Aria Razfar >> Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology >> >> The reason for the phrase "Cartesian linguistics" was explained very > clearly in the opening pages of the book. No one who read at least > that far could believe that I am "a Cartesian," let alone anyone who > read farther. I can't account for the illiteracy of "notable folks." >> >> It's also not a metaphor. Rather, exactly as I described it, which I > would repeat verbatim today. >> >> There's no need to argue against "mind-body dualism." As I've >> discussed > repeatedly, Newton's discoveries terminated the thesis, at least in > its classical form, through Descartes and beyond. >> >> Of course I've changed my views since the '50s and '60s, in fact in >> the > past few months. That's normal in subjects that are not dead. >> >> Noam Chomsky >> >> >> > > > From annalisa@unm.edu Wed Dec 17 22:21:54 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2014 06:21:54 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology In-Reply-To: <057001d01a5d$d743a640$85caf2c0$@uic.edu> References: <039801d01a33$3db3c430$b91b4c90$@uic.edu> <38C43AE248831048B6AF57F364680D3C72A23DDA@OC11EXPO32.exchange.mit.edu> <040801d01a41$4b69dd90$e23d98b0$@uic.edu> <0CBE4C26-68FE-49F7-BE9F-00A0121B4CD8@uniandes.edu.co> <043e01d01a44$b15fac80$141f0580$@uic.edu> <1D18C3B0-9EA5-42E6-8764-A6973960B8B5@uniandes.edu.co> <050701d01a51$084de460$18e9ad20$@uic.edu> <38C43AE248831048B6AF57F364680D3C72A23F69@OC11EXPO32.exchange.mit.edu>, <057001d01a5d$d743a640$85caf2c0$@uic.edu> Message-ID: <1418883714019.64843@unm.edu> I find Chopin quite interesting too. From lsmolucha@hotmail.com Thu Dec 18 01:45:09 2014 From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com (larry smolucha) Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2014 03:45:09 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: , , , , , , , , , , <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net>, , , , , , , , , , <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com>, , , Message-ID: Message from Francine Smolucha: Forgive me for replying to myself - In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic possibilities: In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in Thought and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into English 1962] Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' value of the two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech vocalization). He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that are flammable gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor a gas. [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century European Developmental Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' hence the Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of Piaget's Genetic Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and synthesis based on metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in Vygotsky's example of H2O. > From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > Message from Francine Smolucha: > > Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic > and produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts. > It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more than the > recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can ever be imagined" > (David Kellogg's most recent email.) > > A couple things to consider: > > (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination as the brain has > to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the simplest level of the Gestalt > Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). > > (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just photographic. > > (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try to accurately reproduce > the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, the goal of combinatory > imagination is to create something new out of memories, dreams, musings, and even > sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of objects and symbols. > > (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways that things and concepts can be > combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar and flour. > I can add water and it dissolves a bit > But adding heat changes the combination into a pancake. > [Is this synergistic?] > > Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more examples to put the discussion > in the metaphysical realm. > > > > Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 > > From: dkellogg60@gmail.com > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the case for > > Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I think it's not > > just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are associationists who > > are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary associationism exists and > > some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. Vygotsky > > has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, explain the > > uniqueness of our species? > > > > Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels for its own > > kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a Piagetian > > perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true maturity as a > > species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more to it than > > that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of primate, and our > > solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon rocks in order > > to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged the same way as > > any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. > > > > Making the case for the higher psychological functions and for language is > > not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human exceptionalism. > > It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for the vanguard role > > of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, prolonging > > childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after the sick and the > > elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial organs (tools) and > > even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for our species, it > > is in the societies and the sectors of society where these "circuitous, > > compensatory means of development" are most advanced that lead our > > development as a species. The wretched of the earth always been short on > > rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for material culture > > generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: verily, here > > the first shall be last and the last shall be first. > > > > I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of attention is simply the > > logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says there are only two > > kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So imagination is > > nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, and nothing > > really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when you hear the > > name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there to be able to > > imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work in word meaning. > > > > You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who was given a > > crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been mixed with silver > > by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold. Well, we > > now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not possible to > > measure the differences in water displacement that precisely. The method > > that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the "principal of > > buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. > > > > And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes palimpsest, a velum on > > which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. Because > > parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and written over every > > century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, the pressure > > of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones when the old > > text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only known Greek > > copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". > > > > Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their relationship > > to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they are related to > > each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite similar to the > > way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. > > > > (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) > > > > David Kellogg > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > > > > > I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an associationist, ?sees > > > imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? > > > Henry > > > > > > > On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > > > > > On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division between > > > > higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because Ribot is > > > an > > > > associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of attention. > > > > And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from forest > > > to > > > > farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between the two > > > > great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical world of > > > the > > > > forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses in life > > > > and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" (that > > > > is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the > > > farm,where > > > > written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter months are > > > > wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter talking > > > > animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has to be > > > > more voluntary. > > > > > > > > Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear > > > > understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that underpins > > > Ribot > > > > here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out the > > > > LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices really > > > are > > > > the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, there > > > > isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and animal > > > > imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of > > > volitional > > > > attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without a > > > theory > > > > of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's > > > > distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at all. > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole wrote: > > > >> > > > >> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, thanks to > > > all > > > >> for the food for thought. > > > >> > > > >> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential around the > > > time > > > >> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had seen work > > > on > > > >> memory before, but not imagination. > > > >> > > > >> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal reproductive? > > > >> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of development > > > of > > > >> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a relative > > > >> newcomer to the topic. > > > >> mike > > > >> > > > >> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD > > > >> wrote: > > > >>> > > > >>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. This > > > >>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some weeks > > > in > > > >>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that segmented the > > > >>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. Puns, > > > >>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) > > > >>> Henry > > > >>> > > > >>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole wrote: > > > >>>> > > > >>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they are > > > doing > > > >>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his followers as an > > > >>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so its of > > > >>> course > > > >>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in translation, > > > seems > > > >>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in this > > > >>> passage, > > > >>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter distinction to > > > >>>> "memory." > > > >>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary discourse > > > >>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian colleagues have > > > >>>> illustrated. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists who > > > >>> clearly > > > >>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still possible > > > >> to > > > >>>> include culture in it. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, interestingly > > > >> links > > > >>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" act. > > > >> Parts > > > >>> of > > > >>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that was > > > >> also > > > >>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of creativity > > > and > > > >>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see that the > > > >> two > > > >>>> concepts are linked. > > > >>>> > > > >>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself writing. > > > >>>> mike > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old > > > >>> approaches > > > >>>> to a pesum > > > >>>> > > > >>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden > > > >> wrote: > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it may be > > > >> worth > > > >>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to > > > >>> Imagination > > > >>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between Recollection and > > > >>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive Imagination, > > > (2) > > > >>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he says > > > >> leads > > > >>> to > > > >>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other words, > > > the > > > >>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is accomplished > > > >> through > > > >>>>> these three grades of Imagination. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Andy > > > >>>>> > > > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > >>>>> *Andy Blunden* > > > >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> mike cole wrote: > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and Williams. > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am > > > >> trying > > > >>> to > > > >>>>>> mine for empirical > > > >>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive > > > >>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination > > > develops. > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that there > > > must > > > >>> be a > > > >>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I learned > > > >>> that > > > >>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is linked > > > >> to > > > >>>>>> memory. > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of anticipation > > > >>> and > > > >>>>>> memory. > > > >>>>>> Imagine that! > > > >>>>>> mike > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD > > > > > > >>>>>> wrote: > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination (starting > > > >>> with > > > >>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and provides > > > a > > > >>>>>>> space > > > >>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. This, > > > >>>>>>> coupled > > > >>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground to > > > take > > > >>> part > > > >>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with > > > >> preconceptions: > > > >>>>>>> Vera > > > >>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian Langacker on > > > >>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, > > > particularly > > > >>> the > > > >>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of > > > imagination > > > >>> and > > > >>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of temporality: > > > >>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure), which > > > >> I > > > >>>>>>> think > > > >>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both individual > > > >>> and > > > >>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > > > >>>>>>> Henry > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss > > > >>> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* and the > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> analogy > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* > > > >>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > > > >>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion of > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> "structures > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored under > > > >>> the > > > >>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of modalities > > > >>> that > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> hang > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing that is > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> forming > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we > > > think > > > >>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* > > > >>>>>>>> Larry > > > >>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > hshonerd@gmail.com > > > >>> > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> wrote: > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, > > > >>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how jazzed up > > > >> I > > > >>> am > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> now > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as Larry > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> construes > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various triads, > > > >>> finally > > > >>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of the > > > >>> mind, as > > > >>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa? > > > >> fuera. > > > >>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, > > > >>>>>>>>> Henry > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached are two > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> articles > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists like > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of imagination in a > > > >>>>>>>>>> manner > > > >>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of productive > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> imagination. I > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no intention of > > > >>> doing > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> so. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the attached > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> texts. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I came > > > >> upon > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> the > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked at > > > >>> several > > > >>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne and I > > > >>>>>>>>>> argued > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> in > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of > > > access > > > >>> to > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> the > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. Moreover, > > > >>> such > > > >>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the > > > >>> perception/imagination > > > >>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance to > > > >> Kris's > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> paper > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns > > > about > > > >>> the > > > >>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps they > > > >> will > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> prove > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> useful for those interested. > > > >>>>>>>>>> mike > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> -- > > > >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > > > >>> with an > > > >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>> -- > > > >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > > >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >> > > > >> -- > > > >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > > > >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Thu Dec 18 01:54:15 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2014 20:54:15 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: , , , , , , , , , , <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net>, , , , , , , , , , <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com>, , , Message-ID: <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the metaphorical use of prepositions like: - "there is some value IN your argument" - "I'd like to go OVER that again" - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" - "Let's go THROUGH that again" and so on. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ larry smolucha wrote: > Message from Francine Smolucha: > > Forgive me for replying to myself - > > In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic possibilities: > > In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in Thought > and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into English 1962] > Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' value of the > two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech vocalization). > He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that are flammable > gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor a gas. > > [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century European Developmental > Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' hence the > Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of Piaget's Genetic > Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. > > And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and synthesis based on > metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in Vygotsky's example of H2O. > > >> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com >> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >> >> Message from Francine Smolucha: >> >> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic >> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts. >> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more than the >> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can ever be imagined" >> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) >> >> A couple things to consider: >> >> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination as the brain has >> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the simplest level of the Gestalt >> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). >> >> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just photographic. >> >> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try to accurately reproduce >> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, the goal of combinatory >> imagination is to create something new out of memories, dreams, musings, and even >> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of objects and symbols. >> >> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways that things and concepts can be >> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar and flour. >> I can add water and it dissolves a bit >> But adding heat changes the combination into a pancake. >> [Is this synergistic?] >> >> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more examples to put the discussion >> in the metaphysical realm. >> >> >> >>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 >>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com >>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>> >>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the case for >>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I think it's not >>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are associationists who >>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary associationism exists and >>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. Vygotsky >>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, explain the >>> uniqueness of our species? >>> >>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels for its own >>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a Piagetian >>> perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true maturity as a >>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more to it than >>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of primate, and our >>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon rocks in order >>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged the same way as >>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. >>> >>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and for language is >>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human exceptionalism. >>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for the vanguard role >>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, prolonging >>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after the sick and the >>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial organs (tools) and >>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for our species, it >>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these "circuitous, >>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that lead our >>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always been short on >>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for material culture >>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: verily, here >>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. >>> >>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of attention is simply the >>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says there are only two >>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So imagination is >>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, and nothing >>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when you hear the >>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there to be able to >>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work in word meaning. >>> >>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who was given a >>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been mixed with silver >>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold. Well, we >>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not possible to >>> measure the differences in water displacement that precisely. The method >>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the "principal of >>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. >>> >>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes palimpsest, a velum on >>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. Because >>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and written over every >>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, the pressure >>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones when the old >>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only known Greek >>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". >>> >>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their relationship >>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they are related to >>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite similar to the >>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. >>> >>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>> >>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>> >>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an associationist, ?sees >>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? >>>> Henry >>>> >>>> >>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>> >>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division between >>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because Ribot is >>>>> >>>> an >>>> >>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of attention. >>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from forest >>>>> >>>> to >>>> >>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between the two >>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical world of >>>>> >>>> the >>>> >>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses in life >>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" (that >>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the >>>>> >>>> farm,where >>>> >>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter months are >>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter talking >>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has to be >>>>> more voluntary. >>>>> >>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear >>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that underpins >>>>> >>>> Ribot >>>> >>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out the >>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices really >>>>> >>>> are >>>> >>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, there >>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and animal >>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of >>>>> >>>> volitional >>>> >>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without a >>>>> >>>> theory >>>> >>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's >>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at all. >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>> >>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, thanks to >>>>>> >>>> all >>>> >>>>>> for the food for thought. >>>>>> >>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential around the >>>>>> >>>> time >>>> >>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had seen work >>>>>> >>>> on >>>> >>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. >>>>>> >>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal reproductive? >>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of development >>>>>> >>>> of >>>> >>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a relative >>>>>> newcomer to the topic. >>>>>> mike >>>>>> >>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. This >>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some weeks >>>>>>> >>>> in >>>> >>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that segmented the >>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. Puns, >>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) >>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they are >>>>>>>> >>>> doing >>>> >>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his followers as an >>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so its of >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> course >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in translation, >>>>>>>> >>>> seems >>>> >>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in this >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> passage, >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter distinction to >>>>>>>> "memory." >>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary discourse >>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian colleagues have >>>>>>>> illustrated. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists who >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> clearly >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still possible >>>>>>>> >>>>>> to >>>>>> >>>>>>>> include culture in it. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, interestingly >>>>>>>> >>>>>> links >>>>>> >>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" act. >>>>>>>> >>>>>> Parts >>>>>> >>>>>>> of >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that was >>>>>>>> >>>>>> also >>>>>> >>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of creativity >>>>>>>> >>>> and >>>> >>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see that the >>>>>>>> >>>>>> two >>>>>> >>>>>>>> concepts are linked. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself writing. >>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> approaches >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> to a pesum >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it may be >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> worth >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> Imagination >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between Recollection and >>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive Imagination, >>>>>>>>> >>>> (2) >>>> >>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he says >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> leads >>>>>> >>>>>>> to >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other words, >>>>>>>>> >>>> the >>>> >>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is accomplished >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> through >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and Williams. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> trying >>>>>> >>>>>>> to >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical >>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive >>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination >>>>>>>>>> >>>> develops. >>>> >>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that there >>>>>>>>>> >>>> must >>>> >>>>>>> be a >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I learned >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> that >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is linked >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> to >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of anticipation >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> and >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! >>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination (starting >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> with >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and provides >>>>>>>>>>> >>>> a >>>> >>>>>>>>>>> space >>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. This, >>>>>>>>>>> coupled >>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground to >>>>>>>>>>> >>>> take >>>> >>>>>>> part >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> preconceptions: >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Vera >>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian Langacker on >>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, >>>>>>>>>>> >>>> particularly >>>> >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of >>>>>>>>>>> >>>> imagination >>>> >>>>>>> and >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of temporality: >>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure), which >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> I >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both individual >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> and >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. >>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* and the >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> analogy >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* >>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. >>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion of >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> "structures >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored under >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of modalities >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> that >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> hang >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing that is >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> forming >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> think >>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* >>>>>>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how jazzed up >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> I >>>>>> >>>>>>> am >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> now >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as Larry >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> construes >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various triads, >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> finally >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of the >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> mind, as >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa? >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> fuera. >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, >>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached are two >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> articles >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists like >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of imagination in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of productive >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no intention of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> doing >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> so. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the attached >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I came >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> upon >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked at >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> several >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne and I >>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> access >>>> >>>>>>> to >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. Moreover, >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> such >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> perception/imagination >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> Kris's >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> paper >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> about >>>> >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps they >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> will >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> prove >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> with an >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> > From boblake@georgiasouthern.edu Thu Dec 18 07:57:36 2014 From: boblake@georgiasouthern.edu (Robert Lake) Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2014 10:57:36 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> Message-ID: Hi Francine, I am so glad to see you sharing your insightful reading of Vygotsky on imagination and metaphor. It was actually the connections between imagination, inner speech and metaphor as the means to personal agency that first drew me into Vygotsky studies. Vera John-Steiner, Lois Holzman, Dot Robbins and you were the first people I talked to about this work. In 1936, I.A. Richards published his *Philosophy of Rhetoric*, a work that grew directly out of Vico?s thinking. His thesis was that "thought is metaphoric, and proceeds by comparison, and the metaphors of language derive therefrom? (p. 94). In other words, he believed that at the base of all thinking, there is a metaphoric relationship. Richards takes this one step further when he suggests that metaphors are ?cognitively irreducible? (Johnson, 1981, p. 19) A metaphoric expression therefore becomes a newly created vehicle of meaning which loses potency when seeking to make a literal statement out of its component parts. In 2001, Maxine Greene wrote something similar. "By means of making metaphors, imagination can reorient consciousness through its disclosure of patterns, relationships, shadows, and lights, and slivers of sound that are wholly unexpected, ?new? in some wonderful fashion? (Greene, 2001, p 154). For example,try reducing this back to literal meaning :-) The Road Not Taken By Robert Frost Two roads diverged in a yellow wood, And sorry I could not travel both And be one traveler, long I stood And looked down one as far as I could To where it bent in the undergrowth; Then took the other, as just as fair, And having perhaps the better claim, Because it was grassy and wanted wear; Though as for that the passing there Had worn them really about the same, And both that morning equally lay In leaves no step had trodden black. Oh, I kept the first for another day! Yet knowing how way leads on to way, I doubted if I should ever come back. I shall be telling this with a sigh Somewhere ages and ages hence: Two roads diverged in a wood, and I? I took the one less traveled by, And that has made all the difference. Retrieved from : http://www.poetryfoundation.org/poem/173536 References Greene, M. (2001). *Variations on a blue guitar*. New York, NY: Teachers College Press. Johnson, M. (1981). *Philosophical perspectives on metaphor.* Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Richards,I.A. (1936). *The philosophy of rhetoric. * Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 4:45 AM, larry smolucha wrote: > > Message from Francine Smolucha: > > Forgive me for replying to myself - > > In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic possibilities: > > In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in Thought > and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into English 1962] > Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' value of > the > two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech vocalization). > He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that are > flammable > gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor a gas. > > [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century European > Developmental > Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' hence the > Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of Piaget's > Genetic > Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. > > And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and synthesis based on > metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in Vygotsky's example > of H2O. > > > From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > Message from Francine Smolucha: > > > > Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic > > and produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts. > > It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more than the > > recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can ever be > imagined" > > (David Kellogg's most recent email.) > > > > A couple things to consider: > > > > (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination as the brain > has > > to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the simplest level of > the Gestalt > > Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). > > > > (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just photographic. > > > > (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try to > accurately reproduce > > the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, the goal > of combinatory > > imagination is to create something new out of memories, dreams, musings, > and even > > sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of objects and > symbols. > > > > (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways that > things and concepts can be > > combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar and flour. > > I can add water and it > dissolves a bit > > But adding heat changes the > combination into a pancake. > > [Is this synergistic?] > > > > Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more examples to > put the discussion > > in the metaphysical realm. > > > > > > > Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 > > > From: dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > > > Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the case for > > > Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I think it's not > > > just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are associationists > who > > > are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary associationism > exists and > > > some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. > Vygotsky > > > has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, explain the > > > uniqueness of our species? > > > > > > Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels for its own > > > kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a Piagetian > > > perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true maturity as a > > > species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more to it than > > > that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of primate, and > our > > > solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon rocks in > order > > > to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged the same way > as > > > any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. > > > > > > Making the case for the higher psychological functions and for > language is > > > not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human > exceptionalism. > > > It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for the vanguard > role > > > of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, prolonging > > > childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after the sick and > the > > > elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial organs > (tools) and > > > even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for our > species, it > > > is in the societies and the sectors of society where these "circuitous, > > > compensatory means of development" are most advanced that lead our > > > development as a species. The wretched of the earth always been short > on > > > rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for material culture > > > generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: verily, > here > > > the first shall be last and the last shall be first. > > > > > > I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of attention is > simply the > > > logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says there are only > two > > > kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So imagination > is > > > nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, and > nothing > > > really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when you hear > the > > > name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there to be able > to > > > imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work in word > meaning. > > > > > > You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who was given a > > > crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been mixed with > silver > > > by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold. Well, > we > > > now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not possible to > > > measure the differences in water displacement that precisely. The > method > > > that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the "principal of > > > buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. > > > > > > And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes palimpsest, a velum > on > > > which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. Because > > > parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and written over > every > > > century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, the > pressure > > > of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones when the > old > > > text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only known > Greek > > > copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". > > > > > > Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their > relationship > > > to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they are related > to > > > each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite similar > to the > > > way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. > > > > > > (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD > wrote: > > > > > > > > I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an associationist, > ?sees > > > > imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? > > > > Henry > > > > > > > > > On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division > between > > > > > higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because > Ribot is > > > > an > > > > > associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of > attention. > > > > > And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from > forest > > > > to > > > > > farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between > the two > > > > > great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical > world of > > > > the > > > > > forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses > in life > > > > > and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" > (that > > > > > is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the > > > > farm,where > > > > > written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter > months are > > > > > wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter > talking > > > > > animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has > to be > > > > > more voluntary. > > > > > > > > > > Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear > > > > > understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that > underpins > > > > Ribot > > > > > here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out > the > > > > > LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices > really > > > > are > > > > > the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, > there > > > > > isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and > animal > > > > > imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of > > > > volitional > > > > > attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without > a > > > > theory > > > > > of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's > > > > > distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at > all. > > > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > > > On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole wrote: > > > > >> > > > > >> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, > thanks to > > > > all > > > > >> for the food for thought. > > > > >> > > > > >> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential > around the > > > > time > > > > >> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had > seen work > > > > on > > > > >> memory before, but not imagination. > > > > >> > > > > >> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal > reproductive? > > > > >> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of > development > > > > of > > > > >> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a > relative > > > > >> newcomer to the topic. > > > > >> mike > > > > >> > > > > >> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > hshonerd@gmail.com> > > > > >> wrote: > > > > >>> > > > > >>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. > This > > > > >>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some > weeks > > > > in > > > > >>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that > segmented the > > > > >>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. > Puns, > > > > >>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) > > > > >>> Henry > > > > >>> > > > > >>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole wrote: > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they > are > > > > doing > > > > >>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his > followers as an > > > > >>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so > its of > > > > >>> course > > > > >>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in > translation, > > > > seems > > > > >>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in > this > > > > >>> passage, > > > > >>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter > distinction to > > > > >>>> "memory." > > > > >>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary > discourse > > > > >>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian > colleagues have > > > > >>>> illustrated. > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists > who > > > > >>> clearly > > > > >>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still > possible > > > > >> to > > > > >>>> include culture in it. > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, > interestingly > > > > >> links > > > > >>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" > act. > > > > >> Parts > > > > >>> of > > > > >>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that > was > > > > >> also > > > > >>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of > creativity > > > > and > > > > >>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see > that the > > > > >> two > > > > >>>> concepts are linked. > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself > writing. > > > > >>>> mike > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old > > > > >>> approaches > > > > >>>> to a pesum > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < > ablunden@mira.net> > > > > >> wrote: > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it > may be > > > > >> worth > > > > >>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to > > > > >>> Imagination > > > > >>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between > Recollection and > > > > >>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive > Imagination, > > > > (2) > > > > >>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he > says > > > > >> leads > > > > >>> to > > > > >>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other > words, > > > > the > > > > >>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is > accomplished > > > > >> through > > > > >>>>> these three grades of Imagination. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> Andy > > > > >>>>> > > > > >> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > >>>>> *Andy Blunden* > > > > >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> mike cole wrote: > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and > Williams. > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i > am > > > > >> trying > > > > >>> to > > > > >>>>>> mine for empirical > > > > >>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of > productive > > > > >>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination > > > > develops. > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that > there > > > > must > > > > >>> be a > > > > >>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I > learned > > > > >>> that > > > > >>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is > linked > > > > >> to > > > > >>>>>> memory. > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of > anticipation > > > > >>> and > > > > >>>>>> memory. > > > > >>>>>> Imagine that! > > > > >>>>>> mike > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > hshonerd@gmail.com > > > > > > > > > >>>>>> wrote: > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination > (starting > > > > >>> with > > > > >>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and > provides > > > > a > > > > >>>>>>> space > > > > >>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. > This, > > > > >>>>>>> coupled > > > > >>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground > to > > > > take > > > > >>> part > > > > >>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with > > > > >> preconceptions: > > > > >>>>>>> Vera > > > > >>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian > Langacker on > > > > >>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, > > > > particularly > > > > >>> the > > > > >>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of > > > > imagination > > > > >>> and > > > > >>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of > temporality: > > > > >>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic > structure), which > > > > >> I > > > > >>>>>>> think > > > > >>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both > individual > > > > >>> and > > > > >>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > > > > >>>>>>> Henry > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < > lpscholar2@gmail.com> > > > > >>> wrote: > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* > and the > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> analogy > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* > > > > >>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > > > > >>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his > notion of > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> "structures > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is > explored under > > > > >>> the > > > > >>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of > modalities > > > > >>> that > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> hang > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing > that is > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> forming > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if > we > > > > think > > > > >>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* > > > > >>>>>>>> Larry > > > > >>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > > hshonerd@gmail.com > > > > >>> > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> wrote: > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, > > > > >>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how > jazzed up > > > > >> I > > > > >>> am > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> now > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as > Larry > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> construes > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various > triads, > > > > >>> finally > > > > >>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of > the > > > > >>> mind, as > > > > >>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega > pa? > > > > >> fuera. > > > > >>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, > > > > >>>>>>>>> Henry > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole > wrote: > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached > are two > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> articles > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists > like > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of > imagination in a > > > > >>>>>>>>>> manner > > > > >>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of > productive > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> imagination. I > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no > intention of > > > > >>> doing > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> so. > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the > attached > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> texts. > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I > came > > > > >> upon > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> the > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely > linked at > > > > >>> several > > > > >>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, > Ettienne and I > > > > >>>>>>>>>> argued > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> in > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of > > > > access > > > > >>> to > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> the > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. > Moreover, > > > > >>> such > > > > >>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the > > > > >>> perception/imagination > > > > >>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance > to > > > > >> Kris's > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> paper > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to > concerns > > > > about > > > > >>> the > > > > >>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps > they > > > > >> will > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> prove > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> useful for those interested. > > > > >>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> -- > > > > >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > science > > > > >>> with an > > > > >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> -- > > > > >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > with an > > > > >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >> > > > > >> -- > > > > >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > with an > > > > >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- *Robert Lake Ed.D.*Associate Professor Social Foundations of Education Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading Georgia Southern University Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group P. O. Box 8144 Phone: (912) 478-0355 Fax: (912) 478-5382 Statesboro, GA 30460 From annalisa@unm.edu Thu Dec 18 08:52:23 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2014 16:52:23 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> References: , , , , , , , , , , <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net>, , , , , , , , , , <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com>, , , , <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> Message-ID: <1418921542083.21274@unm.edu> What is the metaphor for "Yes!" ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden Sent: Thursday, December 18, 2014 2:54 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the metaphorical use of prepositions like: - "there is some value IN your argument" - "I'd like to go OVER that again" - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" - "Let's go THROUGH that again" and so on. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Thu Dec 18 08:59:41 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2014 16:59:41 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> References: , , , , , , , , , , <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net>, , , , , , , , , , <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com>, , , <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> Message-ID: Lakoff and Johnson have lots about this, Andy. Martin Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors we live by. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). The metaphorical structure of the human conceptual system. Cognitive Science, 4(2), 195-208. On Dec 18, 2014, at 4:54 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the metaphorical use of prepositions like: > - "there is some value IN your argument" > - "I'd like to go OVER that again" > - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" > - "Let's go THROUGH that again" > > and so on. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > larry smolucha wrote: >> Message from Francine Smolucha: >> >> Forgive me for replying to myself - >> >> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic possibilities: >> >> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in Thought >> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into English 1962] >> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' value of the >> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech vocalization). >> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that are flammable >> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor a gas. >> >> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century European Developmental >> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' hence the >> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of Piaget's Genetic >> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. >> >> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and synthesis based on >> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in Vygotsky's example of H2O. >> >> >>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com >>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>> >>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >>> >>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic >>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts. >>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more than the >>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can ever be imagined" >>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) >>> >>> A couple things to consider: >>> >>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination as the brain has >>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the simplest level of the Gestalt >>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). >>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just photographic. >>> >>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try to accurately reproduce >>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, the goal of combinatory >>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, dreams, musings, and even >>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of objects and symbols. >>> >>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways that things and concepts can be >>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar and flour. >>> I can add water and it dissolves a bit >>> But adding heat changes the combination into a pancake. >>> [Is this synergistic?] >>> >>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more examples to put the discussion >>> in the metaphysical realm. >>> >>> >>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 >>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com >>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>> >>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the case for >>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I think it's not >>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are associationists who >>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary associationism exists and >>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. Vygotsky >>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, explain the >>>> uniqueness of our species? >>>> >>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels for its own >>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a Piagetian >>>> perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true maturity as a >>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more to it than >>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of primate, and our >>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon rocks in order >>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged the same way as >>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. >>>> >>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and for language is >>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human exceptionalism. >>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for the vanguard role >>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, prolonging >>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after the sick and the >>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial organs (tools) and >>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for our species, it >>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these "circuitous, >>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that lead our >>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always been short on >>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for material culture >>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: verily, here >>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. >>>> >>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of attention is simply the >>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says there are only two >>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So imagination is >>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, and nothing >>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when you hear the >>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there to be able to >>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work in word meaning. >>>> >>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who was given a >>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been mixed with silver >>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold. Well, we >>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not possible to >>>> measure the differences in water displacement that precisely. The method >>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the "principal of >>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. >>>> >>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes palimpsest, a velum on >>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. Because >>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and written over every >>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, the pressure >>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones when the old >>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only known Greek >>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". >>>> >>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their relationship >>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they are related to >>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite similar to the >>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. >>>> >>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>> >>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>>> >>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an associationist, ?sees >>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? >>>>> Henry >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division between >>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because Ribot is >>>>>> >>>>> an >>>>> >>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of attention. >>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from forest >>>>>> >>>>> to >>>>> >>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between the two >>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical world of >>>>>> >>>>> the >>>>> >>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses in life >>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" (that >>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the >>>>>> >>>>> farm,where >>>>> >>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter months are >>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter talking >>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has to be >>>>>> more voluntary. >>>>>> >>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear >>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that underpins >>>>>> >>>>> Ribot >>>>> >>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out the >>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices really >>>>>> >>>>> are >>>>> >>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, there >>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and animal >>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of >>>>>> >>>>> volitional >>>>> >>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without a >>>>>> >>>>> theory >>>>> >>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's >>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at all. >>>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>> >>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, thanks to >>>>>>> >>>>> all >>>>> >>>>>>> for the food for thought. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential around the >>>>>>> >>>>> time >>>>> >>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had seen work >>>>>>> >>>>> on >>>>> >>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal reproductive? >>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of development >>>>>>> >>>>> of >>>>> >>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a relative >>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. >>>>>>> mike >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. This >>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some weeks >>>>>>>> >>>>> in >>>>> >>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that segmented the >>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. Puns, >>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) >>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they are >>>>>>>>> >>>>> doing >>>>> >>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his followers as an >>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so its of >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> course >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in translation, >>>>>>>>> >>>>> seems >>>>> >>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in this >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> passage, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter distinction to >>>>>>>>> "memory." >>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary discourse >>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian colleagues have >>>>>>>>> illustrated. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists who >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> clearly >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still possible >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> to >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> include culture in it. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, interestingly >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> links >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" act. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> Parts >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that was >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> also >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of creativity >>>>>>>>> >>>>> and >>>>> >>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see that the >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> two >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself writing. >>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> approaches >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> to a pesum >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it may be >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> worth >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Imagination >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between Recollection and >>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive Imagination, >>>>>>>>>> >>>>> (2) >>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he says >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> leads >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other words, >>>>>>>>>> >>>>> the >>>>> >>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is accomplished >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> through >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and Williams. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> trying >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical >>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive >>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> develops. >>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that there >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> must >>>>> >>>>>>>> be a >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I learned >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is linked >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> to >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of anticipation >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! >>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination (starting >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and provides >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> a >>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> space >>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. This, >>>>>>>>>>>> coupled >>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground to >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> take >>>>> >>>>>>>> part >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> preconceptions: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Vera >>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian Langacker on >>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> particularly >>>>> >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> imagination >>>>> >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of temporality: >>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure), which >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> I >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both individual >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. >>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* and the >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> analogy >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* >>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. >>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion of >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> "structures >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored under >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of modalities >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> hang >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing that is >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> forming >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> think >>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* >>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how jazzed up >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> I >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> am >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> now >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> construes >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various triads, >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> finally >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> mind, as >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa? >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> fuera. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached are two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists like >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of imagination in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of productive >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no intention of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the attached >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I came >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> upon >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked at >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> several >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne and I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> access >>>>> >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. Moreover, >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> such >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> perception/imagination >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> Kris's >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> about >>>>> >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> will >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> with an >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>> >> > From annalisa@unm.edu Thu Dec 18 09:11:20 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2014 17:11:20 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: , , , , , , , , , , <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net>, , , , , , , , , , <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com>, , , <5492A447.7030004@mira.net>, Message-ID: <1418922679801.66748@unm.edu> Andy and Martin, A more current book by the metaphoric caped crusaders is Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its challenge to Western Thought (1999) Basic Books. I don't know if there is one that has come out since, but this one is excellent. I love this book. Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Martin John Packer Sent: Thursday, December 18, 2014 9:59 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination Lakoff and Johnson have lots about this, Andy. Martin Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors we live by. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). The metaphorical structure of the human conceptual system. Cognitive Science, 4(2), 195-208. On Dec 18, 2014, at 4:54 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the metaphorical use of prepositions like: > - "there is some value IN your argument" > - "I'd like to go OVER that again" > - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" > - "Let's go THROUGH that again" > > and so on. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > larry smolucha wrote: >> Message from Francine Smolucha: >> >> Forgive me for replying to myself - >> >> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic possibilities: >> >> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in Thought >> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into English 1962] >> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' value of the >> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech vocalization). >> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that are flammable >> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor a gas. >> >> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century European Developmental >> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' hence the >> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of Piaget's Genetic >> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. >> >> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and synthesis based on >> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in Vygotsky's example of H2O. >> >> >>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com >>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>> >>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >>> >>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic >>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts. >>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more than the >>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can ever be imagined" >>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) >>> >>> A couple things to consider: >>> >>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination as the brain has >>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the simplest level of the Gestalt >>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). >>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just photographic. >>> >>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try to accurately reproduce >>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, the goal of combinatory >>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, dreams, musings, and even >>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of objects and symbols. >>> >>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways that things and concepts can be >>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar and flour. >>> I can add water and it dissolves a bit >>> But adding heat changes the combination into a pancake. >>> [Is this synergistic?] >>> >>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more examples to put the discussion >>> in the metaphysical realm. >>> >>> >>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 >>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com >>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>> >>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the case for >>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I think it's not >>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are associationists who >>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary associationism exists and >>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. Vygotsky >>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, explain the >>>> uniqueness of our species? >>>> >>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels for its own >>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a Piagetian >>>> perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true maturity as a >>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more to it than >>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of primate, and our >>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon rocks in order >>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged the same way as >>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. >>>> >>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and for language is >>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human exceptionalism. >>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for the vanguard role >>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, prolonging >>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after the sick and the >>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial organs (tools) and >>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for our species, it >>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these "circuitous, >>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that lead our >>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always been short on >>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for material culture >>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: verily, here >>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. >>>> >>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of attention is simply the >>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says there are only two >>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So imagination is >>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, and nothing >>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when you hear the >>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there to be able to >>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work in word meaning. >>>> >>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who was given a >>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been mixed with silver >>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold. Well, we >>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not possible to >>>> measure the differences in water displacement that precisely. The method >>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the "principal of >>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. >>>> >>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes palimpsest, a velum on >>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. Because >>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and written over every >>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, the pressure >>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones when the old >>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only known Greek >>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". >>>> >>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their relationship >>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they are related to >>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite similar to the >>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. >>>> >>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>> >>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>>> >>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an associationist, ?sees >>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? >>>>> Henry >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division between >>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because Ribot is >>>>>> >>>>> an >>>>> >>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of attention. >>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from forest >>>>>> >>>>> to >>>>> >>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between the two >>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical world of >>>>>> >>>>> the >>>>> >>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses in life >>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" (that >>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the >>>>>> >>>>> farm,where >>>>> >>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter months are >>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter talking >>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has to be >>>>>> more voluntary. >>>>>> >>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear >>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that underpins >>>>>> >>>>> Ribot >>>>> >>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out the >>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices really >>>>>> >>>>> are >>>>> >>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, there >>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and animal >>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of >>>>>> >>>>> volitional >>>>> >>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without a >>>>>> >>>>> theory >>>>> >>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's >>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at all. >>>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>> >>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, thanks to >>>>>>> >>>>> all >>>>> >>>>>>> for the food for thought. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential around the >>>>>>> >>>>> time >>>>> >>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had seen work >>>>>>> >>>>> on >>>>> >>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal reproductive? >>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of development >>>>>>> >>>>> of >>>>> >>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a relative >>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. >>>>>>> mike >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. This >>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some weeks >>>>>>>> >>>>> in >>>>> >>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that segmented the >>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. Puns, >>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) >>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they are >>>>>>>>> >>>>> doing >>>>> >>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his followers as an >>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so its of >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> course >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in translation, >>>>>>>>> >>>>> seems >>>>> >>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in this >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> passage, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter distinction to >>>>>>>>> "memory." >>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary discourse >>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian colleagues have >>>>>>>>> illustrated. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists who >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> clearly >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still possible >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> to >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> include culture in it. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, interestingly >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> links >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" act. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> Parts >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that was >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> also >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of creativity >>>>>>>>> >>>>> and >>>>> >>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see that the >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> two >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself writing. >>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> approaches >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> to a pesum >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it may be >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> worth >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Imagination >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between Recollection and >>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive Imagination, >>>>>>>>>> >>>>> (2) >>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he says >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> leads >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other words, >>>>>>>>>> >>>>> the >>>>> >>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is accomplished >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> through >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and Williams. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> trying >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical >>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive >>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> develops. >>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that there >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> must >>>>> >>>>>>>> be a >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I learned >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is linked >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> to >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of anticipation >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! >>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination (starting >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and provides >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> a >>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> space >>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. This, >>>>>>>>>>>> coupled >>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground to >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> take >>>>> >>>>>>>> part >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> preconceptions: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Vera >>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian Langacker on >>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> particularly >>>>> >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> imagination >>>>> >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of temporality: >>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure), which >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> I >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both individual >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. >>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* and the >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> analogy >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* >>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. >>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion of >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> "structures >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored under >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of modalities >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> hang >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing that is >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> forming >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> think >>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* >>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how jazzed up >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> I >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> am >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> now >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> construes >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various triads, >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> finally >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> mind, as >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa? >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> fuera. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached are two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists like >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of imagination in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of productive >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no intention of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the attached >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I came >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> upon >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked at >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> several >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne and I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> access >>>>> >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. Moreover, >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> such >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> perception/imagination >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> Kris's >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> about >>>>> >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> will >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> with an >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>> >> > From annalisa@unm.edu Thu Dec 18 09:42:33 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2014 17:42:33 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology In-Reply-To: <1418883714019.64843@unm.edu> References: <039801d01a33$3db3c430$b91b4c90$@uic.edu> <38C43AE248831048B6AF57F364680D3C72A23DDA@OC11EXPO32.exchange.mit.edu> <040801d01a41$4b69dd90$e23d98b0$@uic.edu> <0CBE4C26-68FE-49F7-BE9F-00A0121B4CD8@uniandes.edu.co> <043e01d01a44$b15fac80$141f0580$@uic.edu> <1D18C3B0-9EA5-42E6-8764-A6973960B8B5@uniandes.edu.co> <050701d01a51$084de460$18e9ad20$@uic.edu> <38C43AE248831048B6AF57F364680D3C72A23F69@OC11EXPO32.exchange.mit.edu>, <057001d01a5d$d743a640$85caf2c0$@uic.edu>, <1418883714019.64843@unm.edu> Message-ID: <1418924552837.64699@unm.edu> My former professor Paul Livingston has posted some new papers on his Academia.edu page, and this one seems particularly relevant to this discussion. Hope he doesn't mind me posting this link! https://www.academia.edu/9820768/The_Sense_of_Finitude_and_the_Finitude_of_Sense I will allow the audience to make its own infinite connections. :) Kind regards, Annalisa From hshonerd@gmail.com Thu Dec 18 09:58:46 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2014 10:58:46 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> References: <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <, > <, > <, > <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> Message-ID: I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly embodied, proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to linguistics (For example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on ?lexicon?: nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, being part of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and Halliday see no clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, lexico-grammar. (Lo and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar, adding the ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings are great data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of that? In translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced? Henry > On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the metaphorical use of prepositions like: > - "there is some value IN your argument" > - "I'd like to go OVER that again" > - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" > - "Let's go THROUGH that again" > > and so on. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > larry smolucha wrote: >> Message from Francine Smolucha: >> >> Forgive me for replying to myself - >> >> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic possibilities: >> >> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in Thought >> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into English 1962] >> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' value of the >> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech vocalization). >> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that are flammable >> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor a gas. >> >> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century European Developmental >> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' hence the >> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of Piaget's Genetic >> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. >> >> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and synthesis based on >> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in Vygotsky's example of H2O. >> >> >>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com >>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>> >>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >>> >>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic >>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts. >>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more than the >>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can ever be imagined" >>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) >>> >>> A couple things to consider: >>> >>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination as the brain has >>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the simplest level of the Gestalt >>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). >>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just photographic. >>> >>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try to accurately reproduce >>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, the goal of combinatory >>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, dreams, musings, and even >>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of objects and symbols. >>> >>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways that things and concepts can be >>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar and flour. >>> I can add water and it dissolves a bit >>> But adding heat changes the combination into a pancake. >>> [Is this synergistic?] >>> >>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more examples to put the discussion >>> in the metaphysical realm. >>> >>> >>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 >>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com >>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>> >>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the case for >>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I think it's not >>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are associationists who >>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary associationism exists and >>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. Vygotsky >>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, explain the >>>> uniqueness of our species? >>>> >>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels for its own >>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a Piagetian >>>> perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true maturity as a >>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more to it than >>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of primate, and our >>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon rocks in order >>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged the same way as >>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. >>>> >>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and for language is >>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human exceptionalism. >>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for the vanguard role >>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, prolonging >>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after the sick and the >>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial organs (tools) and >>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for our species, it >>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these "circuitous, >>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that lead our >>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always been short on >>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for material culture >>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: verily, here >>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. >>>> >>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of attention is simply the >>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says there are only two >>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So imagination is >>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, and nothing >>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when you hear the >>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there to be able to >>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work in word meaning. >>>> >>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who was given a >>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been mixed with silver >>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold. Well, we >>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not possible to >>>> measure the differences in water displacement that precisely. The method >>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the "principal of >>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. >>>> >>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes palimpsest, a velum on >>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. Because >>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and written over every >>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, the pressure >>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones when the old >>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only known Greek >>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". >>>> >>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their relationship >>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they are related to >>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite similar to the >>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. >>>> >>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>> >>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>>> >>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an associationist, ?sees >>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? >>>>> Henry >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division between >>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because Ribot is >>>>>> >>>>> an >>>>> >>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of attention. >>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from forest >>>>>> >>>>> to >>>>> >>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between the two >>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical world of >>>>>> >>>>> the >>>>> >>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses in life >>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" (that >>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the >>>>>> >>>>> farm,where >>>>> >>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter months are >>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter talking >>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has to be >>>>>> more voluntary. >>>>>> >>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear >>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that underpins >>>>>> >>>>> Ribot >>>>> >>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out the >>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices really >>>>>> >>>>> are >>>>> >>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, there >>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and animal >>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of >>>>>> >>>>> volitional >>>>> >>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without a >>>>>> >>>>> theory >>>>> >>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's >>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at all. >>>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>> >>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, thanks to >>>>>>> >>>>> all >>>>> >>>>>>> for the food for thought. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential around the >>>>>>> >>>>> time >>>>> >>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had seen work >>>>>>> >>>>> on >>>>> >>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal reproductive? >>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of development >>>>>>> >>>>> of >>>>> >>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a relative >>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. >>>>>>> mike >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. This >>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some weeks >>>>>>>> >>>>> in >>>>> >>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that segmented the >>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. Puns, >>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) >>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they are >>>>>>>>> >>>>> doing >>>>> >>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his followers as an >>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so its of >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> course >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in translation, >>>>>>>>> >>>>> seems >>>>> >>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in this >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> passage, >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter distinction to >>>>>>>>> "memory." >>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary discourse >>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian colleagues have >>>>>>>>> illustrated. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists who >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> clearly >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still possible >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> to >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> include culture in it. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, interestingly >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> links >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" act. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> Parts >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that was >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> also >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of creativity >>>>>>>>> >>>>> and >>>>> >>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see that the >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> two >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself writing. >>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> approaches >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> to a pesum >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it may be >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> worth >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Imagination >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between Recollection and >>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive Imagination, >>>>>>>>>> >>>>> (2) >>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he says >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> leads >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other words, >>>>>>>>>> >>>>> the >>>>> >>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is accomplished >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> through >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and Williams. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> trying >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical >>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive >>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> develops. >>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that there >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> must >>>>> >>>>>>>> be a >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I learned >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is linked >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> to >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of anticipation >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! >>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination (starting >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and provides >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> a >>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> space >>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. This, >>>>>>>>>>>> coupled >>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground to >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> take >>>>> >>>>>>>> part >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> preconceptions: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Vera >>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian Langacker on >>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> particularly >>>>> >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> imagination >>>>> >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of temporality: >>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure), which >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> I >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both individual >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. >>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* and the >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> analogy >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* >>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. >>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion of >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> "structures >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored under >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of modalities >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> hang >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing that is >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> forming >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> think >>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* >>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how jazzed up >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> I >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> am >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> now >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> construes >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various triads, >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> finally >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> mind, as >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa? >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> fuera. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached are two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists like >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of imagination in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of productive >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no intention of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the attached >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I came >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> upon >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked at >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> several >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne and I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> access >>>>> >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. Moreover, >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> such >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> perception/imagination >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> Kris's >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> about >>>>> >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> will >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> with an >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>> >> > From hshonerd@gmail.com Thu Dec 18 10:12:58 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2014 11:12:58 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> Message-ID: Good on Robert! For me, Robert Frost?s poem connects with the quote from Shakespeare in Andy?s article, Activity, Power, and Human Flourishing: > ?There is a tide in the affairs of men. > Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune; > Omitted, all the voyage of their life > Is bound in shallows and in miseries." > [Julius Caesar, Act 4] The difference is that Frost is talking about the individual, Shakespeare (and Andy) about creative collaboration. I love this thread! Henry > On Dec 18, 2014, at 8:57 AM, Robert Lake wrote: > > Hi Francine, > I am so glad to see you sharing your insightful reading of Vygotsky on > imagination and metaphor. It was actually the connections between > imagination, inner speech and metaphor as > the means to personal agency that first drew me into Vygotsky studies. > Vera John-Steiner, Lois Holzman, Dot Robbins and you were the first people > I talked to about this work. > In 1936, I.A. Richards published his *Philosophy of Rhetoric*, a work that > grew directly out of Vico?s thinking. His thesis was that "thought is > metaphoric, and proceeds by comparison, and the metaphors of language > derive therefrom? (p. 94). In other words, he believed that at the base of > all thinking, there is a metaphoric relationship. Richards takes this one > step further when he suggests that metaphors are ?cognitively irreducible? > (Johnson, 1981, p. 19) A metaphoric expression therefore becomes a newly > created vehicle of meaning which loses potency when seeking to make a > literal statement out of its component parts. In 2001, Maxine Greene wrote > something similar. "By means of making metaphors, imagination can reorient > consciousness through its disclosure of patterns, relationships, shadows, > and lights, and slivers of sound that are wholly unexpected, ?new? in some > wonderful fashion? (Greene, 2001, p 154). > > For example,try reducing this back to literal meaning :-) > > The Road Not Taken > By Robert Frost > Two roads diverged in a yellow wood, > And sorry I could not travel both > And be one traveler, long I stood > And looked down one as far as I could > To where it bent in the undergrowth; > > Then took the other, as just as fair, > And having perhaps the better claim, > Because it was grassy and wanted wear; > Though as for that the passing there > Had worn them really about the same, > > And both that morning equally lay > In leaves no step had trodden black. > Oh, I kept the first for another day! > Yet knowing how way leads on to way, > I doubted if I should ever come back. > > I shall be telling this with a sigh > Somewhere ages and ages hence: > Two roads diverged in a wood, and I? > I took the one less traveled by, > And that has made all the difference. > Retrieved from : http://www.poetryfoundation.org/poem/173536 > > References > > Greene, M. (2001). *Variations on a blue guitar*. New York, NY: Teachers > College Press. > > Johnson, M. (1981). *Philosophical perspectives on metaphor.* Minneapolis, > MN: University of Minnesota Press. > > Richards,I.A. (1936). *The philosophy of rhetoric. * Oxford, GB: Oxford > University Press. > > > > On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 4:45 AM, larry smolucha > wrote: >> >> Message from Francine Smolucha: >> >> Forgive me for replying to myself - >> >> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic possibilities: >> >> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in Thought >> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into English 1962] >> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' value of >> the >> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech vocalization). >> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that are >> flammable >> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor a gas. >> >> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century European >> Developmental >> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' hence the >> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of Piaget's >> Genetic >> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. >> >> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and synthesis based on >> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in Vygotsky's example >> of H2O. >> >>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com >>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>> >>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >>> >>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic >>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts. >>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more than the >>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can ever be >> imagined" >>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) >>> >>> A couple things to consider: >>> >>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination as the brain >> has >>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the simplest level of >> the Gestalt >>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). >>> >>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just photographic. >>> >>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try to >> accurately reproduce >>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, the goal >> of combinatory >>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, dreams, musings, >> and even >>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of objects and >> symbols. >>> >>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways that >> things and concepts can be >>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar and flour. >>> I can add water and it >> dissolves a bit >>> But adding heat changes the >> combination into a pancake. >>> [Is this synergistic?] >>> >>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more examples to >> put the discussion >>> in the metaphysical realm. >>> >>> >>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 >>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com >>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>> >>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the case for >>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I think it's not >>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are associationists >> who >>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary associationism >> exists and >>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. >> Vygotsky >>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, explain the >>>> uniqueness of our species? >>>> >>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels for its own >>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a Piagetian >>>> perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true maturity as a >>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more to it than >>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of primate, and >> our >>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon rocks in >> order >>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged the same way >> as >>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. >>>> >>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and for >> language is >>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human >> exceptionalism. >>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for the vanguard >> role >>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, prolonging >>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after the sick and >> the >>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial organs >> (tools) and >>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for our >> species, it >>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these "circuitous, >>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that lead our >>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always been short >> on >>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for material culture >>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: verily, >> here >>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. >>>> >>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of attention is >> simply the >>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says there are only >> two >>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So imagination >> is >>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, and >> nothing >>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when you hear >> the >>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there to be able >> to >>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work in word >> meaning. >>>> >>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who was given a >>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been mixed with >> silver >>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold. Well, >> we >>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not possible to >>>> measure the differences in water displacement that precisely. The >> method >>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the "principal of >>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. >>>> >>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes palimpsest, a velum >> on >>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. Because >>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and written over >> every >>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, the >> pressure >>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones when the >> old >>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only known >> Greek >>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". >>>> >>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their >> relationship >>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they are related >> to >>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite similar >> to the >>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. >>>> >>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>> >>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD >> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an associationist, >> ?sees >>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? >>>>> Henry >>>>> >>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg >> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division >> between >>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because >> Ribot is >>>>> an >>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of >> attention. >>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from >> forest >>>>> to >>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between >> the two >>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical >> world of >>>>> the >>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses >> in life >>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" >> (that >>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the >>>>> farm,where >>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter >> months are >>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter >> talking >>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has >> to be >>>>>> more voluntary. >>>>>> >>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear >>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that >> underpins >>>>> Ribot >>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out >> the >>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices >> really >>>>> are >>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, >> there >>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and >> animal >>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of >>>>> volitional >>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without >> a >>>>> theory >>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's >>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at >> all. >>>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>> >>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, >> thanks to >>>>> all >>>>>>> for the food for thought. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential >> around the >>>>> time >>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had >> seen work >>>>> on >>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal >> reproductive? >>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of >> development >>>>> of >>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a >> relative >>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. >>>>>>> mike >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >> hshonerd@gmail.com> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. >> This >>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some >> weeks >>>>> in >>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that >> segmented the >>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. >> Puns, >>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) >>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they >> are >>>>> doing >>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his >> followers as an >>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so >> its of >>>>>>>> course >>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in >> translation, >>>>> seems >>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in >> this >>>>>>>> passage, >>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter >> distinction to >>>>>>>>> "memory." >>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary >> discourse >>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian >> colleagues have >>>>>>>>> illustrated. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists >> who >>>>>>>> clearly >>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still >> possible >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> include culture in it. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, >> interestingly >>>>>>> links >>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" >> act. >>>>>>> Parts >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that >> was >>>>>>> also >>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of >> creativity >>>>> and >>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see >> that the >>>>>>> two >>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself >> writing. >>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old >>>>>>>> approaches >>>>>>>>> to a pesum >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < >> ablunden@mira.net> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it >> may be >>>>>>> worth >>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to >>>>>>>> Imagination >>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between >> Recollection and >>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive >> Imagination, >>>>> (2) >>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he >> says >>>>>>> leads >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other >> words, >>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is >> accomplished >>>>>>> through >>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and >> Williams. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i >> am >>>>>>> trying >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical >>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of >> productive >>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination >>>>> develops. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that >> there >>>>> must >>>>>>>> be a >>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I >> learned >>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is >> linked >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of >> anticipation >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! >>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination >> (starting >>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and >> provides >>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>> space >>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. >> This, >>>>>>>>>>>> coupled >>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground >> to >>>>> take >>>>>>>> part >>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with >>>>>>> preconceptions: >>>>>>>>>>>> Vera >>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian >> Langacker on >>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, >>>>> particularly >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of >>>>> imagination >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of >> temporality: >>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic >> structure), which >>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both >> individual >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. >>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < >> lpscholar2@gmail.com> >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* >> and the >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> analogy >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* >>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. >>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his >> notion of >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> "structures >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is >> explored under >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of >> modalities >>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> hang >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing >> that is >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> forming >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if >> we >>>>> think >>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* >>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how >> jazzed up >>>>>>> I >>>>>>>> am >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> now >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as >> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> construes >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various >> triads, >>>>>>>> finally >>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of >> the >>>>>>>> mind, as >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega >> pa? >>>>>>> fuera. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole >> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached >> are two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists >> like >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of >> imagination in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of >> productive >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no >> intention of >>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the >> attached >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I >> came >>>>>>> upon >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely >> linked at >>>>>>>> several >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, >> Ettienne and I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of >>>>> access >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. >> Moreover, >>>>>>>> such >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the >>>>>>>> perception/imagination >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance >> to >>>>>>> Kris's >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to >> concerns >>>>> about >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps >> they >>>>>>> will >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural >> science >>>>>>>> with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >> with an >>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >> with an >>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>> >> > > > > -- > > *Robert Lake Ed.D.*Associate Professor > Social Foundations of Education > Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading > Georgia Southern University > Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group > P. O. Box 8144 > Phone: (912) 478-0355 > Fax: (912) 478-5382 > Statesboro, GA 30460 From hshonerd@gmail.com Thu Dec 18 10:17:29 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2014 11:17:29 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: <1418921542083.21274@unm.edu> References: <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <, > <, > <, > <, > <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> <1418921542083.21274@unm.edu> Message-ID: As in getting to YES? Helps with imagination and creativity. H > On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:52 AM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > What is the metaphor for "Yes!" > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Andy Blunden > Sent: Thursday, December 18, 2014 2:54 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the metaphorical use of prepositions like: > > - "there is some value IN your argument" > - "I'd like to go OVER that again" > - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" > - "Let's go THROUGH that again" > > and so on. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Thu Dec 18 10:30:37 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2014 10:30:37 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: <1418922679801.66748@unm.edu> References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> <1418922679801.66748@unm.edu> Message-ID: Robert, I want to push your comment towards Mike's exploration of *rising from the ground AND returning to the ground* You wrote: " In other words, he believed that at the base of all thinking, there is a metaphoric relationship. Richards takes this one step further when he suggests that metaphors are ?cognitively irreducible' " It is the notion of *irreducuible* and its relation to "the literal". The relation OF "the metaphoric" AND t*the literal* - [the rising and falling]. I once again want to bring in Raymond Williams and his notion of effective historical *styles* that grounds our notions of the fact/fiction boundary and what is on one side and what is on the other side. I am suggesting that the interesting phenomena are in the PERMEABLE boundary markings [the imaginal place of gaps and gap-filling] . I wonder if what is irreducible is THIS MOVEMENT ACROSS THE GAPS. Each specific historically effected socially situated consciousness trans -verses this "gap" by trans-verse-ing the gap within the border lands using our imaginal *constructions* [in other theories we would say the imaginal *cultivations*] Performing [moving] within BOTH sedimented AND emerging consciousness It seems to me that our socially situated relation to the *imaginal* and the *literal* may be moving THROUGH OR BEYOND OR INTO OR WITHIN a sea change in the relation of fact/fiction border lands. Turning to Vico and Goethe I read as a trans-verse-al movement [or performance]. In the book *Carnal Hermeneutics* Goethe's "in the beginning is the Deed" is trans-lated into the motto of the book by BONDING *beginning* AND *deed* together. The motto becomes: "in the beginning was embodied sociality" A quick reference to *the third space* in Kris' article on nondominant performances. I read her as *cultivating* a new radical phenomenological embodied sociality that is trans-lating and trans-versing the current border lands. Living WITHIN THIS *third space* as a radical re-visioning of our current modernist *style* Larry On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 9:11 AM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > Andy and Martin, > > A more current book by the metaphoric caped crusaders is Philosophy in the > Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its challenge to Western Thought (1999) Basic > Books. I don't know if there is one that has come out since, but this one > is excellent. > > I love this book. > > Annalisa > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Martin John Packer > Sent: Thursday, December 18, 2014 9:59 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > Lakoff and Johnson have lots about this, Andy. > > Martin > > Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors we live by. Chicago: > University of Chicago Press. > > Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). The metaphorical structure of the human > conceptual system. Cognitive Science, 4(2), 195-208. > > > On Dec 18, 2014, at 4:54 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the metaphorical > use of prepositions like: > > - "there is some value IN your argument" > > - "I'd like to go OVER that again" > > - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" > > - "Let's go THROUGH that again" > > > > and so on. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > larry smolucha wrote: > >> Message from Francine Smolucha: > >> > >> Forgive me for replying to myself - > >> > >> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic possibilities: > >> > >> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in Thought > >> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into English > 1962] > >> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' value > of the > >> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech vocalization). > >> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that are > flammable > >> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor a gas. > >> > >> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century European > Developmental > >> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' hence the > >> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of Piaget's > Genetic > >> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. > >> > >> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and synthesis based > on > >> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in Vygotsky's > example of H2O. > >> > >> > >>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com > >>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > >>> > >>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > >>> > >>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic > >>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts. > >>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more than the > >>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can ever be > imagined" > >>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) > >>> > >>> A couple things to consider: > >>> > >>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination as the > brain has > >>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the simplest level > of the Gestalt > >>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). > >>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just photographic. > >>> > >>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try to > accurately reproduce > >>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, the goal > of combinatory > >>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, dreams, > musings, and even > >>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of objects > and symbols. > >>> > >>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways that > things and concepts can be > >>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar and flour. > >>> I can add water and it > dissolves a bit > >>> But adding heat changes the > combination into a pancake. > >>> [Is this synergistic?] > >>> > >>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more examples > to put the discussion > >>> in the metaphysical realm. > >>> > >>> > >>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 > >>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com > >>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > >>>> > >>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the case for > >>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I think it's > not > >>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are > associationists who > >>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary associationism > exists and > >>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. > Vygotsky > >>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, explain > the > >>>> uniqueness of our species? > >>>> > >>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels for its > own > >>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a Piagetian > >>>> perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true maturity as a > >>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more to it than > >>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of primate, and > our > >>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon rocks in > order > >>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged the same > way as > >>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. > >>>> > >>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and for > language is > >>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human > exceptionalism. > >>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for the > vanguard role > >>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, prolonging > >>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after the sick > and the > >>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial organs > (tools) and > >>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for our > species, it > >>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these > "circuitous, > >>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that lead our > >>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always been short > on > >>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for material > culture > >>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: verily, > here > >>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. > >>>> > >>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of attention is > simply the > >>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says there are > only two > >>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So imagination > is > >>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, and > nothing > >>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when you hear > the > >>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there to be > able to > >>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work in word > meaning. > >>>> > >>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who was given a > >>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been mixed with > silver > >>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold. > Well, we > >>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not possible to > >>>> measure the differences in water displacement that precisely. The > method > >>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the "principal of > >>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. > >>>> > >>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes palimpsest, a > velum on > >>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. Because > >>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and written over > every > >>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, the > pressure > >>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones when the > old > >>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only known > Greek > >>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". > >>>> > >>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their > relationship > >>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they are > related to > >>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite similar > to the > >>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. > >>>> > >>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) > >>>> > >>>> David Kellogg > >>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >>>> > >>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD > wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an associationist, > ?sees > >>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? > >>>>> Henry > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division > between > >>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because > Ribot is > >>>>>> > >>>>> an > >>>>> > >>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of > attention. > >>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from > forest > >>>>>> > >>>>> to > >>>>> > >>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between > the two > >>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical > world of > >>>>>> > >>>>> the > >>>>> > >>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses > in life > >>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" > (that > >>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the > >>>>>> > >>>>> farm,where > >>>>> > >>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter > months are > >>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter > talking > >>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has > to be > >>>>>> more voluntary. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear > >>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that underpins > >>>>>> > >>>>> Ribot > >>>>> > >>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out > the > >>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices > really > >>>>>> > >>>>> are > >>>>> > >>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, > there > >>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and > animal > >>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of > >>>>>> > >>>>> volitional > >>>>> > >>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without a > >>>>>> > >>>>> theory > >>>>> > >>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's > >>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at all. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, > thanks to > >>>>>>> > >>>>> all > >>>>> > >>>>>>> for the food for thought. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential around > the > >>>>>>> > >>>>> time > >>>>> > >>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had seen > work > >>>>>>> > >>>>> on > >>>>> > >>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal > reproductive? > >>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of > development > >>>>>>> > >>>>> of > >>>>> > >>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a > relative > >>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. > >>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > hshonerd@gmail.com> > >>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. > This > >>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some > weeks > >>>>>>>> > >>>>> in > >>>>> > >>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that > segmented the > >>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. Puns, > >>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) > >>>>>>>> Henry > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole wrote: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they are > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>> doing > >>>>> > >>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his followers > as an > >>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so its > of > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> course > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in translation, > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>> seems > >>>>> > >>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in > this > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> passage, > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter distinction > to > >>>>>>>>> "memory." > >>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary > discourse > >>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian colleagues > have > >>>>>>>>> illustrated. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists > who > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> clearly > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still > possible > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> to > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> include culture in it. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, > interestingly > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> links > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" > act. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Parts > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that > was > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> also > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of > creativity > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>> and > >>>>> > >>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see that > the > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> two > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself > writing. > >>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> approaches > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> to a pesum > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden > > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it may > be > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> worth > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Imagination > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between > Recollection and > >>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive > Imagination, > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> (2) > >>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he > says > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> leads > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other > words, > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> the > >>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is accomplished > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> through > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and > Williams. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> trying > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical > >>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive > >>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> develops. > >>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that > there > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> must > >>>>> > >>>>>>>> be a > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I > learned > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> that > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is > linked > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> to > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> memory. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of > anticipation > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> memory. > >>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! > >>>>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > hshonerd@gmail.com > >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination > (starting > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> with > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and > provides > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> a > >>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> space > >>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. > This, > >>>>>>>>>>>> coupled > >>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground > to > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> take > >>>>> > >>>>>>>> part > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> preconceptions: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Vera > >>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian > Langacker on > >>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> particularly > >>>>> > >>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> imagination > >>>>> > >>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of > temporality: > >>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure), > which > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> I > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> think > >>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both > individual > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > >>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < > lpscholar2@gmail.com> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* > and the > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> analogy > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion > of > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> "structures > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored > under > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of > modalities > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> that > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> hang > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing > that is > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> forming > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> think > >>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry > >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com > >>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how > jazzed up > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> I > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> am > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> now > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as > Larry > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> construes > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various > triads, > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> finally > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of > the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> mind, as > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa? > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> fuera. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole > wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached > are two > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists > like > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of > imagination in a > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of > productive > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no > intention of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> doing > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the > attached > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I > came > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> upon > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked > at > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> several > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne > and I > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> in > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> access > >>>>> > >>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. > Moreover, > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> such > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> perception/imagination > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance > to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Kris's > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> about > >>>>> > >>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps > they > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> will > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > science > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> with an > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > with an > >>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > with an > >>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>> > >> > > > > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Thu Dec 18 10:43:55 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2014 10:43:55 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> Message-ID: Dear Colleagues. Might it be appropriate to start another thread on metaphor? My basic starting point is the idea that basic perceptual processes ineluctably require imagination...... measured in milliseconds. Metaphor and linguistic mediation is for sure an essential topic here. I want to hold on to the Suvorov metaphor of imagination as lifting off from the world and returning to it again. (If the Suvorov reference is not familiar I will post relevant paper). A thought: Might it be possible to parse Francine's last message into subtopics while not discouraging cross subtopic conversations? Trying to hold all the threads in my hand. Slow in So Cal. mike On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly embodied, > proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to linguistics (For > example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on ?lexicon?: > nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, being part > of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and Halliday see no > clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, lexico-grammar. (Lo > and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar, adding the > ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings are great > data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of that? In > translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced? > Henry > > > > > On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > > the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the metaphorical > use of prepositions like: > > - "there is some value IN your argument" > > - "I'd like to go OVER that again" > > - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" > > - "Let's go THROUGH that again" > > > > and so on. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > larry smolucha wrote: > >> Message from Francine Smolucha: > >> > >> Forgive me for replying to myself - > >> > >> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic possibilities: > >> > >> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in Thought > >> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into English > 1962] > >> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' value > of the > >> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech vocalization). > >> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that are > flammable > >> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor a gas. > >> > >> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century European > Developmental > >> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' hence the > >> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of Piaget's > Genetic > >> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. > >> > >> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and synthesis based > on > >> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in Vygotsky's > example of H2O. > >> > >> > >>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com > >>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > >>> > >>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > >>> > >>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic > >>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts. > >>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more than the > >>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can ever be > imagined" > >>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) > >>> > >>> A couple things to consider: > >>> > >>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination as the > brain has > >>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the simplest level > of the Gestalt > >>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). > >>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just photographic. > >>> > >>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try to > accurately reproduce > >>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, the goal > of combinatory > >>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, dreams, > musings, and even > >>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of objects > and symbols. > >>> > >>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways that > things and concepts can be > >>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar and flour. > >>> I can add water and it > dissolves a bit > >>> But adding heat changes the > combination into a pancake. > >>> [Is this synergistic?] > >>> > >>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more examples > to put the discussion > >>> in the metaphysical realm. > >>> > >>> > >>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 > >>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com > >>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > >>>> > >>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the case for > >>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I think it's > not > >>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are > associationists who > >>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary associationism > exists and > >>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. > Vygotsky > >>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, explain > the > >>>> uniqueness of our species? > >>>> > >>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels for its > own > >>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a Piagetian > >>>> perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true maturity as a > >>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more to it than > >>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of primate, and > our > >>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon rocks in > order > >>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged the same > way as > >>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. > >>>> > >>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and for > language is > >>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human > exceptionalism. > >>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for the > vanguard role > >>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, prolonging > >>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after the sick > and the > >>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial organs > (tools) and > >>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for our > species, it > >>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these > "circuitous, > >>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that lead our > >>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always been short > on > >>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for material > culture > >>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: verily, > here > >>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. > >>>> > >>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of attention is > simply the > >>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says there are > only two > >>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So imagination > is > >>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, and > nothing > >>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when you hear > the > >>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there to be > able to > >>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work in word > meaning. > >>>> > >>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who was given a > >>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been mixed with > silver > >>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold. > Well, we > >>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not possible to > >>>> measure the differences in water displacement that precisely. The > method > >>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the "principal of > >>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. > >>>> > >>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes palimpsest, a > velum on > >>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. Because > >>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and written over > every > >>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, the > pressure > >>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones when the > old > >>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only known > Greek > >>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". > >>>> > >>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their > relationship > >>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they are > related to > >>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite similar > to the > >>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. > >>>> > >>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) > >>>> > >>>> David Kellogg > >>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >>>> > >>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD > wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an associationist, > ?sees > >>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? > >>>>> Henry > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division > between > >>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because > Ribot is > >>>>>> > >>>>> an > >>>>> > >>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of > attention. > >>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from > forest > >>>>>> > >>>>> to > >>>>> > >>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between > the two > >>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical > world of > >>>>>> > >>>>> the > >>>>> > >>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses > in life > >>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" > (that > >>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the > >>>>>> > >>>>> farm,where > >>>>> > >>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter > months are > >>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter > talking > >>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has > to be > >>>>>> more voluntary. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear > >>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that underpins > >>>>>> > >>>>> Ribot > >>>>> > >>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out > the > >>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices > really > >>>>>> > >>>>> are > >>>>> > >>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, > there > >>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and > animal > >>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of > >>>>>> > >>>>> volitional > >>>>> > >>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without a > >>>>>> > >>>>> theory > >>>>> > >>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's > >>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at all. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, > thanks to > >>>>>>> > >>>>> all > >>>>> > >>>>>>> for the food for thought. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential around > the > >>>>>>> > >>>>> time > >>>>> > >>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had seen > work > >>>>>>> > >>>>> on > >>>>> > >>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal > reproductive? > >>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of > development > >>>>>>> > >>>>> of > >>>>> > >>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a > relative > >>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. > >>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > hshonerd@gmail.com> > >>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. > This > >>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some > weeks > >>>>>>>> > >>>>> in > >>>>> > >>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that > segmented the > >>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. Puns, > >>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) > >>>>>>>> Henry > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole wrote: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they are > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>> doing > >>>>> > >>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his followers > as an > >>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so its > of > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> course > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in translation, > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>> seems > >>>>> > >>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in > this > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> passage, > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter distinction > to > >>>>>>>>> "memory." > >>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary > discourse > >>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian colleagues > have > >>>>>>>>> illustrated. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists > who > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> clearly > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still > possible > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> to > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> include culture in it. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, > interestingly > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> links > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" > act. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Parts > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that > was > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> also > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of > creativity > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>> and > >>>>> > >>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see that > the > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> two > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself > writing. > >>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> approaches > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> to a pesum > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden > > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it may > be > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> worth > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Imagination > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between > Recollection and > >>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive > Imagination, > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> (2) > >>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he > says > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> leads > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other > words, > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> the > >>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is accomplished > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> through > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and > Williams. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> trying > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical > >>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive > >>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> develops. > >>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that > there > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> must > >>>>> > >>>>>>>> be a > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I > learned > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> that > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is > linked > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> to > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> memory. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of > anticipation > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> memory. > >>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! > >>>>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > hshonerd@gmail.com > >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination > (starting > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> with > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and > provides > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> a > >>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> space > >>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. > This, > >>>>>>>>>>>> coupled > >>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground > to > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> take > >>>>> > >>>>>>>> part > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> preconceptions: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Vera > >>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian > Langacker on > >>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> particularly > >>>>> > >>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> imagination > >>>>> > >>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of > temporality: > >>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure), > which > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> I > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> think > >>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both > individual > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > >>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < > lpscholar2@gmail.com> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* > and the > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> analogy > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion > of > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> "structures > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored > under > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of > modalities > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> that > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> hang > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing > that is > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> forming > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> think > >>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry > >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com > >>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how > jazzed up > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> I > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> am > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> now > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as > Larry > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> construes > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various > triads, > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> finally > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of > the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> mind, as > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa? > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> fuera. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole > wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached > are two > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists > like > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of > imagination in a > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of > productive > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no > intention of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> doing > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the > attached > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I > came > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> upon > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked > at > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> several > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne > and I > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> in > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> access > >>>>> > >>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. > Moreover, > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> such > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> perception/imagination > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance > to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Kris's > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> about > >>>>> > >>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps > they > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> will > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > science > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> with an > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > with an > >>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > with an > >>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>> > >> > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From helenaworthen@gmail.com Thu Dec 18 11:32:39 2014 From: helenaworthen@gmail.com (Helena Worthen) Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2014 11:32:39 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <, > <, > <, > <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> Message-ID: Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial relationships from the concrete material world into the conceptual imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 common ones, and between 70 and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far as" -- this is according to https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm). We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. Apparently, in English, they evolved from and did the job done by inflections in parent languages, examples being cases and tenses. But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection like the dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial relationships suggested by contemporary prepositions. I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about this. Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly embodied, proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to linguistics (For example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on ?lexicon?: nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, being part of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and Halliday see no clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, lexico-grammar. (Lo and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar, adding the ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings are great data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of that? In translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced? > Henry > > > >> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the metaphorical use of prepositions like: >> - "there is some value IN your argument" >> - "I'd like to go OVER that again" >> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" >> - "Let's go THROUGH that again" >> >> and so on. >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> larry smolucha wrote: >>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >>> >>> Forgive me for replying to myself - >>> >>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic possibilities: >>> >>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in Thought >>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into English 1962] >>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' value of the >>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech vocalization). >>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that are flammable >>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor a gas. >>> >>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century European Developmental >>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' hence the >>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of Piaget's Genetic >>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. >>> >>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and synthesis based on >>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in Vygotsky's example of H2O. >>> >>> >>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com >>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>> >>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >>>> >>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic >>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts. >>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more than the >>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can ever be imagined" >>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) >>>> >>>> A couple things to consider: >>>> >>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination as the brain has >>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the simplest level of the Gestalt >>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). >>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just photographic. >>>> >>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try to accurately reproduce >>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, the goal of combinatory >>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, dreams, musings, and even >>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of objects and symbols. >>>> >>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways that things and concepts can be >>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar and flour. >>>> I can add water and it dissolves a bit >>>> But adding heat changes the combination into a pancake. >>>> [Is this synergistic?] >>>> >>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more examples to put the discussion >>>> in the metaphysical realm. >>>> >>>> >>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 >>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com >>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>>> >>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the case for >>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I think it's not >>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are associationists who >>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary associationism exists and >>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. Vygotsky >>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, explain the >>>>> uniqueness of our species? >>>>> >>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels for its own >>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a Piagetian >>>>> perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true maturity as a >>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more to it than >>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of primate, and our >>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon rocks in order >>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged the same way as >>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. >>>>> >>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and for language is >>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human exceptionalism. >>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for the vanguard role >>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, prolonging >>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after the sick and the >>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial organs (tools) and >>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for our species, it >>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these "circuitous, >>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that lead our >>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always been short on >>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for material culture >>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: verily, here >>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. >>>>> >>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of attention is simply the >>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says there are only two >>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So imagination is >>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, and nothing >>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when you hear the >>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there to be able to >>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work in word meaning. >>>>> >>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who was given a >>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been mixed with silver >>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold. Well, we >>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not possible to >>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that precisely. The method >>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the "principal of >>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. >>>>> >>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes palimpsest, a velum on >>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. Because >>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and written over every >>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, the pressure >>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones when the old >>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only known Greek >>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". >>>>> >>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their relationship >>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they are related to >>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite similar to the >>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. >>>>> >>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>> >>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an associationist, ?sees >>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? >>>>>> Henry >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division between >>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because Ribot is >>>>>>> >>>>>> an >>>>>> >>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of attention. >>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from forest >>>>>>> >>>>>> to >>>>>> >>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between the two >>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical world of >>>>>>> >>>>>> the >>>>>> >>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses in life >>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" (that >>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the >>>>>>> >>>>>> farm,where >>>>>> >>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter months are >>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter talking >>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has to be >>>>>>> more voluntary. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear >>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that underpins >>>>>>> >>>>>> Ribot >>>>>> >>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out the >>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices really >>>>>>> >>>>>> are >>>>>> >>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, there >>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and animal >>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of >>>>>>> >>>>>> volitional >>>>>> >>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without a >>>>>>> >>>>>> theory >>>>>> >>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's >>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at all. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, thanks to >>>>>>>> >>>>>> all >>>>>> >>>>>>>> for the food for thought. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential around the >>>>>>>> >>>>>> time >>>>>> >>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had seen work >>>>>>>> >>>>>> on >>>>>> >>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal reproductive? >>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of development >>>>>>>> >>>>>> of >>>>>> >>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a relative >>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. >>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. This >>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some weeks >>>>>>>>> >>>>>> in >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that segmented the >>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. Puns, >>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) >>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they are >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> doing >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his followers as an >>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so its of >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> course >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in translation, >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> seems >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in this >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> passage, >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter distinction to >>>>>>>>>> "memory." >>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary discourse >>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian colleagues have >>>>>>>>>> illustrated. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists who >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> clearly >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still possible >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, interestingly >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> links >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" act. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Parts >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that was >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> also >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of creativity >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> and >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see that the >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> two >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself writing. >>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> approaches >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> to a pesum >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it may be >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> worth >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Imagination >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between Recollection and >>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive Imagination, >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> (2) >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he says >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> leads >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other words, >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> the >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is accomplished >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> through >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and Williams. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> trying >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical >>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> develops. >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that there >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> must >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> be a >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I learned >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is linked >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of anticipation >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! >>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination (starting >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and provides >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> a >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> space >>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. This, >>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled >>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground to >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> take >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> part >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> preconceptions: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera >>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian Langacker on >>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> particularly >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> imagination >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of temporality: >>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure), which >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both individual >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. >>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* and the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored under >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of modalities >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> hang >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing that is >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> forming >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> think >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how jazzed up >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> am >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> now >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various triads, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> finally >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> mind, as >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> fuera. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached are two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists like >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of imagination in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of productive >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no intention of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the attached >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I came >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> upon >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked at >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> several >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne and I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> access >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. Moreover, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> such >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> perception/imagination >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Kris's >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> about >>>>>> >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> will >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> with an >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>> >>> >> > From R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk Thu Dec 18 11:41:29 2014 From: R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk (Rod Parker-Rees) Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2014 19:41:29 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination (seeing and believing) Message-ID: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102265CEB@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> I am not sure how appropriate it is to post this here as it is going back to an earlier theme in the discussion - the relationship between perception and imagination. I asked a friend who is on a masters psychology programme and she asked one of her tutors at Bristol University (Paul Howard-Jones http://www.bristol.ac.uk/education/people/person/93406/index.html ). I think his summary of the attached paper may be of interest to some - and the paper is way outside the xmca remit but I have attached in in case anyone is interested enough to want to read more. All the best, Rod This was what I asked: Are you aware of any articles which enumerate the ratio between sensory information (e.g. stimuli from the retinae) and visual memory in the process of seeing? I saw a claim somewhere that only about 10% of what we ?see? is from retinal information, with the rest made up by our interpretation of this information using what we have seen before but I can?t track down any evidence for this so am not confident about it! What I am particularly interested in is what happens when the bodily actions of thinking and perceiving are reduced to ?things? ? ?thoughts? and ?perceptions? or ?images?. It seems important to me that the way we ACT on things is part of what we know about them or, more generally, that we are aware of our environment in terms of our experiences of interacting with it rather than in terms of lists of extracted ?properties? of phenomena And this is Paul's reply: Attached is a highly theoretical paper by a guy (Martin) who was privileged to borrow my wooden fMRI simulator for participants to take magic mushrooms in- fascinating study! It might be relevant to this query. I would summarise it as follows: The brain is thought to comprise hierarchical levels, with input arriving at the lowest levels (light, sound, touch, etc) and a representation of the world generated at the top that can direct our actions (e.g., rain is falling, so grab a coat). To achieve this, each level draws on past history to draw some basic conclusions and these inferences get passed to the level above. So, in the visual system, lower levels process activations of retinal neurons into inferred features (e.g. rain drops). A little further up in the same system, higher levels process the behaviour of features into inferred patterns of movement (e.g....are falling). When a layer forms an inference, it can use it to suppress the information coming from below that gave rise to it. This is good house-keeping, and reduces the amount of information the brain has to process. After all, once a pattern of incoming information is recognised and can be reduced to an inference, it can be filed under ?business as usual? and that stream of information can be ignored - the inference is all we need to know. Information that can?t be turned into inferences ? stuff that doesn?t fit previous history ? deserves more special attention and, rather than getting suppressed, is passed up the levels for a different reason: it can be used to readjust expectations and teach the brain new tricks (i.e. how to make new inferences), so providing a mechanism for the brain to learn. But this essentially means very little of the original perceptual information ever reaches consciousness (unless you take magic mushrooms (not that i am recommending) which Martin thinks diminishes the efficiency of the inference-making. Merry Christmas everyone! -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole Sent: 18 December 2014 18:44 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination Dear Colleagues. Might it be appropriate to start another thread on metaphor? My basic starting point is the idea that basic perceptual processes ineluctably require imagination...... measured in milliseconds. Metaphor and linguistic mediation is for sure an essential topic here. I want to hold on to the Suvorov metaphor of imagination as lifting off from the world and returning to it again. (If the Suvorov reference is not familiar I will post relevant paper). A thought: Might it be possible to parse Francine's last message into subtopics while not discouraging cross subtopic conversations? Trying to hold all the threads in my hand. Slow in So Cal. mike On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly embodied, > proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to linguistics > (For example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on ?lexicon?: > nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, being > part of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and > Halliday see no clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, > lexico-grammar. (Lo and behold, my spell check wanted me to write > lexicon-grammar, adding the ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them > separate!) Word coinings are great data for imagination and > creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of that? In translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced? > Henry > > > > > On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > > the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the > > metaphorical > use of prepositions like: > > - "there is some value IN your argument" > > - "I'd like to go OVER that again" > > - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" > > - "Let's go THROUGH that again" > > > > and so on. > > Andy > > -------------------------------------------------------------------- > > ---- > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > larry smolucha wrote: > >> Message from Francine Smolucha: > >> > >> Forgive me for replying to myself - > >> > >> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic possibilities: > >> > >> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in > >> Thought and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated > >> into English > 1962] > >> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' > >> value > of the > >> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech vocalization). > >> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that are > flammable > >> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor a gas. > >> > >> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century European > Developmental > >> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' hence > >> the Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of > >> Piaget's > Genetic > >> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. > >> > >> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and synthesis > >> based > on > >> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in Vygotsky's > example of H2O. > >> > >> > >>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com > >>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > >>> > >>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > >>> > >>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic and > >>> produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts. > >>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more than > >>> the recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can > >>> ever be > imagined" > >>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) > >>> > >>> A couple things to consider: > >>> > >>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination as the > brain has > >>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the simplest > >>> level > of the Gestalt > >>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). > >>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just photographic. > >>> > >>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try to > accurately reproduce > >>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, the > >>> goal > of combinatory > >>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, dreams, > musings, and even > >>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of > >>> objects > and symbols. > >>> > >>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways that > things and concepts can be > >>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar and flour. > >>> I can add water and it > dissolves a bit > >>> But adding heat changes > >>> the > combination into a pancake. > >>> [Is this synergistic?] > >>> > >>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more > >>> examples > to put the discussion > >>> in the metaphysical realm. > >>> > >>> > >>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 > >>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com > >>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > >>>> > >>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the case > >>>> for Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I > >>>> think it's > not > >>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are > associationists who > >>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary associationism > exists and > >>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. > Vygotsky > >>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, > >>>> explain > the > >>>> uniqueness of our species? > >>>> > >>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels for > >>>> its > own > >>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a Piagetian > >>>> perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true maturity > >>>> as a species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more > >>>> to it than > >>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of primate, > >>>> and > our > >>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon rocks > >>>> in > order > >>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged the > >>>> same > way as > >>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. > >>>> > >>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and for > language is > >>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human > exceptionalism. > >>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for the > vanguard role > >>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, > >>>> prolonging childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking > >>>> after the sick > and the > >>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial organs > (tools) and > >>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for our > species, it > >>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these > "circuitous, > >>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that lead > >>>> our development as a species. The wretched of the earth always > >>>> been short > on > >>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for material > culture > >>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: > >>>> verily, > here > >>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. > >>>> > >>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of attention is > simply the > >>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says there are > only two > >>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So > >>>> imagination > is > >>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, and > nothing > >>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when you > >>>> hear > the > >>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there to be > able to > >>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work in > >>>> word > meaning. > >>>> > >>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who was > >>>> given a crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been > >>>> mixed with > silver > >>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold. > Well, we > >>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not > >>>> possible to measure the differences in water displacement that > >>>> precisely. The > method > >>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the "principal > >>>> of buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. > >>>> > >>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes palimpsest, a > velum on > >>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. > >>>> Because parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and > >>>> written over > every > >>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, the > pressure > >>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones when > >>>> the > old > >>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only > >>>> known > Greek > >>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". > >>>> > >>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their > relationship > >>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they are > related to > >>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite > >>>> similar > to the > >>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. > >>>> > >>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) > >>>> > >>>> David Kellogg > >>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >>>> > >>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD > wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an > >>>>> associationist, > ?sees > >>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? > >>>>> Henry > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg > >>>>>> > wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division > between > >>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because > Ribot is > >>>>>> > >>>>> an > >>>>> > >>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of > attention. > >>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition > >>>>>> from > forest > >>>>>> > >>>>> to > >>>>> > >>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division > >>>>>> between > the two > >>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical > world of > >>>>>> > >>>>> the > >>>>> > >>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic > >>>>>> uses > in life > >>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" > (that > >>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the > >>>>>> > >>>>> farm,where > >>>>> > >>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter > months are > >>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to > >>>>>> encounter > talking > >>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention > >>>>>> has > to be > >>>>>> more voluntary. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very > >>>>>> clear understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism > >>>>>> that underpins > >>>>>> > >>>>> Ribot > >>>>> > >>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points > >>>>>> out > the > >>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices > really > >>>>>> > >>>>> are > >>>>> > >>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of > >>>>>> imagination, > there > >>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human > >>>>>> and > animal > >>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of > >>>>>> > >>>>> volitional > >>>>> > >>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). > >>>>>> Without a > >>>>>> > >>>>> theory > >>>>> > >>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for > >>>>>> Ribot's distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at all. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, > thanks to > >>>>>>> > >>>>> all > >>>>> > >>>>>>> for the food for thought. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential > >>>>>>> around > the > >>>>>>> > >>>>> time > >>>>> > >>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had > >>>>>>> seen > work > >>>>>>> > >>>>> on > >>>>> > >>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal > reproductive? > >>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of > development > >>>>>>> > >>>>> of > >>>>> > >>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being > >>>>>>> a > relative > >>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. > >>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > hshonerd@gmail.com> > >>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. > This > >>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from > >>>>>>>> some > weeks > >>>>>>>> > >>>>> in > >>>>> > >>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that > segmented the > >>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. > >>>>>>>> Puns, according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) > >>>>>>>> Henry > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole wrote: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and > >>>>>>>>> they are > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>> doing > >>>>> > >>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his > >>>>>>>>> followers > as an > >>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so > >>>>>>>>> its > of > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> course > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in > >>>>>>>>> translation, > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>> seems > >>>>> > >>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" > >>>>>>>>> in > this > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> passage, > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter > >>>>>>>>> distinction > to > >>>>>>>>> "memory." > >>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary > discourse > >>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian > >>>>>>>>> colleagues > have > >>>>>>>>> illustrated. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from > >>>>>>>>> theorists > who > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> clearly > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was > >>>>>>>>> still > possible > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> to > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> include culture in it. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, > interestingly > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> links > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" > act. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Parts > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff > >>>>>>>>> that > was > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> also > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of > creativity > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>> and > >>>>> > >>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see > >>>>>>>>> that > the > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> two > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found > >>>>>>>>> himself > writing. > >>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty > >>>>>>>>> old > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> approaches > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> to a pesum > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it > >>>>>>>>>> may > be > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> worth > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place > >>>>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Imagination > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between > Recollection and > >>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive > Imagination, > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> (2) > >>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which > >>>>>>>>>> he > says > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> leads > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other > words, > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> the > >>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is > >>>>>>>>>> accomplished > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> through > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > -- > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and > Williams. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work > >>>>>>>>>>> i am > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> trying > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical > >>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of > >>>>>>>>>>> productive imagination. The Russians write that productive > >>>>>>>>>>> imagination > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> develops. > >>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that > there > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> must > >>>>> > >>>>>>>> be a > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But > >>>>>>>>>>> I > learned > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> that > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and > >>>>>>>>>>> is > linked > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> to > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> memory. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of > anticipation > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> memory. > >>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! > >>>>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > hshonerd@gmail.com > >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination > (starting > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> with > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and > provides > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> a > >>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> space > >>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. > This, > >>>>>>>>>>>> coupled > >>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a > >>>>>>>>>>>> ground > to > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> take > >>>>> > >>>>>>>> part > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> preconceptions: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Vera > >>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian > Langacker on > >>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> particularly > >>>>> > >>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> imagination > >>>>> > >>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of > temporality: > >>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic > >>>>>>>>>>>> structure), > which > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> I > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> think > >>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both > individual > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > >>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < > lpscholar2@gmail.com> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third > >>>>>>>>>>>>> *space* > and the > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> analogy > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his > >>>>>>>>>>>>> notion > of > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> "structures > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is > >>>>>>>>>>>>> explored > under > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of > modalities > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> that > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> hang > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of > >>>>>>>>>>>>> knowing > that is > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> forming > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] > >>>>>>>>>>>>> if we > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> think > >>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com > >>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how > jazzed up > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> I > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> am > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> now > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind > >>>>>>>>>>>>> as > Larry > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> construes > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various > triads, > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> finally > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> mind, as > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa? > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> fuera. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> attached > are two > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> theorists > like > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of > imagination in a > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of > productive > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no > intention of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> doing > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the > attached > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these > >>>>>>>>>>>>> philosophers, I > came > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> upon > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely > >>>>>>>>>>>>> linked > at > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> several > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ettienne > and I > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> in > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> access > >>>>> > >>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. > Moreover, > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> such > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> perception/imagination > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relevance > to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Kris's > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to > >>>>>>>>>>>>> concerns > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> about > >>>>> > >>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Perhaps > they > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> will > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > science > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> with an > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > >>>>>>>>> science > with an > >>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > with an > >>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>> > >> > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: 1265 full.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 476821 bytes Desc: 1265 full.pdf Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141218/ae34918b/attachment-0001.pdf From lsmolucha@hotmail.com Thu Dec 18 13:12:57 2014 From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com (larry smolucha) Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2014 15:12:57 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: , , , , , <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net>, , , , , <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com>, , , , Message-ID: Message from Francine: We want to add these works to a bibliography on imagination. I.A. Richard's quote is right on the mark and interesting in regard to David McNeill's research on hand gestures (see my recent post). Seems to me that we have a Zeitgeist is emerging in our XMCA community. > From: boblake@georgiasouthern.edu > Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2014 10:57:36 -0500 > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > Hi Francine, > I am so glad to see you sharing your insightful reading of Vygotsky on > imagination and metaphor. It was actually the connections between > imagination, inner speech and metaphor as > the means to personal agency that first drew me into Vygotsky studies. > Vera John-Steiner, Lois Holzman, Dot Robbins and you were the first people > I talked to about this work. > In 1936, I.A. Richards published his *Philosophy of Rhetoric*, a work that > grew directly out of Vico?s thinking. His thesis was that "thought is > metaphoric, and proceeds by comparison, and the metaphors of language > derive therefrom? (p. 94). In other words, he believed that at the base of > all thinking, there is a metaphoric relationship. Richards takes this one > step further when he suggests that metaphors are ?cognitively irreducible? > (Johnson, 1981, p. 19) A metaphoric expression therefore becomes a newly > created vehicle of meaning which loses potency when seeking to make a > literal statement out of its component parts. In 2001, Maxine Greene wrote > something similar. "By means of making metaphors, imagination can reorient > consciousness through its disclosure of patterns, relationships, shadows, > and lights, and slivers of sound that are wholly unexpected, ?new? in some > wonderful fashion? (Greene, 2001, p 154). > > For example,try reducing this back to literal meaning :-) > > The Road Not Taken > By Robert Frost > Two roads diverged in a yellow wood, > And sorry I could not travel both > And be one traveler, long I stood > And looked down one as far as I could > To where it bent in the undergrowth; > > Then took the other, as just as fair, > And having perhaps the better claim, > Because it was grassy and wanted wear; > Though as for that the passing there > Had worn them really about the same, > > And both that morning equally lay > In leaves no step had trodden black. > Oh, I kept the first for another day! > Yet knowing how way leads on to way, > I doubted if I should ever come back. > > I shall be telling this with a sigh > Somewhere ages and ages hence: > Two roads diverged in a wood, and I? > I took the one less traveled by, > And that has made all the difference. > Retrieved from : http://www.poetryfoundation.org/poem/173536 > > References > > Greene, M. (2001). *Variations on a blue guitar*. New York, NY: Teachers > College Press. > > Johnson, M. (1981). *Philosophical perspectives on metaphor.* Minneapolis, > MN: University of Minnesota Press. > > Richards,I.A. (1936). *The philosophy of rhetoric. * Oxford, GB: Oxford > University Press. > > > > On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 4:45 AM, larry smolucha > wrote: > > > > Message from Francine Smolucha: > > > > Forgive me for replying to myself - > > > > In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic possibilities: > > > > In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in Thought > > and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into English 1962] > > Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' value of > > the > > two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech vocalization). > > He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that are > > flammable > > gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor a gas. > > > > [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century European > > Developmental > > Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' hence the > > Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of Piaget's > > Genetic > > Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. > > > > And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and synthesis based on > > metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in Vygotsky's example > > of H2O. > > > > > From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com > > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > > > Message from Francine Smolucha: > > > > > > Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic > > > and produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts. > > > It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more than the > > > recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can ever be > > imagined" > > > (David Kellogg's most recent email.) > > > > > > A couple things to consider: > > > > > > (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination as the brain > > has > > > to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the simplest level of > > the Gestalt > > > Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). > > > > > > (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just photographic. > > > > > > (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try to > > accurately reproduce > > > the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, the goal > > of combinatory > > > imagination is to create something new out of memories, dreams, musings, > > and even > > > sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of objects and > > symbols. > > > > > > (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways that > > things and concepts can be > > > combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar and flour. > > > I can add water and it > > dissolves a bit > > > But adding heat changes the > > combination into a pancake. > > > [Is this synergistic?] > > > > > > Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more examples to > > put the discussion > > > in the metaphysical realm. > > > > > > > > > > Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 > > > > From: dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > > > > > Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the case for > > > > Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I think it's not > > > > just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are associationists > > who > > > > are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary associationism > > exists and > > > > some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. > > Vygotsky > > > > has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, explain the > > > > uniqueness of our species? > > > > > > > > Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels for its own > > > > kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a Piagetian > > > > perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true maturity as a > > > > species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more to it than > > > > that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of primate, and > > our > > > > solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon rocks in > > order > > > > to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged the same way > > as > > > > any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. > > > > > > > > Making the case for the higher psychological functions and for > > language is > > > > not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human > > exceptionalism. > > > > It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for the vanguard > > role > > > > of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, prolonging > > > > childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after the sick and > > the > > > > elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial organs > > (tools) and > > > > even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for our > > species, it > > > > is in the societies and the sectors of society where these "circuitous, > > > > compensatory means of development" are most advanced that lead our > > > > development as a species. The wretched of the earth always been short > > on > > > > rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for material culture > > > > generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: verily, > > here > > > > the first shall be last and the last shall be first. > > > > > > > > I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of attention is > > simply the > > > > logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says there are only > > two > > > > kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So imagination > > is > > > > nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, and > > nothing > > > > really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when you hear > > the > > > > name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there to be able > > to > > > > imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work in word > > meaning. > > > > > > > > You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who was given a > > > > crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been mixed with > > silver > > > > by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold. Well, > > we > > > > now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not possible to > > > > measure the differences in water displacement that precisely. The > > method > > > > that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the "principal of > > > > buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. > > > > > > > > And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes palimpsest, a velum > > on > > > > which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. Because > > > > parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and written over > > every > > > > century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, the > > pressure > > > > of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones when the > > old > > > > text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only known > > Greek > > > > copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". > > > > > > > > Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their > > relationship > > > > to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they are related > > to > > > > each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite similar > > to the > > > > way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. > > > > > > > > (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an associationist, > > ?sees > > > > > imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? > > > > > Henry > > > > > > > > > > > On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division > > between > > > > > > higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because > > Ribot is > > > > > an > > > > > > associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of > > attention. > > > > > > And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from > > forest > > > > > to > > > > > > farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between > > the two > > > > > > great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical > > world of > > > > > the > > > > > > forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses > > in life > > > > > > and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" > > (that > > > > > > is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the > > > > > farm,where > > > > > > written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter > > months are > > > > > > wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter > > talking > > > > > > animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has > > to be > > > > > > more voluntary. > > > > > > > > > > > > Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear > > > > > > understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that > > underpins > > > > > Ribot > > > > > > here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out > > the > > > > > > LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices > > really > > > > > are > > > > > > the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, > > there > > > > > > isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and > > animal > > > > > > imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of > > > > > volitional > > > > > > attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without > > a > > > > > theory > > > > > > of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's > > > > > > distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at > > all. > > > > > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > > > > > On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole wrote: > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, > > thanks to > > > > > all > > > > > >> for the food for thought. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential > > around the > > > > > time > > > > > >> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had > > seen work > > > > > on > > > > > >> memory before, but not imagination. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal > > reproductive? > > > > > >> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of > > development > > > > > of > > > > > >> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a > > relative > > > > > >> newcomer to the topic. > > > > > >> mike > > > > > >> > > > > > >> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > hshonerd@gmail.com> > > > > > >> wrote: > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. > > This > > > > > >>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some > > weeks > > > > > in > > > > > >>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that > > segmented the > > > > > >>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. > > Puns, > > > > > >>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) > > > > > >>> Henry > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole wrote: > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they > > are > > > > > doing > > > > > >>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his > > followers as an > > > > > >>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so > > its of > > > > > >>> course > > > > > >>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in > > translation, > > > > > seems > > > > > >>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in > > this > > > > > >>> passage, > > > > > >>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter > > distinction to > > > > > >>>> "memory." > > > > > >>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary > > discourse > > > > > >>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian > > colleagues have > > > > > >>>> illustrated. > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists > > who > > > > > >>> clearly > > > > > >>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still > > possible > > > > > >> to > > > > > >>>> include culture in it. > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, > > interestingly > > > > > >> links > > > > > >>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" > > act. > > > > > >> Parts > > > > > >>> of > > > > > >>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that > > was > > > > > >> also > > > > > >>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of > > creativity > > > > > and > > > > > >>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see > > that the > > > > > >> two > > > > > >>>> concepts are linked. > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself > > writing. > > > > > >>>> mike > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old > > > > > >>> approaches > > > > > >>>> to a pesum > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < > > ablunden@mira.net> > > > > > >> wrote: > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it > > may be > > > > > >> worth > > > > > >>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to > > > > > >>> Imagination > > > > > >>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between > > Recollection and > > > > > >>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive > > Imagination, > > > > > (2) > > > > > >>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he > > says > > > > > >> leads > > > > > >>> to > > > > > >>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other > > words, > > > > > the > > > > > >>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is > > accomplished > > > > > >> through > > > > > >>>>> these three grades of Imagination. > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> Andy > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >> > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > > >>>>> *Andy Blunden* > > > > > >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> mike cole wrote: > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and > > Williams. > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i > > am > > > > > >> trying > > > > > >>> to > > > > > >>>>>> mine for empirical > > > > > >>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of > > productive > > > > > >>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination > > > > > develops. > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that > > there > > > > > must > > > > > >>> be a > > > > > >>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I > > learned > > > > > >>> that > > > > > >>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is > > linked > > > > > >> to > > > > > >>>>>> memory. > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of > > anticipation > > > > > >>> and > > > > > >>>>>> memory. > > > > > >>>>>> Imagine that! > > > > > >>>>>> mike > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > hshonerd@gmail.com > > > > > > > > > > > >>>>>> wrote: > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination > > (starting > > > > > >>> with > > > > > >>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and > > provides > > > > > a > > > > > >>>>>>> space > > > > > >>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. > > This, > > > > > >>>>>>> coupled > > > > > >>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground > > to > > > > > take > > > > > >>> part > > > > > >>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with > > > > > >> preconceptions: > > > > > >>>>>>> Vera > > > > > >>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian > > Langacker on > > > > > >>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, > > > > > particularly > > > > > >>> the > > > > > >>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of > > > > > imagination > > > > > >>> and > > > > > >>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of > > temporality: > > > > > >>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic > > structure), which > > > > > >> I > > > > > >>>>>>> think > > > > > >>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both > > individual > > > > > >>> and > > > > > >>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > > > > > >>>>>>> Henry > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < > > lpscholar2@gmail.com> > > > > > >>> wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* > > and the > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> analogy > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* > > > > > >>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > > > > > >>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his > > notion of > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> "structures > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is > > explored under > > > > > >>> the > > > > > >>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of > > modalities > > > > > >>> that > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> hang > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing > > that is > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> forming > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if > > we > > > > > think > > > > > >>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* > > > > > >>>>>>>> Larry > > > > > >>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > > > hshonerd@gmail.com > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, > > > > > >>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how > > jazzed up > > > > > >> I > > > > > >>> am > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> now > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as > > Larry > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> construes > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various > > triads, > > > > > >>> finally > > > > > >>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of > > the > > > > > >>> mind, as > > > > > >>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega > > pa? > > > > > >> fuera. > > > > > >>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, > > > > > >>>>>>>>> Henry > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole > > wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached > > are two > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> articles > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists > > like > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of > > imagination in a > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> manner > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of > > productive > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> imagination. I > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no > > intention of > > > > > >>> doing > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> so. > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the > > attached > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> texts. > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I > > came > > > > > >> upon > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> the > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely > > linked at > > > > > >>> several > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, > > Ettienne and I > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> argued > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> in > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of > > > > > access > > > > > >>> to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> the > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. > > Moreover, > > > > > >>> such > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the > > > > > >>> perception/imagination > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance > > to > > > > > >> Kris's > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> paper > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to > > concerns > > > > > about > > > > > >>> the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps > > they > > > > > >> will > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> prove > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> useful for those interested. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> -- > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > > science > > > > > >>> with an > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> -- > > > > > >>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > > with an > > > > > >>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> -- > > > > > >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > > with an > > > > > >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > *Robert Lake Ed.D.*Associate Professor > Social Foundations of Education > Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading > Georgia Southern University > Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group > P. O. Box 8144 > Phone: (912) 478-0355 > Fax: (912) 478-5382 > Statesboro, GA 30460 From lsmolucha@hotmail.com Thu Dec 18 13:17:25 2014 From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com (larry smolucha) Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2014 15:17:25 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: , , , , , , , ,,, , , , ,,<548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net>, , , , ,,, , , , , , , ,,<9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com>, , , , , , , <5492A447.7030004@mira.net>, Message-ID: Message from Francine: More bibliography entries that should be added to our list. Historical note: I am familiar with Lakoff and Johnson's work. And, the last time I spoke to George Lakoff in 1989, he said he found my work interesting (SRCD Biennial Convention Kansas City). > From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2014 16:59:41 +0000 > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > Lakoff and Johnson have lots about this, Andy. > > Martin > > Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors we live by. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. > > Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). The metaphorical structure of the human conceptual system. Cognitive Science, 4(2), 195-208. > > > On Dec 18, 2014, at 4:54 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the metaphorical use of prepositions like: > > - "there is some value IN your argument" > > - "I'd like to go OVER that again" > > - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" > > - "Let's go THROUGH that again" > > > > and so on. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > larry smolucha wrote: > >> Message from Francine Smolucha: > >> > >> Forgive me for replying to myself - > >> > >> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic possibilities: > >> > >> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in Thought > >> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into English 1962] > >> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' value of the > >> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech vocalization). > >> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that are flammable > >> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor a gas. > >> > >> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century European Developmental > >> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' hence the > >> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of Piaget's Genetic > >> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. > >> > >> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and synthesis based on > >> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in Vygotsky's example of H2O. > >> > >> > >>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com > >>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > >>> > >>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > >>> > >>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic > >>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts. > >>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more than the > >>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can ever be imagined" > >>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) > >>> > >>> A couple things to consider: > >>> > >>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination as the brain has > >>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the simplest level of the Gestalt > >>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). > >>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just photographic. > >>> > >>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try to accurately reproduce > >>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, the goal of combinatory > >>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, dreams, musings, and even > >>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of objects and symbols. > >>> > >>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways that things and concepts can be > >>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar and flour. > >>> I can add water and it dissolves a bit > >>> But adding heat changes the combination into a pancake. > >>> [Is this synergistic?] > >>> > >>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more examples to put the discussion > >>> in the metaphysical realm. > >>> > >>> > >>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 > >>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com > >>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > >>>> > >>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the case for > >>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I think it's not > >>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are associationists who > >>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary associationism exists and > >>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. Vygotsky > >>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, explain the > >>>> uniqueness of our species? > >>>> > >>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels for its own > >>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a Piagetian > >>>> perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true maturity as a > >>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more to it than > >>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of primate, and our > >>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon rocks in order > >>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged the same way as > >>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. > >>>> > >>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and for language is > >>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human exceptionalism. > >>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for the vanguard role > >>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, prolonging > >>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after the sick and the > >>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial organs (tools) and > >>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for our species, it > >>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these "circuitous, > >>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that lead our > >>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always been short on > >>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for material culture > >>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: verily, here > >>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. > >>>> > >>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of attention is simply the > >>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says there are only two > >>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So imagination is > >>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, and nothing > >>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when you hear the > >>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there to be able to > >>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work in word meaning. > >>>> > >>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who was given a > >>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been mixed with silver > >>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold. Well, we > >>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not possible to > >>>> measure the differences in water displacement that precisely. The method > >>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the "principal of > >>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. > >>>> > >>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes palimpsest, a velum on > >>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. Because > >>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and written over every > >>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, the pressure > >>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones when the old > >>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only known Greek > >>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". > >>>> > >>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their relationship > >>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they are related to > >>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite similar to the > >>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. > >>>> > >>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) > >>>> > >>>> David Kellogg > >>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >>>> > >>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an associationist, ?sees > >>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? > >>>>> Henry > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division between > >>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because Ribot is > >>>>>> > >>>>> an > >>>>> > >>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of attention. > >>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from forest > >>>>>> > >>>>> to > >>>>> > >>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between the two > >>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical world of > >>>>>> > >>>>> the > >>>>> > >>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses in life > >>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" (that > >>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the > >>>>>> > >>>>> farm,where > >>>>> > >>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter months are > >>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter talking > >>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has to be > >>>>>> more voluntary. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear > >>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that underpins > >>>>>> > >>>>> Ribot > >>>>> > >>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out the > >>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices really > >>>>>> > >>>>> are > >>>>> > >>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, there > >>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and animal > >>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of > >>>>>> > >>>>> volitional > >>>>> > >>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without a > >>>>>> > >>>>> theory > >>>>> > >>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's > >>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at all. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, thanks to > >>>>>>> > >>>>> all > >>>>> > >>>>>>> for the food for thought. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential around the > >>>>>>> > >>>>> time > >>>>> > >>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had seen work > >>>>>>> > >>>>> on > >>>>> > >>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal reproductive? > >>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of development > >>>>>>> > >>>>> of > >>>>> > >>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a relative > >>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. > >>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD > >>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. This > >>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some weeks > >>>>>>>> > >>>>> in > >>>>> > >>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that segmented the > >>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. Puns, > >>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) > >>>>>>>> Henry > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole wrote: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they are > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>> doing > >>>>> > >>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his followers as an > >>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so its of > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> course > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in translation, > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>> seems > >>>>> > >>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in this > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> passage, > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter distinction to > >>>>>>>>> "memory." > >>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary discourse > >>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian colleagues have > >>>>>>>>> illustrated. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists who > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> clearly > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still possible > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> to > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> include culture in it. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, interestingly > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> links > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" act. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Parts > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that was > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> also > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of creativity > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>> and > >>>>> > >>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see that the > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> two > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself writing. > >>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> approaches > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> to a pesum > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it may be > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> worth > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Imagination > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between Recollection and > >>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive Imagination, > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> (2) > >>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he says > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> leads > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other words, > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> the > >>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is accomplished > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> through > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and Williams. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> trying > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical > >>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive > >>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> develops. > >>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that there > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> must > >>>>> > >>>>>>>> be a > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I learned > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> that > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is linked > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> to > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> memory. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of anticipation > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> memory. > >>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! > >>>>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination (starting > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> with > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and provides > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> a > >>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> space > >>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. This, > >>>>>>>>>>>> coupled > >>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground to > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> take > >>>>> > >>>>>>>> part > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> preconceptions: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Vera > >>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian Langacker on > >>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> particularly > >>>>> > >>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> imagination > >>>>> > >>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of temporality: > >>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure), which > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> I > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> think > >>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both individual > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > >>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* and the > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> analogy > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion of > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> "structures > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored under > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of modalities > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> that > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> hang > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing that is > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> forming > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> think > >>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry > >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com > >>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how jazzed up > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> I > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> am > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> now > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as Larry > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> construes > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various triads, > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> finally > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> mind, as > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa? > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> fuera. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached are two > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists like > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of imagination in a > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of productive > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no intention of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> doing > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the attached > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I came > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> upon > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked at > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> several > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne and I > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> in > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> access > >>>>> > >>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. Moreover, > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> such > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> perception/imagination > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Kris's > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> about > >>>>> > >>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps they > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> will > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> with an > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > >>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > >>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>> > >> > > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Thu Dec 18 13:28:59 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2014 21:28:59 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <, > <, > <, > <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> Message-ID: <4E1FC669-440B-4735-B4AC-5F072A134511@uniandes.edu.co> Agreed, but different languages pick up on different aspects of our embodied relationship to the world, and in different ways. There are languages, for example, in which one does not look "forward to" an event in the future, because the future is understood as lying behind one. Martin On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:32 PM, Helena Worthen wrote: > Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial relationships from the concrete material world into the conceptual imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 common ones, and between 70 and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far as" -- this is according to https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm). We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. Apparently, in English, they evolved from and did the job done by inflections in parent languages, examples being cases and tenses. > > But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection like the dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial relationships suggested by contemporary prepositions. > > I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about this. > > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >> I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly embodied, proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to linguistics (For example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on ?lexicon?: nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, being part of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and Halliday see no clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, lexico-grammar. (Lo and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar, adding the ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings are great data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of that? In translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced? >> Henry >> >> >> >>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the metaphorical use of prepositions like: >>> - "there is some value IN your argument" >>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again" >>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" >>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again" >>> >>> and so on. >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> larry smolucha wrote: >>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >>>> >>>> Forgive me for replying to myself - >>>> >>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic possibilities: >>>> >>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in Thought >>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into English 1962] >>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' value of the >>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech vocalization). >>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that are flammable >>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor a gas. >>>> >>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century European Developmental >>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' hence the >>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of Piaget's Genetic >>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. >>>> >>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and synthesis based on >>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in Vygotsky's example of H2O. >>>> >>>> >>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com >>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>>> >>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >>>>> >>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic >>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts. >>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more than the >>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can ever be imagined" >>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) >>>>> >>>>> A couple things to consider: >>>>> >>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination as the brain has >>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the simplest level of the Gestalt >>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). >>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just photographic. >>>>> >>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try to accurately reproduce >>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, the goal of combinatory >>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, dreams, musings, and even >>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of objects and symbols. >>>>> >>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways that things and concepts can be >>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar and flour. >>>>> I can add water and it dissolves a bit >>>>> But adding heat changes the combination into a pancake. >>>>> [Is this synergistic?] >>>>> >>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more examples to put the discussion >>>>> in the metaphysical realm. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 >>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com >>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>>>> >>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the case for >>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I think it's not >>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are associationists who >>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary associationism exists and >>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. Vygotsky >>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, explain the >>>>>> uniqueness of our species? >>>>>> >>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels for its own >>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a Piagetian >>>>>> perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true maturity as a >>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more to it than >>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of primate, and our >>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon rocks in order >>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged the same way as >>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. >>>>>> >>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and for language is >>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human exceptionalism. >>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for the vanguard role >>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, prolonging >>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after the sick and the >>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial organs (tools) and >>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for our species, it >>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these "circuitous, >>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that lead our >>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always been short on >>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for material culture >>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: verily, here >>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. >>>>>> >>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of attention is simply the >>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says there are only two >>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So imagination is >>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, and nothing >>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when you hear the >>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there to be able to >>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work in word meaning. >>>>>> >>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who was given a >>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been mixed with silver >>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold. Well, we >>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not possible to >>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that precisely. The method >>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the "principal of >>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. >>>>>> >>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes palimpsest, a velum on >>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. Because >>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and written over every >>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, the pressure >>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones when the old >>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only known Greek >>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". >>>>>> >>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their relationship >>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they are related to >>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite similar to the >>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. >>>>>> >>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) >>>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>> >>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an associationist, ?sees >>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? >>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division between >>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because Ribot is >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> an >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of attention. >>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from forest >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> to >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between the two >>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical world of >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses in life >>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" (that >>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> farm,where >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter months are >>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter talking >>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has to be >>>>>>>> more voluntary. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear >>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that underpins >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> Ribot >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out the >>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices really >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> are >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, there >>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and animal >>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> volitional >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without a >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> theory >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's >>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at all. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, thanks to >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> all >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> for the food for thought. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential around the >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> time >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had seen work >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> on >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal reproductive? >>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of development >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> of >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a relative >>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. >>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD >>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. This >>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some weeks >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> in >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that segmented the >>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. Puns, >>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) >>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they are >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> doing >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his followers as an >>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so its of >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> course >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in translation, >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> seems >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in this >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> passage, >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter distinction to >>>>>>>>>>> "memory." >>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary discourse >>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian colleagues have >>>>>>>>>>> illustrated. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists who >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> clearly >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still possible >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, interestingly >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> links >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" act. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Parts >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that was >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> also >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of creativity >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> and >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see that the >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> two >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself writing. >>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> approaches >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it may be >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> worth >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Imagination >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between Recollection and >>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive Imagination, >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> (2) >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he says >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> leads >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other words, >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is accomplished >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> through >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and Williams. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> trying >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical >>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive >>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> develops. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that there >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> must >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> be a >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I learned >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is linked >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of anticipation >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD >>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination (starting >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and provides >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> a >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> space >>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. This, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled >>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> take >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> part >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> preconceptions: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera >>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian Langacker on >>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> particularly >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> imagination >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of temporality: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure), which >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both individual >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* and the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored under >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of modalities >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing that is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> think >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how jazzed up >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> am >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various triads, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> finally >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> mind, as >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> fuera. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached are two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists like >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of imagination in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of productive >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no intention of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the attached >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I came >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> upon >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked at >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> several >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne and I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> access >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. Moreover, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> such >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Kris's >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> about >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> will >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> with an >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >> > > From hshonerd@gmail.com Thu Dec 18 13:58:04 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2014 14:58:04 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> Message-ID: <4B555DA2-B8D2-4D5E-83DA-777A93B41754@gmail.com> I?m not voting on this, but I would love a copy of the Suvorov paper. Henry > On Dec 18, 2014, at 11:43 AM, mike cole wrote: > > Dear Colleagues. Might it be appropriate to start another thread on > metaphor? > > My basic starting point is the idea that basic perceptual processes > ineluctably require imagination...... measured in milliseconds. Metaphor > and linguistic mediation is for sure > an essential topic here. I want to hold on to the Suvorov metaphor of > imagination as lifting off from the world and returning to it again. (If > the Suvorov reference is not familiar I will post relevant paper). > > A thought: Might it be possible to parse Francine's last message into > subtopics while not discouraging cross subtopic conversations? > > Trying to hold all the threads in my hand. > Slow in So Cal. > mike > > > On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >> >> I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly embodied, >> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to linguistics (For >> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on ?lexicon?: >> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, being part >> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and Halliday see no >> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, lexico-grammar. (Lo >> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar, adding the >> ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings are great >> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of that? In >> translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced? >> Henry >> >> >> >>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the metaphorical >> use of prepositions like: >>> - "there is some value IN your argument" >>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again" >>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" >>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again" >>> >>> and so on. >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> larry smolucha wrote: >>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >>>> >>>> Forgive me for replying to myself - >>>> >>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic possibilities: >>>> >>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in Thought >>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into English >> 1962] >>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' value >> of the >>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech vocalization). >>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that are >> flammable >>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor a gas. >>>> >>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century European >> Developmental >>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' hence the >>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of Piaget's >> Genetic >>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. >>>> >>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and synthesis based >> on >>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in Vygotsky's >> example of H2O. >>>> >>>> >>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com >>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>>> >>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >>>>> >>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic >>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts. >>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more than the >>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can ever be >> imagined" >>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) >>>>> >>>>> A couple things to consider: >>>>> >>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination as the >> brain has >>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the simplest level >> of the Gestalt >>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). >>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just photographic. >>>>> >>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try to >> accurately reproduce >>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, the goal >> of combinatory >>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, dreams, >> musings, and even >>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of objects >> and symbols. >>>>> >>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways that >> things and concepts can be >>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar and flour. >>>>> I can add water and it >> dissolves a bit >>>>> But adding heat changes the >> combination into a pancake. >>>>> [Is this synergistic?] >>>>> >>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more examples >> to put the discussion >>>>> in the metaphysical realm. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 >>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com >>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>>>> >>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the case for >>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I think it's >> not >>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are >> associationists who >>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary associationism >> exists and >>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. >> Vygotsky >>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, explain >> the >>>>>> uniqueness of our species? >>>>>> >>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels for its >> own >>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a Piagetian >>>>>> perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true maturity as a >>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more to it than >>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of primate, and >> our >>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon rocks in >> order >>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged the same >> way as >>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. >>>>>> >>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and for >> language is >>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human >> exceptionalism. >>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for the >> vanguard role >>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, prolonging >>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after the sick >> and the >>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial organs >> (tools) and >>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for our >> species, it >>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these >> "circuitous, >>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that lead our >>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always been short >> on >>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for material >> culture >>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: verily, >> here >>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. >>>>>> >>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of attention is >> simply the >>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says there are >> only two >>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So imagination >> is >>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, and >> nothing >>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when you hear >> the >>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there to be >> able to >>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work in word >> meaning. >>>>>> >>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who was given a >>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been mixed with >> silver >>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold. >> Well, we >>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not possible to >>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that precisely. The >> method >>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the "principal of >>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. >>>>>> >>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes palimpsest, a >> velum on >>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. Because >>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and written over >> every >>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, the >> pressure >>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones when the >> old >>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only known >> Greek >>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". >>>>>> >>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their >> relationship >>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they are >> related to >>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite similar >> to the >>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. >>>>>> >>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) >>>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>> >>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD >> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an associationist, >> ?sees >>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? >>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg >> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division >> between >>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because >> Ribot is >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> an >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of >> attention. >>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from >> forest >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> to >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between >> the two >>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical >> world of >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses >> in life >>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" >> (that >>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> farm,where >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter >> months are >>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter >> talking >>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has >> to be >>>>>>>> more voluntary. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear >>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that underpins >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> Ribot >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out >> the >>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices >> really >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> are >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, >> there >>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and >> animal >>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> volitional >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without a >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> theory >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's >>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at all. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, >> thanks to >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> all >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> for the food for thought. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential around >> the >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> time >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had seen >> work >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> on >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal >> reproductive? >>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of >> development >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> of >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a >> relative >>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. >>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >> hshonerd@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. >> This >>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some >> weeks >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> in >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that >> segmented the >>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. Puns, >>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) >>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they are >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> doing >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his followers >> as an >>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so its >> of >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> course >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in translation, >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> seems >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in >> this >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> passage, >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter distinction >> to >>>>>>>>>>> "memory." >>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary >> discourse >>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian colleagues >> have >>>>>>>>>>> illustrated. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists >> who >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> clearly >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still >> possible >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, >> interestingly >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> links >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" >> act. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Parts >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that >> was >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> also >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of >> creativity >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> and >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see that >> the >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> two >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself >> writing. >>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> approaches >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden >> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it may >> be >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> worth >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Imagination >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between >> Recollection and >>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive >> Imagination, >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> (2) >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he >> says >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> leads >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other >> words, >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is accomplished >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> through >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and >> Williams. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> trying >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical >>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive >>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> develops. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that >> there >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> must >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> be a >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I >> learned >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is >> linked >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of >> anticipation >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination >> (starting >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and >> provides >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> a >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> space >>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. >> This, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled >>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground >> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> take >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> part >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> preconceptions: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera >>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian >> Langacker on >>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> particularly >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> imagination >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of >> temporality: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure), >> which >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both >> individual >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < >> lpscholar2@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* >> and the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion >> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored >> under >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of >> modalities >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing >> that is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> think >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how >> jazzed up >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> am >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as >> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various >> triads, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> finally >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of >> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> mind, as >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> fuera. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole >> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached >> are two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists >> like >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of >> imagination in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of >> productive >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no >> intention of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the >> attached >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I >> came >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> upon >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked >> at >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> several >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne >> and I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> access >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. >> Moreover, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> such >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance >> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Kris's >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> about >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps >> they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> will >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural >> science >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> with an >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >> with an >>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >> with an >>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >> >> > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From dkellogg60@gmail.com Thu Dec 18 13:59:36 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2014 06:59:36 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> Message-ID: As Helena points out, prepositions are from the "grammatical" end of what Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what Halliday calls "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they have three properties that words from the more "lexical" end do not have: a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You can, actually, but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you invent a new name or a new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can). b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific semantic field (the way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of linguistics) but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are used. c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the same effect, which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your argument" the "in" has more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in "there's a fly in your tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in Henry's hands, refer to a book or even a footnote. Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties pretty much define the difference between learning and development, at least as I understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on functions indefinitely while development works by reorganizing the closed set of functions you already have into new systems. Learning is skill specific and local, while development is quite global in its implications. Learning is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new systems, while development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary (and forget it just as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes away. For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of blue that people call the sky") are simply metaphors from the non-productive end of the lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are crisp, concrete, and vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to create sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific writing and thinking today. For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical metaphor is the third great moment in child development (after the break into mother tongue and the break into disciplinary language in school work). Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" implies zero dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two ("on a line', 'on a plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because they are grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them with time: 'at a point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. Compare: "at Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very day), and "in Christmas' (season). David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen wrote: > > Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial > relationships from the concrete material world into the conceptual > imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 common ones, and between 70 > and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far as" -- this > is according to https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm). > We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. Apparently, in > English, they evolved from and did the job done by inflections in parent > languages, examples being cases and tenses. > > But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection like the > dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial relationships suggested > by contemporary prepositions. > > I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about this. > > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > > I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly embodied, > proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to linguistics (For > example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on ?lexicon?: > nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, being part > of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and Halliday see no > clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, lexico-grammar. (Lo > and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar, adding the > ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings are great > data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of that? In > translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced? > > Henry > > > > > > > >> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> > >> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the metaphorical > use of prepositions like: > >> - "there is some value IN your argument" > >> - "I'd like to go OVER that again" > >> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" > >> - "Let's go THROUGH that again" > >> > >> and so on. > >> Andy > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> > >> larry smolucha wrote: > >>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > >>> > >>> Forgive me for replying to myself - > >>> > >>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic possibilities: > >>> > >>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in Thought > >>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into English > 1962] > >>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' value > of the > >>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech vocalization). > >>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that are > flammable > >>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor a gas. > >>> > >>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century European > Developmental > >>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' hence the > >>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of Piaget's > Genetic > >>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. > >>> > >>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and synthesis > based on > >>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in Vygotsky's > example of H2O. > >>> > >>> > >>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com > >>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 > >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > >>>> > >>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > >>>> > >>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic > >>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts. > >>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more than the > >>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can ever be > imagined" > >>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) > >>>> > >>>> A couple things to consider: > >>>> > >>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination as the > brain has > >>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the simplest level > of the Gestalt > >>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). > >>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just photographic. > >>>> > >>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try to > accurately reproduce > >>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, the > goal of combinatory > >>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, dreams, > musings, and even > >>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of objects > and symbols. > >>>> > >>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways that > things and concepts can be > >>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar and flour. > >>>> I can add water and it > dissolves a bit > >>>> But adding heat changes the > combination into a pancake. > >>>> [Is this synergistic?] > >>>> > >>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more examples > to put the discussion > >>>> in the metaphysical realm. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 > >>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com > >>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > >>>>> > >>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the case for > >>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I think it's > not > >>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are > associationists who > >>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary associationism > exists and > >>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. > Vygotsky > >>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, explain > the > >>>>> uniqueness of our species? > >>>>> > >>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels for its > own > >>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a Piagetian > >>>>> perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true maturity as a > >>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more to it > than > >>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of primate, and > our > >>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon rocks in > order > >>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged the same > way as > >>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. > >>>>> > >>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and for > language is > >>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human > exceptionalism. > >>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for the > vanguard role > >>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, prolonging > >>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after the sick > and the > >>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial organs > (tools) and > >>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for our > species, it > >>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these > "circuitous, > >>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that lead our > >>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always been > short on > >>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for material > culture > >>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: > verily, here > >>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. > >>>>> > >>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of attention is > simply the > >>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says there are > only two > >>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So > imagination is > >>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, and > nothing > >>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when you hear > the > >>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there to be > able to > >>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work in word > meaning. > >>>>> > >>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who was given > a > >>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been mixed with > silver > >>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold. > Well, we > >>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not possible to > >>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that precisely. The > method > >>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the "principal of > >>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. > >>>>> > >>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes palimpsest, a > velum on > >>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. Because > >>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and written over > every > >>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, the > pressure > >>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones when the > old > >>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only known > Greek > >>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". > >>>>> > >>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their > relationship > >>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they are > related to > >>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite similar > to the > >>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. > >>>>> > >>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) > >>>>> > >>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >>>>> > >>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD > wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an associationist, > ?sees > >>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? > >>>>>> Henry > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division > between > >>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because > Ribot is > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> an > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of > attention. > >>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from > forest > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> to > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between > the two > >>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical > world of > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> the > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses > in life > >>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" > (that > >>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> farm,where > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter > months are > >>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter > talking > >>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has > to be > >>>>>>> more voluntary. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear > >>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that > underpins > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> Ribot > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out > the > >>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices > really > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> are > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, > there > >>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and > animal > >>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> volitional > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without > a > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> theory > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's > >>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at > all. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, > thanks to > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>> all > >>>>>> > >>>>>>>> for the food for thought. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential > around the > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>> time > >>>>>> > >>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had > seen work > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>> on > >>>>>> > >>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal > reproductive? > >>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of > development > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>> of > >>>>>> > >>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a > relative > >>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. > >>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > hshonerd@gmail.com> > >>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. > This > >>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some > weeks > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>> in > >>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that > segmented the > >>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. > Puns, > >>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) > >>>>>>>>> Henry > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole wrote: > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they > are > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>> doing > >>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his > followers as an > >>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so > its of > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> course > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in > translation, > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>> seems > >>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in > this > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> passage, > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter > distinction to > >>>>>>>>>> "memory." > >>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary > discourse > >>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian > colleagues have > >>>>>>>>>> illustrated. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists > who > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> clearly > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still > possible > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, > interestingly > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> links > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" > act. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Parts > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that > was > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> also > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of > creativity > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>> and > >>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see > that the > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> two > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself > writing. > >>>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> approaches > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> to a pesum > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < > ablunden@mira.net> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it > may be > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> worth > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Imagination > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between > Recollection and > >>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive > Imagination, > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>> (2) > >>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he > says > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> leads > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other > words, > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>> the > >>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is > accomplished > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> through > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and > Williams. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i > am > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> trying > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical > >>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of > productive > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>> develops. > >>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that > there > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>> must > >>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> be a > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I > learned > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> that > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is > linked > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of > anticipation > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > >>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! > >>>>>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > hshonerd@gmail.com > >>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination > (starting > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> with > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and > provides > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>> a > >>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> space > >>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. > This, > >>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled > >>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground > to > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>> take > >>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> part > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> preconceptions: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera > >>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian > Langacker on > >>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>> particularly > >>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>> imagination > >>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of > temporality: > >>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic > structure), which > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> I > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> think > >>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both > individual > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < > lpscholar2@gmail.com> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* > and the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his > notion of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is > explored under > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of > modalities > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> that > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> hang > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing > that is > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> forming > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if > we > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>> think > >>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com > >>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how > jazzed up > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> I > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> am > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> now > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as > Larry > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various > triads, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> finally > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of > the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> mind, as > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega > pa? > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> fuera. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole > wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached > are two > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists > like > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of > imagination in a > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of > productive > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no > intention of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> doing > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the > attached > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I > came > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> upon > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely > linked at > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> several > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, > Ettienne and I > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>> access > >>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. > Moreover, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> such > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> perception/imagination > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance > to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Kris's > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to > concerns > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>> about > >>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps > they > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> will > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > science > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> with an > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > with an > >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > with an > >>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>> > >>> > >> > > > > > From hshonerd@gmail.com Thu Dec 18 14:02:18 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2014 15:02:18 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <, > <, > <, > <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> Message-ID: I am confident Helena knows more than I, but perhaps what I know is complementary. David K. has spoken of ?open? and ?closed? word classes. Traditionally semantics focuses on the open classes (nouns, verbs, adjectives) which are constantly being added to, constantly dropping out of usage,. Prepositions and verb inflections are part of the closed classes whose members are smaller in number and come into a language and drop out more slowly. It may be because of the difference in the speed with which the two classes change that accounts for the focus in traditional semantics on the open classes vis-a-vis the closed. The closed classes are like water for fish? Or oxygen for humans. You just don?t think about it. Vygotsky has said somewhere that science is about discovering such open secrets? Hiding in plain sight. Henry > On Dec 18, 2014, at 12:32 PM, Helena Worthen wrote: > > Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial relationships from the concrete material world into the conceptual imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 common ones, and between 70 and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far as" -- this is according to https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm). We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. Apparently, in English, they evolved from and did the job done by inflections in parent languages, examples being cases and tenses. > > But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection like the dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial relationships suggested by contemporary prepositions. > > I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about this. > > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >> I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly embodied, proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to linguistics (For example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on ?lexicon?: nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, being part of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and Halliday see no clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, lexico-grammar. (Lo and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar, adding the ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings are great data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of that? In translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced? >> Henry >> >> >> >>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the metaphorical use of prepositions like: >>> - "there is some value IN your argument" >>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again" >>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" >>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again" >>> >>> and so on. >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> larry smolucha wrote: >>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >>>> >>>> Forgive me for replying to myself - >>>> >>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic possibilities: >>>> >>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in Thought >>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into English 1962] >>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' value of the >>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech vocalization). >>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that are flammable >>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor a gas. >>>> >>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century European Developmental >>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' hence the >>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of Piaget's Genetic >>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. >>>> >>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and synthesis based on >>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in Vygotsky's example of H2O. >>>> >>>> >>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com >>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>>> >>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >>>>> >>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic >>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts. >>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more than the >>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can ever be imagined" >>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) >>>>> >>>>> A couple things to consider: >>>>> >>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination as the brain has >>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the simplest level of the Gestalt >>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). >>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just photographic. >>>>> >>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try to accurately reproduce >>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, the goal of combinatory >>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, dreams, musings, and even >>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of objects and symbols. >>>>> >>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways that things and concepts can be >>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar and flour. >>>>> I can add water and it dissolves a bit >>>>> But adding heat changes the combination into a pancake. >>>>> [Is this synergistic?] >>>>> >>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more examples to put the discussion >>>>> in the metaphysical realm. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 >>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com >>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>>>> >>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the case for >>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I think it's not >>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are associationists who >>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary associationism exists and >>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. Vygotsky >>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, explain the >>>>>> uniqueness of our species? >>>>>> >>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels for its own >>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a Piagetian >>>>>> perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true maturity as a >>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more to it than >>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of primate, and our >>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon rocks in order >>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged the same way as >>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. >>>>>> >>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and for language is >>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human exceptionalism. >>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for the vanguard role >>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, prolonging >>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after the sick and the >>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial organs (tools) and >>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for our species, it >>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these "circuitous, >>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that lead our >>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always been short on >>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for material culture >>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: verily, here >>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. >>>>>> >>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of attention is simply the >>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says there are only two >>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So imagination is >>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, and nothing >>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when you hear the >>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there to be able to >>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work in word meaning. >>>>>> >>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who was given a >>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been mixed with silver >>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold. Well, we >>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not possible to >>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that precisely. The method >>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the "principal of >>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. >>>>>> >>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes palimpsest, a velum on >>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. Because >>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and written over every >>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, the pressure >>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones when the old >>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only known Greek >>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". >>>>>> >>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their relationship >>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they are related to >>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite similar to the >>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. >>>>>> >>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) >>>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>> >>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an associationist, ?sees >>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? >>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division between >>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because Ribot is >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> an >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of attention. >>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from forest >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> to >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between the two >>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical world of >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses in life >>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" (that >>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> farm,where >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter months are >>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter talking >>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has to be >>>>>>>> more voluntary. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear >>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that underpins >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> Ribot >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out the >>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices really >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> are >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, there >>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and animal >>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> volitional >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without a >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> theory >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's >>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at all. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, thanks to >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> all >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> for the food for thought. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential around the >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> time >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had seen work >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> on >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal reproductive? >>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of development >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> of >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a relative >>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. >>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD >>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. This >>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some weeks >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> in >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that segmented the >>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. Puns, >>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) >>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they are >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> doing >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his followers as an >>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so its of >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> course >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in translation, >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> seems >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in this >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> passage, >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter distinction to >>>>>>>>>>> "memory." >>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary discourse >>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian colleagues have >>>>>>>>>>> illustrated. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists who >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> clearly >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still possible >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, interestingly >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> links >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" act. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Parts >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that was >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> also >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of creativity >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> and >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see that the >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> two >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself writing. >>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> approaches >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it may be >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> worth >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Imagination >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between Recollection and >>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive Imagination, >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> (2) >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he says >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> leads >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other words, >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is accomplished >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> through >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and Williams. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> trying >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical >>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive >>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> develops. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that there >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> must >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> be a >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I learned >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is linked >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of anticipation >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD >>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination (starting >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and provides >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> a >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> space >>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. This, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled >>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> take >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> part >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> preconceptions: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera >>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian Langacker on >>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> particularly >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> imagination >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of temporality: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure), which >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both individual >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* and the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored under >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of modalities >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing that is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> think >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how jazzed up >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> am >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various triads, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> finally >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> mind, as >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> fuera. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached are two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists like >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of imagination in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of productive >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no intention of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the attached >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I came >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> upon >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked at >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> several >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne and I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> access >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. Moreover, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> such >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Kris's >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> about >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> will >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> with an >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >> > > From helenaworthen@gmail.com Thu Dec 18 14:12:45 2014 From: helenaworthen@gmail.com (Helena Worthen) Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2014 14:12:45 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Metaphors In-Reply-To: References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> Message-ID: David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to this: "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to create sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific writing and thinking today." Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I lose you when you say "created to talk about gravity as an entity". Thank you, Helena Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > As Helena points out, prepositions are from the "grammatical" end of what > Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what Halliday calls > "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they have three > properties that words from the more "lexical" end do not have: > > a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You can, actually, > but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you invent a new name or a > new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can). > > b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific semantic field (the > way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of linguistics) > but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are used. > > c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the same effect, > which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your argument" the "in" has > more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in "there's a fly in your > tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in Henry's hands, refer > to a book or even a footnote. > > Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties pretty much > define the difference between learning and development, at least as I > understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on functions > indefinitely while development works by reorganizing the closed set of > functions you already have into new systems. Learning is skill specific > and local, while development is quite global in its implications. Learning > is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new systems, while > development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary (and forget it just > as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes away. > > For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of blue that people > call the sky") are simply metaphors from the non-productive end of the > lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are crisp, concrete, and > vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to create > sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly productive, > which is why they still form the basis of scientific writing and thinking > today. For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical metaphor is the third > great moment in child development (after the break into mother tongue and > the break into disciplinary language in school work). > > Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" implies zero > dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two ("on a line', 'on a > plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because they are > grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them with time: 'at a > point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. Compare: "at > Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very day), and "in > Christmas' (season). > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen > wrote: >> >> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial >> relationships from the concrete material world into the conceptual >> imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 common ones, and between 70 >> and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far as" -- this >> is according to https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm). >> We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. Apparently, in >> English, they evolved from and did the job done by inflections in parent >> languages, examples being cases and tenses. >> >> But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection like the >> dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial relationships suggested >> by contemporary prepositions. >> >> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about this. >> >> Helena Worthen >> helenaworthen@gmail.com >> >> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >> >>> I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly embodied, >> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to linguistics (For >> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on ?lexicon?: >> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, being part >> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and Halliday see no >> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, lexico-grammar. (Lo >> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar, adding the >> ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings are great >> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of that? In >> translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced? >>> Henry >>> >>> >>> >>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the metaphorical >> use of prepositions like: >>>> - "there is some value IN your argument" >>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again" >>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" >>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again" >>>> >>>> and so on. >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> larry smolucha wrote: >>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >>>>> >>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself - >>>>> >>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic possibilities: >>>>> >>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in Thought >>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into English >> 1962] >>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' value >> of the >>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech vocalization). >>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that are >> flammable >>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor a gas. >>>>> >>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century European >> Developmental >>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' hence the >>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of Piaget's >> Genetic >>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. >>>>> >>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and synthesis >> based on >>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in Vygotsky's >> example of H2O. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com >>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>>>> >>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >>>>>> >>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic >>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts. >>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more than the >>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can ever be >> imagined" >>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) >>>>>> >>>>>> A couple things to consider: >>>>>> >>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination as the >> brain has >>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the simplest level >> of the Gestalt >>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). >>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just photographic. >>>>>> >>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try to >> accurately reproduce >>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, the >> goal of combinatory >>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, dreams, >> musings, and even >>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of objects >> and symbols. >>>>>> >>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways that >> things and concepts can be >>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar and flour. >>>>>> I can add water and it >> dissolves a bit >>>>>> But adding heat changes the >> combination into a pancake. >>>>>> [Is this synergistic?] >>>>>> >>>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more examples >> to put the discussion >>>>>> in the metaphysical realm. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 >>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com >>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the case for >>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I think it's >> not >>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are >> associationists who >>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary associationism >> exists and >>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. >> Vygotsky >>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, explain >> the >>>>>>> uniqueness of our species? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels for its >> own >>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a Piagetian >>>>>>> perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true maturity as a >>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more to it >> than >>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of primate, and >> our >>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon rocks in >> order >>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged the same >> way as >>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and for >> language is >>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human >> exceptionalism. >>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for the >> vanguard role >>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, prolonging >>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after the sick >> and the >>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial organs >> (tools) and >>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for our >> species, it >>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these >> "circuitous, >>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that lead our >>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always been >> short on >>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for material >> culture >>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: >> verily, here >>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of attention is >> simply the >>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says there are >> only two >>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So >> imagination is >>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, and >> nothing >>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when you hear >> the >>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there to be >> able to >>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work in word >> meaning. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who was given >> a >>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been mixed with >> silver >>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold. >> Well, we >>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not possible to >>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that precisely. The >> method >>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the "principal of >>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes palimpsest, a >> velum on >>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. Because >>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and written over >> every >>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, the >> pressure >>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones when the >> old >>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only known >> Greek >>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their >> relationship >>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they are >> related to >>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite similar >> to the >>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD >> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an associationist, >> ?sees >>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? >>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg >> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division >> between >>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because >> Ribot is >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> an >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of >> attention. >>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from >> forest >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between >> the two >>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical >> world of >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses >> in life >>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" >> (that >>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> farm,where >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter >> months are >>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter >> talking >>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has >> to be >>>>>>>>> more voluntary. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear >>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that >> underpins >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Ribot >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out >> the >>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices >> really >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> are >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, >> there >>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and >> animal >>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> volitional >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without >> a >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> theory >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's >>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at >> all. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, >> thanks to >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> all >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential >> around the >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> time >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had >> seen work >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> on >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal >> reproductive? >>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of >> development >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a >> relative >>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. >>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >> hshonerd@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. >> This >>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some >> weeks >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that >> segmented the >>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. >> Puns, >>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) >>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they >> are >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his >> followers as an >>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so >> its of >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> course >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in >> translation, >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> seems >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in >> this >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> passage, >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter >> distinction to >>>>>>>>>>>> "memory." >>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary >> discourse >>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian >> colleagues have >>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists >> who >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> clearly >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still >> possible >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, >> interestingly >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> links >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" >> act. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Parts >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that >> was >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> also >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of >> creativity >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see >> that the >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> two >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself >> writing. >>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> approaches >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < >> ablunden@mira.net> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it >> may be >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> worth >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Imagination >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between >> Recollection and >>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive >> Imagination, >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> (2) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he >> says >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> leads >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other >> words, >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is >> accomplished >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> through >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and >> Williams. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i >> am >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> trying >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical >>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of >> productive >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> develops. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that >> there >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> must >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> be a >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I >> learned >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is >> linked >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of >> anticipation >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination >> (starting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and >> provides >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. >> This, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground >> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> take >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> part >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> preconceptions: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian >> Langacker on >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> particularly >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> imagination >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of >> temporality: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic >> structure), which >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both >> individual >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < >> lpscholar2@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* >> and the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his >> notion of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is >> explored under >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of >> modalities >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing >> that is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if >> we >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how >> jazzed up >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> am >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as >> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various >> triads, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> finally >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of >> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> mind, as >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega >> pa? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> fuera. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole >> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached >> are two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists >> like >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of >> imagination in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of >> productive >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no >> intention of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the >> attached >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I >> came >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> upon >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely >> linked at >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> several >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, >> Ettienne and I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> access >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. >> Moreover, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> such >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance >> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Kris's >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to >> concerns >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> about >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps >> they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> will >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural >> science >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> with an >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >> with an >>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >> with an >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >> >> >> From hshonerd@gmail.com Thu Dec 18 14:36:02 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2014 15:36:02 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination (seeing and believing) In-Reply-To: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102265CEB@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> References: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102265CEB@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Message-ID: <9A8CE8FE-43CB-48B6-8553-54349E8F1E1E@gmail.com> Rod, Appropriate or not (though I think it is) your post has me asking why Martin (our Martin?) thinks that the use of that substance diminished the inference making. This will drive Mike crazy, but would a thread on imagination benefit from a discussion of what has been with the species from time immemorial: mind altering substances? We?re talking affordances here, culture, history, activity. Another thread? Henry > On Dec 18, 2014, at 12:41 PM, Rod Parker-Rees wrote: > > I am not sure how appropriate it is to post this here as it is going back to an earlier theme in the discussion - the relationship between perception and imagination. I asked a friend who is on a masters psychology programme and she asked one of her tutors at Bristol University (Paul Howard-Jones http://www.bristol.ac.uk/education/people/person/93406/index.html ). > > I think his summary of the attached paper may be of interest to some - and the paper is way outside the xmca remit but I have attached in in case anyone is interested enough to want to read more. > > All the best, > > Rod > > This was what I asked: > > Are you aware of any articles which enumerate the ratio between sensory information (e.g. stimuli from the retinae) and visual memory in the process of seeing? I saw a claim somewhere that only about 10% of what we ?see? is from retinal information, with the rest made up by our interpretation of this information using what we have seen before but I can?t track down any evidence for this so am not confident about it! What I am particularly interested in is what happens when the bodily actions of thinking and perceiving are reduced to ?things? ? ?thoughts? and ?perceptions? or ?images?. It seems important to me that the way we ACT on things is part of what we know about them or, more generally, that we are aware of our environment in terms of our experiences of interacting with it rather than in terms of lists of extracted ?properties? of phenomena > > And this is Paul's reply: > > Attached is a highly theoretical paper by a guy (Martin) who was privileged to borrow my wooden fMRI simulator for participants to take magic mushrooms in- fascinating study! It might be relevant to this query. > I would summarise it as follows: > The brain is thought to comprise hierarchical levels, with input arriving at the lowest levels (light, sound, touch, etc) and a representation of the world generated at the top that can direct our actions (e.g., rain is falling, so grab a coat). To achieve this, each level draws on past history to draw some basic conclusions and these inferences get passed to the level above. So, in the visual system, lower levels process activations of retinal neurons into inferred features (e.g. rain drops). A little further up in the same system, higher levels process the behaviour of features into inferred patterns of movement (e.g....are falling). When a layer forms an inference, it can use it to suppress the information coming from below that gave rise to it. This is good house-keeping, and reduces the amount of information the brain has to process. After all, once a pattern of incoming information is recognised and can be reduced to an inference, it can be filed under ?business as usual? and that stream of information can be ignored - the inference is all we need to know. Information that can?t be turned into inferences ? stuff that doesn?t fit previous history ? deserves more special attention and, rather than getting suppressed, is passed up the levels for a different reason: it can be used to readjust expectations and teach the brain new tricks (i.e. how to make new inferences), so providing a mechanism for the brain to learn. > > > But this essentially means very little of the original perceptual information ever reaches consciousness (unless you take magic mushrooms (not that i am recommending) which Martin thinks diminishes the efficiency of the inference-making. > > > Merry Christmas everyone! > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole > Sent: 18 December 2014 18:44 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > Dear Colleagues. Might it be appropriate to start another thread on metaphor? > > My basic starting point is the idea that basic perceptual processes ineluctably require imagination...... measured in milliseconds. Metaphor and linguistic mediation is for sure an essential topic here. I want to hold on to the Suvorov metaphor of imagination as lifting off from the world and returning to it again. (If the Suvorov reference is not familiar I will post relevant paper). > > A thought: Might it be possible to parse Francine's last message into subtopics while not discouraging cross subtopic conversations? > > Trying to hold all the threads in my hand. > Slow in So Cal. > mike > > > On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >> >> I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly embodied, >> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to linguistics >> (For example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on ?lexicon?: >> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, being >> part of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and >> Halliday see no clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, >> lexico-grammar. (Lo and behold, my spell check wanted me to write >> lexicon-grammar, adding the ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them >> separate!) Word coinings are great data for imagination and >> creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of that? In translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced? >> Henry >> >> >> >>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>> >>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the >>> metaphorical >> use of prepositions like: >>> - "there is some value IN your argument" >>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again" >>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" >>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again" >>> >>> and so on. >>> Andy >>> -------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> ---- >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> larry smolucha wrote: >>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >>>> >>>> Forgive me for replying to myself - >>>> >>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic possibilities: >>>> >>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in >>>> Thought and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated >>>> into English >> 1962] >>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' >>>> value >> of the >>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech vocalization). >>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that are >> flammable >>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor a gas. >>>> >>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century European >> Developmental >>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' hence >>>> the Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of >>>> Piaget's >> Genetic >>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. >>>> >>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and synthesis >>>> based >> on >>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in Vygotsky's >> example of H2O. >>>> >>>> >>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com >>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>>> >>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >>>>> >>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic and >>>>> produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts. >>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more than >>>>> the recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can >>>>> ever be >> imagined" >>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) >>>>> >>>>> A couple things to consider: >>>>> >>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination as the >> brain has >>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the simplest >>>>> level >> of the Gestalt >>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). >>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just photographic. >>>>> >>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try to >> accurately reproduce >>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, the >>>>> goal >> of combinatory >>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, dreams, >> musings, and even >>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of >>>>> objects >> and symbols. >>>>> >>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways that >> things and concepts can be >>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar and flour. >>>>> I can add water and it >> dissolves a bit >>>>> But adding heat changes >>>>> the >> combination into a pancake. >>>>> [Is this synergistic?] >>>>> >>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more >>>>> examples >> to put the discussion >>>>> in the metaphysical realm. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 >>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com >>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>>>> >>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the case >>>>>> for Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I >>>>>> think it's >> not >>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are >> associationists who >>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary associationism >> exists and >>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. >> Vygotsky >>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, >>>>>> explain >> the >>>>>> uniqueness of our species? >>>>>> >>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels for >>>>>> its >> own >>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a Piagetian >>>>>> perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true maturity >>>>>> as a species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more >>>>>> to it than >>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of primate, >>>>>> and >> our >>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon rocks >>>>>> in >> order >>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged the >>>>>> same >> way as >>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. >>>>>> >>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and for >> language is >>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human >> exceptionalism. >>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for the >> vanguard role >>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, >>>>>> prolonging childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking >>>>>> after the sick >> and the >>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial organs >> (tools) and >>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for our >> species, it >>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these >> "circuitous, >>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that lead >>>>>> our development as a species. The wretched of the earth always >>>>>> been short >> on >>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for material >> culture >>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: >>>>>> verily, >> here >>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. >>>>>> >>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of attention is >> simply the >>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says there are >> only two >>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So >>>>>> imagination >> is >>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, and >> nothing >>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when you >>>>>> hear >> the >>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there to be >> able to >>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work in >>>>>> word >> meaning. >>>>>> >>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who was >>>>>> given a crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been >>>>>> mixed with >> silver >>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold. >> Well, we >>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not >>>>>> possible to measure the differences in water displacement that >>>>>> precisely. The >> method >>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the "principal >>>>>> of buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. >>>>>> >>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes palimpsest, a >> velum on >>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. >>>>>> Because parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and >>>>>> written over >> every >>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, the >> pressure >>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones when >>>>>> the >> old >>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only >>>>>> known >> Greek >>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". >>>>>> >>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their >> relationship >>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they are >> related to >>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite >>>>>> similar >> to the >>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. >>>>>> >>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) >>>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>> >>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD >> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an >>>>>>> associationist, >> ?sees >>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? >>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg >>>>>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division >> between >>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because >> Ribot is >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> an >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of >> attention. >>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition >>>>>>>> from >> forest >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> to >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division >>>>>>>> between >> the two >>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical >> world of >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic >>>>>>>> uses >> in life >>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" >> (that >>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> farm,where >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter >> months are >>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to >>>>>>>> encounter >> talking >>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention >>>>>>>> has >> to be >>>>>>>> more voluntary. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very >>>>>>>> clear understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism >>>>>>>> that underpins >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> Ribot >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points >>>>>>>> out >> the >>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices >> really >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> are >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of >>>>>>>> imagination, >> there >>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human >>>>>>>> and >> animal >>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> volitional >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). >>>>>>>> Without a >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> theory >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for >>>>>>>> Ribot's distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at all. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, >> thanks to >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> all >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> for the food for thought. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential >>>>>>>>> around >> the >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> time >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had >>>>>>>>> seen >> work >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> on >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal >> reproductive? >>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of >> development >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> of >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being >>>>>>>>> a >> relative >>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. >>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >> hshonerd@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. >> This >>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from >>>>>>>>>> some >> weeks >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> in >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that >> segmented the >>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. >>>>>>>>>> Puns, according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) >>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and >>>>>>>>>>> they are >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> doing >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his >>>>>>>>>>> followers >> as an >>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so >>>>>>>>>>> its >> of >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> course >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in >>>>>>>>>>> translation, >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> seems >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" >>>>>>>>>>> in >> this >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> passage, >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter >>>>>>>>>>> distinction >> to >>>>>>>>>>> "memory." >>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary >> discourse >>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian >>>>>>>>>>> colleagues >> have >>>>>>>>>>> illustrated. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from >>>>>>>>>>> theorists >> who >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> clearly >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was >>>>>>>>>>> still >> possible >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, >> interestingly >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> links >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" >> act. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Parts >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff >>>>>>>>>>> that >> was >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> also >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of >> creativity >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> and >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see >>>>>>>>>>> that >> the >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> two >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found >>>>>>>>>>> himself >> writing. >>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty >>>>>>>>>>> old >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> approaches >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it >>>>>>>>>>>> may >> be >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> worth >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place >>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Imagination >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between >> Recollection and >>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive >> Imagination, >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> (2) >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which >>>>>>>>>>>> he >> says >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> leads >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other >> words, >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> the >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is >>>>>>>>>>>> accomplished >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> through >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >> -- >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and >> Williams. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work >>>>>>>>>>>>> i am >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> trying >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical >>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of >>>>>>>>>>>>> productive imagination. The Russians write that productive >>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> develops. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that >> there >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> must >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> be a >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But >>>>>>>>>>>>> I >> learned >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and >>>>>>>>>>>>> is >> linked >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of >> anticipation >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination >> (starting >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and >> provides >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> a >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> space >>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. >> This, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled >>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> ground >> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> take >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> part >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> preconceptions: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera >>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian >> Langacker on >>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> particularly >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> imagination >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of >> temporality: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic >>>>>>>>>>>>>> structure), >> which >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both >> individual >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < >> lpscholar2@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *space* >> and the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion >> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> explored >> under >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of >> modalities >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowing >> that is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> if we >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> think >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how >> jazzed up >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> am >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as >> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various >> triads, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> finally >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of >> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> mind, as >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> fuera. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> attached >> are two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> theorists >> like >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of >> imagination in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of >> productive >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no >> intention of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the >> attached >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> philosophers, I >> came >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> upon >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> linked >> at >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> several >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ettienne >> and I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> access >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. >> Moreover, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> such >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relevance >> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Kris's >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> concerns >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> about >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Perhaps >> they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> will >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural >> science >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> with an >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural >>>>>>>>>>> science >> with an >>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >> with an >>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >> >> > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > ________________________________ > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. > <1265 full.pdf> From annalisa@unm.edu Thu Dec 18 14:39:00 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2014 22:39:00 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: The Annotated Bibliography Project (ABP) In-Reply-To: References: <1418609555710.2387@unm.edu> <1418622071354.57240@unm.edu> <1418674039953.79220@unm.edu> , Message-ID: <1418942339999.84672@unm.edu> Ding! Ding! Just a heads up! We have our first bell ringing for the Annotated Bibliography. Artin sent us a list of texts to add to the ABC. Do you have any texts to add? Inquiring minds want to know! Kind regards, Annalisa P.S. Greg Thompson had the great idea to call it the Annotated Bibliography Compendium, so we can officially call it the ABC, which is perfect for Newcomers! And catchy! From hshonerd@gmail.com Thu Dec 18 14:57:07 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2014 15:57:07 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <, > <, > <, > <, > Message-ID: So sorry, I can?t find the David McNeill reference. A title? A link? I?ll just google for now. Henry > On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:12 PM, larry smolucha wrote: > > Message from Francine: > > We want to add these works to a bibliography on imagination. > I.A. Richard's quote is right on the mark and interesting in regard to > David McNeill's research on hand gestures (see my recent post). > > Seems to me that we have a Zeitgeist is emerging in our XMCA community. > >> From: boblake@georgiasouthern.edu >> Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2014 10:57:36 -0500 >> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >> >> Hi Francine, >> I am so glad to see you sharing your insightful reading of Vygotsky on >> imagination and metaphor. It was actually the connections between >> imagination, inner speech and metaphor as >> the means to personal agency that first drew me into Vygotsky studies. >> Vera John-Steiner, Lois Holzman, Dot Robbins and you were the first people >> I talked to about this work. >> In 1936, I.A. Richards published his *Philosophy of Rhetoric*, a work that >> grew directly out of Vico?s thinking. His thesis was that "thought is >> metaphoric, and proceeds by comparison, and the metaphors of language >> derive therefrom? (p. 94). In other words, he believed that at the base of >> all thinking, there is a metaphoric relationship. Richards takes this one >> step further when he suggests that metaphors are ?cognitively irreducible? >> (Johnson, 1981, p. 19) A metaphoric expression therefore becomes a newly >> created vehicle of meaning which loses potency when seeking to make a >> literal statement out of its component parts. In 2001, Maxine Greene wrote >> something similar. "By means of making metaphors, imagination can reorient >> consciousness through its disclosure of patterns, relationships, shadows, >> and lights, and slivers of sound that are wholly unexpected, ?new? in some >> wonderful fashion? (Greene, 2001, p 154). >> >> For example,try reducing this back to literal meaning :-) >> >> The Road Not Taken >> By Robert Frost >> Two roads diverged in a yellow wood, >> And sorry I could not travel both >> And be one traveler, long I stood >> And looked down one as far as I could >> To where it bent in the undergrowth; >> >> Then took the other, as just as fair, >> And having perhaps the better claim, >> Because it was grassy and wanted wear; >> Though as for that the passing there >> Had worn them really about the same, >> >> And both that morning equally lay >> In leaves no step had trodden black. >> Oh, I kept the first for another day! >> Yet knowing how way leads on to way, >> I doubted if I should ever come back. >> >> I shall be telling this with a sigh >> Somewhere ages and ages hence: >> Two roads diverged in a wood, and I? >> I took the one less traveled by, >> And that has made all the difference. >> Retrieved from : http://www.poetryfoundation.org/poem/173536 >> >> References >> >> Greene, M. (2001). *Variations on a blue guitar*. New York, NY: Teachers >> College Press. >> >> Johnson, M. (1981). *Philosophical perspectives on metaphor.* Minneapolis, >> MN: University of Minnesota Press. >> >> Richards,I.A. (1936). *The philosophy of rhetoric. * Oxford, GB: Oxford >> University Press. >> >> >> >> On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 4:45 AM, larry smolucha >> wrote: >>> >>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >>> >>> Forgive me for replying to myself - >>> >>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic possibilities: >>> >>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in Thought >>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into English 1962] >>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' value of >>> the >>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech vocalization). >>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that are >>> flammable >>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor a gas. >>> >>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century European >>> Developmental >>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' hence the >>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of Piaget's >>> Genetic >>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. >>> >>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and synthesis based on >>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in Vygotsky's example >>> of H2O. >>> >>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com >>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>> >>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >>>> >>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic >>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts. >>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more than the >>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can ever be >>> imagined" >>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) >>>> >>>> A couple things to consider: >>>> >>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination as the brain >>> has >>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the simplest level of >>> the Gestalt >>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). >>>> >>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just photographic. >>>> >>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try to >>> accurately reproduce >>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, the goal >>> of combinatory >>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, dreams, musings, >>> and even >>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of objects and >>> symbols. >>>> >>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways that >>> things and concepts can be >>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar and flour. >>>> I can add water and it >>> dissolves a bit >>>> But adding heat changes the >>> combination into a pancake. >>>> [Is this synergistic?] >>>> >>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more examples to >>> put the discussion >>>> in the metaphysical realm. >>>> >>>> >>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 >>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com >>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>>> >>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the case for >>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I think it's not >>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are associationists >>> who >>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary associationism >>> exists and >>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. >>> Vygotsky >>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, explain the >>>>> uniqueness of our species? >>>>> >>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels for its own >>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a Piagetian >>>>> perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true maturity as a >>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more to it than >>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of primate, and >>> our >>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon rocks in >>> order >>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged the same way >>> as >>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. >>>>> >>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and for >>> language is >>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human >>> exceptionalism. >>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for the vanguard >>> role >>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, prolonging >>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after the sick and >>> the >>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial organs >>> (tools) and >>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for our >>> species, it >>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these "circuitous, >>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that lead our >>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always been short >>> on >>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for material culture >>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: verily, >>> here >>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. >>>>> >>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of attention is >>> simply the >>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says there are only >>> two >>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So imagination >>> is >>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, and >>> nothing >>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when you hear >>> the >>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there to be able >>> to >>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work in word >>> meaning. >>>>> >>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who was given a >>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been mixed with >>> silver >>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold. Well, >>> we >>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not possible to >>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that precisely. The >>> method >>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the "principal of >>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. >>>>> >>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes palimpsest, a velum >>> on >>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. Because >>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and written over >>> every >>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, the >>> pressure >>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones when the >>> old >>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only known >>> Greek >>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". >>>>> >>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their >>> relationship >>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they are related >>> to >>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite similar >>> to the >>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. >>>>> >>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>> >>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD >>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an associationist, >>> ?sees >>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? >>>>>> Henry >>>>>> >>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg >>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division >>> between >>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because >>> Ribot is >>>>>> an >>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of >>> attention. >>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from >>> forest >>>>>> to >>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between >>> the two >>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical >>> world of >>>>>> the >>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses >>> in life >>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" >>> (that >>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the >>>>>> farm,where >>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter >>> months are >>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter >>> talking >>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has >>> to be >>>>>>> more voluntary. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear >>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that >>> underpins >>>>>> Ribot >>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out >>> the >>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices >>> really >>>>>> are >>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, >>> there >>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and >>> animal >>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of >>>>>> volitional >>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without >>> a >>>>>> theory >>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's >>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at >>> all. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, >>> thanks to >>>>>> all >>>>>>>> for the food for thought. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential >>> around the >>>>>> time >>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had >>> seen work >>>>>> on >>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal >>> reproductive? >>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of >>> development >>>>>> of >>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a >>> relative >>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. >>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>> hshonerd@gmail.com> >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. >>> This >>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some >>> weeks >>>>>> in >>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that >>> segmented the >>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. >>> Puns, >>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) >>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they >>> are >>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his >>> followers as an >>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so >>> its of >>>>>>>>> course >>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in >>> translation, >>>>>> seems >>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in >>> this >>>>>>>>> passage, >>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter >>> distinction to >>>>>>>>>> "memory." >>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary >>> discourse >>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian >>> colleagues have >>>>>>>>>> illustrated. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists >>> who >>>>>>>>> clearly >>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still >>> possible >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, >>> interestingly >>>>>>>> links >>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" >>> act. >>>>>>>> Parts >>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that >>> was >>>>>>>> also >>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of >>> creativity >>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see >>> that the >>>>>>>> two >>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself >>> writing. >>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old >>>>>>>>> approaches >>>>>>>>>> to a pesum >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < >>> ablunden@mira.net> >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it >>> may be >>>>>>>> worth >>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to >>>>>>>>> Imagination >>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between >>> Recollection and >>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive >>> Imagination, >>>>>> (2) >>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he >>> says >>>>>>>> leads >>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other >>> words, >>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is >>> accomplished >>>>>>>> through >>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and >>> Williams. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i >>> am >>>>>>>> trying >>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical >>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of >>> productive >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination >>>>>> develops. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that >>> there >>>>>> must >>>>>>>>> be a >>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I >>> learned >>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is >>> linked >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of >>> anticipation >>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! >>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination >>> (starting >>>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and >>> provides >>>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>>> space >>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. >>> This, >>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled >>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground >>> to >>>>>> take >>>>>>>>> part >>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with >>>>>>>> preconceptions: >>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera >>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian >>> Langacker on >>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, >>>>>> particularly >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of >>>>>> imagination >>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of >>> temporality: >>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic >>> structure), which >>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both >>> individual >>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. >>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < >>> lpscholar2@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* >>> and the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his >>> notion of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is >>> explored under >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of >>> modalities >>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> hang >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing >>> that is >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> forming >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if >>> we >>>>>> think >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how >>> jazzed up >>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>> am >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> now >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as >>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various >>> triads, >>>>>>>>> finally >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of >>> the >>>>>>>>> mind, as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega >>> pa? >>>>>>>> fuera. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole >>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached >>> are two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists >>> like >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of >>> imagination in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of >>> productive >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no >>> intention of >>>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the >>> attached >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I >>> came >>>>>>>> upon >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely >>> linked at >>>>>>>>> several >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, >>> Ettienne and I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of >>>>>> access >>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. >>> Moreover, >>>>>>>>> such >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the >>>>>>>>> perception/imagination >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance >>> to >>>>>>>> Kris's >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to >>> concerns >>>>>> about >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps >>> they >>>>>>>> will >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural >>> science >>>>>>>>> with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >>> with an >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >>> with an >>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>> >>> >> >> >> >> -- >> >> *Robert Lake Ed.D.*Associate Professor >> Social Foundations of Education >> Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading >> Georgia Southern University >> Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group >> P. O. Box 8144 >> Phone: (912) 478-0355 >> Fax: (912) 478-5382 >> Statesboro, GA 30460 > From annalisa@unm.edu Thu Dec 18 15:05:32 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2014 23:05:32 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors In-Reply-To: References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> , Message-ID: <1418943930527.52221@unm.edu> Before we head into symbolic territory, I'd like to add that metaphors are useful because they are in a sense their own systems of meaning, little subtextual blocks that are lifted from the world, like a photograph. Just like a photograph, it is a simulation of the world, in terms of an object in the world, activity in the world, or a relationship in the world. Yet the metaphor cannot stand in for the object, activity, or relationship, because then we would just mean the world in which the metaphor reference sits. So the metaphor must be contextualized in terms of how the speaker means it. Perhaps this is why we make distinctions between a metaphor, a metonym, a synonym, a simile, or an analogy? So in this case meaning to the metaphor is like what the photograph references to the photograph. "This is me, this is a picture of me." In painting from the middle ages and the Renaissance for example, biblical references are frequently made from objects in the painting, especially with regard to the Christian saints and disciples. These object-references are not isolated to Christianity iconography, but are available in the Greek Pantheon, the Ancient Egyptians, the Mayans, the Incans, the Aztecs, Buddhism, Hinduism, and other cultures with close proximity to natural environments. It would seem that this is something humans _do_ with imagery. Over time, these metaphors become a kind of language on their own, but they require a context in order to unlock their meaning. That's why I like to compare them to photographs because an "enlightened" audience is required, not just a speaker. Hieroglyphs are interesting to me because they are like letters, but they are not letters. They are like pictures, but then they are not pictures. Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Helena Worthen Sent: Thursday, December 18, 2014 3:12 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Metaphors David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to this: "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to create sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific writing and thinking today." Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I lose you when you say "created to talk about gravity as an entity". Thank you, Helena Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > As Helena points out, prepositions are from the "grammatical" end of what > Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what Halliday calls > "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they have three > properties that words from the more "lexical" end do not have: > > a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You can, actually, > but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you invent a new name or a > new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can). > > b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific semantic field (the > way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of linguistics) > but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are used. > > c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the same effect, > which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your argument" the "in" has > more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in "there's a fly in your > tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in Henry's hands, refer > to a book or even a footnote. > > Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties pretty much > define the difference between learning and development, at least as I > understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on functions > indefinitely while development works by reorganizing the closed set of > functions you already have into new systems. Learning is skill specific > and local, while development is quite global in its implications. Learning > is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new systems, while > development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary (and forget it just > as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes away. > > For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of blue that people > call the sky") are simply metaphors from the non-productive end of the > lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are crisp, concrete, and > vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to create > sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly productive, > which is why they still form the basis of scientific writing and thinking > today. For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical metaphor is the third > great moment in child development (after the break into mother tongue and > the break into disciplinary language in school work). > > Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" implies zero > dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two ("on a line', 'on a > plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because they are > grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them with time: 'at a > point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. Compare: "at > Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very day), and "in > Christmas' (season). > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen > wrote: >> >> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial >> relationships from the concrete material world into the conceptual >> imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 common ones, and between 70 >> and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far as" -- this >> is according to https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm). >> We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. Apparently, in >> English, they evolved from and did the job done by inflections in parent >> languages, examples being cases and tenses. >> >> But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection like the >> dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial relationships suggested >> by contemporary prepositions. >> >> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about this. >> >> Helena Worthen >> helenaworthen@gmail.com >> >> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >> >>> I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly embodied, >> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to linguistics (For >> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on ?lexicon?: >> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, being part >> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and Halliday see no >> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, lexico-grammar. (Lo >> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar, adding the >> ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings are great >> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of that? In >> translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced? >>> Henry >>> >>> >>> >>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the metaphorical >> use of prepositions like: >>>> - "there is some value IN your argument" >>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again" >>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" >>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again" >>>> >>>> and so on. >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> larry smolucha wrote: >>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >>>>> >>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself - >>>>> >>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic possibilities: >>>>> >>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in Thought >>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into English >> 1962] >>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' value >> of the >>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech vocalization). >>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that are >> flammable >>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor a gas. >>>>> >>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century European >> Developmental >>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' hence the >>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of Piaget's >> Genetic >>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. >>>>> >>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and synthesis >> based on >>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in Vygotsky's >> example of H2O. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com >>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>>>> >>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >>>>>> >>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic >>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts. >>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more than the >>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can ever be >> imagined" >>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) >>>>>> >>>>>> A couple things to consider: >>>>>> >>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination as the >> brain has >>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the simplest level >> of the Gestalt >>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). >>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just photographic. >>>>>> >>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try to >> accurately reproduce >>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, the >> goal of combinatory >>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, dreams, >> musings, and even >>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of objects >> and symbols. >>>>>> >>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways that >> things and concepts can be >>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar and flour. >>>>>> I can add water and it >> dissolves a bit >>>>>> But adding heat changes the >> combination into a pancake. >>>>>> [Is this synergistic?] >>>>>> >>>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more examples >> to put the discussion >>>>>> in the metaphysical realm. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 >>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com >>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the case for >>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I think it's >> not >>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are >> associationists who >>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary associationism >> exists and >>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. >> Vygotsky >>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, explain >> the >>>>>>> uniqueness of our species? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels for its >> own >>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a Piagetian >>>>>>> perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true maturity as a >>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more to it >> than >>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of primate, and >> our >>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon rocks in >> order >>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged the same >> way as >>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and for >> language is >>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human >> exceptionalism. >>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for the >> vanguard role >>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, prolonging >>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after the sick >> and the >>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial organs >> (tools) and >>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for our >> species, it >>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these >> "circuitous, >>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that lead our >>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always been >> short on >>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for material >> culture >>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: >> verily, here >>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of attention is >> simply the >>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says there are >> only two >>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So >> imagination is >>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, and >> nothing >>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when you hear >> the >>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there to be >> able to >>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work in word >> meaning. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who was given >> a >>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been mixed with >> silver >>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold. >> Well, we >>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not possible to >>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that precisely. The >> method >>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the "principal of >>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes palimpsest, a >> velum on >>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. Because >>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and written over >> every >>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, the >> pressure >>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones when the >> old >>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only known >> Greek >>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their >> relationship >>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they are >> related to >>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite similar >> to the >>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD >> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an associationist, >> ?sees >>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? >>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg >> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division >> between >>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because >> Ribot is >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> an >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of >> attention. >>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from >> forest >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between >> the two >>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical >> world of >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses >> in life >>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" >> (that >>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> farm,where >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter >> months are >>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter >> talking >>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has >> to be >>>>>>>>> more voluntary. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear >>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that >> underpins >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Ribot >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out >> the >>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices >> really >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> are >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, >> there >>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and >> animal >>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> volitional >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without >> a >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> theory >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's >>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at >> all. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, >> thanks to >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> all >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential >> around the >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> time >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had >> seen work >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> on >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal >> reproductive? >>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of >> development >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a >> relative >>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. >>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >> hshonerd@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. >> This >>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some >> weeks >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that >> segmented the >>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. >> Puns, >>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) >>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they >> are >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his >> followers as an >>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so >> its of >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> course >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in >> translation, >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> seems >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in >> this >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> passage, >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter >> distinction to >>>>>>>>>>>> "memory." >>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary >> discourse >>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian >> colleagues have >>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists >> who >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> clearly >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still >> possible >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, >> interestingly >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> links >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" >> act. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Parts >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that >> was >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> also >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of >> creativity >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see >> that the >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> two >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself >> writing. >>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> approaches >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < >> ablunden@mira.net> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it >> may be >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> worth >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Imagination >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between >> Recollection and >>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive >> Imagination, >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> (2) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he >> says >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> leads >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other >> words, >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is >> accomplished >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> through >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and >> Williams. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i >> am >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> trying >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical >>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of >> productive >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> develops. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that >> there >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> must >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> be a >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I >> learned >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is >> linked >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of >> anticipation >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination >> (starting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and >> provides >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. >> This, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground >> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> take >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> part >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> preconceptions: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian >> Langacker on >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> particularly >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> imagination >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of >> temporality: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic >> structure), which >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both >> individual >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < >> lpscholar2@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* >> and the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his >> notion of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is >> explored under >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of >> modalities >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing >> that is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if >> we >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how >> jazzed up >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> am >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as >> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various >> triads, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> finally >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of >> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> mind, as >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega >> pa? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> fuera. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole >> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached >> are two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists >> like >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of >> imagination in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of >> productive >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no >> intention of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the >> attached >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I >> came >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> upon >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely >> linked at >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> several >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, >> Ettienne and I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> access >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. >> Moreover, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> such >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance >> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Kris's >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to >> concerns >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> about >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps >> they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> will >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural >> science >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> with an >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >> with an >>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >> with an >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >> >> >> From hshonerd@gmail.com Thu Dec 18 15:07:09 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2014 16:07:09 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: <4E1FC669-440B-4735-B4AC-5F072A134511@uniandes.edu.co> References: <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <, > <, > <, > <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> <4E1FC669-440B-4735-B4AC-5F072A134511@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <7A17FEAC-808A-4C48-B3F4-0494E2548F75@gmail.com> Yes. Vygotsky said you don?t understand your first language until you have learned a second. Which is why a linguistics that assumes universal language structure (Chomsky) is suspect. Don?t mean to beat on the guy, since he did join the chat. More to reflect on the linguistic relativity hypothesis, both strong and weak, and the value of cross-cultural work. That?s another thread, but connected. Henry > On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:28 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > > Agreed, but different languages pick up on different aspects of our embodied relationship to the world, and in different ways. There are languages, for example, in which one does not look "forward to" an event in the future, because the future is understood as lying behind one. > > Martin > > On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:32 PM, Helena Worthen wrote: > >> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial relationships from the concrete material world into the conceptual imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 common ones, and between 70 and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far as" -- this is according to https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm). We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. Apparently, in English, they evolved from and did the job done by inflections in parent languages, examples being cases and tenses. >> >> But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection like the dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial relationships suggested by contemporary prepositions. >> >> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about this. >> >> Helena Worthen >> helenaworthen@gmail.com >> >> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >> >>> I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly embodied, proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to linguistics (For example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on ?lexicon?: nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, being part of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and Halliday see no clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, lexico-grammar. (Lo and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar, adding the ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings are great data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of that? In translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced? >>> Henry >>> >>> >>> >>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the metaphorical use of prepositions like: >>>> - "there is some value IN your argument" >>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again" >>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" >>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again" >>>> >>>> and so on. >>>> Andy >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>> >>>> >>>> larry smolucha wrote: >>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >>>>> >>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself - >>>>> >>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic possibilities: >>>>> >>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in Thought >>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into English 1962] >>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' value of the >>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech vocalization). >>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that are flammable >>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor a gas. >>>>> >>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century European Developmental >>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' hence the >>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of Piaget's Genetic >>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. >>>>> >>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and synthesis based on >>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in Vygotsky's example of H2O. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com >>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>>>> >>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >>>>>> >>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic >>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts. >>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more than the >>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can ever be imagined" >>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) >>>>>> >>>>>> A couple things to consider: >>>>>> >>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination as the brain has >>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the simplest level of the Gestalt >>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). >>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just photographic. >>>>>> >>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try to accurately reproduce >>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, the goal of combinatory >>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, dreams, musings, and even >>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of objects and symbols. >>>>>> >>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways that things and concepts can be >>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar and flour. >>>>>> I can add water and it dissolves a bit >>>>>> But adding heat changes the combination into a pancake. >>>>>> [Is this synergistic?] >>>>>> >>>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more examples to put the discussion >>>>>> in the metaphysical realm. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 >>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com >>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the case for >>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I think it's not >>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are associationists who >>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary associationism exists and >>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. Vygotsky >>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, explain the >>>>>>> uniqueness of our species? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels for its own >>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a Piagetian >>>>>>> perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true maturity as a >>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more to it than >>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of primate, and our >>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon rocks in order >>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged the same way as >>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and for language is >>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human exceptionalism. >>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for the vanguard role >>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, prolonging >>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after the sick and the >>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial organs (tools) and >>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for our species, it >>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these "circuitous, >>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that lead our >>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always been short on >>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for material culture >>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: verily, here >>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of attention is simply the >>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says there are only two >>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So imagination is >>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, and nothing >>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when you hear the >>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there to be able to >>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work in word meaning. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who was given a >>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been mixed with silver >>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold. Well, we >>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not possible to >>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that precisely. The method >>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the "principal of >>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes palimpsest, a velum on >>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. Because >>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and written over every >>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, the pressure >>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones when the old >>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only known Greek >>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their relationship >>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they are related to >>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite similar to the >>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an associationist, ?sees >>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? >>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division between >>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because Ribot is >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> an >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of attention. >>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from forest >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between the two >>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical world of >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses in life >>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" (that >>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> farm,where >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter months are >>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter talking >>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has to be >>>>>>>>> more voluntary. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear >>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that underpins >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Ribot >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out the >>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices really >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> are >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, there >>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and animal >>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> volitional >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without a >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> theory >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's >>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at all. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, thanks to >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> all >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential around the >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> time >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had seen work >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> on >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal reproductive? >>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of development >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a relative >>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. >>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. This >>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some weeks >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that segmented the >>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. Puns, >>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) >>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they are >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his followers as an >>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so its of >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> course >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in translation, >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> seems >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in this >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> passage, >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter distinction to >>>>>>>>>>>> "memory." >>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary discourse >>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian colleagues have >>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists who >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> clearly >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still possible >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, interestingly >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> links >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" act. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Parts >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that was >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> also >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of creativity >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see that the >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> two >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself writing. >>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> approaches >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it may be >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> worth >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Imagination >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between Recollection and >>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive Imagination, >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> (2) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he says >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> leads >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other words, >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is accomplished >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> through >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and Williams. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> trying >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical >>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> develops. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that there >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> must >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> be a >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I learned >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is linked >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of anticipation >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD >>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination (starting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and provides >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. This, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> take >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> part >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> preconceptions: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian Langacker on >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> particularly >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> imagination >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of temporality: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure), which >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both individual >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* and the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored under >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of modalities >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing that is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how jazzed up >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> am >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various triads, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> finally >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> mind, as >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> fuera. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached are two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists like >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of imagination in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of productive >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no intention of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the attached >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I came >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> upon >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked at >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> several >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne and I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> access >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. Moreover, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> such >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Kris's >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> about >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> will >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> with an >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >> >> > > From hshonerd@gmail.com Thu Dec 18 16:09:31 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2014 17:09:31 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors In-Reply-To: <1418943930527.52221@unm.edu> References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> <, > <1418943930527.52221@unm.edu> Message-ID: <1988EBA4-D33B-419B-B4BC-80670126753F@gmail.com> Annalisa touches on so much. I would just like to comment on her last paragraph on hieroglyphs. Apparently all writing systems go through stages starting with pictographs. Some go logographic, like Chinese, where you can see the pictographic beginnings. Other languages go alphabetic, whereby the pictographic beginnings are less apparent. The advantage of the logographic, with Chinese in particular, is that very different spoken varieties of the language (Mandarin and Cantonese) have a common written form. Disadvantage: Lots of characters. The advantage of the alphabetic is the fewer number of characters for writing. Disadvantage: Mismatches of pronunciation and writing over time and space. Henry > On Dec 18, 2014, at 4:05 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > Before we head into symbolic territory, I'd like to add that metaphors are useful because they are in a sense their own systems of meaning, little subtextual blocks that are lifted from the world, like a photograph. > Just like a photograph, it is a simulation of the world, in terms of an object in the world, activity in the world, or a relationship in the world. Yet the metaphor cannot stand in for the object, activity, or relationship, because then we would just mean the world in which the metaphor reference sits. So the metaphor must be contextualized in terms of how the speaker means it. > > Perhaps this is why we make distinctions between a metaphor, a metonym, a synonym, a simile, or an analogy? > > So in this case meaning to the metaphor is like what the photograph references to the photograph. > > "This is me, this is a picture of me." > > In painting from the middle ages and the Renaissance for example, biblical references are frequently made from objects in the painting, especially with regard to the Christian saints and disciples. These object-references are not isolated to Christianity iconography, but are available in the Greek Pantheon, the Ancient Egyptians, the Mayans, the Incans, the Aztecs, Buddhism, Hinduism, and other cultures with close proximity to natural environments. It would seem that this is something humans _do_ with imagery. > > Over time, these metaphors become a kind of language on their own, but they require a context in order to unlock their meaning. That's why I like to compare them to photographs because an "enlightened" audience is required, not just a speaker. > > Hieroglyphs are interesting to me because they are like letters, but they are not letters. They are like pictures, but then they are not pictures. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Helena Worthen > Sent: Thursday, December 18, 2014 3:12 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Metaphors > > David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to this: > > "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to create > sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly productive, > which is why they still form the basis of scientific writing and thinking > today." > > Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I lose you when you say "created to talk about gravity as an entity". > > Thank you, > > Helena > > > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > >> As Helena points out, prepositions are from the "grammatical" end of what >> Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what Halliday calls >> "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they have three >> properties that words from the more "lexical" end do not have: >> >> a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You can, actually, >> but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you invent a new name or a >> new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can). >> >> b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific semantic field (the >> way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of linguistics) >> but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are used. >> >> c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the same effect, >> which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your argument" the "in" has >> more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in "there's a fly in your >> tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in Henry's hands, refer >> to a book or even a footnote. >> >> Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties pretty much >> define the difference between learning and development, at least as I >> understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on functions >> indefinitely while development works by reorganizing the closed set of >> functions you already have into new systems. Learning is skill specific >> and local, while development is quite global in its implications. Learning >> is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new systems, while >> development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary (and forget it just >> as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes away. >> >> For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of blue that people >> call the sky") are simply metaphors from the non-productive end of the >> lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are crisp, concrete, and >> vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton >> and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to create >> sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly productive, >> which is why they still form the basis of scientific writing and thinking >> today. For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical metaphor is the third >> great moment in child development (after the break into mother tongue and >> the break into disciplinary language in school work). >> >> Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" implies zero >> dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two ("on a line', 'on a >> plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because they are >> grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them with time: 'at a >> point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. Compare: "at >> Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very day), and "in >> Christmas' (season). >> >> David Kellogg >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >> On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen >> wrote: >>> >>> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial >>> relationships from the concrete material world into the conceptual >>> imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 common ones, and between 70 >>> and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far as" -- this >>> is according to https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm). >>> We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. Apparently, in >>> English, they evolved from and did the job done by inflections in parent >>> languages, examples being cases and tenses. >>> >>> But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection like the >>> dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial relationships suggested >>> by contemporary prepositions. >>> >>> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about this. >>> >>> Helena Worthen >>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>> >>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>> >>>> I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly embodied, >>> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to linguistics (For >>> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on ?lexicon?: >>> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, being part >>> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and Halliday see no >>> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, lexico-grammar. (Lo >>> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar, adding the >>> ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings are great >>> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of that? In >>> translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced? >>>> Henry >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>> >>>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the metaphorical >>> use of prepositions like: >>>>> - "there is some value IN your argument" >>>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again" >>>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" >>>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again" >>>>> >>>>> and so on. >>>>> Andy >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> larry smolucha wrote: >>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >>>>>> >>>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself - >>>>>> >>>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic possibilities: >>>>>> >>>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in Thought >>>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into English >>> 1962] >>>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' value >>> of the >>>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech vocalization). >>>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that are >>> flammable >>>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor a gas. >>>>>> >>>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century European >>> Developmental >>>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' hence the >>>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of Piaget's >>> Genetic >>>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. >>>>>> >>>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and synthesis >>> based on >>>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in Vygotsky's >>> example of H2O. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com >>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic >>>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts. >>>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more than the >>>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can ever be >>> imagined" >>>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> A couple things to consider: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination as the >>> brain has >>>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the simplest level >>> of the Gestalt >>>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). >>>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just photographic. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try to >>> accurately reproduce >>>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, the >>> goal of combinatory >>>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, dreams, >>> musings, and even >>>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of objects >>> and symbols. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways that >>> things and concepts can be >>>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar and flour. >>>>>>> I can add water and it >>> dissolves a bit >>>>>>> But adding heat changes the >>> combination into a pancake. >>>>>>> [Is this synergistic?] >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more examples >>> to put the discussion >>>>>>> in the metaphysical realm. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 >>>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com >>>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the case for >>>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I think it's >>> not >>>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are >>> associationists who >>>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary associationism >>> exists and >>>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. >>> Vygotsky >>>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, explain >>> the >>>>>>>> uniqueness of our species? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels for its >>> own >>>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a Piagetian >>>>>>>> perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true maturity as a >>>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more to it >>> than >>>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of primate, and >>> our >>>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon rocks in >>> order >>>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged the same >>> way as >>>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and for >>> language is >>>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human >>> exceptionalism. >>>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for the >>> vanguard role >>>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, prolonging >>>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after the sick >>> and the >>>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial organs >>> (tools) and >>>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for our >>> species, it >>>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these >>> "circuitous, >>>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that lead our >>>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always been >>> short on >>>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for material >>> culture >>>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: >>> verily, here >>>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of attention is >>> simply the >>>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says there are >>> only two >>>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So >>> imagination is >>>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, and >>> nothing >>>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when you hear >>> the >>>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there to be >>> able to >>>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work in word >>> meaning. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who was given >>> a >>>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been mixed with >>> silver >>>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold. >>> Well, we >>>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not possible to >>>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that precisely. The >>> method >>>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the "principal of >>>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes palimpsest, a >>> velum on >>>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. Because >>>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and written over >>> every >>>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, the >>> pressure >>>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones when the >>> old >>>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only known >>> Greek >>>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their >>> relationship >>>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they are >>> related to >>>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite similar >>> to the >>>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD >>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an associationist, >>> ?sees >>>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? >>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg >>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division >>> between >>>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because >>> Ribot is >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> an >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of >>> attention. >>>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from >>> forest >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between >>> the two >>>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical >>> world of >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses >>> in life >>>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" >>> (that >>>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> farm,where >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter >>> months are >>>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter >>> talking >>>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has >>> to be >>>>>>>>>> more voluntary. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear >>>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that >>> underpins >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Ribot >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out >>> the >>>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices >>> really >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, >>> there >>>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and >>> animal >>>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> volitional >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without >>> a >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> theory >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's >>>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at >>> all. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, >>> thanks to >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> all >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential >>> around the >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> time >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had >>> seen work >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> on >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal >>> reproductive? >>>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of >>> development >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a >>> relative >>>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. >>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>> hshonerd@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. >>> This >>>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some >>> weeks >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that >>> segmented the >>>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. >>> Puns, >>>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) >>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they >>> are >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his >>> followers as an >>>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so >>> its of >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> course >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in >>> translation, >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> seems >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in >>> this >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> passage, >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter >>> distinction to >>>>>>>>>>>>> "memory." >>>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary >>> discourse >>>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian >>> colleagues have >>>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists >>> who >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> clearly >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still >>> possible >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, >>> interestingly >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> links >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" >>> act. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Parts >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that >>> was >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> also >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of >>> creativity >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see >>> that the >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> two >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself >>> writing. >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> approaches >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < >>> ablunden@mira.net> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it >>> may be >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> worth >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Imagination >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between >>> Recollection and >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive >>> Imagination, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> (2) >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he >>> says >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> leads >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other >>> words, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is >>> accomplished >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> through >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and >>> Williams. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i >>> am >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> trying >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of >>> productive >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> develops. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that >>> there >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> must >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> be a >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I >>> learned >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is >>> linked >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of >>> anticipation >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination >>> (starting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and >>> provides >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. >>> This, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground >>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> take >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> part >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> preconceptions: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian >>> Langacker on >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> particularly >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> imagination >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of >>> temporality: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic >>> structure), which >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both >>> individual >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < >>> lpscholar2@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* >>> and the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his >>> notion of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is >>> explored under >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of >>> modalities >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing >>> that is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if >>> we >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how >>> jazzed up >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> am >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as >>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various >>> triads, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> finally >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of >>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> mind, as >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega >>> pa? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> fuera. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole >>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached >>> are two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists >>> like >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of >>> imagination in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of >>> productive >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no >>> intention of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the >>> attached >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I >>> came >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> upon >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely >>> linked at >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> several >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, >>> Ettienne and I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> access >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. >>> Moreover, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> such >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance >>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Kris's >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to >>> concerns >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> about >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps >>> they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> will >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural >>> science >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> with an >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >>> with an >>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >>> with an >>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> > > > From annalisa@unm.edu Thu Dec 18 16:35:36 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2014 00:35:36 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors In-Reply-To: <1988EBA4-D33B-419B-B4BC-80670126753F@gmail.com> References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> <, > <1418943930527.52221@unm.edu>, <1988EBA4-D33B-419B-B4BC-80670126753F@gmail.com> Message-ID: <1418949335093.29262@unm.edu> I'd also like to add this quote from the paper by Modell that Robert Lake added to the fray: page 34: "What is uniquely human is a generative imagination from which the individual can create an internal unseen world. If the neural correlates of a metaphoric process are established, it is likely to reflect some form of bootstrapping, some form of the brain?s ?turning around upon its own schemata,? something analogous to what has been described by Edelman as a ?higher order? consciousness that incorporates a capacity for self-reflection. Edelman proposed that a ?higher order? consciousness is multilayered and complex, as compared to a comparatively less complex primary consciousness, which is ?the remembered present? (1992, p. 109). Edelman does not directly propose a neural theory of metaphor or of imagination, but he does suggest that higher mental functions such as the formation of conceptual categories may reflect ?higher-order maps,? that to construct conceptual categories the brain constructs maps of its own activities, that the brain makes maps of its own maps, which are not fixed topographically. Indeterminism is a necessary attribute of such higher-order functions." --end quote This would seem that our neuronal functioning must stay agile and flexible in order to make these connections at the "speed of light." This description of "the brain?s 'turning around upon its own schemata,'" seems to correspond to the way that a metaphor functions. This indeterminism also supports why there is no one method of thinking processes, that each individual's brain is responding to layers of events and cues and its own ecology determines how it "makes sense" of the content that a person is exposed to in "external" and "internal" worlds. (Sorry Martin!) This content exposure will determine maps of maps of maps that are unique to the individual. I also wonder if the reason memory fails us is that we may lose these maps if they are not utilized. On a little bit different note: Syntax and "indeterminancy" don't seem to go together that well. Meaning does couple with this because meaning can shift based upon use and insight. I'm willing to accept syntax as functioning something like the root or the trunk of the tree, and the branches and leaves being more flexible would be analogous to the infinite ways we can use language through metaphor and combination. Such is my paltry attempt at a linguistic endeavor. Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of HENRY SHONERD Sent: Thursday, December 18, 2014 5:09 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors Annalisa touches on so much. I would just like to comment on her last paragraph on hieroglyphs. Apparently all writing systems go through stages starting with pictographs. Some go logographic, like Chinese, where you can see the pictographic beginnings. Other languages go alphabetic, whereby the pictographic beginnings are less apparent. The advantage of the logographic, with Chinese in particular, is that very different spoken varieties of the language (Mandarin and Cantonese) have a common written form. Disadvantage: Lots of characters. The advantage of the alphabetic is the fewer number of characters for writing. Disadvantage: Mismatches of pronunciation and writing over time and space. Henry > On Dec 18, 2014, at 4:05 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > Before we head into symbolic territory, I'd like to add that metaphors are useful because they are in a sense their own systems of meaning, little subtextual blocks that are lifted from the world, like a photograph. > Just like a photograph, it is a simulation of the world, in terms of an object in the world, activity in the world, or a relationship in the world. Yet the metaphor cannot stand in for the object, activity, or relationship, because then we would just mean the world in which the metaphor reference sits. So the metaphor must be contextualized in terms of how the speaker means it. > > Perhaps this is why we make distinctions between a metaphor, a metonym, a synonym, a simile, or an analogy? > > So in this case meaning to the metaphor is like what the photograph references to the photograph. > > "This is me, this is a picture of me." > > In painting from the middle ages and the Renaissance for example, biblical references are frequently made from objects in the painting, especially with regard to the Christian saints and disciples. These object-references are not isolated to Christianity iconography, but are available in the Greek Pantheon, the Ancient Egyptians, the Mayans, the Incans, the Aztecs, Buddhism, Hinduism, and other cultures with close proximity to natural environments. It would seem that this is something humans _do_ with imagery. > > Over time, these metaphors become a kind of language on their own, but they require a context in order to unlock their meaning. That's why I like to compare them to photographs because an "enlightened" audience is required, not just a speaker. > > Hieroglyphs are interesting to me because they are like letters, but they are not letters. They are like pictures, but then they are not pictures. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Helena Worthen > Sent: Thursday, December 18, 2014 3:12 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Metaphors > > David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to this: > > "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to create > sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly productive, > which is why they still form the basis of scientific writing and thinking > today." > > Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I lose you when you say "created to talk about gravity as an entity". > > Thank you, > > Helena > > > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > >> As Helena points out, prepositions are from the "grammatical" end of what >> Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what Halliday calls >> "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they have three >> properties that words from the more "lexical" end do not have: >> >> a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You can, actually, >> but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you invent a new name or a >> new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can). >> >> b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific semantic field (the >> way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of linguistics) >> but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are used. >> >> c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the same effect, >> which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your argument" the "in" has >> more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in "there's a fly in your >> tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in Henry's hands, refer >> to a book or even a footnote. >> >> Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties pretty much >> define the difference between learning and development, at least as I >> understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on functions >> indefinitely while development works by reorganizing the closed set of >> functions you already have into new systems. Learning is skill specific >> and local, while development is quite global in its implications. Learning >> is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new systems, while >> development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary (and forget it just >> as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes away. >> >> For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of blue that people >> call the sky") are simply metaphors from the non-productive end of the >> lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are crisp, concrete, and >> vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton >> and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to create >> sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly productive, >> which is why they still form the basis of scientific writing and thinking >> today. For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical metaphor is the third >> great moment in child development (after the break into mother tongue and >> the break into disciplinary language in school work). >> >> Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" implies zero >> dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two ("on a line', 'on a >> plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because they are >> grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them with time: 'at a >> point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. Compare: "at >> Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very day), and "in >> Christmas' (season). >> >> David Kellogg >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >> On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen >> wrote: >>> >>> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial >>> relationships from the concrete material world into the conceptual >>> imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 common ones, and between 70 >>> and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far as" -- this >>> is according to https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm). >>> We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. Apparently, in >>> English, they evolved from and did the job done by inflections in parent >>> languages, examples being cases and tenses. >>> >>> But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection like the >>> dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial relationships suggested >>> by contemporary prepositions. >>> >>> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about this. >>> >>> Helena Worthen >>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>> >>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>> >>>> I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly embodied, >>> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to linguistics (For >>> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on ?lexicon?: >>> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, being part >>> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and Halliday see no >>> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, lexico-grammar. (Lo >>> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar, adding the >>> ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings are great >>> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of that? In >>> translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced? >>>> Henry >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>> >>>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the metaphorical >>> use of prepositions like: >>>>> - "there is some value IN your argument" >>>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again" >>>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" >>>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again" >>>>> >>>>> and so on. >>>>> Andy >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> larry smolucha wrote: >>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >>>>>> >>>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself - >>>>>> >>>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic possibilities: >>>>>> >>>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in Thought >>>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into English >>> 1962] >>>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' value >>> of the >>>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech vocalization). >>>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that are >>> flammable >>>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor a gas. >>>>>> >>>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century European >>> Developmental >>>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' hence the >>>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of Piaget's >>> Genetic >>>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. >>>>>> >>>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and synthesis >>> based on >>>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in Vygotsky's >>> example of H2O. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com >>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic >>>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts. >>>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more than the >>>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can ever be >>> imagined" >>>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> A couple things to consider: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination as the >>> brain has >>>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the simplest level >>> of the Gestalt >>>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). >>>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just photographic. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try to >>> accurately reproduce >>>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, the >>> goal of combinatory >>>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, dreams, >>> musings, and even >>>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of objects >>> and symbols. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways that >>> things and concepts can be >>>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar and flour. >>>>>>> I can add water and it >>> dissolves a bit >>>>>>> But adding heat changes the >>> combination into a pancake. >>>>>>> [Is this synergistic?] >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more examples >>> to put the discussion >>>>>>> in the metaphysical realm. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 >>>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com >>>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the case for >>>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I think it's >>> not >>>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are >>> associationists who >>>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary associationism >>> exists and >>>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. >>> Vygotsky >>>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, explain >>> the >>>>>>>> uniqueness of our species? >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels for its >>> own >>>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a Piagetian >>>>>>>> perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true maturity as a >>>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more to it >>> than >>>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of primate, and >>> our >>>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon rocks in >>> order >>>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged the same >>> way as >>>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and for >>> language is >>>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human >>> exceptionalism. >>>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for the >>> vanguard role >>>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, prolonging >>>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after the sick >>> and the >>>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial organs >>> (tools) and >>>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for our >>> species, it >>>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these >>> "circuitous, >>>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that lead our >>>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always been >>> short on >>>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for material >>> culture >>>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: >>> verily, here >>>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of attention is >>> simply the >>>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says there are >>> only two >>>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So >>> imagination is >>>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, and >>> nothing >>>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when you hear >>> the >>>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there to be >>> able to >>>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work in word >>> meaning. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who was given >>> a >>>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been mixed with >>> silver >>>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold. >>> Well, we >>>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not possible to >>>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that precisely. The >>> method >>>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the "principal of >>>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes palimpsest, a >>> velum on >>>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. Because >>>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and written over >>> every >>>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, the >>> pressure >>>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones when the >>> old >>>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only known >>> Greek >>>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their >>> relationship >>>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they are >>> related to >>>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite similar >>> to the >>>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD >>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an associationist, >>> ?sees >>>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? >>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg >>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division >>> between >>>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because >>> Ribot is >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> an >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of >>> attention. >>>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from >>> forest >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between >>> the two >>>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical >>> world of >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses >>> in life >>>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" >>> (that >>>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> farm,where >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter >>> months are >>>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter >>> talking >>>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has >>> to be >>>>>>>>>> more voluntary. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear >>>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that >>> underpins >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Ribot >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out >>> the >>>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices >>> really >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, >>> there >>>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and >>> animal >>>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> volitional >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without >>> a >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> theory >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's >>>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at >>> all. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, >>> thanks to >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> all >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential >>> around the >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> time >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had >>> seen work >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> on >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal >>> reproductive? >>>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of >>> development >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a >>> relative >>>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. >>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>> hshonerd@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. >>> This >>>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some >>> weeks >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that >>> segmented the >>>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. >>> Puns, >>>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) >>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they >>> are >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his >>> followers as an >>>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so >>> its of >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> course >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in >>> translation, >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> seems >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in >>> this >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> passage, >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter >>> distinction to >>>>>>>>>>>>> "memory." >>>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary >>> discourse >>>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian >>> colleagues have >>>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists >>> who >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> clearly >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still >>> possible >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, >>> interestingly >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> links >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" >>> act. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Parts >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that >>> was >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> also >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of >>> creativity >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see >>> that the >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> two >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself >>> writing. >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> approaches >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < >>> ablunden@mira.net> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it >>> may be >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> worth >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Imagination >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between >>> Recollection and >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive >>> Imagination, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> (2) >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he >>> says >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> leads >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other >>> words, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is >>> accomplished >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> through >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and >>> Williams. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i >>> am >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> trying >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of >>> productive >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> develops. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that >>> there >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> must >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> be a >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I >>> learned >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is >>> linked >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of >>> anticipation >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination >>> (starting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and >>> provides >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. >>> This, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground >>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> take >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> part >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> preconceptions: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian >>> Langacker on >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> particularly >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> imagination >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of >>> temporality: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic >>> structure), which >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both >>> individual >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < >>> lpscholar2@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* >>> and the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his >>> notion of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is >>> explored under >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of >>> modalities >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing >>> that is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if >>> we >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how >>> jazzed up >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> am >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as >>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various >>> triads, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> finally >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of >>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> mind, as >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega >>> pa? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> fuera. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole >>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached >>> are two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists >>> like >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of >>> imagination in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of >>> productive >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no >>> intention of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the >>> attached >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I >>> came >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> upon >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely >>> linked at >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> several >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, >>> Ettienne and I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> access >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. >>> Moreover, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> such >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance >>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Kris's >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to >>> concerns >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> about >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps >>> they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> will >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural >>> science >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> with an >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >>> with an >>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >>> with an >>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> > > > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Thu Dec 18 20:54:02 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2014 21:54:02 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology In-Reply-To: <057001d01a5d$d743a640$85caf2c0$@uic.edu> References: <039801d01a33$3db3c430$b91b4c90$@uic.edu> <38C43AE248831048B6AF57F364680D3C72A23DDA@OC11EXPO32.exchange.mit.edu> <040801d01a41$4b69dd90$e23d98b0$@uic.edu> <0CBE4C26-68FE-49F7-BE9F-00A0121B4CD8@uniandes.edu.co> <043e01d01a44$b15fac80$141f0580$@uic.edu> <1D18C3B0-9EA5-42E6-8764-A6973960B8B5@uniandes.edu.co> <050701d01a51$084de460$18e9ad20$@uic.edu> <38C43AE248831048B6AF57F364680D3C72A23F69@OC11EXPO32.exchange.mit.edu> <057001d01a5d$d743a640$85caf2c0$@uic.edu> Message-ID: ?Aria, Any updates to report on Professor Chomsky's take on Vygotsky? -greg? On Wed, Dec 17, 2014 at 5:59 PM, Aria Razfar wrote: > > > Hi Martin, > > See below. He finds Vygotsky's work "quite interesting." Let's see if he > elaborates. I find his persepctive on the "Linguistic Wars" also > interesting. > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistics_Wars > > Aria > > -----Original Message----- > From: Noam Chomsky [mailto:chomsky@mit.edu] > Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 6:09 PM > To: Aria Razfar > Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology > > The "linguistic wars" are largely an invention of overheated imaginations > of > those who thought they were fighting them. If you check the record you'll > discover that I barely participated, and didn't consider them any different > from interchanges within what's claimed to be "my side" of the non-existent > wars. > > Vygotsky did quite interesting work. > > -----Original Message----- > From: Aria Razfar [mailto:arazfar@uic.edu] > Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 6:28 PM > To: Noam Chomsky > Cc: arazfar@uic.edu > Subject: FW: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology > > See question below re: "opinion on Vygotsky"? > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John Packer > Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 5:12 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology > > Since we have Professor Chomsky online, might we be able to ask him his > opinion of Vygotsky? > > Martin > > On Dec 17, 2014, at 4:59 PM, Aria Razfar wrote: > > > Hi Martin, > > > > Metaphor was my take and other cognitive linguist's take (i.e. > > Lakoff). I believe his rejection of "Metaphor" at least in the > > embodied cognition sense is rooted in the "Linguistics Wars." Several > > people in this thread as well others in the field of cognitive > > linguistics made the claim that he was and remains a Cartesian > > dualist. He definitely does not consider himself as such. In order to > > establish the field of linguistics, he had to position it within the > > broader arch of western enlightenment and romanticism. Hence, the > > title of > the book. > > > > Aria > > > > Aria Razfar, Ph.D. > > Associate Professor of Literacy, Language, and Culture Director of > > Graduate Studies, Curriculum and Instruction University of Illinois at > > Chicago > > 1040 W. Harrison St. M/C 147 > > Chicago, IL, 60607 > > > > Director of English Learning through Mathematics, Science and Action > > Research (ELMSA) www.elmsa.org > > > > Webpage: http://education.uic.edu/personnel/faculty/aria-razfar-phd > > Tel: 312-413-8373 > > Fax: 312-996-8134 > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John > > Packer > > Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 3:47 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology > > > > Hi Aria, > > > > It would help to see the message that Noam is responding to! I don't > > see, for example, how metaphor crept into this discussion. (Actually, > > looking back through the thread, I see that this was your proposal.) > > > > I suppose a lot depends on what one means by being "a Cartesian." As I > > just wrote in another message, Chomsky was, I think, positioning his > > approach to linguistics in a tradition in which Descartes was > > prominent: in which one tries to figure out what makes possible a > > specific characteristic or ability of the mind. Chomsky asked what > > universal competence would be necessary to make language possible - > > any > language. > > > > I'm not trying to attach a label to the man; but he give the book its > > title for a reason, and a very respectable one. > > > > Martin > > > > On Dec 17, 2014, at 4:34 PM, Aria Razfar wrote: > > > >> Here is Chomsky's response to whether or not he is a Cartesian. Not > > surprisingly, he categorically rejects the idea of "metaphor" as well. > > At least he's open to change. Now whether our subject is dead or alive > > that is a different question. > >> > >> Aria > >> > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: Noam Chomsky [mailto:chomsky@mit.edu] > >> Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 3:16 PM > >> To: Aria Razfar > >> Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology > >> > >> The reason for the phrase "Cartesian linguistics" was explained very > > clearly in the opening pages of the book. No one who read at least > > that far could believe that I am "a Cartesian," let alone anyone who > > read farther. I can't account for the illiteracy of "notable folks." > >> > >> It's also not a metaphor. Rather, exactly as I described it, which I > > would repeat verbatim today. > >> > >> There's no need to argue against "mind-body dualism." As I've > >> discussed > > repeatedly, Newton's discoveries terminated the thesis, at least in > > its classical form, through Descartes and beyond. > >> > >> Of course I've changed my views since the '50s and '60s, in fact in > >> the > > past few months. That's normal in subjects that are not dead. > >> > >> Noam Chomsky > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > > > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From annalisa@unm.edu Thu Dec 18 20:59:28 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2014 04:59:28 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology In-Reply-To: References: <039801d01a33$3db3c430$b91b4c90$@uic.edu> <38C43AE248831048B6AF57F364680D3C72A23DDA@OC11EXPO32.exchange.mit.edu> <040801d01a41$4b69dd90$e23d98b0$@uic.edu> <0CBE4C26-68FE-49F7-BE9F-00A0121B4CD8@uniandes.edu.co> <043e01d01a44$b15fac80$141f0580$@uic.edu> <1D18C3B0-9EA5-42E6-8764-A6973960B8B5@uniandes.edu.co> <050701d01a51$084de460$18e9ad20$@uic.edu> <38C43AE248831048B6AF57F364680D3C72A23F69@OC11EXPO32.exchange.mit.edu> <057001d01a5d$d743a640$85caf2c0$@uic.edu>, Message-ID: <1418965168210.58099@unm.edu> Greg, Seems all we will get is "quite interesting." I find a lot of things in the world "quite interesting." What can we deduce from this? I wonder... Annalisa From lsmolucha@hotmail.com Thu Dec 18 21:09:26 2014 From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com (larry smolucha) Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2014 23:09:26 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: , <, > <,,> , <, > <,,> , <, > <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <,,> , <, > <,,> , <, , > , <, > <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <,,> , <, > <,,> <,,> , , Message-ID: Message from Francine: Henry, if you go to Amazon Books and type in David McNeill you will get a list of his publications. The first one on the list is his most recent book from 2012 titled How Language Began: Gesture and Speech in Human Evolution (Cambridge University Press). It is the third book he has written on this topic. McNeill's work is based on his empirical research and and interest in Vygotsky's writings. So we have actual research, which XMCARs sometimes bemoan the lack of. Bye the way, I would be in Britain this Spring. > From: hshonerd@gmail.com > Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2014 15:57:07 -0700 > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > So sorry, I can?t find the David McNeill reference. A title? A link? I?ll just google for now. > Henry > > > On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:12 PM, larry smolucha wrote: > > > > Message from Francine: > > > > We want to add these works to a bibliography on imagination. > > I.A. Richard's quote is right on the mark and interesting in regard to > > David McNeill's research on hand gestures (see my recent post). > > > > Seems to me that we have a Zeitgeist is emerging in our XMCA community. > > > >> From: boblake@georgiasouthern.edu > >> Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2014 10:57:36 -0500 > >> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > >> > >> Hi Francine, > >> I am so glad to see you sharing your insightful reading of Vygotsky on > >> imagination and metaphor. It was actually the connections between > >> imagination, inner speech and metaphor as > >> the means to personal agency that first drew me into Vygotsky studies. > >> Vera John-Steiner, Lois Holzman, Dot Robbins and you were the first people > >> I talked to about this work. > >> In 1936, I.A. Richards published his *Philosophy of Rhetoric*, a work that > >> grew directly out of Vico?s thinking. His thesis was that "thought is > >> metaphoric, and proceeds by comparison, and the metaphors of language > >> derive therefrom? (p. 94). In other words, he believed that at the base of > >> all thinking, there is a metaphoric relationship. Richards takes this one > >> step further when he suggests that metaphors are ?cognitively irreducible? > >> (Johnson, 1981, p. 19) A metaphoric expression therefore becomes a newly > >> created vehicle of meaning which loses potency when seeking to make a > >> literal statement out of its component parts. In 2001, Maxine Greene wrote > >> something similar. "By means of making metaphors, imagination can reorient > >> consciousness through its disclosure of patterns, relationships, shadows, > >> and lights, and slivers of sound that are wholly unexpected, ?new? in some > >> wonderful fashion? (Greene, 2001, p 154). > >> > >> For example,try reducing this back to literal meaning :-) > >> > >> The Road Not Taken > >> By Robert Frost > >> Two roads diverged in a yellow wood, > >> And sorry I could not travel both > >> And be one traveler, long I stood > >> And looked down one as far as I could > >> To where it bent in the undergrowth; > >> > >> Then took the other, as just as fair, > >> And having perhaps the better claim, > >> Because it was grassy and wanted wear; > >> Though as for that the passing there > >> Had worn them really about the same, > >> > >> And both that morning equally lay > >> In leaves no step had trodden black. > >> Oh, I kept the first for another day! > >> Yet knowing how way leads on to way, > >> I doubted if I should ever come back. > >> > >> I shall be telling this with a sigh > >> Somewhere ages and ages hence: > >> Two roads diverged in a wood, and I? > >> I took the one less traveled by, > >> And that has made all the difference. > >> Retrieved from : http://www.poetryfoundation.org/poem/173536 > >> > >> References > >> > >> Greene, M. (2001). *Variations on a blue guitar*. New York, NY: Teachers > >> College Press. > >> > >> Johnson, M. (1981). *Philosophical perspectives on metaphor.* Minneapolis, > >> MN: University of Minnesota Press. > >> > >> Richards,I.A. (1936). *The philosophy of rhetoric. * Oxford, GB: Oxford > >> University Press. > >> > >> > >> > >> On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 4:45 AM, larry smolucha > >> wrote: > >>> > >>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > >>> > >>> Forgive me for replying to myself - > >>> > >>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic possibilities: > >>> > >>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in Thought > >>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into English 1962] > >>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' value of > >>> the > >>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech vocalization). > >>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that are > >>> flammable > >>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor a gas. > >>> > >>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century European > >>> Developmental > >>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' hence the > >>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of Piaget's > >>> Genetic > >>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. > >>> > >>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and synthesis based on > >>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in Vygotsky's example > >>> of H2O. > >>> > >>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com > >>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 > >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > >>>> > >>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > >>>> > >>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic > >>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts. > >>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more than the > >>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can ever be > >>> imagined" > >>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) > >>>> > >>>> A couple things to consider: > >>>> > >>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination as the brain > >>> has > >>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the simplest level of > >>> the Gestalt > >>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). > >>>> > >>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just photographic. > >>>> > >>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try to > >>> accurately reproduce > >>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, the goal > >>> of combinatory > >>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, dreams, musings, > >>> and even > >>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of objects and > >>> symbols. > >>>> > >>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways that > >>> things and concepts can be > >>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar and flour. > >>>> I can add water and it > >>> dissolves a bit > >>>> But adding heat changes the > >>> combination into a pancake. > >>>> [Is this synergistic?] > >>>> > >>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more examples to > >>> put the discussion > >>>> in the metaphysical realm. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 > >>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com > >>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > >>>>> > >>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the case for > >>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I think it's not > >>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are associationists > >>> who > >>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary associationism > >>> exists and > >>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. > >>> Vygotsky > >>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, explain the > >>>>> uniqueness of our species? > >>>>> > >>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels for its own > >>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a Piagetian > >>>>> perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true maturity as a > >>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more to it than > >>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of primate, and > >>> our > >>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon rocks in > >>> order > >>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged the same way > >>> as > >>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. > >>>>> > >>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and for > >>> language is > >>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human > >>> exceptionalism. > >>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for the vanguard > >>> role > >>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, prolonging > >>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after the sick and > >>> the > >>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial organs > >>> (tools) and > >>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for our > >>> species, it > >>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these "circuitous, > >>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that lead our > >>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always been short > >>> on > >>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for material culture > >>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: verily, > >>> here > >>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. > >>>>> > >>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of attention is > >>> simply the > >>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says there are only > >>> two > >>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So imagination > >>> is > >>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, and > >>> nothing > >>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when you hear > >>> the > >>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there to be able > >>> to > >>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work in word > >>> meaning. > >>>>> > >>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who was given a > >>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been mixed with > >>> silver > >>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold. Well, > >>> we > >>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not possible to > >>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that precisely. The > >>> method > >>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the "principal of > >>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. > >>>>> > >>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes palimpsest, a velum > >>> on > >>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. Because > >>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and written over > >>> every > >>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, the > >>> pressure > >>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones when the > >>> old > >>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only known > >>> Greek > >>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". > >>>>> > >>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their > >>> relationship > >>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they are related > >>> to > >>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite similar > >>> to the > >>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. > >>>>> > >>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) > >>>>> > >>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >>>>> > >>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD > >>> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an associationist, > >>> ?sees > >>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? > >>>>>> Henry > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg > >>> wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division > >>> between > >>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because > >>> Ribot is > >>>>>> an > >>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of > >>> attention. > >>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from > >>> forest > >>>>>> to > >>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between > >>> the two > >>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical > >>> world of > >>>>>> the > >>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses > >>> in life > >>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" > >>> (that > >>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the > >>>>>> farm,where > >>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter > >>> months are > >>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter > >>> talking > >>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has > >>> to be > >>>>>>> more voluntary. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear > >>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that > >>> underpins > >>>>>> Ribot > >>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out > >>> the > >>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices > >>> really > >>>>>> are > >>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, > >>> there > >>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and > >>> animal > >>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of > >>>>>> volitional > >>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without > >>> a > >>>>>> theory > >>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's > >>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at > >>> all. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, > >>> thanks to > >>>>>> all > >>>>>>>> for the food for thought. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential > >>> around the > >>>>>> time > >>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had > >>> seen work > >>>>>> on > >>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal > >>> reproductive? > >>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of > >>> development > >>>>>> of > >>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a > >>> relative > >>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. > >>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > >>> hshonerd@gmail.com> > >>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. > >>> This > >>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some > >>> weeks > >>>>>> in > >>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that > >>> segmented the > >>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. > >>> Puns, > >>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) > >>>>>>>>> Henry > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole wrote: > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they > >>> are > >>>>>> doing > >>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his > >>> followers as an > >>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so > >>> its of > >>>>>>>>> course > >>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in > >>> translation, > >>>>>> seems > >>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in > >>> this > >>>>>>>>> passage, > >>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter > >>> distinction to > >>>>>>>>>> "memory." > >>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary > >>> discourse > >>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian > >>> colleagues have > >>>>>>>>>> illustrated. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists > >>> who > >>>>>>>>> clearly > >>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still > >>> possible > >>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, > >>> interestingly > >>>>>>>> links > >>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" > >>> act. > >>>>>>>> Parts > >>>>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that > >>> was > >>>>>>>> also > >>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of > >>> creativity > >>>>>> and > >>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see > >>> that the > >>>>>>>> two > >>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself > >>> writing. > >>>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old > >>>>>>>>> approaches > >>>>>>>>>> to a pesum > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < > >>> ablunden@mira.net> > >>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it > >>> may be > >>>>>>>> worth > >>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to > >>>>>>>>> Imagination > >>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between > >>> Recollection and > >>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive > >>> Imagination, > >>>>>> (2) > >>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he > >>> says > >>>>>>>> leads > >>>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other > >>> words, > >>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is > >>> accomplished > >>>>>>>> through > >>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and > >>> Williams. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i > >>> am > >>>>>>>> trying > >>>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical > >>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of > >>> productive > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination > >>>>>> develops. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that > >>> there > >>>>>> must > >>>>>>>>> be a > >>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I > >>> learned > >>>>>>>>> that > >>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is > >>> linked > >>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of > >>> anticipation > >>>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > >>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! > >>>>>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > >>> hshonerd@gmail.com > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination > >>> (starting > >>>>>>>>> with > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and > >>> provides > >>>>>> a > >>>>>>>>>>>>> space > >>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. > >>> This, > >>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled > >>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground > >>> to > >>>>>> take > >>>>>>>>> part > >>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with > >>>>>>>> preconceptions: > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera > >>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian > >>> Langacker on > >>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, > >>>>>> particularly > >>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of > >>>>>> imagination > >>>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of > >>> temporality: > >>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic > >>> structure), which > >>>>>>>> I > >>>>>>>>>>>>> think > >>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both > >>> individual > >>>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < > >>> lpscholar2@gmail.com> > >>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* > >>> and the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his > >>> notion of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is > >>> explored under > >>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of > >>> modalities > >>>>>>>>> that > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> hang > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing > >>> that is > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> forming > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if > >>> we > >>>>>> think > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > >>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how > >>> jazzed up > >>>>>>>> I > >>>>>>>>> am > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> now > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as > >>> Larry > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various > >>> triads, > >>>>>>>>> finally > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of > >>> the > >>>>>>>>> mind, as > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega > >>> pa? > >>>>>>>> fuera. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole > >>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached > >>> are two > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists > >>> like > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of > >>> imagination in a > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of > >>> productive > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no > >>> intention of > >>>>>>>>> doing > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the > >>> attached > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I > >>> came > >>>>>>>> upon > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely > >>> linked at > >>>>>>>>> several > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, > >>> Ettienne and I > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of > >>>>>> access > >>>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. > >>> Moreover, > >>>>>>>>> such > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the > >>>>>>>>> perception/imagination > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance > >>> to > >>>>>>>> Kris's > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to > >>> concerns > >>>>>> about > >>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps > >>> they > >>>>>>>> will > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > >>> science > >>>>>>>>> with an > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > >>> with an > >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > >>> with an > >>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> > >> -- > >> > >> *Robert Lake Ed.D.*Associate Professor > >> Social Foundations of Education > >> Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading > >> Georgia Southern University > >> Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group > >> P. O. Box 8144 > >> Phone: (912) 478-0355 > >> Fax: (912) 478-5382 > >> Statesboro, GA 30460 > > > > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Thu Dec 18 21:17:52 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2014 22:17:52 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination (seeing and believing) In-Reply-To: <9A8CE8FE-43CB-48B6-8553-54349E8F1E1E@gmail.com> References: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102265CEB@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <9A8CE8FE-43CB-48B6-8553-54349E8F1E1E@gmail.com> Message-ID: Rod, The study I found attached to your email was not by a "Martin" (as suggested by Paul in the email). Still more disappointingly there no mention of magic mushrooms in the piece. Any chance you have the article by "Martin" and that can tell us something about people taking magic mushrooms in an fMRI machine? -greg On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 3:36 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > Rod, > Appropriate or not (though I think it is) your post has me asking why > Martin (our Martin?) thinks that the use of that substance diminished the > inference making. This will drive Mike crazy, but would a thread on > imagination benefit from a discussion of what has been with the species > from time immemorial: mind altering substances? We?re talking affordances > here, culture, history, activity. Another thread? > Henry > > > On Dec 18, 2014, at 12:41 PM, Rod Parker-Rees < > R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> wrote: > > > > I am not sure how appropriate it is to post this here as it is going > back to an earlier theme in the discussion - the relationship between > perception and imagination. I asked a friend who is on a masters psychology > programme and she asked one of her tutors at Bristol University (Paul > Howard-Jones > http://www.bristol.ac.uk/education/people/person/93406/index.html ). > > > > I think his summary of the attached paper may be of interest to some - > and the paper is way outside the xmca remit but I have attached in in case > anyone is interested enough to want to read more. > > > > All the best, > > > > Rod > > > > This was what I asked: > > > > Are you aware of any articles which enumerate the ratio between sensory > information (e.g. stimuli from the retinae) and visual memory in the > process of seeing? I saw a claim somewhere that only about 10% of what we > ?see? is from retinal information, with the rest made up by our > interpretation of this information using what we have seen before but I > can?t track down any evidence for this so am not confident about it! What I > am particularly interested in is what happens when the bodily actions of > thinking and perceiving are reduced to ?things? ? ?thoughts? and > ?perceptions? or ?images?. It seems important to me that the way we ACT on > things is part of what we know about them or, more generally, that we are > aware of our environment in terms of our experiences of interacting with it > rather than in terms of lists of extracted ?properties? of phenomena > > > > And this is Paul's reply: > > > > Attached is a highly theoretical paper by a guy (Martin) who was > privileged to borrow my wooden fMRI simulator for participants to take > magic mushrooms in- fascinating study! It might be relevant to this query. > > I would summarise it as follows: > > The brain is thought to comprise hierarchical levels, with input > arriving at the lowest levels (light, sound, touch, etc) and a > representation of the world generated at the top that can direct our > actions (e.g., rain is falling, so grab a coat). To achieve this, each > level draws on past history to draw some basic conclusions and these > inferences get passed to the level above. So, in the visual system, lower > levels process activations of retinal neurons into inferred features (e.g. > rain drops). A little further up in the same system, higher levels process > the behaviour of features into inferred patterns of movement (e.g....are > falling). When a layer forms an inference, it can use it to suppress the > information coming from below that gave rise to it. This is good > house-keeping, and reduces the amount of information the brain has to > process. After all, once a pattern of incoming information is recognised > and can be reduced to an inference, it can be filed under ?business as > usual? and that stream of information can be ignored - the inference is all > we need to know. Information that can?t be turned into inferences ? stuff > that doesn?t fit previous history ? deserves more special attention and, > rather than getting suppressed, is passed up the levels for a different > reason: it can be used to readjust expectations and teach the brain new > tricks (i.e. how to make new inferences), so providing a mechanism for the > brain to learn. > > > > > > But this essentially means very little of the original perceptual > information ever reaches consciousness (unless you take magic mushrooms > (not that i am recommending) which Martin thinks diminishes the efficiency > of the inference-making. > > > > > > Merry Christmas everyone! > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole > > Sent: 18 December 2014 18:44 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > Dear Colleagues. Might it be appropriate to start another thread on > metaphor? > > > > My basic starting point is the idea that basic perceptual processes > ineluctably require imagination...... measured in milliseconds. Metaphor > and linguistic mediation is for sure an essential topic here. I want to > hold on to the Suvorov metaphor of imagination as lifting off from the > world and returning to it again. (If the Suvorov reference is not familiar > I will post relevant paper). > > > > A thought: Might it be possible to parse Francine's last message into > subtopics while not discouraging cross subtopic conversations? > > > > Trying to hold all the threads in my hand. > > Slow in So Cal. > > mike > > > > > > On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD > wrote: > >> > >> I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly embodied, > >> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to linguistics > >> (For example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on > ?lexicon?: > >> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, being > >> part of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and > >> Halliday see no clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, > >> lexico-grammar. (Lo and behold, my spell check wanted me to write > >> lexicon-grammar, adding the ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them > >> separate!) Word coinings are great data for imagination and > >> creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of that? In translation from Russian > is word coining ever practiced? > >> Henry > >> > >> > >> > >>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >>> > >>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the > >>> metaphorical > >> use of prepositions like: > >>> - "there is some value IN your argument" > >>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again" > >>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" > >>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again" > >>> > >>> and so on. > >>> Andy > >>> -------------------------------------------------------------------- > >>> ---- > >>> *Andy Blunden* > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>> > >>> > >>> larry smolucha wrote: > >>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > >>>> > >>>> Forgive me for replying to myself - > >>>> > >>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic > possibilities: > >>>> > >>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in > >>>> Thought and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated > >>>> into English > >> 1962] > >>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' > >>>> value > >> of the > >>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech > vocalization). > >>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that are > >> flammable > >>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor a gas. > >>>> > >>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century European > >> Developmental > >>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' hence > >>>> the Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of > >>>> Piaget's > >> Genetic > >>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. > >>>> > >>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and synthesis > >>>> based > >> on > >>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in Vygotsky's > >> example of H2O. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com > >>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 > >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > >>>>> > >>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > >>>>> > >>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic and > >>>>> produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts. > >>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more than > >>>>> the recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can > >>>>> ever be > >> imagined" > >>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) > >>>>> > >>>>> A couple things to consider: > >>>>> > >>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination as the > >> brain has > >>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the simplest > >>>>> level > >> of the Gestalt > >>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). > >>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just photographic. > >>>>> > >>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try to > >> accurately reproduce > >>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, the > >>>>> goal > >> of combinatory > >>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, dreams, > >> musings, and even > >>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of > >>>>> objects > >> and symbols. > >>>>> > >>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways that > >> things and concepts can be > >>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar and flour. > >>>>> I can add water and it > >> dissolves a bit > >>>>> But adding heat changes > >>>>> the > >> combination into a pancake. > >>>>> [Is this synergistic?] > >>>>> > >>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more > >>>>> examples > >> to put the discussion > >>>>> in the metaphysical realm. > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 > >>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com > >>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the case > >>>>>> for Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I > >>>>>> think it's > >> not > >>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are > >> associationists who > >>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary associationism > >> exists and > >>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. > >> Vygotsky > >>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, > >>>>>> explain > >> the > >>>>>> uniqueness of our species? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels for > >>>>>> its > >> own > >>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a Piagetian > >>>>>> perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true maturity > >>>>>> as a species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more > >>>>>> to it than > >>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of primate, > >>>>>> and > >> our > >>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon rocks > >>>>>> in > >> order > >>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged the > >>>>>> same > >> way as > >>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and for > >> language is > >>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human > >> exceptionalism. > >>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for the > >> vanguard role > >>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, > >>>>>> prolonging childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking > >>>>>> after the sick > >> and the > >>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial organs > >> (tools) and > >>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for our > >> species, it > >>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these > >> "circuitous, > >>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that lead > >>>>>> our development as a species. The wretched of the earth always > >>>>>> been short > >> on > >>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for material > >> culture > >>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: > >>>>>> verily, > >> here > >>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of attention is > >> simply the > >>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says there are > >> only two > >>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So > >>>>>> imagination > >> is > >>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, and > >> nothing > >>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when you > >>>>>> hear > >> the > >>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there to be > >> able to > >>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work in > >>>>>> word > >> meaning. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who was > >>>>>> given a crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been > >>>>>> mixed with > >> silver > >>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold. > >> Well, we > >>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not > >>>>>> possible to measure the differences in water displacement that > >>>>>> precisely. The > >> method > >>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the "principal > >>>>>> of buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes palimpsest, a > >> velum on > >>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. > >>>>>> Because parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and > >>>>>> written over > >> every > >>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, the > >> pressure > >>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones when > >>>>>> the > >> old > >>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only > >>>>>> known > >> Greek > >>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their > >> relationship > >>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they are > >> related to > >>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite > >>>>>> similar > >> to the > >>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) > >>>>>> > >>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD > >> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an > >>>>>>> associationist, > >> ?sees > >>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? > >>>>>>> Henry > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg > >>>>>>>> > >> wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division > >> between > >>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because > >> Ribot is > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> an > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of > >> attention. > >>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition > >>>>>>>> from > >> forest > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> to > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division > >>>>>>>> between > >> the two > >>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical > >> world of > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> the > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic > >>>>>>>> uses > >> in life > >>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" > >> (that > >>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> farm,where > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter > >> months are > >>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to > >>>>>>>> encounter > >> talking > >>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention > >>>>>>>> has > >> to be > >>>>>>>> more voluntary. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very > >>>>>>>> clear understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism > >>>>>>>> that underpins > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Ribot > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points > >>>>>>>> out > >> the > >>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices > >> really > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> are > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of > >>>>>>>> imagination, > >> there > >>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human > >>>>>>>> and > >> animal > >>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> volitional > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). > >>>>>>>> Without a > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> theory > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for > >>>>>>>> Ribot's distinction between higher and lower psychological > functions at all. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, > >> thanks to > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> all > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> for the food for thought. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential > >>>>>>>>> around > >> the > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> time > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had > >>>>>>>>> seen > >> work > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> on > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal > >> reproductive? > >>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of > >> development > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> of > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being > >>>>>>>>> a > >> relative > >>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. > >>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > >> hshonerd@gmail.com> > >>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. > >> This > >>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from > >>>>>>>>>> some > >> weeks > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> in > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that > >> segmented the > >>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. > >>>>>>>>>> Puns, according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) > >>>>>>>>>> Henry > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole > wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and > >>>>>>>>>>> they are > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> doing > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his > >>>>>>>>>>> followers > >> as an > >>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so > >>>>>>>>>>> its > >> of > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> course > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in > >>>>>>>>>>> translation, > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> seems > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" > >>>>>>>>>>> in > >> this > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> passage, > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter > >>>>>>>>>>> distinction > >> to > >>>>>>>>>>> "memory." > >>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary > >> discourse > >>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian > >>>>>>>>>>> colleagues > >> have > >>>>>>>>>>> illustrated. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from > >>>>>>>>>>> theorists > >> who > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> clearly > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was > >>>>>>>>>>> still > >> possible > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, > >> interestingly > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> links > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" > >> act. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Parts > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff > >>>>>>>>>>> that > >> was > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> also > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of > >> creativity > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> and > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see > >>>>>>>>>>> that > >> the > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> two > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found > >>>>>>>>>>> himself > >> writing. > >>>>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty > >>>>>>>>>>> old > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> approaches > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden > >>>>>>>>>>> >>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it > >>>>>>>>>>>> may > >> be > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> worth > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place > >>>>>>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Imagination > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between > >> Recollection and > >>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive > >> Imagination, > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> (2) > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which > >>>>>>>>>>>> he > >> says > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> leads > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other > >> words, > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> the > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is > >>>>>>>>>>>> accomplished > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> through > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > >> -- > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and > >> Williams. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work > >>>>>>>>>>>>> i am > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> trying > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical > >>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of > >>>>>>>>>>>>> productive imagination. The Russians write that productive > >>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> develops. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that > >> there > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> must > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> be a > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I > >> learned > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> that > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and > >>>>>>>>>>>>> is > >> linked > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of > >> anticipation > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! > >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > >> hshonerd@gmail.com > >>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination > >> (starting > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> with > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and > >> provides > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> a > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> space > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. > >> This, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> ground > >> to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> take > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> part > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> preconceptions: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian > >> Langacker on > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> particularly > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> imagination > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of > >> temporality: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> structure), > >> which > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> I > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> think > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both > >> individual > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < > >> lpscholar2@gmail.com> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *space* > >> and the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion > >> of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> explored > >> under > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of > >> modalities > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> that > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowing > >> that is > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> if we > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> think > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how > >> jazzed up > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> I > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> am > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as > >> Larry > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various > >> triads, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> finally > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > >> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> mind, as > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega > pa? > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> fuera. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> attached > >> are two > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> theorists > >> like > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of > >> imagination in a > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of > >> productive > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no > >> intention of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> doing > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the > >> attached > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> philosophers, I > >> came > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> upon > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> linked > >> at > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> several > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ettienne > >> and I > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> access > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. > >> Moreover, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> such > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relevance > >> to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Kris's > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> concerns > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> about > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Perhaps > >> they > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> will > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > >> science > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> with an > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > >>>>>>>>>>> science > >> with an > >>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > >> with an > >>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>> > >> > >> > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > ________________________________ > > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< > http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> > > > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely > for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the > intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the > information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. > If you have received this email in error please let the sender know > immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not > necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts > no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails > and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility > for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its > attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied > by an official order form. > > <1265 full.pdf> > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Thu Dec 18 22:15:48 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2014 23:15:48 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors In-Reply-To: References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> Message-ID: Helena and David, I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the so-called authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred tradition to Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi notion of "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including English) notion of "time" and how each of these languages offers different affordances of meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual understanding, English has a much more reified/objectified/entified sense of time. (btw, I think the first paragraph is easier to follow than the second - and in that first paragraph you'll find our old friend "imagination"). David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to? -greg Taken from: http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/mousesite/Secondary/Whorfframe2.html " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, sunset" are with us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from other nouns. They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in winter" just as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are pluralized and numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. Our thought about the referents of such words hence becomes objectified. Without objectification, it would be a subjective experience of real time, i.e. of the consciousness of "becoming later and later"--simply a cyclic phase similar to an earlier phase in that ever-later-becoming duration. Only by imagination can such a cyclic phase be set beside another and another in the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually perceived) configuration. "But such is the power of linguistic analogy that we do so objectify cyclic phasing. We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g., "phasing." And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting binomial formula of formless item plus form, is so general that it is implicit for all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless items like "substance, matter," by which we can fill out the binomial for an enormously wide range of nouns. But even these are not quite generalized enough to take in our phase nouns. So for the phase nouns we have made a formless item, "time." We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, in the pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" in the pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can say and think "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." Let me again point out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of milk" or "a piece of cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a summer" actually contains or consists of such-and-such a quantity of "time." In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., are not nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They are a formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, and even other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a locative pattern, like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It contains no morpheme like one of "in the house" or "at the tree." It means "when it is morning" or "while morning-phase is occurring." These "temporal s" are not used as subjects or objects, or at all like nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" or "summer is hot"; summer is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions are hot, WHEN heat occurs. One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or "summer recently." There is no objectification, as a region, an extent, a quantity, of the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested about time except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no basis here for a formless item answering to our "time." " On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Helena Worthen wrote: > > David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to this: > > "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to create > sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly productive, > which is why they still form the basis of scientific writing and thinking > today." > > Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I lose you when you > say "created to talk about gravity as an entity". > > Thank you, > > Helena > > > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > As Helena points out, prepositions are from the "grammatical" end of what > > Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what Halliday calls > > "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they have three > > properties that words from the more "lexical" end do not have: > > > > a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You can, > actually, > > but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you invent a new name > or a > > new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can). > > > > b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific semantic field > (the > > way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of linguistics) > > but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are used. > > > > c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the same effect, > > which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your argument" the "in" has > > more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in "there's a fly in your > > tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in Henry's hands, > refer > > to a book or even a footnote. > > > > Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties pretty much > > define the difference between learning and development, at least as I > > understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on functions > > indefinitely while development works by reorganizing the closed set of > > functions you already have into new systems. Learning is skill specific > > and local, while development is quite global in its implications. > Learning > > is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new systems, while > > development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary (and forget it just > > as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes away. > > > > For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of blue that > people > > call the sky") are simply metaphors from the non-productive end of the > > lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are crisp, concrete, and > > vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to create > > sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly productive, > > which is why they still form the basis of scientific writing and thinking > > today. For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical metaphor is the third > > great moment in child development (after the break into mother tongue and > > the break into disciplinary language in school work). > > > > Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" implies zero > > dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two ("on a line', 'on a > > plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because they are > > grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them with time: 'at a > > point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. Compare: "at > > Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very day), and "in > > Christmas' (season). > > > > David Kellogg > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen > > wrote: > >> > >> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial > >> relationships from the concrete material world into the conceptual > >> imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 common ones, and > between 70 > >> and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far as" -- > this > >> is according to https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm). > >> We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. Apparently, in > >> English, they evolved from and did the job done by inflections in parent > >> languages, examples being cases and tenses. > >> > >> But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection like the > >> dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial relationships > suggested > >> by contemporary prepositions. > >> > >> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about this. > >> > >> Helena Worthen > >> helenaworthen@gmail.com > >> > >> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >> > >>> I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly embodied, > >> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to linguistics > (For > >> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on ?lexicon?: > >> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, being > part > >> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and Halliday > see no > >> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, lexico-grammar. > (Lo > >> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar, adding > the > >> ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings are great > >> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of that? In > >> translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced? > >>> Henry > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >>>> > >>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the metaphorical > >> use of prepositions like: > >>>> - "there is some value IN your argument" > >>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again" > >>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" > >>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again" > >>>> > >>>> and so on. > >>>> Andy > >>>> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> larry smolucha wrote: > >>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > >>>>> > >>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself - > >>>>> > >>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic > possibilities: > >>>>> > >>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in > Thought > >>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into English > >> 1962] > >>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' value > >> of the > >>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech > vocalization). > >>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that are > >> flammable > >>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor a gas. > >>>>> > >>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century European > >> Developmental > >>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' hence > the > >>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of Piaget's > >> Genetic > >>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. > >>>>> > >>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and synthesis > >> based on > >>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in Vygotsky's > >> example of H2O. > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com > >>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic > >>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts. > >>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more than the > >>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can ever be > >> imagined" > >>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) > >>>>>> > >>>>>> A couple things to consider: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination as the > >> brain has > >>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the simplest level > >> of the Gestalt > >>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). > >>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just photographic. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try to > >> accurately reproduce > >>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, the > >> goal of combinatory > >>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, dreams, > >> musings, and even > >>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of objects > >> and symbols. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways that > >> things and concepts can be > >>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar and > flour. > >>>>>> I can add water and it > >> dissolves a bit > >>>>>> But adding heat changes the > >> combination into a pancake. > >>>>>> [Is this synergistic?] > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more examples > >> to put the discussion > >>>>>> in the metaphysical realm. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 > >>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com > >>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the case > for > >>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I think it's > >> not > >>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are > >> associationists who > >>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary associationism > >> exists and > >>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. > >> Vygotsky > >>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, explain > >> the > >>>>>>> uniqueness of our species? > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels for its > >> own > >>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a Piagetian > >>>>>>> perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true maturity > as a > >>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more to it > >> than > >>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of primate, > and > >> our > >>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon rocks > in > >> order > >>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged the same > >> way as > >>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and for > >> language is > >>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human > >> exceptionalism. > >>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for the > >> vanguard role > >>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, > prolonging > >>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after the sick > >> and the > >>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial organs > >> (tools) and > >>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for our > >> species, it > >>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these > >> "circuitous, > >>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that lead our > >>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always been > >> short on > >>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for material > >> culture > >>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: > >> verily, here > >>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of attention is > >> simply the > >>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says there are > >> only two > >>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So > >> imagination is > >>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, and > >> nothing > >>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when you > hear > >> the > >>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there to be > >> able to > >>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work in word > >> meaning. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who was > given > >> a > >>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been mixed with > >> silver > >>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold. > >> Well, we > >>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not possible > to > >>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that precisely. The > >> method > >>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the "principal of > >>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes palimpsest, a > >> velum on > >>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. > Because > >>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and written over > >> every > >>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, the > >> pressure > >>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones when > the > >> old > >>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only known > >> Greek > >>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their > >> relationship > >>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they are > >> related to > >>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite > similar > >> to the > >>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD > >> wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an > associationist, > >> ?sees > >>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? > >>>>>>>> Henry > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg > > >> wrote: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division > >> between > >>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because > >> Ribot is > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> an > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of > >> attention. > >>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from > >> forest > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between > >> the two > >>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical > >> world of > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses > >> in life > >>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more > "imaginative" > >> (that > >>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> farm,where > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter > >> months are > >>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter > >> talking > >>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention > has > >> to be > >>>>>>>>> more voluntary. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear > >>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that > >> underpins > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Ribot > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points > out > >> the > >>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices > >> really > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> are > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, > >> there > >>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human > and > >> animal > >>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> volitional > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). > Without > >> a > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> theory > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for > Ribot's > >>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at > >> all. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole wrote: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, > >> thanks to > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> all > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential > >> around the > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> time > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had > >> seen work > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> on > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal > >> reproductive? > >>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of > >> development > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a > >> relative > >>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. > >>>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > >> hshonerd@gmail.com> > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. > >> This > >>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some > >> weeks > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> in > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that > >> segmented the > >>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. > >> Puns, > >>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) > >>>>>>>>>>> Henry > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole > wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they > >> are > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> doing > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his > >> followers as an > >>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so > >> its of > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> course > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in > >> translation, > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> seems > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in > >> this > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> passage, > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter > >> distinction to > >>>>>>>>>>>> "memory." > >>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary > >> discourse > >>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian > >> colleagues have > >>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists > >> who > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> clearly > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still > >> possible > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, > >> interestingly > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> links > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" > >> act. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Parts > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff > that > >> was > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> also > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of > >> creativity > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see > >> that the > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> two > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself > >> writing. > >>>>>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty > old > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> approaches > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < > >> ablunden@mira.net> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it > >> may be > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> worth > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Imagination > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between > >> Recollection and > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive > >> Imagination, > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> (2) > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he > >> says > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> leads > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other > >> words, > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is > >> accomplished > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> through > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and > >> Williams. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i > >> am > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> trying > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of > >> productive > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> develops. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that > >> there > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> must > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> be a > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I > >> learned > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> that > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is > >> linked > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of > >> anticipation > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > >> hshonerd@gmail.com > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination > >> (starting > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> with > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and > >> provides > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> a > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as > fixed. > >> This, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a > ground > >> to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> take > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> part > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> preconceptions: > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian > >> Langacker on > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> particularly > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> imagination > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of > >> temporality: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic > >> structure), which > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> I > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both > >> individual > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < > >> lpscholar2@gmail.com> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* > >> and the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his > >> notion of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is > >> explored under > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of > >> modalities > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> that > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing > >> that is > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if > >> we > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> think > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how > >> jazzed up > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> I > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> am > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind > as > >> Larry > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various > >> triads, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> finally > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks > of > >> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> mind, as > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega > >> pa? > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> fuera. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole > >> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached > >> are two > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT > theorists > >> like > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of > >> imagination in a > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of > >> productive > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no > >> intention of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> doing > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the > >> attached > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, > I > >> came > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> upon > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely > >> linked at > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> several > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, > >> Ettienne and I > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means > of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> access > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. > >> Moreover, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> such > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct > relevance > >> to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Kris's > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to > >> concerns > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> about > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. > Perhaps > >> they > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> will > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > >> science > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> with an > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > >> with an > >>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > >> with an > >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Thu Dec 18 22:33:03 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2014 23:33:03 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> Message-ID: Michael Silverstein has a little known piece "Metaforces of Power in Traditional Oratory" that speaks to this issue as well. For Silverstein, the metaphorical relations established between different contexts (as in ritual, instantiated through practices, linguistic and otherwise) are one of the prime movers of social life. Any linguistic anthropological types? out there (I thought there might be one or two) that appreciate Silverstein's work and would like a copy, hit me up offline and I'll happily share my copy. -greg On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 9:59 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: > > Lakoff and Johnson have lots about this, Andy. > > Martin > > Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors we live by. Chicago: > University of Chicago Press. > > Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). The metaphorical structure of the human > conceptual system. Cognitive Science, 4(2), 195-208. > > > On Dec 18, 2014, at 4:54 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the metaphorical > use of prepositions like: > > - "there is some value IN your argument" > > - "I'd like to go OVER that again" > > - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" > > - "Let's go THROUGH that again" > > > > and so on. > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > larry smolucha wrote: > >> Message from Francine Smolucha: > >> > >> Forgive me for replying to myself - > >> > >> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic possibilities: > >> > >> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in Thought > >> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into English > 1962] > >> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' value > of the > >> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech vocalization). > >> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that are > flammable > >> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor a gas. > >> > >> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century European > Developmental > >> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' hence the > >> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of Piaget's > Genetic > >> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. > >> > >> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and synthesis based > on > >> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in Vygotsky's > example of H2O. > >> > >> > >>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com > >>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > >>> > >>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > >>> > >>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic > >>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts. > >>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more than the > >>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can ever be > imagined" > >>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) > >>> > >>> A couple things to consider: > >>> > >>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination as the > brain has > >>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the simplest level > of the Gestalt > >>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). > >>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just photographic. > >>> > >>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try to > accurately reproduce > >>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, the goal > of combinatory > >>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, dreams, > musings, and even > >>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of objects > and symbols. > >>> > >>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways that > things and concepts can be > >>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar and flour. > >>> I can add water and it > dissolves a bit > >>> But adding heat changes the > combination into a pancake. > >>> [Is this synergistic?] > >>> > >>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more examples > to put the discussion > >>> in the metaphysical realm. > >>> > >>> > >>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 > >>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com > >>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > >>>> > >>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the case for > >>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I think it's > not > >>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are > associationists who > >>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary associationism > exists and > >>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. > Vygotsky > >>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, explain > the > >>>> uniqueness of our species? > >>>> > >>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels for its > own > >>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a Piagetian > >>>> perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true maturity as a > >>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more to it than > >>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of primate, and > our > >>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon rocks in > order > >>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged the same > way as > >>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. > >>>> > >>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and for > language is > >>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human > exceptionalism. > >>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for the > vanguard role > >>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, prolonging > >>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after the sick > and the > >>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial organs > (tools) and > >>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for our > species, it > >>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these > "circuitous, > >>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that lead our > >>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always been short > on > >>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for material > culture > >>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: verily, > here > >>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. > >>>> > >>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of attention is > simply the > >>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says there are > only two > >>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So imagination > is > >>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, and > nothing > >>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when you hear > the > >>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there to be > able to > >>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work in word > meaning. > >>>> > >>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who was given a > >>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been mixed with > silver > >>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold. > Well, we > >>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not possible to > >>>> measure the differences in water displacement that precisely. The > method > >>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the "principal of > >>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. > >>>> > >>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes palimpsest, a > velum on > >>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. Because > >>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and written over > every > >>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, the > pressure > >>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones when the > old > >>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only known > Greek > >>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". > >>>> > >>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their > relationship > >>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they are > related to > >>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite similar > to the > >>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. > >>>> > >>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) > >>>> > >>>> David Kellogg > >>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >>>> > >>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD > wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an associationist, > ?sees > >>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? > >>>>> Henry > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division > between > >>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because > Ribot is > >>>>>> > >>>>> an > >>>>> > >>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of > attention. > >>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from > forest > >>>>>> > >>>>> to > >>>>> > >>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between > the two > >>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical > world of > >>>>>> > >>>>> the > >>>>> > >>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses > in life > >>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" > (that > >>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the > >>>>>> > >>>>> farm,where > >>>>> > >>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter > months are > >>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter > talking > >>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has > to be > >>>>>> more voluntary. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear > >>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that underpins > >>>>>> > >>>>> Ribot > >>>>> > >>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out > the > >>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices > really > >>>>>> > >>>>> are > >>>>> > >>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, > there > >>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and > animal > >>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of > >>>>>> > >>>>> volitional > >>>>> > >>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without a > >>>>>> > >>>>> theory > >>>>> > >>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's > >>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at all. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, > thanks to > >>>>>>> > >>>>> all > >>>>> > >>>>>>> for the food for thought. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential around > the > >>>>>>> > >>>>> time > >>>>> > >>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had seen > work > >>>>>>> > >>>>> on > >>>>> > >>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal > reproductive? > >>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of > development > >>>>>>> > >>>>> of > >>>>> > >>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a > relative > >>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. > >>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > hshonerd@gmail.com> > >>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. > This > >>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some > weeks > >>>>>>>> > >>>>> in > >>>>> > >>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that > segmented the > >>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. Puns, > >>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) > >>>>>>>> Henry > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole wrote: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they are > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>> doing > >>>>> > >>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his followers > as an > >>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so its > of > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> course > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in translation, > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>> seems > >>>>> > >>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in > this > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> passage, > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter distinction > to > >>>>>>>>> "memory." > >>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary > discourse > >>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian colleagues > have > >>>>>>>>> illustrated. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists > who > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> clearly > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still > possible > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> to > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> include culture in it. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, > interestingly > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> links > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" > act. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Parts > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that > was > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> also > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of > creativity > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>> and > >>>>> > >>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see that > the > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> two > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself > writing. > >>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> approaches > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> to a pesum > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden > > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it may > be > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> worth > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Imagination > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between > Recollection and > >>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive > Imagination, > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> (2) > >>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he > says > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> leads > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other > words, > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> the > >>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is accomplished > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> through > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and > Williams. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> trying > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical > >>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive > >>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> develops. > >>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that > there > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> must > >>>>> > >>>>>>>> be a > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I > learned > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> that > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is > linked > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> to > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> memory. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of > anticipation > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> memory. > >>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! > >>>>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > hshonerd@gmail.com > >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination > (starting > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> with > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and > provides > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> a > >>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> space > >>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. > This, > >>>>>>>>>>>> coupled > >>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground > to > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> take > >>>>> > >>>>>>>> part > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> preconceptions: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Vera > >>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian > Langacker on > >>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> particularly > >>>>> > >>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> imagination > >>>>> > >>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of > temporality: > >>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure), > which > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> I > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> think > >>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both > individual > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > >>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < > lpscholar2@gmail.com> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* > and the > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> analogy > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion > of > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> "structures > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored > under > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of > modalities > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> that > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> hang > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing > that is > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> forming > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> think > >>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry > >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com > >>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how > jazzed up > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> I > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> am > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> now > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as > Larry > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> construes > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various > triads, > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> finally > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of > the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> mind, as > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa? > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> fuera. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole > wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached > are two > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists > like > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of > imagination in a > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of > productive > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no > intention of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> doing > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the > attached > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I > came > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> upon > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked > at > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> several > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne > and I > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> in > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> access > >>>>> > >>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. > Moreover, > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> such > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> perception/imagination > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance > to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Kris's > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> about > >>>>> > >>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps > they > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> will > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > science > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> with an > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > with an > >>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > with an > >>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>> > >> > > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From ablunden@mira.net Thu Dec 18 22:57:47 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2014 17:57:47 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Time In-Reply-To: References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> Message-ID: <5493CC6B.5050105@mira.net> That is an extremely interesting paragraph or two on the contrast between typical modern expressions of Time and how the Hopi language expresses corresponding situations. It seems that taking Nature (including Time) to be something which exists independently of us humans and can be known as such, in other words, the founding principle of Natural Science, is built into a premodern language, and is not shared by (at least one) indigenous people. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Greg Thompson wrote: > Helena and David, > I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the so-called > authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred tradition to > Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi notion of > "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including English) notion of > "time" and how each of these languages offers different affordances of > meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual understanding, English has > a much more reified/objectified/entified sense of time. (btw, I think the > first paragraph is easier to follow than the second - and in that first > paragraph you'll find our old friend "imagination"). > David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to? > -greg > > Taken from: > http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/mousesite/Secondary/Whorfframe2.html > > " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, sunset" are with > us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from other nouns. > They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in winter" just > as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are pluralized and > numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. Our thought > about the referents of such words hence becomes objectified. Without > objectification, it would be a subjective experience of real time, i.e. of > the consciousness of "becoming later and later"--simply a cyclic phase > similar to an earlier phase in that ever-later-becoming duration. Only by > imagination can such a cyclic phase be set beside another and another in > the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually perceived) configuration. "But such > is the power of linguistic analogy that we do so objectify cyclic phasing. > We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g., "phasing." > And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting binomial > formula of formless item plus form, is so general that it is implicit for > all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless items like "substance, > matter," by which we can fill out the binomial for an enormously wide range > of nouns. But even these are not quite generalized enough to take in our > phase nouns. So for the phase nouns we have made a formless item, "time." > We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, in the > pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" in the > pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can say and think > "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." Let me again point > out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of milk" or "a piece of > cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a summer" actually contains > or consists of such-and-such a quantity of "time." > > In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., are not > nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They are a > formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, and even > other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a locative pattern, > like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It contains no morpheme like one of > "in the house" or "at the tree." It means "when it is morning" or "while > morning-phase is occurring." These "temporal s" are not used as subjects or > objects, or at all like nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" or > "summer is hot"; summer is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions are hot, > WHEN heat occurs. One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or > "summer recently." There is no objectification, as a region, an extent, a > quantity, of the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested about > time except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no basis > here for a formless item answering to our "time." " > > > > > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Thu Dec 18 23:36:03 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2014 00:36:03 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Time In-Reply-To: <5493CC6B.5050105@mira.net> References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> <5493CC6B.5050105@mira.net> Message-ID: Interesting how you have taken this Andy - to suggest that the Hopi lack a founding principle of Natural Science. Whorf actually takes this in generally the opposite direction. In his work on the Hopi language, he suggests that one finds a language much better suited to thinking about the theoretical physics of Whorf's day (e.g., Einstein's theory of relativity, quantum mechanics, etc.). In that sense, Hopi is, in fact, closer to describing the way the world really is. (and I'll quickly rescind those last six words if you have any objections!). As to your assumption that science requires the objectification of the natural world, I'm sure there are others on the list who would agree with me that there is good reason to question the necessity of subject/object dualism for science. (and perhaps you were referring to a particular scientific tradition by calling it "Natural Science" - maybe scary scare quotes are needed?). -greg On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 11:57 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > That is an extremely interesting paragraph or two on the contrast between > typical modern expressions of Time and how the Hopi language expresses > corresponding situations. It seems that taking Nature (including Time) to > be something which exists independently of us humans and can be known as > such, in other words, the founding principle of Natural Science, is built > into a premodern language, and is not shared by (at least one) indigenous > people. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Greg Thompson wrote: > >> Helena and David, >> I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the so-called >> authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred tradition to >> Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi notion of >> "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including English) notion >> of >> "time" and how each of these languages offers different affordances of >> meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual understanding, English >> has >> a much more reified/objectified/entified sense of time. (btw, I think the >> first paragraph is easier to follow than the second - and in that first >> paragraph you'll find our old friend "imagination"). >> David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to? >> -greg >> >> Taken from: >> http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/ >> mousesite/Secondary/Whorfframe2.html >> >> " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, sunset" are >> with >> us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from other nouns. >> They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in winter" >> just >> as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are pluralized and >> numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. Our thought >> about the referents of such words hence becomes objectified. Without >> objectification, it would be a subjective experience of real time, i.e. of >> the consciousness of "becoming later and later"--simply a cyclic phase >> similar to an earlier phase in that ever-later-becoming duration. Only by >> imagination can such a cyclic phase be set beside another and another in >> the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually perceived) configuration. "But such >> is the power of linguistic analogy that we do so objectify cyclic phasing. >> We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g., "phasing." >> And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting binomial >> formula of formless item plus form, is so general that it is implicit for >> all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless items like "substance, >> matter," by which we can fill out the binomial for an enormously wide >> range >> of nouns. But even these are not quite generalized enough to take in our >> phase nouns. So for the phase nouns we have made a formless item, "time." >> We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, in the >> pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" in the >> pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can say and >> think >> "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." Let me again point >> out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of milk" or "a piece of >> cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a summer" actually contains >> or consists of such-and-such a quantity of "time." >> >> In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., are not >> nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They are a >> formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, and even >> other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a locative >> pattern, >> like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It contains no morpheme like one of >> "in the house" or "at the tree." It means "when it is morning" or "while >> morning-phase is occurring." These "temporal s" are not used as subjects >> or >> objects, or at all like nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" or >> "summer is hot"; summer is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions are >> hot, >> WHEN heat occurs. One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or >> "summer recently." There is no objectification, as a region, an extent, a >> quantity, of the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested about >> time except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no basis >> here for a formless item answering to our "time." " >> >> >> >> >> > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From lsmolucha@hotmail.com Fri Dec 19 02:17:29 2014 From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com (larry smolucha) Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2014 04:17:29 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Time In-Reply-To: References: , , <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net>, , , , , <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com>, , , , <5492A447.7030004@mira.net>, , , , , , <5493CC6B.5050105@mira.net>, Message-ID: I seem to be a verb R. Buckminster Fuller 1970 > Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2014 00:36:03 -0700 > From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com > To: ablunden@mira.net; xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Time > > Interesting how you have taken this Andy - to suggest that the Hopi lack a > founding principle of Natural Science. > > Whorf actually takes this in generally the opposite direction. In his work > on the Hopi language, he suggests that one finds a language much better > suited to thinking about the theoretical physics of Whorf's day (e.g., > Einstein's theory of relativity, quantum mechanics, etc.). In that sense, > Hopi is, in fact, closer to describing the way the world really is. (and > I'll quickly rescind those last six words if you have any objections!). > > As to your assumption that science requires the objectification of the > natural world, I'm sure there are others on the list who would agree with > me that there is good reason to question the necessity of subject/object > dualism for science. (and perhaps you were referring to a particular > scientific tradition by calling it "Natural Science" - maybe scary scare > quotes are needed?). > > -greg > > > On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 11:57 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > > That is an extremely interesting paragraph or two on the contrast between > > typical modern expressions of Time and how the Hopi language expresses > > corresponding situations. It seems that taking Nature (including Time) to > > be something which exists independently of us humans and can be known as > > such, in other words, the founding principle of Natural Science, is built > > into a premodern language, and is not shared by (at least one) indigenous > > people. > > > > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > Greg Thompson wrote: > > > >> Helena and David, > >> I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the so-called > >> authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred tradition to > >> Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi notion of > >> "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including English) notion > >> of > >> "time" and how each of these languages offers different affordances of > >> meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual understanding, English > >> has > >> a much more reified/objectified/entified sense of time. (btw, I think the > >> first paragraph is easier to follow than the second - and in that first > >> paragraph you'll find our old friend "imagination"). > >> David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to? > >> -greg > >> > >> Taken from: > >> http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/ > >> mousesite/Secondary/Whorfframe2.html > >> > >> " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, sunset" are > >> with > >> us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from other nouns. > >> They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in winter" > >> just > >> as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are pluralized and > >> numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. Our thought > >> about the referents of such words hence becomes objectified. Without > >> objectification, it would be a subjective experience of real time, i.e. of > >> the consciousness of "becoming later and later"--simply a cyclic phase > >> similar to an earlier phase in that ever-later-becoming duration. Only by > >> imagination can such a cyclic phase be set beside another and another in > >> the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually perceived) configuration. "But such > >> is the power of linguistic analogy that we do so objectify cyclic phasing. > >> We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g., "phasing." > >> And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting binomial > >> formula of formless item plus form, is so general that it is implicit for > >> all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless items like "substance, > >> matter," by which we can fill out the binomial for an enormously wide > >> range > >> of nouns. But even these are not quite generalized enough to take in our > >> phase nouns. So for the phase nouns we have made a formless item, "time." > >> We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, in the > >> pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" in the > >> pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can say and > >> think > >> "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." Let me again point > >> out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of milk" or "a piece of > >> cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a summer" actually contains > >> or consists of such-and-such a quantity of "time." > >> > >> In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., are not > >> nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They are a > >> formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, and even > >> other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a locative > >> pattern, > >> like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It contains no morpheme like one of > >> "in the house" or "at the tree." It means "when it is morning" or "while > >> morning-phase is occurring." These "temporal s" are not used as subjects > >> or > >> objects, or at all like nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" or > >> "summer is hot"; summer is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions are > >> hot, > >> WHEN heat occurs. One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or > >> "summer recently." There is no objectification, as a region, an extent, a > >> quantity, of the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested about > >> time except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no basis > >> here for a formless item answering to our "time." " > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From lpscholar2@gmail.com Fri Dec 19 03:25:02 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2014 03:25:02 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Time In-Reply-To: References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> <5493CC6B.5050105@mira.net> Message-ID: This notion of our being a "verb" or being a "noun" or being a "position" or possibly being a "pre" - position. What I am wondering is where we are going?? Are we actually "verbs" and "nouns" and "positions" and "pre"-positions?? Do we "exist" in the grammar [syntax] or do we "exist" in the "semantics" [meaning] or do we "exist" in the "Pragmatics" [doing, activity] I apologize if this question is merely "idio"-syncretic but it is the imaginal mutually reciprocal "third space" which I am being invited to occupy in THIS SPECIFIC community as we trans-late the imaginal into "genres" or "forms". For this reason, I want to hold on to the moral virtue of "cosmopolitanism" that Kris Gutierrez articulated in her paper. [Yes a trans-position] Kris wrote: "At the CORE of its [the third space] political-philosophical ROOTS, this program is oriented towards a FORM {LP adds a form as a genre]] of "cosmopolitanism" (Appiah, 2006) characterized by the ideals and practices of a shared humanity, a profound OBLIGATION to others, boundary crossing, and intercultural exchange in which difference is celebrated without being romanticized. To get to this "space" or "place" requires imagination. If Buckminster Fuller "seems" to be a verb, and others "seem" to be nouns while others "seem" to be positions [stances] , while others "seem" to be "pre"-positions, then the imaginal "seems" to be *IN* play. [with the full awareness of *IN* as David K out-lined or under-scored or high-lighted.] I want to ask Francine what she meant by "metaphysical" in her signing off on her recent examples or cases. Kris "pragmatics" or "performance" seems to me "grounded" in the sense of rising [ideal] and returning [to ground] On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 2:17 AM, larry smolucha wrote: > > > > I seem to be a verb > > R. Buckminster Fuller 1970 > > > Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2014 00:36:03 -0700 > > From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com > > To: ablunden@mira.net; xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Time > > > > Interesting how you have taken this Andy - to suggest that the Hopi lack > a > > founding principle of Natural Science. > > > > Whorf actually takes this in generally the opposite direction. In his > work > > on the Hopi language, he suggests that one finds a language much better > > suited to thinking about the theoretical physics of Whorf's day (e.g., > > Einstein's theory of relativity, quantum mechanics, etc.). In that sense, > > Hopi is, in fact, closer to describing the way the world really is. (and > > I'll quickly rescind those last six words if you have any objections!). > > > > As to your assumption that science requires the objectification of the > > natural world, I'm sure there are others on the list who would agree with > > me that there is good reason to question the necessity of subject/object > > dualism for science. (and perhaps you were referring to a particular > > scientific tradition by calling it "Natural Science" - maybe scary scare > > quotes are needed?). > > > > -greg > > > > > > On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 11:57 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > > > > > That is an extremely interesting paragraph or two on the contrast > between > > > typical modern expressions of Time and how the Hopi language expresses > > > corresponding situations. It seems that taking Nature (including Time) > to > > > be something which exists independently of us humans and can be known > as > > > such, in other words, the founding principle of Natural Science, is > built > > > into a premodern language, and is not shared by (at least one) > indigenous > > > people. > > > > > > Andy > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > *Andy Blunden* > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > > Greg Thompson wrote: > > > > > >> Helena and David, > > >> I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the so-called > > >> authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred tradition > to > > >> Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi notion > of > > >> "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including English) > notion > > >> of > > >> "time" and how each of these languages offers different affordances of > > >> meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual understanding, > English > > >> has > > >> a much more reified/objectified/entified sense of time. (btw, I think > the > > >> first paragraph is easier to follow than the second - and in that > first > > >> paragraph you'll find our old friend "imagination"). > > >> David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to? > > >> -greg > > >> > > >> Taken from: > > >> http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/ > > >> mousesite/Secondary/Whorfframe2.html > > >> > > >> " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, sunset" are > > >> with > > >> us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from other > nouns. > > >> They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in winter" > > >> just > > >> as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are pluralized and > > >> numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. Our thought > > >> about the referents of such words hence becomes objectified. Without > > >> objectification, it would be a subjective experience of real time, > i.e. of > > >> the consciousness of "becoming later and later"--simply a cyclic phase > > >> similar to an earlier phase in that ever-later-becoming duration. > Only by > > >> imagination can such a cyclic phase be set beside another and another > in > > >> the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually perceived) configuration. "But > such > > >> is the power of linguistic analogy that we do so objectify cyclic > phasing. > > >> We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g., > "phasing." > > >> And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting > binomial > > >> formula of formless item plus form, is so general that it is implicit > for > > >> all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless items like > "substance, > > >> matter," by which we can fill out the binomial for an enormously wide > > >> range > > >> of nouns. But even these are not quite generalized enough to take in > our > > >> phase nouns. So for the phase nouns we have made a formless item, > "time." > > >> We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, in the > > >> pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" in > the > > >> pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can say and > > >> think > > >> "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." Let me again > point > > >> out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of milk" or "a piece > of > > >> cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a summer" actually > contains > > >> or consists of such-and-such a quantity of "time." > > >> > > >> In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., are not > > >> nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They are a > > >> formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, and > even > > >> other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a locative > > >> pattern, > > >> like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It contains no morpheme like > one of > > >> "in the house" or "at the tree." It means "when it is morning" or > "while > > >> morning-phase is occurring." These "temporal s" are not used as > subjects > > >> or > > >> objects, or at all like nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" or > > >> "summer is hot"; summer is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions are > > >> hot, > > >> WHEN heat occurs. One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or > > >> "summer recently." There is no objectification, as a region, an > extent, a > > >> quantity, of the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested > about > > >> time except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no > basis > > >> here for a formless item answering to our "time." " > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > From R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk Fri Dec 19 12:39:29 2014 From: R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk (Rod Parker-Rees) Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2014 20:39:29 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination (seeing and believing) In-Reply-To: References: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102265CEB@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> <9A8CE8FE-43CB-48B6-8553-54349E8F1E1E@gmail.com> Message-ID: <8F385CC13313CC47B866739C3A4BC31102267BE0@TIS103.uopnet.plymouth.ac.uk> Good point Greg - there is a reference in there to a 1957 study by A Joyce martin but that was into LSD! I have a feeling that Paul may have been referring to the studies reported here http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2014/11/04/magic-mushrooms-brain_n_6100912.html but I will check. All the best, Rod -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson Sent: 19 December 2014 05:18 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination (seeing and believing) Rod, The study I found attached to your email was not by a "Martin" (as suggested by Paul in the email). Still more disappointingly there no mention of magic mushrooms in the piece. Any chance you have the article by "Martin" and that can tell us something about people taking magic mushrooms in an fMRI machine? -greg On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 3:36 PM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > Rod, > Appropriate or not (though I think it is) your post has me asking why > Martin (our Martin?) thinks that the use of that substance diminished > the inference making. This will drive Mike crazy, but would a thread > on imagination benefit from a discussion of what has been with the > species from time immemorial: mind altering substances? We?re talking > affordances here, culture, history, activity. Another thread? > Henry > > > On Dec 18, 2014, at 12:41 PM, Rod Parker-Rees < > R.Parker-Rees@plymouth.ac.uk> wrote: > > > > I am not sure how appropriate it is to post this here as it is going > back to an earlier theme in the discussion - the relationship between > perception and imagination. I asked a friend who is on a masters > psychology programme and she asked one of her tutors at Bristol > University (Paul Howard-Jones > http://www.bristol.ac.uk/education/people/person/93406/index.html ). > > > > I think his summary of the attached paper may be of interest to some > > - > and the paper is way outside the xmca remit but I have attached in in > case anyone is interested enough to want to read more. > > > > All the best, > > > > Rod > > > > This was what I asked: > > > > Are you aware of any articles which enumerate the ratio between > > sensory > information (e.g. stimuli from the retinae) and visual memory in the > process of seeing? I saw a claim somewhere that only about 10% of what > we ?see? is from retinal information, with the rest made up by our > interpretation of this information using what we have seen before but > I can?t track down any evidence for this so am not confident about it! > What I am particularly interested in is what happens when the bodily > actions of thinking and perceiving are reduced to ?things? ? > ?thoughts? and ?perceptions? or ?images?. It seems important to me > that the way we ACT on things is part of what we know about them or, > more generally, that we are aware of our environment in terms of our > experiences of interacting with it rather than in terms of lists of > extracted ?properties? of phenomena > > > > And this is Paul's reply: > > > > Attached is a highly theoretical paper by a guy (Martin) who was > privileged to borrow my wooden fMRI simulator for participants to take > magic mushrooms in- fascinating study! It might be relevant to this query. > > I would summarise it as follows: > > The brain is thought to comprise hierarchical levels, with input > arriving at the lowest levels (light, sound, touch, etc) and a > representation of the world generated at the top that can direct our > actions (e.g., rain is falling, so grab a coat). To achieve this, each > level draws on past history to draw some basic conclusions and these > inferences get passed to the level above. So, in the visual system, > lower levels process activations of retinal neurons into inferred features (e.g. > rain drops). A little further up in the same system, higher levels > process the behaviour of features into inferred patterns of movement > (e.g....are falling). When a layer forms an inference, it can use it > to suppress the information coming from below that gave rise to it. > This is good house-keeping, and reduces the amount of information the > brain has to process. After all, once a pattern of incoming > information is recognised and can be reduced to an inference, it can > be filed under ?business as usual? and that stream of information can > be ignored - the inference is all we need to know. Information that > can?t be turned into inferences ? stuff that doesn?t fit previous > history ? deserves more special attention and, rather than getting > suppressed, is passed up the levels for a different > reason: it can be used to readjust expectations and teach the brain > new tricks (i.e. how to make new inferences), so providing a mechanism > for the brain to learn. > > > > > > But this essentially means very little of the original perceptual > information ever reaches consciousness (unless you take magic > mushrooms (not that i am recommending) which Martin thinks diminishes > the efficiency of the inference-making. > > > > > > Merry Christmas everyone! > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole > > Sent: 18 December 2014 18:44 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > Dear Colleagues. Might it be appropriate to start another thread on > metaphor? > > > > My basic starting point is the idea that basic perceptual processes > ineluctably require imagination...... measured in milliseconds. > Metaphor and linguistic mediation is for sure an essential topic here. > I want to hold on to the Suvorov metaphor of imagination as lifting > off from the world and returning to it again. (If the Suvorov > reference is not familiar I will post relevant paper). > > > > A thought: Might it be possible to parse Francine's last message > > into > subtopics while not discouraging cross subtopic conversations? > > > > Trying to hold all the threads in my hand. > > Slow in So Cal. > > mike > > > > > > On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD > wrote: > >> > >> I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly > >> embodied, proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to > >> linguistics (For example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is > >> focused on > ?lexicon?: > >> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, > >> being part of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker > >> and Halliday see no clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, > >> hence, lexico-grammar. (Lo and behold, my spell check wanted me to > >> write lexicon-grammar, adding the ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep > >> them > >> separate!) Word coinings are great data for imagination and > >> creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of that? In translation from > >> Russian > is word coining ever practiced? > >> Henry > >> > >> > >> > >>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >>> > >>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the > >>> metaphorical > >> use of prepositions like: > >>> - "there is some value IN your argument" > >>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again" > >>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" > >>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again" > >>> > >>> and so on. > >>> Andy > >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>> -- > >>> ---- > >>> *Andy Blunden* > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>> > >>> > >>> larry smolucha wrote: > >>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > >>>> > >>>> Forgive me for replying to myself - > >>>> > >>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic > possibilities: > >>>> > >>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in > >>>> Thought and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated > >>>> into English > >> 1962] > >>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' > >>>> value > >> of the > >>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech > vocalization). > >>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that > >>>> are > >> flammable > >>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor a gas. > >>>> > >>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century European > >> Developmental > >>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' > >>>> hence the Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the > >>>> case of Piaget's > >> Genetic > >>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. > >>>> > >>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and synthesis > >>>> based > >> on > >>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in Vygotsky's > >> example of H2O. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com > >>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 > >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > >>>>> > >>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > >>>>> > >>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic > >>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts. > >>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more than > >>>>> the recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can > >>>>> ever be > >> imagined" > >>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) > >>>>> > >>>>> A couple things to consider: > >>>>> > >>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination as > >>>>> the > >> brain has > >>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the simplest > >>>>> level > >> of the Gestalt > >>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). > >>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just photographic. > >>>>> > >>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try to > >> accurately reproduce > >>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, > >>>>> the goal > >> of combinatory > >>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, dreams, > >> musings, and even > >>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of > >>>>> objects > >> and symbols. > >>>>> > >>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways > >>>>> that > >> things and concepts can be > >>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar and flour. > >>>>> I can add water and it > >> dissolves a bit > >>>>> But adding heat changes > >>>>> the > >> combination into a pancake. > >>>>> [Is this synergistic?] > >>>>> > >>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more > >>>>> examples > >> to put the discussion > >>>>> in the metaphysical realm. > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 > >>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com > >>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the > >>>>>> case for Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. > >>>>>> I think it's > >> not > >>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are > >> associationists who > >>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary > >>>>>> associationism > >> exists and > >>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. > >> Vygotsky > >>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, > >>>>>> explain > >> the > >>>>>> uniqueness of our species? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels for > >>>>>> its > >> own > >>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a > >>>>>> Piagetian perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian > >>>>>> one--true maturity as a species comes with acknowledging that > >>>>>> there is nothing more to it than > >>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of > >>>>>> primate, and > >> our > >>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon > >>>>>> rocks in > >> order > >>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged the > >>>>>> same > >> way as > >>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and for > >> language is > >>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human > >> exceptionalism. > >>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for the > >> vanguard role > >>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, > >>>>>> prolonging childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking > >>>>>> after the sick > >> and the > >>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial organs > >> (tools) and > >>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for our > >> species, it > >>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these > >> "circuitous, > >>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that lead > >>>>>> our development as a species. The wretched of the earth always > >>>>>> been short > >> on > >>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for material > >> culture > >>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: > >>>>>> verily, > >> here > >>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of attention > >>>>>> is > >> simply the > >>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says there > >>>>>> are > >> only two > >>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So > >>>>>> imagination > >> is > >>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, > >>>>>> and > >> nothing > >>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when you > >>>>>> hear > >> the > >>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there to > >>>>>> be > >> able to > >>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work in > >>>>>> word > >> meaning. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who was > >>>>>> given a crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been > >>>>>> mixed with > >> silver > >>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold. > >> Well, we > >>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not > >>>>>> possible to measure the differences in water displacement that > >>>>>> precisely. The > >> method > >>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the "principal > >>>>>> of buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes palimpsest, > >>>>>> a > >> velum on > >>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. > >>>>>> Because parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and > >>>>>> written over > >> every > >>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, > >>>>>> the > >> pressure > >>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones > >>>>>> when the > >> old > >>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only > >>>>>> known > >> Greek > >>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their > >> relationship > >>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they are > >> related to > >>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite > >>>>>> similar > >> to the > >>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) > >>>>>> > >>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD > >>>>>> > >> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an > >>>>>>> associationist, > >> ?sees > >>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? > >>>>>>> Henry > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg > >>>>>>>> > >> wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division > >> between > >>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, > >>>>>>>> because > >> Ribot is > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> an > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form > >>>>>>>> of > >> attention. > >>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition > >>>>>>>> from > >> forest > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> to > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division > >>>>>>>> between > >> the two > >>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and > >>>>>>>> commonsensical > >> world of > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> the > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic > >>>>>>>> uses > >> in life > >>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" > >> (that > >>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of > >>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> farm,where > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter > >> months are > >>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to > >>>>>>>> encounter > >> talking > >>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here > >>>>>>>> attention has > >> to be > >>>>>>>> more voluntary. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very > >>>>>>>> clear understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism > >>>>>>>> that underpins > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Ribot > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky > >>>>>>>> points out > >> the > >>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive > >>>>>>>> practices > >> really > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> are > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of > >>>>>>>> imagination, > >> there > >>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between > >>>>>>>> human and > >> animal > >>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable > >>>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> volitional > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). > >>>>>>>> Without a > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> theory > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for > >>>>>>>> Ribot's distinction between higher and lower psychological > functions at all. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, > >> thanks to > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> all > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> for the food for thought. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential > >>>>>>>>> around > >> the > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> time > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I > >>>>>>>>> had seen > >> work > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> on > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal > >> reproductive? > >>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of > >> development > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> of > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of > >>>>>>>>> being a > >> relative > >>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. > >>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > >> hshonerd@gmail.com> > >>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. > >> This > >>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from > >>>>>>>>>> some > >> weeks > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> in > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that > >> segmented the > >>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. > >>>>>>>>>> Puns, according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) > >>>>>>>>>> Henry > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole > wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and > >>>>>>>>>>> they are > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> doing > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his > >>>>>>>>>>> followers > >> as an > >>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, > >>>>>>>>>>> so its > >> of > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> course > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in > >>>>>>>>>>> translation, > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> seems > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" > >>>>>>>>>>> in > >> this > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> passage, > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter > >>>>>>>>>>> distinction > >> to > >>>>>>>>>>> "memory." > >>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in > >>>>>>>>>>> contemporary > >> discourse > >>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian > >>>>>>>>>>> colleagues > >> have > >>>>>>>>>>> illustrated. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from > >>>>>>>>>>> theorists > >> who > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> clearly > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was > >>>>>>>>>>> still > >> possible > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, > >> interestingly > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> links > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" > >> act. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Parts > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff > >>>>>>>>>>> that > >> was > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> also > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of > >> creativity > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> and > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to > >>>>>>>>>>> see that > >> the > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> two > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found > >>>>>>>>>>> himself > >> writing. > >>>>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which > >>>>>>>>>>> pretty old > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> approaches > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden > >>>>>>>>>>> >>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but > >>>>>>>>>>>> it may > >> be > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> worth > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent > >>>>>>>>>>>> place to > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Imagination > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between > >> Recollection and > >>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive > >> Imagination, > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> (2) > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which > >>>>>>>>>>>> he > >> says > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> leads > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In > >>>>>>>>>>>> other > >> words, > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> the > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is > >>>>>>>>>>>> accomplished > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> through > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------- > >> --- > >> -- > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson > >>>>>>>>>>>>> and > >> Williams. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose > >>>>>>>>>>>>> work i am > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> trying > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical > >>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of > >>>>>>>>>>>>> productive imagination. The Russians write that > >>>>>>>>>>>>> productive imagination > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> develops. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies > >>>>>>>>>>>>> that > >> there > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> must > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> be a > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> But I > >> learned > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> that > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears > >>>>>>>>>>>>> and is > >> linked > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of > >> anticipation > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! > >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > >> hshonerd@gmail.com > >>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination > >> (starting > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> with > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > >> provides > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> a > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> space > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. > >> This, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> ground > >> to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> take > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> part > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> preconceptions: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian > >> Langacker on > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> particularly > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> imagination > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of > >> temporality: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> structure), > >> which > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> I > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> think > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> both > >> individual > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < > >> lpscholar2@gmail.com> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *space* > >> and the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion > >> of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> explored > >> under > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of > >> modalities > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> that > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> knowing > >> that is > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [perceived??] if we > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> think > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *style* Larry On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> SHONERD < > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> how > >> jazzed up > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> I > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> am > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind as > >> Larry > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various > >> triads, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> finally > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notebooks of > >> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> mind, as > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> luega > pa? > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> fuera. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> attached > >> are two > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> theorists > >> like > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of > >> imagination in a > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of > >> productive > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no > >> intention of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> doing > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > >> attached > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> philosophers, I > >> came > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> upon > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> linked > >> at > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> several > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ettienne > >> and I > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> means of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> access > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. > >> Moreover, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> such > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relevance > >> to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Kris's > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> concerns > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> about > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Perhaps > >> they > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> will > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural > >> science > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> with an > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > >>>>>>>>>>> science > >> with an > >>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > >>>>>>>>> science > >> with an > >>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>> > >> > >> > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > > an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > ________________________________ > > [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif]< > http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/worldclass> > > > > This email and any files with it are confidential and intended > > solely > for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not > the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the > information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. > If you have received this email in error please let the sender know > immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not > necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University > accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to > scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept > responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this > email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services > unless accompanied by an official order form. > > <1265 full.pdf> > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson ________________________________ [http://www.plymouth.ac.uk/images/email_footer.gif] This email and any files with it are confidential and intended solely for the use of the recipient to whom it is addressed. If you are not the intended recipient then copying, distribution or other use of the information contained is strictly prohibited and you should not rely on it. If you have received this email in error please let the sender know immediately and delete it from your system(s). Internet emails are not necessarily secure. While we take every care, Plymouth University accepts no responsibility for viruses and it is your responsibility to scan emails and their attachments. Plymouth University does not accept responsibility for any changes made after it was sent. Nothing in this email or its attachments constitutes an order for goods or services unless accompanied by an official order form. From dkellogg60@gmail.com Fri Dec 19 13:05:34 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sat, 20 Dec 2014 06:05:34 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors In-Reply-To: References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> Message-ID: Yes, Haliday is essentially a Whorfian, and that's one of things that brings him close to Vygotsky. (Compare, for example, Chomsky, who is essentially anti-developmental in his ideas about language, and who now rejects the leading role played by social communication and says that communication is epiphenomenal to language, whose original purpose is thought.) For Sapir, and for Whorf, in the beginning of every major onotogenetic, sociogenetic, and even phylogenetic change in language there has to be some change in the nature of communication. So what Andy says about the lack of the basis of modern science in Hopi applies perfectly well to English. When we read the scientific writings of Chaucer on the astrolabe, for example, we do not see words like "reflection", "refraction" or "alignment". Chaucer uses words like "bounce off", "bend through", and "line up" (note the use of prepositions, Helena!). Where did these words come from, and how did they make scientific English possible? Most of us have no problem saying that Isaac Newton discovered the laws of gravitation. But it's only a slight exaggeration to say that what he really discovered was the meaning potential of words like "gravitation". Gravity is, of course, not a thing at all; that is, it's not an entity, but rather a process, the process of falling down, or falling in (preps, again!). So how and above all why does it become an entity? It's interesting to compare Newton's writings on optics with Chaucer's on the astrolabe. The "Opticks" has a fixed format that we recognize almost instantly today: Newton describes his equipment (the prism and the dark room); he then narrates his method as a kind of recipe ("First, I did this; then I did that") and draws conclusions, which he then formulates in mathematical terms (this is essentially the format of Vygotsky's lectures on pedology, so much so that when translating them we had some trouble determining the precise moment when Vygotsky turns to the blackboard to write his conclusion in the form of a law). In order to get them into mathematical shape, though, he has to make sentences that look a lot like equations. "The plumpness of the lens yields a greater refraction of the light", "The reflection of the light from the glass results of the light striking the flatness of the glass" "The curvature of the spectacle glass supplies the lacking plumpness of the eye". In each of these, a quality or a process which would normally be realized as an adjective or a verb is suddenly realized by a noun, creating an imaginary entity. That's grammatical metaphor. Something that is "canonically" realized by a verb ("to grow") is suddenly realized nominally ("growth"), or something that is canonically a quality ('red") is realized verbally ("redden"). We even find related clauses realized as verbs ("She did not know the rules. So she died" is realized by "Death was brought about through ignorance", all of these examples from Halliday). In fact, the Genetic Law that Vygotsky formulates in "Mind in Society" ("Every higher mental function is realized on two planes....") is really just one instance of grammatical metaphor. One of Chomsky's best known arguments for the radical innateness hypothesis is this. If I take a sentence like "Students who do not do their homework do not do well" and I want to make a question, how do I know which "do" to move to the front? Chomsky assumes that this knowledge is essentially innate; it is part of universal grammar. But you can see that "Do students who do not do their homework do well?" can be built up through a process of what we might call "discourse metaphor"--whereby clauses stand for exchanges: Mother: You did your homework, didn't you? Child: No. Mother: You didn't do your homework? Did you do well? Child: No. Mother: You didn't do well? Child: No. Mother: You didn't do you homework so you didn't do well. Do the other students do well? Child: Some of them. Mother: Who does well? Do students who do not do their homework do well? And this of course explains why wh-items like "who" and 'why" have two functions--one inside a clause, where it expresses an intra-mental function (grammar) and one between them where it expresses an inter-mental function (discourse). I realize that grammatical metaphor will seem rather dry and abstract and unpoetic to people who assume that metaphor is only of the lexical kind. But to me, and I think to most children, it is far far more powerful and far more important developmentally. In some ways, it's the lexical metaphor that is responsible for the disenchantment of the child's world, while the grammatical metaphor infinitely expands it. (And here, I'm afraid, I must stop--it's time for breakfast and anyway my one screen is used up!) David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies , or "the . He On 19 December 2014 at 15:15, Greg Thompson wrote: > Helena and David, > I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the so-called > authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred tradition to > Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi notion of > "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including English) notion of > "time" and how each of these languages offers different affordances of > meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual understanding, English has > a much more reified/objectified/entified sense of time. (btw, I think the > first paragraph is easier to follow than the second - and in that first > paragraph you'll find our old friend "imagination"). > David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to? > -greg > > Taken from: > > http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/mousesite/Secondary/Whorfframe2.html > > " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, sunset" are with > us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from other nouns. > They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in winter" just > as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are pluralized and > numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. Our thought > about the referents of such words hence becomes objectified. Without > objectification, it would be a subjective experience of real time, i.e. of > the consciousness of "becoming later and later"--simply a cyclic phase > similar to an earlier phase in that ever-later-becoming duration. Only by > imagination can such a cyclic phase be set beside another and another in > the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually perceived) configuration. "But such > is the power of linguistic analogy that we do so objectify cyclic phasing. > We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g., "phasing." > And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting binomial > formula of formless item plus form, is so general that it is implicit for > all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless items like "substance, > matter," by which we can fill out the binomial for an enormously wide range > of nouns. But even these are not quite generalized enough to take in our > phase nouns. So for the phase nouns we have made a formless item, "time." > We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, in the > pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" in the > pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can say and think > "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." Let me again point > out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of milk" or "a piece of > cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a summer" actually contains > or consists of such-and-such a quantity of "time." > > In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., are not > nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They are a > formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, and even > other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a locative pattern, > like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It contains no morpheme like one of > "in the house" or "at the tree." It means "when it is morning" or "while > morning-phase is occurring." These "temporal s" are not used as subjects or > objects, or at all like nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" or > "summer is hot"; summer is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions are hot, > WHEN heat occurs. One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or > "summer recently." There is no objectification, as a region, an extent, a > quantity, of the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested about > time except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no basis > here for a formless item answering to our "time." " > > > > On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Helena Worthen > wrote: > > > > David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to this: > > > > "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to create > > sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly productive, > > which is why they still form the basis of scientific writing and thinking > > today." > > > > Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I lose you when > you > > say "created to talk about gravity as an entity". > > > > Thank you, > > > > Helena > > > > > > Helena Worthen > > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > > On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > > As Helena points out, prepositions are from the "grammatical" end of > what > > > Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what Halliday > calls > > > "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they have three > > > properties that words from the more "lexical" end do not have: > > > > > > a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You can, > > actually, > > > but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you invent a new name > > or a > > > new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can). > > > > > > b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific semantic field > > (the > > > way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of > linguistics) > > > but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are used. > > > > > > c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the same > effect, > > > which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your argument" the "in" > has > > > more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in "there's a fly in > your > > > tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in Henry's hands, > > refer > > > to a book or even a footnote. > > > > > > Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties pretty much > > > define the difference between learning and development, at least as I > > > understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on functions > > > indefinitely while development works by reorganizing the closed set of > > > functions you already have into new systems. Learning is skill specific > > > and local, while development is quite global in its implications. > > Learning > > > is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new systems, while > > > development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary (and forget it > just > > > as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes away. > > > > > > For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of blue that > > people > > > call the sky") are simply metaphors from the non-productive end of the > > > lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are crisp, concrete, and > > > vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that > Newton > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to create > > > sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly productive, > > > which is why they still form the basis of scientific writing and > thinking > > > today. For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical metaphor is the > third > > > great moment in child development (after the break into mother tongue > and > > > the break into disciplinary language in school work). > > > > > > Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" implies zero > > > dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two ("on a line', 'on a > > > plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because they are > > > grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them with time: 'at > a > > > point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. Compare: "at > > > Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very day), and "in > > > Christmas' (season). > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen > > > wrote: > > >> > > >> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial > > >> relationships from the concrete material world into the conceptual > > >> imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 common ones, and > > between 70 > > >> and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far as" -- > > this > > >> is according to https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm > ). > > >> We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. Apparently, in > > >> English, they evolved from and did the job done by inflections in > parent > > >> languages, examples being cases and tenses. > > >> > > >> But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection like the > > >> dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial relationships > > suggested > > >> by contemporary prepositions. > > >> > > >> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about this. > > >> > > >> Helena Worthen > > >> helenaworthen@gmail.com > > >> > > >> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > >> > > >>> I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly > embodied, > > >> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to linguistics > > (For > > >> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on > ?lexicon?: > > >> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, being > > part > > >> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and Halliday > > see no > > >> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, lexico-grammar. > > (Lo > > >> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar, adding > > the > > >> ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings are > great > > >> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of that? In > > >> translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced? > > >>> Henry > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > >>>> > > >>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the > metaphorical > > >> use of prepositions like: > > >>>> - "there is some value IN your argument" > > >>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again" > > >>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" > > >>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again" > > >>>> > > >>>> and so on. > > >>>> Andy > > >>>> > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> larry smolucha wrote: > > >>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself - > > >>>>> > > >>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic > > possibilities: > > >>>>> > > >>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in > > Thought > > >>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into > English > > >> 1962] > > >>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' > value > > >> of the > > >>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech > > vocalization). > > >>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that are > > >> flammable > > >>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor a > gas. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century European > > >> Developmental > > >>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' hence > > the > > >>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of > Piaget's > > >> Genetic > > >>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and synthesis > > >> based on > > >>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in Vygotsky's > > >> example of H2O. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com > > >>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > >>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 > > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic > > >>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts. > > >>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more than > the > > >>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can ever > be > > >> imagined" > > >>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> A couple things to consider: > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination as the > > >> brain has > > >>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the simplest > level > > >> of the Gestalt > > >>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). > > >>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just > photographic. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try to > > >> accurately reproduce > > >>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, the > > >> goal of combinatory > > >>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, dreams, > > >> musings, and even > > >>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of > objects > > >> and symbols. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways that > > >> things and concepts can be > > >>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar and > > flour. > > >>>>>> I can add water and it > > >> dissolves a bit > > >>>>>> But adding heat changes > the > > >> combination into a pancake. > > >>>>>> [Is this synergistic?] > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more examples > > >> to put the discussion > > >>>>>> in the metaphysical realm. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 > > >>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com > > >>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the case > > for > > >>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I think > it's > > >> not > > >>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are > > >> associationists who > > >>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary associationism > > >> exists and > > >>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. > > >> Vygotsky > > >>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, > explain > > >> the > > >>>>>>> uniqueness of our species? > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels for > its > > >> own > > >>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a Piagetian > > >>>>>>> perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true maturity > > as a > > >>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more to it > > >> than > > >>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of primate, > > and > > >> our > > >>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon rocks > > in > > >> order > > >>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged the > same > > >> way as > > >>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and for > > >> language is > > >>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human > > >> exceptionalism. > > >>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for the > > >> vanguard role > > >>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, > > prolonging > > >>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after the > sick > > >> and the > > >>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial organs > > >> (tools) and > > >>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for our > > >> species, it > > >>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these > > >> "circuitous, > > >>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that lead > our > > >>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always been > > >> short on > > >>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for material > > >> culture > > >>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: > > >> verily, here > > >>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of attention is > > >> simply the > > >>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says there are > > >> only two > > >>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So > > >> imagination is > > >>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, and > > >> nothing > > >>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when you > > hear > > >> the > > >>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there to be > > >> able to > > >>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work in > word > > >> meaning. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who was > > given > > >> a > > >>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been mixed > with > > >> silver > > >>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold. > > >> Well, we > > >>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not > possible > > to > > >>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that precisely. The > > >> method > > >>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the "principal > of > > >>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes palimpsest, a > > >> velum on > > >>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. > > Because > > >>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and written > over > > >> every > > >>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, the > > >> pressure > > >>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones when > > the > > >> old > > >>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only > known > > >> Greek > > >>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their > > >> relationship > > >>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they are > > >> related to > > >>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite > > similar > > >> to the > > >>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> David Kellogg > > >>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD > > >> wrote: > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an > > associationist, > > >> ?sees > > >>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? > > >>>>>>>> Henry > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg < > dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > > > >> wrote: > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division > > >> between > > >>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because > > >> Ribot is > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> an > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of > > >> attention. > > >>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition > from > > >> forest > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> to > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division > between > > >> the two > > >>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical > > >> world of > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> the > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic > uses > > >> in life > > >>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more > > "imaginative" > > >> (that > > >>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> farm,where > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter > > >> months are > > >>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to > encounter > > >> talking > > >>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention > > has > > >> to be > > >>>>>>>>> more voluntary. > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very > clear > > >>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that > > >> underpins > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> Ribot > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points > > out > > >> the > > >>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices > > >> really > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> are > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of > imagination, > > >> there > > >>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human > > and > > >> animal > > >>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> volitional > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). > > Without > > >> a > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> theory > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for > > Ribot's > > >>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at > > >> all. > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > > >>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole > wrote: > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, > > >> thanks to > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> all > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought. > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential > > >> around the > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> time > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had > > >> seen work > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> on > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal > > >> reproductive? > > >>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of > > >> development > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> of > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being > a > > >> relative > > >>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. > > >>>>>>>>>> mike > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com> > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket > list. > > >> This > > >>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from > some > > >> weeks > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> in > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that > > >> segmented the > > >>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. > > >> Puns, > > >>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) > > >>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole > > wrote: > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and > they > > >> are > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> doing > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his > > >> followers as an > > >>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so > > >> its of > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> course > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in > > >> translation, > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> seems > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" > in > > >> this > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> passage, > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter > > >> distinction to > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "memory." > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary > > >> discourse > > >>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian > > >> colleagues have > > >>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated. > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from > theorists > > >> who > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> clearly > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was > still > > >> possible > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> to > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, > > >> interestingly > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> links > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a > "voluntary" > > >> act. > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> Parts > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> of > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff > > that > > >> was > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> also > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of > > >> creativity > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> and > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see > > >> that the > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> two > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found > himself > > >> writing. > > >>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty > > old > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> approaches > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < > > >> ablunden@mira.net> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it > > >> may be > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> worth > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place > to > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> Imagination > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between > > >> Recollection and > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive > > >> Imagination, > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> (2) > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which > he > > >> says > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> leads > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other > > >> words, > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> the > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is > > >> accomplished > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> through > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and > > >> Williams. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose > work i > > >> am > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> trying > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of > > >> productive > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive > imagination > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> develops. > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that > > >> there > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> must > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> be a > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But > I > > >> learned > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and > is > > >> linked > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> to > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of > > >> anticipation > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination > > >> (starting > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> with > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and > > >> provides > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> a > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as > > fixed. > > >> This, > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a > > ground > > >> to > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> take > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> part > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> preconceptions: > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian > > >> Langacker on > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> particularly > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> imagination > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of > > >> temporality: > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic > > >> structure), which > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> I > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both > > >> individual > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < > > >> lpscholar2@gmail.com> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third > *space* > > >> and the > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his > > >> notion of > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is > > >> explored under > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of > > >> modalities > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of > knowing > > >> that is > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] > if > > >> we > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> think > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how > > >> jazzed up > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> I > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> am > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind > > as > > >> Larry > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various > > >> triads, > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> finally > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks > > of > > >> the > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> mind, as > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, > luega > > >> pa? > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> fuera. > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole < > mcole@ucsd.edu> > > >> wrote: > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, > attached > > >> are two > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT > > theorists > > >> like > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of > > >> imagination in a > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of > > >> productive > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no > > >> intention of > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> doing > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the > > >> attached > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these > philosophers, > > I > > >> came > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> upon > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely > > >> linked at > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> several > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, > > >> Ettienne and I > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a > means > > of > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> access > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. > > >> Moreover, > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> such > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct > > relevance > > >> to > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> Kris's > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to > > >> concerns > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> about > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in > development. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. > > Perhaps > > >> they > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> will > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > > >> science > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> with an > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> -- > > >>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > science > > >> with an > > >>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> -- > > >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > > >> with an > > >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>> > > >>> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > From mcole@ucsd.edu Fri Dec 19 13:08:22 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2014 13:08:22 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: Literacy-Focused Communities of Practice In-Reply-To: <051101d01bc2$32bd3350$f707f10a@94160WEBDB> References: <051101d01bc2$32bd3350$f707f10a@94160WEBDB> Message-ID: The lead article appears to be a broad interest to xmcaophiles. mike ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Teachers College Record Date: Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 11:30 AM Subject: Literacy-Focused Communities of Practice To: Recipient [image: Title] [image: Subscribe Today] [image: transparent 13] Freely-Available This Week Articles Reading in the Crawl Space: A Study of an Urban School's Literacy-Focused Community of Practice by Chantal Francois In this article, I draw on observations and interviews to depict one urban secondary school's independent reading efforts that resemble a literacy-focused community of practice. This research reconceptualizes our understanding of effective instructional practices for adolescents, emphasizing a multidimensional approach that highlights the role of reading as a social activity. The Advanced Placement Arms Race and the Reproduction of Educational Inequality by Joshua Klugman From 2000 to 2002, the state of California attempted to expand access to Advanced Placement subjects for students attending public schools. This study shows this intervention succeeded in expanding the AP curricula and enrollments at disadvantaged schools; however, schools serving affluent communities broadened their AP offerings at the same (if not faster) rate, resulting in effectively maintained inequalities in AP access. Book Reviews The Memory Hole: The U.S. History Curriculum Under Siege by Fritz Fischer reviewed by J. Spencer Clark & Stephanie Speicher ------------------------------ The Broken Compass: Parental Involvement with Children's Education by Keith Robinson & Angel L. Harris reviewed by Margaret M. Ferrara & Casey A. Everheart ------------------------------ Evaluating The Undergraduate Research Experience: A Guide for Program Directors and Principal Investigators by Gabriel M. Della-Piana, Connie Kubo Della-Piana & Michael K. Gardner reviewed by Bridget Lepore ------------------------------ Race, Empire, and English Language Teaching: Creating Responsible and Ethical Anti-Racist Practice by Suhanthie Motha reviewed by Eva Ponte & Kevin Traynor ------------------------------ Raising Global IQ: Preparing Our Students for a Shrinking Planet by Carl Hobert reviewed by Kristina R. Llewellyn Commentaries Presence and Proximity: Teacher Educators Really Seeing Their Students Become Teachers by Reynaldo Reyes This commentary is a call to teacher educators to engage in field experiences in which they are able to really see their students become future teachers. Being present to witness students problematizing pedagogy is as important for the learning of future teachers as it is for teacher educators. Presence and proximity of teacher educators to their students creates a space of unique accountability on both sides, a desire by students to demonstrate their learning as future teachers, and the recognition by teacher educators that the learning that is happening can be used to improve their own pedagogy. This week education researcher Christy Powell discusses her paper School, Activism and Politics at the Movies: Educator Reactions to the Film Waiting for "Superman" . Watch and discuss this episode of The Voice on Vialogues . Annual Yearbooks for 2014 by Gary Natriello The editors of the Teachers College Record are pleased to announce the Annual Yearbooks for 2014. Call for Papers: Special Issue on the Intersection of High-Stakes Testing Accountability Practices and Special Education Services by Sharon L. Nichols A call for a special issue of the Teachers College Record. Follow us on Twitter: @TCRecord ------------------------------ To unsubscribe from this newsletter, please browse to: https://www.tcrecord.org/MyAccount.asp?uid=100293&pwd=1384520 -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From hshonerd@gmail.com Fri Dec 19 13:15:43 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2014 14:15:43 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination In-Reply-To: References: <,> <, > <,,> <, > <, > <, , > <, > <, > <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <, , > <,> <, > <,,> <, > <, , > <, > <, > <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <, , > <,> <, > <,,> <, , > <, > <, > Message-ID: Thank you, Francine! Gesture is great stuff. McNeill?s work very interesting, especially, I think, for the rhythmic integration of speech and gesture. I think the Scollons work on this. I won?t in Europe until early summer. Bon voyage. Henry > On Dec 18, 2014, at 10:09 PM, larry smolucha wrote: > > Message from Francine: > > Henry, if you go to Amazon Books and type in David McNeill you will > get a list of his publications. The first one on the list is his most recent > book from 2012 titled How Language Began: Gesture and Speech in > Human Evolution (Cambridge University Press). > It is the third book he has written on this topic. > > McNeill's work is based on his empirical research and and interest in > Vygotsky's writings. So we have actual research, which XMCARs sometimes > bemoan the lack of. > > Bye the way, I would be in Britain this Spring. > >> From: hshonerd@gmail.com >> Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2014 15:57:07 -0700 >> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >> >> >> So sorry, I can?t find the David McNeill reference. A title? A link? I?ll just google for now. >> Henry >> >>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:12 PM, larry smolucha wrote: >>> >>> Message from Francine: >>> >>> We want to add these works to a bibliography on imagination. >>> I.A. Richard's quote is right on the mark and interesting in regard to >>> David McNeill's research on hand gestures (see my recent post). >>> >>> Seems to me that we have a Zeitgeist is emerging in our XMCA community. >>> >>>> From: boblake@georgiasouthern.edu >>>> Date: Thu, 18 Dec 2014 10:57:36 -0500 >>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>> >>>> Hi Francine, >>>> I am so glad to see you sharing your insightful reading of Vygotsky on >>>> imagination and metaphor. It was actually the connections between >>>> imagination, inner speech and metaphor as >>>> the means to personal agency that first drew me into Vygotsky studies. >>>> Vera John-Steiner, Lois Holzman, Dot Robbins and you were the first people >>>> I talked to about this work. >>>> In 1936, I.A. Richards published his *Philosophy of Rhetoric*, a work that >>>> grew directly out of Vico?s thinking. His thesis was that "thought is >>>> metaphoric, and proceeds by comparison, and the metaphors of language >>>> derive therefrom? (p. 94). In other words, he believed that at the base of >>>> all thinking, there is a metaphoric relationship. Richards takes this one >>>> step further when he suggests that metaphors are ?cognitively irreducible? >>>> (Johnson, 1981, p. 19) A metaphoric expression therefore becomes a newly >>>> created vehicle of meaning which loses potency when seeking to make a >>>> literal statement out of its component parts. In 2001, Maxine Greene wrote >>>> something similar. "By means of making metaphors, imagination can reorient >>>> consciousness through its disclosure of patterns, relationships, shadows, >>>> and lights, and slivers of sound that are wholly unexpected, ?new? in some >>>> wonderful fashion? (Greene, 2001, p 154). >>>> >>>> For example,try reducing this back to literal meaning :-) >>>> >>>> The Road Not Taken >>>> By Robert Frost >>>> Two roads diverged in a yellow wood, >>>> And sorry I could not travel both >>>> And be one traveler, long I stood >>>> And looked down one as far as I could >>>> To where it bent in the undergrowth; >>>> >>>> Then took the other, as just as fair, >>>> And having perhaps the better claim, >>>> Because it was grassy and wanted wear; >>>> Though as for that the passing there >>>> Had worn them really about the same, >>>> >>>> And both that morning equally lay >>>> In leaves no step had trodden black. >>>> Oh, I kept the first for another day! >>>> Yet knowing how way leads on to way, >>>> I doubted if I should ever come back. >>>> >>>> I shall be telling this with a sigh >>>> Somewhere ages and ages hence: >>>> Two roads diverged in a wood, and I? >>>> I took the one less traveled by, >>>> And that has made all the difference. >>>> Retrieved from : http://www.poetryfoundation.org/poem/173536 >>>> >>>> References >>>> >>>> Greene, M. (2001). *Variations on a blue guitar*. New York, NY: Teachers >>>> College Press. >>>> >>>> Johnson, M. (1981). *Philosophical perspectives on metaphor.* Minneapolis, >>>> MN: University of Minnesota Press. >>>> >>>> Richards,I.A. (1936). *The philosophy of rhetoric. * Oxford, GB: Oxford >>>> University Press. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 4:45 AM, larry smolucha >>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >>>>> >>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself - >>>>> >>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic possibilities: >>>>> >>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in Thought >>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into English 1962] >>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' value of >>>>> the >>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech vocalization). >>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that are >>>>> flammable >>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor a gas. >>>>> >>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century European >>>>> Developmental >>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' hence the >>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of Piaget's >>>>> Genetic >>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. >>>>> >>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and synthesis based on >>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in Vygotsky's example >>>>> of H2O. >>>>> >>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com >>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>>>> >>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >>>>>> >>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic >>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts. >>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more than the >>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can ever be >>>>> imagined" >>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) >>>>>> >>>>>> A couple things to consider: >>>>>> >>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination as the brain >>>>> has >>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the simplest level of >>>>> the Gestalt >>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). >>>>>> >>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just photographic. >>>>>> >>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try to >>>>> accurately reproduce >>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, the goal >>>>> of combinatory >>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, dreams, musings, >>>>> and even >>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of objects and >>>>> symbols. >>>>>> >>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways that >>>>> things and concepts can be >>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar and flour. >>>>>> I can add water and it >>>>> dissolves a bit >>>>>> But adding heat changes the >>>>> combination into a pancake. >>>>>> [Is this synergistic?] >>>>>> >>>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more examples to >>>>> put the discussion >>>>>> in the metaphysical realm. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 >>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com >>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the case for >>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I think it's not >>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are associationists >>>>> who >>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary associationism >>>>> exists and >>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. >>>>> Vygotsky >>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, explain the >>>>>>> uniqueness of our species? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels for its own >>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a Piagetian >>>>>>> perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true maturity as a >>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more to it than >>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of primate, and >>>>> our >>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon rocks in >>>>> order >>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged the same way >>>>> as >>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and for >>>>> language is >>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human >>>>> exceptionalism. >>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for the vanguard >>>>> role >>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, prolonging >>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after the sick and >>>>> the >>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial organs >>>>> (tools) and >>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for our >>>>> species, it >>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these "circuitous, >>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that lead our >>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always been short >>>>> on >>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for material culture >>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: verily, >>>>> here >>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of attention is >>>>> simply the >>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says there are only >>>>> two >>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So imagination >>>>> is >>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, and >>>>> nothing >>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when you hear >>>>> the >>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there to be able >>>>> to >>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work in word >>>>> meaning. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who was given a >>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been mixed with >>>>> silver >>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold. Well, >>>>> we >>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not possible to >>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that precisely. The >>>>> method >>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the "principal of >>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes palimpsest, a velum >>>>> on >>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. Because >>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and written over >>>>> every >>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, the >>>>> pressure >>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones when the >>>>> old >>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only known >>>>> Greek >>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their >>>>> relationship >>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they are related >>>>> to >>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite similar >>>>> to the >>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) >>>>>>> >>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD >>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an associationist, >>>>> ?sees >>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? >>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg >>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division >>>>> between >>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because >>>>> Ribot is >>>>>>>> an >>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of >>>>> attention. >>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from >>>>> forest >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between >>>>> the two >>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical >>>>> world of >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses >>>>> in life >>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" >>>>> (that >>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the >>>>>>>> farm,where >>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter >>>>> months are >>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter >>>>> talking >>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has >>>>> to be >>>>>>>>> more voluntary. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear >>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that >>>>> underpins >>>>>>>> Ribot >>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out >>>>> the >>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices >>>>> really >>>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, >>>>> there >>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and >>>>> animal >>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of >>>>>>>> volitional >>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without >>>>> a >>>>>>>> theory >>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's >>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at >>>>> all. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, >>>>> thanks to >>>>>>>> all >>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential >>>>> around the >>>>>>>> time >>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had >>>>> seen work >>>>>>>> on >>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal >>>>> reproductive? >>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of >>>>> development >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a >>>>> relative >>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. >>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. >>>>> This >>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some >>>>> weeks >>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that >>>>> segmented the >>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. >>>>> Puns, >>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) >>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they >>>>> are >>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his >>>>> followers as an >>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so >>>>> its of >>>>>>>>>>> course >>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in >>>>> translation, >>>>>>>> seems >>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in >>>>> this >>>>>>>>>>> passage, >>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter >>>>> distinction to >>>>>>>>>>>> "memory." >>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary >>>>> discourse >>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian >>>>> colleagues have >>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists >>>>> who >>>>>>>>>>> clearly >>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still >>>>> possible >>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, >>>>> interestingly >>>>>>>>>> links >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" >>>>> act. >>>>>>>>>> Parts >>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that >>>>> was >>>>>>>>>> also >>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of >>>>> creativity >>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see >>>>> that the >>>>>>>>>> two >>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself >>>>> writing. >>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old >>>>>>>>>>> approaches >>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < >>>>> ablunden@mira.net> >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it >>>>> may be >>>>>>>>>> worth >>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to >>>>>>>>>>> Imagination >>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between >>>>> Recollection and >>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive >>>>> Imagination, >>>>>>>> (2) >>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he >>>>> says >>>>>>>>>> leads >>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other >>>>> words, >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is >>>>> accomplished >>>>>>>>>> through >>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and >>>>> Williams. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i >>>>> am >>>>>>>>>> trying >>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical >>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of >>>>> productive >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination >>>>>>>> develops. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies that >>>>> there >>>>>>>> must >>>>>>>>>>> be a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I >>>>> learned >>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is >>>>> linked >>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of >>>>> anticipation >>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination >>>>> (starting >>>>>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and >>>>> provides >>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. >>>>> This, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground >>>>> to >>>>>>>> take >>>>>>>>>>> part >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with >>>>>>>>>> preconceptions: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian >>>>> Langacker on >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, >>>>>>>> particularly >>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of >>>>>>>> imagination >>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of >>>>> temporality: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic >>>>> structure), which >>>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both >>>>> individual >>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < >>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* >>>>> and the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his >>>>> notion of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is >>>>> explored under >>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of >>>>> modalities >>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing >>>>> that is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if >>>>> we >>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how >>>>> jazzed up >>>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>>> am >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as >>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various >>>>> triads, >>>>>>>>>>> finally >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of >>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> mind, as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega >>>>> pa? >>>>>>>>>> fuera. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole >>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, attached >>>>> are two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists >>>>> like >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of >>>>> imagination in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of >>>>> productive >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no >>>>> intention of >>>>>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the >>>>> attached >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I >>>>> came >>>>>>>>>> upon >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely >>>>> linked at >>>>>>>>>>> several >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, >>>>> Ettienne and I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of >>>>>>>> access >>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. >>>>> Moreover, >>>>>>>>>>> such >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the >>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct relevance >>>>> to >>>>>>>>>> Kris's >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to >>>>> concerns >>>>>>>> about >>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in development. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps >>>>> they >>>>>>>>>> will >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural >>>>> science >>>>>>>>>>> with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >>>>> with an >>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science >>>>> with an >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> >>>> *Robert Lake Ed.D.*Associate Professor >>>> Social Foundations of Education >>>> Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading >>>> Georgia Southern University >>>> Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group >>>> P. O. Box 8144 >>>> Phone: (912) 478-0355 >>>> Fax: (912) 478-5382 >>>> Statesboro, GA 30460 >>> >> >> > From boblake@georgiasouthern.edu Fri Dec 19 13:43:24 2014 From: boblake@georgiasouthern.edu (Robert Lake) Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2014 16:43:24 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors In-Reply-To: References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> Message-ID: Hi Everyone, I appreciate this thread's emphasis on the relativistic character of metaphoric language and find think that it supports Vygotsky's notion of the fluid nature of language as it emerges from socio-cultural and socio-historical contexts in meaning making (in contrast to biological determinism). Because each culture makes meaning in widely diverse ways, language forms and usage might have complex intricacies and shades of meaning on one concept alone. Along with the example of early 20th century Hopi's view of time, there are other more recent examples from the present day that suggest ways that language can shape thought . Consider the Australian aboriginal language, Guugu Yimithirr, from north Queensland who have no words for right or left, in front of, or behind to describe location. Instead they use the points of the compass even when requesting that someone move over to make room. They will say ?move a bit to the east.? To tell you where exactly they left something in your house, they?ll say, ?I left it on the southern edge of the western table.? (Deutscher, 2010, p. MM 42) The effect on the thinking of this group is phenomenal in orienting the speakers to their directional spatial environment to such a degree that roughly 1 out of every 10 words in conversational Guugu Yimithirr includes either north, south, east or west and is accompanied with precise hand gestures (ibid). Consequently in this culture, language acquisition involves constant awareness of spaces relative to the points of the compass. Deutscher relays a fascinating story about the ways that memory is stored for the speakers of this language. The story also serves as a clear example of Vygotsky?s notion of language as a mediating tool as a means of creating higher levels of consciousness through spatial kinesthetic approaches to meaning creation. One Guugu Yimithirr speaker was filmed telling his friends the story of how in his youth, he capsized in shark-infested waters. He and an older person were caught in a storm, and their boat tipped over. They both jumped into the water and managed to swim nearly three miles to the shore, only to discover that the missionary for whom they worked was far more concerned at the loss of the boat than relieved at their miraculous escape. Apart from the dramatic content, the remarkable thing about the story was that it was remembered throughout in cardinal directions: the speaker jumped into the water on the western side of the boat, his companion to the east of the boat, they saw a giant shark swimming north and so on. Perhaps the cardinal directions were just made up for the occasion? Well, quite by chance, the same person was filmed some years later telling the same story. The cardinal directions matched exactly in the two tellings. Even more remarkable were the spontaneous hand gestures that accompanied the story. For instance, the direction in which the boat rolled over was gestured in the correct geographic orientation, regardless of the direction the speaker was facing in the two films (ibid). *Robert* Deutscher, G. (2010, August 29) Does your language shape how you think? *The New York Times* *Sunday Magazine, *p. MM 42. On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 4:05 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > Yes, Haliday is essentially a Whorfian, and that's one of things that > brings him close to Vygotsky. (Compare, for example, Chomsky, who is > essentially anti-developmental in his ideas about language, and who now > rejects the leading role played by social communication and says that > communication is epiphenomenal to language, whose original purpose is > thought.) For Sapir, and for Whorf, in the beginning of every major > onotogenetic, sociogenetic, and even phylogenetic change in language there > has to be some change in the nature of communication. > > So what Andy says about the lack of the basis of modern science in Hopi > applies perfectly well to English. When we read the scientific writings of > Chaucer on the astrolabe, for example, we do not see words like > "reflection", "refraction" or "alignment". Chaucer uses words like "bounce > off", "bend through", and "line up" (note the use of prepositions, > Helena!). Where did these words come from, and how did they make scientific > English possible? > > Most of us have no problem saying that Isaac Newton discovered the laws of > gravitation. But it's only a slight exaggeration to say that what he really > discovered was the meaning potential of words like "gravitation". Gravity > is, of course, not a thing at all; that is, it's not an entity, but rather > a process, the process of falling down, or falling in (preps, again!). So > how and above all why does it become an entity? > > It's interesting to compare Newton's writings on optics with Chaucer's on > the astrolabe. The "Opticks" has a fixed format that we recognize almost > instantly today: Newton describes his equipment (the prism and the dark > room); he then narrates his method as a kind of recipe ("First, I did this; > then I did that") and draws conclusions, which he then formulates in > mathematical terms (this is essentially the format of Vygotsky's lectures > on pedology, so much so that when translating them we had some trouble > determining the precise moment when Vygotsky turns to the blackboard to > write his conclusion in the form of a law). > > In order to get them into mathematical shape, though, he has to make > sentences that look a lot like equations. "The plumpness of the lens yields > a greater refraction of the light", "The reflection of the light from the > glass results of the light striking the flatness of the glass" "The > curvature of the spectacle glass supplies the lacking plumpness of the > eye". In each of these, a quality or a process which would normally be > realized as an adjective or a verb is suddenly realized by a noun, creating > an imaginary entity. > > That's grammatical metaphor. Something that is "canonically" realized by a > verb ("to grow") is suddenly realized nominally ("growth"), or something > that is canonically a quality ('red") is realized verbally ("redden"). We > even find related clauses realized as verbs ("She did not know the rules. > So she died" is realized by "Death was brought about through ignorance", > all of these examples from Halliday). In fact, the Genetic Law that > Vygotsky formulates in "Mind in Society" ("Every higher mental function is > realized on two planes....") is really just one instance of grammatical > metaphor. > > One of Chomsky's best known arguments for the radical innateness hypothesis > is this. If I take a sentence like "Students who do not do their homework > do not do well" and I want to make a question, how do I know which "do" to > move to the front? Chomsky assumes that this knowledge is essentially > innate; it is part of universal grammar. But you can see that "Do students > who do not do their homework do well?" can be built up through a process of > what we might call "discourse metaphor"--whereby clauses stand for > exchanges: > > Mother: You did your homework, didn't you? > Child: No. > Mother: You didn't do your homework? Did you do well? > Child: No. > Mother: You didn't do well? > Child: No. > Mother: You didn't do you homework so you didn't do well. Do the other > students do well? > Child: Some of them. > Mother: Who does well? Do students who do not do their homework do well? > > And this of course explains why wh-items like "who" and 'why" have two > functions--one inside a clause, where it expresses an intra-mental function > (grammar) and one between them where it expresses an inter-mental function > (discourse). > > I realize that grammatical metaphor will seem rather dry and abstract and > unpoetic to people who assume that metaphor is only of the lexical kind. > But to me, and I think to most children, it is far far more powerful and > far more important developmentally. In some ways, it's the lexical metaphor > that is responsible for the disenchantment of the child's world, while the > grammatical metaphor infinitely expands it. (And here, I'm afraid, I must > stop--it's time for breakfast and anyway my one screen is used up!) > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > , or "the > > . He > > On 19 December 2014 at 15:15, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > > Helena and David, > > I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the so-called > > authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred tradition to > > Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi notion of > > "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including English) notion > of > > "time" and how each of these languages offers different affordances of > > meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual understanding, English > has > > a much more reified/objectified/entified sense of time. (btw, I think the > > first paragraph is easier to follow than the second - and in that first > > paragraph you'll find our old friend "imagination"). > > David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to? > > -greg > > > > Taken from: > > > > > http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/mousesite/Secondary/Whorfframe2.html > > > > " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, sunset" are > with > > us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from other nouns. > > They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in winter" > just > > as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are pluralized and > > numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. Our thought > > about the referents of such words hence becomes objectified. Without > > objectification, it would be a subjective experience of real time, i.e. > of > > the consciousness of "becoming later and later"--simply a cyclic phase > > similar to an earlier phase in that ever-later-becoming duration. Only by > > imagination can such a cyclic phase be set beside another and another in > > the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually perceived) configuration. "But > such > > is the power of linguistic analogy that we do so objectify cyclic > phasing. > > We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g., > "phasing." > > And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting binomial > > formula of formless item plus form, is so general that it is implicit for > > all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless items like "substance, > > matter," by which we can fill out the binomial for an enormously wide > range > > of nouns. But even these are not quite generalized enough to take in our > > phase nouns. So for the phase nouns we have made a formless item, "time." > > We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, in the > > pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" in the > > pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can say and > think > > "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." Let me again point > > out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of milk" or "a piece of > > cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a summer" actually > contains > > or consists of such-and-such a quantity of "time." > > > > In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., are not > > nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They are a > > formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, and even > > other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a locative > pattern, > > like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It contains no morpheme like one > of > > "in the house" or "at the tree." It means "when it is morning" or "while > > morning-phase is occurring." These "temporal s" are not used as subjects > or > > objects, or at all like nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" or > > "summer is hot"; summer is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions are > hot, > > WHEN heat occurs. One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or > > "summer recently." There is no objectification, as a region, an extent, a > > quantity, of the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested about > > time except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no basis > > here for a formless item answering to our "time." " > > > > > > > > On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Helena Worthen > > > wrote: > > > > > > David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to this: > > > > > > "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to create > > > sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly productive, > > > which is why they still form the basis of scientific writing and > thinking > > > today." > > > > > > Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I lose you when > > you > > > say "created to talk about gravity as an entity". > > > > > > Thank you, > > > > > > Helena > > > > > > > > > Helena Worthen > > > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > > > > On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > > > > As Helena points out, prepositions are from the "grammatical" end of > > what > > > > Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what Halliday > > calls > > > > "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they have > three > > > > properties that words from the more "lexical" end do not have: > > > > > > > > a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You can, > > > actually, > > > > but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you invent a new > name > > > or a > > > > new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can). > > > > > > > > b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific semantic > field > > > (the > > > > way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of > > linguistics) > > > > but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are used. > > > > > > > > c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the same > > effect, > > > > which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your argument" the "in" > > has > > > > more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in "there's a fly in > > your > > > > tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in Henry's hands, > > > refer > > > > to a book or even a footnote. > > > > > > > > Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties pretty > much > > > > define the difference between learning and development, at least as I > > > > understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on functions > > > > indefinitely while development works by reorganizing the closed set > of > > > > functions you already have into new systems. Learning is skill > specific > > > > and local, while development is quite global in its implications. > > > Learning > > > > is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new systems, > while > > > > development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary (and forget it > > just > > > > as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes away. > > > > > > > > For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of blue that > > > people > > > > call the sky") are simply metaphors from the non-productive end of > the > > > > lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are crisp, concrete, > and > > > > vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that > > Newton > > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to create > > > > sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly > productive, > > > > which is why they still form the basis of scientific writing and > > thinking > > > > today. For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical metaphor is the > > third > > > > great moment in child development (after the break into mother tongue > > and > > > > the break into disciplinary language in school work). > > > > > > > > Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" implies > zero > > > > dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two ("on a line', 'on > a > > > > plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because they are > > > > grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them with time: > 'at > > a > > > > point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. Compare: "at > > > > Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very day), and "in > > > > Christmas' (season). > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen < > helenaworthen@gmail.com> > > > > wrote: > > > >> > > > >> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial > > > >> relationships from the concrete material world into the conceptual > > > >> imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 common ones, and > > > between 70 > > > >> and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far as" -- > > > this > > > >> is according to > https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm > > ). > > > >> We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. Apparently, in > > > >> English, they evolved from and did the job done by inflections in > > parent > > > >> languages, examples being cases and tenses. > > > >> > > > >> But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection like > the > > > >> dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial relationships > > > suggested > > > >> by contemporary prepositions. > > > >> > > > >> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about this. > > > >> > > > >> Helena Worthen > > > >> helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > >> > > > >> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > > >> > > > >>> I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly > > embodied, > > > >> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to > linguistics > > > (For > > > >> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on > > ?lexicon?: > > > >> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, > being > > > part > > > >> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and Halliday > > > see no > > > >> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, > lexico-grammar. > > > (Lo > > > >> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar, > adding > > > the > > > >> ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings are > > great > > > >> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of that? > In > > > >> translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced? > > > >>> Henry > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > > >>>> > > > >>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the > > metaphorical > > > >> use of prepositions like: > > > >>>> - "there is some value IN your argument" > > > >>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again" > > > >>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" > > > >>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again" > > > >>>> > > > >>>> and so on. > > > >>>> Andy > > > >>>> > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > > > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>> larry smolucha wrote: > > > >>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself - > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic > > > possibilities: > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in > > > Thought > > > >>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into > > English > > > >> 1962] > > > >>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' > > value > > > >> of the > > > >>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech > > > vocalization). > > > >>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that > are > > > >> flammable > > > >>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor a > > gas. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century European > > > >> Developmental > > > >>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' > hence > > > the > > > >>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of > > Piaget's > > > >> Genetic > > > >>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and synthesis > > > >> based on > > > >>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in Vygotsky's > > > >> example of H2O. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com > > > >>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > >>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 > > > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic > > > >>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the > parts. > > > >>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more than > > the > > > >>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can ever > > be > > > >> imagined" > > > >>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> A couple things to consider: > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination as > the > > > >> brain has > > > >>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the simplest > > level > > > >> of the Gestalt > > > >>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). > > > >>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just > > photographic. > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try to > > > >> accurately reproduce > > > >>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, > the > > > >> goal of combinatory > > > >>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, dreams, > > > >> musings, and even > > > >>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of > > objects > > > >> and symbols. > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways > that > > > >> things and concepts can be > > > >>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar and > > > flour. > > > >>>>>> I can add water and it > > > >> dissolves a bit > > > >>>>>> But adding heat changes > > the > > > >> combination into a pancake. > > > >>>>>> [Is this synergistic?] > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more > examples > > > >> to put the discussion > > > >>>>>> in the metaphysical realm. > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 > > > >>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > >>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the > case > > > for > > > >>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I think > > it's > > > >> not > > > >>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are > > > >> associationists who > > > >>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary > associationism > > > >> exists and > > > >>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. > > > >> Vygotsky > > > >>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, > > explain > > > >> the > > > >>>>>>> uniqueness of our species? > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels for > > its > > > >> own > > > >>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a > Piagetian > > > >>>>>>> perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true > maturity > > > as a > > > >>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more to > it > > > >> than > > > >>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of > primate, > > > and > > > >> our > > > >>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon > rocks > > > in > > > >> order > > > >>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged the > > same > > > >> way as > > > >>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and for > > > >> language is > > > >>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human > > > >> exceptionalism. > > > >>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for the > > > >> vanguard role > > > >>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, > > > prolonging > > > >>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after the > > sick > > > >> and the > > > >>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial organs > > > >> (tools) and > > > >>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for our > > > >> species, it > > > >>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these > > > >> "circuitous, > > > >>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that lead > > our > > > >>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always been > > > >> short on > > > >>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for material > > > >> culture > > > >>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: > > > >> verily, here > > > >>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of attention > is > > > >> simply the > > > >>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says there > are > > > >> only two > > > >>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So > > > >> imagination is > > > >>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, > and > > > >> nothing > > > >>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when you > > > hear > > > >> the > > > >>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there to > be > > > >> able to > > > >>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work in > > word > > > >> meaning. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who was > > > given > > > >> a > > > >>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been mixed > > with > > > >> silver > > > >>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of > gold. > > > >> Well, we > > > >>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not > > possible > > > to > > > >>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that precisely. > The > > > >> method > > > >>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the "principal > > of > > > >>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes palimpsest, > a > > > >> velum on > > > >>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. > > > Because > > > >>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and written > > over > > > >> every > > > >>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, > the > > > >> pressure > > > >>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones > when > > > the > > > >> old > > > >>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only > > known > > > >> Greek > > > >>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their > > > >> relationship > > > >>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they are > > > >> related to > > > >>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite > > > similar > > > >> to the > > > >>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> David Kellogg > > > >>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD < > hshonerd@gmail.com> > > > >> wrote: > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an > > > associationist, > > > >> ?sees > > > >>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? > > > >>>>>>>> Henry > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg < > > dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > > > > > >> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division > > > >> between > > > >>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, > because > > > >> Ribot is > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> an > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form > of > > > >> attention. > > > >>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition > > from > > > >> forest > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> to > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division > > between > > > >> the two > > > >>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and > commonsensical > > > >> world of > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic > > uses > > > >> in life > > > >>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more > > > "imaginative" > > > >> (that > > > >>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of > the > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> farm,where > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter > > > >> months are > > > >>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to > > encounter > > > >> talking > > > >>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here > attention > > > has > > > >> to be > > > >>>>>>>>> more voluntary. > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very > > clear > > > >>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that > > > >> underpins > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> Ribot > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky > points > > > out > > > >> the > > > >>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive > practices > > > >> really > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> are > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of > > imagination, > > > >> there > > > >>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between > human > > > and > > > >> animal > > > >>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable > of > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> volitional > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). > > > Without > > > >> a > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> theory > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for > > > Ribot's > > > >>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological functions > at > > > >> all. > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > > > >>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole > > wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, > > > >> thanks to > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> all > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought. > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential > > > >> around the > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> time > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I > had > > > >> seen work > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> on > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal > > > >> reproductive? > > > >>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of > > > >> development > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> of > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of > being > > a > > > >> relative > > > >>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. > > > >>>>>>>>>> mike > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com> > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket > > list. > > > >> This > > > >>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from > > some > > > >> weeks > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> in > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that > > > >> segmented the > > > >>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met > aphorizing?. > > > >> Puns, > > > >>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole > > > wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and > > they > > > >> are > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> doing > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his > > > >> followers as an > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, > so > > > >> its of > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> course > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in > > > >> translation, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> seems > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" > > in > > > >> this > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> passage, > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter > > > >> distinction to > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "memory." > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in > contemporary > > > >> discourse > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian > > > >> colleagues have > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from > > theorists > > > >> who > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> clearly > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was > > still > > > >> possible > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> to > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, > > > >> interestingly > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> links > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a > > "voluntary" > > > >> act. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Parts > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> of > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff > > > that > > > >> was > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> also > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of > > > >> creativity > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> and > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to > see > > > >> that the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> two > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found > > himself > > > >> writing. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which > pretty > > > old > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> approaches > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < > > > >> ablunden@mira.net> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but > it > > > >> may be > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> worth > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent > place > > to > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Imagination > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between > > > >> Recollection and > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive > > > >> Imagination, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> (2) > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which > > he > > > >> says > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> leads > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In > other > > > >> words, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is > > > >> accomplished > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> through > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >> > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson > and > > > >> Williams. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose > > work i > > > >> am > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> trying > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of > > > >> productive > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive > > imagination > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> develops. > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies > that > > > >> there > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> must > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> be a > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. > But > > I > > > >> learned > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears > and > > is > > > >> linked > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> to > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of > > > >> anticipation > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on > imagination > > > >> (starting > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, > and > > > >> provides > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> a > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as > > > fixed. > > > >> This, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a > > > ground > > > >> to > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> take > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> part > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> preconceptions: > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian > > > >> Langacker on > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> particularly > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full > of > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> imagination > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of > > > >> temporality: > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic > > > >> structure), which > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> I > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for > both > > > >> individual > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < > > > >> lpscholar2@gmail.com> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third > > *space* > > > >> and the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his > > > >> notion of > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is > > > >> explored under > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of > > > >> modalities > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of > > knowing > > > >> that is > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" > [perceived??] > > if > > > >> we > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> think > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as > *style* > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say > how > > > >> jazzed up > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> I > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> am > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the > mind > > > as > > > >> Larry > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various > > > >> triads, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> finally > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my > notebooks > > > of > > > >> the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> mind, as > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, > > luega > > > >> pa? > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> fuera. > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole < > > mcole@ucsd.edu> > > > >> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, > > attached > > > >> are two > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT > > > theorists > > > >> like > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of > > > >> imagination in a > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of > > > >> productive > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no > > > >> intention of > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> doing > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in > the > > > >> attached > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these > > philosophers, > > > I > > > >> came > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> upon > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely > > > >> linked at > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> several > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, > > > >> Ettienne and I > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a > > means > > > of > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> access > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander > Suvorov. > > > >> Moreover, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> such > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct > > > relevance > > > >> to > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Kris's > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to > > > >> concerns > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> about > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in > > development. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. > > > Perhaps > > > >> they > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> will > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a > natural > > > >> science > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with an > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> -- > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > > science > > > >> with an > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> -- > > > >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > science > > > >> with an > > > >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > -- *Robert Lake Ed.D.*Associate Professor Social Foundations of Education Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading Georgia Southern University Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group P. O. Box 8144 Phone: (912) 478-0355 Fax: (912) 478-5382 Statesboro, GA 30460 From lsmolucha@hotmail.com Fri Dec 19 15:37:49 2014 From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com (larry smolucha) Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2014 17:37:49 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Time, Imagination, Metaphor In-Reply-To: References: , , <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net>, , , , , <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com>, , , , <5492A447.7030004@mira.net>, , , , , , <5493CC6B.5050105@mira.net>, , , Message-ID: Message from Francine: These three threads are all related (not forgetting perception and imagination). One of the things about XMCA threads is that the members each have so much to contribute, from their own perspectives as well as bibliographic references. The discourse does get philosophical raising old metaphysics questions of epistemology "How do we know what we know?" "How is our understanding shaped by language and culture?" XMCARs tend to be particularly self-conscious about their own use of language - which is good. There seems to be a striving for a new framework (paradigm) that clarifies these cross-cultural semiotic differences. The project I am working on is on how new ideas, customs, inventions, language, art, music, etc. are created through Cultural Synergy - when 'artifacts' from one culture enter another and are combined into something more than how the artifacts functioned in their original cultures. I can give mundane examples such as how noodles from China become spaghetti, elbow macaroni, etc. Or, the wheel as a potter's wheel, a wagon wheel, a gear, a grinding stone, a steering wheel, etc. (and all the mechanical devices that combine wheels, like pulleys and clocks and the first calculator). Concrete examples are a good start but there are more conceptual examples that I have just not had time to clarify. The discussion of time as it differs cross-culturally is a good starting point. Where I personally would want to go with this, is to look how how new conceptions of time emerge through inter-cultural contact. That is metaphysics. I also wonder how the semiotics of European, Middle Eastern, and Chinese cultures are related to their invention of the wheel and advancements in metallurgy. (Noting that Western African tribes did smelting of ore). The 'Natural' Science that arises from European culture begins as mechanical physics and alchemy in which machines have parts and chemicals have elements. It has evolved into the study of energy, and systems theory. There is enough here for ten volumes. Anyone interested? > Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2014 03:25:02 -0800 > From: lpscholar2@gmail.com > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Time > > This notion of our being a "verb" or being a "noun" or being a "position" > or possibly being a "pre" - position. > What I am wondering is where we are going?? > Are we actually "verbs" and "nouns" and "positions" and "pre"-positions?? > Do we "exist" in the grammar [syntax] or do we "exist" in the "semantics" > [meaning] or do we "exist" in the "Pragmatics" [doing, activity] > > I apologize if this question is merely "idio"-syncretic but it is the > imaginal mutually reciprocal "third space" which I am being invited to > occupy in THIS SPECIFIC community as we trans-late the imaginal into > "genres" or "forms". For this reason, I want to hold on to the moral virtue > of "cosmopolitanism" that Kris Gutierrez articulated in her paper. [Yes a > trans-position] Kris wrote: > "At the CORE of its [the third space] political-philosophical ROOTS, this > program is oriented towards a FORM {LP adds a form as a genre]] of > "cosmopolitanism" (Appiah, 2006) characterized by the ideals and practices > of a shared humanity, a profound OBLIGATION to others, boundary crossing, > and intercultural exchange in which difference is celebrated without being > romanticized. > To get to this "space" or "place" requires imagination. > > If Buckminster Fuller "seems" to be a verb, and others "seem" to be nouns > while others "seem" to be positions [stances] , while others "seem" to be > "pre"-positions, then the imaginal "seems" to be *IN* play. [with the full > awareness of *IN* as David K out-lined or under-scored or high-lighted.] > > I want to ask Francine what she meant by "metaphysical" in her signing off > on her recent examples or cases. Kris "pragmatics" or "performance" seems > to me "grounded" in the sense of rising [ideal] and returning [to ground] > > > > > > On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 2:17 AM, larry smolucha > wrote: > > > > > > > > I seem to be a verb > > > > R. Buckminster Fuller 1970 > > > > > Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2014 00:36:03 -0700 > > > From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com > > > To: ablunden@mira.net; xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Time > > > > > > Interesting how you have taken this Andy - to suggest that the Hopi lack > > a > > > founding principle of Natural Science. > > > > > > Whorf actually takes this in generally the opposite direction. In his > > work > > > on the Hopi language, he suggests that one finds a language much better > > > suited to thinking about the theoretical physics of Whorf's day (e.g., > > > Einstein's theory of relativity, quantum mechanics, etc.). In that sense, > > > Hopi is, in fact, closer to describing the way the world really is. (and > > > I'll quickly rescind those last six words if you have any objections!). > > > > > > As to your assumption that science requires the objectification of the > > > natural world, I'm sure there are others on the list who would agree with > > > me that there is good reason to question the necessity of subject/object > > > dualism for science. (and perhaps you were referring to a particular > > > scientific tradition by calling it "Natural Science" - maybe scary scare > > > quotes are needed?). > > > > > > -greg > > > > > > > > > On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 11:57 PM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > > > > > > > That is an extremely interesting paragraph or two on the contrast > > between > > > > typical modern expressions of Time and how the Hopi language expresses > > > > corresponding situations. It seems that taking Nature (including Time) > > to > > > > be something which exists independently of us humans and can be known > > as > > > > such, in other words, the founding principle of Natural Science, is > > built > > > > into a premodern language, and is not shared by (at least one) > > indigenous > > > > people. > > > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > *Andy Blunden* > > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > > > > > Greg Thompson wrote: > > > > > > > >> Helena and David, > > > >> I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the so-called > > > >> authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred tradition > > to > > > >> Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi notion > > of > > > >> "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including English) > > notion > > > >> of > > > >> "time" and how each of these languages offers different affordances of > > > >> meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual understanding, > > English > > > >> has > > > >> a much more reified/objectified/entified sense of time. (btw, I think > > the > > > >> first paragraph is easier to follow than the second - and in that > > first > > > >> paragraph you'll find our old friend "imagination"). > > > >> David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to? > > > >> -greg > > > >> > > > >> Taken from: > > > >> http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/ > > > >> mousesite/Secondary/Whorfframe2.html > > > >> > > > >> " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, sunset" are > > > >> with > > > >> us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from other > > nouns. > > > >> They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in winter" > > > >> just > > > >> as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are pluralized and > > > >> numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. Our thought > > > >> about the referents of such words hence becomes objectified. Without > > > >> objectification, it would be a subjective experience of real time, > > i.e. of > > > >> the consciousness of "becoming later and later"--simply a cyclic phase > > > >> similar to an earlier phase in that ever-later-becoming duration. > > Only by > > > >> imagination can such a cyclic phase be set beside another and another > > in > > > >> the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually perceived) configuration. "But > > such > > > >> is the power of linguistic analogy that we do so objectify cyclic > > phasing. > > > >> We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g., > > "phasing." > > > >> And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting > > binomial > > > >> formula of formless item plus form, is so general that it is implicit > > for > > > >> all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless items like > > "substance, > > > >> matter," by which we can fill out the binomial for an enormously wide > > > >> range > > > >> of nouns. But even these are not quite generalized enough to take in > > our > > > >> phase nouns. So for the phase nouns we have made a formless item, > > "time." > > > >> We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, in the > > > >> pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" in > > the > > > >> pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can say and > > > >> think > > > >> "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." Let me again > > point > > > >> out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of milk" or "a piece > > of > > > >> cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a summer" actually > > contains > > > >> or consists of such-and-such a quantity of "time." > > > >> > > > >> In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., are not > > > >> nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They are a > > > >> formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, and > > even > > > >> other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a locative > > > >> pattern, > > > >> like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It contains no morpheme like > > one of > > > >> "in the house" or "at the tree." It means "when it is morning" or > > "while > > > >> morning-phase is occurring." These "temporal s" are not used as > > subjects > > > >> or > > > >> objects, or at all like nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" or > > > >> "summer is hot"; summer is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions are > > > >> hot, > > > >> WHEN heat occurs. One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or > > > >> "summer recently." There is no objectification, as a region, an > > extent, a > > > >> quantity, of the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested > > about > > > >> time except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no > > basis > > > >> here for a formless item answering to our "time." " > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > Assistant Professor > > > Department of Anthropology > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > Brigham Young University > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > From lsmolucha@hotmail.com Fri Dec 19 15:48:11 2014 From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com (larry smolucha) Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2014 17:48:11 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors In-Reply-To: References: , , , , , <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net>, , , , , <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com>, , , , <5492A447.7030004@mira.net>, , , , , , , Message-ID: Message from Francine: Just a thought - Is the use of nouns, verbs, prepositions a result of developing a written language based on an alphabet? Language use in a culture with no written language would surely differ significantly. And written languages based on hieroglyphs, pictograms, cuneiform, Norse Runes, Celtic oghams, etc. surely divide and frame experience differently. > From: boblake@georgiasouthern.edu > Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2014 16:43:24 -0500 > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors > > Hi Everyone, > I appreciate this thread's emphasis on the relativistic character of > metaphoric language and find think that it supports Vygotsky's notion of > the fluid nature of language as it emerges from socio-cultural and > socio-historical contexts in meaning making (in contrast to biological > determinism). Because each culture makes meaning in widely diverse ways, > language forms and usage might have complex intricacies and shades of > meaning on one concept alone. Along with the example of early 20th century > Hopi's view of time, there are other more recent examples from the present > day that suggest ways that language can shape thought . > > Consider the Australian aboriginal language, Guugu Yimithirr, from north > Queensland who have no words for right or left, in front of, or behind to > describe location. Instead they use the points of the compass even when > requesting that someone move over to make room. They will say ?move a bit > to the east.? To tell you where exactly they left something in your house, > they?ll say, ?I left it on the southern edge of the western table.? (Deutscher, > 2010, p. MM 42) > > The effect on the thinking of this group is phenomenal in orienting the > speakers to their directional spatial environment to such a degree that > roughly 1 out of every 10 words in conversational Guugu Yimithirr includes > either north, south, east or west and is accompanied with precise hand > gestures (ibid). Consequently in this culture, language acquisition > involves constant awareness of spaces relative to the points of the > compass. Deutscher relays a fascinating story about the ways that memory > is stored for the speakers of this language. The story also serves as a > clear example of Vygotsky?s notion of language as a mediating tool as a > means of creating higher levels of consciousness through spatial > kinesthetic approaches to meaning creation. > > > > One Guugu Yimithirr speaker was filmed telling his friends the story of how > in his youth, he capsized in shark-infested waters. He and an older person > were caught in a storm, and their boat tipped over. They both jumped into > the water and managed to swim nearly three miles to the shore, only to > discover that the missionary for whom they worked was far more concerned at > the loss of the boat than relieved at their miraculous escape. Apart from > the dramatic content, the remarkable thing about the story was that it was > remembered throughout in cardinal directions: the speaker jumped into the > water on the western side of the boat, his companion to the east of the > boat, they saw a giant shark swimming north and so on. Perhaps the cardinal > directions were just made up for the occasion? Well, quite by chance, the > same person was filmed some years later telling the same story. The > cardinal directions matched exactly in the two tellings. Even more > remarkable were the spontaneous hand gestures that accompanied the story. > For instance, the direction in which the boat rolled over was gestured in > the correct geographic orientation, regardless of the direction the speaker > was facing in the two films (ibid). > > > *Robert* > > > Deutscher, G. (2010, August 29) Does your language shape how you think? *The > New York Times* *Sunday Magazine, *p. MM 42. > > > > > On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 4:05 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > Yes, Haliday is essentially a Whorfian, and that's one of things that > > brings him close to Vygotsky. (Compare, for example, Chomsky, who is > > essentially anti-developmental in his ideas about language, and who now > > rejects the leading role played by social communication and says that > > communication is epiphenomenal to language, whose original purpose is > > thought.) For Sapir, and for Whorf, in the beginning of every major > > onotogenetic, sociogenetic, and even phylogenetic change in language there > > has to be some change in the nature of communication. > > > > So what Andy says about the lack of the basis of modern science in Hopi > > applies perfectly well to English. When we read the scientific writings of > > Chaucer on the astrolabe, for example, we do not see words like > > "reflection", "refraction" or "alignment". Chaucer uses words like "bounce > > off", "bend through", and "line up" (note the use of prepositions, > > Helena!). Where did these words come from, and how did they make scientific > > English possible? > > > > Most of us have no problem saying that Isaac Newton discovered the laws of > > gravitation. But it's only a slight exaggeration to say that what he really > > discovered was the meaning potential of words like "gravitation". Gravity > > is, of course, not a thing at all; that is, it's not an entity, but rather > > a process, the process of falling down, or falling in (preps, again!). So > > how and above all why does it become an entity? > > > > It's interesting to compare Newton's writings on optics with Chaucer's on > > the astrolabe. The "Opticks" has a fixed format that we recognize almost > > instantly today: Newton describes his equipment (the prism and the dark > > room); he then narrates his method as a kind of recipe ("First, I did this; > > then I did that") and draws conclusions, which he then formulates in > > mathematical terms (this is essentially the format of Vygotsky's lectures > > on pedology, so much so that when translating them we had some trouble > > determining the precise moment when Vygotsky turns to the blackboard to > > write his conclusion in the form of a law). > > > > In order to get them into mathematical shape, though, he has to make > > sentences that look a lot like equations. "The plumpness of the lens yields > > a greater refraction of the light", "The reflection of the light from the > > glass results of the light striking the flatness of the glass" "The > > curvature of the spectacle glass supplies the lacking plumpness of the > > eye". In each of these, a quality or a process which would normally be > > realized as an adjective or a verb is suddenly realized by a noun, creating > > an imaginary entity. > > > > That's grammatical metaphor. Something that is "canonically" realized by a > > verb ("to grow") is suddenly realized nominally ("growth"), or something > > that is canonically a quality ('red") is realized verbally ("redden"). We > > even find related clauses realized as verbs ("She did not know the rules. > > So she died" is realized by "Death was brought about through ignorance", > > all of these examples from Halliday). In fact, the Genetic Law that > > Vygotsky formulates in "Mind in Society" ("Every higher mental function is > > realized on two planes....") is really just one instance of grammatical > > metaphor. > > > > One of Chomsky's best known arguments for the radical innateness hypothesis > > is this. If I take a sentence like "Students who do not do their homework > > do not do well" and I want to make a question, how do I know which "do" to > > move to the front? Chomsky assumes that this knowledge is essentially > > innate; it is part of universal grammar. But you can see that "Do students > > who do not do their homework do well?" can be built up through a process of > > what we might call "discourse metaphor"--whereby clauses stand for > > exchanges: > > > > Mother: You did your homework, didn't you? > > Child: No. > > Mother: You didn't do your homework? Did you do well? > > Child: No. > > Mother: You didn't do well? > > Child: No. > > Mother: You didn't do you homework so you didn't do well. Do the other > > students do well? > > Child: Some of them. > > Mother: Who does well? Do students who do not do their homework do well? > > > > And this of course explains why wh-items like "who" and 'why" have two > > functions--one inside a clause, where it expresses an intra-mental function > > (grammar) and one between them where it expresses an inter-mental function > > (discourse). > > > > I realize that grammatical metaphor will seem rather dry and abstract and > > unpoetic to people who assume that metaphor is only of the lexical kind. > > But to me, and I think to most children, it is far far more powerful and > > far more important developmentally. In some ways, it's the lexical metaphor > > that is responsible for the disenchantment of the child's world, while the > > grammatical metaphor infinitely expands it. (And here, I'm afraid, I must > > stop--it's time for breakfast and anyway my one screen is used up!) > > > > David Kellogg > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > , or "the > > > > . He > > > > On 19 December 2014 at 15:15, Greg Thompson > > wrote: > > > > > Helena and David, > > > I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the so-called > > > authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred tradition to > > > Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi notion of > > > "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including English) notion > > of > > > "time" and how each of these languages offers different affordances of > > > meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual understanding, English > > has > > > a much more reified/objectified/entified sense of time. (btw, I think the > > > first paragraph is easier to follow than the second - and in that first > > > paragraph you'll find our old friend "imagination"). > > > David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to? > > > -greg > > > > > > Taken from: > > > > > > > > http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/mousesite/Secondary/Whorfframe2.html > > > > > > " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, sunset" are > > with > > > us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from other nouns. > > > They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in winter" > > just > > > as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are pluralized and > > > numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. Our thought > > > about the referents of such words hence becomes objectified. Without > > > objectification, it would be a subjective experience of real time, i.e. > > of > > > the consciousness of "becoming later and later"--simply a cyclic phase > > > similar to an earlier phase in that ever-later-becoming duration. Only by > > > imagination can such a cyclic phase be set beside another and another in > > > the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually perceived) configuration. "But > > such > > > is the power of linguistic analogy that we do so objectify cyclic > > phasing. > > > We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g., > > "phasing." > > > And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting binomial > > > formula of formless item plus form, is so general that it is implicit for > > > all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless items like "substance, > > > matter," by which we can fill out the binomial for an enormously wide > > range > > > of nouns. But even these are not quite generalized enough to take in our > > > phase nouns. So for the phase nouns we have made a formless item, "time." > > > We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, in the > > > pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" in the > > > pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can say and > > think > > > "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." Let me again point > > > out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of milk" or "a piece of > > > cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a summer" actually > > contains > > > or consists of such-and-such a quantity of "time." > > > > > > In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., are not > > > nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They are a > > > formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, and even > > > other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a locative > > pattern, > > > like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It contains no morpheme like one > > of > > > "in the house" or "at the tree." It means "when it is morning" or "while > > > morning-phase is occurring." These "temporal s" are not used as subjects > > or > > > objects, or at all like nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" or > > > "summer is hot"; summer is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions are > > hot, > > > WHEN heat occurs. One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or > > > "summer recently." There is no objectification, as a region, an extent, a > > > quantity, of the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested about > > > time except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no basis > > > here for a formless item answering to our "time." " > > > > > > > > > > > > On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Helena Worthen > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to this: > > > > > > > > "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton > > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to create > > > > sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly productive, > > > > which is why they still form the basis of scientific writing and > > thinking > > > > today." > > > > > > > > Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I lose you when > > > you > > > > say "created to talk about gravity as an entity". > > > > > > > > Thank you, > > > > > > > > Helena > > > > > > > > > > > > Helena Worthen > > > > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > > > > > > On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > > > > > > As Helena points out, prepositions are from the "grammatical" end of > > > what > > > > > Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what Halliday > > > calls > > > > > "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they have > > three > > > > > properties that words from the more "lexical" end do not have: > > > > > > > > > > a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You can, > > > > actually, > > > > > but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you invent a new > > name > > > > or a > > > > > new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can). > > > > > > > > > > b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific semantic > > field > > > > (the > > > > > way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of > > > linguistics) > > > > > but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are used. > > > > > > > > > > c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the same > > > effect, > > > > > which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your argument" the "in" > > > has > > > > > more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in "there's a fly in > > > your > > > > > tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in Henry's hands, > > > > refer > > > > > to a book or even a footnote. > > > > > > > > > > Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties pretty > > much > > > > > define the difference between learning and development, at least as I > > > > > understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on functions > > > > > indefinitely while development works by reorganizing the closed set > > of > > > > > functions you already have into new systems. Learning is skill > > specific > > > > > and local, while development is quite global in its implications. > > > > Learning > > > > > is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new systems, > > while > > > > > development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary (and forget it > > > just > > > > > as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes away. > > > > > > > > > > For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of blue that > > > > people > > > > > call the sky") are simply metaphors from the non-productive end of > > the > > > > > lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are crisp, concrete, > > and > > > > > vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that > > > Newton > > > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to create > > > > > sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly > > productive, > > > > > which is why they still form the basis of scientific writing and > > > thinking > > > > > today. For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical metaphor is the > > > third > > > > > great moment in child development (after the break into mother tongue > > > and > > > > > the break into disciplinary language in school work). > > > > > > > > > > Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" implies > > zero > > > > > dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two ("on a line', 'on > > a > > > > > plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because they are > > > > > grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them with time: > > 'at > > > a > > > > > point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. Compare: "at > > > > > Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very day), and "in > > > > > Christmas' (season). > > > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > > > On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen < > > helenaworthen@gmail.com> > > > > > wrote: > > > > >> > > > > >> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial > > > > >> relationships from the concrete material world into the conceptual > > > > >> imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 common ones, and > > > > between 70 > > > > >> and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far as" -- > > > > this > > > > >> is according to > > https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm > > > ). > > > > >> We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. Apparently, in > > > > >> English, they evolved from and did the job done by inflections in > > > parent > > > > >> languages, examples being cases and tenses. > > > > >> > > > > >> But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection like > > the > > > > >> dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial relationships > > > > suggested > > > > >> by contemporary prepositions. > > > > >> > > > > >> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about this. > > > > >> > > > > >> Helena Worthen > > > > >> helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > > >> > > > > >> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > > > >> > > > > >>> I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly > > > embodied, > > > > >> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to > > linguistics > > > > (For > > > > >> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on > > > ?lexicon?: > > > > >> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, > > being > > > > part > > > > >> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and Halliday > > > > see no > > > > >> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, > > lexico-grammar. > > > > (Lo > > > > >> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar, > > adding > > > > the > > > > >> ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings are > > > great > > > > >> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of that? > > In > > > > >> translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced? > > > > >>> Henry > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden > > > wrote: > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the > > > metaphorical > > > > >> use of prepositions like: > > > > >>>> - "there is some value IN your argument" > > > > >>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again" > > > > >>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" > > > > >>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again" > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> and so on. > > > > >>>> Andy > > > > >>>> > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > > > > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> larry smolucha wrote: > > > > >>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself - > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic > > > > possibilities: > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in > > > > Thought > > > > >>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into > > > English > > > > >> 1962] > > > > >>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' > > > value > > > > >> of the > > > > >>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech > > > > vocalization). > > > > >>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that > > are > > > > >> flammable > > > > >>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor a > > > gas. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century European > > > > >> Developmental > > > > >>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' > > hence > > > > the > > > > >>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of > > > Piaget's > > > > >> Genetic > > > > >>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and synthesis > > > > >> based on > > > > >>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in Vygotsky's > > > > >> example of H2O. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com > > > > >>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > >>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 > > > > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic > > > > >>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the > > parts. > > > > >>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more than > > > the > > > > >>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can ever > > > be > > > > >> imagined" > > > > >>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> A couple things to consider: > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination as > > the > > > > >> brain has > > > > >>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the simplest > > > level > > > > >> of the Gestalt > > > > >>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). > > > > >>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just > > > photographic. > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try to > > > > >> accurately reproduce > > > > >>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, > > the > > > > >> goal of combinatory > > > > >>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, dreams, > > > > >> musings, and even > > > > >>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of > > > objects > > > > >> and symbols. > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways > > that > > > > >> things and concepts can be > > > > >>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar and > > > > flour. > > > > >>>>>> I can add water and it > > > > >> dissolves a bit > > > > >>>>>> But adding heat changes > > > the > > > > >> combination into a pancake. > > > > >>>>>> [Is this synergistic?] > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more > > examples > > > > >> to put the discussion > > > > >>>>>> in the metaphysical realm. > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 > > > > >>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > > >>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the > > case > > > > for > > > > >>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I think > > > it's > > > > >> not > > > > >>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are > > > > >> associationists who > > > > >>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary > > associationism > > > > >> exists and > > > > >>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. > > > > >> Vygotsky > > > > >>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, > > > explain > > > > >> the > > > > >>>>>>> uniqueness of our species? > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels for > > > its > > > > >> own > > > > >>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a > > Piagetian > > > > >>>>>>> perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true > > maturity > > > > as a > > > > >>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more to > > it > > > > >> than > > > > >>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of > > primate, > > > > and > > > > >> our > > > > >>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon > > rocks > > > > in > > > > >> order > > > > >>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged the > > > same > > > > >> way as > > > > >>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and for > > > > >> language is > > > > >>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human > > > > >> exceptionalism. > > > > >>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for the > > > > >> vanguard role > > > > >>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, > > > > prolonging > > > > >>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after the > > > sick > > > > >> and the > > > > >>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial organs > > > > >> (tools) and > > > > >>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for our > > > > >> species, it > > > > >>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these > > > > >> "circuitous, > > > > >>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that lead > > > our > > > > >>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always been > > > > >> short on > > > > >>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for material > > > > >> culture > > > > >>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: > > > > >> verily, here > > > > >>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of attention > > is > > > > >> simply the > > > > >>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says there > > are > > > > >> only two > > > > >>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So > > > > >> imagination is > > > > >>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, > > and > > > > >> nothing > > > > >>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when you > > > > hear > > > > >> the > > > > >>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there to > > be > > > > >> able to > > > > >>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work in > > > word > > > > >> meaning. > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who was > > > > given > > > > >> a > > > > >>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been mixed > > > with > > > > >> silver > > > > >>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of > > gold. > > > > >> Well, we > > > > >>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not > > > possible > > > > to > > > > >>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that precisely. > > The > > > > >> method > > > > >>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the "principal > > > of > > > > >>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes palimpsest, > > a > > > > >> velum on > > > > >>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. > > > > Because > > > > >>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and written > > > over > > > > >> every > > > > >>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, > > the > > > > >> pressure > > > > >>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones > > when > > > > the > > > > >> old > > > > >>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only > > > known > > > > >> Greek > > > > >>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their > > > > >> relationship > > > > >>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they are > > > > >> related to > > > > >>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite > > > > similar > > > > >> to the > > > > >>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> David Kellogg > > > > >>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD < > > hshonerd@gmail.com> > > > > >> wrote: > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an > > > > associationist, > > > > >> ?sees > > > > >>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? > > > > >>>>>>>> Henry > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg < > > > dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > > > > > > > >> wrote: > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division > > > > >> between > > > > >>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, > > because > > > > >> Ribot is > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> an > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form > > of > > > > >> attention. > > > > >>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition > > > from > > > > >> forest > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> to > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division > > > between > > > > >> the two > > > > >>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and > > commonsensical > > > > >> world of > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> the > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic > > > uses > > > > >> in life > > > > >>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more > > > > "imaginative" > > > > >> (that > > > > >>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of > > the > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> farm,where > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter > > > > >> months are > > > > >>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to > > > encounter > > > > >> talking > > > > >>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here > > attention > > > > has > > > > >> to be > > > > >>>>>>>>> more voluntary. > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very > > > clear > > > > >>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that > > > > >> underpins > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> Ribot > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky > > points > > > > out > > > > >> the > > > > >>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive > > practices > > > > >> really > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> are > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of > > > imagination, > > > > >> there > > > > >>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between > > human > > > > and > > > > >> animal > > > > >>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable > > of > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> volitional > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). > > > > Without > > > > >> a > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> theory > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for > > > > Ribot's > > > > >>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological functions > > at > > > > >> all. > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > > > > >>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole > > > wrote: > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, > > > > >> thanks to > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> all > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought. > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential > > > > >> around the > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> time > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I > > had > > > > >> seen work > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> on > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal > > > > >> reproductive? > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of > > > > >> development > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> of > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of > > being > > > a > > > > >> relative > > > > >>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. > > > > >>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket > > > list. > > > > >> This > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from > > > some > > > > >> weeks > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> in > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that > > > > >> segmented the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met > > aphorizing?. > > > > >> Puns, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole > > > > wrote: > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and > > > they > > > > >> are > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> doing > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his > > > > >> followers as an > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, > > so > > > > >> its of > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> course > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in > > > > >> translation, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> seems > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" > > > in > > > > >> this > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> passage, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter > > > > >> distinction to > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "memory." > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in > > contemporary > > > > >> discourse > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian > > > > >> colleagues have > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from > > > theorists > > > > >> who > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> clearly > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was > > > still > > > > >> possible > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> to > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, > > > > >> interestingly > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> links > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a > > > "voluntary" > > > > >> act. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Parts > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff > > > > that > > > > >> was > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> also > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of > > > > >> creativity > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> and > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to > > see > > > > >> that the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> two > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found > > > himself > > > > >> writing. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which > > pretty > > > > old > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> approaches > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < > > > > >> ablunden@mira.net> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but > > it > > > > >> may be > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> worth > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent > > place > > > to > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Imagination > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between > > > > >> Recollection and > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive > > > > >> Imagination, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> (2) > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which > > > he > > > > >> says > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> leads > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In > > other > > > > >> words, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> the > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is > > > > >> accomplished > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> through > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >> > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson > > and > > > > >> Williams. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose > > > work i > > > > >> am > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> trying > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of > > > > >> productive > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive > > > imagination > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> develops. > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies > > that > > > > >> there > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> must > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> be a > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. > > But > > > I > > > > >> learned > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears > > and > > > is > > > > >> linked > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> to > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of > > > > >> anticipation > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on > > imagination > > > > >> (starting > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, > > and > > > > >> provides > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> a > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as > > > > fixed. > > > > >> This, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a > > > > ground > > > > >> to > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> take > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> part > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> preconceptions: > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian > > > > >> Langacker on > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> particularly > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full > > of > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> imagination > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of > > > > >> temporality: > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic > > > > >> structure), which > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> I > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for > > both > > > > >> individual > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < > > > > >> lpscholar2@gmail.com> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third > > > *space* > > > > >> and the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his > > > > >> notion of > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is > > > > >> explored under > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of > > > > >> modalities > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of > > > knowing > > > > >> that is > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" > > [perceived??] > > > if > > > > >> we > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> think > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as > > *style* > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say > > how > > > > >> jazzed up > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> I > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> am > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the > > mind > > > > as > > > > >> Larry > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various > > > > >> triads, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> finally > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my > > notebooks > > > > of > > > > >> the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> mind, as > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, > > > luega > > > > >> pa? > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> fuera. > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole < > > > mcole@ucsd.edu> > > > > >> wrote: > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, > > > attached > > > > >> are two > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT > > > > theorists > > > > >> like > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of > > > > >> imagination in a > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of > > > > >> productive > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no > > > > >> intention of > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> doing > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in > > the > > > > >> attached > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these > > > philosophers, > > > > I > > > > >> came > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> upon > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely > > > > >> linked at > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> several > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, > > > > >> Ettienne and I > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a > > > means > > > > of > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> access > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander > > Suvorov. > > > > >> Moreover, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> such > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct > > > > relevance > > > > >> to > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Kris's > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to > > > > >> concerns > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> about > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in > > > development. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. > > > > Perhaps > > > > >> they > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> will > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a > > natural > > > > >> science > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with an > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> -- > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > > > science > > > > >> with an > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> -- > > > > >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > > science > > > > >> with an > > > > >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>> > > > > >>> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > Assistant Professor > > > Department of Anthropology > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > Brigham Young University > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > -- > > *Robert Lake Ed.D.*Associate Professor > Social Foundations of Education > Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading > Georgia Southern University > Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group > P. O. Box 8144 > Phone: (912) 478-0355 > Fax: (912) 478-5382 > Statesboro, GA 30460 From lpscholar2@gmail.com Fri Dec 19 16:41:30 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2014 16:41:30 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors In-Reply-To: References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> Message-ID: David, Robert, Francine I find the insights offered by "grammatical metaphor" [contrasted with "lexical metaphor"] and the comparison of Chaucer's use of grammatical metaphor in relation TO Newton as potentially pregnant with possibility. LINKING also to Hopi ways of moving in the world and Aboriginal ways of orienting indicates a potent vantage point for elaborating cultural-historical theory and sociocritical literacy. Is "metaphor" too vast a topic line. David's examples of "grammatical metaphor" within specific historical developments seem to situate science and reason and equating in a radically different relation to the imaginal?. I also wonder if another thread should explore the multiple complex German themes of the imaginal in Kant, Hegel, that was recently posted. I was lost in the subtle differences but sense these differences in German may be relevant to our exploration of the imaginal. I am learning the complexity of this theme and "grammatical metaphor" seems to be key to different notions of the fact/fiction reciprocal trans-lations Larry On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 3:48 PM, larry smolucha wrote: > > Message from Francine: > > Just a thought - Is the use of nouns, verbs, prepositions a result > of developing a written language based on an alphabet? > > Language use in a culture with no written language would surely differ > significantly. > > And written languages based on hieroglyphs, pictograms, cuneiform, > Norse Runes, Celtic oghams, etc. surely divide and frame experience > differently. > > > > From: boblake@georgiasouthern.edu > > Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2014 16:43:24 -0500 > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors > > > > Hi Everyone, > > I appreciate this thread's emphasis on the relativistic character of > > metaphoric language and find think that it supports Vygotsky's notion of > > the fluid nature of language as it emerges from socio-cultural and > > socio-historical contexts in meaning making (in contrast to biological > > determinism). Because each culture makes meaning in widely diverse ways, > > language forms and usage might have complex intricacies and shades of > > meaning on one concept alone. Along with the example of early 20th > century > > Hopi's view of time, there are other more recent examples from the > present > > day that suggest ways that language can shape thought . > > > > Consider the Australian aboriginal language, Guugu Yimithirr, from north > > Queensland who have no words for right or left, in front of, or behind to > > describe location. Instead they use the points of the compass even when > > requesting that someone move over to make room. They will say ?move a bit > > to the east.? To tell you where exactly they left something in your > house, > > they?ll say, ?I left it on the southern edge of the western table.? > (Deutscher, > > 2010, p. MM 42) > > > > The effect on the thinking of this group is phenomenal in orienting the > > speakers to their directional spatial environment to such a degree that > > roughly 1 out of every 10 words in conversational Guugu Yimithirr > includes > > either north, south, east or west and is accompanied with precise hand > > gestures (ibid). Consequently in this culture, language acquisition > > involves constant awareness of spaces relative to the points of the > > compass. Deutscher relays a fascinating story about the ways that memory > > is stored for the speakers of this language. The story also serves as a > > clear example of Vygotsky?s notion of language as a mediating tool as a > > means of creating higher levels of consciousness through spatial > > kinesthetic approaches to meaning creation. > > > > > > > > One Guugu Yimithirr speaker was filmed telling his friends the story of > how > > in his youth, he capsized in shark-infested waters. He and an older > person > > were caught in a storm, and their boat tipped over. They both jumped into > > the water and managed to swim nearly three miles to the shore, only to > > discover that the missionary for whom they worked was far more concerned > at > > the loss of the boat than relieved at their miraculous escape. Apart from > > the dramatic content, the remarkable thing about the story was that it > was > > remembered throughout in cardinal directions: the speaker jumped into the > > water on the western side of the boat, his companion to the east of the > > boat, they saw a giant shark swimming north and so on. Perhaps the > cardinal > > directions were just made up for the occasion? Well, quite by chance, the > > same person was filmed some years later telling the same story. The > > cardinal directions matched exactly in the two tellings. Even more > > remarkable were the spontaneous hand gestures that accompanied the story. > > For instance, the direction in which the boat rolled over was gestured in > > the correct geographic orientation, regardless of the direction the > speaker > > was facing in the two films (ibid). > > > > > > *Robert* > > > > > > Deutscher, G. (2010, August 29) Does your language shape how you think? > *The > > New York Times* *Sunday Magazine, *p. MM 42. > > > > > > > > > > On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 4:05 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > > > > > > Yes, Haliday is essentially a Whorfian, and that's one of things that > > > brings him close to Vygotsky. (Compare, for example, Chomsky, who is > > > essentially anti-developmental in his ideas about language, and who now > > > rejects the leading role played by social communication and says that > > > communication is epiphenomenal to language, whose original purpose is > > > thought.) For Sapir, and for Whorf, in the beginning of every major > > > onotogenetic, sociogenetic, and even phylogenetic change in language > there > > > has to be some change in the nature of communication. > > > > > > So what Andy says about the lack of the basis of modern science in Hopi > > > applies perfectly well to English. When we read the scientific > writings of > > > Chaucer on the astrolabe, for example, we do not see words like > > > "reflection", "refraction" or "alignment". Chaucer uses words like > "bounce > > > off", "bend through", and "line up" (note the use of prepositions, > > > Helena!). Where did these words come from, and how did they make > scientific > > > English possible? > > > > > > Most of us have no problem saying that Isaac Newton discovered the > laws of > > > gravitation. But it's only a slight exaggeration to say that what he > really > > > discovered was the meaning potential of words like "gravitation". > Gravity > > > is, of course, not a thing at all; that is, it's not an entity, but > rather > > > a process, the process of falling down, or falling in (preps, again!). > So > > > how and above all why does it become an entity? > > > > > > It's interesting to compare Newton's writings on optics with Chaucer's > on > > > the astrolabe. The "Opticks" has a fixed format that we recognize > almost > > > instantly today: Newton describes his equipment (the prism and the dark > > > room); he then narrates his method as a kind of recipe ("First, I did > this; > > > then I did that") and draws conclusions, which he then formulates in > > > mathematical terms (this is essentially the format of Vygotsky's > lectures > > > on pedology, so much so that when translating them we had some trouble > > > determining the precise moment when Vygotsky turns to the blackboard to > > > write his conclusion in the form of a law). > > > > > > In order to get them into mathematical shape, though, he has to make > > > sentences that look a lot like equations. "The plumpness of the lens > yields > > > a greater refraction of the light", "The reflection of the light from > the > > > glass results of the light striking the flatness of the glass" "The > > > curvature of the spectacle glass supplies the lacking plumpness of the > > > eye". In each of these, a quality or a process which would normally be > > > realized as an adjective or a verb is suddenly realized by a noun, > creating > > > an imaginary entity. > > > > > > That's grammatical metaphor. Something that is "canonically" realized > by a > > > verb ("to grow") is suddenly realized nominally ("growth"), or > something > > > that is canonically a quality ('red") is realized verbally ("redden"). > We > > > even find related clauses realized as verbs ("She did not know the > rules. > > > So she died" is realized by "Death was brought about through > ignorance", > > > all of these examples from Halliday). In fact, the Genetic Law that > > > Vygotsky formulates in "Mind in Society" ("Every higher mental > function is > > > realized on two planes....") is really just one instance of grammatical > > > metaphor. > > > > > > One of Chomsky's best known arguments for the radical innateness > hypothesis > > > is this. If I take a sentence like "Students who do not do their > homework > > > do not do well" and I want to make a question, how do I know which > "do" to > > > move to the front? Chomsky assumes that this knowledge is essentially > > > innate; it is part of universal grammar. But you can see that "Do > students > > > who do not do their homework do well?" can be built up through a > process of > > > what we might call "discourse metaphor"--whereby clauses stand for > > > exchanges: > > > > > > Mother: You did your homework, didn't you? > > > Child: No. > > > Mother: You didn't do your homework? Did you do well? > > > Child: No. > > > Mother: You didn't do well? > > > Child: No. > > > Mother: You didn't do you homework so you didn't do well. Do the other > > > students do well? > > > Child: Some of them. > > > Mother: Who does well? Do students who do not do their homework do > well? > > > > > > And this of course explains why wh-items like "who" and 'why" have two > > > functions--one inside a clause, where it expresses an intra-mental > function > > > (grammar) and one between them where it expresses an inter-mental > function > > > (discourse). > > > > > > I realize that grammatical metaphor will seem rather dry and abstract > and > > > unpoetic to people who assume that metaphor is only of the lexical > kind. > > > But to me, and I think to most children, it is far far more powerful > and > > > far more important developmentally. In some ways, it's the lexical > metaphor > > > that is responsible for the disenchantment of the child's world, while > the > > > grammatical metaphor infinitely expands it. (And here, I'm afraid, I > must > > > stop--it's time for breakfast and anyway my one screen is used up!) > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > > > > > , or "the > > > > > > . He > > > > > > On 19 December 2014 at 15:15, Greg Thompson > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > Helena and David, > > > > I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the > so-called > > > > authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred > tradition to > > > > Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi > notion of > > > > "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including English) > notion > > > of > > > > "time" and how each of these languages offers different affordances > of > > > > meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual understanding, > English > > > has > > > > a much more reified/objectified/entified sense of time. (btw, I > think the > > > > first paragraph is easier to follow than the second - and in that > first > > > > paragraph you'll find our old friend "imagination"). > > > > David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to? > > > > -greg > > > > > > > > Taken from: > > > > > > > > > > > > http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/mousesite/Secondary/Whorfframe2.html > > > > > > > > " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, sunset" > are > > > with > > > > us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from other > nouns. > > > > They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in > winter" > > > just > > > > as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are pluralized and > > > > numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. Our > thought > > > > about the referents of such words hence becomes objectified. Without > > > > objectification, it would be a subjective experience of real time, > i.e. > > > of > > > > the consciousness of "becoming later and later"--simply a cyclic > phase > > > > similar to an earlier phase in that ever-later-becoming duration. > Only by > > > > imagination can such a cyclic phase be set beside another and > another in > > > > the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually perceived) configuration. "But > > > such > > > > is the power of linguistic analogy that we do so objectify cyclic > > > phasing. > > > > We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g., > > > "phasing." > > > > And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting > binomial > > > > formula of formless item plus form, is so general that it is > implicit for > > > > all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless items like > "substance, > > > > matter," by which we can fill out the binomial for an enormously wide > > > range > > > > of nouns. But even these are not quite generalized enough to take in > our > > > > phase nouns. So for the phase nouns we have made a formless item, > "time." > > > > We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, in > the > > > > pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" in > the > > > > pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can say and > > > think > > > > "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." Let me again > point > > > > out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of milk" or "a > piece of > > > > cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a summer" actually > > > contains > > > > or consists of such-and-such a quantity of "time." > > > > > > > > In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., are > not > > > > nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They are > a > > > > formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, and > even > > > > other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a locative > > > pattern, > > > > like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It contains no morpheme like > one > > > of > > > > "in the house" or "at the tree." It means "when it is morning" or > "while > > > > morning-phase is occurring." These "temporal s" are not used as > subjects > > > or > > > > objects, or at all like nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" > or > > > > "summer is hot"; summer is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions > are > > > hot, > > > > WHEN heat occurs. One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or > > > > "summer recently." There is no objectification, as a region, an > extent, a > > > > quantity, of the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested > about > > > > time except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no > basis > > > > here for a formless item answering to our "time." " > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Helena Worthen < > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to this: > > > > > > > > > > "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton > > > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to > create > > > > > sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly > productive, > > > > > which is why they still form the basis of scientific writing and > > > thinking > > > > > today." > > > > > > > > > > Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I lose you > when > > > > you > > > > > say "created to talk about gravity as an entity". > > > > > > > > > > Thank you, > > > > > > > > > > Helena > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Helena Worthen > > > > > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > > > > > > > > On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > As Helena points out, prepositions are from the "grammatical" > end of > > > > what > > > > > > Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what > Halliday > > > > calls > > > > > > "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they have > > > three > > > > > > properties that words from the more "lexical" end do not have: > > > > > > > > > > > > a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You can, > > > > > actually, > > > > > > but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you invent a new > > > name > > > > > or a > > > > > > new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can). > > > > > > > > > > > > b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific semantic > > > field > > > > > (the > > > > > > way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of > > > > linguistics) > > > > > > but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are used. > > > > > > > > > > > > c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the same > > > > effect, > > > > > > which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your argument" the > "in" > > > > has > > > > > > more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in "there's a > fly in > > > > your > > > > > > tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in Henry's > hands, > > > > > refer > > > > > > to a book or even a footnote. > > > > > > > > > > > > Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties pretty > > > much > > > > > > define the difference between learning and development, at least > as I > > > > > > understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on functions > > > > > > indefinitely while development works by reorganizing the closed > set > > > of > > > > > > functions you already have into new systems. Learning is skill > > > specific > > > > > > and local, while development is quite global in its implications. > > > > > Learning > > > > > > is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new systems, > > > while > > > > > > development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary (and > forget it > > > > just > > > > > > as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes away. > > > > > > > > > > > > For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of blue > that > > > > > people > > > > > > call the sky") are simply metaphors from the non-productive end > of > > > the > > > > > > lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are crisp, > concrete, > > > and > > > > > > vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations > that > > > > Newton > > > > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to > create > > > > > > sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly > > > productive, > > > > > > which is why they still form the basis of scientific writing and > > > > thinking > > > > > > today. For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical metaphor is > the > > > > third > > > > > > great moment in child development (after the break into mother > tongue > > > > and > > > > > > the break into disciplinary language in school work). > > > > > > > > > > > > Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" implies > > > zero > > > > > > dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two ("on a line', > 'on > > > a > > > > > > plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because they > are > > > > > > grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them with > time: > > > 'at > > > > a > > > > > > point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. Compare: "at > > > > > > Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very day), and > "in > > > > > > Christmas' (season). > > > > > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > > > > > On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen < > > > helenaworthen@gmail.com> > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial > > > > > >> relationships from the concrete material world into the > conceptual > > > > > >> imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 common ones, and > > > > > between 70 > > > > > >> and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far > as" -- > > > > > this > > > > > >> is according to > > > https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm > > > > ). > > > > > >> We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. > Apparently, in > > > > > >> English, they evolved from and did the job done by inflections > in > > > > parent > > > > > >> languages, examples being cases and tenses. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection > like > > > the > > > > > >> dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial > relationships > > > > > suggested > > > > > >> by contemporary prepositions. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about this. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Helena Worthen > > > > > >> helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > > > >> > > > > > >> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > > > > >> > > > > > >>> I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly > > > > embodied, > > > > > >> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to > > > linguistics > > > > > (For > > > > > >> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on > > > > ?lexicon?: > > > > > >> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, > > > being > > > > > part > > > > > >> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and > Halliday > > > > > see no > > > > > >> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, > > > lexico-grammar. > > > > > (Lo > > > > > >> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar, > > > adding > > > > > the > > > > > >> ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings > are > > > > great > > > > > >> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of > that? > > > In > > > > > >> translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced? > > > > > >>> Henry > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden > > > > wrote: > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the > > > > metaphorical > > > > > >> use of prepositions like: > > > > > >>>> - "there is some value IN your argument" > > > > > >>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again" > > > > > >>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" > > > > > >>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again" > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> and so on. > > > > > >>>> Andy > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > > > > > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> larry smolucha wrote: > > > > > >>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself - > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic > > > > > possibilities: > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published > in > > > > > Thought > > > > > >>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into > > > > English > > > > > >> 1962] > > > > > >>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the > 'additive' > > > > value > > > > > >> of the > > > > > >>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech > > > > > vocalization). > > > > > >>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements > that > > > are > > > > > >> flammable > > > > > >>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable > nor a > > > > gas. > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century > European > > > > > >> Developmental > > > > > >>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' > > > hence > > > > > the > > > > > >>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of > > > > Piaget's > > > > > >> Genetic > > > > > >>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and > synthesis > > > > > >> based on > > > > > >>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in > Vygotsky's > > > > > >> example of H2O. > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com > > > > > >>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > >>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 > > > > > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be > synergistic > > > > > >>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the > > > parts. > > > > > >>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more > than > > > > the > > > > > >>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can > ever > > > > be > > > > > >> imagined" > > > > > >>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> A couple things to consider: > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination > as > > > the > > > > > >> brain has > > > > > >>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the > simplest > > > > level > > > > > >> of the Gestalt > > > > > >>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). > > > > > >>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just > > > > photographic. > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try > to > > > > > >> accurately reproduce > > > > > >>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. > Whereas, > > > the > > > > > >> goal of combinatory > > > > > >>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, > dreams, > > > > > >> musings, and even > > > > > >>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of > > > > objects > > > > > >> and symbols. > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different > ways > > > that > > > > > >> things and concepts can be > > > > > >>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar > and > > > > > flour. > > > > > >>>>>> I can add water and > it > > > > > >> dissolves a bit > > > > > >>>>>> But adding heat > changes > > > > the > > > > > >> combination into a pancake. > > > > > >>>>>> [Is this synergistic?] > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more > > > examples > > > > > >> to put the discussion > > > > > >>>>>> in the metaphysical realm. > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 > > > > > >>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > > > >>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the > > > case > > > > > for > > > > > >>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I > think > > > > it's > > > > > >> not > > > > > >>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are > > > > > >> associationists who > > > > > >>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary > > > associationism > > > > > >> exists and > > > > > >>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as > mediation. > > > > > >> Vygotsky > > > > > >>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, > > > > explain > > > > > >> the > > > > > >>>>>>> uniqueness of our species? > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species > feels for > > > > its > > > > > >> own > > > > > >>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a > > > Piagetian > > > > > >>>>>>> perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true > > > maturity > > > > > as a > > > > > >>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing > more to > > > it > > > > > >> than > > > > > >>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of > > > primate, > > > > > and > > > > > >> our > > > > > >>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon > > > rocks > > > > > in > > > > > >> order > > > > > >>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged > the > > > > same > > > > > >> way as > > > > > >>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and > for > > > > > >> language is > > > > > >>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human > > > > > >> exceptionalism. > > > > > >>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for > the > > > > > >> vanguard role > > > > > >>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, > > > > > prolonging > > > > > >>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after > the > > > > sick > > > > > >> and the > > > > > >>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial > organs > > > > > >> (tools) and > > > > > >>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for > our > > > > > >> species, it > > > > > >>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these > > > > > >> "circuitous, > > > > > >>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that > lead > > > > our > > > > > >>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always > been > > > > > >> short on > > > > > >>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for > material > > > > > >> culture > > > > > >>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another > matter: > > > > > >> verily, here > > > > > >>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of > attention > > > is > > > > > >> simply the > > > > > >>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says > there > > > are > > > > > >> only two > > > > > >>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So > > > > > >> imagination is > > > > > >>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete > experiences, > > > and > > > > > >> nothing > > > > > >>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, > when you > > > > > hear > > > > > >> the > > > > > >>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been > there to > > > be > > > > > >> able to > > > > > >>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at > work in > > > > word > > > > > >> meaning. > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who > was > > > > > given > > > > > >> a > > > > > >>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been > mixed > > > > with > > > > > >> silver > > > > > >>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of > > > gold. > > > > > >> Well, we > > > > > >>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not > > > > possible > > > > > to > > > > > >>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that > precisely. > > > The > > > > > >> method > > > > > >>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the > "principal > > > > of > > > > > >>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes > palimpsest, > > > a > > > > > >> velum on > > > > > >>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each > other. > > > > > Because > > > > > >>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and > written > > > > over > > > > > >> every > > > > > >>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was > soft, > > > the > > > > > >> pressure > > > > > >>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones > > > when > > > > > the > > > > > >> old > > > > > >>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the > only > > > > known > > > > > >> Greek > > > > > >>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor > their > > > > > >> relationship > > > > > >>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they > are > > > > > >> related to > > > > > >>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's > quite > > > > > similar > > > > > >> to the > > > > > >>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> David Kellogg > > > > > >>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD < > > > hshonerd@gmail.com> > > > > > >> wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an > > > > > associationist, > > > > > >> ?sees > > > > > >>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? > > > > > >>>>>>>> Henry > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg < > > > > dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > > > > > > > > > >> wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the > division > > > > > >> between > > > > > >>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, > > > because > > > > > >> Ribot is > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> an > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal > form > > > of > > > > > >> attention. > > > > > >>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the > transition > > > > from > > > > > >> forest > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> to > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division > > > > between > > > > > >> the two > > > > > >>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and > > > commonsensical > > > > > >> world of > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> the > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly > prosaic > > > > uses > > > > > >> in life > > > > > >>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more > > > > > "imaginative" > > > > > >> (that > > > > > >>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world > of > > > the > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> farm,where > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long > winter > > > > > >> months are > > > > > >>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to > > > > encounter > > > > > >> talking > > > > > >>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here > > > attention > > > > > has > > > > > >> to be > > > > > >>>>>>>>> more voluntary. > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a > very > > > > clear > > > > > >>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism > that > > > > > >> underpins > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> Ribot > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky > > > points > > > > > out > > > > > >> the > > > > > >>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive > > > practices > > > > > >> really > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> are > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of > > > > imagination, > > > > > >> there > > > > > >>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between > > > human > > > > > and > > > > > >> animal > > > > > >>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly > capable > > > of > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> volitional > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than > humans). > > > > > Without > > > > > >> a > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> theory > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis > for > > > > > Ribot's > > > > > >>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological > functions > > > at > > > > > >> all. > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > > > > > >>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole > > > > wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of > imagination, > > > > > >> thanks to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> all > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very > influential > > > > > >> around the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> time > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. > I > > > had > > > > > >> seen work > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> on > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective > equal > > > > > >> reproductive? > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies > of > > > > > >> development > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> of > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of > > > being > > > > a > > > > > >> relative > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my > bucket > > > > list. > > > > > >> This > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings > from > > > > some > > > > > >> weeks > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> in > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct > that > > > > > >> segmented the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met > > > aphorizing?. > > > > > >> Puns, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole < > mcole@ucsd.edu> > > > > > wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant > and > > > > they > > > > > >> are > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> doing > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his > > > > > >> followers as an > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by > Hegel, > > > so > > > > > >> its of > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> course > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in > > > > > >> translation, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> seems > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, > "recollection" > > > > in > > > > > >> this > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> passage, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter > > > > > >> distinction to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "memory." > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in > > > contemporary > > > > > >> discourse > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian > > > > > >> colleagues have > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from > > > > theorists > > > > > >> who > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> clearly > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it > was > > > > still > > > > > >> possible > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, > > > > > >> interestingly > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> links > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a > > > > "voluntary" > > > > > >> act. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Parts > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children > stuff > > > > > that > > > > > >> was > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> also > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts > of > > > > > >> creativity > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> and > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious > to > > > see > > > > > >> that the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> two > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found > > > > himself > > > > > >> writing. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which > > > pretty > > > > > old > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> approaches > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < > > > > > >> ablunden@mira.net> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, > but > > > it > > > > > >> may be > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> worth > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent > > > place > > > > to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Imagination > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between > > > > > >> Recollection and > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive > > > > > >> Imagination, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> (2) > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, > which > > > > he > > > > > >> says > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> leads > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In > > > other > > > > > >> words, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> the > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is > > > > > >> accomplished > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> through > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >> > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading > Strawson > > > and > > > > > >> Williams. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists > whose > > > > work i > > > > > >> am > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> trying > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of > > > > > >> productive > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive > > > > imagination > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> develops. > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive > implies > > > that > > > > > >> there > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> must > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> be a > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive > imagination. > > > But > > > > I > > > > > >> learned > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination > appears > > > and > > > > is > > > > > >> linked > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable > part of > > > > > >> anticipation > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on > > > imagination > > > > > >> (starting > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous > look, > > > and > > > > > >> provides > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> a > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural > as > > > > > fixed. > > > > > >> This, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives > me a > > > > > ground > > > > > >> to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> take > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> part > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start > with > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> preconceptions: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive > grammarian > > > > > >> Langacker on > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive > domains, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> particularly > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is > full > > > of > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> imagination > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two > aspects of > > > > > >> temporality: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic > > > > > >> structure), which > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> I > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for > > > both > > > > > >> individual > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < > > > > > >> lpscholar2@gmail.com> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third > > > > *space* > > > > > >> and the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and > his > > > > > >> notion of > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion > is > > > > > >> explored under > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a > *set* of > > > > > >> modalities > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of > > > > knowing > > > > > >> that is > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" > > > [perceived??] > > > > if > > > > > >> we > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> think > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as > > > *style* > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to > say > > > how > > > > > >> jazzed up > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> I > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> am > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, > the > > > mind > > > > > as > > > > > >> Larry > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually > various > > > > > >> triads, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> finally > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my > > > notebooks > > > > > of > > > > > >> the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> mind, as > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap > adentro, > > > > luega > > > > > >> pa? > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> fuera. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole < > > > > mcole@ucsd.edu> > > > > > >> wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, > > > > attached > > > > > >> are two > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT > > > > > theorists > > > > > >> like > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of > > > > > >> imagination in a > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion > of > > > > > >> productive > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have > no > > > > > >> intention of > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> doing > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated > in > > > the > > > > > >> attached > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these > > > > philosophers, > > > > > I > > > > > >> came > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> upon > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very > closely > > > > > >> linked at > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> several > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our > naivete, > > > > > >> Ettienne and I > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as > a > > > > means > > > > > of > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> access > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander > > > Suvorov. > > > > > >> Moreover, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> such > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct > > > > > relevance > > > > > >> to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Kris's > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak > to > > > > > >> concerns > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> about > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in > > > > development. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination > thread. > > > > > Perhaps > > > > > >> they > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> will > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a > > > natural > > > > > >> science > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with an > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson.pdf> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> -- > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > > > > science > > > > > >> with an > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> -- > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > > > science > > > > > >> with an > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > > Assistant Professor > > > > Department of Anthropology > > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > > Brigham Young University > > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > *Robert Lake Ed.D.*Associate Professor > > Social Foundations of Education > > Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading > > Georgia Southern University > > Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group > > P. O. Box 8144 > > Phone: (912) 478-0355 > > Fax: (912) 478-5382 > > Statesboro, GA 30460 > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Fri Dec 19 17:19:57 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2014 17:19:57 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Time, Imagination, Metaphor In-Reply-To: References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> <5493CC6B.5050105@mira.net> Message-ID: Francine, Your comment: "The 'Natural' Science that arises from European culture begins as mechanical physics and alchemy in which machines have parts and chemicals have elements." Having "parts" and having "elements" as the beginning "point" or "position" from which we get "in" to this theme of "natural" science Francine would you say this theme iis also a "mytheme"? I read this as a type of *opening* of an origin narrative or history as situating development in specific concrete situations. [situate as both verb and noun] with a theme of "cultural diversity" I keep mentioning Raymond Williams as I find he writes within *THIS* STYLE and it is very helpful for getting my bearings. It will put IN play what we mean by "academic or scientific" concepts as possibly historically effected understandings. Will we also explore Kris's notion of "vertical" and "horizontal" concepts within cultural synergy? David K's "grammatical metaphors" may also be involved in this cultural diversity. I have been considering reading more from Raymond Williams, so would consider a shared reading with a similar exploration of cultural permeability of time, imagination, metaphor, perception and trans-versal ways of orienting or moving *in* the world. Larry On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 3:37 PM, larry smolucha wrote: > > Message from Francine: > > These three threads are all related (not forgetting perception and > imagination). > > One of the things about XMCA threads is that the members each have so much > to contribute, from their own perspectives as well as bibliographic > references. > > The discourse does get philosophical raising old metaphysics questions of > epistemology "How do we know what we know?" "How is our understanding > shaped by language and culture?" XMCARs tend to be particularly > self-conscious > about their own use of language - which is good. There seems to be a > striving > for a new framework (paradigm) that clarifies these cross-cultural semiotic > differences. > > The project I am working on is on how new ideas, customs, inventions, > language, > art, music, etc. are created through Cultural Synergy - when 'artifacts' > from one > culture enter another and are combined into something more than how the > artifacts functioned in their original cultures. I can give mundane > examples such as how > noodles from China become spaghetti, elbow macaroni, etc. Or, the wheel as > a potter's wheel, a wagon wheel, a gear, a grinding stone, a steering > wheel, etc. > (and all the mechanical devices that combine wheels, like pulleys and > clocks and > the first calculator). Concrete examples are a good start but there are > more > conceptual examples that I have just not had time to clarify. The > discussion > of time as it differs cross-culturally is a good starting point. Where I > personally > would want to go with this, is to look how how new conceptions of time > emerge through > inter-cultural contact. That is metaphysics. > > I also wonder how the semiotics of European, Middle Eastern, and Chinese > cultures > are related to their invention of the wheel and advancements in metallurgy. > (Noting that Western African tribes did smelting of ore). The 'Natural' > Science > that arises from European culture begins as mechanical physics and alchemy > in which machines have parts and chemicals have elements. It has evolved > into > the study of energy, and systems theory. > > There is enough here for ten volumes. Anyone interested? > > > > > > > > > Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2014 03:25:02 -0800 > > From: lpscholar2@gmail.com > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Time > > > > This notion of our being a "verb" or being a "noun" or being a > "position" > > or possibly being a "pre" - position. > > What I am wondering is where we are going?? > > Are we actually "verbs" and "nouns" and "positions" and "pre"-positions?? > > Do we "exist" in the grammar [syntax] or do we "exist" in the "semantics" > > [meaning] or do we "exist" in the "Pragmatics" [doing, activity] > > > > I apologize if this question is merely "idio"-syncretic but it is the > > imaginal mutually reciprocal "third space" which I am being invited to > > occupy in THIS SPECIFIC community as we trans-late the imaginal into > > "genres" or "forms". For this reason, I want to hold on to the moral > virtue > > of "cosmopolitanism" that Kris Gutierrez articulated in her paper. [Yes a > > trans-position] Kris wrote: > > "At the CORE of its [the third space] political-philosophical ROOTS, this > > program is oriented towards a FORM {LP adds a form as a genre]] of > > "cosmopolitanism" (Appiah, 2006) characterized by the ideals and > practices > > of a shared humanity, a profound OBLIGATION to others, boundary crossing, > > and intercultural exchange in which difference is celebrated without > being > > romanticized. > > To get to this "space" or "place" requires imagination. > > > > If Buckminster Fuller "seems" to be a verb, and others "seem" to be nouns > > while others "seem" to be positions [stances] , while others "seem" to be > > "pre"-positions, then the imaginal "seems" to be *IN* play. [with the > full > > awareness of *IN* as David K out-lined or under-scored or high-lighted.] > > > > I want to ask Francine what she meant by "metaphysical" in her signing > off > > on her recent examples or cases. Kris "pragmatics" or "performance" > seems > > to me "grounded" in the sense of rising [ideal] and returning [to ground] > > > > > > > > > > > > On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 2:17 AM, larry smolucha > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > I seem to be a verb > > > > > > R. Buckminster Fuller 1970 > > > > > > > Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2014 00:36:03 -0700 > > > > From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com > > > > To: ablunden@mira.net; xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Time > > > > > > > > Interesting how you have taken this Andy - to suggest that the Hopi > lack > > > a > > > > founding principle of Natural Science. > > > > > > > > Whorf actually takes this in generally the opposite direction. In his > > > work > > > > on the Hopi language, he suggests that one finds a language much > better > > > > suited to thinking about the theoretical physics of Whorf's day > (e.g., > > > > Einstein's theory of relativity, quantum mechanics, etc.). In that > sense, > > > > Hopi is, in fact, closer to describing the way the world really is. > (and > > > > I'll quickly rescind those last six words if you have any > objections!). > > > > > > > > As to your assumption that science requires the objectification of > the > > > > natural world, I'm sure there are others on the list who would agree > with > > > > me that there is good reason to question the necessity of > subject/object > > > > dualism for science. (and perhaps you were referring to a particular > > > > scientific tradition by calling it "Natural Science" - maybe scary > scare > > > > quotes are needed?). > > > > > > > > -greg > > > > > > > > > > > > On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 11:57 PM, Andy Blunden > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > That is an extremely interesting paragraph or two on the contrast > > > between > > > > > typical modern expressions of Time and how the Hopi language > expresses > > > > > corresponding situations. It seems that taking Nature (including > Time) > > > to > > > > > be something which exists independently of us humans and can be > known > > > as > > > > > such, in other words, the founding principle of Natural Science, is > > > built > > > > > into a premodern language, and is not shared by (at least one) > > > indigenous > > > > > people. > > > > > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > > *Andy Blunden* > > > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Greg Thompson wrote: > > > > > > > > > >> Helena and David, > > > > >> I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the > so-called > > > > >> authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred > tradition > > > to > > > > >> Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi > notion > > > of > > > > >> "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including English) > > > notion > > > > >> of > > > > >> "time" and how each of these languages offers different > affordances of > > > > >> meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual understanding, > > > English > > > > >> has > > > > >> a much more reified/objectified/entified sense of time. (btw, I > think > > > the > > > > >> first paragraph is easier to follow than the second - and in that > > > first > > > > >> paragraph you'll find our old friend "imagination"). > > > > >> David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to? > > > > >> -greg > > > > >> > > > > >> Taken from: > > > > >> http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/ > > > > >> mousesite/Secondary/Whorfframe2.html > > > > >> > > > > >> " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, > sunset" are > > > > >> with > > > > >> us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from other > > > nouns. > > > > >> They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in > winter" > > > > >> just > > > > >> as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are pluralized > and > > > > >> numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. Our > thought > > > > >> about the referents of such words hence becomes objectified. > Without > > > > >> objectification, it would be a subjective experience of real time, > > > i.e. of > > > > >> the consciousness of "becoming later and later"--simply a cyclic > phase > > > > >> similar to an earlier phase in that ever-later-becoming duration. > > > Only by > > > > >> imagination can such a cyclic phase be set beside another and > another > > > in > > > > >> the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually perceived) configuration. > "But > > > such > > > > >> is the power of linguistic analogy that we do so objectify cyclic > > > phasing. > > > > >> We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g., > > > "phasing." > > > > >> And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting > > > binomial > > > > >> formula of formless item plus form, is so general that it is > implicit > > > for > > > > >> all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless items like > > > "substance, > > > > >> matter," by which we can fill out the binomial for an enormously > wide > > > > >> range > > > > >> of nouns. But even these are not quite generalized enough to take > in > > > our > > > > >> phase nouns. So for the phase nouns we have made a formless item, > > > "time." > > > > >> We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, > in the > > > > >> pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" > in > > > the > > > > >> pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can say > and > > > > >> think > > > > >> "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." Let me again > > > point > > > > >> out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of milk" or "a > piece > > > of > > > > >> cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a summer" actually > > > contains > > > > >> or consists of such-and-such a quantity of "time." > > > > >> > > > > >> In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., > are not > > > > >> nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They > are a > > > > >> formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, > and > > > even > > > > >> other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a locative > > > > >> pattern, > > > > >> like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It contains no morpheme > like > > > one of > > > > >> "in the house" or "at the tree." It means "when it is morning" or > > > "while > > > > >> morning-phase is occurring." These "temporal s" are not used as > > > subjects > > > > >> or > > > > >> objects, or at all like nouns. One does not say "it's a hot > summer" or > > > > >> "summer is hot"; summer is not hot, summer is only WHEN > conditions are > > > > >> hot, > > > > >> WHEN heat occurs. One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer > now" or > > > > >> "summer recently." There is no objectification, as a region, an > > > extent, a > > > > >> quantity, of the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested > > > about > > > > >> time except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is > no > > > basis > > > > >> here for a formless item answering to our "time." " > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > > Assistant Professor > > > > Department of Anthropology > > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > > Brigham Young University > > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > From helenaworthen@gmail.com Fri Dec 19 17:32:21 2014 From: helenaworthen@gmail.com (Helena Worthen) Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2014 17:32:21 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Metaphors In-Reply-To: References: <051101d01bc2$32bd3350$f707f10a@94160WEBDB> Message-ID: Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com Some examples of prepositions :) -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: photo 2.PNG Type: image/png Size: 51072 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141219/7df9b428/attachment-0001.png From annalisa@unm.edu Fri Dec 19 18:30:22 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Sat, 20 Dec 2014 02:30:22 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors In-Reply-To: References: <051101d01bc2$32bd3350$f707f10a@94160WEBDB> , Message-ID: <1419042621940.54930@unm.edu> Helena, Truly awesome picture for English choo-choo trains!!!! I'm not sure how this would work for languages which combine prepositions into a single word, which Sanskrit does, and many other languages too: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grammatical_case#Sanskrit ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+annalisa=unm.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Helena Worthen Sent: Friday, December 19, 2014 6:32 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Metaphors Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com Some examples of prepositions :) From annalisa@unm.edu Fri Dec 19 18:38:55 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Sat, 20 Dec 2014 02:38:55 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors In-Reply-To: References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> , Message-ID: <1419043134656.6915@unm.edu> Hi metaphorically reasoning friends reasoning about metaphors, I wanted to say that there is a connection between what Larry is calling imaginal metaphors (I think he is calling them that), and what David is calling grammatical metaphors (I think he is calling them that). They are both classes of metaphors, but of a different order. In both cases, I'd say they can be of a cultural type and an embodied type. For example in the case of English prepositions, they are to an English speaker embodied and spatial, but in comparison to Sanskrit it would be also cultural because the word is separated from the object. For imaginal metaphors these can be embodied and cultural as well. "She sings sweetly," is embodied; "A rose is a rose is a rose by any other name," is cultural (coming from Shakespeare), unless I have misquoted him, of course. Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Larry Purss Sent: Friday, December 19, 2014 5:41 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors David, Robert, Francine I find the insights offered by "grammatical metaphor" [contrasted with "lexical metaphor"] and the comparison of Chaucer's use of grammatical metaphor in relation TO Newton as potentially pregnant with possibility. LINKING also to Hopi ways of moving in the world and Aboriginal ways of orienting indicates a potent vantage point for elaborating cultural-historical theory and sociocritical literacy. Is "metaphor" too vast a topic line. David's examples of "grammatical metaphor" within specific historical developments seem to situate science and reason and equating in a radically different relation to the imaginal?. I also wonder if another thread should explore the multiple complex German themes of the imaginal in Kant, Hegel, that was recently posted. I was lost in the subtle differences but sense these differences in German may be relevant to our exploration of the imaginal. I am learning the complexity of this theme and "grammatical metaphor" seems to be key to different notions of the fact/fiction reciprocal trans-lations Larry On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 3:48 PM, larry smolucha wrote: > > Message from Francine: > > Just a thought - Is the use of nouns, verbs, prepositions a result > of developing a written language based on an alphabet? > > Language use in a culture with no written language would surely differ > significantly. > > And written languages based on hieroglyphs, pictograms, cuneiform, > Norse Runes, Celtic oghams, etc. surely divide and frame experience > differently. > > > > From: boblake@georgiasouthern.edu > > Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2014 16:43:24 -0500 > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors > > > > Hi Everyone, > > I appreciate this thread's emphasis on the relativistic character of > > metaphoric language and find think that it supports Vygotsky's notion of > > the fluid nature of language as it emerges from socio-cultural and > > socio-historical contexts in meaning making (in contrast to biological > > determinism). Because each culture makes meaning in widely diverse ways, > > language forms and usage might have complex intricacies and shades of > > meaning on one concept alone. Along with the example of early 20th > century > > Hopi's view of time, there are other more recent examples from the > present > > day that suggest ways that language can shape thought . > > > > Consider the Australian aboriginal language, Guugu Yimithirr, from north > > Queensland who have no words for right or left, in front of, or behind to > > describe location. Instead they use the points of the compass even when > > requesting that someone move over to make room. They will say ?move a bit > > to the east.? To tell you where exactly they left something in your > house, > > they?ll say, ?I left it on the southern edge of the western table.? > (Deutscher, > > 2010, p. MM 42) > > > > The effect on the thinking of this group is phenomenal in orienting the > > speakers to their directional spatial environment to such a degree that > > roughly 1 out of every 10 words in conversational Guugu Yimithirr > includes > > either north, south, east or west and is accompanied with precise hand > > gestures (ibid). Consequently in this culture, language acquisition > > involves constant awareness of spaces relative to the points of the > > compass. Deutscher relays a fascinating story about the ways that memory > > is stored for the speakers of this language. The story also serves as a > > clear example of Vygotsky?s notion of language as a mediating tool as a > > means of creating higher levels of consciousness through spatial > > kinesthetic approaches to meaning creation. > > > > > > > > One Guugu Yimithirr speaker was filmed telling his friends the story of > how > > in his youth, he capsized in shark-infested waters. He and an older > person > > were caught in a storm, and their boat tipped over. They both jumped into > > the water and managed to swim nearly three miles to the shore, only to > > discover that the missionary for whom they worked was far more concerned > at > > the loss of the boat than relieved at their miraculous escape. Apart from > > the dramatic content, the remarkable thing about the story was that it > was > > remembered throughout in cardinal directions: the speaker jumped into the > > water on the western side of the boat, his companion to the east of the > > boat, they saw a giant shark swimming north and so on. Perhaps the > cardinal > > directions were just made up for the occasion? Well, quite by chance, the > > same person was filmed some years later telling the same story. The > > cardinal directions matched exactly in the two tellings. Even more > > remarkable were the spontaneous hand gestures that accompanied the story. > > For instance, the direction in which the boat rolled over was gestured in > > the correct geographic orientation, regardless of the direction the > speaker > > was facing in the two films (ibid). > > > > > > *Robert* > > > > > > Deutscher, G. (2010, August 29) Does your language shape how you think? > *The > > New York Times* *Sunday Magazine, *p. MM 42. > > > > > > > > > > On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 4:05 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > > > > > > Yes, Haliday is essentially a Whorfian, and that's one of things that > > > brings him close to Vygotsky. (Compare, for example, Chomsky, who is > > > essentially anti-developmental in his ideas about language, and who now > > > rejects the leading role played by social communication and says that > > > communication is epiphenomenal to language, whose original purpose is > > > thought.) For Sapir, and for Whorf, in the beginning of every major > > > onotogenetic, sociogenetic, and even phylogenetic change in language > there > > > has to be some change in the nature of communication. > > > > > > So what Andy says about the lack of the basis of modern science in Hopi > > > applies perfectly well to English. When we read the scientific > writings of > > > Chaucer on the astrolabe, for example, we do not see words like > > > "reflection", "refraction" or "alignment". Chaucer uses words like > "bounce > > > off", "bend through", and "line up" (note the use of prepositions, > > > Helena!). Where did these words come from, and how did they make > scientific > > > English possible? > > > > > > Most of us have no problem saying that Isaac Newton discovered the > laws of > > > gravitation. But it's only a slight exaggeration to say that what he > really > > > discovered was the meaning potential of words like "gravitation". > Gravity > > > is, of course, not a thing at all; that is, it's not an entity, but > rather > > > a process, the process of falling down, or falling in (preps, again!). > So > > > how and above all why does it become an entity? > > > > > > It's interesting to compare Newton's writings on optics with Chaucer's > on > > > the astrolabe. The "Opticks" has a fixed format that we recognize > almost > > > instantly today: Newton describes his equipment (the prism and the dark > > > room); he then narrates his method as a kind of recipe ("First, I did > this; > > > then I did that") and draws conclusions, which he then formulates in > > > mathematical terms (this is essentially the format of Vygotsky's > lectures > > > on pedology, so much so that when translating them we had some trouble > > > determining the precise moment when Vygotsky turns to the blackboard to > > > write his conclusion in the form of a law). > > > > > > In order to get them into mathematical shape, though, he has to make > > > sentences that look a lot like equations. "The plumpness of the lens > yields > > > a greater refraction of the light", "The reflection of the light from > the > > > glass results of the light striking the flatness of the glass" "The > > > curvature of the spectacle glass supplies the lacking plumpness of the > > > eye". In each of these, a quality or a process which would normally be > > > realized as an adjective or a verb is suddenly realized by a noun, > creating > > > an imaginary entity. > > > > > > That's grammatical metaphor. Something that is "canonically" realized > by a > > > verb ("to grow") is suddenly realized nominally ("growth"), or > something > > > that is canonically a quality ('red") is realized verbally ("redden"). > We > > > even find related clauses realized as verbs ("She did not know the > rules. > > > So she died" is realized by "Death was brought about through > ignorance", > > > all of these examples from Halliday). In fact, the Genetic Law that > > > Vygotsky formulates in "Mind in Society" ("Every higher mental > function is > > > realized on two planes....") is really just one instance of grammatical > > > metaphor. > > > > > > One of Chomsky's best known arguments for the radical innateness > hypothesis > > > is this. If I take a sentence like "Students who do not do their > homework > > > do not do well" and I want to make a question, how do I know which > "do" to > > > move to the front? Chomsky assumes that this knowledge is essentially > > > innate; it is part of universal grammar. But you can see that "Do > students > > > who do not do their homework do well?" can be built up through a > process of > > > what we might call "discourse metaphor"--whereby clauses stand for > > > exchanges: > > > > > > Mother: You did your homework, didn't you? > > > Child: No. > > > Mother: You didn't do your homework? Did you do well? > > > Child: No. > > > Mother: You didn't do well? > > > Child: No. > > > Mother: You didn't do you homework so you didn't do well. Do the other > > > students do well? > > > Child: Some of them. > > > Mother: Who does well? Do students who do not do their homework do > well? > > > > > > And this of course explains why wh-items like "who" and 'why" have two > > > functions--one inside a clause, where it expresses an intra-mental > function > > > (grammar) and one between them where it expresses an inter-mental > function > > > (discourse). > > > > > > I realize that grammatical metaphor will seem rather dry and abstract > and > > > unpoetic to people who assume that metaphor is only of the lexical > kind. > > > But to me, and I think to most children, it is far far more powerful > and > > > far more important developmentally. In some ways, it's the lexical > metaphor > > > that is responsible for the disenchantment of the child's world, while > the > > > grammatical metaphor infinitely expands it. (And here, I'm afraid, I > must > > > stop--it's time for breakfast and anyway my one screen is used up!) > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > > > > > , or "the > > > > > > . He > > > > > > On 19 December 2014 at 15:15, Greg Thompson > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > Helena and David, > > > > I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the > so-called > > > > authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred > tradition to > > > > Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi > notion of > > > > "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including English) > notion > > > of > > > > "time" and how each of these languages offers different affordances > of > > > > meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual understanding, > English > > > has > > > > a much more reified/objectified/entified sense of time. (btw, I > think the > > > > first paragraph is easier to follow than the second - and in that > first > > > > paragraph you'll find our old friend "imagination"). > > > > David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to? > > > > -greg > > > > > > > > Taken from: > > > > > > > > > > > > http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/mousesite/Secondary/Whorfframe2.html > > > > > > > > " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, sunset" > are > > > with > > > > us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from other > nouns. > > > > They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in > winter" > > > just > > > > as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are pluralized and > > > > numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. Our > thought > > > > about the referents of such words hence becomes objectified. Without > > > > objectification, it would be a subjective experience of real time, > i.e. > > > of > > > > the consciousness of "becoming later and later"--simply a cyclic > phase > > > > similar to an earlier phase in that ever-later-becoming duration. > Only by > > > > imagination can such a cyclic phase be set beside another and > another in > > > > the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually perceived) configuration. "But > > > such > > > > is the power of linguistic analogy that we do so objectify cyclic > > > phasing. > > > > We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g., > > > "phasing." > > > > And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting > binomial > > > > formula of formless item plus form, is so general that it is > implicit for > > > > all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless items like > "substance, > > > > matter," by which we can fill out the binomial for an enormously wide > > > range > > > > of nouns. But even these are not quite generalized enough to take in > our > > > > phase nouns. So for the phase nouns we have made a formless item, > "time." > > > > We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, in > the > > > > pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" in > the > > > > pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can say and > > > think > > > > "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." Let me again > point > > > > out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of milk" or "a > piece of > > > > cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a summer" actually > > > contains > > > > or consists of such-and-such a quantity of "time." > > > > > > > > In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., are > not > > > > nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They are > a > > > > formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, and > even > > > > other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a locative > > > pattern, > > > > like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It contains no morpheme like > one > > > of > > > > "in the house" or "at the tree." It means "when it is morning" or > "while > > > > morning-phase is occurring." These "temporal s" are not used as > subjects > > > or > > > > objects, or at all like nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" > or > > > > "summer is hot"; summer is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions > are > > > hot, > > > > WHEN heat occurs. One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or > > > > "summer recently." There is no objectification, as a region, an > extent, a > > > > quantity, of the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested > about > > > > time except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no > basis > > > > here for a formless item answering to our "time." " > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Helena Worthen < > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to this: > > > > > > > > > > "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton > > > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to > create > > > > > sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly > productive, > > > > > which is why they still form the basis of scientific writing and > > > thinking > > > > > today." > > > > > > > > > > Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I lose you > when > > > > you > > > > > say "created to talk about gravity as an entity". > > > > > > > > > > Thank you, > > > > > > > > > > Helena > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Helena Worthen > > > > > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > > > > > > > > On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > As Helena points out, prepositions are from the "grammatical" > end of > > > > what > > > > > > Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what > Halliday > > > > calls > > > > > > "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they have > > > three > > > > > > properties that words from the more "lexical" end do not have: > > > > > > > > > > > > a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You can, > > > > > actually, > > > > > > but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you invent a new > > > name > > > > > or a > > > > > > new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can). > > > > > > > > > > > > b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific semantic > > > field > > > > > (the > > > > > > way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of > > > > linguistics) > > > > > > but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are used. > > > > > > > > > > > > c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the same > > > > effect, > > > > > > which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your argument" the > "in" > > > > has > > > > > > more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in "there's a > fly in > > > > your > > > > > > tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in Henry's > hands, > > > > > refer > > > > > > to a book or even a footnote. > > > > > > > > > > > > Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties pretty > > > much > > > > > > define the difference between learning and development, at least > as I > > > > > > understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on functions > > > > > > indefinitely while development works by reorganizing the closed > set > > > of > > > > > > functions you already have into new systems. Learning is skill > > > specific > > > > > > and local, while development is quite global in its implications. > > > > > Learning > > > > > > is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new systems, > > > while > > > > > > development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary (and > forget it > > > > just > > > > > > as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes away. > > > > > > > > > > > > For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of blue > that > > > > > people > > > > > > call the sky") are simply metaphors from the non-productive end > of > > > the > > > > > > lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are crisp, > concrete, > > > and > > > > > > vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations > that > > > > Newton > > > > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to > create > > > > > > sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly > > > productive, > > > > > > which is why they still form the basis of scientific writing and > > > > thinking > > > > > > today. For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical metaphor is > the > > > > third > > > > > > great moment in child development (after the break into mother > tongue > > > > and > > > > > > the break into disciplinary language in school work). > > > > > > > > > > > > Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" implies > > > zero > > > > > > dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two ("on a line', > 'on > > > a > > > > > > plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because they > are > > > > > > grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them with > time: > > > 'at > > > > a > > > > > > point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. Compare: "at > > > > > > Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very day), and > "in > > > > > > Christmas' (season). > > > > > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > > > > > On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen < > > > helenaworthen@gmail.com> > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial > > > > > >> relationships from the concrete material world into the > conceptual > > > > > >> imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 common ones, and > > > > > between 70 > > > > > >> and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far > as" -- > > > > > this > > > > > >> is according to > > > https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm > > > > ). > > > > > >> We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. > Apparently, in > > > > > >> English, they evolved from and did the job done by inflections > in > > > > parent > > > > > >> languages, examples being cases and tenses. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection > like > > > the > > > > > >> dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial > relationships > > > > > suggested > > > > > >> by contemporary prepositions. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about this. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Helena Worthen > > > > > >> helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > > > >> > > > > > >> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > > > > >> > > > > > >>> I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly > > > > embodied, > > > > > >> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to > > > linguistics > > > > > (For > > > > > >> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on > > > > ?lexicon?: > > > > > >> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, > > > being > > > > > part > > > > > >> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and > Halliday > > > > > see no > > > > > >> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, > > > lexico-grammar. > > > > > (Lo > > > > > >> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar, > > > adding > > > > > the > > > > > >> ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings > are > > > > great > > > > > >> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of > that? > > > In > > > > > >> translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced? > > > > > >>> Henry > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden > > > > wrote: > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the > > > > metaphorical > > > > > >> use of prepositions like: > > > > > >>>> - "there is some value IN your argument" > > > > > >>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again" > > > > > >>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" > > > > > >>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again" > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> and so on. > > > > > >>>> Andy > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > > > > > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> larry smolucha wrote: > > > > > >>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself - > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic > > > > > possibilities: > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published > in > > > > > Thought > > > > > >>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into > > > > English > > > > > >> 1962] > > > > > >>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the > 'additive' > > > > value > > > > > >> of the > > > > > >>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech > > > > > vocalization). > > > > > >>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements > that > > > are > > > > > >> flammable > > > > > >>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable > nor a > > > > gas. > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century > European > > > > > >> Developmental > > > > > >>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' > > > hence > > > > > the > > > > > >>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of > > > > Piaget's > > > > > >> Genetic > > > > > >>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and > synthesis > > > > > >> based on > > > > > >>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in > Vygotsky's > > > > > >> example of H2O. > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com > > > > > >>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > >>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 > > > > > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be > synergistic > > > > > >>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the > > > parts. > > > > > >>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more > than > > > > the > > > > > >>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can > ever > > > > be > > > > > >> imagined" > > > > > >>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> A couple things to consider: > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination > as > > > the > > > > > >> brain has > > > > > >>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the > simplest > > > > level > > > > > >> of the Gestalt > > > > > >>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). > > > > > >>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just > > > > photographic. > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try > to > > > > > >> accurately reproduce > > > > > >>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. > Whereas, > > > the > > > > > >> goal of combinatory > > > > > >>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, > dreams, > > > > > >> musings, and even > > > > > >>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of > > > > objects > > > > > >> and symbols. > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different > ways > > > that > > > > > >> things and concepts can be > > > > > >>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar > and > > > > > flour. > > > > > >>>>>> I can add water and > it > > > > > >> dissolves a bit > > > > > >>>>>> But adding heat > changes > > > > the > > > > > >> combination into a pancake. > > > > > >>>>>> [Is this synergistic?] > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more > > > examples > > > > > >> to put the discussion > > > > > >>>>>> in the metaphysical realm. > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 > > > > > >>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > > > >>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the > > > case > > > > > for > > > > > >>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I > think > > > > it's > > > > > >> not > > > > > >>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are > > > > > >> associationists who > > > > > >>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary > > > associationism > > > > > >> exists and > > > > > >>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as > mediation. > > > > > >> Vygotsky > > > > > >>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, > > > > explain > > > > > >> the > > > > > >>>>>>> uniqueness of our species? > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species > feels for > > > > its > > > > > >> own > > > > > >>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a > > > Piagetian > > > > > >>>>>>> perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true > > > maturity > > > > > as a > > > > > >>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing > more to > > > it > > > > > >> than > > > > > >>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of > > > primate, > > > > > and > > > > > >> our > > > > > >>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon > > > rocks > > > > > in > > > > > >> order > > > > > >>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged > the > > > > same > > > > > >> way as > > > > > >>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and > for > > > > > >> language is > > > > > >>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human > > > > > >> exceptionalism. > > > > > >>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for > the > > > > > >> vanguard role > > > > > >>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, > > > > > prolonging > > > > > >>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after > the > > > > sick > > > > > >> and the > > > > > >>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial > organs > > > > > >> (tools) and > > > > > >>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for > our > > > > > >> species, it > > > > > >>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these > > > > > >> "circuitous, > > > > > >>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that > lead > > > > our > > > > > >>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always > been > > > > > >> short on > > > > > >>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for > material > > > > > >> culture > > > > > >>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another > matter: > > > > > >> verily, here > > > > > >>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of > attention > > > is > > > > > >> simply the > > > > > >>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says > there > > > are > > > > > >> only two > > > > > >>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So > > > > > >> imagination is > > > > > >>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete > experiences, > > > and > > > > > >> nothing > > > > > >>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, > when you > > > > > hear > > > > > >> the > > > > > >>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been > there to > > > be > > > > > >> able to > > > > > >>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at > work in > > > > word > > > > > >> meaning. > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who > was > > > > > given > > > > > >> a > > > > > >>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been > mixed > > > > with > > > > > >> silver > > > > > >>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of > > > gold. > > > > > >> Well, we > > > > > >>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not > > > > possible > > > > > to > > > > > >>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that > precisely. > > > The > > > > > >> method > > > > > >>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the > "principal > > > > of > > > > > >>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes > palimpsest, > > > a > > > > > >> velum on > > > > > >>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each > other. > > > > > Because > > > > > >>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and > written > > > > over > > > > > >> every > > > > > >>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was > soft, > > > the > > > > > >> pressure > > > > > >>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones > > > when > > > > > the > > > > > >> old > > > > > >>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the > only > > > > known > > > > > >> Greek > > > > > >>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor > their > > > > > >> relationship > > > > > >>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they > are > > > > > >> related to > > > > > >>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's > quite > > > > > similar > > > > > >> to the > > > > > >>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> David Kellogg > > > > > >>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD < > > > hshonerd@gmail.com> > > > > > >> wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an > > > > > associationist, > > > > > >> ?sees > > > > > >>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? > > > > > >>>>>>>> Henry > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg < > > > > dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > > > > > > > > > >> wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the > division > > > > > >> between > > > > > >>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, > > > because > > > > > >> Ribot is > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> an > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal > form > > > of > > > > > >> attention. > > > > > >>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the > transition > > > > from > > > > > >> forest > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> to > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division > > > > between > > > > > >> the two > > > > > >>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and > > > commonsensical > > > > > >> world of > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> the > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly > prosaic > > > > uses > > > > > >> in life > > > > > >>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more > > > > > "imaginative" > > > > > >> (that > > > > > >>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world > of > > > the > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> farm,where > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long > winter > > > > > >> months are > > > > > >>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to > > > > encounter > > > > > >> talking > > > > > >>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here > > > attention > > > > > has > > > > > >> to be > > > > > >>>>>>>>> more voluntary. > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a > very > > > > clear > > > > > >>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism > that > > > > > >> underpins > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> Ribot > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky > > > points > > > > > out > > > > > >> the > > > > > >>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive > > > practices > > > > > >> really > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> are > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of > > > > imagination, > > > > > >> there > > > > > >>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between > > > human > > > > > and > > > > > >> animal > > > > > >>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly > capable > > > of > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> volitional > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than > humans). > > > > > Without > > > > > >> a > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> theory > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis > for > > > > > Ribot's > > > > > >>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological > functions > > > at > > > > > >> all. > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > > > > > >>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole > > > > wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of > imagination, > > > > > >> thanks to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> all > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very > influential > > > > > >> around the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> time > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. > I > > > had > > > > > >> seen work > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> on > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective > equal > > > > > >> reproductive? > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies > of > > > > > >> development > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> of > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of > > > being > > > > a > > > > > >> relative > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my > bucket > > > > list. > > > > > >> This > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings > from > > > > some > > > > > >> weeks > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> in > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct > that > > > > > >> segmented the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met > > > aphorizing?. > > > > > >> Puns, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole < > mcole@ucsd.edu> > > > > > wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant > and > > > > they > > > > > >> are > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> doing > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his > > > > > >> followers as an > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by > Hegel, > > > so > > > > > >> its of > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> course > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in > > > > > >> translation, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> seems > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, > "recollection" > > > > in > > > > > >> this > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> passage, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter > > > > > >> distinction to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "memory." > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in > > > contemporary > > > > > >> discourse > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian > > > > > >> colleagues have > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from > > > > theorists > > > > > >> who > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> clearly > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it > was > > > > still > > > > > >> possible > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, > > > > > >> interestingly > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> links > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a > > > > "voluntary" > > > > > >> act. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Parts > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children > stuff > > > > > that > > > > > >> was > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> also > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts > of > > > > > >> creativity > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> and > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious > to > > > see > > > > > >> that the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> two > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found > > > > himself > > > > > >> writing. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which > > > pretty > > > > > old > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> approaches > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < > > > > > >> ablunden@mira.net> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, > but > > > it > > > > > >> may be > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> worth > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent > > > place > > > > to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Imagination > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between > > > > > >> Recollection and > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive > > > > > >> Imagination, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> (2) > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, > which > > > > he > > > > > >> says > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> leads > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In > > > other > > > > > >> words, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> the > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is > > > > > >> accomplished > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> through > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >> > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading > Strawson > > > and > > > > > >> Williams. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists > whose > > > > work i > > > > > >> am > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> trying > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of > > > > > >> productive > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive > > > > imagination > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> develops. > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive > implies > > > that > > > > > >> there > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> must > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> be a > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive > imagination. > > > But > > > > I > > > > > >> learned > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination > appears > > > and > > > > is > > > > > >> linked > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable > part of > > > > > >> anticipation > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on > > > imagination > > > > > >> (starting > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous > look, > > > and > > > > > >> provides > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> a > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural > as > > > > > fixed. > > > > > >> This, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives > me a > > > > > ground > > > > > >> to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> take > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> part > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start > with > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> preconceptions: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive > grammarian > > > > > >> Langacker on > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive > domains, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> particularly > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is > full > > > of > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> imagination > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two > aspects of > > > > > >> temporality: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic > > > > > >> structure), which > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> I > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for > > > both > > > > > >> individual > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < > > > > > >> lpscholar2@gmail.com> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third > > > > *space* > > > > > >> and the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and > his > > > > > >> notion of > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion > is > > > > > >> explored under > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a > *set* of > > > > > >> modalities > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of > > > > knowing > > > > > >> that is > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" > > > [perceived??] > > > > if > > > > > >> we > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> think > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as > > > *style* > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to > say > > > how > > > > > >> jazzed up > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> I > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> am > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, > the > > > mind > > > > > as > > > > > >> Larry > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually > various > > > > > >> triads, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> finally > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my > > > notebooks > > > > > of > > > > > >> the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> mind, as > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap > adentro, > > > > luega > > > > > >> pa? > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> fuera. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole < > > > > mcole@ucsd.edu> > > > > > >> wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, > > > > attached > > > > > >> are two > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT > > > > > theorists > > > > > >> like > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of > > > > > >> imagination in a > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion > of > > > > > >> productive > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have > no > > > > > >> intention of > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> doing > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated > in > > > the > > > > > >> attached > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these > > > > philosophers, > > > > > I > > > > > >> came > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> upon > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very > closely > > > > > >> linked at > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> several > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our > naivete, > > > > > >> Ettienne and I > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as > a > > > > means > > > > > of > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> access > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander > > > Suvorov. > > > > > >> Moreover, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> such > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct > > > > > relevance > > > > > >> to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Kris's > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak > to > > > > > >> concerns > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> about > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in > > > > development. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination > thread. > > > > > Perhaps > > > > > >> they > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> will > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a > > > natural > > > > > >> science > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with an > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson.pdf> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> -- > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > > > > science > > > > > >> with an > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> -- > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > > > science > > > > > >> with an > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > > Assistant Professor > > > > Department of Anthropology > > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > > Brigham Young University > > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > *Robert Lake Ed.D.*Associate Professor > > Social Foundations of Education > > Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading > > Georgia Southern University > > Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group > > P. O. Box 8144 > > Phone: (912) 478-0355 > > Fax: (912) 478-5382 > > Statesboro, GA 30460 > > From dkirsh@lsu.edu Fri Dec 19 19:46:07 2014 From: dkirsh@lsu.edu (David H Kirshner) Date: Sat, 20 Dec 2014 03:46:07 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors In-Reply-To: References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> Message-ID: The topic of how grammatical form relates to meaning calls to mind the groundbreaking work of Eleanor Orr--whom you've probably never heard of on account of the fact that her work was condemned by a politically-correct faction of race-conscious sociolinguists who decided her analysis of Black English Vernacular could too easily be appropriated into racist discourses about language deficiency. Orr was a Washington DC area teacher and principal in the 1970s and 1980s, who traced math difficulties of her African American students to subtle grammatical differences between Black English dialect and standard English. Her 1987 book goes into compelling detail to support the thesis that the meaning structure of basic mathematical terms is embedded in the grammatical setting in which those terms are expressed. For instance, the meaning of ?distance? is embedded in the grammatical structure ?distance from _________ to __________? where the place-holders hold locations; if you don?t have that grammatical structure, and you're in a linguistic environment in which that structure is assumed, you're likely not going to be able to gain full access to the concept. The attached excerpts from her book--ignore the Forward, unless you'd like some context--reveal some of her students' bizarre conceptions of distance (and other basic mathematical concepts) as revealed in their diagrams. Her approach involves linguistic analysis of sentences produced by her African American students that she reads as collapsed versions of standard English sentences, with differences in prepositional structure being highlighted (but other grammatical elements also are indicated). This work cuts against the grain of anything going on in mathematics education. The Piagetian view that dominates that field holds that basic concepts come about from reflection on our actions in our engagement with the material world. When language enters the conversation, it's with respect to semantic structure; to my knowledge, nobody's ever implicated syntax directly in basic quantitative understanding. This work is particularly interesting to me in connection with my 21-year-old son who is autistic, and whose grammatical function is severely impaired. He has a decent vocabulary, but unless the setting for the conversation provides contextual clues, he can't piece together how the semantic elements are linked to one another. It is only recently that it occurred to me his lack of a secure sense of basic quantitative terms like ?more? and ?less? may be rooted in his grammatical incapacities. The XMCA discussion, thus far, has touched on grammar with respect to lexical items such as prepositions. But we've not yet tied that to the grammatical forms that embed those lexical items. I'm very curious as to whether that further connection can be made. David Kirshner Orr, E., W. (1987). Twice as less: Black English and the performance of black students in mathematics and science. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg Sent: Friday, December 19, 2014 3:06 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors Yes, Haliday is essentially a Whorfian, and that's one of things that brings him close to Vygotsky. (Compare, for example, Chomsky, who is essentially anti-developmental in his ideas about language, and who now rejects the leading role played by social communication and says that communication is epiphenomenal to language, whose original purpose is thought.) For Sapir, and for Whorf, in the beginning of every major onotogenetic, sociogenetic, and even phylogenetic change in language there has to be some change in the nature of communication. So what Andy says about the lack of the basis of modern science in Hopi applies perfectly well to English. When we read the scientific writings of Chaucer on the astrolabe, for example, we do not see words like "reflection", "refraction" or "alignment". Chaucer uses words like "bounce off", "bend through", and "line up" (note the use of prepositions, Helena!). Where did these words come from, and how did they make scientific English possible? Most of us have no problem saying that Isaac Newton discovered the laws of gravitation. But it's only a slight exaggeration to say that what he really discovered was the meaning potential of words like "gravitation". Gravity is, of course, not a thing at all; that is, it's not an entity, but rather a process, the process of falling down, or falling in (preps, again!). So how and above all why does it become an entity? It's interesting to compare Newton's writings on optics with Chaucer's on the astrolabe. The "Opticks" has a fixed format that we recognize almost instantly today: Newton describes his equipment (the prism and the dark room); he then narrates his method as a kind of recipe ("First, I did this; then I did that") and draws conclusions, which he then formulates in mathematical terms (this is essentially the format of Vygotsky's lectures on pedology, so much so that when translating them we had some trouble determining the precise moment when Vygotsky turns to the blackboard to write his conclusion in the form of a law). In order to get them into mathematical shape, though, he has to make sentences that look a lot like equations. "The plumpness of the lens yields a greater refraction of the light", "The reflection of the light from the glass results of the light striking the flatness of the glass" "The curvature of the spectacle glass supplies the lacking plumpness of the eye". In each of these, a quality or a process which would normally be realized as an adjective or a verb is suddenly realized by a noun, creating an imaginary entity. That's grammatical metaphor. Something that is "canonically" realized by a verb ("to grow") is suddenly realized nominally ("growth"), or something that is canonically a quality ('red") is realized verbally ("redden"). We even find related clauses realized as verbs ("She did not know the rules. So she died" is realized by "Death was brought about through ignorance", all of these examples from Halliday). In fact, the Genetic Law that Vygotsky formulates in "Mind in Society" ("Every higher mental function is realized on two planes....") is really just one instance of grammatical metaphor. One of Chomsky's best known arguments for the radical innateness hypothesis is this. If I take a sentence like "Students who do not do their homework do not do well" and I want to make a question, how do I know which "do" to move to the front? Chomsky assumes that this knowledge is essentially innate; it is part of universal grammar. But you can see that "Do students who do not do their homework do well?" can be built up through a process of what we might call "discourse metaphor"--whereby clauses stand for exchanges: Mother: You did your homework, didn't you? Child: No. Mother: You didn't do your homework? Did you do well? Child: No. Mother: You didn't do well? Child: No. Mother: You didn't do you homework so you didn't do well. Do the other students do well? Child: Some of them. Mother: Who does well? Do students who do not do their homework do well? And this of course explains why wh-items like "who" and 'why" have two functions--one inside a clause, where it expresses an intra-mental function (grammar) and one between them where it expresses an inter-mental function (discourse). I realize that grammatical metaphor will seem rather dry and abstract and unpoetic to people who assume that metaphor is only of the lexical kind. But to me, and I think to most children, it is far far more powerful and far more important developmentally. In some ways, it's the lexical metaphor that is responsible for the disenchantment of the child's world, while the grammatical metaphor infinitely expands it. (And here, I'm afraid, I must stop--it's time for breakfast and anyway my one screen is used up!) David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies , or "the . He On 19 December 2014 at 15:15, Greg Thompson wrote: > Helena and David, > I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the so-called > authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred tradition > to > Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi notion > of "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including English) > notion of "time" and how each of these languages offers different > affordances of meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual > understanding, English has a much more reified/objectified/entified > sense of time. (btw, I think the first paragraph is easier to follow > than the second - and in that first paragraph you'll find our old friend "imagination"). > David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to? > -greg > > Taken from: > > http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/mousesite/Second > ary/Whorfframe2.html > > " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, sunset" are > with us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from other nouns. > They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in winter" > just as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are pluralized > and numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. Our > thought about the referents of such words hence becomes objectified. > Without objectification, it would be a subjective experience of real > time, i.e. of the consciousness of "becoming later and later"--simply > a cyclic phase similar to an earlier phase in that ever-later-becoming > duration. Only by imagination can such a cyclic phase be set beside > another and another in the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually > perceived) configuration. "But such is the power of linguistic analogy that we do so objectify cyclic phasing. > We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g., "phasing." > And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting > binomial formula of formless item plus form, is so general that it is > implicit for all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless items > like "substance, matter," by which we can fill out the binomial for an > enormously wide range of nouns. But even these are not quite > generalized enough to take in our phase nouns. So for the phase nouns we have made a formless item, "time." > We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, in the > pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" in > the pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can say > and think "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." Let me > again point out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of milk" > or "a piece of cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a > summer" actually contains or consists of such-and-such a quantity of "time." > > In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., are not > nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They are a > formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, and > even other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a > locative pattern, like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It contains > no morpheme like one of "in the house" or "at the tree." It means > "when it is morning" or "while morning-phase is occurring." These > "temporal s" are not used as subjects or objects, or at all like > nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" or "summer is hot"; summer > is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions are hot, WHEN heat occurs. > One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or "summer recently." > There is no objectification, as a region, an extent, a quantity, of > the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested about time > except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no basis here for a formless item answering to our "time." " > > > > On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Helena Worthen > > wrote: > > > > David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to this: > > > > "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to create > > sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly > > productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific > > writing and thinking today." > > > > Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I lose you > > when > you > > say "created to talk about gravity as an entity". > > > > Thank you, > > > > Helena > > > > > > Helena Worthen > > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > > On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > > As Helena points out, prepositions are from the "grammatical" end > > > of > what > > > Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what > > > Halliday > calls > > > "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they have > > > three properties that words from the more "lexical" end do not have: > > > > > > a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You can, > > actually, > > > but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you invent a new > > > name > > or a > > > new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can). > > > > > > b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific semantic > > > field > > (the > > > way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of > linguistics) > > > but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are used. > > > > > > c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the same > effect, > > > which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your argument" the "in" > has > > > more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in "there's a fly > > > in > your > > > tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in Henry's > > > hands, > > refer > > > to a book or even a footnote. > > > > > > Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties pretty > > > much define the difference between learning and development, at > > > least as I understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on > > > functions indefinitely while development works by reorganizing the > > > closed set of functions you already have into new systems. > > > Learning is skill specific and local, while development is quite global in its implications. > > Learning > > > is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new systems, > > > while development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary (and > > > forget it > just > > > as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes away. > > > > > > For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of blue > > > that > > people > > > call the sky") are simply metaphors from the non-productive end of > > > the lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are crisp, > > > concrete, and vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the > > > nominalizations that > Newton > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to > > > create sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly > > > productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific > > > writing and > thinking > > > today. For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical metaphor is the > third > > > great moment in child development (after the break into mother > > > tongue > and > > > the break into disciplinary language in school work). > > > > > > Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" implies > > > zero dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two ("on a > > > line', 'on a > > > plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because they are > > > grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them with time: > > > 'at > a > > > point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. Compare: "at > > > Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very day), and > > > "in Christmas' (season). > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen > > > > > > wrote: > > >> > > >> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial > > >> relationships from the concrete material world into the > > >> conceptual imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 common > > >> ones, and > > between 70 > > >> and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far as" > > >> -- > > this > > >> is according to > > >> https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm > ). > > >> We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. Apparently, > > >> in English, they evolved from and did the job done by inflections > > >> in > parent > > >> languages, examples being cases and tenses. > > >> > > >> But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection > > >> like the dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial > > >> relationships > > suggested > > >> by contemporary prepositions. > > >> > > >> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about this. > > >> > > >> Helena Worthen > > >> helenaworthen@gmail.com > > >> > > >> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > >> > > >>> I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly > embodied, > > >> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to > > >> linguistics > > (For > > >> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on > ?lexicon?: > > >> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, > > >> being > > part > > >> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and > > >> Halliday > > see no > > >> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, lexico-grammar. > > (Lo > > >> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar, > > >> adding > > the > > >> ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings are > great > > >> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of > > >> that? In translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced? > > >>> Henry > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > >>>> > > >>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the > metaphorical > > >> use of prepositions like: > > >>>> - "there is some value IN your argument" > > >>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again" > > >>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" > > >>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again" > > >>>> > > >>>> and so on. > > >>>> Andy > > >>>> > > -------------------------------------------------------------------- > > ---- > > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> larry smolucha wrote: > > >>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself - > > >>>>> > > >>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic > > possibilities: > > >>>>> > > >>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in > > Thought > > >>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into > English > > >> 1962] > > >>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' > value > > >> of the > > >>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech > > vocalization). > > >>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that > > >>>>> are > > >> flammable > > >>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor > > >>>>> a > gas. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century > > >>>>> European > > >> Developmental > > >>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' > > >>>>> hence > > the > > >>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of > Piaget's > > >> Genetic > > >>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and > > >>>>> synthesis > > >> based on > > >>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in > > >>>>> Vygotsky's > > >> example of H2O. > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com > > >>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > >>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 > > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic > > >>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts. > > >>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more > > >>>>>> than > the > > >>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can > > >>>>>> ever > be > > >> imagined" > > >>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> A couple things to consider: > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination > > >>>>>> as the > > >> brain has > > >>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the > > >>>>>> simplest > level > > >> of the Gestalt > > >>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). > > >>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just > photographic. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try > > >>>>>> to > > >> accurately reproduce > > >>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, > > >>>>>> the > > >> goal of combinatory > > >>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, > > >>>>>> dreams, > > >> musings, and even > > >>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of > objects > > >> and symbols. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways > > >>>>>> that > > >> things and concepts can be > > >>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar > > >>>>>> and > > flour. > > >>>>>> I can add water and > > >>>>>> it > > >> dissolves a bit > > >>>>>> But adding heat > > >>>>>> changes > the > > >> combination into a pancake. > > >>>>>> [Is this synergistic?] > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more > > >>>>>> examples > > >> to put the discussion > > >>>>>> in the metaphysical realm. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 > > >>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com > > >>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the > > >>>>>>> case > > for > > >>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I > > >>>>>>> think > it's > > >> not > > >>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are > > >> associationists who > > >>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary > > >>>>>>> associationism > > >> exists and > > >>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. > > >> Vygotsky > > >>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, > explain > > >> the > > >>>>>>> uniqueness of our species? > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels > > >>>>>>> for > its > > >> own > > >>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a > > >>>>>>> Piagetian perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian > > >>>>>>> one--true maturity > > as a > > >>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more > > >>>>>>> to it > > >> than > > >>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of > > >>>>>>> primate, > > and > > >> our > > >>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon > > >>>>>>> rocks > > in > > >> order > > >>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged > > >>>>>>> the > same > > >> way as > > >>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and > > >>>>>>> for > > >> language is > > >>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human > > >> exceptionalism. > > >>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for > > >>>>>>> the > > >> vanguard role > > >>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, > > prolonging > > >>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after > > >>>>>>> the > sick > > >> and the > > >>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial > > >>>>>>> organs > > >> (tools) and > > >>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for > > >>>>>>> our > > >> species, it > > >>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these > > >> "circuitous, > > >>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that > > >>>>>>> lead > our > > >>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always > > >>>>>>> been > > >> short on > > >>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for > > >>>>>>> material > > >> culture > > >>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: > > >> verily, here > > >>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of > > >>>>>>> attention is > > >> simply the > > >>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says > > >>>>>>> there are > > >> only two > > >>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So > > >> imagination is > > >>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, > > >>>>>>> and > > >> nothing > > >>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when > > >>>>>>> you > > hear > > >> the > > >>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there > > >>>>>>> to be > > >> able to > > >>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work > > >>>>>>> in > word > > >> meaning. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who > > >>>>>>> was > > given > > >> a > > >>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been > > >>>>>>> mixed > with > > >> silver > > >>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold. > > >> Well, we > > >>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not > possible > > to > > >>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that > > >>>>>>> precisely. The > > >> method > > >>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the > > >>>>>>> "principal > of > > >>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes > > >>>>>>> palimpsest, a > > >> velum on > > >>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. > > Because > > >>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and > > >>>>>>> written > over > > >> every > > >>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, > > >>>>>>> the > > >> pressure > > >>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones > > >>>>>>> when > > the > > >> old > > >>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only > known > > >> Greek > > >>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their > > >> relationship > > >>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they > > >>>>>>> are > > >> related to > > >>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite > > similar > > >> to the > > >>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> David Kellogg > > >>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD > > >>>>>>> > > >> wrote: > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an > > associationist, > > >> ?sees > > >>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? > > >>>>>>>> Henry > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg < > dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > > > >> wrote: > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the > > >>>>>>>>> division > > >> between > > >>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, > > >>>>>>>>> because > > >> Ribot is > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> an > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal > > >>>>>>>>> form of > > >> attention. > > >>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the > > >>>>>>>>> transition > from > > >> forest > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> to > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division > between > > >> the two > > >>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and > > >>>>>>>>> commonsensical > > >> world of > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> the > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly > > >>>>>>>>> prosaic > uses > > >> in life > > >>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more > > "imaginative" > > >> (that > > >>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world > > >>>>>>>>> of the > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> farm,where > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long > > >>>>>>>>> winter > > >> months are > > >>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to > encounter > > >> talking > > >>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here > > >>>>>>>>> attention > > has > > >> to be > > >>>>>>>>> more voluntary. > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a > > >>>>>>>>> very > clear > > >>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that > > >> underpins > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> Ribot > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky > > >>>>>>>>> points > > out > > >> the > > >>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive > > >>>>>>>>> practices > > >> really > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> are > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of > imagination, > > >> there > > >>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between > > >>>>>>>>> human > > and > > >> animal > > >>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly > > >>>>>>>>> capable of > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> volitional > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). > > Without > > >> a > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> theory > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis > > >>>>>>>>> for > > Ribot's > > >>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological > > >>>>>>>>> functions at > > >> all. > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > > >>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole > wrote: > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination, > > >> thanks to > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> all > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought. > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very > > >>>>>>>>>> influential > > >> around the > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> time > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I > > >>>>>>>>>> had > > >> seen work > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> on > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective > > >>>>>>>>>> equal > > >> reproductive? > > >>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies > > >>>>>>>>>> of > > >> development > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> of > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of > > >>>>>>>>>> being > a > > >> relative > > >>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. > > >>>>>>>>>> mike > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com> > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my > > >>>>>>>>>>> bucket > list. > > >> This > > >>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings > > >>>>>>>>>>> from > some > > >> weeks > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> in > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > >> segmented the > > >>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. > > >> Puns, > > >>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) > > >>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > wrote: > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant > > >>>>>>>>>>>> and > they > > >> are > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> doing > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his > > >> followers as an > > >>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel, so > > >> its of > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> course > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in > > >> translation, > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> seems > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" > in > > >> this > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> passage, > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter > > >> distinction to > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "memory." > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary > > >> discourse > > >>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian > > >> colleagues have > > >>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated. > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from > theorists > > >> who > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> clearly > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was > still > > >> possible > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> to > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, > > >> interestingly > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> links > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a > "voluntary" > > >> act. > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> Parts > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> of > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children > > >>>>>>>>>>>> stuff > > that > > >> was > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> also > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts > > >>>>>>>>>>>> of > > >> creativity > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> and > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to > > >>>>>>>>>>>> see > > >> that the > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> two > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found > himself > > >> writing. > > >>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which > > >>>>>>>>>>>> pretty > > old > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> approaches > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < > > >> ablunden@mira.net> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> but it > > >> may be > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> worth > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> place > to > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> Imagination > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between > > >> Recollection and > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive > > >> Imagination, > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> (2) > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> which > he > > >> says > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> leads > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> other > > >> words, > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> the > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is > > >> accomplished > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> through > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >> > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > -- > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > > >> Williams. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose > work i > > >> am > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> trying > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of > > >> productive > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive > imagination > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> develops. > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that > > >> there > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> must > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> be a > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> But > I > > >> learned > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > is > > >> linked > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> to > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > > >> anticipation > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination > > >> (starting > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> with > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> look, and > > >> provides > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> a > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as > > fixed. > > >> This, > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a > > ground > > >> to > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> take > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> part > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> preconceptions: > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> grammarian > > >> Langacker on > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> domains, > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> particularly > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> full of > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> imagination > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > > >> temporality: > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic > > >> structure), which > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> I > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> both > > >> individual > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < > > >> lpscholar2@gmail.com> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third > *space* > > >> and the > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> his > > >> notion of > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is > > >> explored under > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > > >> modalities > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of > knowing > > >> that is > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [perceived??] > if > > >> we > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> think > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *style* Larry On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> HENRY SHONERD < > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> say how > > >> jazzed up > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> I > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> am > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind > > as > > >> Larry > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> various > > >> triads, > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> finally > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notebooks > > of > > >> the > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> mind, as > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, > luega > > >> pa? > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> fuera. > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole < > mcole@ucsd.edu> > > >> wrote: > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, > attached > > >> are two > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT > > theorists > > >> like > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of > > >> imagination in a > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of > > >> productive > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no > > >> intention of > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> doing > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the > > >> attached > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these > philosophers, > > I > > >> came > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> upon > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> closely > > >> linked at > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> several > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, > > >> Ettienne and I > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a > means > > of > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> access > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. > > >> Moreover, > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> such > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct > > relevance > > >> to > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> Kris's > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to > > >> concerns > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> about > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in > development. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. > > Perhaps > > >> they > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> will > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural > > >> science > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> with an > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> -- > > >>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > science > > >> with an > > >>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> -- > > >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > > >>>>>>>>>> science > > >> with an > > >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>> > > >>> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: OrrBEV.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 573635 bytes Desc: OrrBEV.pdf Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141220/f3403841/attachment.pdf From annalisa@unm.edu Fri Dec 19 21:06:48 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Sat, 20 Dec 2014 05:06:48 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Time, Imagination, Metaphor In-Reply-To: References: , , <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net>, , , , , <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com>, , , , <5492A447.7030004@mira.net>, , , , , , <5493CC6B.5050105@mira.net>, , , , Message-ID: <1419052007614.61660@unm.edu> Hello Francine (and Larry), Yes! Let's not forget perception and imagination! And let me second subjective perspectives and bibliographic references! [If anyone has any to add to the ABC that come to mind, please forward them to me! TQ] I fully enjoy the noodle into pasta example. Are you saying that time is metaphysical? Would space be metaphysical too? Robert brought up a perfect example of the Hopi's view of time and the Guugu Yimithirr of Australia and their method of employing cardinal directions to orient themselves in space. http://xmca.ucsd.edu/yarns/15874?keywords=#52113 That example also reminded me of the Greek Poet Simonides of Ceos and the Memory Palace... see the Extreme Memory Tournament http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/19/remembering-as-an-extreme-sport/ and the book that tells you how to remember everything: http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C03E3DF1E3FF93BA35750C0A9679D8B63 Also Francine, when you say: > The 'Natural' Science that arises from European culture begins as mechanical physics and alchemy in which machines have parts and chemicals have elements. It has evolved into the study of energy, and systems theory. I wanted to say, don't forget to include astrology with alchemy and mechanical physics! :) (Which is an ancient systems theory) and then becomes astronomy, and this has certainly altered our sense of both time and space by light years! :) Kind regards, Annalisa From ewall@umich.edu Fri Dec 19 21:24:45 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2014 23:24:45 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors In-Reply-To: References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> Message-ID: <78A7A9DF-94D1-4BBC-998F-A26AD72BCCD0@umich.edu> David Possibly of interest would be the efforts in the 80s to develop a mathematical register for the Maori language. I seem to remember that it had to be developed from the early grades on. Ed On Dec 19, 2014, at 9:46 PM, David H Kirshner wrote: > The topic of how grammatical form relates to meaning calls to mind the groundbreaking work of Eleanor Orr--whom you've probably never heard of on account of the fact that her work was condemned by a politically-correct faction of race-conscious sociolinguists who decided her analysis of Black English Vernacular could too easily be appropriated into racist discourses about language deficiency. > > Orr was a Washington DC area teacher and principal in the 1970s and 1980s, who traced math difficulties of her African American students to subtle grammatical differences between Black English dialect and standard English. Her 1987 book goes into compelling detail to support the thesis that the meaning structure of basic mathematical terms is embedded in the grammatical setting in which those terms are expressed. For instance, the meaning of ?distance? is embedded in the grammatical structure ?distance from _________ to __________? where the place-holders hold locations; if you don?t have that grammatical structure, and you're in a linguistic environment in which that structure is assumed, you're likely not going to be able to gain full access to the concept. > > The attached excerpts from her book--ignore the Forward, unless you'd like some context--reveal some of her students' bizarre conceptions of distance (and other basic mathematical concepts) as revealed in their diagrams. Her approach involves linguistic analysis of sentences produced by her African American students that she reads as collapsed versions of standard English sentences, with differences in prepositional structure being highlighted (but other grammatical elements also are indicated). > > This work cuts against the grain of anything going on in mathematics education. The Piagetian view that dominates that field holds that basic concepts come about from reflection on our actions in our engagement with the material world. When language enters the conversation, it's with respect to semantic structure; to my knowledge, nobody's ever implicated syntax directly in basic quantitative understanding. > > This work is particularly interesting to me in connection with my 21-year-old son who is autistic, and whose grammatical function is severely impaired. He has a decent vocabulary, but unless the setting for the conversation provides contextual clues, he can't piece together how the semantic elements are linked to one another. It is only recently that it occurred to me his lack of a secure sense of basic quantitative terms like ?more? and ?less? may be rooted in his grammatical incapacities. > > The XMCA discussion, thus far, has touched on grammar with respect to lexical items such as prepositions. But we've not yet tied that to the grammatical forms that embed those lexical items. I'm very curious as to whether that further connection can be made. > > David Kirshner > > Orr, E., W. (1987). Twice as less: Black English and the performance of black students in mathematics and science. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg > Sent: Friday, December 19, 2014 3:06 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors > > Yes, Haliday is essentially a Whorfian, and that's one of things that brings him close to Vygotsky. (Compare, for example, Chomsky, who is essentially anti-developmental in his ideas about language, and who now rejects the leading role played by social communication and says that communication is epiphenomenal to language, whose original purpose is > thought.) For Sapir, and for Whorf, in the beginning of every major onotogenetic, sociogenetic, and even phylogenetic change in language there has to be some change in the nature of communication. > > So what Andy says about the lack of the basis of modern science in Hopi applies perfectly well to English. When we read the scientific writings of Chaucer on the astrolabe, for example, we do not see words like "reflection", "refraction" or "alignment". Chaucer uses words like "bounce off", "bend through", and "line up" (note the use of prepositions, Helena!). Where did these words come from, and how did they make scientific English possible? > > Most of us have no problem saying that Isaac Newton discovered the laws of gravitation. But it's only a slight exaggeration to say that what he really discovered was the meaning potential of words like "gravitation". Gravity is, of course, not a thing at all; that is, it's not an entity, but rather a process, the process of falling down, or falling in (preps, again!). So how and above all why does it become an entity? > > It's interesting to compare Newton's writings on optics with Chaucer's on the astrolabe. The "Opticks" has a fixed format that we recognize almost instantly today: Newton describes his equipment (the prism and the dark room); he then narrates his method as a kind of recipe ("First, I did this; then I did that") and draws conclusions, which he then formulates in mathematical terms (this is essentially the format of Vygotsky's lectures on pedology, so much so that when translating them we had some trouble determining the precise moment when Vygotsky turns to the blackboard to write his conclusion in the form of a law). > > In order to get them into mathematical shape, though, he has to make sentences that look a lot like equations. "The plumpness of the lens yields a greater refraction of the light", "The reflection of the light from the glass results of the light striking the flatness of the glass" "The curvature of the spectacle glass supplies the lacking plumpness of the eye". In each of these, a quality or a process which would normally be realized as an adjective or a verb is suddenly realized by a noun, creating an imaginary entity. > > That's grammatical metaphor. Something that is "canonically" realized by a verb ("to grow") is suddenly realized nominally ("growth"), or something that is canonically a quality ('red") is realized verbally ("redden"). We even find related clauses realized as verbs ("She did not know the rules. > So she died" is realized by "Death was brought about through ignorance", all of these examples from Halliday). In fact, the Genetic Law that Vygotsky formulates in "Mind in Society" ("Every higher mental function is realized on two planes....") is really just one instance of grammatical metaphor. > > One of Chomsky's best known arguments for the radical innateness hypothesis is this. If I take a sentence like "Students who do not do their homework do not do well" and I want to make a question, how do I know which "do" to move to the front? Chomsky assumes that this knowledge is essentially innate; it is part of universal grammar. But you can see that "Do students who do not do their homework do well?" can be built up through a process of what we might call "discourse metaphor"--whereby clauses stand for > exchanges: > > Mother: You did your homework, didn't you? > Child: No. > Mother: You didn't do your homework? Did you do well? > Child: No. > Mother: You didn't do well? > Child: No. > Mother: You didn't do you homework so you didn't do well. Do the other students do well? > Child: Some of them. > Mother: Who does well? Do students who do not do their homework do well? > > And this of course explains why wh-items like "who" and 'why" have two functions--one inside a clause, where it expresses an intra-mental function > (grammar) and one between them where it expresses an inter-mental function (discourse). > > I realize that grammatical metaphor will seem rather dry and abstract and unpoetic to people who assume that metaphor is only of the lexical kind. > But to me, and I think to most children, it is far far more powerful and far more important developmentally. In some ways, it's the lexical metaphor that is responsible for the disenchantment of the child's world, while the grammatical metaphor infinitely expands it. (And here, I'm afraid, I must stop--it's time for breakfast and anyway my one screen is used up!) > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > , or "the > > . He > > On 19 December 2014 at 15:15, Greg Thompson > wrote: > >> Helena and David, >> I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the so-called >> authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred tradition >> to >> Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi notion >> of "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including English) >> notion of "time" and how each of these languages offers different >> affordances of meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual >> understanding, English has a much more reified/objectified/entified >> sense of time. (btw, I think the first paragraph is easier to follow >> than the second - and in that first paragraph you'll find our old friend "imagination"). >> David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to? >> -greg >> >> Taken from: >> >> http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/mousesite/Second >> ary/Whorfframe2.html >> >> " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, sunset" are >> with us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from other nouns. >> They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in winter" >> just as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are pluralized >> and numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. Our >> thought about the referents of such words hence becomes objectified. >> Without objectification, it would be a subjective experience of real >> time, i.e. of the consciousness of "becoming later and later"--simply >> a cyclic phase similar to an earlier phase in that ever-later-becoming >> duration. Only by imagination can such a cyclic phase be set beside >> another and another in the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually >> perceived) configuration. "But such is the power of linguistic analogy that we do so objectify cyclic phasing. >> We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g., "phasing." >> And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting >> binomial formula of formless item plus form, is so general that it is >> implicit for all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless items >> like "substance, matter," by which we can fill out the binomial for an >> enormously wide range of nouns. But even these are not quite >> generalized enough to take in our phase nouns. So for the phase nouns we have made a formless item, "time." >> We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, in the >> pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" in >> the pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can say >> and think "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." Let me >> again point out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of milk" >> or "a piece of cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a >> summer" actually contains or consists of such-and-such a quantity of "time." >> >> In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., are not >> nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They are a >> formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, and >> even other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a >> locative pattern, like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It contains >> no morpheme like one of "in the house" or "at the tree." It means >> "when it is morning" or "while morning-phase is occurring." These >> "temporal s" are not used as subjects or objects, or at all like >> nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" or "summer is hot"; summer >> is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions are hot, WHEN heat occurs. >> One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or "summer recently." >> There is no objectification, as a region, an extent, a quantity, of >> the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested about time >> except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no basis here for a formless item answering to our "time." " >> >> >> >> On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Helena Worthen >> >> wrote: >>> >>> David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to this: >>> >>> "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton >>> and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to create >>> sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly >>> productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific >>> writing and thinking today." >>> >>> Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I lose you >>> when >> you >>> say "created to talk about gravity as an entity". >>> >>> Thank you, >>> >>> Helena >>> >>> >>> Helena Worthen >>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>> >>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>> >>>> As Helena points out, prepositions are from the "grammatical" end >>>> of >> what >>>> Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what >>>> Halliday >> calls >>>> "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they have >>>> three properties that words from the more "lexical" end do not have: >>>> >>>> a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You can, >>> actually, >>>> but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you invent a new >>>> name >>> or a >>>> new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can). >>>> >>>> b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific semantic >>>> field >>> (the >>>> way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of >> linguistics) >>>> but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are used. >>>> >>>> c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the same >> effect, >>>> which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your argument" the "in" >> has >>>> more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in "there's a fly >>>> in >> your >>>> tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in Henry's >>>> hands, >>> refer >>>> to a book or even a footnote. >>>> >>>> Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties pretty >>>> much define the difference between learning and development, at >>>> least as I understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on >>>> functions indefinitely while development works by reorganizing the >>>> closed set of functions you already have into new systems. >>>> Learning is skill specific and local, while development is quite global in its implications. >>> Learning >>>> is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new systems, >>>> while development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary (and >>>> forget it >> just >>>> as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes away. >>>> >>>> For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of blue >>>> that >>> people >>>> call the sky") are simply metaphors from the non-productive end of >>>> the lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are crisp, >>>> concrete, and vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the >>>> nominalizations that >> Newton >>>> and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to >>>> create sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly >>>> productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific >>>> writing and >> thinking >>>> today. For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical metaphor is the >> third >>>> great moment in child development (after the break into mother >>>> tongue >> and >>>> the break into disciplinary language in school work). >>>> >>>> Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" implies >>>> zero dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two ("on a >>>> line', 'on a >>>> plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because they are >>>> grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them with time: >>>> 'at >> a >>>> point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. Compare: "at >>>> Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very day), and >>>> "in Christmas' (season). >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>> >>>> On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen >>>> >>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial >>>>> relationships from the concrete material world into the >>>>> conceptual imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 common >>>>> ones, and >>> between 70 >>>>> and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far as" >>>>> -- >>> this >>>>> is according to >>>>> https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm >> ). >>>>> We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. Apparently, >>>>> in English, they evolved from and did the job done by inflections >>>>> in >> parent >>>>> languages, examples being cases and tenses. >>>>> >>>>> But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection >>>>> like the dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial >>>>> relationships >>> suggested >>>>> by contemporary prepositions. >>>>> >>>>> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about this. >>>>> >>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>> >>>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly >> embodied, >>>>> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to >>>>> linguistics >>> (For >>>>> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on >> ?lexicon?: >>>>> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, >>>>> being >>> part >>>>> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and >>>>> Halliday >>> see no >>>>> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, lexico-grammar. >>> (Lo >>>>> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar, >>>>> adding >>> the >>>>> ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings are >> great >>>>> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of >>>>> that? In translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced? >>>>>> Henry >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden >> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the >> metaphorical >>>>> use of prepositions like: >>>>>>> - "there is some value IN your argument" >>>>>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again" >>>>>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" >>>>>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again" >>>>>>> >>>>>>> and so on. >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> >>> -------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> ---- >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> larry smolucha wrote: >>>>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself - >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic >>> possibilities: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in >>> Thought >>>>>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into >> English >>>>> 1962] >>>>>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' >> value >>>>> of the >>>>>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech >>> vocalization). >>>>>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that >>>>>>>> are >>>>> flammable >>>>>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor >>>>>>>> a >> gas. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century >>>>>>>> European >>>>> Developmental >>>>>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' >>>>>>>> hence >>> the >>>>>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of >> Piaget's >>>>> Genetic >>>>>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and >>>>>>>> synthesis >>>>> based on >>>>>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in >>>>>>>> Vygotsky's >>>>> example of H2O. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com >>>>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 >>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic >>>>>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts. >>>>>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more >>>>>>>>> than >> the >>>>>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can >>>>>>>>> ever >> be >>>>> imagined" >>>>>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> A couple things to consider: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination >>>>>>>>> as the >>>>> brain has >>>>>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the >>>>>>>>> simplest >> level >>>>> of the Gestalt >>>>>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). >>>>>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just >> photographic. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try >>>>>>>>> to >>>>> accurately reproduce >>>>>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, >>>>>>>>> the >>>>> goal of combinatory >>>>>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, >>>>>>>>> dreams, >>>>> musings, and even >>>>>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of >> objects >>>>> and symbols. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways >>>>>>>>> that >>>>> things and concepts can be >>>>>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar >>>>>>>>> and >>> flour. >>>>>>>>> I can add water and >>>>>>>>> it >>>>> dissolves a bit >>>>>>>>> But adding heat >>>>>>>>> changes >> the >>>>> combination into a pancake. >>>>>>>>> [Is this synergistic?] >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more >>>>>>>>> examples >>>>> to put the discussion >>>>>>>>> in the metaphysical realm. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 >>>>>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the >>>>>>>>>> case >>> for >>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I >>>>>>>>>> think >> it's >>>>> not >>>>>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are >>>>> associationists who >>>>>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary >>>>>>>>>> associationism >>>>> exists and >>>>>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. >>>>> Vygotsky >>>>>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, >> explain >>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> uniqueness of our species? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels >>>>>>>>>> for >> its >>>>> own >>>>>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a >>>>>>>>>> Piagetian perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian >>>>>>>>>> one--true maturity >>> as a >>>>>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more >>>>>>>>>> to it >>>>> than >>>>>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of >>>>>>>>>> primate, >>> and >>>>> our >>>>>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon >>>>>>>>>> rocks >>> in >>>>> order >>>>>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged >>>>>>>>>> the >> same >>>>> way as >>>>>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and >>>>>>>>>> for >>>>> language is >>>>>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human >>>>> exceptionalism. >>>>>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for >>>>>>>>>> the >>>>> vanguard role >>>>>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, >>> prolonging >>>>>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after >>>>>>>>>> the >> sick >>>>> and the >>>>>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial >>>>>>>>>> organs >>>>> (tools) and >>>>>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for >>>>>>>>>> our >>>>> species, it >>>>>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these >>>>> "circuitous, >>>>>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that >>>>>>>>>> lead >> our >>>>>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always >>>>>>>>>> been >>>>> short on >>>>>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for >>>>>>>>>> material >>>>> culture >>>>>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: >>>>> verily, here >>>>>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of >>>>>>>>>> attention is >>>>> simply the >>>>>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says >>>>>>>>>> there are >>>>> only two >>>>>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So >>>>> imagination is >>>>>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, >>>>>>>>>> and >>>>> nothing >>>>>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when >>>>>>>>>> you >>> hear >>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there >>>>>>>>>> to be >>>>> able to >>>>>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work >>>>>>>>>> in >> word >>>>> meaning. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who >>>>>>>>>> was >>> given >>>>> a >>>>>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been >>>>>>>>>> mixed >> with >>>>> silver >>>>>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold. >>>>> Well, we >>>>>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not >> possible >>> to >>>>>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that >>>>>>>>>> precisely. The >>>>> method >>>>>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the >>>>>>>>>> "principal >> of >>>>>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes >>>>>>>>>> palimpsest, a >>>>> velum on >>>>>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. >>> Because >>>>>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and >>>>>>>>>> written >> over >>>>> every >>>>>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, >>>>>>>>>> the >>>>> pressure >>>>>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones >>>>>>>>>> when >>> the >>>>> old >>>>>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only >> known >>>>> Greek >>>>>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their >>>>> relationship >>>>>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they >>>>>>>>>> are >>>>> related to >>>>>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite >>> similar >>>>> to the >>>>>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD >>>>>>>>>> >>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an >>> associationist, >>>>> ?sees >>>>>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? >>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg < >> dkellogg60@gmail.com >>>> >>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the >>>>>>>>>>>> division >>>>> between >>>>>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, >>>>>>>>>>>> because >>>>> Ribot is >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> an >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal >>>>>>>>>>>> form of >>>>> attention. >>>>>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the >>>>>>>>>>>> transition >> from >>>>> forest >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division >> between >>>>> the two >>>>>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and >>>>>>>>>>>> commonsensical >>>>> world of >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly >>>>>>>>>>>> prosaic >> uses >>>>> in life >>>>>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more >>> "imaginative" >>>>> (that >>>>>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world >>>>>>>>>>>> of the >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> farm,where >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long >>>>>>>>>>>> winter >>>>> months are >>>>>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to >> encounter >>>>> talking >>>>>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here >>>>>>>>>>>> attention >>> has >>>>> to be >>>>>>>>>>>> more voluntary. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a >>>>>>>>>>>> very >> clear >>>>>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that >>>>> underpins >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Ribot >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky >>>>>>>>>>>> points >>> out >>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive >>>>>>>>>>>> practices >>>>> really >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of >> imagination, >>>>> there >>>>>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between >>>>>>>>>>>> human >>> and >>>>> animal >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly >>>>>>>>>>>> capable of >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> volitional >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). >>> Without >>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> theory >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis >>>>>>>>>>>> for >>> Ribot's >>>>>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological >>>>>>>>>>>> functions at >>>>> all. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole >> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of >>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination, >>>>> thanks to >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> all >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very >>>>>>>>>>>>> influential >>>>> around the >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> time >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I >>>>>>>>>>>>> had >>>>> seen work >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> on >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective >>>>>>>>>>>>> equal >>>>> reproductive? >>>>>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies >>>>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>> development >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of >>>>>>>>>>>>> being >> a >>>>> relative >>>>>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my >>>>>>>>>>>>>> bucket >> list. >>>>> This >>>>>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings >>>>>>>>>>>>>> from >> some >>>>> weeks >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>> segmented the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. >>>>> Puns, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and >> they >>>>> are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his >>>>> followers as an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel, so >>>>> its of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> course >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in >>>>> translation, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> seems >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" >> in >>>>> this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> passage, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter >>>>> distinction to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "memory." >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary >>>>> discourse >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian >>>>> colleagues have >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from >> theorists >>>>> who >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> clearly >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was >> still >>>>> possible >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, >>>>> interestingly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> links >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a >> "voluntary" >>>>> act. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Parts >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> stuff >>> that >>>>> was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> also >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>> creativity >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> see >>>>> that the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> two >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found >> himself >>>>> writing. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> pretty >>> old >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> approaches >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < >>>>> ablunden@mira.net> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but it >>>>> may be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> worth >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> place >> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagination >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between >>>>> Recollection and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive >>>>> Imagination, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> (2) >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> which >> he >>>>> says >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> leads >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> other >>>>> words, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is >>>>> accomplished >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> through >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>> Williams. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose >> work i >>>>> am >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> trying >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of >>>>> productive >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive >> imagination >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> develops. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>> there >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> must >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> be a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But >> I >>>>> learned >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and >> is >>>>> linked >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>> anticipation >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination >>>>> (starting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> look, and >>>>> provides >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as >>> fixed. >>>>> This, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a >>> ground >>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> take >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> part >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> preconceptions: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> grammarian >>>>> Langacker on >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> domains, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> particularly >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> full of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> imagination >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>> temporality: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic >>>>> structure), which >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> both >>>>> individual >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < >>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third >> *space* >>>>> and the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> his >>>>> notion of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is >>>>> explored under >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>> modalities >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of >> knowing >>>>> that is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [perceived??] >> if >>>>> we >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *style* Larry On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> HENRY SHONERD < >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> say how >>>>> jazzed up >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> am >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind >>> as >>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> various >>>>> triads, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> finally >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notebooks >>> of >>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind, as >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, >> luega >>>>> pa? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> fuera. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole < >> mcole@ucsd.edu> >>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, >> attached >>>>> are two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT >>> theorists >>>>> like >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of >>>>> imagination in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of >>>>> productive >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no >>>>> intention of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the >>>>> attached >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these >> philosophers, >>> I >>>>> came >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> upon >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> closely >>>>> linked at >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> several >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, >>>>> Ettienne and I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a >> means >>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> access >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. >>>>> Moreover, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> such >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct >>> relevance >>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Kris's >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>> concerns >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> about >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in >> development. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. >>> Perhaps >>>>> they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> will >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural >>>>> science >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural >> science >>>>> with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural >>>>>>>>>>>>> science >>>>> with an >>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> -- >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Anthropology >> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> Brigham Young University >> Provo, UT 84602 >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> > From lsmolucha@hotmail.com Sat Dec 20 02:44:10 2014 From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com (larry smolucha) Date: Sat, 20 Dec 2014 04:44:10 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Time, Imagination, Metaphor In-Reply-To: References: , , <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net>, , , , , <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com>, , , , <5492A447.7030004@mira.net>, , , , , , <5493CC6B.5050105@mira.net>, , , , Message-ID: Message from Francine; Yes, what I have been saying can be viewed from the perspective of a 'mytheme', and (from what I can quickly glean) from the writings of Raymond Williams and Kris Guiterrez. [In regard to 'mytheme,' structuralists like Levi-Strauss would posit cross-cultural commonalities that are inherently part of myth-making or language - Richard Dawkins would call it a 'meme' and treat it as a cultural construct]. My own orientation comes from Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1967) and Stephen Toulmin's Human Understanding (1972). Toulmin was my Master's thesis sponsor. Kuhn's book is a must read. He introduced the concept of science as paradigmatic change and introduced 'paradigm' into the common vernacular. But Kuhn, Toulmin, and myself were/are not phenomenologists - we recognize that there is an external reality that cultures strive to understand. There are different ways of understanding that external reality, and frankly some work better than others. [Metaphysics is not phenomenology, although phenomenology is one type of epistemology]. If my semiotic system does not orient me to see a wall in front of me, I will still walk into a wall. If my semiotics do not allow for the perception that a car is coming at me, and I do not move, I am still going to be hit by that car. In Hopi, I allowed myself to be hit by the car, (or kicked by a mule) since a 'lower' entity can not act on a higher life form. Also, while Yoda can tell young Luke that he can raise his spaceship out of the mud using 'The Force' - I would not recommend that approach if your car is stuck in a snow bank. > Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2014 17:19:57 -0800 > From: lpscholar2@gmail.com > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Time, Imagination, Metaphor > > Francine, > Your comment: > > "The 'Natural' Science that arises from European culture begins as > mechanical physics and alchemy > in which machines have parts and chemicals have elements." > > Having "parts" and having "elements" as the beginning "point" or "position" > from which we get "in" to this theme of "natural" science > Francine would you say this theme iis also a "mytheme"? > I read this as a type of *opening* of an origin narrative or history as > situating development in specific concrete situations. [situate as both > verb and noun] with a theme of "cultural diversity" I keep mentioning > Raymond Williams as I find he writes within *THIS* STYLE and it is very > helpful for getting my bearings. > > It will put IN play what we mean by "academic or scientific" concepts as > possibly historically effected understandings. > Will we also explore Kris's notion of "vertical" and "horizontal" concepts > within cultural synergy? > David K's "grammatical metaphors" may also be involved in this cultural > diversity. > I have been considering reading more from Raymond Williams, so would > consider a shared reading with a similar exploration of cultural > permeability of time, imagination, metaphor, perception and trans-versal > ways of orienting or moving *in* the world. > Larry > > On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 3:37 PM, larry smolucha > wrote: > > > > Message from Francine: > > > > These three threads are all related (not forgetting perception and > > imagination). > > > > One of the things about XMCA threads is that the members each have so much > > to contribute, from their own perspectives as well as bibliographic > > references. > > > > The discourse does get philosophical raising old metaphysics questions of > > epistemology "How do we know what we know?" "How is our understanding > > shaped by language and culture?" XMCARs tend to be particularly > > self-conscious > > about their own use of language - which is good. There seems to be a > > striving > > for a new framework (paradigm) that clarifies these cross-cultural semiotic > > differences. > > > > The project I am working on is on how new ideas, customs, inventions, > > language, > > art, music, etc. are created through Cultural Synergy - when 'artifacts' > > from one > > culture enter another and are combined into something more than how the > > artifacts functioned in their original cultures. I can give mundane > > examples such as how > > noodles from China become spaghetti, elbow macaroni, etc. Or, the wheel as > > a potter's wheel, a wagon wheel, a gear, a grinding stone, a steering > > wheel, etc. > > (and all the mechanical devices that combine wheels, like pulleys and > > clocks and > > the first calculator). Concrete examples are a good start but there are > > more > > conceptual examples that I have just not had time to clarify. The > > discussion > > of time as it differs cross-culturally is a good starting point. Where I > > personally > > would want to go with this, is to look how how new conceptions of time > > emerge through > > inter-cultural contact. That is metaphysics. > > > > I also wonder how the semiotics of European, Middle Eastern, and Chinese > > cultures > > are related to their invention of the wheel and advancements in metallurgy. > > (Noting that Western African tribes did smelting of ore). The 'Natural' > > Science > > that arises from European culture begins as mechanical physics and alchemy > > in which machines have parts and chemicals have elements. It has evolved > > into > > the study of energy, and systems theory. > > > > There is enough here for ten volumes. Anyone interested? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2014 03:25:02 -0800 > > > From: lpscholar2@gmail.com > > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Time > > > > > > This notion of our being a "verb" or being a "noun" or being a > > "position" > > > or possibly being a "pre" - position. > > > What I am wondering is where we are going?? > > > Are we actually "verbs" and "nouns" and "positions" and "pre"-positions?? > > > Do we "exist" in the grammar [syntax] or do we "exist" in the "semantics" > > > [meaning] or do we "exist" in the "Pragmatics" [doing, activity] > > > > > > I apologize if this question is merely "idio"-syncretic but it is the > > > imaginal mutually reciprocal "third space" which I am being invited to > > > occupy in THIS SPECIFIC community as we trans-late the imaginal into > > > "genres" or "forms". For this reason, I want to hold on to the moral > > virtue > > > of "cosmopolitanism" that Kris Gutierrez articulated in her paper. [Yes a > > > trans-position] Kris wrote: > > > "At the CORE of its [the third space] political-philosophical ROOTS, this > > > program is oriented towards a FORM {LP adds a form as a genre]] of > > > "cosmopolitanism" (Appiah, 2006) characterized by the ideals and > > practices > > > of a shared humanity, a profound OBLIGATION to others, boundary crossing, > > > and intercultural exchange in which difference is celebrated without > > being > > > romanticized. > > > To get to this "space" or "place" requires imagination. > > > > > > If Buckminster Fuller "seems" to be a verb, and others "seem" to be nouns > > > while others "seem" to be positions [stances] , while others "seem" to be > > > "pre"-positions, then the imaginal "seems" to be *IN* play. [with the > > full > > > awareness of *IN* as David K out-lined or under-scored or high-lighted.] > > > > > > I want to ask Francine what she meant by "metaphysical" in her signing > > off > > > on her recent examples or cases. Kris "pragmatics" or "performance" > > seems > > > to me "grounded" in the sense of rising [ideal] and returning [to ground] > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 2:17 AM, larry smolucha > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I seem to be a verb > > > > > > > > R. Buckminster Fuller 1970 > > > > > > > > > Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2014 00:36:03 -0700 > > > > > From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com > > > > > To: ablunden@mira.net; xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Time > > > > > > > > > > Interesting how you have taken this Andy - to suggest that the Hopi > > lack > > > > a > > > > > founding principle of Natural Science. > > > > > > > > > > Whorf actually takes this in generally the opposite direction. In his > > > > work > > > > > on the Hopi language, he suggests that one finds a language much > > better > > > > > suited to thinking about the theoretical physics of Whorf's day > > (e.g., > > > > > Einstein's theory of relativity, quantum mechanics, etc.). In that > > sense, > > > > > Hopi is, in fact, closer to describing the way the world really is. > > (and > > > > > I'll quickly rescind those last six words if you have any > > objections!). > > > > > > > > > > As to your assumption that science requires the objectification of > > the > > > > > natural world, I'm sure there are others on the list who would agree > > with > > > > > me that there is good reason to question the necessity of > > subject/object > > > > > dualism for science. (and perhaps you were referring to a particular > > > > > scientific tradition by calling it "Natural Science" - maybe scary > > scare > > > > > quotes are needed?). > > > > > > > > > > -greg > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 11:57 PM, Andy Blunden > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > That is an extremely interesting paragraph or two on the contrast > > > > between > > > > > > typical modern expressions of Time and how the Hopi language > > expresses > > > > > > corresponding situations. It seems that taking Nature (including > > Time) > > > > to > > > > > > be something which exists independently of us humans and can be > > known > > > > as > > > > > > such, in other words, the founding principle of Natural Science, is > > > > built > > > > > > into a premodern language, and is not shared by (at least one) > > > > indigenous > > > > > > people. > > > > > > > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > > > *Andy Blunden* > > > > > > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Greg Thompson wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > >> Helena and David, > > > > > >> I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the > > so-called > > > > > >> authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred > > tradition > > > > to > > > > > >> Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi > > notion > > > > of > > > > > >> "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including English) > > > > notion > > > > > >> of > > > > > >> "time" and how each of these languages offers different > > affordances of > > > > > >> meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual understanding, > > > > English > > > > > >> has > > > > > >> a much more reified/objectified/entified sense of time. (btw, I > > think > > > > the > > > > > >> first paragraph is easier to follow than the second - and in that > > > > first > > > > > >> paragraph you'll find our old friend "imagination"). > > > > > >> David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to? > > > > > >> -greg > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Taken from: > > > > > >> http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/ > > > > > >> mousesite/Secondary/Whorfframe2.html > > > > > >> > > > > > >> " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, > > sunset" are > > > > > >> with > > > > > >> us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from other > > > > nouns. > > > > > >> They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in > > winter" > > > > > >> just > > > > > >> as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are pluralized > > and > > > > > >> numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. Our > > thought > > > > > >> about the referents of such words hence becomes objectified. > > Without > > > > > >> objectification, it would be a subjective experience of real time, > > > > i.e. of > > > > > >> the consciousness of "becoming later and later"--simply a cyclic > > phase > > > > > >> similar to an earlier phase in that ever-later-becoming duration. > > > > Only by > > > > > >> imagination can such a cyclic phase be set beside another and > > another > > > > in > > > > > >> the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually perceived) configuration. > > "But > > > > such > > > > > >> is the power of linguistic analogy that we do so objectify cyclic > > > > phasing. > > > > > >> We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g., > > > > "phasing." > > > > > >> And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting > > > > binomial > > > > > >> formula of formless item plus form, is so general that it is > > implicit > > > > for > > > > > >> all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless items like > > > > "substance, > > > > > >> matter," by which we can fill out the binomial for an enormously > > wide > > > > > >> range > > > > > >> of nouns. But even these are not quite generalized enough to take > > in > > > > our > > > > > >> phase nouns. So for the phase nouns we have made a formless item, > > > > "time." > > > > > >> We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, > > in the > > > > > >> pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" > > in > > > > the > > > > > >> pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can say > > and > > > > > >> think > > > > > >> "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." Let me again > > > > point > > > > > >> out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of milk" or "a > > piece > > > > of > > > > > >> cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a summer" actually > > > > contains > > > > > >> or consists of such-and-such a quantity of "time." > > > > > >> > > > > > >> In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., > > are not > > > > > >> nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They > > are a > > > > > >> formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, > > and > > > > even > > > > > >> other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a locative > > > > > >> pattern, > > > > > >> like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It contains no morpheme > > like > > > > one of > > > > > >> "in the house" or "at the tree." It means "when it is morning" or > > > > "while > > > > > >> morning-phase is occurring." These "temporal s" are not used as > > > > subjects > > > > > >> or > > > > > >> objects, or at all like nouns. One does not say "it's a hot > > summer" or > > > > > >> "summer is hot"; summer is not hot, summer is only WHEN > > conditions are > > > > > >> hot, > > > > > >> WHEN heat occurs. One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer > > now" or > > > > > >> "summer recently." There is no objectification, as a region, an > > > > extent, a > > > > > >> quantity, of the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested > > > > about > > > > > >> time except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is > > no > > > > basis > > > > > >> here for a formless item answering to our "time." " > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > > > Assistant Professor > > > > > Department of Anthropology > > > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > > > Brigham Young University > > > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > From lsmolucha@hotmail.com Sat Dec 20 03:08:54 2014 From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com (larry smolucha) Date: Sat, 20 Dec 2014 05:08:54 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Time, Imagination, Metaphor In-Reply-To: <1419052007614.61660@unm.edu> References: , , , , <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net>, , , , , , , , , , <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com>, , , , , , , , <5492A447.7030004@mira.net>, , , , , , , , , , , , <5493CC6B.5050105@mira.net>, , , , , , , , <1419052007614.61660@unm.edu> Message-ID: Message from Francine: Metaphysics is an old term for philosophy. Metaphysics includes the study of ontology, cosmology and epistemology. Our discussions have been epistemological, specifically how different cultures understand time and space. We have not gotten into an ontological discussion (yet) about the 'real' nature of time and space. Some people use the term metaphysics to refer to a type of spiritual metaphysics. The practice of mind over matter. In my previous post, I used the examples of walking into a wall or in front of a car, in denial of their existence. The probabilities are not in your favor. But I did run out in front of a speeding car once, to snatch up my toddler, and 'miraculously' the driver was able to stop and did not hit me (as I held my son in my arms protecting his head expecting we would be thrown to the ground). Similarly, in Dancing with Wolves, when Kevin Costner rides back and forth past the Confederate lines who are shooting at him - he is defying the odds. Physics has become a probabilistic science that does not rule out the possibility that if you drop a glass of water it might fall upward, but the probabilities of that happening are astronomical. > From: annalisa@unm.edu > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Date: Sat, 20 Dec 2014 05:06:48 +0000 > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Time, Imagination, Metaphor > > Hello Francine (and Larry), > > Yes! Let's not forget perception and imagination! > > And let me second subjective perspectives and bibliographic references! > > [If anyone has any to add to the ABC that come to mind, please forward them to me! TQ] > > I fully enjoy the noodle into pasta example. Are you saying that time is metaphysical? Would space be metaphysical too? > > Robert brought up a perfect example of the Hopi's view of time and the Guugu Yimithirr of Australia and their method of employing cardinal directions to orient themselves in space. > http://xmca.ucsd.edu/yarns/15874?keywords=#52113 > > That example also reminded me of the Greek Poet Simonides of Ceos and the Memory Palace... see the Extreme Memory Tournament > http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/19/remembering-as-an-extreme-sport/ > and the book that tells you how to remember everything: > http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C03E3DF1E3FF93BA35750C0A9679D8B63 > > Also Francine, when you say: > > The 'Natural' Science that arises from European culture begins as mechanical physics and alchemy in which machines have parts and chemicals have elements. It has evolved into the study of energy, and systems theory. > > I wanted to say, don't forget to include astrology with alchemy and mechanical physics! :) (Which is an ancient systems theory) and then becomes astronomy, and this has certainly altered our sense of both time and space by light years! :) > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > From hshonerd@gmail.com Sat Dec 20 07:39:19 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Sat, 20 Dec 2014 08:39:19 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors In-Reply-To: References: <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <, > <, > <, > <, > <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > <, > Message-ID: <2C440C2D-59A4-47BB-8C31-0C689221C167@gmail.com> I am late to this, but I wonder if things, processes and relations capture pretty much everything about language and thinking. So nouns, as things, verbs, as processes and prepositions, as relations. Henry > On Dec 19, 2014, at 4:48 PM, larry smolucha wrote: > > Message from Francine: > > Just a thought - Is the use of nouns, verbs, prepositions a result > of developing a written language based on an alphabet? > > Language use in a culture with no written language would surely differ > significantly. > > And written languages based on hieroglyphs, pictograms, cuneiform, > Norse Runes, Celtic oghams, etc. surely divide and frame experience > differently. > > >> From: boblake@georgiasouthern.edu >> Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2014 16:43:24 -0500 >> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors >> >> Hi Everyone, >> I appreciate this thread's emphasis on the relativistic character of >> metaphoric language and find think that it supports Vygotsky's notion of >> the fluid nature of language as it emerges from socio-cultural and >> socio-historical contexts in meaning making (in contrast to biological >> determinism). Because each culture makes meaning in widely diverse ways, >> language forms and usage might have complex intricacies and shades of >> meaning on one concept alone. Along with the example of early 20th century >> Hopi's view of time, there are other more recent examples from the present >> day that suggest ways that language can shape thought . >> >> Consider the Australian aboriginal language, Guugu Yimithirr, from north >> Queensland who have no words for right or left, in front of, or behind to >> describe location. Instead they use the points of the compass even when >> requesting that someone move over to make room. They will say ?move a bit >> to the east.? To tell you where exactly they left something in your house, >> they?ll say, ?I left it on the southern edge of the western table.? (Deutscher, >> 2010, p. MM 42) >> >> The effect on the thinking of this group is phenomenal in orienting the >> speakers to their directional spatial environment to such a degree that >> roughly 1 out of every 10 words in conversational Guugu Yimithirr includes >> either north, south, east or west and is accompanied with precise hand >> gestures (ibid). Consequently in this culture, language acquisition >> involves constant awareness of spaces relative to the points of the >> compass. Deutscher relays a fascinating story about the ways that memory >> is stored for the speakers of this language. The story also serves as a >> clear example of Vygotsky?s notion of language as a mediating tool as a >> means of creating higher levels of consciousness through spatial >> kinesthetic approaches to meaning creation. >> >> >> >> One Guugu Yimithirr speaker was filmed telling his friends the story of how >> in his youth, he capsized in shark-infested waters. He and an older person >> were caught in a storm, and their boat tipped over. They both jumped into >> the water and managed to swim nearly three miles to the shore, only to >> discover that the missionary for whom they worked was far more concerned at >> the loss of the boat than relieved at their miraculous escape. Apart from >> the dramatic content, the remarkable thing about the story was that it was >> remembered throughout in cardinal directions: the speaker jumped into the >> water on the western side of the boat, his companion to the east of the >> boat, they saw a giant shark swimming north and so on. Perhaps the cardinal >> directions were just made up for the occasion? Well, quite by chance, the >> same person was filmed some years later telling the same story. The >> cardinal directions matched exactly in the two tellings. Even more >> remarkable were the spontaneous hand gestures that accompanied the story. >> For instance, the direction in which the boat rolled over was gestured in >> the correct geographic orientation, regardless of the direction the speaker >> was facing in the two films (ibid). >> >> >> *Robert* >> >> >> Deutscher, G. (2010, August 29) Does your language shape how you think? *The >> New York Times* *Sunday Magazine, *p. MM 42. >> >> >> >> >> On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 4:05 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>> >>> Yes, Haliday is essentially a Whorfian, and that's one of things that >>> brings him close to Vygotsky. (Compare, for example, Chomsky, who is >>> essentially anti-developmental in his ideas about language, and who now >>> rejects the leading role played by social communication and says that >>> communication is epiphenomenal to language, whose original purpose is >>> thought.) For Sapir, and for Whorf, in the beginning of every major >>> onotogenetic, sociogenetic, and even phylogenetic change in language there >>> has to be some change in the nature of communication. >>> >>> So what Andy says about the lack of the basis of modern science in Hopi >>> applies perfectly well to English. When we read the scientific writings of >>> Chaucer on the astrolabe, for example, we do not see words like >>> "reflection", "refraction" or "alignment". Chaucer uses words like "bounce >>> off", "bend through", and "line up" (note the use of prepositions, >>> Helena!). Where did these words come from, and how did they make scientific >>> English possible? >>> >>> Most of us have no problem saying that Isaac Newton discovered the laws of >>> gravitation. But it's only a slight exaggeration to say that what he really >>> discovered was the meaning potential of words like "gravitation". Gravity >>> is, of course, not a thing at all; that is, it's not an entity, but rather >>> a process, the process of falling down, or falling in (preps, again!). So >>> how and above all why does it become an entity? >>> >>> It's interesting to compare Newton's writings on optics with Chaucer's on >>> the astrolabe. The "Opticks" has a fixed format that we recognize almost >>> instantly today: Newton describes his equipment (the prism and the dark >>> room); he then narrates his method as a kind of recipe ("First, I did this; >>> then I did that") and draws conclusions, which he then formulates in >>> mathematical terms (this is essentially the format of Vygotsky's lectures >>> on pedology, so much so that when translating them we had some trouble >>> determining the precise moment when Vygotsky turns to the blackboard to >>> write his conclusion in the form of a law). >>> >>> In order to get them into mathematical shape, though, he has to make >>> sentences that look a lot like equations. "The plumpness of the lens yields >>> a greater refraction of the light", "The reflection of the light from the >>> glass results of the light striking the flatness of the glass" "The >>> curvature of the spectacle glass supplies the lacking plumpness of the >>> eye". In each of these, a quality or a process which would normally be >>> realized as an adjective or a verb is suddenly realized by a noun, creating >>> an imaginary entity. >>> >>> That's grammatical metaphor. Something that is "canonically" realized by a >>> verb ("to grow") is suddenly realized nominally ("growth"), or something >>> that is canonically a quality ('red") is realized verbally ("redden"). We >>> even find related clauses realized as verbs ("She did not know the rules. >>> So she died" is realized by "Death was brought about through ignorance", >>> all of these examples from Halliday). In fact, the Genetic Law that >>> Vygotsky formulates in "Mind in Society" ("Every higher mental function is >>> realized on two planes....") is really just one instance of grammatical >>> metaphor. >>> >>> One of Chomsky's best known arguments for the radical innateness hypothesis >>> is this. If I take a sentence like "Students who do not do their homework >>> do not do well" and I want to make a question, how do I know which "do" to >>> move to the front? Chomsky assumes that this knowledge is essentially >>> innate; it is part of universal grammar. But you can see that "Do students >>> who do not do their homework do well?" can be built up through a process of >>> what we might call "discourse metaphor"--whereby clauses stand for >>> exchanges: >>> >>> Mother: You did your homework, didn't you? >>> Child: No. >>> Mother: You didn't do your homework? Did you do well? >>> Child: No. >>> Mother: You didn't do well? >>> Child: No. >>> Mother: You didn't do you homework so you didn't do well. Do the other >>> students do well? >>> Child: Some of them. >>> Mother: Who does well? Do students who do not do their homework do well? >>> >>> And this of course explains why wh-items like "who" and 'why" have two >>> functions--one inside a clause, where it expresses an intra-mental function >>> (grammar) and one between them where it expresses an inter-mental function >>> (discourse). >>> >>> I realize that grammatical metaphor will seem rather dry and abstract and >>> unpoetic to people who assume that metaphor is only of the lexical kind. >>> But to me, and I think to most children, it is far far more powerful and >>> far more important developmentally. In some ways, it's the lexical metaphor >>> that is responsible for the disenchantment of the child's world, while the >>> grammatical metaphor infinitely expands it. (And here, I'm afraid, I must >>> stop--it's time for breakfast and anyway my one screen is used up!) >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>> >>> >>> >>> , or "the >>> >>> . He >>> >>> On 19 December 2014 at 15:15, Greg Thompson >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Helena and David, >>>> I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the so-called >>>> authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred tradition to >>>> Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi notion of >>>> "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including English) notion >>> of >>>> "time" and how each of these languages offers different affordances of >>>> meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual understanding, English >>> has >>>> a much more reified/objectified/entified sense of time. (btw, I think the >>>> first paragraph is easier to follow than the second - and in that first >>>> paragraph you'll find our old friend "imagination"). >>>> David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to? >>>> -greg >>>> >>>> Taken from: >>>> >>>> >>> http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/mousesite/Secondary/Whorfframe2.html >>>> >>>> " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, sunset" are >>> with >>>> us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from other nouns. >>>> They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in winter" >>> just >>>> as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are pluralized and >>>> numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. Our thought >>>> about the referents of such words hence becomes objectified. Without >>>> objectification, it would be a subjective experience of real time, i.e. >>> of >>>> the consciousness of "becoming later and later"--simply a cyclic phase >>>> similar to an earlier phase in that ever-later-becoming duration. Only by >>>> imagination can such a cyclic phase be set beside another and another in >>>> the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually perceived) configuration. "But >>> such >>>> is the power of linguistic analogy that we do so objectify cyclic >>> phasing. >>>> We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g., >>> "phasing." >>>> And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting binomial >>>> formula of formless item plus form, is so general that it is implicit for >>>> all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless items like "substance, >>>> matter," by which we can fill out the binomial for an enormously wide >>> range >>>> of nouns. But even these are not quite generalized enough to take in our >>>> phase nouns. So for the phase nouns we have made a formless item, "time." >>>> We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, in the >>>> pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" in the >>>> pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can say and >>> think >>>> "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." Let me again point >>>> out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of milk" or "a piece of >>>> cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a summer" actually >>> contains >>>> or consists of such-and-such a quantity of "time." >>>> >>>> In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., are not >>>> nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They are a >>>> formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, and even >>>> other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a locative >>> pattern, >>>> like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It contains no morpheme like one >>> of >>>> "in the house" or "at the tree." It means "when it is morning" or "while >>>> morning-phase is occurring." These "temporal s" are not used as subjects >>> or >>>> objects, or at all like nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" or >>>> "summer is hot"; summer is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions are >>> hot, >>>> WHEN heat occurs. One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or >>>> "summer recently." There is no objectification, as a region, an extent, a >>>> quantity, of the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested about >>>> time except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no basis >>>> here for a formless item answering to our "time." " >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Helena Worthen >>> >>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to this: >>>>> >>>>> "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton >>>>> and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to create >>>>> sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly productive, >>>>> which is why they still form the basis of scientific writing and >>> thinking >>>>> today." >>>>> >>>>> Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I lose you when >>>> you >>>>> say "created to talk about gravity as an entity". >>>>> >>>>> Thank you, >>>>> >>>>> Helena >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>> >>>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> As Helena points out, prepositions are from the "grammatical" end of >>>> what >>>>>> Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what Halliday >>>> calls >>>>>> "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they have >>> three >>>>>> properties that words from the more "lexical" end do not have: >>>>>> >>>>>> a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You can, >>>>> actually, >>>>>> but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you invent a new >>> name >>>>> or a >>>>>> new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can). >>>>>> >>>>>> b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific semantic >>> field >>>>> (the >>>>>> way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of >>>> linguistics) >>>>>> but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are used. >>>>>> >>>>>> c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the same >>>> effect, >>>>>> which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your argument" the "in" >>>> has >>>>>> more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in "there's a fly in >>>> your >>>>>> tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in Henry's hands, >>>>> refer >>>>>> to a book or even a footnote. >>>>>> >>>>>> Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties pretty >>> much >>>>>> define the difference between learning and development, at least as I >>>>>> understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on functions >>>>>> indefinitely while development works by reorganizing the closed set >>> of >>>>>> functions you already have into new systems. Learning is skill >>> specific >>>>>> and local, while development is quite global in its implications. >>>>> Learning >>>>>> is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new systems, >>> while >>>>>> development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary (and forget it >>>> just >>>>>> as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes away. >>>>>> >>>>>> For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of blue that >>>>> people >>>>>> call the sky") are simply metaphors from the non-productive end of >>> the >>>>>> lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are crisp, concrete, >>> and >>>>>> vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that >>>> Newton >>>>>> and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to create >>>>>> sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly >>> productive, >>>>>> which is why they still form the basis of scientific writing and >>>> thinking >>>>>> today. For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical metaphor is the >>>> third >>>>>> great moment in child development (after the break into mother tongue >>>> and >>>>>> the break into disciplinary language in school work). >>>>>> >>>>>> Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" implies >>> zero >>>>>> dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two ("on a line', 'on >>> a >>>>>> plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because they are >>>>>> grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them with time: >>> 'at >>>> a >>>>>> point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. Compare: "at >>>>>> Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very day), and "in >>>>>> Christmas' (season). >>>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>> >>>>>> On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen < >>> helenaworthen@gmail.com> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial >>>>>>> relationships from the concrete material world into the conceptual >>>>>>> imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 common ones, and >>>>> between 70 >>>>>>> and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far as" -- >>>>> this >>>>>>> is according to >>> https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm >>>> ). >>>>>>> We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. Apparently, in >>>>>>> English, they evolved from and did the job done by inflections in >>>> parent >>>>>>> languages, examples being cases and tenses. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection like >>> the >>>>>>> dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial relationships >>>>> suggested >>>>>>> by contemporary prepositions. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about this. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly >>>> embodied, >>>>>>> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to >>> linguistics >>>>> (For >>>>>>> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on >>>> ?lexicon?: >>>>>>> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, >>> being >>>>> part >>>>>>> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and Halliday >>>>> see no >>>>>>> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, >>> lexico-grammar. >>>>> (Lo >>>>>>> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar, >>> adding >>>>> the >>>>>>> ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings are >>>> great >>>>>>> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of that? >>> In >>>>>>> translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced? >>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden >>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the >>>> metaphorical >>>>>>> use of prepositions like: >>>>>>>>> - "there is some value IN your argument" >>>>>>>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again" >>>>>>>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" >>>>>>>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again" >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> and so on. >>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>> >>>>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> larry smolucha wrote: >>>>>>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself - >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic >>>>> possibilities: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in >>>>> Thought >>>>>>>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into >>>> English >>>>>>> 1962] >>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' >>>> value >>>>>>> of the >>>>>>>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech >>>>> vocalization). >>>>>>>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that >>> are >>>>>>> flammable >>>>>>>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor a >>>> gas. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century European >>>>>>> Developmental >>>>>>>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' >>> hence >>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of >>>> Piaget's >>>>>>> Genetic >>>>>>>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and synthesis >>>>>>> based on >>>>>>>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in Vygotsky's >>>>>>> example of H2O. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com >>>>>>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 >>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic >>>>>>>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the >>> parts. >>>>>>>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more than >>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can ever >>>> be >>>>>>> imagined" >>>>>>>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> A couple things to consider: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination as >>> the >>>>>>> brain has >>>>>>>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the simplest >>>> level >>>>>>> of the Gestalt >>>>>>>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). >>>>>>>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just >>>> photographic. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try to >>>>>>> accurately reproduce >>>>>>>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, >>> the >>>>>>> goal of combinatory >>>>>>>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, dreams, >>>>>>> musings, and even >>>>>>>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of >>>> objects >>>>>>> and symbols. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways >>> that >>>>>>> things and concepts can be >>>>>>>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar and >>>>> flour. >>>>>>>>>>> I can add water and it >>>>>>> dissolves a bit >>>>>>>>>>> But adding heat changes >>>> the >>>>>>> combination into a pancake. >>>>>>>>>>> [Is this synergistic?] >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more >>> examples >>>>>>> to put the discussion >>>>>>>>>>> in the metaphysical realm. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 >>>>>>>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the >>> case >>>>> for >>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I think >>>> it's >>>>>>> not >>>>>>>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are >>>>>>> associationists who >>>>>>>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary >>> associationism >>>>>>> exists and >>>>>>>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. >>>>>>> Vygotsky >>>>>>>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, >>>> explain >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> uniqueness of our species? >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels for >>>> its >>>>>>> own >>>>>>>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a >>> Piagetian >>>>>>>>>>>> perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true >>> maturity >>>>> as a >>>>>>>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more to >>> it >>>>>>> than >>>>>>>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of >>> primate, >>>>> and >>>>>>> our >>>>>>>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon >>> rocks >>>>> in >>>>>>> order >>>>>>>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged the >>>> same >>>>>>> way as >>>>>>>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and for >>>>>>> language is >>>>>>>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human >>>>>>> exceptionalism. >>>>>>>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for the >>>>>>> vanguard role >>>>>>>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, >>>>> prolonging >>>>>>>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after the >>>> sick >>>>>>> and the >>>>>>>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial organs >>>>>>> (tools) and >>>>>>>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for our >>>>>>> species, it >>>>>>>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these >>>>>>> "circuitous, >>>>>>>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that lead >>>> our >>>>>>>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always been >>>>>>> short on >>>>>>>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for material >>>>>>> culture >>>>>>>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: >>>>>>> verily, here >>>>>>>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of attention >>> is >>>>>>> simply the >>>>>>>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says there >>> are >>>>>>> only two >>>>>>>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So >>>>>>> imagination is >>>>>>>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, >>> and >>>>>>> nothing >>>>>>>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when you >>>>> hear >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there to >>> be >>>>>>> able to >>>>>>>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work in >>>> word >>>>>>> meaning. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who was >>>>> given >>>>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been mixed >>>> with >>>>>>> silver >>>>>>>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of >>> gold. >>>>>>> Well, we >>>>>>>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not >>>> possible >>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that precisely. >>> The >>>>>>> method >>>>>>>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the "principal >>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes palimpsest, >>> a >>>>>>> velum on >>>>>>>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. >>>>> Because >>>>>>>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and written >>>> over >>>>>>> every >>>>>>>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, >>> the >>>>>>> pressure >>>>>>>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones >>> when >>>>> the >>>>>>> old >>>>>>>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only >>>> known >>>>>>> Greek >>>>>>>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their >>>>>>> relationship >>>>>>>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they are >>>>>>> related to >>>>>>>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite >>>>> similar >>>>>>> to the >>>>>>>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD < >>> hshonerd@gmail.com> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an >>>>> associationist, >>>>>>> ?sees >>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? >>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg < >>>> dkellogg60@gmail.com >>>>>> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division >>>>>>> between >>>>>>>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, >>> because >>>>>>> Ribot is >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> an >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form >>> of >>>>>>> attention. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition >>>> from >>>>>>> forest >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division >>>> between >>>>>>> the two >>>>>>>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and >>> commonsensical >>>>>>> world of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic >>>> uses >>>>>>> in life >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more >>>>> "imaginative" >>>>>>> (that >>>>>>>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of >>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> farm,where >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter >>>>>>> months are >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to >>>> encounter >>>>>>> talking >>>>>>>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here >>> attention >>>>> has >>>>>>> to be >>>>>>>>>>>>>> more voluntary. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very >>>> clear >>>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that >>>>>>> underpins >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky >>> points >>>>> out >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive >>> practices >>>>>>> really >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of >>>> imagination, >>>>>>> there >>>>>>>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between >>> human >>>>> and >>>>>>> animal >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable >>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> volitional >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). >>>>> Without >>>>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> theory >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for >>>>> Ribot's >>>>>>>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological functions >>> at >>>>>>> all. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole >>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, >>>>>>> thanks to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> all >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential >>>>>>> around the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> time >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I >>> had >>>>>>> seen work >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> on >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal >>>>>>> reproductive? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of >>>>>>> development >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of >>> being >>>> a >>>>>>> relative >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket >>>> list. >>>>>>> This >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from >>>> some >>>>>>> weeks >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that >>>>>>> segmented the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met >>> aphorizing?. >>>>>>> Puns, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole >>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and >>>> they >>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his >>>>>>> followers as an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, >>> so >>>>>>> its of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> course >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in >>>>>>> translation, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> seems >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" >>>> in >>>>>>> this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> passage, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter >>>>>>> distinction to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "memory." >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in >>> contemporary >>>>>>> discourse >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian >>>>>>> colleagues have >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from >>>> theorists >>>>>>> who >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clearly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was >>>> still >>>>>>> possible >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, >>>>>>> interestingly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> links >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a >>>> "voluntary" >>>>>>> act. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Parts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff >>>>> that >>>>>>> was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> also >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of >>>>>>> creativity >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to >>> see >>>>>>> that the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found >>>> himself >>>>>>> writing. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which >>> pretty >>>>> old >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> approaches >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < >>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but >>> it >>>>>>> may be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> worth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent >>> place >>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagination >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between >>>>>>> Recollection and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive >>>>>>> Imagination, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> (2) >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which >>>> he >>>>>>> says >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> leads >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In >>> other >>>>>>> words, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is >>>>>>> accomplished >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> through >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson >>> and >>>>>>> Williams. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose >>>> work i >>>>>>> am >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> trying >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of >>>>>>> productive >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive >>>> imagination >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> develops. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies >>> that >>>>>>> there >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> must >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. >>> But >>>> I >>>>>>> learned >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears >>> and >>>> is >>>>>>> linked >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of >>>>>>> anticipation >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on >>> imagination >>>>>>> (starting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, >>> and >>>>>>> provides >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as >>>>> fixed. >>>>>>> This, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a >>>>> ground >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> take >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> part >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preconceptions: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian >>>>>>> Langacker on >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full >>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of >>>>>>> temporality: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic >>>>>>> structure), which >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for >>> both >>>>>>> individual >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < >>>>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third >>>> *space* >>>>>>> and the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his >>>>>>> notion of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is >>>>>>> explored under >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of >>>>>>> modalities >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of >>>> knowing >>>>>>> that is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" >>> [perceived??] >>>> if >>>>>>> we >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as >>> *style* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say >>> how >>>>>>> jazzed up >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the >>> mind >>>>> as >>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various >>>>>>> triads, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> finally >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my >>> notebooks >>>>> of >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind, as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, >>>> luega >>>>>>> pa? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fuera. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole < >>>> mcole@ucsd.edu> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, >>>> attached >>>>>>> are two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT >>>>> theorists >>>>>>> like >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of >>>>>>> imagination in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of >>>>>>> productive >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no >>>>>>> intention of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in >>> the >>>>>>> attached >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these >>>> philosophers, >>>>> I >>>>>>> came >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> upon >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely >>>>>>> linked at >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> several >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, >>>>>>> Ettienne and I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a >>>> means >>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> access >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander >>> Suvorov. >>>>>>> Moreover, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> such >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct >>>>> relevance >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kris's >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to >>>>>>> concerns >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> about >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in >>>> development. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. >>>>> Perhaps >>>>>>> they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> will >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a >>> natural >>>>>>> science >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural >>>> science >>>>>>> with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural >>> science >>>>>>> with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>> Assistant Professor >>>> Department of Anthropology >>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>> Brigham Young University >>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>>> >>> >> >> >> -- >> >> *Robert Lake Ed.D.*Associate Professor >> Social Foundations of Education >> Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading >> Georgia Southern University >> Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group >> P. O. Box 8144 >> Phone: (912) 478-0355 >> Fax: (912) 478-5382 >> Statesboro, GA 30460 > From hshonerd@gmail.com Sat Dec 20 07:43:05 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Sat, 20 Dec 2014 08:43:05 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Time, Imagination, Metaphor In-Reply-To: References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> <5493CC6B.5050105@mira.net> Message-ID: <2C35C258-0126-4861-9A81-65E0B7EEA498@gmail.com> Re: ?vertical? and ?horizontal?: think paradigmatic and syntagmatic. Henry > On Dec 19, 2014, at 6:19 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > > Francine, > Your comment: > > "The 'Natural' Science that arises from European culture begins as > mechanical physics and alchemy > in which machines have parts and chemicals have elements." > > Having "parts" and having "elements" as the beginning "point" or "position" > from which we get "in" to this theme of "natural" science > Francine would you say this theme iis also a "mytheme"? > I read this as a type of *opening* of an origin narrative or history as > situating development in specific concrete situations. [situate as both > verb and noun] with a theme of "cultural diversity" I keep mentioning > Raymond Williams as I find he writes within *THIS* STYLE and it is very > helpful for getting my bearings. > > It will put IN play what we mean by "academic or scientific" concepts as > possibly historically effected understandings. > Will we also explore Kris's notion of "vertical" and "horizontal" concepts > within cultural synergy? > David K's "grammatical metaphors" may also be involved in this cultural > diversity. > I have been considering reading more from Raymond Williams, so would > consider a shared reading with a similar exploration of cultural > permeability of time, imagination, metaphor, perception and trans-versal > ways of orienting or moving *in* the world. > Larry > > On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 3:37 PM, larry smolucha > wrote: >> >> Message from Francine: >> >> These three threads are all related (not forgetting perception and >> imagination). >> >> One of the things about XMCA threads is that the members each have so much >> to contribute, from their own perspectives as well as bibliographic >> references. >> >> The discourse does get philosophical raising old metaphysics questions of >> epistemology "How do we know what we know?" "How is our understanding >> shaped by language and culture?" XMCARs tend to be particularly >> self-conscious >> about their own use of language - which is good. There seems to be a >> striving >> for a new framework (paradigm) that clarifies these cross-cultural semiotic >> differences. >> >> The project I am working on is on how new ideas, customs, inventions, >> language, >> art, music, etc. are created through Cultural Synergy - when 'artifacts' >> from one >> culture enter another and are combined into something more than how the >> artifacts functioned in their original cultures. I can give mundane >> examples such as how >> noodles from China become spaghetti, elbow macaroni, etc. Or, the wheel as >> a potter's wheel, a wagon wheel, a gear, a grinding stone, a steering >> wheel, etc. >> (and all the mechanical devices that combine wheels, like pulleys and >> clocks and >> the first calculator). Concrete examples are a good start but there are >> more >> conceptual examples that I have just not had time to clarify. The >> discussion >> of time as it differs cross-culturally is a good starting point. Where I >> personally >> would want to go with this, is to look how how new conceptions of time >> emerge through >> inter-cultural contact. That is metaphysics. >> >> I also wonder how the semiotics of European, Middle Eastern, and Chinese >> cultures >> are related to their invention of the wheel and advancements in metallurgy. >> (Noting that Western African tribes did smelting of ore). The 'Natural' >> Science >> that arises from European culture begins as mechanical physics and alchemy >> in which machines have parts and chemicals have elements. It has evolved >> into >> the study of energy, and systems theory. >> >> There is enough here for ten volumes. Anyone interested? >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2014 03:25:02 -0800 >>> From: lpscholar2@gmail.com >>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Time >>> >>> This notion of our being a "verb" or being a "noun" or being a >> "position" >>> or possibly being a "pre" - position. >>> What I am wondering is where we are going?? >>> Are we actually "verbs" and "nouns" and "positions" and "pre"-positions?? >>> Do we "exist" in the grammar [syntax] or do we "exist" in the "semantics" >>> [meaning] or do we "exist" in the "Pragmatics" [doing, activity] >>> >>> I apologize if this question is merely "idio"-syncretic but it is the >>> imaginal mutually reciprocal "third space" which I am being invited to >>> occupy in THIS SPECIFIC community as we trans-late the imaginal into >>> "genres" or "forms". For this reason, I want to hold on to the moral >> virtue >>> of "cosmopolitanism" that Kris Gutierrez articulated in her paper. [Yes a >>> trans-position] Kris wrote: >>> "At the CORE of its [the third space] political-philosophical ROOTS, this >>> program is oriented towards a FORM {LP adds a form as a genre]] of >>> "cosmopolitanism" (Appiah, 2006) characterized by the ideals and >> practices >>> of a shared humanity, a profound OBLIGATION to others, boundary crossing, >>> and intercultural exchange in which difference is celebrated without >> being >>> romanticized. >>> To get to this "space" or "place" requires imagination. >>> >>> If Buckminster Fuller "seems" to be a verb, and others "seem" to be nouns >>> while others "seem" to be positions [stances] , while others "seem" to be >>> "pre"-positions, then the imaginal "seems" to be *IN* play. [with the >> full >>> awareness of *IN* as David K out-lined or under-scored or high-lighted.] >>> >>> I want to ask Francine what she meant by "metaphysical" in her signing >> off >>> on her recent examples or cases. Kris "pragmatics" or "performance" >> seems >>> to me "grounded" in the sense of rising [ideal] and returning [to ground] >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 2:17 AM, larry smolucha >>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I seem to be a verb >>>> >>>> R. Buckminster Fuller 1970 >>>> >>>>> Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2014 00:36:03 -0700 >>>>> From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com >>>>> To: ablunden@mira.net; xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Time >>>>> >>>>> Interesting how you have taken this Andy - to suggest that the Hopi >> lack >>>> a >>>>> founding principle of Natural Science. >>>>> >>>>> Whorf actually takes this in generally the opposite direction. In his >>>> work >>>>> on the Hopi language, he suggests that one finds a language much >> better >>>>> suited to thinking about the theoretical physics of Whorf's day >> (e.g., >>>>> Einstein's theory of relativity, quantum mechanics, etc.). In that >> sense, >>>>> Hopi is, in fact, closer to describing the way the world really is. >> (and >>>>> I'll quickly rescind those last six words if you have any >> objections!). >>>>> >>>>> As to your assumption that science requires the objectification of >> the >>>>> natural world, I'm sure there are others on the list who would agree >> with >>>>> me that there is good reason to question the necessity of >> subject/object >>>>> dualism for science. (and perhaps you were referring to a particular >>>>> scientific tradition by calling it "Natural Science" - maybe scary >> scare >>>>> quotes are needed?). >>>>> >>>>> -greg >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 11:57 PM, Andy Blunden >>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> That is an extremely interesting paragraph or two on the contrast >>>> between >>>>>> typical modern expressions of Time and how the Hopi language >> expresses >>>>>> corresponding situations. It seems that taking Nature (including >> Time) >>>> to >>>>>> be something which exists independently of us humans and can be >> known >>>> as >>>>>> such, in other words, the founding principle of Natural Science, is >>>> built >>>>>> into a premodern language, and is not shared by (at least one) >>>> indigenous >>>>>> people. >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> >>>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Greg Thompson wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Helena and David, >>>>>>> I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the >> so-called >>>>>>> authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred >> tradition >>>> to >>>>>>> Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi >> notion >>>> of >>>>>>> "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including English) >>>> notion >>>>>>> of >>>>>>> "time" and how each of these languages offers different >> affordances of >>>>>>> meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual understanding, >>>> English >>>>>>> has >>>>>>> a much more reified/objectified/entified sense of time. (btw, I >> think >>>> the >>>>>>> first paragraph is easier to follow than the second - and in that >>>> first >>>>>>> paragraph you'll find our old friend "imagination"). >>>>>>> David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to? >>>>>>> -greg >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Taken from: >>>>>>> http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/ >>>>>>> mousesite/Secondary/Whorfframe2.html >>>>>>> >>>>>>> " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, >> sunset" are >>>>>>> with >>>>>>> us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from other >>>> nouns. >>>>>>> They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in >> winter" >>>>>>> just >>>>>>> as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are pluralized >> and >>>>>>> numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. Our >> thought >>>>>>> about the referents of such words hence becomes objectified. >> Without >>>>>>> objectification, it would be a subjective experience of real time, >>>> i.e. of >>>>>>> the consciousness of "becoming later and later"--simply a cyclic >> phase >>>>>>> similar to an earlier phase in that ever-later-becoming duration. >>>> Only by >>>>>>> imagination can such a cyclic phase be set beside another and >> another >>>> in >>>>>>> the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually perceived) configuration. >> "But >>>> such >>>>>>> is the power of linguistic analogy that we do so objectify cyclic >>>> phasing. >>>>>>> We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g., >>>> "phasing." >>>>>>> And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting >>>> binomial >>>>>>> formula of formless item plus form, is so general that it is >> implicit >>>> for >>>>>>> all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless items like >>>> "substance, >>>>>>> matter," by which we can fill out the binomial for an enormously >> wide >>>>>>> range >>>>>>> of nouns. But even these are not quite generalized enough to take >> in >>>> our >>>>>>> phase nouns. So for the phase nouns we have made a formless item, >>>> "time." >>>>>>> We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, >> in the >>>>>>> pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" >> in >>>> the >>>>>>> pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can say >> and >>>>>>> think >>>>>>> "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." Let me again >>>> point >>>>>>> out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of milk" or "a >> piece >>>> of >>>>>>> cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a summer" actually >>>> contains >>>>>>> or consists of such-and-such a quantity of "time." >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., >> are not >>>>>>> nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They >> are a >>>>>>> formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, >> and >>>> even >>>>>>> other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a locative >>>>>>> pattern, >>>>>>> like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It contains no morpheme >> like >>>> one of >>>>>>> "in the house" or "at the tree." It means "when it is morning" or >>>> "while >>>>>>> morning-phase is occurring." These "temporal s" are not used as >>>> subjects >>>>>>> or >>>>>>> objects, or at all like nouns. One does not say "it's a hot >> summer" or >>>>>>> "summer is hot"; summer is not hot, summer is only WHEN >> conditions are >>>>>>> hot, >>>>>>> WHEN heat occurs. One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer >> now" or >>>>>>> "summer recently." There is no objectification, as a region, an >>>> extent, a >>>>>>> quantity, of the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested >>>> about >>>>>>> time except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is >> no >>>> basis >>>>>>> here for a formless item answering to our "time." " >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>>> Assistant Professor >>>>> Department of Anthropology >>>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>>> Brigham Young University >>>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>>> >>>> >> From hshonerd@gmail.com Sat Dec 20 08:32:54 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Sat, 20 Dec 2014 09:32:54 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors In-Reply-To: <1419043134656.6915@unm.edu> References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> <, > <1419043134656.6915@unm.edu> Message-ID: I am wondering if anything cultural is NOT embodied, since culture is human. Henry > On Dec 19, 2014, at 7:38 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > Hi metaphorically reasoning friends reasoning about metaphors, > > I wanted to say that there is a connection between what Larry is calling imaginal metaphors (I think he is calling them that), and what David is calling grammatical metaphors (I think he is calling them that). > > They are both classes of metaphors, but of a different order. > > In both cases, I'd say they can be of a cultural type and an embodied type. For example in the case of English prepositions, they are to an English speaker embodied and spatial, but in comparison to Sanskrit it would be also cultural because the word is separated from the object. > > For imaginal metaphors these can be embodied and cultural as well. "She sings sweetly," is embodied; "A rose is a rose is a rose by any other name," is cultural (coming from Shakespeare), unless I have misquoted him, of course. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Larry Purss > Sent: Friday, December 19, 2014 5:41 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors > > David, Robert, Francine > I find the insights offered by "grammatical metaphor" [contrasted with > "lexical metaphor"] and the comparison of Chaucer's use of grammatical > metaphor in relation TO Newton as potentially pregnant with possibility. > > LINKING also to Hopi ways of moving in the world and Aboriginal ways of > orienting indicates a potent vantage point for elaborating > cultural-historical theory and sociocritical literacy. > Is "metaphor" too vast a topic line. David's examples of "grammatical > metaphor" within specific historical developments seem to situate science > and reason and equating in a radically different relation to the > imaginal?. > > I also wonder if another thread should explore the multiple complex German > themes of the imaginal in Kant, Hegel, that was recently posted. I was lost > in the subtle differences but sense these differences in German may be > relevant to our exploration of the imaginal. > I am learning the complexity of this theme and "grammatical metaphor" seems > to be key to different notions of the fact/fiction reciprocal trans-lations > Larry > > On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 3:48 PM, larry smolucha > wrote: >> >> Message from Francine: >> >> Just a thought - Is the use of nouns, verbs, prepositions a result >> of developing a written language based on an alphabet? >> >> Language use in a culture with no written language would surely differ >> significantly. >> >> And written languages based on hieroglyphs, pictograms, cuneiform, >> Norse Runes, Celtic oghams, etc. surely divide and frame experience >> differently. >> >> >>> From: boblake@georgiasouthern.edu >>> Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2014 16:43:24 -0500 >>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors >>> >>> Hi Everyone, >>> I appreciate this thread's emphasis on the relativistic character of >>> metaphoric language and find think that it supports Vygotsky's notion of >>> the fluid nature of language as it emerges from socio-cultural and >>> socio-historical contexts in meaning making (in contrast to biological >>> determinism). Because each culture makes meaning in widely diverse ways, >>> language forms and usage might have complex intricacies and shades of >>> meaning on one concept alone. Along with the example of early 20th >> century >>> Hopi's view of time, there are other more recent examples from the >> present >>> day that suggest ways that language can shape thought . >>> >>> Consider the Australian aboriginal language, Guugu Yimithirr, from north >>> Queensland who have no words for right or left, in front of, or behind to >>> describe location. Instead they use the points of the compass even when >>> requesting that someone move over to make room. They will say ?move a bit >>> to the east.? To tell you where exactly they left something in your >> house, >>> they?ll say, ?I left it on the southern edge of the western table.? >> (Deutscher, >>> 2010, p. MM 42) >>> >>> The effect on the thinking of this group is phenomenal in orienting the >>> speakers to their directional spatial environment to such a degree that >>> roughly 1 out of every 10 words in conversational Guugu Yimithirr >> includes >>> either north, south, east or west and is accompanied with precise hand >>> gestures (ibid). Consequently in this culture, language acquisition >>> involves constant awareness of spaces relative to the points of the >>> compass. Deutscher relays a fascinating story about the ways that memory >>> is stored for the speakers of this language. The story also serves as a >>> clear example of Vygotsky?s notion of language as a mediating tool as a >>> means of creating higher levels of consciousness through spatial >>> kinesthetic approaches to meaning creation. >>> >>> >>> >>> One Guugu Yimithirr speaker was filmed telling his friends the story of >> how >>> in his youth, he capsized in shark-infested waters. He and an older >> person >>> were caught in a storm, and their boat tipped over. They both jumped into >>> the water and managed to swim nearly three miles to the shore, only to >>> discover that the missionary for whom they worked was far more concerned >> at >>> the loss of the boat than relieved at their miraculous escape. Apart from >>> the dramatic content, the remarkable thing about the story was that it >> was >>> remembered throughout in cardinal directions: the speaker jumped into the >>> water on the western side of the boat, his companion to the east of the >>> boat, they saw a giant shark swimming north and so on. Perhaps the >> cardinal >>> directions were just made up for the occasion? Well, quite by chance, the >>> same person was filmed some years later telling the same story. The >>> cardinal directions matched exactly in the two tellings. Even more >>> remarkable were the spontaneous hand gestures that accompanied the story. >>> For instance, the direction in which the boat rolled over was gestured in >>> the correct geographic orientation, regardless of the direction the >> speaker >>> was facing in the two films (ibid). >>> >>> >>> *Robert* >>> >>> >>> Deutscher, G. (2010, August 29) Does your language shape how you think? >> *The >>> New York Times* *Sunday Magazine, *p. MM 42. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 4:05 PM, David Kellogg >> wrote: >>>> >>>> Yes, Haliday is essentially a Whorfian, and that's one of things that >>>> brings him close to Vygotsky. (Compare, for example, Chomsky, who is >>>> essentially anti-developmental in his ideas about language, and who now >>>> rejects the leading role played by social communication and says that >>>> communication is epiphenomenal to language, whose original purpose is >>>> thought.) For Sapir, and for Whorf, in the beginning of every major >>>> onotogenetic, sociogenetic, and even phylogenetic change in language >> there >>>> has to be some change in the nature of communication. >>>> >>>> So what Andy says about the lack of the basis of modern science in Hopi >>>> applies perfectly well to English. When we read the scientific >> writings of >>>> Chaucer on the astrolabe, for example, we do not see words like >>>> "reflection", "refraction" or "alignment". Chaucer uses words like >> "bounce >>>> off", "bend through", and "line up" (note the use of prepositions, >>>> Helena!). Where did these words come from, and how did they make >> scientific >>>> English possible? >>>> >>>> Most of us have no problem saying that Isaac Newton discovered the >> laws of >>>> gravitation. But it's only a slight exaggeration to say that what he >> really >>>> discovered was the meaning potential of words like "gravitation". >> Gravity >>>> is, of course, not a thing at all; that is, it's not an entity, but >> rather >>>> a process, the process of falling down, or falling in (preps, again!). >> So >>>> how and above all why does it become an entity? >>>> >>>> It's interesting to compare Newton's writings on optics with Chaucer's >> on >>>> the astrolabe. The "Opticks" has a fixed format that we recognize >> almost >>>> instantly today: Newton describes his equipment (the prism and the dark >>>> room); he then narrates his method as a kind of recipe ("First, I did >> this; >>>> then I did that") and draws conclusions, which he then formulates in >>>> mathematical terms (this is essentially the format of Vygotsky's >> lectures >>>> on pedology, so much so that when translating them we had some trouble >>>> determining the precise moment when Vygotsky turns to the blackboard to >>>> write his conclusion in the form of a law). >>>> >>>> In order to get them into mathematical shape, though, he has to make >>>> sentences that look a lot like equations. "The plumpness of the lens >> yields >>>> a greater refraction of the light", "The reflection of the light from >> the >>>> glass results of the light striking the flatness of the glass" "The >>>> curvature of the spectacle glass supplies the lacking plumpness of the >>>> eye". In each of these, a quality or a process which would normally be >>>> realized as an adjective or a verb is suddenly realized by a noun, >> creating >>>> an imaginary entity. >>>> >>>> That's grammatical metaphor. Something that is "canonically" realized >> by a >>>> verb ("to grow") is suddenly realized nominally ("growth"), or >> something >>>> that is canonically a quality ('red") is realized verbally ("redden"). >> We >>>> even find related clauses realized as verbs ("She did not know the >> rules. >>>> So she died" is realized by "Death was brought about through >> ignorance", >>>> all of these examples from Halliday). In fact, the Genetic Law that >>>> Vygotsky formulates in "Mind in Society" ("Every higher mental >> function is >>>> realized on two planes....") is really just one instance of grammatical >>>> metaphor. >>>> >>>> One of Chomsky's best known arguments for the radical innateness >> hypothesis >>>> is this. If I take a sentence like "Students who do not do their >> homework >>>> do not do well" and I want to make a question, how do I know which >> "do" to >>>> move to the front? Chomsky assumes that this knowledge is essentially >>>> innate; it is part of universal grammar. But you can see that "Do >> students >>>> who do not do their homework do well?" can be built up through a >> process of >>>> what we might call "discourse metaphor"--whereby clauses stand for >>>> exchanges: >>>> >>>> Mother: You did your homework, didn't you? >>>> Child: No. >>>> Mother: You didn't do your homework? Did you do well? >>>> Child: No. >>>> Mother: You didn't do well? >>>> Child: No. >>>> Mother: You didn't do you homework so you didn't do well. Do the other >>>> students do well? >>>> Child: Some of them. >>>> Mother: Who does well? Do students who do not do their homework do >> well? >>>> >>>> And this of course explains why wh-items like "who" and 'why" have two >>>> functions--one inside a clause, where it expresses an intra-mental >> function >>>> (grammar) and one between them where it expresses an inter-mental >> function >>>> (discourse). >>>> >>>> I realize that grammatical metaphor will seem rather dry and abstract >> and >>>> unpoetic to people who assume that metaphor is only of the lexical >> kind. >>>> But to me, and I think to most children, it is far far more powerful >> and >>>> far more important developmentally. In some ways, it's the lexical >> metaphor >>>> that is responsible for the disenchantment of the child's world, while >> the >>>> grammatical metaphor infinitely expands it. (And here, I'm afraid, I >> must >>>> stop--it's time for breakfast and anyway my one screen is used up!) >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> , or "the >>>> >>>> . He >>>> >>>> On 19 December 2014 at 15:15, Greg Thompson >> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Helena and David, >>>>> I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the >> so-called >>>>> authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred >> tradition to >>>>> Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi >> notion of >>>>> "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including English) >> notion >>>> of >>>>> "time" and how each of these languages offers different affordances >> of >>>>> meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual understanding, >> English >>>> has >>>>> a much more reified/objectified/entified sense of time. (btw, I >> think the >>>>> first paragraph is easier to follow than the second - and in that >> first >>>>> paragraph you'll find our old friend "imagination"). >>>>> David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to? >>>>> -greg >>>>> >>>>> Taken from: >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >> http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/mousesite/Secondary/Whorfframe2.html >>>>> >>>>> " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, sunset" >> are >>>> with >>>>> us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from other >> nouns. >>>>> They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in >> winter" >>>> just >>>>> as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are pluralized and >>>>> numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. Our >> thought >>>>> about the referents of such words hence becomes objectified. Without >>>>> objectification, it would be a subjective experience of real time, >> i.e. >>>> of >>>>> the consciousness of "becoming later and later"--simply a cyclic >> phase >>>>> similar to an earlier phase in that ever-later-becoming duration. >> Only by >>>>> imagination can such a cyclic phase be set beside another and >> another in >>>>> the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually perceived) configuration. "But >>>> such >>>>> is the power of linguistic analogy that we do so objectify cyclic >>>> phasing. >>>>> We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g., >>>> "phasing." >>>>> And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting >> binomial >>>>> formula of formless item plus form, is so general that it is >> implicit for >>>>> all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless items like >> "substance, >>>>> matter," by which we can fill out the binomial for an enormously wide >>>> range >>>>> of nouns. But even these are not quite generalized enough to take in >> our >>>>> phase nouns. So for the phase nouns we have made a formless item, >> "time." >>>>> We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, in >> the >>>>> pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" in >> the >>>>> pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can say and >>>> think >>>>> "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." Let me again >> point >>>>> out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of milk" or "a >> piece of >>>>> cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a summer" actually >>>> contains >>>>> or consists of such-and-such a quantity of "time." >>>>> >>>>> In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., are >> not >>>>> nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They are >> a >>>>> formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, and >> even >>>>> other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a locative >>>> pattern, >>>>> like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It contains no morpheme like >> one >>>> of >>>>> "in the house" or "at the tree." It means "when it is morning" or >> "while >>>>> morning-phase is occurring." These "temporal s" are not used as >> subjects >>>> or >>>>> objects, or at all like nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" >> or >>>>> "summer is hot"; summer is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions >> are >>>> hot, >>>>> WHEN heat occurs. One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or >>>>> "summer recently." There is no objectification, as a region, an >> extent, a >>>>> quantity, of the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested >> about >>>>> time except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no >> basis >>>>> here for a formless item answering to our "time." " >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Helena Worthen < >> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>> >>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to this: >>>>>> >>>>>> "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton >>>>>> and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to >> create >>>>>> sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly >> productive, >>>>>> which is why they still form the basis of scientific writing and >>>> thinking >>>>>> today." >>>>>> >>>>>> Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I lose you >> when >>>>> you >>>>>> say "created to talk about gravity as an entity". >>>>>> >>>>>> Thank you, >>>>>> >>>>>> Helena >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>>> >>>>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> As Helena points out, prepositions are from the "grammatical" >> end of >>>>> what >>>>>>> Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what >> Halliday >>>>> calls >>>>>>> "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they have >>>> three >>>>>>> properties that words from the more "lexical" end do not have: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You can, >>>>>> actually, >>>>>>> but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you invent a new >>>> name >>>>>> or a >>>>>>> new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific semantic >>>> field >>>>>> (the >>>>>>> way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of >>>>> linguistics) >>>>>>> but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are used. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the same >>>>> effect, >>>>>>> which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your argument" the >> "in" >>>>> has >>>>>>> more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in "there's a >> fly in >>>>> your >>>>>>> tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in Henry's >> hands, >>>>>> refer >>>>>>> to a book or even a footnote. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties pretty >>>> much >>>>>>> define the difference between learning and development, at least >> as I >>>>>>> understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on functions >>>>>>> indefinitely while development works by reorganizing the closed >> set >>>> of >>>>>>> functions you already have into new systems. Learning is skill >>>> specific >>>>>>> and local, while development is quite global in its implications. >>>>>> Learning >>>>>>> is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new systems, >>>> while >>>>>>> development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary (and >> forget it >>>>> just >>>>>>> as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes away. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of blue >> that >>>>>> people >>>>>>> call the sky") are simply metaphors from the non-productive end >> of >>>> the >>>>>>> lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are crisp, >> concrete, >>>> and >>>>>>> vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations >> that >>>>> Newton >>>>>>> and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to >> create >>>>>>> sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly >>>> productive, >>>>>>> which is why they still form the basis of scientific writing and >>>>> thinking >>>>>>> today. For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical metaphor is >> the >>>>> third >>>>>>> great moment in child development (after the break into mother >> tongue >>>>> and >>>>>>> the break into disciplinary language in school work). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" implies >>>> zero >>>>>>> dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two ("on a line', >> 'on >>>> a >>>>>>> plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because they >> are >>>>>>> grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them with >> time: >>>> 'at >>>>> a >>>>>>> point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. Compare: "at >>>>>>> Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very day), and >> "in >>>>>>> Christmas' (season). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen < >>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial >>>>>>>> relationships from the concrete material world into the >> conceptual >>>>>>>> imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 common ones, and >>>>>> between 70 >>>>>>>> and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far >> as" -- >>>>>> this >>>>>>>> is according to >>>> https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm >>>>> ). >>>>>>>> We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. >> Apparently, in >>>>>>>> English, they evolved from and did the job done by inflections >> in >>>>> parent >>>>>>>> languages, examples being cases and tenses. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection >> like >>>> the >>>>>>>> dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial >> relationships >>>>>> suggested >>>>>>>> by contemporary prepositions. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about this. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly >>>>> embodied, >>>>>>>> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to >>>> linguistics >>>>>> (For >>>>>>>> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on >>>>> ?lexicon?: >>>>>>>> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, >>>> being >>>>>> part >>>>>>>> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and >> Halliday >>>>>> see no >>>>>>>> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, >>>> lexico-grammar. >>>>>> (Lo >>>>>>>> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar, >>>> adding >>>>>> the >>>>>>>> ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings >> are >>>>> great >>>>>>>> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of >> that? >>>> In >>>>>>>> translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced? >>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden >>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the >>>>> metaphorical >>>>>>>> use of prepositions like: >>>>>>>>>> - "there is some value IN your argument" >>>>>>>>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again" >>>>>>>>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" >>>>>>>>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again" >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> and so on. >>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> larry smolucha wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself - >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic >>>>>> possibilities: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published >> in >>>>>> Thought >>>>>>>>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into >>>>> English >>>>>>>> 1962] >>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the >> 'additive' >>>>> value >>>>>>>> of the >>>>>>>>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech >>>>>> vocalization). >>>>>>>>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements >> that >>>> are >>>>>>>> flammable >>>>>>>>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable >> nor a >>>>> gas. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century >> European >>>>>>>> Developmental >>>>>>>>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' >>>> hence >>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of >>>>> Piaget's >>>>>>>> Genetic >>>>>>>>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and >> synthesis >>>>>>>> based on >>>>>>>>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in >> Vygotsky's >>>>>>>> example of H2O. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 >>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be >> synergistic >>>>>>>>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the >>>> parts. >>>>>>>>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more >> than >>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can >> ever >>>>> be >>>>>>>> imagined" >>>>>>>>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> A couple things to consider: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination >> as >>>> the >>>>>>>> brain has >>>>>>>>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the >> simplest >>>>> level >>>>>>>> of the Gestalt >>>>>>>>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). >>>>>>>>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just >>>>> photographic. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try >> to >>>>>>>> accurately reproduce >>>>>>>>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. >> Whereas, >>>> the >>>>>>>> goal of combinatory >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, >> dreams, >>>>>>>> musings, and even >>>>>>>>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of >>>>> objects >>>>>>>> and symbols. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different >> ways >>>> that >>>>>>>> things and concepts can be >>>>>>>>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar >> and >>>>>> flour. >>>>>>>>>>>> I can add water and >> it >>>>>>>> dissolves a bit >>>>>>>>>>>> But adding heat >> changes >>>>> the >>>>>>>> combination into a pancake. >>>>>>>>>>>> [Is this synergistic?] >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more >>>> examples >>>>>>>> to put the discussion >>>>>>>>>>>> in the metaphysical realm. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 >>>>>>>>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the >>>> case >>>>>> for >>>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I >> think >>>>> it's >>>>>>>> not >>>>>>>>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are >>>>>>>> associationists who >>>>>>>>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary >>>> associationism >>>>>>>> exists and >>>>>>>>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as >> mediation. >>>>>>>> Vygotsky >>>>>>>>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, >>>>> explain >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>> uniqueness of our species? >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species >> feels for >>>>> its >>>>>>>> own >>>>>>>>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a >>>> Piagetian >>>>>>>>>>>>> perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true >>>> maturity >>>>>> as a >>>>>>>>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing >> more to >>>> it >>>>>>>> than >>>>>>>>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of >>>> primate, >>>>>> and >>>>>>>> our >>>>>>>>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon >>>> rocks >>>>>> in >>>>>>>> order >>>>>>>>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged >> the >>>>> same >>>>>>>> way as >>>>>>>>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and >> for >>>>>>>> language is >>>>>>>>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human >>>>>>>> exceptionalism. >>>>>>>>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for >> the >>>>>>>> vanguard role >>>>>>>>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, >>>>>> prolonging >>>>>>>>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after >> the >>>>> sick >>>>>>>> and the >>>>>>>>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial >> organs >>>>>>>> (tools) and >>>>>>>>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for >> our >>>>>>>> species, it >>>>>>>>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these >>>>>>>> "circuitous, >>>>>>>>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that >> lead >>>>> our >>>>>>>>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always >> been >>>>>>>> short on >>>>>>>>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for >> material >>>>>>>> culture >>>>>>>>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another >> matter: >>>>>>>> verily, here >>>>>>>>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of >> attention >>>> is >>>>>>>> simply the >>>>>>>>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says >> there >>>> are >>>>>>>> only two >>>>>>>>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So >>>>>>>> imagination is >>>>>>>>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete >> experiences, >>>> and >>>>>>>> nothing >>>>>>>>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, >> when you >>>>>> hear >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been >> there to >>>> be >>>>>>>> able to >>>>>>>>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at >> work in >>>>> word >>>>>>>> meaning. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who >> was >>>>>> given >>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been >> mixed >>>>> with >>>>>>>> silver >>>>>>>>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of >>>> gold. >>>>>>>> Well, we >>>>>>>>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not >>>>> possible >>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that >> precisely. >>>> The >>>>>>>> method >>>>>>>>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the >> "principal >>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes >> palimpsest, >>>> a >>>>>>>> velum on >>>>>>>>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each >> other. >>>>>> Because >>>>>>>>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and >> written >>>>> over >>>>>>>> every >>>>>>>>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was >> soft, >>>> the >>>>>>>> pressure >>>>>>>>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones >>>> when >>>>>> the >>>>>>>> old >>>>>>>>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the >> only >>>>> known >>>>>>>> Greek >>>>>>>>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor >> their >>>>>>>> relationship >>>>>>>>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they >> are >>>>>>>> related to >>>>>>>>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's >> quite >>>>>> similar >>>>>>>> to the >>>>>>>>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD < >>>> hshonerd@gmail.com> >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an >>>>>> associationist, >>>>>>>> ?sees >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg < >>>>> dkellogg60@gmail.com >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the >> division >>>>>>>> between >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, >>>> because >>>>>>>> Ribot is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> an >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal >> form >>>> of >>>>>>>> attention. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the >> transition >>>>> from >>>>>>>> forest >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division >>>>> between >>>>>>>> the two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and >>>> commonsensical >>>>>>>> world of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly >> prosaic >>>>> uses >>>>>>>> in life >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more >>>>>> "imaginative" >>>>>>>> (that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world >> of >>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> farm,where >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long >> winter >>>>>>>> months are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to >>>>> encounter >>>>>>>> talking >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here >>>> attention >>>>>> has >>>>>>>> to be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> more voluntary. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a >> very >>>>> clear >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism >> that >>>>>>>> underpins >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky >>>> points >>>>>> out >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive >>>> practices >>>>>>>> really >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of >>>>> imagination, >>>>>>>> there >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between >>>> human >>>>>> and >>>>>>>> animal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly >> capable >>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> volitional >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than >> humans). >>>>>> Without >>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> theory >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis >> for >>>>>> Ribot's >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological >> functions >>>> at >>>>>>>> all. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole >>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of >> imagination, >>>>>>>> thanks to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> all >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very >> influential >>>>>>>> around the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> time >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. >> I >>>> had >>>>>>>> seen work >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> on >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective >> equal >>>>>>>> reproductive? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies >> of >>>>>>>> development >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of >>>> being >>>>> a >>>>>>>> relative >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my >> bucket >>>>> list. >>>>>>>> This >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings >> from >>>>> some >>>>>>>> weeks >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct >> that >>>>>>>> segmented the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met >>>> aphorizing?. >>>>>>>> Puns, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole < >> mcole@ucsd.edu> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant >> and >>>>> they >>>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his >>>>>>>> followers as an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by >> Hegel, >>>> so >>>>>>>> its of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> course >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in >>>>>>>> translation, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> seems >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, >> "recollection" >>>>> in >>>>>>>> this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> passage, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter >>>>>>>> distinction to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "memory." >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in >>>> contemporary >>>>>>>> discourse >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian >>>>>>>> colleagues have >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from >>>>> theorists >>>>>>>> who >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clearly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it >> was >>>>> still >>>>>>>> possible >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, >>>>>>>> interestingly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> links >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a >>>>> "voluntary" >>>>>>>> act. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Parts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children >> stuff >>>>>> that >>>>>>>> was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> also >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts >> of >>>>>>>> creativity >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious >> to >>>> see >>>>>>>> that the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found >>>>> himself >>>>>>>> writing. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which >>>> pretty >>>>>> old >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> approaches >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < >>>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, >> but >>>> it >>>>>>>> may be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> worth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent >>>> place >>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagination >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between >>>>>>>> Recollection and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive >>>>>>>> Imagination, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> (2) >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, >> which >>>>> he >>>>>>>> says >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> leads >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In >>>> other >>>>>>>> words, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is >>>>>>>> accomplished >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> through >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading >> Strawson >>>> and >>>>>>>> Williams. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists >> whose >>>>> work i >>>>>>>> am >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> trying >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of >>>>>>>> productive >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive >>>>> imagination >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> develops. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive >> implies >>>> that >>>>>>>> there >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> must >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive >> imagination. >>>> But >>>>> I >>>>>>>> learned >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination >> appears >>>> and >>>>> is >>>>>>>> linked >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable >> part of >>>>>>>> anticipation >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on >>>> imagination >>>>>>>> (starting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous >> look, >>>> and >>>>>>>> provides >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural >> as >>>>>> fixed. >>>>>>>> This, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives >> me a >>>>>> ground >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> take >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> part >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start >> with >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preconceptions: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive >> grammarian >>>>>>>> Langacker on >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive >> domains, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is >> full >>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two >> aspects of >>>>>>>> temporality: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic >>>>>>>> structure), which >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for >>>> both >>>>>>>> individual >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < >>>>>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third >>>>> *space* >>>>>>>> and the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and >> his >>>>>>>> notion of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion >> is >>>>>>>> explored under >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a >> *set* of >>>>>>>> modalities >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of >>>>> knowing >>>>>>>> that is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" >>>> [perceived??] >>>>> if >>>>>>>> we >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as >>>> *style* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to >> say >>>> how >>>>>>>> jazzed up >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, >> the >>>> mind >>>>>> as >>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually >> various >>>>>>>> triads, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> finally >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my >>>> notebooks >>>>>> of >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind, as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap >> adentro, >>>>> luega >>>>>>>> pa? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fuera. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole < >>>>> mcole@ucsd.edu> >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, >>>>> attached >>>>>>>> are two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT >>>>>> theorists >>>>>>>> like >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of >>>>>>>> imagination in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion >> of >>>>>>>> productive >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have >> no >>>>>>>> intention of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated >> in >>>> the >>>>>>>> attached >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these >>>>> philosophers, >>>>>> I >>>>>>>> came >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> upon >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very >> closely >>>>>>>> linked at >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> several >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our >> naivete, >>>>>>>> Ettienne and I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as >> a >>>>> means >>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> access >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander >>>> Suvorov. >>>>>>>> Moreover, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> such >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct >>>>>> relevance >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kris's >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak >> to >>>>>>>> concerns >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> about >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in >>>>> development. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination >> thread. >>>>>> Perhaps >>>>>>>> they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> will >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a >>>> natural >>>>>>>> science >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > Strawson.pdf> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural >>>>> science >>>>>>>> with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural >>>> science >>>>>>>> with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>>> Assistant Professor >>>>> Department of Anthropology >>>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>>> Brigham Young University >>>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> *Robert Lake Ed.D.*Associate Professor >>> Social Foundations of Education >>> Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading >>> Georgia Southern University >>> Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group >>> P. O. Box 8144 >>> Phone: (912) 478-0355 >>> Fax: (912) 478-5382 >>> Statesboro, GA 30460 >> >> > From hshonerd@gmail.com Sat Dec 20 08:43:15 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Sat, 20 Dec 2014 09:43:15 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors In-Reply-To: References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> Message-ID: <65B84E4F-B9C3-4CC2-A3BC-C5B4F0F8B918@gmail.com> David stirred up a lot of stuff. I was especially interested in his invented dialog (I think invented) between a mother and child, showing how grammar is built from dialog, that is grammar is usage based, rather than usage being grammar based. Henry > On Dec 19, 2014, at 5:41 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > > David, Robert, Francine > I find the insights offered by "grammatical metaphor" [contrasted with > "lexical metaphor"] and the comparison of Chaucer's use of grammatical > metaphor in relation TO Newton as potentially pregnant with possibility. > > LINKING also to Hopi ways of moving in the world and Aboriginal ways of > orienting indicates a potent vantage point for elaborating > cultural-historical theory and sociocritical literacy. > Is "metaphor" too vast a topic line. David's examples of "grammatical > metaphor" within specific historical developments seem to situate science > and reason and equating in a radically different relation to the > imaginal?. > > I also wonder if another thread should explore the multiple complex German > themes of the imaginal in Kant, Hegel, that was recently posted. I was lost > in the subtle differences but sense these differences in German may be > relevant to our exploration of the imaginal. > I am learning the complexity of this theme and "grammatical metaphor" seems > to be key to different notions of the fact/fiction reciprocal trans-lations > Larry > > On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 3:48 PM, larry smolucha > wrote: >> >> Message from Francine: >> >> Just a thought - Is the use of nouns, verbs, prepositions a result >> of developing a written language based on an alphabet? >> >> Language use in a culture with no written language would surely differ >> significantly. >> >> And written languages based on hieroglyphs, pictograms, cuneiform, >> Norse Runes, Celtic oghams, etc. surely divide and frame experience >> differently. >> >> >>> From: boblake@georgiasouthern.edu >>> Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2014 16:43:24 -0500 >>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors >>> >>> Hi Everyone, >>> I appreciate this thread's emphasis on the relativistic character of >>> metaphoric language and find think that it supports Vygotsky's notion of >>> the fluid nature of language as it emerges from socio-cultural and >>> socio-historical contexts in meaning making (in contrast to biological >>> determinism). Because each culture makes meaning in widely diverse ways, >>> language forms and usage might have complex intricacies and shades of >>> meaning on one concept alone. Along with the example of early 20th >> century >>> Hopi's view of time, there are other more recent examples from the >> present >>> day that suggest ways that language can shape thought . >>> >>> Consider the Australian aboriginal language, Guugu Yimithirr, from north >>> Queensland who have no words for right or left, in front of, or behind to >>> describe location. Instead they use the points of the compass even when >>> requesting that someone move over to make room. They will say ?move a bit >>> to the east.? To tell you where exactly they left something in your >> house, >>> they?ll say, ?I left it on the southern edge of the western table.? >> (Deutscher, >>> 2010, p. MM 42) >>> >>> The effect on the thinking of this group is phenomenal in orienting the >>> speakers to their directional spatial environment to such a degree that >>> roughly 1 out of every 10 words in conversational Guugu Yimithirr >> includes >>> either north, south, east or west and is accompanied with precise hand >>> gestures (ibid). Consequently in this culture, language acquisition >>> involves constant awareness of spaces relative to the points of the >>> compass. Deutscher relays a fascinating story about the ways that memory >>> is stored for the speakers of this language. The story also serves as a >>> clear example of Vygotsky?s notion of language as a mediating tool as a >>> means of creating higher levels of consciousness through spatial >>> kinesthetic approaches to meaning creation. >>> >>> >>> >>> One Guugu Yimithirr speaker was filmed telling his friends the story of >> how >>> in his youth, he capsized in shark-infested waters. He and an older >> person >>> were caught in a storm, and their boat tipped over. They both jumped into >>> the water and managed to swim nearly three miles to the shore, only to >>> discover that the missionary for whom they worked was far more concerned >> at >>> the loss of the boat than relieved at their miraculous escape. Apart from >>> the dramatic content, the remarkable thing about the story was that it >> was >>> remembered throughout in cardinal directions: the speaker jumped into the >>> water on the western side of the boat, his companion to the east of the >>> boat, they saw a giant shark swimming north and so on. Perhaps the >> cardinal >>> directions were just made up for the occasion? Well, quite by chance, the >>> same person was filmed some years later telling the same story. The >>> cardinal directions matched exactly in the two tellings. Even more >>> remarkable were the spontaneous hand gestures that accompanied the story. >>> For instance, the direction in which the boat rolled over was gestured in >>> the correct geographic orientation, regardless of the direction the >> speaker >>> was facing in the two films (ibid). >>> >>> >>> *Robert* >>> >>> >>> Deutscher, G. (2010, August 29) Does your language shape how you think? >> *The >>> New York Times* *Sunday Magazine, *p. MM 42. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 4:05 PM, David Kellogg >> wrote: >>>> >>>> Yes, Haliday is essentially a Whorfian, and that's one of things that >>>> brings him close to Vygotsky. (Compare, for example, Chomsky, who is >>>> essentially anti-developmental in his ideas about language, and who now >>>> rejects the leading role played by social communication and says that >>>> communication is epiphenomenal to language, whose original purpose is >>>> thought.) For Sapir, and for Whorf, in the beginning of every major >>>> onotogenetic, sociogenetic, and even phylogenetic change in language >> there >>>> has to be some change in the nature of communication. >>>> >>>> So what Andy says about the lack of the basis of modern science in Hopi >>>> applies perfectly well to English. When we read the scientific >> writings of >>>> Chaucer on the astrolabe, for example, we do not see words like >>>> "reflection", "refraction" or "alignment". Chaucer uses words like >> "bounce >>>> off", "bend through", and "line up" (note the use of prepositions, >>>> Helena!). Where did these words come from, and how did they make >> scientific >>>> English possible? >>>> >>>> Most of us have no problem saying that Isaac Newton discovered the >> laws of >>>> gravitation. But it's only a slight exaggeration to say that what he >> really >>>> discovered was the meaning potential of words like "gravitation". >> Gravity >>>> is, of course, not a thing at all; that is, it's not an entity, but >> rather >>>> a process, the process of falling down, or falling in (preps, again!). >> So >>>> how and above all why does it become an entity? >>>> >>>> It's interesting to compare Newton's writings on optics with Chaucer's >> on >>>> the astrolabe. The "Opticks" has a fixed format that we recognize >> almost >>>> instantly today: Newton describes his equipment (the prism and the dark >>>> room); he then narrates his method as a kind of recipe ("First, I did >> this; >>>> then I did that") and draws conclusions, which he then formulates in >>>> mathematical terms (this is essentially the format of Vygotsky's >> lectures >>>> on pedology, so much so that when translating them we had some trouble >>>> determining the precise moment when Vygotsky turns to the blackboard to >>>> write his conclusion in the form of a law). >>>> >>>> In order to get them into mathematical shape, though, he has to make >>>> sentences that look a lot like equations. "The plumpness of the lens >> yields >>>> a greater refraction of the light", "The reflection of the light from >> the >>>> glass results of the light striking the flatness of the glass" "The >>>> curvature of the spectacle glass supplies the lacking plumpness of the >>>> eye". In each of these, a quality or a process which would normally be >>>> realized as an adjective or a verb is suddenly realized by a noun, >> creating >>>> an imaginary entity. >>>> >>>> That's grammatical metaphor. Something that is "canonically" realized >> by a >>>> verb ("to grow") is suddenly realized nominally ("growth"), or >> something >>>> that is canonically a quality ('red") is realized verbally ("redden"). >> We >>>> even find related clauses realized as verbs ("She did not know the >> rules. >>>> So she died" is realized by "Death was brought about through >> ignorance", >>>> all of these examples from Halliday). In fact, the Genetic Law that >>>> Vygotsky formulates in "Mind in Society" ("Every higher mental >> function is >>>> realized on two planes....") is really just one instance of grammatical >>>> metaphor. >>>> >>>> One of Chomsky's best known arguments for the radical innateness >> hypothesis >>>> is this. If I take a sentence like "Students who do not do their >> homework >>>> do not do well" and I want to make a question, how do I know which >> "do" to >>>> move to the front? Chomsky assumes that this knowledge is essentially >>>> innate; it is part of universal grammar. But you can see that "Do >> students >>>> who do not do their homework do well?" can be built up through a >> process of >>>> what we might call "discourse metaphor"--whereby clauses stand for >>>> exchanges: >>>> >>>> Mother: You did your homework, didn't you? >>>> Child: No. >>>> Mother: You didn't do your homework? Did you do well? >>>> Child: No. >>>> Mother: You didn't do well? >>>> Child: No. >>>> Mother: You didn't do you homework so you didn't do well. Do the other >>>> students do well? >>>> Child: Some of them. >>>> Mother: Who does well? Do students who do not do their homework do >> well? >>>> >>>> And this of course explains why wh-items like "who" and 'why" have two >>>> functions--one inside a clause, where it expresses an intra-mental >> function >>>> (grammar) and one between them where it expresses an inter-mental >> function >>>> (discourse). >>>> >>>> I realize that grammatical metaphor will seem rather dry and abstract >> and >>>> unpoetic to people who assume that metaphor is only of the lexical >> kind. >>>> But to me, and I think to most children, it is far far more powerful >> and >>>> far more important developmentally. In some ways, it's the lexical >> metaphor >>>> that is responsible for the disenchantment of the child's world, while >> the >>>> grammatical metaphor infinitely expands it. (And here, I'm afraid, I >> must >>>> stop--it's time for breakfast and anyway my one screen is used up!) >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> , or "the >>>> >>>> . He >>>> >>>> On 19 December 2014 at 15:15, Greg Thompson >> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Helena and David, >>>>> I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the >> so-called >>>>> authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred >> tradition to >>>>> Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi >> notion of >>>>> "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including English) >> notion >>>> of >>>>> "time" and how each of these languages offers different affordances >> of >>>>> meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual understanding, >> English >>>> has >>>>> a much more reified/objectified/entified sense of time. (btw, I >> think the >>>>> first paragraph is easier to follow than the second - and in that >> first >>>>> paragraph you'll find our old friend "imagination"). >>>>> David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to? >>>>> -greg >>>>> >>>>> Taken from: >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >> http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/mousesite/Secondary/Whorfframe2.html >>>>> >>>>> " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, sunset" >> are >>>> with >>>>> us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from other >> nouns. >>>>> They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in >> winter" >>>> just >>>>> as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are pluralized and >>>>> numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. Our >> thought >>>>> about the referents of such words hence becomes objectified. Without >>>>> objectification, it would be a subjective experience of real time, >> i.e. >>>> of >>>>> the consciousness of "becoming later and later"--simply a cyclic >> phase >>>>> similar to an earlier phase in that ever-later-becoming duration. >> Only by >>>>> imagination can such a cyclic phase be set beside another and >> another in >>>>> the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually perceived) configuration. "But >>>> such >>>>> is the power of linguistic analogy that we do so objectify cyclic >>>> phasing. >>>>> We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g., >>>> "phasing." >>>>> And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting >> binomial >>>>> formula of formless item plus form, is so general that it is >> implicit for >>>>> all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless items like >> "substance, >>>>> matter," by which we can fill out the binomial for an enormously wide >>>> range >>>>> of nouns. But even these are not quite generalized enough to take in >> our >>>>> phase nouns. So for the phase nouns we have made a formless item, >> "time." >>>>> We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, in >> the >>>>> pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" in >> the >>>>> pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can say and >>>> think >>>>> "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." Let me again >> point >>>>> out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of milk" or "a >> piece of >>>>> cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a summer" actually >>>> contains >>>>> or consists of such-and-such a quantity of "time." >>>>> >>>>> In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., are >> not >>>>> nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They are >> a >>>>> formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, and >> even >>>>> other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a locative >>>> pattern, >>>>> like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It contains no morpheme like >> one >>>> of >>>>> "in the house" or "at the tree." It means "when it is morning" or >> "while >>>>> morning-phase is occurring." These "temporal s" are not used as >> subjects >>>> or >>>>> objects, or at all like nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" >> or >>>>> "summer is hot"; summer is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions >> are >>>> hot, >>>>> WHEN heat occurs. One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or >>>>> "summer recently." There is no objectification, as a region, an >> extent, a >>>>> quantity, of the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested >> about >>>>> time except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no >> basis >>>>> here for a formless item answering to our "time." " >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Helena Worthen < >> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>> >>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to this: >>>>>> >>>>>> "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton >>>>>> and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to >> create >>>>>> sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly >> productive, >>>>>> which is why they still form the basis of scientific writing and >>>> thinking >>>>>> today." >>>>>> >>>>>> Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I lose you >> when >>>>> you >>>>>> say "created to talk about gravity as an entity". >>>>>> >>>>>> Thank you, >>>>>> >>>>>> Helena >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>>> >>>>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> As Helena points out, prepositions are from the "grammatical" >> end of >>>>> what >>>>>>> Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what >> Halliday >>>>> calls >>>>>>> "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they have >>>> three >>>>>>> properties that words from the more "lexical" end do not have: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You can, >>>>>> actually, >>>>>>> but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you invent a new >>>> name >>>>>> or a >>>>>>> new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific semantic >>>> field >>>>>> (the >>>>>>> way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of >>>>> linguistics) >>>>>>> but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are used. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the same >>>>> effect, >>>>>>> which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your argument" the >> "in" >>>>> has >>>>>>> more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in "there's a >> fly in >>>>> your >>>>>>> tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in Henry's >> hands, >>>>>> refer >>>>>>> to a book or even a footnote. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties pretty >>>> much >>>>>>> define the difference between learning and development, at least >> as I >>>>>>> understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on functions >>>>>>> indefinitely while development works by reorganizing the closed >> set >>>> of >>>>>>> functions you already have into new systems. Learning is skill >>>> specific >>>>>>> and local, while development is quite global in its implications. >>>>>> Learning >>>>>>> is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new systems, >>>> while >>>>>>> development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary (and >> forget it >>>>> just >>>>>>> as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes away. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of blue >> that >>>>>> people >>>>>>> call the sky") are simply metaphors from the non-productive end >> of >>>> the >>>>>>> lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are crisp, >> concrete, >>>> and >>>>>>> vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations >> that >>>>> Newton >>>>>>> and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to >> create >>>>>>> sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly >>>> productive, >>>>>>> which is why they still form the basis of scientific writing and >>>>> thinking >>>>>>> today. For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical metaphor is >> the >>>>> third >>>>>>> great moment in child development (after the break into mother >> tongue >>>>> and >>>>>>> the break into disciplinary language in school work). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" implies >>>> zero >>>>>>> dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two ("on a line', >> 'on >>>> a >>>>>>> plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because they >> are >>>>>>> grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them with >> time: >>>> 'at >>>>> a >>>>>>> point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. Compare: "at >>>>>>> Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very day), and >> "in >>>>>>> Christmas' (season). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen < >>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial >>>>>>>> relationships from the concrete material world into the >> conceptual >>>>>>>> imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 common ones, and >>>>>> between 70 >>>>>>>> and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far >> as" -- >>>>>> this >>>>>>>> is according to >>>> https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm >>>>> ). >>>>>>>> We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. >> Apparently, in >>>>>>>> English, they evolved from and did the job done by inflections >> in >>>>> parent >>>>>>>> languages, examples being cases and tenses. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection >> like >>>> the >>>>>>>> dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial >> relationships >>>>>> suggested >>>>>>>> by contemporary prepositions. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about this. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly >>>>> embodied, >>>>>>>> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to >>>> linguistics >>>>>> (For >>>>>>>> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on >>>>> ?lexicon?: >>>>>>>> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, >>>> being >>>>>> part >>>>>>>> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and >> Halliday >>>>>> see no >>>>>>>> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, >>>> lexico-grammar. >>>>>> (Lo >>>>>>>> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar, >>>> adding >>>>>> the >>>>>>>> ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings >> are >>>>> great >>>>>>>> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of >> that? >>>> In >>>>>>>> translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced? >>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden >>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the >>>>> metaphorical >>>>>>>> use of prepositions like: >>>>>>>>>> - "there is some value IN your argument" >>>>>>>>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again" >>>>>>>>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" >>>>>>>>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again" >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> and so on. >>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> larry smolucha wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself - >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic >>>>>> possibilities: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published >> in >>>>>> Thought >>>>>>>>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into >>>>> English >>>>>>>> 1962] >>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the >> 'additive' >>>>> value >>>>>>>> of the >>>>>>>>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech >>>>>> vocalization). >>>>>>>>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements >> that >>>> are >>>>>>>> flammable >>>>>>>>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable >> nor a >>>>> gas. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century >> European >>>>>>>> Developmental >>>>>>>>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' >>>> hence >>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of >>>>> Piaget's >>>>>>>> Genetic >>>>>>>>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and >> synthesis >>>>>>>> based on >>>>>>>>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in >> Vygotsky's >>>>>>>> example of H2O. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 >>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be >> synergistic >>>>>>>>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the >>>> parts. >>>>>>>>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more >> than >>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can >> ever >>>>> be >>>>>>>> imagined" >>>>>>>>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> A couple things to consider: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination >> as >>>> the >>>>>>>> brain has >>>>>>>>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the >> simplest >>>>> level >>>>>>>> of the Gestalt >>>>>>>>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). >>>>>>>>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just >>>>> photographic. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try >> to >>>>>>>> accurately reproduce >>>>>>>>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. >> Whereas, >>>> the >>>>>>>> goal of combinatory >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, >> dreams, >>>>>>>> musings, and even >>>>>>>>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of >>>>> objects >>>>>>>> and symbols. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different >> ways >>>> that >>>>>>>> things and concepts can be >>>>>>>>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar >> and >>>>>> flour. >>>>>>>>>>>> I can add water and >> it >>>>>>>> dissolves a bit >>>>>>>>>>>> But adding heat >> changes >>>>> the >>>>>>>> combination into a pancake. >>>>>>>>>>>> [Is this synergistic?] >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more >>>> examples >>>>>>>> to put the discussion >>>>>>>>>>>> in the metaphysical realm. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 >>>>>>>>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the >>>> case >>>>>> for >>>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I >> think >>>>> it's >>>>>>>> not >>>>>>>>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are >>>>>>>> associationists who >>>>>>>>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary >>>> associationism >>>>>>>> exists and >>>>>>>>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as >> mediation. >>>>>>>> Vygotsky >>>>>>>>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, >>>>> explain >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>> uniqueness of our species? >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species >> feels for >>>>> its >>>>>>>> own >>>>>>>>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a >>>> Piagetian >>>>>>>>>>>>> perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true >>>> maturity >>>>>> as a >>>>>>>>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing >> more to >>>> it >>>>>>>> than >>>>>>>>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of >>>> primate, >>>>>> and >>>>>>>> our >>>>>>>>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon >>>> rocks >>>>>> in >>>>>>>> order >>>>>>>>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged >> the >>>>> same >>>>>>>> way as >>>>>>>>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and >> for >>>>>>>> language is >>>>>>>>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human >>>>>>>> exceptionalism. >>>>>>>>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for >> the >>>>>>>> vanguard role >>>>>>>>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, >>>>>> prolonging >>>>>>>>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after >> the >>>>> sick >>>>>>>> and the >>>>>>>>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial >> organs >>>>>>>> (tools) and >>>>>>>>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for >> our >>>>>>>> species, it >>>>>>>>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these >>>>>>>> "circuitous, >>>>>>>>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that >> lead >>>>> our >>>>>>>>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always >> been >>>>>>>> short on >>>>>>>>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for >> material >>>>>>>> culture >>>>>>>>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another >> matter: >>>>>>>> verily, here >>>>>>>>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of >> attention >>>> is >>>>>>>> simply the >>>>>>>>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says >> there >>>> are >>>>>>>> only two >>>>>>>>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So >>>>>>>> imagination is >>>>>>>>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete >> experiences, >>>> and >>>>>>>> nothing >>>>>>>>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, >> when you >>>>>> hear >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been >> there to >>>> be >>>>>>>> able to >>>>>>>>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at >> work in >>>>> word >>>>>>>> meaning. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who >> was >>>>>> given >>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been >> mixed >>>>> with >>>>>>>> silver >>>>>>>>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of >>>> gold. >>>>>>>> Well, we >>>>>>>>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not >>>>> possible >>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that >> precisely. >>>> The >>>>>>>> method >>>>>>>>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the >> "principal >>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes >> palimpsest, >>>> a >>>>>>>> velum on >>>>>>>>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each >> other. >>>>>> Because >>>>>>>>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and >> written >>>>> over >>>>>>>> every >>>>>>>>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was >> soft, >>>> the >>>>>>>> pressure >>>>>>>>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones >>>> when >>>>>> the >>>>>>>> old >>>>>>>>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the >> only >>>>> known >>>>>>>> Greek >>>>>>>>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor >> their >>>>>>>> relationship >>>>>>>>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they >> are >>>>>>>> related to >>>>>>>>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's >> quite >>>>>> similar >>>>>>>> to the >>>>>>>>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD < >>>> hshonerd@gmail.com> >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an >>>>>> associationist, >>>>>>>> ?sees >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg < >>>>> dkellogg60@gmail.com >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the >> division >>>>>>>> between >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, >>>> because >>>>>>>> Ribot is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> an >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal >> form >>>> of >>>>>>>> attention. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the >> transition >>>>> from >>>>>>>> forest >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division >>>>> between >>>>>>>> the two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and >>>> commonsensical >>>>>>>> world of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly >> prosaic >>>>> uses >>>>>>>> in life >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more >>>>>> "imaginative" >>>>>>>> (that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world >> of >>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> farm,where >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long >> winter >>>>>>>> months are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to >>>>> encounter >>>>>>>> talking >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here >>>> attention >>>>>> has >>>>>>>> to be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> more voluntary. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a >> very >>>>> clear >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism >> that >>>>>>>> underpins >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky >>>> points >>>>>> out >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive >>>> practices >>>>>>>> really >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of >>>>> imagination, >>>>>>>> there >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between >>>> human >>>>>> and >>>>>>>> animal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly >> capable >>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> volitional >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than >> humans). >>>>>> Without >>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> theory >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis >> for >>>>>> Ribot's >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological >> functions >>>> at >>>>>>>> all. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole >>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of >> imagination, >>>>>>>> thanks to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> all >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very >> influential >>>>>>>> around the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> time >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. >> I >>>> had >>>>>>>> seen work >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> on >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective >> equal >>>>>>>> reproductive? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies >> of >>>>>>>> development >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of >>>> being >>>>> a >>>>>>>> relative >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my >> bucket >>>>> list. >>>>>>>> This >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings >> from >>>>> some >>>>>>>> weeks >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct >> that >>>>>>>> segmented the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met >>>> aphorizing?. >>>>>>>> Puns, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole < >> mcole@ucsd.edu> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant >> and >>>>> they >>>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his >>>>>>>> followers as an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by >> Hegel, >>>> so >>>>>>>> its of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> course >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in >>>>>>>> translation, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> seems >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, >> "recollection" >>>>> in >>>>>>>> this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> passage, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter >>>>>>>> distinction to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "memory." >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in >>>> contemporary >>>>>>>> discourse >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian >>>>>>>> colleagues have >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from >>>>> theorists >>>>>>>> who >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clearly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it >> was >>>>> still >>>>>>>> possible >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, >>>>>>>> interestingly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> links >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a >>>>> "voluntary" >>>>>>>> act. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Parts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children >> stuff >>>>>> that >>>>>>>> was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> also >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts >> of >>>>>>>> creativity >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious >> to >>>> see >>>>>>>> that the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found >>>>> himself >>>>>>>> writing. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which >>>> pretty >>>>>> old >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> approaches >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < >>>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, >> but >>>> it >>>>>>>> may be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> worth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent >>>> place >>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagination >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between >>>>>>>> Recollection and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive >>>>>>>> Imagination, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> (2) >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, >> which >>>>> he >>>>>>>> says >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> leads >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In >>>> other >>>>>>>> words, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is >>>>>>>> accomplished >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> through >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading >> Strawson >>>> and >>>>>>>> Williams. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists >> whose >>>>> work i >>>>>>>> am >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> trying >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of >>>>>>>> productive >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive >>>>> imagination >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> develops. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive >> implies >>>> that >>>>>>>> there >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> must >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive >> imagination. >>>> But >>>>> I >>>>>>>> learned >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination >> appears >>>> and >>>>> is >>>>>>>> linked >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable >> part of >>>>>>>> anticipation >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on >>>> imagination >>>>>>>> (starting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous >> look, >>>> and >>>>>>>> provides >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural >> as >>>>>> fixed. >>>>>>>> This, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives >> me a >>>>>> ground >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> take >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> part >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start >> with >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preconceptions: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive >> grammarian >>>>>>>> Langacker on >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive >> domains, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is >> full >>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two >> aspects of >>>>>>>> temporality: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic >>>>>>>> structure), which >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for >>>> both >>>>>>>> individual >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < >>>>>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third >>>>> *space* >>>>>>>> and the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and >> his >>>>>>>> notion of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion >> is >>>>>>>> explored under >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a >> *set* of >>>>>>>> modalities >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of >>>>> knowing >>>>>>>> that is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" >>>> [perceived??] >>>>> if >>>>>>>> we >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as >>>> *style* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to >> say >>>> how >>>>>>>> jazzed up >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, >> the >>>> mind >>>>>> as >>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually >> various >>>>>>>> triads, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> finally >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my >>>> notebooks >>>>>> of >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind, as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap >> adentro, >>>>> luega >>>>>>>> pa? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fuera. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole < >>>>> mcole@ucsd.edu> >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, >>>>> attached >>>>>>>> are two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT >>>>>> theorists >>>>>>>> like >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of >>>>>>>> imagination in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion >> of >>>>>>>> productive >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have >> no >>>>>>>> intention of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated >> in >>>> the >>>>>>>> attached >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these >>>>> philosophers, >>>>>> I >>>>>>>> came >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> upon >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very >> closely >>>>>>>> linked at >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> several >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our >> naivete, >>>>>>>> Ettienne and I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as >> a >>>>> means >>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> access >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander >>>> Suvorov. >>>>>>>> Moreover, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> such >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct >>>>>> relevance >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kris's >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak >> to >>>>>>>> concerns >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> about >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in >>>>> development. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination >> thread. >>>>>> Perhaps >>>>>>>> they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> will >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a >>>> natural >>>>>>>> science >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > Strawson.pdf> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural >>>>> science >>>>>>>> with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural >>>> science >>>>>>>> with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>>> Assistant Professor >>>>> Department of Anthropology >>>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>>> Brigham Young University >>>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> *Robert Lake Ed.D.*Associate Professor >>> Social Foundations of Education >>> Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading >>> Georgia Southern University >>> Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group >>> P. O. Box 8144 >>> Phone: (912) 478-0355 >>> Fax: (912) 478-5382 >>> Statesboro, GA 30460 >> >> From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sat Dec 20 08:58:50 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Sat, 20 Dec 2014 08:58:50 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Time, Imagination, Metaphor In-Reply-To: References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> <5493CC6B.5050105@mira.net> <1419052007614.61660@unm.edu> Message-ID: Francine, Henry Thanks for these replies. THIS opens up a vast *field* One quick question. The term "phenomenologist or phenomenology may be a term that has many meanings. Francine, when you write: If my semiotic system does not orient me to see a wall in front of me, I will still walk into a wall. If my semiotics do not allow for the perception that a car is coming at me, and I do not move Will still get hit by the car" I understand that phenomenology says to look *at* the *things* themselves. in other words, look at "walking into the wall" look at "swerving to avoid the wall" look at "the way we use "semiotic systems". look at the way "we abstract" from the things themselves. Husserl's phenomenology which is Kantian is NOT phenomenology. I understand phenomenology as sharing and overlapping and existing "within" notions such as Kris "Third Space" as a thing itself that is both forming AND formed as phenomenologically existent.. For me the "border" that is interesting in phenomenology is between Heidegger or Sartre who privilege subjective phenomena and the hermeneutical and embodied [carnal] approaches of intersubjective phenomenology. Kris' exploration of the hybrid testimonio AS PERFORMED within subjective [autobiography] AND intersubjective [radically reciprocal dialogue] and form[ing] a hybrid "space" [a third space] which becomes "community" can be seen as a performance of "gap-filling' which is a semiotic and a phenomenological and an existential action [and activity] . When this hybrid third space becomes "familiar" [like family] a new TYPE or GENRE of "trust" develops from which "I" and "we" can move "out" or "in" to the wider world of phenomenologically existent "things" themselves [including semiological things] I am a novice in my understanding of phenomenology, but it is a historically situated TYPE of knowing [and seeing and action] as emphasizing the things themselves. What gets high-lighted and focused "on" may be different but does not exclude the things I have mentioned as the things placed "in front" of our "selves" To summarize, Kris' "third space" as imaginal "place" AND an actual "place" BOTH form[ing] AND formed is a hybrid space/place. David Kellogg's exploration of grammatical metaphor [and its place in trans-versals "of" the subjective/intersubjective performance and trans-versals "of" the fact/'fiction performance are phenomena that can be looked "at" from both "within" or without" . From within the form[ing] or from without "as" the sedimented already form[ed].. David K is now "in" my head [or "in" my body] with grammatical metaphor calling me to pay attention. What Kris adds is the centrality of the "third space' is a moral virtue [cosmopolitanism] with the CALL for being "obligated" to respond to our humanness. This connects with Francine's call for cultural synergy Larry On Sat, Dec 20, 2014 at 3:08 AM, larry smolucha wrote: > Message from Francine: > > Metaphysics is an old term for philosophy. Metaphysics includes the study > of ontology, > cosmology and epistemology. Our discussions have been epistemological, > specifically > how different cultures understand time and space. We have not gotten into > an > ontological discussion (yet) about the 'real' nature of time and space. > > Some people use the term metaphysics to refer to a type of spiritual > metaphysics. > The practice of mind over matter. In my previous post, I used the examples > of walking into > a wall or in front of a car, in denial of their existence. The > probabilities are not in your > favor. But I did run out in front of a speeding car once, to snatch up my > toddler, and > 'miraculously' the driver was able to stop and did not hit me (as I held > my son in my arms > protecting his head expecting we would be thrown to the ground). > Similarly, in > Dancing with Wolves, when Kevin Costner rides back and forth past the > Confederate lines > who are shooting at him - he is defying the odds. Physics has become a > probabilistic science that does not rule out the possibility that if you > drop a glass of water it might fall upward, > but the probabilities of that happening are astronomical. > > > > From: annalisa@unm.edu > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > Date: Sat, 20 Dec 2014 05:06:48 +0000 > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Time, Imagination, Metaphor > > > > Hello Francine (and Larry), > > > > Yes! Let's not forget perception and imagination! > > > > And let me second subjective perspectives and bibliographic references! > > > > [If anyone has any to add to the ABC that come to mind, please forward > them to me! TQ] > > > > I fully enjoy the noodle into pasta example. Are you saying that time is > metaphysical? Would space be metaphysical too? > > > > Robert brought up a perfect example of the Hopi's view of time and the > Guugu Yimithirr of Australia and their method of employing cardinal > directions to orient themselves in space. > > http://xmca.ucsd.edu/yarns/15874?keywords=#52113 > > > > That example also reminded me of the Greek Poet Simonides of Ceos and > the Memory Palace... see the Extreme Memory Tournament > > > http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/19/remembering-as-an-extreme-sport/ > > and the book that tells you how to remember everything: > > > http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C03E3DF1E3FF93BA35750C0A9679D8B63 > > > > Also Francine, when you say: > > > The 'Natural' Science that arises from European culture begins as > mechanical physics and alchemy in which machines have parts and chemicals > have elements. It has evolved into the study of energy, and systems theory. > > > > I wanted to say, don't forget to include astrology with alchemy and > mechanical physics! :) (Which is an ancient systems theory) and then > becomes astronomy, and this has certainly altered our sense of both time > and space by light years! :) > > > > Kind regards, > > > > Annalisa > > > > From hshonerd@gmail.com Sat Dec 20 09:22:04 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Sat, 20 Dec 2014 10:22:04 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors In-Reply-To: References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> Message-ID: <406FBE3B-E840-4DCB-AD45-AF67CDAAE5AF@gmail.com> One quick and dirty way to assess language is a cloze test, which essentially requires the user to put lexical items into a grammatical structure, as in the example David provides ?distance from_____to ____?. Henry > On Dec 19, 2014, at 8:46 PM, David H Kirshner wrote: > > The topic of how grammatical form relates to meaning calls to mind the groundbreaking work of Eleanor Orr--whom you've probably never heard of on account of the fact that her work was condemned by a politically-correct faction of race-conscious sociolinguists who decided her analysis of Black English Vernacular could too easily be appropriated into racist discourses about language deficiency. > > Orr was a Washington DC area teacher and principal in the 1970s and 1980s, who traced math difficulties of her African American students to subtle grammatical differences between Black English dialect and standard English. Her 1987 book goes into compelling detail to support the thesis that the meaning structure of basic mathematical terms is embedded in the grammatical setting in which those terms are expressed. For instance, the meaning of ?distance? is embedded in the grammatical structure ?distance from _________ to __________? where the place-holders hold locations; if you don?t have that grammatical structure, and you're in a linguistic environment in which that structure is assumed, you're likely not going to be able to gain full access to the concept. > > The attached excerpts from her book--ignore the Forward, unless you'd like some context--reveal some of her students' bizarre conceptions of distance (and other basic mathematical concepts) as revealed in their diagrams. Her approach involves linguistic analysis of sentences produced by her African American students that she reads as collapsed versions of standard English sentences, with differences in prepositional structure being highlighted (but other grammatical elements also are indicated). > > This work cuts against the grain of anything going on in mathematics education. The Piagetian view that dominates that field holds that basic concepts come about from reflection on our actions in our engagement with the material world. When language enters the conversation, it's with respect to semantic structure; to my knowledge, nobody's ever implicated syntax directly in basic quantitative understanding. > > This work is particularly interesting to me in connection with my 21-year-old son who is autistic, and whose grammatical function is severely impaired. He has a decent vocabulary, but unless the setting for the conversation provides contextual clues, he can't piece together how the semantic elements are linked to one another. It is only recently that it occurred to me his lack of a secure sense of basic quantitative terms like ?more? and ?less? may be rooted in his grammatical incapacities. > > The XMCA discussion, thus far, has touched on grammar with respect to lexical items such as prepositions. But we've not yet tied that to the grammatical forms that embed those lexical items. I'm very curious as to whether that further connection can be made. > > David Kirshner > > Orr, E., W. (1987). Twice as less: Black English and the performance of black students in mathematics and science. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg > Sent: Friday, December 19, 2014 3:06 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors > > Yes, Haliday is essentially a Whorfian, and that's one of things that brings him close to Vygotsky. (Compare, for example, Chomsky, who is essentially anti-developmental in his ideas about language, and who now rejects the leading role played by social communication and says that communication is epiphenomenal to language, whose original purpose is > thought.) For Sapir, and for Whorf, in the beginning of every major onotogenetic, sociogenetic, and even phylogenetic change in language there has to be some change in the nature of communication. > > So what Andy says about the lack of the basis of modern science in Hopi applies perfectly well to English. When we read the scientific writings of Chaucer on the astrolabe, for example, we do not see words like "reflection", "refraction" or "alignment". Chaucer uses words like "bounce off", "bend through", and "line up" (note the use of prepositions, Helena!). Where did these words come from, and how did they make scientific English possible? > > Most of us have no problem saying that Isaac Newton discovered the laws of gravitation. But it's only a slight exaggeration to say that what he really discovered was the meaning potential of words like "gravitation". Gravity is, of course, not a thing at all; that is, it's not an entity, but rather a process, the process of falling down, or falling in (preps, again!). So how and above all why does it become an entity? > > It's interesting to compare Newton's writings on optics with Chaucer's on the astrolabe. The "Opticks" has a fixed format that we recognize almost instantly today: Newton describes his equipment (the prism and the dark room); he then narrates his method as a kind of recipe ("First, I did this; then I did that") and draws conclusions, which he then formulates in mathematical terms (this is essentially the format of Vygotsky's lectures on pedology, so much so that when translating them we had some trouble determining the precise moment when Vygotsky turns to the blackboard to write his conclusion in the form of a law). > > In order to get them into mathematical shape, though, he has to make sentences that look a lot like equations. "The plumpness of the lens yields a greater refraction of the light", "The reflection of the light from the glass results of the light striking the flatness of the glass" "The curvature of the spectacle glass supplies the lacking plumpness of the eye". In each of these, a quality or a process which would normally be realized as an adjective or a verb is suddenly realized by a noun, creating an imaginary entity. > > That's grammatical metaphor. Something that is "canonically" realized by a verb ("to grow") is suddenly realized nominally ("growth"), or something that is canonically a quality ('red") is realized verbally ("redden"). We even find related clauses realized as verbs ("She did not know the rules. > So she died" is realized by "Death was brought about through ignorance", all of these examples from Halliday). In fact, the Genetic Law that Vygotsky formulates in "Mind in Society" ("Every higher mental function is realized on two planes....") is really just one instance of grammatical metaphor. > > One of Chomsky's best known arguments for the radical innateness hypothesis is this. If I take a sentence like "Students who do not do their homework do not do well" and I want to make a question, how do I know which "do" to move to the front? Chomsky assumes that this knowledge is essentially innate; it is part of universal grammar. But you can see that "Do students who do not do their homework do well?" can be built up through a process of what we might call "discourse metaphor"--whereby clauses stand for > exchanges: > > Mother: You did your homework, didn't you? > Child: No. > Mother: You didn't do your homework? Did you do well? > Child: No. > Mother: You didn't do well? > Child: No. > Mother: You didn't do you homework so you didn't do well. Do the other students do well? > Child: Some of them. > Mother: Who does well? Do students who do not do their homework do well? > > And this of course explains why wh-items like "who" and 'why" have two functions--one inside a clause, where it expresses an intra-mental function > (grammar) and one between them where it expresses an inter-mental function (discourse). > > I realize that grammatical metaphor will seem rather dry and abstract and unpoetic to people who assume that metaphor is only of the lexical kind. > But to me, and I think to most children, it is far far more powerful and far more important developmentally. In some ways, it's the lexical metaphor that is responsible for the disenchantment of the child's world, while the grammatical metaphor infinitely expands it. (And here, I'm afraid, I must stop--it's time for breakfast and anyway my one screen is used up!) > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > , or "the > > . He > > On 19 December 2014 at 15:15, Greg Thompson > wrote: > >> Helena and David, >> I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the so-called >> authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred tradition >> to >> Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi notion >> of "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including English) >> notion of "time" and how each of these languages offers different >> affordances of meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual >> understanding, English has a much more reified/objectified/entified >> sense of time. (btw, I think the first paragraph is easier to follow >> than the second - and in that first paragraph you'll find our old friend "imagination"). >> David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to? >> -greg >> >> Taken from: >> >> http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/mousesite/Second >> ary/Whorfframe2.html >> >> " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, sunset" are >> with us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from other nouns. >> They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in winter" >> just as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are pluralized >> and numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. Our >> thought about the referents of such words hence becomes objectified. >> Without objectification, it would be a subjective experience of real >> time, i.e. of the consciousness of "becoming later and later"--simply >> a cyclic phase similar to an earlier phase in that ever-later-becoming >> duration. Only by imagination can such a cyclic phase be set beside >> another and another in the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually >> perceived) configuration. "But such is the power of linguistic analogy that we do so objectify cyclic phasing. >> We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g., "phasing." >> And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting >> binomial formula of formless item plus form, is so general that it is >> implicit for all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless items >> like "substance, matter," by which we can fill out the binomial for an >> enormously wide range of nouns. But even these are not quite >> generalized enough to take in our phase nouns. So for the phase nouns we have made a formless item, "time." >> We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, in the >> pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" in >> the pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can say >> and think "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." Let me >> again point out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of milk" >> or "a piece of cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a >> summer" actually contains or consists of such-and-such a quantity of "time." >> >> In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., are not >> nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They are a >> formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, and >> even other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a >> locative pattern, like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It contains >> no morpheme like one of "in the house" or "at the tree." It means >> "when it is morning" or "while morning-phase is occurring." These >> "temporal s" are not used as subjects or objects, or at all like >> nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" or "summer is hot"; summer >> is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions are hot, WHEN heat occurs. >> One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or "summer recently." >> There is no objectification, as a region, an extent, a quantity, of >> the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested about time >> except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no basis here for a formless item answering to our "time." " >> >> >> >> On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Helena Worthen >> >> wrote: >>> >>> David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to this: >>> >>> "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton >>> and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to create >>> sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly >>> productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific >>> writing and thinking today." >>> >>> Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I lose you >>> when >> you >>> say "created to talk about gravity as an entity". >>> >>> Thank you, >>> >>> Helena >>> >>> >>> Helena Worthen >>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>> >>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>> >>>> As Helena points out, prepositions are from the "grammatical" end >>>> of >> what >>>> Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what >>>> Halliday >> calls >>>> "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they have >>>> three properties that words from the more "lexical" end do not have: >>>> >>>> a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You can, >>> actually, >>>> but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you invent a new >>>> name >>> or a >>>> new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can). >>>> >>>> b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific semantic >>>> field >>> (the >>>> way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of >> linguistics) >>>> but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are used. >>>> >>>> c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the same >> effect, >>>> which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your argument" the "in" >> has >>>> more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in "there's a fly >>>> in >> your >>>> tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in Henry's >>>> hands, >>> refer >>>> to a book or even a footnote. >>>> >>>> Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties pretty >>>> much define the difference between learning and development, at >>>> least as I understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on >>>> functions indefinitely while development works by reorganizing the >>>> closed set of functions you already have into new systems. >>>> Learning is skill specific and local, while development is quite global in its implications. >>> Learning >>>> is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new systems, >>>> while development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary (and >>>> forget it >> just >>>> as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes away. >>>> >>>> For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of blue >>>> that >>> people >>>> call the sky") are simply metaphors from the non-productive end of >>>> the lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are crisp, >>>> concrete, and vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the >>>> nominalizations that >> Newton >>>> and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to >>>> create sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly >>>> productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific >>>> writing and >> thinking >>>> today. For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical metaphor is the >> third >>>> great moment in child development (after the break into mother >>>> tongue >> and >>>> the break into disciplinary language in school work). >>>> >>>> Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" implies >>>> zero dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two ("on a >>>> line', 'on a >>>> plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because they are >>>> grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them with time: >>>> 'at >> a >>>> point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. Compare: "at >>>> Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very day), and >>>> "in Christmas' (season). >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>> >>>> On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen >>>> >>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial >>>>> relationships from the concrete material world into the >>>>> conceptual imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 common >>>>> ones, and >>> between 70 >>>>> and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far as" >>>>> -- >>> this >>>>> is according to >>>>> https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm >> ). >>>>> We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. Apparently, >>>>> in English, they evolved from and did the job done by inflections >>>>> in >> parent >>>>> languages, examples being cases and tenses. >>>>> >>>>> But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection >>>>> like the dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial >>>>> relationships >>> suggested >>>>> by contemporary prepositions. >>>>> >>>>> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about this. >>>>> >>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>> >>>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly >> embodied, >>>>> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to >>>>> linguistics >>> (For >>>>> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on >> ?lexicon?: >>>>> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, >>>>> being >>> part >>>>> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and >>>>> Halliday >>> see no >>>>> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, lexico-grammar. >>> (Lo >>>>> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar, >>>>> adding >>> the >>>>> ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings are >> great >>>>> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of >>>>> that? In translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced? >>>>>> Henry >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden >> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the >> metaphorical >>>>> use of prepositions like: >>>>>>> - "there is some value IN your argument" >>>>>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again" >>>>>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" >>>>>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again" >>>>>>> >>>>>>> and so on. >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> >>> -------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> ---- >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> larry smolucha wrote: >>>>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself - >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic >>> possibilities: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in >>> Thought >>>>>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into >> English >>>>> 1962] >>>>>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' >> value >>>>> of the >>>>>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech >>> vocalization). >>>>>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that >>>>>>>> are >>>>> flammable >>>>>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor >>>>>>>> a >> gas. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century >>>>>>>> European >>>>> Developmental >>>>>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' >>>>>>>> hence >>> the >>>>>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of >> Piaget's >>>>> Genetic >>>>>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and >>>>>>>> synthesis >>>>> based on >>>>>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in >>>>>>>> Vygotsky's >>>>> example of H2O. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com >>>>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 >>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic >>>>>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts. >>>>>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more >>>>>>>>> than >> the >>>>>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can >>>>>>>>> ever >> be >>>>> imagined" >>>>>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> A couple things to consider: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination >>>>>>>>> as the >>>>> brain has >>>>>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the >>>>>>>>> simplest >> level >>>>> of the Gestalt >>>>>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). >>>>>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just >> photographic. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try >>>>>>>>> to >>>>> accurately reproduce >>>>>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, >>>>>>>>> the >>>>> goal of combinatory >>>>>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, >>>>>>>>> dreams, >>>>> musings, and even >>>>>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of >> objects >>>>> and symbols. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways >>>>>>>>> that >>>>> things and concepts can be >>>>>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar >>>>>>>>> and >>> flour. >>>>>>>>> I can add water and >>>>>>>>> it >>>>> dissolves a bit >>>>>>>>> But adding heat >>>>>>>>> changes >> the >>>>> combination into a pancake. >>>>>>>>> [Is this synergistic?] >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more >>>>>>>>> examples >>>>> to put the discussion >>>>>>>>> in the metaphysical realm. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 >>>>>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the >>>>>>>>>> case >>> for >>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I >>>>>>>>>> think >> it's >>>>> not >>>>>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are >>>>> associationists who >>>>>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary >>>>>>>>>> associationism >>>>> exists and >>>>>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. >>>>> Vygotsky >>>>>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, >> explain >>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> uniqueness of our species? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels >>>>>>>>>> for >> its >>>>> own >>>>>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a >>>>>>>>>> Piagetian perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian >>>>>>>>>> one--true maturity >>> as a >>>>>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more >>>>>>>>>> to it >>>>> than >>>>>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of >>>>>>>>>> primate, >>> and >>>>> our >>>>>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon >>>>>>>>>> rocks >>> in >>>>> order >>>>>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged >>>>>>>>>> the >> same >>>>> way as >>>>>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and >>>>>>>>>> for >>>>> language is >>>>>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human >>>>> exceptionalism. >>>>>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for >>>>>>>>>> the >>>>> vanguard role >>>>>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, >>> prolonging >>>>>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after >>>>>>>>>> the >> sick >>>>> and the >>>>>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial >>>>>>>>>> organs >>>>> (tools) and >>>>>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for >>>>>>>>>> our >>>>> species, it >>>>>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these >>>>> "circuitous, >>>>>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that >>>>>>>>>> lead >> our >>>>>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always >>>>>>>>>> been >>>>> short on >>>>>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for >>>>>>>>>> material >>>>> culture >>>>>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: >>>>> verily, here >>>>>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of >>>>>>>>>> attention is >>>>> simply the >>>>>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says >>>>>>>>>> there are >>>>> only two >>>>>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So >>>>> imagination is >>>>>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, >>>>>>>>>> and >>>>> nothing >>>>>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when >>>>>>>>>> you >>> hear >>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there >>>>>>>>>> to be >>>>> able to >>>>>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work >>>>>>>>>> in >> word >>>>> meaning. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who >>>>>>>>>> was >>> given >>>>> a >>>>>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been >>>>>>>>>> mixed >> with >>>>> silver >>>>>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold. >>>>> Well, we >>>>>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not >> possible >>> to >>>>>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that >>>>>>>>>> precisely. The >>>>> method >>>>>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the >>>>>>>>>> "principal >> of >>>>>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes >>>>>>>>>> palimpsest, a >>>>> velum on >>>>>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. >>> Because >>>>>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and >>>>>>>>>> written >> over >>>>> every >>>>>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, >>>>>>>>>> the >>>>> pressure >>>>>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones >>>>>>>>>> when >>> the >>>>> old >>>>>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only >> known >>>>> Greek >>>>>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their >>>>> relationship >>>>>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they >>>>>>>>>> are >>>>> related to >>>>>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite >>> similar >>>>> to the >>>>>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD >>>>>>>>>> >>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an >>> associationist, >>>>> ?sees >>>>>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? >>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg < >> dkellogg60@gmail.com >>>> >>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the >>>>>>>>>>>> division >>>>> between >>>>>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, >>>>>>>>>>>> because >>>>> Ribot is >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> an >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal >>>>>>>>>>>> form of >>>>> attention. >>>>>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the >>>>>>>>>>>> transition >> from >>>>> forest >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division >> between >>>>> the two >>>>>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and >>>>>>>>>>>> commonsensical >>>>> world of >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly >>>>>>>>>>>> prosaic >> uses >>>>> in life >>>>>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more >>> "imaginative" >>>>> (that >>>>>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world >>>>>>>>>>>> of the >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> farm,where >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long >>>>>>>>>>>> winter >>>>> months are >>>>>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to >> encounter >>>>> talking >>>>>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here >>>>>>>>>>>> attention >>> has >>>>> to be >>>>>>>>>>>> more voluntary. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a >>>>>>>>>>>> very >> clear >>>>>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that >>>>> underpins >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Ribot >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky >>>>>>>>>>>> points >>> out >>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive >>>>>>>>>>>> practices >>>>> really >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of >> imagination, >>>>> there >>>>>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between >>>>>>>>>>>> human >>> and >>>>> animal >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly >>>>>>>>>>>> capable of >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> volitional >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). >>> Without >>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> theory >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis >>>>>>>>>>>> for >>> Ribot's >>>>>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological >>>>>>>>>>>> functions at >>>>> all. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole >> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of >>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination, >>>>> thanks to >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> all >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very >>>>>>>>>>>>> influential >>>>> around the >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> time >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I >>>>>>>>>>>>> had >>>>> seen work >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> on >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective >>>>>>>>>>>>> equal >>>>> reproductive? >>>>>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies >>>>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>> development >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of >>>>>>>>>>>>> being >> a >>>>> relative >>>>>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my >>>>>>>>>>>>>> bucket >> list. >>>>> This >>>>>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings >>>>>>>>>>>>>> from >> some >>>>> weeks >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>> segmented the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. >>>>> Puns, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and >> they >>>>> are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his >>>>> followers as an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel, so >>>>> its of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> course >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in >>>>> translation, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> seems >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" >> in >>>>> this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> passage, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter >>>>> distinction to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "memory." >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary >>>>> discourse >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian >>>>> colleagues have >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from >> theorists >>>>> who >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> clearly >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was >> still >>>>> possible >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, >>>>> interestingly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> links >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a >> "voluntary" >>>>> act. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Parts >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> stuff >>> that >>>>> was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> also >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>> creativity >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> see >>>>> that the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> two >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found >> himself >>>>> writing. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> pretty >>> old >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> approaches >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < >>>>> ablunden@mira.net> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but it >>>>> may be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> worth >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> place >> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagination >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between >>>>> Recollection and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive >>>>> Imagination, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> (2) >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> which >> he >>>>> says >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> leads >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> other >>>>> words, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is >>>>> accomplished >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> through >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>> Williams. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose >> work i >>>>> am >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> trying >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of >>>>> productive >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive >> imagination >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> develops. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>> there >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> must >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> be a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But >> I >>>>> learned >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and >> is >>>>> linked >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>> anticipation >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination >>>>> (starting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> look, and >>>>> provides >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as >>> fixed. >>>>> This, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a >>> ground >>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> take >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> part >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> preconceptions: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> grammarian >>>>> Langacker on >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> domains, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> particularly >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> full of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> imagination >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>> temporality: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic >>>>> structure), which >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> both >>>>> individual >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < >>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third >> *space* >>>>> and the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> his >>>>> notion of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is >>>>> explored under >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>> modalities >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of >> knowing >>>>> that is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [perceived??] >> if >>>>> we >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *style* Larry On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> HENRY SHONERD < >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> say how >>>>> jazzed up >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> am >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind >>> as >>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> various >>>>> triads, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> finally >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notebooks >>> of >>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind, as >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, >> luega >>>>> pa? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> fuera. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole < >> mcole@ucsd.edu> >>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, >> attached >>>>> are two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT >>> theorists >>>>> like >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of >>>>> imagination in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of >>>>> productive >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no >>>>> intention of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the >>>>> attached >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these >> philosophers, >>> I >>>>> came >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> upon >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> closely >>>>> linked at >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> several >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, >>>>> Ettienne and I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a >> means >>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> access >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. >>>>> Moreover, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> such >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct >>> relevance >>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Kris's >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>> concerns >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> about >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in >> development. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. >>> Perhaps >>>>> they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> will >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural >>>>> science >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural >> science >>>>> with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural >>>>>>>>>>>>> science >>>>> with an >>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> -- >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Anthropology >> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> Brigham Young University >> Provo, UT 84602 >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> > From lsmolucha@hotmail.com Sat Dec 20 10:55:22 2014 From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com (larry smolucha) Date: Sat, 20 Dec 2014 12:55:22 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors In-Reply-To: <2C440C2D-59A4-47BB-8C31-0C689221C167@gmail.com> References: , <, > <,,> , <, > <,,> , <, > <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <,,> , <, > <,,> , <, , > , <, > <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <,,> , <, > <,,> ,<, > <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> <,,> ,<, > <,,> , <, > <,,> , <, , > , <, >, , , <2C440C2D-59A4-47BB-8C31-0C689221C167@gmail.com> Message-ID: Message from Francine: This is a a good way of simplifying what has been discussed. And it is also a way to enter into a discussion of how a phenomenon like winter might be referred to as a thing (noun), as a process (verb like wintering in Aspen, or winterize your car), and even as a relational prepositional phrase, perhaps adverb (In the bleak mid-winter). Also, gerunds are verbs that can function as nouns - I can't use wintering as a noun in an intelligent sentence- but let's use 'singing can lift your spirits.' > From: hshonerd@gmail.com > Date: Sat, 20 Dec 2014 08:39:19 -0700 > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors > > I am late to this, but I wonder if things, processes and relations capture pretty much everything about language and thinking. So nouns, as things, verbs, as processes and prepositions, as relations. > Henry > > > On Dec 19, 2014, at 4:48 PM, larry smolucha wrote: > > > > Message from Francine: > > > > Just a thought - Is the use of nouns, verbs, prepositions a result > > of developing a written language based on an alphabet? > > > > Language use in a culture with no written language would surely differ > > significantly. > > > > And written languages based on hieroglyphs, pictograms, cuneiform, > > Norse Runes, Celtic oghams, etc. surely divide and frame experience > > differently. > > > > > >> From: boblake@georgiasouthern.edu > >> Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2014 16:43:24 -0500 > >> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors > >> > >> Hi Everyone, > >> I appreciate this thread's emphasis on the relativistic character of > >> metaphoric language and find think that it supports Vygotsky's notion of > >> the fluid nature of language as it emerges from socio-cultural and > >> socio-historical contexts in meaning making (in contrast to biological > >> determinism). Because each culture makes meaning in widely diverse ways, > >> language forms and usage might have complex intricacies and shades of > >> meaning on one concept alone. Along with the example of early 20th century > >> Hopi's view of time, there are other more recent examples from the present > >> day that suggest ways that language can shape thought . > >> > >> Consider the Australian aboriginal language, Guugu Yimithirr, from north > >> Queensland who have no words for right or left, in front of, or behind to > >> describe location. Instead they use the points of the compass even when > >> requesting that someone move over to make room. They will say ?move a bit > >> to the east.? To tell you where exactly they left something in your house, > >> they?ll say, ?I left it on the southern edge of the western table.? (Deutscher, > >> 2010, p. MM 42) > >> > >> The effect on the thinking of this group is phenomenal in orienting the > >> speakers to their directional spatial environment to such a degree that > >> roughly 1 out of every 10 words in conversational Guugu Yimithirr includes > >> either north, south, east or west and is accompanied with precise hand > >> gestures (ibid). Consequently in this culture, language acquisition > >> involves constant awareness of spaces relative to the points of the > >> compass. Deutscher relays a fascinating story about the ways that memory > >> is stored for the speakers of this language. The story also serves as a > >> clear example of Vygotsky?s notion of language as a mediating tool as a > >> means of creating higher levels of consciousness through spatial > >> kinesthetic approaches to meaning creation. > >> > >> > >> > >> One Guugu Yimithirr speaker was filmed telling his friends the story of how > >> in his youth, he capsized in shark-infested waters. He and an older person > >> were caught in a storm, and their boat tipped over. They both jumped into > >> the water and managed to swim nearly three miles to the shore, only to > >> discover that the missionary for whom they worked was far more concerned at > >> the loss of the boat than relieved at their miraculous escape. Apart from > >> the dramatic content, the remarkable thing about the story was that it was > >> remembered throughout in cardinal directions: the speaker jumped into the > >> water on the western side of the boat, his companion to the east of the > >> boat, they saw a giant shark swimming north and so on. Perhaps the cardinal > >> directions were just made up for the occasion? Well, quite by chance, the > >> same person was filmed some years later telling the same story. The > >> cardinal directions matched exactly in the two tellings. Even more > >> remarkable were the spontaneous hand gestures that accompanied the story. > >> For instance, the direction in which the boat rolled over was gestured in > >> the correct geographic orientation, regardless of the direction the speaker > >> was facing in the two films (ibid). > >> > >> > >> *Robert* > >> > >> > >> Deutscher, G. (2010, August 29) Does your language shape how you think? *The > >> New York Times* *Sunday Magazine, *p. MM 42. > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 4:05 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > >>> > >>> Yes, Haliday is essentially a Whorfian, and that's one of things that > >>> brings him close to Vygotsky. (Compare, for example, Chomsky, who is > >>> essentially anti-developmental in his ideas about language, and who now > >>> rejects the leading role played by social communication and says that > >>> communication is epiphenomenal to language, whose original purpose is > >>> thought.) For Sapir, and for Whorf, in the beginning of every major > >>> onotogenetic, sociogenetic, and even phylogenetic change in language there > >>> has to be some change in the nature of communication. > >>> > >>> So what Andy says about the lack of the basis of modern science in Hopi > >>> applies perfectly well to English. When we read the scientific writings of > >>> Chaucer on the astrolabe, for example, we do not see words like > >>> "reflection", "refraction" or "alignment". Chaucer uses words like "bounce > >>> off", "bend through", and "line up" (note the use of prepositions, > >>> Helena!). Where did these words come from, and how did they make scientific > >>> English possible? > >>> > >>> Most of us have no problem saying that Isaac Newton discovered the laws of > >>> gravitation. But it's only a slight exaggeration to say that what he really > >>> discovered was the meaning potential of words like "gravitation". Gravity > >>> is, of course, not a thing at all; that is, it's not an entity, but rather > >>> a process, the process of falling down, or falling in (preps, again!). So > >>> how and above all why does it become an entity? > >>> > >>> It's interesting to compare Newton's writings on optics with Chaucer's on > >>> the astrolabe. The "Opticks" has a fixed format that we recognize almost > >>> instantly today: Newton describes his equipment (the prism and the dark > >>> room); he then narrates his method as a kind of recipe ("First, I did this; > >>> then I did that") and draws conclusions, which he then formulates in > >>> mathematical terms (this is essentially the format of Vygotsky's lectures > >>> on pedology, so much so that when translating them we had some trouble > >>> determining the precise moment when Vygotsky turns to the blackboard to > >>> write his conclusion in the form of a law). > >>> > >>> In order to get them into mathematical shape, though, he has to make > >>> sentences that look a lot like equations. "The plumpness of the lens yields > >>> a greater refraction of the light", "The reflection of the light from the > >>> glass results of the light striking the flatness of the glass" "The > >>> curvature of the spectacle glass supplies the lacking plumpness of the > >>> eye". In each of these, a quality or a process which would normally be > >>> realized as an adjective or a verb is suddenly realized by a noun, creating > >>> an imaginary entity. > >>> > >>> That's grammatical metaphor. Something that is "canonically" realized by a > >>> verb ("to grow") is suddenly realized nominally ("growth"), or something > >>> that is canonically a quality ('red") is realized verbally ("redden"). We > >>> even find related clauses realized as verbs ("She did not know the rules. > >>> So she died" is realized by "Death was brought about through ignorance", > >>> all of these examples from Halliday). In fact, the Genetic Law that > >>> Vygotsky formulates in "Mind in Society" ("Every higher mental function is > >>> realized on two planes....") is really just one instance of grammatical > >>> metaphor. > >>> > >>> One of Chomsky's best known arguments for the radical innateness hypothesis > >>> is this. If I take a sentence like "Students who do not do their homework > >>> do not do well" and I want to make a question, how do I know which "do" to > >>> move to the front? Chomsky assumes that this knowledge is essentially > >>> innate; it is part of universal grammar. But you can see that "Do students > >>> who do not do their homework do well?" can be built up through a process of > >>> what we might call "discourse metaphor"--whereby clauses stand for > >>> exchanges: > >>> > >>> Mother: You did your homework, didn't you? > >>> Child: No. > >>> Mother: You didn't do your homework? Did you do well? > >>> Child: No. > >>> Mother: You didn't do well? > >>> Child: No. > >>> Mother: You didn't do you homework so you didn't do well. Do the other > >>> students do well? > >>> Child: Some of them. > >>> Mother: Who does well? Do students who do not do their homework do well? > >>> > >>> And this of course explains why wh-items like "who" and 'why" have two > >>> functions--one inside a clause, where it expresses an intra-mental function > >>> (grammar) and one between them where it expresses an inter-mental function > >>> (discourse). > >>> > >>> I realize that grammatical metaphor will seem rather dry and abstract and > >>> unpoetic to people who assume that metaphor is only of the lexical kind. > >>> But to me, and I think to most children, it is far far more powerful and > >>> far more important developmentally. In some ways, it's the lexical metaphor > >>> that is responsible for the disenchantment of the child's world, while the > >>> grammatical metaphor infinitely expands it. (And here, I'm afraid, I must > >>> stop--it's time for breakfast and anyway my one screen is used up!) > >>> > >>> David Kellogg > >>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> , or "the > >>> > >>> . He > >>> > >>> On 19 December 2014 at 15:15, Greg Thompson > >>> wrote: > >>> > >>>> Helena and David, > >>>> I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the so-called > >>>> authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred tradition to > >>>> Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi notion of > >>>> "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including English) notion > >>> of > >>>> "time" and how each of these languages offers different affordances of > >>>> meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual understanding, English > >>> has > >>>> a much more reified/objectified/entified sense of time. (btw, I think the > >>>> first paragraph is easier to follow than the second - and in that first > >>>> paragraph you'll find our old friend "imagination"). > >>>> David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to? > >>>> -greg > >>>> > >>>> Taken from: > >>>> > >>>> > >>> http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/mousesite/Secondary/Whorfframe2.html > >>>> > >>>> " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, sunset" are > >>> with > >>>> us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from other nouns. > >>>> They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in winter" > >>> just > >>>> as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are pluralized and > >>>> numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. Our thought > >>>> about the referents of such words hence becomes objectified. Without > >>>> objectification, it would be a subjective experience of real time, i.e. > >>> of > >>>> the consciousness of "becoming later and later"--simply a cyclic phase > >>>> similar to an earlier phase in that ever-later-becoming duration. Only by > >>>> imagination can such a cyclic phase be set beside another and another in > >>>> the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually perceived) configuration. "But > >>> such > >>>> is the power of linguistic analogy that we do so objectify cyclic > >>> phasing. > >>>> We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g., > >>> "phasing." > >>>> And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting binomial > >>>> formula of formless item plus form, is so general that it is implicit for > >>>> all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless items like "substance, > >>>> matter," by which we can fill out the binomial for an enormously wide > >>> range > >>>> of nouns. But even these are not quite generalized enough to take in our > >>>> phase nouns. So for the phase nouns we have made a formless item, "time." > >>>> We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, in the > >>>> pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" in the > >>>> pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can say and > >>> think > >>>> "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." Let me again point > >>>> out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of milk" or "a piece of > >>>> cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a summer" actually > >>> contains > >>>> or consists of such-and-such a quantity of "time." > >>>> > >>>> In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., are not > >>>> nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They are a > >>>> formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, and even > >>>> other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a locative > >>> pattern, > >>>> like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It contains no morpheme like one > >>> of > >>>> "in the house" or "at the tree." It means "when it is morning" or "while > >>>> morning-phase is occurring." These "temporal s" are not used as subjects > >>> or > >>>> objects, or at all like nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" or > >>>> "summer is hot"; summer is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions are > >>> hot, > >>>> WHEN heat occurs. One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or > >>>> "summer recently." There is no objectification, as a region, an extent, a > >>>> quantity, of the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested about > >>>> time except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no basis > >>>> here for a formless item answering to our "time." " > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Helena Worthen >>>> > >>>> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to this: > >>>>> > >>>>> "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton > >>>>> and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to create > >>>>> sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly productive, > >>>>> which is why they still form the basis of scientific writing and > >>> thinking > >>>>> today." > >>>>> > >>>>> Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I lose you when > >>>> you > >>>>> say "created to talk about gravity as an entity". > >>>>> > >>>>> Thank you, > >>>>> > >>>>> Helena > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> Helena Worthen > >>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com > >>>>> > >>>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> As Helena points out, prepositions are from the "grammatical" end of > >>>> what > >>>>>> Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what Halliday > >>>> calls > >>>>>> "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they have > >>> three > >>>>>> properties that words from the more "lexical" end do not have: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You can, > >>>>> actually, > >>>>>> but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you invent a new > >>> name > >>>>> or a > >>>>>> new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can). > >>>>>> > >>>>>> b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific semantic > >>> field > >>>>> (the > >>>>>> way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of > >>>> linguistics) > >>>>>> but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are used. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the same > >>>> effect, > >>>>>> which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your argument" the "in" > >>>> has > >>>>>> more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in "there's a fly in > >>>> your > >>>>>> tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in Henry's hands, > >>>>> refer > >>>>>> to a book or even a footnote. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties pretty > >>> much > >>>>>> define the difference between learning and development, at least as I > >>>>>> understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on functions > >>>>>> indefinitely while development works by reorganizing the closed set > >>> of > >>>>>> functions you already have into new systems. Learning is skill > >>> specific > >>>>>> and local, while development is quite global in its implications. > >>>>> Learning > >>>>>> is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new systems, > >>> while > >>>>>> development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary (and forget it > >>>> just > >>>>>> as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes away. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of blue that > >>>>> people > >>>>>> call the sky") are simply metaphors from the non-productive end of > >>> the > >>>>>> lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are crisp, concrete, > >>> and > >>>>>> vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that > >>>> Newton > >>>>>> and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to create > >>>>>> sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly > >>> productive, > >>>>>> which is why they still form the basis of scientific writing and > >>>> thinking > >>>>>> today. For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical metaphor is the > >>>> third > >>>>>> great moment in child development (after the break into mother tongue > >>>> and > >>>>>> the break into disciplinary language in school work). > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" implies > >>> zero > >>>>>> dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two ("on a line', 'on > >>> a > >>>>>> plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because they are > >>>>>> grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them with time: > >>> 'at > >>>> a > >>>>>> point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. Compare: "at > >>>>>> Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very day), and "in > >>>>>> Christmas' (season). > >>>>>> > >>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen < > >>> helenaworthen@gmail.com> > >>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial > >>>>>>> relationships from the concrete material world into the conceptual > >>>>>>> imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 common ones, and > >>>>> between 70 > >>>>>>> and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far as" -- > >>>>> this > >>>>>>> is according to > >>> https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm > >>>> ). > >>>>>>> We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. Apparently, in > >>>>>>> English, they evolved from and did the job done by inflections in > >>>> parent > >>>>>>> languages, examples being cases and tenses. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection like > >>> the > >>>>>>> dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial relationships > >>>>> suggested > >>>>>>> by contemporary prepositions. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about this. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Helena Worthen > >>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly > >>>> embodied, > >>>>>>> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to > >>> linguistics > >>>>> (For > >>>>>>> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on > >>>> ?lexicon?: > >>>>>>> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, > >>> being > >>>>> part > >>>>>>> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and Halliday > >>>>> see no > >>>>>>> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, > >>> lexico-grammar. > >>>>> (Lo > >>>>>>> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar, > >>> adding > >>>>> the > >>>>>>> ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings are > >>>> great > >>>>>>> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of that? > >>> In > >>>>>>> translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced? > >>>>>>>> Henry > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden > >>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the > >>>> metaphorical > >>>>>>> use of prepositions like: > >>>>>>>>> - "there is some value IN your argument" > >>>>>>>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again" > >>>>>>>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" > >>>>>>>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again" > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> and so on. > >>>>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>> > >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> larry smolucha wrote: > >>>>>>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself - > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic > >>>>> possibilities: > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in > >>>>> Thought > >>>>>>>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into > >>>> English > >>>>>>> 1962] > >>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' > >>>> value > >>>>>>> of the > >>>>>>>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech > >>>>> vocalization). > >>>>>>>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that > >>> are > >>>>>>> flammable > >>>>>>>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor a > >>>> gas. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century European > >>>>>>> Developmental > >>>>>>>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' > >>> hence > >>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of > >>>> Piaget's > >>>>>>> Genetic > >>>>>>>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and synthesis > >>>>>>> based on > >>>>>>>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in Vygotsky's > >>>>>>> example of H2O. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com > >>>>>>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>>>>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 > >>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic > >>>>>>>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the > >>> parts. > >>>>>>>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more than > >>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can ever > >>>> be > >>>>>>> imagined" > >>>>>>>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> A couple things to consider: > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination as > >>> the > >>>>>>> brain has > >>>>>>>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the simplest > >>>> level > >>>>>>> of the Gestalt > >>>>>>>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). > >>>>>>>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just > >>>> photographic. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try to > >>>>>>> accurately reproduce > >>>>>>>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, > >>> the > >>>>>>> goal of combinatory > >>>>>>>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, dreams, > >>>>>>> musings, and even > >>>>>>>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of > >>>> objects > >>>>>>> and symbols. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways > >>> that > >>>>>>> things and concepts can be > >>>>>>>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar and > >>>>> flour. > >>>>>>>>>>> I can add water and it > >>>>>>> dissolves a bit > >>>>>>>>>>> But adding heat changes > >>>> the > >>>>>>> combination into a pancake. > >>>>>>>>>>> [Is this synergistic?] > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more > >>> examples > >>>>>>> to put the discussion > >>>>>>>>>>> in the metaphysical realm. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 > >>>>>>>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com > >>>>>>>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the > >>> case > >>>>> for > >>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I think > >>>> it's > >>>>>>> not > >>>>>>>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are > >>>>>>> associationists who > >>>>>>>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary > >>> associationism > >>>>>>> exists and > >>>>>>>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. > >>>>>>> Vygotsky > >>>>>>>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, > >>>> explain > >>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>> uniqueness of our species? > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels for > >>>> its > >>>>>>> own > >>>>>>>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a > >>> Piagetian > >>>>>>>>>>>> perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true > >>> maturity > >>>>> as a > >>>>>>>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more to > >>> it > >>>>>>> than > >>>>>>>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of > >>> primate, > >>>>> and > >>>>>>> our > >>>>>>>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon > >>> rocks > >>>>> in > >>>>>>> order > >>>>>>>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged the > >>>> same > >>>>>>> way as > >>>>>>>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and for > >>>>>>> language is > >>>>>>>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human > >>>>>>> exceptionalism. > >>>>>>>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for the > >>>>>>> vanguard role > >>>>>>>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, > >>>>> prolonging > >>>>>>>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after the > >>>> sick > >>>>>>> and the > >>>>>>>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial organs > >>>>>>> (tools) and > >>>>>>>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for our > >>>>>>> species, it > >>>>>>>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these > >>>>>>> "circuitous, > >>>>>>>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that lead > >>>> our > >>>>>>>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always been > >>>>>>> short on > >>>>>>>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for material > >>>>>>> culture > >>>>>>>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: > >>>>>>> verily, here > >>>>>>>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of attention > >>> is > >>>>>>> simply the > >>>>>>>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says there > >>> are > >>>>>>> only two > >>>>>>>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So > >>>>>>> imagination is > >>>>>>>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, > >>> and > >>>>>>> nothing > >>>>>>>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when you > >>>>> hear > >>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there to > >>> be > >>>>>>> able to > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work in > >>>> word > >>>>>>> meaning. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who was > >>>>> given > >>>>>>> a > >>>>>>>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been mixed > >>>> with > >>>>>>> silver > >>>>>>>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of > >>> gold. > >>>>>>> Well, we > >>>>>>>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not > >>>> possible > >>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that precisely. > >>> The > >>>>>>> method > >>>>>>>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the "principal > >>>> of > >>>>>>>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes palimpsest, > >>> a > >>>>>>> velum on > >>>>>>>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. > >>>>> Because > >>>>>>>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and written > >>>> over > >>>>>>> every > >>>>>>>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, > >>> the > >>>>>>> pressure > >>>>>>>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones > >>> when > >>>>> the > >>>>>>> old > >>>>>>>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only > >>>> known > >>>>>>> Greek > >>>>>>>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their > >>>>>>> relationship > >>>>>>>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they are > >>>>>>> related to > >>>>>>>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite > >>>>> similar > >>>>>>> to the > >>>>>>>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD < > >>> hshonerd@gmail.com> > >>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an > >>>>> associationist, > >>>>>>> ?sees > >>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg < > >>>> dkellogg60@gmail.com > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division > >>>>>>> between > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, > >>> because > >>>>>>> Ribot is > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> an > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form > >>> of > >>>>>>> attention. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition > >>>> from > >>>>>>> forest > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division > >>>> between > >>>>>>> the two > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and > >>> commonsensical > >>>>>>> world of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic > >>>> uses > >>>>>>> in life > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more > >>>>> "imaginative" > >>>>>>> (that > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of > >>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> farm,where > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter > >>>>>>> months are > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to > >>>> encounter > >>>>>>> talking > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here > >>> attention > >>>>> has > >>>>>>> to be > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> more voluntary. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very > >>>> clear > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that > >>>>>>> underpins > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky > >>> points > >>>>> out > >>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive > >>> practices > >>>>>>> really > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> are > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of > >>>> imagination, > >>>>>>> there > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between > >>> human > >>>>> and > >>>>>>> animal > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable > >>> of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> volitional > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). > >>>>> Without > >>>>>>> a > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> theory > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for > >>>>> Ribot's > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological functions > >>> at > >>>>>>> all. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole > >>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, > >>>>>>> thanks to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> all > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential > >>>>>>> around the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> time > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I > >>> had > >>>>>>> seen work > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> on > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal > >>>>>>> reproductive? > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of > >>>>>>> development > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of > >>> being > >>>> a > >>>>>>> relative > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > >>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket > >>>> list. > >>>>>>> This > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from > >>>> some > >>>>>>> weeks > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> in > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that > >>>>>>> segmented the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met > >>> aphorizing?. > >>>>>>> Puns, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole > >>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and > >>>> they > >>>>>>> are > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> doing > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his > >>>>>>> followers as an > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, > >>> so > >>>>>>> its of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> course > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in > >>>>>>> translation, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> seems > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" > >>>> in > >>>>>>> this > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> passage, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter > >>>>>>> distinction to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "memory." > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in > >>> contemporary > >>>>>>> discourse > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian > >>>>>>> colleagues have > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from > >>>> theorists > >>>>>>> who > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clearly > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was > >>>> still > >>>>>>> possible > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, > >>>>>>> interestingly > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> links > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a > >>>> "voluntary" > >>>>>>> act. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Parts > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff > >>>>> that > >>>>>>> was > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> also > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of > >>>>>>> creativity > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to > >>> see > >>>>>>> that the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> two > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found > >>>> himself > >>>>>>> writing. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which > >>> pretty > >>>>> old > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> approaches > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < > >>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but > >>> it > >>>>>>> may be > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> worth > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent > >>> place > >>>> to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagination > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between > >>>>>>> Recollection and > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive > >>>>>>> Imagination, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> (2) > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which > >>>> he > >>>>>>> says > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> leads > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In > >>> other > >>>>>>> words, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is > >>>>>>> accomplished > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> through > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson > >>> and > >>>>>>> Williams. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose > >>>> work i > >>>>>>> am > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> trying > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of > >>>>>>> productive > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive > >>>> imagination > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> develops. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies > >>> that > >>>>>>> there > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> must > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be a > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. > >>> But > >>>> I > >>>>>>> learned > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears > >>> and > >>>> is > >>>>>>> linked > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of > >>>>>>> anticipation > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > >>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on > >>> imagination > >>>>>>> (starting > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, > >>> and > >>>>>>> provides > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> a > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as > >>>>> fixed. > >>>>>>> This, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a > >>>>> ground > >>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> take > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> part > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preconceptions: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian > >>>>>>> Langacker on > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full > >>> of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of > >>>>>>> temporality: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic > >>>>>>> structure), which > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for > >>> both > >>>>>>> individual > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < > >>>>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third > >>>> *space* > >>>>>>> and the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his > >>>>>>> notion of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is > >>>>>>> explored under > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of > >>>>>>> modalities > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of > >>>> knowing > >>>>>>> that is > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" > >>> [perceived??] > >>>> if > >>>>>>> we > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> think > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as > >>> *style* > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to say > >>> how > >>>>>>> jazzed up > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the > >>> mind > >>>>> as > >>>>>>> Larry > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various > >>>>>>> triads, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> finally > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my > >>> notebooks > >>>>> of > >>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind, as > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, > >>>> luega > >>>>>>> pa? > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fuera. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole < > >>>> mcole@ucsd.edu> > >>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, > >>>> attached > >>>>>>> are two > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT > >>>>> theorists > >>>>>>> like > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of > >>>>>>> imagination in a > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of > >>>>>>> productive > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no > >>>>>>> intention of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doing > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in > >>> the > >>>>>>> attached > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these > >>>> philosophers, > >>>>> I > >>>>>>> came > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> upon > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very closely > >>>>>>> linked at > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> several > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, > >>>>>>> Ettienne and I > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a > >>>> means > >>>>> of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> access > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander > >>> Suvorov. > >>>>>>> Moreover, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> such > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct > >>>>> relevance > >>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kris's > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to > >>>>>>> concerns > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> about > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in > >>>> development. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. > >>>>> Perhaps > >>>>>>> they > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> will > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a > >>> natural > >>>>>>> science > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with an > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > >>>> science > >>>>>>> with an > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > >>> science > >>>>>>> with an > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> -- > >>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >>>> Assistant Professor > >>>> Department of Anthropology > >>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >>>> Brigham Young University > >>>> Provo, UT 84602 > >>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >>>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> -- > >> > >> *Robert Lake Ed.D.*Associate Professor > >> Social Foundations of Education > >> Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading > >> Georgia Southern University > >> Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group > >> P. O. Box 8144 > >> Phone: (912) 478-0355 > >> Fax: (912) 478-5382 > >> Statesboro, GA 30460 > > > > From lsmolucha@hotmail.com Sat Dec 20 11:13:32 2014 From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com (larry smolucha) Date: Sat, 20 Dec 2014 13:13:32 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Time, Imagination, Metaphor In-Reply-To: <2C35C258-0126-4861-9A81-65E0B7EEA498@gmail.com> References: , , <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net>, , , , , <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com>, , , , <5492A447.7030004@mira.net>, , , , , , <5493CC6B.5050105@mira.net>, , , , , <2C35C258-0126-4861-9A81-65E0B7EEA498@gmail.com> Message-ID: My concern with using de Saussure's terms are (1) that most people use the term 'paradigm' or 'paradigmatic' as referring to a world view as a result of Thomas Kuhn's 1967 book. The way de Saussure used paradigmatic is what I call Aristotelian logic (something is either A or not A). (2) Syntagmatic as considering both this and that is what I usually think of as Dialetical Reasoning. Of course, de Saussure is refering to substituting words in a sentence rather than focusing on concepts. Perhaps, Kris Guittieriz will comment on Henry's suggestion about 'vertical' and 'horizontal' being akin to paradigmatic and syntagmatic. > From: hshonerd@gmail.com > Date: Sat, 20 Dec 2014 08:43:05 -0700 > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Time, Imagination, Metaphor > > Re: ?vertical? and ?horizontal?: think paradigmatic and syntagmatic. > Henry > > > On Dec 19, 2014, at 6:19 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > > Francine, > > Your comment: > > > > "The 'Natural' Science that arises from European culture begins as > > mechanical physics and alchemy > > in which machines have parts and chemicals have elements." > > > > Having "parts" and having "elements" as the beginning "point" or "position" > > from which we get "in" to this theme of "natural" science > > Francine would you say this theme iis also a "mytheme"? > > I read this as a type of *opening* of an origin narrative or history as > > situating development in specific concrete situations. [situate as both > > verb and noun] with a theme of "cultural diversity" I keep mentioning > > Raymond Williams as I find he writes within *THIS* STYLE and it is very > > helpful for getting my bearings. > > > > It will put IN play what we mean by "academic or scientific" concepts as > > possibly historically effected understandings. > > Will we also explore Kris's notion of "vertical" and "horizontal" concepts > > within cultural synergy? > > David K's "grammatical metaphors" may also be involved in this cultural > > diversity. > > I have been considering reading more from Raymond Williams, so would > > consider a shared reading with a similar exploration of cultural > > permeability of time, imagination, metaphor, perception and trans-versal > > ways of orienting or moving *in* the world. > > Larry > > > > On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 3:37 PM, larry smolucha > > wrote: > >> > >> Message from Francine: > >> > >> These three threads are all related (not forgetting perception and > >> imagination). > >> > >> One of the things about XMCA threads is that the members each have so much > >> to contribute, from their own perspectives as well as bibliographic > >> references. > >> > >> The discourse does get philosophical raising old metaphysics questions of > >> epistemology "How do we know what we know?" "How is our understanding > >> shaped by language and culture?" XMCARs tend to be particularly > >> self-conscious > >> about their own use of language - which is good. There seems to be a > >> striving > >> for a new framework (paradigm) that clarifies these cross-cultural semiotic > >> differences. > >> > >> The project I am working on is on how new ideas, customs, inventions, > >> language, > >> art, music, etc. are created through Cultural Synergy - when 'artifacts' > >> from one > >> culture enter another and are combined into something more than how the > >> artifacts functioned in their original cultures. I can give mundane > >> examples such as how > >> noodles from China become spaghetti, elbow macaroni, etc. Or, the wheel as > >> a potter's wheel, a wagon wheel, a gear, a grinding stone, a steering > >> wheel, etc. > >> (and all the mechanical devices that combine wheels, like pulleys and > >> clocks and > >> the first calculator). Concrete examples are a good start but there are > >> more > >> conceptual examples that I have just not had time to clarify. The > >> discussion > >> of time as it differs cross-culturally is a good starting point. Where I > >> personally > >> would want to go with this, is to look how how new conceptions of time > >> emerge through > >> inter-cultural contact. That is metaphysics. > >> > >> I also wonder how the semiotics of European, Middle Eastern, and Chinese > >> cultures > >> are related to their invention of the wheel and advancements in metallurgy. > >> (Noting that Western African tribes did smelting of ore). The 'Natural' > >> Science > >> that arises from European culture begins as mechanical physics and alchemy > >> in which machines have parts and chemicals have elements. It has evolved > >> into > >> the study of energy, and systems theory. > >> > >> There is enough here for ten volumes. Anyone interested? > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >>> Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2014 03:25:02 -0800 > >>> From: lpscholar2@gmail.com > >>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Time > >>> > >>> This notion of our being a "verb" or being a "noun" or being a > >> "position" > >>> or possibly being a "pre" - position. > >>> What I am wondering is where we are going?? > >>> Are we actually "verbs" and "nouns" and "positions" and "pre"-positions?? > >>> Do we "exist" in the grammar [syntax] or do we "exist" in the "semantics" > >>> [meaning] or do we "exist" in the "Pragmatics" [doing, activity] > >>> > >>> I apologize if this question is merely "idio"-syncretic but it is the > >>> imaginal mutually reciprocal "third space" which I am being invited to > >>> occupy in THIS SPECIFIC community as we trans-late the imaginal into > >>> "genres" or "forms". For this reason, I want to hold on to the moral > >> virtue > >>> of "cosmopolitanism" that Kris Gutierrez articulated in her paper. [Yes a > >>> trans-position] Kris wrote: > >>> "At the CORE of its [the third space] political-philosophical ROOTS, this > >>> program is oriented towards a FORM {LP adds a form as a genre]] of > >>> "cosmopolitanism" (Appiah, 2006) characterized by the ideals and > >> practices > >>> of a shared humanity, a profound OBLIGATION to others, boundary crossing, > >>> and intercultural exchange in which difference is celebrated without > >> being > >>> romanticized. > >>> To get to this "space" or "place" requires imagination. > >>> > >>> If Buckminster Fuller "seems" to be a verb, and others "seem" to be nouns > >>> while others "seem" to be positions [stances] , while others "seem" to be > >>> "pre"-positions, then the imaginal "seems" to be *IN* play. [with the > >> full > >>> awareness of *IN* as David K out-lined or under-scored or high-lighted.] > >>> > >>> I want to ask Francine what she meant by "metaphysical" in her signing > >> off > >>> on her recent examples or cases. Kris "pragmatics" or "performance" > >> seems > >>> to me "grounded" in the sense of rising [ideal] and returning [to ground] > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 2:17 AM, larry smolucha > >>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> I seem to be a verb > >>>> > >>>> R. Buckminster Fuller 1970 > >>>> > >>>>> Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2014 00:36:03 -0700 > >>>>> From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com > >>>>> To: ablunden@mira.net; xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Time > >>>>> > >>>>> Interesting how you have taken this Andy - to suggest that the Hopi > >> lack > >>>> a > >>>>> founding principle of Natural Science. > >>>>> > >>>>> Whorf actually takes this in generally the opposite direction. In his > >>>> work > >>>>> on the Hopi language, he suggests that one finds a language much > >> better > >>>>> suited to thinking about the theoretical physics of Whorf's day > >> (e.g., > >>>>> Einstein's theory of relativity, quantum mechanics, etc.). In that > >> sense, > >>>>> Hopi is, in fact, closer to describing the way the world really is. > >> (and > >>>>> I'll quickly rescind those last six words if you have any > >> objections!). > >>>>> > >>>>> As to your assumption that science requires the objectification of > >> the > >>>>> natural world, I'm sure there are others on the list who would agree > >> with > >>>>> me that there is good reason to question the necessity of > >> subject/object > >>>>> dualism for science. (and perhaps you were referring to a particular > >>>>> scientific tradition by calling it "Natural Science" - maybe scary > >> scare > >>>>> quotes are needed?). > >>>>> > >>>>> -greg > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 11:57 PM, Andy Blunden > >>>> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> That is an extremely interesting paragraph or two on the contrast > >>>> between > >>>>>> typical modern expressions of Time and how the Hopi language > >> expresses > >>>>>> corresponding situations. It seems that taking Nature (including > >> Time) > >>>> to > >>>>>> be something which exists independently of us humans and can be > >> known > >>>> as > >>>>>> such, in other words, the founding principle of Natural Science, is > >>>> built > >>>>>> into a premodern language, and is not shared by (at least one) > >>>> indigenous > >>>>>> people. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Andy > >>>>>> > >>>> > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Greg Thompson wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> Helena and David, > >>>>>>> I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the > >> so-called > >>>>>>> authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred > >> tradition > >>>> to > >>>>>>> Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi > >> notion > >>>> of > >>>>>>> "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including English) > >>>> notion > >>>>>>> of > >>>>>>> "time" and how each of these languages offers different > >> affordances of > >>>>>>> meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual understanding, > >>>> English > >>>>>>> has > >>>>>>> a much more reified/objectified/entified sense of time. (btw, I > >> think > >>>> the > >>>>>>> first paragraph is easier to follow than the second - and in that > >>>> first > >>>>>>> paragraph you'll find our old friend "imagination"). > >>>>>>> David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to? > >>>>>>> -greg > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Taken from: > >>>>>>> http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/ > >>>>>>> mousesite/Secondary/Whorfframe2.html > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, > >> sunset" are > >>>>>>> with > >>>>>>> us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from other > >>>> nouns. > >>>>>>> They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in > >> winter" > >>>>>>> just > >>>>>>> as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are pluralized > >> and > >>>>>>> numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. Our > >> thought > >>>>>>> about the referents of such words hence becomes objectified. > >> Without > >>>>>>> objectification, it would be a subjective experience of real time, > >>>> i.e. of > >>>>>>> the consciousness of "becoming later and later"--simply a cyclic > >> phase > >>>>>>> similar to an earlier phase in that ever-later-becoming duration. > >>>> Only by > >>>>>>> imagination can such a cyclic phase be set beside another and > >> another > >>>> in > >>>>>>> the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually perceived) configuration. > >> "But > >>>> such > >>>>>>> is the power of linguistic analogy that we do so objectify cyclic > >>>> phasing. > >>>>>>> We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g., > >>>> "phasing." > >>>>>>> And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting > >>>> binomial > >>>>>>> formula of formless item plus form, is so general that it is > >> implicit > >>>> for > >>>>>>> all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless items like > >>>> "substance, > >>>>>>> matter," by which we can fill out the binomial for an enormously > >> wide > >>>>>>> range > >>>>>>> of nouns. But even these are not quite generalized enough to take > >> in > >>>> our > >>>>>>> phase nouns. So for the phase nouns we have made a formless item, > >>>> "time." > >>>>>>> We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, > >> in the > >>>>>>> pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" > >> in > >>>> the > >>>>>>> pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can say > >> and > >>>>>>> think > >>>>>>> "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." Let me again > >>>> point > >>>>>>> out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of milk" or "a > >> piece > >>>> of > >>>>>>> cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a summer" actually > >>>> contains > >>>>>>> or consists of such-and-such a quantity of "time." > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., > >> are not > >>>>>>> nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They > >> are a > >>>>>>> formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, > >> and > >>>> even > >>>>>>> other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a locative > >>>>>>> pattern, > >>>>>>> like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It contains no morpheme > >> like > >>>> one of > >>>>>>> "in the house" or "at the tree." It means "when it is morning" or > >>>> "while > >>>>>>> morning-phase is occurring." These "temporal s" are not used as > >>>> subjects > >>>>>>> or > >>>>>>> objects, or at all like nouns. One does not say "it's a hot > >> summer" or > >>>>>>> "summer is hot"; summer is not hot, summer is only WHEN > >> conditions are > >>>>>>> hot, > >>>>>>> WHEN heat occurs. One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer > >> now" or > >>>>>>> "summer recently." There is no objectification, as a region, an > >>>> extent, a > >>>>>>> quantity, of the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested > >>>> about > >>>>>>> time except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is > >> no > >>>> basis > >>>>>>> here for a formless item answering to our "time." " > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> -- > >>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >>>>> Assistant Professor > >>>>> Department of Anthropology > >>>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >>>>> Brigham Young University > >>>>> Provo, UT 84602 > >>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >>>> > >>>> > >> > > From annalisa@unm.edu Sat Dec 20 11:32:11 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Sat, 20 Dec 2014 19:32:11 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors In-Reply-To: References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> <, > <1419043134656.6915@unm.edu>, Message-ID: <1419103930161.40677@unm.edu> That's an interesting question, Henry. Perhaps it is better to pose a continuum: there are classes of metaphors that are more embodied, meaning in terms of space and relational to the speaker, on one end, and others that are more image-based, meaning in terms of culture and the meanings of these images. Of course since most metaphors are spoken, anything in language would be cultural. But a metaphor located in a painting for example would become a symbol, a word that was missing in my discussion about paintings. So is a symbol an ontological metaphor? A metaphor with a body? No, because math symbols are not metaphors. Hmm... Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+annalisa=unm.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of HENRY SHONERD Sent: Saturday, December 20, 2014 9:32 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors I am wondering if anything cultural is NOT embodied, since culture is human. Henry > On Dec 19, 2014, at 7:38 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > Hi metaphorically reasoning friends reasoning about metaphors, > > I wanted to say that there is a connection between what Larry is calling imaginal metaphors (I think he is calling them that), and what David is calling grammatical metaphors (I think he is calling them that). > > They are both classes of metaphors, but of a different order. > > In both cases, I'd say they can be of a cultural type and an embodied type. For example in the case of English prepositions, they are to an English speaker embodied and spatial, but in comparison to Sanskrit it would be also cultural because the word is separated from the object. > > For imaginal metaphors these can be embodied and cultural as well. "She sings sweetly," is embodied; "A rose is a rose is a rose by any other name," is cultural (coming from Shakespeare), unless I have misquoted him, of course. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Larry Purss > Sent: Friday, December 19, 2014 5:41 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors > > David, Robert, Francine > I find the insights offered by "grammatical metaphor" [contrasted with > "lexical metaphor"] and the comparison of Chaucer's use of grammatical > metaphor in relation TO Newton as potentially pregnant with possibility. > > LINKING also to Hopi ways of moving in the world and Aboriginal ways of > orienting indicates a potent vantage point for elaborating > cultural-historical theory and sociocritical literacy. > Is "metaphor" too vast a topic line. David's examples of "grammatical > metaphor" within specific historical developments seem to situate science > and reason and equating in a radically different relation to the > imaginal?. > > I also wonder if another thread should explore the multiple complex German > themes of the imaginal in Kant, Hegel, that was recently posted. I was lost > in the subtle differences but sense these differences in German may be > relevant to our exploration of the imaginal. > I am learning the complexity of this theme and "grammatical metaphor" seems > to be key to different notions of the fact/fiction reciprocal trans-lations > Larry > > On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 3:48 PM, larry smolucha > wrote: >> >> Message from Francine: >> >> Just a thought - Is the use of nouns, verbs, prepositions a result >> of developing a written language based on an alphabet? >> >> Language use in a culture with no written language would surely differ >> significantly. >> >> And written languages based on hieroglyphs, pictograms, cuneiform, >> Norse Runes, Celtic oghams, etc. surely divide and frame experience >> differently. >> >> >>> From: boblake@georgiasouthern.edu >>> Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2014 16:43:24 -0500 >>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors >>> >>> Hi Everyone, >>> I appreciate this thread's emphasis on the relativistic character of >>> metaphoric language and find think that it supports Vygotsky's notion of >>> the fluid nature of language as it emerges from socio-cultural and >>> socio-historical contexts in meaning making (in contrast to biological >>> determinism). Because each culture makes meaning in widely diverse ways, >>> language forms and usage might have complex intricacies and shades of >>> meaning on one concept alone. Along with the example of early 20th >> century >>> Hopi's view of time, there are other more recent examples from the >> present >>> day that suggest ways that language can shape thought . >>> >>> Consider the Australian aboriginal language, Guugu Yimithirr, from north >>> Queensland who have no words for right or left, in front of, or behind to >>> describe location. Instead they use the points of the compass even when >>> requesting that someone move over to make room. They will say ?move a bit >>> to the east.? To tell you where exactly they left something in your >> house, >>> they?ll say, ?I left it on the southern edge of the western table.? >> (Deutscher, >>> 2010, p. MM 42) >>> >>> The effect on the thinking of this group is phenomenal in orienting the >>> speakers to their directional spatial environment to such a degree that >>> roughly 1 out of every 10 words in conversational Guugu Yimithirr >> includes >>> either north, south, east or west and is accompanied with precise hand >>> gestures (ibid). Consequently in this culture, language acquisition >>> involves constant awareness of spaces relative to the points of the >>> compass. Deutscher relays a fascinating story about the ways that memory >>> is stored for the speakers of this language. The story also serves as a >>> clear example of Vygotsky?s notion of language as a mediating tool as a >>> means of creating higher levels of consciousness through spatial >>> kinesthetic approaches to meaning creation. >>> >>> >>> >>> One Guugu Yimithirr speaker was filmed telling his friends the story of >> how >>> in his youth, he capsized in shark-infested waters. He and an older >> person >>> were caught in a storm, and their boat tipped over. They both jumped into >>> the water and managed to swim nearly three miles to the shore, only to >>> discover that the missionary for whom they worked was far more concerned >> at >>> the loss of the boat than relieved at their miraculous escape. Apart from >>> the dramatic content, the remarkable thing about the story was that it >> was >>> remembered throughout in cardinal directions: the speaker jumped into the >>> water on the western side of the boat, his companion to the east of the >>> boat, they saw a giant shark swimming north and so on. Perhaps the >> cardinal >>> directions were just made up for the occasion? Well, quite by chance, the >>> same person was filmed some years later telling the same story. The >>> cardinal directions matched exactly in the two tellings. Even more >>> remarkable were the spontaneous hand gestures that accompanied the story. >>> For instance, the direction in which the boat rolled over was gestured in >>> the correct geographic orientation, regardless of the direction the >> speaker >>> was facing in the two films (ibid). >>> >>> >>> *Robert* >>> >>> >>> Deutscher, G. (2010, August 29) Does your language shape how you think? >> *The >>> New York Times* *Sunday Magazine, *p. MM 42. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 4:05 PM, David Kellogg >> wrote: >>>> >>>> Yes, Haliday is essentially a Whorfian, and that's one of things that >>>> brings him close to Vygotsky. (Compare, for example, Chomsky, who is >>>> essentially anti-developmental in his ideas about language, and who now >>>> rejects the leading role played by social communication and says that >>>> communication is epiphenomenal to language, whose original purpose is >>>> thought.) For Sapir, and for Whorf, in the beginning of every major >>>> onotogenetic, sociogenetic, and even phylogenetic change in language >> there >>>> has to be some change in the nature of communication. >>>> >>>> So what Andy says about the lack of the basis of modern science in Hopi >>>> applies perfectly well to English. When we read the scientific >> writings of >>>> Chaucer on the astrolabe, for example, we do not see words like >>>> "reflection", "refraction" or "alignment". Chaucer uses words like >> "bounce >>>> off", "bend through", and "line up" (note the use of prepositions, >>>> Helena!). Where did these words come from, and how did they make >> scientific >>>> English possible? >>>> >>>> Most of us have no problem saying that Isaac Newton discovered the >> laws of >>>> gravitation. But it's only a slight exaggeration to say that what he >> really >>>> discovered was the meaning potential of words like "gravitation". >> Gravity >>>> is, of course, not a thing at all; that is, it's not an entity, but >> rather >>>> a process, the process of falling down, or falling in (preps, again!). >> So >>>> how and above all why does it become an entity? >>>> >>>> It's interesting to compare Newton's writings on optics with Chaucer's >> on >>>> the astrolabe. The "Opticks" has a fixed format that we recognize >> almost >>>> instantly today: Newton describes his equipment (the prism and the dark >>>> room); he then narrates his method as a kind of recipe ("First, I did >> this; >>>> then I did that") and draws conclusions, which he then formulates in >>>> mathematical terms (this is essentially the format of Vygotsky's >> lectures >>>> on pedology, so much so that when translating them we had some trouble >>>> determining the precise moment when Vygotsky turns to the blackboard to >>>> write his conclusion in the form of a law). >>>> >>>> In order to get them into mathematical shape, though, he has to make >>>> sentences that look a lot like equations. "The plumpness of the lens >> yields >>>> a greater refraction of the light", "The reflection of the light from >> the >>>> glass results of the light striking the flatness of the glass" "The >>>> curvature of the spectacle glass supplies the lacking plumpness of the >>>> eye". In each of these, a quality or a process which would normally be >>>> realized as an adjective or a verb is suddenly realized by a noun, >> creating >>>> an imaginary entity. >>>> >>>> That's grammatical metaphor. Something that is "canonically" realized >> by a >>>> verb ("to grow") is suddenly realized nominally ("growth"), or >> something >>>> that is canonically a quality ('red") is realized verbally ("redden"). >> We >>>> even find related clauses realized as verbs ("She did not know the >> rules. >>>> So she died" is realized by "Death was brought about through >> ignorance", >>>> all of these examples from Halliday). In fact, the Genetic Law that >>>> Vygotsky formulates in "Mind in Society" ("Every higher mental >> function is >>>> realized on two planes....") is really just one instance of grammatical >>>> metaphor. >>>> >>>> One of Chomsky's best known arguments for the radical innateness >> hypothesis >>>> is this. If I take a sentence like "Students who do not do their >> homework >>>> do not do well" and I want to make a question, how do I know which >> "do" to >>>> move to the front? Chomsky assumes that this knowledge is essentially >>>> innate; it is part of universal grammar. But you can see that "Do >> students >>>> who do not do their homework do well?" can be built up through a >> process of >>>> what we might call "discourse metaphor"--whereby clauses stand for >>>> exchanges: >>>> >>>> Mother: You did your homework, didn't you? >>>> Child: No. >>>> Mother: You didn't do your homework? Did you do well? >>>> Child: No. >>>> Mother: You didn't do well? >>>> Child: No. >>>> Mother: You didn't do you homework so you didn't do well. Do the other >>>> students do well? >>>> Child: Some of them. >>>> Mother: Who does well? Do students who do not do their homework do >> well? >>>> >>>> And this of course explains why wh-items like "who" and 'why" have two >>>> functions--one inside a clause, where it expresses an intra-mental >> function >>>> (grammar) and one between them where it expresses an inter-mental >> function >>>> (discourse). >>>> >>>> I realize that grammatical metaphor will seem rather dry and abstract >> and >>>> unpoetic to people who assume that metaphor is only of the lexical >> kind. >>>> But to me, and I think to most children, it is far far more powerful >> and >>>> far more important developmentally. In some ways, it's the lexical >> metaphor >>>> that is responsible for the disenchantment of the child's world, while >> the >>>> grammatical metaphor infinitely expands it. (And here, I'm afraid, I >> must >>>> stop--it's time for breakfast and anyway my one screen is used up!) >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> , or "the >>>> >>>> . He >>>> >>>> On 19 December 2014 at 15:15, Greg Thompson >> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Helena and David, >>>>> I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the >> so-called >>>>> authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred >> tradition to >>>>> Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi >> notion of >>>>> "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including English) >> notion >>>> of >>>>> "time" and how each of these languages offers different affordances >> of >>>>> meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual understanding, >> English >>>> has >>>>> a much more reified/objectified/entified sense of time. (btw, I >> think the >>>>> first paragraph is easier to follow than the second - and in that >> first >>>>> paragraph you'll find our old friend "imagination"). >>>>> David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to? >>>>> -greg >>>>> >>>>> Taken from: >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >> http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/mousesite/Secondary/Whorfframe2.html >>>>> >>>>> " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, sunset" >> are >>>> with >>>>> us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from other >> nouns. >>>>> They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in >> winter" >>>> just >>>>> as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are pluralized and >>>>> numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. Our >> thought >>>>> about the referents of such words hence becomes objectified. Without >>>>> objectification, it would be a subjective experience of real time, >> i.e. >>>> of >>>>> the consciousness of "becoming later and later"--simply a cyclic >> phase >>>>> similar to an earlier phase in that ever-later-becoming duration. >> Only by >>>>> imagination can such a cyclic phase be set beside another and >> another in >>>>> the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually perceived) configuration. "But >>>> such >>>>> is the power of linguistic analogy that we do so objectify cyclic >>>> phasing. >>>>> We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g., >>>> "phasing." >>>>> And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting >> binomial >>>>> formula of formless item plus form, is so general that it is >> implicit for >>>>> all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless items like >> "substance, >>>>> matter," by which we can fill out the binomial for an enormously wide >>>> range >>>>> of nouns. But even these are not quite generalized enough to take in >> our >>>>> phase nouns. So for the phase nouns we have made a formless item, >> "time." >>>>> We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, in >> the >>>>> pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" in >> the >>>>> pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can say and >>>> think >>>>> "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." Let me again >> point >>>>> out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of milk" or "a >> piece of >>>>> cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a summer" actually >>>> contains >>>>> or consists of such-and-such a quantity of "time." >>>>> >>>>> In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., are >> not >>>>> nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They are >> a >>>>> formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, and >> even >>>>> other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a locative >>>> pattern, >>>>> like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It contains no morpheme like >> one >>>> of >>>>> "in the house" or "at the tree." It means "when it is morning" or >> "while >>>>> morning-phase is occurring." These "temporal s" are not used as >> subjects >>>> or >>>>> objects, or at all like nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" >> or >>>>> "summer is hot"; summer is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions >> are >>>> hot, >>>>> WHEN heat occurs. One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or >>>>> "summer recently." There is no objectification, as a region, an >> extent, a >>>>> quantity, of the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested >> about >>>>> time except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no >> basis >>>>> here for a formless item answering to our "time." " >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Helena Worthen < >> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>> >>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to this: >>>>>> >>>>>> "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton >>>>>> and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to >> create >>>>>> sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly >> productive, >>>>>> which is why they still form the basis of scientific writing and >>>> thinking >>>>>> today." >>>>>> >>>>>> Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I lose you >> when >>>>> you >>>>>> say "created to talk about gravity as an entity". >>>>>> >>>>>> Thank you, >>>>>> >>>>>> Helena >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>>> >>>>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> As Helena points out, prepositions are from the "grammatical" >> end of >>>>> what >>>>>>> Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what >> Halliday >>>>> calls >>>>>>> "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they have >>>> three >>>>>>> properties that words from the more "lexical" end do not have: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You can, >>>>>> actually, >>>>>>> but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you invent a new >>>> name >>>>>> or a >>>>>>> new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific semantic >>>> field >>>>>> (the >>>>>>> way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of >>>>> linguistics) >>>>>>> but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are used. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the same >>>>> effect, >>>>>>> which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your argument" the >> "in" >>>>> has >>>>>>> more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in "there's a >> fly in >>>>> your >>>>>>> tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in Henry's >> hands, >>>>>> refer >>>>>>> to a book or even a footnote. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties pretty >>>> much >>>>>>> define the difference between learning and development, at least >> as I >>>>>>> understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on functions >>>>>>> indefinitely while development works by reorganizing the closed >> set >>>> of >>>>>>> functions you already have into new systems. Learning is skill >>>> specific >>>>>>> and local, while development is quite global in its implications. >>>>>> Learning >>>>>>> is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new systems, >>>> while >>>>>>> development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary (and >> forget it >>>>> just >>>>>>> as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes away. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of blue >> that >>>>>> people >>>>>>> call the sky") are simply metaphors from the non-productive end >> of >>>> the >>>>>>> lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are crisp, >> concrete, >>>> and >>>>>>> vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations >> that >>>>> Newton >>>>>>> and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to >> create >>>>>>> sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly >>>> productive, >>>>>>> which is why they still form the basis of scientific writing and >>>>> thinking >>>>>>> today. For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical metaphor is >> the >>>>> third >>>>>>> great moment in child development (after the break into mother >> tongue >>>>> and >>>>>>> the break into disciplinary language in school work). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" implies >>>> zero >>>>>>> dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two ("on a line', >> 'on >>>> a >>>>>>> plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because they >> are >>>>>>> grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them with >> time: >>>> 'at >>>>> a >>>>>>> point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. Compare: "at >>>>>>> Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very day), and >> "in >>>>>>> Christmas' (season). >>>>>>> >>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen < >>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial >>>>>>>> relationships from the concrete material world into the >> conceptual >>>>>>>> imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 common ones, and >>>>>> between 70 >>>>>>>> and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far >> as" -- >>>>>> this >>>>>>>> is according to >>>> https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm >>>>> ). >>>>>>>> We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. >> Apparently, in >>>>>>>> English, they evolved from and did the job done by inflections >> in >>>>> parent >>>>>>>> languages, examples being cases and tenses. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection >> like >>>> the >>>>>>>> dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial >> relationships >>>>>> suggested >>>>>>>> by contemporary prepositions. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about this. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly >>>>> embodied, >>>>>>>> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to >>>> linguistics >>>>>> (For >>>>>>>> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on >>>>> ?lexicon?: >>>>>>>> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, >>>> being >>>>>> part >>>>>>>> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and >> Halliday >>>>>> see no >>>>>>>> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, >>>> lexico-grammar. >>>>>> (Lo >>>>>>>> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar, >>>> adding >>>>>> the >>>>>>>> ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings >> are >>>>> great >>>>>>>> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of >> that? >>>> In >>>>>>>> translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced? >>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden >>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the >>>>> metaphorical >>>>>>>> use of prepositions like: >>>>>>>>>> - "there is some value IN your argument" >>>>>>>>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again" >>>>>>>>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" >>>>>>>>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again" >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> and so on. >>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> larry smolucha wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself - >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic >>>>>> possibilities: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published >> in >>>>>> Thought >>>>>>>>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into >>>>> English >>>>>>>> 1962] >>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the >> 'additive' >>>>> value >>>>>>>> of the >>>>>>>>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech >>>>>> vocalization). >>>>>>>>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements >> that >>>> are >>>>>>>> flammable >>>>>>>>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable >> nor a >>>>> gas. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century >> European >>>>>>>> Developmental >>>>>>>>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' >>>> hence >>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of >>>>> Piaget's >>>>>>>> Genetic >>>>>>>>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and >> synthesis >>>>>>>> based on >>>>>>>>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in >> Vygotsky's >>>>>>>> example of H2O. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 >>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be >> synergistic >>>>>>>>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the >>>> parts. >>>>>>>>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more >> than >>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can >> ever >>>>> be >>>>>>>> imagined" >>>>>>>>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> A couple things to consider: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination >> as >>>> the >>>>>>>> brain has >>>>>>>>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the >> simplest >>>>> level >>>>>>>> of the Gestalt >>>>>>>>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). >>>>>>>>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just >>>>> photographic. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try >> to >>>>>>>> accurately reproduce >>>>>>>>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. >> Whereas, >>>> the >>>>>>>> goal of combinatory >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, >> dreams, >>>>>>>> musings, and even >>>>>>>>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of >>>>> objects >>>>>>>> and symbols. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different >> ways >>>> that >>>>>>>> things and concepts can be >>>>>>>>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar >> and >>>>>> flour. >>>>>>>>>>>> I can add water and >> it >>>>>>>> dissolves a bit >>>>>>>>>>>> But adding heat >> changes >>>>> the >>>>>>>> combination into a pancake. >>>>>>>>>>>> [Is this synergistic?] >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more >>>> examples >>>>>>>> to put the discussion >>>>>>>>>>>> in the metaphysical realm. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 >>>>>>>>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the >>>> case >>>>>> for >>>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I >> think >>>>> it's >>>>>>>> not >>>>>>>>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are >>>>>>>> associationists who >>>>>>>>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary >>>> associationism >>>>>>>> exists and >>>>>>>>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as >> mediation. >>>>>>>> Vygotsky >>>>>>>>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, >>>>> explain >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>> uniqueness of our species? >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species >> feels for >>>>> its >>>>>>>> own >>>>>>>>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a >>>> Piagetian >>>>>>>>>>>>> perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true >>>> maturity >>>>>> as a >>>>>>>>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing >> more to >>>> it >>>>>>>> than >>>>>>>>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of >>>> primate, >>>>>> and >>>>>>>> our >>>>>>>>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon >>>> rocks >>>>>> in >>>>>>>> order >>>>>>>>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged >> the >>>>> same >>>>>>>> way as >>>>>>>>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and >> for >>>>>>>> language is >>>>>>>>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human >>>>>>>> exceptionalism. >>>>>>>>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for >> the >>>>>>>> vanguard role >>>>>>>>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, >>>>>> prolonging >>>>>>>>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after >> the >>>>> sick >>>>>>>> and the >>>>>>>>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial >> organs >>>>>>>> (tools) and >>>>>>>>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for >> our >>>>>>>> species, it >>>>>>>>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these >>>>>>>> "circuitous, >>>>>>>>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that >> lead >>>>> our >>>>>>>>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always >> been >>>>>>>> short on >>>>>>>>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for >> material >>>>>>>> culture >>>>>>>>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another >> matter: >>>>>>>> verily, here >>>>>>>>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of >> attention >>>> is >>>>>>>> simply the >>>>>>>>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says >> there >>>> are >>>>>>>> only two >>>>>>>>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So >>>>>>>> imagination is >>>>>>>>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete >> experiences, >>>> and >>>>>>>> nothing >>>>>>>>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, >> when you >>>>>> hear >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been >> there to >>>> be >>>>>>>> able to >>>>>>>>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at >> work in >>>>> word >>>>>>>> meaning. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who >> was >>>>>> given >>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been >> mixed >>>>> with >>>>>>>> silver >>>>>>>>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of >>>> gold. >>>>>>>> Well, we >>>>>>>>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not >>>>> possible >>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that >> precisely. >>>> The >>>>>>>> method >>>>>>>>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the >> "principal >>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes >> palimpsest, >>>> a >>>>>>>> velum on >>>>>>>>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each >> other. >>>>>> Because >>>>>>>>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and >> written >>>>> over >>>>>>>> every >>>>>>>>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was >> soft, >>>> the >>>>>>>> pressure >>>>>>>>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones >>>> when >>>>>> the >>>>>>>> old >>>>>>>>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the >> only >>>>> known >>>>>>>> Greek >>>>>>>>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor >> their >>>>>>>> relationship >>>>>>>>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they >> are >>>>>>>> related to >>>>>>>>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's >> quite >>>>>> similar >>>>>>>> to the >>>>>>>>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD < >>>> hshonerd@gmail.com> >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an >>>>>> associationist, >>>>>>>> ?sees >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg < >>>>> dkellogg60@gmail.com >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the >> division >>>>>>>> between >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, >>>> because >>>>>>>> Ribot is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> an >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal >> form >>>> of >>>>>>>> attention. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the >> transition >>>>> from >>>>>>>> forest >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division >>>>> between >>>>>>>> the two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and >>>> commonsensical >>>>>>>> world of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly >> prosaic >>>>> uses >>>>>>>> in life >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more >>>>>> "imaginative" >>>>>>>> (that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world >> of >>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> farm,where >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long >> winter >>>>>>>> months are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to >>>>> encounter >>>>>>>> talking >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here >>>> attention >>>>>> has >>>>>>>> to be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> more voluntary. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a >> very >>>>> clear >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism >> that >>>>>>>> underpins >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky >>>> points >>>>>> out >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive >>>> practices >>>>>>>> really >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of >>>>> imagination, >>>>>>>> there >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between >>>> human >>>>>> and >>>>>>>> animal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly >> capable >>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> volitional >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than >> humans). >>>>>> Without >>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> theory >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis >> for >>>>>> Ribot's >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological >> functions >>>> at >>>>>>>> all. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole >>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of >> imagination, >>>>>>>> thanks to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> all >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very >> influential >>>>>>>> around the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> time >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. >> I >>>> had >>>>>>>> seen work >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> on >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective >> equal >>>>>>>> reproductive? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies >> of >>>>>>>> development >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of >>>> being >>>>> a >>>>>>>> relative >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my >> bucket >>>>> list. >>>>>>>> This >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings >> from >>>>> some >>>>>>>> weeks >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct >> that >>>>>>>> segmented the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met >>>> aphorizing?. >>>>>>>> Puns, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole < >> mcole@ucsd.edu> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant >> and >>>>> they >>>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his >>>>>>>> followers as an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by >> Hegel, >>>> so >>>>>>>> its of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> course >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in >>>>>>>> translation, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> seems >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, >> "recollection" >>>>> in >>>>>>>> this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> passage, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter >>>>>>>> distinction to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "memory." >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in >>>> contemporary >>>>>>>> discourse >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian >>>>>>>> colleagues have >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from >>>>> theorists >>>>>>>> who >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clearly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it >> was >>>>> still >>>>>>>> possible >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, >>>>>>>> interestingly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> links >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a >>>>> "voluntary" >>>>>>>> act. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Parts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children >> stuff >>>>>> that >>>>>>>> was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> also >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts >> of >>>>>>>> creativity >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious >> to >>>> see >>>>>>>> that the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found >>>>> himself >>>>>>>> writing. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which >>>> pretty >>>>>> old >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> approaches >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < >>>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, >> but >>>> it >>>>>>>> may be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> worth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent >>>> place >>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagination >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between >>>>>>>> Recollection and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive >>>>>>>> Imagination, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> (2) >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, >> which >>>>> he >>>>>>>> says >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> leads >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In >>>> other >>>>>>>> words, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is >>>>>>>> accomplished >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> through >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading >> Strawson >>>> and >>>>>>>> Williams. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists >> whose >>>>> work i >>>>>>>> am >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> trying >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of >>>>>>>> productive >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive >>>>> imagination >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> develops. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive >> implies >>>> that >>>>>>>> there >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> must >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive >> imagination. >>>> But >>>>> I >>>>>>>> learned >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination >> appears >>>> and >>>>> is >>>>>>>> linked >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable >> part of >>>>>>>> anticipation >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on >>>> imagination >>>>>>>> (starting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous >> look, >>>> and >>>>>>>> provides >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural >> as >>>>>> fixed. >>>>>>>> This, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives >> me a >>>>>> ground >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> take >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> part >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start >> with >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preconceptions: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive >> grammarian >>>>>>>> Langacker on >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive >> domains, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is >> full >>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two >> aspects of >>>>>>>> temporality: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic >>>>>>>> structure), which >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for >>>> both >>>>>>>> individual >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < >>>>>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third >>>>> *space* >>>>>>>> and the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and >> his >>>>>>>> notion of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion >> is >>>>>>>> explored under >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a >> *set* of >>>>>>>> modalities >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of >>>>> knowing >>>>>>>> that is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" >>>> [perceived??] >>>>> if >>>>>>>> we >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as >>>> *style* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to >> say >>>> how >>>>>>>> jazzed up >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, >> the >>>> mind >>>>>> as >>>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually >> various >>>>>>>> triads, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> finally >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my >>>> notebooks >>>>>> of >>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind, as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap >> adentro, >>>>> luega >>>>>>>> pa? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fuera. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole < >>>>> mcole@ucsd.edu> >>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, >>>>> attached >>>>>>>> are two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT >>>>>> theorists >>>>>>>> like >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of >>>>>>>> imagination in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion >> of >>>>>>>> productive >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have >> no >>>>>>>> intention of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated >> in >>>> the >>>>>>>> attached >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these >>>>> philosophers, >>>>>> I >>>>>>>> came >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> upon >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very >> closely >>>>>>>> linked at >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> several >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our >> naivete, >>>>>>>> Ettienne and I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as >> a >>>>> means >>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> access >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander >>>> Suvorov. >>>>>>>> Moreover, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> such >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct >>>>>> relevance >>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kris's >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak >> to >>>>>>>> concerns >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> about >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in >>>>> development. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination >> thread. >>>>>> Perhaps >>>>>>>> they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> will >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a >>>> natural >>>>>>>> science >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > Strawson.pdf> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural >>>>> science >>>>>>>> with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural >>>> science >>>>>>>> with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>>> Assistant Professor >>>>> Department of Anthropology >>>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>>> Brigham Young University >>>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> *Robert Lake Ed.D.*Associate Professor >>> Social Foundations of Education >>> Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading >>> Georgia Southern University >>> Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group >>> P. O. Box 8144 >>> Phone: (912) 478-0355 >>> Fax: (912) 478-5382 >>> Statesboro, GA 30460 >> >> > From mcole@ucsd.edu Sat Dec 20 11:45:05 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sat, 20 Dec 2014 11:45:05 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors In-Reply-To: <1419042621940.54930@unm.edu> References: <051101d01bc2$32bd3350$f707f10a@94160WEBDB> <1419042621940.54930@unm.edu> Message-ID: ?How did the trains run back when Sanskrit was in style, Annalissa? :-)) mike? On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 6:30 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Helena, > > Truly awesome picture for English choo-choo trains!!!! > > I'm not sure how this would work for languages which combine prepositions > into a single word, which Sanskrit does, and many other languages too: > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grammatical_case#Sanskrit > > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+annalisa=unm.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Helena > Worthen > Sent: Friday, December 19, 2014 6:32 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Metaphors > > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > Some examples of prepositions :) > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sat Dec 20 09:43:44 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (lpscholar2@gmail.com) Date: Sat, 20 Dec 2014 17:43:44 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?q?Metaphors?= In-Reply-To: <406FBE3B-E840-4DCB-AD45-AF67CDAAE5AF@gmail.com> References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> , <406FBE3B-E840-4DCB-AD45-AF67CDAAE5AF@gmail.com> Message-ID: <5495d416.c85a420a.7c5b.ffffd4b2@mx.google.com> Henry, So, what are we doing when we complete a cloze test? Are we reasoning. are we gap-filling, are we operating within grammatical metaphors? If I understand what David Kellogg is pointing us to look at, this cloze test shows what was operating ?behind" the "scenes" in the unfolding drama of science and faith. Our cultural way of operating oriented within a "system" as profound as bodily orienting within a landscape. "knowing" [sensing] at all times where one is oriented in this concrete situated place as embodied AND cultural historical. Through cultural synergy understanding how situated and specific is our Western way of knowing Sent from Windows Mail From: HENRY SHONERD Sent: ?Saturday?, ?December? ?20?, ?2014 ?9?:?22? ?AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity One quick and dirty way to assess language is a cloze test, which essentially requires the user to put lexical items into a grammatical structure, as in the example David provides ?distance from_____to ____?. Henry > On Dec 19, 2014, at 8:46 PM, David H Kirshner wrote: > > The topic of how grammatical form relates to meaning calls to mind the groundbreaking work of Eleanor Orr--whom you've probably never heard of on account of the fact that her work was condemned by a politically-correct faction of race-conscious sociolinguists who decided her analysis of Black English Vernacular could too easily be appropriated into racist discourses about language deficiency. > > Orr was a Washington DC area teacher and principal in the 1970s and 1980s, who traced math difficulties of her African American students to subtle grammatical differences between Black English dialect and standard English. Her 1987 book goes into compelling detail to support the thesis that the meaning structure of basic mathematical terms is embedded in the grammatical setting in which those terms are expressed. For instance, the meaning of ?distance? is embedded in the grammatical structure ?distance from _________ to __________? where the place-holders hold locations; if you don?t have that grammatical structure, and you're in a linguistic environment in which that structure is assumed, you're likely not going to be able to gain full access to the concept. > > The attached excerpts from her book--ignore the Forward, unless you'd like some context--reveal some of her students' bizarre conceptions of distance (and other basic mathematical concepts) as revealed in their diagrams. Her approach involves linguistic analysis of sentences produced by her African American students that she reads as collapsed versions of standard English sentences, with differences in prepositional structure being highlighted (but other grammatical elements also are indicated). > > This work cuts against the grain of anything going on in mathematics education. The Piagetian view that dominates that field holds that basic concepts come about from reflection on our actions in our engagement with the material world. When language enters the conversation, it's with respect to semantic structure; to my knowledge, nobody's ever implicated syntax directly in basic quantitative understanding. > > This work is particularly interesting to me in connection with my 21-year-old son who is autistic, and whose grammatical function is severely impaired. He has a decent vocabulary, but unless the setting for the conversation provides contextual clues, he can't piece together how the semantic elements are linked to one another. It is only recently that it occurred to me his lack of a secure sense of basic quantitative terms like ?more? and ?less? may be rooted in his grammatical incapacities. > > The XMCA discussion, thus far, has touched on grammar with respect to lexical items such as prepositions. But we've not yet tied that to the grammatical forms that embed those lexical items. I'm very curious as to whether that further connection can be made. > > David Kirshner > > Orr, E., W. (1987). Twice as less: Black English and the performance of black students in mathematics and science. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg > Sent: Friday, December 19, 2014 3:06 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors > > Yes, Haliday is essentially a Whorfian, and that's one of things that brings him close to Vygotsky. (Compare, for example, Chomsky, who is essentially anti-developmental in his ideas about language, and who now rejects the leading role played by social communication and says that communication is epiphenomenal to language, whose original purpose is > thought.) For Sapir, and for Whorf, in the beginning of every major onotogenetic, sociogenetic, and even phylogenetic change in language there has to be some change in the nature of communication. > > So what Andy says about the lack of the basis of modern science in Hopi applies perfectly well to English. When we read the scientific writings of Chaucer on the astrolabe, for example, we do not see words like "reflection", "refraction" or "alignment". Chaucer uses words like "bounce off", "bend through", and "line up" (note the use of prepositions, Helena!). Where did these words come from, and how did they make scientific English possible? > > Most of us have no problem saying that Isaac Newton discovered the laws of gravitation. But it's only a slight exaggeration to say that what he really discovered was the meaning potential of words like "gravitation". Gravity is, of course, not a thing at all; that is, it's not an entity, but rather a process, the process of falling down, or falling in (preps, again!). So how and above all why does it become an entity? > > It's interesting to compare Newton's writings on optics with Chaucer's on the astrolabe. The "Opticks" has a fixed format that we recognize almost instantly today: Newton describes his equipment (the prism and the dark room); he then narrates his method as a kind of recipe ("First, I did this; then I did that") and draws conclusions, which he then formulates in mathematical terms (this is essentially the format of Vygotsky's lectures on pedology, so much so that when translating them we had some trouble determining the precise moment when Vygotsky turns to the blackboard to write his conclusion in the form of a law). > > In order to get them into mathematical shape, though, he has to make sentences that look a lot like equations. "The plumpness of the lens yields a greater refraction of the light", "The reflection of the light from the glass results of the light striking the flatness of the glass" "The curvature of the spectacle glass supplies the lacking plumpness of the eye". In each of these, a quality or a process which would normally be realized as an adjective or a verb is suddenly realized by a noun, creating an imaginary entity. > > That's grammatical metaphor. Something that is "canonically" realized by a verb ("to grow") is suddenly realized nominally ("growth"), or something that is canonically a quality ('red") is realized verbally ("redden"). We even find related clauses realized as verbs ("She did not know the rules. > So she died" is realized by "Death was brought about through ignorance", all of these examples from Halliday). In fact, the Genetic Law that Vygotsky formulates in "Mind in Society" ("Every higher mental function is realized on two planes....") is really just one instance of grammatical metaphor. > > One of Chomsky's best known arguments for the radical innateness hypothesis is this. If I take a sentence like "Students who do not do their homework do not do well" and I want to make a question, how do I know which "do" to move to the front? Chomsky assumes that this knowledge is essentially innate; it is part of universal grammar. But you can see that "Do students who do not do their homework do well?" can be built up through a process of what we might call "discourse metaphor"--whereby clauses stand for > exchanges: > > Mother: You did your homework, didn't you? > Child: No. > Mother: You didn't do your homework? Did you do well? > Child: No. > Mother: You didn't do well? > Child: No. > Mother: You didn't do you homework so you didn't do well. Do the other students do well? > Child: Some of them. > Mother: Who does well? Do students who do not do their homework do well? > > And this of course explains why wh-items like "who" and 'why" have two functions--one inside a clause, where it expresses an intra-mental function > (grammar) and one between them where it expresses an inter-mental function (discourse). > > I realize that grammatical metaphor will seem rather dry and abstract and unpoetic to people who assume that metaphor is only of the lexical kind. > But to me, and I think to most children, it is far far more powerful and far more important developmentally. In some ways, it's the lexical metaphor that is responsible for the disenchantment of the child's world, while the grammatical metaphor infinitely expands it. (And here, I'm afraid, I must stop--it's time for breakfast and anyway my one screen is used up!) > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > , or "the > > . He > > On 19 December 2014 at 15:15, Greg Thompson > wrote: > >> Helena and David, >> I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the so-called >> authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred tradition >> to >> Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi notion >> of "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including English) >> notion of "time" and how each of these languages offers different >> affordances of meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual >> understanding, English has a much more reified/objectified/entified >> sense of time. (btw, I think the first paragraph is easier to follow >> than the second - and in that first paragraph you'll find our old friend "imagination"). >> David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to? >> -greg >> >> Taken from: >> >> http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/mousesite/Second >> ary/Whorfframe2.html >> >> " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, sunset" are >> with us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from other nouns. >> They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in winter" >> just as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are pluralized >> and numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. Our >> thought about the referents of such words hence becomes objectified. >> Without objectification, it would be a subjective experience of real >> time, i.e. of the consciousness of "becoming later and later"--simply >> a cyclic phase similar to an earlier phase in that ever-later-becoming >> duration. Only by imagination can such a cyclic phase be set beside >> another and another in the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually >> perceived) configuration. "But such is the power of linguistic analogy that we do so objectify cyclic phasing. >> We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g., "phasing." >> And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting >> binomial formula of formless item plus form, is so general that it is >> implicit for all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless items >> like "substance, matter," by which we can fill out the binomial for an >> enormously wide range of nouns. But even these are not quite >> generalized enough to take in our phase nouns. So for the phase nouns we have made a formless item, "time." >> We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, in the >> pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" in >> the pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can say >> and think "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." Let me >> again point out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of milk" >> or "a piece of cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a >> summer" actually contains or consists of such-and-such a quantity of "time." >> >> In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., are not >> nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They are a >> formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, and >> even other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a >> locative pattern, like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It contains >> no morpheme like one of "in the house" or "at the tree." It means >> "when it is morning" or "while morning-phase is occurring." These >> "temporal s" are not used as subjects or objects, or at all like >> nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" or "summer is hot"; summer >> is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions are hot, WHEN heat occurs. >> One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or "summer recently." >> There is no objectification, as a region, an extent, a quantity, of >> the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested about time >> except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no basis here for a formless item answering to our "time." " >> >> >> >> On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Helena Worthen >> >> wrote: >>> >>> David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to this: >>> >>> "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton >>> and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to create >>> sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly >>> productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific >>> writing and thinking today." >>> >>> Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I lose you >>> when >> you >>> say "created to talk about gravity as an entity". >>> >>> Thank you, >>> >>> Helena >>> >>> >>> Helena Worthen >>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>> >>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>> >>>> As Helena points out, prepositions are from the "grammatical" end >>>> of >> what >>>> Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what >>>> Halliday >> calls >>>> "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they have >>>> three properties that words from the more "lexical" end do not have: >>>> >>>> a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You can, >>> actually, >>>> but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you invent a new >>>> name >>> or a >>>> new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can). >>>> >>>> b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific semantic >>>> field >>> (the >>>> way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of >> linguistics) >>>> but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are used. >>>> >>>> c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the same >> effect, >>>> which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your argument" the "in" >> has >>>> more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in "there's a fly >>>> in >> your >>>> tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in Henry's >>>> hands, >>> refer >>>> to a book or even a footnote. >>>> >>>> Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties pretty >>>> much define the difference between learning and development, at >>>> least as I understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on >>>> functions indefinitely while development works by reorganizing the >>>> closed set of functions you already have into new systems. >>>> Learning is skill specific and local, while development is quite global in its implications. >>> Learning >>>> is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new systems, >>>> while development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary (and >>>> forget it >> just >>>> as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes away. >>>> >>>> For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of blue >>>> that >>> people >>>> call the sky") are simply metaphors from the non-productive end of >>>> the lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are crisp, >>>> concrete, and vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the >>>> nominalizations that >> Newton >>>> and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to >>>> create sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly >>>> productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific >>>> writing and >> thinking >>>> today. For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical metaphor is the >> third >>>> great moment in child development (after the break into mother >>>> tongue >> and >>>> the break into disciplinary language in school work). >>>> >>>> Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" implies >>>> zero dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two ("on a >>>> line', 'on a >>>> plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because they are >>>> grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them with time: >>>> 'at >> a >>>> point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. Compare: "at >>>> Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very day), and >>>> "in Christmas' (season). >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>> >>>> On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen >>>> >>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial >>>>> relationships from the concrete material world into the >>>>> conceptual imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 common >>>>> ones, and >>> between 70 >>>>> and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far as" >>>>> -- >>> this >>>>> is according to >>>>> https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm >> ). >>>>> We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. Apparently, >>>>> in English, they evolved from and did the job done by inflections >>>>> in >> parent >>>>> languages, examples being cases and tenses. >>>>> >>>>> But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection >>>>> like the dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial >>>>> relationships >>> suggested >>>>> by contemporary prepositions. >>>>> >>>>> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about this. >>>>> >>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>> >>>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly >> embodied, >>>>> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to >>>>> linguistics >>> (For >>>>> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on >> ?lexicon?: >>>>> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, >>>>> being >>> part >>>>> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and >>>>> Halliday >>> see no >>>>> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, lexico-grammar. >>> (Lo >>>>> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar, >>>>> adding >>> the >>>>> ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings are >> great >>>>> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of >>>>> that? In translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced? >>>>>> Henry >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden >> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the >> metaphorical >>>>> use of prepositions like: >>>>>>> - "there is some value IN your argument" >>>>>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again" >>>>>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" >>>>>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again" >>>>>>> >>>>>>> and so on. >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> >>> -------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> ---- >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> larry smolucha wrote: >>>>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself - >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic >>> possibilities: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in >>> Thought >>>>>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into >> English >>>>> 1962] >>>>>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' >> value >>>>> of the >>>>>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech >>> vocalization). >>>>>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that >>>>>>>> are >>>>> flammable >>>>>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor >>>>>>>> a >> gas. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century >>>>>>>> European >>>>> Developmental >>>>>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' >>>>>>>> hence >>> the >>>>>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of >> Piaget's >>>>> Genetic >>>>>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and >>>>>>>> synthesis >>>>> based on >>>>>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in >>>>>>>> Vygotsky's >>>>> example of H2O. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com >>>>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 >>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic >>>>>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts. >>>>>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more >>>>>>>>> than >> the >>>>>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can >>>>>>>>> ever >> be >>>>> imagined" >>>>>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> A couple things to consider: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination >>>>>>>>> as the >>>>> brain has >>>>>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the >>>>>>>>> simplest >> level >>>>> of the Gestalt >>>>>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). >>>>>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just >> photographic. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try >>>>>>>>> to >>>>> accurately reproduce >>>>>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, >>>>>>>>> the >>>>> goal of combinatory >>>>>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, >>>>>>>>> dreams, >>>>> musings, and even >>>>>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of >> objects >>>>> and symbols. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways >>>>>>>>> that >>>>> things and concepts can be >>>>>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar >>>>>>>>> and >>> flour. >>>>>>>>> I can add water and >>>>>>>>> it >>>>> dissolves a bit >>>>>>>>> But adding heat >>>>>>>>> changes >> the >>>>> combination into a pancake. >>>>>>>>> [Is this synergistic?] >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more >>>>>>>>> examples >>>>> to put the discussion >>>>>>>>> in the metaphysical realm. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 >>>>>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the >>>>>>>>>> case >>> for >>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I >>>>>>>>>> think >> it's >>>>> not >>>>>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are >>>>> associationists who >>>>>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary >>>>>>>>>> associationism >>>>> exists and >>>>>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. >>>>> Vygotsky >>>>>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, >> explain >>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> uniqueness of our species? >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels >>>>>>>>>> for >> its >>>>> own >>>>>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a >>>>>>>>>> Piagetian perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian >>>>>>>>>> one--true maturity >>> as a >>>>>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more >>>>>>>>>> to it >>>>> than >>>>>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of >>>>>>>>>> primate, >>> and >>>>> our >>>>>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon >>>>>>>>>> rocks >>> in >>>>> order >>>>>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged >>>>>>>>>> the >> same >>>>> way as >>>>>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and >>>>>>>>>> for >>>>> language is >>>>>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human >>>>> exceptionalism. >>>>>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for >>>>>>>>>> the >>>>> vanguard role >>>>>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, >>> prolonging >>>>>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after >>>>>>>>>> the >> sick >>>>> and the >>>>>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial >>>>>>>>>> organs >>>>> (tools) and >>>>>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for >>>>>>>>>> our >>>>> species, it >>>>>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these >>>>> "circuitous, >>>>>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that >>>>>>>>>> lead >> our >>>>>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always >>>>>>>>>> been >>>>> short on >>>>>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for >>>>>>>>>> material >>>>> culture >>>>>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: >>>>> verily, here >>>>>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of >>>>>>>>>> attention is >>>>> simply the >>>>>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says >>>>>>>>>> there are >>>>> only two >>>>>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So >>>>> imagination is >>>>>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, >>>>>>>>>> and >>>>> nothing >>>>>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when >>>>>>>>>> you >>> hear >>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there >>>>>>>>>> to be >>>>> able to >>>>>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work >>>>>>>>>> in >> word >>>>> meaning. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who >>>>>>>>>> was >>> given >>>>> a >>>>>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been >>>>>>>>>> mixed >> with >>>>> silver >>>>>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold. >>>>> Well, we >>>>>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not >> possible >>> to >>>>>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that >>>>>>>>>> precisely. The >>>>> method >>>>>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the >>>>>>>>>> "principal >> of >>>>>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes >>>>>>>>>> palimpsest, a >>>>> velum on >>>>>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. >>> Because >>>>>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and >>>>>>>>>> written >> over >>>>> every >>>>>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, >>>>>>>>>> the >>>>> pressure >>>>>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones >>>>>>>>>> when >>> the >>>>> old >>>>>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only >> known >>>>> Greek >>>>>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their >>>>> relationship >>>>>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they >>>>>>>>>> are >>>>> related to >>>>>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite >>> similar >>>>> to the >>>>>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD >>>>>>>>>> >>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an >>> associationist, >>>>> ?sees >>>>>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? >>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg < >> dkellogg60@gmail.com >>>> >>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the >>>>>>>>>>>> division >>>>> between >>>>>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, >>>>>>>>>>>> because >>>>> Ribot is >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> an >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal >>>>>>>>>>>> form of >>>>> attention. >>>>>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the >>>>>>>>>>>> transition >> from >>>>> forest >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division >> between >>>>> the two >>>>>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and >>>>>>>>>>>> commonsensical >>>>> world of >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly >>>>>>>>>>>> prosaic >> uses >>>>> in life >>>>>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more >>> "imaginative" >>>>> (that >>>>>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world >>>>>>>>>>>> of the >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> farm,where >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long >>>>>>>>>>>> winter >>>>> months are >>>>>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to >> encounter >>>>> talking >>>>>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here >>>>>>>>>>>> attention >>> has >>>>> to be >>>>>>>>>>>> more voluntary. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a >>>>>>>>>>>> very >> clear >>>>>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that >>>>> underpins >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Ribot >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky >>>>>>>>>>>> points >>> out >>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive >>>>>>>>>>>> practices >>>>> really >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of >> imagination, >>>>> there >>>>>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between >>>>>>>>>>>> human >>> and >>>>> animal >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly >>>>>>>>>>>> capable of >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> volitional >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). >>> Without >>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> theory >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis >>>>>>>>>>>> for >>> Ribot's >>>>>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological >>>>>>>>>>>> functions at >>>>> all. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole >> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of >>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination, >>>>> thanks to >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> all >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very >>>>>>>>>>>>> influential >>>>> around the >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> time >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I >>>>>>>>>>>>> had >>>>> seen work >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> on >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective >>>>>>>>>>>>> equal >>>>> reproductive? >>>>>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies >>>>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>> development >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of >>>>>>>>>>>>> being >> a >>>>> relative >>>>>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my >>>>>>>>>>>>>> bucket >> list. >>>>> This >>>>>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings >>>>>>>>>>>>>> from >> some >>>>> weeks >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>> segmented the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. >>>>> Puns, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and >> they >>>>> are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his >>>>> followers as an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel, so >>>>> its of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> course >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in >>>>> translation, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> seems >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" >> in >>>>> this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> passage, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter >>>>> distinction to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "memory." >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary >>>>> discourse >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian >>>>> colleagues have >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from >> theorists >>>>> who >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> clearly >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was >> still >>>>> possible >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, >>>>> interestingly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> links >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a >> "voluntary" >>>>> act. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Parts >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> stuff >>> that >>>>> was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> also >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>> creativity >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> see >>>>> that the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> two >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found >> himself >>>>> writing. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> pretty >>> old >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> approaches >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < >>>>> ablunden@mira.net> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but it >>>>> may be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> worth >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> place >> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagination >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between >>>>> Recollection and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive >>>>> Imagination, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> (2) >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> which >> he >>>>> says >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> leads >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> other >>>>> words, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is >>>>> accomplished >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> through >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>> Williams. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose >> work i >>>>> am >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> trying >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of >>>>> productive >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive >> imagination >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> develops. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>> there >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> must >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> be a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But >> I >>>>> learned >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and >> is >>>>> linked >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>> anticipation >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination >>>>> (starting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> look, and >>>>> provides >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as >>> fixed. >>>>> This, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a >>> ground >>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> take >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> part >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> preconceptions: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> grammarian >>>>> Langacker on >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> domains, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> particularly >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> full of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> imagination >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>> temporality: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic >>>>> structure), which >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> both >>>>> individual >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < >>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third >> *space* >>>>> and the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> his >>>>> notion of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is >>>>> explored under >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>> modalities >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of >> knowing >>>>> that is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [perceived??] >> if >>>>> we >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *style* Larry On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> HENRY SHONERD < >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> say how >>>>> jazzed up >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> am >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind >>> as >>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> various >>>>> triads, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> finally >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notebooks >>> of >>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind, as >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, >> luega >>>>> pa? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> fuera. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole < >> mcole@ucsd.edu> >>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, >> attached >>>>> are two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT >>> theorists >>>>> like >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of >>>>> imagination in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of >>>>> productive >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no >>>>> intention of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the >>>>> attached >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these >> philosophers, >>> I >>>>> came >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> upon >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> closely >>>>> linked at >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> several >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, >>>>> Ettienne and I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a >> means >>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> access >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. >>>>> Moreover, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> such >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct >>> relevance >>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Kris's >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>> concerns >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> about >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in >> development. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. >>> Perhaps >>>>> they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> will >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural >>>>> science >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural >> science >>>>> with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural >>>>>>>>>>>>> science >>>>> with an >>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> -- >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Anthropology >> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> Brigham Young University >> Provo, UT 84602 >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sat Dec 20 11:59:16 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Sat, 20 Dec 2014 11:59:16 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors In-Reply-To: References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> <2C440C2D-59A4-47BB-8C31-0C689221C167@gmail.com> Message-ID: Horizontal development AS practices. What KIND of practices? Practices that develop "within" Pracices which develop "across" These metaphorical words [within, across, and also "between"] CARRY us as performances which are form[ing] and formative. Where? In situated specific practices. THIS adds to the vertical dimension On Sat, Dec 20, 2014 at 10:55 AM, larry smolucha wrote: > Message from Francine: > > This is a a good way of simplifying what has been discussed. > And it is also a way to enter into a discussion of how a phenomenon > like winter might be referred to as a thing (noun), as a process (verb > like wintering in > Aspen, or winterize your car), and even as a relational prepositional > phrase, > perhaps adverb (In the bleak mid-winter). Also, gerunds are verbs that can > function as nouns - I can't use wintering as a noun in an intelligent > sentence- > but let's use 'singing can lift your spirits.' > > > From: hshonerd@gmail.com > > Date: Sat, 20 Dec 2014 08:39:19 -0700 > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors > > > > I am late to this, but I wonder if things, processes and relations > capture pretty much everything about language and thinking. So nouns, as > things, verbs, as processes and prepositions, as relations. > > Henry > > > > > On Dec 19, 2014, at 4:48 PM, larry smolucha > wrote: > > > > > > Message from Francine: > > > > > > Just a thought - Is the use of nouns, verbs, prepositions a result > > > of developing a written language based on an alphabet? > > > > > > Language use in a culture with no written language would surely differ > > > significantly. > > > > > > And written languages based on hieroglyphs, pictograms, cuneiform, > > > Norse Runes, Celtic oghams, etc. surely divide and frame experience > > > differently. > > > > > > > > >> From: boblake@georgiasouthern.edu > > >> Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2014 16:43:24 -0500 > > >> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors > > >> > > >> Hi Everyone, > > >> I appreciate this thread's emphasis on the relativistic character of > > >> metaphoric language and find think that it supports Vygotsky's notion > of > > >> the fluid nature of language as it emerges from socio-cultural and > > >> socio-historical contexts in meaning making (in contrast to biological > > >> determinism). Because each culture makes meaning in widely diverse > ways, > > >> language forms and usage might have complex intricacies and shades of > > >> meaning on one concept alone. Along with the example of early 20th > century > > >> Hopi's view of time, there are other more recent examples from the > present > > >> day that suggest ways that language can shape thought . > > >> > > >> Consider the Australian aboriginal language, Guugu Yimithirr, from > north > > >> Queensland who have no words for right or left, in front of, or > behind to > > >> describe location. Instead they use the points of the compass even > when > > >> requesting that someone move over to make room. They will say ?move a > bit > > >> to the east.? To tell you where exactly they left something in your > house, > > >> they?ll say, ?I left it on the southern edge of the western table.? > (Deutscher, > > >> 2010, p. MM 42) > > >> > > >> The effect on the thinking of this group is phenomenal in orienting > the > > >> speakers to their directional spatial environment to such a degree > that > > >> roughly 1 out of every 10 words in conversational Guugu Yimithirr > includes > > >> either north, south, east or west and is accompanied with precise > hand > > >> gestures (ibid). Consequently in this culture, language acquisition > > >> involves constant awareness of spaces relative to the points of the > > >> compass. Deutscher relays a fascinating story about the ways that > memory > > >> is stored for the speakers of this language. The story also serves > as a > > >> clear example of Vygotsky?s notion of language as a mediating tool as > a > > >> means of creating higher levels of consciousness through spatial > > >> kinesthetic approaches to meaning creation. > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> One Guugu Yimithirr speaker was filmed telling his friends the story > of how > > >> in his youth, he capsized in shark-infested waters. He and an older > person > > >> were caught in a storm, and their boat tipped over. They both jumped > into > > >> the water and managed to swim nearly three miles to the shore, only to > > >> discover that the missionary for whom they worked was far more > concerned at > > >> the loss of the boat than relieved at their miraculous escape. Apart > from > > >> the dramatic content, the remarkable thing about the story was that > it was > > >> remembered throughout in cardinal directions: the speaker jumped into > the > > >> water on the western side of the boat, his companion to the east of > the > > >> boat, they saw a giant shark swimming north and so on. Perhaps the > cardinal > > >> directions were just made up for the occasion? Well, quite by chance, > the > > >> same person was filmed some years later telling the same story. The > > >> cardinal directions matched exactly in the two tellings. Even more > > >> remarkable were the spontaneous hand gestures that accompanied the > story. > > >> For instance, the direction in which the boat rolled over was > gestured in > > >> the correct geographic orientation, regardless of the direction the > speaker > > >> was facing in the two films (ibid). > > >> > > >> > > >> *Robert* > > >> > > >> > > >> Deutscher, G. (2010, August 29) Does your language shape how you > think? *The > > >> New York Times* *Sunday Magazine, *p. MM 42. > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 4:05 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > > >>> > > >>> Yes, Haliday is essentially a Whorfian, and that's one of things that > > >>> brings him close to Vygotsky. (Compare, for example, Chomsky, who is > > >>> essentially anti-developmental in his ideas about language, and who > now > > >>> rejects the leading role played by social communication and says that > > >>> communication is epiphenomenal to language, whose original purpose is > > >>> thought.) For Sapir, and for Whorf, in the beginning of every major > > >>> onotogenetic, sociogenetic, and even phylogenetic change in language > there > > >>> has to be some change in the nature of communication. > > >>> > > >>> So what Andy says about the lack of the basis of modern science in > Hopi > > >>> applies perfectly well to English. When we read the scientific > writings of > > >>> Chaucer on the astrolabe, for example, we do not see words like > > >>> "reflection", "refraction" or "alignment". Chaucer uses words like > "bounce > > >>> off", "bend through", and "line up" (note the use of prepositions, > > >>> Helena!). Where did these words come from, and how did they make > scientific > > >>> English possible? > > >>> > > >>> Most of us have no problem saying that Isaac Newton discovered the > laws of > > >>> gravitation. But it's only a slight exaggeration to say that what he > really > > >>> discovered was the meaning potential of words like "gravitation". > Gravity > > >>> is, of course, not a thing at all; that is, it's not an entity, but > rather > > >>> a process, the process of falling down, or falling in (preps, > again!). So > > >>> how and above all why does it become an entity? > > >>> > > >>> It's interesting to compare Newton's writings on optics with > Chaucer's on > > >>> the astrolabe. The "Opticks" has a fixed format that we recognize > almost > > >>> instantly today: Newton describes his equipment (the prism and the > dark > > >>> room); he then narrates his method as a kind of recipe ("First, I > did this; > > >>> then I did that") and draws conclusions, which he then formulates in > > >>> mathematical terms (this is essentially the format of Vygotsky's > lectures > > >>> on pedology, so much so that when translating them we had some > trouble > > >>> determining the precise moment when Vygotsky turns to the blackboard > to > > >>> write his conclusion in the form of a law). > > >>> > > >>> In order to get them into mathematical shape, though, he has to make > > >>> sentences that look a lot like equations. "The plumpness of the lens > yields > > >>> a greater refraction of the light", "The reflection of the light > from the > > >>> glass results of the light striking the flatness of the glass" "The > > >>> curvature of the spectacle glass supplies the lacking plumpness of > the > > >>> eye". In each of these, a quality or a process which would normally > be > > >>> realized as an adjective or a verb is suddenly realized by a noun, > creating > > >>> an imaginary entity. > > >>> > > >>> That's grammatical metaphor. Something that is "canonically" > realized by a > > >>> verb ("to grow") is suddenly realized nominally ("growth"), or > something > > >>> that is canonically a quality ('red") is realized verbally > ("redden"). We > > >>> even find related clauses realized as verbs ("She did not know the > rules. > > >>> So she died" is realized by "Death was brought about through > ignorance", > > >>> all of these examples from Halliday). In fact, the Genetic Law that > > >>> Vygotsky formulates in "Mind in Society" ("Every higher mental > function is > > >>> realized on two planes....") is really just one instance of > grammatical > > >>> metaphor. > > >>> > > >>> One of Chomsky's best known arguments for the radical innateness > hypothesis > > >>> is this. If I take a sentence like "Students who do not do their > homework > > >>> do not do well" and I want to make a question, how do I know which > "do" to > > >>> move to the front? Chomsky assumes that this knowledge is essentially > > >>> innate; it is part of universal grammar. But you can see that "Do > students > > >>> who do not do their homework do well?" can be built up through a > process of > > >>> what we might call "discourse metaphor"--whereby clauses stand for > > >>> exchanges: > > >>> > > >>> Mother: You did your homework, didn't you? > > >>> Child: No. > > >>> Mother: You didn't do your homework? Did you do well? > > >>> Child: No. > > >>> Mother: You didn't do well? > > >>> Child: No. > > >>> Mother: You didn't do you homework so you didn't do well. Do the > other > > >>> students do well? > > >>> Child: Some of them. > > >>> Mother: Who does well? Do students who do not do their homework do > well? > > >>> > > >>> And this of course explains why wh-items like "who" and 'why" have > two > > >>> functions--one inside a clause, where it expresses an intra-mental > function > > >>> (grammar) and one between them where it expresses an inter-mental > function > > >>> (discourse). > > >>> > > >>> I realize that grammatical metaphor will seem rather dry and > abstract and > > >>> unpoetic to people who assume that metaphor is only of the lexical > kind. > > >>> But to me, and I think to most children, it is far far more powerful > and > > >>> far more important developmentally. In some ways, it's the lexical > metaphor > > >>> that is responsible for the disenchantment of the child's world, > while the > > >>> grammatical metaphor infinitely expands it. (And here, I'm afraid, I > must > > >>> stop--it's time for breakfast and anyway my one screen is used up!) > > >>> > > >>> David Kellogg > > >>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> , or "the > > >>> > > >>> . He > > >>> > > >>> On 19 December 2014 at 15:15, Greg Thompson < > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > > >>> wrote: > > >>> > > >>>> Helena and David, > > >>>> I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the > so-called > > >>>> authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred > tradition to > > >>>> Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi > notion of > > >>>> "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including English) > notion > > >>> of > > >>>> "time" and how each of these languages offers different affordances > of > > >>>> meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual understanding, > English > > >>> has > > >>>> a much more reified/objectified/entified sense of time. (btw, I > think the > > >>>> first paragraph is easier to follow than the second - and in that > first > > >>>> paragraph you'll find our old friend "imagination"). > > >>>> David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to? > > >>>> -greg > > >>>> > > >>>> Taken from: > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>> > http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/mousesite/Secondary/Whorfframe2.html > > >>>> > > >>>> " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, sunset" > are > > >>> with > > >>>> us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from other > nouns. > > >>>> They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in > winter" > > >>> just > > >>>> as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are pluralized and > > >>>> numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. Our > thought > > >>>> about the referents of such words hence becomes objectified. Without > > >>>> objectification, it would be a subjective experience of real time, > i.e. > > >>> of > > >>>> the consciousness of "becoming later and later"--simply a cyclic > phase > > >>>> similar to an earlier phase in that ever-later-becoming duration. > Only by > > >>>> imagination can such a cyclic phase be set beside another and > another in > > >>>> the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually perceived) configuration. > "But > > >>> such > > >>>> is the power of linguistic analogy that we do so objectify cyclic > > >>> phasing. > > >>>> We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g., > > >>> "phasing." > > >>>> And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting > binomial > > >>>> formula of formless item plus form, is so general that it is > implicit for > > >>>> all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless items like > "substance, > > >>>> matter," by which we can fill out the binomial for an enormously > wide > > >>> range > > >>>> of nouns. But even these are not quite generalized enough to take > in our > > >>>> phase nouns. So for the phase nouns we have made a formless item, > "time." > > >>>> We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, in > the > > >>>> pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" in > the > > >>>> pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can say > and > > >>> think > > >>>> "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." Let me again > point > > >>>> out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of milk" or "a > piece of > > >>>> cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a summer" actually > > >>> contains > > >>>> or consists of such-and-such a quantity of "time." > > >>>> > > >>>> In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., are > not > > >>>> nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They > are a > > >>>> formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, > and even > > >>>> other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a locative > > >>> pattern, > > >>>> like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It contains no morpheme like > one > > >>> of > > >>>> "in the house" or "at the tree." It means "when it is morning" or > "while > > >>>> morning-phase is occurring." These "temporal s" are not used as > subjects > > >>> or > > >>>> objects, or at all like nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" > or > > >>>> "summer is hot"; summer is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions > are > > >>> hot, > > >>>> WHEN heat occurs. One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" > or > > >>>> "summer recently." There is no objectification, as a region, an > extent, a > > >>>> quantity, of the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested > about > > >>>> time except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no > basis > > >>>> here for a formless item answering to our "time." " > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Helena Worthen < > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > >>>> > > >>>> wrote: > > >>>>> > > >>>>> David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to this: > > >>>>> > > >>>>> "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton > > >>>>> and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to > create > > >>>>> sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly > productive, > > >>>>> which is why they still form the basis of scientific writing and > > >>> thinking > > >>>>> today." > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I lose you > when > > >>>> you > > >>>>> say "created to talk about gravity as an entity". > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Thank you, > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Helena > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> Helena Worthen > > >>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com > > >>>>> > > >>>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > >>>>> > > >>>>>> As Helena points out, prepositions are from the "grammatical" end > of > > >>>> what > > >>>>>> Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what > Halliday > > >>>> calls > > >>>>>> "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they have > > >>> three > > >>>>>> properties that words from the more "lexical" end do not have: > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You can, > > >>>>> actually, > > >>>>>> but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you invent a new > > >>> name > > >>>>> or a > > >>>>>> new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can). > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific semantic > > >>> field > > >>>>> (the > > >>>>>> way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of > > >>>> linguistics) > > >>>>>> but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are used. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the same > > >>>> effect, > > >>>>>> which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your argument" the > "in" > > >>>> has > > >>>>>> more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in "there's a fly > in > > >>>> your > > >>>>>> tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in Henry's > hands, > > >>>>> refer > > >>>>>> to a book or even a footnote. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties pretty > > >>> much > > >>>>>> define the difference between learning and development, at least > as I > > >>>>>> understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on functions > > >>>>>> indefinitely while development works by reorganizing the closed > set > > >>> of > > >>>>>> functions you already have into new systems. Learning is skill > > >>> specific > > >>>>>> and local, while development is quite global in its implications. > > >>>>> Learning > > >>>>>> is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new systems, > > >>> while > > >>>>>> development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary (and forget > it > > >>>> just > > >>>>>> as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes away. > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of blue > that > > >>>>> people > > >>>>>> call the sky") are simply metaphors from the non-productive end of > > >>> the > > >>>>>> lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are crisp, > concrete, > > >>> and > > >>>>>> vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that > > >>>> Newton > > >>>>>> and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to > create > > >>>>>> sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly > > >>> productive, > > >>>>>> which is why they still form the basis of scientific writing and > > >>>> thinking > > >>>>>> today. For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical metaphor is the > > >>>> third > > >>>>>> great moment in child development (after the break into mother > tongue > > >>>> and > > >>>>>> the break into disciplinary language in school work). > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" implies > > >>> zero > > >>>>>> dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two ("on a line', > 'on > > >>> a > > >>>>>> plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because they are > > >>>>>> grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them with time: > > >>> 'at > > >>>> a > > >>>>>> point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. Compare: "at > > >>>>>> Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very day), and > "in > > >>>>>> Christmas' (season). > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> David Kellogg > > >>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen < > > >>> helenaworthen@gmail.com> > > >>>>>> wrote: > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial > > >>>>>>> relationships from the concrete material world into the > conceptual > > >>>>>>> imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 common ones, and > > >>>>> between 70 > > >>>>>>> and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far > as" -- > > >>>>> this > > >>>>>>> is according to > > >>> https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm > > >>>> ). > > >>>>>>> We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. Apparently, > in > > >>>>>>> English, they evolved from and did the job done by inflections in > > >>>> parent > > >>>>>>> languages, examples being cases and tenses. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection > like > > >>> the > > >>>>>>> dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial relationships > > >>>>> suggested > > >>>>>>> by contemporary prepositions. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about this. > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> Helena Worthen > > >>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly > > >>>> embodied, > > >>>>>>> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to > > >>> linguistics > > >>>>> (For > > >>>>>>> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on > > >>>> ?lexicon?: > > >>>>>>> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, > > >>> being > > >>>>> part > > >>>>>>> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and > Halliday > > >>>>> see no > > >>>>>>> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, > > >>> lexico-grammar. > > >>>>> (Lo > > >>>>>>> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar, > > >>> adding > > >>>>> the > > >>>>>>> ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings are > > >>>> great > > >>>>>>> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of > that? > > >>> In > > >>>>>>> translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced? > > >>>>>>>> Henry > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden > > >>>> wrote: > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the > > >>>> metaphorical > > >>>>>>> use of prepositions like: > > >>>>>>>>> - "there is some value IN your argument" > > >>>>>>>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again" > > >>>>>>>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" > > >>>>>>>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again" > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> and so on. > > >>>>>>>>> Andy > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > >>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > > >>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> larry smolucha wrote: > > >>>>>>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself - > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic > > >>>>> possibilities: > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in > > >>>>> Thought > > >>>>>>>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into > > >>>> English > > >>>>>>> 1962] > > >>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the > 'additive' > > >>>> value > > >>>>>>> of the > > >>>>>>>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech > > >>>>> vocalization). > > >>>>>>>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that > > >>> are > > >>>>>>> flammable > > >>>>>>>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable > nor a > > >>>> gas. > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century > European > > >>>>>>> Developmental > > >>>>>>>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' > > >>> hence > > >>>>> the > > >>>>>>>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of > > >>>> Piaget's > > >>>>>>> Genetic > > >>>>>>>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and > synthesis > > >>>>>>> based on > > >>>>>>>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in > Vygotsky's > > >>>>>>> example of H2O. > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com > > >>>>>>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > >>>>>>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 > > >>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic > > >>>>>>>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the > > >>> parts. > > >>>>>>>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more > than > > >>>> the > > >>>>>>>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can > ever > > >>>> be > > >>>>>>> imagined" > > >>>>>>>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> A couple things to consider: > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination > as > > >>> the > > >>>>>>> brain has > > >>>>>>>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the > simplest > > >>>> level > > >>>>>>> of the Gestalt > > >>>>>>>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). > > >>>>>>>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just > > >>>> photographic. > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try > to > > >>>>>>> accurately reproduce > > >>>>>>>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, > > >>> the > > >>>>>>> goal of combinatory > > >>>>>>>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, > dreams, > > >>>>>>> musings, and even > > >>>>>>>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of > > >>>> objects > > >>>>>>> and symbols. > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways > > >>> that > > >>>>>>> things and concepts can be > > >>>>>>>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar > and > > >>>>> flour. > > >>>>>>>>>>> I can add water and it > > >>>>>>> dissolves a bit > > >>>>>>>>>>> But adding heat > changes > > >>>> the > > >>>>>>> combination into a pancake. > > >>>>>>>>>>> [Is this synergistic?] > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more > > >>> examples > > >>>>>>> to put the discussion > > >>>>>>>>>>> in the metaphysical realm. > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 > > >>>>>>>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com > > >>>>>>>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the > > >>> case > > >>>>> for > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I > think > > >>>> it's > > >>>>>>> not > > >>>>>>>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are > > >>>>>>> associationists who > > >>>>>>>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary > > >>> associationism > > >>>>>>> exists and > > >>>>>>>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as > mediation. > > >>>>>>> Vygotsky > > >>>>>>>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, > > >>>> explain > > >>>>>>> the > > >>>>>>>>>>>> uniqueness of our species? > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels > for > > >>>> its > > >>>>>>> own > > >>>>>>>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a > > >>> Piagetian > > >>>>>>>>>>>> perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true > > >>> maturity > > >>>>> as a > > >>>>>>>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more > to > > >>> it > > >>>>>>> than > > >>>>>>>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of > > >>> primate, > > >>>>> and > > >>>>>>> our > > >>>>>>>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon > > >>> rocks > > >>>>> in > > >>>>>>> order > > >>>>>>>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged > the > > >>>> same > > >>>>>>> way as > > >>>>>>>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and > for > > >>>>>>> language is > > >>>>>>>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human > > >>>>>>> exceptionalism. > > >>>>>>>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for > the > > >>>>>>> vanguard role > > >>>>>>>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, > > >>>>> prolonging > > >>>>>>>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after > the > > >>>> sick > > >>>>>>> and the > > >>>>>>>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial > organs > > >>>>>>> (tools) and > > >>>>>>>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for > our > > >>>>>>> species, it > > >>>>>>>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these > > >>>>>>> "circuitous, > > >>>>>>>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that > lead > > >>>> our > > >>>>>>>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always > been > > >>>>>>> short on > > >>>>>>>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for > material > > >>>>>>> culture > > >>>>>>>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another > matter: > > >>>>>>> verily, here > > >>>>>>>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of > attention > > >>> is > > >>>>>>> simply the > > >>>>>>>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says > there > > >>> are > > >>>>>>> only two > > >>>>>>>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So > > >>>>>>> imagination is > > >>>>>>>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, > > >>> and > > >>>>>>> nothing > > >>>>>>>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when > you > > >>>>> hear > > >>>>>>> the > > >>>>>>>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there > to > > >>> be > > >>>>>>> able to > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work > in > > >>>> word > > >>>>>>> meaning. > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who > was > > >>>>> given > > >>>>>>> a > > >>>>>>>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been > mixed > > >>>> with > > >>>>>>> silver > > >>>>>>>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of > > >>> gold. > > >>>>>>> Well, we > > >>>>>>>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not > > >>>> possible > > >>>>> to > > >>>>>>>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that > precisely. > > >>> The > > >>>>>>> method > > >>>>>>>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the > "principal > > >>>> of > > >>>>>>>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes > palimpsest, > > >>> a > > >>>>>>> velum on > > >>>>>>>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each > other. > > >>>>> Because > > >>>>>>>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and > written > > >>>> over > > >>>>>>> every > > >>>>>>>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, > > >>> the > > >>>>>>> pressure > > >>>>>>>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones > > >>> when > > >>>>> the > > >>>>>>> old > > >>>>>>>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only > > >>>> known > > >>>>>>> Greek > > >>>>>>>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their > > >>>>>>> relationship > > >>>>>>>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they > are > > >>>>>>> related to > > >>>>>>>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite > > >>>>> similar > > >>>>>>> to the > > >>>>>>>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD < > > >>> hshonerd@gmail.com> > > >>>>>>> wrote: > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an > > >>>>> associationist, > > >>>>>>> ?sees > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg < > > >>>> dkellogg60@gmail.com > > >>>>>> > > >>>>>>> wrote: > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the > division > > >>>>>>> between > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, > > >>> because > > >>>>>>> Ribot is > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> an > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal > form > > >>> of > > >>>>>>> attention. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the > transition > > >>>> from > > >>>>>>> forest > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> to > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division > > >>>> between > > >>>>>>> the two > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and > > >>> commonsensical > > >>>>>>> world of > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> the > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly > prosaic > > >>>> uses > > >>>>>>> in life > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more > > >>>>> "imaginative" > > >>>>>>> (that > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world > of > > >>> the > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> farm,where > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long > winter > > >>>>>>> months are > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to > > >>>> encounter > > >>>>>>> talking > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here > > >>> attention > > >>>>> has > > >>>>>>> to be > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> more voluntary. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a > very > > >>>> clear > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that > > >>>>>>> underpins > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky > > >>> points > > >>>>> out > > >>>>>>> the > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive > > >>> practices > > >>>>>>> really > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> are > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of > > >>>> imagination, > > >>>>>>> there > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between > > >>> human > > >>>>> and > > >>>>>>> animal > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly > capable > > >>> of > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> volitional > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). > > >>>>> Without > > >>>>>>> a > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> theory > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis > for > > >>>>> Ribot's > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological > functions > > >>> at > > >>>>>>> all. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole > > >>>> wrote: > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of > imagination, > > >>>>>>> thanks to > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> all > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very > influential > > >>>>>>> around the > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> time > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I > > >>> had > > >>>>>>> seen work > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> on > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective > equal > > >>>>>>> reproductive? > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies > of > > >>>>>>> development > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> of > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of > > >>> being > > >>>> a > > >>>>>>> relative > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > >>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my > bucket > > >>>> list. > > >>>>>>> This > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings > from > > >>>> some > > >>>>>>> weeks > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> in > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct > that > > >>>>>>> segmented the > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met > > >>> aphorizing?. > > >>>>>>> Puns, > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole < > mcole@ucsd.edu> > > >>>>> wrote: > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant > and > > >>>> they > > >>>>>>> are > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> doing > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his > > >>>>>>> followers as an > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by > Hegel, > > >>> so > > >>>>>>> its of > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> course > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in > > >>>>>>> translation, > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> seems > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, > "recollection" > > >>>> in > > >>>>>>> this > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> passage, > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter > > >>>>>>> distinction to > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "memory." > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in > > >>> contemporary > > >>>>>>> discourse > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian > > >>>>>>> colleagues have > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from > > >>>> theorists > > >>>>>>> who > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clearly > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was > > >>>> still > > >>>>>>> possible > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, > > >>>>>>> interestingly > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> links > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a > > >>>> "voluntary" > > >>>>>>> act. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Parts > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children > stuff > > >>>>> that > > >>>>>>> was > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> also > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts > of > > >>>>>>> creativity > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> and > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to > > >>> see > > >>>>>>> that the > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> two > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found > > >>>> himself > > >>>>>>> writing. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which > > >>> pretty > > >>>>> old > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> approaches > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < > > >>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, > but > > >>> it > > >>>>>>> may be > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> worth > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent > > >>> place > > >>>> to > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagination > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between > > >>>>>>> Recollection and > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive > > >>>>>>> Imagination, > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> (2) > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, > which > > >>>> he > > >>>>>>> says > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> leads > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In > > >>> other > > >>>>>>> words, > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> the > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is > > >>>>>>> accomplished > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> through > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson > > >>> and > > >>>>>>> Williams. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose > > >>>> work i > > >>>>>>> am > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> trying > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of > > >>>>>>> productive > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive > > >>>> imagination > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> develops. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies > > >>> that > > >>>>>>> there > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> must > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be a > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. > > >>> But > > >>>> I > > >>>>>>> learned > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears > > >>> and > > >>>> is > > >>>>>>> linked > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part > of > > >>>>>>> anticipation > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > >>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on > > >>> imagination > > >>>>>>> (starting > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous > look, > > >>> and > > >>>>>>> provides > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> a > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural > as > > >>>>> fixed. > > >>>>>>> This, > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me > a > > >>>>> ground > > >>>>>>> to > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> take > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> part > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start > with > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preconceptions: > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive > grammarian > > >>>>>>> Langacker on > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive > domains, > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is > full > > >>> of > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects > of > > >>>>>>> temporality: > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic > > >>>>>>> structure), which > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for > > >>> both > > >>>>>>> individual > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < > > >>>>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third > > >>>> *space* > > >>>>>>> and the > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and > his > > >>>>>>> notion of > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is > > >>>>>>> explored under > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a > *set* of > > >>>>>>> modalities > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of > > >>>> knowing > > >>>>>>> that is > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" > > >>> [perceived??] > > >>>> if > > >>>>>>> we > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> think > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as > > >>> *style* > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Larry > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to > say > > >>> how > > >>>>>>> jazzed up > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the > > >>> mind > > >>>>> as > > >>>>>>> Larry > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually > various > > >>>>>>> triads, > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> finally > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my > > >>> notebooks > > >>>>> of > > >>>>>>> the > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind, as > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, > > >>>> luega > > >>>>>>> pa? > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fuera. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole < > > >>>> mcole@ucsd.edu> > > >>>>>>> wrote: > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, > > >>>> attached > > >>>>>>> are two > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT > > >>>>> theorists > > >>>>>>> like > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of > > >>>>>>> imagination in a > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of > > >>>>>>> productive > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no > > >>>>>>> intention of > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doing > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated > in > > >>> the > > >>>>>>> attached > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these > > >>>> philosophers, > > >>>>> I > > >>>>>>> came > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> upon > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very > closely > > >>>>>>> linked at > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> several > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, > > >>>>>>> Ettienne and I > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a > > >>>> means > > >>>>> of > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> access > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander > > >>> Suvorov. > > >>>>>>> Moreover, > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> such > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct > > >>>>> relevance > > >>>>>>> to > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kris's > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak > to > > >>>>>>> concerns > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> about > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in > > >>>> development. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. > > >>>>> Perhaps > > >>>>>>> they > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> will > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a > > >>> natural > > >>>>>>> science > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with an > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > > >>>> science > > >>>>>>> with an > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > > >>> science > > >>>>>>> with an > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> -- > > >>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > >>>> Assistant Professor > > >>>> Department of Anthropology > > >>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > >>>> Brigham Young University > > >>>> Provo, UT 84602 > > >>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > >>>> > > >>> > > >> > > >> > > >> -- > > >> > > >> *Robert Lake Ed.D.*Associate Professor > > >> Social Foundations of Education > > >> Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading > > >> Georgia Southern University > > >> Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group > > >> P. O. Box 8144 > > >> Phone: (912) 478-0355 > > >> Fax: (912) 478-5382 > > >> Statesboro, GA 30460 > > > > > > > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Sat Dec 20 12:25:13 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sat, 20 Dec 2014 12:25:13 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context In-Reply-To: References: <2E5441F3-C50E-478B-BCCA-EA180B2591A3@ucla.edu> <70AEA66B-2185-4863-A4A8-FE86A87FCB43@gmail.com> Message-ID: Dear Thread readers I am wondering, Kris, if there is a youtube version of the teatro session where the student really does fly. To me, a pervasive feature of your pedagogy is that it is future oriented. The past serves as an entry to the future. And the future is not just talked about, it is enacted in thought provoking ways. For example, it seems important to link that video to the prior in-class version of the discussion where they are just starting out and Manuel says. ?With all the repression and the oppression and suffering in the world, we?re telling you to pick up books! We?re asking you to study; that?s what we do with oppression,? asserts Manuel, the instructor: Maybe this is a beginning for us, who knows (.) ri:ght? Think about this place as a workshop, as a factory. Una maqui::la (.) pero de sue?os (.) Right?... This is where we think about- this is your fu:ture ((Points out toward campus)) (1.2) What?s on the o:ther si:de? ((Points at a couple of students off camera)) (1.5) You kno::w? (.) You kno:w? (.) No? You know what?s on the other side? I wanna find out (though) (.) This is what I wanna do= =I wanna dream our fu:ture (.) and I don?t just wanna dream it= =I wanna look over what?s on the other side= The future orientation of the discourse (social dreaming as a practice seems all about possible future), to me at least, comes through very powerfully. You define sociocritical in various ways Kris. This one seems most relevant to the emphasis of pedagogy and political activism. Is that right? a sociocritical literacy is a syncretic literacy organized around a pedagogical approach that focuses on how individuals and their communities influence and are influenced by social, political, and cultural discourses and practices in historically specific times and locations. mike On Tue, Dec 16, 2014 at 10:36 PM, Kris Gutierrez wrote: > Larry, thank you; you raise so many important things to think about. I > will read your post again more carefully and respond and ask you more, as > you push the thinking here. Kris > > > Kris Gutierrez > gutierkd@gmail.com > > Kris D. Guti?rrez > Professor > Graduate School of Education > 5629 Tolman Hall #1670 > University of California, Berkeley > Berkeley CA 94720-1670 > > Distinguished Professor > Learning Sciences and Literacy > School of Education > University of Colorado, Boulder > > > > On Dec 15, 2014, at 6:08 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > > Kris, > > I have been engaged with your explorations of new ways or paths of > creating > > *hybrid third spaces*. Your comment that forming third spaces: > > > > "involved intentional moves that 1) brought together and reorganized > > different discourses, cultural practices, histories, and genres that were > > generally considered incompatible or in tension with one another; 2) > > preserved and foregrounded their tension; and 3) sought to maintain the > > value, history, and integrity of the everyday vis-?-vis the dominant > form, > > especially in light of historical power relations. The syncretic > > testimonio is such an example. A nod here to Cindy Cruz?s powerful and > > informing work on testimonio. > >> (I have a new piece in press which you read, Mike, that attempts to > > elaborate the syncretic approach." > > > > Kris, I hope we can organize THIS thread to stay with your attempts to > > "elaborate the syncretic approach". Your section of the paper on page > 149, > > 150 *Rising to the Concrete* gives a clear example of the hybrid nature > of > > your playing with academic and everyday language and not privileging the > > scientific language. > > > > I believe your work is returning to a time when our language games were > not > > so divided into fact/fiction modes. Your elaborating "ecologically valid" > > genres "DEVELOPED IN THE COGNITIVE, SOCIAL, AND HISTORICAL PRACTICES OF > ALL > > THE PARTICIPANTS" captures the radical mashing together of the young and > > the old as "syncretic testimonio" Honouring the everyday language on an > > equal footing with the scientific *styles* of writing. THIS mashing up as > > "hybrid text" including BOTH autobiography and intersubjectively > developed > > texts. > > > > I read this *new* way or path as a return to rhetorical, persausive ways > of > > composing meaning. Raymond Williams describes epochal *styles* of > orienting > > to the world that begin in structures of feeling [he considered the term > > *structures of experience* but preferred *structures of feelings* to > > capture their felt *structure* as a set of elements that are mashed > > together]. > > > > Our current dominant *style* structures the scientific genres as > *factual* > > while the imaginal [social dreaming etc] are *merely* subjective and > > personal and idiosyncretic. > > Kris, your "syncretic testimonio" is seeing through the impoverishment of > > THAT dominant genre and playing with forms that are BOTH subjective > > [autobiography] AND intersubjective as historically effected > consciousness. > > You are working within a nondominant ecology but you are gesturing > toward a > > much more radical turn that the dominant culture must take. Raymond > > Williams within the Marxism and Literature tradition is working also for > > these radical turns. I personally also see the hermeneutical turn as > > compatible with your stated goal to develop a program oriented towards a > > form of "cosmopolitanism" [see page 148 of Kris' article] > > > > This paper is a wonderful example of "rising to the concrete" or > > imaginatively "rising off the ground and returning to the ground" [an > > imaginal path of social intersubjective dreaming] > > > > Larry > > On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 12:51 PM, mike cole [?] > [?][?][?] > > > > So much for trying to organized xmca discussion by threads! It hard to > keep > > track of the jumble of the email flow! I assume those who are following > the > > KrisRRQ thread will see this. > > reveling in the rain > > mike > > > >> > >> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 11:42 AM, Kris Gutierrez > >> wrote: > >>> > >>> Luisa, thanks. I have always been a lurker on XMCA but can never keep > >>> with all the discussions. I?m hoping the discussions will get us > into > >>> the questions you raise and I?m happy to post references and pdfs too > >>> (e.g., Tejeda?s decolonizing and Espinoza?s article on Educational > >>> Sanctuaries). Espinoza?s social dreaming is discussed in the RRQ > article > >>> and I?ll look to see where else he might have written about it. I > don?t > >>> know when the syncretic piece will be out but will check. Thanks for > >> your > >>> interest. > >>> > >>> > >>> In particular, I hope we can also discuss the ways the social > imagination > >>> (embodied and realized through Boal's teatro del oprimido, > historicizing > >>> pedagogies, and syncretic texts, etc.) were central to the ubiquitous > >>> "future oriented" organization of the activities that Mike points > >> out?that > >>> is, the process of becoming historical actors. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> Kris > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> Kris Gutierrez > >>> gutierkd@gmail.com > >>> > >>> Kris D. Guti?rrez > >>> Professor > >>> Graduate School of Education > >>> 5629 Tolman Hall #1670 > >>> University of California, Berkeley > >>> Berkeley CA 94720-1670 > >>> > >>> Distinguished Professor > >>> Learning Sciences and Literacy > >>> School of Education > >>> University of Colorado, Boulder > >>> > >>> > >>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 11:25 AM, Luisa Aires wrote: > >>>> > >>>> Dear Professor Kris Gutierrez > >>>> > >>>> It is delightful to see you here in XMCA :-) > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> I must confess that after reading your post, I am going to read your > >>> text again because you added so much interesting information about MSLI > >>> program (for example, I didn?t know that MSLI had strong links with 5th > >>> dimension). > >>>> > >>>> I would like to learn about Chicano/a and ethnic studies, Tejeda?s > >>> decolonizing framework and pedagogies, and Manuel Espinoza?s notions of > >>> social dreaming. How can we access the most important references of > those > >>> theories? > >>>> > >>>> One more question (we need to take advantage of your presence here > ;-): > >>> when and how can we access your new piece about syncretic approach? > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> Best wishes, > >>>> > >>>> Lu?sa A. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> -- > >>>> Department of Education and Distance Learning, Universidade Aberta > >>>> Centre of Studies on Migrations and Intercultural Relations (CEMRI) > >>>> R. Amial, n? 752, 4200-055 Porto, Portugal > >>>> laires@uab.pt > >>>> www.uab.pt > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> 2014-12-12 17:55 GMT+00:00 Kris Gutierrez >>> gutierkd@gmail.com>>: > >>>> > >>>> I don?t know if this went through last night.; so I?m reposting. > >>> apologies if you get it twice > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 12:45 AM, Kris Gutierrez >>> > wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> Re: Mike/Miguel, (Mike, XMCA has a weird email address for me and I > >>> am unable to post; would you post if it doesn?t come through?) > >>>>> > >>>>> Miguel, who has deep knowledge of an important time in the > >>> Migrant Program (MSLI), rightly points out that the development of > >>> sociocritical > >>>>> > >>>>> literacies/ syncretic approaches to learning must be understood in > >>> the context of the larger designed ecology and its history. And I > can?t > >>> begin to do > >>>> > >>>>> it justice here. But here are some reflections. > >>>>> > >>>>> Building on a decade of earlier designs that brought together Freire > >>> and cultural historical theoretical perspectives, and Chicano/a and > >> ethnic > >>> studies > >>>>> > >>>>> to create new forms of teaching and learning, and theorizations of > >>> the Third Space that preceded the development of the month long migrant > >>>> > >>>>> program, MSLI was designed as a hybrid space organized around an > >>> historicizing pedagogy, informed, deepened, and augmented by > >>>>> > >>>>> Tejeda?s robust decolonizing framework and pedagogies, and Manuel > >>> Espinoza?s notions of social dreaming and the importance of students > >>>> > >>>>> becoming historical actors who could "who invoke the past in order to > >>> re-mediate it so that it becomes a resource for current and future > >>> action.? Their > >>>> > >>>>> work is key to understanding the MSLI ecology. Our long-term 5th > >>> Dimension work (UC Links), its theoretical underpinnings, and the > >>> pedagogical > >>>> > >>>>> approaches to undergraduate education and learning in informal > >>> contexts were also a part of the mix, as most of the MSLI instructional > >>> team also > >>>> > >>>>> was involved in 5th D work. Of significance, all MSLI staff had > >>> extensive knowledge of CHAT, critical pedagogies, social theories, > >>> disciplinary > >>>> > >>>>> learning, as well as direct experience with and in immigrant, > >> migrant, > >>> and non dominant communities, their histories, repertoires, lived > >>> experiences, > >>>> > >>>>> and possibilities. > >>>>> > >>>>> There are many other important contributions of others I could > >>> elaborate here that contributed to the iterative design, re-mediation, > >> and > >>>>> > >>>>> implementation and sustainability of this program, including > >>> Miguel's. Consider Shirin Vossoughi?s recent MCA article, Social > >>> Analytic Artifacts > >>>> > >>>>> Made Concrete,? in which she beautifully elaborates the ways > >>> social analytic artifacts served as tools ?that deepened and propelled > >> the > >>> collective > >>>> > >>>>> analysis of social problems? for migrant students and the > >>> instructional teams. > >>>>> > >>>>> Our collective efforts and design were oriented toward > >>> transformation and change and had multiple aims: sociopolitical, > >> cultural, > >>> educational, > >>>>> > >>>>> including reframing education and learning in ways that brought the > >>> everyday and scientific (school-based) concepts into conversation with > >> one > >>>>> > >>>>> another (a different kind of conversation to be sure). The goal in > >>> this regard was to put scientific and everyday concepts on a more > level > >>> playing field > >>>>> > >>>>> such that scientific concepts were not placed in an hierarchical > >>> relationship with the everyday. Disciplinary learning and critical > forms > >>> of literacy were > >>>>> > >>>>> placed in conversation, their tensions made the object of analysis > >>> ?all toward the production of more meaningful and expansive forms of > >>> learning. > >>>>> > >>>>> Mike and Yrjo have written important work on this, and, Carol Lee?s > >>> work is another robust example. > >>>>> > >>>>> And, of course, there is a history of work among researchers in the > >>> sociocultural tradition who have attended to the consequential nature > of > >>> everyday > >>>>> > >>>>> knowledge and practices in expansive ways (e.g., Scribner & Cole, > >>> 1973; Lave, 1988; 2012; Lave & Rogoff, 1984; Rogoff, 2003, as key > >> examples > >>> of > >>>>> > >>>>> work that informs this thinking, including ongoing conversations and > >>> collaborations with and weekly meetings at LCHC with Mike, Yrjo, > >>> Olga,Vasquez > >>>>> > >>>>> and others). > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> Our approach to consequential learning involved the development > >>> of syncretic approaches to literacy and social scientific thinking. The > >>> design > >>>>> > >>>>> involved intentional moves that 1) brought together and reorganized > >>> different discourses, cultural practices, histories, and genres that > were > >>> generally considered incompatible or in tension with one another; 2) > >>> preserved and foregrounded their tension; and 3) sought to maintain the > >>> value, history, and integrity of the everyday vis-?-vis the dominant > >> form, > >>> especially in light of historical power relations. The syncretic > >>> testimonio is such an example. A nod here to Cindy Cruz?s powerful and > >>> informing work on testimonio. > >>>>> (I have a new piece in press which you read, Mike, that attempts to > >>> elaborate the syncretic approach). > >>>>> > >>>>> A footnote on the sociocritical article. The RRQ Sociocritical > >>> Literacy article was the publication of my AERA Scribner Lecture (2005 > >> for > >>> the 2004 Scribner Award for my work on the Third Space; the lecture and > >> its > >>> published piece were my attempt to further theorize the Third Space, > >> using > >>> MSLI as a robust example. > >>>>> > >>>>> Hope this provides more context and food for thought. excuse typos > >>> and lapses, it?s late. Kris > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> Kris D. Guti?rrez > >>>>> Professor > >>>>> Graduate School of Education > >>>>> 5629 Tolman Hall #1670 > >>>>> University of California, Berkeley > >>>>> Berkeley CA 94720-1670 > >>>>> > >>>>> Distinguished Professor > >>>>> Learning Sciences and Literacy > >>>>> School of Education > >>>>> University of Colorado, Boulder > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> On Dec 11, 2014, at 6:49 AM, mike cole >>> mcole@ucsd.edu> >> > wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Thanks for the additional info. > >>>>>> All makes sense to me. > >>>>>> Mike > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On Wednesday, December 10, 2014, Zavala, Miguel < > >>>>>> mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu >>> mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu> mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu > >>> >> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> While the focus is on public education, any space is amenable for > >>>>>>> analysis. We sometimes get issues from parent organizers, student > >>>>>>> organizations, interviews of students fighting for social justice > >> in > >>>>>>> college campuses. Formal, non-formal, institutional, > >>> non-institutional, > >>>>>>> etc. will work. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> If the submission focuses on 'praxis', on responses and resistance > >>> to the > >>>>>>> neoliberal privatization of education, any space and sustained > >>> activity, > >>>>>>> etc. is worth looking at-- but a connection should be drawn to how > >> it > >>>>>>> deliberately responds to neoliberalism and its messy tentacles, > >>> perhaps > >>>>>>> highlighting possible worlds and social dreams. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> A connection can definitely be drawn between sociocritical studies > >>> and > >>>>>>> this topic, certainly. I believe the work we did in MSLI (I was an > >>>>>>> integral member of MSLI for 3 years) was in many ways creating > >>> alternative > >>>>>>> spaces and social dreams; in a way it was a bottom-up approach of > >>> building > >>>>>>> consciousness and I think Freire would have been proud of our work. > >>> As > >>>>>>> lead instructor, Carlos Tejeda's decolonizing pedagogies framework > >>> lead to > >>>>>>> some beautiful, creative activity in that space, for many years. > >> As > >>> an > >>>>>>> instantiation of sociocritical literacies, I would say the work > >> Kris > >>>>>>> outlines is definitely a great example of "responses to > >>> neoliberalism" and > >>>>>>> was here and there a part of our talk/framing as we moved > >>> pedagogically. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> As an editor of the journal, the 'constraint' we do have is that > >>>>>>> submissions be written for a general audience; I know that is > >>> ambiguous. > >>>>>>> Keep in mind that the articles get read by our members in ARE, > >> their > >>>>>>> students, they are sometimes used as political education in > >>> conferences, > >>>>>>> in some instances reading circles in non-formal community settings. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> -Miguel > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> On 12/10/14 10:24 PM, "mike cole" >>> mcole@ucsd.edu> > > >>> > wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> How broad is your mandates, Miguel? Does it extend to after > >> school? > >>> Seems > >>>>>>>> like it would help to know the kinds of efforts you consider > >>> exemplary > >>>>>>>> classics. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Does this topic fit in with sociocritical studies? > >>>>>>>> Mike > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> On Wednesday, December 10, 2014, Zavala, Miguel < > >>>>>>>> mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu >>> mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu> mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu > >>> > > wrote: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> XMCA List Family, > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> I am relaying a call for manuscripts on a pressing issue > >> impacting > >>>>>>>>> education everywhere. We conceptualized the idea of a grassroots > >>>>>>>>> journal in > >>>>>>>>> 2007 and it has grown, albeit slowly. Here's the latest call. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Thanks! > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> ------------------- > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Regeneraci?n, the Association of Raza Educators Journal > >>>>>>>>> Volume 6, Issue 1 (Spring 2015) > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> CALL FOR SUBMISSIONS > >>>>>>>>> Deadline: February 15, 2015 > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> The theme for our next issue: > >>>>>>>>> "Resisting The Neoliberal Privatization of Education: Reclaiming > >>>>>>>>> Teachers' > >>>>>>>>> Unions, Education, and Epistemologies" > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Undeniably, ever since the World Bank declared education a > >>> trade-able > >>>>>>>>> service--trumping the idea that education is a basic human > >>>>>>>>> right--education > >>>>>>>>> and teachers have been increasingly under attack by corporations, > >>>>>>>>> venture > >>>>>>>>> philanthropists, and a growing managerial middle class, who > >>> function > >>>>>>>>> within > >>>>>>>>> a neoliberal ideology that places insurmountable faith in markets > >>> and > >>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>> expansion of capitalism globally into all facets of everyday > >> life. > >>> We > >>>>>>>>> believe that the neoliberal project to de-fund and privatize > >> public > >>>>>>>>> education interlocks with the idea of a racial-colonial State. > >>> Thus, > >>>>>>>>> it is > >>>>>>>>> no coincidence that neoliberal experiments to privatize public > >>> education > >>>>>>>>> have materialized in large urban districts, such as Chicago, New > >>> York, > >>>>>>>>> Los > >>>>>>>>> Angeles, etc., where we find a significant number of Raza, Black, > >>> and > >>>>>>>>> other > >>>>>>>>> historically marginalized peoples. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> In this issue of Regeneraci?n we seek both analysis and praxis, > >>> that is > >>>>>>>>> texts that help us understand more deeply how neoliberalism is > >>> manifest > >>>>>>>>> in > >>>>>>>>> particular geographic, social, and cultural spaces. As well, we > >> are > >>>>>>>>> looking > >>>>>>>>> for texts that provide examples of resistance to the corporate > >>> takeover > >>>>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>> public education. How are urban and other communities responding > >>> to the > >>>>>>>>> attacks on education and teachers? What grassroots and strategic > >>> spaces > >>>>>>>>> are > >>>>>>>>> created that provide alternatives to neoliberalism and > >>> capitalism? How > >>>>>>>>> are > >>>>>>>>> teachers' unions being reinvented? What role does the fight for > >>> Ethnic > >>>>>>>>> Studies present as a counter to the neoliberal attack? > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> FORMAT: Submissions may come from students, educators, parents, > >>>>>>>>> community > >>>>>>>>> organizers, or organizations; we also welcome scholarly > >>> submissions that > >>>>>>>>> are written for a general audience. Formats may include > >>> testimonios, > >>>>>>>>> essays, poetry, art, personal narrative, as well as analytic and > >>>>>>>>> empirical > >>>>>>>>> studies. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> LENGTH: 700-3000 words > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> SUBMISSION DEADLINE: February 15, 2015 > >>>>>>>>> PUBLICATION DATE: April 15, 2015 > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> If you have any questions please contact: > >> razaeducators@yahoo.com > >>> >> >>> razaeducators@yahoo.com>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> >>> razaeducators@yahoo.com> >>> razaeducators@yahoo.com>> > >>>>>>> > > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> To access past issues of Regeneraci?n: > >>>>>>>>> http://www.razaeducators.org/archives_newsletter.html < > >>> http://www.razaeducators.org/archives_newsletter.html> < > >>> http://www.razaeducators.org/archives_newsletter.html < > >>> http://www.razaeducators.org/archives_newsletter.html>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> The Association of Raza Educators > >>>>>>>>> www.razaeducators.org < > >>> http://www.razaeducators.org/ >< > >>> http://www.razaeducators.org < > >>> http://www.razaeducators.org/ >> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science > >> with > >>> an > >>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> -- > >>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with > >> an > >>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> Kris Gutierrez > >>>>> k.gutierrez@me.com >>> k.gutierrez@me.com > > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> Kris D. Guti?rrez > >>>>> Professor > >>>>> Graduate School of Education > >>>>> 5629 Tolman Hall #1670 > >>>>> University of California, Berkeley > >>>>> Berkeley CA 94720-1670 > >>>>> > >>>>> Distinguished Professor > >>>>> Learning Sciences and Literacy > >>>>> School of Education > >>>>> University of Colorado, Boulder > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> -- > >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >> > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Sat Dec 20 13:14:00 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Sat, 20 Dec 2014 14:14:00 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors In-Reply-To: References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> Message-ID: The issues that are raised by Orr are indeed important ones. I am a fan of her work as it points to important differences in language usage among AAE speakers. I agree that she shouldn't have been condemned for pointing out these differences (particularly considering how important it is for teachers to understand the consequences of these differences). If you want to help AAE speaking students do better on standardized tests, then you absolutely need to pay attention to these differences. My one concern here is that I do feel like there is a problem of deficit thinking that is at least implied in her work (and maybe "implied" is too strong a term - maybe it's just that she doesn't provide evidence to discourage us from this view). What we don't see in this book is any serious consideration of how AAE speakers actually use prepositions - e.g., the ways of using language that exist in the community of AAE speakers. This gives Orr's work a feel somewhat like the studies of math among the Kpelle studied by Gay and Cole in the pre-early days of LCHC (see wiki for more: http://lchcfestschrift.wikispaces.com/Chapter+1). Before they showed up on the scene, everyone had assumed that the Kpelle (Liberia) couldn't comprehend basic math concepts b.c. they weren't learning it in the ways that it was being taught (and perhaps there were even linguistic relativity arguments that pointed to this). Rather then continuing to pluck these folks out of context and run them through various types of experiments, Gay and Cole "explicitly began with the assumption that ?we must know more about the indigenous mathematics so that we can build effective bridges to the new mathematics that we are trying to introduce?" >From their research, they found that the Kpelle actually had high competence with complex mathematical problems (e.g., estimating volumes). As they write: "Overall, the data suggested that no generalized lack of mathematical, perceptual, or problem solving abilities stood in the way of mathematics education. When the materials and procedures used in assessment tasks were designed to match closely valued local practices, lack of ability could be replaced by apparent special ability. At the same time, schooling did appear to influence performance in tasks that were routinely used to measure cognitive development." So I think I would be more comfortable with Orr's work if she were to have included this kind of rich understanding of usage in context and how prepositions actually are used among AAE speakers. This points to a larger question that might be irksome to some folks, but the question regards the extent to which mathematical language is predicated upon a particular form of what Whorf called "Standard Average European." In short, the idea here is that Math has a history and a culture. This doesn't mean that it is useless or a waste of time, just that it is a particular way of encountering the world that is good for particular things and not for others. I think we've gone round this mulberry bush before, but that was just more grist for the mill (I prefer my metaphors mixed!). -greg On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 8:46 PM, David H Kirshner wrote: > > The topic of how grammatical form relates to meaning calls to mind the > groundbreaking work of Eleanor Orr--whom you've probably never heard of on > account of the fact that her work was condemned by a politically-correct > faction of race-conscious sociolinguists who decided her analysis of Black > English Vernacular could too easily be appropriated into racist discourses > about language deficiency. > > Orr was a Washington DC area teacher and principal in the 1970s and 1980s, > who traced math difficulties of her African American students to subtle > grammatical differences between Black English dialect and standard English. > Her 1987 book goes into compelling detail to support the thesis that the > meaning structure of basic mathematical terms is embedded in the > grammatical setting in which those terms are expressed. For instance, the > meaning of ?distance? is embedded in the grammatical structure ?distance > from _________ to __________? where the place-holders hold locations; if > you don?t have that grammatical structure, and you're in a linguistic > environment in which that structure is assumed, you're likely not going to > be able to gain full access to the concept. > > The attached excerpts from her book--ignore the Forward, unless you'd like > some context--reveal some of her students' bizarre conceptions of distance > (and other basic mathematical concepts) as revealed in their diagrams. Her > approach involves linguistic analysis of sentences produced by her African > American students that she reads as collapsed versions of standard English > sentences, with differences in prepositional structure being highlighted > (but other grammatical elements also are indicated). > > This work cuts against the grain of anything going on in mathematics > education. The Piagetian view that dominates that field holds that basic > concepts come about from reflection on our actions in our engagement with > the material world. When language enters the conversation, it's with > respect to semantic structure; to my knowledge, nobody's ever implicated > syntax directly in basic quantitative understanding. > > This work is particularly interesting to me in connection with my > 21-year-old son who is autistic, and whose grammatical function is severely > impaired. He has a decent vocabulary, but unless the setting for the > conversation provides contextual clues, he can't piece together how the > semantic elements are linked to one another. It is only recently that it > occurred to me his lack of a secure sense of basic quantitative terms like > ?more? and ?less? may be rooted in his grammatical incapacities. > > The XMCA discussion, thus far, has touched on grammar with respect to > lexical items such as prepositions. But we've not yet tied that to the > grammatical forms that embed those lexical items. I'm very curious as to > whether that further connection can be made. > > David Kirshner > > Orr, E., W. (1987). Twice as less: Black English and the performance of > black students in mathematics and science. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg > Sent: Friday, December 19, 2014 3:06 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors > > Yes, Haliday is essentially a Whorfian, and that's one of things that > brings him close to Vygotsky. (Compare, for example, Chomsky, who is > essentially anti-developmental in his ideas about language, and who now > rejects the leading role played by social communication and says that > communication is epiphenomenal to language, whose original purpose is > thought.) For Sapir, and for Whorf, in the beginning of every major > onotogenetic, sociogenetic, and even phylogenetic change in language there > has to be some change in the nature of communication. > > So what Andy says about the lack of the basis of modern science in Hopi > applies perfectly well to English. When we read the scientific writings of > Chaucer on the astrolabe, for example, we do not see words like > "reflection", "refraction" or "alignment". Chaucer uses words like "bounce > off", "bend through", and "line up" (note the use of prepositions, > Helena!). Where did these words come from, and how did they make scientific > English possible? > > Most of us have no problem saying that Isaac Newton discovered the laws of > gravitation. But it's only a slight exaggeration to say that what he really > discovered was the meaning potential of words like "gravitation". Gravity > is, of course, not a thing at all; that is, it's not an entity, but rather > a process, the process of falling down, or falling in (preps, again!). So > how and above all why does it become an entity? > > It's interesting to compare Newton's writings on optics with Chaucer's on > the astrolabe. The "Opticks" has a fixed format that we recognize almost > instantly today: Newton describes his equipment (the prism and the dark > room); he then narrates his method as a kind of recipe ("First, I did this; > then I did that") and draws conclusions, which he then formulates in > mathematical terms (this is essentially the format of Vygotsky's lectures > on pedology, so much so that when translating them we had some trouble > determining the precise moment when Vygotsky turns to the blackboard to > write his conclusion in the form of a law). > > In order to get them into mathematical shape, though, he has to make > sentences that look a lot like equations. "The plumpness of the lens yields > a greater refraction of the light", "The reflection of the light from the > glass results of the light striking the flatness of the glass" "The > curvature of the spectacle glass supplies the lacking plumpness of the > eye". In each of these, a quality or a process which would normally be > realized as an adjective or a verb is suddenly realized by a noun, creating > an imaginary entity. > > That's grammatical metaphor. Something that is "canonically" realized by a > verb ("to grow") is suddenly realized nominally ("growth"), or something > that is canonically a quality ('red") is realized verbally ("redden"). We > even find related clauses realized as verbs ("She did not know the rules. > So she died" is realized by "Death was brought about through ignorance", > all of these examples from Halliday). In fact, the Genetic Law that > Vygotsky formulates in "Mind in Society" ("Every higher mental function is > realized on two planes....") is really just one instance of grammatical > metaphor. > > One of Chomsky's best known arguments for the radical innateness > hypothesis is this. If I take a sentence like "Students who do not do their > homework do not do well" and I want to make a question, how do I know which > "do" to move to the front? Chomsky assumes that this knowledge is > essentially innate; it is part of universal grammar. But you can see that > "Do students who do not do their homework do well?" can be built up through > a process of what we might call "discourse metaphor"--whereby clauses stand > for > exchanges: > > Mother: You did your homework, didn't you? > Child: No. > Mother: You didn't do your homework? Did you do well? > Child: No. > Mother: You didn't do well? > Child: No. > Mother: You didn't do you homework so you didn't do well. Do the other > students do well? > Child: Some of them. > Mother: Who does well? Do students who do not do their homework do well? > > And this of course explains why wh-items like "who" and 'why" have two > functions--one inside a clause, where it expresses an intra-mental function > (grammar) and one between them where it expresses an inter-mental function > (discourse). > > I realize that grammatical metaphor will seem rather dry and abstract and > unpoetic to people who assume that metaphor is only of the lexical kind. > But to me, and I think to most children, it is far far more powerful and > far more important developmentally. In some ways, it's the lexical metaphor > that is responsible for the disenchantment of the child's world, while the > grammatical metaphor infinitely expands it. (And here, I'm afraid, I must > stop--it's time for breakfast and anyway my one screen is used up!) > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > , or "the > > . He > > On 19 December 2014 at 15:15, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > > Helena and David, > > I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the so-called > > authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred tradition > > to > > Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi notion > > of "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including English) > > notion of "time" and how each of these languages offers different > > affordances of meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual > > understanding, English has a much more reified/objectified/entified > > sense of time. (btw, I think the first paragraph is easier to follow > > than the second - and in that first paragraph you'll find our old friend > "imagination"). > > David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to? > > -greg > > > > Taken from: > > > > http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/mousesite/Second > > ary/Whorfframe2.html > > > > " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, sunset" are > > with us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from other > nouns. > > They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in winter" > > just as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are pluralized > > and numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. Our > > thought about the referents of such words hence becomes objectified. > > Without objectification, it would be a subjective experience of real > > time, i.e. of the consciousness of "becoming later and later"--simply > > a cyclic phase similar to an earlier phase in that ever-later-becoming > > duration. Only by imagination can such a cyclic phase be set beside > > another and another in the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually > > perceived) configuration. "But such is the power of linguistic analogy > that we do so objectify cyclic phasing. > > We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g., > "phasing." > > And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting > > binomial formula of formless item plus form, is so general that it is > > implicit for all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless items > > like "substance, matter," by which we can fill out the binomial for an > > enormously wide range of nouns. But even these are not quite > > generalized enough to take in our phase nouns. So for the phase nouns we > have made a formless item, "time." > > We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, in the > > pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" in > > the pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can say > > and think "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." Let me > > again point out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of milk" > > or "a piece of cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a > > summer" actually contains or consists of such-and-such a quantity of > "time." > > > > In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., are not > > nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They are a > > formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, and > > even other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a > > locative pattern, like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It contains > > no morpheme like one of "in the house" or "at the tree." It means > > "when it is morning" or "while morning-phase is occurring." These > > "temporal s" are not used as subjects or objects, or at all like > > nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" or "summer is hot"; summer > > is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions are hot, WHEN heat occurs. > > One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or "summer recently." > > There is no objectification, as a region, an extent, a quantity, of > > the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested about time > > except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no basis > here for a formless item answering to our "time." " > > > > > > > > On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Helena Worthen > > > > wrote: > > > > > > David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to this: > > > > > > "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to create > > > sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly > > > productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific > > > writing and thinking today." > > > > > > Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I lose you > > > when > > you > > > say "created to talk about gravity as an entity". > > > > > > Thank you, > > > > > > Helena > > > > > > > > > Helena Worthen > > > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > > > > On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > > > > As Helena points out, prepositions are from the "grammatical" end > > > > of > > what > > > > Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what > > > > Halliday > > calls > > > > "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they have > > > > three properties that words from the more "lexical" end do not have: > > > > > > > > a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You can, > > > actually, > > > > but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you invent a new > > > > name > > > or a > > > > new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can). > > > > > > > > b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific semantic > > > > field > > > (the > > > > way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of > > linguistics) > > > > but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are used. > > > > > > > > c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the same > > effect, > > > > which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your argument" the "in" > > has > > > > more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in "there's a fly > > > > in > > your > > > > tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in Henry's > > > > hands, > > > refer > > > > to a book or even a footnote. > > > > > > > > Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties pretty > > > > much define the difference between learning and development, at > > > > least as I understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on > > > > functions indefinitely while development works by reorganizing the > > > > closed set of functions you already have into new systems. > > > > Learning is skill specific and local, while development is quite > global in its implications. > > > Learning > > > > is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new systems, > > > > while development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary (and > > > > forget it > > just > > > > as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes away. > > > > > > > > For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of blue > > > > that > > > people > > > > call the sky") are simply metaphors from the non-productive end of > > > > the lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are crisp, > > > > concrete, and vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the > > > > nominalizations that > > Newton > > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to > > > > create sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly > > > > productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific > > > > writing and > > thinking > > > > today. For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical metaphor is the > > third > > > > great moment in child development (after the break into mother > > > > tongue > > and > > > > the break into disciplinary language in school work). > > > > > > > > Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" implies > > > > zero dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two ("on a > > > > line', 'on a > > > > plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because they are > > > > grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them with time: > > > > 'at > > a > > > > point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. Compare: "at > > > > Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very day), and > > > > "in Christmas' (season). > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > >> > > > >> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial > > > >> relationships from the concrete material world into the > > > >> conceptual imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 common > > > >> ones, and > > > between 70 > > > >> and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far as" > > > >> -- > > > this > > > >> is according to > > > >> https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm > > ). > > > >> We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. Apparently, > > > >> in English, they evolved from and did the job done by inflections > > > >> in > > parent > > > >> languages, examples being cases and tenses. > > > >> > > > >> But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection > > > >> like the dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial > > > >> relationships > > > suggested > > > >> by contemporary prepositions. > > > >> > > > >> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about this. > > > >> > > > >> Helena Worthen > > > >> helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > >> > > > >> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > > >> > > > >>> I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly > > embodied, > > > >> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to > > > >> linguistics > > > (For > > > >> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on > > ?lexicon?: > > > >> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, > > > >> being > > > part > > > >> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and > > > >> Halliday > > > see no > > > >> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, > lexico-grammar. > > > (Lo > > > >> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar, > > > >> adding > > > the > > > >> ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings are > > great > > > >> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of > > > >> that? In translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced? > > > >>> Henry > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > > >>>> > > > >>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the > > metaphorical > > > >> use of prepositions like: > > > >>>> - "there is some value IN your argument" > > > >>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again" > > > >>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" > > > >>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again" > > > >>>> > > > >>>> and so on. > > > >>>> Andy > > > >>>> > > > -------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > ---- > > > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > > > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>> larry smolucha wrote: > > > >>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself - > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic > > > possibilities: > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in > > > Thought > > > >>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into > > English > > > >> 1962] > > > >>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' > > value > > > >> of the > > > >>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech > > > vocalization). > > > >>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that > > > >>>>> are > > > >> flammable > > > >>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor > > > >>>>> a > > gas. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century > > > >>>>> European > > > >> Developmental > > > >>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' > > > >>>>> hence > > > the > > > >>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of > > Piaget's > > > >> Genetic > > > >>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and > > > >>>>> synthesis > > > >> based on > > > >>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in > > > >>>>> Vygotsky's > > > >> example of H2O. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com > > > >>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > >>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 > > > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic > > > >>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the > parts. > > > >>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more > > > >>>>>> than > > the > > > >>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can > > > >>>>>> ever > > be > > > >> imagined" > > > >>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> A couple things to consider: > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination > > > >>>>>> as the > > > >> brain has > > > >>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the > > > >>>>>> simplest > > level > > > >> of the Gestalt > > > >>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). > > > >>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just > > photographic. > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try > > > >>>>>> to > > > >> accurately reproduce > > > >>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, > > > >>>>>> the > > > >> goal of combinatory > > > >>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, > > > >>>>>> dreams, > > > >> musings, and even > > > >>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of > > objects > > > >> and symbols. > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways > > > >>>>>> that > > > >> things and concepts can be > > > >>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar > > > >>>>>> and > > > flour. > > > >>>>>> I can add water and > > > >>>>>> it > > > >> dissolves a bit > > > >>>>>> But adding heat > > > >>>>>> changes > > the > > > >> combination into a pancake. > > > >>>>>> [Is this synergistic?] > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more > > > >>>>>> examples > > > >> to put the discussion > > > >>>>>> in the metaphysical realm. > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 > > > >>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > >>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the > > > >>>>>>> case > > > for > > > >>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I > > > >>>>>>> think > > it's > > > >> not > > > >>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are > > > >> associationists who > > > >>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary > > > >>>>>>> associationism > > > >> exists and > > > >>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. > > > >> Vygotsky > > > >>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, > > explain > > > >> the > > > >>>>>>> uniqueness of our species? > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels > > > >>>>>>> for > > its > > > >> own > > > >>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a > > > >>>>>>> Piagetian perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian > > > >>>>>>> one--true maturity > > > as a > > > >>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more > > > >>>>>>> to it > > > >> than > > > >>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of > > > >>>>>>> primate, > > > and > > > >> our > > > >>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon > > > >>>>>>> rocks > > > in > > > >> order > > > >>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged > > > >>>>>>> the > > same > > > >> way as > > > >>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and > > > >>>>>>> for > > > >> language is > > > >>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human > > > >> exceptionalism. > > > >>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for > > > >>>>>>> the > > > >> vanguard role > > > >>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, > > > prolonging > > > >>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after > > > >>>>>>> the > > sick > > > >> and the > > > >>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial > > > >>>>>>> organs > > > >> (tools) and > > > >>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for > > > >>>>>>> our > > > >> species, it > > > >>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these > > > >> "circuitous, > > > >>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that > > > >>>>>>> lead > > our > > > >>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always > > > >>>>>>> been > > > >> short on > > > >>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for > > > >>>>>>> material > > > >> culture > > > >>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: > > > >> verily, here > > > >>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of > > > >>>>>>> attention is > > > >> simply the > > > >>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says > > > >>>>>>> there are > > > >> only two > > > >>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So > > > >> imagination is > > > >>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, > > > >>>>>>> and > > > >> nothing > > > >>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when > > > >>>>>>> you > > > hear > > > >> the > > > >>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there > > > >>>>>>> to be > > > >> able to > > > >>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work > > > >>>>>>> in > > word > > > >> meaning. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who > > > >>>>>>> was > > > given > > > >> a > > > >>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been > > > >>>>>>> mixed > > with > > > >> silver > > > >>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of > gold. > > > >> Well, we > > > >>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not > > possible > > > to > > > >>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that > > > >>>>>>> precisely. The > > > >> method > > > >>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the > > > >>>>>>> "principal > > of > > > >>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes > > > >>>>>>> palimpsest, a > > > >> velum on > > > >>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. > > > Because > > > >>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and > > > >>>>>>> written > > over > > > >> every > > > >>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, > > > >>>>>>> the > > > >> pressure > > > >>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones > > > >>>>>>> when > > > the > > > >> old > > > >>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only > > known > > > >> Greek > > > >>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their > > > >> relationship > > > >>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they > > > >>>>>>> are > > > >> related to > > > >>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite > > > similar > > > >> to the > > > >>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> David Kellogg > > > >>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD > > > >>>>>>> > > > >> wrote: > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an > > > associationist, > > > >> ?sees > > > >>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? > > > >>>>>>>> Henry > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg < > > dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > > > > > >> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the > > > >>>>>>>>> division > > > >> between > > > >>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, > > > >>>>>>>>> because > > > >> Ribot is > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> an > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal > > > >>>>>>>>> form of > > > >> attention. > > > >>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the > > > >>>>>>>>> transition > > from > > > >> forest > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> to > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division > > between > > > >> the two > > > >>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and > > > >>>>>>>>> commonsensical > > > >> world of > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly > > > >>>>>>>>> prosaic > > uses > > > >> in life > > > >>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more > > > "imaginative" > > > >> (that > > > >>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world > > > >>>>>>>>> of the > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> farm,where > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long > > > >>>>>>>>> winter > > > >> months are > > > >>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to > > encounter > > > >> talking > > > >>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here > > > >>>>>>>>> attention > > > has > > > >> to be > > > >>>>>>>>> more voluntary. > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a > > > >>>>>>>>> very > > clear > > > >>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that > > > >> underpins > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> Ribot > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky > > > >>>>>>>>> points > > > out > > > >> the > > > >>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive > > > >>>>>>>>> practices > > > >> really > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> are > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of > > imagination, > > > >> there > > > >>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between > > > >>>>>>>>> human > > > and > > > >> animal > > > >>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly > > > >>>>>>>>> capable of > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> volitional > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). > > > Without > > > >> a > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> theory > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis > > > >>>>>>>>> for > > > Ribot's > > > >>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological > > > >>>>>>>>> functions at > > > >> all. > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > > > >>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole > > wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination, > > > >> thanks to > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> all > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought. > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very > > > >>>>>>>>>> influential > > > >> around the > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> time > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I > > > >>>>>>>>>> had > > > >> seen work > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> on > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective > > > >>>>>>>>>> equal > > > >> reproductive? > > > >>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies > > > >>>>>>>>>> of > > > >> development > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> of > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of > > > >>>>>>>>>> being > > a > > > >> relative > > > >>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. > > > >>>>>>>>>> mike > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com> > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my > > > >>>>>>>>>>> bucket > > list. > > > >> This > > > >>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings > > > >>>>>>>>>>> from > > some > > > >> weeks > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> in > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > >> segmented the > > > >>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met > aphorizing?. > > > >> Puns, > > > >>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> and > > they > > > >> are > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> doing > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his > > > >> followers as an > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel, so > > > >> its of > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> course > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in > > > >> translation, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> seems > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" > > in > > > >> this > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> passage, > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter > > > >> distinction to > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "memory." > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary > > > >> discourse > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian > > > >> colleagues have > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from > > theorists > > > >> who > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> clearly > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was > > still > > > >> possible > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> to > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, > > > >> interestingly > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> links > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a > > "voluntary" > > > >> act. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Parts > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> of > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> stuff > > > that > > > >> was > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> also > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > >> creativity > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> and > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> see > > > >> that the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> two > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found > > himself > > > >> writing. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> pretty > > > old > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> approaches > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < > > > >> ablunden@mira.net> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> but it > > > >> may be > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> worth > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> place > > to > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Imagination > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between > > > >> Recollection and > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive > > > >> Imagination, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> (2) > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> which > > he > > > >> says > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> leads > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> other > > > >> words, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is > > > >> accomplished > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> through > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >> > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > -- > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > > > >> Williams. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose > > work i > > > >> am > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> trying > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of > > > >> productive > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive > > imagination > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> develops. > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that > > > >> there > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> must > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> be a > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> But > > I > > > >> learned > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > > is > > > >> linked > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> to > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > >> anticipation > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination > > > >> (starting > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> look, and > > > >> provides > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> a > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as > > > fixed. > > > >> This, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a > > > ground > > > >> to > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> take > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> part > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> preconceptions: > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> grammarian > > > >> Langacker on > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> domains, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> particularly > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> full of > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> imagination > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > >> temporality: > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic > > > >> structure), which > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> I > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> both > > > >> individual > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < > > > >> lpscholar2@gmail.com> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third > > *space* > > > >> and the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> his > > > >> notion of > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is > > > >> explored under > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > >> modalities > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of > > knowing > > > >> that is > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [perceived??] > > if > > > >> we > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> think > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *style* Larry On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> HENRY SHONERD < > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> say how > > > >> jazzed up > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> I > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> am > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind > > > as > > > >> Larry > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> various > > > >> triads, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> finally > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notebooks > > > of > > > >> the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> mind, as > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, > > luega > > > >> pa? > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> fuera. > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole < > > mcole@ucsd.edu> > > > >> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, > > attached > > > >> are two > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT > > > theorists > > > >> like > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of > > > >> imagination in a > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of > > > >> productive > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no > > > >> intention of > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> doing > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the > > > >> attached > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these > > philosophers, > > > I > > > >> came > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> upon > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> closely > > > >> linked at > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> several > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, > > > >> Ettienne and I > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a > > means > > > of > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> access > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander > Suvorov. > > > >> Moreover, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> such > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct > > > relevance > > > >> to > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Kris's > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to > > > >> concerns > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> about > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in > > development. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. > > > Perhaps > > > >> they > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> will > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural > > > >> science > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with an > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> -- > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > > science > > > >> with an > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> -- > > > >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > > > >>>>>>>>>> science > > > >> with an > > > >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From annalisa@unm.edu Sat Dec 20 13:26:30 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Sat, 20 Dec 2014 21:26:30 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors In-Reply-To: References: <051101d01bc2$32bd3350$f707f10a@94160WEBDB> <1419042621940.54930@unm.edu>, Message-ID: <1419110789539.99301@unm.edu> Hi Mike, I'm sure the time schedule was a little more loose, so... it's a different case! :) But whatever the answer, it would likely be the same for ancient Greek, and I think some Latin. It is interesting. Does time (how it is conceived) have any connection to prepositional structures? Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of mike cole Sent: Saturday, December 20, 2014 12:45 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors ?How did the trains run back when Sanskrit was in style, Annalissa? :-)) mike? On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 6:30 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Helena, > > Truly awesome picture for English choo-choo trains!!!! > > I'm not sure how this would work for languages which combine prepositions > into a single word, which Sanskrit does, and many other languages too: > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grammatical_case#Sanskrit > > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+annalisa=unm.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Helena > Worthen > Sent: Friday, December 19, 2014 6:32 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Metaphors > > Helena Worthen > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > Some examples of prepositions :) From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Sat Dec 20 13:28:35 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Sat, 20 Dec 2014 14:28:35 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Time, Imagination, Metaphor In-Reply-To: References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> <5493CC6B.5050105@mira.net> <1419052007614.61660@unm.edu> Message-ID: terms, terms, terms. Ontological. Just wanted to mention that there are different understandings of this term "ontological". The classic understanding of "ontological" is that it refers to the "real" nature of things in time and space. But there is a new understanding of "ontological" that has come up in the social sciences in the past 20 years or so that takes seriously the possibility of "plural ontologies" - i.e. that there may be different "reals" constituted by people in different times and places - all of them "real" (if perhaps "real" in different ways). The hope of this literature is to get beyond subjective/objective dualism that is implied in the classical formulation of "ontological". I feel that these are important considerations to keep in mind so that we don't talk too much past each other. I think that it is also important to keep these in mind so that we can appreciate how the concerns of XMCA folks might intersect with current conversations in social theory. -greg On Sat, Dec 20, 2014 at 4:08 AM, larry smolucha wrote: > > Message from Francine: > > Metaphysics is an old term for philosophy. Metaphysics includes the study > of ontology, > cosmology and epistemology. Our discussions have been epistemological, > specifically > how different cultures understand time and space. We have not gotten into > an > ontological discussion (yet) about the 'real' nature of time and space. > > Some people use the term metaphysics to refer to a type of spiritual > metaphysics. > The practice of mind over matter. In my previous post, I used the examples > of walking into > a wall or in front of a car, in denial of their existence. The > probabilities are not in your > favor. But I did run out in front of a speeding car once, to snatch up my > toddler, and > 'miraculously' the driver was able to stop and did not hit me (as I held > my son in my arms > protecting his head expecting we would be thrown to the ground). > Similarly, in > Dancing with Wolves, when Kevin Costner rides back and forth past the > Confederate lines > who are shooting at him - he is defying the odds. Physics has become a > probabilistic science that does not rule out the possibility that if you > drop a glass of water it might fall upward, > but the probabilities of that happening are astronomical. > > > > From: annalisa@unm.edu > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > Date: Sat, 20 Dec 2014 05:06:48 +0000 > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Time, Imagination, Metaphor > > > > Hello Francine (and Larry), > > > > Yes! Let's not forget perception and imagination! > > > > And let me second subjective perspectives and bibliographic references! > > > > [If anyone has any to add to the ABC that come to mind, please forward > them to me! TQ] > > > > I fully enjoy the noodle into pasta example. Are you saying that time is > metaphysical? Would space be metaphysical too? > > > > Robert brought up a perfect example of the Hopi's view of time and the > Guugu Yimithirr of Australia and their method of employing cardinal > directions to orient themselves in space. > > http://xmca.ucsd.edu/yarns/15874?keywords=#52113 > > > > That example also reminded me of the Greek Poet Simonides of Ceos and > the Memory Palace... see the Extreme Memory Tournament > > > http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/19/remembering-as-an-extreme-sport/ > > and the book that tells you how to remember everything: > > > http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C03E3DF1E3FF93BA35750C0A9679D8B63 > > > > Also Francine, when you say: > > > The 'Natural' Science that arises from European culture begins as > mechanical physics and alchemy in which machines have parts and chemicals > have elements. It has evolved into the study of energy, and systems theory. > > > > I wanted to say, don't forget to include astrology with alchemy and > mechanical physics! :) (Which is an ancient systems theory) and then > becomes astronomy, and this has certainly altered our sense of both time > and space by light years! :) > > > > Kind regards, > > > > Annalisa > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sat Dec 20 13:30:41 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sun, 21 Dec 2014 06:30:41 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors In-Reply-To: <78A7A9DF-94D1-4BBC-998F-A26AD72BCCD0@umich.edu> References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> <78A7A9DF-94D1-4BBC-998F-A26AD72BCCD0@umich.edu> Message-ID: Thanks, Ed! Very useful--I have been studying the Hawaiian language immersion programme which I just missed (I went to elementary school in Hawaii while the use of Hawaiian in school was still banned). The Hawaiian immersion programme was modeled on the successful work in New Zealand transforming Maori into a language of school instruction, but one of the biggest problems they had at first was creating an instructional register for mathematics. Say, for example, you are teaching kids to calculate the volume of a container by multiplying its three dimensions. You need a word for a container. Not a calabash or a basket or a pot, which have very distinct realizations in Hawaiian, but a generalized container of any kind. The general, abstract notion of a container is actually a very important part of your instructional register, and that for two reasons. First of all, in order to see how the calculation works, you really need a container that doesn't really exist: an idealized container with nice, straight sides that will lend themselves perfectly to measuring and multiplication. Imagine trying to teach this lesson with a calabash, that is, the kind of hollow gourd that you see used as a percussion instrument in this song from the Disney movie "Lilo and Stitch": http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xVptV_Da5qw (See 0.58--the calabash is only there for about a second). Secondly, in order to understand how to use the calculation, you really need the idea that it with work, more or less, with any container--and that the calabash, the basket and the pot are all as if imperfect realizations of some Platonic ideal container. This is, of course, totally false: things are quite the other way around, as the fact of languages like Hawaiian that have words for different containers but no hyperconcept for all containers will demonstrate. We have the actual artifacts before we have the ideal object. But, like grammatical metaphor, the Platonic ideal container is a highly productive fiction. Derrida, who is the other uber-structuralist of language besides Chomsky, claimed that writing preceded speaking, and so he might have agreed with Francine that a non-alphabetic writing system is going to have profound effects on the "thinginess" of the semantics (whereas for the rest of us a language tends to get, at least in the long run, the kind of writing system that its speaking system requires, as soon as the vagaries introduced by zealous missionaries and tone-deaf colonial officials have been ironed out). Chinese was not written alphabetically until the introduction of Hanyu Pinyin at the end of the 1950s (an intervention that was designed to standardize pronunciation and which largely failed). But Chinese has nouns, verbs and expressions that function in ways that are essentially identical to our prepositions (they are somewhat more verby than preps, in Chinese you say that a teacup is "being on" the table). But Francine is certainly right to say that the non-alphabetic writing system has affected the way Chinese think about language and made our way of thinking about language quite different from yours. Chinese doesn't really have the phoneme as a layer of sound analysis and doesn't need it (but then, neither do you)! David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 20 December 2014 at 14:24, Ed Wall wrote: > David > > Possibly of interest would be the efforts in the 80s to develop a > mathematical register for the Maori language. I seem to remember that it > had to be developed from the early grades on. > > Ed > > On Dec 19, 2014, at 9:46 PM, David H Kirshner wrote: > > > The topic of how grammatical form relates to meaning calls to mind the > groundbreaking work of Eleanor Orr--whom you've probably never heard of on > account of the fact that her work was condemned by a politically-correct > faction of race-conscious sociolinguists who decided her analysis of Black > English Vernacular could too easily be appropriated into racist discourses > about language deficiency. > > > > Orr was a Washington DC area teacher and principal in the 1970s and > 1980s, who traced math difficulties of her African American students to > subtle grammatical differences between Black English dialect and standard > English. Her 1987 book goes into compelling detail to support the thesis > that the meaning structure of basic mathematical terms is embedded in the > grammatical setting in which those terms are expressed. For instance, the > meaning of ?distance? is embedded in the grammatical structure ?distance > from _________ to __________? where the place-holders hold locations; if > you don?t have that grammatical structure, and you're in a linguistic > environment in which that structure is assumed, you're likely not going to > be able to gain full access to the concept. > > > > The attached excerpts from her book--ignore the Forward, unless you'd > like some context--reveal some of her students' bizarre conceptions of > distance (and other basic mathematical concepts) as revealed in their > diagrams. Her approach involves linguistic analysis of sentences produced > by her African American students that she reads as collapsed versions of > standard English sentences, with differences in prepositional structure > being highlighted (but other grammatical elements also are indicated). > > > > This work cuts against the grain of anything going on in mathematics > education. The Piagetian view that dominates that field holds that basic > concepts come about from reflection on our actions in our engagement with > the material world. When language enters the conversation, it's with > respect to semantic structure; to my knowledge, nobody's ever implicated > syntax directly in basic quantitative understanding. > > > > This work is particularly interesting to me in connection with my > 21-year-old son who is autistic, and whose grammatical function is severely > impaired. He has a decent vocabulary, but unless the setting for the > conversation provides contextual clues, he can't piece together how the > semantic elements are linked to one another. It is only recently that it > occurred to me his lack of a secure sense of basic quantitative terms like > ?more? and ?less? may be rooted in his grammatical incapacities. > > > > The XMCA discussion, thus far, has touched on grammar with respect to > lexical items such as prepositions. But we've not yet tied that to the > grammatical forms that embed those lexical items. I'm very curious as to > whether that further connection can be made. > > > > David Kirshner > > > > Orr, E., W. (1987). Twice as less: Black English and the performance of > black students in mathematics and science. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg > > Sent: Friday, December 19, 2014 3:06 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors > > > > Yes, Haliday is essentially a Whorfian, and that's one of things that > brings him close to Vygotsky. (Compare, for example, Chomsky, who is > essentially anti-developmental in his ideas about language, and who now > rejects the leading role played by social communication and says that > communication is epiphenomenal to language, whose original purpose is > > thought.) For Sapir, and for Whorf, in the beginning of every major > onotogenetic, sociogenetic, and even phylogenetic change in language there > has to be some change in the nature of communication. > > > > So what Andy says about the lack of the basis of modern science in Hopi > applies perfectly well to English. When we read the scientific writings of > Chaucer on the astrolabe, for example, we do not see words like > "reflection", "refraction" or "alignment". Chaucer uses words like "bounce > off", "bend through", and "line up" (note the use of prepositions, > Helena!). Where did these words come from, and how did they make scientific > English possible? > > > > Most of us have no problem saying that Isaac Newton discovered the laws > of gravitation. But it's only a slight exaggeration to say that what he > really discovered was the meaning potential of words like "gravitation". > Gravity is, of course, not a thing at all; that is, it's not an entity, but > rather a process, the process of falling down, or falling in (preps, > again!). So how and above all why does it become an entity? > > > > It's interesting to compare Newton's writings on optics with Chaucer's > on the astrolabe. The "Opticks" has a fixed format that we recognize almost > instantly today: Newton describes his equipment (the prism and the dark > room); he then narrates his method as a kind of recipe ("First, I did this; > then I did that") and draws conclusions, which he then formulates in > mathematical terms (this is essentially the format of Vygotsky's lectures > on pedology, so much so that when translating them we had some trouble > determining the precise moment when Vygotsky turns to the blackboard to > write his conclusion in the form of a law). > > > > In order to get them into mathematical shape, though, he has to make > sentences that look a lot like equations. "The plumpness of the lens yields > a greater refraction of the light", "The reflection of the light from the > glass results of the light striking the flatness of the glass" "The > curvature of the spectacle glass supplies the lacking plumpness of the > eye". In each of these, a quality or a process which would normally be > realized as an adjective or a verb is suddenly realized by a noun, creating > an imaginary entity. > > > > That's grammatical metaphor. Something that is "canonically" realized by > a verb ("to grow") is suddenly realized nominally ("growth"), or something > that is canonically a quality ('red") is realized verbally ("redden"). We > even find related clauses realized as verbs ("She did not know the rules. > > So she died" is realized by "Death was brought about through ignorance", > all of these examples from Halliday). In fact, the Genetic Law that > Vygotsky formulates in "Mind in Society" ("Every higher mental function is > realized on two planes....") is really just one instance of grammatical > metaphor. > > > > One of Chomsky's best known arguments for the radical innateness > hypothesis is this. If I take a sentence like "Students who do not do their > homework do not do well" and I want to make a question, how do I know which > "do" to move to the front? Chomsky assumes that this knowledge is > essentially innate; it is part of universal grammar. But you can see that > "Do students who do not do their homework do well?" can be built up through > a process of what we might call "discourse metaphor"--whereby clauses stand > for > > exchanges: > > > > Mother: You did your homework, didn't you? > > Child: No. > > Mother: You didn't do your homework? Did you do well? > > Child: No. > > Mother: You didn't do well? > > Child: No. > > Mother: You didn't do you homework so you didn't do well. Do the other > students do well? > > Child: Some of them. > > Mother: Who does well? Do students who do not do their homework do well? > > > > And this of course explains why wh-items like "who" and 'why" have two > functions--one inside a clause, where it expresses an intra-mental function > > (grammar) and one between them where it expresses an inter-mental > function (discourse). > > > > I realize that grammatical metaphor will seem rather dry and abstract > and unpoetic to people who assume that metaphor is only of the lexical kind. > > But to me, and I think to most children, it is far far more powerful and > far more important developmentally. In some ways, it's the lexical metaphor > that is responsible for the disenchantment of the child's world, while the > grammatical metaphor infinitely expands it. (And here, I'm afraid, I must > stop--it's time for breakfast and anyway my one screen is used up!) > > > > David Kellogg > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > , or "the > > > > . He > > > > On 19 December 2014 at 15:15, Greg Thompson > > wrote: > > > >> Helena and David, > >> I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the so-called > >> authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred tradition > >> to > >> Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi notion > >> of "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including English) > >> notion of "time" and how each of these languages offers different > >> affordances of meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual > >> understanding, English has a much more reified/objectified/entified > >> sense of time. (btw, I think the first paragraph is easier to follow > >> than the second - and in that first paragraph you'll find our old > friend "imagination"). > >> David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to? > >> -greg > >> > >> Taken from: > >> > >> http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/mousesite/Second > >> ary/Whorfframe2.html > >> > >> " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, sunset" are > >> with us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from other > nouns. > >> They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in winter" > >> just as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are pluralized > >> and numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. Our > >> thought about the referents of such words hence becomes objectified. > >> Without objectification, it would be a subjective experience of real > >> time, i.e. of the consciousness of "becoming later and later"--simply > >> a cyclic phase similar to an earlier phase in that ever-later-becoming > >> duration. Only by imagination can such a cyclic phase be set beside > >> another and another in the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually > >> perceived) configuration. "But such is the power of linguistic analogy > that we do so objectify cyclic phasing. > >> We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g., > "phasing." > >> And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting > >> binomial formula of formless item plus form, is so general that it is > >> implicit for all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless items > >> like "substance, matter," by which we can fill out the binomial for an > >> enormously wide range of nouns. But even these are not quite > >> generalized enough to take in our phase nouns. So for the phase nouns > we have made a formless item, "time." > >> We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, in the > >> pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" in > >> the pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can say > >> and think "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." Let me > >> again point out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of milk" > >> or "a piece of cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a > >> summer" actually contains or consists of such-and-such a quantity of > "time." > >> > >> In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., are not > >> nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They are a > >> formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, and > >> even other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a > >> locative pattern, like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It contains > >> no morpheme like one of "in the house" or "at the tree." It means > >> "when it is morning" or "while morning-phase is occurring." These > >> "temporal s" are not used as subjects or objects, or at all like > >> nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" or "summer is hot"; summer > >> is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions are hot, WHEN heat occurs. > >> One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or "summer recently." > >> There is no objectification, as a region, an extent, a quantity, of > >> the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested about time > >> except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no basis > here for a formless item answering to our "time." " > >> > >> > >> > >> On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Helena Worthen > >> > >> wrote: > >>> > >>> David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to this: > >>> > >>> "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton > >>> and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to create > >>> sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly > >>> productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific > >>> writing and thinking today." > >>> > >>> Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I lose you > >>> when > >> you > >>> say "created to talk about gravity as an entity". > >>> > >>> Thank you, > >>> > >>> Helena > >>> > >>> > >>> Helena Worthen > >>> helenaworthen@gmail.com > >>> > >>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > >>> > >>>> As Helena points out, prepositions are from the "grammatical" end > >>>> of > >> what > >>>> Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what > >>>> Halliday > >> calls > >>>> "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they have > >>>> three properties that words from the more "lexical" end do not have: > >>>> > >>>> a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You can, > >>> actually, > >>>> but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you invent a new > >>>> name > >>> or a > >>>> new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can). > >>>> > >>>> b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific semantic > >>>> field > >>> (the > >>>> way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of > >> linguistics) > >>>> but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are used. > >>>> > >>>> c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the same > >> effect, > >>>> which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your argument" the "in" > >> has > >>>> more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in "there's a fly > >>>> in > >> your > >>>> tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in Henry's > >>>> hands, > >>> refer > >>>> to a book or even a footnote. > >>>> > >>>> Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties pretty > >>>> much define the difference between learning and development, at > >>>> least as I understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on > >>>> functions indefinitely while development works by reorganizing the > >>>> closed set of functions you already have into new systems. > >>>> Learning is skill specific and local, while development is quite > global in its implications. > >>> Learning > >>>> is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new systems, > >>>> while development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary (and > >>>> forget it > >> just > >>>> as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes away. > >>>> > >>>> For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of blue > >>>> that > >>> people > >>>> call the sky") are simply metaphors from the non-productive end of > >>>> the lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are crisp, > >>>> concrete, and vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the > >>>> nominalizations that > >> Newton > >>>> and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to > >>>> create sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly > >>>> productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific > >>>> writing and > >> thinking > >>>> today. For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical metaphor is the > >> third > >>>> great moment in child development (after the break into mother > >>>> tongue > >> and > >>>> the break into disciplinary language in school work). > >>>> > >>>> Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" implies > >>>> zero dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two ("on a > >>>> line', 'on a > >>>> plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because they are > >>>> grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them with time: > >>>> 'at > >> a > >>>> point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. Compare: "at > >>>> Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very day), and > >>>> "in Christmas' (season). > >>>> > >>>> David Kellogg > >>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >>>> > >>>> On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen > >>>> > >>>> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial > >>>>> relationships from the concrete material world into the > >>>>> conceptual imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 common > >>>>> ones, and > >>> between 70 > >>>>> and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far as" > >>>>> -- > >>> this > >>>>> is according to > >>>>> https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm > >> ). > >>>>> We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. Apparently, > >>>>> in English, they evolved from and did the job done by inflections > >>>>> in > >> parent > >>>>> languages, examples being cases and tenses. > >>>>> > >>>>> But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection > >>>>> like the dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial > >>>>> relationships > >>> suggested > >>>>> by contemporary prepositions. > >>>>> > >>>>> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about this. > >>>>> > >>>>> Helena Worthen > >>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com > >>>>> > >>>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly > >> embodied, > >>>>> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to > >>>>> linguistics > >>> (For > >>>>> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on > >> ?lexicon?: > >>>>> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, > >>>>> being > >>> part > >>>>> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and > >>>>> Halliday > >>> see no > >>>>> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, lexico-grammar. > >>> (Lo > >>>>> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar, > >>>>> adding > >>> the > >>>>> ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings are > >> great > >>>>> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of > >>>>> that? In translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced? > >>>>>> Henry > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden > >> wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the > >> metaphorical > >>>>> use of prepositions like: > >>>>>>> - "there is some value IN your argument" > >>>>>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again" > >>>>>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" > >>>>>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again" > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> and so on. > >>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>> > >>> -------------------------------------------------------------------- > >>> ---- > >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> larry smolucha wrote: > >>>>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself - > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic > >>> possibilities: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in > >>> Thought > >>>>>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into > >> English > >>>>> 1962] > >>>>>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' > >> value > >>>>> of the > >>>>>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech > >>> vocalization). > >>>>>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that > >>>>>>>> are > >>>>> flammable > >>>>>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor > >>>>>>>> a > >> gas. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century > >>>>>>>> European > >>>>> Developmental > >>>>>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' > >>>>>>>> hence > >>> the > >>>>>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of > >> Piaget's > >>>>> Genetic > >>>>>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and > >>>>>>>> synthesis > >>>>> based on > >>>>>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in > >>>>>>>> Vygotsky's > >>>>> example of H2O. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com > >>>>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 > >>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic > >>>>>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts. > >>>>>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more > >>>>>>>>> than > >> the > >>>>>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can > >>>>>>>>> ever > >> be > >>>>> imagined" > >>>>>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> A couple things to consider: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination > >>>>>>>>> as the > >>>>> brain has > >>>>>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the > >>>>>>>>> simplest > >> level > >>>>> of the Gestalt > >>>>>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). > >>>>>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just > >> photographic. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try > >>>>>>>>> to > >>>>> accurately reproduce > >>>>>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, > >>>>>>>>> the > >>>>> goal of combinatory > >>>>>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, > >>>>>>>>> dreams, > >>>>> musings, and even > >>>>>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of > >> objects > >>>>> and symbols. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways > >>>>>>>>> that > >>>>> things and concepts can be > >>>>>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar > >>>>>>>>> and > >>> flour. > >>>>>>>>> I can add water and > >>>>>>>>> it > >>>>> dissolves a bit > >>>>>>>>> But adding heat > >>>>>>>>> changes > >> the > >>>>> combination into a pancake. > >>>>>>>>> [Is this synergistic?] > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more > >>>>>>>>> examples > >>>>> to put the discussion > >>>>>>>>> in the metaphysical realm. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 > >>>>>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com > >>>>>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the > >>>>>>>>>> case > >>> for > >>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I > >>>>>>>>>> think > >> it's > >>>>> not > >>>>>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are > >>>>> associationists who > >>>>>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary > >>>>>>>>>> associationism > >>>>> exists and > >>>>>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. > >>>>> Vygotsky > >>>>>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, > >> explain > >>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>> uniqueness of our species? > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels > >>>>>>>>>> for > >> its > >>>>> own > >>>>>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a > >>>>>>>>>> Piagetian perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian > >>>>>>>>>> one--true maturity > >>> as a > >>>>>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more > >>>>>>>>>> to it > >>>>> than > >>>>>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of > >>>>>>>>>> primate, > >>> and > >>>>> our > >>>>>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon > >>>>>>>>>> rocks > >>> in > >>>>> order > >>>>>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged > >>>>>>>>>> the > >> same > >>>>> way as > >>>>>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and > >>>>>>>>>> for > >>>>> language is > >>>>>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human > >>>>> exceptionalism. > >>>>>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for > >>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>> vanguard role > >>>>>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, > >>> prolonging > >>>>>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after > >>>>>>>>>> the > >> sick > >>>>> and the > >>>>>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial > >>>>>>>>>> organs > >>>>> (tools) and > >>>>>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for > >>>>>>>>>> our > >>>>> species, it > >>>>>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these > >>>>> "circuitous, > >>>>>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that > >>>>>>>>>> lead > >> our > >>>>>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always > >>>>>>>>>> been > >>>>> short on > >>>>>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for > >>>>>>>>>> material > >>>>> culture > >>>>>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: > >>>>> verily, here > >>>>>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of > >>>>>>>>>> attention is > >>>>> simply the > >>>>>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says > >>>>>>>>>> there are > >>>>> only two > >>>>>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So > >>>>> imagination is > >>>>>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, > >>>>>>>>>> and > >>>>> nothing > >>>>>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when > >>>>>>>>>> you > >>> hear > >>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there > >>>>>>>>>> to be > >>>>> able to > >>>>>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work > >>>>>>>>>> in > >> word > >>>>> meaning. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who > >>>>>>>>>> was > >>> given > >>>>> a > >>>>>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been > >>>>>>>>>> mixed > >> with > >>>>> silver > >>>>>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold. > >>>>> Well, we > >>>>>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not > >> possible > >>> to > >>>>>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that > >>>>>>>>>> precisely. The > >>>>> method > >>>>>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the > >>>>>>>>>> "principal > >> of > >>>>>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes > >>>>>>>>>> palimpsest, a > >>>>> velum on > >>>>>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. > >>> Because > >>>>>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and > >>>>>>>>>> written > >> over > >>>>> every > >>>>>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, > >>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>> pressure > >>>>>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones > >>>>>>>>>> when > >>> the > >>>>> old > >>>>>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only > >> known > >>>>> Greek > >>>>>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their > >>>>> relationship > >>>>>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they > >>>>>>>>>> are > >>>>> related to > >>>>>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite > >>> similar > >>>>> to the > >>>>>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an > >>> associationist, > >>>>> ?sees > >>>>>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? > >>>>>>>>>>> Henry > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg < > >> dkellogg60@gmail.com > >>>> > >>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the > >>>>>>>>>>>> division > >>>>> between > >>>>>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, > >>>>>>>>>>>> because > >>>>> Ribot is > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> an > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal > >>>>>>>>>>>> form of > >>>>> attention. > >>>>>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the > >>>>>>>>>>>> transition > >> from > >>>>> forest > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division > >> between > >>>>> the two > >>>>>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and > >>>>>>>>>>>> commonsensical > >>>>> world of > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly > >>>>>>>>>>>> prosaic > >> uses > >>>>> in life > >>>>>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more > >>> "imaginative" > >>>>> (that > >>>>>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world > >>>>>>>>>>>> of the > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> farm,where > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long > >>>>>>>>>>>> winter > >>>>> months are > >>>>>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to > >> encounter > >>>>> talking > >>>>>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here > >>>>>>>>>>>> attention > >>> has > >>>>> to be > >>>>>>>>>>>> more voluntary. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a > >>>>>>>>>>>> very > >> clear > >>>>>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that > >>>>> underpins > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Ribot > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky > >>>>>>>>>>>> points > >>> out > >>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive > >>>>>>>>>>>> practices > >>>>> really > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> are > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of > >> imagination, > >>>>> there > >>>>>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between > >>>>>>>>>>>> human > >>> and > >>>>> animal > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly > >>>>>>>>>>>> capable of > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> volitional > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). > >>> Without > >>>>> a > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> theory > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis > >>>>>>>>>>>> for > >>> Ribot's > >>>>>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological > >>>>>>>>>>>> functions at > >>>>> all. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole > >> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of > >>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination, > >>>>> thanks to > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> all > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very > >>>>>>>>>>>>> influential > >>>>> around the > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> time > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I > >>>>>>>>>>>>> had > >>>>> seen work > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> on > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective > >>>>>>>>>>>>> equal > >>>>> reproductive? > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies > >>>>>>>>>>>>> of > >>>>> development > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of > >>>>>>>>>>>>> being > >> a > >>>>> relative > >>>>>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > >>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> bucket > >> list. > >>>>> This > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> from > >> some > >>>>> weeks > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> in > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that > >>>>> segmented the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. > >>>>> Puns, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > >> they > >>>>> are > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> doing > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his > >>>>> followers as an > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel, so > >>>>> its of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> course > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in > >>>>> translation, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> seems > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" > >> in > >>>>> this > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> passage, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter > >>>>> distinction to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "memory." > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary > >>>>> discourse > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian > >>>>> colleagues have > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from > >> theorists > >>>>> who > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> clearly > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was > >> still > >>>>> possible > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, > >>>>> interestingly > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> links > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a > >> "voluntary" > >>>>> act. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Parts > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> stuff > >>> that > >>>>> was > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> also > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > >>>>> creativity > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> see > >>>>> that the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> two > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found > >> himself > >>>>> writing. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> pretty > >>> old > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> approaches > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < > >>>>> ablunden@mira.net> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but it > >>>>> may be > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> worth > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> place > >> to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagination > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between > >>>>> Recollection and > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive > >>>>> Imagination, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> (2) > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> which > >> he > >>>>> says > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> leads > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> other > >>>>> words, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is > >>>>> accomplished > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> through > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> > >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > >> -- > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > >>>>> Williams. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose > >> work i > >>>>> am > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> trying > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of > >>>>> productive > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive > >> imagination > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> develops. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that > >>>>> there > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> must > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> be a > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But > >> I > >>>>> learned > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > >> is > >>>>> linked > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > >>>>> anticipation > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > >>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination > >>>>> (starting > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> with > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> look, and > >>>>> provides > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> a > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as > >>> fixed. > >>>>> This, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a > >>> ground > >>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> take > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> part > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> preconceptions: > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> grammarian > >>>>> Langacker on > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> domains, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> particularly > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> full of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> imagination > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > >>>>> temporality: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic > >>>>> structure), which > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> both > >>>>> individual > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < > >>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third > >> *space* > >>>>> and the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> his > >>>>> notion of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is > >>>>> explored under > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > >>>>> modalities > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of > >> knowing > >>>>> that is > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [perceived??] > >> if > >>>>> we > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> think > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *style* Larry On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> HENRY SHONERD < > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> say how > >>>>> jazzed up > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> am > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind > >>> as > >>>>> Larry > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> various > >>>>> triads, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> finally > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notebooks > >>> of > >>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind, as > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, > >> luega > >>>>> pa? > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> fuera. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole < > >> mcole@ucsd.edu> > >>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, > >> attached > >>>>> are two > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT > >>> theorists > >>>>> like > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of > >>>>> imagination in a > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of > >>>>> productive > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no > >>>>> intention of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> doing > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the > >>>>> attached > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these > >> philosophers, > >>> I > >>>>> came > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> upon > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> closely > >>>>> linked at > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> several > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, > >>>>> Ettienne and I > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a > >> means > >>> of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> access > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. > >>>>> Moreover, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> such > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct > >>> relevance > >>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Kris's > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to > >>>>> concerns > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> about > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in > >> development. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. > >>> Perhaps > >>>>> they > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> will > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural > >>>>> science > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> with an > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > >> science > >>>>> with an > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > >>>>>>>>>>>>> science > >>>>> with an > >>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> -- > >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >> Assistant Professor > >> Department of Anthropology > >> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >> Brigham Young University > >> Provo, UT 84602 > >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >> > > > > > From annalisa@unm.edu Sat Dec 20 14:45:12 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Sat, 20 Dec 2014 22:45:12 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Time, Imagination, Metaphor In-Reply-To: References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> <5493CC6B.5050105@mira.net> <1419052007614.61660@unm.edu> , Message-ID: <1419115512170.24268@unm.edu> Hi Greg! Post-modernism certainly makes the case that things mean different things to different folks doing different things, and now it appears ontology also means something different now too! I must offer a thing that may make all these other things a little nuanced: First, I agree that the subject and the object dualism must be readdressed to move away from the Objective Reality Which Is Really Fiction. One way to challenge this is to say that there is no Objective Reality and that there is only Subjective Reality interpreting objects as they come along, which indicates that there are an infinite number of realities present and apparent. I don't know how this can work effectively, because somehow there must be commonality or agreed-upon terms and realities, a kind of Social Contract pertaining to objects, always available for reevaluation. Second, I would like to propose a different way to look at this. Rather than isolating the subject or the object, and emphasizing that, perhaps what is more important is the Context in which the subject and object are located. That is, the environmental factors, which would include culture. In other words, the ontology can still maintain something of the classical definition, but there can be an expansion to include where the object is located in space and time. Much of these indicators are not captured in language explicitly, but implied in the cultural setting. So I think what this means is that everything about meaning can't be captured by language, and that language is an important piece, but not the only piece (Not that anyone is saying that here). For example, no one living would recall that Edward Muybridge created the stop-photography of the galloping horse because he was hired by Mr. Stanford to help settle a bet whether or not a galloping horse's hooves are ever up off the ground at point it its gait. When people think about Muybridge they think about the objects he produced, the photographs. But that wager was the originating context of that work, between two tycoons, no doubt. From that whim discovery of a new world of action was revealed, in which the flow of the world was made available for visual inspection that without the tool of the camera had been beyond our perception. Of course out of that came the invention of moving pictures and the film industry. That world was always there. Horses have galloped in the world for as long as they could gallop, and that fact of being up off the ground was also present in the world. We just didn't know about it. Just like we may have forgotten the wager that was the genesis of the stop-action photographs. What does this have to do with the price of fish? Well, I mean to impress the idea that it isn't necessarily the object (in this case the photograph) that changed, but the environment in which it was used and purposed. The subjects not possessing understanding about the nature of the photograph didn't have preconceived notions about it, and so ignorance was a virtue. But when we look back at these objects, they have changed in meaning. Furthermore, I'd say that contexts not being made available in the language might have evolved in this manner because it makes language ecological not to include them. They are implied between the speaker and the listener. Unfortunately, this absence of context creates more conflict about meaning than the notion of an objective definition. It would be analogous to the various photographs taken by Muybridge. If one party sees the horse never leaving the ground and another party sees the horse leaving the ground, each party could point to a different photograph to assert one's claim. But the horse is in motion, it is both up off the ground and on the ground. These points of contact (an individual photograph) to a given context is not only difficult to capture in language, it is difficult to show that they actually change. And so people are left making wagers without a method of stop-photography to show not only the differences but also the flow of change, or even the acceleration of change. Each of these transitions create different problems. And there are all these unanswered bets on what is really (emphasis on real) going on here between subjects and objects! I propose that we require a system in which to encapsulate contexts, a kind of stop-action photography for language, by which to frame and determine these points of meaning and how they ebb and flow in time and space. Does this exist? If not, I would like to invent it, with a little help from my friends. This it the thing I would like to offer as a possibility. On that happy note, I would like to ask you Greg, would you mind to provide to me a few articles that encapsulate this new understanding of ontologies in the last 20 years to which you refer? This could be added to the ABC! Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Greg Thompson Sent: Saturday, December 20, 2014 2:28 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Time, Imagination, Metaphor terms, terms, terms. Ontological. Just wanted to mention that there are different understandings of this term "ontological". The classic understanding of "ontological" is that it refers to the "real" nature of things in time and space. But there is a new understanding of "ontological" that has come up in the social sciences in the past 20 years or so that takes seriously the possibility of "plural ontologies" - i.e. that there may be different "reals" constituted by people in different times and places - all of them "real" (if perhaps "real" in different ways). The hope of this literature is to get beyond subjective/objective dualism that is implied in the classical formulation of "ontological". I feel that these are important considerations to keep in mind so that we don't talk too much past each other. I think that it is also important to keep these in mind so that we can appreciate how the concerns of XMCA folks might intersect with current conversations in social theory. -greg From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sat Dec 20 15:32:35 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sun, 21 Dec 2014 08:32:35 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors In-Reply-To: <5495d416.c85a420a.7c5b.ffffd4b2@mx.google.com> References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> <406FBE3B-E840-4DCB-AD45-AF67CDAAE5AF@gmail.com> <5495d416.c85a420a.7c5b.ffffd4b2@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Larry-- (I'm afraid that the one screen rule is just going to result in multiple e-mails every day! But that in itself is instructive: when I am teaching I like to make a distinction between "tall and thin" threads of dialogue--that is, complex text that consists of many short turns, where the complexity is mostly inter-mental) and "short and fat" threads--where the complexity is mostly inside a turn of talk. So maybe Helena's one-screen rule is really a request for the inter-mental expansion of complexity, which is, after all, the essence of good instructional discourse!) In the 1970s, J.W. Oller had a beautiful and wrong hypothesis called "Unitary Competence". The idea is something like this: instead of "four skills" (reading, writing, speaking, and listening, derived from behavior) or "two knowledges" (grammar and vocabulary, or "words and rules", as cognitivists like Pinker like to say), human language ability is essentially unitary, and consists of something called expectancy grammar. Expectancy grammar is what you see on a cloze test--it's the ability to expect the next word in a clause. With children I sometimes play an amusing game called "INAW BICBAW" ("It's not a word, but it could be a word"). You demonstrate this fairly easily by putting up the letter "a" and saying you've lost, because "a" is a word, and therefore violates the INAW rule, which says that the result of a turn cannot be a word. So then you put up "b" and add "c", but you lose again because there is no word that begins with "bc" and so you've violated the BICBAW rule, which says that it could, someday, turn out to be a word. The children then realize that "be" violates the INAW rule and "bz" the "BICBAW" rule, but "bi" is a possible move, and "bik" is OK too, but the next move will either violate INAW or BICBAW. When the kids get bored, you take up to the next level, "INAS BICBAS" ("It's not a sentence, but it could be a sentence"). Here 'a" is a possible move, because although it's a word, it's not a sentence, and the next move might be "bike" or something like that, and then you seem to need a verb, but an intransitive verb (e.g. 'goes') will violate the INAS rule, so you go for a modal auxiliary ('can") etc.As you can see, the guiding principle of the game is Oller's Expectancy Grammar--what Chomsky dismissively calls Phrase Structure Grammar. Now, what about preps? Well, of course, preps do "predict" noun complements (although it's possible to put a prep in front of another prep, as in "look forward to" or "in front of"). But they do this CANONICALLY--that's what expectancy means. That is, we are led to expect, by the historicity of our language experience, certain prepositional complements and not others. The problem is, of course, creativity--we are also led to expect the unexpected, and one of the most obvious ways that has happened in English is through prepositional phrasal verbs ("bring up", "run down", "sweep off") where the prep can function as an adverb, and violate the INAS rule, leading to a sudden stop! And with that he swept off..... David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies PS: Oh, about Oller! He was very beautiful and very wrong. I think he runs an institute for creation science somewhere in New Mexico now.... dk , and there On 21 December 2014 at 02:43, wrote: > Henry, > > So, what are we doing when we complete a cloze test? Are we reasoning. > are we gap-filling, are we operating within grammatical metaphors? If I > understand what David Kellogg is pointing us to look at, this cloze test > shows what was operating ?behind" the "scenes" in the unfolding drama of > science and faith. Our cultural way of operating oriented within a > "system" as profound as bodily orienting within a landscape. > > "knowing" [sensing] at all times where one is oriented in this concrete > situated place as embodied AND cultural historical. > > Through cultural synergy understanding how situated and specific is our > Western way of knowing > > > > > > > Sent from Windows Mail > > > > > > From: HENRY SHONERD > Sent: ?Saturday?, ?December? ?20?, ?2014 ?9?:?22? ?AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > > > One quick and dirty way to assess language is a cloze test, which > essentially requires the user to put lexical items into a grammatical > structure, as in the example David provides ?distance from_____to ____?. > Henry > > > On Dec 19, 2014, at 8:46 PM, David H Kirshner wrote: > > > > The topic of how grammatical form relates to meaning calls to mind the > groundbreaking work of Eleanor Orr--whom you've probably never heard of on > account of the fact that her work was condemned by a politically-correct > faction of race-conscious sociolinguists who decided her analysis of Black > English Vernacular could too easily be appropriated into racist discourses > about language deficiency. > > > > Orr was a Washington DC area teacher and principal in the 1970s and > 1980s, who traced math difficulties of her African American students to > subtle grammatical differences between Black English dialect and standard > English. Her 1987 book goes into compelling detail to support the thesis > that the meaning structure of basic mathematical terms is embedded in the > grammatical setting in which those terms are expressed. For instance, the > meaning of ?distance? is embedded in the grammatical structure ?distance > from _________ to __________? where the place-holders hold locations; if > you don?t have that grammatical structure, and you're in a linguistic > environment in which that structure is assumed, you're likely not going to > be able to gain full access to the concept. > > > > The attached excerpts from her book--ignore the Forward, unless you'd > like some context--reveal some of her students' bizarre conceptions of > distance (and other basic mathematical concepts) as revealed in their > diagrams. Her approach involves linguistic analysis of sentences produced > by her African American students that she reads as collapsed versions of > standard English sentences, with differences in prepositional structure > being highlighted (but other grammatical elements also are indicated). > > > > This work cuts against the grain of anything going on in mathematics > education. The Piagetian view that dominates that field holds that basic > concepts come about from reflection on our actions in our engagement with > the material world. When language enters the conversation, it's with > respect to semantic structure; to my knowledge, nobody's ever implicated > syntax directly in basic quantitative understanding. > > > > This work is particularly interesting to me in connection with my > 21-year-old son who is autistic, and whose grammatical function is severely > impaired. He has a decent vocabulary, but unless the setting for the > conversation provides contextual clues, he can't piece together how the > semantic elements are linked to one another. It is only recently that it > occurred to me his lack of a secure sense of basic quantitative terms like > ?more? and ?less? may be rooted in his grammatical incapacities. > > > > The XMCA discussion, thus far, has touched on grammar with respect to > lexical items such as prepositions. But we've not yet tied that to the > grammatical forms that embed those lexical items. I'm very curious as to > whether that further connection can be made. > > > > David Kirshner > > > > Orr, E., W. (1987). Twice as less: Black English and the performance of > black students in mathematics and science. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg > > Sent: Friday, December 19, 2014 3:06 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors > > > > Yes, Haliday is essentially a Whorfian, and that's one of things that > brings him close to Vygotsky. (Compare, for example, Chomsky, who is > essentially anti-developmental in his ideas about language, and who now > rejects the leading role played by social communication and says that > communication is epiphenomenal to language, whose original purpose is > > thought.) For Sapir, and for Whorf, in the beginning of every major > onotogenetic, sociogenetic, and even phylogenetic change in language there > has to be some change in the nature of communication. > > > > So what Andy says about the lack of the basis of modern science in Hopi > applies perfectly well to English. When we read the scientific writings of > Chaucer on the astrolabe, for example, we do not see words like > "reflection", "refraction" or "alignment". Chaucer uses words like "bounce > off", "bend through", and "line up" (note the use of prepositions, > Helena!). Where did these words come from, and how did they make scientific > English possible? > > > > Most of us have no problem saying that Isaac Newton discovered the laws > of gravitation. But it's only a slight exaggeration to say that what he > really discovered was the meaning potential of words like "gravitation". > Gravity is, of course, not a thing at all; that is, it's not an entity, but > rather a process, the process of falling down, or falling in (preps, > again!). So how and above all why does it become an entity? > > > > It's interesting to compare Newton's writings on optics with Chaucer's > on the astrolabe. The "Opticks" has a fixed format that we recognize almost > instantly today: Newton describes his equipment (the prism and the dark > room); he then narrates his method as a kind of recipe ("First, I did this; > then I did that") and draws conclusions, which he then formulates in > mathematical terms (this is essentially the format of Vygotsky's lectures > on pedology, so much so that when translating them we had some trouble > determining the precise moment when Vygotsky turns to the blackboard to > write his conclusion in the form of a law). > > > > In order to get them into mathematical shape, though, he has to make > sentences that look a lot like equations. "The plumpness of the lens yields > a greater refraction of the light", "The reflection of the light from the > glass results of the light striking the flatness of the glass" "The > curvature of the spectacle glass supplies the lacking plumpness of the > eye". In each of these, a quality or a process which would normally be > realized as an adjective or a verb is suddenly realized by a noun, creating > an imaginary entity. > > > > That's grammatical metaphor. Something that is "canonically" realized by > a verb ("to grow") is suddenly realized nominally ("growth"), or something > that is canonically a quality ('red") is realized verbally ("redden"). We > even find related clauses realized as verbs ("She did not know the rules. > > So she died" is realized by "Death was brought about through ignorance", > all of these examples from Halliday). In fact, the Genetic Law that > Vygotsky formulates in "Mind in Society" ("Every higher mental function is > realized on two planes....") is really just one instance of grammatical > metaphor. > > > > One of Chomsky's best known arguments for the radical innateness > hypothesis is this. If I take a sentence like "Students who do not do their > homework do not do well" and I want to make a question, how do I know which > "do" to move to the front? Chomsky assumes that this knowledge is > essentially innate; it is part of universal grammar. But you can see that > "Do students who do not do their homework do well?" can be built up through > a process of what we might call "discourse metaphor"--whereby clauses stand > for > > exchanges: > > > > Mother: You did your homework, didn't you? > > Child: No. > > Mother: You didn't do your homework? Did you do well? > > Child: No. > > Mother: You didn't do well? > > Child: No. > > Mother: You didn't do you homework so you didn't do well. Do the other > students do well? > > Child: Some of them. > > Mother: Who does well? Do students who do not do their homework do well? > > > > And this of course explains why wh-items like "who" and 'why" have two > functions--one inside a clause, where it expresses an intra-mental function > > (grammar) and one between them where it expresses an inter-mental > function (discourse). > > > > I realize that grammatical metaphor will seem rather dry and abstract > and unpoetic to people who assume that metaphor is only of the lexical kind. > > But to me, and I think to most children, it is far far more powerful and > far more important developmentally. In some ways, it's the lexical metaphor > that is responsible for the disenchantment of the child's world, while the > grammatical metaphor infinitely expands it. (And here, I'm afraid, I must > stop--it's time for breakfast and anyway my one screen is used up!) > > > > David Kellogg > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > , or "the > > > > . He > > > > On 19 December 2014 at 15:15, Greg Thompson > > wrote: > > > >> Helena and David, > >> I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the so-called > >> authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred tradition > >> to > >> Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi notion > >> of "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including English) > >> notion of "time" and how each of these languages offers different > >> affordances of meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual > >> understanding, English has a much more reified/objectified/entified > >> sense of time. (btw, I think the first paragraph is easier to follow > >> than the second - and in that first paragraph you'll find our old > friend "imagination"). > >> David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to? > >> -greg > >> > >> Taken from: > >> > >> http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/mousesite/Second > >> ary/Whorfframe2.html > >> > >> " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, sunset" are > >> with us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from other > nouns. > >> They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in winter" > >> just as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are pluralized > >> and numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. Our > >> thought about the referents of such words hence becomes objectified. > >> Without objectification, it would be a subjective experience of real > >> time, i.e. of the consciousness of "becoming later and later"--simply > >> a cyclic phase similar to an earlier phase in that ever-later-becoming > >> duration. Only by imagination can such a cyclic phase be set beside > >> another and another in the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually > >> perceived) configuration. "But such is the power of linguistic analogy > that we do so objectify cyclic phasing. > >> We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g., > "phasing." > >> And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting > >> binomial formula of formless item plus form, is so general that it is > >> implicit for all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless items > >> like "substance, matter," by which we can fill out the binomial for an > >> enormously wide range of nouns. But even these are not quite > >> generalized enough to take in our phase nouns. So for the phase nouns > we have made a formless item, "time." > >> We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, in the > >> pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" in > >> the pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can say > >> and think "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." Let me > >> again point out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of milk" > >> or "a piece of cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a > >> summer" actually contains or consists of such-and-such a quantity of > "time." > >> > >> In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., are not > >> nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They are a > >> formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, and > >> even other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a > >> locative pattern, like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It contains > >> no morpheme like one of "in the house" or "at the tree." It means > >> "when it is morning" or "while morning-phase is occurring." These > >> "temporal s" are not used as subjects or objects, or at all like > >> nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" or "summer is hot"; summer > >> is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions are hot, WHEN heat occurs. > >> One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or "summer recently." > >> There is no objectification, as a region, an extent, a quantity, of > >> the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested about time > >> except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no basis > here for a formless item answering to our "time." " > >> > >> > >> > >> On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Helena Worthen > >> > >> wrote: > >>> > >>> David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to this: > >>> > >>> "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton > >>> and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to create > >>> sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly > >>> productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific > >>> writing and thinking today." > >>> > >>> Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I lose you > >>> when > >> you > >>> say "created to talk about gravity as an entity". > >>> > >>> Thank you, > >>> > >>> Helena > >>> > >>> > >>> Helena Worthen > >>> helenaworthen@gmail.com > >>> > >>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > >>> > >>>> As Helena points out, prepositions are from the "grammatical" end > >>>> of > >> what > >>>> Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what > >>>> Halliday > >> calls > >>>> "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they have > >>>> three properties that words from the more "lexical" end do not have: > >>>> > >>>> a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You can, > >>> actually, > >>>> but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you invent a new > >>>> name > >>> or a > >>>> new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can). > >>>> > >>>> b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific semantic > >>>> field > >>> (the > >>>> way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of > >> linguistics) > >>>> but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are used. > >>>> > >>>> c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the same > >> effect, > >>>> which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your argument" the "in" > >> has > >>>> more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in "there's a fly > >>>> in > >> your > >>>> tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in Henry's > >>>> hands, > >>> refer > >>>> to a book or even a footnote. > >>>> > >>>> Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties pretty > >>>> much define the difference between learning and development, at > >>>> least as I understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on > >>>> functions indefinitely while development works by reorganizing the > >>>> closed set of functions you already have into new systems. > >>>> Learning is skill specific and local, while development is quite > global in its implications. > >>> Learning > >>>> is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new systems, > >>>> while development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary (and > >>>> forget it > >> just > >>>> as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes away. > >>>> > >>>> For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of blue > >>>> that > >>> people > >>>> call the sky") are simply metaphors from the non-productive end of > >>>> the lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are crisp, > >>>> concrete, and vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the > >>>> nominalizations that > >> Newton > >>>> and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to > >>>> create sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly > >>>> productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific > >>>> writing and > >> thinking > >>>> today. For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical metaphor is the > >> third > >>>> great moment in child development (after the break into mother > >>>> tongue > >> and > >>>> the break into disciplinary language in school work). > >>>> > >>>> Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" implies > >>>> zero dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two ("on a > >>>> line', 'on a > >>>> plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because they are > >>>> grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them with time: > >>>> 'at > >> a > >>>> point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. Compare: "at > >>>> Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very day), and > >>>> "in Christmas' (season). > >>>> > >>>> David Kellogg > >>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >>>> > >>>> On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen > >>>> > >>>> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial > >>>>> relationships from the concrete material world into the > >>>>> conceptual imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 common > >>>>> ones, and > >>> between 70 > >>>>> and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far as" > >>>>> -- > >>> this > >>>>> is according to > >>>>> https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm > >> ). > >>>>> We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. Apparently, > >>>>> in English, they evolved from and did the job done by inflections > >>>>> in > >> parent > >>>>> languages, examples being cases and tenses. > >>>>> > >>>>> But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection > >>>>> like the dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial > >>>>> relationships > >>> suggested > >>>>> by contemporary prepositions. > >>>>> > >>>>> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about this. > >>>>> > >>>>> Helena Worthen > >>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com > >>>>> > >>>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>>> I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly > >> embodied, > >>>>> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to > >>>>> linguistics > >>> (For > >>>>> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on > >> ?lexicon?: > >>>>> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, > >>>>> being > >>> part > >>>>> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and > >>>>> Halliday > >>> see no > >>>>> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, lexico-grammar. > >>> (Lo > >>>>> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar, > >>>>> adding > >>> the > >>>>> ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings are > >> great > >>>>> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of > >>>>> that? In translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced? > >>>>>> Henry > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden > >> wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the > >> metaphorical > >>>>> use of prepositions like: > >>>>>>> - "there is some value IN your argument" > >>>>>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again" > >>>>>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" > >>>>>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again" > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> and so on. > >>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>> > >>> -------------------------------------------------------------------- > >>> ---- > >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> larry smolucha wrote: > >>>>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself - > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic > >>> possibilities: > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in > >>> Thought > >>>>>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into > >> English > >>>>> 1962] > >>>>>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' > >> value > >>>>> of the > >>>>>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech > >>> vocalization). > >>>>>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that > >>>>>>>> are > >>>>> flammable > >>>>>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor > >>>>>>>> a > >> gas. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century > >>>>>>>> European > >>>>> Developmental > >>>>>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' > >>>>>>>> hence > >>> the > >>>>>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of > >> Piaget's > >>>>> Genetic > >>>>>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and > >>>>>>>> synthesis > >>>>> based on > >>>>>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in > >>>>>>>> Vygotsky's > >>>>> example of H2O. > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com > >>>>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 > >>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic > >>>>>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts. > >>>>>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more > >>>>>>>>> than > >> the > >>>>>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can > >>>>>>>>> ever > >> be > >>>>> imagined" > >>>>>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> A couple things to consider: > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination > >>>>>>>>> as the > >>>>> brain has > >>>>>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the > >>>>>>>>> simplest > >> level > >>>>> of the Gestalt > >>>>>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). > >>>>>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just > >> photographic. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try > >>>>>>>>> to > >>>>> accurately reproduce > >>>>>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, > >>>>>>>>> the > >>>>> goal of combinatory > >>>>>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, > >>>>>>>>> dreams, > >>>>> musings, and even > >>>>>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of > >> objects > >>>>> and symbols. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways > >>>>>>>>> that > >>>>> things and concepts can be > >>>>>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar > >>>>>>>>> and > >>> flour. > >>>>>>>>> I can add water and > >>>>>>>>> it > >>>>> dissolves a bit > >>>>>>>>> But adding heat > >>>>>>>>> changes > >> the > >>>>> combination into a pancake. > >>>>>>>>> [Is this synergistic?] > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more > >>>>>>>>> examples > >>>>> to put the discussion > >>>>>>>>> in the metaphysical realm. > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 > >>>>>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com > >>>>>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the > >>>>>>>>>> case > >>> for > >>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I > >>>>>>>>>> think > >> it's > >>>>> not > >>>>>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are > >>>>> associationists who > >>>>>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary > >>>>>>>>>> associationism > >>>>> exists and > >>>>>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. > >>>>> Vygotsky > >>>>>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, > >> explain > >>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>> uniqueness of our species? > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels > >>>>>>>>>> for > >> its > >>>>> own > >>>>>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a > >>>>>>>>>> Piagetian perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian > >>>>>>>>>> one--true maturity > >>> as a > >>>>>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more > >>>>>>>>>> to it > >>>>> than > >>>>>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of > >>>>>>>>>> primate, > >>> and > >>>>> our > >>>>>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon > >>>>>>>>>> rocks > >>> in > >>>>> order > >>>>>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged > >>>>>>>>>> the > >> same > >>>>> way as > >>>>>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and > >>>>>>>>>> for > >>>>> language is > >>>>>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human > >>>>> exceptionalism. > >>>>>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for > >>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>> vanguard role > >>>>>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, > >>> prolonging > >>>>>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after > >>>>>>>>>> the > >> sick > >>>>> and the > >>>>>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial > >>>>>>>>>> organs > >>>>> (tools) and > >>>>>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for > >>>>>>>>>> our > >>>>> species, it > >>>>>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these > >>>>> "circuitous, > >>>>>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that > >>>>>>>>>> lead > >> our > >>>>>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always > >>>>>>>>>> been > >>>>> short on > >>>>>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for > >>>>>>>>>> material > >>>>> culture > >>>>>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: > >>>>> verily, here > >>>>>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of > >>>>>>>>>> attention is > >>>>> simply the > >>>>>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says > >>>>>>>>>> there are > >>>>> only two > >>>>>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So > >>>>> imagination is > >>>>>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, > >>>>>>>>>> and > >>>>> nothing > >>>>>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when > >>>>>>>>>> you > >>> hear > >>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there > >>>>>>>>>> to be > >>>>> able to > >>>>>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work > >>>>>>>>>> in > >> word > >>>>> meaning. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who > >>>>>>>>>> was > >>> given > >>>>> a > >>>>>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been > >>>>>>>>>> mixed > >> with > >>>>> silver > >>>>>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold. > >>>>> Well, we > >>>>>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not > >> possible > >>> to > >>>>>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that > >>>>>>>>>> precisely. The > >>>>> method > >>>>>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the > >>>>>>>>>> "principal > >> of > >>>>>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes > >>>>>>>>>> palimpsest, a > >>>>> velum on > >>>>>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. > >>> Because > >>>>>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and > >>>>>>>>>> written > >> over > >>>>> every > >>>>>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, > >>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>> pressure > >>>>>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones > >>>>>>>>>> when > >>> the > >>>>> old > >>>>>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only > >> known > >>>>> Greek > >>>>>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their > >>>>> relationship > >>>>>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they > >>>>>>>>>> are > >>>>> related to > >>>>>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite > >>> similar > >>>>> to the > >>>>>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an > >>> associationist, > >>>>> ?sees > >>>>>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? > >>>>>>>>>>> Henry > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg < > >> dkellogg60@gmail.com > >>>> > >>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the > >>>>>>>>>>>> division > >>>>> between > >>>>>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, > >>>>>>>>>>>> because > >>>>> Ribot is > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> an > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal > >>>>>>>>>>>> form of > >>>>> attention. > >>>>>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the > >>>>>>>>>>>> transition > >> from > >>>>> forest > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division > >> between > >>>>> the two > >>>>>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and > >>>>>>>>>>>> commonsensical > >>>>> world of > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly > >>>>>>>>>>>> prosaic > >> uses > >>>>> in life > >>>>>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more > >>> "imaginative" > >>>>> (that > >>>>>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world > >>>>>>>>>>>> of the > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> farm,where > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long > >>>>>>>>>>>> winter > >>>>> months are > >>>>>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to > >> encounter > >>>>> talking > >>>>>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here > >>>>>>>>>>>> attention > >>> has > >>>>> to be > >>>>>>>>>>>> more voluntary. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a > >>>>>>>>>>>> very > >> clear > >>>>>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that > >>>>> underpins > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> Ribot > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky > >>>>>>>>>>>> points > >>> out > >>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive > >>>>>>>>>>>> practices > >>>>> really > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> are > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of > >> imagination, > >>>>> there > >>>>>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between > >>>>>>>>>>>> human > >>> and > >>>>> animal > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly > >>>>>>>>>>>> capable of > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> volitional > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). > >>> Without > >>>>> a > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> theory > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis > >>>>>>>>>>>> for > >>> Ribot's > >>>>>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological > >>>>>>>>>>>> functions at > >>>>> all. > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > >>>>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole > >> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of > >>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination, > >>>>> thanks to > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> all > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very > >>>>>>>>>>>>> influential > >>>>> around the > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> time > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I > >>>>>>>>>>>>> had > >>>>> seen work > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> on > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective > >>>>>>>>>>>>> equal > >>>>> reproductive? > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies > >>>>>>>>>>>>> of > >>>>> development > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of > >>>>>>>>>>>>> being > >> a > >>>>> relative > >>>>>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > >>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> bucket > >> list. > >>>>> This > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> from > >> some > >>>>> weeks > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> in > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that > >>>>> segmented the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. > >>>>> Puns, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > >> they > >>>>> are > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> doing > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his > >>>>> followers as an > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel, so > >>>>> its of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> course > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in > >>>>> translation, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> seems > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" > >> in > >>>>> this > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> passage, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter > >>>>> distinction to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "memory." > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary > >>>>> discourse > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian > >>>>> colleagues have > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from > >> theorists > >>>>> who > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> clearly > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was > >> still > >>>>> possible > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, > >>>>> interestingly > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> links > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a > >> "voluntary" > >>>>> act. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Parts > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> stuff > >>> that > >>>>> was > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> also > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > >>>>> creativity > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> see > >>>>> that the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> two > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found > >> himself > >>>>> writing. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> pretty > >>> old > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> approaches > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < > >>>>> ablunden@mira.net> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but it > >>>>> may be > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> worth > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> place > >> to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagination > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between > >>>>> Recollection and > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive > >>>>> Imagination, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> (2) > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> which > >> he > >>>>> says > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> leads > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> other > >>>>> words, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is > >>>>> accomplished > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> through > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>> > >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > >> -- > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > >>>>> Williams. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose > >> work i > >>>>> am > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> trying > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of > >>>>> productive > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive > >> imagination > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> develops. > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that > >>>>> there > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> must > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> be a > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But > >> I > >>>>> learned > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > >> is > >>>>> linked > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > >>>>> anticipation > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > >>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination > >>>>> (starting > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> with > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> look, and > >>>>> provides > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> a > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as > >>> fixed. > >>>>> This, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a > >>> ground > >>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> take > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> part > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> preconceptions: > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> grammarian > >>>>> Langacker on > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> domains, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> particularly > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> full of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> imagination > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > >>>>> temporality: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic > >>>>> structure), which > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> both > >>>>> individual > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < > >>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third > >> *space* > >>>>> and the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> his > >>>>> notion of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is > >>>>> explored under > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > >>>>> modalities > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of > >> knowing > >>>>> that is > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [perceived??] > >> if > >>>>> we > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> think > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *style* Larry On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> HENRY SHONERD < > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> say how > >>>>> jazzed up > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> am > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind > >>> as > >>>>> Larry > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> various > >>>>> triads, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> finally > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notebooks > >>> of > >>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind, as > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, > >> luega > >>>>> pa? > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> fuera. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole < > >> mcole@ucsd.edu> > >>>>> wrote: > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, > >> attached > >>>>> are two > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT > >>> theorists > >>>>> like > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of > >>>>> imagination in a > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of > >>>>> productive > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no > >>>>> intention of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> doing > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the > >>>>> attached > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these > >> philosophers, > >>> I > >>>>> came > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> upon > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> closely > >>>>> linked at > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> several > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, > >>>>> Ettienne and I > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a > >> means > >>> of > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> access > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. > >>>>> Moreover, > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> such > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct > >>> relevance > >>>>> to > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Kris's > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to > >>>>> concerns > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> about > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in > >> development. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. > >>> Perhaps > >>>>> they > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> will > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural > >>>>> science > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> with an > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > >> science > >>>>> with an > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > >>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > >>>>>>>>>>>>> science > >>>>> with an > >>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> -- > >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >> Assistant Professor > >> Department of Anthropology > >> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >> Brigham Young University > >> Provo, UT 84602 > >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >> > > From dkirsh@lsu.edu Sat Dec 20 22:37:35 2014 From: dkirsh@lsu.edu (David H Kirshner) Date: Sun, 21 Dec 2014 06:37:35 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors In-Reply-To: References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> Message-ID: Greg, I'm delighted that you're familiar with and appreciative of Orr's work. Cleary she didn't provide "serious consideration of how AAE speakers actually use prepositions"--she couldn't have, as she was not a native speaker of Black English dialect, and she was not a linguist. But I'm not sure how paying serious attention to technical nuances of Black English grammar would have helped, as her analyses show that the African American students in her classes were not speaking either standard English or Black English Vernacular, but rather a hybrid that arises from their efforts to emulate standard English. Now, it's true her work didn't parallel the approach Gay and Cole took to understanding what other psychologists were classifying as linguistic and cognitive deficits by carefully studying the native language and culture. On the other hand, she did something Gay and Cole didn't do, namely micro-analyze the linguistic miscues operating in the classroom, and the resultant dilemmas of comprehension this created for her African American students. As the excerpt copied below illustrates, Orr was scrupulously attentive to understanding her students' experience of distance and location given the different linguistic setting. And her analyses consistently point to the mismatch between the native dialect and the language of instruction as the source of the problems, not the native dialect, itself. To label this work as implicitly racist, I think cedes too much to those who mistrust science as a tool of the oppressor, and whose only locus of attention is the history and legacy of social injustice. Even now, in this discussion, we are missing the point. The major significance of Orr's work is not that differences in grammatical structure have semantic implications. This is merely a window to the dramatic realization that semantics are written into grammatical form. David Excerpt from Orr (1987): "Jane gives us in these diagrams a glimpse into the kinds of mental images she constructs when she is using the single symbol length, representing both location and distance, as a tool with which to think. Even the diagrams Jane drew for problems 13 and 14 begin to be less incomprehensible if one attempts to construct in one's own mind images of the information given in these problems, while adhering to the requirement that length be used to represent both location and distance. They can be seen as possible consequents or extensions of the symbol length when it is used to represent both location and distance. Consider, for instance, the mental images one might construct in responding to problem 13: Two cities, both represented by line segments, are equal distances (that is, equal line segments) closer to a third city (another line segment) than two other cities (line segments) are. The first two cities must be represented by equal line segments because they are equal distances closer to the third city than the other two cities are. And these other two cities must also be represented by equal line segments because they are equal distances from the third city. One can see that Jane's diagrams are not as lacking in reason as they may initially have appeared to be. "Jane's diagrams suggest the possibility that when words, or symbols are used as instruments with which to think, the use in one language of a single symbol in contexts where a second language requires two or more can lead a speaker of the first language to arrive at a different mental construct of some given information from that arrived at by a speaker of the second language. Or, as in Jane's attempt to handle problem 14, the result may be an inability to arrive at a workable mental construct at all." (p. 25) [Note, this excerpt is part of a longer segment I emailed on Dec. 19 that shows Jane's diagrams that Orr is referring to.] -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson Sent: Saturday, December 20, 2014 3:14 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors The issues that are raised by Orr are indeed important ones. I am a fan of her work as it points to important differences in language usage among AAE speakers. I agree that she shouldn't have been condemned for pointing out these differences (particularly considering how important it is for teachers to understand the consequences of these differences). If you want to help AAE speaking students do better on standardized tests, then you absolutely need to pay attention to these differences. My one concern here is that I do feel like there is a problem of deficit thinking that is at least implied in her work (and maybe "implied" is too strong a term - maybe it's just that she doesn't provide evidence to discourage us from this view). What we don't see in this book is any serious consideration of how AAE speakers actually use prepositions - e.g., the ways of using language that exist in the community of AAE speakers. This gives Orr's work a feel somewhat like the studies of math among the Kpelle studied by Gay and Cole in the pre-early days of LCHC (see wiki for more: http://lchcfestschrift.wikispaces.com/Chapter+1). Before they showed up on the scene, everyone had assumed that the Kpelle (Liberia) couldn't comprehend basic math concepts b.c. they weren't learning it in the ways that it was being taught (and perhaps there were even linguistic relativity arguments that pointed to this). Rather then continuing to pluck these folks out of context and run them through various types of experiments, Gay and Cole "explicitly began with the assumption that ?we must know more about the indigenous mathematics so that we can build effective bridges to the new mathematics that we are trying to introduce?" >From their research, they found that the Kpelle actually had high competence with complex mathematical problems (e.g., estimating volumes). As they write: "Overall, the data suggested that no generalized lack of mathematical, perceptual, or problem solving abilities stood in the way of mathematics education. When the materials and procedures used in assessment tasks were designed to match closely valued local practices, lack of ability could be replaced by apparent special ability. At the same time, schooling did appear to influence performance in tasks that were routinely used to measure cognitive development." So I think I would be more comfortable with Orr's work if she were to have included this kind of rich understanding of usage in context and how prepositions actually are used among AAE speakers. This points to a larger question that might be irksome to some folks, but the question regards the extent to which mathematical language is predicated upon a particular form of what Whorf called "Standard Average European." In short, the idea here is that Math has a history and a culture. This doesn't mean that it is useless or a waste of time, just that it is a particular way of encountering the world that is good for particular things and not for others. I think we've gone round this mulberry bush before, but that was just more grist for the mill (I prefer my metaphors mixed!). -greg On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 8:46 PM, David H Kirshner > wrote: > > The topic of how grammatical form relates to meaning calls to mind the > groundbreaking work of Eleanor Orr--whom you've probably never heard of on > account of the fact that her work was condemned by a politically-correct > faction of race-conscious sociolinguists who decided her analysis of Black > English Vernacular could too easily be appropriated into racist discourses > about language deficiency. > > Orr was a Washington DC area teacher and principal in the 1970s and 1980s, > who traced math difficulties of her African American students to subtle > grammatical differences between Black English dialect and standard English. > Her 1987 book goes into compelling detail to support the thesis that the > meaning structure of basic mathematical terms is embedded in the > grammatical setting in which those terms are expressed. For instance, the > meaning of ?distance? is embedded in the grammatical structure ?distance > from _________ to __________? where the place-holders hold locations; if > you don?t have that grammatical structure, and you're in a linguistic > environment in which that structure is assumed, you're likely not going to > be able to gain full access to the concept. > > The attached excerpts from her book--ignore the Forward, unless you'd like > some context--reveal some of her students' bizarre conceptions of distance > (and other basic mathematical concepts) as revealed in their diagrams. Her > approach involves linguistic analysis of sentences produced by her African > American students that she reads as collapsed versions of standard English > sentences, with differences in prepositional structure being highlighted > (but other grammatical elements also are indicated). > > This work cuts against the grain of anything going on in mathematics > education. The Piagetian view that dominates that field holds that basic > concepts come about from reflection on our actions in our engagement with > the material world. When language enters the conversation, it's with > respect to semantic structure; to my knowledge, nobody's ever implicated > syntax directly in basic quantitative understanding. > > This work is particularly interesting to me in connection with my > 21-year-old son who is autistic, and whose grammatical function is severely > impaired. He has a decent vocabulary, but unless the setting for the > conversation provides contextual clues, he can't piece together how the > semantic elements are linked to one another. It is only recently that it > occurred to me his lack of a secure sense of basic quantitative terms like > ?more? and ?less? may be rooted in his grammatical incapacities. > > The XMCA discussion, thus far, has touched on grammar with respect to > lexical items such as prepositions. But we've not yet tied that to the > grammatical forms that embed those lexical items. I'm very curious as to > whether that further connection can be made. > > David Kirshner > > Orr, E., W. (1987). Twice as less: Black English and the performance of > black students in mathematics and science. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg > Sent: Friday, December 19, 2014 3:06 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors > > Yes, Haliday is essentially a Whorfian, and that's one of things that > brings him close to Vygotsky. (Compare, for example, Chomsky, who is > essentially anti-developmental in his ideas about language, and who now > rejects the leading role played by social communication and says that > communication is epiphenomenal to language, whose original purpose is > thought.) For Sapir, and for Whorf, in the beginning of every major > onotogenetic, sociogenetic, and even phylogenetic change in language there > has to be some change in the nature of communication. > > So what Andy says about the lack of the basis of modern science in Hopi > applies perfectly well to English. When we read the scientific writings of > Chaucer on the astrolabe, for example, we do not see words like > "reflection", "refraction" or "alignment". Chaucer uses words like "bounce > off", "bend through", and "line up" (note the use of prepositions, > Helena!). Where did these words come from, and how did they make scientific > English possible? > > Most of us have no problem saying that Isaac Newton discovered the laws of > gravitation. But it's only a slight exaggeration to say that what he really > discovered was the meaning potential of words like "gravitation". Gravity > is, of course, not a thing at all; that is, it's not an entity, but rather > a process, the process of falling down, or falling in (preps, again!). So > how and above all why does it become an entity? > > It's interesting to compare Newton's writings on optics with Chaucer's on > the astrolabe. The "Opticks" has a fixed format that we recognize almost > instantly today: Newton describes his equipment (the prism and the dark > room); he then narrates his method as a kind of recipe ("First, I did this; > then I did that") and draws conclusions, which he then formulates in > mathematical terms (this is essentially the format of Vygotsky's lectures > on pedology, so much so that when translating them we had some trouble > determining the precise moment when Vygotsky turns to the blackboard to > write his conclusion in the form of a law). > > In order to get them into mathematical shape, though, he has to make > sentences that look a lot like equations. "The plumpness of the lens yields > a greater refraction of the light", "The reflection of the light from the > glass results of the light striking the flatness of the glass" "The > curvature of the spectacle glass supplies the lacking plumpness of the > eye". In each of these, a quality or a process which would normally be > realized as an adjective or a verb is suddenly realized by a noun, creating > an imaginary entity. > > That's grammatical metaphor. Something that is "canonically" realized by a > verb ("to grow") is suddenly realized nominally ("growth"), or something > that is canonically a quality ('red") is realized verbally ("redden"). We > even find related clauses realized as verbs ("She did not know the rules. > So she died" is realized by "Death was brought about through ignorance", > all of these examples from Halliday). In fact, the Genetic Law that > Vygotsky formulates in "Mind in Society" ("Every higher mental function is > realized on two planes....") is really just one instance of grammatical > metaphor. > > One of Chomsky's best known arguments for the radical innateness > hypothesis is this. If I take a sentence like "Students who do not do their > homework do not do well" and I want to make a question, how do I know which > "do" to move to the front? Chomsky assumes that this knowledge is > essentially innate; it is part of universal grammar. But you can see that > "Do students who do not do their homework do well?" can be built up through > a process of what we might call "discourse metaphor"--whereby clauses stand > for > exchanges: > > Mother: You did your homework, didn't you? > Child: No. > Mother: You didn't do your homework? Did you do well? > Child: No. > Mother: You didn't do well? > Child: No. > Mother: You didn't do you homework so you didn't do well. Do the other > students do well? > Child: Some of them. > Mother: Who does well? Do students who do not do their homework do well? > > And this of course explains why wh-items like "who" and 'why" have two > functions--one inside a clause, where it expresses an intra-mental function > (grammar) and one between them where it expresses an inter-mental function > (discourse). > > I realize that grammatical metaphor will seem rather dry and abstract and > unpoetic to people who assume that metaphor is only of the lexical kind. > But to me, and I think to most children, it is far far more powerful and > far more important developmentally. In some ways, it's the lexical metaphor > that is responsible for the disenchantment of the child's world, while the > grammatical metaphor infinitely expands it. (And here, I'm afraid, I must > stop--it's time for breakfast and anyway my one screen is used up!) > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > , or "the > > . He > > On 19 December 2014 at 15:15, Greg Thompson > > wrote: > > > Helena and David, > > I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the so-called > > authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred tradition > > to > > Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi notion > > of "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including English) > > notion of "time" and how each of these languages offers different > > affordances of meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual > > understanding, English has a much more reified/objectified/entified > > sense of time. (btw, I think the first paragraph is easier to follow > > than the second - and in that first paragraph you'll find our old friend > "imagination"). > > David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to? > > -greg > > > > Taken from: > > > > http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/mousesite/Second > > ary/Whorfframe2.html > > > > " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, sunset" are > > with us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from other > nouns. > > They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in winter" > > just as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are pluralized > > and numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. Our > > thought about the referents of such words hence becomes objectified. > > Without objectification, it would be a subjective experience of real > > time, i.e. of the consciousness of "becoming later and later"--simply > > a cyclic phase similar to an earlier phase in that ever-later-becoming > > duration. Only by imagination can such a cyclic phase be set beside > > another and another in the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually > > perceived) configuration. "But such is the power of linguistic analogy > that we do so objectify cyclic phasing. > > We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g., > "phasing." > > And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting > > binomial formula of formless item plus form, is so general that it is > > implicit for all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless items > > like "substance, matter," by which we can fill out the binomial for an > > enormously wide range of nouns. But even these are not quite > > generalized enough to take in our phase nouns. So for the phase nouns we > have made a formless item, "time." > > We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, in the > > pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" in > > the pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can say > > and think "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." Let me > > again point out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of milk" > > or "a piece of cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a > > summer" actually contains or consists of such-and-such a quantity of > "time." > > > > In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., are not > > nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They are a > > formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, and > > even other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a > > locative pattern, like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It contains > > no morpheme like one of "in the house" or "at the tree." It means > > "when it is morning" or "while morning-phase is occurring." These > > "temporal s" are not used as subjects or objects, or at all like > > nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" or "summer is hot"; summer > > is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions are hot, WHEN heat occurs. > > One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or "summer recently." > > There is no objectification, as a region, an extent, a quantity, of > > the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested about time > > except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no basis > here for a formless item answering to our "time." " > > > > > > > > On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Helena Worthen > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to this: > > > > > > "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to create > > > sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly > > > productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific > > > writing and thinking today." > > > > > > Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I lose you > > > when > > you > > > say "created to talk about gravity as an entity". > > > > > > Thank you, > > > > > > Helena > > > > > > > > > Helena Worthen > > > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > > > > On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > > > > As Helena points out, prepositions are from the "grammatical" end > > > > of > > what > > > > Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what > > > > Halliday > > calls > > > > "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they have > > > > three properties that words from the more "lexical" end do not have: > > > > > > > > a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You can, > > > actually, > > > > but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you invent a new > > > > name > > > or a > > > > new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can). > > > > > > > > b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific semantic > > > > field > > > (the > > > > way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of > > linguistics) > > > > but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are used. > > > > > > > > c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the same > > effect, > > > > which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your argument" the "in" > > has > > > > more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in "there's a fly > > > > in > > your > > > > tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in Henry's > > > > hands, > > > refer > > > > to a book or even a footnote. > > > > > > > > Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties pretty > > > > much define the difference between learning and development, at > > > > least as I understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on > > > > functions indefinitely while development works by reorganizing the > > > > closed set of functions you already have into new systems. > > > > Learning is skill specific and local, while development is quite > global in its implications. > > > Learning > > > > is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new systems, > > > > while development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary (and > > > > forget it > > just > > > > as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes away. > > > > > > > > For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of blue > > > > that > > > people > > > > call the sky") are simply metaphors from the non-productive end of > > > > the lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are crisp, > > > > concrete, and vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the > > > > nominalizations that > > Newton > > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to > > > > create sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly > > > > productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific > > > > writing and > > thinking > > > > today. For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical metaphor is the > > third > > > > great moment in child development (after the break into mother > > > > tongue > > and > > > > the break into disciplinary language in school work). > > > > > > > > Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" implies > > > > zero dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two ("on a > > > > line', 'on a > > > > plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because they are > > > > grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them with time: > > > > 'at > > a > > > > point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. Compare: "at > > > > Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very day), and > > > > "in Christmas' (season). > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > >> > > > >> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial > > > >> relationships from the concrete material world into the > > > >> conceptual imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 common > > > >> ones, and > > > between 70 > > > >> and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far as" > > > >> -- > > > this > > > >> is according to > > > >> https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm > > ). > > > >> We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. Apparently, > > > >> in English, they evolved from and did the job done by inflections > > > >> in > > parent > > > >> languages, examples being cases and tenses. > > > >> > > > >> But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection > > > >> like the dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial > > > >> relationships > > > suggested > > > >> by contemporary prepositions. > > > >> > > > >> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about this. > > > >> > > > >> Helena Worthen > > > >> helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > >> > > > >> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > > >> > > > >>> I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly > > embodied, > > > >> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to > > > >> linguistics > > > (For > > > >> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on > > ?lexicon?: > > > >> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, > > > >> being > > > part > > > >> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and > > > >> Halliday > > > see no > > > >> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, > lexico-grammar. > > > (Lo > > > >> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar, > > > >> adding > > > the > > > >> ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings are > > great > > > >> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of > > > >> that? In translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced? > > > >>> Henry > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden > > > wrote: > > > >>>> > > > >>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the > > metaphorical > > > >> use of prepositions like: > > > >>>> - "there is some value IN your argument" > > > >>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again" > > > >>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" > > > >>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again" > > > >>>> > > > >>>> and so on. > > > >>>> Andy > > > >>>> > > > -------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > ---- > > > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > > > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>> larry smolucha wrote: > > > >>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself - > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic > > > possibilities: > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in > > > Thought > > > >>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into > > English > > > >> 1962] > > > >>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' > > value > > > >> of the > > > >>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech > > > vocalization). > > > >>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that > > > >>>>> are > > > >> flammable > > > >>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor > > > >>>>> a > > gas. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century > > > >>>>> European > > > >> Developmental > > > >>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' > > > >>>>> hence > > > the > > > >>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of > > Piaget's > > > >> Genetic > > > >>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and > > > >>>>> synthesis > > > >> based on > > > >>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in > > > >>>>> Vygotsky's > > > >> example of H2O. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com > > > >>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > >>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 > > > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic > > > >>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the > parts. > > > >>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more > > > >>>>>> than > > the > > > >>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can > > > >>>>>> ever > > be > > > >> imagined" > > > >>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> A couple things to consider: > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination > > > >>>>>> as the > > > >> brain has > > > >>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the > > > >>>>>> simplest > > level > > > >> of the Gestalt > > > >>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). > > > >>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just > > photographic. > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try > > > >>>>>> to > > > >> accurately reproduce > > > >>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, > > > >>>>>> the > > > >> goal of combinatory > > > >>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, > > > >>>>>> dreams, > > > >> musings, and even > > > >>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of > > objects > > > >> and symbols. > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways > > > >>>>>> that > > > >> things and concepts can be > > > >>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar > > > >>>>>> and > > > flour. > > > >>>>>> I can add water and > > > >>>>>> it > > > >> dissolves a bit > > > >>>>>> But adding heat > > > >>>>>> changes > > the > > > >> combination into a pancake. > > > >>>>>> [Is this synergistic?] > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more > > > >>>>>> examples > > > >> to put the discussion > > > >>>>>> in the metaphysical realm. > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 > > > >>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > >>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the > > > >>>>>>> case > > > for > > > >>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I > > > >>>>>>> think > > it's > > > >> not > > > >>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are > > > >> associationists who > > > >>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary > > > >>>>>>> associationism > > > >> exists and > > > >>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. > > > >> Vygotsky > > > >>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, > > explain > > > >> the > > > >>>>>>> uniqueness of our species? > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels > > > >>>>>>> for > > its > > > >> own > > > >>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a > > > >>>>>>> Piagetian perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian > > > >>>>>>> one--true maturity > > > as a > > > >>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more > > > >>>>>>> to it > > > >> than > > > >>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of > > > >>>>>>> primate, > > > and > > > >> our > > > >>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon > > > >>>>>>> rocks > > > in > > > >> order > > > >>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged > > > >>>>>>> the > > same > > > >> way as > > > >>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and > > > >>>>>>> for > > > >> language is > > > >>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human > > > >> exceptionalism. > > > >>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for > > > >>>>>>> the > > > >> vanguard role > > > >>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, > > > prolonging > > > >>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after > > > >>>>>>> the > > sick > > > >> and the > > > >>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial > > > >>>>>>> organs > > > >> (tools) and > > > >>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for > > > >>>>>>> our > > > >> species, it > > > >>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these > > > >> "circuitous, > > > >>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that > > > >>>>>>> lead > > our > > > >>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always > > > >>>>>>> been > > > >> short on > > > >>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for > > > >>>>>>> material > > > >> culture > > > >>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: > > > >> verily, here > > > >>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of > > > >>>>>>> attention is > > > >> simply the > > > >>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says > > > >>>>>>> there are > > > >> only two > > > >>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So > > > >> imagination is > > > >>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, > > > >>>>>>> and > > > >> nothing > > > >>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when > > > >>>>>>> you > > > hear > > > >> the > > > >>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there > > > >>>>>>> to be > > > >> able to > > > >>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work > > > >>>>>>> in > > word > > > >> meaning. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who > > > >>>>>>> was > > > given > > > >> a > > > >>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been > > > >>>>>>> mixed > > with > > > >> silver > > > >>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of > gold. > > > >> Well, we > > > >>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not > > possible > > > to > > > >>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that > > > >>>>>>> precisely. The > > > >> method > > > >>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the > > > >>>>>>> "principal > > of > > > >>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes > > > >>>>>>> palimpsest, a > > > >> velum on > > > >>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. > > > Because > > > >>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and > > > >>>>>>> written > > over > > > >> every > > > >>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, > > > >>>>>>> the > > > >> pressure > > > >>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones > > > >>>>>>> when > > > the > > > >> old > > > >>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only > > known > > > >> Greek > > > >>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their > > > >> relationship > > > >>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they > > > >>>>>>> are > > > >> related to > > > >>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite > > > similar > > > >> to the > > > >>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> David Kellogg > > > >>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >> wrote: > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an > > > associationist, > > > >> ?sees > > > >>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? > > > >>>>>>>> Henry > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg < > > dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > > > > > >> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the > > > >>>>>>>>> division > > > >> between > > > >>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, > > > >>>>>>>>> because > > > >> Ribot is > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> an > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal > > > >>>>>>>>> form of > > > >> attention. > > > >>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the > > > >>>>>>>>> transition > > from > > > >> forest > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> to > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division > > between > > > >> the two > > > >>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and > > > >>>>>>>>> commonsensical > > > >> world of > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly > > > >>>>>>>>> prosaic > > uses > > > >> in life > > > >>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more > > > "imaginative" > > > >> (that > > > >>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world > > > >>>>>>>>> of the > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> farm,where > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long > > > >>>>>>>>> winter > > > >> months are > > > >>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to > > encounter > > > >> talking > > > >>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here > > > >>>>>>>>> attention > > > has > > > >> to be > > > >>>>>>>>> more voluntary. > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a > > > >>>>>>>>> very > > clear > > > >>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that > > > >> underpins > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> Ribot > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky > > > >>>>>>>>> points > > > out > > > >> the > > > >>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive > > > >>>>>>>>> practices > > > >> really > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> are > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of > > imagination, > > > >> there > > > >>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between > > > >>>>>>>>> human > > > and > > > >> animal > > > >>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly > > > >>>>>>>>> capable of > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> volitional > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). > > > Without > > > >> a > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> theory > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis > > > >>>>>>>>> for > > > Ribot's > > > >>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological > > > >>>>>>>>> functions at > > > >> all. > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > > > >>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole > > > wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination, > > > >> thanks to > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> all > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought. > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very > > > >>>>>>>>>> influential > > > >> around the > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> time > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I > > > >>>>>>>>>> had > > > >> seen work > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> on > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective > > > >>>>>>>>>> equal > > > >> reproductive? > > > >>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies > > > >>>>>>>>>> of > > > >> development > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> of > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of > > > >>>>>>>>>> being > > a > > > >> relative > > > >>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. > > > >>>>>>>>>> mike > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com> > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my > > > >>>>>>>>>>> bucket > > list. > > > >> This > > > >>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings > > > >>>>>>>>>>> from > > some > > > >> weeks > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> in > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > >> segmented the > > > >>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met > aphorizing?. > > > >> Puns, > > > >>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> and > > they > > > >> are > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> doing > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his > > > >> followers as an > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel, so > > > >> its of > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> course > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in > > > >> translation, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> seems > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" > > in > > > >> this > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> passage, > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter > > > >> distinction to > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "memory." > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary > > > >> discourse > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian > > > >> colleagues have > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from > > theorists > > > >> who > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> clearly > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was > > still > > > >> possible > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> to > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, > > > >> interestingly > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> links > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a > > "voluntary" > > > >> act. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Parts > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> of > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> stuff > > > that > > > >> was > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> also > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > >> creativity > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> and > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> see > > > >> that the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> two > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found > > himself > > > >> writing. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> pretty > > > old > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> approaches > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < > > > >> ablunden@mira.net> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> but it > > > >> may be > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> worth > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> place > > to > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Imagination > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between > > > >> Recollection and > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive > > > >> Imagination, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> (2) > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> which > > he > > > >> says > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> leads > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> other > > > >> words, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is > > > >> accomplished > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> through > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >> > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > -- > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > > > >> Williams. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose > > work i > > > >> am > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> trying > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of > > > >> productive > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive > > imagination > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> develops. > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that > > > >> there > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> must > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> be a > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> But > > I > > > >> learned > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > > is > > > >> linked > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> to > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > >> anticipation > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination > > > >> (starting > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> look, and > > > >> provides > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> a > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as > > > fixed. > > > >> This, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a > > > ground > > > >> to > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> take > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> part > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> preconceptions: > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> grammarian > > > >> Langacker on > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> domains, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> particularly > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> full of > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> imagination > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > >> temporality: > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic > > > >> structure), which > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> I > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> both > > > >> individual > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < > > > >> lpscholar2@gmail.com> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third > > *space* > > > >> and the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> his > > > >> notion of > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is > > > >> explored under > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > >> modalities > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of > > knowing > > > >> that is > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [perceived??] > > if > > > >> we > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> think > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *style* Larry On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> HENRY SHONERD < > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> say how > > > >> jazzed up > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> I > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> am > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind > > > as > > > >> Larry > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> various > > > >> triads, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> finally > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notebooks > > > of > > > >> the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> mind, as > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, > > luega > > > >> pa? > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> fuera. > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole < > > mcole@ucsd.edu> > > > >> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, > > attached > > > >> are two > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT > > > theorists > > > >> like > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of > > > >> imagination in a > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of > > > >> productive > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no > > > >> intention of > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> doing > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the > > > >> attached > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these > > philosophers, > > > I > > > >> came > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> upon > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> closely > > > >> linked at > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> several > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, > > > >> Ettienne and I > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a > > means > > > of > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> access > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander > Suvorov. > > > >> Moreover, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> such > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct > > > relevance > > > >> to > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Kris's > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to > > > >> concerns > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> about > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in > > development. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. > > > Perhaps > > > >> they > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> will > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural > > > >> science > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with an > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> -- > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > > science > > > >> with an > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> -- > > > >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > > > >>>>>>>>>> science > > > >> with an > > > >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Sun Dec 21 04:12:37 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Sun, 21 Dec 2014 07:12:37 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors Message-ID: I am on holiday and said I would give the group a break, but I could not resist... Orr ' s work parallels my own research and my theory of "a mismatch of linguistic structure and social class function" hypothesis as key to understanding the Black-White test score gap. ?The biggest responses to Orr's work were from the black middle class and white liberals, who wanted to focus on the opportunity gap as the basis for black academic underachievement. ?This negated the fact that test scores reveal there is a deficit among blacks in comprehending questions on standardized tests written in standard english. ?Arguing that there is a deficit is not the same as saying that AAE does not allow a black child to critically think as William Labov (1972) highlighted in his work, "Language in the inner-cities." ?The problem is when Orr and Labov were writing, AAE was not viewed as a distinct linguistic system. ?Labov ' s work, building on chomsky, changes that by highlighting the ability of speakers of AAE to grasp highly conceptual problems if addressed within the systemicity of AAE. ?The logical conclusion, as I see it, is not to jump to the conclusion that orr's research is/was racist, but to recognize AAE as a distinct linguistic system and treat black students from the inner-cities as ESOL (english speakers of other languages) students. Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: David H Kirshner
Date:12/21/2014 1:37 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors
Greg, I'm delighted that you're familiar with and appreciative of Orr's work. Cleary she didn't provide "serious consideration of how AAE speakers actually use prepositions"--she couldn't have, as she was not a native speaker of Black English dialect, and she was not a linguist. But I'm not sure how paying serious attention to technical nuances of Black English grammar would have helped, as her analyses show that the African American students in her classes were not speaking either standard English or Black English Vernacular, but rather a hybrid that arises from their efforts to emulate standard English. Now, it's true her work didn't parallel the approach Gay and Cole took to understanding what other psychologists were classifying as linguistic and cognitive deficits by carefully studying the native language and culture. On the other hand, she did something Gay and Cole didn't do, namely micro-analyze the linguistic miscues operating in the classroom, and the resultant dilemmas of comprehension this created for her African American students. As the excerpt copied below illustrates, Orr was scrupulously attentive to understanding her students' experience of distance and location given the different linguistic setting. And her analyses consistently point to the mismatch between the native dialect and the language of instruction as the source of the problems, not the native dialect, itself. To label this work as implicitly racist, I think cedes too much to those who mistrust science as a tool of the oppressor, and whose only locus of attention is the history and legacy of social injustice. Even now, in this discussion, we are missing the point. The major significance of Orr's work is not that differences in grammatical structure have semantic implications. This is merely a window to the dramatic realization that semantics are written into grammatical form. David Excerpt from Orr (1987): "Jane gives us in these diagrams a glimpse into the kinds of mental images she constructs when she is using the single symbol length, representing both location and distance, as a tool with which to think. Even the diagrams Jane drew for problems 13 and 14 begin to be less incomprehensible if one attempts to construct in one's own mind images of the information given in these problems, while adhering to the requirement that length be used to represent both location and distance. They can be seen as possible consequents or extensions of the symbol length when it is used to represent both location and distance. Consider, for instance, the mental images one might construct in responding to problem 13: Two cities, both represented by line segments, are equal distances (that is, equal line segments) closer to a third city (another line segment) than two other cities (line segments) are. The first two cities must be represented by equal line segments because they are equal distances closer to the third city than the other two cities are. And these other two cities must also be represented by equal line segments because they are equal distances from the third city. One can see that Jane's diagrams are not as lacking in reason as they may initially have appeared to be. "Jane's diagrams suggest the possibility that when words, or symbols are used as instruments with which to think, the use in one language of a single symbol in contexts where a second language requires two or more can lead a speaker of the first language to arrive at a different mental construct of some given information from that arrived at by a speaker of the second language. Or, as in Jane's attempt to handle problem 14, the result may be an inability to arrive at a workable mental construct at all." (p. 25) [Note, this excerpt is part of a longer segment I emailed on Dec. 19 that shows Jane's diagrams that Orr is referring to.] -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson Sent: Saturday, December 20, 2014 3:14 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors The issues that are raised by Orr are indeed important ones. I am a fan of her work as it points to important differences in language usage among AAE speakers. I agree that she shouldn't have been condemned for pointing out these differences (particularly considering how important it is for teachers to understand the consequences of these differences). If you want to help AAE speaking students do better on standardized tests, then you absolutely need to pay attention to these differences. My one concern here is that I do feel like there is a problem of deficit thinking that is at least implied in her work (and maybe "implied" is too strong a term - maybe it's just that she doesn't provide evidence to discourage us from this view). What we don't see in this book is any serious consideration of how AAE speakers actually use prepositions - e.g., the ways of using language that exist in the community of AAE speakers. This gives Orr's work a feel somewhat like the studies of math among the Kpelle studied by Gay and Cole in the pre-early days of LCHC (see wiki for more: http://lchcfestschrift.wikispaces.com/Chapter+1). Before they showed up on the scene, everyone had assumed that the Kpelle (Liberia) couldn't comprehend basic math concepts b.c. they weren't learning it in the ways that it was being taught (and perhaps there were even linguistic relativity arguments that pointed to this). Rather then continuing to pluck these folks out of context and run them through various types of experiments, Gay and Cole "explicitly began with the assumption that ?we must know more about the indigenous mathematics so that we can build effective bridges to the new mathematics that we are trying to introduce?" >From their research, they found that the Kpelle actually had high competence with complex mathematical problems (e.g., estimating volumes). As they write: "Overall, the data suggested that no generalized lack of mathematical, perceptual, or problem solving abilities stood in the way of mathematics education. When the materials and procedures used in assessment tasks were designed to match closely valued local practices, lack of ability could be replaced by apparent special ability. At the same time, schooling did appear to influence performance in tasks that were routinely used to measure cognitive development." So I think I would be more comfortable with Orr's work if she were to have included this kind of rich understanding of usage in context and how prepositions actually are used among AAE speakers. This points to a larger question that might be irksome to some folks, but the question regards the extent to which mathematical language is predicated upon a particular form of what Whorf called "Standard Average European." In short, the idea here is that Math has a history and a culture. This doesn't mean that it is useless or a waste of time, just that it is a particular way of encountering the world that is good for particular things and not for others. I think we've gone round this mulberry bush before, but that was just more grist for the mill (I prefer my metaphors mixed!). -greg On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 8:46 PM, David H Kirshner > wrote: > > The topic of how grammatical form relates to meaning calls to mind the > groundbreaking work of Eleanor Orr--whom you've probably never heard of on > account of the fact that her work was condemned by a politically-correct > faction of race-conscious sociolinguists who decided her analysis of Black > English Vernacular could too easily be appropriated into racist discourses > about language deficiency. > > Orr was a Washington DC area teacher and principal in the 1970s and 1980s, > who traced math difficulties of her African American students to subtle > grammatical differences between Black English dialect and standard English. > Her 1987 book goes into compelling detail to support the thesis that the > meaning structure of basic mathematical terms is embedded in the > grammatical setting in which those terms are expressed. For instance, the > meaning of ?distance? is embedded in the grammatical structure ?distance > from _________ to __________? where the place-holders hold locations; if > you don?t have that grammatical structure, and you're in a linguistic > environment in which that structure is assumed, you're likely not going to > be able to gain full access to the concept. > > The attached excerpts from her book--ignore the Forward, unless you'd like > some context--reveal some of her students' bizarre conceptions of distance > (and other basic mathematical concepts) as revealed in their diagrams. Her > approach involves linguistic analysis of sentences produced by her African > American students that she reads as collapsed versions of standard English > sentences, with differences in prepositional structure being highlighted > (but other grammatical elements also are indicated). > > This work cuts against the grain of anything going on in mathematics > education. The Piagetian view that dominates that field holds that basic > concepts come about from reflection on our actions in our engagement with > the material world. When language enters the conversation, it's with > respect to semantic structure; to my knowledge, nobody's ever implicated > syntax directly in basic quantitative understanding. > > This work is particularly interesting to me in connection with my > 21-year-old son who is autistic, and whose grammatical function is severely > impaired. He has a decent vocabulary, but unless the setting for the > conversation provides contextual clues, he can't piece together how the > semantic elements are linked to one another. It is only recently that it > occurred to me his lack of a secure sense of basic quantitative terms like > ?more? and ?less? may be rooted in his grammatical incapacities. > > The XMCA discussion, thus far, has touched on grammar with respect to > lexical items such as prepositions. But we've not yet tied that to the > grammatical forms that embed those lexical items. I'm very curious as to > whether that further connection can be made. > > David Kirshner > > Orr, E., W. (1987). Twice as less: Black English and the performance of > black students in mathematics and science. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg > Sent: Friday, December 19, 2014 3:06 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors > > Yes, Haliday is essentially a Whorfian, and that's one of things that > brings him close to Vygotsky. (Compare, for example, Chomsky, who is > essentially anti-developmental in his ideas about language, and who now > rejects the leading role played by social communication and says that > communication is epiphenomenal to language, whose original purpose is > thought.) For Sapir, and for Whorf, in the beginning of every major > onotogenetic, sociogenetic, and even phylogenetic change in language there > has to be some change in the nature of communication. > > So what Andy says about the lack of the basis of modern science in Hopi > applies perfectly well to English. When we read the scientific writings of > Chaucer on the astrolabe, for example, we do not see words like > "reflection", "refraction" or "alignment". Chaucer uses words like "bounce > off", "bend through", and "line up" (note the use of prepositions, > Helena!). Where did these words come from, and how did they make scientific > English possible? > > Most of us have no problem saying that Isaac Newton discovered the laws of > gravitation. But it's only a slight exaggeration to say that what he really > discovered was the meaning potential of words like "gravitation". Gravity > is, of course, not a thing at all; that is, it's not an entity, but rather > a process, the process of falling down, or falling in (preps, again!). So > how and above all why does it become an entity? > > It's interesting to compare Newton's writings on optics with Chaucer's on > the astrolabe. The "Opticks" has a fixed format that we recognize almost > instantly today: Newton describes his equipment (the prism and the dark > room); he then narrates his method as a kind of recipe ("First, I did this; > then I did that") and draws conclusions, which he then formulates in > mathematical terms (this is essentially the format of Vygotsky's lectures > on pedology, so much so that when translating them we had some trouble > determining the precise moment when Vygotsky turns to the blackboard to > write his conclusion in the form of a law). > > In order to get them into mathematical shape, though, he has to make > sentences that look a lot like equations. "The plumpness of the lens yields > a greater refraction of the light", "The reflection of the light from the > glass results of the light striking the flatness of the glass" "The > curvature of the spectacle glass supplies the lacking plumpness of the > eye". In each of these, a quality or a process which would normally be > realized as an adjective or a verb is suddenly realized by a noun, creating > an imaginary entity. > > That's grammatical metaphor. Something that is "canonically" realized by a > verb ("to grow") is suddenly realized nominally ("growth"), or something > that is canonically a quality ('red") is realized verbally ("redden"). We > even find related clauses realized as verbs ("She did not know the rules. > So she died" is realized by "Death was brought about through ignorance", > all of these examples from Halliday). In fact, the Genetic Law that > Vygotsky formulates in "Mind in Society" ("Every higher mental function is > realized on two planes....") is really just one instance of grammatical > metaphor. > > One of Chomsky's best known arguments for the radical innateness > hypothesis is this. If I take a sentence like "Students who do not do their > homework do not do well" and I want to make a question, how do I know which > "do" to move to the front? Chomsky assumes that this knowledge is > essentially innate; it is part of universal grammar. But you can see that > "Do students who do not do their homework do well?" can be built up through > a process of what we might call "discourse metaphor"--whereby clauses stand > for > exchanges: > > Mother: You did your homework, didn't you? > Child: No. > Mother: You didn't do your homework? Did you do well? > Child: No. > Mother: You didn't do well? > Child: No. > Mother: You didn't do you homework so you didn't do well. Do the other > students do well? > Child: Some of them. > Mother: Who does well? Do students who do not do their homework do well? > > And this of course explains why wh-items like "who" and 'why" have two > functions--one inside a clause, where it expresses an intra-mental function > (grammar) and one between them where it expresses an inter-mental function > (discourse). > > I realize that grammatical metaphor will seem rather dry and abstract and > unpoetic to people who assume that metaphor is only of the lexical kind. > But to me, and I think to most children, it is far far more powerful and > far more important developmentally. In some ways, it's the lexical metaphor > that is responsible for the disenchantment of the child's world, while the > grammatical metaphor infinitely expands it. (And here, I'm afraid, I must > stop--it's time for breakfast and anyway my one screen is used up!) > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > , or "the > > . He > > On 19 December 2014 at 15:15, Greg Thompson > > wrote: > > > Helena and David, > > I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the so-called > > authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred tradition > > to > > Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi notion > > of "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including English) > > notion of "time" and how each of these languages offers different > > affordances of meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual > > understanding, English has a much more reified/objectified/entified > > sense of time. (btw, I think the first paragraph is easier to follow > > than the second - and in that first paragraph you'll find our old friend > "imagination"). > > David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to? > > -greg > > > > Taken from: > > > > http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/mousesite/Second > > ary/Whorfframe2.html > > > > " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, sunset" are > > with us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from other > nouns. > > They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in winter" > > just as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are pluralized > > and numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. Our > > thought about the referents of such words hence becomes objectified. > > Without objectification, it would be a subjective experience of real > > time, i.e. of the consciousness of "becoming later and later"--simply > > a cyclic phase similar to an earlier phase in that ever-later-becoming > > duration. Only by imagination can such a cyclic phase be set beside > > another and another in the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually > > perceived) configuration. "But such is the power of linguistic analogy > that we do so objectify cyclic phasing. > > We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g., > "phasing." > > And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting > > binomial formula of formless item plus form, is so general that it is > > implicit for all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless items > > like "substance, matter," by which we can fill out the binomial for an > > enormously wide range of nouns. But even these are not quite > > generalized enough to take in our phase nouns. So for the phase nouns we > have made a formless item, "time." > > We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, in the > > pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" in > > the pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can say > > and think "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." Let me > > again point out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of milk" > > or "a piece of cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a > > summer" actually contains or consists of such-and-such a quantity of > "time." > > > > In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., are not > > nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They are a > > formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, and > > even other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a > > locative pattern, like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It contains > > no morpheme like one of "in the house" or "at the tree." It means > > "when it is morning" or "while morning-phase is occurring." These > > "temporal s" are not used as subjects or objects, or at all like > > nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" or "summer is hot"; summer > > is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions are hot, WHEN heat occurs. > > One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or "summer recently." > > There is no objectification, as a region, an extent, a quantity, of > > the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested about time > > except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no basis > here for a formless item answering to our "time." " > > > > > > > > On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Helena Worthen > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to this: > > > > > > "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to create > > > sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly > > > productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific > > > writing and thinking today." > > > > > > Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I lose you > > > when > > you > > > say "created to talk about gravity as an entity". > > > > > > Thank you, > > > > > > Helena > > > > > > > > > Helena Worthen > > > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > > > > On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > > > > As Helena points out, prepositions are from the "grammatical" end > > > > of > > what > > > > Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what > > > > Halliday > > calls > > > > "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they have > > > > three properties that words from the more "lexical" end do not have: > > > > > > > > a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You can, > > > actually, > > > > but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you invent a new > > > > name > > > or a > > > > new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can). > > > > > > > > b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific semantic > > > > field > > > (the > > > > way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of > > linguistics) > > > > but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are used. > > > > > > > > c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the same > > effect, > > > > which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your argument" the "in" > > has > > > > more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in "there's a fly > > > > in > > your > > > > tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in Henry's > > > > hands, > > > refer > > > > to a book or even a footnote. > > > > > > > > Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties pretty > > > > much define the difference between learning and development, at > > > > least as I understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on > > > > functions indefinitely while development works by reorganizing the > > > > closed set of functions you already have into new systems. > > > > Learning is skill specific and local, while development is quite > global in its implications. > > > Learning > > > > is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new systems, > > > > while development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary (and > > > > forget it > > just > > > > as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes away. > > > > > > > > For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of blue > > > > that > > > people > > > > call the sky") are simply metaphors from the non-productive end of > > > > the lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are crisp, > > > > concrete, and vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the > > > > nominalizations that > > Newton > > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to > > > > create sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly > > > > productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific > > > > writing and > > thinking > > > > today. For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical metaphor is the > > third > > > > great moment in child development (after the break into mother > > > > tongue > > and > > > > the break into disciplinary language in school work). > > > > > > > > Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" implies > > > > zero dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two ("on a > > > > line', 'on a > > > > plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because they are > > > > grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them with time: > > > > 'at > > a > > > > point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. Compare: "at > > > > Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very day), and > > > > "in Christmas' (season). > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > >> > > > >> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial > > > >> relationships from the concrete material world into the > > > >> conceptual imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 common > > > >> ones, and > > > between 70 > > > >> and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far as" > > > >> -- > > > this > > > >> is according to > > > >> https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm > > ). > > > >> We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. Apparently, > > > >> in English, they evolved from and did the job done by inflections > > > >> in > > parent > > > >> languages, examples being cases and tenses. > > > >> > > > >> But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection > > > >> like the dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial > > > >> relationships > > > suggested > > > >> by contemporary prepositions. > > > >> > > > >> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about this. > > > >> > > > >> Helena Worthen > > > >> helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > >> > > > >> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > > >> > > > >>> I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly > > embodied, > > > >> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to > > > >> linguistics > > > (For > > > >> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on > > ?lexicon?: > > > >> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, > > > >> being > > > part > > > >> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and > > > >> Halliday > > > see no > > > >> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, > lexico-grammar. > > > (Lo > > > >> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar, > > > >> adding > > > the > > > >> ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings are > > great > > > >> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of > > > >> that? In translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced? > > > >>> Henry > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden > > > wrote: > > > >>>> > > > >>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the > > metaphorical > > > >> use of prepositions like: > > > >>>> - "there is some value IN your argument" > > > >>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again" > > > >>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" > > > >>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again" > > > >>>> > > > >>>> and so on. > > > >>>> Andy > > > >>>> > > > -------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > ---- > > > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > > > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>> larry smolucha wrote: > > > >>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself - > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic > > > possibilities: > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in > > > Thought > > > >>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into > > English > > > >> 1962] > > > >>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' > > value > > > >> of the > > > >>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech > > > vocalization). > > > >>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that > > > >>>>> are > > > >> flammable > > > >>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor > > > >>>>> a > > gas. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century > > > >>>>> European > > > >> Developmental > > > >>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' > > > >>>>> hence > > > the > > > >>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of > > Piaget's > > > >> Genetic > > > >>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and > > > >>>>> synthesis > > > >> based on > > > >>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in > > > >>>>> Vygotsky's > > > >> example of H2O. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com > > > >>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > >>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 > > > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic > > > >>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the > parts. > > > >>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more > > > >>>>>> than > > the > > > >>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can > > > >>>>>> ever > > be > > > >> imagined" > > > >>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> A couple things to consider: > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination > > > >>>>>> as the > > > >> brain has > > > >>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the > > > >>>>>> simplest > > level > > > >> of the Gestalt > > > >>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). > > > >>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just > > photographic. > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try > > > >>>>>> to > > > >> accurately reproduce > > > >>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, > > > >>>>>> the > > > >> goal of combinatory > > > >>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, > > > >>>>>> dreams, > > > >> musings, and even > > > >>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of > > objects > > > >> and symbols. > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways > > > >>>>>> that > > > >> things and concepts can be > > > >>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar > > > >>>>>> and > > > flour. > > > >>>>>> I can add water and > > > >>>>>> it > > > >> dissolves a bit > > > >>>>>> But adding heat > > > >>>>>> changes > > the > > > >> combination into a pancake. > > > >>>>>> [Is this synergistic?] > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more > > > >>>>>> examples > > > >> to put the discussion > > > >>>>>> in the metaphysical realm. > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 > > > >>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > >>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the > > > >>>>>>> case > > > for > > > >>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I > > > >>>>>>> think > > it's > > > >> not > > > >>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are > > > >> associationists who > > > >>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary > > > >>>>>>> associationism > > > >> exists and > > > >>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. > > > >> Vygotsky > > > >>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, > > explain > > > >> the > > > >>>>>>> uniqueness of our species? > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels > > > >>>>>>> for > > its > > > >> own > > > >>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a > > > >>>>>>> Piagetian perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian > > > >>>>>>> one--true maturity > > > as a > > > >>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more > > > >>>>>>> to it > > > >> than > > > >>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of > > > >>>>>>> primate, > > > and > > > >> our > > > >>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon > > > >>>>>>> rocks > > > in > > > >> order > > > >>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged > > > >>>>>>> the > > same > > > >> way as > > > >>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and > > > >>>>>>> for > > > >> language is > > > >>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human > > > >> exceptionalism. > > > >>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for > > > >>>>>>> the > > > >> vanguard role > > > >>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, > > > prolonging > > > >>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after > > > >>>>>>> the > > sick > > > >> and the > > > >>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial > > > >>>>>>> organs > > > >> (tools) and > > > >>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for > > > >>>>>>> our > > > >> species, it > > > >>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these > > > >> "circuitous, > > > >>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that > > > >>>>>>> lead > > our > > > >>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always > > > >>>>>>> been > > > >> short on > > > >>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for > > > >>>>>>> material > > > >> culture > > > >>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: > > > >> verily, here > > > >>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of > > > >>>>>>> attention is > > > >> simply the > > > >>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says > > > >>>>>>> there are > > > >> only two > > > >>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So > > > >> imagination is > > > >>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, > > > >>>>>>> and > > > >> nothing > > > >>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when > > > >>>>>>> you > > > hear > > > >> the > > > >>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there > > > >>>>>>> to be > > > >> able to > > > >>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work > > > >>>>>>> in > > word > > > >> meaning. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who > > > >>>>>>> was > > > given > > > >> a > > > >>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been > > > >>>>>>> mixed > > with > > > >> silver > > > >>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of > gold. > > > >> Well, we > > > >>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not > > possible > > > to > > > >>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that > > > >>>>>>> precisely. The > > > >> method > > > >>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the > > > >>>>>>> "principal > > of > > > >>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes > > > >>>>>>> palimpsest, a > > > >> velum on > > > >>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. > > > Because > > > >>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and > > > >>>>>>> written > > over > > > >> every > > > >>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, > > > >>>>>>> the > > > >> pressure > > > >>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones > > > >>>>>>> when > > > the > > > >> old > > > >>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only > > known > > > >> Greek > > > >>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their > > > >> relationship > > > >>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they > > > >>>>>>> are > > > >> related to > > > >>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite > > > similar > > > >> to the > > > >>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> David Kellogg > > > >>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >> wrote: > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an > > > associationist, > > > >> ?sees > > > >>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? > > > >>>>>>>> Henry > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg < > > dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > > > > > >> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the > > > >>>>>>>>> division > > > >> between > > > >>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, > > > >>>>>>>>> because > > > >> Ribot is > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> an > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal > > > >>>>>>>>> form of > > > >> attention. > > > >>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the > > > >>>>>>>>> transition > > from > > > >> forest > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> to > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division > > between > > > >> the two > > > >>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and > > > >>>>>>>>> commonsensical > > > >> world of > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly > > > >>>>>>>>> prosaic > > uses > > > >> in life > > > >>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more > > > "imaginative" > > > >> (that > > > >>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world > > > >>>>>>>>> of the > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> farm,where > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long > > > >>>>>>>>> winter > > > >> months are > > > >>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to > > encounter > > > >> talking > > > >>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here > > > >>>>>>>>> attention > > > has > > > >> to be > > > >>>>>>>>> more voluntary. > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a > > > >>>>>>>>> very > > clear > > > >>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that > > > >> underpins > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> Ribot > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky > > > >>>>>>>>> points > > > out > > > >> the > > > >>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive > > > >>>>>>>>> practices > > > >> really > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> are > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of > > imagination, > > > >> there > > > >>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between > > > >>>>>>>>> human > > > and > > > >> animal > > > >>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly > > > >>>>>>>>> capable of > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> volitional > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). > > > Without > > > >> a > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> theory > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis > > > >>>>>>>>> for > > > Ribot's > > > >>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological > > > >>>>>>>>> functions at > > > >> all. > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > > > >>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole > > > wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination, > > > >> thanks to > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> all > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought. > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very > > > >>>>>>>>>> influential > > > >> around the > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> time > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I > > > >>>>>>>>>> had > > > >> seen work > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> on > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective > > > >>>>>>>>>> equal > > > >> reproductive? > > > >>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies > > > >>>>>>>>>> of > > > >> development > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> of > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of > > > >>>>>>>>>> being > > a > > > >> relative > > > >>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. > > > >>>>>>>>>> mike > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com> > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my > > > >>>>>>>>>>> bucket > > list. > > > >> This > > > >>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings > > > >>>>>>>>>>> from > > some > > > >> weeks > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> in > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > >> segmented the > > > >>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met > aphorizing?. > > > >> Puns, > > > >>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> and > > they > > > >> are > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> doing > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his > > > >> followers as an > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel, so > > > >> its of > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> course > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in > > > >> translation, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> seems > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" > > in > > > >> this > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> passage, > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter > > > >> distinction to > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "memory." > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary > > > >> discourse > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian > > > >> colleagues have > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from > > theorists > > > >> who > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> clearly > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was > > still > > > >> possible > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> to > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, > > > >> interestingly > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> links > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a > > "voluntary" > > > >> act. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Parts > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> of > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> stuff > > > that > > > >> was > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> also > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > >> creativity > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> and > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> see > > > >> that the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> two > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found > > himself > > > >> writing. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> pretty > > > old > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> approaches > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < > > > >> ablunden@mira.net> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> but it > > > >> may be > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> worth > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> place > > to > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Imagination > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between > > > >> Recollection and > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive > > > >> Imagination, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> (2) > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> which > > he > > > >> says > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> leads > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> other > > > >> words, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is > > > >> accomplished > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> through > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >> > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > -- > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > > > >> Williams. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose > > work i > > > >> am > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> trying > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of > > > >> productive > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive > > imagination > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> develops. > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that > > > >> there > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> must > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> be a > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> But > > I > > > >> learned > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > > is > > > >> linked > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> to > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > >> anticipation > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination > > > >> (starting > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> look, and > > > >> provides > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> a > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as > > > fixed. > > > >> This, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a > > > ground > > > >> to > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> take > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> part > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> preconceptions: > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> grammarian > > > >> Langacker on > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> domains, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> particularly > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> full of > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> imagination > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > >> temporality: > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic > > > >> structure), which > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> I > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> both > > > >> individual > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < > > > >> lpscholar2@gmail.com> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third > > *space* > > > >> and the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> his > > > >> notion of > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is > > > >> explored under > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > >> modalities > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of > > knowing > > > >> that is > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [perceived??] > > if > > > >> we > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> think > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *style* Larry On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> HENRY SHONERD < > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> say how > > > >> jazzed up > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> I > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> am > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind > > > as > > > >> Larry > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> various > > > >> triads, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> finally > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notebooks > > > of > > > >> the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> mind, as > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, > > luega > > > >> pa? > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> fuera. > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole < > > mcole@ucsd.edu> > > > >> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, > > attached > > > >> are two > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT > > > theorists > > > >> like > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of > > > >> imagination in a > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of > > > >> productive > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no > > > >> intention of > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> doing > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the > > > >> attached > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these > > philosophers, > > > I > > > >> came > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> upon > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> closely > > > >> linked at > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> several > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, > > > >> Ettienne and I > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a > > means > > > of > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> access > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander > Suvorov. > > > >> Moreover, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> such > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct > > > relevance > > > >> to > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Kris's > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to > > > >> concerns > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> about > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in > > development. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. > > > Perhaps > > > >> they > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> will > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural > > > >> science > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with an > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> -- > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > > science > > > >> with an > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> -- > > > >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > > > >>>>>>>>>> science > > > >> with an > > > >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From ulvi.icil@gmail.com Sun Dec 21 04:15:44 2014 From: ulvi.icil@gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?VWx2aSDEsMOnaWw=?=) Date: Sun, 21 Dec 2014 14:15:44 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Maths and science in Russia Message-ID: Hello, I know there are some works comparing Russia (Davydov's curriculum) and US, and even some works done in US with an application of Davydov's, e.g. by Schmittau. I would like to know, not in detail, but just in general, which main factors lie behind this success in Russia, it is Davydov, or Zarkov or any other scholar's method. Thanks in advance, Ulvi -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Math_2011.png Type: image/png Size: 55698 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141221/e4948b43/attachment.png From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Sun Dec 21 07:36:05 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Sun, 21 Dec 2014 08:36:05 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors In-Reply-To: References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> Message-ID: In the interests of following the recently suggested injunction not to directly address specific interlocutors, I'll talk in generalities (This makes it a bit more challenging to have a conversation but it also makes one think about the extractable and generalizable point that is beyond the immediate context). In my previous post (apologies for drawing on prior context), I neither suggested nor intended to imply that Orr's work is racist (do intentions matter when it comes to meaning?). This speaks to some of the difficulties of talking about issues of race. And in this connection let's not forget the fact that this list-serve is dominated by white men - that doesn't mean that we are necessarily racist but it does mean that we are likely to be ignorant of many aspects of these issues. Nonetheless, I believe that we can overcome our ignorance through education, by learning more about the issues - even when it comes to trying to understand cultures and languages that we did not grow up with. And while I think that there is good evidence for the linguistic relativity hypothesis, I do not believe that language is a determining influence in ALL thinking (Whorf uses the term "habitual" to describe the type of thinking that is most susceptible to the influence of language). That means that even if you don't speak AAE, you can still study it and even come to understand how the grammatical forms lend themselves to particular ways of understanding the world (this is what linguistic anthropology is all about!). And this is my concern with Orr's work. With all academic work, I think it is worth considering questions like "How would racists take up our research?" In the case of Orr's work, my sense is that racists could easily take up her research to argue (perhaps even by using the linguistic relativity hypothesis) that AAE speakers are unable to do complex mathematical thinking. This is why I would think that it is important to give a positive articulation of what AAE does as a language. It is certainly important to understand what it CAN'T do (e.g., help one learn math in a particular way), but it is equally important to understand what it CAN do. As Paul points out, Labov has done some of the work addressing this. But note that Labov's work was done 40 years ago and no one has sought to replicate or do any kind of similar work. What gives? -greg -greg On Sat, Dec 20, 2014 at 11:37 PM, David H Kirshner wrote: > Greg, > > I'm delighted that you're familiar with and appreciative of Orr's work. > > Cleary she didn't provide "serious consideration of how AAE speakers > actually use prepositions"--she couldn't have, as she was not a native > speaker of Black English dialect, and she was not a linguist. But I'm not > sure how paying serious attention to technical nuances of Black English > grammar would have helped, as her analyses show that the African American > students in her classes were not speaking either standard English or Black > English Vernacular, but rather a hybrid that arises from their efforts to > emulate standard English. > > Now, it's true her work didn't parallel the approach Gay and Cole took to > understanding what other psychologists were classifying as linguistic and > cognitive deficits by carefully studying the native language and culture. > On the other hand, she did something Gay and Cole didn't do, namely > micro-analyze the linguistic miscues operating in the classroom, and the > resultant dilemmas of comprehension this created for her African American > students. > > As the excerpt copied below illustrates, Orr was scrupulously attentive to > understanding her students' experience of distance and location given the > different linguistic setting. And her analyses consistently point to the > mismatch between the native dialect and the language of instruction as the > source of the problems, not the native dialect, itself. To label this work > as implicitly racist, I think cedes too much to those who mistrust science > as a tool of the oppressor, and whose only locus of attention is the > history and legacy of social injustice. Even now, in this discussion, we > are missing the point. The major significance of Orr's work is not that > differences in grammatical structure have semantic implications. This is > merely a window to the dramatic realization that semantics are written into > grammatical form. > > David > > Excerpt from Orr (1987): > > "Jane gives us in these diagrams a glimpse into the kinds of mental images > she constructs when she is using the single symbol length, representing > both location and distance, as a tool with which to think. Even the > diagrams Jane drew for problems 13 and 14 begin to be less incomprehensible > if one attempts to construct in one's own mind images of the information > given in these problems, while adhering to the requirement that length be > used to represent both location and distance. They can be seen as possible > consequents or extensions of the symbol length when it is used to represent > both location and distance. Consider, for instance, the mental images one > might construct in responding to problem 13: Two cities, both represented > by line segments, are equal distances (that is, equal line segments) closer > to a third city (another line segment) than two other cities (line > segments) are. The first two cities must be represented by equal line > segments because they are equal distances closer to the third city than the > other two cities are. And these other two cities must also be represented > by equal line segments because they are equal distances from the third > city. One can see that Jane's diagrams are not as lacking in reason as they > may initially have appeared to be. > > "Jane's diagrams suggest the possibility that when words, or symbols are > used as instruments with which to think, the use in one language of a > single symbol in contexts where a second language requires two or more can > lead a speaker of the first language to arrive at a different mental > construct of some given information from that arrived at by a speaker of > the second language. Or, as in Jane's attempt to handle problem 14, the > result may be an inability to arrive at a workable mental construct at > all." (p. 25) > > [Note, this excerpt is part of a longer segment I emailed on Dec. 19 that > shows Jane's diagrams that Orr is referring to.] > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson > Sent: Saturday, December 20, 2014 3:14 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors > > The issues that are raised by Orr are indeed important ones. I am a fan of > her work as it points to important differences in language usage among AAE > speakers. I agree that she shouldn't have been condemned for pointing out > these differences (particularly considering how important it is for > teachers to understand the consequences of these differences). If you want > to help AAE speaking students do better on standardized tests, then you > absolutely need to pay attention to these differences. > > My one concern here is that I do feel like there is a problem of deficit > thinking that is at least implied in her work (and maybe "implied" is too > strong a term - maybe it's just that she doesn't provide evidence to > discourage us from this view). What we don't see in this book is any > serious consideration of how AAE speakers actually use prepositions - e.g., > the ways of using language that exist in the community of AAE speakers. > This gives Orr's work a feel somewhat like the studies of math among the > Kpelle studied by Gay and Cole in the pre-early days of LCHC (see wiki for > more: http://lchcfestschrift.wikispaces.com/Chapter+1). Before they > showed > up on the scene, everyone had assumed that the Kpelle (Liberia) couldn't > comprehend basic math concepts b.c. they weren't learning it in the ways > that it was being taught (and perhaps there were even linguistic relativity > arguments that pointed to this). Rather then continuing to pluck these > folks out of context and run them through various types of experiments, Gay > and Cole "explicitly began with the assumption that ?we must know more > about the indigenous mathematics so that we can build effective bridges to > the new mathematics that we are trying to introduce?" > >From their research, they found that the Kpelle actually had high > competence with complex mathematical problems (e.g., estimating volumes). > As they write: > "Overall, the data suggested that no generalized lack of mathematical, > perceptual, or problem solving abilities stood in the way of mathematics > education. When the materials and procedures used in assessment tasks were > designed to match closely valued local practices, lack of ability could be > replaced by apparent special ability. At the same time, schooling did > appear to influence performance in tasks that were routinely used to > measure cognitive development." > So I think I would be more comfortable with Orr's work if she were to have > included this kind of rich understanding of usage in context and how > prepositions actually are used among AAE speakers. > > This points to a larger question that might be irksome to some folks, but > the question regards the extent to which mathematical language is > predicated upon a particular form of what Whorf called "Standard Average > European." In short, the idea here is that Math has a history and a > culture. This doesn't mean that it is useless or a waste of time, just that > it is a particular way of encountering the world that is good for > particular things and not for others. > > I think we've gone round this mulberry bush before, but that was just more > grist for the mill (I prefer my metaphors mixed!). > > -greg > > > > > > On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 8:46 PM, David H Kirshner dkirsh@lsu.edu>> wrote: > > > > The topic of how grammatical form relates to meaning calls to mind the > > groundbreaking work of Eleanor Orr--whom you've probably never heard of > on > > account of the fact that her work was condemned by a politically-correct > > faction of race-conscious sociolinguists who decided her analysis of > Black > > English Vernacular could too easily be appropriated into racist > discourses > > about language deficiency. > > > > Orr was a Washington DC area teacher and principal in the 1970s and > 1980s, > > who traced math difficulties of her African American students to subtle > > grammatical differences between Black English dialect and standard > English. > > Her 1987 book goes into compelling detail to support the thesis that the > > meaning structure of basic mathematical terms is embedded in the > > grammatical setting in which those terms are expressed. For instance, the > > meaning of ?distance? is embedded in the grammatical structure ?distance > > from _________ to __________? where the place-holders hold locations; if > > you don?t have that grammatical structure, and you're in a linguistic > > environment in which that structure is assumed, you're likely not going > to > > be able to gain full access to the concept. > > > > The attached excerpts from her book--ignore the Forward, unless you'd > like > > some context--reveal some of her students' bizarre conceptions of > distance > > (and other basic mathematical concepts) as revealed in their diagrams. > Her > > approach involves linguistic analysis of sentences produced by her > African > > American students that she reads as collapsed versions of standard > English > > sentences, with differences in prepositional structure being highlighted > > (but other grammatical elements also are indicated). > > > > This work cuts against the grain of anything going on in mathematics > > education. The Piagetian view that dominates that field holds that basic > > concepts come about from reflection on our actions in our engagement with > > the material world. When language enters the conversation, it's with > > respect to semantic structure; to my knowledge, nobody's ever implicated > > syntax directly in basic quantitative understanding. > > > > This work is particularly interesting to me in connection with my > > 21-year-old son who is autistic, and whose grammatical function is > severely > > impaired. He has a decent vocabulary, but unless the setting for the > > conversation provides contextual clues, he can't piece together how the > > semantic elements are linked to one another. It is only recently that it > > occurred to me his lack of a secure sense of basic quantitative terms > like > > ?more? and ?less? may be rooted in his grammatical incapacities. > > > > The XMCA discussion, thus far, has touched on grammar with respect to > > lexical items such as prepositions. But we've not yet tied that to the > > grammatical forms that embed those lexical items. I'm very curious as to > > whether that further connection can be made. > > > > David Kirshner > > > > Orr, E., W. (1987). Twice as less: Black English and the performance of > > black students in mathematics and science. New York: W. W. Norton & > Company. > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg > > Sent: Friday, December 19, 2014 3:06 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors > > > > Yes, Haliday is essentially a Whorfian, and that's one of things that > > brings him close to Vygotsky. (Compare, for example, Chomsky, who is > > essentially anti-developmental in his ideas about language, and who now > > rejects the leading role played by social communication and says that > > communication is epiphenomenal to language, whose original purpose is > > thought.) For Sapir, and for Whorf, in the beginning of every major > > onotogenetic, sociogenetic, and even phylogenetic change in language > there > > has to be some change in the nature of communication. > > > > So what Andy says about the lack of the basis of modern science in Hopi > > applies perfectly well to English. When we read the scientific writings > of > > Chaucer on the astrolabe, for example, we do not see words like > > "reflection", "refraction" or "alignment". Chaucer uses words like > "bounce > > off", "bend through", and "line up" (note the use of prepositions, > > Helena!). Where did these words come from, and how did they make > scientific > > English possible? > > > > Most of us have no problem saying that Isaac Newton discovered the laws > of > > gravitation. But it's only a slight exaggeration to say that what he > really > > discovered was the meaning potential of words like "gravitation". Gravity > > is, of course, not a thing at all; that is, it's not an entity, but > rather > > a process, the process of falling down, or falling in (preps, again!). So > > how and above all why does it become an entity? > > > > It's interesting to compare Newton's writings on optics with Chaucer's on > > the astrolabe. The "Opticks" has a fixed format that we recognize almost > > instantly today: Newton describes his equipment (the prism and the dark > > room); he then narrates his method as a kind of recipe ("First, I did > this; > > then I did that") and draws conclusions, which he then formulates in > > mathematical terms (this is essentially the format of Vygotsky's lectures > > on pedology, so much so that when translating them we had some trouble > > determining the precise moment when Vygotsky turns to the blackboard to > > write his conclusion in the form of a law). > > > > In order to get them into mathematical shape, though, he has to make > > sentences that look a lot like equations. "The plumpness of the lens > yields > > a greater refraction of the light", "The reflection of the light from the > > glass results of the light striking the flatness of the glass" "The > > curvature of the spectacle glass supplies the lacking plumpness of the > > eye". In each of these, a quality or a process which would normally be > > realized as an adjective or a verb is suddenly realized by a noun, > creating > > an imaginary entity. > > > > That's grammatical metaphor. Something that is "canonically" realized by > a > > verb ("to grow") is suddenly realized nominally ("growth"), or something > > that is canonically a quality ('red") is realized verbally ("redden"). We > > even find related clauses realized as verbs ("She did not know the rules. > > So she died" is realized by "Death was brought about through ignorance", > > all of these examples from Halliday). In fact, the Genetic Law that > > Vygotsky formulates in "Mind in Society" ("Every higher mental function > is > > realized on two planes....") is really just one instance of grammatical > > metaphor. > > > > One of Chomsky's best known arguments for the radical innateness > > hypothesis is this. If I take a sentence like "Students who do not do > their > > homework do not do well" and I want to make a question, how do I know > which > > "do" to move to the front? Chomsky assumes that this knowledge is > > essentially innate; it is part of universal grammar. But you can see that > > "Do students who do not do their homework do well?" can be built up > through > > a process of what we might call "discourse metaphor"--whereby clauses > stand > > for > > exchanges: > > > > Mother: You did your homework, didn't you? > > Child: No. > > Mother: You didn't do your homework? Did you do well? > > Child: No. > > Mother: You didn't do well? > > Child: No. > > Mother: You didn't do you homework so you didn't do well. Do the other > > students do well? > > Child: Some of them. > > Mother: Who does well? Do students who do not do their homework do well? > > > > And this of course explains why wh-items like "who" and 'why" have two > > functions--one inside a clause, where it expresses an intra-mental > function > > (grammar) and one between them where it expresses an inter-mental > function > > (discourse). > > > > I realize that grammatical metaphor will seem rather dry and abstract and > > unpoetic to people who assume that metaphor is only of the lexical kind. > > But to me, and I think to most children, it is far far more powerful and > > far more important developmentally. In some ways, it's the lexical > metaphor > > that is responsible for the disenchantment of the child's world, while > the > > grammatical metaphor infinitely expands it. (And here, I'm afraid, I must > > stop--it's time for breakfast and anyway my one screen is used up!) > > > > David Kellogg > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > , or "the > > > > . He > > > > On 19 December 2014 at 15:15, Greg Thompson > > > wrote: > > > > > Helena and David, > > > I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the so-called > > > authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred tradition > > > to > > > Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi notion > > > of "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including English) > > > notion of "time" and how each of these languages offers different > > > affordances of meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual > > > understanding, English has a much more reified/objectified/entified > > > sense of time. (btw, I think the first paragraph is easier to follow > > > than the second - and in that first paragraph you'll find our old > friend > > "imagination"). > > > David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to? > > > -greg > > > > > > Taken from: > > > > > > http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/mousesite/Second > > > ary/Whorfframe2.html > > > > > > " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, sunset" are > > > with us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from other > > nouns. > > > They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in winter" > > > just as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are pluralized > > > and numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. Our > > > thought about the referents of such words hence becomes objectified. > > > Without objectification, it would be a subjective experience of real > > > time, i.e. of the consciousness of "becoming later and later"--simply > > > a cyclic phase similar to an earlier phase in that ever-later-becoming > > > duration. Only by imagination can such a cyclic phase be set beside > > > another and another in the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually > > > perceived) configuration. "But such is the power of linguistic analogy > > that we do so objectify cyclic phasing. > > > We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g., > > "phasing." > > > And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting > > > binomial formula of formless item plus form, is so general that it is > > > implicit for all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless items > > > like "substance, matter," by which we can fill out the binomial for an > > > enormously wide range of nouns. But even these are not quite > > > generalized enough to take in our phase nouns. So for the phase nouns > we > > have made a formless item, "time." > > > We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, in the > > > pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" in > > > the pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can say > > > and think "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." Let me > > > again point out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of milk" > > > or "a piece of cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a > > > summer" actually contains or consists of such-and-such a quantity of > > "time." > > > > > > In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., are not > > > nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They are a > > > formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, and > > > even other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a > > > locative pattern, like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It contains > > > no morpheme like one of "in the house" or "at the tree." It means > > > "when it is morning" or "while morning-phase is occurring." These > > > "temporal s" are not used as subjects or objects, or at all like > > > nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" or "summer is hot"; summer > > > is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions are hot, WHEN heat occurs. > > > One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or "summer recently." > > > There is no objectification, as a region, an extent, a quantity, of > > > the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested about time > > > except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no basis > > here for a formless item answering to our "time." " > > > > > > > > > > > > On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Helena Worthen > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to this: > > > > > > > > "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton > > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to create > > > > sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly > > > > productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific > > > > writing and thinking today." > > > > > > > > Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I lose you > > > > when > > > you > > > > say "created to talk about gravity as an entity". > > > > > > > > Thank you, > > > > > > > > Helena > > > > > > > > > > > > Helena Worthen > > > > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > > > > > > On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > > > > > > As Helena points out, prepositions are from the "grammatical" end > > > > > of > > > what > > > > > Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what > > > > > Halliday > > > calls > > > > > "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they have > > > > > three properties that words from the more "lexical" end do not > have: > > > > > > > > > > a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You can, > > > > actually, > > > > > but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you invent a new > > > > > name > > > > or a > > > > > new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can). > > > > > > > > > > b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific semantic > > > > > field > > > > (the > > > > > way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of > > > linguistics) > > > > > but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are used. > > > > > > > > > > c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the same > > > effect, > > > > > which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your argument" the > "in" > > > has > > > > > more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in "there's a fly > > > > > in > > > your > > > > > tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in Henry's > > > > > hands, > > > > refer > > > > > to a book or even a footnote. > > > > > > > > > > Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties pretty > > > > > much define the difference between learning and development, at > > > > > least as I understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on > > > > > functions indefinitely while development works by reorganizing the > > > > > closed set of functions you already have into new systems. > > > > > Learning is skill specific and local, while development is quite > > global in its implications. > > > > Learning > > > > > is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new systems, > > > > > while development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary (and > > > > > forget it > > > just > > > > > as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes away. > > > > > > > > > > For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of blue > > > > > that > > > > people > > > > > call the sky") are simply metaphors from the non-productive end of > > > > > the lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are crisp, > > > > > concrete, and vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the > > > > > nominalizations that > > > Newton > > > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to > > > > > create sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly > > > > > productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific > > > > > writing and > > > thinking > > > > > today. For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical metaphor is the > > > third > > > > > great moment in child development (after the break into mother > > > > > tongue > > > and > > > > > the break into disciplinary language in school work). > > > > > > > > > > Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" implies > > > > > zero dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two ("on a > > > > > line', 'on a > > > > > plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because they are > > > > > grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them with time: > > > > > 'at > > > a > > > > > point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. Compare: "at > > > > > Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very day), and > > > > > "in Christmas' (season). > > > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > > > On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen > > > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > >> > > > > >> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial > > > > >> relationships from the concrete material world into the > > > > >> conceptual imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 common > > > > >> ones, and > > > > between 70 > > > > >> and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far as" > > > > >> -- > > > > this > > > > >> is according to > > > > >> https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm > > > ). > > > > >> We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. Apparently, > > > > >> in English, they evolved from and did the job done by inflections > > > > >> in > > > parent > > > > >> languages, examples being cases and tenses. > > > > >> > > > > >> But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection > > > > >> like the dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial > > > > >> relationships > > > > suggested > > > > >> by contemporary prepositions. > > > > >> > > > > >> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about this. > > > > >> > > > > >> Helena Worthen > > > > >> helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > > >> > > > > >> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > > > >> > > > > >>> I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly > > > embodied, > > > > >> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to > > > > >> linguistics > > > > (For > > > > >> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on > > > ?lexicon?: > > > > >> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, > > > > >> being > > > > part > > > > >> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and > > > > >> Halliday > > > > see no > > > > >> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, > > lexico-grammar. > > > > (Lo > > > > >> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar, > > > > >> adding > > > > the > > > > >> ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings are > > > great > > > > >> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of > > > > >> that? In translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced? > > > > >>> Henry > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden > > > > wrote: > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the > > > metaphorical > > > > >> use of prepositions like: > > > > >>>> - "there is some value IN your argument" > > > > >>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again" > > > > >>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" > > > > >>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again" > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> and so on. > > > > >>>> Andy > > > > >>>> > > > > -------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > ---- > > > > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > > > > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> larry smolucha wrote: > > > > >>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself - > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic > > > > possibilities: > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in > > > > Thought > > > > >>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into > > > English > > > > >> 1962] > > > > >>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' > > > value > > > > >> of the > > > > >>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech > > > > vocalization). > > > > >>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that > > > > >>>>> are > > > > >> flammable > > > > >>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor > > > > >>>>> a > > > gas. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century > > > > >>>>> European > > > > >> Developmental > > > > >>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' > > > > >>>>> hence > > > > the > > > > >>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of > > > Piaget's > > > > >> Genetic > > > > >>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and > > > > >>>>> synthesis > > > > >> based on > > > > >>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in > > > > >>>>> Vygotsky's > > > > >> example of H2O. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com > > > > >>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > >>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 > > > > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic > > > > >>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the > > parts. > > > > >>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more > > > > >>>>>> than > > > the > > > > >>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can > > > > >>>>>> ever > > > be > > > > >> imagined" > > > > >>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> A couple things to consider: > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination > > > > >>>>>> as the > > > > >> brain has > > > > >>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the > > > > >>>>>> simplest > > > level > > > > >> of the Gestalt > > > > >>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). > > > > >>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just > > > photographic. > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try > > > > >>>>>> to > > > > >> accurately reproduce > > > > >>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, > > > > >>>>>> the > > > > >> goal of combinatory > > > > >>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, > > > > >>>>>> dreams, > > > > >> musings, and even > > > > >>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of > > > objects > > > > >> and symbols. > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways > > > > >>>>>> that > > > > >> things and concepts can be > > > > >>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar > > > > >>>>>> and > > > > flour. > > > > >>>>>> I can add water and > > > > >>>>>> it > > > > >> dissolves a bit > > > > >>>>>> But adding heat > > > > >>>>>> changes > > > the > > > > >> combination into a pancake. > > > > >>>>>> [Is this synergistic?] > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more > > > > >>>>>> examples > > > > >> to put the discussion > > > > >>>>>> in the metaphysical realm. > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 > > > > >>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > > >>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the > > > > >>>>>>> case > > > > for > > > > >>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I > > > > >>>>>>> think > > > it's > > > > >> not > > > > >>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are > > > > >> associationists who > > > > >>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary > > > > >>>>>>> associationism > > > > >> exists and > > > > >>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as > mediation. > > > > >> Vygotsky > > > > >>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, > > > explain > > > > >> the > > > > >>>>>>> uniqueness of our species? > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels > > > > >>>>>>> for > > > its > > > > >> own > > > > >>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a > > > > >>>>>>> Piagetian perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian > > > > >>>>>>> one--true maturity > > > > as a > > > > >>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more > > > > >>>>>>> to it > > > > >> than > > > > >>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of > > > > >>>>>>> primate, > > > > and > > > > >> our > > > > >>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon > > > > >>>>>>> rocks > > > > in > > > > >> order > > > > >>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged > > > > >>>>>>> the > > > same > > > > >> way as > > > > >>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and > > > > >>>>>>> for > > > > >> language is > > > > >>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human > > > > >> exceptionalism. > > > > >>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for > > > > >>>>>>> the > > > > >> vanguard role > > > > >>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, > > > > prolonging > > > > >>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after > > > > >>>>>>> the > > > sick > > > > >> and the > > > > >>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial > > > > >>>>>>> organs > > > > >> (tools) and > > > > >>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for > > > > >>>>>>> our > > > > >> species, it > > > > >>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these > > > > >> "circuitous, > > > > >>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that > > > > >>>>>>> lead > > > our > > > > >>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always > > > > >>>>>>> been > > > > >> short on > > > > >>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for > > > > >>>>>>> material > > > > >> culture > > > > >>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: > > > > >> verily, here > > > > >>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of > > > > >>>>>>> attention is > > > > >> simply the > > > > >>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says > > > > >>>>>>> there are > > > > >> only two > > > > >>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So > > > > >> imagination is > > > > >>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, > > > > >>>>>>> and > > > > >> nothing > > > > >>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when > > > > >>>>>>> you > > > > hear > > > > >> the > > > > >>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there > > > > >>>>>>> to be > > > > >> able to > > > > >>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work > > > > >>>>>>> in > > > word > > > > >> meaning. > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who > > > > >>>>>>> was > > > > given > > > > >> a > > > > >>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been > > > > >>>>>>> mixed > > > with > > > > >> silver > > > > >>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of > > gold. > > > > >> Well, we > > > > >>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not > > > possible > > > > to > > > > >>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that > > > > >>>>>>> precisely. The > > > > >> method > > > > >>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the > > > > >>>>>>> "principal > > > of > > > > >>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes > > > > >>>>>>> palimpsest, a > > > > >> velum on > > > > >>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. > > > > Because > > > > >>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and > > > > >>>>>>> written > > > over > > > > >> every > > > > >>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, > > > > >>>>>>> the > > > > >> pressure > > > > >>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones > > > > >>>>>>> when > > > > the > > > > >> old > > > > >>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only > > > known > > > > >> Greek > > > > >>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their > > > > >> relationship > > > > >>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they > > > > >>>>>>> are > > > > >> related to > > > > >>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite > > > > similar > > > > >> to the > > > > >>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> David Kellogg > > > > >>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >> wrote: > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an > > > > associationist, > > > > >> ?sees > > > > >>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? > > > > >>>>>>>> Henry > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg < > > > dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > > > > > > > >> wrote: > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the > > > > >>>>>>>>> division > > > > >> between > > > > >>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, > > > > >>>>>>>>> because > > > > >> Ribot is > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> an > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal > > > > >>>>>>>>> form of > > > > >> attention. > > > > >>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the > > > > >>>>>>>>> transition > > > from > > > > >> forest > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> to > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division > > > between > > > > >> the two > > > > >>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and > > > > >>>>>>>>> commonsensical > > > > >> world of > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> the > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly > > > > >>>>>>>>> prosaic > > > uses > > > > >> in life > > > > >>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more > > > > "imaginative" > > > > >> (that > > > > >>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world > > > > >>>>>>>>> of the > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> farm,where > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long > > > > >>>>>>>>> winter > > > > >> months are > > > > >>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to > > > encounter > > > > >> talking > > > > >>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here > > > > >>>>>>>>> attention > > > > has > > > > >> to be > > > > >>>>>>>>> more voluntary. > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a > > > > >>>>>>>>> very > > > clear > > > > >>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that > > > > >> underpins > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> Ribot > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky > > > > >>>>>>>>> points > > > > out > > > > >> the > > > > >>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive > > > > >>>>>>>>> practices > > > > >> really > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> are > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of > > > imagination, > > > > >> there > > > > >>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between > > > > >>>>>>>>> human > > > > and > > > > >> animal > > > > >>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly > > > > >>>>>>>>> capable of > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> volitional > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). > > > > Without > > > > >> a > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> theory > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis > > > > >>>>>>>>> for > > > > Ribot's > > > > >>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological > > > > >>>>>>>>> functions at > > > > >> all. > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > > > > >>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole > > > > wrote: > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of > > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination, > > > > >> thanks to > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> all > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought. > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very > > > > >>>>>>>>>> influential > > > > >> around the > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> time > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I > > > > >>>>>>>>>> had > > > > >> seen work > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> on > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective > > > > >>>>>>>>>> equal > > > > >> reproductive? > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies > > > > >>>>>>>>>> of > > > > >> development > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> of > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of > > > > >>>>>>>>>> being > > > a > > > > >> relative > > > > >>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. > > > > >>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> bucket > > > list. > > > > >> This > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> from > > > some > > > > >> weeks > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> in > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > > >> segmented the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met > > aphorizing?. > > > > >> Puns, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > wrote: > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> and > > > they > > > > >> are > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> doing > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his > > > > >> followers as an > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel, so > > > > >> its of > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> course > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in > > > > >> translation, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> seems > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, > "recollection" > > > in > > > > >> this > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> passage, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter > > > > >> distinction to > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "memory." > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary > > > > >> discourse > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian > > > > >> colleagues have > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from > > > theorists > > > > >> who > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> clearly > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was > > > still > > > > >> possible > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> to > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, > > > > >> interestingly > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> links > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a > > > "voluntary" > > > > >> act. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Parts > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> stuff > > > > that > > > > >> was > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> also > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > >> creativity > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> and > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> see > > > > >> that the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> two > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found > > > himself > > > > >> writing. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> pretty > > > > old > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> approaches > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < > > > > >> ablunden@mira.net> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> but it > > > > >> may be > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> worth > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> place > > > to > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Imagination > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between > > > > >> Recollection and > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive > > > > >> Imagination, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> (2) > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> which > > > he > > > > >> says > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> leads > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> other > > > > >> words, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> the > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is > > > > >> accomplished > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> through > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >> > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > -- > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > >> Williams. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose > > > work i > > > > >> am > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> trying > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of > > > > >> productive > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive > > > imagination > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> develops. > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that > > > > >> there > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> must > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> be a > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> But > > > I > > > > >> learned > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > > > is > > > > >> linked > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> to > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > >> anticipation > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination > > > > >> (starting > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> look, and > > > > >> provides > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> a > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as > > > > fixed. > > > > >> This, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a > > > > ground > > > > >> to > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> take > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> part > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> preconceptions: > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> grammarian > > > > >> Langacker on > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> domains, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> particularly > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> full of > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> imagination > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > >> temporality: > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic > > > > >> structure), which > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> I > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> both > > > > >> individual > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < > > > > >> lpscholar2@gmail.com> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third > > > *space* > > > > >> and the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> his > > > > >> notion of > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is > > > > >> explored under > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > >> modalities > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of > > > knowing > > > > >> that is > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [perceived??] > > > if > > > > >> we > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> think > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *style* Larry On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> HENRY SHONERD < > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> say how > > > > >> jazzed up > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> I > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> am > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind > > > > as > > > > >> Larry > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> various > > > > >> triads, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> finally > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notebooks > > > > of > > > > >> the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> mind, as > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, > > > luega > > > > >> pa? > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> fuera. > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole < > > > mcole@ucsd.edu> > > > > >> wrote: > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, > > > attached > > > > >> are two > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT > > > > theorists > > > > >> like > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of > > > > >> imagination in a > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of > > > > >> productive > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no > > > > >> intention of > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> doing > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the > > > > >> attached > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these > > > philosophers, > > > > I > > > > >> came > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> upon > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> closely > > > > >> linked at > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> several > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, > > > > >> Ettienne and I > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a > > > means > > > > of > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> access > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander > > Suvorov. > > > > >> Moreover, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> such > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct > > > > relevance > > > > >> to > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Kris's > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to > > > > >> concerns > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> about > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in > > > development. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. > > > > Perhaps > > > > >> they > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> will > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural > > > > >> science > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with an > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> -- > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > > > science > > > > >> with an > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> -- > > > > >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > > > > >>>>>>>>>> science > > > > >> with an > > > > >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>> > > > > >>> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > Assistant Professor > > > Department of Anthropology > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > Brigham Young University > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From arazfar@uic.edu Sun Dec 21 07:43:25 2014 From: arazfar@uic.edu (Aria Razfar) Date: Sun, 21 Dec 2014 09:43:25 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology In-Reply-To: References: <039801d01a33$3db3c430$b91b4c90$@uic.edu> <38C43AE248831048B6AF57F364680D3C72A23DDA@OC11EXPO32.exchange.mit.edu> <040801d01a41$4b69dd90$e23d98b0$@uic.edu> <0CBE4C26-68FE-49F7-BE9F-00A0121B4CD8@uniandes.edu.co> <043e01d01a44$b15fac80$141f0580$@uic.edu> <1D18C3B0-9EA5-42E6-8764-A6973960B8B5@uniandes.edu.co> <050701d01a51$084de460$18e9ad20$@uic.edu> <38C43AE248831048B6AF57F364680D3C72A23F69@OC11EXPO32.exchange.mit.edu> <057001d01a5d$d743a640$85caf2c0$@uic.edu> Message-ID: <061001d01d34$dc790d10$956b2730$@uic.edu> Greg, The topic that seemed to interest him most about Vygotsky was "inner speech" and its connection to culture, social activities and even history. The representation of Chomsky's "nativist" position in sociocultural literature seems to be decontextualized, acultural, and ahistorical, and to some degree rightfully so. Although he would include culture, social activity, and even history as part of "stable cognitive elements" and are definitely "more than habits" which was the main goal of his writings in the 50s and 60s. He sees his goal and Vygotsky's goal of arguing for creativity to be the same although in two different contexts. It was clear to me that he doesn't see the controversies, at least not the same way post "social turn" scholars and self-proclaimed Chomskians have framed it. He sees his views of language and cognition as very much compatible with Vygotsky's insights, especially the ones he's read closely. It's been years since he's written about these topics, so unfortunately there isn't a paper. His take on the roots of the "controversies" and the subsequent careers built on it are "quite interesting." Did you have any specific questions? Aria Aria Razfar, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Literacy, Language, and Culture Director of Graduate Studies, Curriculum and Instruction University of Illinois at Chicago 1040 W. Harrison St. M/C 147 Chicago, IL, 60607 Director of English Learning through Mathematics, Science and Action Research (ELMSA) www.elmsa.org Webpage: http://education.uic.edu/personnel/faculty/aria-razfar-phd Tel: 312-413-8373 Fax: 312-996-8134 -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson Sent: Thursday, December 18, 2014 10:54 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology ?Aria, Any updates to report on Professor Chomsky's take on Vygotsky? -greg? On Wed, Dec 17, 2014 at 5:59 PM, Aria Razfar wrote: > > > Hi Martin, > > See below. He finds Vygotsky's work "quite interesting." Let's see if > he elaborates. I find his persepctive on the "Linguistic Wars" also > interesting. > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistics_Wars > > Aria > > -----Original Message----- > From: Noam Chomsky [mailto:chomsky@mit.edu] > Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 6:09 PM > To: Aria Razfar > Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology > > The "linguistic wars" are largely an invention of overheated > imaginations of those who thought they were fighting them. If you > check the record you'll discover that I barely participated, and > didn't consider them any different from interchanges within what's > claimed to be "my side" of the non-existent wars. > > Vygotsky did quite interesting work. > > -----Original Message----- > From: Aria Razfar [mailto:arazfar@uic.edu] > Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 6:28 PM > To: Noam Chomsky > Cc: arazfar@uic.edu > Subject: FW: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology > > See question below re: "opinion on Vygotsky"? > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John > Packer > Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 5:12 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology > > Since we have Professor Chomsky online, might we be able to ask him > his opinion of Vygotsky? > > Martin > > On Dec 17, 2014, at 4:59 PM, Aria Razfar wrote: > > > Hi Martin, > > > > Metaphor was my take and other cognitive linguist's take (i.e. > > Lakoff). I believe his rejection of "Metaphor" at least in the > > embodied cognition sense is rooted in the "Linguistics Wars." > > Several people in this thread as well others in the field of > > cognitive linguistics made the claim that he was and remains a > > Cartesian dualist. He definitely does not consider himself as such. > > In order to establish the field of linguistics, he had to position > > it within the broader arch of western enlightenment and romanticism. > > Hence, the title of > the book. > > > > Aria > > > > Aria Razfar, Ph.D. > > Associate Professor of Literacy, Language, and Culture Director of > > Graduate Studies, Curriculum and Instruction University of Illinois > > at Chicago > > 1040 W. Harrison St. M/C 147 > > Chicago, IL, 60607 > > > > Director of English Learning through Mathematics, Science and Action > > Research (ELMSA) www.elmsa.org > > > > Webpage: http://education.uic.edu/personnel/faculty/aria-razfar-phd > > Tel: 312-413-8373 > > Fax: 312-996-8134 > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John > > Packer > > Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 3:47 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology > > > > Hi Aria, > > > > It would help to see the message that Noam is responding to! I don't > > see, for example, how metaphor crept into this discussion. > > (Actually, looking back through the thread, I see that this was your > > proposal.) > > > > I suppose a lot depends on what one means by being "a Cartesian." As > > I just wrote in another message, Chomsky was, I think, positioning > > his approach to linguistics in a tradition in which Descartes was > > prominent: in which one tries to figure out what makes possible a > > specific characteristic or ability of the mind. Chomsky asked what > > universal competence would be necessary to make language possible - > > any > language. > > > > I'm not trying to attach a label to the man; but he give the book > > its title for a reason, and a very respectable one. > > > > Martin > > > > On Dec 17, 2014, at 4:34 PM, Aria Razfar wrote: > > > >> Here is Chomsky's response to whether or not he is a Cartesian. Not > > surprisingly, he categorically rejects the idea of "metaphor" as well. > > At least he's open to change. Now whether our subject is dead or > > alive that is a different question. > >> > >> Aria > >> > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: Noam Chomsky [mailto:chomsky@mit.edu] > >> Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 3:16 PM > >> To: Aria Razfar > >> Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology > >> > >> The reason for the phrase "Cartesian linguistics" was explained > >> very > > clearly in the opening pages of the book. No one who read at least > > that far could believe that I am "a Cartesian," let alone anyone who > > read farther. I can't account for the illiteracy of "notable folks." > >> > >> It's also not a metaphor. Rather, exactly as I described it, which > >> I > > would repeat verbatim today. > >> > >> There's no need to argue against "mind-body dualism." As I've > >> discussed > > repeatedly, Newton's discoveries terminated the thesis, at least in > > its classical form, through Descartes and beyond. > >> > >> Of course I've changed my views since the '50s and '60s, in fact in > >> the > > past few months. That's normal in subjects that are not dead. > >> > >> Noam Chomsky > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > > > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From carolmacdon@gmail.com Sun Dec 21 07:55:46 2014 From: carolmacdon@gmail.com (Carol Macdonald) Date: Sun, 21 Dec 2014 17:55:46 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors In-Reply-To: References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> Message-ID: Hi A small piece of info about Labov. At the height of the psychologists' theory of deficit, the linguists and sociolinguists came to the fore with a profoundly important observation of difference. No language has a deficit. As you know, Labov did a partial replication of the deficit situation. The big white man into an interview with a small black child, and performed dysmally. However, Labov has set up his own second analysis, by asking the children in the "waiting room" to take care of his white rat. That situation produced an abundance of language. These children were certainly not short of language, not "nonverbal". There was also the problem of the double negative of African American dialect. Psychologists said that a double negative was equal to a positive, and then therefore speakers of AAE were incapable of logical thought. Labov laid out the paradigm of positive and negatives in AAE, to show just how logical it is. As a linguistics student in the early 70s, we were inordinately proud of these linguistic insights. It was the birth of sociolinguists. I apologise for the lack of references for this presentation. Please correct any details. Carol On 21 December 2014 at 17:36, Greg Thompson wrote: > > In the interests of following the recently suggested injunction not to > directly address specific interlocutors, I'll talk in generalities (This > makes it a bit more challenging to have a conversation but it also makes > one think about the extractable and generalizable point that is beyond the > immediate context). > > In my previous post (apologies for drawing on prior context), I neither > suggested nor intended to imply that Orr's work is racist (do intentions > matter when it comes to meaning?). This speaks to some of the difficulties > of talking about issues of race. And in this connection let's not forget > the fact that this list-serve is dominated by white men - that doesn't mean > that we are necessarily racist but it does mean that we are likely to be > ignorant of many aspects of these issues. > > Nonetheless, I believe that we can overcome our ignorance through > education, by learning more about the issues - even when it comes to trying > to understand cultures and languages that we did not grow up with. And > while I think that there is good evidence for the linguistic relativity > hypothesis, I do not believe that language is a determining influence in > ALL thinking (Whorf uses the term "habitual" to describe the type of > thinking that is most susceptible to the influence of language). That means > that even if you don't speak AAE, you can still study it and even come to > understand how the grammatical forms lend themselves to particular ways of > understanding the world (this is what linguistic anthropology is all > about!). > > And this is my concern with Orr's work. With all academic work, I think it > is worth considering questions like "How would racists take up our > research?" In the case of Orr's work, my sense is that racists could easily > take up her research to argue (perhaps even by using the linguistic > relativity hypothesis) that AAE speakers are unable to do complex > mathematical thinking. This is why I would think that it is important to > give a positive articulation of what AAE does as a language. It is > certainly important to understand what it CAN'T do (e.g., help one learn > math in a particular way), but it is equally important to understand what > it CAN do. > > As Paul points out, Labov has done some of the work addressing this. But > note that Labov's work was done 40 years ago and no one has sought to > replicate or do any kind of similar work. What gives? > > -greg > > > > > -greg > > On Sat, Dec 20, 2014 at 11:37 PM, David H Kirshner wrote: > > > Greg, > > > > I'm delighted that you're familiar with and appreciative of Orr's work. > > > > Cleary she didn't provide "serious consideration of how AAE speakers > > actually use prepositions"--she couldn't have, as she was not a native > > speaker of Black English dialect, and she was not a linguist. But I'm not > > sure how paying serious attention to technical nuances of Black English > > grammar would have helped, as her analyses show that the African American > > students in her classes were not speaking either standard English or > Black > > English Vernacular, but rather a hybrid that arises from their efforts to > > emulate standard English. > > > > Now, it's true her work didn't parallel the approach Gay and Cole took to > > understanding what other psychologists were classifying as linguistic and > > cognitive deficits by carefully studying the native language and culture. > > On the other hand, she did something Gay and Cole didn't do, namely > > micro-analyze the linguistic miscues operating in the classroom, and the > > resultant dilemmas of comprehension this created for her African American > > students. > > > > As the excerpt copied below illustrates, Orr was scrupulously attentive > to > > understanding her students' experience of distance and location given the > > different linguistic setting. And her analyses consistently point to the > > mismatch between the native dialect and the language of instruction as > the > > source of the problems, not the native dialect, itself. To label this > work > > as implicitly racist, I think cedes too much to those who mistrust > science > > as a tool of the oppressor, and whose only locus of attention is the > > history and legacy of social injustice. Even now, in this discussion, we > > are missing the point. The major significance of Orr's work is not that > > differences in grammatical structure have semantic implications. This is > > merely a window to the dramatic realization that semantics are written > into > > grammatical form. > > > > David > > > > Excerpt from Orr (1987): > > > > "Jane gives us in these diagrams a glimpse into the kinds of mental > images > > she constructs when she is using the single symbol length, representing > > both location and distance, as a tool with which to think. Even the > > diagrams Jane drew for problems 13 and 14 begin to be less > incomprehensible > > if one attempts to construct in one's own mind images of the information > > given in these problems, while adhering to the requirement that length be > > used to represent both location and distance. They can be seen as > possible > > consequents or extensions of the symbol length when it is used to > represent > > both location and distance. Consider, for instance, the mental images one > > might construct in responding to problem 13: Two cities, both represented > > by line segments, are equal distances (that is, equal line segments) > closer > > to a third city (another line segment) than two other cities (line > > segments) are. The first two cities must be represented by equal line > > segments because they are equal distances closer to the third city than > the > > other two cities are. And these other two cities must also be represented > > by equal line segments because they are equal distances from the third > > city. One can see that Jane's diagrams are not as lacking in reason as > they > > may initially have appeared to be. > > > > "Jane's diagrams suggest the possibility that when words, or symbols are > > used as instruments with which to think, the use in one language of a > > single symbol in contexts where a second language requires two or more > can > > lead a speaker of the first language to arrive at a different mental > > construct of some given information from that arrived at by a speaker of > > the second language. Or, as in Jane's attempt to handle problem 14, the > > result may be an inability to arrive at a workable mental construct at > > all." (p. 25) > > > > [Note, this excerpt is part of a longer segment I emailed on Dec. 19 that > > shows Jane's diagrams that Orr is referring to.] > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson > > Sent: Saturday, December 20, 2014 3:14 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors > > > > The issues that are raised by Orr are indeed important ones. I am a fan > of > > her work as it points to important differences in language usage among > AAE > > speakers. I agree that she shouldn't have been condemned for pointing out > > these differences (particularly considering how important it is for > > teachers to understand the consequences of these differences). If you > want > > to help AAE speaking students do better on standardized tests, then you > > absolutely need to pay attention to these differences. > > > > My one concern here is that I do feel like there is a problem of deficit > > thinking that is at least implied in her work (and maybe "implied" is too > > strong a term - maybe it's just that she doesn't provide evidence to > > discourage us from this view). What we don't see in this book is any > > serious consideration of how AAE speakers actually use prepositions - > e.g., > > the ways of using language that exist in the community of AAE speakers. > > This gives Orr's work a feel somewhat like the studies of math among the > > Kpelle studied by Gay and Cole in the pre-early days of LCHC (see wiki > for > > more: http://lchcfestschrift.wikispaces.com/Chapter+1). Before they > > showed > > up on the scene, everyone had assumed that the Kpelle (Liberia) couldn't > > comprehend basic math concepts b.c. they weren't learning it in the ways > > that it was being taught (and perhaps there were even linguistic > relativity > > arguments that pointed to this). Rather then continuing to pluck these > > folks out of context and run them through various types of experiments, > Gay > > and Cole "explicitly began with the assumption that "we must know more > > about the indigenous mathematics so that we can build effective bridges > to > > the new mathematics that we are trying to introduce"" > > >From their research, they found that the Kpelle actually had high > > competence with complex mathematical problems (e.g., estimating volumes). > > As they write: > > "Overall, the data suggested that no generalized lack of mathematical, > > perceptual, or problem solving abilities stood in the way of mathematics > > education. When the materials and procedures used in assessment tasks > were > > designed to match closely valued local practices, lack of ability could > be > > replaced by apparent special ability. At the same time, schooling did > > appear to influence performance in tasks that were routinely used to > > measure cognitive development." > > So I think I would be more comfortable with Orr's work if she were to > have > > included this kind of rich understanding of usage in context and how > > prepositions actually are used among AAE speakers. > > > > This points to a larger question that might be irksome to some folks, but > > the question regards the extent to which mathematical language is > > predicated upon a particular form of what Whorf called "Standard Average > > European." In short, the idea here is that Math has a history and a > > culture. This doesn't mean that it is useless or a waste of time, just > that > > it is a particular way of encountering the world that is good for > > particular things and not for others. > > > > I think we've gone round this mulberry bush before, but that was just > more > > grist for the mill (I prefer my metaphors mixed!). > > > > -greg > > > > > > > > > > > > On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 8:46 PM, David H Kirshner > dkirsh@lsu.edu>> wrote: > > > > > > The topic of how grammatical form relates to meaning calls to mind the > > > groundbreaking work of Eleanor Orr--whom you've probably never heard of > > on > > > account of the fact that her work was condemned by a > politically-correct > > > faction of race-conscious sociolinguists who decided her analysis of > > Black > > > English Vernacular could too easily be appropriated into racist > > discourses > > > about language deficiency. > > > > > > Orr was a Washington DC area teacher and principal in the 1970s and > > 1980s, > > > who traced math difficulties of her African American students to subtle > > > grammatical differences between Black English dialect and standard > > English. > > > Her 1987 book goes into compelling detail to support the thesis that > the > > > meaning structure of basic mathematical terms is embedded in the > > > grammatical setting in which those terms are expressed. For instance, > the > > > meaning of "distance" is embedded in the grammatical structure > "distance > > > from _________ to __________" where the place-holders hold locations; > if > > > you don't have that grammatical structure, and you're in a linguistic > > > environment in which that structure is assumed, you're likely not going > > to > > > be able to gain full access to the concept. > > > > > > The attached excerpts from her book--ignore the Forward, unless you'd > > like > > > some context--reveal some of her students' bizarre conceptions of > > distance > > > (and other basic mathematical concepts) as revealed in their diagrams. > > Her > > > approach involves linguistic analysis of sentences produced by her > > African > > > American students that she reads as collapsed versions of standard > > English > > > sentences, with differences in prepositional structure being > highlighted > > > (but other grammatical elements also are indicated). > > > > > > This work cuts against the grain of anything going on in mathematics > > > education. The Piagetian view that dominates that field holds that > basic > > > concepts come about from reflection on our actions in our engagement > with > > > the material world. When language enters the conversation, it's with > > > respect to semantic structure; to my knowledge, nobody's ever > implicated > > > syntax directly in basic quantitative understanding. > > > > > > This work is particularly interesting to me in connection with my > > > 21-year-old son who is autistic, and whose grammatical function is > > severely > > > impaired. He has a decent vocabulary, but unless the setting for the > > > conversation provides contextual clues, he can't piece together how the > > > semantic elements are linked to one another. It is only recently that > it > > > occurred to me his lack of a secure sense of basic quantitative terms > > like > > > "more" and "less" may be rooted in his grammatical incapacities. > > > > > > The XMCA discussion, thus far, has touched on grammar with respect to > > > lexical items such as prepositions. But we've not yet tied that to the > > > grammatical forms that embed those lexical items. I'm very curious as > to > > > whether that further connection can be made. > > > > > > David Kirshner > > > > > > Orr, E., W. (1987). Twice as less: Black English and the performance of > > > black students in mathematics and science. New York: W. W. Norton & > > Company. > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg > > > Sent: Friday, December 19, 2014 3:06 PM > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors > > > > > > Yes, Haliday is essentially a Whorfian, and that's one of things that > > > brings him close to Vygotsky. (Compare, for example, Chomsky, who is > > > essentially anti-developmental in his ideas about language, and who now > > > rejects the leading role played by social communication and says that > > > communication is epiphenomenal to language, whose original purpose is > > > thought.) For Sapir, and for Whorf, in the beginning of every major > > > onotogenetic, sociogenetic, and even phylogenetic change in language > > there > > > has to be some change in the nature of communication. > > > > > > So what Andy says about the lack of the basis of modern science in Hopi > > > applies perfectly well to English. When we read the scientific writings > > of > > > Chaucer on the astrolabe, for example, we do not see words like > > > "reflection", "refraction" or "alignment". Chaucer uses words like > > "bounce > > > off", "bend through", and "line up" (note the use of prepositions, > > > Helena!). Where did these words come from, and how did they make > > scientific > > > English possible? > > > > > > Most of us have no problem saying that Isaac Newton discovered the laws > > of > > > gravitation. But it's only a slight exaggeration to say that what he > > really > > > discovered was the meaning potential of words like "gravitation". > Gravity > > > is, of course, not a thing at all; that is, it's not an entity, but > > rather > > > a process, the process of falling down, or falling in (preps, again!). > So > > > how and above all why does it become an entity? > > > > > > It's interesting to compare Newton's writings on optics with Chaucer's > on > > > the astrolabe. The "Opticks" has a fixed format that we recognize > almost > > > instantly today: Newton describes his equipment (the prism and the dark > > > room); he then narrates his method as a kind of recipe ("First, I did > > this; > > > then I did that") and draws conclusions, which he then formulates in > > > mathematical terms (this is essentially the format of Vygotsky's > lectures > > > on pedology, so much so that when translating them we had some trouble > > > determining the precise moment when Vygotsky turns to the blackboard to > > > write his conclusion in the form of a law). > > > > > > In order to get them into mathematical shape, though, he has to make > > > sentences that look a lot like equations. "The plumpness of the lens > > yields > > > a greater refraction of the light", "The reflection of the light from > the > > > glass results of the light striking the flatness of the glass" "The > > > curvature of the spectacle glass supplies the lacking plumpness of the > > > eye". In each of these, a quality or a process which would normally be > > > realized as an adjective or a verb is suddenly realized by a noun, > > creating > > > an imaginary entity. > > > > > > That's grammatical metaphor. Something that is "canonically" realized > by > > a > > > verb ("to grow") is suddenly realized nominally ("growth"), or > something > > > that is canonically a quality ('red") is realized verbally ("redden"). > We > > > even find related clauses realized as verbs ("She did not know the > rules. > > > So she died" is realized by "Death was brought about through > ignorance", > > > all of these examples from Halliday). In fact, the Genetic Law that > > > Vygotsky formulates in "Mind in Society" ("Every higher mental function > > is > > > realized on two planes....") is really just one instance of grammatical > > > metaphor. > > > > > > One of Chomsky's best known arguments for the radical innateness > > > hypothesis is this. If I take a sentence like "Students who do not do > > their > > > homework do not do well" and I want to make a question, how do I know > > which > > > "do" to move to the front? Chomsky assumes that this knowledge is > > > essentially innate; it is part of universal grammar. But you can see > that > > > "Do students who do not do their homework do well?" can be built up > > through > > > a process of what we might call "discourse metaphor"--whereby clauses > > stand > > > for > > > exchanges: > > > > > > Mother: You did your homework, didn't you? > > > Child: No. > > > Mother: You didn't do your homework? Did you do well? > > > Child: No. > > > Mother: You didn't do well? > > > Child: No. > > > Mother: You didn't do you homework so you didn't do well. Do the other > > > students do well? > > > Child: Some of them. > > > Mother: Who does well? Do students who do not do their homework do > well? > > > > > > And this of course explains why wh-items like "who" and 'why" have two > > > functions--one inside a clause, where it expresses an intra-mental > > function > > > (grammar) and one between them where it expresses an inter-mental > > function > > > (discourse). > > > > > > I realize that grammatical metaphor will seem rather dry and abstract > and > > > unpoetic to people who assume that metaphor is only of the lexical > kind. > > > But to me, and I think to most children, it is far far more powerful > and > > > far more important developmentally. In some ways, it's the lexical > > metaphor > > > that is responsible for the disenchantment of the child's world, while > > the > > > grammatical metaphor infinitely expands it. (And here, I'm afraid, I > must > > > stop--it's time for breakfast and anyway my one screen is used up!) > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > > > > > , or "the > > > > > > . He > > > > > > On 19 December 2014 at 15:15, Greg Thompson > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > Helena and David, > > > > I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the > so-called > > > > authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred tradition > > > > to > > > > Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi notion > > > > of "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including English) > > > > notion of "time" and how each of these languages offers different > > > > affordances of meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual > > > > understanding, English has a much more reified/objectified/entified > > > > sense of time. (btw, I think the first paragraph is easier to follow > > > > than the second - and in that first paragraph you'll find our old > > friend > > > "imagination"). > > > > David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to? > > > > -greg > > > > > > > > Taken from: > > > > > > > > > http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/mousesite/Second > > > > ary/Whorfframe2.html > > > > > > > > " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, sunset" > are > > > > with us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from > other > > > nouns. > > > > They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in > winter" > > > > just as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are pluralized > > > > and numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. Our > > > > thought about the referents of such words hence becomes objectified. > > > > Without objectification, it would be a subjective experience of real > > > > time, i.e. of the consciousness of "becoming later and later"--simply > > > > a cyclic phase similar to an earlier phase in that > ever-later-becoming > > > > duration. Only by imagination can such a cyclic phase be set beside > > > > another and another in the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually > > > > perceived) configuration. "But such is the power of linguistic > analogy > > > that we do so objectify cyclic phasing. > > > > We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g., > > > "phasing." > > > > And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting > > > > binomial formula of formless item plus form, is so general that it is > > > > implicit for all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless items > > > > like "substance, matter," by which we can fill out the binomial for > an > > > > enormously wide range of nouns. But even these are not quite > > > > generalized enough to take in our phase nouns. So for the phase nouns > > we > > > have made a formless item, "time." > > > > We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, in > the > > > > pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" in > > > > the pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can say > > > > and think "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." Let > me > > > > again point out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of milk" > > > > or "a piece of cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a > > > > summer" actually contains or consists of such-and-such a quantity of > > > "time." > > > > > > > > In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., are > not > > > > nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They are > a > > > > formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, and > > > > even other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a > > > > locative pattern, like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It contains > > > > no morpheme like one of "in the house" or "at the tree." It means > > > > "when it is morning" or "while morning-phase is occurring." These > > > > "temporal s" are not used as subjects or objects, or at all like > > > > nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" or "summer is hot"; > summer > > > > is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions are hot, WHEN heat occurs. > > > > One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or "summer > recently." > > > > There is no objectification, as a region, an extent, a quantity, of > > > > the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested about time > > > > except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no basis > > > here for a formless item answering to our "time." " > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Helena Worthen > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to this: > > > > > > > > > > "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton > > > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to > create > > > > > sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly > > > > > productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific > > > > > writing and thinking today." > > > > > > > > > > Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I lose you > > > > > when > > > > you > > > > > say "created to talk about gravity as an entity". > > > > > > > > > > Thank you, > > > > > > > > > > Helena > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Helena Worthen > > > > > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > > > > > > > > On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > As Helena points out, prepositions are from the "grammatical" end > > > > > > of > > > > what > > > > > > Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what > > > > > > Halliday > > > > calls > > > > > > "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they have > > > > > > three properties that words from the more "lexical" end do not > > have: > > > > > > > > > > > > a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You can, > > > > > actually, > > > > > > but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you invent a new > > > > > > name > > > > > or a > > > > > > new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can). > > > > > > > > > > > > b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific semantic > > > > > > field > > > > > (the > > > > > > way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of > > > > linguistics) > > > > > > but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are used. > > > > > > > > > > > > c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the same > > > > effect, > > > > > > which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your argument" the > > "in" > > > > has > > > > > > more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in "there's a fly > > > > > > in > > > > your > > > > > > tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in Henry's > > > > > > hands, > > > > > refer > > > > > > to a book or even a footnote. > > > > > > > > > > > > Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties pretty > > > > > > much define the difference between learning and development, at > > > > > > least as I understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on > > > > > > functions indefinitely while development works by reorganizing > the > > > > > > closed set of functions you already have into new systems. > > > > > > Learning is skill specific and local, while development is quite > > > global in its implications. > > > > > Learning > > > > > > is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new systems, > > > > > > while development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary (and > > > > > > forget it > > > > just > > > > > > as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes away. > > > > > > > > > > > > For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of blue > > > > > > that > > > > > people > > > > > > call the sky") are simply metaphors from the non-productive end > of > > > > > > the lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are crisp, > > > > > > concrete, and vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the > > > > > > nominalizations that > > > > Newton > > > > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to > > > > > > create sentences that look like mathematical equations, are > highly > > > > > > productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific > > > > > > writing and > > > > thinking > > > > > > today. For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical metaphor is > the > > > > third > > > > > > great moment in child development (after the break into mother > > > > > > tongue > > > > and > > > > > > the break into disciplinary language in school work). > > > > > > > > > > > > Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" implies > > > > > > zero dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two ("on a > > > > > > line', 'on a > > > > > > plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because they > are > > > > > > grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them with > time: > > > > > > 'at > > > > a > > > > > > point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. Compare: "at > > > > > > Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very day), and > > > > > > "in Christmas' (season). > > > > > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > > > > > On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen > > > > > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial > > > > > >> relationships from the concrete material world into the > > > > > >> conceptual imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 > common > > > > > >> ones, and > > > > > between 70 > > > > > >> and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far > as" > > > > > >> -- > > > > > this > > > > > >> is according to > > > > > >> https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm > > > > ). > > > > > >> We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. Apparently, > > > > > >> in English, they evolved from and did the job done by > inflections > > > > > >> in > > > > parent > > > > > >> languages, examples being cases and tenses. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection > > > > > >> like the dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial > > > > > >> relationships > > > > > suggested > > > > > >> by contemporary prepositions. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about this. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Helena Worthen > > > > > >> helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > > > >> > > > > > >> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > > > > >> > > > > > >>> I'm with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly > > > > embodied, > > > > > >> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to > > > > > >> linguistics > > > > > (For > > > > > >> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on > > > > "lexicon": > > > > > >> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, > > > > > >> being > > > > > part > > > > > >> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and > > > > > >> Halliday > > > > > see no > > > > > >> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, > > > lexico-grammar. > > > > > (Lo > > > > > >> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar, > > > > > >> adding > > > > > the > > > > > >> "n". The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings > are > > > > great > > > > > >> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of > > > > > >> that? In translation from Russian is word coining ever > practiced? > > > > > >>> Henry > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the > > > > metaphorical > > > > > >> use of prepositions like: > > > > > >>>> - "there is some value IN your argument" > > > > > >>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again" > > > > > >>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" > > > > > >>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again" > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> and so on. > > > > > >>>> Andy > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > -------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > > ---- > > > > > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > > > > > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> larry smolucha wrote: > > > > > >>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself - > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic > > > > > possibilities: > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published > in > > > > > Thought > > > > > >>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into > > > > English > > > > > >> 1962] > > > > > >>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the > 'additive' > > > > value > > > > > >> of the > > > > > >>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech > > > > > vocalization). > > > > > >>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements > that > > > > > >>>>> are > > > > > >> flammable > > > > > >>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable > nor > > > > > >>>>> a > > > > gas. > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century > > > > > >>>>> European > > > > > >> Developmental > > > > > >>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' > > > > > >>>>> hence > > > > > the > > > > > >>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of > > > > Piaget's > > > > > >> Genetic > > > > > >>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and > > > > > >>>>> synthesis > > > > > >> based on > > > > > >>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in > > > > > >>>>> Vygotsky's > > > > > >> example of H2O. > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com > > > > > >>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > >>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 > > > > > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be > synergistic > > > > > >>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the > > > parts. > > > > > >>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more > > > > > >>>>>> than > > > > the > > > > > >>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can > > > > > >>>>>> ever > > > > be > > > > > >> imagined" > > > > > >>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> A couple things to consider: > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination > > > > > >>>>>> as the > > > > > >> brain has > > > > > >>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the > > > > > >>>>>> simplest > > > > level > > > > > >> of the Gestalt > > > > > >>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). > > > > > >>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just > > > > photographic. > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try > > > > > >>>>>> to > > > > > >> accurately reproduce > > > > > >>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. > Whereas, > > > > > >>>>>> the > > > > > >> goal of combinatory > > > > > >>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, > > > > > >>>>>> dreams, > > > > > >> musings, and even > > > > > >>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of > > > > objects > > > > > >> and symbols. > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different > ways > > > > > >>>>>> that > > > > > >> things and concepts can be > > > > > >>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar > > > > > >>>>>> and > > > > > flour. > > > > > >>>>>> I can add water and > > > > > >>>>>> it > > > > > >> dissolves a bit > > > > > >>>>>> But adding heat > > > > > >>>>>> changes > > > > the > > > > > >> combination into a pancake. > > > > > >>>>>> [Is this synergistic?] > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more > > > > > >>>>>> examples > > > > > >> to put the discussion > > > > > >>>>>> in the metaphysical realm. > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 > > > > > >>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > > > >>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the > > > > > >>>>>>> case > > > > > for > > > > > >>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I > > > > > >>>>>>> think > > > > it's > > > > > >> not > > > > > >>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are > > > > > >> associationists who > > > > > >>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary > > > > > >>>>>>> associationism > > > > > >> exists and > > > > > >>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as > > mediation. > > > > > >> Vygotsky > > > > > >>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, > > > > explain > > > > > >> the > > > > > >>>>>>> uniqueness of our species? > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels > > > > > >>>>>>> for > > > > its > > > > > >> own > > > > > >>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a > > > > > >>>>>>> Piagetian perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian > > > > > >>>>>>> one--true maturity > > > > > as a > > > > > >>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more > > > > > >>>>>>> to it > > > > > >> than > > > > > >>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of > > > > > >>>>>>> primate, > > > > > and > > > > > >> our > > > > > >>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon > > > > > >>>>>>> rocks > > > > > in > > > > > >> order > > > > > >>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged > > > > > >>>>>>> the > > > > same > > > > > >> way as > > > > > >>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and > > > > > >>>>>>> for > > > > > >> language is > > > > > >>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human > > > > > >> exceptionalism. > > > > > >>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for > > > > > >>>>>>> the > > > > > >> vanguard role > > > > > >>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, > > > > > prolonging > > > > > >>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after > > > > > >>>>>>> the > > > > sick > > > > > >> and the > > > > > >>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial > > > > > >>>>>>> organs > > > > > >> (tools) and > > > > > >>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for > > > > > >>>>>>> our > > > > > >> species, it > > > > > >>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these > > > > > >> "circuitous, > > > > > >>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that > > > > > >>>>>>> lead > > > > our > > > > > >>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always > > > > > >>>>>>> been > > > > > >> short on > > > > > >>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for > > > > > >>>>>>> material > > > > > >> culture > > > > > >>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another > matter: > > > > > >> verily, here > > > > > >>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of > > > > > >>>>>>> attention is > > > > > >> simply the > > > > > >>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says > > > > > >>>>>>> there are > > > > > >> only two > > > > > >>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So > > > > > >> imagination is > > > > > >>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete > experiences, > > > > > >>>>>>> and > > > > > >> nothing > > > > > >>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when > > > > > >>>>>>> you > > > > > hear > > > > > >> the > > > > > >>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there > > > > > >>>>>>> to be > > > > > >> able to > > > > > >>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work > > > > > >>>>>>> in > > > > word > > > > > >> meaning. > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who > > > > > >>>>>>> was > > > > > given > > > > > >> a > > > > > >>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been > > > > > >>>>>>> mixed > > > > with > > > > > >> silver > > > > > >>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of > > > gold. > > > > > >> Well, we > > > > > >>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not > > > > possible > > > > > to > > > > > >>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that > > > > > >>>>>>> precisely. The > > > > > >> method > > > > > >>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the > > > > > >>>>>>> "principal > > > > of > > > > > >>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes > > > > > >>>>>>> palimpsest, a > > > > > >> velum on > > > > > >>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each > other. > > > > > Because > > > > > >>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and > > > > > >>>>>>> written > > > > over > > > > > >> every > > > > > >>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was > soft, > > > > > >>>>>>> the > > > > > >> pressure > > > > > >>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones > > > > > >>>>>>> when > > > > > the > > > > > >> old > > > > > >>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the > only > > > > known > > > > > >> Greek > > > > > >>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor > their > > > > > >> relationship > > > > > >>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they > > > > > >>>>>>> are > > > > > >> related to > > > > > >>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's > quite > > > > > similar > > > > > >> to the > > > > > >>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> David Kellogg > > > > > >>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > >> wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an > > > > > associationist, > > > > > >> "sees > > > > > >>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention"? > > > > > >>>>>>>> Henry > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg < > > > > dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > > > > > > > > > >> wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the > > > > > >>>>>>>>> division > > > > > >> between > > > > > >>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, > > > > > >>>>>>>>> because > > > > > >> Ribot is > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> an > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal > > > > > >>>>>>>>> form of > > > > > >> attention. > > > > > >>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the > > > > > >>>>>>>>> transition > > > > from > > > > > >> forest > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> to > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division > > > > between > > > > > >> the two > > > > > >>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and > > > > > >>>>>>>>> commonsensical > > > > > >> world of > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> the > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly > > > > > >>>>>>>>> prosaic > > > > uses > > > > > >> in life > > > > > >>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more > > > > > "imaginative" > > > > > >> (that > > > > > >>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world > > > > > >>>>>>>>> of the > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> farm,where > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long > > > > > >>>>>>>>> winter > > > > > >> months are > > > > > >>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to > > > > encounter > > > > > >> talking > > > > > >>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here > > > > > >>>>>>>>> attention > > > > > has > > > > > >> to be > > > > > >>>>>>>>> more voluntary. > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a > > > > > >>>>>>>>> very > > > > clear > > > > > >>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism > that > > > > > >> underpins > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> Ribot > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky > > > > > >>>>>>>>> points > > > > > out > > > > > >> the > > > > > >>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive > > > > > >>>>>>>>> practices > > > > > >> really > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> are > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of > > > > imagination, > > > > > >> there > > > > > >>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between > > > > > >>>>>>>>> human > > > > > and > > > > > >> animal > > > > > >>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly > > > > > >>>>>>>>> capable of > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> volitional > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than > humans). > > > > > Without > > > > > >> a > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> theory > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis > > > > > >>>>>>>>> for > > > > > Ribot's > > > > > >>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological > > > > > >>>>>>>>> functions at > > > > > >> all. > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > > > > > >>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination, > > > > > >> thanks to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> all > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> influential > > > > > >> around the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> time > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. > I > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> had > > > > > >> seen work > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> on > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> equal > > > > > >> reproductive? > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> of > > > > > >> development > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> of > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> being > > > > a > > > > > >> relative > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> bucket > > > > list. > > > > > >> This > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> from > > > > some > > > > > >> weeks > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> in > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > > > >> segmented the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as "met > > > aphorizing". > > > > > >> Puns, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > they > > > > > >> are > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> doing > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his > > > > > >> followers as an > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel, so > > > > > >> its of > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> course > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in > > > > > >> translation, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> seems > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, > > "recollection" > > > > in > > > > > >> this > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> passage, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter > > > > > >> distinction to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "memory." > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary > > > > > >> discourse > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian > > > > > >> colleagues have > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from > > > > theorists > > > > > >> who > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> clearly > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it > was > > > > still > > > > > >> possible > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, > > > > > >> interestingly > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> links > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a > > > > "voluntary" > > > > > >> act. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Parts > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> stuff > > > > > that > > > > > >> was > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> also > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > > >> creativity > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> and > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious > to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> see > > > > > >> that the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> two > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found > > > > himself > > > > > >> writing. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> pretty > > > > > old > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> approaches > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < > > > > > >> ablunden@mira.net> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> but it > > > > > >> may be > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> worth > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> place > > > > to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Imagination > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between > > > > > >> Recollection and > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive > > > > > >> Imagination, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> (2) > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> which > > > > he > > > > > >> says > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> leads > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> other > > > > > >> words, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> the > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is > > > > > >> accomplished > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> through > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >> > > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > -- > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading > Strawson > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > > >> Williams. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists > whose > > > > work i > > > > > >> am > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> trying > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of > > > > > >> productive > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive > > > > imagination > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> develops. > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive > implies > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that > > > > > >> there > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> must > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> be a > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of imagination called UNproductive > imagination. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> But > > > > I > > > > > >> learned > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination > appears > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > is > > > > > >> linked > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > > >> anticipation > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination > > > > > >> (starting > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> look, and > > > > > >> provides > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> a > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as > > > > > fixed. > > > > > >> This, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a > > > > > ground > > > > > >> to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> take > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> part > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> preconceptions: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> grammarian > > > > > >> Langacker on > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> domains, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> particularly > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> full of > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> imagination > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > > >> temporality: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic > > > > > >> structure), which > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> I > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> both > > > > > >> individual > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < > > > > > >> lpscholar2@gmail.com> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third > > > > *space* > > > > > >> and the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> his > > > > > >> notion of > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion > is > > > > > >> explored under > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a > *set* > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > > >> modalities > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of > > > > knowing > > > > > >> that is > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [perceived??] > > > > if > > > > > >> we > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> think > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *style* Larry On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> HENRY SHONERD < > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> say how > > > > > >> jazzed up > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> I > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> am > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, > the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind > > > > > as > > > > > >> Larry > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> various > > > > > >> triads, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> finally > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notebooks > > > > > of > > > > > >> the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> mind, as > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I'll be back! Gap > adentro, > > > > luega > > > > > >> pa' > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> fuera. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole < > > > > mcole@ucsd.edu> > > > > > >> wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, > > > > attached > > > > > >> are two > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT > > > > > theorists > > > > > >> like > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of > > > > > >> imagination in a > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion > of > > > > > >> productive > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have > no > > > > > >> intention of > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> doing > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the > > > > > >> attached > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these > > > > philosophers, > > > > > I > > > > > >> came > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> upon > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> closely > > > > > >> linked at > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> several > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our > naivete, > > > > > >> Ettienne and I > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as > a > > > > means > > > > > of > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> access > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander > > > Suvorov. > > > > > >> Moreover, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> such > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct > > > > > relevance > > > > > >> to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Kris's > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to > > > > > >> concerns > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> about > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in > > > > development. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination > thread. > > > > > Perhaps > > > > > >> they > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> will > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural > > > > > >> science > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with an > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson.pdf> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> -- > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > > > > science > > > > > >> with an > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> -- > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> science > > > > > >> with an > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > > Assistant Professor > > > > Department of Anthropology > > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > > Brigham Young University > > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Sun Dec 21 08:25:19 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Sun, 21 Dec 2014 11:25:19 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors Message-ID: Hi greg, Doing the 1990s, the California school system were discussing using AAE to teach standard english. ?The black middle class went crazy over the issue. There is a gap between academia, which views AAE ?as a distinct linguistic system and the masses, the black middle class of teachers, preachers, and other educated professionals, who are less likely to do so. In my own research it is apparent when you look at standardized test scores and content...black students from the inner cities are not understanding the content. ?I am currently doing field work at an urban school in Florida that is 100 percent black, and the teachers and administration are all black. ?I am looking at the impact that teaching reading via language arts instruction will have on test scores. The school has been an "F" school for the past 5 years. ? The students struggle with vocabulary and understanding author's purpose. ?Testing in Florida starts in the 3rd grade. ?Last year out of the 70 third graders who took the state standardized tests, 10 were proficient in reading...yes 10. ?The state average for proficiency is 65 percent for whites, 34 percent for blacks. ? Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: Greg Thompson
Date:12/21/2014 10:36 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors
In the interests of following the recently suggested injunction not to directly address specific interlocutors, I'll talk in generalities (This makes it a bit more challenging to have a conversation but it also makes one think about the extractable and generalizable point that is beyond the immediate context). In my previous post (apologies for drawing on prior context), I neither suggested nor intended to imply that Orr's work is racist (do intentions matter when it comes to meaning?). This speaks to some of the difficulties of talking about issues of race. And in this connection let's not forget the fact that this list-serve is dominated by white men - that doesn't mean that we are necessarily racist but it does mean that we are likely to be ignorant of many aspects of these issues. Nonetheless, I believe that we can overcome our ignorance through education, by learning more about the issues - even when it comes to trying to understand cultures and languages that we did not grow up with. And while I think that there is good evidence for the linguistic relativity hypothesis, I do not believe that language is a determining influence in ALL thinking (Whorf uses the term "habitual" to describe the type of thinking that is most susceptible to the influence of language). That means that even if you don't speak AAE, you can still study it and even come to understand how the grammatical forms lend themselves to particular ways of understanding the world (this is what linguistic anthropology is all about!). And this is my concern with Orr's work. With all academic work, I think it is worth considering questions like "How would racists take up our research?" In the case of Orr's work, my sense is that racists could easily take up her research to argue (perhaps even by using the linguistic relativity hypothesis) that AAE speakers are unable to do complex mathematical thinking. This is why I would think that it is important to give a positive articulation of what AAE does as a language. It is certainly important to understand what it CAN'T do (e.g., help one learn math in a particular way), but it is equally important to understand what it CAN do. As Paul points out, Labov has done some of the work addressing this. But note that Labov's work was done 40 years ago and no one has sought to replicate or do any kind of similar work. What gives? -greg -greg On Sat, Dec 20, 2014 at 11:37 PM, David H Kirshner wrote: > Greg, > > I'm delighted that you're familiar with and appreciative of Orr's work. > > Cleary she didn't provide "serious consideration of how AAE speakers > actually use prepositions"--she couldn't have, as she was not a native > speaker of Black English dialect, and she was not a linguist. But I'm not > sure how paying serious attention to technical nuances of Black English > grammar would have helped, as her analyses show that the African American > students in her classes were not speaking either standard English or Black > English Vernacular, but rather a hybrid that arises from their efforts to > emulate standard English. > > Now, it's true her work didn't parallel the approach Gay and Cole took to > understanding what other psychologists were classifying as linguistic and > cognitive deficits by carefully studying the native language and culture. > On the other hand, she did something Gay and Cole didn't do, namely > micro-analyze the linguistic miscues operating in the classroom, and the > resultant dilemmas of comprehension this created for her African American > students. > > As the excerpt copied below illustrates, Orr was scrupulously attentive to > understanding her students' experience of distance and location given the > different linguistic setting. And her analyses consistently point to the > mismatch between the native dialect and the language of instruction as the > source of the problems, not the native dialect, itself. To label this work > as implicitly racist, I think cedes too much to those who mistrust science > as a tool of the oppressor, and whose only locus of attention is the > history and legacy of social injustice. Even now, in this discussion, we > are missing the point. The major significance of Orr's work is not that > differences in grammatical structure have semantic implications. This is > merely a window to the dramatic realization that semantics are written into > grammatical form. > > David > > Excerpt from Orr (1987): > > "Jane gives us in these diagrams a glimpse into the kinds of mental images > she constructs when she is using the single symbol length, representing > both location and distance, as a tool with which to think. Even the > diagrams Jane drew for problems 13 and 14 begin to be less incomprehensible > if one attempts to construct in one's own mind images of the information > given in these problems, while adhering to the requirement that length be > used to represent both location and distance. They can be seen as possible > consequents or extensions of the symbol length when it is used to represent > both location and distance. Consider, for instance, the mental images one > might construct in responding to problem 13: Two cities, both represented > by line segments, are equal distances (that is, equal line segments) closer > to a third city (another line segment) than two other cities (line > segments) are. The first two cities must be represented by equal line > segments because they are equal distances closer to the third city than the > other two cities are. And these other two cities must also be represented > by equal line segments because they are equal distances from the third > city. One can see that Jane's diagrams are not as lacking in reason as they > may initially have appeared to be. > > "Jane's diagrams suggest the possibility that when words, or symbols are > used as instruments with which to think, the use in one language of a > single symbol in contexts where a second language requires two or more can > lead a speaker of the first language to arrive at a different mental > construct of some given information from that arrived at by a speaker of > the second language. Or, as in Jane's attempt to handle problem 14, the > result may be an inability to arrive at a workable mental construct at > all." (p. 25) > > [Note, this excerpt is part of a longer segment I emailed on Dec. 19 that > shows Jane's diagrams that Orr is referring to.] > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson > Sent: Saturday, December 20, 2014 3:14 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors > > The issues that are raised by Orr are indeed important ones. I am a fan of > her work as it points to important differences in language usage among AAE > speakers. I agree that she shouldn't have been condemned for pointing out > these differences (particularly considering how important it is for > teachers to understand the consequences of these differences). If you want > to help AAE speaking students do better on standardized tests, then you > absolutely need to pay attention to these differences. > > My one concern here is that I do feel like there is a problem of deficit > thinking that is at least implied in her work (and maybe "implied" is too > strong a term - maybe it's just that she doesn't provide evidence to > discourage us from this view). What we don't see in this book is any > serious consideration of how AAE speakers actually use prepositions - e.g., > the ways of using language that exist in the community of AAE speakers. > This gives Orr's work a feel somewhat like the studies of math among the > Kpelle studied by Gay and Cole in the pre-early days of LCHC (see wiki for > more: http://lchcfestschrift.wikispaces.com/Chapter+1). Before they > showed > up on the scene, everyone had assumed that the Kpelle (Liberia) couldn't > comprehend basic math concepts b.c. they weren't learning it in the ways > that it was being taught (and perhaps there were even linguistic relativity > arguments that pointed to this). Rather then continuing to pluck these > folks out of context and run them through various types of experiments, Gay > and Cole "explicitly began with the assumption that ?we must know more > about the indigenous mathematics so that we can build effective bridges to > the new mathematics that we are trying to introduce?" > >From their research, they found that the Kpelle actually had high > competence with complex mathematical problems (e.g., estimating volumes). > As they write: > "Overall, the data suggested that no generalized lack of mathematical, > perceptual, or problem solving abilities stood in the way of mathematics > education. When the materials and procedures used in assessment tasks were > designed to match closely valued local practices, lack of ability could be > replaced by apparent special ability. At the same time, schooling did > appear to influence performance in tasks that were routinely used to > measure cognitive development." > So I think I would be more comfortable with Orr's work if she were to have > included this kind of rich understanding of usage in context and how > prepositions actually are used among AAE speakers. > > This points to a larger question that might be irksome to some folks, but > the question regards the extent to which mathematical language is > predicated upon a particular form of what Whorf called "Standard Average > European." In short, the idea here is that Math has a history and a > culture. This doesn't mean that it is useless or a waste of time, just that > it is a particular way of encountering the world that is good for > particular things and not for others. > > I think we've gone round this mulberry bush before, but that was just more > grist for the mill (I prefer my metaphors mixed!). > > -greg > > > > > > On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 8:46 PM, David H Kirshner dkirsh@lsu.edu>> wrote: > > > > The topic of how grammatical form relates to meaning calls to mind the > > groundbreaking work of Eleanor Orr--whom you've probably never heard of > on > > account of the fact that her work was condemned by a politically-correct > > faction of race-conscious sociolinguists who decided her analysis of > Black > > English Vernacular could too easily be appropriated into racist > discourses > > about language deficiency. > > > > Orr was a Washington DC area teacher and principal in the 1970s and > 1980s, > > who traced math difficulties of her African American students to subtle > > grammatical differences between Black English dialect and standard > English. > > Her 1987 book goes into compelling detail to support the thesis that the > > meaning structure of basic mathematical terms is embedded in the > > grammatical setting in which those terms are expressed. For instance, the > > meaning of ?distance? is embedded in the grammatical structure ?distance > > from _________ to __________? where the place-holders hold locations; if > > you don?t have that grammatical structure, and you're in a linguistic > > environment in which that structure is assumed, you're likely not going > to > > be able to gain full access to the concept. > > > > The attached excerpts from her book--ignore the Forward, unless you'd > like > > some context--reveal some of her students' bizarre conceptions of > distance > > (and other basic mathematical concepts) as revealed in their diagrams. > Her > > approach involves linguistic analysis of sentences produced by her > African > > American students that she reads as collapsed versions of standard > English > > sentences, with differences in prepositional structure being highlighted > > (but other grammatical elements also are indicated). > > > > This work cuts against the grain of anything going on in mathematics > > education. The Piagetian view that dominates that field holds that basic > > concepts come about from reflection on our actions in our engagement with > > the material world. When language enters the conversation, it's with > > respect to semantic structure; to my knowledge, nobody's ever implicated > > syntax directly in basic quantitative understanding. > > > > This work is particularly interesting to me in connection with my > > 21-year-old son who is autistic, and whose grammatical function is > severely > > impaired. He has a decent vocabulary, but unless the setting for the > > conversation provides contextual clues, he can't piece together how the > > semantic elements are linked to one another. It is only recently that it > > occurred to me his lack of a secure sense of basic quantitative terms > like > > ?more? and ?less? may be rooted in his grammatical incapacities. > > > > The XMCA discussion, thus far, has touched on grammar with respect to > > lexical items such as prepositions. But we've not yet tied that to the > > grammatical forms that embed those lexical items. I'm very curious as to > > whether that further connection can be made. > > > > David Kirshner > > > > Orr, E., W. (1987). Twice as less: Black English and the performance of > > black students in mathematics and science. New York: W. W. Norton & > Company. > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg > > Sent: Friday, December 19, 2014 3:06 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors > > > > Yes, Haliday is essentially a Whorfian, and that's one of things that > > brings him close to Vygotsky. (Compare, for example, Chomsky, who is > > essentially anti-developmental in his ideas about language, and who now > > rejects the leading role played by social communication and says that > > communication is epiphenomenal to language, whose original purpose is > > thought.) For Sapir, and for Whorf, in the beginning of every major > > onotogenetic, sociogenetic, and even phylogenetic change in language > there > > has to be some change in the nature of communication. > > > > So what Andy says about the lack of the basis of modern science in Hopi > > applies perfectly well to English. When we read the scientific writings > of > > Chaucer on the astrolabe, for example, we do not see words like > > "reflection", "refraction" or "alignment". Chaucer uses words like > "bounce > > off", "bend through", and "line up" (note the use of prepositions, > > Helena!). Where did these words come from, and how did they make > scientific > > English possible? > > > > Most of us have no problem saying that Isaac Newton discovered the laws > of > > gravitation. But it's only a slight exaggeration to say that what he > really > > discovered was the meaning potential of words like "gravitation". Gravity > > is, of course, not a thing at all; that is, it's not an entity, but > rather > > a process, the process of falling down, or falling in (preps, again!). So > > how and above all why does it become an entity? > > > > It's interesting to compare Newton's writings on optics with Chaucer's on > > the astrolabe. The "Opticks" has a fixed format that we recognize almost > > instantly today: Newton describes his equipment (the prism and the dark > > room); he then narrates his method as a kind of recipe ("First, I did > this; > > then I did that") and draws conclusions, which he then formulates in > > mathematical terms (this is essentially the format of Vygotsky's lectures > > on pedology, so much so that when translating them we had some trouble > > determining the precise moment when Vygotsky turns to the blackboard to > > write his conclusion in the form of a law). > > > > In order to get them into mathematical shape, though, he has to make > > sentences that look a lot like equations. "The plumpness of the lens > yields > > a greater refraction of the light", "The reflection of the light from the > > glass results of the light striking the flatness of the glass" "The > > curvature of the spectacle glass supplies the lacking plumpness of the > > eye". In each of these, a quality or a process which would normally be > > realized as an adjective or a verb is suddenly realized by a noun, > creating > > an imaginary entity. > > > > That's grammatical metaphor. Something that is "canonically" realized by > a > > verb ("to grow") is suddenly realized nominally ("growth"), or something > > that is canonically a quality ('red") is realized verbally ("redden"). We > > even find related clauses realized as verbs ("She did not know the rules. > > So she died" is realized by "Death was brought about through ignorance", > > all of these examples from Halliday). In fact, the Genetic Law that > > Vygotsky formulates in "Mind in Society" ("Every higher mental function > is > > realized on two planes....") is really just one instance of grammatical > > metaphor. > > > > One of Chomsky's best known arguments for the radical innateness > > hypothesis is this. If I take a sentence like "Students who do not do > their > > homework do not do well" and I want to make a question, how do I know > which > > "do" to move to the front? Chomsky assumes that this knowledge is > > essentially innate; it is part of universal grammar. But you can see that > > "Do students who do not do their homework do well?" can be built up > through > > a process of what we might call "discourse metaphor"--whereby clauses > stand > > for > > exchanges: > > > > Mother: You did your homework, didn't you? > > Child: No. > > Mother: You didn't do your homework? Did you do well? > > Child: No. > > Mother: You didn't do well? > > Child: No. > > Mother: You didn't do you homework so you didn't do well. Do the other > > students do well? > > Child: Some of them. > > Mother: Who does well? Do students who do not do their homework do well? > > > > And this of course explains why wh-items like "who" and 'why" have two > > functions--one inside a clause, where it expresses an intra-mental > function > > (grammar) and one between them where it expresses an inter-mental > function > > (discourse). > > > > I realize that grammatical metaphor will seem rather dry and abstract and > > unpoetic to people who assume that metaphor is only of the lexical kind. > > But to me, and I think to most children, it is far far more powerful and > > far more important developmentally. In some ways, it's the lexical > metaphor > > that is responsible for the disenchantment of the child's world, while > the > > grammatical metaphor infinitely expands it. (And here, I'm afraid, I must > > stop--it's time for breakfast and anyway my one screen is used up!) > > > > David Kellogg > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > , or "the > > > > . He > > > > On 19 December 2014 at 15:15, Greg Thompson > > > wrote: > > > > > Helena and David, > > > I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the so-called > > > authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred tradition > > > to > > > Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi notion > > > of "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including English) > > > notion of "time" and how each of these languages offers different > > > affordances of meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual > > > understanding, English has a much more reified/objectified/entified > > > sense of time. (btw, I think the first paragraph is easier to follow > > > than the second - and in that first paragraph you'll find our old > friend > > "imagination"). > > > David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to? > > > -greg > > > > > > Taken from: > > > > > > http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/mousesite/Second > > > ary/Whorfframe2.html > > > > > > " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, sunset" are > > > with us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from other > > nouns. > > > They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in winter" > > > just as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are pluralized > > > and numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. Our > > > thought about the referents of such words hence becomes objectified. > > > Without objectification, it would be a subjective experience of real > > > time, i.e. of the consciousness of "becoming later and later"--simply > > > a cyclic phase similar to an earlier phase in that ever-later-becoming > > > duration. Only by imagination can such a cyclic phase be set beside > > > another and another in the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually > > > perceived) configuration. "But such is the power of linguistic analogy > > that we do so objectify cyclic phasing. > > > We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g., > > "phasing." > > > And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting > > > binomial formula of formless item plus form, is so general that it is > > > implicit for all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless items > > > like "substance, matter," by which we can fill out the binomial for an > > > enormously wide range of nouns. But even these are not quite > > > generalized enough to take in our phase nouns. So for the phase nouns > we > > have made a formless item, "time." > > > We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, in the > > > pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" in > > > the pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can say > > > and think "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." Let me > > > again point out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of milk" > > > or "a piece of cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a > > > summer" actually contains or consists of such-and-such a quantity of > > "time." > > > > > > In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., are not > > > nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They are a > > > formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, and > > > even other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a > > > locative pattern, like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It contains > > > no morpheme like one of "in the house" or "at the tree." It means > > > "when it is morning" or "while morning-phase is occurring." These > > > "temporal s" are not used as subjects or objects, or at all like > > > nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" or "summer is hot"; summer > > > is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions are hot, WHEN heat occurs. > > > One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or "summer recently." > > > There is no objectification, as a region, an extent, a quantity, of > > > the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested about time > > > except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no basis > > here for a formless item answering to our "time." " > > > > > > > > > > > > On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Helena Worthen > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to this: > > > > > > > > "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton > > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to create > > > > sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly > > > > productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific > > > > writing and thinking today." > > > > > > > > Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I lose you > > > > when > > > you > > > > say "created to talk about gravity as an entity". > > > > > > > > Thank you, > > > > > > > > Helena > > > > > > > > > > > > Helena Worthen > > > > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > > > > > > On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > > > > > > As Helena points out, prepositions are from the "grammatical" end > > > > > of > > > what > > > > > Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what > > > > > Halliday > > > calls > > > > > "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they have > > > > > three properties that words from the more "lexical" end do not > have: > > > > > > > > > > a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You can, > > > > actually, > > > > > but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you invent a new > > > > > name > > > > or a > > > > > new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can). > > > > > > > > > > b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific semantic > > > > > field > > > > (the > > > > > way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of > > > linguistics) > > > > > but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are used. > > > > > > > > > > c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the same > > > effect, > > > > > which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your argument" the > "in" > > > has > > > > > more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in "there's a fly > > > > > in > > > your > > > > > tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in Henry's > > > > > hands, > > > > refer > > > > > to a book or even a footnote. > > > > > > > > > > Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties pretty > > > > > much define the difference between learning and development, at > > > > > least as I understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on > > > > > functions indefinitely while development works by reorganizing the > > > > > closed set of functions you already have into new systems. > > > > > Learning is skill specific and local, while development is quite > > global in its implications. > > > > Learning > > > > > is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new systems, > > > > > while development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary (and > > > > > forget it > > > just > > > > > as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes away. > > > > > > > > > > For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of blue > > > > > that > > > > people > > > > > call the sky") are simply metaphors from the non-productive end of > > > > > the lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are crisp, > > > > > concrete, and vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the > > > > > nominalizations that > > > Newton > > > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to > > > > > create sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly > > > > > productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific > > > > > writing and > > > thinking > > > > > today. For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical metaphor is the > > > third > > > > > great moment in child development (after the break into mother > > > > > tongue > > > and > > > > > the break into disciplinary language in school work). > > > > > > > > > > Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" implies > > > > > zero dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two ("on a > > > > > line', 'on a > > > > > plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because they are > > > > > grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them with time: > > > > > 'at > > > a > > > > > point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. Compare: "at > > > > > Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very day), and > > > > > "in Christmas' (season). > > > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > > > On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen > > > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > >> > > > > >> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial > > > > >> relationships from the concrete material world into the > > > > >> conceptual imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 common > > > > >> ones, and > > > > between 70 > > > > >> and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far as" > > > > >> -- > > > > this > > > > >> is according to > > > > >> https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm > > > ). > > > > >> We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. Apparently, > > > > >> in English, they evolved from and did the job done by inflections > > > > >> in > > > parent > > > > >> languages, examples being cases and tenses. > > > > >> > > > > >> But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection > > > > >> like the dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial > > > > >> relationships > > > > suggested > > > > >> by contemporary prepositions. > > > > >> > > > > >> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about this. > > > > >> > > > > >> Helena Worthen > > > > >> helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > > >> > > > > >> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > > > >> > > > > >>> I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly > > > embodied, > > > > >> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to > > > > >> linguistics > > > > (For > > > > >> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on > > > ?lexicon?: > > > > >> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, > > > > >> being > > > > part > > > > >> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and > > > > >> Halliday > > > > see no > > > > >> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, > > lexico-grammar. > > > > (Lo > > > > >> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar, > > > > >> adding > > > > the > > > > >> ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings are > > > great > > > > >> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of > > > > >> that? In translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced? > > > > >>> Henry > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden > > > > wrote: > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the > > > metaphorical > > > > >> use of prepositions like: > > > > >>>> - "there is some value IN your argument" > > > > >>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again" > > > > >>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" > > > > >>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again" > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> and so on. > > > > >>>> Andy > > > > >>>> > > > > -------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > ---- > > > > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > > > > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> larry smolucha wrote: > > > > >>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself - > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic > > > > possibilities: > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in > > > > Thought > > > > >>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into > > > English > > > > >> 1962] > > > > >>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' > > > value > > > > >> of the > > > > >>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech > > > > vocalization). > > > > >>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that > > > > >>>>> are > > > > >> flammable > > > > >>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor > > > > >>>>> a > > > gas. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century > > > > >>>>> European > > > > >> Developmental > > > > >>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' > > > > >>>>> hence > > > > the > > > > >>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of > > > Piaget's > > > > >> Genetic > > > > >>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and > > > > >>>>> synthesis > > > > >> based on > > > > >>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in > > > > >>>>> Vygotsky's > > > > >> example of H2O. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com > > > > >>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > >>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 > > > > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic > > > > >>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the > > parts. > > > > >>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more > > > > >>>>>> than > > > the > > > > >>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can > > > > >>>>>> ever > > > be > > > > >> imagined" > > > > >>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> A couple things to consider: > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination > > > > >>>>>> as the > > > > >> brain has > > > > >>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the > > > > >>>>>> simplest > > > level > > > > >> of the Gestalt > > > > >>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). > > > > >>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just > > > photographic. > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try > > > > >>>>>> to > > > > >> accurately reproduce > > > > >>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, > > > > >>>>>> the > > > > >> goal of combinatory > > > > >>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, > > > > >>>>>> dreams, > > > > >> musings, and even > > > > >>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of > > > objects > > > > >> and symbols. > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways > > > > >>>>>> that > > > > >> things and concepts can be > > > > >>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar > > > > >>>>>> and > > > > flour. > > > > >>>>>> I can add water and > > > > >>>>>> it > > > > >> dissolves a bit > > > > >>>>>> But adding heat > > > > >>>>>> changes > > > the > > > > >> combination into a pancake. > > > > >>>>>> [Is this synergistic?] > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more > > > > >>>>>> examples > > > > >> to put the discussion > > > > >>>>>> in the metaphysical realm. > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 > > > > >>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > > >>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the > > > > >>>>>>> case > > > > for > > > > >>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I > > > > >>>>>>> think > > > it's > > > > >> not > > > > >>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are > > > > >> associationists who > > > > >>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary > > > > >>>>>>> associationism > > > > >> exists and > > > > >>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as > mediation. > > > > >> Vygotsky > > > > >>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, > > > explain > > > > >> the > > > > >>>>>>> uniqueness of our species? > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels > > > > >>>>>>> for > > > its > > > > >> own > > > > >>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a > > > > >>>>>>> Piagetian perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian > > > > >>>>>>> one--true maturity > > > > as a > > > > >>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more > > > > >>>>>>> to it > > > > >> than > > > > >>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of > > > > >>>>>>> primate, > > > > and > > > > >> our > > > > >>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon > > > > >>>>>>> rocks > > > > in > > > > >> order > > > > >>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged > > > > >>>>>>> the > > > same > > > > >> way as > > > > >>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and > > > > >>>>>>> for > > > > >> language is > > > > >>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human > > > > >> exceptionalism. > > > > >>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for > > > > >>>>>>> the > > > > >> vanguard role > > > > >>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, > > > > prolonging > > > > >>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after > > > > >>>>>>> the > > > sick > > > > >> and the > > > > >>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial > > > > >>>>>>> organs > > > > >> (tools) and > > > > >>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for > > > > >>>>>>> our > > > > >> species, it > > > > >>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these > > > > >> "circuitous, > > > > >>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that > > > > >>>>>>> lead > > > our > > > > >>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always > > > > >>>>>>> been > > > > >> short on > > > > >>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for > > > > >>>>>>> material > > > > >> culture > > > > >>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: > > > > >> verily, here > > > > >>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of > > > > >>>>>>> attention is > > > > >> simply the > > > > >>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says > > > > >>>>>>> there are > > > > >> only two > > > > >>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So > > > > >> imagination is > > > > >>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, > > > > >>>>>>> and > > > > >> nothing > > > > >>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when > > > > >>>>>>> you > > > > hear > > > > >> the > > > > >>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there > > > > >>>>>>> to be > > > > >> able to > > > > >>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work > > > > >>>>>>> in > > > word > > > > >> meaning. > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who > > > > >>>>>>> was > > > > given > > > > >> a > > > > >>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been > > > > >>>>>>> mixed > > > with > > > > >> silver > > > > >>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of > > gold. > > > > >> Well, we > > > > >>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not > > > possible > > > > to > > > > >>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that > > > > >>>>>>> precisely. The > > > > >> method > > > > >>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the > > > > >>>>>>> "principal > > > of > > > > >>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes > > > > >>>>>>> palimpsest, a > > > > >> velum on > > > > >>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. > > > > Because > > > > >>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and > > > > >>>>>>> written > > > over > > > > >> every > > > > >>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, > > > > >>>>>>> the > > > > >> pressure > > > > >>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones > > > > >>>>>>> when > > > > the > > > > >> old > > > > >>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only > > > known > > > > >> Greek > > > > >>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their > > > > >> relationship > > > > >>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they > > > > >>>>>>> are > > > > >> related to > > > > >>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite > > > > similar > > > > >> to the > > > > >>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> David Kellogg > > > > >>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >> wrote: > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an > > > > associationist, > > > > >> ?sees > > > > >>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? > > > > >>>>>>>> Henry > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg < > > > dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > > > > > > > >> wrote: > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the > > > > >>>>>>>>> division > > > > >> between > > > > >>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, > > > > >>>>>>>>> because > > > > >> Ribot is > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> an > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal > > > > >>>>>>>>> form of > > > > >> attention. > > > > >>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the > > > > >>>>>>>>> transition > > > from > > > > >> forest > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> to > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division > > > between > > > > >> the two > > > > >>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and > > > > >>>>>>>>> commonsensical > > > > >> world of > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> the > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly > > > > >>>>>>>>> prosaic > > > uses > > > > >> in life > > > > >>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more > > > > "imaginative" > > > > >> (that > > > > >>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world > > > > >>>>>>>>> of the > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> farm,where > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long > > > > >>>>>>>>> winter > > > > >> months are > > > > >>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to > > > encounter > > > > >> talking > > > > >>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here > > > > >>>>>>>>> attention > > > > has > > > > >> to be > > > > >>>>>>>>> more voluntary. > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a > > > > >>>>>>>>> very > > > clear > > > > >>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that > > > > >> underpins > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> Ribot > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky > > > > >>>>>>>>> points > > > > out > > > > >> the > > > > >>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive > > > > >>>>>>>>> practices > > > > >> really > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> are > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of > > > imagination, > > > > >> there > > > > >>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between > > > > >>>>>>>>> human > > > > and > > > > >> animal > > > > >>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly > > > > >>>>>>>>> capable of > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> volitional > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). > > > > Without > > > > >> a > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> theory > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis > > > > >>>>>>>>> for > > > > Ribot's > > > > >>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological > > > > >>>>>>>>> functions at > > > > >> all. > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > > > > >>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole > > > > wrote: > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of > > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination, > > > > >> thanks to > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> all > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought. > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very > > > > >>>>>>>>>> influential > > > > >> around the > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> time > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I > > > > >>>>>>>>>> had > > > > >> seen work > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> on > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective > > > > >>>>>>>>>> equal > > > > >> reproductive? > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies > > > > >>>>>>>>>> of > > > > >> development > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> of > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of > > > > >>>>>>>>>> being > > > a > > > > >> relative > > > > >>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. > > > > >>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> bucket > > > list. > > > > >> This > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> from > > > some > > > > >> weeks > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> in > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > > >> segmented the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met > > aphorizing?. > > > > >> Puns, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > wrote: > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> and > > > they > > > > >> are > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> doing > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his > > > > >> followers as an > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel, so > > > > >> its of > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> course > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in > > > > >> translation, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> seems > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, > "recollection" > > > in > > > > >> this > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> passage, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter > > > > >> distinction to > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "memory." > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary > > > > >> discourse > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian > > > > >> colleagues have > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from > > > theorists > > > > >> who > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> clearly > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was > > > still > > > > >> possible > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> to > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, > > > > >> interestingly > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> links > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a > > > "voluntary" > > > > >> act. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Parts > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> stuff > > > > that > > > > >> was > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> also > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > >> creativity > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> and > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> see > > > > >> that the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> two > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found > > > himself > > > > >> writing. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> pretty > > > > old > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> approaches > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < > > > > >> ablunden@mira.net> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> but it > > > > >> may be > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> worth > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> place > > > to > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Imagination > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between > > > > >> Recollection and > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive > > > > >> Imagination, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> (2) > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> which > > > he > > > > >> says > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> leads > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> other > > > > >> words, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> the > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is > > > > >> accomplished > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> through > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >> > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > -- > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > >> Williams. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose > > > work i > > > > >> am > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> trying > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of > > > > >> productive > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive > > > imagination > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> develops. > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that > > > > >> there > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> must > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> be a > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> But > > > I > > > > >> learned > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > > > is > > > > >> linked > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> to > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > >> anticipation > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination > > > > >> (starting > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> look, and > > > > >> provides > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> a > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as > > > > fixed. > > > > >> This, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a > > > > ground > > > > >> to > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> take > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> part > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> preconceptions: > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> grammarian > > > > >> Langacker on > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> domains, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> particularly > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> full of > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> imagination > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > >> temporality: > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic > > > > >> structure), which > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> I > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> both > > > > >> individual > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < > > > > >> lpscholar2@gmail.com> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third > > > *space* > > > > >> and the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> his > > > > >> notion of > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is > > > > >> explored under > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > >> modalities > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of > > > knowing > > > > >> that is > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [perceived??] > > > if > > > > >> we > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> think > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *style* Larry On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> HENRY SHONERD < > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> say how > > > > >> jazzed up > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> I > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> am > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind > > > > as > > > > >> Larry > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> various > > > > >> triads, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> finally > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notebooks > > > > of > > > > >> the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> mind, as > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, > > > luega > > > > >> pa? > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> fuera. > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole < > > > mcole@ucsd.edu> > > > > >> wrote: > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, > > > attached > > > > >> are two > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT > > > > theorists > > > > >> like > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of > > > > >> imagination in a > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of > > > > >> productive > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no > > > > >> intention of > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> doing > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the > > > > >> attached > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these > > > philosophers, > > > > I > > > > >> came > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> upon > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> closely > > > > >> linked at > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> several > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, > > > > >> Ettienne and I > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a > > > means > > > > of > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> access > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander > > Suvorov. > > > > >> Moreover, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> such > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct > > > > relevance > > > > >> to > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Kris's > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to > > > > >> concerns > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> about > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in > > > development. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. > > > > Perhaps > > > > >> they > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> will > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural > > > > >> science > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with an > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> -- > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > > > science > > > > >> with an > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> -- > > > > >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > > > > >>>>>>>>>> science > > > > >> with an > > > > >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>> > > > > >>> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > Assistant Professor > > > Department of Anthropology > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > Brigham Young University > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Sun Dec 21 08:59:06 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Sun, 21 Dec 2014 16:59:06 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors In-Reply-To: References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> Message-ID: Double negatives in Spanish too. And we all know how that really slowed the Spanish down! Not. Martin On Dec 21, 2014, at 10:55 AM, Carol Macdonald wrote: > There was also the problem of the double negative of African American > dialect. Psychologists said that a double negative was equal to a > positive, and then therefore speakers of AAE were incapable of logical > thought. Labov laid out the paradigm of positive and negatives in AAE, to > show just how logical it is. From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Sun Dec 21 09:26:24 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (greg.a.thompson@gmail.com) Date: Sun, 21 Dec 2014 10:26:24 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors In-Reply-To: References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> Message-ID: Re double negatives as "negative concord": Russian too no? Greg Sent from my iPhone > On Dec 21, 2014, at 9:59 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: > > Double negatives in Spanish too. And we all know how that really slowed the Spanish down! Not. > > Martin > > >> On Dec 21, 2014, at 10:55 AM, Carol Macdonald wrote: >> >> There was also the problem of the double negative of African American >> dialect. Psychologists said that a double negative was equal to a >> positive, and then therefore speakers of AAE were incapable of logical >> thought. Labov laid out the paradigm of positive and negatives in AAE, to >> show just how logical it is. > > From annalisa@unm.edu Sun Dec 21 09:32:48 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Sun, 21 Dec 2014 17:32:48 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Speakers of AAE Message-ID: <1419183168363.46553@unm.edu> How about all you AAE locutioners come on over here and leave the metaphor discussants in the metaphor thread? Thanks! Annalisa From vygotsky@unm.edu Sun Dec 21 10:03:33 2014 From: vygotsky@unm.edu (Vera John-Steiner) Date: Sun, 21 Dec 2014 11:03:33 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors In-Reply-To: References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> Message-ID: <001801d01d48$72681920$57384b60$@edu> Hi, About Labov's work, the children were taking care of a rabbit and making cogent arguments about feeding, etc. Vera -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Carol Macdonald Sent: Sunday, December 21, 2014 8:56 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors Hi A small piece of info about Labov. At the height of the psychologists' theory of deficit, the linguists and sociolinguists came to the fore with a profoundly important observation of difference. No language has a deficit. As you know, Labov did a partial replication of the deficit situation. The big white man into an interview with a small black child, and performed dysmally. However, Labov has set up his own second analysis, by asking the children in the "waiting room" to take care of his white rat. That situation produced an abundance of language. These children were certainly not short of language, not "nonverbal". There was also the problem of the double negative of African American dialect. Psychologists said that a double negative was equal to a positive, and then therefore speakers of AAE were incapable of logical thought. Labov laid out the paradigm of positive and negatives in AAE, to show just how logical it is. As a linguistics student in the early 70s, we were inordinately proud of these linguistic insights. It was the birth of sociolinguists. I apologise for the lack of references for this presentation. Please correct any details. Carol On 21 December 2014 at 17:36, Greg Thompson wrote: > > In the interests of following the recently suggested injunction not to > directly address specific interlocutors, I'll talk in generalities (This > makes it a bit more challenging to have a conversation but it also makes > one think about the extractable and generalizable point that is beyond the > immediate context). > > In my previous post (apologies for drawing on prior context), I neither > suggested nor intended to imply that Orr's work is racist (do intentions > matter when it comes to meaning?). This speaks to some of the difficulties > of talking about issues of race. And in this connection let's not forget > the fact that this list-serve is dominated by white men - that doesn't mean > that we are necessarily racist but it does mean that we are likely to be > ignorant of many aspects of these issues. > > Nonetheless, I believe that we can overcome our ignorance through > education, by learning more about the issues - even when it comes to trying > to understand cultures and languages that we did not grow up with. And > while I think that there is good evidence for the linguistic relativity > hypothesis, I do not believe that language is a determining influence in > ALL thinking (Whorf uses the term "habitual" to describe the type of > thinking that is most susceptible to the influence of language). That means > that even if you don't speak AAE, you can still study it and even come to > understand how the grammatical forms lend themselves to particular ways of > understanding the world (this is what linguistic anthropology is all > about!). > > And this is my concern with Orr's work. With all academic work, I think it > is worth considering questions like "How would racists take up our > research?" In the case of Orr's work, my sense is that racists could easily > take up her research to argue (perhaps even by using the linguistic > relativity hypothesis) that AAE speakers are unable to do complex > mathematical thinking. This is why I would think that it is important to > give a positive articulation of what AAE does as a language. It is > certainly important to understand what it CAN'T do (e.g., help one learn > math in a particular way), but it is equally important to understand what > it CAN do. > > As Paul points out, Labov has done some of the work addressing this. But > note that Labov's work was done 40 years ago and no one has sought to > replicate or do any kind of similar work. What gives? > > -greg > > > > > -greg > > On Sat, Dec 20, 2014 at 11:37 PM, David H Kirshner wrote: > > > Greg, > > > > I'm delighted that you're familiar with and appreciative of Orr's work. > > > > Cleary she didn't provide "serious consideration of how AAE speakers > > actually use prepositions"--she couldn't have, as she was not a native > > speaker of Black English dialect, and she was not a linguist. But I'm not > > sure how paying serious attention to technical nuances of Black English > > grammar would have helped, as her analyses show that the African American > > students in her classes were not speaking either standard English or > Black > > English Vernacular, but rather a hybrid that arises from their efforts to > > emulate standard English. > > > > Now, it's true her work didn't parallel the approach Gay and Cole took to > > understanding what other psychologists were classifying as linguistic and > > cognitive deficits by carefully studying the native language and culture. > > On the other hand, she did something Gay and Cole didn't do, namely > > micro-analyze the linguistic miscues operating in the classroom, and the > > resultant dilemmas of comprehension this created for her African American > > students. > > > > As the excerpt copied below illustrates, Orr was scrupulously attentive > to > > understanding her students' experience of distance and location given the > > different linguistic setting. And her analyses consistently point to the > > mismatch between the native dialect and the language of instruction as > the > > source of the problems, not the native dialect, itself. To label this > work > > as implicitly racist, I think cedes too much to those who mistrust > science > > as a tool of the oppressor, and whose only locus of attention is the > > history and legacy of social injustice. Even now, in this discussion, we > > are missing the point. The major significance of Orr's work is not that > > differences in grammatical structure have semantic implications. This is > > merely a window to the dramatic realization that semantics are written > into > > grammatical form. > > > > David > > > > Excerpt from Orr (1987): > > > > "Jane gives us in these diagrams a glimpse into the kinds of mental > images > > she constructs when she is using the single symbol length, representing > > both location and distance, as a tool with which to think. Even the > > diagrams Jane drew for problems 13 and 14 begin to be less > incomprehensible > > if one attempts to construct in one's own mind images of the information > > given in these problems, while adhering to the requirement that length be > > used to represent both location and distance. They can be seen as > possible > > consequents or extensions of the symbol length when it is used to > represent > > both location and distance. Consider, for instance, the mental images one > > might construct in responding to problem 13: Two cities, both represented > > by line segments, are equal distances (that is, equal line segments) > closer > > to a third city (another line segment) than two other cities (line > > segments) are. The first two cities must be represented by equal line > > segments because they are equal distances closer to the third city than > the > > other two cities are. And these other two cities must also be represented > > by equal line segments because they are equal distances from the third > > city. One can see that Jane's diagrams are not as lacking in reason as > they > > may initially have appeared to be. > > > > "Jane's diagrams suggest the possibility that when words, or symbols are > > used as instruments with which to think, the use in one language of a > > single symbol in contexts where a second language requires two or more > can > > lead a speaker of the first language to arrive at a different mental > > construct of some given information from that arrived at by a speaker of > > the second language. Or, as in Jane's attempt to handle problem 14, the > > result may be an inability to arrive at a workable mental construct at > > all." (p. 25) > > > > [Note, this excerpt is part of a longer segment I emailed on Dec. 19 that > > shows Jane's diagrams that Orr is referring to.] > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson > > Sent: Saturday, December 20, 2014 3:14 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors > > > > The issues that are raised by Orr are indeed important ones. I am a fan > of > > her work as it points to important differences in language usage among > AAE > > speakers. I agree that she shouldn't have been condemned for pointing out > > these differences (particularly considering how important it is for > > teachers to understand the consequences of these differences). If you > want > > to help AAE speaking students do better on standardized tests, then you > > absolutely need to pay attention to these differences. > > > > My one concern here is that I do feel like there is a problem of deficit > > thinking that is at least implied in her work (and maybe "implied" is too > > strong a term - maybe it's just that she doesn't provide evidence to > > discourage us from this view). What we don't see in this book is any > > serious consideration of how AAE speakers actually use prepositions - > e.g., > > the ways of using language that exist in the community of AAE speakers. > > This gives Orr's work a feel somewhat like the studies of math among the > > Kpelle studied by Gay and Cole in the pre-early days of LCHC (see wiki > for > > more: http://lchcfestschrift.wikispaces.com/Chapter+1). Before they > > showed > > up on the scene, everyone had assumed that the Kpelle (Liberia) couldn't > > comprehend basic math concepts b.c. they weren't learning it in the ways > > that it was being taught (and perhaps there were even linguistic > relativity > > arguments that pointed to this). Rather then continuing to pluck these > > folks out of context and run them through various types of experiments, > Gay > > and Cole "explicitly began with the assumption that "we must know more > > about the indigenous mathematics so that we can build effective bridges > to > > the new mathematics that we are trying to introduce"" > > >From their research, they found that the Kpelle actually had high > > competence with complex mathematical problems (e.g., estimating volumes). > > As they write: > > "Overall, the data suggested that no generalized lack of mathematical, > > perceptual, or problem solving abilities stood in the way of mathematics > > education. When the materials and procedures used in assessment tasks > were > > designed to match closely valued local practices, lack of ability could > be > > replaced by apparent special ability. At the same time, schooling did > > appear to influence performance in tasks that were routinely used to > > measure cognitive development." > > So I think I would be more comfortable with Orr's work if she were to > have > > included this kind of rich understanding of usage in context and how > > prepositions actually are used among AAE speakers. > > > > This points to a larger question that might be irksome to some folks, but > > the question regards the extent to which mathematical language is > > predicated upon a particular form of what Whorf called "Standard Average > > European." In short, the idea here is that Math has a history and a > > culture. This doesn't mean that it is useless or a waste of time, just > that > > it is a particular way of encountering the world that is good for > > particular things and not for others. > > > > I think we've gone round this mulberry bush before, but that was just > more > > grist for the mill (I prefer my metaphors mixed!). > > > > -greg > > > > > > > > > > > > On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 8:46 PM, David H Kirshner > dkirsh@lsu.edu>> wrote: > > > > > > The topic of how grammatical form relates to meaning calls to mind the > > > groundbreaking work of Eleanor Orr--whom you've probably never heard of > > on > > > account of the fact that her work was condemned by a > politically-correct > > > faction of race-conscious sociolinguists who decided her analysis of > > Black > > > English Vernacular could too easily be appropriated into racist > > discourses > > > about language deficiency. > > > > > > Orr was a Washington DC area teacher and principal in the 1970s and > > 1980s, > > > who traced math difficulties of her African American students to subtle > > > grammatical differences between Black English dialect and standard > > English. > > > Her 1987 book goes into compelling detail to support the thesis that > the > > > meaning structure of basic mathematical terms is embedded in the > > > grammatical setting in which those terms are expressed. For instance, > the > > > meaning of "distance" is embedded in the grammatical structure > "distance > > > from _________ to __________" where the place-holders hold locations; > if > > > you don't have that grammatical structure, and you're in a linguistic > > > environment in which that structure is assumed, you're likely not going > > to > > > be able to gain full access to the concept. > > > > > > The attached excerpts from her book--ignore the Forward, unless you'd > > like > > > some context--reveal some of her students' bizarre conceptions of > > distance > > > (and other basic mathematical concepts) as revealed in their diagrams. > > Her > > > approach involves linguistic analysis of sentences produced by her > > African > > > American students that she reads as collapsed versions of standard > > English > > > sentences, with differences in prepositional structure being > highlighted > > > (but other grammatical elements also are indicated). > > > > > > This work cuts against the grain of anything going on in mathematics > > > education. The Piagetian view that dominates that field holds that > basic > > > concepts come about from reflection on our actions in our engagement > with > > > the material world. When language enters the conversation, it's with > > > respect to semantic structure; to my knowledge, nobody's ever > implicated > > > syntax directly in basic quantitative understanding. > > > > > > This work is particularly interesting to me in connection with my > > > 21-year-old son who is autistic, and whose grammatical function is > > severely > > > impaired. He has a decent vocabulary, but unless the setting for the > > > conversation provides contextual clues, he can't piece together how the > > > semantic elements are linked to one another. It is only recently that > it > > > occurred to me his lack of a secure sense of basic quantitative terms > > like > > > "more" and "less" may be rooted in his grammatical incapacities. > > > > > > The XMCA discussion, thus far, has touched on grammar with respect to > > > lexical items such as prepositions. But we've not yet tied that to the > > > grammatical forms that embed those lexical items. I'm very curious as > to > > > whether that further connection can be made. > > > > > > David Kirshner > > > > > > Orr, E., W. (1987). Twice as less: Black English and the performance of > > > black students in mathematics and science. New York: W. W. Norton & > > Company. > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg > > > Sent: Friday, December 19, 2014 3:06 PM > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors > > > > > > Yes, Haliday is essentially a Whorfian, and that's one of things that > > > brings him close to Vygotsky. (Compare, for example, Chomsky, who is > > > essentially anti-developmental in his ideas about language, and who now > > > rejects the leading role played by social communication and says that > > > communication is epiphenomenal to language, whose original purpose is > > > thought.) For Sapir, and for Whorf, in the beginning of every major > > > onotogenetic, sociogenetic, and even phylogenetic change in language > > there > > > has to be some change in the nature of communication. > > > > > > So what Andy says about the lack of the basis of modern science in Hopi > > > applies perfectly well to English. When we read the scientific writings > > of > > > Chaucer on the astrolabe, for example, we do not see words like > > > "reflection", "refraction" or "alignment". Chaucer uses words like > > "bounce > > > off", "bend through", and "line up" (note the use of prepositions, > > > Helena!). Where did these words come from, and how did they make > > scientific > > > English possible? > > > > > > Most of us have no problem saying that Isaac Newton discovered the laws > > of > > > gravitation. But it's only a slight exaggeration to say that what he > > really > > > discovered was the meaning potential of words like "gravitation". > Gravity > > > is, of course, not a thing at all; that is, it's not an entity, but > > rather > > > a process, the process of falling down, or falling in (preps, again!). > So > > > how and above all why does it become an entity? > > > > > > It's interesting to compare Newton's writings on optics with Chaucer's > on > > > the astrolabe. The "Opticks" has a fixed format that we recognize > almost > > > instantly today: Newton describes his equipment (the prism and the dark > > > room); he then narrates his method as a kind of recipe ("First, I did > > this; > > > then I did that") and draws conclusions, which he then formulates in > > > mathematical terms (this is essentially the format of Vygotsky's > lectures > > > on pedology, so much so that when translating them we had some trouble > > > determining the precise moment when Vygotsky turns to the blackboard to > > > write his conclusion in the form of a law). > > > > > > In order to get them into mathematical shape, though, he has to make > > > sentences that look a lot like equations. "The plumpness of the lens > > yields > > > a greater refraction of the light", "The reflection of the light from > the > > > glass results of the light striking the flatness of the glass" "The > > > curvature of the spectacle glass supplies the lacking plumpness of the > > > eye". In each of these, a quality or a process which would normally be > > > realized as an adjective or a verb is suddenly realized by a noun, > > creating > > > an imaginary entity. > > > > > > That's grammatical metaphor. Something that is "canonically" realized > by > > a > > > verb ("to grow") is suddenly realized nominally ("growth"), or > something > > > that is canonically a quality ('red") is realized verbally ("redden"). > We > > > even find related clauses realized as verbs ("She did not know the > rules. > > > So she died" is realized by "Death was brought about through > ignorance", > > > all of these examples from Halliday). In fact, the Genetic Law that > > > Vygotsky formulates in "Mind in Society" ("Every higher mental function > > is > > > realized on two planes....") is really just one instance of grammatical > > > metaphor. > > > > > > One of Chomsky's best known arguments for the radical innateness > > > hypothesis is this. If I take a sentence like "Students who do not do > > their > > > homework do not do well" and I want to make a question, how do I know > > which > > > "do" to move to the front? Chomsky assumes that this knowledge is > > > essentially innate; it is part of universal grammar. But you can see > that > > > "Do students who do not do their homework do well?" can be built up > > through > > > a process of what we might call "discourse metaphor"--whereby clauses > > stand > > > for > > > exchanges: > > > > > > Mother: You did your homework, didn't you? > > > Child: No. > > > Mother: You didn't do your homework? Did you do well? > > > Child: No. > > > Mother: You didn't do well? > > > Child: No. > > > Mother: You didn't do you homework so you didn't do well. Do the other > > > students do well? > > > Child: Some of them. > > > Mother: Who does well? Do students who do not do their homework do > well? > > > > > > And this of course explains why wh-items like "who" and 'why" have two > > > functions--one inside a clause, where it expresses an intra-mental > > function > > > (grammar) and one between them where it expresses an inter-mental > > function > > > (discourse). > > > > > > I realize that grammatical metaphor will seem rather dry and abstract > and > > > unpoetic to people who assume that metaphor is only of the lexical > kind. > > > But to me, and I think to most children, it is far far more powerful > and > > > far more important developmentally. In some ways, it's the lexical > > metaphor > > > that is responsible for the disenchantment of the child's world, while > > the > > > grammatical metaphor infinitely expands it. (And here, I'm afraid, I > must > > > stop--it's time for breakfast and anyway my one screen is used up!) > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > > > > > , or "the > > > > > > . He > > > > > > On 19 December 2014 at 15:15, Greg Thompson > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > Helena and David, > > > > I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the > so-called > > > > authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred tradition > > > > to > > > > Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi notion > > > > of "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including English) > > > > notion of "time" and how each of these languages offers different > > > > affordances of meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual > > > > understanding, English has a much more reified/objectified/entified > > > > sense of time. (btw, I think the first paragraph is easier to follow > > > > than the second - and in that first paragraph you'll find our old > > friend > > > "imagination"). > > > > David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to? > > > > -greg > > > > > > > > Taken from: > > > > > > > > > http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/mousesite/Second > > > > ary/Whorfframe2.html > > > > > > > > " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, sunset" > are > > > > with us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from > other > > > nouns. > > > > They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in > winter" > > > > just as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are pluralized > > > > and numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. Our > > > > thought about the referents of such words hence becomes objectified. > > > > Without objectification, it would be a subjective experience of real > > > > time, i.e. of the consciousness of "becoming later and later"--simply > > > > a cyclic phase similar to an earlier phase in that > ever-later-becoming > > > > duration. Only by imagination can such a cyclic phase be set beside > > > > another and another in the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually > > > > perceived) configuration. "But such is the power of linguistic > analogy > > > that we do so objectify cyclic phasing. > > > > We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g., > > > "phasing." > > > > And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting > > > > binomial formula of formless item plus form, is so general that it is > > > > implicit for all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless items > > > > like "substance, matter," by which we can fill out the binomial for > an > > > > enormously wide range of nouns. But even these are not quite > > > > generalized enough to take in our phase nouns. So for the phase nouns > > we > > > have made a formless item, "time." > > > > We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, in > the > > > > pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" in > > > > the pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can say > > > > and think "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." Let > me > > > > again point out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of milk" > > > > or "a piece of cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a > > > > summer" actually contains or consists of such-and-such a quantity of > > > "time." > > > > > > > > In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., are > not > > > > nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They are > a > > > > formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, and > > > > even other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a > > > > locative pattern, like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It contains > > > > no morpheme like one of "in the house" or "at the tree." It means > > > > "when it is morning" or "while morning-phase is occurring." These > > > > "temporal s" are not used as subjects or objects, or at all like > > > > nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" or "summer is hot"; > summer > > > > is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions are hot, WHEN heat occurs. > > > > One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or "summer > recently." > > > > There is no objectification, as a region, an extent, a quantity, of > > > > the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested about time > > > > except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no basis > > > here for a formless item answering to our "time." " > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Helena Worthen > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to this: > > > > > > > > > > "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton > > > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to > create > > > > > sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly > > > > > productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific > > > > > writing and thinking today." > > > > > > > > > > Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I lose you > > > > > when > > > > you > > > > > say "created to talk about gravity as an entity". > > > > > > > > > > Thank you, > > > > > > > > > > Helena > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Helena Worthen > > > > > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > > > > > > > > On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > As Helena points out, prepositions are from the "grammatical" end > > > > > > of > > > > what > > > > > > Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what > > > > > > Halliday > > > > calls > > > > > > "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they have > > > > > > three properties that words from the more "lexical" end do not > > have: > > > > > > > > > > > > a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You can, > > > > > actually, > > > > > > but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you invent a new > > > > > > name > > > > > or a > > > > > > new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can). > > > > > > > > > > > > b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific semantic > > > > > > field > > > > > (the > > > > > > way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of > > > > linguistics) > > > > > > but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are used. > > > > > > > > > > > > c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the same > > > > effect, > > > > > > which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your argument" the > > "in" > > > > has > > > > > > more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in "there's a fly > > > > > > in > > > > your > > > > > > tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in Henry's > > > > > > hands, > > > > > refer > > > > > > to a book or even a footnote. > > > > > > > > > > > > Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties pretty > > > > > > much define the difference between learning and development, at > > > > > > least as I understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on > > > > > > functions indefinitely while development works by reorganizing > the > > > > > > closed set of functions you already have into new systems. > > > > > > Learning is skill specific and local, while development is quite > > > global in its implications. > > > > > Learning > > > > > > is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new systems, > > > > > > while development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary (and > > > > > > forget it > > > > just > > > > > > as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes away. > > > > > > > > > > > > For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of blue > > > > > > that > > > > > people > > > > > > call the sky") are simply metaphors from the non-productive end > of > > > > > > the lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are crisp, > > > > > > concrete, and vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the > > > > > > nominalizations that > > > > Newton > > > > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to > > > > > > create sentences that look like mathematical equations, are > highly > > > > > > productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific > > > > > > writing and > > > > thinking > > > > > > today. For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical metaphor is > the > > > > third > > > > > > great moment in child development (after the break into mother > > > > > > tongue > > > > and > > > > > > the break into disciplinary language in school work). > > > > > > > > > > > > Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" implies > > > > > > zero dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two ("on a > > > > > > line', 'on a > > > > > > plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because they > are > > > > > > grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them with > time: > > > > > > 'at > > > > a > > > > > > point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. Compare: "at > > > > > > Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very day), and > > > > > > "in Christmas' (season). > > > > > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > > > > > On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen > > > > > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial > > > > > >> relationships from the concrete material world into the > > > > > >> conceptual imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 > common > > > > > >> ones, and > > > > > between 70 > > > > > >> and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far > as" > > > > > >> -- > > > > > this > > > > > >> is according to > > > > > >> https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm > > > > ). > > > > > >> We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. Apparently, > > > > > >> in English, they evolved from and did the job done by > inflections > > > > > >> in > > > > parent > > > > > >> languages, examples being cases and tenses. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection > > > > > >> like the dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial > > > > > >> relationships > > > > > suggested > > > > > >> by contemporary prepositions. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about this. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Helena Worthen > > > > > >> helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > > > >> > > > > > >> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > > > > >> > > > > > >>> I'm with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly > > > > embodied, > > > > > >> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to > > > > > >> linguistics > > > > > (For > > > > > >> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on > > > > "lexicon": > > > > > >> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, > > > > > >> being > > > > > part > > > > > >> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and > > > > > >> Halliday > > > > > see no > > > > > >> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, > > > lexico-grammar. > > > > > (Lo > > > > > >> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar, > > > > > >> adding > > > > > the > > > > > >> "n". The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings > are > > > > great > > > > > >> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of > > > > > >> that? In translation from Russian is word coining ever > practiced? > > > > > >>> Henry > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the > > > > metaphorical > > > > > >> use of prepositions like: > > > > > >>>> - "there is some value IN your argument" > > > > > >>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again" > > > > > >>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" > > > > > >>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again" > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> and so on. > > > > > >>>> Andy > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > -------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > > ---- > > > > > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > > > > > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> larry smolucha wrote: > > > > > >>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself - > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic > > > > > possibilities: > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published > in > > > > > Thought > > > > > >>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into > > > > English > > > > > >> 1962] > > > > > >>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the > 'additive' > > > > value > > > > > >> of the > > > > > >>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech > > > > > vocalization). > > > > > >>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements > that > > > > > >>>>> are > > > > > >> flammable > > > > > >>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable > nor > > > > > >>>>> a > > > > gas. > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century > > > > > >>>>> European > > > > > >> Developmental > > > > > >>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' > > > > > >>>>> hence > > > > > the > > > > > >>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of > > > > Piaget's > > > > > >> Genetic > > > > > >>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and > > > > > >>>>> synthesis > > > > > >> based on > > > > > >>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in > > > > > >>>>> Vygotsky's > > > > > >> example of H2O. > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com > > > > > >>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > >>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 > > > > > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be > synergistic > > > > > >>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the > > > parts. > > > > > >>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more > > > > > >>>>>> than > > > > the > > > > > >>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can > > > > > >>>>>> ever > > > > be > > > > > >> imagined" > > > > > >>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> A couple things to consider: > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination > > > > > >>>>>> as the > > > > > >> brain has > > > > > >>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the > > > > > >>>>>> simplest > > > > level > > > > > >> of the Gestalt > > > > > >>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). > > > > > >>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just > > > > photographic. > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try > > > > > >>>>>> to > > > > > >> accurately reproduce > > > > > >>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. > Whereas, > > > > > >>>>>> the > > > > > >> goal of combinatory > > > > > >>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, > > > > > >>>>>> dreams, > > > > > >> musings, and even > > > > > >>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of > > > > objects > > > > > >> and symbols. > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different > ways > > > > > >>>>>> that > > > > > >> things and concepts can be > > > > > >>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar > > > > > >>>>>> and > > > > > flour. > > > > > >>>>>> I can add water and > > > > > >>>>>> it > > > > > >> dissolves a bit > > > > > >>>>>> But adding heat > > > > > >>>>>> changes > > > > the > > > > > >> combination into a pancake. > > > > > >>>>>> [Is this synergistic?] > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more > > > > > >>>>>> examples > > > > > >> to put the discussion > > > > > >>>>>> in the metaphysical realm. > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 > > > > > >>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > > > >>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the > > > > > >>>>>>> case > > > > > for > > > > > >>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I > > > > > >>>>>>> think > > > > it's > > > > > >> not > > > > > >>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are > > > > > >> associationists who > > > > > >>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary > > > > > >>>>>>> associationism > > > > > >> exists and > > > > > >>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as > > mediation. > > > > > >> Vygotsky > > > > > >>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, > > > > explain > > > > > >> the > > > > > >>>>>>> uniqueness of our species? > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels > > > > > >>>>>>> for > > > > its > > > > > >> own > > > > > >>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a > > > > > >>>>>>> Piagetian perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian > > > > > >>>>>>> one--true maturity > > > > > as a > > > > > >>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more > > > > > >>>>>>> to it > > > > > >> than > > > > > >>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of > > > > > >>>>>>> primate, > > > > > and > > > > > >> our > > > > > >>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon > > > > > >>>>>>> rocks > > > > > in > > > > > >> order > > > > > >>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged > > > > > >>>>>>> the > > > > same > > > > > >> way as > > > > > >>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and > > > > > >>>>>>> for > > > > > >> language is > > > > > >>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human > > > > > >> exceptionalism. > > > > > >>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for > > > > > >>>>>>> the > > > > > >> vanguard role > > > > > >>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, > > > > > prolonging > > > > > >>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after > > > > > >>>>>>> the > > > > sick > > > > > >> and the > > > > > >>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial > > > > > >>>>>>> organs > > > > > >> (tools) and > > > > > >>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for > > > > > >>>>>>> our > > > > > >> species, it > > > > > >>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these > > > > > >> "circuitous, > > > > > >>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that > > > > > >>>>>>> lead > > > > our > > > > > >>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always > > > > > >>>>>>> been > > > > > >> short on > > > > > >>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for > > > > > >>>>>>> material > > > > > >> culture > > > > > >>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another > matter: > > > > > >> verily, here > > > > > >>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of > > > > > >>>>>>> attention is > > > > > >> simply the > > > > > >>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says > > > > > >>>>>>> there are > > > > > >> only two > > > > > >>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So > > > > > >> imagination is > > > > > >>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete > experiences, > > > > > >>>>>>> and > > > > > >> nothing > > > > > >>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when > > > > > >>>>>>> you > > > > > hear > > > > > >> the > > > > > >>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there > > > > > >>>>>>> to be > > > > > >> able to > > > > > >>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work > > > > > >>>>>>> in > > > > word > > > > > >> meaning. > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who > > > > > >>>>>>> was > > > > > given > > > > > >> a > > > > > >>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been > > > > > >>>>>>> mixed > > > > with > > > > > >> silver > > > > > >>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of > > > gold. > > > > > >> Well, we > > > > > >>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not > > > > possible > > > > > to > > > > > >>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that > > > > > >>>>>>> precisely. The > > > > > >> method > > > > > >>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the > > > > > >>>>>>> "principal > > > > of > > > > > >>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes > > > > > >>>>>>> palimpsest, a > > > > > >> velum on > > > > > >>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each > other. > > > > > Because > > > > > >>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and > > > > > >>>>>>> written > > > > over > > > > > >> every > > > > > >>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was > soft, > > > > > >>>>>>> the > > > > > >> pressure > > > > > >>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones > > > > > >>>>>>> when > > > > > the > > > > > >> old > > > > > >>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the > only > > > > known > > > > > >> Greek > > > > > >>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor > their > > > > > >> relationship > > > > > >>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they > > > > > >>>>>>> are > > > > > >> related to > > > > > >>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's > quite > > > > > similar > > > > > >> to the > > > > > >>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> David Kellogg > > > > > >>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > >> wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an > > > > > associationist, > > > > > >> "sees > > > > > >>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention"? > > > > > >>>>>>>> Henry > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg < > > > > dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > > > > > > > > > >> wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the > > > > > >>>>>>>>> division > > > > > >> between > > > > > >>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, > > > > > >>>>>>>>> because > > > > > >> Ribot is > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> an > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal > > > > > >>>>>>>>> form of > > > > > >> attention. > > > > > >>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the > > > > > >>>>>>>>> transition > > > > from > > > > > >> forest > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> to > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division > > > > between > > > > > >> the two > > > > > >>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and > > > > > >>>>>>>>> commonsensical > > > > > >> world of > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> the > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly > > > > > >>>>>>>>> prosaic > > > > uses > > > > > >> in life > > > > > >>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more > > > > > "imaginative" > > > > > >> (that > > > > > >>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world > > > > > >>>>>>>>> of the > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> farm,where > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long > > > > > >>>>>>>>> winter > > > > > >> months are > > > > > >>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to > > > > encounter > > > > > >> talking > > > > > >>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here > > > > > >>>>>>>>> attention > > > > > has > > > > > >> to be > > > > > >>>>>>>>> more voluntary. > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a > > > > > >>>>>>>>> very > > > > clear > > > > > >>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism > that > > > > > >> underpins > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> Ribot > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky > > > > > >>>>>>>>> points > > > > > out > > > > > >> the > > > > > >>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive > > > > > >>>>>>>>> practices > > > > > >> really > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> are > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of > > > > imagination, > > > > > >> there > > > > > >>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between > > > > > >>>>>>>>> human > > > > > and > > > > > >> animal > > > > > >>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly > > > > > >>>>>>>>> capable of > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> volitional > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than > humans). > > > > > Without > > > > > >> a > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> theory > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis > > > > > >>>>>>>>> for > > > > > Ribot's > > > > > >>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological > > > > > >>>>>>>>> functions at > > > > > >> all. > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > > > > > >>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination, > > > > > >> thanks to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> all > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> influential > > > > > >> around the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> time > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. > I > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> had > > > > > >> seen work > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> on > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> equal > > > > > >> reproductive? > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> of > > > > > >> development > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> of > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> being > > > > a > > > > > >> relative > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> bucket > > > > list. > > > > > >> This > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> from > > > > some > > > > > >> weeks > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> in > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > > > >> segmented the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as "met > > > aphorizing". > > > > > >> Puns, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > they > > > > > >> are > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> doing > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his > > > > > >> followers as an > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel, so > > > > > >> its of > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> course > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in > > > > > >> translation, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> seems > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, > > "recollection" > > > > in > > > > > >> this > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> passage, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter > > > > > >> distinction to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "memory." > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary > > > > > >> discourse > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian > > > > > >> colleagues have > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from > > > > theorists > > > > > >> who > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> clearly > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it > was > > > > still > > > > > >> possible > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, > > > > > >> interestingly > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> links > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a > > > > "voluntary" > > > > > >> act. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Parts > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> stuff > > > > > that > > > > > >> was > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> also > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > > >> creativity > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> and > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious > to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> see > > > > > >> that the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> two > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found > > > > himself > > > > > >> writing. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> pretty > > > > > old > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> approaches > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < > > > > > >> ablunden@mira.net> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> but it > > > > > >> may be > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> worth > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> place > > > > to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Imagination > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between > > > > > >> Recollection and > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive > > > > > >> Imagination, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> (2) > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> which > > > > he > > > > > >> says > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> leads > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> other > > > > > >> words, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> the > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is > > > > > >> accomplished > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> through > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >> > > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > -- > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading > Strawson > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > > >> Williams. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists > whose > > > > work i > > > > > >> am > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> trying > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of > > > > > >> productive > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive > > > > imagination > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> develops. > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive > implies > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that > > > > > >> there > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> must > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> be a > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of imagination called UNproductive > imagination. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> But > > > > I > > > > > >> learned > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination > appears > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > is > > > > > >> linked > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > > >> anticipation > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination > > > > > >> (starting > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> look, and > > > > > >> provides > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> a > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as > > > > > fixed. > > > > > >> This, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a > > > > > ground > > > > > >> to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> take > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> part > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> preconceptions: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> grammarian > > > > > >> Langacker on > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> domains, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> particularly > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> full of > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> imagination > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > > >> temporality: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic > > > > > >> structure), which > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> I > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> both > > > > > >> individual > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < > > > > > >> lpscholar2@gmail.com> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third > > > > *space* > > > > > >> and the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> his > > > > > >> notion of > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion > is > > > > > >> explored under > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a > *set* > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > > >> modalities > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of > > > > knowing > > > > > >> that is > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [perceived??] > > > > if > > > > > >> we > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> think > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *style* Larry On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> HENRY SHONERD < > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> say how > > > > > >> jazzed up > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> I > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> am > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, > the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind > > > > > as > > > > > >> Larry > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> various > > > > > >> triads, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> finally > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notebooks > > > > > of > > > > > >> the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> mind, as > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I'll be back! Gap > adentro, > > > > luega > > > > > >> pa' > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> fuera. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole < > > > > mcole@ucsd.edu> > > > > > >> wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, > > > > attached > > > > > >> are two > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT > > > > > theorists > > > > > >> like > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of > > > > > >> imagination in a > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion > of > > > > > >> productive > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have > no > > > > > >> intention of > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> doing > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the > > > > > >> attached > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these > > > > philosophers, > > > > > I > > > > > >> came > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> upon > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> closely > > > > > >> linked at > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> several > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our > naivete, > > > > > >> Ettienne and I > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as > a > > > > means > > > > > of > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> access > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander > > > Suvorov. > > > > > >> Moreover, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> such > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct > > > > > relevance > > > > > >> to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Kris's > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to > > > > > >> concerns > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> about > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in > > > > development. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination > thread. > > > > > Perhaps > > > > > >> they > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> will > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural > > > > > >> science > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with an > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson.pdf> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> -- > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > > > > science > > > > > >> with an > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> -- > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> science > > > > > >> with an > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > > Assistant Professor > > > > Department of Anthropology > > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > > Brigham Young University > > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From annalisa@unm.edu Sun Dec 21 10:20:15 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Sun, 21 Dec 2014 18:20:15 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors In-Reply-To: References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> <2C440C2D-59A4-47BB-8C31-0C689221C167@gmail.com> , Message-ID: <1419186014985.37125@unm.edu> Is this about where the metaphor thread picks up? Please continue! :) Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Larry Purss Sent: Saturday, December 20, 2014 12:59 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors Horizontal development AS practices. What KIND of practices? Practices that develop "within" Pracices which develop "across" These metaphorical words [within, across, and also "between"] CARRY us as performances which are form[ing] and formative. Where? In situated specific practices. THIS adds to the vertical dimension ---***---***--- On Sat, Dec 20, 2014 at 10:55 AM, larry smolucha wrote: Message from Francine: This is a a good way of simplifying what has been discussed. And it is also a way to enter into a discussion of how a phenomenon like winter might be referred to as a thing (noun), as a process (verb like wintering in Aspen, or winterize your car), and even as a relational prepositional phrase, perhaps adverb (In the bleak mid-winter). Also, gerunds are verbs that can function as nouns - I can't use wintering as a noun in an intelligent sentence- but let's use 'singing can lift your spirits.' ---***---***--- From: hshonerd@gmail.com Date: Sat, 20 Dec 2014 08:39:19 -0700 To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors I am late to this, but I wonder if things, processes and relations capture pretty much everything about language and thinking. So nouns, as things, verbs, as processes and prepositions, as relations. Henry ---***---***--- On Dec 19, 2014, at 4:48 PM, larry smolucha wrote: Message from Francine: This is a a good way of simplifying what has been discussed. And it is also a way to enter into a discussion of how a phenomenon like winter might be referred to as a thing (noun), as a process (verb like wintering in Aspen, or winterize your car), and even as a relational prepositional phrase, perhaps adverb (In the bleak mid-winter). Also, gerunds are verbs that can function as nouns - I can't use wintering as a noun in an intelligent sentence- but let's use 'singing can lift your spirits.' ---***---***--- From: hshonerd@gmail.com Date: Sat, 20 Dec 2014 08:39:19 -0700 To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors I am late to this, but I wonder if things, processes and relations capture pretty much everything about language and thinking. So nouns, as things, verbs, as processes and prepositions, as relations. Henry ---***---***--- On Dec 19, 2014, at 4:48 PM, larry smolucha wrote: Message from Francine: Just a thought - Is the use of nouns, verbs, prepositions a result of developing a written language based on an alphabet? Language use in a culture with no written language would surely differ significantly. And written languages based on hieroglyphs, pictograms, cuneiform, Norse Runes, Celtic oghams, etc. surely divide and frame experience differently. ---***---***--- From: boblake@georgiasouthern.edu Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2014 16:43:24 -0500 To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors Hi Everyone, I appreciate this thread's emphasis on the relativistic character of metaphoric language and find think that it supports Vygotsky's notion of the fluid nature of language as it emerges from socio-cultural and socio-historical contexts in meaning making (in contrast to biological determinism). Because each culture makes meaning in widely diverse ways, language forms and usage might have complex intricacies and shades of meaning on one concept alone. Along with the example of early 20th century Hopi's view of time, there are other more recent examples from the present day that suggest ways that language can shape thought. Consider the Australian aboriginal language, Guugu Yimithirr, from north Queensland who have no words for right or left, in front of, or behind to describe location. Instead they use the points of the compass even when requesting that someone move over to make room. They will say ?move a bit to the east.? To tell you where exactly they left something in your house, they?ll say, ?I left it on the southern edge of the western table.? (Deutscher, 2010, p. MM 42) The effect on the thinking of this group is phenomenal in orienting the speakers to their directional spatial environment to such a degree that roughly 1 out of every 10 words in conversational Guugu Yimithirr includes either north, south, east or west and is accompanied with precise hand gestures (ibid). Consequently in this culture, language acquisition involves constant awareness of spaces relative to the points of the compass. Deutscher relays a fascinating story about the ways that memory is stored for the speakers of this language. The story also serves as a clear example of Vygotsky?s notion of language as a mediating tool as a means of creating higher levels of consciousness through spatial kinesthetic approaches to meaning creation. One Guugu Yimithirr speaker was filmed telling his friends the story of how in his youth, he capsized in shark-infested waters. He and an older person were caught in a storm, and their boat tipped over. They both jumped into the water and managed to swim nearly three miles to the shore, only to discover that the missionary for whom they worked was far more concerned at the loss of the boat than relieved at their miraculous escape. Apart from the dramatic content, the remarkable thing about the story was that it was remembered throughout in cardinal directions: the speaker jumped into the water on the western side of the boat, his companion to the east of the boat, they saw a giant shark swimming north and so on. Perhaps the cardinal directions were just made up for the occasion? Well, quite by chance, the same person was filmed some years later telling the same story. The cardinal directions matched exactly in the two tellings. Even more remarkable were the spontaneous hand gestures that accompanied the story. For instance, the direction in which the boat rolled over was gestured in the correct geographic orientation, regardless of the direction the speaker was facing in the two films (ibid). *Robert* Deutscher, G. (2010, August 29) Does your language shape how you think? *The New York Times* *Sunday Magazine, *p. MM 42. ---***---***--- On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 4:05 PM, David Kellogg wrote: Yes, Haliday is essentially a Whorfian, and that's one of things that brings him close to Vygotsky. (Compare, for example, Chomsky, who is essentially anti-developmental in his ideas about language, and who now rejects the leading role played by social communication and says that communication is epiphenomenal to language, whose original purpose is thought.) For Sapir, and for Whorf, in the beginning of every major onotogenetic, sociogenetic, and even phylogenetic change in language there has to be some change in the nature of communication. So what Andy says about the lack of the basis of modern science in Hopi applies perfectly well to English. When we read the scientific writings of Chaucer on the astrolabe, for example, we do not see words like "reflection", "refraction" or "alignment". Chaucer uses words like "bounce off", "bend through", and "line up" (note the use of prepositions, Helena!). Where did these words come from, and how did they make scientific English possible? Most of us have no problem saying that Isaac Newton discovered the laws of gravitation. But it's only a slight exaggeration to say that what he really discovered was the meaning potential of words like "gravitation". Gravity is, of course, not a thing at all; that is, it's not an entity, but rather a process, the process of falling down, or falling in (preps, again!). So how and above all why does it become an entity? It's interesting to compare Newton's writings on optics with Chaucer's on the astrolabe. The "Opticks" has a fixed format that we recognize almost instantly today: Newton describes his equipment (the prism and the dark room); he then narrates his method as a kind of recipe ("First, I did this; then I did that") and draws conclusions, which he then formulates in mathematical terms (this is essentially the format of Vygotsky's lectures on pedology, so much so that when translating them we had some trouble determining the precise moment when Vygotsky turns to the blackboard to write his conclusion in the form of a law). In order to get them into mathematical shape, though, he has to make sentences that look a lot like equations. "The plumpness of the lens yields a greater refraction of the light", "The reflection of the light from the glass results of the light striking the flatness of the glass" "The curvature of the spectacle glass supplies the lacking plumpness of the eye". In each of these, a quality or a process which would normally be realized as an adjective or a verb is suddenly realized by a noun, creating an imaginary entity. That's grammatical metaphor. Something that is "canonically" realized by a verb ("to grow") is suddenly realized nominally ("growth"), or something that is canonically a quality ('red") is realized verbally ("redden"). We even find related clauses realized as verbs ("She did not know the rules. So she died" is realized by "Death was brought about through ignorance", all of these examples from Halliday). In fact, the Genetic Law that Vygotsky formulates in "Mind in Society" ("Every higher mental function is realized on two planes....") is really just one instance of grammatical metaphor. One of Chomsky's best known arguments for the radical innateness hypothesis is this. If I take a sentence like "Students who do not do their homework do not do well" and I want to make a question, how do I know which "do" to move to the front? Chomsky assumes that this knowledge is essentially innate; it is part of universal grammar. But you can see that "Do students who do not do their homework do well?" can be built up through a process of what we might call "discourse metaphor"--whereby clauses stand for exchanges: Mother: You did your homework, didn't you? Child: No. Mother: You didn't do your homework? Did you do well? Child: No. Mother: You didn't do well? Child: No. Mother: You didn't do you homework so you didn't do well. Do the other students do well? Child: Some of them. Mother: Who does well? Do students who do not do their homework do well? And this of course explains why wh-items like "who" and 'why" have two functions--one inside a clause, where it expresses an intra-mental function (grammar) and one between them where it expresses an inter-mental function (discourse). I realize that grammatical metaphor will seem rather dry and abstract and unpoetic to people who assume that metaphor is only of the lexical kind. But to me, and I think to most children, it is far far more powerful and far more important developmentally. In some ways, it's the lexical metaphor that is responsible for the disenchantment of the child's world, while the grammatical metaphor infinitely expands it. (And here, I'm afraid, I must stop--it's time for breakfast and anyway my one screen is used up!) David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies ---***---***--- On 19 December 2014 at 15:15, Greg Thompson wrote: Helena and David, I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the so-called authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred tradition to Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi notion of "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including English) notion of "time" and how each of these languages offers different affordances of meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual understanding, English has a much more reified/objectified/entified sense of time. (btw, I think the first paragraph is easier to follow than the second - and in that first paragraph you'll find our old friend "imagination"). David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to? -greg Taken from: http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/mousesite/Secondary/Whorfframe2.html ["Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, sunset" are with us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from other nouns. They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in winter" just as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are pluralized and numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. Our thought about the referents of such words hence becomes objectified. Without objectification, it would be a subjective experience of real time, i.e. of the consciousness of "becoming later and later"--simply a cyclic phase similar to an earlier phase in that ever-later-becoming duration. Only by imagination can such a cyclic phase be set beside another and another in the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually perceived) configuration. "But such is the power of linguistic analogy that we do so objectify cyclic phasing. We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g., "phasing." And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting binomial formula of formless item plus form, is so general that it is implicit for all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless items like "substance, matter," by which we can fill out the binomial for an enormously wide range of nouns. But even these are not quite generalized enough to take in our phase nouns. So for the phase nouns we have made a formless item, "time." We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, in the pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" in the pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can say and think "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." Let me again point out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of milk" or "a piece of cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a summer" actually contains or consists of such-and-such a quantity of "time." In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., are not nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They are a formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, and even other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a locative pattern, like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It contains no morpheme like one of "in the house" or "at the tree." It means "when it is morning" or "while morning-phase is occurring." These "temporal s" are not used as subjects or objects, or at all like nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" or "summer is hot"; summer is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions are hot, WHEN heat occurs. One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or "summer recently." There is no objectification, as a region, an extent, a quantity, of the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested about time except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no basis here for a formless item answering to our "time." ] ---***---***--- On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Helena Worthen wrote: David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to this: "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to create sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific writing and thinking today." Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I lose you when you say "created to talk about gravity as an entity". Thank you, Helena Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com ---***---***--- On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote: As Helena points out, prepositions are from the "grammatical" end of what Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what Halliday calls "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they have three properties that words from the more "lexical" end do not have: a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You can, actually, but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you invent a new name or a new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can). b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific semantic field (the way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of linguistics) but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are used. c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the same effect, which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your argument" the "in" has more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in "there's a fly in your tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in Henry's hands, refer to a book or even a footnote. Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties pretty much define the difference between learning and development, at least as I understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on functions indefinitely while development works by reorganizing the closed set of functions you already have into new systems. Learning is skill specific and local, while development is quite global in its implications. Learning is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new systems, while development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary (and forget it just as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes away. For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of blue that people call the sky") are simply metaphors from the non-productive end of the lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are crisp, concrete, and vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to create sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific writing and thinking today. For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical metaphor is the third great moment in child development (after the break into mother tongue and the break into disciplinary language in school work). Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" implies zero dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two ("on a line', 'on a plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because they are grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them with time: 'at a point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. Compare: "at Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very day), and "in Christmas' (season). David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies ---***---***--- On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen : Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial relationships from the concrete material world into the conceptual imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 common ones, and between 70 and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far as" -- this is according to https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm ). We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. Apparently, in English, they evolved from and did the job done by inflections in parent languages, examples being cases and tenses. But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection like the dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial relationships suggested by contemporary prepositions. I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about this. Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com ---***---***--- On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly embodied, proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to linguistics (For example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on ?lexicon?: nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, being part of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and Halliday see no clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, lexico-grammar. (Lo and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar, adding the ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings are great data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of that? In translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced? Henry On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the metaphorical use of prepositions like: - "there is some value IN your argument" - "I'd like to go OVER that again" - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" - "Let's go THROUGH that again" and so on. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ ---***---***--- larry smolucha wrote: Message from Francine Smolucha: Forgive me for replying to myself - In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic possibilities: In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in Thought and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into English 1962] Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' value of the two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech vocalization). He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that are flammable gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor a gas. [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century European Developmental Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' hence the Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of Piaget's Genetic Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and synthesis based on metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in Vygotsky's example of H2O. ---***---***--- From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination Message from Francine Smolucha: Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic and produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts. It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more than the recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can ever be imagined" (David Kellogg's most recent email.) A couple things to consider: (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination as the brain has to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the simplest level of the Gestalt Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just photographic. (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try to accurately reproduce the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, the goal of combinatory imagination is to create something new out of memories, dreams, musings, and even sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of objects and symbols. (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways that things and concepts can be combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar and f I can add water and it dissolves a bit But adding heat changes the combination into a pancake. [Is this synergistic?] Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more examples to put the discussion in the metaphysical realm. ---***---***--- Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the case for Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I think it's not just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are associationists who are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary associationism exists and some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. Vygotsky has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, explain the uniqueness of our species? Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels for its own kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a Piagetian perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true maturity as a species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more to it than that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of primate, and our solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon rocks in order to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged the same way as any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. Making the case for the higher psychological functions and for language is not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human exceptionalism. It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for the vanguard role of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, prolonging childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after the sick and the elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial organs (tools) and even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for our species, it is in the societies and the sectors of society where these "circuitous, compensatory means of development" are most advanced that lead our development as a species. The wretched of the earth always been short on rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for material culture generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: verily, here the first shall be last and the last shall be first. I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of attention is simply the logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says there are only two kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So imagination is nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, and nothing really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when you hear the name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there to be able to imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work in word meaning. You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who was given a crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been mixed with silver by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold. Well, we now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not possible to measure the differences in water displacement that precisely. The method that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the "principal of buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes palimpsest, a velum on which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. Because parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and written over every century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, the pressure of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones when the old text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only known Greek copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their relationship to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they are related to each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite similar to the way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies ---***---***--- On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD < hshonerd@gmail.com wrote: I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an associationist, ?sees imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? Henry ---***---***--- On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg < dkellogg60@gmail.com > wrote: On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division between higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because Ribot is an associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of attention. And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from forest to farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between the two great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical world of the forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses in life and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" (that is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the farm,where written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter months are wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter talking animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has to be more voluntary. Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that underpins Ribot here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out the LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices really are the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, there isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and animal imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of volitional attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without a theory of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at all. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies ---***---***--- On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole wrote: Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, thanks to all for the food for thought. Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential around the time emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had seen work on memory before, but not imagination. Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal reproductive? Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of development of imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a relative newcomer to the topic. mike ---***---***--- On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < hshonerd@gmail.com > wrote: Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. This business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some weeks in our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that segmented the last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. Puns, according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) Henry ---***---***--- On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole < mcole@ucsd.edu > wrote: Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they are doing contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his followers as an inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so its of course interesting to see those additional categories emerge. 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in translation, seems awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in this passage, for example, is not a currently used term in counter distinction to "memory." Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary discourse across languages as our explorations with out Russian colleagues have illustrated. That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists who clearly influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still possible to include culture in it. Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, interestingly links imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" act. Parts of it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that was also "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of creativity and imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see that the two concepts are linked. Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself writing. mike Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old approaches to a pesum ---***---***--- On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < ablunden@mira.net wrote >: I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it may be worth noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to Imagination in the section on Representation, mediating between Recollection and Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive Imagination, (2) Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he says leads to the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other words, the transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is accomplished through these three grades of Imagination. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ ---***---***--- mike cole wrote: Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and Williams. Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am trying to mine for empirical strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination develops. At first I thought that the use of productive implies that there must be a kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I learned that instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is linked to memory. So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of anticipation and memory. Imagine that! mike ---***---***--- On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < hshonerd@gmail.com>: Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination (starting with Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and provides a space for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. This, coupled with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground to take part in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with preconceptions: Vera on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian Langacker on symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, particularly the temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of imagination and creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of temporality: sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure), which I think must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both individual and distributed construals of cognition and feeling. Henry ---***---***--- On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote: Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* and the analogy to *gap-filling* I am on holiday so limited access to internet. However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion of "structures of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored under the notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of modalities that hang together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing that is forming but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we think imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* Larry ---***---***--- On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < hshonerd@gmail.com> wrote: Mike and Larry, I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how jazzed up I am now about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as Larry construes it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various triads, finally found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of the mind, as Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa? fuera. Fractally yours, Henry ---***---***--- On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole < mcole@ucsd.edu wrote: For those interested in the imagination thread, attached are two articles by philosophers who have worried about the issue. My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists like Zaporozhets and his students who studied the development of imagination in a manner that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of productive imagination. I am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no intention of doing so. But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the attached texts. Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I came upon the idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked at several levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne and I argued in our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of access to the work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. Moreover, such views emphasize the future orientation of the perception/imagination process. I believe that these views have direct relevance to Kris's paper to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns about the role of different forms of symbolic play in development. So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps they will prove useful for those interested. mike [Imagination and Perception by P.F. Strawson.pdf] From lholzman@eastsideinstitute.org Sun Dec 21 10:23:50 2014 From: lholzman@eastsideinstitute.org (Lois Holzman) Date: Sun, 21 Dec 2014 13:23:50 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Eduardo Vianna profile Message-ID: Today's NY Times has a feature on Eduardo Vianna, a Vygotskian colleague who teaches at LaGuardia Community College. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/21/nyregion/raising-ambitions-the-challenge-in-teaching-at-community-colleges.html?ref=nyregion Eduardo received the Cultural-Historical Research SIG Early Achievement Award in 2010 (I think that was the year). Lois Lois Holzman Director, East Side Institute for Group & Short Term Psychotherapy 119 West 23 St, suite 902 New York, NY 10011 Chair, Global Outreach, All Stars Project, UX Tel. +1.212.941.8906 x324 Fax +1.718.797.3966 lholzman@eastsideinstitute.org Social Media Facebook | LinkedIn | Twitter Blogs Psychology Today| Psychology of Becoming | ESI Community News Websites Lois Holzman | East Side Institute | Performing the World All Stars Project From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sun Dec 21 10:02:26 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (lpscholar2@gmail.com) Date: Sun, 21 Dec 2014 18:02:26 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?q?Speakers_of_AAE?= In-Reply-To: <1419183168363.46553@unm.edu> References: <1419183168363.46553@unm.edu> Message-ID: <54971134.a531460a.6105.ffff9722@mx.google.com> I am in over my head when exploring linquistic themes. However, the power of ?grammatical structures? within events and even multiple ?ontologies? [as recently discussed] leaves me wanting to understand more linquistic anthropology. I want to add Peter Jones voice to our explorations though a quote he offered while critiquing ?Critical Discourse Analysi? He wrote? Our position, in contrast with the practice of CDA, is that the identification of the communicational processes and strategies relevant to particular engagements, the understanding and interpretation of what the relevant or significant communicational forms, meanings and patterns are in a particular situation or event is something that emerges in the course of detailed empirical investigation of the relevant event in all its complexity. There is simply no method or procedure of discourse analysis to be applied short of this process of deciding what words mean in the course of interpretatively reconstructing an entire action or event to which the words contribute. Within the event itself there is no level or dimension of ?discourse? as a self-contained, stable and iterable system of forms and meanings.? As I read this quote and link it to the power of grammatical syntax as it ?shapes? meaning I?m asking how Peter Jones and David Kellogg overlap? In the above paragraph how is ?peter? agentively using the syntactical grammar for ?personal? ends? and how dominatingly is the grammatical syntax ?shaping? what the person ?peter? is ?becoming? Is the grammatical syntax an ?aspect? or ?element? of the ?shaping? and ?forming? context WITHIN a multimodal relational interplay OR Is ?Peter? one ?aspect? or ?element? WITHIN THE EVENT OR ACTION. In other words is ?Peter? more centrally located [as ?agentic?] IN DECIDING, and also more deliberate, IN DESIGNING [self-consciously deciding] the action and events AS ?activity? ?Who IS doing the deciding, and how agentively? Back to ?the third space? as a ?case? Is the DESIGN of the third space an agentive shaping? I read Kris as saying there is a hybrid agency BOTH autobiographical and intersubjective.. How central in shapting this ?third space? is grammatical metaphor. Is grammatical metaphor dominant, or is Kris as deciding and designing PRE-structures more agentively dominant or is it the radical reciprocal inter-subjective hybridity OF and IN ?the third space? what is dominant? These are questions generated in my ?musings? linking and transverse-ing our explorations as performances. Larry Sent from Windows Mail From: Annalisa Aguilar Sent: ?Sunday?, ?December? ?21?, ?2014 ?9?:?32? ?AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity How about all you AAE locutioners come on over here and leave the metaphor discussants in the metaphor thread? Thanks! Annalisa From annalisa@unm.edu Sun Dec 21 10:42:24 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Sun, 21 Dec 2014 18:42:24 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology In-Reply-To: <061001d01d34$dc790d10$956b2730$@uic.edu> References: <039801d01a33$3db3c430$b91b4c90$@uic.edu> <38C43AE248831048B6AF57F364680D3C72A23DDA@OC11EXPO32.exchange.mit.edu> <040801d01a41$4b69dd90$e23d98b0$@uic.edu> <0CBE4C26-68FE-49F7-BE9F-00A0121B4CD8@uniandes.edu.co> <043e01d01a44$b15fac80$141f0580$@uic.edu> <1D18C3B0-9EA5-42E6-8764-A6973960B8B5@uniandes.edu.co> <050701d01a51$084de460$18e9ad20$@uic.edu> <38C43AE248831048B6AF57F364680D3C72A23F69@OC11EXPO32.exchange.mit.edu> <057001d01a5d$d743a640$85caf2c0$@uic.edu> , <061001d01d34$dc790d10$956b2730$@uic.edu> Message-ID: <1419187343939.81696@unm.edu> Aria, Thanks for something more specific. It helps. Would you mind clarifying, when you say: > He sees his goal and Vygotsky's goal of arguing for creativity to be the same although in two different contexts. What are the two different contexts? Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Aria Razfar Sent: Sunday, December 21, 2014 8:43 AM To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology Greg, The topic that seemed to interest him most about Vygotsky was "inner speech" and its connection to culture, social activities and even history. The representation of Chomsky's "nativist" position in sociocultural literature seems to be decontextualized, acultural, and ahistorical, and to some degree rightfully so. Although he would include culture, social activity, and even history as part of "stable cognitive elements" and are definitely "more than habits" which was the main goal of his writings in the 50s and 60s. He sees his goal and Vygotsky's goal of arguing for creativity to be the same although in two different contexts. It was clear to me that he doesn't see the controversies, at least not the same way post "social turn" scholars and self-proclaimed Chomskians have framed it. He sees his views of language and cognition as very much compatible with Vygotsky's insights, especially the ones he's read closely. It's been years since he's written about these topics, so unfortunately there isn't a paper. His take on the roots of the "controversies" and the subsequent careers built on it are "quite interesting." Did you have any specific questions? Aria Aria Razfar, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Literacy, Language, and Culture Director of Graduate Studies, Curriculum and Instruction University of Illinois at Chicago 1040 W. Harrison St. M/C 147 Chicago, IL, 60607 Director of English Learning through Mathematics, Science and Action Research (ELMSA) www.elmsa.org Webpage: http://education.uic.edu/personnel/faculty/aria-razfar-phd Tel: 312-413-8373 Fax: 312-996-8134 -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson Sent: Thursday, December 18, 2014 10:54 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology ?Aria, Any updates to report on Professor Chomsky's take on Vygotsky? -greg? On Wed, Dec 17, 2014 at 5:59 PM, Aria Razfar wrote: > > > Hi Martin, > > See below. He finds Vygotsky's work "quite interesting." Let's see if > he elaborates. I find his persepctive on the "Linguistic Wars" also > interesting. > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistics_Wars > > Aria > > -----Original Message----- > From: Noam Chomsky [mailto:chomsky@mit.edu] > Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 6:09 PM > To: Aria Razfar > Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology > > The "linguistic wars" are largely an invention of overheated > imaginations of those who thought they were fighting them. If you > check the record you'll discover that I barely participated, and > didn't consider them any different from interchanges within what's > claimed to be "my side" of the non-existent wars. > > Vygotsky did quite interesting work. > > -----Original Message----- > From: Aria Razfar [mailto:arazfar@uic.edu] > Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 6:28 PM > To: Noam Chomsky > Cc: arazfar@uic.edu > Subject: FW: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology > > See question below re: "opinion on Vygotsky"? > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John > Packer > Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 5:12 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology > > Since we have Professor Chomsky online, might we be able to ask him > his opinion of Vygotsky? > > Martin > > On Dec 17, 2014, at 4:59 PM, Aria Razfar wrote: > > > Hi Martin, > > > > Metaphor was my take and other cognitive linguist's take (i.e. > > Lakoff). I believe his rejection of "Metaphor" at least in the > > embodied cognition sense is rooted in the "Linguistics Wars." > > Several people in this thread as well others in the field of > > cognitive linguistics made the claim that he was and remains a > > Cartesian dualist. He definitely does not consider himself as such. > > In order to establish the field of linguistics, he had to position > > it within the broader arch of western enlightenment and romanticism. > > Hence, the title of > the book. > > > > Aria > > > > Aria Razfar, Ph.D. > > Associate Professor of Literacy, Language, and Culture Director of > > Graduate Studies, Curriculum and Instruction University of Illinois > > at Chicago > > 1040 W. Harrison St. M/C 147 > > Chicago, IL, 60607 > > > > Director of English Learning through Mathematics, Science and Action > > Research (ELMSA) www.elmsa.org > > > > Webpage: http://education.uic.edu/personnel/faculty/aria-razfar-phd > > Tel: 312-413-8373 > > Fax: 312-996-8134 > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John > > Packer > > Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 3:47 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology > > > > Hi Aria, > > > > It would help to see the message that Noam is responding to! I don't > > see, for example, how metaphor crept into this discussion. > > (Actually, looking back through the thread, I see that this was your > > proposal.) > > > > I suppose a lot depends on what one means by being "a Cartesian." As > > I just wrote in another message, Chomsky was, I think, positioning > > his approach to linguistics in a tradition in which Descartes was > > prominent: in which one tries to figure out what makes possible a > > specific characteristic or ability of the mind. Chomsky asked what > > universal competence would be necessary to make language possible - > > any > language. > > > > I'm not trying to attach a label to the man; but he give the book > > its title for a reason, and a very respectable one. > > > > Martin > > > > On Dec 17, 2014, at 4:34 PM, Aria Razfar wrote: > > > >> Here is Chomsky's response to whether or not he is a Cartesian. Not > > surprisingly, he categorically rejects the idea of "metaphor" as well. > > At least he's open to change. Now whether our subject is dead or > > alive that is a different question. > >> > >> Aria > >> > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: Noam Chomsky [mailto:chomsky@mit.edu] > >> Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 3:16 PM > >> To: Aria Razfar > >> Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology > >> The reason for the phrase "Cartesian linguistics" was explained very clearly in the opening pages of the book. No one who read at least that far could believe that I am "a Cartesian," let alone anyone who read farther. I can't account for the illiteracy of "notable folks." > >> It's also not a metaphor. Rather, exactly as I described it, which I would repeat verbatim today. > >> There's no need to argue against "mind-body dualism." As I've discussed repeatedly, Newton's discoveries terminated the thesis, at least in its classical form, through Descartes and beyond. > >> Of course I've changed my views since the '50s and '60s, in fact in the past few months. That's normal in subjects that are not dead. > >> > >> Noam Chomsky From annalisa@unm.edu Sun Dec 21 11:09:57 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Sun, 21 Dec 2014 19:09:57 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Speakers of AAE In-Reply-To: <54971134.a531460a.6105.ffff9722@mx.google.com> References: <1419183168363.46553@unm.edu>, <54971134.a531460a.6105.ffff9722@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <1419188997288.35561@unm.edu> Hi, I've extracted what I could from the Metaphor thread regarding AAE, Labov, etc. Hope this is of service to those who wish to further discuss AAE and Orr's work. I apologize if I did not get everything. I'm of the sense David Kirshner is very happy this topic is on stage, so I hope you all will not see me as being rude for asking it to go to a new thread? Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: on behalf of lpscholar2@gmail.com Sent: Sunday, December 21, 2014 11:02 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Speakers of AAE I am in over my head when exploring linquistic themes. However, the power of ?grammatical structures? within events and even multiple ?ontologies? [as recently discussed] leaves me wanting to understand more linquistic anthropology. I want to add Peter Jones voice to our explorations though a quote he offered while critiquing ?Critical Discourse Analysis? He wrote ?Our position, in contrast with the practice of CDA, is that the identification of the communicational processes and strategies relevant to particular engagements, the understanding and interpretation of what the relevant or significant communicational forms, meanings and patterns are in a particular situation or event is something that emerges in the course of detailed empirical investigation of the relevant event in all its complexity. There is simply no method or procedure of discourse analysis to be applied short of this process of deciding what words mean in the course of interpretatively reconstructing an entire action or event to which the words contribute. Within the event itself there is no level or dimension of ?discourse? as a self-contained, stable and iterable system of forms and meanings.? As I read this quote and link it to the power of grammatical syntax as it ?shapes? meaning I?m asking how Peter Jones and David Kellogg overlap? In the above paragraph how is ?peter? agentively using the syntactical grammar for ?personal? ends? and how dominatingly is the grammatical syntax ?shaping? what the person ?peter? is ?becoming? Is the grammatical syntax an ?aspect? or ?element? of the ?shaping? and ?forming? context WITHIN a multimodal relational interplay OR Is ?Peter? one ?aspect? or ?element? WITHIN THE EVENT OR ACTION. In other words is ?Peter? more centrally located [as ?agentic?] IN DECIDING, and also more deliberate, IN DESIGNING [self-consciously deciding] the action and events AS ?activity? ?Who IS doing the deciding, and how agentively? Back to ?the third space? as a ?case? Is the DESIGN of the third space an agentive shaping? I read Kris as saying there is a hybrid agency BOTH autobiographical and intersubjective.. How central in shapting this ?third space? is grammatical metaphor. Is grammatical metaphor dominant, or is Kris as deciding and designing PRE-structures more agentively dominant or is it the radical reciprocal inter-subjective hybridity OF and IN ?the third space? what is dominant? These are questions generated in my ?musings? linking and transverse-ing our explorations as performances. Larry From: Vera John-Steiner Sun 12/21/2014 11:05 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity ; Hi, About Labov's work, the children were taking care of a rabbit and making cogent arguments about feeding, etc. Vera From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Sun 12/21/2014 10:28 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity ; Re double negatives as "negative concord": Russian too no? Greg From: Martin John Packer Sun 12/21/2014 10:01 AM To:eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity ; Double negatives in Spanish too. And we all know how that really slowed the Spanish down! Not. Martin On Dec 21, 2014, at 10:55 AM, Carol Macdonald wrote: > There was also the problem of the double negative of African American > dialect. Psychologists said that a double negative was equal to a > positive, and then therefore speakers of AAE were incapable of logical > thought. Labov laid out the paradigm of positive and negatives in AAE, to > show just how logical it is. On Dec 21, 2014, at 10:55 AM, Carol Macdonald Sun 12/21/2014 8:57 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity ; Hi A small piece of info about Labov. At the height of the psychologists' theory of deficit, the linguists and sociolinguists came to the fore with a profoundly important observation of difference. No language has a deficit. As you know, Labov did a partial replication of the deficit situation. The big white man into an interview with a small black child, and performed dysmally. However, Labov has set up his own second analysis, by asking the children in the "waiting room" to take care of his white rat. That situation produced an abundance of language. These children were certainly not short of language, not "nonverbal". There was also the problem of the double negative of African American dialect. Psychologists said that a double negative was equal to a positive, and then therefore speakers of AAE were incapable of logical thought. Labov laid out the paradigm of positive and negatives in AAE, to show just how logical it is. As a linguistics student in the early 70s, we were inordinately proud of these linguistic insights. It was the birth of sociolinguists. I apologise for the lack of references for this presentation. Please correct any details. Carol From: Dr. Paul C. Mocombe Date: Sun 12/21/2014 9:26 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity ; Hi greg, Doing the 1990s, the California school system were discussing using AAE to teach standard english. The black middle class went crazy over the issue. There is a gap between academia, which views AAE as a distinct linguistic system and the masses, the black middle class of teachers, preachers, and other educated professionals, who are less likely to do so. In my own research it is apparent when you look at standardized test scores and content...black students from the inner cities are not understanding the content. I am currently doing field work at an urban school in Florida that is 100 percent black, and the teachers and administration are all black. I am looking at the impact that teaching reading via language arts instruction will have on test scores. The school has been an "F" school for the past 5 years. The students struggle with vocabulary and understanding author's purpose. Testing in Florida starts in the 3rd grade. Last year out of the 70 third graders who took the state standardized tests, 10 were proficient in reading...yes 10. The state average for proficiency is 65 percent for whites, 34 percent for blacks. Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com www.readingroomcurriculum.com www.paulcmocombe.info -------- Original message -------- From: Greg Thompson Date:12/21/2014 10:36 AM (GMT-05:00) To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors In the interests of following the recently suggested injunction not to directly address specific interlocutors, I'll talk in generalities (This makes it a bit more challenging to have a conversation but it also makes one think about the extractable and generalizable point that is beyond the immediate context). In my previous post (apologies for drawing on prior context), I neither suggested nor intended to imply that Orr's work is racist (do intentions matter when it comes to meaning?). This speaks to some of the difficulties of talking about issues of race. And in this connection let's not forget the fact that this list-serve is dominated by white men - that doesn't mean that we are necessarily racist but it does mean that we are likely to be ignorant of many aspects of these issues. Nonetheless, I believe that we can overcome our ignorance through education, by learning more about the issues - even when it comes to trying to understand cultures and languages that we did not grow up with. And while I think that there is good evidence for the linguistic relativity hypothesis, I do not believe that language is a determining influence in ALL thinking (Whorf uses the term "habitual" to describe the type of thinking that is most susceptible to the influence of language). That means that even if you don't speak AAE, you can still study it and even come to understand how the grammatical forms lend themselves to particular ways of understanding the world (this is what linguistic anthropology is all about!). And this is my concern with Orr's work. With all academic work, I think it is worth considering questions like "How would racists take up our research?" In the case of Orr's work, my sense is that racists could easily take up her research to argue (perhaps even by using the linguistic relativity hypothesis) that AAE speakers are unable to do complex mathematical thinking. This is why I would think that it is important to give a positive articulation of what AAE does as a language. It is certainly important to understand what it CAN'T do (e.g., help one learn math in a particular way), but it is equally important to understand what it CAN do. As Paul points out, Labov has done some of the work addressing this. But note that Labov's work was done 40 years ago and no one has sought to replicate or do any kind of similar work. What gives? -greg On Sat, Dec 20, 2014 at 11:37 PM, David H Kirshner wrote: > Greg, > > I'm delighted that you're familiar with and appreciative of Orr's work. > > Cleary she didn't provide "serious consideration of how AAE speakers > actually use prepositions"--she couldn't have, as she was not a native > speaker of Black English dialect, and she was not a linguist. But I'm not > sure how paying serious attention to technical nuances of Black English > grammar would have helped, as her analyses show that the African American > students in her classes were not speaking either standard English or Black > English Vernacular, but rather a hybrid that arises from their efforts to > emulate standard English. > > Now, it's true her work didn't parallel the approach Gay and Cole took to > understanding what other psychologists were classifying as linguistic and > cognitive deficits by carefully studying the native language and culture. > On the other hand, she did something Gay and Cole didn't do, namely > micro-analyze the linguistic miscues operating in the classroom, and the > resultant dilemmas of comprehension this created for her African American > students. > > As the excerpt copied below illustrates, Orr was scrupulously attentive to > understanding her students' experience of distance and location given the > different linguistic setting. And her analyses consistently point to the > mismatch between the native dialect and the language of instruction as the > source of the problems, not the native dialect, itself. To label this work > as implicitly racist, I think cedes too much to those who mistrust science > as a tool of the oppressor, and whose only locus of attention is the > history and legacy of social injustice. Even now, in this discussion, we > are missing the point. The major significance of Orr's work is not that > differences in grammatical structure have semantic implications. This is > merely a window to the dramatic realization that semantics are written into > grammatical form. > > David > > Excerpt from Orr (1987): > > "Jane gives us in these diagrams a glimpse into the kinds of mental images > she constructs when she is using the single symbol length, representing > both location and distance, as a tool with which to think. Even the > diagrams Jane drew for problems 13 and 14 begin to be less incomprehensible > if one attempts to construct in one's own mind images of the information > given in these problems, while adhering to the requirement that length be > used to represent both location and distance. They can be seen as possible > consequents or extensions of the symbol length when it is used to represent > both location and distance. Consider, for instance, the mental images one > might construct in responding to problem 13: Two cities, both represented > by line segments, are equal distances (that is, equal line segments) closer > to a third city (another line segment) than two other cities (line > segments) are. The first two cities must be represented by equal line > segments because they are equal distances closer to the third city than the > other two cities are. And these other two cities must also be represented > by equal line segments because they are equal distances from the third > city. One can see that Jane's diagrams are not as lacking in reason as they > may initially have appeared to be. > > "Jane's diagrams suggest the possibility that when words, or symbols are > used as instruments with which to think, the use in one language of a > single symbol in contexts where a second language requires two or more can > lead a speaker of the first language to arrive at a different mental > construct of some given information from that arrived at by a speaker of > the second language. Or, as in Jane's attempt to handle problem 14, the > result may be an inability to arrive at a workable mental construct at > all." (p. 25) > > [Note, this excerpt is part of a longer segment I emailed on Dec. 19 that > shows Jane's diagrams that Orr is referring to.] > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson > Sent: Saturday, December 20, 2014 3:14 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors > > The issues that are raised by Orr are indeed important ones. I am a fan of > her work as it points to important differences in language usage among AAE > speakers. I agree that she shouldn't have been condemned for pointing out > these differences (particularly considering how important it is for > teachers to understand the consequences of these differences). If you want > to help AAE speaking students do better on standardized tests, then you > absolutely need to pay attention to these differences. > > My one concern here is that I do feel like there is a problem of deficit > thinking that is at least implied in her work (and maybe "implied" is too > strong a term - maybe it's just that she doesn't provide evidence to > discourage us from this view). What we don't see in this book is any > serious consideration of how AAE speakers actually use prepositions - e.g., > the ways of using language that exist in the community of AAE speakers. > This gives Orr's work a feel somewhat like the studies of math among the > Kpelle studied by Gay and Cole in the pre-early days of LCHC (see wiki for > more: http://lchcfestschrift.wikispaces.com/Chapter+1). Before they > showed > up on the scene, everyone had assumed that the Kpelle (Liberia) couldn't > comprehend basic math concepts b.c. they weren't learning it in the ways > that it was being taught (and perhaps there were even linguistic relativity > arguments that pointed to this). Rather then continuing to pluck these > folks out of context and run them through various types of experiments, Gay > and Cole "explicitly began with the assumption that ?we must know more > about the indigenous mathematics so that we can build effective bridges to > the new mathematics that we are trying to introduce?" > >From their research, they found that the Kpelle actually had high > competence with complex mathematical problems (e.g., estimating volumes). > As they write: > "Overall, the data suggested that no generalized lack of mathematical, > perceptual, or problem solving abilities stood in the way of mathematics > education. When the materials and procedures used in assessment tasks were > designed to match closely valued local practices, lack of ability could be > replaced by apparent special ability. At the same time, schooling did > appear to influence performance in tasks that were routinely used to > measure cognitive development." > So I think I would be more comfortable with Orr's work if she were to have > included this kind of rich understanding of usage in context and how > prepositions actually are used among AAE speakers. > > This points to a larger question that might be irksome to some folks, but > the question regards the extent to which mathematical language is > predicated upon a particular form of what Whorf called "Standard Average > European." In short, the idea here is that Math has a history and a > culture. This doesn't mean that it is useless or a waste of time, just that > it is a particular way of encountering the world that is good for > particular things and not for others. > > I think we've gone round this mulberry bush before, but that was just more > grist for the mill (I prefer my metaphors mixed!). > > -greg > > > > > > On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 8:46 PM, David H Kirshner dkirsh@lsu.edu>> wrote: > > > > The topic of how grammatical form relates to meaning calls to mind the > > groundbreaking work of Eleanor Orr--whom you've probably never heard of > on > > account of the fact that her work was condemned by a politically-correct > > faction of race-conscious sociolinguists who decided her analysis of > Black > > English Vernacular could too easily be appropriated into racist > discourses > > about language deficiency. > > > > Orr was a Washington DC area teacher and principal in the 1970s and > 1980s, > > who traced math difficulties of her African American students to subtle > > grammatical differences between Black English dialect and standard > English. > > Her 1987 book goes into compelling detail to support the thesis that the > > meaning structure of basic mathematical terms is embedded in the > > grammatical setting in which those terms are expressed. For instance, the > > meaning of ?distance? is embedded in the grammatical structure ?distance > > from _________ to __________? where the place-holders hold locations; if > > you don?t have that grammatical structure, and you're in a linguistic > > environment in which that structure is assumed, you're likely not going > to > > be able to gain full access to the concept. > > > > The attached excerpts from her book--ignore the Forward, unless you'd > like > > some context--reveal some of her students' bizarre conceptions of > distance > > (and other basic mathematical concepts) as revealed in their diagrams. > Her > > approach involves linguistic analysis of sentences produced by her > African > > American students that she reads as collapsed versions of standard > English > > sentences, with differences in prepositional structure being highlighted > > (but other grammatical elements also are indicated). > > > > This work cuts against the grain of anything going on in mathematics > > education. The Piagetian view that dominates that field holds that basic > > concepts come about from reflection on our actions in our engagement with > > the material world. When language enters the conversation, it's with > > respect to semantic structure; to my knowledge, nobody's ever implicated > > syntax directly in basic quantitative understanding. > > > > This work is particularly interesting to me in connection with my > > 21-year-old son who is autistic, and whose grammatical function is > severely > > impaired. He has a decent vocabulary, but unless the setting for the > > conversation provides contextual clues, he can't piece together how the > > semantic elements are linked to one another. It is only recently that it > > occurred to me his lack of a secure sense of basic quantitative terms > like > > ?more? and ?less? may be rooted in his grammatical incapacities. > > > > The XMCA discussion, thus far, has touched on grammar with respect to > > lexical items such as prepositions. But we've not yet tied that to the > > grammatical forms that embed those lexical items. I'm very curious as to > > whether that further connection can be made. > > > > David Kirshner > > > > Orr, E., W. (1987). Twice as less: Black English and the performance of > > black students in mathematics and science. New York: W. W. Norton & > Company. From evianna@lagcc.cuny.edu Sun Dec 21 11:16:55 2014 From: evianna@lagcc.cuny.edu (Eduardo Vianna) Date: Sun, 21 Dec 2014 14:16:55 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Eduardo Vianna profile Message-ID: <5496D6560200001F0002E5BE@mailgate.lagcc.cuny.edu> Thank you for posting this, Lois. In case anyone is interested, the research project mentioned in the NY Times article is described in a chapter I wrote with Naja Hougaard and Anna Stetsenko published this year in the book edited by Andy Blunden on collaborative projects: Vianna, E., Hougaard, N. & Stetsenko,A. (2014). The Dialectics of Collective and Individual Transformation: Transformative Activist Research in a CollaborativeLearning Community Project. In A. Blunden (Ed.), Project collaboration: An interdisciplinary study. Boston, MA:Brill Academic Publishers. Eduardo Eduardo Vianna, Ph.D. Associate Professor Social Science Department LaGuardia Community College 31-10 Thomson Ave Long Island City, NY 11101 (718)482-6043 >>> Lois Holzman 12/21/14 1:25 PM >>> Today's NY Times has a feature on Eduardo Vianna, a Vygotskian colleague who teaches at LaGuardia Community College. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/21/nyregion/raising-ambitions-the-challenge-in-teaching-at-community-colleges.html?ref=nyregion Eduardo received the Cultural-Historical Research SIG Early Achievement Award in 2010 (I think that was the year). Lois Lois Holzman Director, East Side Institute for Group & Short Term Psychotherapy 119 West 23 St, suite 902 New York, NY 10011 Chair, Global Outreach, All Stars Project, UX Tel. +1.212.941.8906 x324 Fax +1.718.797.3966 lholzman@eastsideinstitute.org Social Media Facebook | LinkedIn | Twitter Blogs Psychology Today| Psychology of Becoming | ESI Community News Websites Lois Holzman | East Side Institute | Performing the World All Stars Project From arazfar@uic.edu Sun Dec 21 11:38:38 2014 From: arazfar@uic.edu (Aria Razfar) Date: Sun, 21 Dec 2014 13:38:38 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology In-Reply-To: <1419187343939.81696@unm.edu> References: <039801d01a33$3db3c430$b91b4c90$@uic.edu> <38C43AE248831048B6AF57F364680D3C72A23DDA@OC11EXPO32.exchange.mit.edu> <040801d01a41$4b69dd90$e23d98b0$@uic.edu> <0CBE4C26-68FE-49F7-BE9F-00A0121B4CD8@uniandes.edu.co> <043e01d01a44$b15fac80$141f0580$@uic.edu> <1D18C3B0-9EA5-42E6-8764-A6973960B8B5@uniandes.edu.co> <050701d01a51$084de460$18e9ad20$@uic.edu> <38C43AE248831048B6AF57F364680D3C72A23F69@OC11EXPO32.exchange.mit.edu> <057001d01a5d$d743a640$85caf2c0$@uic.edu> , <061001d01d34$dc790d10$956b2730$@uic.edu> <1419187343939.81696@unm.edu> Message-ID: <067901d01d55$b8a8f2d0$29fad870$@uic.edu> Annalisa, The two different contexts are early 20th century Soviet Psychology and mid-20th Century U.S. Psychology. While different in terms of space and time, it was similar in terms of content. Chomsky arguing for creativity and freedom of thought in a context dominated by Skinner's Behaviorism. Vygotsky arguing for creativity in a context dominated by the behaviorism of Pavlovian-Marxist Psychology. Aria Aria Razfar, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Literacy, Language, and Culture Director of Graduate Studies, Curriculum and Instruction University of Illinois at Chicago 1040 W. Harrison St. M/C 147 Chicago, IL, 60607 Director of English Learning through Mathematics, Science and Action Research (ELMSA) www.elmsa.org Webpage: http://education.uic.edu/personnel/faculty/aria-razfar-phd Tel: 312-413-8373 Fax: 312-996-8134 -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Annalisa Aguilar Sent: Sunday, December 21, 2014 12:42 PM To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology Aria, Thanks for something more specific. It helps. Would you mind clarifying, when you say: > He sees his goal and Vygotsky's goal of arguing for creativity to be the same although in two different contexts. What are the two different contexts? Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Aria Razfar Sent: Sunday, December 21, 2014 8:43 AM To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology Greg, The topic that seemed to interest him most about Vygotsky was "inner speech" and its connection to culture, social activities and even history. The representation of Chomsky's "nativist" position in sociocultural literature seems to be decontextualized, acultural, and ahistorical, and to some degree rightfully so. Although he would include culture, social activity, and even history as part of "stable cognitive elements" and are definitely "more than habits" which was the main goal of his writings in the 50s and 60s. He sees his goal and Vygotsky's goal of arguing for creativity to be the same although in two different contexts. It was clear to me that he doesn't see the controversies, at least not the same way post "social turn" scholars and self-proclaimed Chomskians have framed it. He sees his views of language and cognition as very much compatible with Vygotsky's insights, especially the ones he's read closely. It's been years since he's written about these topics, so unf ortunately there isn't a paper. His take on the roots of the "controversies" and the subsequent careers built on it are "quite interesting." Did you have any specific questions? Aria Aria Razfar, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Literacy, Language, and Culture Director of Graduate Studies, Curriculum and Instruction University of Illinois at Chicago 1040 W. Harrison St. M/C 147 Chicago, IL, 60607 Director of English Learning through Mathematics, Science and Action Research (ELMSA) www.elmsa.org Webpage: http://education.uic.edu/personnel/faculty/aria-razfar-phd Tel: 312-413-8373 Fax: 312-996-8134 -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson Sent: Thursday, December 18, 2014 10:54 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology ?Aria, Any updates to report on Professor Chomsky's take on Vygotsky? -greg? On Wed, Dec 17, 2014 at 5:59 PM, Aria Razfar wrote: > > > Hi Martin, > > See below. He finds Vygotsky's work "quite interesting." Let's see if > he elaborates. I find his persepctive on the "Linguistic Wars" also > interesting. > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistics_Wars > > Aria > > -----Original Message----- > From: Noam Chomsky [mailto:chomsky@mit.edu] > Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 6:09 PM > To: Aria Razfar > Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology > > The "linguistic wars" are largely an invention of overheated > imaginations of those who thought they were fighting them. If you > check the record you'll discover that I barely participated, and > didn't consider them any different from interchanges within what's > claimed to be "my side" of the non-existent wars. > > Vygotsky did quite interesting work. > > -----Original Message----- > From: Aria Razfar [mailto:arazfar@uic.edu] > Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 6:28 PM > To: Noam Chomsky > Cc: arazfar@uic.edu > Subject: FW: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology > > See question below re: "opinion on Vygotsky"? > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John > Packer > Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 5:12 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology > > Since we have Professor Chomsky online, might we be able to ask him > his opinion of Vygotsky? > > Martin > > On Dec 17, 2014, at 4:59 PM, Aria Razfar wrote: > > > Hi Martin, > > > > Metaphor was my take and other cognitive linguist's take (i.e. > > Lakoff). I believe his rejection of "Metaphor" at least in the > > embodied cognition sense is rooted in the "Linguistics Wars." > > Several people in this thread as well others in the field of > > cognitive linguistics made the claim that he was and remains a > > Cartesian dualist. He definitely does not consider himself as such. > > In order to establish the field of linguistics, he had to position > > it within the broader arch of western enlightenment and romanticism. > > Hence, the title of > the book. > > > > Aria > > > > Aria Razfar, Ph.D. > > Associate Professor of Literacy, Language, and Culture Director of > > Graduate Studies, Curriculum and Instruction University of Illinois > > at Chicago > > 1040 W. Harrison St. M/C 147 > > Chicago, IL, 60607 > > > > Director of English Learning through Mathematics, Science and Action > > Research (ELMSA) www.elmsa.org > > > > Webpage: http://education.uic.edu/personnel/faculty/aria-razfar-phd > > Tel: 312-413-8373 > > Fax: 312-996-8134 > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John > > Packer > > Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 3:47 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology > > > > Hi Aria, > > > > It would help to see the message that Noam is responding to! I don't > > see, for example, how metaphor crept into this discussion. > > (Actually, looking back through the thread, I see that this was your > > proposal.) > > > > I suppose a lot depends on what one means by being "a Cartesian." As > > I just wrote in another message, Chomsky was, I think, positioning > > his approach to linguistics in a tradition in which Descartes was > > prominent: in which one tries to figure out what makes possible a > > specific characteristic or ability of the mind. Chomsky asked what > > universal competence would be necessary to make language possible - > > any > language. > > > > I'm not trying to attach a label to the man; but he give the book > > its title for a reason, and a very respectable one. > > > > Martin > > > > On Dec 17, 2014, at 4:34 PM, Aria Razfar wrote: > > > >> Here is Chomsky's response to whether or not he is a Cartesian. Not > > surprisingly, he categorically rejects the idea of "metaphor" as well. > > At least he's open to change. Now whether our subject is dead or > > alive that is a different question. > >> > >> Aria > >> > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: Noam Chomsky [mailto:chomsky@mit.edu] > >> Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 3:16 PM > >> To: Aria Razfar > >> Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology > >> The reason for the phrase "Cartesian linguistics" was explained very clearly in the opening pages of the book. No one who read at least that far could believe that I am "a Cartesian," let alone anyone who read farther. I can't account for the illiteracy of "notable folks." > >> It's also not a metaphor. Rather, exactly as I described it, which I would repeat verbatim today. > >> There's no need to argue against "mind-body dualism." As I've discussed repeatedly, Newton's discoveries terminated the thesis, at least in its classical form, through Descartes and beyond. > >> Of course I've changed my views since the '50s and '60s, in fact in the past few months. That's normal in subjects that are not dead. > >> > >> Noam Chomsky From mcole@ucsd.edu Sun Dec 21 12:27:19 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sun, 21 Dec 2014 12:27:19 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Eduardo Vianna profile In-Reply-To: <5496D6560200001F0002E5BE@mailgate.lagcc.cuny.edu> References: <5496D6560200001F0002E5BE@mailgate.lagcc.cuny.edu> Message-ID: Great that your work got this attention, Eduardo. I first saw it when a colleague sent it out to our department! mike On Sun, Dec 21, 2014 at 11:16 AM, Eduardo Vianna wrote: > Thank you for posting this, Lois. In case anyone is interested, the > research project mentioned in the NY Times article is described in a > chapter I wrote with Naja Hougaard and Anna Stetsenko published this year > in the book edited by Andy Blunden on collaborative projects: > > Vianna, E., Hougaard, N. & Stetsenko,A. (2014). The Dialectics of > Collective and Individual Transformation: Transformative Activist Research > in a CollaborativeLearning Community Project. In A. Blunden (Ed.), Project > collaboration: An interdisciplinary study. Boston, MA:Brill Academic > Publishers. > > Eduardo > > Eduardo Vianna, Ph.D. > Associate Professor > Social Science Department > LaGuardia Community College > 31-10 Thomson Ave > Long Island City, NY 11101 > (718)482-6043 > >>> Lois Holzman 12/21/14 1:25 PM >>> > Today's NY Times has a feature on Eduardo Vianna, a Vygotskian colleague > who teaches at LaGuardia Community College. > > http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/21/nyregion/raising-ambitions-the-challenge-in-teaching-at-community-colleges.html?ref=nyregion > Eduardo received the Cultural-Historical Research SIG Early Achievement > Award in 2010 (I think that was the year). > Lois > > > Lois Holzman > Director, East Side Institute for Group & Short Term Psychotherapy > 119 West 23 St, suite 902 > New York, NY 10011 > Chair, Global Outreach, All Stars Project, UX > Tel. +1.212.941.8906 x324 > Fax +1.718.797.3966 > lholzman@eastsideinstitute.org > Social Media > Facebook | LinkedIn | Twitter > Blogs > Psychology Today| Psychology of Becoming | ESI Community News > Websites > Lois Holzman | East Side Institute | Performing the World > All Stars Project > > > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sun Dec 21 12:36:22 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Sun, 21 Dec 2014 12:36:22 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Roy Harris and Integrationist Linquistics Message-ID: Peter Jones writes on intergrationist approaches to language and references Roy Harris: Here is Roy in his own words tOur position, in contrast with the practice of CDA, is that the identification of the communicational processes and strategies relevant to particular engagements, the understanding and interpretation of what the relevant or significant communicational forms, meanings and patterns are in a particular situation or event is something that emerges in the course of detailed empirical investigation of the relevant event in all its complexity. There is simply no method or procedure of discourse analysis to be applied short of this process of deciding what words mean in the course of interpretatively reconstructing an entire action or event to which the words contribute. Within the event itself there is no level or dimension of ?discourse? as a self-contained, stable and iterable system of forms and meanings. The central focus is on *context* and every semiological *act* cannot be interpreted except in its specific situated context. I started a new thread as may not be of any interest to others From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Sun Dec 21 14:01:24 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Sun, 21 Dec 2014 22:01:24 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Maths and science in Russia In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Ulvi, The essential 'method' is to facilitate students' own experimentation with methods. This is called learning activity. Huw On 21 December 2014 at 12:15, Ulvi ??il wrote: > > Hello, > > I know there are some works comparing Russia (Davydov's curriculum) and US, > and even some works done in US with an application of Davydov's, e.g. by > Schmittau. > > I would like to know, not in detail, but just in general, which main > factors lie behind this success in Russia, it is Davydov, or Zarkov or any > other scholar's method. > > Thanks in advance, > > Ulvi > From ulvi.icil@gmail.com Sun Dec 21 14:15:49 2014 From: ulvi.icil@gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?VWx2aSDEsMOnaWw=?=) Date: Mon, 22 Dec 2014 00:15:49 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Maths and science in Russia In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Thanks Huw. Yes, I know in Davydov it is called learning activity but my question was aimed at the curriculum situation in Russia, current math curriculum applied in Russia's primary schools? What is this curriculum? Is it the one proposed by Davydov or bearing another name? And to put it in terms of Vygotsky, is the curriculum currently applied, and which seems to be quite successful, has anything to do with Vygotskian theory in Russia and in other countries where maths seems to be a successful discipline in primary years. Best, Ulvi 2014-12-22 0:01 GMT+02:00 Huw Lloyd : > Ulvi, > > The essential 'method' is to facilitate students' own experimentation with > methods. This is called learning activity. > > Huw > > On 21 December 2014 at 12:15, Ulvi ??il wrote: > > > > Hello, > > > > I know there are some works comparing Russia (Davydov's curriculum) and > US, > > and even some works done in US with an application of Davydov's, e.g. by > > Schmittau. > > > > I would like to know, not in detail, but just in general, which main > > factors lie behind this success in Russia, it is Davydov, or Zarkov or > any > > other scholar's method. > > > > Thanks in advance, > > > > Ulvi > > > From ewall@umich.edu Sun Dec 21 14:48:34 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Sun, 21 Dec 2014 16:48:34 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Maths and science in Russia In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <626322EE-DC59-4C94-A4AD-5C54F6045589@umich.edu> Ulvi According to the 2015 TIMSS, the average score of fourth graders in the US is 541 where that of England and the Russian Federation is 542. I know that, in general, the mathematics curriculum in the US and England has nothing much to do with Vygotsky (and yet a lot to do with Piaget). A number of mathematics educators think that the math curriculum in the early grades in the US is not particularly successful (hat is one of the reasons behind some recent reform efforts in the US). Why do you think, given these average scores (and, of course, there are questions about TIMSS), the curriculum in Russia is "quite successful?" Ed Wall On Dec 21, 2014, at 4:15 PM, Ulvi ??il wrote: > Thanks Huw. > Yes, I know in Davydov it is called learning activity but my question was > aimed at the curriculum situation in Russia, current math curriculum > applied in Russia's primary schools? > What is this curriculum? Is it the one proposed by Davydov or bearing > another name? > And to put it in terms of Vygotsky, is the curriculum currently applied, > and which seems to be quite successful, has anything to do with Vygotskian > theory in Russia and in other countries where maths seems to be a > successful discipline in primary years. > > Best, > Ulvi > > > 2014-12-22 0:01 GMT+02:00 Huw Lloyd : > >> Ulvi, >> >> The essential 'method' is to facilitate students' own experimentation with >> methods. This is called learning activity. >> >> Huw >> >> On 21 December 2014 at 12:15, Ulvi ??il wrote: >>> >>> Hello, >>> >>> I know there are some works comparing Russia (Davydov's curriculum) and >> US, >>> and even some works done in US with an application of Davydov's, e.g. by >>> Schmittau. >>> >>> I would like to know, not in detail, but just in general, which main >>> factors lie behind this success in Russia, it is Davydov, or Zarkov or >> any >>> other scholar's method. >>> >>> Thanks in advance, >>> >>> Ulvi >>> >> From ewall@umich.edu Sun Dec 21 14:50:20 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Sun, 21 Dec 2014 16:50:20 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Maths and science in Russia In-Reply-To: <626322EE-DC59-4C94-A4AD-5C54F6045589@umich.edu> References: <626322EE-DC59-4C94-A4AD-5C54F6045589@umich.edu> Message-ID: <1EA8E45A-A521-4161-8534-A00338B32009@umich.edu> Sorry I mistyped, I meant 2011. Ed On Dec 21, 2014, at 4:48 PM, Ed Wall wrote: > Ulvi > > According to the 2015 TIMSS, the average score of fourth graders in the US is 541 where that of England and the Russian Federation is 542. I know that, in general, the mathematics curriculum in the US and England has nothing much to do with Vygotsky (and yet a lot to do with Piaget). A number of mathematics educators think that the math curriculum in the early grades in the US is not particularly successful (hat is one of the reasons behind some recent reform efforts in the US). Why do you think, given these average scores (and, of course, there are questions about TIMSS), the curriculum in Russia is "quite successful?" > > Ed Wall > On Dec 21, 2014, at 4:15 PM, Ulvi ??il wrote: > >> Thanks Huw. >> Yes, I know in Davydov it is called learning activity but my question was >> aimed at the curriculum situation in Russia, current math curriculum >> applied in Russia's primary schools? >> What is this curriculum? Is it the one proposed by Davydov or bearing >> another name? >> And to put it in terms of Vygotsky, is the curriculum currently applied, >> and which seems to be quite successful, has anything to do with Vygotskian >> theory in Russia and in other countries where maths seems to be a >> successful discipline in primary years. >> >> Best, >> Ulvi >> >> >> 2014-12-22 0:01 GMT+02:00 Huw Lloyd : >> >>> Ulvi, >>> >>> The essential 'method' is to facilitate students' own experimentation with >>> methods. This is called learning activity. >>> >>> Huw >>> >>> On 21 December 2014 at 12:15, Ulvi ??il wrote: >>>> >>>> Hello, >>>> >>>> I know there are some works comparing Russia (Davydov's curriculum) and >>> US, >>>> and even some works done in US with an application of Davydov's, e.g. by >>>> Schmittau. >>>> >>>> I would like to know, not in detail, but just in general, which main >>>> factors lie behind this success in Russia, it is Davydov, or Zarkov or >>> any >>>> other scholar's method. >>>> >>>> Thanks in advance, >>>> >>>> Ulvi >>>> >>> > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sun Dec 21 14:50:03 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Mon, 22 Dec 2014 07:50:03 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Maths and science in Russia In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Let me float a hypothesis, and see what Huw and Ulvi make of it. A learning activity (any learning activity) is best described not as a synoptic hierarchy of molar units like operation, action and activity. Viewed diachronically, from the point of view of psychology, a learning activity is a non-hierarchical historical sequence, such that any given "method" eventually, in time, turns out to fetter progress and must be discarded, and the end result is not an inter-mental social form of activity but instead an intramental psychological one. Take the Schmittau work that Ulvi references as a concrete example. Schmittau showed that the American curriculum (like the Korean one) introduces the notion of number by counting separate objects. This allows the child to grasp the number very concretely and quickly. Groupings are then introduced, and this corresponds once again to what we see children do naturally (see Chapter Eight of HDHMF). So at every point the American curriculum takes the line of least resistance. But that means that at a specific point, the notion of number based on concrete, separable objects becomes a fetter on the child's progress. Schmittau locates this point quite precisely: it's the moment when the child, accustomed to add known quantitites of physical objects together to obtain an unknown quantity, is asked to start with an unknown quantity, remove a known quantity, and, by obtaining a known quantity, figure out what the initial whole was (e.g. "I made a bunch of snowballs and put them in the freezer. I threw one at my big brother at a Christmas pary, and two at my friends when they teased me at New Years. Now I have only half a dozen left for April Fools Day. How many snowballs did I make?") Chapter Eight of HDHMF asks the question of whether "arithmetical figures" (that is, physical groupings of countable objects) will keep the child back from learning the symbolic manipulations afforded by the decimal system of writing digits, or whether they will naturally evolve into the decimal system (because the children will of their own will invent a physical grouping of ten objects). Interestingly, Vygotsky concludes that any experiment along these lines would be unethical (and THERE is a correspondence with Chomsky, who has often correctly noted how one of the things that keeps linguistics in a "paper and pencil" era corresponding to sixteenth century physics is the immorality of experimentation on human subjects). But, like Chomsky, he resolves the question with paper and pencil (in Chapter Thirteen) with a very amusing MIS-reading of Thorndike's "Psychology of Arithmetic". Thorndike is criticizing the way in which our parents and grandparents were taught arithmetic as a symbolic system akin to language. Vygotsky apparently doesn't get Thorndike's irony, and thinks that Thorndike is lauding this culturally approved method over Lay's newfangled system based on "arithmetical figures" (dominos, in fact). See the attachment: it involves analyzing a picture where there is one girl on a swing and another on the ground ("How many girls are there?") a kitten on a stump and another on the ground (which Vygotsky misremembers as dogs). And so, by a process of misreading and misremembering, Vygotsky turns Thorndike into a cognitivist. Thorndike would probably rather be a dog. Interestingly, the way Vygotsky resolves the whole dispute is similar--that is, the child triumphs not through the adequacy of his or her own method or through seeing the superiority of the adult method, but rather through the inadequacies of both. For example (and this is my example), a child with a notion of number based entirely on separable objects has a very hard time measuring how old he is in precise terms. On the other hand, the adult method of measuring years out in months is NOT a decimal method. The child therefore has to grasp and perfect the adult system just in order to answer the simple question--how old are you in years EXACTLY? David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 22 December 2014 at 07:01, Huw Lloyd wrote: > Ulvi, > > The essential 'method' is to facilitate students' own experimentation with > methods. This is called learning activity. > > Huw > > On 21 December 2014 at 12:15, Ulvi ??il wrote: > > > > Hello, > > > > I know there are some works comparing Russia (Davydov's curriculum) and > US, > > and even some works done in US with an application of Davydov's, e.g. by > > Schmittau. > > > > I would like to know, not in detail, but just in general, which main > > factors lie behind this success in Russia, it is Davydov, or Zarkov or > any > > other scholar's method. > > > > Thanks in advance, > > > > Ulvi > > > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: For Ulvi and Huw.docx Type: application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document Size: 1864844 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141222/4f5e39ec/attachment-0001.bin From vygotsky@unm.edu Sun Dec 21 15:00:12 2014 From: vygotsky@unm.edu (Vera John-Steiner) Date: Sun, 21 Dec 2014 16:00:12 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Eduardo Vianna profile In-Reply-To: <5496D6560200001F0002E5BE@mailgate.lagcc.cuny.edu> References: <5496D6560200001F0002E5BE@mailgate.lagcc.cuny.edu> Message-ID: <003401d01d71$e3de21c0$ab9a6540$@edu> Dear Eduardo, In what part of the Times was the profile? Exciting, Vera -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Eduardo Vianna Sent: Sunday, December 21, 2014 12:17 PM To: lholzman@eastsideinstitute.org; xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Eduardo Vianna profile Thank you for posting this, Lois. In case anyone is interested, the research project mentioned in the NY Times article is described in a chapter I wrote with Naja Hougaard and Anna Stetsenko published this year in the book edited by Andy Blunden on collaborative projects: Vianna, E., Hougaard, N. & Stetsenko,A. (2014). The Dialectics of Collective and Individual Transformation: Transformative Activist Research in a CollaborativeLearning Community Project. In A. Blunden (Ed.), Project collaboration: An interdisciplinary study. Boston, MA:Brill Academic Publishers. Eduardo Eduardo Vianna, Ph.D. Associate Professor Social Science Department LaGuardia Community College 31-10 Thomson Ave Long Island City, NY 11101 (718)482-6043 >>> Lois Holzman 12/21/14 1:25 PM >>> Today's NY Times has a feature on Eduardo Vianna, a Vygotskian colleague who teaches at LaGuardia Community College. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/21/nyregion/raising-ambitions-the-challenge-i n-teaching-at-community-colleges.html?ref=nyregion Eduardo received the Cultural-Historical Research SIG Early Achievement Award in 2010 (I think that was the year). Lois Lois Holzman Director, East Side Institute for Group & Short Term Psychotherapy 119 West 23 St, suite 902 New York, NY 10011 Chair, Global Outreach, All Stars Project, UX Tel. +1.212.941.8906 x324 Fax +1.718.797.3966 lholzman@eastsideinstitute.org Social Media Facebook | LinkedIn | Twitter Blogs Psychology Today| Psychology of Becoming | ESI Community News Websites Lois Holzman | East Side Institute | Performing the World All Stars Project From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sun Dec 21 15:08:24 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Mon, 22 Dec 2014 08:08:24 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Roy Harris and Integrationist Linquistics In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: I must make a confession: I went through a period of infatuation with integrationist linguistics, and as a result I have published articles as recently as 2011 which embarrass me a little to read today (as I discovered to my chagrin last week, when our class in Trends and Issues in ELT had to read one of them!) Let me offer some context. Larry's quote is about Critical Discourse Analysis, which is a form of discourse analysis that draws heavily on Halliday. My own teacher Widdowson has criticized CDA on grounds that are not that different from Harris's: CDA approaches a text with a very decided agenda in mind, and tends to "read off" a particular meaning from a text by examining a few features which are held, on theoretical grounds only, to be significant. For example, let's say I have the following data from a role play by sixth graders doing "The Ant and the Grasshopper" (This is from p. 65 of my book "The Great Globe and All Who It Inherit", Sense 2014). Grasshopper: ????~ (*singing gaily) *?lal-lal-la-la? sings gaily) Old Ant: ?? ?? ???! ??? ???! (?That so-and-so! And I?m trying to work!?) Young Ant: ????. ?? ??? ? ??? ???? ? ??? ????? ???. (?You?re right. Because of these jerks, our society is falling apart!?) Grasshopper: ? ???, ?? ?? (?I heard that! Cut it out! ?) Ss: (*nervous laughter*) Fighter Ant: ? ?? ?? ??. (?You don?t know what you are talking about!?) Ss: (*nervous laughter*) Grasshopper (*laughing*): ? ?? ??, ? ??? ??! (?Get out of here or come and fight me!?) Ss: (*laughter*) Old Ant: ?? ????? ??? ?? ?? ?? ??? ?? ???(.) ??! (?These ungrateful things, these young things attacking the old.?? Aaaak! (*The old ant is attacked.*) Ss: (*laughter*) Now, using CDA I would point out that the original Korean text tends to omit subjects and modals, which--unlike the English translation--allows the speakers to evade modal responsibility (in much the same way you do when you say things like "the vase broke" instead of "I broke your vase"). Harris and Widdowson would point out that this ignores the other things that must be integrated into a really empirical account of the data: how the children DO take responsibility for their actions by embodying them, by their facial expressions, by their gestures, etc. And in 2011 I would have been totally bowled over by this argument. Now it seems to me pretheoretical and ultra-empiricist. AND...not least...it ignores an absolutely crucial and systemic fact about the language, which is that Korean is a pro-drop language (in Chomskyan terms)--that is, like Spanish, we normally omit the subject in contexts where it can be understood easily. This is a fact about language as a system of functions; it does not need to be recovered from an empirical analysis of the kind Harris describes (e.g. Conversation Analysis procedures of the sort developed by Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson). David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 22 December 2014 at 05:36, Larry Purss wrote: > Peter Jones writes on intergrationist approaches to language and references > Roy Harris: > Here is Roy in his own words > > tOur position, in contrast with the practice of CDA, is that the > identification of the communicational processes and strategies relevant to > particular engagements, the understanding and interpretation of what the > relevant or significant communicational forms, meanings and patterns are in > a particular situation or event is something that emerges in the course of > detailed empirical investigation of the relevant event in all its > complexity. There is simply no method or procedure of discourse analysis to > be applied short of this process of deciding what words mean in the course > of interpretatively reconstructing an entire action or event to which the > words contribute. Within the event itself there is no level or dimension of > ?discourse? as a self-contained, stable and iterable system of forms and > meanings. > > > The central focus is on *context* and every semiological *act* cannot be > interpreted except in its specific situated context. > I started a new thread as may not be of any interest to others > From ulvi.icil@gmail.com Sun Dec 21 15:09:42 2014 From: ulvi.icil@gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?VWx2aSDEsMOnaWw=?=) Date: Mon, 22 Dec 2014 01:09:42 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Maths and science in Russia In-Reply-To: <626322EE-DC59-4C94-A4AD-5C54F6045589@umich.edu> References: <626322EE-DC59-4C94-A4AD-5C54F6045589@umich.edu> Message-ID: Thanks Ed. The picture I attached earlier may have misled me. In the below link. You seem to be right, Russia does not seem to be particularly successful. But according to this http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trends_in_International_Mathematics_and_Science_Study . Countries' scores with flags. Russia seems still to be successful than US at TIMSS2011 for eight grade. On the other hand, I suppose that there is a considerable deterioration, decentralization and processes alike in Russia after 1990. About Piaget dominance in US and England; can it be thought that Piaget's dominance is hindering math curriculum to be a developed one because it does not take into account early development of abstract thinking in children? My question about Russia's actual math curriculum is still open. 2014-12-22 0:48 GMT+02:00 Ed Wall : > Ulvi > > According to the 2015 TIMSS, the average score of fourth graders in > the US is 541 where that of England and the Russian Federation is 542. I > know that, in general, the mathematics curriculum in the US and England has > nothing much to do with Vygotsky (and yet a lot to do with Piaget). A > number of mathematics educators think that the math curriculum in the early > grades in the US is not particularly successful (hat is one of the reasons > behind some recent reform efforts in the US). Why do you think, given these > average scores (and, of course, there are questions about TIMSS), the > curriculum in Russia is "quite successful?" > > Ed Wall > On Dec 21, 2014, at 4:15 PM, Ulvi ??il wrote: > > > Thanks Huw. > > Yes, I know in Davydov it is called learning activity but my question was > > aimed at the curriculum situation in Russia, current math curriculum > > applied in Russia's primary schools? > > What is this curriculum? Is it the one proposed by Davydov or bearing > > another name? > > And to put it in terms of Vygotsky, is the curriculum currently applied, > > and which seems to be quite successful, has anything to do with > Vygotskian > > theory in Russia and in other countries where maths seems to be a > > successful discipline in primary years. > > > > Best, > > Ulvi > > > > > > 2014-12-22 0:01 GMT+02:00 Huw Lloyd : > > > >> Ulvi, > >> > >> The essential 'method' is to facilitate students' own experimentation > with > >> methods. This is called learning activity. > >> > >> Huw > >> > >> On 21 December 2014 at 12:15, Ulvi ??il wrote: > >>> > >>> Hello, > >>> > >>> I know there are some works comparing Russia (Davydov's curriculum) and > >> US, > >>> and even some works done in US with an application of Davydov's, e.g. > by > >>> Schmittau. > >>> > >>> I would like to know, not in detail, but just in general, which main > >>> factors lie behind this success in Russia, it is Davydov, or Zarkov or > >> any > >>> other scholar's method. > >>> > >>> Thanks in advance, > >>> > >>> Ulvi > >>> > >> > > > From ewall@umich.edu Sun Dec 21 15:29:21 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Sun, 21 Dec 2014 17:29:21 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Maths and science in Russia In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: David This is quite interesting. Let me give some different takes on some of what you write (I, by the way, am still unsure) Some say part of the fetters you refer to are in the manner in which the equal sign is used (e.g. as compute) and the propensity for vertical addition in the early grades. I have seen a US 3rd grade teacher complicate things somewhat (she and the children were definitely working with countable objects) in starting with an unknown quantity, remove a known quantity, and, by obtaining a known quantity, figure out what the initial whole was without too much trouble. That isn't too say that things might not have proceeded more efficiently with another curricular starting point. There is an interesting different between Korean students and US students in the early grades. US students have something called eleven and twelve and Korean students have something translated, in effect, as ten-one and ten-two. There has been speculation by some that these can be fetters of a sort on the way to decimal number (there are also things called nickel and quarter and five dollars not to mention inches, etc. which can also be somewhat un-helpful). On a different note, what is the adult system of determining how old one is in years, exactly? I know how young children do this correctly, but inexactly. Ed On Dec 21, 2014, at 4:50 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > Let me float a hypothesis, and see what Huw and Ulvi make of it. A learning > activity (any learning activity) is best described not as a synoptic > hierarchy of molar units like operation, action and activity. Viewed > diachronically, from the point of view of psychology, a learning activity > is a non-hierarchical historical sequence, such that any given > "method" eventually, in time, turns out to fetter progress and must be > discarded, and the end result is not an inter-mental social form of > activity but instead an intramental psychological one. > > Take the Schmittau work that Ulvi references as a concrete example. > Schmittau showed that the American curriculum (like the Korean one) > introduces the notion of number by counting separate objects. This allows > the child to grasp the number very concretely and quickly. Groupings are > then introduced, and this corresponds once again to what we see children do > naturally (see Chapter Eight of HDHMF). So at every point the American > curriculum takes the line of least resistance. But that means that at a > specific point, the notion of number based on concrete, separable objects > becomes a fetter on the child's progress. Schmittau locates this point > quite precisely: it's the moment when the child, accustomed to add known > quantitites of physical objects together to obtain an unknown quantity, is > asked to start with an unknown quantity, remove a known quantity, and, by > obtaining a known quantity, figure out what the initial whole was (e.g. > "I made a bunch of snowballs and put them in the freezer. I threw one at my > big brother at a Christmas pary, and two at my friends when they teased me > at New Years. Now I have only half a dozen left for April Fools Day. How > many snowballs did I make?") > > Chapter Eight of HDHMF asks the question of whether "arithmetical figures" > (that is, physical groupings of countable objects) will keep the child back > from learning the symbolic manipulations afforded by the decimal system of > writing digits, or whether they will naturally evolve into the decimal > system (because the children will of their own will invent a physical > grouping of ten objects). Interestingly, Vygotsky concludes that any > experiment along these lines would be unethical (and THERE is a > correspondence with Chomsky, who has often correctly noted how one of the > things that keeps linguistics in a "paper and pencil" era corresponding to > sixteenth century physics is the immorality of experimentation on human > subjects). But, like Chomsky, he resolves the question with paper and > pencil (in Chapter Thirteen) with a very amusing MIS-reading of Thorndike's > "Psychology of Arithmetic". > > Thorndike is criticizing the way in which our parents and grandparents were > taught arithmetic as a symbolic system akin to language. Vygotsky > apparently doesn't get Thorndike's irony, and thinks that Thorndike is > lauding this culturally approved method over Lay's newfangled system based > on "arithmetical figures" (dominos, in fact). See the attachment: it > involves analyzing a picture where there is one girl on a swing and another > on the ground ("How many girls are there?") a kitten on a stump and another > on the ground (which Vygotsky misremembers as dogs). And so, by a process > of misreading and misremembering, Vygotsky turns Thorndike into a > cognitivist. Thorndike would probably rather be a dog. > > Interestingly, the way Vygotsky resolves the whole dispute is similar--that > is, the child triumphs not through the adequacy of his or her own method or > through seeing the superiority of the adult method, but rather through the > inadequacies of both. For example (and this is my example), a child with a > notion of number based entirely on separable objects has a very hard time > measuring how old he is in precise terms. On the other hand, the adult > method of measuring years out in months is NOT a decimal method. The child > therefore has to grasp and perfect the adult system just in order to answer > the simple question--how old are you in years EXACTLY? > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > On 22 December 2014 at 07:01, Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> Ulvi, >> >> The essential 'method' is to facilitate students' own experimentation with >> methods. This is called learning activity. >> >> Huw >> >> On 21 December 2014 at 12:15, Ulvi ??il wrote: >>> >>> Hello, >>> >>> I know there are some works comparing Russia (Davydov's curriculum) and >> US, >>> and even some works done in US with an application of Davydov's, e.g. by >>> Schmittau. >>> >>> I would like to know, not in detail, but just in general, which main >>> factors lie behind this success in Russia, it is Davydov, or Zarkov or >> any >>> other scholar's method. >>> >>> Thanks in advance, >>> >>> Ulvi >>> >> > From ulvi.icil@gmail.com Sun Dec 21 15:37:08 2014 From: ulvi.icil@gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?VWx2aSDEsMOnaWw=?=) Date: Mon, 22 Dec 2014 01:37:08 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Maths and science in Russia In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: It is known that differently than English, French etc, in Chinese, numbers names are much shorter, like nine nine for 99 probably instead of ninety nine and this is a facilitating factor for math learning. If I do not misunderstand David, you intend to the point that US math curriculum is focused much more on empirical rather than the abstract thinking. It seems that Davydov, just in the opposite, proposes a curriculum giving a prominent place to this latter and says that this learning by counting in later stages constitute an obstacle for the children. 2014-12-22 1:29 GMT+02:00 Ed Wall : > David > > This is quite interesting. Let me give some different takes on some > of what you write (I, by the way, am still unsure) > > Some say part of the fetters you refer to are in the manner in which > the equal sign is used (e.g. as compute) and the propensity for vertical > addition in the early grades. I have seen a US 3rd grade teacher complicate > things somewhat (she and the children were definitely working with > countable objects) in starting with an unknown quantity, remove a known > quantity, and, by obtaining a known quantity, figure out what the initial > whole was without too much trouble. That isn't too say that things might > not have proceeded more efficiently with another curricular starting point. > > There is an interesting different between Korean students and US > students in the early grades. US students have something called eleven and > twelve and Korean students have something translated, in effect, as ten-one > and ten-two. There has been speculation by some that these can be fetters > of a sort on the way to decimal number (there are also things called nickel > and quarter and five dollars not to mention inches, etc. which can also be > somewhat un-helpful). > > > On a different note, what is the adult system of determining how old > one is in years, exactly? I know how young children do this correctly, but > inexactly. > > Ed > > On Dec 21, 2014, at 4:50 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > Let me float a hypothesis, and see what Huw and Ulvi make of it. A > learning > > activity (any learning activity) is best described not as a synoptic > > hierarchy of molar units like operation, action and activity. Viewed > > diachronically, from the point of view of psychology, a learning activity > > is a non-hierarchical historical sequence, such that any given > > "method" eventually, in time, turns out to fetter progress and must be > > discarded, and the end result is not an inter-mental social form of > > activity but instead an intramental psychological one. > > > > Take the Schmittau work that Ulvi references as a concrete example. > > Schmittau showed that the American curriculum (like the Korean one) > > introduces the notion of number by counting separate objects. This allows > > the child to grasp the number very concretely and quickly. Groupings are > > then introduced, and this corresponds once again to what we see children > do > > naturally (see Chapter Eight of HDHMF). So at every point the American > > curriculum takes the line of least resistance. But that means that at a > > specific point, the notion of number based on concrete, separable objects > > becomes a fetter on the child's progress. Schmittau locates this point > > quite precisely: it's the moment when the child, accustomed to add known > > quantitites of physical objects together to obtain an unknown quantity, > is > > asked to start with an unknown quantity, remove a known quantity, and, by > > obtaining a known quantity, figure out what the initial whole was (e.g. > > "I made a bunch of snowballs and put them in the freezer. I threw one at > my > > big brother at a Christmas pary, and two at my friends when they teased > me > > at New Years. Now I have only half a dozen left for April Fools Day. How > > many snowballs did I make?") > > > > Chapter Eight of HDHMF asks the question of whether "arithmetical > figures" > > (that is, physical groupings of countable objects) will keep the child > back > > from learning the symbolic manipulations afforded by the decimal system > of > > writing digits, or whether they will naturally evolve into the decimal > > system (because the children will of their own will invent a physical > > grouping of ten objects). Interestingly, Vygotsky concludes that any > > experiment along these lines would be unethical (and THERE is a > > correspondence with Chomsky, who has often correctly noted how one of the > > things that keeps linguistics in a "paper and pencil" era corresponding > to > > sixteenth century physics is the immorality of experimentation on human > > subjects). But, like Chomsky, he resolves the question with paper and > > pencil (in Chapter Thirteen) with a very amusing MIS-reading of > Thorndike's > > "Psychology of Arithmetic". > > > > Thorndike is criticizing the way in which our parents and grandparents > were > > taught arithmetic as a symbolic system akin to language. Vygotsky > > apparently doesn't get Thorndike's irony, and thinks that Thorndike is > > lauding this culturally approved method over Lay's newfangled system > based > > on "arithmetical figures" (dominos, in fact). See the attachment: it > > involves analyzing a picture where there is one girl on a swing and > another > > on the ground ("How many girls are there?") a kitten on a stump and > another > > on the ground (which Vygotsky misremembers as dogs). And so, by a process > > of misreading and misremembering, Vygotsky turns Thorndike into a > > cognitivist. Thorndike would probably rather be a dog. > > > > Interestingly, the way Vygotsky resolves the whole dispute is > similar--that > > is, the child triumphs not through the adequacy of his or her own method > or > > through seeing the superiority of the adult method, but rather through > the > > inadequacies of both. For example (and this is my example), a child with > a > > notion of number based entirely on separable objects has a very hard time > > measuring how old he is in precise terms. On the other hand, the adult > > method of measuring years out in months is NOT a decimal method. The > child > > therefore has to grasp and perfect the adult system just in order to > answer > > the simple question--how old are you in years EXACTLY? > > > > David Kellogg > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > > > > > On 22 December 2014 at 07:01, Huw Lloyd > wrote: > > > >> Ulvi, > >> > >> The essential 'method' is to facilitate students' own experimentation > with > >> methods. This is called learning activity. > >> > >> Huw > >> > >> On 21 December 2014 at 12:15, Ulvi ??il wrote: > >>> > >>> Hello, > >>> > >>> I know there are some works comparing Russia (Davydov's curriculum) and > >> US, > >>> and even some works done in US with an application of Davydov's, e.g. > by > >>> Schmittau. > >>> > >>> I would like to know, not in detail, but just in general, which main > >>> factors lie behind this success in Russia, it is Davydov, or Zarkov or > >> any > >>> other scholar's method. > >>> > >>> Thanks in advance, > >>> > >>> Ulvi > >>> > >> > > > > > From annalisa@unm.edu Sun Dec 21 15:39:47 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Sun, 21 Dec 2014 23:39:47 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology In-Reply-To: <067901d01d55$b8a8f2d0$29fad870$@uic.edu> References: <039801d01a33$3db3c430$b91b4c90$@uic.edu> <38C43AE248831048B6AF57F364680D3C72A23DDA@OC11EXPO32.exchange.mit.edu> <040801d01a41$4b69dd90$e23d98b0$@uic.edu> <0CBE4C26-68FE-49F7-BE9F-00A0121B4CD8@uniandes.edu.co> <043e01d01a44$b15fac80$141f0580$@uic.edu> <1D18C3B0-9EA5-42E6-8764-A6973960B8B5@uniandes.edu.co> <050701d01a51$084de460$18e9ad20$@uic.edu> <38C43AE248831048B6AF57F364680D3C72A23F69@OC11EXPO32.exchange.mit.edu> <057001d01a5d$d743a640$85caf2c0$@uic.edu> , <061001d01d34$dc790d10$956b2730$@uic.edu> <1419187343939.81696@unm.edu>, <067901d01d55$b8a8f2d0$29fad870$@uic.edu> Message-ID: <1419205186894.59536@unm.edu> Hi Aria, In a stance of good-will, I'd like to extend this thread with childlike curiosity in the hope it is received with a playful and creative spirit. I have heard of the controversy of Chomsky and the Behaviorists, as it is quite notorious, and I'm grateful to Chomsky for breaking the log-jam in the US for Behaviorism. However, I have never heard of the controversy between Vygotsky and Pavlovian-Marxist Psychology, or that Vygotsky's claim against them was to promote creativity. So thanks for that. I hope others will give this some additional light. My sense though is, and maybe I'm wrong about this, Vygotsky was interested in creating a general psychology and he felt that language was the means of connecting culture with phylogeny, and phylogeny with culture. This approach has provided wide vistas for inquiry apparently. So Vygotsky was more concerned with understanding the way these processes developed, and like Darwin, was more concerned with describing these processes before explaining them completely (in the sense of tying culture to biology precisely). [Any peanuts from the peanut gallery here?] I am at a loss to compare this to Chomsky, for my surface understanding is that he is what is called a "nativist," and my understanding of this term is that proponents claim there are solely genetic explanations for human language, that there is something innate in us that emerges in maturation, along the lines of Piaget (I hope I've not gummed things up here by making that comparison), whereby "development leads learning." That it is all biology. I'm not sure either what Chomsky's claims are for creativity through this path, if everything is determined through biology. We can all want creativity for humankind, but how is creativity explained in Chomsky's model? [An aside: I'm curious how Chomsky explains Koko the signing ape? And where are the other signing apes?] Forgive me please if I have posed these juxtapositions in limited and simplistic constructs. I don't think it's my biology, but rather that my knowledge of the subject matter is sorely limited, and that can be (and I hope will be) changed through my interaction with all the lovely knowing others on this list. :) Trawling around lchc, I found this quote by Toulmin (From: One is Not Born a Personality by Karl Levitin (1980)): "Through his brief career, Vygotsky?s preoccupations centred on consciousness: more specifically, on the modes in which consciousness is ?represented? ? both mentally and neurologically ? in the life of the individual. In his view, these problems cannot be convincingly dealt with by focusing either on our genetic inheritance and innate capacities alone or on the influence of external, environmental factors alone. Vygotsky was willing to take neither the ?nativist? route preferred today by Chomsky ... nor the ?external conditioning? route followed by Skinner ... Those two routes ? he insisted ? were not the only options available to us. Instead, he undertook a new kind of developmental attack on these problems." This book was written in 1980 and so apparently this is how Chomsky was perceived back then, as a nativist. Is this no longer the case? If he is no longer a nativist, then please explain the changes of mind that occurred? My understanding is that the Cartesian claim is made (to describe Chomsky) because there is no means of linking the mind to the body, no means of linking the culture, the history, the tool, the society to the individual. The mind is seen as separate. I'm ready to be shown (not told) how that connection is made. I don't think anyone means that he is adopting the carbon-copy of Descartes's philosophy. Many things can be Cartesian, even number lines, for example, which exist in a very abstract place! The "battle for consciousness" is that our creativity manifests (overall) in response to the outside, beginning (as in the genesis of) with our caregivers as infants, and these initial interactions eventually manifest in language as a response to gesture (pointing). This is frequently given short-shrift from those not familiar with Vygotsky. One can take creativity (as may be linked to an expression of consciousness) a couple ways. One is that our creativity is fatally determined, with an internal engine for problem solving. Another is that we are totally plastic entities reacting to the outside without much filtering going on. Both of these models seem mechanical to me. A third, more dynamic version, is that there is something dynamic going on, a three-way process that over time responds to itself and to outside influences at once, and so there is something like a spiral development going on throughout the life of the individual, always in regard to oneself *and* the broad soup of one's culture and environment, activity is (for many here) the engine for that interaction. Yet the genesis for this spiral begins from the outside, through the caregiver. What is the genesis for the nativist model? In any case, even if one adopts (what I'm calling) the dynamic model of consciousness (as a dialectical process), one can interpret this as: There is only one "proper" way that this dynamic process can optimally occur, or: There can be plural means for this dynamic process to optimally occur. Moreover, maybe there can be no feasible definition of what is optimal, because it all depends upon so many factors, known and unknown. By the way, in my search of lchc, I also found a book review (2009) by our own David Kellogg (which I've attached), who explains there are at least three Vygotskies (as indicated by Norris Minick). Much like there are two Wittgensteins, I gather? So I wonder, which Vygotsky you might be referring to? And then it occurred to me this may mean there are more than one Chomksy, perhaps? If so, how many are there? :) And to which one are you referring to? At the genesis of his short career Vygotsky jumped into a conference in Moscow between Chelpanov and Pavlov to present his first paper, and as David writes, "According to Luria?s account (1979: 38), Vygotsky?s paper, from both ends of the room simultaneously, brought the house down." It might be easy to make the comparison of splashes into established academic circles, but I wonder if this might reduce the nature of Vygotsky's work as reactionary (as against the Pavlov-Marxist psychologists) rather than as creative and even consciousness-raising in his attempt to unite the two psychologies? But of course, I am biased! Incidentally, David makes an interesting comparison between Vygotsky and Volosinov in his review. I wonder if David's book review might be a vehicle for comparison and contrast in this thread? It appears that both Vygotsky and Volosinov made observations that were similar in terms of the value of the social influences of development. There are many here on this list who are not linguists, myself being one! So if I've made any grievous generalizations concerning linguistics and linguists that are totally in error, I hope you will forgive me. I also would enjoy any clarifications from old timers of our community if they feel any energy after the eggnog. My search is for understanding so I might be knowledgeable about these things. Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Aria Razfar Sent: Sunday, December 21, 2014 12:38 PM To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology Annalisa, The two different contexts are early 20th century Soviet Psychology and mid-20th Century U.S. Psychology. While different in terms of space and time, it was similar in terms of content. Chomsky arguing for creativity and freedom of thought in a context dominated by Skinner's Behaviorism. Vygotsky arguing for creativity in a context dominated by the behaviorism of Pavlovian-Marxist Psychology. Aria Aria Razfar, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Literacy, Language, and Culture Director of Graduate Studies, Curriculum and Instruction University of Illinois at Chicago 1040 W. Harrison St. M/C 147 Chicago, IL, 60607 Director of English Learning through Mathematics, Science and Action Research (ELMSA) www.elmsa.org Webpage: http://education.uic.edu/personnel/faculty/aria-razfar-phd Tel: 312-413-8373 Fax: 312-996-8134 -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Annalisa Aguilar Sent: Sunday, December 21, 2014 12:42 PM To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology Aria, Thanks for something more specific. It helps. Would you mind clarifying, when you say: > He sees his goal and Vygotsky's goal of arguing for creativity to be the same although in two different contexts. What are the two different contexts? Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Aria Razfar Sent: Sunday, December 21, 2014 8:43 AM To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology Greg, The topic that seemed to interest him most about Vygotsky was "inner speech" and its connection to culture, social activities and even history. The representation of Chomsky's "nativist" position in sociocultural literature seems to be decontextualized, acultural, and ahistorical, and to some degree rightfully so. Although he would include culture, social activity, and even history as part of "stable cognitive elements" and are definitely "more than habits" which was the main goal of his writings in the 50s and 60s. He sees his goal and Vygotsky's goal of arguing for creativity to be the same although in two different contexts. It was clear to me that he doesn't see the controversies, at least not the same way post "social turn" scholars and self-proclaimed Chomskians have framed it. He sees his views of language and cognition as very much compatible with Vygotsky's insights, especially the ones he's read closely. It's been years since he's written about these topics, so unf ortunately there isn't a paper. His take on the roots of the "controversies" and the subsequent careers built on it are "quite interesting." Did you have any specific questions? Aria Aria Razfar, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Literacy, Language, and Culture Director of Graduate Studies, Curriculum and Instruction University of Illinois at Chicago 1040 W. Harrison St. M/C 147 Chicago, IL, 60607 Director of English Learning through Mathematics, Science and Action Research (ELMSA) www.elmsa.org Webpage: http://education.uic.edu/personnel/faculty/aria-razfar-phd Tel: 312-413-8373 Fax: 312-996-8134 -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson Sent: Thursday, December 18, 2014 10:54 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology ?Aria, Any updates to report on Professor Chomsky's take on Vygotsky? -greg? On Wed, Dec 17, 2014 at 5:59 PM, Aria Razfar wrote: > > > Hi Martin, > > See below. He finds Vygotsky's work "quite interesting." Let's see if > he elaborates. I find his persepctive on the "Linguistic Wars" also > interesting. > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistics_Wars > > Aria > > -----Original Message----- > From: Noam Chomsky [mailto:chomsky@mit.edu] > Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 6:09 PM > To: Aria Razfar > Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology > > The "linguistic wars" are largely an invention of overheated > imaginations of those who thought they were fighting them. If you > check the record you'll discover that I barely participated, and > didn't consider them any different from interchanges within what's > claimed to be "my side" of the non-existent wars. > > Vygotsky did quite interesting work. > > -----Original Message----- > From: Aria Razfar [mailto:arazfar@uic.edu] > Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 6:28 PM > To: Noam Chomsky > Cc: arazfar@uic.edu > Subject: FW: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology > > See question below re: "opinion on Vygotsky"? > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John > Packer > Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 5:12 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology > > Since we have Professor Chomsky online, might we be able to ask him > his opinion of Vygotsky? > > Martin > > On Dec 17, 2014, at 4:59 PM, Aria Razfar wrote: > > > Hi Martin, > > > > Metaphor was my take and other cognitive linguist's take (i.e. > > Lakoff). I believe his rejection of "Metaphor" at least in the > > embodied cognition sense is rooted in the "Linguistics Wars." > > Several people in this thread as well others in the field of > > cognitive linguistics made the claim that he was and remains a > > Cartesian dualist. He definitely does not consider himself as such. > > In order to establish the field of linguistics, he had to position > > it within the broader arch of western enlightenment and romanticism. > > Hence, the title of > the book. > > > > Aria > > > > Aria Razfar, Ph.D. > > Associate Professor of Literacy, Language, and Culture Director of > > Graduate Studies, Curriculum and Instruction University of Illinois > > at Chicago > > 1040 W. Harrison St. M/C 147 > > Chicago, IL, 60607 > > > > Director of English Learning through Mathematics, Science and Action > > Research (ELMSA) www.elmsa.org > > > > Webpage: http://education.uic.edu/personnel/faculty/aria-razfar-phd > > Tel: 312-413-8373 > > Fax: 312-996-8134 > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John > > Packer > > Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 3:47 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology > > > > Hi Aria, > > > > It would help to see the message that Noam is responding to! I don't > > see, for example, how metaphor crept into this discussion. > > (Actually, looking back through the thread, I see that this was your > > proposal.) > > > > I suppose a lot depends on what one means by being "a Cartesian." As > > I just wrote in another message, Chomsky was, I think, positioning > > his approach to linguistics in a tradition in which Descartes was > > prominent: in which one tries to figure out what makes possible a > > specific characteristic or ability of the mind. Chomsky asked what > > universal competence would be necessary to make language possible - > > any > language. > > > > I'm not trying to attach a label to the man; but he give the book > > its title for a reason, and a very respectable one. > > > > Martin > > > > On Dec 17, 2014, at 4:34 PM, Aria Razfar wrote: > > > >> Here is Chomsky's response to whether or not he is a Cartesian. Not > > surprisingly, he categorically rejects the idea of "metaphor" as well. > > At least he's open to change. Now whether our subject is dead or > > alive that is a different question. > >> > >> Aria > >> > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: Noam Chomsky [mailto:chomsky@mit.edu] > >> Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 3:16 PM > >> To: Aria Razfar > >> Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology > >> The reason for the phrase "Cartesian linguistics" was explained very clearly in the opening pages of the book. No one who read at least that far could believe that I am "a Cartesian," let alone anyone who read farther. I can't account for the illiteracy of "notable folks." > >> It's also not a metaphor. Rather, exactly as I described it, which I would repeat verbatim today. > >> There's no need to argue against "mind-body dualism." As I've discussed repeatedly, Newton's discoveries terminated the thesis, at least in its classical form, through Descartes and beyond. > >> Of course I've changed my views since the '50s and '60s, in fact in the past few months. That's normal in subjects that are not dead. > >> > >> Noam Chomsky -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Kellogg_Classic Book Review - Volosinov and Vygotsky_2009.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 112529 bytes Desc: Kellogg_Classic Book Review - Volosinov and Vygotsky_2009.pdf Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141221/28c75a9e/attachment.pdf From annalisa@unm.edu Sun Dec 21 15:47:07 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Sun, 21 Dec 2014 23:47:07 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Eduardo Vianna profile In-Reply-To: <003401d01d71$e3de21c0$ab9a6540$@edu> References: <5496D6560200001F0002E5BE@mailgate.lagcc.cuny.edu>, <003401d01d71$e3de21c0$ab9a6540$@edu> Message-ID: <1419205626630.47474@unm.edu> Hi Vera, The link may be broken in Lois's post, so I'm adding it again here: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/21/nyregion/raising-ambitions-the-challenge-in-teaching-at-community-colleges.html The following also appears in fine print at the bottom of the online article: "A version of this article appears in print on December 21, 2014, on page MB1 of the New York edition with the headline: Raising Their Sights." Maybe this helps? Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Vera John-Steiner Sent: Sunday, December 21, 2014 4:00 PM To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Eduardo Vianna profile Dear Eduardo, In what part of the Times was the profile? Exciting, Vera -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Eduardo Vianna Sent: Sunday, December 21, 2014 12:17 PM To: lholzman@eastsideinstitute.org; xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Eduardo Vianna profile Thank you for posting this, Lois. In case anyone is interested, the research project mentioned in the NY Times article is described in a chapter I wrote with Naja Hougaard and Anna Stetsenko published this year in the book edited by Andy Blunden on collaborative projects: Vianna, E., Hougaard, N. & Stetsenko,A. (2014). The Dialectics of Collective and Individual Transformation: Transformative Activist Research in a CollaborativeLearning Community Project. In A. Blunden (Ed.), Project collaboration: An interdisciplinary study. Boston, MA:Brill Academic Publishers. Eduardo Eduardo Vianna, Ph.D. Associate Professor Social Science Department LaGuardia Community College 31-10 Thomson Ave Long Island City, NY 11101 (718)482-6043 >>> Lois Holzman 12/21/14 1:25 PM >>> Today's NY Times has a feature on Eduardo Vianna, a Vygotskian colleague who teaches at LaGuardia Community College. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/21/nyregion/raising-ambitions-the-challenge-i n-teaching-at-community-colleges.html?ref=nyregion Eduardo received the Cultural-Historical Research SIG Early Achievement Award in 2010 (I think that was the year). Lois Lois Holzman Director, East Side Institute for Group & Short Term Psychotherapy 119 West 23 St, suite 902 New York, NY 10011 Chair, Global Outreach, All Stars Project, UX Tel. +1.212.941.8906 x324 Fax +1.718.797.3966 lholzman@eastsideinstitute.org Social Media Facebook | LinkedIn | Twitter Blogs Psychology Today| Psychology of Becoming | ESI Community News Websites Lois Holzman | East Side Institute | Performing the World All Stars Project From ewall@umich.edu Sun Dec 21 15:53:52 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Sun, 21 Dec 2014 17:53:52 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Maths and science in Russia In-Reply-To: References: <626322EE-DC59-4C94-A4AD-5C54F6045589@umich.edu> Message-ID: Ulvi Yes, Russia has and I suspect continues to be more successful that the US in 8th grade and that, I think, might call in question seeming US success in 4th grade (there are perhaps complicating factors). At least, a number of people think so which is, as I said before, one reason for recent reform efforts in the US. As regards the Russian mathematics curriculum, you might want to take a look at a 1980 4th grade Russian mathematics text ftp://math.stanford.edu/pub/papers/milgram/russian-grade-4-problems.pdf This is significantly beyond, in places, what is taught to US 4th graders and may, in part, speak to what happens by 8th grade. You might want to take a look at Russian Mathematics Education: History and World Significance (Schmittau has a chapter). Ed On Dec 21, 2014, at 5:09 PM, Ulvi ??il wrote: > Thanks Ed. > > The picture I attached earlier may have misled me. In the below link. > > You seem to be right, Russia does not seem to be particularly successful. > > But according to this > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trends_in_International_Mathematics_and_Science_Study > . > > Countries' scores with flags. > > Russia seems still to be successful than US at TIMSS2011 for eight grade. > > On the other hand, I suppose that there is a considerable deterioration, > decentralization and processes alike in Russia after 1990. > > About Piaget dominance in US and England; > > can it be thought that Piaget's dominance is hindering math curriculum to > be a developed one because it does not take into account early development > of abstract thinking in children? > > My question about Russia's actual math curriculum is still open. > > > > > > > > > > 2014-12-22 0:48 GMT+02:00 Ed Wall : > >> Ulvi >> >> According to the 2015 TIMSS, the average score of fourth graders in >> the US is 541 where that of England and the Russian Federation is 542. I >> know that, in general, the mathematics curriculum in the US and England has >> nothing much to do with Vygotsky (and yet a lot to do with Piaget). A >> number of mathematics educators think that the math curriculum in the early >> grades in the US is not particularly successful (hat is one of the reasons >> behind some recent reform efforts in the US). Why do you think, given these >> average scores (and, of course, there are questions about TIMSS), the >> curriculum in Russia is "quite successful?" >> >> Ed Wall >> On Dec 21, 2014, at 4:15 PM, Ulvi ??il wrote: >> >>> Thanks Huw. >>> Yes, I know in Davydov it is called learning activity but my question was >>> aimed at the curriculum situation in Russia, current math curriculum >>> applied in Russia's primary schools? >>> What is this curriculum? Is it the one proposed by Davydov or bearing >>> another name? >>> And to put it in terms of Vygotsky, is the curriculum currently applied, >>> and which seems to be quite successful, has anything to do with >> Vygotskian >>> theory in Russia and in other countries where maths seems to be a >>> successful discipline in primary years. >>> >>> Best, >>> Ulvi >>> >>> >>> 2014-12-22 0:01 GMT+02:00 Huw Lloyd : >>> >>>> Ulvi, >>>> >>>> The essential 'method' is to facilitate students' own experimentation >> with >>>> methods. This is called learning activity. >>>> >>>> Huw >>>> >>>> On 21 December 2014 at 12:15, Ulvi ??il wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Hello, >>>>> >>>>> I know there are some works comparing Russia (Davydov's curriculum) and >>>> US, >>>>> and even some works done in US with an application of Davydov's, e.g. >> by >>>>> Schmittau. >>>>> >>>>> I would like to know, not in detail, but just in general, which main >>>>> factors lie behind this success in Russia, it is Davydov, or Zarkov or >>>> any >>>>> other scholar's method. >>>>> >>>>> Thanks in advance, >>>>> >>>>> Ulvi >>>>> >>>> >> >> >> From ulvi.icil@gmail.com Sun Dec 21 15:57:28 2014 From: ulvi.icil@gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?VWx2aSDEsMOnaWw=?=) Date: Mon, 22 Dec 2014 01:57:28 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Maths and science in Russia In-Reply-To: References: <626322EE-DC59-4C94-A4AD-5C54F6045589@umich.edu> Message-ID: Thank you very much Ed. 2014-12-22 1:53 GMT+02:00 Ed Wall : > Ulvi > > Yes, Russia has and I suspect continues to be more successful > that the US in 8th grade and that, I think, might call in question seeming > US success in 4th grade (there are perhaps complicating factors). At least, > a number of people think so which is, as I said before, one reason for > recent reform efforts in the US. > > As regards the Russian mathematics curriculum, you might want to > take a look at a 1980 4th grade Russian mathematics text > > ftp://math.stanford.edu/pub/papers/milgram/russian-grade-4-problems.pdf > > This is significantly beyond, in places, what is taught to US 4th graders > and may, in part, speak to what happens by 8th grade. > > You might want to take a look at Russian Mathematics Education: History > and World Significance (Schmittau has a chapter). > > Ed > > On Dec 21, 2014, at 5:09 PM, Ulvi ??il wrote: > > > Thanks Ed. > > > > The picture I attached earlier may have misled me. In the below link. > > > > You seem to be right, Russia does not seem to be particularly successful. > > > > But according to this > > > > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trends_in_International_Mathematics_and_Science_Study > > . > > > > Countries' scores with flags. > > > > Russia seems still to be successful than US at TIMSS2011 for eight grade. > > > > On the other hand, I suppose that there is a considerable deterioration, > > decentralization and processes alike in Russia after 1990. > > > > About Piaget dominance in US and England; > > > > can it be thought that Piaget's dominance is hindering math curriculum to > > be a developed one because it does not take into account early > development > > of abstract thinking in children? > > > > My question about Russia's actual math curriculum is still open. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 2014-12-22 0:48 GMT+02:00 Ed Wall : > > > >> Ulvi > >> > >> According to the 2015 TIMSS, the average score of fourth graders in > >> the US is 541 where that of England and the Russian Federation is 542. I > >> know that, in general, the mathematics curriculum in the US and England > has > >> nothing much to do with Vygotsky (and yet a lot to do with Piaget). A > >> number of mathematics educators think that the math curriculum in the > early > >> grades in the US is not particularly successful (hat is one of the > reasons > >> behind some recent reform efforts in the US). Why do you think, given > these > >> average scores (and, of course, there are questions about TIMSS), the > >> curriculum in Russia is "quite successful?" > >> > >> Ed Wall > >> On Dec 21, 2014, at 4:15 PM, Ulvi ??il wrote: > >> > >>> Thanks Huw. > >>> Yes, I know in Davydov it is called learning activity but my question > was > >>> aimed at the curriculum situation in Russia, current math curriculum > >>> applied in Russia's primary schools? > >>> What is this curriculum? Is it the one proposed by Davydov or bearing > >>> another name? > >>> And to put it in terms of Vygotsky, is the curriculum currently > applied, > >>> and which seems to be quite successful, has anything to do with > >> Vygotskian > >>> theory in Russia and in other countries where maths seems to be a > >>> successful discipline in primary years. > >>> > >>> Best, > >>> Ulvi > >>> > >>> > >>> 2014-12-22 0:01 GMT+02:00 Huw Lloyd : > >>> > >>>> Ulvi, > >>>> > >>>> The essential 'method' is to facilitate students' own experimentation > >> with > >>>> methods. This is called learning activity. > >>>> > >>>> Huw > >>>> > >>>> On 21 December 2014 at 12:15, Ulvi ??il wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> Hello, > >>>>> > >>>>> I know there are some works comparing Russia (Davydov's curriculum) > and > >>>> US, > >>>>> and even some works done in US with an application of Davydov's, e.g. > >> by > >>>>> Schmittau. > >>>>> > >>>>> I would like to know, not in detail, but just in general, which main > >>>>> factors lie behind this success in Russia, it is Davydov, or Zarkov > or > >>>> any > >>>>> other scholar's method. > >>>>> > >>>>> Thanks in advance, > >>>>> > >>>>> Ulvi > >>>>> > >>>> > >> > >> > >> > > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Sun Dec 21 16:08:08 2014 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Mon, 22 Dec 2014 00:08:08 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Maths and science in Russia In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 21 December 2014 at 22:50, David Kellogg wrote: > > Let me float a hypothesis, and see what Huw and Ulvi make of it. A learning > activity (any learning activity) is best described not as a synoptic > hierarchy of molar units like operation, action and activity. Viewed > diachronically, from the point of view of psychology, a learning activity > is a non-hierarchical historical sequence, such that any given > "method" eventually, in time, turns out to fetter progress and must be > discarded, and the end result is not an inter-mental social form of > activity but instead an intramental psychological one. > A method remains and it entails more skilful work than conventional instruction. However, one could argue that standard instructional approaches are actually more difficult from the perspective of facilitating independent thought and practice (the purpose of L.A. based instruction) on the part of the student, because they fail to achieve this in any supportive manner. Learning activity is simply what it is called in this area of research. I think David is going into lots of interesting subtleties, but I fear some folk are reading this with an administrative mindset rather than a research mindset. From an administrative perspective "successful" is treated as a very clear and simple thing. From a research perspective into psychological development, it is a nonsense term and entirely problematic. Given the difficulties of relating "successful" to genuine developments in students learning, I see no answer to the desire for a general answer. I think the question is wrong -- no-one who actually wants an intelligent, thought provoking answer should go round expecting (or, worse, demanding) "general" or simple answers to simplified questions. On such issues we may neatly separate researchers from administrators. Huw From ewall@umich.edu Sun Dec 21 16:13:18 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Sun, 21 Dec 2014 18:13:18 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Maths and science in Russia In-Reply-To: References: <626322EE-DC59-4C94-A4AD-5C54F6045589@umich.edu> Message-ID: <90CE9AFD-D8C1-4E6B-83E0-EF73FD343E54@umich.edu> Ulvi Actually, you might find the other volume in this series more useful for your question: Russian Mathematical Education: Programs and Practices (also edited by Karp. Ed On Dec 21, 2014, at 5:57 PM, Ulvi ??il wrote: > Thank you very much Ed. > > > 2014-12-22 1:53 GMT+02:00 Ed Wall : > >> Ulvi >> >> Yes, Russia has and I suspect continues to be more successful >> that the US in 8th grade and that, I think, might call in question seeming >> US success in 4th grade (there are perhaps complicating factors). At least, >> a number of people think so which is, as I said before, one reason for >> recent reform efforts in the US. >> >> As regards the Russian mathematics curriculum, you might want to >> take a look at a 1980 4th grade Russian mathematics text >> >> ftp://math.stanford.edu/pub/papers/milgram/russian-grade-4-problems.pdf >> >> This is significantly beyond, in places, what is taught to US 4th graders >> and may, in part, speak to what happens by 8th grade. >> >> You might want to take a look at Russian Mathematics Education: History >> and World Significance (Schmittau has a chapter). >> >> Ed >> >> On Dec 21, 2014, at 5:09 PM, Ulvi ??il wrote: >> >>> Thanks Ed. >>> >>> The picture I attached earlier may have misled me. In the below link. >>> >>> You seem to be right, Russia does not seem to be particularly successful. >>> >>> But according to this >>> >>> >> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trends_in_International_Mathematics_and_Science_Study >>> . >>> >>> Countries' scores with flags. >>> >>> Russia seems still to be successful than US at TIMSS2011 for eight grade. >>> >>> On the other hand, I suppose that there is a considerable deterioration, >>> decentralization and processes alike in Russia after 1990. >>> >>> About Piaget dominance in US and England; >>> >>> can it be thought that Piaget's dominance is hindering math curriculum to >>> be a developed one because it does not take into account early >> development >>> of abstract thinking in children? >>> >>> My question about Russia's actual math curriculum is still open. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> 2014-12-22 0:48 GMT+02:00 Ed Wall : >>> >>>> Ulvi >>>> >>>> According to the 2015 TIMSS, the average score of fourth graders in >>>> the US is 541 where that of England and the Russian Federation is 542. I >>>> know that, in general, the mathematics curriculum in the US and England >> has >>>> nothing much to do with Vygotsky (and yet a lot to do with Piaget). A >>>> number of mathematics educators think that the math curriculum in the >> early >>>> grades in the US is not particularly successful (hat is one of the >> reasons >>>> behind some recent reform efforts in the US). Why do you think, given >> these >>>> average scores (and, of course, there are questions about TIMSS), the >>>> curriculum in Russia is "quite successful?" >>>> >>>> Ed Wall >>>> On Dec 21, 2014, at 4:15 PM, Ulvi ??il wrote: >>>> >>>>> Thanks Huw. >>>>> Yes, I know in Davydov it is called learning activity but my question >> was >>>>> aimed at the curriculum situation in Russia, current math curriculum >>>>> applied in Russia's primary schools? >>>>> What is this curriculum? Is it the one proposed by Davydov or bearing >>>>> another name? >>>>> And to put it in terms of Vygotsky, is the curriculum currently >> applied, >>>>> and which seems to be quite successful, has anything to do with >>>> Vygotskian >>>>> theory in Russia and in other countries where maths seems to be a >>>>> successful discipline in primary years. >>>>> >>>>> Best, >>>>> Ulvi >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> 2014-12-22 0:01 GMT+02:00 Huw Lloyd : >>>>> >>>>>> Ulvi, >>>>>> >>>>>> The essential 'method' is to facilitate students' own experimentation >>>> with >>>>>> methods. This is called learning activity. >>>>>> >>>>>> Huw >>>>>> >>>>>> On 21 December 2014 at 12:15, Ulvi ??il wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Hello, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I know there are some works comparing Russia (Davydov's curriculum) >> and >>>>>> US, >>>>>>> and even some works done in US with an application of Davydov's, e.g. >>>> by >>>>>>> Schmittau. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I would like to know, not in detail, but just in general, which main >>>>>>> factors lie behind this success in Russia, it is Davydov, or Zarkov >> or >>>>>> any >>>>>>> other scholar's method. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Thanks in advance, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Ulvi >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> >> From ulvi.icil@gmail.com Sun Dec 21 16:18:14 2014 From: ulvi.icil@gmail.com (=?UTF-8?B?VWx2aSDEsMOnaWw=?=) Date: Mon, 22 Dec 2014 02:18:14 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Maths and science in Russia In-Reply-To: <90CE9AFD-D8C1-4E6B-83E0-EF73FD343E54@umich.edu> References: <626322EE-DC59-4C94-A4AD-5C54F6045589@umich.edu> <90CE9AFD-D8C1-4E6B-83E0-EF73FD343E54@umich.edu> Message-ID: Yes Ed, I noticed that 2nd volume's content, program and practices. Huw, you are right, "successful" is a wrong term, so the question is somewhat erroneous. 2014-12-22 2:13 GMT+02:00 Ed Wall : > Ulvi > > Actually, you might find the other volume in this series more useful > for your question: Russian Mathematical Education: Programs and Practices > (also edited by Karp. > > Ed > > On Dec 21, 2014, at 5:57 PM, Ulvi ??il wrote: > > > Thank you very much Ed. > > > > > > 2014-12-22 1:53 GMT+02:00 Ed Wall : > > > >> Ulvi > >> > >> Yes, Russia has and I suspect continues to be more successful > >> that the US in 8th grade and that, I think, might call in question > seeming > >> US success in 4th grade (there are perhaps complicating factors). At > least, > >> a number of people think so which is, as I said before, one reason for > >> recent reform efforts in the US. > >> > >> As regards the Russian mathematics curriculum, you might want to > >> take a look at a 1980 4th grade Russian mathematics text > >> > >> > ftp://math.stanford.edu/pub/papers/milgram/russian-grade-4-problems.pdf > >> > >> This is significantly beyond, in places, what is taught to US 4th > graders > >> and may, in part, speak to what happens by 8th grade. > >> > >> You might want to take a look at Russian Mathematics Education: History > >> and World Significance (Schmittau has a chapter). > >> > >> Ed > >> > >> On Dec 21, 2014, at 5:09 PM, Ulvi ??il wrote: > >> > >>> Thanks Ed. > >>> > >>> The picture I attached earlier may have misled me. In the below link. > >>> > >>> You seem to be right, Russia does not seem to be particularly > successful. > >>> > >>> But according to this > >>> > >>> > >> > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trends_in_International_Mathematics_and_Science_Study > >>> . > >>> > >>> Countries' scores with flags. > >>> > >>> Russia seems still to be successful than US at TIMSS2011 for eight > grade. > >>> > >>> On the other hand, I suppose that there is a considerable > deterioration, > >>> decentralization and processes alike in Russia after 1990. > >>> > >>> About Piaget dominance in US and England; > >>> > >>> can it be thought that Piaget's dominance is hindering math curriculum > to > >>> be a developed one because it does not take into account early > >> development > >>> of abstract thinking in children? > >>> > >>> My question about Russia's actual math curriculum is still open. > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> 2014-12-22 0:48 GMT+02:00 Ed Wall : > >>> > >>>> Ulvi > >>>> > >>>> According to the 2015 TIMSS, the average score of fourth graders > in > >>>> the US is 541 where that of England and the Russian Federation is > 542. I > >>>> know that, in general, the mathematics curriculum in the US and > England > >> has > >>>> nothing much to do with Vygotsky (and yet a lot to do with Piaget). A > >>>> number of mathematics educators think that the math curriculum in the > >> early > >>>> grades in the US is not particularly successful (hat is one of the > >> reasons > >>>> behind some recent reform efforts in the US). Why do you think, given > >> these > >>>> average scores (and, of course, there are questions about TIMSS), the > >>>> curriculum in Russia is "quite successful?" > >>>> > >>>> Ed Wall > >>>> On Dec 21, 2014, at 4:15 PM, Ulvi ??il wrote: > >>>> > >>>>> Thanks Huw. > >>>>> Yes, I know in Davydov it is called learning activity but my question > >> was > >>>>> aimed at the curriculum situation in Russia, current math curriculum > >>>>> applied in Russia's primary schools? > >>>>> What is this curriculum? Is it the one proposed by Davydov or bearing > >>>>> another name? > >>>>> And to put it in terms of Vygotsky, is the curriculum currently > >> applied, > >>>>> and which seems to be quite successful, has anything to do with > >>>> Vygotskian > >>>>> theory in Russia and in other countries where maths seems to be a > >>>>> successful discipline in primary years. > >>>>> > >>>>> Best, > >>>>> Ulvi > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> 2014-12-22 0:01 GMT+02:00 Huw Lloyd : > >>>>> > >>>>>> Ulvi, > >>>>>> > >>>>>> The essential 'method' is to facilitate students' own > experimentation > >>>> with > >>>>>> methods. This is called learning activity. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Huw > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On 21 December 2014 at 12:15, Ulvi ??il > wrote: > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Hello, > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> I know there are some works comparing Russia (Davydov's curriculum) > >> and > >>>>>> US, > >>>>>>> and even some works done in US with an application of Davydov's, > e.g. > >>>> by > >>>>>>> Schmittau. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> I would like to know, not in detail, but just in general, which > main > >>>>>>> factors lie behind this success in Russia, it is Davydov, or Zarkov > >> or > >>>>>> any > >>>>>>> other scholar's method. > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Thanks in advance, > >>>>>>> > >>>>>>> Ulvi > >>>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >> > >> > >> > > > From evianna@lagcc.cuny.edu Sun Dec 21 17:55:16 2014 From: evianna@lagcc.cuny.edu (Eduardo Vianna) Date: Sun, 21 Dec 2014 20:55:16 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Eduardo Vianna profile Message-ID: <549733B30200001F0002E610@mailgate.lagcc.cuny.edu> Thank you, Annalisa, for sending a good link. I should also note that the student featured in the Times story, Mike Rifino, is the co-author of a commentary chapter in Andy Blunden's edited book too. He is now a Ph.D. student in Human Development at the CUNY Graduate Center with Anna Stetsenko. Rifino, M.,Matsuura, K., & Medina, F. (2014). The Peer Activist Learning Community: APeer Perspective. In Blunden, A. (Ed.), Collaborative Projects:AnInterdisciplinary Study. Leiden and Boston: Brill. Eduardo >>> Annalisa Aguilar 12/21/14 6:48 PM >>> Hi Vera, The link may be broken in Lois's post, so I'm adding it again here: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/21/nyregion/raising-ambitions-the-challenge-in-teaching-at-community-colleges.html The following also appears in fine print at the bottom of the online article: "A version of this article appears in print on December 21, 2014, on page MB1 of the New York edition with the headline: Raising Their Sights." Maybe this helps? Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Vera John-Steiner Sent: Sunday, December 21, 2014 4:00 PM To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Eduardo Vianna profile Dear Eduardo, In what part of the Times was the profile? Exciting, Vera -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Eduardo Vianna Sent: Sunday, December 21, 2014 12:17 PM To: lholzman@eastsideinstitute.org; xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Eduardo Vianna profile Thank you for posting this, Lois. In case anyone is interested, the research project mentioned in the NY Times article is described in a chapter I wrote with Naja Hougaard and Anna Stetsenko published this year in the book edited by Andy Blunden on collaborative projects: Vianna, E., Hougaard, N. & Stetsenko,A. (2014). The Dialectics of Collective and Individual Transformation: Transformative Activist Research in a CollaborativeLearning Community Project. In A. Blunden (Ed.), Project collaboration: An interdisciplinary study. Boston, MA:Brill Academic Publishers. Eduardo Eduardo Vianna, Ph.D. Associate Professor Social Science Department LaGuardia Community College 31-10 Thomson Ave Long Island City, NY 11101 (718)482-6043 >>> Lois Holzman 12/21/14 1:25 PM >>> Today's NY Times has a feature on Eduardo Vianna, a Vygotskian colleague who teaches at LaGuardia Community College. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/21/nyregion/raising-ambitions-the-challenge-i n-teaching-at-community-colleges.html?ref=nyregion Eduardo received the Cultural-Historical Research SIG Early Achievement Award in 2010 (I think that was the year). Lois Lois Holzman Director, East Side Institute for Group & Short Term Psychotherapy 119 West 23 St, suite 902 New York, NY 10011 Chair, Global Outreach, All Stars Project, UX Tel. +1.212.941.8906 x324 Fax +1.718.797.3966 lholzman@eastsideinstitute.org Social Media Facebook | LinkedIn | Twitter Blogs Psychology Today| Psychology of Becoming | ESI Community News Websites Lois Holzman | East Side Institute | Performing the World All Stars Project From ablunden@mira.net Sun Dec 21 18:22:50 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 22 Dec 2014 13:22:50 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Goldin-Meadow? Message-ID: <5497807A.2080003@mira.net> Can anyone send me a PDF of the Susan Goldin-Meadow paper on "the case of David" or the one on "The resilience of language" (2003) a monograph published by Psychology Press, or " The development of language-like communication without a language model" (1977) in Science? -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ From djwdoc@yahoo.com Sun Dec 21 18:25:17 2014 From: djwdoc@yahoo.com (Douglas Williams) Date: Mon, 22 Dec 2014 02:25:17 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors In-Reply-To: <1419186014985.37125@unm.edu> References: <1419186014985.37125@unm.edu> Message-ID: <1467326129.17956.1419215117783.JavaMail.yahoo@jws10613.mail.bf1.yahoo.com> Hi-- I will hazard the thought that it might be fruitful to at least consider the cognitive linguistics literature on the topic (notably Lakoff, Women, Fire and Dangerous Things, and Turner, More than Cool Reason). I thought that they extended Sergei Eisenstein, and more broadly on Dewey and CHAT, though George Lakoff himself was not enthusiastic about syncretic approaches to his work, to put it mildly. I have not noticed syncretic approaches are common here. I think this is the territory Vygotsky approaches in The Psychology of Art. For example:? "A work of art can be applied as a predicate to new, imperceptive phenomena or ideas, to apperceive them in the same way as the image in a word helps apperceive the new meaning. What we are unable to understand immediately and directly can be understood in a roundabout way, allegorically. The whole psychological effect of a work of art can then be entirely credited to this indirectness."? I would be interested in seeing more commentary relating CHAT with that line of research. Certainly Vygotsky, Luria, and others of their group were thinking about these issues. Eisenstein/ Vygotsky /Luria?s project: Cinematic Thinking and the Integrative Science of Mind and Brain. | ? | | ? | ? | ? | ? | ? | | Eisenstein/ Vygotsky /Luria?s project: Cinematic Thinking and the Integrative Science of Mind and Br...Introduction When Sergei Eisenstein died on the 11th of February 1948, a post-mortem examination was conducted to establish the cause of death. | | | | View on www.screeningthepast.com | Preview by Yahoo | | | | ? | The pre-linguistic brain that we share with mammals generally operates through imagistic narratives. This is something that dreams and memory formation make clear--the recent convergence of neuropsychological research with the classical method of memory palaces as a tool for recall, and the more recent commentary by Temple Grandin on the subject (Thinking in Pictures), simply underscores the degree to which language builds on an existing pattern of imagistic recall, and cogniition too, even among cows, Grandin tells us ("Cattle I have worked with have had the ability to apply previously learned skills to new situations, which also implies a capacity for thought.") Metaphor builds on these images to provide source domains for conceptual framing of new events, on the basis of past experience. Memory consolidation builds the narratives and refines the preferred frames. I have thought from time to time that there is something kind of important about understanding this general idea, and I would be interested in seeing the insights of those of you who have doubtlessly studied the issue more deeply than I. Shared metaphors are deeply interesting (I think), for what they tell us about the system of socioeconomic interaction within which we are embedded. And of course, if you like art and literature, then all the better.... Regards,Doug From: Annalisa Aguilar To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Sunday, December 21, 2014 10:20 AM Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors Is this about where the metaphor thread picks up? Please continue! :) Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Larry Purss Sent: Saturday, December 20, 2014 12:59 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors Horizontal development AS practices. What KIND of practices? Practices that develop "within" Pracices which develop "across" These metaphorical words [within, across, and also "between"] CARRY us as performances which are form[ing] and formative. Where? In situated specific practices. THIS adds to the vertical dimension ---***---***--- On Sat, Dec 20, 2014 at 10:55 AM, larry smolucha wrote: Message from Francine: This is a a good way of simplifying what has been discussed. And it is also a way to enter into a discussion of how a phenomenon like winter might be referred to as a thing (noun), as a process (verb like wintering in Aspen, or winterize your car), and even as a relational prepositional phrase, perhaps adverb (In the bleak mid-winter). Also, gerunds are verbs that can function as nouns - I can't use wintering as a noun in an intelligent sentence- but let's use 'singing can lift your spirits.' ---***---***--- From: hshonerd@gmail.com Date: Sat, 20 Dec 2014 08:39:19 -0700 To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors I am late to this, but I wonder if things, processes and relations capture pretty much everything about language and thinking. So nouns, as things, verbs, as processes and prepositions, as relations. Henry ---***---***--- On Dec 19, 2014, at 4:48 PM, larry smolucha wrote: Message from Francine: This is a a good way of simplifying what has been discussed. And it is also a way to enter into a discussion of how a phenomenon like winter might be referred to as a thing (noun), as a process (verb like wintering in Aspen, or winterize your car), and even as a relational prepositional phrase, perhaps adverb (In the bleak mid-winter). Also, gerunds are verbs that can function as nouns - I can't use wintering as a noun in an intelligent sentence- but let's use 'singing can lift your spirits.' ---***---***--- From: hshonerd@gmail.com Date: Sat, 20 Dec 2014 08:39:19 -0700 To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors I am late to this, but I wonder if things, processes and relations capture pretty much everything about language and thinking. So nouns, as things, verbs, as processes and prepositions, as relations. Henry ---***---***--- On Dec 19, 2014, at 4:48 PM, larry smolucha wrote: Message from Francine: Just a thought - Is the use of nouns, verbs, prepositions a result of developing a written language based on an alphabet? Language use in a culture with no written language would surely differ significantly. And written languages based on hieroglyphs, pictograms, cuneiform, Norse Runes, Celtic oghams, etc. surely divide and frame experience differently. ---***---***--- From: boblake@georgiasouthern.edu Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2014 16:43:24 -0500 To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors Hi Everyone, I appreciate this thread's emphasis on the relativistic character of metaphoric language and find think that it supports Vygotsky's notion of the fluid nature of language as it emerges from socio-cultural and socio-historical contexts in meaning making (in contrast to biological determinism). Because each culture makes meaning in widely diverse ways, language forms and usage might have complex intricacies and shades of meaning on one concept alone. Along with the example of early 20th century Hopi's view of time, there are other more recent examples from the present day that suggest ways that language can shape thought. Consider the Australian aboriginal language, Guugu Yimithirr, from north Queensland who have no words for right or left, in front of, or behind to describe location. Instead they use the points of the compass even when requesting that someone move over to make room. They will say ?move a bit to the east.? To tell you where exactly they left something in your house, they?ll say, ?I left it on the southern edge of the western table.? (Deutscher, 2010, p. MM 42) The effect on the thinking of this group is phenomenal in orienting the speakers to their directional spatial environment to such a degree that roughly 1 out of every 10 words in conversational Guugu Yimithirr includes either north, south, east or west and is accompanied with precise hand gestures (ibid). Consequently in this culture, language acquisition involves constant awareness of spaces relative to the points of the compass. Deutscher relays a fascinating story about the ways that memory is stored for the speakers of this language. The story also serves as a clear example of Vygotsky?s notion of language as a mediating tool as a means of creating higher levels of consciousness through spatial kinesthetic approaches to meaning creation. One Guugu Yimithirr speaker was filmed telling his friends the story of how in his youth, he capsized in shark-infested waters. He and an older person were caught in a storm, and their boat tipped over. They both jumped into the water and managed to swim nearly three miles to the shore, only to discover that the missionary for whom they worked was far more concerned at the loss of the boat than relieved at their miraculous escape. Apart from the dramatic content, the remarkable thing about the story was that it was remembered throughout in cardinal directions: the speaker jumped into the water on the western side of the boat, his companion to the east of the boat, they saw a giant shark swimming north and so on. Perhaps the cardinal directions were just made up for the occasion? Well, quite by chance, the same person was filmed some years later telling the same story. The cardinal directions matched exactly in the two tellings. Even more remarkable were the spontaneous hand gestures that accompanied the story. For instance, the direction in which the boat rolled over was gestured in the correct geographic orientation, regardless of the direction the speaker was facing in the two films (ibid). *Robert* Deutscher, G. (2010, August 29) Does your language shape how you think? *The New York Times* *Sunday Magazine, *p. MM 42. ---***---***--- On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 4:05 PM, David Kellogg wrote: Yes, Haliday is essentially a Whorfian, and that's one of things that brings him close to Vygotsky. (Compare, for example, Chomsky, who is essentially anti-developmental in his ideas about language, and who now rejects the leading role played by social communication and says that communication is epiphenomenal to language, whose original purpose is thought.) For Sapir, and for Whorf, in the beginning of every major onotogenetic, sociogenetic, and even phylogenetic change in language there has to be some change in the nature of communication. So what Andy says about the lack of the basis of modern science in Hopi applies perfectly well to English. When we read the scientific writings of Chaucer on the astrolabe, for example, we do not see words like "reflection", "refraction" or "alignment". Chaucer uses words like "bounce off", "bend through", and "line up" (note the use of prepositions, Helena!). Where did these words come from, and how did they make scientific English possible? Most of us have no problem saying that Isaac Newton discovered the laws of gravitation. But it's only a slight exaggeration to say that what he really discovered was the meaning potential of words like "gravitation". Gravity is, of course, not a thing at all; that is, it's not an entity, but rather a process, the process of falling down, or falling in (preps, again!). So how and above all why does it become an entity? It's interesting to compare Newton's writings on optics with Chaucer's on the astrolabe. The "Opticks" has a fixed format that we recognize almost instantly today: Newton describes his equipment (the prism and the dark room); he then narrates his method as a kind of recipe ("First, I did this; then I did that") and draws conclusions, which he then formulates in mathematical terms (this is essentially the format of Vygotsky's lectures on pedology, so much so that when translating them we had some trouble determining the precise moment when Vygotsky turns to the blackboard to write his conclusion in the form of a law). In order to get them into mathematical shape, though, he has to make sentences that look a lot like equations. "The plumpness of the lens yields a greater refraction of the light", "The reflection of the light from the glass results of the light striking the flatness of the glass" "The curvature of the spectacle glass supplies the lacking plumpness of the eye". In each of these, a quality or a process which would normally be realized as an adjective or a verb is suddenly realized by a noun, creating an imaginary entity. That's grammatical metaphor. Something that is "canonically" realized by a verb ("to grow") is suddenly realized nominally ("growth"), or something that is canonically a quality ('red") is realized verbally ("redden"). We even find related clauses realized as verbs ("She did not know the rules. So she died" is realized by "Death was brought about through ignorance", all of these examples from Halliday). In fact, the Genetic Law that Vygotsky formulates in "Mind in Society" ("Every higher mental function is realized on two planes....") is really just one instance of grammatical metaphor. One of Chomsky's best known arguments for the radical innateness hypothesis is this. If I take a sentence like "Students who do not do their homework do not do well" and I want to make a question, how do I know which "do" to move to the front? Chomsky assumes that this knowledge is essentially innate; it is part of universal grammar. But you can see that "Do students who do not do their homework do well?" can be built up through a process of what we might call "discourse metaphor"--whereby clauses stand for exchanges: Mother: You did your homework, didn't you? Child: No. Mother: You didn't do your homework? Did you do well? Child: No. Mother: You didn't do well? Child: No. Mother: You didn't do you homework so you didn't do well. Do the other students do well? Child: Some of them. Mother: Who does well? Do students who do not do their homework do well? And this of course explains why wh-items like "who" and 'why" have two functions--one inside a clause, where it expresses an intra-mental function (grammar) and one between them where it expresses an inter-mental function (discourse). I realize that grammatical metaphor will seem rather dry and abstract and unpoetic to people who assume that metaphor is only of the lexical kind. But to me, and I think to most children, it is far far more powerful and far more important developmentally. In some ways, it's the lexical metaphor that is responsible for the disenchantment of the child's world, while the grammatical metaphor infinitely expands it. (And here, I'm afraid, I must stop--it's time for breakfast and anyway my one screen is used up!) David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies ---***---***--- On 19 December 2014 at 15:15, Greg Thompson wrote: Helena and David, I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the so-called authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred tradition to Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi notion of "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including English) notion of "time" and how each of these languages offers different affordances of meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual understanding, English has a much more reified/objectified/entified sense of time. (btw, I think the first paragraph is easier to follow than the second - and in that first paragraph you'll find our old friend "imagination"). David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to? -greg Taken from: http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/mousesite/Secondary/Whorfframe2.html ["Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, sunset" are with us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from other nouns. They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in winter" just as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are pluralized and numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. Our thought about the referents of such words hence becomes objectified. Without objectification, it would be a subjective experience of real time, i.e. of the consciousness of "becoming later and later"--simply a cyclic phase similar to an earlier phase in that ever-later-becoming duration. Only by imagination can such a cyclic phase be set beside another and another in the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually perceived) configuration. "But such is the power of linguistic analogy that we do so objectify cyclic phasing. We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g., "phasing." And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting binomial formula of formless item plus form, is so general that it is implicit for all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless items like "substance, matter," by which we can fill out the binomial for an enormously wide range of nouns. But even these are not quite generalized enough to take in our phase nouns. So for the phase nouns we have made a formless item, "time." We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, in the pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" in the pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can say and think "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." Let me again point out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of milk" or "a piece of cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a summer" actually contains or consists of such-and-such a quantity of "time." In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., are not nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They are a formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, and even other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a locative pattern, like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It contains no morpheme like one of "in the house" or "at the tree." It means "when it is morning" or "while morning-phase is occurring." These "temporal s" are not used as subjects or objects, or at all like nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" or "summer is hot"; summer is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions are hot, WHEN heat occurs. One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or "summer recently." There is no objectification, as a region, an extent, a quantity, of the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested about time except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no basis here for a formless item answering to our "time." ] ---***---***--- On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Helena Worthen wrote: David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to this: "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to create sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific writing and thinking today." Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I lose you when you say "created to talk about gravity as an entity". Thank you, Helena Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com ---***---***--- On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote: As Helena points out, prepositions are from the "grammatical" end of what Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what Halliday calls "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they have three properties that words from the more "lexical" end do not have: a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You can, actually, but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you invent a new name or a new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can). b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific semantic field (the way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of linguistics) but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are used. c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the same effect, which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your argument" the "in" has more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in "there's a fly in your tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in Henry's hands, refer to a book or even a footnote. Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties pretty much define the difference between learning and development, at least as I understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on functions indefinitely while development works by reorganizing the closed set of functions you already have into new systems. Learning is skill specific and local, while development is quite global in its implications. Learning is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new systems, while development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary (and forget it just as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes away. For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of blue that people call the sky") are simply metaphors from the non-productive end of the lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are crisp, concrete, and vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to create sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific writing and thinking today. For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical metaphor is the third great moment in child development (after the break into mother tongue and the break into disciplinary language in school work). Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" implies zero dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two ("on a line', 'on a plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because they are grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them with time: 'at a point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. Compare: "at Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very day), and "in Christmas' (season). David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies ---***---***--- On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen : Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial relationships from the concrete material world into the conceptual imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 common ones, and between 70 and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far as" -- this is according to https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm ). We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. Apparently, in English, they evolved from and did the job done by inflections in parent languages, examples being cases and tenses. But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection like the dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial relationships suggested by contemporary prepositions. I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about this. Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com ---***---***--- On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly embodied, proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to linguistics (For example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on ?lexicon?: nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, being part of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and Halliday see no clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, lexico-grammar. (Lo and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar, adding the ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings are great data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of that? In translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced? Henry On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the metaphorical use of prepositions like: - "there is some value IN your argument" - "I'd like to go OVER that again" - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" - "Let's go THROUGH that again" and so on. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ ---***---***--- larry smolucha wrote: Message from Francine Smolucha: Forgive me for replying to myself - In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic possibilities: In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in Thought and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into English 1962] Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' value of the two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech vocalization). He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that are flammable gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor a gas. [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century European Developmental Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' hence the Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of Piaget's Genetic Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and synthesis based on metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in Vygotsky's example of H2O. ---***---***--- From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination Message from Francine Smolucha: Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic and produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts. It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more than the recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can ever be imagined" (David Kellogg's most recent email.) A couple things to consider: (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination as the brain has to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the simplest level of the Gestalt Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just photographic. (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try to accurately reproduce the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, the goal of combinatory imagination is to create something new out of memories, dreams, musings, and even sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of objects and symbols. (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways that things and concepts can be combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar and f I can add water and it dissolves a bit? But adding heat changes the combination into a pancake. [Is this synergistic?] Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more examples to put the discussion in the metaphysical realm. ---***---***--- Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the case for Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I think it's not just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are associationists who are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary associationism exists and some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. Vygotsky has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, explain the uniqueness of our species? Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels for its own kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a Piagetian perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true maturity as a species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more to it than that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of primate, and our solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon rocks in order to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged the same way as any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. Making the case for the higher psychological functions and for language is not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human exceptionalism. It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for the vanguard role of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, prolonging childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after the sick and the elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial organs (tools) and even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for our species, it is in the societies and the sectors of society where these "circuitous, compensatory means of development" are most advanced that lead our development as a species. The wretched of the earth always been short on rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for material culture generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: verily, here the first shall be last and the last shall be first. I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of attention is simply the logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says there are only two kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So imagination is nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, and nothing really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when you hear the name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there to be able to imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work in word meaning. You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who was given a crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been mixed with silver by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold. Well, we now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not possible to measure the differences in water displacement that precisely. The method that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the "principal of buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes palimpsest, a velum on which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. Because parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and written over every century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, the pressure of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones when the old text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only known Greek copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their relationship to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they are related to each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite similar to the way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies ---***---***--- On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD < hshonerd@gmail.com wrote: I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an associationist, ?sees imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? Henry ---***---***--- On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg < dkellogg60@gmail.com > wrote: On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division between higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because Ribot is an associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of attention. And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from forest to farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between the two great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical world of the forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses in life and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" (that is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the farm,where written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter months are wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter talking animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has to be more voluntary. Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that underpins Ribot here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out the LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices really are the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, there isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and animal imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of volitional attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without a theory of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at all. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies ---***---***--- On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole wrote: Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, thanks to all for the food for thought. Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential around the time emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had seen work on memory before, but not imagination. Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal reproductive? Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of development of imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a relative newcomer to the topic. mike ---***---***--- On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < hshonerd@gmail.com > wrote: Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. This business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some weeks in our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that segmented the last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. Puns, according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) Henry ---***---***--- On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole < mcole@ucsd.edu > wrote: Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they are doing contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his followers as an inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so its of course interesting to see those additional categories emerge. 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in translation, seems awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in this passage, for example, is not a currently used term in counter distinction to "memory." Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary discourse across languages as our explorations with out Russian colleagues have illustrated. That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists who clearly influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still possible to include culture in it. Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, interestingly links imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" act. Parts of it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that was also "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of creativity and imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see that the two concepts are linked. Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself writing. mike Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old approaches to a pesum ---***---***--- On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < ablunden@mira.net wrote >: I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it may be worth noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to Imagination in the section on Representation, mediating between Recollection and Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive Imagination, (2) Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he says leads to the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other words, the transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is accomplished through these three grades of Imagination. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ ---***---***--- mike cole wrote: Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and Williams. Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am trying to mine for empirical strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination develops. At first I thought that the use of productive implies that there must be a kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I learned that instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is linked to memory. So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of anticipation and memory. Imagine that! mike ---***---***--- On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < hshonerd@gmail.com>: Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination (starting with Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and provides a space for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. This, coupled with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground to take part in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with preconceptions: Vera on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian Langacker on symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, particularly the temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of imagination and creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of temporality: sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure), which I think must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both individual and distributed construals of cognition and feeling. Henry ---***---***--- On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote: Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* and the analogy to *gap-filling* I am on holiday so limited access to internet. However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion of "structures of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored under the notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of modalities that hang together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing that is forming but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we think imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* Larry ---***---***--- On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < hshonerd@gmail.com> wrote: Mike and Larry, I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how jazzed up I am now about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as Larry construes it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various triads, finally found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of the mind, as Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa? fuera. Fractally yours, Henry ---***---***--- On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole < mcole@ucsd.edu wrote: For those interested in the imagination thread, attached are two articles by philosophers who have worried about the issue. My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists like Zaporozhets and his students who studied the development of imagination in a manner that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of productive imagination. I am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no intention of doing so. But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the attached texts. Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I came upon the idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked at several levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne and I argued in our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of access to the work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. Moreover, such views emphasize the future orientation of the perception/imagination process. I believe that these views have direct relevance to Kris's paper to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns about the role of different forms of symbolic play in development. So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps they will prove useful for those interested. mike [Imagination and Perception by P.F. Strawson.pdf] From ablunden@mira.net Sun Dec 21 18:35:45 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 22 Dec 2014 13:35:45 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Eduardo Vianna profile In-Reply-To: <549733B30200001F0002E610@mailgate.lagcc.cuny.edu> References: <549733B30200001F0002E610@mailgate.lagcc.cuny.edu> Message-ID: <54978381.5090205@mira.net> And it is a really great story as well! You certainly need some viable way forward for those who find themselves excluded in the US and New York in particular, at the moment. :( Eduardo's article you can read here: https://www.academia.edu/8208504/ Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Eduardo Vianna wrote: > Thank you, Annalisa, for sending a good link. I should also note that the student featured in the Times story, Mike Rifino, is the co-author of a commentary chapter in Andy Blunden's edited book too. He is now a Ph.D. student in Human Development at the CUNY Graduate Center with Anna Stetsenko. > > Rifino, M.,Matsuura, K., & Medina, F. (2014). The Peer Activist Learning Community: APeer Perspective. In Blunden, A. (Ed.), Collaborative Projects:AnInterdisciplinary Study. Leiden and Boston: Brill. > > Eduardo > > > >>>> Annalisa Aguilar 12/21/14 6:48 PM >>> >>>> > Hi Vera, > > The link may be broken in Lois's post, so I'm adding it again here: > http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/21/nyregion/raising-ambitions-the-challenge-in-teaching-at-community-colleges.html > > The following also appears in fine print at the bottom of the online article: > "A version of this article appears in print on December 21, 2014, on page MB1 of the New York edition with the headline: Raising Their Sights." > > Maybe this helps? > > Annalisa > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Vera John-Steiner > Sent: Sunday, December 21, 2014 4:00 PM > To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Eduardo Vianna profile > > Dear Eduardo, > > In what part of the Times was the profile? > Exciting, > Vera > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Eduardo Vianna > Sent: Sunday, December 21, 2014 12:17 PM > To: lholzman@eastsideinstitute.org; xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Eduardo Vianna profile > > Thank you for posting this, Lois. In case anyone is interested, the research > project mentioned in the NY Times article is described in a chapter I wrote > with Naja Hougaard and Anna Stetsenko published this year in the book edited > by Andy Blunden on collaborative projects: > > Vianna, E., Hougaard, N. & Stetsenko,A. (2014). The Dialectics of Collective > and Individual Transformation: Transformative Activist Research in a > CollaborativeLearning Community Project. In A. Blunden (Ed.), Project > collaboration: An interdisciplinary study. Boston, MA:Brill Academic > Publishers. > > Eduardo > > Eduardo Vianna, Ph.D. > Associate Professor > Social Science Department > LaGuardia Community College > 31-10 Thomson Ave > Long Island City, NY 11101 > (718)482-6043 > >>>> Lois Holzman 12/21/14 1:25 PM >>> >>>> > Today's NY Times has a feature on Eduardo Vianna, a Vygotskian colleague who > teaches at LaGuardia Community College. > http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/21/nyregion/raising-ambitions-the-challenge-i > n-teaching-at-community-colleges.html?ref=nyregion > Eduardo received the Cultural-Historical Research SIG Early Achievement > Award in 2010 (I think that was the year). > Lois > > > Lois Holzman > Director, East Side Institute for Group & Short Term Psychotherapy > 119 West 23 St, suite 902 > New York, NY 10011 > Chair, Global Outreach, All Stars Project, UX Tel. +1.212.941.8906 x324 Fax > +1.718.797.3966 lholzman@eastsideinstitute.org Social Media Facebook | > LinkedIn | Twitter Blogs Psychology Today| Psychology of Becoming | ESI > Community News Websites Lois Holzman | East Side Institute | Performing the > World All Stars Project > > > > > > > > > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Sun Dec 21 19:22:08 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 22 Dec 2014 14:22:08 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Goldin-Meadow? In-Reply-To: <5497807A.2080003@mira.net> References: <5497807A.2080003@mira.net> Message-ID: <54978E60.5000301@mira.net> Annalisa has provided me with everything I needed. Thanks A. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Andy Blunden wrote: > Can anyone send me a PDF of the Susan Goldin-Meadow paper on "the case > of David" or the one on "The resilience of language" (2003) a > monograph published by Psychology Press, or " The development of > language-like communication without a language model" (1977) in Science? > > From daviddpreiss@gmail.com Sun Dec 21 19:32:24 2014 From: daviddpreiss@gmail.com (David Preiss) Date: Mon, 22 Dec 2014 00:32:24 -0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Anti-intellectualism is taking over the US | Comment is free | theguardian.com Message-ID: <7CB4A92F-EAC7-4580-807D-CCB1A3BC32DC@gmail.com> Book censorship is back in the 21st century.... Just a quote if you don't want to check the full link: "In fact, I invite you to take on as your summer reading the astonishingly lengthy list of books that have been removed from the Tucson public school system as part of this wholesale elimination of the Mexican-American studies curriculum. The authors and editors include Isabel Allende, Junot D?az, Jonathan Kozol, Rudolfo Anaya, bell hooks, Sandra Cisneros, James Baldwin, Howard Zinn, Rodolfo Acu?a, Ronald Takaki, Jerome Skolnick and Gloria Anzald?a. Even Thoreau's Civil Disobedience and Shakespeare's The Tempest received the hatchet." http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/may/18/anti-intellectualism-us-book-banning David From annalisa@unm.edu Sun Dec 21 21:57:17 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Mon, 22 Dec 2014 05:57:17 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors In-Reply-To: <1467326129.17956.1419215117783.JavaMail.yahoo@jws10613.mail.bf1.yahoo.com> References: <1419186014985.37125@unm.edu>, <1467326129.17956.1419215117783.JavaMail.yahoo@jws10613.mail.bf1.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <1419227837293.38427@unm.edu> Hi Doug! I wondered if you had a chance to see this post of mine: http://xmca.ucsd.edu/yarns/15878?keywords=#52142 Would not mind your thoughts on that! :) You may find some common threads. Or not! :) Hint: I enjoy your use of the word "frame"! Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Douglas Williams Sent: Sunday, December 21, 2014 7:25 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors Hi-- I will hazard the thought that it might be fruitful to at least consider the cognitive linguistics literature on the topic (notably Lakoff, Women, Fire and Dangerous Things, and Turner, More than Cool Reason). I thought that they extended Sergei Eisenstein, and more broadly on Dewey and CHAT, though George Lakoff himself was not enthusiastic about syncretic approaches to his work, to put it mildly. I have not noticed syncretic approaches are common here. I think this is the territory Vygotsky approaches in The Psychology of Art. For example: "A work of art can be applied as a predicate to new, imperceptive phenomena or ideas, to apperceive them in the same way as the image in a word helps apperceive the new meaning. What we are unable to understand immediately and directly can be understood in a roundabout way, allegorically. The whole psychological effect of a work of art can then be entirely credited to this indirectness."? I would be interested in seeing more commentary relating CHAT with that line of research. Certainly Vygotsky, Luria, and others of their group were thinking about these issues. Eisenstein/ Vygotsky /Luria?s project: Cinematic Thinking and the Integrative Science of Mind and Brain. Introduction When Sergei Eisenstein died on the 11th of February 1948, a post-mortem examination was conducted to establish the cause of death. View on www.screeningthepast.com The pre-linguistic brain that we share with mammals generally operates through imagistic narratives. This is something that dreams and memory formation make clear--the recent convergence of neuropsychological research with the classical method of memory palaces as a tool for recall, and the more recent commentary by Temple Grandin on the subject (Thinking in Pictures), simply underscores the degree to which language builds on an existing pattern of imagistic recall, and cogniition too, even among cows, Grandin tells us ("Cattle I have worked with have had the ability to apply previously learned skills to new situations, which also implies a capacity for thought.") Metaphor builds on these images to provide source domains for conceptual framing of new events, on the basis of past experience. Memory consolidation builds the narratives and refines the preferred frames. I have thought from time to time that there is something kind of important about understanding this general idea, and I would be interested in seeing the insights of those of you who have doubtlessly studied the issue more deeply than I. Shared metaphors are deeply interesting (I think), for what they tell us about the system of socioeconomic interaction within which we are embedded. And of course, if you like art and literature, then all the better.... Regards,Doug From: Annalisa Aguilar To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Sunday, December 21, 2014 10:20 AM Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors Is this about where the metaphor thread picks up? Please continue! :) Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Larry Purss Sent: Saturday, December 20, 2014 12:59 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors Horizontal development AS practices. What KIND of practices? Practices that develop "within" Pracices which develop "across" These metaphorical words [within, across, and also "between"] CARRY us as performances which are form[ing] and formative. Where? In situated specific practices. THIS adds to the vertical dimension ---***---***--- On Sat, Dec 20, 2014 at 10:55 AM, larry smolucha wrote: Message from Francine: This is a a good way of simplifying what has been discussed. And it is also a way to enter into a discussion of how a phenomenon like winter might be referred to as a thing (noun), as a process (verb like wintering in Aspen, or winterize your car), and even as a relational prepositional phrase, perhaps adverb (In the bleak mid-winter). Also, gerunds are verbs that can function as nouns - I can't use wintering as a noun in an intelligent sentence- but let's use 'singing can lift your spirits.' ---***---***--- From: hshonerd@gmail.com Date: Sat, 20 Dec 2014 08:39:19 -0700 To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors I am late to this, but I wonder if things, processes and relations capture pretty much everything about language and thinking. So nouns, as things, verbs, as processes and prepositions, as relations. Henry ---***---***--- On Dec 19, 2014, at 4:48 PM, larry smolucha wrote: Message from Francine: This is a a good way of simplifying what has been discussed. And it is also a way to enter into a discussion of how a phenomenon like winter might be referred to as a thing (noun), as a process (verb like wintering in Aspen, or winterize your car), and even as a relational prepositional phrase, perhaps adverb (In the bleak mid-winter). Also, gerunds are verbs that can function as nouns - I can't use wintering as a noun in an intelligent sentence- but let's use 'singing can lift your spirits.' ---***---***--- From: hshonerd@gmail.com Date: Sat, 20 Dec 2014 08:39:19 -0700 To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors I am late to this, but I wonder if things, processes and relations capture pretty much everything about language and thinking. So nouns, as things, verbs, as processes and prepositions, as relations. Henry ---***---***--- On Dec 19, 2014, at 4:48 PM, larry smolucha wrote: Message from Francine: Just a thought - Is the use of nouns, verbs, prepositions a result of developing a written language based on an alphabet? Language use in a culture with no written language would surely differ significantly. And written languages based on hieroglyphs, pictograms, cuneiform, Norse Runes, Celtic oghams, etc. surely divide and frame experience differently. ---***---***--- From: boblake@georgiasouthern.edu Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2014 16:43:24 -0500 To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors Hi Everyone, I appreciate this thread's emphasis on the relativistic character of metaphoric language and find think that it supports Vygotsky's notion of the fluid nature of language as it emerges from socio-cultural and socio-historical contexts in meaning making (in contrast to biological determinism). Because each culture makes meaning in widely diverse ways, language forms and usage might have complex intricacies and shades of meaning on one concept alone. Along with the example of early 20th century Hopi's view of time, there are other more recent examples from the present day that suggest ways that language can shape thought. Consider the Australian aboriginal language, Guugu Yimithirr, from north Queensland who have no words for right or left, in front of, or behind to describe location. Instead they use the points of the compass even when requesting that someone move over to make room. They will say ?move a bit to the east.? To tell you where exactly they left something in your house, they?ll say, ?I left it on the southern edge of the western table.? (Deutscher, 2010, p. MM 42) The effect on the thinking of this group is phenomenal in orienting the speakers to their directional spatial environment to such a degree that roughly 1 out of every 10 words in conversational Guugu Yimithirr includes either north, south, east or west and is accompanied with precise hand gestures (ibid). Consequently in this culture, language acquisition involves constant awareness of spaces relative to the points of the compass. Deutscher relays a fascinating story about the ways that memory is stored for the speakers of this language. The story also serves as a clear example of Vygotsky?s notion of language as a mediating tool as a means of creating higher levels of consciousness through spatial kinesthetic approaches to meaning creation. One Guugu Yimithirr speaker was filmed telling his friends the story of how in his youth, he capsized in shark-infested waters. He and an older person were caught in a storm, and their boat tipped over. They both jumped into the water and managed to swim nearly three miles to the shore, only to discover that the missionary for whom they worked was far more concerned at the loss of the boat than relieved at their miraculous escape. Apart from the dramatic content, the remarkable thing about the story was that it was remembered throughout in cardinal directions: the speaker jumped into the water on the western side of the boat, his companion to the east of the boat, they saw a giant shark swimming north and so on. Perhaps the cardinal directions were just made up for the occasion? Well, quite by chance, the same person was filmed some years later telling the same story. The cardinal directions matched exactly in the two tellings. Even more remarkable were the spontaneous hand gestures that accompanied the story. For instance, the direction in which the boat rolled over was gestured in the correct geographic orientation, regardless of the direction the speaker was facing in the two films (ibid). *Robert* Deutscher, G. (2010, August 29) Does your language shape how you think? *The New York Times* *Sunday Magazine, *p. MM 42. ---***---***--- On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 4:05 PM, David Kellogg wrote: Yes, Haliday is essentially a Whorfian, and that's one of things that brings him close to Vygotsky. (Compare, for example, Chomsky, who is essentially anti-developmental in his ideas about language, and who now rejects the leading role played by social communication and says that communication is epiphenomenal to language, whose original purpose is thought.) For Sapir, and for Whorf, in the beginning of every major onotogenetic, sociogenetic, and even phylogenetic change in language there has to be some change in the nature of communication. So what Andy says about the lack of the basis of modern science in Hopi applies perfectly well to English. When we read the scientific writings of Chaucer on the astrolabe, for example, we do not see words like "reflection", "refraction" or "alignment". Chaucer uses words like "bounce off", "bend through", and "line up" (note the use of prepositions, Helena!). Where did these words come from, and how did they make scientific English possible? Most of us have no problem saying that Isaac Newton discovered the laws of gravitation. But it's only a slight exaggeration to say that what he really discovered was the meaning potential of words like "gravitation". Gravity is, of course, not a thing at all; that is, it's not an entity, but rather a process, the process of falling down, or falling in (preps, again!). So how and above all why does it become an entity? It's interesting to compare Newton's writings on optics with Chaucer's on the astrolabe. The "Opticks" has a fixed format that we recognize almost instantly today: Newton describes his equipment (the prism and the dark room); he then narrates his method as a kind of recipe ("First, I did this; then I did that") and draws conclusions, which he then formulates in mathematical terms (this is essentially the format of Vygotsky's lectures on pedology, so much so that when translating them we had some trouble determining the precise moment when Vygotsky turns to the blackboard to write his conclusion in the form of a law). In order to get them into mathematical shape, though, he has to make sentences that look a lot like equations. "The plumpness of the lens yields a greater refraction of the light", "The reflection of the light from the glass results of the light striking the flatness of the glass" "The curvature of the spectacle glass supplies the lacking plumpness of the eye". In each of these, a quality or a process which would normally be realized as an adjective or a verb is suddenly realized by a noun, creating an imaginary entity. That's grammatical metaphor. Something that is "canonically" realized by a verb ("to grow") is suddenly realized nominally ("growth"), or something that is canonically a quality ('red") is realized verbally ("redden"). We even find related clauses realized as verbs ("She did not know the rules. So she died" is realized by "Death was brought about through ignorance", all of these examples from Halliday). In fact, the Genetic Law that Vygotsky formulates in "Mind in Society" ("Every higher mental function is realized on two planes....") is really just one instance of grammatical metaphor. One of Chomsky's best known arguments for the radical innateness hypothesis is this. If I take a sentence like "Students who do not do their homework do not do well" and I want to make a question, how do I know which "do" to move to the front? Chomsky assumes that this knowledge is essentially innate; it is part of universal grammar. But you can see that "Do students who do not do their homework do well?" can be built up through a process of what we might call "discourse metaphor"--whereby clauses stand for exchanges: Mother: You did your homework, didn't you? Child: No. Mother: You didn't do your homework? Did you do well? Child: No. Mother: You didn't do well? Child: No. Mother: You didn't do you homework so you didn't do well. Do the other students do well? Child: Some of them. Mother: Who does well? Do students who do not do their homework do well? And this of course explains why wh-items like "who" and 'why" have two functions--one inside a clause, where it expresses an intra-mental function (grammar) and one between them where it expresses an inter-mental function (discourse). I realize that grammatical metaphor will seem rather dry and abstract and unpoetic to people who assume that metaphor is only of the lexical kind. But to me, and I think to most children, it is far far more powerful and far more important developmentally. In some ways, it's the lexical metaphor that is responsible for the disenchantment of the child's world, while the grammatical metaphor infinitely expands it. (And here, I'm afraid, I must stop--it's time for breakfast and anyway my one screen is used up!) David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies ---***---***--- On 19 December 2014 at 15:15, Greg Thompson wrote: Helena and David, I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the so-called authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred tradition to Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi notion of "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including English) notion of "time" and how each of these languages offers different affordances of meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual understanding, English has a much more reified/objectified/entified sense of time. (btw, I think the first paragraph is easier to follow than the second - and in that first paragraph you'll find our old friend "imagination"). David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to? -greg Taken from: http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/mousesite/Secondary/Whorfframe2.html ["Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, sunset" are with us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from other nouns. They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in winter" just as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are pluralized and numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. Our thought about the referents of such words hence becomes objectified. Without objectification, it would be a subjective experience of real time, i.e. of the consciousness of "becoming later and later"--simply a cyclic phase similar to an earlier phase in that ever-later-becoming duration. Only by imagination can such a cyclic phase be set beside another and another in the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually perceived) configuration. "But such is the power of linguistic analogy that we do so objectify cyclic phasing. We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g., "phasing." And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting binomial formula of formless item plus form, is so general that it is implicit for all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless items like "substance, matter," by which we can fill out the binomial for an enormously wide range of nouns. But even these are not quite generalized enough to take in our phase nouns. So for the phase nouns we have made a formless item, "time." We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, in the pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" in the pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can say and think "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." Let me again point out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of milk" or "a piece of cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a summer" actually contains or consists of such-and-such a quantity of "time." In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., are not nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They are a formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, and even other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a locative pattern, like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It contains no morpheme like one of "in the house" or "at the tree." It means "when it is morning" or "while morning-phase is occurring." These "temporal s" are not used as subjects or objects, or at all like nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" or "summer is hot"; summer is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions are hot, WHEN heat occurs. One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or "summer recently." There is no objectification, as a region, an extent, a quantity, of the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested about time except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no basis here for a formless item answering to our "time." ] ---***---***--- On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Helena Worthen wrote: David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to this: "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to create sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific writing and thinking today." Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I lose you when you say "created to talk about gravity as an entity". Thank you, Helena Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com ---***---***--- On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote: As Helena points out, prepositions are from the "grammatical" end of what Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what Halliday calls "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they have three properties that words from the more "lexical" end do not have: a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You can, actually, but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you invent a new name or a new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can). b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific semantic field (the way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of linguistics) but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are used. c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the same effect, which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your argument" the "in" has more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in "there's a fly in your tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in Henry's hands, refer to a book or even a footnote. Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties pretty much define the difference between learning and development, at least as I understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on functions indefinitely while development works by reorganizing the closed set of functions you already have into new systems. Learning is skill specific and local, while development is quite global in its implications. Learning is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new systems, while development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary (and forget it just as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes away. For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of blue that people call the sky") are simply metaphors from the non-productive end of the lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are crisp, concrete, and vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to create sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific writing and thinking today. For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical metaphor is the third great moment in child development (after the break into mother tongue and the break into disciplinary language in school work). Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" implies zero dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two ("on a line', 'on a plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because they are grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them with time: 'at a point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. Compare: "at Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very day), and "in Christmas' (season). David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies ---***---***--- On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen : Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial relationships from the concrete material world into the conceptual imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 common ones, and between 70 and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far as" -- this is according to https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm ). We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. Apparently, in English, they evolved from and did the job done by inflections in parent languages, examples being cases and tenses. But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection like the dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial relationships suggested by contemporary prepositions. I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about this. Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com ---***---***--- On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly embodied, proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to linguistics (For example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on ?lexicon?: nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, being part of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and Halliday see no clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, lexico-grammar. (Lo and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar, adding the ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings are great data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of that? In translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced? Henry On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the metaphorical use of prepositions like: - "there is some value IN your argument" - "I'd like to go OVER that again" - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" - "Let's go THROUGH that again" and so on. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ ---***---***--- larry smolucha wrote: Message from Francine Smolucha: Forgive me for replying to myself - In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic possibilities: In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in Thought and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into English 1962] Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' value of the two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech vocalization). He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that are flammable gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor a gas. [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century European Developmental Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' hence the Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of Piaget's Genetic Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and synthesis based on metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in Vygotsky's example of H2O. ---***---***--- From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination Message from Francine Smolucha: Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic and produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts. It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more than the recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can ever be imagined" (David Kellogg's most recent email.) A couple things to consider: (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination as the brain has to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the simplest level of the Gestalt Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just photographic. (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try to accurately reproduce the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, the goal of combinatory imagination is to create something new out of memories, dreams, musings, and even sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of objects and symbols. (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways that things and concepts can be combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar and f I can add water and it dissolves a bit But adding heat changes the combination into a pancake. [Is this synergistic?] Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more examples to put the discussion in the metaphysical realm. ---***---***--- Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the case for Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I think it's not just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are associationists who are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary associationism exists and some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. Vygotsky has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, explain the uniqueness of our species? Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels for its own kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a Piagetian perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian one--true maturity as a species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more to it than that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of primate, and our solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon rocks in order to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged the same way as any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. Making the case for the higher psychological functions and for language is not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human exceptionalism. It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for the vanguard role of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, prolonging childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after the sick and the elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial organs (tools) and even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for our species, it is in the societies and the sectors of society where these "circuitous, compensatory means of development" are most advanced that lead our development as a species. The wretched of the earth always been short on rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for material culture generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: verily, here the first shall be last and the last shall be first. I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of attention is simply the logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says there are only two kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So imagination is nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, and nothing really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when you hear the name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there to be able to imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work in word meaning. You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who was given a crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been mixed with silver by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold. Well, we now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not possible to measure the differences in water displacement that precisely. The method that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the "principal of buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes palimpsest, a velum on which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. Because parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and written over every century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, the pressure of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones when the old text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only known Greek copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their relationship to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they are related to each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite similar to the way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies ---***---***--- On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD < hshonerd@gmail.com wrote: I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an associationist, ?sees imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? Henry ---***---***--- On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg < dkellogg60@gmail.com > wrote: On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the division between higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, because Ribot is an associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal form of attention. And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the transition from forest to farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division between the two great periods of semio-history: the literal and commonsensical world of the forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly prosaic uses in life and death struggles for existence, and the much more "imaginative" (that is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world of the farm,where written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long winter months are wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to encounter talking animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here attention has to be more voluntary. Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a very clear understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that underpins Ribot here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky points out the LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive practices really are the true source of volitional attention and thus of imagination, there isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between human and animal imagination, because of course animals are perfectly capable of volitional attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). Without a theory of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis for Ribot's distinction between higher and lower psychological functions at all. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies ---***---***--- On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole wrote: Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of imagination, thanks to all for the food for thought. Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very influential around the time emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I had seen work on memory before, but not imagination. Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective equal reproductive? Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies of development of imagination to these various categories --- The cost of being a relative newcomer to the topic. mike ---***---***--- On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < hshonerd@gmail.com > wrote: Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my bucket list. This business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings from some weeks in our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct that segmented the last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. Puns, according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) Henry ---***---***--- On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole < mcole@ucsd.edu > wrote: Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant and they are doing contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his followers as an inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by Hegel, so its of course interesting to see those additional categories emerge. 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in translation, seems awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" in this passage, for example, is not a currently used term in counter distinction to "memory." Normal problems. There are serious problems in contemporary discourse across languages as our explorations with out Russian colleagues have illustrated. That said, I feel as if I am learning something from theorists who clearly influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was still possible to include culture in it. Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, interestingly links imagination to both movement and the meaning of a "voluntary" act. Parts of it are offputting, primitives thinking like children stuff that was also "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts of creativity and imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to see that the two concepts are linked. Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found himself writing. mike Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which pretty old approaches to a pesum ---***---***--- On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < ablunden@mira.net wrote >: I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, but it may be worth noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent place to Imagination in the section on Representation, mediating between Recollection and Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive Imagination, (2) Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, which he says leads to the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In other words, the transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is accomplished through these three grades of Imagination. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ ---***---***--- mike cole wrote: Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson and Williams. Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose work i am trying to mine for empirical strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of productive imagination. The Russians write that productive imagination develops. At first I thought that the use of productive implies that there must be a kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. But I learned that instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears and is linked to memory. So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part of anticipation and memory. Imagine that! mike ---***---***--- On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < hshonerd@gmail.com>: Strawson provides a long view historically on imagination (starting with Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous look, and provides a space for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural as fixed. This, coupled with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me a ground to take part in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start with preconceptions: Vera on creative collaboration and the cognitive grammarian Langacker on symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive domains, particularly the temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is full of imagination and creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects of temporality: sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic structure), which I think must both figure in imagination and creativity, for both individual and distributed construals of cognition and feeling. Henry ---***---***--- On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < lpscholar2@gmail.com> wrote: Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. I too see the affinities with notions of the third *space* and the analogy to *gap-filling* I am on holiday so limited access to internet. However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and his notion of "structures of feeling" that David K references. This notion is explored under the notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* of modalities that hang together. This notion suggests there is a form of knowing that is forming but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" [perceived??] if we think imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as *style* Larry ---***---***--- On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, HENRY SHONERD < hshonerd@gmail.com> wrote: Mike and Larry, I promise to read your profer, but just want to say how jazzed up I am now about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the mind as Larry construes it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually various triads, finally found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my notebooks of the mind, as Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, luega pa? fuera. Fractally yours, Henry ---***---***--- On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole < mcole@ucsd.edu wrote: For those interested in the imagination thread, attached are two articles by philosophers who have worried about the issue. My current interest stems from the work of CHAT theorists like Zaporozhets and his students who studied the development of imagination in a manner that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of productive imagination. I am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no intention of doing so. But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated in the attached texts. Through reading the Russians and then these philosophers, I came upon the idea that perception and imagination are very closely linked at several levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, Ettienne and I argued in our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a means of access to the work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. Moreover, such views emphasize the future orientation of the perception/imagination process. I believe that these views have direct relevance to Kris's paper to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak to concerns about the role of different forms of symbolic play in development. So here are the papers on the imagination thread. Perhaps they will prove useful for those interested. mike [Imagination and Perception by P.F. Strawson.pdf] From dkirsh@lsu.edu Sun Dec 21 22:46:46 2014 From: dkirsh@lsu.edu (David H Kirshner) Date: Mon, 22 Dec 2014 06:46:46 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors / Speaking of AAE Message-ID: Greg, I disagree with you that Orr could/should have taken a more culturally sensitive approach to her studies of AAE speakers' difficulties in classrooms dominated by standard English instruction. But I in no wise intended to imply your wishing she had done so places you among cast of characters who condemned her work as racist. I'm very sorry if my words suggested otherwise. David -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson Sent: Sunday, December 21, 2014 9:36 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors In the interests of following the recently suggested injunction not to directly address specific interlocutors, I'll talk in generalities (This makes it a bit more challenging to have a conversation but it also makes one think about the extractable and generalizable point that is beyond the immediate context). In my previous post (apologies for drawing on prior context), I neither suggested nor intended to imply that Orr's work is racist (do intentions matter when it comes to meaning?). This speaks to some of the difficulties of talking about issues of race. And in this connection let's not forget the fact that this list-serve is dominated by white men - that doesn't mean that we are necessarily racist but it does mean that we are likely to be ignorant of many aspects of these issues. Nonetheless, I believe that we can overcome our ignorance through education, by learning more about the issues - even when it comes to trying to understand cultures and languages that we did not grow up with. And while I think that there is good evidence for the linguistic relativity hypothesis, I do not believe that language is a determining influence in ALL thinking (Whorf uses the term "habitual" to describe the type of thinking that is most susceptible to the influence of language). That means that even if you don't speak AAE, you can still study it and even come to understand how the grammatical forms lend themselves to particular ways of understanding the world (this is what linguistic anthropology is all about!). And this is my concern with Orr's work. With all academic work, I think it is worth considering questions like "How would racists take up our research?" In the case of Orr's work, my sense is that racists could easily take up her research to argue (perhaps even by using the linguistic relativity hypothesis) that AAE speakers are unable to do complex mathematical thinking. This is why I would think that it is important to give a positive articulation of what AAE does as a language. It is certainly important to understand what it CAN'T do (e.g., help one learn math in a particular way), but it is equally important to understand what it CAN do. As Paul points out, Labov has done some of the work addressing this. But note that Labov's work was done 40 years ago and no one has sought to replicate or do any kind of similar work. What gives? -greg -greg On Sat, Dec 20, 2014 at 11:37 PM, David H Kirshner wrote: > Greg, > > I'm delighted that you're familiar with and appreciative of Orr's work. > > Cleary she didn't provide "serious consideration of how AAE speakers > actually use prepositions"--she couldn't have, as she was not a native > speaker of Black English dialect, and she was not a linguist. But I'm not > sure how paying serious attention to technical nuances of Black English > grammar would have helped, as her analyses show that the African American > students in her classes were not speaking either standard English or Black > English Vernacular, but rather a hybrid that arises from their efforts to > emulate standard English. > > Now, it's true her work didn't parallel the approach Gay and Cole took to > understanding what other psychologists were classifying as linguistic and > cognitive deficits by carefully studying the native language and culture. > On the other hand, she did something Gay and Cole didn't do, namely > micro-analyze the linguistic miscues operating in the classroom, and the > resultant dilemmas of comprehension this created for her African American > students. > > As the excerpt copied below illustrates, Orr was scrupulously attentive to > understanding her students' experience of distance and location given the > different linguistic setting. And her analyses consistently point to the > mismatch between the native dialect and the language of instruction as the > source of the problems, not the native dialect, itself. To label this work > as implicitly racist, I think cedes too much to those who mistrust science > as a tool of the oppressor, and whose only locus of attention is the > history and legacy of social injustice. Even now, in this discussion, we > are missing the point. The major significance of Orr's work is not that > differences in grammatical structure have semantic implications. This is > merely a window to the dramatic realization that semantics are written into > grammatical form. > > David > > Excerpt from Orr (1987): > > "Jane gives us in these diagrams a glimpse into the kinds of mental images > she constructs when she is using the single symbol length, representing > both location and distance, as a tool with which to think. Even the > diagrams Jane drew for problems 13 and 14 begin to be less incomprehensible > if one attempts to construct in one's own mind images of the information > given in these problems, while adhering to the requirement that length be > used to represent both location and distance. They can be seen as possible > consequents or extensions of the symbol length when it is used to represent > both location and distance. Consider, for instance, the mental images one > might construct in responding to problem 13: Two cities, both represented > by line segments, are equal distances (that is, equal line segments) closer > to a third city (another line segment) than two other cities (line > segments) are. The first two cities must be represented by equal line > segments because they are equal distances closer to the third city than the > other two cities are. And these other two cities must also be represented > by equal line segments because they are equal distances from the third > city. One can see that Jane's diagrams are not as lacking in reason as they > may initially have appeared to be. > > "Jane's diagrams suggest the possibility that when words, or symbols are > used as instruments with which to think, the use in one language of a > single symbol in contexts where a second language requires two or more can > lead a speaker of the first language to arrive at a different mental > construct of some given information from that arrived at by a speaker of > the second language. Or, as in Jane's attempt to handle problem 14, the > result may be an inability to arrive at a workable mental construct at > all." (p. 25) > > [Note, this excerpt is part of a longer segment I emailed on Dec. 19 that > shows Jane's diagrams that Orr is referring to.] > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson > Sent: Saturday, December 20, 2014 3:14 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors > > The issues that are raised by Orr are indeed important ones. I am a fan of > her work as it points to important differences in language usage among AAE > speakers. I agree that she shouldn't have been condemned for pointing out > these differences (particularly considering how important it is for > teachers to understand the consequences of these differences). If you want > to help AAE speaking students do better on standardized tests, then you > absolutely need to pay attention to these differences. > > My one concern here is that I do feel like there is a problem of deficit > thinking that is at least implied in her work (and maybe "implied" is too > strong a term - maybe it's just that she doesn't provide evidence to > discourage us from this view). What we don't see in this book is any > serious consideration of how AAE speakers actually use prepositions - e.g., > the ways of using language that exist in the community of AAE speakers. > This gives Orr's work a feel somewhat like the studies of math among the > Kpelle studied by Gay and Cole in the pre-early days of LCHC (see wiki for > more: http://lchcfestschrift.wikispaces.com/Chapter+1). Before they > showed > up on the scene, everyone had assumed that the Kpelle (Liberia) couldn't > comprehend basic math concepts b.c. they weren't learning it in the ways > that it was being taught (and perhaps there were even linguistic relativity > arguments that pointed to this). Rather then continuing to pluck these > folks out of context and run them through various types of experiments, Gay > and Cole "explicitly began with the assumption that ?we must know more > about the indigenous mathematics so that we can build effective bridges to > the new mathematics that we are trying to introduce?" > >From their research, they found that the Kpelle actually had high > competence with complex mathematical problems (e.g., estimating volumes). > As they write: > "Overall, the data suggested that no generalized lack of mathematical, > perceptual, or problem solving abilities stood in the way of mathematics > education. When the materials and procedures used in assessment tasks were > designed to match closely valued local practices, lack of ability could be > replaced by apparent special ability. At the same time, schooling did > appear to influence performance in tasks that were routinely used to > measure cognitive development." > So I think I would be more comfortable with Orr's work if she were to have > included this kind of rich understanding of usage in context and how > prepositions actually are used among AAE speakers. > > This points to a larger question that might be irksome to some folks, but > the question regards the extent to which mathematical language is > predicated upon a particular form of what Whorf called "Standard Average > European." In short, the idea here is that Math has a history and a > culture. This doesn't mean that it is useless or a waste of time, just that > it is a particular way of encountering the world that is good for > particular things and not for others. > > I think we've gone round this mulberry bush before, but that was just more > grist for the mill (I prefer my metaphors mixed!). > > -greg > > > > > > On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 8:46 PM, David H Kirshner dkirsh@lsu.edu>> wrote: > > > > The topic of how grammatical form relates to meaning calls to mind the > > groundbreaking work of Eleanor Orr--whom you've probably never heard of > on > > account of the fact that her work was condemned by a politically-correct > > faction of race-conscious sociolinguists who decided her analysis of > Black > > English Vernacular could too easily be appropriated into racist > discourses > > about language deficiency. > > > > Orr was a Washington DC area teacher and principal in the 1970s and > 1980s, > > who traced math difficulties of her African American students to subtle > > grammatical differences between Black English dialect and standard > English. > > Her 1987 book goes into compelling detail to support the thesis that the > > meaning structure of basic mathematical terms is embedded in the > > grammatical setting in which those terms are expressed. For instance, the > > meaning of ?distance? is embedded in the grammatical structure ?distance > > from _________ to __________? where the place-holders hold locations; if > > you don?t have that grammatical structure, and you're in a linguistic > > environment in which that structure is assumed, you're likely not going > to > > be able to gain full access to the concept. > > > > The attached excerpts from her book--ignore the Forward, unless you'd > like > > some context--reveal some of her students' bizarre conceptions of > distance > > (and other basic mathematical concepts) as revealed in their diagrams. > Her > > approach involves linguistic analysis of sentences produced by her > African > > American students that she reads as collapsed versions of standard > English > > sentences, with differences in prepositional structure being highlighted > > (but other grammatical elements also are indicated). > > > > This work cuts against the grain of anything going on in mathematics > > education. The Piagetian view that dominates that field holds that basic > > concepts come about from reflection on our actions in our engagement with > > the material world. When language enters the conversation, it's with > > respect to semantic structure; to my knowledge, nobody's ever implicated > > syntax directly in basic quantitative understanding. > > > > This work is particularly interesting to me in connection with my > > 21-year-old son who is autistic, and whose grammatical function is > severely > > impaired. He has a decent vocabulary, but unless the setting for the > > conversation provides contextual clues, he can't piece together how the > > semantic elements are linked to one another. It is only recently that it > > occurred to me his lack of a secure sense of basic quantitative terms > like > > ?more? and ?less? may be rooted in his grammatical incapacities. > > > > The XMCA discussion, thus far, has touched on grammar with respect to > > lexical items such as prepositions. But we've not yet tied that to the > > grammatical forms that embed those lexical items. I'm very curious as to > > whether that further connection can be made. > > > > David Kirshner > > > > Orr, E., W. (1987). Twice as less: Black English and the performance of > > black students in mathematics and science. New York: W. W. Norton & > Company. > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg > > Sent: Friday, December 19, 2014 3:06 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors > > > > Yes, Haliday is essentially a Whorfian, and that's one of things that > > brings him close to Vygotsky. (Compare, for example, Chomsky, who is > > essentially anti-developmental in his ideas about language, and who now > > rejects the leading role played by social communication and says that > > communication is epiphenomenal to language, whose original purpose is > > thought.) For Sapir, and for Whorf, in the beginning of every major > > onotogenetic, sociogenetic, and even phylogenetic change in language > there > > has to be some change in the nature of communication. > > > > So what Andy says about the lack of the basis of modern science in Hopi > > applies perfectly well to English. When we read the scientific writings > of > > Chaucer on the astrolabe, for example, we do not see words like > > "reflection", "refraction" or "alignment". Chaucer uses words like > "bounce > > off", "bend through", and "line up" (note the use of prepositions, > > Helena!). Where did these words come from, and how did they make > scientific > > English possible? > > > > Most of us have no problem saying that Isaac Newton discovered the laws > of > > gravitation. But it's only a slight exaggeration to say that what he > really > > discovered was the meaning potential of words like "gravitation". Gravity > > is, of course, not a thing at all; that is, it's not an entity, but > rather > > a process, the process of falling down, or falling in (preps, again!). So > > how and above all why does it become an entity? > > > > It's interesting to compare Newton's writings on optics with Chaucer's on > > the astrolabe. The "Opticks" has a fixed format that we recognize almost > > instantly today: Newton describes his equipment (the prism and the dark > > room); he then narrates his method as a kind of recipe ("First, I did > this; > > then I did that") and draws conclusions, which he then formulates in > > mathematical terms (this is essentially the format of Vygotsky's lectures > > on pedology, so much so that when translating them we had some trouble > > determining the precise moment when Vygotsky turns to the blackboard to > > write his conclusion in the form of a law). > > > > In order to get them into mathematical shape, though, he has to make > > sentences that look a lot like equations. "The plumpness of the lens > yields > > a greater refraction of the light", "The reflection of the light from the > > glass results of the light striking the flatness of the glass" "The > > curvature of the spectacle glass supplies the lacking plumpness of the > > eye". In each of these, a quality or a process which would normally be > > realized as an adjective or a verb is suddenly realized by a noun, > creating > > an imaginary entity. > > > > That's grammatical metaphor. Something that is "canonically" realized by > a > > verb ("to grow") is suddenly realized nominally ("growth"), or something > > that is canonically a quality ('red") is realized verbally ("redden"). We > > even find related clauses realized as verbs ("She did not know the rules. > > So she died" is realized by "Death was brought about through ignorance", > > all of these examples from Halliday). In fact, the Genetic Law that > > Vygotsky formulates in "Mind in Society" ("Every higher mental function > is > > realized on two planes....") is really just one instance of grammatical > > metaphor. > > > > One of Chomsky's best known arguments for the radical innateness > > hypothesis is this. If I take a sentence like "Students who do not do > their > > homework do not do well" and I want to make a question, how do I know > which > > "do" to move to the front? Chomsky assumes that this knowledge is > > essentially innate; it is part of universal grammar. But you can see that > > "Do students who do not do their homework do well?" can be built up > through > > a process of what we might call "discourse metaphor"--whereby clauses > stand > > for > > exchanges: > > > > Mother: You did your homework, didn't you? > > Child: No. > > Mother: You didn't do your homework? Did you do well? > > Child: No. > > Mother: You didn't do well? > > Child: No. > > Mother: You didn't do you homework so you didn't do well. Do the other > > students do well? > > Child: Some of them. > > Mother: Who does well? Do students who do not do their homework do well? > > > > And this of course explains why wh-items like "who" and 'why" have two > > functions--one inside a clause, where it expresses an intra-mental > function > > (grammar) and one between them where it expresses an inter-mental > function > > (discourse). > > > > I realize that grammatical metaphor will seem rather dry and abstract and > > unpoetic to people who assume that metaphor is only of the lexical kind. > > But to me, and I think to most children, it is far far more powerful and > > far more important developmentally. In some ways, it's the lexical > metaphor > > that is responsible for the disenchantment of the child's world, while > the > > grammatical metaphor infinitely expands it. (And here, I'm afraid, I must > > stop--it's time for breakfast and anyway my one screen is used up!) > > > > David Kellogg > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > , or "the > > > > . He > > > > On 19 December 2014 at 15:15, Greg Thompson > > > wrote: > > > > > Helena and David, > > > I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the so-called > > > authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred tradition > > > to > > > Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi notion > > > of "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including English) > > > notion of "time" and how each of these languages offers different > > > affordances of meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual > > > understanding, English has a much more reified/objectified/entified > > > sense of time. (btw, I think the first paragraph is easier to follow > > > than the second - and in that first paragraph you'll find our old > friend > > "imagination"). > > > David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to? > > > -greg > > > > > > Taken from: > > > > > > http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/mousesite/Second > > > ary/Whorfframe2.html > > > > > > " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, sunset" are > > > with us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from other > > nouns. > > > They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in winter" > > > just as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are pluralized > > > and numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. Our > > > thought about the referents of such words hence becomes objectified. > > > Without objectification, it would be a subjective experience of real > > > time, i.e. of the consciousness of "becoming later and later"--simply > > > a cyclic phase similar to an earlier phase in that ever-later-becoming > > > duration. Only by imagination can such a cyclic phase be set beside > > > another and another in the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually > > > perceived) configuration. "But such is the power of linguistic analogy > > that we do so objectify cyclic phasing. > > > We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g., > > "phasing." > > > And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting > > > binomial formula of formless item plus form, is so general that it is > > > implicit for all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless items > > > like "substance, matter," by which we can fill out the binomial for an > > > enormously wide range of nouns. But even these are not quite > > > generalized enough to take in our phase nouns. So for the phase nouns > we > > have made a formless item, "time." > > > We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, in the > > > pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" in > > > the pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can say > > > and think "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." Let me > > > again point out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of milk" > > > or "a piece of cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a > > > summer" actually contains or consists of such-and-such a quantity of > > "time." > > > > > > In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., are not > > > nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They are a > > > formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, and > > > even other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a > > > locative pattern, like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It contains > > > no morpheme like one of "in the house" or "at the tree." It means > > > "when it is morning" or "while morning-phase is occurring." These > > > "temporal s" are not used as subjects or objects, or at all like > > > nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" or "summer is hot"; summer > > > is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions are hot, WHEN heat occurs. > > > One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or "summer recently." > > > There is no objectification, as a region, an extent, a quantity, of > > > the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested about time > > > except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no basis > > here for a formless item answering to our "time." " > > > > > > > > > > > > On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Helena Worthen > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to this: > > > > > > > > "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton > > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to create > > > > sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly > > > > productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific > > > > writing and thinking today." > > > > > > > > Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I lose you > > > > when > > > you > > > > say "created to talk about gravity as an entity". > > > > > > > > Thank you, > > > > > > > > Helena > > > > > > > > > > > > Helena Worthen > > > > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > > > > > > On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > > > > > > As Helena points out, prepositions are from the "grammatical" end > > > > > of > > > what > > > > > Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what > > > > > Halliday > > > calls > > > > > "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they have > > > > > three properties that words from the more "lexical" end do not > have: > > > > > > > > > > a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You can, > > > > actually, > > > > > but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you invent a new > > > > > name > > > > or a > > > > > new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can). > > > > > > > > > > b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific semantic > > > > > field > > > > (the > > > > > way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of > > > linguistics) > > > > > but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are used. > > > > > > > > > > c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the same > > > effect, > > > > > which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your argument" the > "in" > > > has > > > > > more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in "there's a fly > > > > > in > > > your > > > > > tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in Henry's > > > > > hands, > > > > refer > > > > > to a book or even a footnote. > > > > > > > > > > Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties pretty > > > > > much define the difference between learning and development, at > > > > > least as I understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on > > > > > functions indefinitely while development works by reorganizing the > > > > > closed set of functions you already have into new systems. > > > > > Learning is skill specific and local, while development is quite > > global in its implications. > > > > Learning > > > > > is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new systems, > > > > > while development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary (and > > > > > forget it > > > just > > > > > as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes away. > > > > > > > > > > For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of blue > > > > > that > > > > people > > > > > call the sky") are simply metaphors from the non-productive end of > > > > > the lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are crisp, > > > > > concrete, and vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the > > > > > nominalizations that > > > Newton > > > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to > > > > > create sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly > > > > > productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific > > > > > writing and > > > thinking > > > > > today. For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical metaphor is the > > > third > > > > > great moment in child development (after the break into mother > > > > > tongue > > > and > > > > > the break into disciplinary language in school work). > > > > > > > > > > Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" implies > > > > > zero dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two ("on a > > > > > line', 'on a > > > > > plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because they are > > > > > grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them with time: > > > > > 'at > > > a > > > > > point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. Compare: "at > > > > > Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very day), and > > > > > "in Christmas' (season). > > > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > > > On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen > > > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > >> > > > > >> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial > > > > >> relationships from the concrete material world into the > > > > >> conceptual imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 common > > > > >> ones, and > > > > between 70 > > > > >> and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far as" > > > > >> -- > > > > this > > > > >> is according to > > > > >> https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm > > > ). > > > > >> We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. Apparently, > > > > >> in English, they evolved from and did the job done by inflections > > > > >> in > > > parent > > > > >> languages, examples being cases and tenses. > > > > >> > > > > >> But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection > > > > >> like the dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial > > > > >> relationships > > > > suggested > > > > >> by contemporary prepositions. > > > > >> > > > > >> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about this. > > > > >> > > > > >> Helena Worthen > > > > >> helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > > >> > > > > >> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > > > >> > > > > >>> I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly > > > embodied, > > > > >> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to > > > > >> linguistics > > > > (For > > > > >> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on > > > ?lexicon?: > > > > >> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, > > > > >> being > > > > part > > > > >> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and > > > > >> Halliday > > > > see no > > > > >> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, > > lexico-grammar. > > > > (Lo > > > > >> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar, > > > > >> adding > > > > the > > > > >> ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings are > > > great > > > > >> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of > > > > >> that? In translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced? > > > > >>> Henry > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden > > > > wrote: > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the > > > metaphorical > > > > >> use of prepositions like: > > > > >>>> - "there is some value IN your argument" > > > > >>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again" > > > > >>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" > > > > >>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again" > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> and so on. > > > > >>>> Andy > > > > >>>> > > > > -------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > ---- > > > > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > > > > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> larry smolucha wrote: > > > > >>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself - > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic > > > > possibilities: > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in > > > > Thought > > > > >>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into > > > English > > > > >> 1962] > > > > >>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' > > > value > > > > >> of the > > > > >>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech > > > > vocalization). > > > > >>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that > > > > >>>>> are > > > > >> flammable > > > > >>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor > > > > >>>>> a > > > gas. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century > > > > >>>>> European > > > > >> Developmental > > > > >>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' > > > > >>>>> hence > > > > the > > > > >>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of > > > Piaget's > > > > >> Genetic > > > > >>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and > > > > >>>>> synthesis > > > > >> based on > > > > >>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in > > > > >>>>> Vygotsky's > > > > >> example of H2O. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com > > > > >>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > >>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 > > > > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic > > > > >>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the > > parts. > > > > >>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more > > > > >>>>>> than > > > the > > > > >>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can > > > > >>>>>> ever > > > be > > > > >> imagined" > > > > >>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> A couple things to consider: > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination > > > > >>>>>> as the > > > > >> brain has > > > > >>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the > > > > >>>>>> simplest > > > level > > > > >> of the Gestalt > > > > >>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). > > > > >>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just > > > photographic. > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try > > > > >>>>>> to > > > > >> accurately reproduce > > > > >>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, > > > > >>>>>> the > > > > >> goal of combinatory > > > > >>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, > > > > >>>>>> dreams, > > > > >> musings, and even > > > > >>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of > > > objects > > > > >> and symbols. > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways > > > > >>>>>> that > > > > >> things and concepts can be > > > > >>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar > > > > >>>>>> and > > > > flour. > > > > >>>>>> I can add water and > > > > >>>>>> it > > > > >> dissolves a bit > > > > >>>>>> But adding heat > > > > >>>>>> changes > > > the > > > > >> combination into a pancake. > > > > >>>>>> [Is this synergistic?] > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more > > > > >>>>>> examples > > > > >> to put the discussion > > > > >>>>>> in the metaphysical realm. > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 > > > > >>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > > >>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the > > > > >>>>>>> case > > > > for > > > > >>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I > > > > >>>>>>> think > > > it's > > > > >> not > > > > >>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are > > > > >> associationists who > > > > >>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary > > > > >>>>>>> associationism > > > > >> exists and > > > > >>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as > mediation. > > > > >> Vygotsky > > > > >>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, > > > explain > > > > >> the > > > > >>>>>>> uniqueness of our species? > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels > > > > >>>>>>> for > > > its > > > > >> own > > > > >>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a > > > > >>>>>>> Piagetian perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian > > > > >>>>>>> one--true maturity > > > > as a > > > > >>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more > > > > >>>>>>> to it > > > > >> than > > > > >>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of > > > > >>>>>>> primate, > > > > and > > > > >> our > > > > >>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon > > > > >>>>>>> rocks > > > > in > > > > >> order > > > > >>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged > > > > >>>>>>> the > > > same > > > > >> way as > > > > >>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and > > > > >>>>>>> for > > > > >> language is > > > > >>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human > > > > >> exceptionalism. > > > > >>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for > > > > >>>>>>> the > > > > >> vanguard role > > > > >>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, > > > > prolonging > > > > >>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after > > > > >>>>>>> the > > > sick > > > > >> and the > > > > >>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial > > > > >>>>>>> organs > > > > >> (tools) and > > > > >>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for > > > > >>>>>>> our > > > > >> species, it > > > > >>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these > > > > >> "circuitous, > > > > >>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that > > > > >>>>>>> lead > > > our > > > > >>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always > > > > >>>>>>> been > > > > >> short on > > > > >>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for > > > > >>>>>>> material > > > > >> culture > > > > >>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: > > > > >> verily, here > > > > >>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of > > > > >>>>>>> attention is > > > > >> simply the > > > > >>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says > > > > >>>>>>> there are > > > > >> only two > > > > >>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So > > > > >> imagination is > > > > >>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, > > > > >>>>>>> and > > > > >> nothing > > > > >>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when > > > > >>>>>>> you > > > > hear > > > > >> the > > > > >>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there > > > > >>>>>>> to be > > > > >> able to > > > > >>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work > > > > >>>>>>> in > > > word > > > > >> meaning. > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who > > > > >>>>>>> was > > > > given > > > > >> a > > > > >>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been > > > > >>>>>>> mixed > > > with > > > > >> silver > > > > >>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of > > gold. > > > > >> Well, we > > > > >>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not > > > possible > > > > to > > > > >>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that > > > > >>>>>>> precisely. The > > > > >> method > > > > >>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the > > > > >>>>>>> "principal > > > of > > > > >>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes > > > > >>>>>>> palimpsest, a > > > > >> velum on > > > > >>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. > > > > Because > > > > >>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and > > > > >>>>>>> written > > > over > > > > >> every > > > > >>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, > > > > >>>>>>> the > > > > >> pressure > > > > >>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones > > > > >>>>>>> when > > > > the > > > > >> old > > > > >>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only > > > known > > > > >> Greek > > > > >>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their > > > > >> relationship > > > > >>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they > > > > >>>>>>> are > > > > >> related to > > > > >>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite > > > > similar > > > > >> to the > > > > >>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> David Kellogg > > > > >>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >> wrote: > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an > > > > associationist, > > > > >> ?sees > > > > >>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? > > > > >>>>>>>> Henry > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg < > > > dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > > > > > > > >> wrote: > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the > > > > >>>>>>>>> division > > > > >> between > > > > >>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, > > > > >>>>>>>>> because > > > > >> Ribot is > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> an > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal > > > > >>>>>>>>> form of > > > > >> attention. > > > > >>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the > > > > >>>>>>>>> transition > > > from > > > > >> forest > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> to > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division > > > between > > > > >> the two > > > > >>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and > > > > >>>>>>>>> commonsensical > > > > >> world of > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> the > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly > > > > >>>>>>>>> prosaic > > > uses > > > > >> in life > > > > >>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more > > > > "imaginative" > > > > >> (that > > > > >>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world > > > > >>>>>>>>> of the > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> farm,where > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long > > > > >>>>>>>>> winter > > > > >> months are > > > > >>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to > > > encounter > > > > >> talking > > > > >>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here > > > > >>>>>>>>> attention > > > > has > > > > >> to be > > > > >>>>>>>>> more voluntary. > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a > > > > >>>>>>>>> very > > > clear > > > > >>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that > > > > >> underpins > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> Ribot > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky > > > > >>>>>>>>> points > > > > out > > > > >> the > > > > >>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive > > > > >>>>>>>>> practices > > > > >> really > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> are > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of > > > imagination, > > > > >> there > > > > >>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between > > > > >>>>>>>>> human > > > > and > > > > >> animal > > > > >>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly > > > > >>>>>>>>> capable of > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> volitional > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). > > > > Without > > > > >> a > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> theory > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis > > > > >>>>>>>>> for > > > > Ribot's > > > > >>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological > > > > >>>>>>>>> functions at > > > > >> all. > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > > > > >>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole > > > > wrote: > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of > > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination, > > > > >> thanks to > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> all > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought. > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very > > > > >>>>>>>>>> influential > > > > >> around the > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> time > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I > > > > >>>>>>>>>> had > > > > >> seen work > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> on > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective > > > > >>>>>>>>>> equal > > > > >> reproductive? > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies > > > > >>>>>>>>>> of > > > > >> development > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> of > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of > > > > >>>>>>>>>> being > > > a > > > > >> relative > > > > >>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. > > > > >>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> bucket > > > list. > > > > >> This > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> from > > > some > > > > >> weeks > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> in > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > > >> segmented the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met > > aphorizing?. > > > > >> Puns, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > wrote: > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> and > > > they > > > > >> are > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> doing > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his > > > > >> followers as an > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel, so > > > > >> its of > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> course > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in > > > > >> translation, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> seems > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, > "recollection" > > > in > > > > >> this > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> passage, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter > > > > >> distinction to > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "memory." > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary > > > > >> discourse > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian > > > > >> colleagues have > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from > > > theorists > > > > >> who > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> clearly > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was > > > still > > > > >> possible > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> to > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, > > > > >> interestingly > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> links > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a > > > "voluntary" > > > > >> act. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Parts > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> stuff > > > > that > > > > >> was > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> also > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > >> creativity > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> and > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> see > > > > >> that the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> two > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found > > > himself > > > > >> writing. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> pretty > > > > old > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> approaches > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < > > > > >> ablunden@mira.net> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> but it > > > > >> may be > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> worth > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> place > > > to > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Imagination > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between > > > > >> Recollection and > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive > > > > >> Imagination, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> (2) > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> which > > > he > > > > >> says > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> leads > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> other > > > > >> words, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> the > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is > > > > >> accomplished > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> through > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >> > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > -- > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > >> Williams. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose > > > work i > > > > >> am > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> trying > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of > > > > >> productive > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive > > > imagination > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> develops. > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that > > > > >> there > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> must > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> be a > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> But > > > I > > > > >> learned > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > > > is > > > > >> linked > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> to > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > >> anticipation > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination > > > > >> (starting > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> look, and > > > > >> provides > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> a > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as > > > > fixed. > > > > >> This, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a > > > > ground > > > > >> to > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> take > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> part > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> preconceptions: > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> grammarian > > > > >> Langacker on > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> domains, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> particularly > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> full of > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> imagination > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > >> temporality: > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic > > > > >> structure), which > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> I > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> both > > > > >> individual > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < > > > > >> lpscholar2@gmail.com> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third > > > *space* > > > > >> and the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> his > > > > >> notion of > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is > > > > >> explored under > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > >> modalities > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of > > > knowing > > > > >> that is > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [perceived??] > > > if > > > > >> we > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> think > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *style* Larry On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> HENRY SHONERD < > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> say how > > > > >> jazzed up > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> I > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> am > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind > > > > as > > > > >> Larry > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> various > > > > >> triads, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> finally > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notebooks > > > > of > > > > >> the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> mind, as > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, > > > luega > > > > >> pa? > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> fuera. > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole < > > > mcole@ucsd.edu> > > > > >> wrote: > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, > > > attached > > > > >> are two > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT > > > > theorists > > > > >> like > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of > > > > >> imagination in a > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of > > > > >> productive > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no > > > > >> intention of > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> doing > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the > > > > >> attached > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these > > > philosophers, > > > > I > > > > >> came > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> upon > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> closely > > > > >> linked at > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> several > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, > > > > >> Ettienne and I > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a > > > means > > > > of > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> access > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander > > Suvorov. > > > > >> Moreover, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> such > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct > > > > relevance > > > > >> to > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Kris's > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to > > > > >> concerns > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> about > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in > > > development. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. > > > > Perhaps > > > > >> they > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> will > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural > > > > >> science > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with an > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> -- > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > > > science > > > > >> with an > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> -- > > > > >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > > > > >>>>>>>>>> science > > > > >> with an > > > > >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>> > > > > >>> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > Assistant Professor > > > Department of Anthropology > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > Brigham Young University > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From dkirsh@lsu.edu Sun Dec 21 23:14:39 2014 From: dkirsh@lsu.edu (David H Kirshner) Date: Mon, 22 Dec 2014 07:14:39 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors / Speakers of AAE Message-ID: Paul, When you get a chance, I'd be interested in learning more about your work on the "mismatch of linguistic structure and social class function," particularly, as to whether the linguistic structures you're engaged with are syntactic, versus semantic or pragmatic. My feeling is that the political dimensions into which Orr's work is read are keeping us from the more radical implication of her work that meanings of certain basic quantitative and mathematical terms (e.g., distance, location, more, and less) are written into the syntax of standard English. This contradicts what I take to be the Zeitgeist of thinking in this area (including of most XMCAers) which traces meaning to the social and cultural worlds and our intentional engagements therein. I don't think we're well equipped to entertain the syntactic thesis--especially, when it might involve tackling such challenging and troubling questions as the one Greg Thompson posed: "the extent to which mathematical language is predicated upon a particular form of what Whorf called 'Standard Average European'." David -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Dr. Paul C. Mocombe Sent: Sunday, December 21, 2014 6:13 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors I am on holiday and said I would give the group a break, but I could not resist... Orr ' s work parallels my own research and my theory of "a mismatch of linguistic structure and social class function" hypothesis as key to understanding the Black-White test score gap. ?The biggest responses to Orr's work were from the black middle class and white liberals, who wanted to focus on the opportunity gap as the basis for black academic underachievement. ?This negated the fact that test scores reveal there is a deficit among blacks in comprehending questions on standardized tests written in standard english. ?Arguing that there is a deficit is not the same as saying that AAE does not allow a black child to critically think as William Labov (1972) highlighted in his work, "Language in the inner-cities." ?The problem is when Orr and Labov were writing, AAE was not viewed as a distinct linguistic system. ?Labov ' s work, building on chomsky, changes that by highlighting the ability of speakers of AAE to grasp highly conceptual problems if addressed within the systemicity of AAE. ?The logical conclusion, as I see it, is not to jump to the conclusion that orr's research is/was racist, but to recognize AAE as a distinct linguistic system and treat black students from the inner-cities as ESOL (english speakers of other languages) students. Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: David H Kirshner
Date:12/21/2014 1:37 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors
Greg, I'm delighted that you're familiar with and appreciative of Orr's work. Cleary she didn't provide "serious consideration of how AAE speakers actually use prepositions"--she couldn't have, as she was not a native speaker of Black English dialect, and she was not a linguist. But I'm not sure how paying serious attention to technical nuances of Black English grammar would have helped, as her analyses show that the African American students in her classes were not speaking either standard English or Black English Vernacular, but rather a hybrid that arises from their efforts to emulate standard English. Now, it's true her work didn't parallel the approach Gay and Cole took to understanding what other psychologists were classifying as linguistic and cognitive deficits by carefully studying the native language and culture. On the other hand, she did something Gay and Cole didn't do, namely micro-analyze the linguistic miscues operating in the classroom, and the resultant dilemmas of comprehension this created for her African American students. As the excerpt copied below illustrates, Orr was scrupulously attentive to understanding her students' experience of distance and location given the different linguistic setting. And her analyses consistently point to the mismatch between the native dialect and the language of instruction as the source of the problems, not the native dialect, itself. To label this work as implicitly racist, I think cedes too much to those who mistrust science as a tool of the oppressor, and whose only locus of attention is the history and legacy of social injustice. Even now, in this discussion, we are missing the point. The major significance of Orr's work is not that differences in grammatical structure have semantic implications. This is merely a window to the dramatic realization that semantics are written into grammatical form. David Excerpt from Orr (1987): "Jane gives us in these diagrams a glimpse into the kinds of mental images she constructs when she is using the single symbol length, representing both location and distance, as a tool with which to think. Even the diagrams Jane drew for problems 13 and 14 begin to be less incomprehensible if one attempts to construct in one's own mind images of the information given in these problems, while adhering to the requirement that length be used to represent both location and distance. They can be seen as possible consequents or extensions of the symbol length when it is used to represent both location and distance. Consider, for instance, the mental images one might construct in responding to problem 13: Two cities, both represented by line segments, are equal distances (that is, equal line segments) closer to a third city (another line segment) than two other cities (line segments) are. The first two cities must be represented by equal line segments because they are equal distances closer to the third city than the other two cities are. And these other two cities must also be represented by equal line segments because they are equal distances from the third city. One can see that Jane's diagrams are not as lacking in reason as they may initially have appeared to be. "Jane's diagrams suggest the possibility that when words, or symbols are used as instruments with which to think, the use in one language of a single symbol in contexts where a second language requires two or more can lead a speaker of the first language to arrive at a different mental construct of some given information from that arrived at by a speaker of the second language. Or, as in Jane's attempt to handle problem 14, the result may be an inability to arrive at a workable mental construct at all." (p. 25) [Note, this excerpt is part of a longer segment I emailed on Dec. 19 that shows Jane's diagrams that Orr is referring to.] -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson Sent: Saturday, December 20, 2014 3:14 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors The issues that are raised by Orr are indeed important ones. I am a fan of her work as it points to important differences in language usage among AAE speakers. I agree that she shouldn't have been condemned for pointing out these differences (particularly considering how important it is for teachers to understand the consequences of these differences). If you want to help AAE speaking students do better on standardized tests, then you absolutely need to pay attention to these differences. My one concern here is that I do feel like there is a problem of deficit thinking that is at least implied in her work (and maybe "implied" is too strong a term - maybe it's just that she doesn't provide evidence to discourage us from this view). What we don't see in this book is any serious consideration of how AAE speakers actually use prepositions - e.g., the ways of using language that exist in the community of AAE speakers. This gives Orr's work a feel somewhat like the studies of math among the Kpelle studied by Gay and Cole in the pre-early days of LCHC (see wiki for more: http://lchcfestschrift.wikispaces.com/Chapter+1). Before they showed up on the scene, everyone had assumed that the Kpelle (Liberia) couldn't comprehend basic math concepts b.c. they weren't learning it in the ways that it was being taught (and perhaps there were even linguistic relativity arguments that pointed to this). Rather then continuing to pluck these folks out of context and run them through various types of experiments, Gay and Cole "explicitly began with the assumption that ?we must know more about the indigenous mathematics so that we can build effective bridges to the new mathematics that we are trying to introduce?" >From their research, they found that the Kpelle actually had high competence with complex mathematical problems (e.g., estimating volumes). As they write: "Overall, the data suggested that no generalized lack of mathematical, perceptual, or problem solving abilities stood in the way of mathematics education. When the materials and procedures used in assessment tasks were designed to match closely valued local practices, lack of ability could be replaced by apparent special ability. At the same time, schooling did appear to influence performance in tasks that were routinely used to measure cognitive development." So I think I would be more comfortable with Orr's work if she were to have included this kind of rich understanding of usage in context and how prepositions actually are used among AAE speakers. This points to a larger question that might be irksome to some folks, but the question regards the extent to which mathematical language is predicated upon a particular form of what Whorf called "Standard Average European." In short, the idea here is that Math has a history and a culture. This doesn't mean that it is useless or a waste of time, just that it is a particular way of encountering the world that is good for particular things and not for others. I think we've gone round this mulberry bush before, but that was just more grist for the mill (I prefer my metaphors mixed!). -greg On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 8:46 PM, David H Kirshner > wrote: > > The topic of how grammatical form relates to meaning calls to mind the > groundbreaking work of Eleanor Orr--whom you've probably never heard of on > account of the fact that her work was condemned by a politically-correct > faction of race-conscious sociolinguists who decided her analysis of Black > English Vernacular could too easily be appropriated into racist discourses > about language deficiency. > > Orr was a Washington DC area teacher and principal in the 1970s and 1980s, > who traced math difficulties of her African American students to subtle > grammatical differences between Black English dialect and standard English. > Her 1987 book goes into compelling detail to support the thesis that the > meaning structure of basic mathematical terms is embedded in the > grammatical setting in which those terms are expressed. For instance, the > meaning of ?distance? is embedded in the grammatical structure ?distance > from _________ to __________? where the place-holders hold locations; if > you don?t have that grammatical structure, and you're in a linguistic > environment in which that structure is assumed, you're likely not going to > be able to gain full access to the concept. > > The attached excerpts from her book--ignore the Forward, unless you'd like > some context--reveal some of her students' bizarre conceptions of distance > (and other basic mathematical concepts) as revealed in their diagrams. Her > approach involves linguistic analysis of sentences produced by her African > American students that she reads as collapsed versions of standard English > sentences, with differences in prepositional structure being highlighted > (but other grammatical elements also are indicated). > > This work cuts against the grain of anything going on in mathematics > education. The Piagetian view that dominates that field holds that basic > concepts come about from reflection on our actions in our engagement with > the material world. When language enters the conversation, it's with > respect to semantic structure; to my knowledge, nobody's ever implicated > syntax directly in basic quantitative understanding. > > This work is particularly interesting to me in connection with my > 21-year-old son who is autistic, and whose grammatical function is severely > impaired. He has a decent vocabulary, but unless the setting for the > conversation provides contextual clues, he can't piece together how the > semantic elements are linked to one another. It is only recently that it > occurred to me his lack of a secure sense of basic quantitative terms like > ?more? and ?less? may be rooted in his grammatical incapacities. > > The XMCA discussion, thus far, has touched on grammar with respect to > lexical items such as prepositions. But we've not yet tied that to the > grammatical forms that embed those lexical items. I'm very curious as to > whether that further connection can be made. > > David Kirshner > > Orr, E., W. (1987). Twice as less: Black English and the performance of > black students in mathematics and science. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg > Sent: Friday, December 19, 2014 3:06 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors > > Yes, Haliday is essentially a Whorfian, and that's one of things that > brings him close to Vygotsky. (Compare, for example, Chomsky, who is > essentially anti-developmental in his ideas about language, and who now > rejects the leading role played by social communication and says that > communication is epiphenomenal to language, whose original purpose is > thought.) For Sapir, and for Whorf, in the beginning of every major > onotogenetic, sociogenetic, and even phylogenetic change in language there > has to be some change in the nature of communication. > > So what Andy says about the lack of the basis of modern science in Hopi > applies perfectly well to English. When we read the scientific writings of > Chaucer on the astrolabe, for example, we do not see words like > "reflection", "refraction" or "alignment". Chaucer uses words like "bounce > off", "bend through", and "line up" (note the use of prepositions, > Helena!). Where did these words come from, and how did they make scientific > English possible? > > Most of us have no problem saying that Isaac Newton discovered the laws of > gravitation. But it's only a slight exaggeration to say that what he really > discovered was the meaning potential of words like "gravitation". Gravity > is, of course, not a thing at all; that is, it's not an entity, but rather > a process, the process of falling down, or falling in (preps, again!). So > how and above all why does it become an entity? > > It's interesting to compare Newton's writings on optics with Chaucer's on > the astrolabe. The "Opticks" has a fixed format that we recognize almost > instantly today: Newton describes his equipment (the prism and the dark > room); he then narrates his method as a kind of recipe ("First, I did this; > then I did that") and draws conclusions, which he then formulates in > mathematical terms (this is essentially the format of Vygotsky's lectures > on pedology, so much so that when translating them we had some trouble > determining the precise moment when Vygotsky turns to the blackboard to > write his conclusion in the form of a law). > > In order to get them into mathematical shape, though, he has to make > sentences that look a lot like equations. "The plumpness of the lens yields > a greater refraction of the light", "The reflection of the light from the > glass results of the light striking the flatness of the glass" "The > curvature of the spectacle glass supplies the lacking plumpness of the > eye". In each of these, a quality or a process which would normally be > realized as an adjective or a verb is suddenly realized by a noun, creating > an imaginary entity. > > That's grammatical metaphor. Something that is "canonically" realized by a > verb ("to grow") is suddenly realized nominally ("growth"), or something > that is canonically a quality ('red") is realized verbally ("redden"). We > even find related clauses realized as verbs ("She did not know the rules. > So she died" is realized by "Death was brought about through ignorance", > all of these examples from Halliday). In fact, the Genetic Law that > Vygotsky formulates in "Mind in Society" ("Every higher mental function is > realized on two planes....") is really just one instance of grammatical > metaphor. > > One of Chomsky's best known arguments for the radical innateness > hypothesis is this. If I take a sentence like "Students who do not do their > homework do not do well" and I want to make a question, how do I know which > "do" to move to the front? Chomsky assumes that this knowledge is > essentially innate; it is part of universal grammar. But you can see that > "Do students who do not do their homework do well?" can be built up through > a process of what we might call "discourse metaphor"--whereby clauses stand > for > exchanges: > > Mother: You did your homework, didn't you? > Child: No. > Mother: You didn't do your homework? Did you do well? > Child: No. > Mother: You didn't do well? > Child: No. > Mother: You didn't do you homework so you didn't do well. Do the other > students do well? > Child: Some of them. > Mother: Who does well? Do students who do not do their homework do well? > > And this of course explains why wh-items like "who" and 'why" have two > functions--one inside a clause, where it expresses an intra-mental function > (grammar) and one between them where it expresses an inter-mental function > (discourse). > > I realize that grammatical metaphor will seem rather dry and abstract and > unpoetic to people who assume that metaphor is only of the lexical kind. > But to me, and I think to most children, it is far far more powerful and > far more important developmentally. In some ways, it's the lexical metaphor > that is responsible for the disenchantment of the child's world, while the > grammatical metaphor infinitely expands it. (And here, I'm afraid, I must > stop--it's time for breakfast and anyway my one screen is used up!) > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > , or "the > > . He > > On 19 December 2014 at 15:15, Greg Thompson > > wrote: > > > Helena and David, > > I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the so-called > > authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred tradition > > to > > Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi notion > > of "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including English) > > notion of "time" and how each of these languages offers different > > affordances of meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual > > understanding, English has a much more reified/objectified/entified > > sense of time. (btw, I think the first paragraph is easier to follow > > than the second - and in that first paragraph you'll find our old friend > "imagination"). > > David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to? > > -greg > > > > Taken from: > > > > http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/mousesite/Second > > ary/Whorfframe2.html > > > > " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, sunset" are > > with us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from other > nouns. > > They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in winter" > > just as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are pluralized > > and numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. Our > > thought about the referents of such words hence becomes objectified. > > Without objectification, it would be a subjective experience of real > > time, i.e. of the consciousness of "becoming later and later"--simply > > a cyclic phase similar to an earlier phase in that ever-later-becoming > > duration. Only by imagination can such a cyclic phase be set beside > > another and another in the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually > > perceived) configuration. "But such is the power of linguistic analogy > that we do so objectify cyclic phasing. > > We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g., > "phasing." > > And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting > > binomial formula of formless item plus form, is so general that it is > > implicit for all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless items > > like "substance, matter," by which we can fill out the binomial for an > > enormously wide range of nouns. But even these are not quite > > generalized enough to take in our phase nouns. So for the phase nouns we > have made a formless item, "time." > > We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, in the > > pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" in > > the pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can say > > and think "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." Let me > > again point out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of milk" > > or "a piece of cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a > > summer" actually contains or consists of such-and-such a quantity of > "time." > > > > In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., are not > > nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They are a > > formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, and > > even other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a > > locative pattern, like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It contains > > no morpheme like one of "in the house" or "at the tree." It means > > "when it is morning" or "while morning-phase is occurring." These > > "temporal s" are not used as subjects or objects, or at all like > > nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" or "summer is hot"; summer > > is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions are hot, WHEN heat occurs. > > One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or "summer recently." > > There is no objectification, as a region, an extent, a quantity, of > > the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested about time > > except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no basis > here for a formless item answering to our "time." " > > > > > > > > On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Helena Worthen > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to this: > > > > > > "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to create > > > sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly > > > productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific > > > writing and thinking today." > > > > > > Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I lose you > > > when > > you > > > say "created to talk about gravity as an entity". > > > > > > Thank you, > > > > > > Helena > > > > > > > > > Helena Worthen > > > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > > > > On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > > > > As Helena points out, prepositions are from the "grammatical" end > > > > of > > what > > > > Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what > > > > Halliday > > calls > > > > "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they have > > > > three properties that words from the more "lexical" end do not have: > > > > > > > > a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You can, > > > actually, > > > > but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you invent a new > > > > name > > > or a > > > > new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can). > > > > > > > > b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific semantic > > > > field > > > (the > > > > way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of > > linguistics) > > > > but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are used. > > > > > > > > c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the same > > effect, > > > > which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your argument" the "in" > > has > > > > more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in "there's a fly > > > > in > > your > > > > tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in Henry's > > > > hands, > > > refer > > > > to a book or even a footnote. > > > > > > > > Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties pretty > > > > much define the difference between learning and development, at > > > > least as I understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on > > > > functions indefinitely while development works by reorganizing the > > > > closed set of functions you already have into new systems. > > > > Learning is skill specific and local, while development is quite > global in its implications. > > > Learning > > > > is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new systems, > > > > while development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary (and > > > > forget it > > just > > > > as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes away. > > > > > > > > For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of blue > > > > that > > > people > > > > call the sky") are simply metaphors from the non-productive end of > > > > the lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are crisp, > > > > concrete, and vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the > > > > nominalizations that > > Newton > > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to > > > > create sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly > > > > productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific > > > > writing and > > thinking > > > > today. For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical metaphor is the > > third > > > > great moment in child development (after the break into mother > > > > tongue > > and > > > > the break into disciplinary language in school work). > > > > > > > > Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" implies > > > > zero dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two ("on a > > > > line', 'on a > > > > plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because they are > > > > grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them with time: > > > > 'at > > a > > > > point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. Compare: "at > > > > Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very day), and > > > > "in Christmas' (season). > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > >> > > > >> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial > > > >> relationships from the concrete material world into the > > > >> conceptual imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 common > > > >> ones, and > > > between 70 > > > >> and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far as" > > > >> -- > > > this > > > >> is according to > > > >> https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm > > ). > > > >> We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. Apparently, > > > >> in English, they evolved from and did the job done by inflections > > > >> in > > parent > > > >> languages, examples being cases and tenses. > > > >> > > > >> But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection > > > >> like the dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial > > > >> relationships > > > suggested > > > >> by contemporary prepositions. > > > >> > > > >> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about this. > > > >> > > > >> Helena Worthen > > > >> helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > >> > > > >> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > > >> > > > >>> I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly > > embodied, > > > >> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to > > > >> linguistics > > > (For > > > >> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on > > ?lexicon?: > > > >> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, > > > >> being > > > part > > > >> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and > > > >> Halliday > > > see no > > > >> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, > lexico-grammar. > > > (Lo > > > >> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar, > > > >> adding > > > the > > > >> ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings are > > great > > > >> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of > > > >> that? In translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced? > > > >>> Henry > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden > > > wrote: > > > >>>> > > > >>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the > > metaphorical > > > >> use of prepositions like: > > > >>>> - "there is some value IN your argument" > > > >>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again" > > > >>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" > > > >>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again" > > > >>>> > > > >>>> and so on. > > > >>>> Andy > > > >>>> > > > -------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > ---- > > > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > > > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>> larry smolucha wrote: > > > >>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself - > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic > > > possibilities: > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in > > > Thought > > > >>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into > > English > > > >> 1962] > > > >>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' > > value > > > >> of the > > > >>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech > > > vocalization). > > > >>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that > > > >>>>> are > > > >> flammable > > > >>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor > > > >>>>> a > > gas. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century > > > >>>>> European > > > >> Developmental > > > >>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' > > > >>>>> hence > > > the > > > >>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of > > Piaget's > > > >> Genetic > > > >>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and > > > >>>>> synthesis > > > >> based on > > > >>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in > > > >>>>> Vygotsky's > > > >> example of H2O. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com > > > >>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > >>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 > > > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic > > > >>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the > parts. > > > >>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more > > > >>>>>> than > > the > > > >>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can > > > >>>>>> ever > > be > > > >> imagined" > > > >>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> A couple things to consider: > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination > > > >>>>>> as the > > > >> brain has > > > >>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the > > > >>>>>> simplest > > level > > > >> of the Gestalt > > > >>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). > > > >>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just > > photographic. > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try > > > >>>>>> to > > > >> accurately reproduce > > > >>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, > > > >>>>>> the > > > >> goal of combinatory > > > >>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, > > > >>>>>> dreams, > > > >> musings, and even > > > >>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of > > objects > > > >> and symbols. > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways > > > >>>>>> that > > > >> things and concepts can be > > > >>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar > > > >>>>>> and > > > flour. > > > >>>>>> I can add water and > > > >>>>>> it > > > >> dissolves a bit > > > >>>>>> But adding heat > > > >>>>>> changes > > the > > > >> combination into a pancake. > > > >>>>>> [Is this synergistic?] > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more > > > >>>>>> examples > > > >> to put the discussion > > > >>>>>> in the metaphysical realm. > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 > > > >>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > >>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the > > > >>>>>>> case > > > for > > > >>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I > > > >>>>>>> think > > it's > > > >> not > > > >>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are > > > >> associationists who > > > >>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary > > > >>>>>>> associationism > > > >> exists and > > > >>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. > > > >> Vygotsky > > > >>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, > > explain > > > >> the > > > >>>>>>> uniqueness of our species? > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels > > > >>>>>>> for > > its > > > >> own > > > >>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a > > > >>>>>>> Piagetian perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian > > > >>>>>>> one--true maturity > > > as a > > > >>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more > > > >>>>>>> to it > > > >> than > > > >>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of > > > >>>>>>> primate, > > > and > > > >> our > > > >>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon > > > >>>>>>> rocks > > > in > > > >> order > > > >>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged > > > >>>>>>> the > > same > > > >> way as > > > >>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and > > > >>>>>>> for > > > >> language is > > > >>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human > > > >> exceptionalism. > > > >>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for > > > >>>>>>> the > > > >> vanguard role > > > >>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, > > > prolonging > > > >>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after > > > >>>>>>> the > > sick > > > >> and the > > > >>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial > > > >>>>>>> organs > > > >> (tools) and > > > >>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for > > > >>>>>>> our > > > >> species, it > > > >>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these > > > >> "circuitous, > > > >>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that > > > >>>>>>> lead > > our > > > >>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always > > > >>>>>>> been > > > >> short on > > > >>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for > > > >>>>>>> material > > > >> culture > > > >>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: > > > >> verily, here > > > >>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of > > > >>>>>>> attention is > > > >> simply the > > > >>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says > > > >>>>>>> there are > > > >> only two > > > >>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So > > > >> imagination is > > > >>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, > > > >>>>>>> and > > > >> nothing > > > >>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when > > > >>>>>>> you > > > hear > > > >> the > > > >>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there > > > >>>>>>> to be > > > >> able to > > > >>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work > > > >>>>>>> in > > word > > > >> meaning. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who > > > >>>>>>> was > > > given > > > >> a > > > >>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been > > > >>>>>>> mixed > > with > > > >> silver > > > >>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of > gold. > > > >> Well, we > > > >>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not > > possible > > > to > > > >>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that > > > >>>>>>> precisely. The > > > >> method > > > >>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the > > > >>>>>>> "principal > > of > > > >>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes > > > >>>>>>> palimpsest, a > > > >> velum on > > > >>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. > > > Because > > > >>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and > > > >>>>>>> written > > over > > > >> every > > > >>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, > > > >>>>>>> the > > > >> pressure > > > >>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones > > > >>>>>>> when > > > the > > > >> old > > > >>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only > > known > > > >> Greek > > > >>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their > > > >> relationship > > > >>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they > > > >>>>>>> are > > > >> related to > > > >>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite > > > similar > > > >> to the > > > >>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> David Kellogg > > > >>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >> wrote: > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an > > > associationist, > > > >> ?sees > > > >>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? > > > >>>>>>>> Henry > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg < > > dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > > > > > >> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the > > > >>>>>>>>> division > > > >> between > > > >>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, > > > >>>>>>>>> because > > > >> Ribot is > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> an > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal > > > >>>>>>>>> form of > > > >> attention. > > > >>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the > > > >>>>>>>>> transition > > from > > > >> forest > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> to > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division > > between > > > >> the two > > > >>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and > > > >>>>>>>>> commonsensical > > > >> world of > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly > > > >>>>>>>>> prosaic > > uses > > > >> in life > > > >>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more > > > "imaginative" > > > >> (that > > > >>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world > > > >>>>>>>>> of the > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> farm,where > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long > > > >>>>>>>>> winter > > > >> months are > > > >>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to > > encounter > > > >> talking > > > >>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here > > > >>>>>>>>> attention > > > has > > > >> to be > > > >>>>>>>>> more voluntary. > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a > > > >>>>>>>>> very > > clear > > > >>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that > > > >> underpins > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> Ribot > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky > > > >>>>>>>>> points > > > out > > > >> the > > > >>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive > > > >>>>>>>>> practices > > > >> really > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> are > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of > > imagination, > > > >> there > > > >>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between > > > >>>>>>>>> human > > > and > > > >> animal > > > >>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly > > > >>>>>>>>> capable of > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> volitional > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). > > > Without > > > >> a > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> theory > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis > > > >>>>>>>>> for > > > Ribot's > > > >>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological > > > >>>>>>>>> functions at > > > >> all. > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > > > >>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole > > > wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination, > > > >> thanks to > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> all > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought. > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very > > > >>>>>>>>>> influential > > > >> around the > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> time > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I > > > >>>>>>>>>> had > > > >> seen work > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> on > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective > > > >>>>>>>>>> equal > > > >> reproductive? > > > >>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies > > > >>>>>>>>>> of > > > >> development > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> of > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of > > > >>>>>>>>>> being > > a > > > >> relative > > > >>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. > > > >>>>>>>>>> mike > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com> > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my > > > >>>>>>>>>>> bucket > > list. > > > >> This > > > >>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings > > > >>>>>>>>>>> from > > some > > > >> weeks > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> in > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > >> segmented the > > > >>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met > aphorizing?. > > > >> Puns, > > > >>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> and > > they > > > >> are > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> doing > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his > > > >> followers as an > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel, so > > > >> its of > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> course > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in > > > >> translation, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> seems > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" > > in > > > >> this > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> passage, > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter > > > >> distinction to > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "memory." > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary > > > >> discourse > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian > > > >> colleagues have > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from > > theorists > > > >> who > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> clearly > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was > > still > > > >> possible > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> to > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, > > > >> interestingly > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> links > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a > > "voluntary" > > > >> act. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Parts > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> of > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> stuff > > > that > > > >> was > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> also > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > >> creativity > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> and > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> see > > > >> that the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> two > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found > > himself > > > >> writing. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> pretty > > > old > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> approaches > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < > > > >> ablunden@mira.net> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> but it > > > >> may be > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> worth > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> place > > to > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Imagination > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between > > > >> Recollection and > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive > > > >> Imagination, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> (2) > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> which > > he > > > >> says > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> leads > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> other > > > >> words, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is > > > >> accomplished > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> through > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >> > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > -- > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > > > >> Williams. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose > > work i > > > >> am > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> trying > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of > > > >> productive > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive > > imagination > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> develops. > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that > > > >> there > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> must > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> be a > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> But > > I > > > >> learned > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > > is > > > >> linked > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> to > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > >> anticipation > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination > > > >> (starting > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> look, and > > > >> provides > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> a > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as > > > fixed. > > > >> This, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a > > > ground > > > >> to > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> take > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> part > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> preconceptions: > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> grammarian > > > >> Langacker on > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> domains, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> particularly > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> full of > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> imagination > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > >> temporality: > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic > > > >> structure), which > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> I > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> both > > > >> individual > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < > > > >> lpscholar2@gmail.com> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third > > *space* > > > >> and the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> his > > > >> notion of > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is > > > >> explored under > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > >> modalities > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of > > knowing > > > >> that is > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [perceived??] > > if > > > >> we > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> think > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *style* Larry On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> HENRY SHONERD < > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> say how > > > >> jazzed up > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> I > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> am > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind > > > as > > > >> Larry > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> various > > > >> triads, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> finally > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notebooks > > > of > > > >> the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> mind, as > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, > > luega > > > >> pa? > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> fuera. > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole < > > mcole@ucsd.edu> > > > >> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, > > attached > > > >> are two > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT > > > theorists > > > >> like > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of > > > >> imagination in a > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of > > > >> productive > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no > > > >> intention of > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> doing > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the > > > >> attached > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these > > philosophers, > > > I > > > >> came > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> upon > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> closely > > > >> linked at > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> several > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, > > > >> Ettienne and I > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a > > means > > > of > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> access > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander > Suvorov. > > > >> Moreover, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> such > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct > > > relevance > > > >> to > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Kris's > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to > > > >> concerns > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> about > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in > > development. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. > > > Perhaps > > > >> they > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> will > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural > > > >> science > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with an > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> -- > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > > science > > > >> with an > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> -- > > > >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > > > >>>>>>>>>> science > > > >> with an > > > >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From pmocombe@mocombeian.com Mon Dec 22 04:37:16 2014 From: pmocombe@mocombeian.com (Dr. Paul C. Mocombe) Date: Mon, 22 Dec 2014 07:37:16 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors / Speakers of AAE Message-ID: <5rg3dtd8wecce7qgqgsnw3ir.1419251836551@email.android.com> David, I started off looking at the syntactically differences between AAE and SE which is leading to black academic underachievement on standardized tests. ?However, the more I became immersed in the research I realized that there was a pragmatic and semantic dimension along the lines of basil Bernstein ' s conceptualization. ?In the case of the latter, in analyzing their answers to certain test score items, i realized there was a social class component to the language. ?For example, a test question, which all the students got wrong but they all selected the same answer read, "My mother put up new curtains over the windows in the living room...Of the choices below please select a synonym for curtains..." 1. Drapes? 2. Sheets 3. Logs 4. Mirror all of the (70) students selected 2. ?Sheets. ?When questioned why. ?They all said that most people in their neighborhoods use sheets as curtains. ?In the former case, black american students, boys in particular, identified speaking AAE with certain professions, athletics and rapping, which they aspired to. ? My forthcoming book is titled, "the black-white test score gap: a mismatch of linguistic structure and social class function" ?palgrave Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com? www.readingroomcurriculum.com? www.paulcmocombe.info?
-------- Original message --------
From: David H Kirshner
Date:12/22/2014 2:14 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors / Speakers of AAE
Paul, When you get a chance, I'd be interested in learning more about your work on the "mismatch of linguistic structure and social class function," particularly, as to whether the linguistic structures you're engaged with are syntactic, versus semantic or pragmatic. My feeling is that the political dimensions into which Orr's work is read are keeping us from the more radical implication of her work that meanings of certain basic quantitative and mathematical terms (e.g., distance, location, more, and less) are written into the syntax of standard English. This contradicts what I take to be the Zeitgeist of thinking in this area (including of most XMCAers) which traces meaning to the social and cultural worlds and our intentional engagements therein. I don't think we're well equipped to entertain the syntactic thesis--especially, when it might involve tackling such challenging and troubling questions as the one Greg Thompson posed: "the extent to which mathematical language is predicated upon a particular form of what Whorf called 'Standard Average European'." David -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Dr. Paul C. Mocombe Sent: Sunday, December 21, 2014 6:13 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors I am on holiday and said I would give the group a break, but I could not resist... Orr ' s work parallels my own research and my theory of "a mismatch of linguistic structure and social class function" hypothesis as key to understanding the Black-White test score gap. The biggest responses to Orr's work were from the black middle class and white liberals, who wanted to focus on the opportunity gap as the basis for black academic underachievement. This negated the fact that test scores reveal there is a deficit among blacks in comprehending questions on standardized tests written in standard english. Arguing that there is a deficit is not the same as saying that AAE does not allow a black child to critically think as William Labov (1972) highlighted in his work, "Language in the inner-cities." The problem is when Orr and Labov were writing, AAE was not viewed as a distinct linguistic system. Labov ' s work, building on chomsky, changes that by highlighting the ability of speakers of AAE to grasp highly conceptual problems if addressed within the systemicity of AAE. The logical conclusion, as I see it, is not to jump to the conclusion that orr's research is/was racist, but to recognize AAE as a distinct linguistic system and treat black students from the inner-cities as ESOL (english speakers of other languages) students. Dr. Paul C. Mocombe President The Mocombeian Foundation, Inc. www.mocombeian.com www.readingroomcurriculum.com www.paulcmocombe.info
-------- Original message --------
From: David H Kirshner
Date:12/21/2014 1:37 AM (GMT-05:00)
To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity"
Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors
Greg, I'm delighted that you're familiar with and appreciative of Orr's work. Cleary she didn't provide "serious consideration of how AAE speakers actually use prepositions"--she couldn't have, as she was not a native speaker of Black English dialect, and she was not a linguist. But I'm not sure how paying serious attention to technical nuances of Black English grammar would have helped, as her analyses show that the African American students in her classes were not speaking either standard English or Black English Vernacular, but rather a hybrid that arises from their efforts to emulate standard English. Now, it's true her work didn't parallel the approach Gay and Cole took to understanding what other psychologists were classifying as linguistic and cognitive deficits by carefully studying the native language and culture. On the other hand, she did something Gay and Cole didn't do, namely micro-analyze the linguistic miscues operating in the classroom, and the resultant dilemmas of comprehension this created for her African American students. As the excerpt copied below illustrates, Orr was scrupulously attentive to understanding her students' experience of distance and location given the different linguistic setting. And her analyses consistently point to the mismatch between the native dialect and the language of instruction as the source of the problems, not the native dialect, itself. To label this work as implicitly racist, I think cedes too much to those who mistrust science as a tool of the oppressor, and whose only locus of attention is the history and legacy of social injustice. Even now, in this discussion, we are missing the point. The major significance of Orr's work is not that differences in grammatical structure have semantic implications. This is merely a window to the dramatic realization that semantics are written into grammatical form. David Excerpt from Orr (1987): "Jane gives us in these diagrams a glimpse into the kinds of mental images she constructs when she is using the single symbol length, representing both location and distance, as a tool with which to think. Even the diagrams Jane drew for problems 13 and 14 begin to be less incomprehensible if one attempts to construct in one's own mind images of the information given in these problems, while adhering to the requirement that length be used to represent both location and distance. They can be seen as possible consequents or extensions of the symbol length when it is used to represent both location and distance. Consider, for instance, the mental images one might construct in responding to problem 13: Two cities, both represented by line segments, are equal distances (that is, equal line segments) closer to a third city (another line segment) than two other cities (line segments) are. The first two cities must be represented by equal line segments because they are equal distances closer to the third city than the other two cities are. And these other two cities must also be represented by equal line segments because they are equal distances from the third city. One can see that Jane's diagrams are not as lacking in reason as they may initially have appeared to be. "Jane's diagrams suggest the possibility that when words, or symbols are used as instruments with which to think, the use in one language of a single symbol in contexts where a second language requires two or more can lead a speaker of the first language to arrive at a different mental construct of some given information from that arrived at by a speaker of the second language. Or, as in Jane's attempt to handle problem 14, the result may be an inability to arrive at a workable mental construct at all." (p. 25) [Note, this excerpt is part of a longer segment I emailed on Dec. 19 that shows Jane's diagrams that Orr is referring to.] -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson Sent: Saturday, December 20, 2014 3:14 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors The issues that are raised by Orr are indeed important ones. I am a fan of her work as it points to important differences in language usage among AAE speakers. I agree that she shouldn't have been condemned for pointing out these differences (particularly considering how important it is for teachers to understand the consequences of these differences). If you want to help AAE speaking students do better on standardized tests, then you absolutely need to pay attention to these differences. My one concern here is that I do feel like there is a problem of deficit thinking that is at least implied in her work (and maybe "implied" is too strong a term - maybe it's just that she doesn't provide evidence to discourage us from this view). What we don't see in this book is any serious consideration of how AAE speakers actually use prepositions - e.g., the ways of using language that exist in the community of AAE speakers. This gives Orr's work a feel somewhat like the studies of math among the Kpelle studied by Gay and Cole in the pre-early days of LCHC (see wiki for more: http://lchcfestschrift.wikispaces.com/Chapter+1). Before they showed up on the scene, everyone had assumed that the Kpelle (Liberia) couldn't comprehend basic math concepts b.c. they weren't learning it in the ways that it was being taught (and perhaps there were even linguistic relativity arguments that pointed to this). Rather then continuing to pluck these folks out of context and run them through various types of experiments, Gay and Cole "explicitly began with the assumption that ?we must know more about the indigenous mathematics so that we can build effective bridges to the new mathematics that we are trying to introduce?" >From their research, they found that the Kpelle actually had high competence with complex mathematical problems (e.g., estimating volumes). As they write: "Overall, the data suggested that no generalized lack of mathematical, perceptual, or problem solving abilities stood in the way of mathematics education. When the materials and procedures used in assessment tasks were designed to match closely valued local practices, lack of ability could be replaced by apparent special ability. At the same time, schooling did appear to influence performance in tasks that were routinely used to measure cognitive development." So I think I would be more comfortable with Orr's work if she were to have included this kind of rich understanding of usage in context and how prepositions actually are used among AAE speakers. This points to a larger question that might be irksome to some folks, but the question regards the extent to which mathematical language is predicated upon a particular form of what Whorf called "Standard Average European." In short, the idea here is that Math has a history and a culture. This doesn't mean that it is useless or a waste of time, just that it is a particular way of encountering the world that is good for particular things and not for others. I think we've gone round this mulberry bush before, but that was just more grist for the mill (I prefer my metaphors mixed!). -greg On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 8:46 PM, David H Kirshner > wrote: > > The topic of how grammatical form relates to meaning calls to mind the > groundbreaking work of Eleanor Orr--whom you've probably never heard of on > account of the fact that her work was condemned by a politically-correct > faction of race-conscious sociolinguists who decided her analysis of Black > English Vernacular could too easily be appropriated into racist discourses > about language deficiency. > > Orr was a Washington DC area teacher and principal in the 1970s and 1980s, > who traced math difficulties of her African American students to subtle > grammatical differences between Black English dialect and standard English. > Her 1987 book goes into compelling detail to support the thesis that the > meaning structure of basic mathematical terms is embedded in the > grammatical setting in which those terms are expressed. For instance, the > meaning of ?distance? is embedded in the grammatical structure ?distance > from _________ to __________? where the place-holders hold locations; if > you don?t have that grammatical structure, and you're in a linguistic > environment in which that structure is assumed, you're likely not going to > be able to gain full access to the concept. > > The attached excerpts from her book--ignore the Forward, unless you'd like > some context--reveal some of her students' bizarre conceptions of distance > (and other basic mathematical concepts) as revealed in their diagrams. Her > approach involves linguistic analysis of sentences produced by her African > American students that she reads as collapsed versions of standard English > sentences, with differences in prepositional structure being highlighted > (but other grammatical elements also are indicated). > > This work cuts against the grain of anything going on in mathematics > education. The Piagetian view that dominates that field holds that basic > concepts come about from reflection on our actions in our engagement with > the material world. When language enters the conversation, it's with > respect to semantic structure; to my knowledge, nobody's ever implicated > syntax directly in basic quantitative understanding. > > This work is particularly interesting to me in connection with my > 21-year-old son who is autistic, and whose grammatical function is severely > impaired. He has a decent vocabulary, but unless the setting for the > conversation provides contextual clues, he can't piece together how the > semantic elements are linked to one another. It is only recently that it > occurred to me his lack of a secure sense of basic quantitative terms like > ?more? and ?less? may be rooted in his grammatical incapacities. > > The XMCA discussion, thus far, has touched on grammar with respect to > lexical items such as prepositions. But we've not yet tied that to the > grammatical forms that embed those lexical items. I'm very curious as to > whether that further connection can be made. > > David Kirshner > > Orr, E., W. (1987). Twice as less: Black English and the performance of > black students in mathematics and science. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg > Sent: Friday, December 19, 2014 3:06 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors > > Yes, Haliday is essentially a Whorfian, and that's one of things that > brings him close to Vygotsky. (Compare, for example, Chomsky, who is > essentially anti-developmental in his ideas about language, and who now > rejects the leading role played by social communication and says that > communication is epiphenomenal to language, whose original purpose is > thought.) For Sapir, and for Whorf, in the beginning of every major > onotogenetic, sociogenetic, and even phylogenetic change in language there > has to be some change in the nature of communication. > > So what Andy says about the lack of the basis of modern science in Hopi > applies perfectly well to English. When we read the scientific writings of > Chaucer on the astrolabe, for example, we do not see words like > "reflection", "refraction" or "alignment". Chaucer uses words like "bounce > off", "bend through", and "line up" (note the use of prepositions, > Helena!). Where did these words come from, and how did they make scientific > English possible? > > Most of us have no problem saying that Isaac Newton discovered the laws of > gravitation. But it's only a slight exaggeration to say that what he really > discovered was the meaning potential of words like "gravitation". Gravity > is, of course, not a thing at all; that is, it's not an entity, but rather > a process, the process of falling down, or falling in (preps, again!). So > how and above all why does it become an entity? > > It's interesting to compare Newton's writings on optics with Chaucer's on > the astrolabe. The "Opticks" has a fixed format that we recognize almost > instantly today: Newton describes his equipment (the prism and the dark > room); he then narrates his method as a kind of recipe ("First, I did this; > then I did that") and draws conclusions, which he then formulates in > mathematical terms (this is essentially the format of Vygotsky's lectures > on pedology, so much so that when translating them we had some trouble > determining the precise moment when Vygotsky turns to the blackboard to > write his conclusion in the form of a law). > > In order to get them into mathematical shape, though, he has to make > sentences that look a lot like equations. "The plumpness of the lens yields > a greater refraction of the light", "The reflection of the light from the > glass results of the light striking the flatness of the glass" "The > curvature of the spectacle glass supplies the lacking plumpness of the > eye". In each of these, a quality or a process which would normally be > realized as an adjective or a verb is suddenly realized by a noun, creating > an imaginary entity. > > That's grammatical metaphor. Something that is "canonically" realized by a > verb ("to grow") is suddenly realized nominally ("growth"), or something > that is canonically a quality ('red") is realized verbally ("redden"). We > even find related clauses realized as verbs ("She did not know the rules. > So she died" is realized by "Death was brought about through ignorance", > all of these examples from Halliday). In fact, the Genetic Law that > Vygotsky formulates in "Mind in Society" ("Every higher mental function is > realized on two planes....") is really just one instance of grammatical > metaphor. > > One of Chomsky's best known arguments for the radical innateness > hypothesis is this. If I take a sentence like "Students who do not do their > homework do not do well" and I want to make a question, how do I know which > "do" to move to the front? Chomsky assumes that this knowledge is > essentially innate; it is part of universal grammar. But you can see that > "Do students who do not do their homework do well?" can be built up through > a process of what we might call "discourse metaphor"--whereby clauses stand > for > exchanges: > > Mother: You did your homework, didn't you? > Child: No. > Mother: You didn't do your homework? Did you do well? > Child: No. > Mother: You didn't do well? > Child: No. > Mother: You didn't do you homework so you didn't do well. Do the other > students do well? > Child: Some of them. > Mother: Who does well? Do students who do not do their homework do well? > > And this of course explains why wh-items like "who" and 'why" have two > functions--one inside a clause, where it expresses an intra-mental function > (grammar) and one between them where it expresses an inter-mental function > (discourse). > > I realize that grammatical metaphor will seem rather dry and abstract and > unpoetic to people who assume that metaphor is only of the lexical kind. > But to me, and I think to most children, it is far far more powerful and > far more important developmentally. In some ways, it's the lexical metaphor > that is responsible for the disenchantment of the child's world, while the > grammatical metaphor infinitely expands it. (And here, I'm afraid, I must > stop--it's time for breakfast and anyway my one screen is used up!) > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > , or "the > > . He > > On 19 December 2014 at 15:15, Greg Thompson > > wrote: > > > Helena and David, > > I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the so-called > > authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred tradition > > to > > Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi notion > > of "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including English) > > notion of "time" and how each of these languages offers different > > affordances of meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual > > understanding, English has a much more reified/objectified/entified > > sense of time. (btw, I think the first paragraph is easier to follow > > than the second - and in that first paragraph you'll find our old friend > "imagination"). > > David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to? > > -greg > > > > Taken from: > > > > http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/mousesite/Second > > ary/Whorfframe2.html > > > > " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, sunset" are > > with us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from other > nouns. > > They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in winter" > > just as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are pluralized > > and numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. Our > > thought about the referents of such words hence becomes objectified. > > Without objectification, it would be a subjective experience of real > > time, i.e. of the consciousness of "becoming later and later"--simply > > a cyclic phase similar to an earlier phase in that ever-later-becoming > > duration. Only by imagination can such a cyclic phase be set beside > > another and another in the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually > > perceived) configuration. "But such is the power of linguistic analogy > that we do so objectify cyclic phasing. > > We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g., > "phasing." > > And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting > > binomial formula of formless item plus form, is so general that it is > > implicit for all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless items > > like "substance, matter," by which we can fill out the binomial for an > > enormously wide range of nouns. But even these are not quite > > generalized enough to take in our phase nouns. So for the phase nouns we > have made a formless item, "time." > > We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, in the > > pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" in > > the pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can say > > and think "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." Let me > > again point out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of milk" > > or "a piece of cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a > > summer" actually contains or consists of such-and-such a quantity of > "time." > > > > In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., are not > > nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They are a > > formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, and > > even other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a > > locative pattern, like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It contains > > no morpheme like one of "in the house" or "at the tree." It means > > "when it is morning" or "while morning-phase is occurring." These > > "temporal s" are not used as subjects or objects, or at all like > > nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" or "summer is hot"; summer > > is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions are hot, WHEN heat occurs. > > One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or "summer recently." > > There is no objectification, as a region, an extent, a quantity, of > > the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested about time > > except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no basis > here for a formless item answering to our "time." " > > > > > > > > On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Helena Worthen > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to this: > > > > > > "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to create > > > sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly > > > productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific > > > writing and thinking today." > > > > > > Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I lose you > > > when > > you > > > say "created to talk about gravity as an entity". > > > > > > Thank you, > > > > > > Helena > > > > > > > > > Helena Worthen > > > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > > > > On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > > > > As Helena points out, prepositions are from the "grammatical" end > > > > of > > what > > > > Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what > > > > Halliday > > calls > > > > "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they have > > > > three properties that words from the more "lexical" end do not have: > > > > > > > > a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You can, > > > actually, > > > > but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you invent a new > > > > name > > > or a > > > > new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can). > > > > > > > > b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific semantic > > > > field > > > (the > > > > way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of > > linguistics) > > > > but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are used. > > > > > > > > c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the same > > effect, > > > > which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your argument" the "in" > > has > > > > more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in "there's a fly > > > > in > > your > > > > tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in Henry's > > > > hands, > > > refer > > > > to a book or even a footnote. > > > > > > > > Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties pretty > > > > much define the difference between learning and development, at > > > > least as I understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on > > > > functions indefinitely while development works by reorganizing the > > > > closed set of functions you already have into new systems. > > > > Learning is skill specific and local, while development is quite > global in its implications. > > > Learning > > > > is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new systems, > > > > while development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary (and > > > > forget it > > just > > > > as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes away. > > > > > > > > For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of blue > > > > that > > > people > > > > call the sky") are simply metaphors from the non-productive end of > > > > the lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are crisp, > > > > concrete, and vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the > > > > nominalizations that > > Newton > > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to > > > > create sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly > > > > productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific > > > > writing and > > thinking > > > > today. For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical metaphor is the > > third > > > > great moment in child development (after the break into mother > > > > tongue > > and > > > > the break into disciplinary language in school work). > > > > > > > > Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" implies > > > > zero dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two ("on a > > > > line', 'on a > > > > plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because they are > > > > grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them with time: > > > > 'at > > a > > > > point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. Compare: "at > > > > Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very day), and > > > > "in Christmas' (season). > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > >> > > > >> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial > > > >> relationships from the concrete material world into the > > > >> conceptual imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 common > > > >> ones, and > > > between 70 > > > >> and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far as" > > > >> -- > > > this > > > >> is according to > > > >> https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm > > ). > > > >> We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. Apparently, > > > >> in English, they evolved from and did the job done by inflections > > > >> in > > parent > > > >> languages, examples being cases and tenses. > > > >> > > > >> But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection > > > >> like the dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial > > > >> relationships > > > suggested > > > >> by contemporary prepositions. > > > >> > > > >> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about this. > > > >> > > > >> Helena Worthen > > > >> helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > >> > > > >> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > > >> > > > >>> I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly > > embodied, > > > >> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to > > > >> linguistics > > > (For > > > >> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on > > ?lexicon?: > > > >> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, > > > >> being > > > part > > > >> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and > > > >> Halliday > > > see no > > > >> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, > lexico-grammar. > > > (Lo > > > >> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar, > > > >> adding > > > the > > > >> ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings are > > great > > > >> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of > > > >> that? In translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced? > > > >>> Henry > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden > > > wrote: > > > >>>> > > > >>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the > > metaphorical > > > >> use of prepositions like: > > > >>>> - "there is some value IN your argument" > > > >>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again" > > > >>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" > > > >>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again" > > > >>>> > > > >>>> and so on. > > > >>>> Andy > > > >>>> > > > -------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > ---- > > > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > > > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > >>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>> larry smolucha wrote: > > > >>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself - > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic > > > possibilities: > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in > > > Thought > > > >>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into > > English > > > >> 1962] > > > >>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' > > value > > > >> of the > > > >>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech > > > vocalization). > > > >>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that > > > >>>>> are > > > >> flammable > > > >>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor > > > >>>>> a > > gas. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century > > > >>>>> European > > > >> Developmental > > > >>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' > > > >>>>> hence > > > the > > > >>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of > > Piaget's > > > >> Genetic > > > >>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and > > > >>>>> synthesis > > > >> based on > > > >>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in > > > >>>>> Vygotsky's > > > >> example of H2O. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com > > > >>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > >>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 > > > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic > > > >>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the > parts. > > > >>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more > > > >>>>>> than > > the > > > >>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can > > > >>>>>> ever > > be > > > >> imagined" > > > >>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> A couple things to consider: > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination > > > >>>>>> as the > > > >> brain has > > > >>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the > > > >>>>>> simplest > > level > > > >> of the Gestalt > > > >>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). > > > >>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just > > photographic. > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try > > > >>>>>> to > > > >> accurately reproduce > > > >>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, > > > >>>>>> the > > > >> goal of combinatory > > > >>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, > > > >>>>>> dreams, > > > >> musings, and even > > > >>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of > > objects > > > >> and symbols. > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways > > > >>>>>> that > > > >> things and concepts can be > > > >>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar > > > >>>>>> and > > > flour. > > > >>>>>> I can add water and > > > >>>>>> it > > > >> dissolves a bit > > > >>>>>> But adding heat > > > >>>>>> changes > > the > > > >> combination into a pancake. > > > >>>>>> [Is this synergistic?] > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more > > > >>>>>> examples > > > >> to put the discussion > > > >>>>>> in the metaphysical realm. > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 > > > >>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > >>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the > > > >>>>>>> case > > > for > > > >>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I > > > >>>>>>> think > > it's > > > >> not > > > >>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are > > > >> associationists who > > > >>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary > > > >>>>>>> associationism > > > >> exists and > > > >>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. > > > >> Vygotsky > > > >>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, > > explain > > > >> the > > > >>>>>>> uniqueness of our species? > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels > > > >>>>>>> for > > its > > > >> own > > > >>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a > > > >>>>>>> Piagetian perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian > > > >>>>>>> one--true maturity > > > as a > > > >>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more > > > >>>>>>> to it > > > >> than > > > >>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of > > > >>>>>>> primate, > > > and > > > >> our > > > >>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon > > > >>>>>>> rocks > > > in > > > >> order > > > >>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged > > > >>>>>>> the > > same > > > >> way as > > > >>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and > > > >>>>>>> for > > > >> language is > > > >>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human > > > >> exceptionalism. > > > >>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for > > > >>>>>>> the > > > >> vanguard role > > > >>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, > > > prolonging > > > >>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after > > > >>>>>>> the > > sick > > > >> and the > > > >>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial > > > >>>>>>> organs > > > >> (tools) and > > > >>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for > > > >>>>>>> our > > > >> species, it > > > >>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these > > > >> "circuitous, > > > >>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that > > > >>>>>>> lead > > our > > > >>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always > > > >>>>>>> been > > > >> short on > > > >>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for > > > >>>>>>> material > > > >> culture > > > >>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: > > > >> verily, here > > > >>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of > > > >>>>>>> attention is > > > >> simply the > > > >>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says > > > >>>>>>> there are > > > >> only two > > > >>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So > > > >> imagination is > > > >>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, > > > >>>>>>> and > > > >> nothing > > > >>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when > > > >>>>>>> you > > > hear > > > >> the > > > >>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there > > > >>>>>>> to be > > > >> able to > > > >>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work > > > >>>>>>> in > > word > > > >> meaning. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who > > > >>>>>>> was > > > given > > > >> a > > > >>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been > > > >>>>>>> mixed > > with > > > >> silver > > > >>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of > gold. > > > >> Well, we > > > >>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not > > possible > > > to > > > >>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that > > > >>>>>>> precisely. The > > > >> method > > > >>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the > > > >>>>>>> "principal > > of > > > >>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes > > > >>>>>>> palimpsest, a > > > >> velum on > > > >>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. > > > Because > > > >>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and > > > >>>>>>> written > > over > > > >> every > > > >>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, > > > >>>>>>> the > > > >> pressure > > > >>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones > > > >>>>>>> when > > > the > > > >> old > > > >>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only > > known > > > >> Greek > > > >>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their > > > >> relationship > > > >>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they > > > >>>>>>> are > > > >> related to > > > >>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite > > > similar > > > >> to the > > > >>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> David Kellogg > > > >>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >> wrote: > > > >>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an > > > associationist, > > > >> ?sees > > > >>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? > > > >>>>>>>> Henry > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg < > > dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > > > > > >> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the > > > >>>>>>>>> division > > > >> between > > > >>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, > > > >>>>>>>>> because > > > >> Ribot is > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> an > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal > > > >>>>>>>>> form of > > > >> attention. > > > >>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the > > > >>>>>>>>> transition > > from > > > >> forest > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> to > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division > > between > > > >> the two > > > >>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and > > > >>>>>>>>> commonsensical > > > >> world of > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly > > > >>>>>>>>> prosaic > > uses > > > >> in life > > > >>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more > > > "imaginative" > > > >> (that > > > >>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world > > > >>>>>>>>> of the > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> farm,where > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long > > > >>>>>>>>> winter > > > >> months are > > > >>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to > > encounter > > > >> talking > > > >>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here > > > >>>>>>>>> attention > > > has > > > >> to be > > > >>>>>>>>> more voluntary. > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a > > > >>>>>>>>> very > > clear > > > >>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that > > > >> underpins > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> Ribot > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky > > > >>>>>>>>> points > > > out > > > >> the > > > >>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive > > > >>>>>>>>> practices > > > >> really > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> are > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of > > imagination, > > > >> there > > > >>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between > > > >>>>>>>>> human > > > and > > > >> animal > > > >>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly > > > >>>>>>>>> capable of > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> volitional > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). > > > Without > > > >> a > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> theory > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis > > > >>>>>>>>> for > > > Ribot's > > > >>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological > > > >>>>>>>>> functions at > > > >> all. > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > > > >>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole > > > wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination, > > > >> thanks to > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> all > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought. > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very > > > >>>>>>>>>> influential > > > >> around the > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> time > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I > > > >>>>>>>>>> had > > > >> seen work > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> on > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective > > > >>>>>>>>>> equal > > > >> reproductive? > > > >>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies > > > >>>>>>>>>> of > > > >> development > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> of > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of > > > >>>>>>>>>> being > > a > > > >> relative > > > >>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. > > > >>>>>>>>>> mike > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com> > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my > > > >>>>>>>>>>> bucket > > list. > > > >> This > > > >>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings > > > >>>>>>>>>>> from > > some > > > >> weeks > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> in > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > >> segmented the > > > >>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met > aphorizing?. > > > >> Puns, > > > >>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> and > > they > > > >> are > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> doing > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his > > > >> followers as an > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel, so > > > >> its of > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> course > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in > > > >> translation, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> seems > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" > > in > > > >> this > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> passage, > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter > > > >> distinction to > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "memory." > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary > > > >> discourse > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian > > > >> colleagues have > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from > > theorists > > > >> who > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> clearly > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was > > still > > > >> possible > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> to > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, > > > >> interestingly > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> links > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a > > "voluntary" > > > >> act. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Parts > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> of > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> stuff > > > that > > > >> was > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> also > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > >> creativity > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> and > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> see > > > >> that the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> two > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found > > himself > > > >> writing. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> pretty > > > old > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> approaches > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < > > > >> ablunden@mira.net> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> but it > > > >> may be > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> worth > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> place > > to > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Imagination > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between > > > >> Recollection and > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive > > > >> Imagination, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> (2) > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> which > > he > > > >> says > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> leads > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> other > > > >> words, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is > > > >> accomplished > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> through > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >> > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > -- > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > > > >> Williams. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose > > work i > > > >> am > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> trying > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of > > > >> productive > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive > > imagination > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> develops. > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that > > > >> there > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> must > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> be a > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> But > > I > > > >> learned > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > > is > > > >> linked > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> to > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > >> anticipation > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination > > > >> (starting > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> look, and > > > >> provides > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> a > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as > > > fixed. > > > >> This, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a > > > ground > > > >> to > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> take > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> part > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> preconceptions: > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> grammarian > > > >> Langacker on > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> domains, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> particularly > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> full of > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> imagination > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > >> temporality: > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic > > > >> structure), which > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> I > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> both > > > >> individual > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < > > > >> lpscholar2@gmail.com> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third > > *space* > > > >> and the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> his > > > >> notion of > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is > > > >> explored under > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > >> modalities > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of > > knowing > > > >> that is > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [perceived??] > > if > > > >> we > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> think > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *style* Larry On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> HENRY SHONERD < > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> say how > > > >> jazzed up > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> I > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> am > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind > > > as > > > >> Larry > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> various > > > >> triads, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> finally > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notebooks > > > of > > > >> the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> mind, as > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, > > luega > > > >> pa? > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> fuera. > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole < > > mcole@ucsd.edu> > > > >> wrote: > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, > > attached > > > >> are two > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT > > > theorists > > > >> like > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of > > > >> imagination in a > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of > > > >> productive > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no > > > >> intention of > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> doing > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the > > > >> attached > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these > > philosophers, > > > I > > > >> came > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> upon > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> closely > > > >> linked at > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> several > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, > > > >> Ettienne and I > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a > > means > > > of > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> access > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander > Suvorov. > > > >> Moreover, > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> such > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct > > > relevance > > > >> to > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> Kris's > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to > > > >> concerns > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> about > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in > > development. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. > > > Perhaps > > > >> they > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> will > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural > > > >> science > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with an > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> -- > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > > science > > > >> with an > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> -- > > > >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > > > >>>>>>>>>> science > > > >> with an > > > >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>>>> > > > >>>>>> > > > >>>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From dkirsh@lsu.edu Mon Dec 22 05:24:43 2014 From: dkirsh@lsu.edu (David H Kirshner) Date: Mon, 22 Dec 2014 13:24:43 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors / Speaking of AAE In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Greg, I disagree with you that Orr could/should have taken a more culturally sensitive approach to her studies of AAE speakers' difficulties in classrooms dominated by standard English instruction. But I in no wise intended to imply your wishing she had done so places you among those who consider her work as racist. I'm very sorry if my words suggested otherwise. David -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson Sent: Sunday, December 21, 2014 9:36 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors In the interests of following the recently suggested injunction not to directly address specific interlocutors, I'll talk in generalities (This makes it a bit more challenging to have a conversation but it also makes one think about the extractable and generalizable point that is beyond the immediate context). In my previous post (apologies for drawing on prior context), I neither suggested nor intended to imply that Orr's work is racist (do intentions matter when it comes to meaning?). This speaks to some of the difficulties of talking about issues of race. And in this connection let's not forget the fact that this list-serve is dominated by white men - that doesn't mean that we are necessarily racist but it does mean that we are likely to be ignorant of many aspects of these issues. Nonetheless, I believe that we can overcome our ignorance through education, by learning more about the issues - even when it comes to trying to understand cultures and languages that we did not grow up with. And while I think that there is good evidence for the linguistic relativity hypothesis, I do not believe that language is a determining influence in ALL thinking (Whorf uses the term "habitual" to describe the type of thinking that is most susceptible to the influence of language). That means that even if you don't speak AAE, you can still study it and even come to understand how the grammatical forms lend themselves to particular ways of understanding the world (this is what linguistic anthropology is all about!). And this is my concern with Orr's work. With all academic work, I think it is worth considering questions like "How would racists take up our research?" In the case of Orr's work, my sense is that racists could easily take up her research to argue (perhaps even by using the linguistic relativity hypothesis) that AAE speakers are unable to do complex mathematical thinking. This is why I would think that it is important to give a positive articulation of what AAE does as a language. It is certainly important to understand what it CAN'T do (e.g., help one learn math in a particular way), but it is equally important to understand what it CAN do. As Paul points out, Labov has done some of the work addressing this. But note that Labov's work was done 40 years ago and no one has sought to replicate or do any kind of similar work. What gives? -greg -greg On Sat, Dec 20, 2014 at 11:37 PM, David H Kirshner wrote: > Greg, > > I'm delighted that you're familiar with and appreciative of Orr's work. > > Cleary she didn't provide "serious consideration of how AAE speakers > actually use prepositions"--she couldn't have, as she was not a native > speaker of Black English dialect, and she was not a linguist. But I'm not > sure how paying serious attention to technical nuances of Black English > grammar would have helped, as her analyses show that the African American > students in her classes were not speaking either standard English or Black > English Vernacular, but rather a hybrid that arises from their efforts to > emulate standard English. > > Now, it's true her work didn't parallel the approach Gay and Cole took to > understanding what other psychologists were classifying as linguistic and > cognitive deficits by carefully studying the native language and culture. > On the other hand, she did something Gay and Cole didn't do, namely > micro-analyze the linguistic miscues operating in the classroom, and the > resultant dilemmas of comprehension this created for her African American > students. > > As the excerpt copied below illustrates, Orr was scrupulously attentive to > understanding her students' experience of distance and location given the > different linguistic setting. And her analyses consistently point to the > mismatch between the native dialect and the language of instruction as the > source of the problems, not the native dialect, itself. To label this work > as implicitly racist, I think cedes too much to those who mistrust science > as a tool of the oppressor, and whose only locus of attention is the > history and legacy of social injustice. Even now, in this discussion, we > are missing the point. The major significance of Orr's work is not that > differences in grammatical structure have semantic implications. This is > merely a window to the dramatic realization that semantics are written into > grammatical form. > > David > > Excerpt from Orr (1987): > > "Jane gives us in these diagrams a glimpse into the kinds of mental images > she constructs when she is using the single symbol length, representing > both location and distance, as a tool with which to think. Even the > diagrams Jane drew for problems 13 and 14 begin to be less incomprehensible > if one attempts to construct in one's own mind images of the information > given in these problems, while adhering to the requirement that length be > used to represent both location and distance. They can be seen as possible > consequents or extensions of the symbol length when it is used to represent > both location and distance. Consider, for instance, the mental images one > might construct in responding to problem 13: Two cities, both represented > by line segments, are equal distances (that is, equal line segments) closer > to a third city (another line segment) than two other cities (line > segments) are. The first two cities must be represented by equal line > segments because they are equal distances closer to the third city than the > other two cities are. And these other two cities must also be represented > by equal line segments because they are equal distances from the third > city. One can see that Jane's diagrams are not as lacking in reason as they > may initially have appeared to be. > > "Jane's diagrams suggest the possibility that when words, or symbols are > used as instruments with which to think, the use in one language of a > single symbol in contexts where a second language requires two or more can > lead a speaker of the first language to arrive at a different mental > construct of some given information from that arrived at by a speaker of > the second language. Or, as in Jane's attempt to handle problem 14, the > result may be an inability to arrive at a workable mental construct at > all." (p. 25) > > [Note, this excerpt is part of a longer segment I emailed on Dec. 19 that > shows Jane's diagrams that Orr is referring to.] > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson > Sent: Saturday, December 20, 2014 3:14 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors > > The issues that are raised by Orr are indeed important ones. I am a fan of > her work as it points to important differences in language usage among AAE > speakers. I agree that she shouldn't have been condemned for pointing out > these differences (particularly considering how important it is for > teachers to understand the consequences of these differences). If you want > to help AAE speaking students do better on standardized tests, then you > absolutely need to pay attention to these differences. > > My one concern here is that I do feel like there is a problem of deficit > thinking that is at least implied in her work (and maybe "implied" is too > strong a term - maybe it's just that she doesn't provide evidence to > discourage us from this view). What we don't see in this book is any > serious consideration of how AAE speakers actually use prepositions - e.g., > the ways of using language that exist in the community of AAE speakers. > This gives Orr's work a feel somewhat like the studies of math among the > Kpelle studied by Gay and Cole in the pre-early days of LCHC (see wiki for > more: http://lchcfestschrift.wikispaces.com/Chapter+1). Before they > showed > up on the scene, everyone had assumed that the Kpelle (Liberia) couldn't > comprehend basic math concepts b.c. they weren't learning it in the ways > that it was being taught (and perhaps there were even linguistic relativity > arguments that pointed to this). Rather then continuing to pluck these > folks out of context and run them through various types of experiments, Gay > and Cole "explicitly began with the assumption that ?we must know more > about the indigenous mathematics so that we can build effective bridges to > the new mathematics that we are trying to introduce?" > >From their research, they found that the Kpelle actually had high > competence with complex mathematical problems (e.g., estimating volumes). > As they write: > "Overall, the data suggested that no generalized lack of mathematical, > perceptual, or problem solving abilities stood in the way of mathematics > education. When the materials and procedures used in assessment tasks were > designed to match closely valued local practices, lack of ability could be > replaced by apparent special ability. At the same time, schooling did > appear to influence performance in tasks that were routinely used to > measure cognitive development." > So I think I would be more comfortable with Orr's work if she were to have > included this kind of rich understanding of usage in context and how > prepositions actually are used among AAE speakers. > > This points to a larger question that might be irksome to some folks, but > the question regards the extent to which mathematical language is > predicated upon a particular form of what Whorf called "Standard Average > European." In short, the idea here is that Math has a history and a > culture. This doesn't mean that it is useless or a waste of time, just that > it is a particular way of encountering the world that is good for > particular things and not for others. > > I think we've gone round this mulberry bush before, but that was just more > grist for the mill (I prefer my metaphors mixed!). > > -greg > > > > > > On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 8:46 PM, David H Kirshner dkirsh@lsu.edu>> wrote: > > > > The topic of how grammatical form relates to meaning calls to mind the > > groundbreaking work of Eleanor Orr--whom you've probably never heard of > on > > account of the fact that her work was condemned by a politically-correct > > faction of race-conscious sociolinguists who decided her analysis of > Black > > English Vernacular could too easily be appropriated into racist > discourses > > about language deficiency. > > > > Orr was a Washington DC area teacher and principal in the 1970s and > 1980s, > > who traced math difficulties of her African American students to subtle > > grammatical differences between Black English dialect and standard > English. > > Her 1987 book goes into compelling detail to support the thesis that the > > meaning structure of basic mathematical terms is embedded in the > > grammatical setting in which those terms are expressed. For instance, the > > meaning of ?distance? is embedded in the grammatical structure ?distance > > from _________ to __________? where the place-holders hold locations; if > > you don?t have that grammatical structure, and you're in a linguistic > > environment in which that structure is assumed, you're likely not going > to > > be able to gain full access to the concept. > > > > The attached excerpts from her book--ignore the Forward, unless you'd > like > > some context--reveal some of her students' bizarre conceptions of > distance > > (and other basic mathematical concepts) as revealed in their diagrams. > Her > > approach involves linguistic analysis of sentences produced by her > African > > American students that she reads as collapsed versions of standard > English > > sentences, with differences in prepositional structure being highlighted > > (but other grammatical elements also are indicated). > > > > This work cuts against the grain of anything going on in mathematics > > education. The Piagetian view that dominates that field holds that basic > > concepts come about from reflection on our actions in our engagement with > > the material world. When language enters the conversation, it's with > > respect to semantic structure; to my knowledge, nobody's ever implicated > > syntax directly in basic quantitative understanding. > > > > This work is particularly interesting to me in connection with my > > 21-year-old son who is autistic, and whose grammatical function is > severely > > impaired. He has a decent vocabulary, but unless the setting for the > > conversation provides contextual clues, he can't piece together how the > > semantic elements are linked to one another. It is only recently that it > > occurred to me his lack of a secure sense of basic quantitative terms > like > > ?more? and ?less? may be rooted in his grammatical incapacities. > > > > The XMCA discussion, thus far, has touched on grammar with respect to > > lexical items such as prepositions. But we've not yet tied that to the > > grammatical forms that embed those lexical items. I'm very curious as to > > whether that further connection can be made. > > > > David Kirshner > > > > Orr, E., W. (1987). Twice as less: Black English and the performance of > > black students in mathematics and science. New York: W. W. Norton & > Company. > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg > > Sent: Friday, December 19, 2014 3:06 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors > > > > Yes, Haliday is essentially a Whorfian, and that's one of things that > > brings him close to Vygotsky. (Compare, for example, Chomsky, who is > > essentially anti-developmental in his ideas about language, and who now > > rejects the leading role played by social communication and says that > > communication is epiphenomenal to language, whose original purpose is > > thought.) For Sapir, and for Whorf, in the beginning of every major > > onotogenetic, sociogenetic, and even phylogenetic change in language > there > > has to be some change in the nature of communication. > > > > So what Andy says about the lack of the basis of modern science in Hopi > > applies perfectly well to English. When we read the scientific writings > of > > Chaucer on the astrolabe, for example, we do not see words like > > "reflection", "refraction" or "alignment". Chaucer uses words like > "bounce > > off", "bend through", and "line up" (note the use of prepositions, > > Helena!). Where did these words come from, and how did they make > scientific > > English possible? > > > > Most of us have no problem saying that Isaac Newton discovered the laws > of > > gravitation. But it's only a slight exaggeration to say that what he > really > > discovered was the meaning potential of words like "gravitation". Gravity > > is, of course, not a thing at all; that is, it's not an entity, but > rather > > a process, the process of falling down, or falling in (preps, again!). So > > how and above all why does it become an entity? > > > > It's interesting to compare Newton's writings on optics with Chaucer's on > > the astrolabe. The "Opticks" has a fixed format that we recognize almost > > instantly today: Newton describes his equipment (the prism and the dark > > room); he then narrates his method as a kind of recipe ("First, I did > this; > > then I did that") and draws conclusions, which he then formulates in > > mathematical terms (this is essentially the format of Vygotsky's lectures > > on pedology, so much so that when translating them we had some trouble > > determining the precise moment when Vygotsky turns to the blackboard to > > write his conclusion in the form of a law). > > > > In order to get them into mathematical shape, though, he has to make > > sentences that look a lot like equations. "The plumpness of the lens > yields > > a greater refraction of the light", "The reflection of the light from the > > glass results of the light striking the flatness of the glass" "The > > curvature of the spectacle glass supplies the lacking plumpness of the > > eye". In each of these, a quality or a process which would normally be > > realized as an adjective or a verb is suddenly realized by a noun, > creating > > an imaginary entity. > > > > That's grammatical metaphor. Something that is "canonically" realized by > a > > verb ("to grow") is suddenly realized nominally ("growth"), or something > > that is canonically a quality ('red") is realized verbally ("redden"). We > > even find related clauses realized as verbs ("She did not know the rules. > > So she died" is realized by "Death was brought about through ignorance", > > all of these examples from Halliday). In fact, the Genetic Law that > > Vygotsky formulates in "Mind in Society" ("Every higher mental function > is > > realized on two planes....") is really just one instance of grammatical > > metaphor. > > > > One of Chomsky's best known arguments for the radical innateness > > hypothesis is this. If I take a sentence like "Students who do not do > their > > homework do not do well" and I want to make a question, how do I know > which > > "do" to move to the front? Chomsky assumes that this knowledge is > > essentially innate; it is part of universal grammar. But you can see that > > "Do students who do not do their homework do well?" can be built up > through > > a process of what we might call "discourse metaphor"--whereby clauses > stand > > for > > exchanges: > > > > Mother: You did your homework, didn't you? > > Child: No. > > Mother: You didn't do your homework? Did you do well? > > Child: No. > > Mother: You didn't do well? > > Child: No. > > Mother: You didn't do you homework so you didn't do well. Do the other > > students do well? > > Child: Some of them. > > Mother: Who does well? Do students who do not do their homework do well? > > > > And this of course explains why wh-items like "who" and 'why" have two > > functions--one inside a clause, where it expresses an intra-mental > function > > (grammar) and one between them where it expresses an inter-mental > function > > (discourse). > > > > I realize that grammatical metaphor will seem rather dry and abstract and > > unpoetic to people who assume that metaphor is only of the lexical kind. > > But to me, and I think to most children, it is far far more powerful and > > far more important developmentally. In some ways, it's the lexical > metaphor > > that is responsible for the disenchantment of the child's world, while > the > > grammatical metaphor infinitely expands it. (And here, I'm afraid, I must > > stop--it's time for breakfast and anyway my one screen is used up!) > > > > David Kellogg > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > , or "the > > > > . He > > > > On 19 December 2014 at 15:15, Greg Thompson > > > wrote: > > > > > Helena and David, > > > I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the so-called > > > authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred tradition > > > to > > > Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi notion > > > of "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including English) > > > notion of "time" and how each of these languages offers different > > > affordances of meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual > > > understanding, English has a much more reified/objectified/entified > > > sense of time. (btw, I think the first paragraph is easier to follow > > > than the second - and in that first paragraph you'll find our old > friend > > "imagination"). > > > David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to? > > > -greg > > > > > > Taken from: > > > > > > http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/mousesite/Second > > > ary/Whorfframe2.html > > > > > > " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, sunset" are > > > with us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from other > > nouns. > > > They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in winter" > > > just as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are pluralized > > > and numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. Our > > > thought about the referents of such words hence becomes objectified. > > > Without objectification, it would be a subjective experience of real > > > time, i.e. of the consciousness of "becoming later and later"--simply > > > a cyclic phase similar to an earlier phase in that ever-later-becoming > > > duration. Only by imagination can such a cyclic phase be set beside > > > another and another in the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually > > > perceived) configuration. "But such is the power of linguistic analogy > > that we do so objectify cyclic phasing. > > > We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g., > > "phasing." > > > And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting > > > binomial formula of formless item plus form, is so general that it is > > > implicit for all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless items > > > like "substance, matter," by which we can fill out the binomial for an > > > enormously wide range of nouns. But even these are not quite > > > generalized enough to take in our phase nouns. So for the phase nouns > we > > have made a formless item, "time." > > > We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, in the > > > pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" in > > > the pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can say > > > and think "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." Let me > > > again point out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of milk" > > > or "a piece of cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a > > > summer" actually contains or consists of such-and-such a quantity of > > "time." > > > > > > In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., are not > > > nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They are a > > > formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, and > > > even other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a > > > locative pattern, like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It contains > > > no morpheme like one of "in the house" or "at the tree." It means > > > "when it is morning" or "while morning-phase is occurring." These > > > "temporal s" are not used as subjects or objects, or at all like > > > nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" or "summer is hot"; summer > > > is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions are hot, WHEN heat occurs. > > > One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or "summer recently." > > > There is no objectification, as a region, an extent, a quantity, of > > > the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested about time > > > except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no basis > > here for a formless item answering to our "time." " > > > > > > > > > > > > On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Helena Worthen > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to this: > > > > > > > > "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton > > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to create > > > > sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly > > > > productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific > > > > writing and thinking today." > > > > > > > > Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I lose you > > > > when > > > you > > > > say "created to talk about gravity as an entity". > > > > > > > > Thank you, > > > > > > > > Helena > > > > > > > > > > > > Helena Worthen > > > > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > > > > > > On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > > > > > > As Helena points out, prepositions are from the "grammatical" end > > > > > of > > > what > > > > > Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what > > > > > Halliday > > > calls > > > > > "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they have > > > > > three properties that words from the more "lexical" end do not > have: > > > > > > > > > > a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You can, > > > > actually, > > > > > but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you invent a new > > > > > name > > > > or a > > > > > new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can). > > > > > > > > > > b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific semantic > > > > > field > > > > (the > > > > > way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of > > > linguistics) > > > > > but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are used. > > > > > > > > > > c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the same > > > effect, > > > > > which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your argument" the > "in" > > > has > > > > > more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in "there's a fly > > > > > in > > > your > > > > > tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in Henry's > > > > > hands, > > > > refer > > > > > to a book or even a footnote. > > > > > > > > > > Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties pretty > > > > > much define the difference between learning and development, at > > > > > least as I understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on > > > > > functions indefinitely while development works by reorganizing the > > > > > closed set of functions you already have into new systems. > > > > > Learning is skill specific and local, while development is quite > > global in its implications. > > > > Learning > > > > > is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new systems, > > > > > while development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary (and > > > > > forget it > > > just > > > > > as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes away. > > > > > > > > > > For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of blue > > > > > that > > > > people > > > > > call the sky") are simply metaphors from the non-productive end of > > > > > the lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are crisp, > > > > > concrete, and vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the > > > > > nominalizations that > > > Newton > > > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to > > > > > create sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly > > > > > productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific > > > > > writing and > > > thinking > > > > > today. For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical metaphor is the > > > third > > > > > great moment in child development (after the break into mother > > > > > tongue > > > and > > > > > the break into disciplinary language in school work). > > > > > > > > > > Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" implies > > > > > zero dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two ("on a > > > > > line', 'on a > > > > > plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because they are > > > > > grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them with time: > > > > > 'at > > > a > > > > > point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. Compare: "at > > > > > Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very day), and > > > > > "in Christmas' (season). > > > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > > > On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen > > > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > >> > > > > >> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial > > > > >> relationships from the concrete material world into the > > > > >> conceptual imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 common > > > > >> ones, and > > > > between 70 > > > > >> and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far as" > > > > >> -- > > > > this > > > > >> is according to > > > > >> https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm > > > ). > > > > >> We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. Apparently, > > > > >> in English, they evolved from and did the job done by inflections > > > > >> in > > > parent > > > > >> languages, examples being cases and tenses. > > > > >> > > > > >> But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection > > > > >> like the dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial > > > > >> relationships > > > > suggested > > > > >> by contemporary prepositions. > > > > >> > > > > >> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about this. > > > > >> > > > > >> Helena Worthen > > > > >> helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > > >> > > > > >> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > > > >> > > > > >>> I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly > > > embodied, > > > > >> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to > > > > >> linguistics > > > > (For > > > > >> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on > > > ?lexicon?: > > > > >> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, > > > > >> being > > > > part > > > > >> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and > > > > >> Halliday > > > > see no > > > > >> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, > > lexico-grammar. > > > > (Lo > > > > >> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar, > > > > >> adding > > > > the > > > > >> ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings are > > > great > > > > >> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of > > > > >> that? In translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced? > > > > >>> Henry > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden > > > > wrote: > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the > > > metaphorical > > > > >> use of prepositions like: > > > > >>>> - "there is some value IN your argument" > > > > >>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again" > > > > >>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" > > > > >>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again" > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> and so on. > > > > >>>> Andy > > > > >>>> > > > > -------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > ---- > > > > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > > > > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> > > > > >>>> larry smolucha wrote: > > > > >>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself - > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic > > > > possibilities: > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in > > > > Thought > > > > >>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into > > > English > > > > >> 1962] > > > > >>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' > > > value > > > > >> of the > > > > >>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech > > > > vocalization). > > > > >>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that > > > > >>>>> are > > > > >> flammable > > > > >>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor > > > > >>>>> a > > > gas. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century > > > > >>>>> European > > > > >> Developmental > > > > >>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' > > > > >>>>> hence > > > > the > > > > >>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of > > > Piaget's > > > > >> Genetic > > > > >>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and > > > > >>>>> synthesis > > > > >> based on > > > > >>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in > > > > >>>>> Vygotsky's > > > > >> example of H2O. > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com > > > > >>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > >>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 > > > > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic > > > > >>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the > > parts. > > > > >>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more > > > > >>>>>> than > > > the > > > > >>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can > > > > >>>>>> ever > > > be > > > > >> imagined" > > > > >>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> A couple things to consider: > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination > > > > >>>>>> as the > > > > >> brain has > > > > >>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the > > > > >>>>>> simplest > > > level > > > > >> of the Gestalt > > > > >>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). > > > > >>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just > > > photographic. > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try > > > > >>>>>> to > > > > >> accurately reproduce > > > > >>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, > > > > >>>>>> the > > > > >> goal of combinatory > > > > >>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, > > > > >>>>>> dreams, > > > > >> musings, and even > > > > >>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of > > > objects > > > > >> and symbols. > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways > > > > >>>>>> that > > > > >> things and concepts can be > > > > >>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar > > > > >>>>>> and > > > > flour. > > > > >>>>>> I can add water and > > > > >>>>>> it > > > > >> dissolves a bit > > > > >>>>>> But adding heat > > > > >>>>>> changes > > > the > > > > >> combination into a pancake. > > > > >>>>>> [Is this synergistic?] > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more > > > > >>>>>> examples > > > > >> to put the discussion > > > > >>>>>> in the metaphysical realm. > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 > > > > >>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > > >>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the > > > > >>>>>>> case > > > > for > > > > >>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I > > > > >>>>>>> think > > > it's > > > > >> not > > > > >>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are > > > > >> associationists who > > > > >>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary > > > > >>>>>>> associationism > > > > >> exists and > > > > >>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as > mediation. > > > > >> Vygotsky > > > > >>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, > > > explain > > > > >> the > > > > >>>>>>> uniqueness of our species? > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels > > > > >>>>>>> for > > > its > > > > >> own > > > > >>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a > > > > >>>>>>> Piagetian perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian > > > > >>>>>>> one--true maturity > > > > as a > > > > >>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more > > > > >>>>>>> to it > > > > >> than > > > > >>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of > > > > >>>>>>> primate, > > > > and > > > > >> our > > > > >>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon > > > > >>>>>>> rocks > > > > in > > > > >> order > > > > >>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged > > > > >>>>>>> the > > > same > > > > >> way as > > > > >>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and > > > > >>>>>>> for > > > > >> language is > > > > >>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human > > > > >> exceptionalism. > > > > >>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for > > > > >>>>>>> the > > > > >> vanguard role > > > > >>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, > > > > prolonging > > > > >>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after > > > > >>>>>>> the > > > sick > > > > >> and the > > > > >>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial > > > > >>>>>>> organs > > > > >> (tools) and > > > > >>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for > > > > >>>>>>> our > > > > >> species, it > > > > >>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these > > > > >> "circuitous, > > > > >>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that > > > > >>>>>>> lead > > > our > > > > >>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always > > > > >>>>>>> been > > > > >> short on > > > > >>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for > > > > >>>>>>> material > > > > >> culture > > > > >>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: > > > > >> verily, here > > > > >>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of > > > > >>>>>>> attention is > > > > >> simply the > > > > >>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says > > > > >>>>>>> there are > > > > >> only two > > > > >>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So > > > > >> imagination is > > > > >>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, > > > > >>>>>>> and > > > > >> nothing > > > > >>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when > > > > >>>>>>> you > > > > hear > > > > >> the > > > > >>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there > > > > >>>>>>> to be > > > > >> able to > > > > >>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work > > > > >>>>>>> in > > > word > > > > >> meaning. > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who > > > > >>>>>>> was > > > > given > > > > >> a > > > > >>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been > > > > >>>>>>> mixed > > > with > > > > >> silver > > > > >>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of > > gold. > > > > >> Well, we > > > > >>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not > > > possible > > > > to > > > > >>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that > > > > >>>>>>> precisely. The > > > > >> method > > > > >>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the > > > > >>>>>>> "principal > > > of > > > > >>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes > > > > >>>>>>> palimpsest, a > > > > >> velum on > > > > >>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. > > > > Because > > > > >>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and > > > > >>>>>>> written > > > over > > > > >> every > > > > >>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, > > > > >>>>>>> the > > > > >> pressure > > > > >>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones > > > > >>>>>>> when > > > > the > > > > >> old > > > > >>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only > > > known > > > > >> Greek > > > > >>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their > > > > >> relationship > > > > >>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they > > > > >>>>>>> are > > > > >> related to > > > > >>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite > > > > similar > > > > >> to the > > > > >>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> David Kellogg > > > > >>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >> wrote: > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an > > > > associationist, > > > > >> ?sees > > > > >>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? > > > > >>>>>>>> Henry > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg < > > > dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > > > > > > > >> wrote: > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the > > > > >>>>>>>>> division > > > > >> between > > > > >>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, > > > > >>>>>>>>> because > > > > >> Ribot is > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> an > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal > > > > >>>>>>>>> form of > > > > >> attention. > > > > >>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the > > > > >>>>>>>>> transition > > > from > > > > >> forest > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> to > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division > > > between > > > > >> the two > > > > >>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and > > > > >>>>>>>>> commonsensical > > > > >> world of > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> the > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly > > > > >>>>>>>>> prosaic > > > uses > > > > >> in life > > > > >>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more > > > > "imaginative" > > > > >> (that > > > > >>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world > > > > >>>>>>>>> of the > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> farm,where > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long > > > > >>>>>>>>> winter > > > > >> months are > > > > >>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to > > > encounter > > > > >> talking > > > > >>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here > > > > >>>>>>>>> attention > > > > has > > > > >> to be > > > > >>>>>>>>> more voluntary. > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a > > > > >>>>>>>>> very > > > clear > > > > >>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that > > > > >> underpins > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> Ribot > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky > > > > >>>>>>>>> points > > > > out > > > > >> the > > > > >>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive > > > > >>>>>>>>> practices > > > > >> really > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> are > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of > > > imagination, > > > > >> there > > > > >>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between > > > > >>>>>>>>> human > > > > and > > > > >> animal > > > > >>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly > > > > >>>>>>>>> capable of > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> volitional > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). > > > > Without > > > > >> a > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> theory > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis > > > > >>>>>>>>> for > > > > Ribot's > > > > >>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological > > > > >>>>>>>>> functions at > > > > >> all. > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > > > > >>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole > > > > wrote: > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of > > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination, > > > > >> thanks to > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> all > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought. > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very > > > > >>>>>>>>>> influential > > > > >> around the > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> time > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I > > > > >>>>>>>>>> had > > > > >> seen work > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> on > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective > > > > >>>>>>>>>> equal > > > > >> reproductive? > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies > > > > >>>>>>>>>> of > > > > >> development > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> of > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of > > > > >>>>>>>>>> being > > > a > > > > >> relative > > > > >>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. > > > > >>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> bucket > > > list. > > > > >> This > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> from > > > some > > > > >> weeks > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> in > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > > >> segmented the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met > > aphorizing?. > > > > >> Puns, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > wrote: > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> and > > > they > > > > >> are > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> doing > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his > > > > >> followers as an > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel, so > > > > >> its of > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> course > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in > > > > >> translation, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> seems > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, > "recollection" > > > in > > > > >> this > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> passage, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter > > > > >> distinction to > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "memory." > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary > > > > >> discourse > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian > > > > >> colleagues have > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from > > > theorists > > > > >> who > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> clearly > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was > > > still > > > > >> possible > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> to > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, > > > > >> interestingly > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> links > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a > > > "voluntary" > > > > >> act. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Parts > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> stuff > > > > that > > > > >> was > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> also > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > >> creativity > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> and > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> see > > > > >> that the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> two > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found > > > himself > > > > >> writing. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> pretty > > > > old > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> approaches > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < > > > > >> ablunden@mira.net> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> but it > > > > >> may be > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> worth > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> place > > > to > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Imagination > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between > > > > >> Recollection and > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive > > > > >> Imagination, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> (2) > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> which > > > he > > > > >> says > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> leads > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> other > > > > >> words, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> the > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is > > > > >> accomplished > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> through > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >> > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > -- > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > >> Williams. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose > > > work i > > > > >> am > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> trying > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of > > > > >> productive > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive > > > imagination > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> develops. > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that > > > > >> there > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> must > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> be a > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> But > > > I > > > > >> learned > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > > > is > > > > >> linked > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> to > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > >> anticipation > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination > > > > >> (starting > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> look, and > > > > >> provides > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> a > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as > > > > fixed. > > > > >> This, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a > > > > ground > > > > >> to > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> take > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> part > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> preconceptions: > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> grammarian > > > > >> Langacker on > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> domains, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> particularly > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> full of > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> imagination > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > >> temporality: > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic > > > > >> structure), which > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> I > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> both > > > > >> individual > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < > > > > >> lpscholar2@gmail.com> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third > > > *space* > > > > >> and the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> his > > > > >> notion of > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is > > > > >> explored under > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > >> modalities > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of > > > knowing > > > > >> that is > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [perceived??] > > > if > > > > >> we > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> think > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *style* Larry On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> HENRY SHONERD < > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> say how > > > > >> jazzed up > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> I > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> am > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind > > > > as > > > > >> Larry > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> various > > > > >> triads, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> finally > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notebooks > > > > of > > > > >> the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> mind, as > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, > > > luega > > > > >> pa? > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> fuera. > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole < > > > mcole@ucsd.edu> > > > > >> wrote: > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, > > > attached > > > > >> are two > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT > > > > theorists > > > > >> like > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of > > > > >> imagination in a > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of > > > > >> productive > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no > > > > >> intention of > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> doing > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the > > > > >> attached > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these > > > philosophers, > > > > I > > > > >> came > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> upon > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> closely > > > > >> linked at > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> several > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, > > > > >> Ettienne and I > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a > > > means > > > > of > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> access > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander > > Suvorov. > > > > >> Moreover, > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> such > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct > > > > relevance > > > > >> to > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Kris's > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to > > > > >> concerns > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> about > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in > > > development. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. > > > > Perhaps > > > > >> they > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> will > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural > > > > >> science > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with an > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> -- > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > > > science > > > > >> with an > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> -- > > > > >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > > > > >>>>>>>>>> science > > > > >> with an > > > > >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > >>>>>> > > > > >>>>> > > > > >>>> > > > > >>> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > Assistant Professor > > > Department of Anthropology > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > Brigham Young University > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Mon Dec 22 08:00:40 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Mon, 22 Dec 2014 09:00:40 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors / Speaking of AAE In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: ?David Ki, No worries. No offense taken. But thanks for the just-in-case note. And yes, I agree to disagree. Respectfully, greg? On Mon, Dec 22, 2014 at 6:24 AM, David H Kirshner wrote: > > Greg, > > I disagree with you that Orr could/should have taken a more culturally > sensitive approach to her studies of AAE speakers' difficulties in > classrooms dominated by standard English instruction. But I in no wise > intended to imply your wishing she had done so places you among those who > consider her work as racist. I'm very sorry if my words suggested otherwise. > > David > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson > Sent: Sunday, December 21, 2014 9:36 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors > > In the interests of following the recently suggested injunction not to > directly address specific interlocutors, I'll talk in generalities (This > makes it a bit more challenging to have a conversation but it also makes > one think about the extractable and generalizable point that is beyond the > immediate context). > > In my previous post (apologies for drawing on prior context), I neither > suggested nor intended to imply that Orr's work is racist (do intentions > matter when it comes to meaning?). This speaks to some of the difficulties > of talking about issues of race. And in this connection let's not forget > the fact that this list-serve is dominated by white men - that doesn't mean > that we are necessarily racist but it does mean that we are likely to be > ignorant of many aspects of these issues. > > Nonetheless, I believe that we can overcome our ignorance through > education, by learning more about the issues - even when it comes to trying > to understand cultures and languages that we did not grow up with. And > while I think that there is good evidence for the linguistic relativity > hypothesis, I do not believe that language is a determining influence in > ALL thinking (Whorf uses the term "habitual" to describe the type of > thinking that is most susceptible to the influence of language). That means > that even if you don't speak AAE, you can still study it and even come to > understand how the grammatical forms lend themselves to particular ways of > understanding the world (this is what linguistic anthropology is all > about!). > > And this is my concern with Orr's work. With all academic work, I think it > is worth considering questions like "How would racists take up our > research?" In the case of Orr's work, my sense is that racists could easily > take up her research to argue (perhaps even by using the linguistic > relativity hypothesis) that AAE speakers are unable to do complex > mathematical thinking. This is why I would think that it is important to > give a positive articulation of what AAE does as a language. It is > certainly important to understand what it CAN'T do (e.g., help one learn > math in a particular way), but it is equally important to understand what > it CAN do. > > As Paul points out, Labov has done some of the work addressing this. But > note that Labov's work was done 40 years ago and no one has sought to > replicate or do any kind of similar work. What gives? > > -greg > > > > > -greg > > On Sat, Dec 20, 2014 at 11:37 PM, David H Kirshner wrote: > > > Greg, > > > > I'm delighted that you're familiar with and appreciative of Orr's work. > > > > Cleary she didn't provide "serious consideration of how AAE speakers > > actually use prepositions"--she couldn't have, as she was not a native > > speaker of Black English dialect, and she was not a linguist. But I'm not > > sure how paying serious attention to technical nuances of Black English > > grammar would have helped, as her analyses show that the African American > > students in her classes were not speaking either standard English or > Black > > English Vernacular, but rather a hybrid that arises from their efforts to > > emulate standard English. > > > > Now, it's true her work didn't parallel the approach Gay and Cole took to > > understanding what other psychologists were classifying as linguistic and > > cognitive deficits by carefully studying the native language and culture. > > On the other hand, she did something Gay and Cole didn't do, namely > > micro-analyze the linguistic miscues operating in the classroom, and the > > resultant dilemmas of comprehension this created for her African American > > students. > > > > As the excerpt copied below illustrates, Orr was scrupulously attentive > to > > understanding her students' experience of distance and location given the > > different linguistic setting. And her analyses consistently point to the > > mismatch between the native dialect and the language of instruction as > the > > source of the problems, not the native dialect, itself. To label this > work > > as implicitly racist, I think cedes too much to those who mistrust > science > > as a tool of the oppressor, and whose only locus of attention is the > > history and legacy of social injustice. Even now, in this discussion, we > > are missing the point. The major significance of Orr's work is not that > > differences in grammatical structure have semantic implications. This is > > merely a window to the dramatic realization that semantics are written > into > > grammatical form. > > > > David > > > > Excerpt from Orr (1987): > > > > "Jane gives us in these diagrams a glimpse into the kinds of mental > images > > she constructs when she is using the single symbol length, representing > > both location and distance, as a tool with which to think. Even the > > diagrams Jane drew for problems 13 and 14 begin to be less > incomprehensible > > if one attempts to construct in one's own mind images of the information > > given in these problems, while adhering to the requirement that length be > > used to represent both location and distance. They can be seen as > possible > > consequents or extensions of the symbol length when it is used to > represent > > both location and distance. Consider, for instance, the mental images one > > might construct in responding to problem 13: Two cities, both represented > > by line segments, are equal distances (that is, equal line segments) > closer > > to a third city (another line segment) than two other cities (line > > segments) are. The first two cities must be represented by equal line > > segments because they are equal distances closer to the third city than > the > > other two cities are. And these other two cities must also be represented > > by equal line segments because they are equal distances from the third > > city. One can see that Jane's diagrams are not as lacking in reason as > they > > may initially have appeared to be. > > > > "Jane's diagrams suggest the possibility that when words, or symbols are > > used as instruments with which to think, the use in one language of a > > single symbol in contexts where a second language requires two or more > can > > lead a speaker of the first language to arrive at a different mental > > construct of some given information from that arrived at by a speaker of > > the second language. Or, as in Jane's attempt to handle problem 14, the > > result may be an inability to arrive at a workable mental construct at > > all." (p. 25) > > > > [Note, this excerpt is part of a longer segment I emailed on Dec. 19 that > > shows Jane's diagrams that Orr is referring to.] > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson > > Sent: Saturday, December 20, 2014 3:14 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors > > > > The issues that are raised by Orr are indeed important ones. I am a fan > of > > her work as it points to important differences in language usage among > AAE > > speakers. I agree that she shouldn't have been condemned for pointing out > > these differences (particularly considering how important it is for > > teachers to understand the consequences of these differences). If you > want > > to help AAE speaking students do better on standardized tests, then you > > absolutely need to pay attention to these differences. > > > > My one concern here is that I do feel like there is a problem of deficit > > thinking that is at least implied in her work (and maybe "implied" is too > > strong a term - maybe it's just that she doesn't provide evidence to > > discourage us from this view). What we don't see in this book is any > > serious consideration of how AAE speakers actually use prepositions - > e.g., > > the ways of using language that exist in the community of AAE speakers. > > This gives Orr's work a feel somewhat like the studies of math among the > > Kpelle studied by Gay and Cole in the pre-early days of LCHC (see wiki > for > > more: http://lchcfestschrift.wikispaces.com/Chapter+1). Before they > > showed > > up on the scene, everyone had assumed that the Kpelle (Liberia) couldn't > > comprehend basic math concepts b.c. they weren't learning it in the ways > > that it was being taught (and perhaps there were even linguistic > relativity > > arguments that pointed to this). Rather then continuing to pluck these > > folks out of context and run them through various types of experiments, > Gay > > and Cole "explicitly began with the assumption that ?we must know more > > about the indigenous mathematics so that we can build effective bridges > to > > the new mathematics that we are trying to introduce?" > > >From their research, they found that the Kpelle actually had high > > competence with complex mathematical problems (e.g., estimating volumes). > > As they write: > > "Overall, the data suggested that no generalized lack of mathematical, > > perceptual, or problem solving abilities stood in the way of mathematics > > education. When the materials and procedures used in assessment tasks > were > > designed to match closely valued local practices, lack of ability could > be > > replaced by apparent special ability. At the same time, schooling did > > appear to influence performance in tasks that were routinely used to > > measure cognitive development." > > So I think I would be more comfortable with Orr's work if she were to > have > > included this kind of rich understanding of usage in context and how > > prepositions actually are used among AAE speakers. > > > > This points to a larger question that might be irksome to some folks, but > > the question regards the extent to which mathematical language is > > predicated upon a particular form of what Whorf called "Standard Average > > European." In short, the idea here is that Math has a history and a > > culture. This doesn't mean that it is useless or a waste of time, just > that > > it is a particular way of encountering the world that is good for > > particular things and not for others. > > > > I think we've gone round this mulberry bush before, but that was just > more > > grist for the mill (I prefer my metaphors mixed!). > > > > -greg > > > > > > > > > > > > On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 8:46 PM, David H Kirshner > dkirsh@lsu.edu>> wrote: > > > > > > The topic of how grammatical form relates to meaning calls to mind the > > > groundbreaking work of Eleanor Orr--whom you've probably never heard of > > on > > > account of the fact that her work was condemned by a > politically-correct > > > faction of race-conscious sociolinguists who decided her analysis of > > Black > > > English Vernacular could too easily be appropriated into racist > > discourses > > > about language deficiency. > > > > > > Orr was a Washington DC area teacher and principal in the 1970s and > > 1980s, > > > who traced math difficulties of her African American students to subtle > > > grammatical differences between Black English dialect and standard > > English. > > > Her 1987 book goes into compelling detail to support the thesis that > the > > > meaning structure of basic mathematical terms is embedded in the > > > grammatical setting in which those terms are expressed. For instance, > the > > > meaning of ?distance? is embedded in the grammatical structure > ?distance > > > from _________ to __________? where the place-holders hold locations; > if > > > you don?t have that grammatical structure, and you're in a linguistic > > > environment in which that structure is assumed, you're likely not going > > to > > > be able to gain full access to the concept. > > > > > > The attached excerpts from her book--ignore the Forward, unless you'd > > like > > > some context--reveal some of her students' bizarre conceptions of > > distance > > > (and other basic mathematical concepts) as revealed in their diagrams. > > Her > > > approach involves linguistic analysis of sentences produced by her > > African > > > American students that she reads as collapsed versions of standard > > English > > > sentences, with differences in prepositional structure being > highlighted > > > (but other grammatical elements also are indicated). > > > > > > This work cuts against the grain of anything going on in mathematics > > > education. The Piagetian view that dominates that field holds that > basic > > > concepts come about from reflection on our actions in our engagement > with > > > the material world. When language enters the conversation, it's with > > > respect to semantic structure; to my knowledge, nobody's ever > implicated > > > syntax directly in basic quantitative understanding. > > > > > > This work is particularly interesting to me in connection with my > > > 21-year-old son who is autistic, and whose grammatical function is > > severely > > > impaired. He has a decent vocabulary, but unless the setting for the > > > conversation provides contextual clues, he can't piece together how the > > > semantic elements are linked to one another. It is only recently that > it > > > occurred to me his lack of a secure sense of basic quantitative terms > > like > > > ?more? and ?less? may be rooted in his grammatical incapacities. > > > > > > The XMCA discussion, thus far, has touched on grammar with respect to > > > lexical items such as prepositions. But we've not yet tied that to the > > > grammatical forms that embed those lexical items. I'm very curious as > to > > > whether that further connection can be made. > > > > > > David Kirshner > > > > > > Orr, E., W. (1987). Twice as less: Black English and the performance of > > > black students in mathematics and science. New York: W. W. Norton & > > Company. > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg > > > Sent: Friday, December 19, 2014 3:06 PM > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors > > > > > > Yes, Haliday is essentially a Whorfian, and that's one of things that > > > brings him close to Vygotsky. (Compare, for example, Chomsky, who is > > > essentially anti-developmental in his ideas about language, and who now > > > rejects the leading role played by social communication and says that > > > communication is epiphenomenal to language, whose original purpose is > > > thought.) For Sapir, and for Whorf, in the beginning of every major > > > onotogenetic, sociogenetic, and even phylogenetic change in language > > there > > > has to be some change in the nature of communication. > > > > > > So what Andy says about the lack of the basis of modern science in Hopi > > > applies perfectly well to English. When we read the scientific writings > > of > > > Chaucer on the astrolabe, for example, we do not see words like > > > "reflection", "refraction" or "alignment". Chaucer uses words like > > "bounce > > > off", "bend through", and "line up" (note the use of prepositions, > > > Helena!). Where did these words come from, and how did they make > > scientific > > > English possible? > > > > > > Most of us have no problem saying that Isaac Newton discovered the laws > > of > > > gravitation. But it's only a slight exaggeration to say that what he > > really > > > discovered was the meaning potential of words like "gravitation". > Gravity > > > is, of course, not a thing at all; that is, it's not an entity, but > > rather > > > a process, the process of falling down, or falling in (preps, again!). > So > > > how and above all why does it become an entity? > > > > > > It's interesting to compare Newton's writings on optics with Chaucer's > on > > > the astrolabe. The "Opticks" has a fixed format that we recognize > almost > > > instantly today: Newton describes his equipment (the prism and the dark > > > room); he then narrates his method as a kind of recipe ("First, I did > > this; > > > then I did that") and draws conclusions, which he then formulates in > > > mathematical terms (this is essentially the format of Vygotsky's > lectures > > > on pedology, so much so that when translating them we had some trouble > > > determining the precise moment when Vygotsky turns to the blackboard to > > > write his conclusion in the form of a law). > > > > > > In order to get them into mathematical shape, though, he has to make > > > sentences that look a lot like equations. "The plumpness of the lens > > yields > > > a greater refraction of the light", "The reflection of the light from > the > > > glass results of the light striking the flatness of the glass" "The > > > curvature of the spectacle glass supplies the lacking plumpness of the > > > eye". In each of these, a quality or a process which would normally be > > > realized as an adjective or a verb is suddenly realized by a noun, > > creating > > > an imaginary entity. > > > > > > That's grammatical metaphor. Something that is "canonically" realized > by > > a > > > verb ("to grow") is suddenly realized nominally ("growth"), or > something > > > that is canonically a quality ('red") is realized verbally ("redden"). > We > > > even find related clauses realized as verbs ("She did not know the > rules. > > > So she died" is realized by "Death was brought about through > ignorance", > > > all of these examples from Halliday). In fact, the Genetic Law that > > > Vygotsky formulates in "Mind in Society" ("Every higher mental function > > is > > > realized on two planes....") is really just one instance of grammatical > > > metaphor. > > > > > > One of Chomsky's best known arguments for the radical innateness > > > hypothesis is this. If I take a sentence like "Students who do not do > > their > > > homework do not do well" and I want to make a question, how do I know > > which > > > "do" to move to the front? Chomsky assumes that this knowledge is > > > essentially innate; it is part of universal grammar. But you can see > that > > > "Do students who do not do their homework do well?" can be built up > > through > > > a process of what we might call "discourse metaphor"--whereby clauses > > stand > > > for > > > exchanges: > > > > > > Mother: You did your homework, didn't you? > > > Child: No. > > > Mother: You didn't do your homework? Did you do well? > > > Child: No. > > > Mother: You didn't do well? > > > Child: No. > > > Mother: You didn't do you homework so you didn't do well. Do the other > > > students do well? > > > Child: Some of them. > > > Mother: Who does well? Do students who do not do their homework do > well? > > > > > > And this of course explains why wh-items like "who" and 'why" have two > > > functions--one inside a clause, where it expresses an intra-mental > > function > > > (grammar) and one between them where it expresses an inter-mental > > function > > > (discourse). > > > > > > I realize that grammatical metaphor will seem rather dry and abstract > and > > > unpoetic to people who assume that metaphor is only of the lexical > kind. > > > But to me, and I think to most children, it is far far more powerful > and > > > far more important developmentally. In some ways, it's the lexical > > metaphor > > > that is responsible for the disenchantment of the child's world, while > > the > > > grammatical metaphor infinitely expands it. (And here, I'm afraid, I > must > > > stop--it's time for breakfast and anyway my one screen is used up!) > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > > > > > , or "the > > > > > > . He > > > > > > On 19 December 2014 at 15:15, Greg Thompson > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > Helena and David, > > > > I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the > so-called > > > > authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred tradition > > > > to > > > > Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi notion > > > > of "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including English) > > > > notion of "time" and how each of these languages offers different > > > > affordances of meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual > > > > understanding, English has a much more reified/objectified/entified > > > > sense of time. (btw, I think the first paragraph is easier to follow > > > > than the second - and in that first paragraph you'll find our old > > friend > > > "imagination"). > > > > David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to? > > > > -greg > > > > > > > > Taken from: > > > > > > > > > http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/mousesite/Second > > > > ary/Whorfframe2.html > > > > > > > > " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, sunset" > are > > > > with us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from > other > > > nouns. > > > > They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in > winter" > > > > just as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are pluralized > > > > and numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. Our > > > > thought about the referents of such words hence becomes objectified. > > > > Without objectification, it would be a subjective experience of real > > > > time, i.e. of the consciousness of "becoming later and later"--simply > > > > a cyclic phase similar to an earlier phase in that > ever-later-becoming > > > > duration. Only by imagination can such a cyclic phase be set beside > > > > another and another in the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually > > > > perceived) configuration. "But such is the power of linguistic > analogy > > > that we do so objectify cyclic phasing. > > > > We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g., > > > "phasing." > > > > And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting > > > > binomial formula of formless item plus form, is so general that it is > > > > implicit for all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless items > > > > like "substance, matter," by which we can fill out the binomial for > an > > > > enormously wide range of nouns. But even these are not quite > > > > generalized enough to take in our phase nouns. So for the phase nouns > > we > > > have made a formless item, "time." > > > > We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, in > the > > > > pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" in > > > > the pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can say > > > > and think "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." Let > me > > > > again point out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of milk" > > > > or "a piece of cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a > > > > summer" actually contains or consists of such-and-such a quantity of > > > "time." > > > > > > > > In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., are > not > > > > nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They are > a > > > > formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, and > > > > even other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a > > > > locative pattern, like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It contains > > > > no morpheme like one of "in the house" or "at the tree." It means > > > > "when it is morning" or "while morning-phase is occurring." These > > > > "temporal s" are not used as subjects or objects, or at all like > > > > nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" or "summer is hot"; > summer > > > > is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions are hot, WHEN heat occurs. > > > > One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or "summer > recently." > > > > There is no objectification, as a region, an extent, a quantity, of > > > > the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested about time > > > > except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no basis > > > here for a formless item answering to our "time." " > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Helena Worthen > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to this: > > > > > > > > > > "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton > > > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to > create > > > > > sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly > > > > > productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific > > > > > writing and thinking today." > > > > > > > > > > Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I lose you > > > > > when > > > > you > > > > > say "created to talk about gravity as an entity". > > > > > > > > > > Thank you, > > > > > > > > > > Helena > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Helena Worthen > > > > > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > > > > > > > > On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > As Helena points out, prepositions are from the "grammatical" end > > > > > > of > > > > what > > > > > > Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what > > > > > > Halliday > > > > calls > > > > > > "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they have > > > > > > three properties that words from the more "lexical" end do not > > have: > > > > > > > > > > > > a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You can, > > > > > actually, > > > > > > but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you invent a new > > > > > > name > > > > > or a > > > > > > new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can). > > > > > > > > > > > > b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific semantic > > > > > > field > > > > > (the > > > > > > way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of > > > > linguistics) > > > > > > but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are used. > > > > > > > > > > > > c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the same > > > > effect, > > > > > > which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your argument" the > > "in" > > > > has > > > > > > more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in "there's a fly > > > > > > in > > > > your > > > > > > tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in Henry's > > > > > > hands, > > > > > refer > > > > > > to a book or even a footnote. > > > > > > > > > > > > Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties pretty > > > > > > much define the difference between learning and development, at > > > > > > least as I understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on > > > > > > functions indefinitely while development works by reorganizing > the > > > > > > closed set of functions you already have into new systems. > > > > > > Learning is skill specific and local, while development is quite > > > global in its implications. > > > > > Learning > > > > > > is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new systems, > > > > > > while development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary (and > > > > > > forget it > > > > just > > > > > > as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes away. > > > > > > > > > > > > For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of blue > > > > > > that > > > > > people > > > > > > call the sky") are simply metaphors from the non-productive end > of > > > > > > the lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are crisp, > > > > > > concrete, and vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the > > > > > > nominalizations that > > > > Newton > > > > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to > > > > > > create sentences that look like mathematical equations, are > highly > > > > > > productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific > > > > > > writing and > > > > thinking > > > > > > today. For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical metaphor is > the > > > > third > > > > > > great moment in child development (after the break into mother > > > > > > tongue > > > > and > > > > > > the break into disciplinary language in school work). > > > > > > > > > > > > Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" implies > > > > > > zero dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two ("on a > > > > > > line', 'on a > > > > > > plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because they > are > > > > > > grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them with > time: > > > > > > 'at > > > > a > > > > > > point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. Compare: "at > > > > > > Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very day), and > > > > > > "in Christmas' (season). > > > > > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > > > > > On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen > > > > > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial > > > > > >> relationships from the concrete material world into the > > > > > >> conceptual imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 > common > > > > > >> ones, and > > > > > between 70 > > > > > >> and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far > as" > > > > > >> -- > > > > > this > > > > > >> is according to > > > > > >> https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm > > > > ). > > > > > >> We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. Apparently, > > > > > >> in English, they evolved from and did the job done by > inflections > > > > > >> in > > > > parent > > > > > >> languages, examples being cases and tenses. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection > > > > > >> like the dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial > > > > > >> relationships > > > > > suggested > > > > > >> by contemporary prepositions. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about this. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Helena Worthen > > > > > >> helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > > > >> > > > > > >> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > > > > >> > > > > > >>> I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly > > > > embodied, > > > > > >> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to > > > > > >> linguistics > > > > > (For > > > > > >> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on > > > > ?lexicon?: > > > > > >> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, > > > > > >> being > > > > > part > > > > > >> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and > > > > > >> Halliday > > > > > see no > > > > > >> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, > > > lexico-grammar. > > > > > (Lo > > > > > >> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar, > > > > > >> adding > > > > > the > > > > > >> ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings > are > > > > great > > > > > >> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of > > > > > >> that? In translation from Russian is word coining ever > practiced? > > > > > >>> Henry > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the > > > > metaphorical > > > > > >> use of prepositions like: > > > > > >>>> - "there is some value IN your argument" > > > > > >>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again" > > > > > >>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" > > > > > >>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again" > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> and so on. > > > > > >>>> Andy > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > -------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > > ---- > > > > > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > > > > > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> larry smolucha wrote: > > > > > >>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself - > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic > > > > > possibilities: > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published > in > > > > > Thought > > > > > >>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into > > > > English > > > > > >> 1962] > > > > > >>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the > 'additive' > > > > value > > > > > >> of the > > > > > >>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech > > > > > vocalization). > > > > > >>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements > that > > > > > >>>>> are > > > > > >> flammable > > > > > >>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable > nor > > > > > >>>>> a > > > > gas. > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century > > > > > >>>>> European > > > > > >> Developmental > > > > > >>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' > > > > > >>>>> hence > > > > > the > > > > > >>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of > > > > Piaget's > > > > > >> Genetic > > > > > >>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and > > > > > >>>>> synthesis > > > > > >> based on > > > > > >>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in > > > > > >>>>> Vygotsky's > > > > > >> example of H2O. > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com > > > > > >>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > >>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 > > > > > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be > synergistic > > > > > >>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the > > > parts. > > > > > >>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more > > > > > >>>>>> than > > > > the > > > > > >>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can > > > > > >>>>>> ever > > > > be > > > > > >> imagined" > > > > > >>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> A couple things to consider: > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination > > > > > >>>>>> as the > > > > > >> brain has > > > > > >>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the > > > > > >>>>>> simplest > > > > level > > > > > >> of the Gestalt > > > > > >>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). > > > > > >>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just > > > > photographic. > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try > > > > > >>>>>> to > > > > > >> accurately reproduce > > > > > >>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. > Whereas, > > > > > >>>>>> the > > > > > >> goal of combinatory > > > > > >>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, > > > > > >>>>>> dreams, > > > > > >> musings, and even > > > > > >>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of > > > > objects > > > > > >> and symbols. > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different > ways > > > > > >>>>>> that > > > > > >> things and concepts can be > > > > > >>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar > > > > > >>>>>> and > > > > > flour. > > > > > >>>>>> I can add water and > > > > > >>>>>> it > > > > > >> dissolves a bit > > > > > >>>>>> But adding heat > > > > > >>>>>> changes > > > > the > > > > > >> combination into a pancake. > > > > > >>>>>> [Is this synergistic?] > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more > > > > > >>>>>> examples > > > > > >> to put the discussion > > > > > >>>>>> in the metaphysical realm. > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 > > > > > >>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > > > >>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the > > > > > >>>>>>> case > > > > > for > > > > > >>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I > > > > > >>>>>>> think > > > > it's > > > > > >> not > > > > > >>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are > > > > > >> associationists who > > > > > >>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary > > > > > >>>>>>> associationism > > > > > >> exists and > > > > > >>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as > > mediation. > > > > > >> Vygotsky > > > > > >>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, > > > > explain > > > > > >> the > > > > > >>>>>>> uniqueness of our species? > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels > > > > > >>>>>>> for > > > > its > > > > > >> own > > > > > >>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a > > > > > >>>>>>> Piagetian perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian > > > > > >>>>>>> one--true maturity > > > > > as a > > > > > >>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more > > > > > >>>>>>> to it > > > > > >> than > > > > > >>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of > > > > > >>>>>>> primate, > > > > > and > > > > > >> our > > > > > >>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon > > > > > >>>>>>> rocks > > > > > in > > > > > >> order > > > > > >>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged > > > > > >>>>>>> the > > > > same > > > > > >> way as > > > > > >>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and > > > > > >>>>>>> for > > > > > >> language is > > > > > >>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human > > > > > >> exceptionalism. > > > > > >>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for > > > > > >>>>>>> the > > > > > >> vanguard role > > > > > >>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, > > > > > prolonging > > > > > >>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after > > > > > >>>>>>> the > > > > sick > > > > > >> and the > > > > > >>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial > > > > > >>>>>>> organs > > > > > >> (tools) and > > > > > >>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for > > > > > >>>>>>> our > > > > > >> species, it > > > > > >>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these > > > > > >> "circuitous, > > > > > >>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that > > > > > >>>>>>> lead > > > > our > > > > > >>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always > > > > > >>>>>>> been > > > > > >> short on > > > > > >>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for > > > > > >>>>>>> material > > > > > >> culture > > > > > >>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another > matter: > > > > > >> verily, here > > > > > >>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of > > > > > >>>>>>> attention is > > > > > >> simply the > > > > > >>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says > > > > > >>>>>>> there are > > > > > >> only two > > > > > >>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So > > > > > >> imagination is > > > > > >>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete > experiences, > > > > > >>>>>>> and > > > > > >> nothing > > > > > >>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when > > > > > >>>>>>> you > > > > > hear > > > > > >> the > > > > > >>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there > > > > > >>>>>>> to be > > > > > >> able to > > > > > >>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work > > > > > >>>>>>> in > > > > word > > > > > >> meaning. > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who > > > > > >>>>>>> was > > > > > given > > > > > >> a > > > > > >>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been > > > > > >>>>>>> mixed > > > > with > > > > > >> silver > > > > > >>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of > > > gold. > > > > > >> Well, we > > > > > >>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not > > > > possible > > > > > to > > > > > >>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that > > > > > >>>>>>> precisely. The > > > > > >> method > > > > > >>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the > > > > > >>>>>>> "principal > > > > of > > > > > >>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes > > > > > >>>>>>> palimpsest, a > > > > > >> velum on > > > > > >>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each > other. > > > > > Because > > > > > >>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and > > > > > >>>>>>> written > > > > over > > > > > >> every > > > > > >>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was > soft, > > > > > >>>>>>> the > > > > > >> pressure > > > > > >>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones > > > > > >>>>>>> when > > > > > the > > > > > >> old > > > > > >>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the > only > > > > known > > > > > >> Greek > > > > > >>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor > their > > > > > >> relationship > > > > > >>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they > > > > > >>>>>>> are > > > > > >> related to > > > > > >>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's > quite > > > > > similar > > > > > >> to the > > > > > >>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> David Kellogg > > > > > >>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > >> wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an > > > > > associationist, > > > > > >> ?sees > > > > > >>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? > > > > > >>>>>>>> Henry > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg < > > > > dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > > > > > > > > > >> wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the > > > > > >>>>>>>>> division > > > > > >> between > > > > > >>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, > > > > > >>>>>>>>> because > > > > > >> Ribot is > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> an > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal > > > > > >>>>>>>>> form of > > > > > >> attention. > > > > > >>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the > > > > > >>>>>>>>> transition > > > > from > > > > > >> forest > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> to > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division > > > > between > > > > > >> the two > > > > > >>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and > > > > > >>>>>>>>> commonsensical > > > > > >> world of > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> the > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly > > > > > >>>>>>>>> prosaic > > > > uses > > > > > >> in life > > > > > >>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more > > > > > "imaginative" > > > > > >> (that > > > > > >>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world > > > > > >>>>>>>>> of the > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> farm,where > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long > > > > > >>>>>>>>> winter > > > > > >> months are > > > > > >>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to > > > > encounter > > > > > >> talking > > > > > >>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here > > > > > >>>>>>>>> attention > > > > > has > > > > > >> to be > > > > > >>>>>>>>> more voluntary. > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a > > > > > >>>>>>>>> very > > > > clear > > > > > >>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism > that > > > > > >> underpins > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> Ribot > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky > > > > > >>>>>>>>> points > > > > > out > > > > > >> the > > > > > >>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive > > > > > >>>>>>>>> practices > > > > > >> really > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> are > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of > > > > imagination, > > > > > >> there > > > > > >>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between > > > > > >>>>>>>>> human > > > > > and > > > > > >> animal > > > > > >>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly > > > > > >>>>>>>>> capable of > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> volitional > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than > humans). > > > > > Without > > > > > >> a > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> theory > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis > > > > > >>>>>>>>> for > > > > > Ribot's > > > > > >>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological > > > > > >>>>>>>>> functions at > > > > > >> all. > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > > > > > >>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination, > > > > > >> thanks to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> all > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> influential > > > > > >> around the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> time > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. > I > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> had > > > > > >> seen work > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> on > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> equal > > > > > >> reproductive? > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> of > > > > > >> development > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> of > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> being > > > > a > > > > > >> relative > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> bucket > > > > list. > > > > > >> This > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> from > > > > some > > > > > >> weeks > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> in > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > > > >> segmented the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met > > > aphorizing?. > > > > > >> Puns, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > they > > > > > >> are > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> doing > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his > > > > > >> followers as an > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel, so > > > > > >> its of > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> course > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in > > > > > >> translation, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> seems > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, > > "recollection" > > > > in > > > > > >> this > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> passage, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter > > > > > >> distinction to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "memory." > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary > > > > > >> discourse > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian > > > > > >> colleagues have > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from > > > > theorists > > > > > >> who > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> clearly > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it > was > > > > still > > > > > >> possible > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, > > > > > >> interestingly > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> links > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a > > > > "voluntary" > > > > > >> act. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Parts > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> stuff > > > > > that > > > > > >> was > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> also > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > > >> creativity > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> and > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious > to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> see > > > > > >> that the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> two > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found > > > > himself > > > > > >> writing. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> pretty > > > > > old > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> approaches > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < > > > > > >> ablunden@mira.net> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> but it > > > > > >> may be > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> worth > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> place > > > > to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Imagination > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between > > > > > >> Recollection and > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive > > > > > >> Imagination, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> (2) > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> which > > > > he > > > > > >> says > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> leads > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> other > > > > > >> words, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> the > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is > > > > > >> accomplished > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> through > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >> > > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > -- > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading > Strawson > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > > >> Williams. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists > whose > > > > work i > > > > > >> am > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> trying > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of > > > > > >> productive > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive > > > > imagination > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> develops. > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive > implies > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that > > > > > >> there > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> must > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> be a > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive > imagination. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> But > > > > I > > > > > >> learned > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination > appears > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > is > > > > > >> linked > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > > >> anticipation > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination > > > > > >> (starting > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> look, and > > > > > >> provides > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> a > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as > > > > > fixed. > > > > > >> This, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a > > > > > ground > > > > > >> to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> take > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> part > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> preconceptions: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> grammarian > > > > > >> Langacker on > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> domains, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> particularly > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> full of > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> imagination > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > > >> temporality: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic > > > > > >> structure), which > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> I > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> both > > > > > >> individual > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < > > > > > >> lpscholar2@gmail.com> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third > > > > *space* > > > > > >> and the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> his > > > > > >> notion of > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion > is > > > > > >> explored under > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a > *set* > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > > >> modalities > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of > > > > knowing > > > > > >> that is > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [perceived??] > > > > if > > > > > >> we > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> think > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *style* Larry On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> HENRY SHONERD < > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> say how > > > > > >> jazzed up > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> I > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> am > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, > the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind > > > > > as > > > > > >> Larry > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> various > > > > > >> triads, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> finally > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notebooks > > > > > of > > > > > >> the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> mind, as > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap > adentro, > > > > luega > > > > > >> pa? > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> fuera. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole < > > > > mcole@ucsd.edu> > > > > > >> wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, > > > > attached > > > > > >> are two > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT > > > > > theorists > > > > > >> like > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of > > > > > >> imagination in a > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion > of > > > > > >> productive > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have > no > > > > > >> intention of > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> doing > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the > > > > > >> attached > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these > > > > philosophers, > > > > > I > > > > > >> came > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> upon > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> closely > > > > > >> linked at > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> several > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our > naivete, > > > > > >> Ettienne and I > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as > a > > > > means > > > > > of > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> access > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander > > > Suvorov. > > > > > >> Moreover, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> such > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct > > > > > relevance > > > > > >> to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Kris's > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to > > > > > >> concerns > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> about > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in > > > > development. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination > thread. > > > > > Perhaps > > > > > >> they > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> will > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural > > > > > >> science > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with an > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson.pdf> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> -- > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > > > > science > > > > > >> with an > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> -- > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> science > > > > > >> with an > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > > Assistant Professor > > > > Department of Anthropology > > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > > Brigham Young University > > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon Dec 22 08:33:34 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 22 Dec 2014 08:33:34 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors / Speaking of AAE In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: I am not in general following this thread, being waaaaaaaaaaaaaay behind on the imagination thread, but I tripped over the exchange regarding Orr and AAE. To keep it short, I attach two documents. The first is a draft segment from Cultural Psychology (1996) and the other an empirical report of even greater activity. For those who do not know the Labov work, the Word file might prove useful. for those of you for whom this topic is of continuing interest, perhaps the published paper is of more value. It is not true that no one followed up on Labov. It is probably true that no one followed up on the followup. mike On Mon, Dec 22, 2014 at 8:00 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > ?David Ki, > No worries. No offense taken. But thanks for the just-in-case note. > And yes, I agree to disagree. > Respectfully, > greg? > > On Mon, Dec 22, 2014 at 6:24 AM, David H Kirshner wrote: > > > > Greg, > > > > I disagree with you that Orr could/should have taken a more culturally > > sensitive approach to her studies of AAE speakers' difficulties in > > classrooms dominated by standard English instruction. But I in no wise > > intended to imply your wishing she had done so places you among those who > > consider her work as racist. I'm very sorry if my words suggested > otherwise. > > > > David > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg > Thompson > > Sent: Sunday, December 21, 2014 9:36 AM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors > > > > In the interests of following the recently suggested injunction not to > > directly address specific interlocutors, I'll talk in generalities (This > > makes it a bit more challenging to have a conversation but it also makes > > one think about the extractable and generalizable point that is beyond > the > > immediate context). > > > > In my previous post (apologies for drawing on prior context), I neither > > suggested nor intended to imply that Orr's work is racist (do intentions > > matter when it comes to meaning?). This speaks to some of the > difficulties > > of talking about issues of race. And in this connection let's not forget > > the fact that this list-serve is dominated by white men - that doesn't > mean > > that we are necessarily racist but it does mean that we are likely to be > > ignorant of many aspects of these issues. > > > > Nonetheless, I believe that we can overcome our ignorance through > > education, by learning more about the issues - even when it comes to > trying > > to understand cultures and languages that we did not grow up with. And > > while I think that there is good evidence for the linguistic relativity > > hypothesis, I do not believe that language is a determining influence in > > ALL thinking (Whorf uses the term "habitual" to describe the type of > > thinking that is most susceptible to the influence of language). That > means > > that even if you don't speak AAE, you can still study it and even come to > > understand how the grammatical forms lend themselves to particular ways > of > > understanding the world (this is what linguistic anthropology is all > > about!). > > > > And this is my concern with Orr's work. With all academic work, I think > it > > is worth considering questions like "How would racists take up our > > research?" In the case of Orr's work, my sense is that racists could > easily > > take up her research to argue (perhaps even by using the linguistic > > relativity hypothesis) that AAE speakers are unable to do complex > > mathematical thinking. This is why I would think that it is important to > > give a positive articulation of what AAE does as a language. It is > > certainly important to understand what it CAN'T do (e.g., help one learn > > math in a particular way), but it is equally important to understand what > > it CAN do. > > > > As Paul points out, Labov has done some of the work addressing this. But > > note that Labov's work was done 40 years ago and no one has sought to > > replicate or do any kind of similar work. What gives? > > > > -greg > > > > > > > > > > -greg > > > > On Sat, Dec 20, 2014 at 11:37 PM, David H Kirshner > wrote: > > > > > Greg, > > > > > > I'm delighted that you're familiar with and appreciative of Orr's work. > > > > > > Cleary she didn't provide "serious consideration of how AAE speakers > > > actually use prepositions"--she couldn't have, as she was not a native > > > speaker of Black English dialect, and she was not a linguist. But I'm > not > > > sure how paying serious attention to technical nuances of Black English > > > grammar would have helped, as her analyses show that the African > American > > > students in her classes were not speaking either standard English or > > Black > > > English Vernacular, but rather a hybrid that arises from their efforts > to > > > emulate standard English. > > > > > > Now, it's true her work didn't parallel the approach Gay and Cole took > to > > > understanding what other psychologists were classifying as linguistic > and > > > cognitive deficits by carefully studying the native language and > culture. > > > On the other hand, she did something Gay and Cole didn't do, namely > > > micro-analyze the linguistic miscues operating in the classroom, and > the > > > resultant dilemmas of comprehension this created for her African > American > > > students. > > > > > > As the excerpt copied below illustrates, Orr was scrupulously attentive > > to > > > understanding her students' experience of distance and location given > the > > > different linguistic setting. And her analyses consistently point to > the > > > mismatch between the native dialect and the language of instruction as > > the > > > source of the problems, not the native dialect, itself. To label this > > work > > > as implicitly racist, I think cedes too much to those who mistrust > > science > > > as a tool of the oppressor, and whose only locus of attention is the > > > history and legacy of social injustice. Even now, in this discussion, > we > > > are missing the point. The major significance of Orr's work is not that > > > differences in grammatical structure have semantic implications. This > is > > > merely a window to the dramatic realization that semantics are written > > into > > > grammatical form. > > > > > > David > > > > > > Excerpt from Orr (1987): > > > > > > "Jane gives us in these diagrams a glimpse into the kinds of mental > > images > > > she constructs when she is using the single symbol length, representing > > > both location and distance, as a tool with which to think. Even the > > > diagrams Jane drew for problems 13 and 14 begin to be less > > incomprehensible > > > if one attempts to construct in one's own mind images of the > information > > > given in these problems, while adhering to the requirement that length > be > > > used to represent both location and distance. They can be seen as > > possible > > > consequents or extensions of the symbol length when it is used to > > represent > > > both location and distance. Consider, for instance, the mental images > one > > > might construct in responding to problem 13: Two cities, both > represented > > > by line segments, are equal distances (that is, equal line segments) > > closer > > > to a third city (another line segment) than two other cities (line > > > segments) are. The first two cities must be represented by equal line > > > segments because they are equal distances closer to the third city than > > the > > > other two cities are. And these other two cities must also be > represented > > > by equal line segments because they are equal distances from the third > > > city. One can see that Jane's diagrams are not as lacking in reason as > > they > > > may initially have appeared to be. > > > > > > "Jane's diagrams suggest the possibility that when words, or symbols > are > > > used as instruments with which to think, the use in one language of a > > > single symbol in contexts where a second language requires two or more > > can > > > lead a speaker of the first language to arrive at a different mental > > > construct of some given information from that arrived at by a speaker > of > > > the second language. Or, as in Jane's attempt to handle problem 14, the > > > result may be an inability to arrive at a workable mental construct at > > > all." (p. 25) > > > > > > [Note, this excerpt is part of a longer segment I emailed on Dec. 19 > that > > > shows Jane's diagrams that Orr is referring to.] > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson > > > Sent: Saturday, December 20, 2014 3:14 PM > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors > > > > > > The issues that are raised by Orr are indeed important ones. I am a fan > > of > > > her work as it points to important differences in language usage among > > AAE > > > speakers. I agree that she shouldn't have been condemned for pointing > out > > > these differences (particularly considering how important it is for > > > teachers to understand the consequences of these differences). If you > > want > > > to help AAE speaking students do better on standardized tests, then you > > > absolutely need to pay attention to these differences. > > > > > > My one concern here is that I do feel like there is a problem of > deficit > > > thinking that is at least implied in her work (and maybe "implied" is > too > > > strong a term - maybe it's just that she doesn't provide evidence to > > > discourage us from this view). What we don't see in this book is any > > > serious consideration of how AAE speakers actually use prepositions - > > e.g., > > > the ways of using language that exist in the community of AAE speakers. > > > This gives Orr's work a feel somewhat like the studies of math among > the > > > Kpelle studied by Gay and Cole in the pre-early days of LCHC (see wiki > > for > > > more: http://lchcfestschrift.wikispaces.com/Chapter+1). Before they > > > showed > > > up on the scene, everyone had assumed that the Kpelle (Liberia) > couldn't > > > comprehend basic math concepts b.c. they weren't learning it in the > ways > > > that it was being taught (and perhaps there were even linguistic > > relativity > > > arguments that pointed to this). Rather then continuing to pluck these > > > folks out of context and run them through various types of experiments, > > Gay > > > and Cole "explicitly began with the assumption that ?we must know more > > > about the indigenous mathematics so that we can build effective bridges > > to > > > the new mathematics that we are trying to introduce?" > > > >From their research, they found that the Kpelle actually had high > > > competence with complex mathematical problems (e.g., estimating > volumes). > > > As they write: > > > "Overall, the data suggested that no generalized lack of mathematical, > > > perceptual, or problem solving abilities stood in the way of > mathematics > > > education. When the materials and procedures used in assessment tasks > > were > > > designed to match closely valued local practices, lack of ability could > > be > > > replaced by apparent special ability. At the same time, schooling did > > > appear to influence performance in tasks that were routinely used to > > > measure cognitive development." > > > So I think I would be more comfortable with Orr's work if she were to > > have > > > included this kind of rich understanding of usage in context and how > > > prepositions actually are used among AAE speakers. > > > > > > This points to a larger question that might be irksome to some folks, > but > > > the question regards the extent to which mathematical language is > > > predicated upon a particular form of what Whorf called "Standard > Average > > > European." In short, the idea here is that Math has a history and a > > > culture. This doesn't mean that it is useless or a waste of time, just > > that > > > it is a particular way of encountering the world that is good for > > > particular things and not for others. > > > > > > I think we've gone round this mulberry bush before, but that was just > > more > > > grist for the mill (I prefer my metaphors mixed!). > > > > > > -greg > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 8:46 PM, David H Kirshner > > > dkirsh@lsu.edu>> wrote: > > > > > > > > The topic of how grammatical form relates to meaning calls to mind > the > > > > groundbreaking work of Eleanor Orr--whom you've probably never heard > of > > > on > > > > account of the fact that her work was condemned by a > > politically-correct > > > > faction of race-conscious sociolinguists who decided her analysis of > > > Black > > > > English Vernacular could too easily be appropriated into racist > > > discourses > > > > about language deficiency. > > > > > > > > Orr was a Washington DC area teacher and principal in the 1970s and > > > 1980s, > > > > who traced math difficulties of her African American students to > subtle > > > > grammatical differences between Black English dialect and standard > > > English. > > > > Her 1987 book goes into compelling detail to support the thesis that > > the > > > > meaning structure of basic mathematical terms is embedded in the > > > > grammatical setting in which those terms are expressed. For instance, > > the > > > > meaning of ?distance? is embedded in the grammatical structure > > ?distance > > > > from _________ to __________? where the place-holders hold locations; > > if > > > > you don?t have that grammatical structure, and you're in a linguistic > > > > environment in which that structure is assumed, you're likely not > going > > > to > > > > be able to gain full access to the concept. > > > > > > > > The attached excerpts from her book--ignore the Forward, unless you'd > > > like > > > > some context--reveal some of her students' bizarre conceptions of > > > distance > > > > (and other basic mathematical concepts) as revealed in their > diagrams. > > > Her > > > > approach involves linguistic analysis of sentences produced by her > > > African > > > > American students that she reads as collapsed versions of standard > > > English > > > > sentences, with differences in prepositional structure being > > highlighted > > > > (but other grammatical elements also are indicated). > > > > > > > > This work cuts against the grain of anything going on in mathematics > > > > education. The Piagetian view that dominates that field holds that > > basic > > > > concepts come about from reflection on our actions in our engagement > > with > > > > the material world. When language enters the conversation, it's with > > > > respect to semantic structure; to my knowledge, nobody's ever > > implicated > > > > syntax directly in basic quantitative understanding. > > > > > > > > This work is particularly interesting to me in connection with my > > > > 21-year-old son who is autistic, and whose grammatical function is > > > severely > > > > impaired. He has a decent vocabulary, but unless the setting for the > > > > conversation provides contextual clues, he can't piece together how > the > > > > semantic elements are linked to one another. It is only recently that > > it > > > > occurred to me his lack of a secure sense of basic quantitative terms > > > like > > > > ?more? and ?less? may be rooted in his grammatical incapacities. > > > > > > > > The XMCA discussion, thus far, has touched on grammar with respect to > > > > lexical items such as prepositions. But we've not yet tied that to > the > > > > grammatical forms that embed those lexical items. I'm very curious as > > to > > > > whether that further connection can be made. > > > > > > > > David Kirshner > > > > > > > > Orr, E., W. (1987). Twice as less: Black English and the performance > of > > > > black students in mathematics and science. New York: W. W. Norton & > > > Company. > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg > > > > Sent: Friday, December 19, 2014 3:06 PM > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors > > > > > > > > Yes, Haliday is essentially a Whorfian, and that's one of things that > > > > brings him close to Vygotsky. (Compare, for example, Chomsky, who is > > > > essentially anti-developmental in his ideas about language, and who > now > > > > rejects the leading role played by social communication and says that > > > > communication is epiphenomenal to language, whose original purpose is > > > > thought.) For Sapir, and for Whorf, in the beginning of every major > > > > onotogenetic, sociogenetic, and even phylogenetic change in language > > > there > > > > has to be some change in the nature of communication. > > > > > > > > So what Andy says about the lack of the basis of modern science in > Hopi > > > > applies perfectly well to English. When we read the scientific > writings > > > of > > > > Chaucer on the astrolabe, for example, we do not see words like > > > > "reflection", "refraction" or "alignment". Chaucer uses words like > > > "bounce > > > > off", "bend through", and "line up" (note the use of prepositions, > > > > Helena!). Where did these words come from, and how did they make > > > scientific > > > > English possible? > > > > > > > > Most of us have no problem saying that Isaac Newton discovered the > laws > > > of > > > > gravitation. But it's only a slight exaggeration to say that what he > > > really > > > > discovered was the meaning potential of words like "gravitation". > > Gravity > > > > is, of course, not a thing at all; that is, it's not an entity, but > > > rather > > > > a process, the process of falling down, or falling in (preps, > again!). > > So > > > > how and above all why does it become an entity? > > > > > > > > It's interesting to compare Newton's writings on optics with > Chaucer's > > on > > > > the astrolabe. The "Opticks" has a fixed format that we recognize > > almost > > > > instantly today: Newton describes his equipment (the prism and the > dark > > > > room); he then narrates his method as a kind of recipe ("First, I did > > > this; > > > > then I did that") and draws conclusions, which he then formulates in > > > > mathematical terms (this is essentially the format of Vygotsky's > > lectures > > > > on pedology, so much so that when translating them we had some > trouble > > > > determining the precise moment when Vygotsky turns to the blackboard > to > > > > write his conclusion in the form of a law). > > > > > > > > In order to get them into mathematical shape, though, he has to make > > > > sentences that look a lot like equations. "The plumpness of the lens > > > yields > > > > a greater refraction of the light", "The reflection of the light from > > the > > > > glass results of the light striking the flatness of the glass" "The > > > > curvature of the spectacle glass supplies the lacking plumpness of > the > > > > eye". In each of these, a quality or a process which would normally > be > > > > realized as an adjective or a verb is suddenly realized by a noun, > > > creating > > > > an imaginary entity. > > > > > > > > That's grammatical metaphor. Something that is "canonically" realized > > by > > > a > > > > verb ("to grow") is suddenly realized nominally ("growth"), or > > something > > > > that is canonically a quality ('red") is realized verbally > ("redden"). > > We > > > > even find related clauses realized as verbs ("She did not know the > > rules. > > > > So she died" is realized by "Death was brought about through > > ignorance", > > > > all of these examples from Halliday). In fact, the Genetic Law that > > > > Vygotsky formulates in "Mind in Society" ("Every higher mental > function > > > is > > > > realized on two planes....") is really just one instance of > grammatical > > > > metaphor. > > > > > > > > One of Chomsky's best known arguments for the radical innateness > > > > hypothesis is this. If I take a sentence like "Students who do not do > > > their > > > > homework do not do well" and I want to make a question, how do I know > > > which > > > > "do" to move to the front? Chomsky assumes that this knowledge is > > > > essentially innate; it is part of universal grammar. But you can see > > that > > > > "Do students who do not do their homework do well?" can be built up > > > through > > > > a process of what we might call "discourse metaphor"--whereby clauses > > > stand > > > > for > > > > exchanges: > > > > > > > > Mother: You did your homework, didn't you? > > > > Child: No. > > > > Mother: You didn't do your homework? Did you do well? > > > > Child: No. > > > > Mother: You didn't do well? > > > > Child: No. > > > > Mother: You didn't do you homework so you didn't do well. Do the > other > > > > students do well? > > > > Child: Some of them. > > > > Mother: Who does well? Do students who do not do their homework do > > well? > > > > > > > > And this of course explains why wh-items like "who" and 'why" have > two > > > > functions--one inside a clause, where it expresses an intra-mental > > > function > > > > (grammar) and one between them where it expresses an inter-mental > > > function > > > > (discourse). > > > > > > > > I realize that grammatical metaphor will seem rather dry and abstract > > and > > > > unpoetic to people who assume that metaphor is only of the lexical > > kind. > > > > But to me, and I think to most children, it is far far more powerful > > and > > > > far more important developmentally. In some ways, it's the lexical > > > metaphor > > > > that is responsible for the disenchantment of the child's world, > while > > > the > > > > grammatical metaphor infinitely expands it. (And here, I'm afraid, I > > must > > > > stop--it's time for breakfast and anyway my one screen is used up!) > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > , or "the > > > > > > > > . He > > > > > > > > On 19 December 2014 at 15:15, Greg Thompson < > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > Helena and David, > > > > > I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the > > so-called > > > > > authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred > tradition > > > > > to > > > > > Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi > notion > > > > > of "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including > English) > > > > > notion of "time" and how each of these languages offers different > > > > > affordances of meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual > > > > > understanding, English has a much more reified/objectified/entified > > > > > sense of time. (btw, I think the first paragraph is easier to > follow > > > > > than the second - and in that first paragraph you'll find our old > > > friend > > > > "imagination"). > > > > > David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to? > > > > > -greg > > > > > > > > > > Taken from: > > > > > > > > > > > > http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/mousesite/Second > > > > > ary/Whorfframe2.html > > > > > > > > > > " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, sunset" > > are > > > > > with us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from > > other > > > > nouns. > > > > > They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in > > winter" > > > > > just as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are > pluralized > > > > > and numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. Our > > > > > thought about the referents of such words hence becomes > objectified. > > > > > Without objectification, it would be a subjective experience of > real > > > > > time, i.e. of the consciousness of "becoming later and > later"--simply > > > > > a cyclic phase similar to an earlier phase in that > > ever-later-becoming > > > > > duration. Only by imagination can such a cyclic phase be set beside > > > > > another and another in the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually > > > > > perceived) configuration. "But such is the power of linguistic > > analogy > > > > that we do so objectify cyclic phasing. > > > > > We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g., > > > > "phasing." > > > > > And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting > > > > > binomial formula of formless item plus form, is so general that it > is > > > > > implicit for all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless > items > > > > > like "substance, matter," by which we can fill out the binomial for > > an > > > > > enormously wide range of nouns. But even these are not quite > > > > > generalized enough to take in our phase nouns. So for the phase > nouns > > > we > > > > have made a formless item, "time." > > > > > We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, in > > the > > > > > pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" in > > > > > the pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can > say > > > > > and think "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." Let > > me > > > > > again point out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of > milk" > > > > > or "a piece of cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a > > > > > summer" actually contains or consists of such-and-such a quantity > of > > > > "time." > > > > > > > > > > In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., are > > not > > > > > nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They > are > > a > > > > > formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, > and > > > > > even other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a > > > > > locative pattern, like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It > contains > > > > > no morpheme like one of "in the house" or "at the tree." It means > > > > > "when it is morning" or "while morning-phase is occurring." These > > > > > "temporal s" are not used as subjects or objects, or at all like > > > > > nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" or "summer is hot"; > > summer > > > > > is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions are hot, WHEN heat > occurs. > > > > > One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or "summer > > recently." > > > > > There is no objectification, as a region, an extent, a quantity, of > > > > > the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested about time > > > > > except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no > basis > > > > here for a formless item answering to our "time." " > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Helena Worthen > > > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to this: > > > > > > > > > > > > "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that > Newton > > > > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to > > create > > > > > > sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly > > > > > > productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific > > > > > > writing and thinking today." > > > > > > > > > > > > Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I lose you > > > > > > when > > > > > you > > > > > > say "created to talk about gravity as an entity". > > > > > > > > > > > > Thank you, > > > > > > > > > > > > Helena > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Helena Worthen > > > > > > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > > > > > > > > > > On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > As Helena points out, prepositions are from the "grammatical" > end > > > > > > > of > > > > > what > > > > > > > Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what > > > > > > > Halliday > > > > > calls > > > > > > > "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they > have > > > > > > > three properties that words from the more "lexical" end do not > > > have: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You > can, > > > > > > actually, > > > > > > > but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you invent a > new > > > > > > > name > > > > > > or a > > > > > > > new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can). > > > > > > > > > > > > > > b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific > semantic > > > > > > > field > > > > > > (the > > > > > > > way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of > > > > > linguistics) > > > > > > > but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are used. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the > same > > > > > effect, > > > > > > > which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your argument" the > > > "in" > > > > > has > > > > > > > more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in "there's a > fly > > > > > > > in > > > > > your > > > > > > > tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in Henry's > > > > > > > hands, > > > > > > refer > > > > > > > to a book or even a footnote. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties > pretty > > > > > > > much define the difference between learning and development, at > > > > > > > least as I understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on > > > > > > > functions indefinitely while development works by reorganizing > > the > > > > > > > closed set of functions you already have into new systems. > > > > > > > Learning is skill specific and local, while development is > quite > > > > global in its implications. > > > > > > Learning > > > > > > > is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new > systems, > > > > > > > while development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary > (and > > > > > > > forget it > > > > > just > > > > > > > as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes > away. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of blue > > > > > > > that > > > > > > people > > > > > > > call the sky") are simply metaphors from the non-productive end > > of > > > > > > > the lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are crisp, > > > > > > > concrete, and vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the > > > > > > > nominalizations that > > > > > Newton > > > > > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to > > > > > > > create sentences that look like mathematical equations, are > > highly > > > > > > > productive, which is why they still form the basis of > scientific > > > > > > > writing and > > > > > thinking > > > > > > > today. For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical metaphor is > > the > > > > > third > > > > > > > great moment in child development (after the break into mother > > > > > > > tongue > > > > > and > > > > > > > the break into disciplinary language in school work). > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" > implies > > > > > > > zero dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two ("on a > > > > > > > line', 'on a > > > > > > > plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because they > > are > > > > > > > grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them with > > time: > > > > > > > 'at > > > > > a > > > > > > > point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. Compare: > "at > > > > > > > Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very day), > and > > > > > > > "in Christmas' (season). > > > > > > > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial > > > > > > >> relationships from the concrete material world into the > > > > > > >> conceptual imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 > > common > > > > > > >> ones, and > > > > > > between 70 > > > > > > >> and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far > > as" > > > > > > >> -- > > > > > > this > > > > > > >> is according to > > > > > > >> https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm > > > > > ). > > > > > > >> We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. > Apparently, > > > > > > >> in English, they evolved from and did the job done by > > inflections > > > > > > >> in > > > > > parent > > > > > > >> languages, examples being cases and tenses. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection > > > > > > >> like the dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial > > > > > > >> relationships > > > > > > suggested > > > > > > >> by contemporary prepositions. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about > this. > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> Helena Worthen > > > > > > >> helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >>> I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly > > > > > embodied, > > > > > > >> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to > > > > > > >> linguistics > > > > > > (For > > > > > > >> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on > > > > > ?lexicon?: > > > > > > >> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of > prepositions, > > > > > > >> being > > > > > > part > > > > > > >> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and > > > > > > >> Halliday > > > > > > see no > > > > > > >> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, > > > > lexico-grammar. > > > > > > (Lo > > > > > > >> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar, > > > > > > >> adding > > > > > > the > > > > > > >> ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings > > are > > > > > great > > > > > > >> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of > > > > > > >> that? In translation from Russian is word coining ever > > practiced? > > > > > > >>> Henry > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > >>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden < > ablunden@mira.net > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > >>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the > > > > > metaphorical > > > > > > >> use of prepositions like: > > > > > > >>>> - "there is some value IN your argument" > > > > > > >>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again" > > > > > > >>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" > > > > > > >>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again" > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > >>>> and so on. > > > > > > >>>> Andy > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > -------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > > > ---- > > > > > > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > > > > > > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > >>>> larry smolucha wrote: > > > > > > >>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > >>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself - > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > >>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic > > > > > > possibilities: > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > >>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published > > in > > > > > > Thought > > > > > > >>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated > into > > > > > English > > > > > > >> 1962] > > > > > > >>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the > > 'additive' > > > > > value > > > > > > >> of the > > > > > > >>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech > > > > > > vocalization). > > > > > > >>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements > > that > > > > > > >>>>> are > > > > > > >> flammable > > > > > > >>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable > > nor > > > > > > >>>>> a > > > > > gas. > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > >>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century > > > > > > >>>>> European > > > > > > >> Developmental > > > > > > >>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean > 'developmental' > > > > > > >>>>> hence > > > > > > the > > > > > > >>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of > > > > > Piaget's > > > > > > >> Genetic > > > > > > >>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > >>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and > > > > > > >>>>> synthesis > > > > > > >> based on > > > > > > >>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in > > > > > > >>>>> Vygotsky's > > > > > > >> example of H2O. > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com > > > > > > >>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > >>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 > > > > > > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be > > synergistic > > > > > > >>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the > > > > parts. > > > > > > >>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more > > > > > > >>>>>> than > > > > > the > > > > > > >>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new > can > > > > > > >>>>>> ever > > > > > be > > > > > > >> imagined" > > > > > > >>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> A couple things to consider: > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of > imagination > > > > > > >>>>>> as the > > > > > > >> brain has > > > > > > >>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the > > > > > > >>>>>> simplest > > > > > level > > > > > > >> of the Gestalt > > > > > > >>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). > > > > > > >>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just > > > > > photographic. > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to > try > > > > > > >>>>>> to > > > > > > >> accurately reproduce > > > > > > >>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. > > Whereas, > > > > > > >>>>>> the > > > > > > >> goal of combinatory > > > > > > >>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, > > > > > > >>>>>> dreams, > > > > > > >> musings, and even > > > > > > >>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation > of > > > > > objects > > > > > > >> and symbols. > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different > > ways > > > > > > >>>>>> that > > > > > > >> things and concepts can be > > > > > > >>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar > > > > > > >>>>>> and > > > > > > flour. > > > > > > >>>>>> I can add water > and > > > > > > >>>>>> it > > > > > > >> dissolves a bit > > > > > > >>>>>> But adding heat > > > > > > >>>>>> changes > > > > > the > > > > > > >> combination into a pancake. > > > > > > >>>>>> [Is this synergistic?] > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more > > > > > > >>>>>> examples > > > > > > >> to put the discussion > > > > > > >>>>>> in the metaphysical realm. > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 > > > > > > >>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > > > > >>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make > the > > > > > > >>>>>>> case > > > > > > for > > > > > > >>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I > > > > > > >>>>>>> think > > > > > it's > > > > > > >> not > > > > > > >>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are > > > > > > >> associationists who > > > > > > >>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary > > > > > > >>>>>>> associationism > > > > > > >> exists and > > > > > > >>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as > > > mediation. > > > > > > >> Vygotsky > > > > > > >>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking > religion, > > > > > explain > > > > > > >> the > > > > > > >>>>>>> uniqueness of our species? > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species > feels > > > > > > >>>>>>> for > > > > > its > > > > > > >> own > > > > > > >>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a > > > > > > >>>>>>> Piagetian perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian > > > > > > >>>>>>> one--true maturity > > > > > > as a > > > > > > >>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing > more > > > > > > >>>>>>> to it > > > > > > >> than > > > > > > >>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of > > > > > > >>>>>>> primate, > > > > > > and > > > > > > >> our > > > > > > >>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled > upon > > > > > > >>>>>>> rocks > > > > > > in > > > > > > >> order > > > > > > >>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged > > > > > > >>>>>>> the > > > > > same > > > > > > >> way as > > > > > > >>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions > and > > > > > > >>>>>>> for > > > > > > >> language is > > > > > > >>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human > > > > > > >> exceptionalism. > > > > > > >>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for > > > > > > >>>>>>> the > > > > > > >> vanguard role > > > > > > >>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other > species, > > > > > > prolonging > > > > > > >>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after > > > > > > >>>>>>> the > > > > > sick > > > > > > >> and the > > > > > > >>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial > > > > > > >>>>>>> organs > > > > > > >> (tools) and > > > > > > >>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important > for > > > > > > >>>>>>> our > > > > > > >> species, it > > > > > > >>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where > these > > > > > > >> "circuitous, > > > > > > >>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that > > > > > > >>>>>>> lead > > > > > our > > > > > > >>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth > always > > > > > > >>>>>>> been > > > > > > >> short on > > > > > > >>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for > > > > > > >>>>>>> material > > > > > > >> culture > > > > > > >>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another > > matter: > > > > > > >> verily, here > > > > > > >>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of > > > > > > >>>>>>> attention is > > > > > > >> simply the > > > > > > >>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says > > > > > > >>>>>>> there are > > > > > > >> only two > > > > > > >>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So > > > > > > >> imagination is > > > > > > >>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete > > experiences, > > > > > > >>>>>>> and > > > > > > >> nothing > > > > > > >>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, > when > > > > > > >>>>>>> you > > > > > > hear > > > > > > >> the > > > > > > >>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been > there > > > > > > >>>>>>> to be > > > > > > >> able to > > > > > > >>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at > work > > > > > > >>>>>>> in > > > > > word > > > > > > >> meaning. > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, > who > > > > > > >>>>>>> was > > > > > > given > > > > > > >> a > > > > > > >>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been > > > > > > >>>>>>> mixed > > > > > with > > > > > > >> silver > > > > > > >>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity > of > > > > gold. > > > > > > >> Well, we > > > > > > >>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not > > > > > possible > > > > > > to > > > > > > >>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that > > > > > > >>>>>>> precisely. The > > > > > > >> method > > > > > > >>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the > > > > > > >>>>>>> "principal > > > > > of > > > > > > >>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes > > > > > > >>>>>>> palimpsest, a > > > > > > >> velum on > > > > > > >>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each > > other. > > > > > > Because > > > > > > >>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and > > > > > > >>>>>>> written > > > > > over > > > > > > >> every > > > > > > >>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was > > soft, > > > > > > >>>>>>> the > > > > > > >> pressure > > > > > > >>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new > ones > > > > > > >>>>>>> when > > > > > > the > > > > > > >> old > > > > > > >>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the > > only > > > > > known > > > > > > >> Greek > > > > > > >>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor > > their > > > > > > >> relationship > > > > > > >>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact > they > > > > > > >>>>>>> are > > > > > > >> related to > > > > > > >>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's > > quite > > > > > > similar > > > > > > >> to the > > > > > > >>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> David Kellogg > > > > > > >>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > >> wrote: > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an > > > > > > associationist, > > > > > > >> ?sees > > > > > > >>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? > > > > > > >>>>>>>> Henry > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg < > > > > > dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > > > > > > > > > > > >> wrote: > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> division > > > > > > >> between > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> because > > > > > > >> Ribot is > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> an > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> form of > > > > > > >> attention. > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> transition > > > > > from > > > > > > >> forest > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> to > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the > division > > > > > between > > > > > > >> the two > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> commonsensical > > > > > > >> world of > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> the > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> prosaic > > > > > uses > > > > > > >> in life > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more > > > > > > "imaginative" > > > > > > >> (that > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the > world > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> of the > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> farm,where > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> winter > > > > > > >> months are > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to > > > > > encounter > > > > > > >> talking > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> attention > > > > > > has > > > > > > >> to be > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> more voluntary. > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> very > > > > > clear > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism > > that > > > > > > >> underpins > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> Ribot > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> points > > > > > > out > > > > > > >> the > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> practices > > > > > > >> really > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> are > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of > > > > > imagination, > > > > > > >> there > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference > between > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> human > > > > > > and > > > > > > >> animal > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> capable of > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> volitional > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than > > humans). > > > > > > Without > > > > > > >> a > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> theory > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> for > > > > > > Ribot's > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> functions at > > > > > > >> all. > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole < > mcole@ucsd.edu > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination, > > > > > > >> thanks to > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> all > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought. > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> influential > > > > > > >> around the > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> time > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th > century. > > I > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> had > > > > > > >> seen work > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> on > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> equal > > > > > > >> reproductive? > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical > studies > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> of > > > > > > >> development > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> of > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost > of > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> being > > > > > a > > > > > > >> relative > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> bucket > > > > > list. > > > > > > >> This > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> from > > > > > some > > > > > > >> weeks > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> in > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > > > > >> segmented the > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met > > > > aphorizing?. > > > > > > >> Puns, > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > > they > > > > > > >> are > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> doing > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and > his > > > > > > >> followers as an > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel, so > > > > > > >> its of > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> course > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories > emerge. > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in > > > > > > >> translation, > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> seems > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, > > > "recollection" > > > > > in > > > > > > >> this > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> passage, > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter > > > > > > >> distinction to > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "memory." > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary > > > > > > >> discourse > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out > Russian > > > > > > >> colleagues have > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated. > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from > > > > > theorists > > > > > > >> who > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> clearly > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it > > was > > > > > still > > > > > > >> possible > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> to > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" > which, > > > > > > >> interestingly > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> links > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a > > > > > "voluntary" > > > > > > >> act. > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Parts > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> stuff > > > > > > that > > > > > > >> was > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> also > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the > concepts > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > > > >> creativity > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> and > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious > > to > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> see > > > > > > >> that the > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> two > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he > found > > > > > himself > > > > > > >> writing. > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to > which > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> pretty > > > > > > old > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> approaches > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < > > > > > > >> ablunden@mira.net> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively > contemporary, > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> but it > > > > > > >> may be > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> worth > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a > prominent > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> place > > > > > to > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Imagination > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between > > > > > > >> Recollection and > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) > Reproductive > > > > > > >> Imagination, > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> (2) > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> which > > > > > he > > > > > > >> says > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> leads > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. > In > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> other > > > > > > >> words, > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> the > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is > > > > > > >> accomplished > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> through > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > > -- > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading > > Strawson > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > > > >> Williams. > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists > > whose > > > > > work i > > > > > > >> am > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> trying > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak > of > > > > > > >> productive > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive > > > > > imagination > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> develops. > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive > > implies > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that > > > > > > >> there > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> must > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> be a > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive > > imagination. > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> But > > > > > I > > > > > > >> learned > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination > > appears > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > > is > > > > > > >> linked > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> to > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable > part > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > > > >> anticipation > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination > > > > > > >> (starting > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> look, and > > > > > > >> provides > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> a > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the > socio-cultural > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as > > > > > > fixed. > > > > > > >> This, > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives > me > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a > > > > > > ground > > > > > > >> to > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> take > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> part > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> preconceptions: > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> grammarian > > > > > > >> Langacker on > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> domains, > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> particularly > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> full of > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> imagination > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two > aspects > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > > > >> temporality: > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic > > > > > > >> structure), which > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> I > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, > for > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> both > > > > > > >> individual > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < > > > > > > >> lpscholar2@gmail.com> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this > topic. > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the > third > > > > > *space* > > > > > > >> and the > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams > and > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> his > > > > > > >> notion of > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion > > is > > > > > > >> explored under > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a > > *set* > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > > > >> modalities > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form > of > > > > > knowing > > > > > > >> that is > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [perceived??] > > > > > if > > > > > > >> we > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> think > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *style* Larry On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> HENRY SHONERD < > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> say how > > > > > > >> jazzed up > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> I > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> am > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, > > the > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind > > > > > > as > > > > > > >> Larry > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> various > > > > > > >> triads, > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> finally > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notebooks > > > > > > of > > > > > > >> the > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> mind, as > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap > > adentro, > > > > > luega > > > > > > >> pa? > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> fuera. > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole < > > > > > mcole@ucsd.edu> > > > > > > >> wrote: > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination > thread, > > > > > attached > > > > > > >> are two > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the > issue. > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of > CHAT > > > > > > theorists > > > > > > >> like > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development > of > > > > > > >> imagination in a > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion > > of > > > > > > >> productive > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have > > no > > > > > > >> intention of > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> doing > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as > explicated > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the > > > > > > >> attached > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these > > > > > philosophers, > > > > > > I > > > > > > >> came > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> upon > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> closely > > > > > > >> linked at > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> several > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our > > naivete, > > > > > > >> Ettienne and I > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier > as > > a > > > > > means > > > > > > of > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> access > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander > > > > Suvorov. > > > > > > >> Moreover, > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> such > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have > direct > > > > > > relevance > > > > > > >> to > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Kris's > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also > speak > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to > > > > > > >> concerns > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> about > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in > > > > > development. > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination > > thread. > > > > > > Perhaps > > > > > > >> they > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> will > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural > > > > > > >> science > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with an > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > Strawson.pdf> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> -- > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a > natural > > > > > science > > > > > > >> with an > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> -- > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> science > > > > > > >> with an > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > > > Assistant Professor > > > > > Department of Anthropology > > > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > > > Brigham Young University > > > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > Assistant Professor > > > Department of Anthropology > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > Brigham Young University > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Preschoolers.doc Type: application/msword Size: 40960 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141222/12bfe4c9/attachment-0001.doc -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: cole.hall.dowley.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 2417387 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141222/12bfe4c9/attachment-0001.pdf From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Dec 22 08:28:44 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Mon, 22 Dec 2014 16:28:44 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors / Speaking of AAE In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: <1419265723100.30782@unm.edu> Can anyone say if and how Vygotsky's Development of Scientific Concepts in Childhood would pertain to this challenge? I see unclear connections. Does anyone else find something more clear than I? Also Gee's work on academic language comes to mind. Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Greg Thompson Sent: Monday, December 22, 2014 9:00 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors / Speaking of AAE ?David Ki, No worries. No offense taken. But thanks for the just-in-case note. And yes, I agree to disagree. Respectfully, greg? On Mon, Dec 22, 2014 at 6:24 AM, David H Kirshner wrote: > > Greg, > > I disagree with you that Orr could/should have taken a more culturally > sensitive approach to her studies of AAE speakers' difficulties in > classrooms dominated by standard English instruction. But I in no wise > intended to imply your wishing she had done so places you among those who > consider her work as racist. I'm very sorry if my words suggested otherwise. > > David > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson > Sent: Sunday, December 21, 2014 9:36 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors > > In the interests of following the recently suggested injunction not to > directly address specific interlocutors, I'll talk in generalities (This > makes it a bit more challenging to have a conversation but it also makes > one think about the extractable and generalizable point that is beyond the > immediate context). > > In my previous post (apologies for drawing on prior context), I neither > suggested nor intended to imply that Orr's work is racist (do intentions > matter when it comes to meaning?). This speaks to some of the difficulties > of talking about issues of race. And in this connection let's not forget > the fact that this list-serve is dominated by white men - that doesn't mean > that we are necessarily racist but it does mean that we are likely to be > ignorant of many aspects of these issues. > > Nonetheless, I believe that we can overcome our ignorance through > education, by learning more about the issues - even when it comes to trying > to understand cultures and languages that we did not grow up with. And > while I think that there is good evidence for the linguistic relativity > hypothesis, I do not believe that language is a determining influence in > ALL thinking (Whorf uses the term "habitual" to describe the type of > thinking that is most susceptible to the influence of language). That means > that even if you don't speak AAE, you can still study it and even come to > understand how the grammatical forms lend themselves to particular ways of > understanding the world (this is what linguistic anthropology is all > about!). > > And this is my concern with Orr's work. With all academic work, I think it > is worth considering questions like "How would racists take up our > research?" In the case of Orr's work, my sense is that racists could easily > take up her research to argue (perhaps even by using the linguistic > relativity hypothesis) that AAE speakers are unable to do complex > mathematical thinking. This is why I would think that it is important to > give a positive articulation of what AAE does as a language. It is > certainly important to understand what it CAN'T do (e.g., help one learn > math in a particular way), but it is equally important to understand what > it CAN do. > > As Paul points out, Labov has done some of the work addressing this. But > note that Labov's work was done 40 years ago and no one has sought to > replicate or do any kind of similar work. What gives? > > -greg > > > > > -greg > > On Sat, Dec 20, 2014 at 11:37 PM, David H Kirshner wrote: > > > Greg, > > > > I'm delighted that you're familiar with and appreciative of Orr's work. > > > > Cleary she didn't provide "serious consideration of how AAE speakers > > actually use prepositions"--she couldn't have, as she was not a native > > speaker of Black English dialect, and she was not a linguist. But I'm not > > sure how paying serious attention to technical nuances of Black English > > grammar would have helped, as her analyses show that the African American > > students in her classes were not speaking either standard English or > Black > > English Vernacular, but rather a hybrid that arises from their efforts to > > emulate standard English. > > > > Now, it's true her work didn't parallel the approach Gay and Cole took to > > understanding what other psychologists were classifying as linguistic and > > cognitive deficits by carefully studying the native language and culture. > > On the other hand, she did something Gay and Cole didn't do, namely > > micro-analyze the linguistic miscues operating in the classroom, and the > > resultant dilemmas of comprehension this created for her African American > > students. > > > > As the excerpt copied below illustrates, Orr was scrupulously attentive > to > > understanding her students' experience of distance and location given the > > different linguistic setting. And her analyses consistently point to the > > mismatch between the native dialect and the language of instruction as > the > > source of the problems, not the native dialect, itself. To label this > work > > as implicitly racist, I think cedes too much to those who mistrust > science > > as a tool of the oppressor, and whose only locus of attention is the > > history and legacy of social injustice. Even now, in this discussion, we > > are missing the point. The major significance of Orr's work is not that > > differences in grammatical structure have semantic implications. This is > > merely a window to the dramatic realization that semantics are written > into > > grammatical form. > > > > David > > > > Excerpt from Orr (1987): > > > > "Jane gives us in these diagrams a glimpse into the kinds of mental > images > > she constructs when she is using the single symbol length, representing > > both location and distance, as a tool with which to think. Even the > > diagrams Jane drew for problems 13 and 14 begin to be less > incomprehensible > > if one attempts to construct in one's own mind images of the information > > given in these problems, while adhering to the requirement that length be > > used to represent both location and distance. They can be seen as > possible > > consequents or extensions of the symbol length when it is used to > represent > > both location and distance. Consider, for instance, the mental images one > > might construct in responding to problem 13: Two cities, both represented > > by line segments, are equal distances (that is, equal line segments) > closer > > to a third city (another line segment) than two other cities (line > > segments) are. The first two cities must be represented by equal line > > segments because they are equal distances closer to the third city than > the > > other two cities are. And these other two cities must also be represented > > by equal line segments because they are equal distances from the third > > city. One can see that Jane's diagrams are not as lacking in reason as > they > > may initially have appeared to be. > > > > "Jane's diagrams suggest the possibility that when words, or symbols are > > used as instruments with which to think, the use in one language of a > > single symbol in contexts where a second language requires two or more > can > > lead a speaker of the first language to arrive at a different mental > > construct of some given information from that arrived at by a speaker of > > the second language. Or, as in Jane's attempt to handle problem 14, the > > result may be an inability to arrive at a workable mental construct at > > all." (p. 25) > > > > [Note, this excerpt is part of a longer segment I emailed on Dec. 19 that > > shows Jane's diagrams that Orr is referring to.] > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson > > Sent: Saturday, December 20, 2014 3:14 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors > > > > The issues that are raised by Orr are indeed important ones. I am a fan > of > > her work as it points to important differences in language usage among > AAE > > speakers. I agree that she shouldn't have been condemned for pointing out > > these differences (particularly considering how important it is for > > teachers to understand the consequences of these differences). If you > want > > to help AAE speaking students do better on standardized tests, then you > > absolutely need to pay attention to these differences. > > > > My one concern here is that I do feel like there is a problem of deficit > > thinking that is at least implied in her work (and maybe "implied" is too > > strong a term - maybe it's just that she doesn't provide evidence to > > discourage us from this view). What we don't see in this book is any > > serious consideration of how AAE speakers actually use prepositions - > e.g., > > the ways of using language that exist in the community of AAE speakers. > > This gives Orr's work a feel somewhat like the studies of math among the > > Kpelle studied by Gay and Cole in the pre-early days of LCHC (see wiki > for > > more: http://lchcfestschrift.wikispaces.com/Chapter+1). Before they > > showed > > up on the scene, everyone had assumed that the Kpelle (Liberia) couldn't > > comprehend basic math concepts b.c. they weren't learning it in the ways > > that it was being taught (and perhaps there were even linguistic > relativity > > arguments that pointed to this). Rather then continuing to pluck these > > folks out of context and run them through various types of experiments, > Gay > > and Cole "explicitly began with the assumption that ?we must know more > > about the indigenous mathematics so that we can build effective bridges > to > > the new mathematics that we are trying to introduce?" > > >From their research, they found that the Kpelle actually had high > > competence with complex mathematical problems (e.g., estimating volumes). > > As they write: > > "Overall, the data suggested that no generalized lack of mathematical, > > perceptual, or problem solving abilities stood in the way of mathematics > > education. When the materials and procedures used in assessment tasks > were > > designed to match closely valued local practices, lack of ability could > be > > replaced by apparent special ability. At the same time, schooling did > > appear to influence performance in tasks that were routinely used to > > measure cognitive development." > > So I think I would be more comfortable with Orr's work if she were to > have > > included this kind of rich understanding of usage in context and how > > prepositions actually are used among AAE speakers. > > > > This points to a larger question that might be irksome to some folks, but > > the question regards the extent to which mathematical language is > > predicated upon a particular form of what Whorf called "Standard Average > > European." In short, the idea here is that Math has a history and a > > culture. This doesn't mean that it is useless or a waste of time, just > that > > it is a particular way of encountering the world that is good for > > particular things and not for others. > > > > I think we've gone round this mulberry bush before, but that was just > more > > grist for the mill (I prefer my metaphors mixed!). > > > > -greg > > > > > > > > > > > > On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 8:46 PM, David H Kirshner > dkirsh@lsu.edu>> wrote: > > > > > > The topic of how grammatical form relates to meaning calls to mind the > > > groundbreaking work of Eleanor Orr--whom you've probably never heard of > > on > > > account of the fact that her work was condemned by a > politically-correct > > > faction of race-conscious sociolinguists who decided her analysis of > > Black > > > English Vernacular could too easily be appropriated into racist > > discourses > > > about language deficiency. > > > > > > Orr was a Washington DC area teacher and principal in the 1970s and > > 1980s, > > > who traced math difficulties of her African American students to subtle > > > grammatical differences between Black English dialect and standard > > English. > > > Her 1987 book goes into compelling detail to support the thesis that > the > > > meaning structure of basic mathematical terms is embedded in the > > > grammatical setting in which those terms are expressed. For instance, > the > > > meaning of ?distance? is embedded in the grammatical structure > ?distance > > > from _________ to __________? where the place-holders hold locations; > if > > > you don?t have that grammatical structure, and you're in a linguistic > > > environment in which that structure is assumed, you're likely not going > > to > > > be able to gain full access to the concept. > > > > > > The attached excerpts from her book--ignore the Forward, unless you'd > > like > > > some context--reveal some of her students' bizarre conceptions of > > distance > > > (and other basic mathematical concepts) as revealed in their diagrams. > > Her > > > approach involves linguistic analysis of sentences produced by her > > African > > > American students that she reads as collapsed versions of standard > > English > > > sentences, with differences in prepositional structure being > highlighted > > > (but other grammatical elements also are indicated). > > > > > > This work cuts against the grain of anything going on in mathematics > > > education. The Piagetian view that dominates that field holds that > basic > > > concepts come about from reflection on our actions in our engagement > with > > > the material world. When language enters the conversation, it's with > > > respect to semantic structure; to my knowledge, nobody's ever > implicated > > > syntax directly in basic quantitative understanding. > > > > > > This work is particularly interesting to me in connection with my > > > 21-year-old son who is autistic, and whose grammatical function is > > severely > > > impaired. He has a decent vocabulary, but unless the setting for the > > > conversation provides contextual clues, he can't piece together how the > > > semantic elements are linked to one another. It is only recently that > it > > > occurred to me his lack of a secure sense of basic quantitative terms > > like > > > ?more? and ?less? may be rooted in his grammatical incapacities. > > > > > > The XMCA discussion, thus far, has touched on grammar with respect to > > > lexical items such as prepositions. But we've not yet tied that to the > > > grammatical forms that embed those lexical items. I'm very curious as > to > > > whether that further connection can be made. > > > > > > David Kirshner > > > > > > Orr, E., W. (1987). Twice as less: Black English and the performance of > > > black students in mathematics and science. New York: W. W. Norton & > > Company. > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg > > > Sent: Friday, December 19, 2014 3:06 PM > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors > > > > > > Yes, Haliday is essentially a Whorfian, and that's one of things that > > > brings him close to Vygotsky. (Compare, for example, Chomsky, who is > > > essentially anti-developmental in his ideas about language, and who now > > > rejects the leading role played by social communication and says that > > > communication is epiphenomenal to language, whose original purpose is > > > thought.) For Sapir, and for Whorf, in the beginning of every major > > > onotogenetic, sociogenetic, and even phylogenetic change in language > > there > > > has to be some change in the nature of communication. > > > > > > So what Andy says about the lack of the basis of modern science in Hopi > > > applies perfectly well to English. When we read the scientific writings > > of > > > Chaucer on the astrolabe, for example, we do not see words like > > > "reflection", "refraction" or "alignment". Chaucer uses words like > > "bounce > > > off", "bend through", and "line up" (note the use of prepositions, > > > Helena!). Where did these words come from, and how did they make > > scientific > > > English possible? > > > > > > Most of us have no problem saying that Isaac Newton discovered the laws > > of > > > gravitation. But it's only a slight exaggeration to say that what he > > really > > > discovered was the meaning potential of words like "gravitation". > Gravity > > > is, of course, not a thing at all; that is, it's not an entity, but > > rather > > > a process, the process of falling down, or falling in (preps, again!). > So > > > how and above all why does it become an entity? > > > > > > It's interesting to compare Newton's writings on optics with Chaucer's > on > > > the astrolabe. The "Opticks" has a fixed format that we recognize > almost > > > instantly today: Newton describes his equipment (the prism and the dark > > > room); he then narrates his method as a kind of recipe ("First, I did > > this; > > > then I did that") and draws conclusions, which he then formulates in > > > mathematical terms (this is essentially the format of Vygotsky's > lectures > > > on pedology, so much so that when translating them we had some trouble > > > determining the precise moment when Vygotsky turns to the blackboard to > > > write his conclusion in the form of a law). > > > > > > In order to get them into mathematical shape, though, he has to make > > > sentences that look a lot like equations. "The plumpness of the lens > > yields > > > a greater refraction of the light", "The reflection of the light from > the > > > glass results of the light striking the flatness of the glass" "The > > > curvature of the spectacle glass supplies the lacking plumpness of the > > > eye". In each of these, a quality or a process which would normally be > > > realized as an adjective or a verb is suddenly realized by a noun, > > creating > > > an imaginary entity. > > > > > > That's grammatical metaphor. Something that is "canonically" realized > by > > a > > > verb ("to grow") is suddenly realized nominally ("growth"), or > something > > > that is canonically a quality ('red") is realized verbally ("redden"). > We > > > even find related clauses realized as verbs ("She did not know the > rules. > > > So she died" is realized by "Death was brought about through > ignorance", > > > all of these examples from Halliday). In fact, the Genetic Law that > > > Vygotsky formulates in "Mind in Society" ("Every higher mental function > > is > > > realized on two planes....") is really just one instance of grammatical > > > metaphor. > > > > > > One of Chomsky's best known arguments for the radical innateness > > > hypothesis is this. If I take a sentence like "Students who do not do > > their > > > homework do not do well" and I want to make a question, how do I know > > which > > > "do" to move to the front? Chomsky assumes that this knowledge is > > > essentially innate; it is part of universal grammar. But you can see > that > > > "Do students who do not do their homework do well?" can be built up > > through > > > a process of what we might call "discourse metaphor"--whereby clauses > > stand > > > for > > > exchanges: > > > > > > Mother: You did your homework, didn't you? > > > Child: No. > > > Mother: You didn't do your homework? Did you do well? > > > Child: No. > > > Mother: You didn't do well? > > > Child: No. > > > Mother: You didn't do you homework so you didn't do well. Do the other > > > students do well? > > > Child: Some of them. > > > Mother: Who does well? Do students who do not do their homework do > well? > > > > > > And this of course explains why wh-items like "who" and 'why" have two > > > functions--one inside a clause, where it expresses an intra-mental > > function > > > (grammar) and one between them where it expresses an inter-mental > > function > > > (discourse). > > > > > > I realize that grammatical metaphor will seem rather dry and abstract > and > > > unpoetic to people who assume that metaphor is only of the lexical > kind. > > > But to me, and I think to most children, it is far far more powerful > and > > > far more important developmentally. In some ways, it's the lexical > > metaphor > > > that is responsible for the disenchantment of the child's world, while > > the > > > grammatical metaphor infinitely expands it. (And here, I'm afraid, I > must > > > stop--it's time for breakfast and anyway my one screen is used up!) > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > > > > > , or "the > > > > > > . He > > > > > > On 19 December 2014 at 15:15, Greg Thompson > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > Helena and David, > > > > I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the > so-called > > > > authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred tradition > > > > to > > > > Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi notion > > > > of "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including English) > > > > notion of "time" and how each of these languages offers different > > > > affordances of meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual > > > > understanding, English has a much more reified/objectified/entified > > > > sense of time. (btw, I think the first paragraph is easier to follow > > > > than the second - and in that first paragraph you'll find our old > > friend > > > "imagination"). > > > > David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to? > > > > -greg > > > > > > > > Taken from: > > > > > > > > > http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/mousesite/Second > > > > ary/Whorfframe2.html > > > > > > > > " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, sunset" > are > > > > with us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from > other > > > nouns. > > > > They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in > winter" > > > > just as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are pluralized > > > > and numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. Our > > > > thought about the referents of such words hence becomes objectified. > > > > Without objectification, it would be a subjective experience of real > > > > time, i.e. of the consciousness of "becoming later and later"--simply > > > > a cyclic phase similar to an earlier phase in that > ever-later-becoming > > > > duration. Only by imagination can such a cyclic phase be set beside > > > > another and another in the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually > > > > perceived) configuration. "But such is the power of linguistic > analogy > > > that we do so objectify cyclic phasing. > > > > We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g., > > > "phasing." > > > > And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting > > > > binomial formula of formless item plus form, is so general that it is > > > > implicit for all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless items > > > > like "substance, matter," by which we can fill out the binomial for > an > > > > enormously wide range of nouns. But even these are not quite > > > > generalized enough to take in our phase nouns. So for the phase nouns > > we > > > have made a formless item, "time." > > > > We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, in > the > > > > pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" in > > > > the pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can say > > > > and think "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." Let > me > > > > again point out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of milk" > > > > or "a piece of cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a > > > > summer" actually contains or consists of such-and-such a quantity of > > > "time." > > > > > > > > In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., are > not > > > > nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They are > a > > > > formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, and > > > > even other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a > > > > locative pattern, like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It contains > > > > no morpheme like one of "in the house" or "at the tree." It means > > > > "when it is morning" or "while morning-phase is occurring." These > > > > "temporal s" are not used as subjects or objects, or at all like > > > > nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" or "summer is hot"; > summer > > > > is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions are hot, WHEN heat occurs. > > > > One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or "summer > recently." > > > > There is no objectification, as a region, an extent, a quantity, of > > > > the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested about time > > > > except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no basis > > > here for a formless item answering to our "time." " > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Helena Worthen > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to this: > > > > > > > > > > "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton > > > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to > create > > > > > sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly > > > > > productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific > > > > > writing and thinking today." > > > > > > > > > > Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I lose you > > > > > when > > > > you > > > > > say "created to talk about gravity as an entity". > > > > > > > > > > Thank you, > > > > > > > > > > Helena > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Helena Worthen > > > > > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > > > > > > > > On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > As Helena points out, prepositions are from the "grammatical" end > > > > > > of > > > > what > > > > > > Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what > > > > > > Halliday > > > > calls > > > > > > "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they have > > > > > > three properties that words from the more "lexical" end do not > > have: > > > > > > > > > > > > a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You can, > > > > > actually, > > > > > > but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you invent a new > > > > > > name > > > > > or a > > > > > > new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can). > > > > > > > > > > > > b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific semantic > > > > > > field > > > > > (the > > > > > > way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of > > > > linguistics) > > > > > > but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are used. > > > > > > > > > > > > c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the same > > > > effect, > > > > > > which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your argument" the > > "in" > > > > has > > > > > > more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in "there's a fly > > > > > > in > > > > your > > > > > > tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in Henry's > > > > > > hands, > > > > > refer > > > > > > to a book or even a footnote. > > > > > > > > > > > > Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties pretty > > > > > > much define the difference between learning and development, at > > > > > > least as I understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on > > > > > > functions indefinitely while development works by reorganizing > the > > > > > > closed set of functions you already have into new systems. > > > > > > Learning is skill specific and local, while development is quite > > > global in its implications. > > > > > Learning > > > > > > is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new systems, > > > > > > while development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary (and > > > > > > forget it > > > > just > > > > > > as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes away. > > > > > > > > > > > > For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of blue > > > > > > that > > > > > people > > > > > > call the sky") are simply metaphors from the non-productive end > of > > > > > > the lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are crisp, > > > > > > concrete, and vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the > > > > > > nominalizations that > > > > Newton > > > > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to > > > > > > create sentences that look like mathematical equations, are > highly > > > > > > productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific > > > > > > writing and > > > > thinking > > > > > > today. For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical metaphor is > the > > > > third > > > > > > great moment in child development (after the break into mother > > > > > > tongue > > > > and > > > > > > the break into disciplinary language in school work). > > > > > > > > > > > > Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" implies > > > > > > zero dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two ("on a > > > > > > line', 'on a > > > > > > plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because they > are > > > > > > grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them with > time: > > > > > > 'at > > > > a > > > > > > point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. Compare: "at > > > > > > Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very day), and > > > > > > "in Christmas' (season). > > > > > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > > > > > On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen > > > > > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial > > > > > >> relationships from the concrete material world into the > > > > > >> conceptual imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 > common > > > > > >> ones, and > > > > > between 70 > > > > > >> and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far > as" > > > > > >> -- > > > > > this > > > > > >> is according to > > > > > >> https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm > > > > ). > > > > > >> We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. Apparently, > > > > > >> in English, they evolved from and did the job done by > inflections > > > > > >> in > > > > parent > > > > > >> languages, examples being cases and tenses. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection > > > > > >> like the dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial > > > > > >> relationships > > > > > suggested > > > > > >> by contemporary prepositions. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about this. > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Helena Worthen > > > > > >> helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > > > >> > > > > > >> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > > > > >> > > > > > >>> I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly > > > > embodied, > > > > > >> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to > > > > > >> linguistics > > > > > (For > > > > > >> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on > > > > ?lexicon?: > > > > > >> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, > > > > > >> being > > > > > part > > > > > >> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and > > > > > >> Halliday > > > > > see no > > > > > >> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, > > > lexico-grammar. > > > > > (Lo > > > > > >> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar, > > > > > >> adding > > > > > the > > > > > >> ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings > are > > > > great > > > > > >> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of > > > > > >> that? In translation from Russian is word coining ever > practiced? > > > > > >>> Henry > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the > > > > metaphorical > > > > > >> use of prepositions like: > > > > > >>>> - "there is some value IN your argument" > > > > > >>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again" > > > > > >>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" > > > > > >>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again" > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> and so on. > > > > > >>>> Andy > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > -------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > > ---- > > > > > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > > > > > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>>> larry smolucha wrote: > > > > > >>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself - > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic > > > > > possibilities: > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published > in > > > > > Thought > > > > > >>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into > > > > English > > > > > >> 1962] > > > > > >>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the > 'additive' > > > > value > > > > > >> of the > > > > > >>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech > > > > > vocalization). > > > > > >>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements > that > > > > > >>>>> are > > > > > >> flammable > > > > > >>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable > nor > > > > > >>>>> a > > > > gas. > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century > > > > > >>>>> European > > > > > >> Developmental > > > > > >>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' > > > > > >>>>> hence > > > > > the > > > > > >>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of > > > > Piaget's > > > > > >> Genetic > > > > > >>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and > > > > > >>>>> synthesis > > > > > >> based on > > > > > >>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in > > > > > >>>>> Vygotsky's > > > > > >> example of H2O. > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com > > > > > >>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > >>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 > > > > > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be > synergistic > > > > > >>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the > > > parts. > > > > > >>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more > > > > > >>>>>> than > > > > the > > > > > >>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can > > > > > >>>>>> ever > > > > be > > > > > >> imagined" > > > > > >>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> A couple things to consider: > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination > > > > > >>>>>> as the > > > > > >> brain has > > > > > >>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the > > > > > >>>>>> simplest > > > > level > > > > > >> of the Gestalt > > > > > >>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). > > > > > >>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just > > > > photographic. > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try > > > > > >>>>>> to > > > > > >> accurately reproduce > > > > > >>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. > Whereas, > > > > > >>>>>> the > > > > > >> goal of combinatory > > > > > >>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, > > > > > >>>>>> dreams, > > > > > >> musings, and even > > > > > >>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of > > > > objects > > > > > >> and symbols. > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different > ways > > > > > >>>>>> that > > > > > >> things and concepts can be > > > > > >>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar > > > > > >>>>>> and > > > > > flour. > > > > > >>>>>> I can add water and > > > > > >>>>>> it > > > > > >> dissolves a bit > > > > > >>>>>> But adding heat > > > > > >>>>>> changes > > > > the > > > > > >> combination into a pancake. > > > > > >>>>>> [Is this synergistic?] > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more > > > > > >>>>>> examples > > > > > >> to put the discussion > > > > > >>>>>> in the metaphysical realm. > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 > > > > > >>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > > > >>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the > > > > > >>>>>>> case > > > > > for > > > > > >>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I > > > > > >>>>>>> think > > > > it's > > > > > >> not > > > > > >>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are > > > > > >> associationists who > > > > > >>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary > > > > > >>>>>>> associationism > > > > > >> exists and > > > > > >>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as > > mediation. > > > > > >> Vygotsky > > > > > >>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, > > > > explain > > > > > >> the > > > > > >>>>>>> uniqueness of our species? > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels > > > > > >>>>>>> for > > > > its > > > > > >> own > > > > > >>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a > > > > > >>>>>>> Piagetian perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian > > > > > >>>>>>> one--true maturity > > > > > as a > > > > > >>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more > > > > > >>>>>>> to it > > > > > >> than > > > > > >>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of > > > > > >>>>>>> primate, > > > > > and > > > > > >> our > > > > > >>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon > > > > > >>>>>>> rocks > > > > > in > > > > > >> order > > > > > >>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged > > > > > >>>>>>> the > > > > same > > > > > >> way as > > > > > >>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and > > > > > >>>>>>> for > > > > > >> language is > > > > > >>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human > > > > > >> exceptionalism. > > > > > >>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for > > > > > >>>>>>> the > > > > > >> vanguard role > > > > > >>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, > > > > > prolonging > > > > > >>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after > > > > > >>>>>>> the > > > > sick > > > > > >> and the > > > > > >>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial > > > > > >>>>>>> organs > > > > > >> (tools) and > > > > > >>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for > > > > > >>>>>>> our > > > > > >> species, it > > > > > >>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these > > > > > >> "circuitous, > > > > > >>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that > > > > > >>>>>>> lead > > > > our > > > > > >>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always > > > > > >>>>>>> been > > > > > >> short on > > > > > >>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for > > > > > >>>>>>> material > > > > > >> culture > > > > > >>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another > matter: > > > > > >> verily, here > > > > > >>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of > > > > > >>>>>>> attention is > > > > > >> simply the > > > > > >>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says > > > > > >>>>>>> there are > > > > > >> only two > > > > > >>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So > > > > > >> imagination is > > > > > >>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete > experiences, > > > > > >>>>>>> and > > > > > >> nothing > > > > > >>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when > > > > > >>>>>>> you > > > > > hear > > > > > >> the > > > > > >>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there > > > > > >>>>>>> to be > > > > > >> able to > > > > > >>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work > > > > > >>>>>>> in > > > > word > > > > > >> meaning. > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who > > > > > >>>>>>> was > > > > > given > > > > > >> a > > > > > >>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been > > > > > >>>>>>> mixed > > > > with > > > > > >> silver > > > > > >>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of > > > gold. > > > > > >> Well, we > > > > > >>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not > > > > possible > > > > > to > > > > > >>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that > > > > > >>>>>>> precisely. The > > > > > >> method > > > > > >>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the > > > > > >>>>>>> "principal > > > > of > > > > > >>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes > > > > > >>>>>>> palimpsest, a > > > > > >> velum on > > > > > >>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each > other. > > > > > Because > > > > > >>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and > > > > > >>>>>>> written > > > > over > > > > > >> every > > > > > >>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was > soft, > > > > > >>>>>>> the > > > > > >> pressure > > > > > >>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones > > > > > >>>>>>> when > > > > > the > > > > > >> old > > > > > >>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the > only > > > > known > > > > > >> Greek > > > > > >>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor > their > > > > > >> relationship > > > > > >>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they > > > > > >>>>>>> are > > > > > >> related to > > > > > >>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's > quite > > > > > similar > > > > > >> to the > > > > > >>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> David Kellogg > > > > > >>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > >> wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an > > > > > associationist, > > > > > >> ?sees > > > > > >>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? > > > > > >>>>>>>> Henry > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg < > > > > dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > > > > > > > > > >> wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the > > > > > >>>>>>>>> division > > > > > >> between > > > > > >>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, > > > > > >>>>>>>>> because > > > > > >> Ribot is > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> an > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal > > > > > >>>>>>>>> form of > > > > > >> attention. > > > > > >>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the > > > > > >>>>>>>>> transition > > > > from > > > > > >> forest > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> to > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division > > > > between > > > > > >> the two > > > > > >>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and > > > > > >>>>>>>>> commonsensical > > > > > >> world of > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> the > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly > > > > > >>>>>>>>> prosaic > > > > uses > > > > > >> in life > > > > > >>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more > > > > > "imaginative" > > > > > >> (that > > > > > >>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world > > > > > >>>>>>>>> of the > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> farm,where > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long > > > > > >>>>>>>>> winter > > > > > >> months are > > > > > >>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to > > > > encounter > > > > > >> talking > > > > > >>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here > > > > > >>>>>>>>> attention > > > > > has > > > > > >> to be > > > > > >>>>>>>>> more voluntary. > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a > > > > > >>>>>>>>> very > > > > clear > > > > > >>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism > that > > > > > >> underpins > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> Ribot > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky > > > > > >>>>>>>>> points > > > > > out > > > > > >> the > > > > > >>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive > > > > > >>>>>>>>> practices > > > > > >> really > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> are > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of > > > > imagination, > > > > > >> there > > > > > >>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between > > > > > >>>>>>>>> human > > > > > and > > > > > >> animal > > > > > >>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly > > > > > >>>>>>>>> capable of > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> volitional > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than > humans). > > > > > Without > > > > > >> a > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> theory > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis > > > > > >>>>>>>>> for > > > > > Ribot's > > > > > >>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological > > > > > >>>>>>>>> functions at > > > > > >> all. > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > > > > > >>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination, > > > > > >> thanks to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> all > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> influential > > > > > >> around the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> time > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. > I > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> had > > > > > >> seen work > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> on > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> equal > > > > > >> reproductive? > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> of > > > > > >> development > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> of > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> being > > > > a > > > > > >> relative > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> bucket > > > > list. > > > > > >> This > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> from > > > > some > > > > > >> weeks > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> in > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > > > >> segmented the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met > > > aphorizing?. > > > > > >> Puns, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > they > > > > > >> are > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> doing > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his > > > > > >> followers as an > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel, so > > > > > >> its of > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> course > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in > > > > > >> translation, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> seems > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, > > "recollection" > > > > in > > > > > >> this > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> passage, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter > > > > > >> distinction to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "memory." > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary > > > > > >> discourse > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian > > > > > >> colleagues have > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from > > > > theorists > > > > > >> who > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> clearly > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it > was > > > > still > > > > > >> possible > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, > > > > > >> interestingly > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> links > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a > > > > "voluntary" > > > > > >> act. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Parts > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> stuff > > > > > that > > > > > >> was > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> also > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > > >> creativity > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> and > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious > to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> see > > > > > >> that the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> two > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found > > > > himself > > > > > >> writing. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> pretty > > > > > old > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> approaches > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < > > > > > >> ablunden@mira.net> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> but it > > > > > >> may be > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> worth > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> place > > > > to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Imagination > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between > > > > > >> Recollection and > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive > > > > > >> Imagination, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> (2) > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> which > > > > he > > > > > >> says > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> leads > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> other > > > > > >> words, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> the > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is > > > > > >> accomplished > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> through > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >> > > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > -- > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading > Strawson > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > > >> Williams. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists > whose > > > > work i > > > > > >> am > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> trying > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of > > > > > >> productive > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive > > > > imagination > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> develops. > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive > implies > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that > > > > > >> there > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> must > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> be a > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive > imagination. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> But > > > > I > > > > > >> learned > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination > appears > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > is > > > > > >> linked > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > > >> anticipation > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination > > > > > >> (starting > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> look, and > > > > > >> provides > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> a > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as > > > > > fixed. > > > > > >> This, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a > > > > > ground > > > > > >> to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> take > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> part > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> preconceptions: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> grammarian > > > > > >> Langacker on > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> domains, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> particularly > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> full of > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> imagination > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > > >> temporality: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic > > > > > >> structure), which > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> I > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> both > > > > > >> individual > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < > > > > > >> lpscholar2@gmail.com> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third > > > > *space* > > > > > >> and the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> his > > > > > >> notion of > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion > is > > > > > >> explored under > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a > *set* > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > > >> modalities > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of > > > > knowing > > > > > >> that is > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [perceived??] > > > > if > > > > > >> we > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> think > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *style* Larry On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> HENRY SHONERD < > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> say how > > > > > >> jazzed up > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> I > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> am > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, > the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind > > > > > as > > > > > >> Larry > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> various > > > > > >> triads, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> finally > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notebooks > > > > > of > > > > > >> the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> mind, as > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap > adentro, > > > > luega > > > > > >> pa? > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> fuera. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole < > > > > mcole@ucsd.edu> > > > > > >> wrote: > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, > > > > attached > > > > > >> are two > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT > > > > > theorists > > > > > >> like > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of > > > > > >> imagination in a > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion > of > > > > > >> productive > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have > no > > > > > >> intention of > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> doing > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the > > > > > >> attached > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these > > > > philosophers, > > > > > I > > > > > >> came > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> upon > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> closely > > > > > >> linked at > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> several > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our > naivete, > > > > > >> Ettienne and I > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as > a > > > > means > > > > > of > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> access > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander > > > Suvorov. > > > > > >> Moreover, > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> such > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct > > > > > relevance > > > > > >> to > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Kris's > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to > > > > > >> concerns > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> about > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in > > > > development. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination > thread. > > > > > Perhaps > > > > > >> they > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> will > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural > > > > > >> science > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with an > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson.pdf> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> -- > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > > > > science > > > > > >> with an > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> -- > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> science > > > > > >> with an > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > >>>> > > > > > >>> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > > Assistant Professor > > > > Department of Anthropology > > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > > Brigham Young University > > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Dec 22 09:12:22 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Mon, 22 Dec 2014 17:12:22 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors / Speaking of AAE In-Reply-To: <1419265723100.30782@unm.edu> References: , , <1419265723100.30782@unm.edu> Message-ID: <1419268341646.7844@unm.edu> See, now there is something blowing in the wind because I got this link (below) in my email box just now. This particular post is intended to deepen, not segue this conversation, to remind us how layered everything is, how many overlaps there are. I think Greg is right, intentions do matter. First layer: http://aeon.co/magazine/culture/sam-cookes-civil-rights-song-and-heartbreak An Aeon article on Sam Cooke's A Change Is Gonna Come by Manjula Martin And then, the second layer: http://grooveshark.com/#!/s/A+Change+Is+Gonna+Come/4vA2d9?src=5 Where you can listen to the song itself, even while reading the article. In the spirit (and hope) of transformation I thought, there _IS_ a connection to Scientific Concepts: the Everyday, and the Personal, and the Public and the Voice and the Protest and Our Education and how They All Link Together. Thanks for letting me share! Kind regards, Annalisa From hshonerd@gmail.com Sun Dec 21 09:08:27 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Sun, 21 Dec 2014 10:08:27 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Time, Imagination, Metaphor In-Reply-To: <1419115512170.24268@unm.edu> References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> <5493CC6B.5050105@mira.net> <1419052007614.61660@unm.edu> <, > <1419115512170.24268@unm.edu> Message-ID: <2AB7D36B-CF48-476F-90B9-7E57515FF515@gmail.com> Back to syntagmatic and paradigmatic. The Muybridge photographs over time are in syntagmatic relation with one another. A paradigmatic relation would be comparisons of two sets of photographs, one set showing the horse galloping and one set showing the horse trotting. A few posts back Francine connected the paradigmatic and syntagmatic to Saussure. I think the concept is more general, goes beyond language. In the same way things, processes and relations can be used for language (nouns, verbs and prepositions), but are not restricted to that domain. I think this relates to Annalisa?s post asking to invent a new language. It might be useful to consider how language is one semiotic domain, but not the only one. Much of the richness of conceptualization and the world can be gotten to through immersion in these other domains and relating the one to the other. IMHO. Henry > On Dec 20, 2014, at 3:45 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > Hi Greg! > > Post-modernism certainly makes the case that things mean different things to different folks doing different things, and now it appears ontology also means something different now too! > > I must offer a thing that may make all these other things a little nuanced: > > First, I agree that the subject and the object dualism must be readdressed to move away from the Objective Reality Which Is Really Fiction. One way to challenge this is to say that there is no Objective Reality and that there is only Subjective Reality interpreting objects as they come along, which indicates that there are an infinite number of realities present and apparent. I don't know how this can work effectively, because somehow there must be commonality or agreed-upon terms and realities, a kind of Social Contract pertaining to objects, always available for reevaluation. > > Second, I would like to propose a different way to look at this. Rather than isolating the subject or the object, and emphasizing that, perhaps what is more important is the Context in which the subject and object are located. That is, the environmental factors, which would include culture. > > In other words, the ontology can still maintain something of the classical definition, but there can be an expansion to include where the object is located in space and time. Much of these indicators are not captured in language explicitly, but implied in the cultural setting. So I think what this means is that everything about meaning can't be captured by language, and that language is an important piece, but not the only piece (Not that anyone is saying that here). > > For example, no one living would recall that Edward Muybridge created the stop-photography of the galloping horse because he was hired by Mr. Stanford to help settle a bet whether or not a galloping horse's hooves are ever up off the ground at point it its gait. When people think about Muybridge they think about the objects he produced, the photographs. > > But that wager was the originating context of that work, between two tycoons, no doubt. From that whim discovery of a new world of action was revealed, in which the flow of the world was made available for visual inspection that without the tool of the camera had been beyond our perception. Of course out of that came the invention of moving pictures and the film industry. > > That world was always there. Horses have galloped in the world for as long as they could gallop, and that fact of being up off the ground was also present in the world. We just didn't know about it. Just like we may have forgotten the wager that was the genesis of the stop-action photographs. > > What does this have to do with the price of fish? > > Well, I mean to impress the idea that it isn't necessarily the object (in this case the photograph) that changed, but the environment in which it was used and purposed. The subjects not possessing understanding about the nature of the photograph didn't have preconceived notions about it, and so ignorance was a virtue. But when we look back at these objects, they have changed in meaning. > > Furthermore, I'd say that contexts not being made available in the language might have evolved in this manner because it makes language ecological not to include them. They are implied between the speaker and the listener. > > Unfortunately, this absence of context creates more conflict about meaning than the notion of an objective definition. It would be analogous to the various photographs taken by Muybridge. If one party sees the horse never leaving the ground and another party sees the horse leaving the ground, each party could point to a different photograph to assert one's claim. But the horse is in motion, it is both up off the ground and on the ground. These points of contact (an individual photograph) to a given context is not only difficult to capture in language, it is difficult to show that they actually change. > > And so people are left making wagers without a method of stop-photography to show not only the differences but also the flow of change, or even the acceleration of change. Each of these transitions create different problems. And there are all these unanswered bets on what is really (emphasis on real) going on here between subjects and objects! > > I propose that we require a system in which to encapsulate contexts, a kind of stop-action photography for language, by which to frame and determine these points of meaning and how they ebb and flow in time and space. Does this exist? If not, I would like to invent it, with a little help from my friends. This it the thing I would like to offer as a possibility. > > On that happy note, I would like to ask you Greg, would you mind to provide to me a few articles that encapsulate this new understanding of ontologies in the last 20 years to which you refer? > > This could be added to the ABC! > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Greg Thompson > Sent: Saturday, December 20, 2014 2:28 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Time, Imagination, Metaphor > > terms, terms, terms. > Ontological. > Just wanted to mention that there are different understandings of this term > "ontological". The classic understanding of "ontological" is that it refers > to the "real" nature of things in time and space. > > But there is a new understanding of "ontological" that has come up in the > social sciences in the past 20 years or so that takes seriously the > possibility of "plural ontologies" - i.e. that there may be different > "reals" constituted by people in different times and places - all of them > "real" (if perhaps "real" in different ways). The hope of this literature > is to get beyond subjective/objective dualism that is implied in the > classical formulation of "ontological". > > I feel that these are important considerations to keep in mind so that we > don't talk too much past each other. I think that it is also important to > keep these in mind so that we can appreciate how the concerns of XMCA folks > might intersect with current conversations in social theory. > > -greg > From hshonerd@gmail.com Sun Dec 21 09:48:00 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Sun, 21 Dec 2014 10:48:00 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors In-Reply-To: References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> <406FBE3B-E840-4DCB-AD45-AF67CDAAE5AF@gmail.com> <5495d416.c85a420a.7c5b.ffffd4b2@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <14CDE7F4-2288-4A20-A63F-9D4451A4A19F@gmail.com> It was actually from Oller that I leaned about cloze testing back in the 70s! Oller was and still is passionate about his religion. I helped arrange a round table at Univ of NM in the early 80s on L1 acquisition. There were three perspectives presented: Chomskian/lnnatist by Oller, empiricist/behaviorist by a fellow names Charlton, and interactionist by Vera John-Steiner. Though tangential to this metaphor thread, it seems relevant. Oller?s ?expectancy grammar? was a pair to his ?episode hypothesis? which argued that L2 teaching should be discourse based, through narratives and dialogs. This metaphor thread, I think, informs, and is informed by issues of development. Henry P.S. Oller also did a lot of research on dictation as a language assessment. A very interesting man. Brilliant and passionately Christian. > On Dec 20, 2014, at 4:32 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > Larry-- > > (I'm afraid that the one screen rule is just going to result in multiple > e-mails every day! But that in itself is instructive: when I am teaching I > like to make a distinction between "tall and thin" threads of > dialogue--that is, complex text that consists of many short turns, where > the complexity is mostly inter-mental) and "short and fat" threads--where > the complexity is mostly inside a turn of talk. So maybe Helena's > one-screen rule is really a request for the inter-mental expansion of > complexity, which is, after all, the essence of good instructional > discourse!) > > In the 1970s, J.W. Oller had a beautiful and wrong hypothesis called > "Unitary Competence". The idea is something like this: instead of "four > skills" (reading, writing, speaking, and listening, derived from behavior) > or "two knowledges" (grammar and vocabulary, or "words and rules", as > cognitivists like Pinker like to say), human language ability is > essentially unitary, and consists of something called expectancy grammar. > Expectancy grammar is what you see on a cloze test--it's the ability to > expect the next word in a clause. > > With children I sometimes play an amusing game called "INAW BICBAW" ("It's > not a word, but it could be a word"). You demonstrate this fairly easily by > putting up the letter "a" and saying you've lost, because "a" is a word, > and therefore violates the INAW rule, which says that the result of a turn > cannot be a word. So then you put up "b" and add "c", but you lose again > because there is no word that begins with "bc" and so you've violated the > BICBAW rule, which says that it could, someday, turn out to be a word. The > children then realize that "be" violates the INAW rule and "bz" the > "BICBAW" rule, but "bi" is a possible move, and "bik" is OK too, but the > next move will either violate INAW or BICBAW. > > When the kids get bored, you take up to the next level, "INAS BICBAS" > ("It's not a sentence, but it could be a sentence"). Here 'a" is a possible > move, because although it's a word, it's not a sentence, and the next move > might be "bike" or something like that, and then you seem to need a verb, > but an intransitive verb (e.g. 'goes') will violate the INAS rule, so you > go for a modal auxiliary ('can") etc.As you can see, the guiding principle > of the game is Oller's Expectancy Grammar--what Chomsky dismissively calls > Phrase Structure Grammar. > > Now, what about preps? Well, of course, preps do "predict" noun complements > (although it's possible to put a prep in front of another prep, as in "look > forward to" or "in front of"). But they do this CANONICALLY--that's what > expectancy means. That is, we are led to expect, by the historicity of our > language experience, certain prepositional complements and not others. The > problem is, of course, creativity--we are also led to expect the > unexpected, and one of the most obvious ways that has happened in English > is through prepositional phrasal verbs ("bring up", "run down", "sweep > off") where the prep can function as an adverb, and violate the INAS rule, > leading to a sudden stop! > > And with that he swept off..... > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > PS: Oh, about Oller! He was very beautiful and very wrong. I think he runs > an institute for creation science somewhere in New Mexico now.... > > dk > > > > , and there > > On 21 December 2014 at 02:43, wrote: > >> Henry, >> >> So, what are we doing when we complete a cloze test? Are we reasoning. >> are we gap-filling, are we operating within grammatical metaphors? If I >> understand what David Kellogg is pointing us to look at, this cloze test >> shows what was operating ?behind" the "scenes" in the unfolding drama of >> science and faith. Our cultural way of operating oriented within a >> "system" as profound as bodily orienting within a landscape. >> >> "knowing" [sensing] at all times where one is oriented in this concrete >> situated place as embodied AND cultural historical. >> >> Through cultural synergy understanding how situated and specific is our >> Western way of knowing >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Sent from Windows Mail >> >> >> >> >> >> From: HENRY SHONERD >> Sent: ?Saturday?, ?December? ?20?, ?2014 ?9?:?22? ?AM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> >> >> >> >> >> One quick and dirty way to assess language is a cloze test, which >> essentially requires the user to put lexical items into a grammatical >> structure, as in the example David provides ?distance from_____to ____?. >> Henry >> >>> On Dec 19, 2014, at 8:46 PM, David H Kirshner wrote: >>> >>> The topic of how grammatical form relates to meaning calls to mind the >> groundbreaking work of Eleanor Orr--whom you've probably never heard of on >> account of the fact that her work was condemned by a politically-correct >> faction of race-conscious sociolinguists who decided her analysis of Black >> English Vernacular could too easily be appropriated into racist discourses >> about language deficiency. >>> >>> Orr was a Washington DC area teacher and principal in the 1970s and >> 1980s, who traced math difficulties of her African American students to >> subtle grammatical differences between Black English dialect and standard >> English. Her 1987 book goes into compelling detail to support the thesis >> that the meaning structure of basic mathematical terms is embedded in the >> grammatical setting in which those terms are expressed. For instance, the >> meaning of ?distance? is embedded in the grammatical structure ?distance >> from _________ to __________? where the place-holders hold locations; if >> you don?t have that grammatical structure, and you're in a linguistic >> environment in which that structure is assumed, you're likely not going to >> be able to gain full access to the concept. >>> >>> The attached excerpts from her book--ignore the Forward, unless you'd >> like some context--reveal some of her students' bizarre conceptions of >> distance (and other basic mathematical concepts) as revealed in their >> diagrams. Her approach involves linguistic analysis of sentences produced >> by her African American students that she reads as collapsed versions of >> standard English sentences, with differences in prepositional structure >> being highlighted (but other grammatical elements also are indicated). >>> >>> This work cuts against the grain of anything going on in mathematics >> education. The Piagetian view that dominates that field holds that basic >> concepts come about from reflection on our actions in our engagement with >> the material world. When language enters the conversation, it's with >> respect to semantic structure; to my knowledge, nobody's ever implicated >> syntax directly in basic quantitative understanding. >>> >>> This work is particularly interesting to me in connection with my >> 21-year-old son who is autistic, and whose grammatical function is severely >> impaired. He has a decent vocabulary, but unless the setting for the >> conversation provides contextual clues, he can't piece together how the >> semantic elements are linked to one another. It is only recently that it >> occurred to me his lack of a secure sense of basic quantitative terms like >> ?more? and ?less? may be rooted in his grammatical incapacities. >>> >>> The XMCA discussion, thus far, has touched on grammar with respect to >> lexical items such as prepositions. But we've not yet tied that to the >> grammatical forms that embed those lexical items. I'm very curious as to >> whether that further connection can be made. >>> >>> David Kirshner >>> >>> Orr, E., W. (1987). Twice as less: Black English and the performance of >> black students in mathematics and science. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg >>> Sent: Friday, December 19, 2014 3:06 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors >>> >>> Yes, Haliday is essentially a Whorfian, and that's one of things that >> brings him close to Vygotsky. (Compare, for example, Chomsky, who is >> essentially anti-developmental in his ideas about language, and who now >> rejects the leading role played by social communication and says that >> communication is epiphenomenal to language, whose original purpose is >>> thought.) For Sapir, and for Whorf, in the beginning of every major >> onotogenetic, sociogenetic, and even phylogenetic change in language there >> has to be some change in the nature of communication. >>> >>> So what Andy says about the lack of the basis of modern science in Hopi >> applies perfectly well to English. When we read the scientific writings of >> Chaucer on the astrolabe, for example, we do not see words like >> "reflection", "refraction" or "alignment". Chaucer uses words like "bounce >> off", "bend through", and "line up" (note the use of prepositions, >> Helena!). Where did these words come from, and how did they make scientific >> English possible? >>> >>> Most of us have no problem saying that Isaac Newton discovered the laws >> of gravitation. But it's only a slight exaggeration to say that what he >> really discovered was the meaning potential of words like "gravitation". >> Gravity is, of course, not a thing at all; that is, it's not an entity, but >> rather a process, the process of falling down, or falling in (preps, >> again!). So how and above all why does it become an entity? >>> >>> It's interesting to compare Newton's writings on optics with Chaucer's >> on the astrolabe. The "Opticks" has a fixed format that we recognize almost >> instantly today: Newton describes his equipment (the prism and the dark >> room); he then narrates his method as a kind of recipe ("First, I did this; >> then I did that") and draws conclusions, which he then formulates in >> mathematical terms (this is essentially the format of Vygotsky's lectures >> on pedology, so much so that when translating them we had some trouble >> determining the precise moment when Vygotsky turns to the blackboard to >> write his conclusion in the form of a law). >>> >>> In order to get them into mathematical shape, though, he has to make >> sentences that look a lot like equations. "The plumpness of the lens yields >> a greater refraction of the light", "The reflection of the light from the >> glass results of the light striking the flatness of the glass" "The >> curvature of the spectacle glass supplies the lacking plumpness of the >> eye". In each of these, a quality or a process which would normally be >> realized as an adjective or a verb is suddenly realized by a noun, creating >> an imaginary entity. >>> >>> That's grammatical metaphor. Something that is "canonically" realized by >> a verb ("to grow") is suddenly realized nominally ("growth"), or something >> that is canonically a quality ('red") is realized verbally ("redden"). We >> even find related clauses realized as verbs ("She did not know the rules. >>> So she died" is realized by "Death was brought about through ignorance", >> all of these examples from Halliday). In fact, the Genetic Law that >> Vygotsky formulates in "Mind in Society" ("Every higher mental function is >> realized on two planes....") is really just one instance of grammatical >> metaphor. >>> >>> One of Chomsky's best known arguments for the radical innateness >> hypothesis is this. If I take a sentence like "Students who do not do their >> homework do not do well" and I want to make a question, how do I know which >> "do" to move to the front? Chomsky assumes that this knowledge is >> essentially innate; it is part of universal grammar. But you can see that >> "Do students who do not do their homework do well?" can be built up through >> a process of what we might call "discourse metaphor"--whereby clauses stand >> for >>> exchanges: >>> >>> Mother: You did your homework, didn't you? >>> Child: No. >>> Mother: You didn't do your homework? Did you do well? >>> Child: No. >>> Mother: You didn't do well? >>> Child: No. >>> Mother: You didn't do you homework so you didn't do well. Do the other >> students do well? >>> Child: Some of them. >>> Mother: Who does well? Do students who do not do their homework do well? >>> >>> And this of course explains why wh-items like "who" and 'why" have two >> functions--one inside a clause, where it expresses an intra-mental function >>> (grammar) and one between them where it expresses an inter-mental >> function (discourse). >>> >>> I realize that grammatical metaphor will seem rather dry and abstract >> and unpoetic to people who assume that metaphor is only of the lexical kind. >>> But to me, and I think to most children, it is far far more powerful and >> far more important developmentally. In some ways, it's the lexical metaphor >> that is responsible for the disenchantment of the child's world, while the >> grammatical metaphor infinitely expands it. (And here, I'm afraid, I must >> stop--it's time for breakfast and anyway my one screen is used up!) >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>> >>> >>> >>> , or "the >>> >>> . He >>> >>> On 19 December 2014 at 15:15, Greg Thompson >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Helena and David, >>>> I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the so-called >>>> authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred tradition >>>> to >>>> Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi notion >>>> of "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including English) >>>> notion of "time" and how each of these languages offers different >>>> affordances of meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual >>>> understanding, English has a much more reified/objectified/entified >>>> sense of time. (btw, I think the first paragraph is easier to follow >>>> than the second - and in that first paragraph you'll find our old >> friend "imagination"). >>>> David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to? >>>> -greg >>>> >>>> Taken from: >>>> >>>> http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/mousesite/Second >>>> ary/Whorfframe2.html >>>> >>>> " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, sunset" are >>>> with us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from other >> nouns. >>>> They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in winter" >>>> just as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are pluralized >>>> and numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. Our >>>> thought about the referents of such words hence becomes objectified. >>>> Without objectification, it would be a subjective experience of real >>>> time, i.e. of the consciousness of "becoming later and later"--simply >>>> a cyclic phase similar to an earlier phase in that ever-later-becoming >>>> duration. Only by imagination can such a cyclic phase be set beside >>>> another and another in the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually >>>> perceived) configuration. "But such is the power of linguistic analogy >> that we do so objectify cyclic phasing. >>>> We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g., >> "phasing." >>>> And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting >>>> binomial formula of formless item plus form, is so general that it is >>>> implicit for all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless items >>>> like "substance, matter," by which we can fill out the binomial for an >>>> enormously wide range of nouns. But even these are not quite >>>> generalized enough to take in our phase nouns. So for the phase nouns >> we have made a formless item, "time." >>>> We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, in the >>>> pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" in >>>> the pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can say >>>> and think "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." Let me >>>> again point out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of milk" >>>> or "a piece of cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a >>>> summer" actually contains or consists of such-and-such a quantity of >> "time." >>>> >>>> In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., are not >>>> nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They are a >>>> formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, and >>>> even other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a >>>> locative pattern, like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It contains >>>> no morpheme like one of "in the house" or "at the tree." It means >>>> "when it is morning" or "while morning-phase is occurring." These >>>> "temporal s" are not used as subjects or objects, or at all like >>>> nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" or "summer is hot"; summer >>>> is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions are hot, WHEN heat occurs. >>>> One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or "summer recently." >>>> There is no objectification, as a region, an extent, a quantity, of >>>> the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested about time >>>> except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no basis >> here for a formless item answering to our "time." " >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Helena Worthen >>>> >>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to this: >>>>> >>>>> "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that Newton >>>>> and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to create >>>>> sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly >>>>> productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific >>>>> writing and thinking today." >>>>> >>>>> Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I lose you >>>>> when >>>> you >>>>> say "created to talk about gravity as an entity". >>>>> >>>>> Thank you, >>>>> >>>>> Helena >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>> >>>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> As Helena points out, prepositions are from the "grammatical" end >>>>>> of >>>> what >>>>>> Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what >>>>>> Halliday >>>> calls >>>>>> "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they have >>>>>> three properties that words from the more "lexical" end do not have: >>>>>> >>>>>> a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You can, >>>>> actually, >>>>>> but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you invent a new >>>>>> name >>>>> or a >>>>>> new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can). >>>>>> >>>>>> b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific semantic >>>>>> field >>>>> (the >>>>>> way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of >>>> linguistics) >>>>>> but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are used. >>>>>> >>>>>> c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the same >>>> effect, >>>>>> which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your argument" the "in" >>>> has >>>>>> more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in "there's a fly >>>>>> in >>>> your >>>>>> tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in Henry's >>>>>> hands, >>>>> refer >>>>>> to a book or even a footnote. >>>>>> >>>>>> Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties pretty >>>>>> much define the difference between learning and development, at >>>>>> least as I understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on >>>>>> functions indefinitely while development works by reorganizing the >>>>>> closed set of functions you already have into new systems. >>>>>> Learning is skill specific and local, while development is quite >> global in its implications. >>>>> Learning >>>>>> is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new systems, >>>>>> while development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary (and >>>>>> forget it >>>> just >>>>>> as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes away. >>>>>> >>>>>> For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of blue >>>>>> that >>>>> people >>>>>> call the sky") are simply metaphors from the non-productive end of >>>>>> the lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are crisp, >>>>>> concrete, and vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the >>>>>> nominalizations that >>>> Newton >>>>>> and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to >>>>>> create sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly >>>>>> productive, which is why they still form the basis of scientific >>>>>> writing and >>>> thinking >>>>>> today. For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical metaphor is the >>>> third >>>>>> great moment in child development (after the break into mother >>>>>> tongue >>>> and >>>>>> the break into disciplinary language in school work). >>>>>> >>>>>> Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" implies >>>>>> zero dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two ("on a >>>>>> line', 'on a >>>>>> plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because they are >>>>>> grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them with time: >>>>>> 'at >>>> a >>>>>> point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. Compare: "at >>>>>> Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very day), and >>>>>> "in Christmas' (season). >>>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>> >>>>>> On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen >>>>>> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" spatial >>>>>>> relationships from the concrete material world into the >>>>>>> conceptual imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 common >>>>>>> ones, and >>>>> between 70 >>>>>>> and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as far as" >>>>>>> -- >>>>> this >>>>>>> is according to >>>>>>> https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm >>>> ). >>>>>>> We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. Apparently, >>>>>>> in English, they evolved from and did the job done by inflections >>>>>>> in >>>> parent >>>>>>> languages, examples being cases and tenses. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> But there is real difference in meaning between an inflection >>>>>>> like the dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial >>>>>>> relationships >>>>> suggested >>>>>>> by contemporary prepositions. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about this. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Helena Worthen >>>>>>> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are clearly >>>> embodied, >>>>>>> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to >>>>>>> linguistics >>>>> (For >>>>>>> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused on >>>> ?lexicon?: >>>>>>> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of prepositions, >>>>>>> being >>>>> part >>>>>>> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and >>>>>>> Halliday >>>>> see no >>>>>>> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, lexico-grammar. >>>>> (Lo >>>>>>> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write lexicon-grammar, >>>>>>> adding >>>>> the >>>>>>> ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word coinings are >>>> great >>>>>>> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of >>>>>>> that? In translation from Russian is word coining ever practiced? >>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden >>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the >>>> metaphorical >>>>>>> use of prepositions like: >>>>>>>>> - "there is some value IN your argument" >>>>>>>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again" >>>>>>>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" >>>>>>>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again" >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> and so on. >>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>> >>>>> -------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>>> ---- >>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> larry smolucha wrote: >>>>>>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself - >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic >>>>> possibilities: >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) published in >>>>> Thought >>>>>>>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated into >>>> English >>>>>>> 1962] >>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the 'additive' >>>> value >>>>>>> of the >>>>>>>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech >>>>> vocalization). >>>>>>>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements that >>>>>>>>>> are >>>>>>> flammable >>>>>>>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither flammable nor >>>>>>>>>> a >>>> gas. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century >>>>>>>>>> European >>>>>>> Developmental >>>>>>>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean 'developmental' >>>>>>>>>> hence >>>>> the >>>>>>>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case of >>>> Piaget's >>>>>>> Genetic >>>>>>>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and >>>>>>>>>> synthesis >>>>>>> based on >>>>>>>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in >>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky's >>>>>>> example of H2O. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com >>>>>>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 >>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be synergistic >>>>>>>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of the parts. >>>>>>>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing more >>>>>>>>>>> than >>>> the >>>>>>>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new can >>>>>>>>>>> ever >>>> be >>>>>>> imagined" >>>>>>>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> A couple things to consider: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of imagination >>>>>>>>>>> as the >>>>>>> brain has >>>>>>>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the >>>>>>>>>>> simplest >>>> level >>>>>>> of the Gestalt >>>>>>>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). >>>>>>>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just >>>> photographic. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to try >>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>> accurately reproduce >>>>>>>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. Whereas, >>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>> goal of combinatory >>>>>>>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, >>>>>>>>>>> dreams, >>>>>>> musings, and even >>>>>>>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation of >>>> objects >>>>>>> and symbols. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different ways >>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>> things and concepts can be >>>>>>>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and sugar >>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>> flour. >>>>>>>>>>> I can add water and >>>>>>>>>>> it >>>>>>> dissolves a bit >>>>>>>>>>> But adding heat >>>>>>>>>>> changes >>>> the >>>>>>> combination into a pancake. >>>>>>>>>>> [Is this synergistic?] >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of more >>>>>>>>>>> examples >>>>>>> to put the discussion >>>>>>>>>>> in the metaphysical realm. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 >>>>>>>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>>>>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make the >>>>>>>>>>>> case >>>>> for >>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. I >>>>>>>>>>>> think >>>> it's >>>>>>> not >>>>>>>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are >>>>>>> associationists who >>>>>>>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary >>>>>>>>>>>> associationism >>>>>>> exists and >>>>>>>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as mediation. >>>>>>> Vygotsky >>>>>>>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking religion, >>>> explain >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> uniqueness of our species? >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species feels >>>>>>>>>>>> for >>>> its >>>>>>> own >>>>>>>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a >>>>>>>>>>>> Piagetian perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian >>>>>>>>>>>> one--true maturity >>>>> as a >>>>>>>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing more >>>>>>>>>>>> to it >>>>>>> than >>>>>>>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of >>>>>>>>>>>> primate, >>>>> and >>>>>>> our >>>>>>>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled upon >>>>>>>>>>>> rocks >>>>> in >>>>>>> order >>>>>>>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be judged >>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>> same >>>>>>> way as >>>>>>>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions and >>>>>>>>>>>> for >>>>>>> language is >>>>>>>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case human >>>>>>> exceptionalism. >>>>>>>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case for >>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>> vanguard role >>>>>>>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other species, >>>>> prolonging >>>>>>>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking after >>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>> sick >>>>>>> and the >>>>>>>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because artificial >>>>>>>>>>>> organs >>>>>>> (tools) and >>>>>>>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important for >>>>>>>>>>>> our >>>>>>> species, it >>>>>>>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where these >>>>>>> "circuitous, >>>>>>>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced that >>>>>>>>>>>> lead >>>> our >>>>>>>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth always >>>>>>>>>>>> been >>>>>>> short on >>>>>>>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for >>>>>>>>>>>> material >>>>>>> culture >>>>>>>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another matter: >>>>>>> verily, here >>>>>>>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of >>>>>>>>>>>> attention is >>>>>>> simply the >>>>>>>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says >>>>>>>>>>>> there are >>>>>>> only two >>>>>>>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. So >>>>>>> imagination is >>>>>>>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete experiences, >>>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>> nothing >>>>>>>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, when >>>>>>>>>>>> you >>>>> hear >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been there >>>>>>>>>>>> to be >>>>>>> able to >>>>>>>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at work >>>>>>>>>>>> in >>>> word >>>>>>> meaning. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, who >>>>>>>>>>>> was >>>>> given >>>>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been >>>>>>>>>>>> mixed >>>> with >>>>>>> silver >>>>>>>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity of gold. >>>>>>> Well, we >>>>>>>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's not >>>> possible >>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that >>>>>>>>>>>> precisely. The >>>>>>> method >>>>>>>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the >>>>>>>>>>>> "principal >>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes >>>>>>>>>>>> palimpsest, a >>>>>>> velum on >>>>>>>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each other. >>>>> Because >>>>>>>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and >>>>>>>>>>>> written >>>> over >>>>>>> every >>>>>>>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was soft, >>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>> pressure >>>>>>>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new ones >>>>>>>>>>>> when >>>>> the >>>>>>> old >>>>>>>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the only >>>> known >>>>>>> Greek >>>>>>>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor their >>>>>>> relationship >>>>>>>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact they >>>>>>>>>>>> are >>>>>>> related to >>>>>>>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's quite >>>>> similar >>>>>>> to the >>>>>>>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an >>>>> associationist, >>>>>>> ?sees >>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? >>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg < >>>> dkellogg60@gmail.com >>>>>> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> division >>>>>>> between >>>>>>>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the other, >>>>>>>>>>>>>> because >>>>>>> Ribot is >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> an >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather distal >>>>>>>>>>>>>> form of >>>>>>> attention. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> transition >>>> from >>>>>>> forest >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the division >>>> between >>>>>>> the two >>>>>>>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and >>>>>>>>>>>>>> commonsensical >>>>>>> world of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly >>>>>>>>>>>>>> prosaic >>>> uses >>>>>>> in life >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more >>>>> "imaginative" >>>>>>> (that >>>>>>>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the world >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> farm,where >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where long >>>>>>>>>>>>>> winter >>>>>>> months are >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely to >>>> encounter >>>>>>> talking >>>>>>>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here >>>>>>>>>>>>>> attention >>>>> has >>>>>>> to be >>>>>>>>>>>>>> more voluntary. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> very >>>> clear >>>>>>>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism that >>>>>>> underpins >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. Vygotsky >>>>>>>>>>>>>> points >>>>> out >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive >>>>>>>>>>>>>> practices >>>>>>> really >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of >>>> imagination, >>>>>>> there >>>>>>>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference between >>>>>>>>>>>>>> human >>>>> and >>>>>>> animal >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly >>>>>>>>>>>>>> capable of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> volitional >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than humans). >>>>> Without >>>>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> theory >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any basis >>>>>>>>>>>>>> for >>>>> Ribot's >>>>>>>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological >>>>>>>>>>>>>> functions at >>>>>>> all. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole >>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination, >>>>>>> thanks to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> all >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> influential >>>>>>> around the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> time >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th century. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> had >>>>>>> seen work >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> on >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> equal >>>>>>> reproductive? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical studies >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>> development >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> being >>>> a >>>>>>> relative >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> bucket >>>> list. >>>>>>> This >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal musings >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> from >>>> some >>>>>>> weeks >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell correct >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>> segmented the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met aphorizing?. >>>>>>> Puns, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward Kant >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and >>>> they >>>>>>> are >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and his >>>>>>> followers as an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel, so >>>>>>> its of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> course >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories emerge. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially in >>>>>>> translation, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> seems >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, "recollection" >>>> in >>>>>>> this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> passage, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in counter >>>>>>> distinction to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "memory." >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary >>>>>>> discourse >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out Russian >>>>>>> colleagues have >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something from >>>> theorists >>>>>>> who >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> clearly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when it was >>>> still >>>>>>> possible >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" which, >>>>>>> interestingly >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> links >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a >>>> "voluntary" >>>>>>> act. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Parts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like children >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> stuff >>>>> that >>>>>>> was >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> also >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the concepts >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>> creativity >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its curious to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> see >>>>>>> that the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he found >>>> himself >>>>>>> writing. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to which >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> pretty >>>>> old >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> approaches >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < >>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively contemporary, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but it >>>>>>> may be >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> worth >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a prominent >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> place >>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagination >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating between >>>>>>> Recollection and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) Reproductive >>>>>>> Imagination, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> (2) >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive Imagination, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> which >>>> he >>>>>>> says >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> leads >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive Memory. In >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> other >>>>>>> words, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect is >>>>>>> accomplished >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> through >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading Strawson >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>> Williams. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists whose >>>> work i >>>>>>> am >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> trying >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) speak of >>>>>>> productive >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive >>>> imagination >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> develops. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive implies >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>> there >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> must >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive imagination. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But >>>> I >>>>>>> learned >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination appears >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and >>>> is >>>>>>> linked >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable part >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>> anticipation >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination >>>>>>> (starting >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> look, and >>>>>>> provides >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> a >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the socio-cultural >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as >>>>> fixed. >>>>>>> This, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, gives me >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a >>>>> ground >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> take >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> part >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I start >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preconceptions: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> grammarian >>>>>>> Langacker on >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> domains, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> particularly >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> full of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two aspects >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>> temporality: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and rhythmic >>>>>>> structure), which >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, for >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> both >>>>>>> individual >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and feeling. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < >>>>>>> lpscholar2@gmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this topic. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the third >>>> *space* >>>>>>> and the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> his >>>>>>> notion of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This notion is >>>>>>> explored under >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a *set* >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of >>>>>>> modalities >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a form of >>>> knowing >>>>>>> that is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [perceived??] >>>> if >>>>>>> we >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> think >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *style* Larry On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> HENRY SHONERD < >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> say how >>>>>>> jazzed up >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going wild, the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind >>>>> as >>>>>>> Larry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> various >>>>>>> triads, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> finally >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notebooks >>>>> of >>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind, as >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap adentro, >>>> luega >>>>>>> pa? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fuera. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole < >>>> mcole@ucsd.edu> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination thread, >>>> attached >>>>>>> are two >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the issue. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of CHAT >>>>> theorists >>>>>>> like >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development of >>>>>>> imagination in a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's notion of >>>>>>> productive >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and have no >>>>>>> intention of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> doing >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as explicated >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the >>>>>>> attached >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these >>>> philosophers, >>>>> I >>>>>>> came >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> upon >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> closely >>>>>>> linked at >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> several >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our naivete, >>>>>>> Ettienne and I >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier as a >>>> means >>>>> of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> access >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander Suvorov. >>>>>>> Moreover, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> such >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have direct >>>>> relevance >>>>>>> to >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kris's >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also speak >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>>>>>> concerns >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> about >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in >>>> development. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination thread. >>>>> Perhaps >>>>>>> they >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> will >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural >>>>>>> science >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural >>>> science >>>>>>> with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> science >>>>>>> with an >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>> Assistant Professor >>>> Department of Anthropology >>>> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>> Brigham Young University >>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>>> >>> From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Dec 22 10:26:24 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Mon, 22 Dec 2014 18:26:24 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Time, Imagination, Metaphor In-Reply-To: <2AB7D36B-CF48-476F-90B9-7E57515FF515@gmail.com> References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> <5493CC6B.5050105@mira.net> <1419052007614.61660@unm.edu> <, > <1419115512170.24268@unm.edu>, <2AB7D36B-CF48-476F-90B9-7E57515FF515@gmail.com> Message-ID: <1419272784008.9961@unm.edu> Thanks Henry! Yes, it has to do with setting and placement in time. Language is important, but how one says the word and where one says the word and why one says the word and even IF one says the word seems to have more importance than which word it is or where that word appears in a sentence. Yes, I'm referring to context. Of course this is why I don't think computers will ever be able to speak to us in conversations: they don't have bodies and they can only mimic, and even if they have sensors on them that can detect place, will they ever be able to detect mood or affect? I mean, it seems that we have our own issues in addressing the pain of others (the reference to Susan Sontag is accidental and intentional). Are we expecting computers to take care of that for us? Like the babysitting television set? So I wondered if there is a way to capture environments and places in a descriptive sense (? la Darwin) and to be able to note if there are any interesting realities that emerge from that kind of study? In the same way we learn something about the nature of movement from Muybridge's work, can we learn something about the nature of setting in which locution happens? What patterns emerge? And how might these patterns be represented visually? Can something be learned by going over older studies that would offer new insights? Certainly this relates to power, it relates to the public vs the private, it relates to growth and change, but what I hope to preserve when making this proposition for a new language, is the unity we feel as human beings with our environment, how connectedness is preserved vs how it is adulterated. I echo something that Wittgenstein pondered, regarding the sense of feeling perfectly safe. It is not only the ineffable that is unspoken, but those things that are not represented and consequently can escape our notice. Just like the horse's hooves up off the ground. Kind regards, Annalisa From arazfar@uic.edu Mon Dec 22 10:49:25 2014 From: arazfar@uic.edu (Aria Razfar) Date: Mon, 22 Dec 2014 12:49:25 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology In-Reply-To: <1419205186894.59536@unm.edu> References: <039801d01a33$3db3c430$b91b4c90$@uic.edu> <38C43AE248831048B6AF57F364680D3C72A23DDA@OC11EXPO32.exchange.mit.edu> <040801d01a41$4b69dd90$e23d98b0$@uic.edu> <0CBE4C26-68FE-49F7-BE9F-00A0121B4CD8@uniandes.edu.co> <043e01d01a44$b15fac80$141f0580$@uic.edu> <1D18C3B0-9EA5-42E6-8764-A6973960B8B5@uniandes.edu.co> <050701d01a51$084de460$18e9ad20$@uic.edu> <38C43AE248831048B6AF57F364680D3C72A23F69@OC11EXPO32.exchange.mit.edu> <057001d01a5d$d743a640$85caf2c0$@uic.edu> , <061001d01d34$dc790d10$956b2730$@uic.edu> <1419187343939.81696@unm.edu>, <067901d01d55$b8a8f2d0$29fad870$@uic.edu> <1419205186894.59536@unm.edu> Message-ID: <087c01d01e18$026b28d0$07417a70$@uic.edu> Hi Annalisa, After reading your post and David's book review, I feel there is a need to clarify some broader points for the purpose of framing our discussion. First let me say, I appreciate your stance to continue this conversation with "childlike curiosity" and a "playful creative spirit." It is precisely this intention and practice of dialogic imagination "to hear the other" that matters. It is good to apply this to our collective comparison of Vygotsky and Chomsky. Allow me to be explicit about some of the broader framing issues, before tackling one of the specific questions you raise. The question of compatibility and/or incompatibility seems like a non-productive starting point. I would even say this is a "non-dialogic stance" and anti-Vygotskian stance on the nature of knowledge. We can assume and empirically show that every theory is a unique and "true" stance on the world. At the same time every theory is not unique and a "false" stance on the world, especially when viewed from the boundaries. The convergence or divergence of perspectives depends on how fully we historicize and contextualize each perspective. With this dialogic consciousness we can have productive conversations full of contestation yet moving toward bigger points of convergence and coherence. A goal espoused by Vygotsky in his pursuit of a general psychology, and Chomsky in his pursuit of universal grammar. It is in this spirit that I wish to complicate one of the questions you raise and perhaps others will chime in: the characterization of the nativist position as "solely genetic explanations for human language" or "it's all biology." This assertion begs two questions: if it is not all biology or genetics then what is it? Second, what is meant by biology and the nature of 'genetics.' A child and an ape (Koko for example), are placed in the same auditory environment, with roughly the same genome, similar contexts-yet they develop two different modes of communication/language. Even the sign language developed by Koko is debated with regards to "meaning" and whether or not her actions are the result of conditioning. Ironically, the Chomskyan and Vygotskian are asking the same question about "meaning." On the question of "two Wittgenstein's" "three Vygotskys" and which one I am referring to. This is the easiest question. At the Novodevichy Cemetery in Moscow, there are at least four resting in one grave site. I guess I am referring to all of them and more. But there is only one Vygtosky, one Wittgenstein. They share a common thread of pushing the closed circles of their time. Both were tucked away in a cemetery reserved "for non-conformists." Thanks for pushing Annalisa. Aria Aria Razfar, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Literacy, Language, and Culture Director of Graduate Studies, Curriculum and Instruction University of Illinois at Chicago 1040 W. Harrison St. M/C 147 Chicago, IL, 60607 Director of English Learning through Mathematics, Science and Action Research (ELMSA) www.elmsa.org Webpage: http://education.uic.edu/personnel/faculty/aria-razfar-phd Tel: 312-413-8373 Fax: 312-996-8134 -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Annalisa Aguilar Sent: Sunday, December 21, 2014 5:40 PM To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology Hi Aria, In a stance of good-will, I'd like to extend this thread with childlike curiosity in the hope it is received with a playful and creative spirit. I have heard of the controversy of Chomsky and the Behaviorists, as it is quite notorious, and I'm grateful to Chomsky for breaking the log-jam in the US for Behaviorism. However, I have never heard of the controversy between Vygotsky and Pavlovian-Marxist Psychology, or that Vygotsky's claim against them was to promote creativity. So thanks for that. I hope others will give this some additional light. My sense though is, and maybe I'm wrong about this, Vygotsky was interested in creating a general psychology and he felt that language was the means of connecting culture with phylogeny, and phylogeny with culture. This approach has provided wide vistas for inquiry apparently. So Vygotsky was more concerned with understanding the way these processes developed, and like Darwin, was more concerned with describing these processes before explaining them completely (in the sense of tying culture to biology precisely). [Any peanuts from the peanut gallery here?] I am at a loss to compare this to Chomsky, for my surface understanding is that he is what is called a "nativist," and my understanding of this term is that proponents claim there are solely genetic explanations for human language, that there is something innate in us that emerges in maturation, along the lines of Piaget (I hope I've not gummed things up here by making that comparison), whereby "development leads learning." That it is all biology. I'm not sure either what Chomsky's claims are for creativity through this path, if everything is determined through biology. We can all want creativity for humankind, but how is creativity explained in Chomsky's model? [An aside: I'm curious how Chomsky explains Koko the signing ape? And where are the other signing apes?] Forgive me please if I have posed these juxtapositions in limited and simplistic constructs. I don't think it's my biology, but rather that my knowledge of the subject matter is sorely limited, and that can be (and I hope will be) changed through my interaction with all the lovely knowing others on this list. :) Trawling around lchc, I found this quote by Toulmin (From: One is Not Born a Personality by Karl Levitin (1980)): "Through his brief career, Vygotsky?s preoccupations centred on consciousness: more specifically, on the modes in which consciousness is ?represented? ? both mentally and neurologically ? in the life of the individual. In his view, these problems cannot be convincingly dealt with by focusing either on our genetic inheritance and innate capacities alone or on the influence of external, environmental factors alone. Vygotsky was willing to take neither the ?nativist? route preferred today by Chomsky ... nor the ?external conditioning? route followed by Skinner ... Those two routes ? he insisted ? were not the only options available to us. Instead, he undertook a new kind of developmental attack on these problems." This book was written in 1980 and so apparently this is how Chomsky was perceived back then, as a nativist. Is this no longer the case? If he is no longer a nativist, then please explain the changes of mind that occurred? My understanding is that the Cartesian claim is made (to describe Chomsky) because there is no means of linking the mind to the body, no means of linking the culture, the history, the tool, the society to the individual. The mind is seen as separate. I'm ready to be shown (not told) how that connection is made. I don't think anyone means that he is adopting the carbon-copy of Descartes's philosophy. Many things can be Cartesian, even number lines, for example, which exist in a very abstract place! The "battle for consciousness" is that our creativity manifests (overall) in response to the outside, beginning (as in the genesis of) with our caregivers as infants, and these initial interactions eventually manifest in language as a response to gesture (pointing). This is frequently given short-shrift from those not familiar with Vygotsky. One can take creativity (as may be linked to an expression of consciousness) a couple ways. One is that our creativity is fatally determined, with an internal engine for problem solving. Another is that we are totally plastic entities reacting to the outside without much filtering going on. Both of these models seem mechanical to me. A third, more dynamic version, is that there is something dynamic going on, a three-way process that over time responds to itself and to outside influences at once, and so there is something like a spiral development going on throughout the life of the individual, always in regard to oneself *and* the broad soup of one's culture and environment, activity is (for many here) the engine for that interaction. Yet the genesis for this spiral begins from the outside, through the caregiver. What is the genesis for the nativist model? In any case, even if one adopts (what I'm calling) the dynamic model of consciousness (as a dialectical process), one can interpret this as: There is only one "proper" way that this dynamic process can optimally occur, or: There can be plural means for this dynamic process to optimally occur. Moreover, maybe there can be no feasible definition of what is optimal, because it all depends upon so many factors, known and unknown. By the way, in my search of lchc, I also found a book review (2009) by our own David Kellogg (which I've attached), who explains there are at least three Vygotskies (as indicated by Norris Minick). Much like there are two Wittgensteins, I gather? So I wonder, which Vygotsky you might be referring to? And then it occurred to me this may mean there are more than one Chomksy, perhaps? If so, how many are there? :) And to which one are you referring to? At the genesis of his short career Vygotsky jumped into a conference in Moscow between Chelpanov and Pavlov to present his first paper, and as David writes, "According to Luria?s account (1979: 38), Vygotsky?s paper, from both ends of the room simultaneously, brought the house down." It might be easy to make the comparison of splashes into established academic circles, but I wonder if this might reduce the nature of Vygotsky's work as reactionary (as against the Pavlov-Marxist psychologists) rather than as creative and even consciousness-raising in his attempt to unite the two psychologies? But of course, I am biased! Incidentally, David makes an interesting comparison between Vygotsky and Volosinov in his review. I wonder if David's book review might be a vehicle for comparison and contrast in this thread? It appears that both Vygotsky and Volosinov made observations that were similar in terms of the value of the social influences of development. There are many here on this list who are not linguists, myself being one! So if I've made any grievous generalizations concerning linguistics and linguists that are totally in error, I hope you will forgive me. I also would enjoy any clarifications from old timers of our community if they feel any energy after the eggnog. My search is for understanding so I might be knowledgeable about these things. Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Aria Razfar Sent: Sunday, December 21, 2014 12:38 PM To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology Annalisa, The two different contexts are early 20th century Soviet Psychology and mid-20th Century U.S. Psychology. While different in terms of space and time, it was similar in terms of content. Chomsky arguing for creativity and freedom of thought in a context dominated by Skinner's Behaviorism. Vygotsky arguing for creativity in a context dominated by the behaviorism of Pavlovian-Marxist Psychology. Aria Aria Razfar, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Literacy, Language, and Culture Director of Graduate Studies, Curriculum and Instruction University of Illinois at Chicago 1040 W. Harrison St. M/C 147 Chicago, IL, 60607 Director of English Learning through Mathematics, Science and Action Research (ELMSA) www.elmsa.org Webpage: http://education.uic.edu/personnel/faculty/aria-razfar-phd Tel: 312-413-8373 Fax: 312-996-8134 -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Annalisa Aguilar Sent: Sunday, December 21, 2014 12:42 PM To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology Aria, Thanks for something more specific. It helps. Would you mind clarifying, when you say: > He sees his goal and Vygotsky's goal of arguing for creativity to be the same although in two different contexts. What are the two different contexts? Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of Aria Razfar Sent: Sunday, December 21, 2014 8:43 AM To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology Greg, The topic that seemed to interest him most about Vygotsky was "inner speech" and its connection to culture, social activities and even history. The representation of Chomsky's "nativist" position in sociocultural literature seems to be decontextualized, acultural, and ahistorical, and to some degree rightfully so. Although he would include culture, social activity, and even history as part of "stable cognitive elements" and are definitely "more than habits" which was the main goal of his writings in the 50s and 60s. He sees his goal and Vygotsky's goal of arguing for creativity to be the same although in two different contexts. It was clear to me that he doesn't see the controversies, at least not the same way post "social turn" scholars and self-proclaimed Chomskians have framed it. He sees his views of language and cognition as very much compatible with Vygotsky's insights, especially the ones he's read closely. It's been years since he's written about these topics, so unf ortunately there isn't a paper. His take on the roots of the "controversies" and the subsequent careers built on it are "quite interesting." Did you have any specific questions? Aria Aria Razfar, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Literacy, Language, and Culture Director of Graduate Studies, Curriculum and Instruction University of Illinois at Chicago 1040 W. Harrison St. M/C 147 Chicago, IL, 60607 Director of English Learning through Mathematics, Science and Action Research (ELMSA) www.elmsa.org Webpage: http://education.uic.edu/personnel/faculty/aria-razfar-phd Tel: 312-413-8373 Fax: 312-996-8134 -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson Sent: Thursday, December 18, 2014 10:54 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology ?Aria, Any updates to report on Professor Chomsky's take on Vygotsky? -greg? On Wed, Dec 17, 2014 at 5:59 PM, Aria Razfar wrote: > > > Hi Martin, > > See below. He finds Vygotsky's work "quite interesting." Let's see if > he elaborates. I find his persepctive on the "Linguistic Wars" also > interesting. > > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistics_Wars > > Aria > > -----Original Message----- > From: Noam Chomsky [mailto:chomsky@mit.edu] > Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 6:09 PM > To: Aria Razfar > Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology > > The "linguistic wars" are largely an invention of overheated > imaginations of those who thought they were fighting them. If you > check the record you'll discover that I barely participated, and > didn't consider them any different from interchanges within what's > claimed to be "my side" of the non-existent wars. > > Vygotsky did quite interesting work. > > -----Original Message----- > From: Aria Razfar [mailto:arazfar@uic.edu] > Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 6:28 PM > To: Noam Chomsky > Cc: arazfar@uic.edu > Subject: FW: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology > > See question below re: "opinion on Vygotsky"? > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John > Packer > Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 5:12 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology > > Since we have Professor Chomsky online, might we be able to ask him > his opinion of Vygotsky? > > Martin > > On Dec 17, 2014, at 4:59 PM, Aria Razfar wrote: > > > Hi Martin, > > > > Metaphor was my take and other cognitive linguist's take (i.e. > > Lakoff). I believe his rejection of "Metaphor" at least in the > > embodied cognition sense is rooted in the "Linguistics Wars." > > Several people in this thread as well others in the field of > > cognitive linguistics made the claim that he was and remains a > > Cartesian dualist. He definitely does not consider himself as such. > > In order to establish the field of linguistics, he had to position > > it within the broader arch of western enlightenment and romanticism. > > Hence, the title of > the book. > > > > Aria > > > > Aria Razfar, Ph.D. > > Associate Professor of Literacy, Language, and Culture Director of > > Graduate Studies, Curriculum and Instruction University of Illinois > > at Chicago > > 1040 W. Harrison St. M/C 147 > > Chicago, IL, 60607 > > > > Director of English Learning through Mathematics, Science and Action > > Research (ELMSA) www.elmsa.org > > > > Webpage: http://education.uic.edu/personnel/faculty/aria-razfar-phd > > Tel: 312-413-8373 > > Fax: 312-996-8134 > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Martin John > > Packer > > Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 3:47 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology > > > > Hi Aria, > > > > It would help to see the message that Noam is responding to! I don't > > see, for example, how metaphor crept into this discussion. > > (Actually, looking back through the thread, I see that this was your > > proposal.) > > > > I suppose a lot depends on what one means by being "a Cartesian." As > > I just wrote in another message, Chomsky was, I think, positioning > > his approach to linguistics in a tradition in which Descartes was > > prominent: in which one tries to figure out what makes possible a > > specific characteristic or ability of the mind. Chomsky asked what > > universal competence would be necessary to make language possible - > > any > language. > > > > I'm not trying to attach a label to the man; but he give the book > > its title for a reason, and a very respectable one. > > > > Martin > > > > On Dec 17, 2014, at 4:34 PM, Aria Razfar wrote: > > > >> Here is Chomsky's response to whether or not he is a Cartesian. Not > > surprisingly, he categorically rejects the idea of "metaphor" as well. > > At least he's open to change. Now whether our subject is dead or > > alive that is a different question. > >> > >> Aria > >> > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: Noam Chomsky [mailto:chomsky@mit.edu] > >> Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 3:16 PM > >> To: Aria Razfar > >> Subject: RE: [Xmca-l] Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology > >> The reason for the phrase "Cartesian linguistics" was explained very clearly in the opening pages of the book. No one who read at least that far could believe that I am "a Cartesian," let alone anyone who read farther. I can't account for the illiteracy of "notable folks." > >> It's also not a metaphor. Rather, exactly as I described it, which I would repeat verbatim today. > >> There's no need to argue against "mind-body dualism." As I've discussed repeatedly, Newton's discoveries terminated the thesis, at least in its classical form, through Descartes and beyond. > >> Of course I've changed my views since the '50s and '60s, in fact in the past few months. That's normal in subjects that are not dead. > >> > >> Noam Chomsky From boblake@georgiasouthern.edu Mon Dec 22 11:07:12 2014 From: boblake@georgiasouthern.edu (Robert Lake) Date: Mon, 22 Dec 2014 14:07:12 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Time, Imagination, Metaphor In-Reply-To: <1419272784008.9961@unm.edu> References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> <5493CC6B.5050105@mira.net> <1419052007614.61660@unm.edu> <1419115512170.24268@unm.edu> <2AB7D36B-CF48-476F-90B9-7E57515FF515@gmail.com> <1419272784008.9961@unm.edu> Message-ID: Hi Annalisa, Henry and anyone else reading this. First of all thank-you for the link to the piece about "A Change is Gonna Come". Every now and then I look for new covers of this song which I never get tired of hearing. I have to say that Tina Turner's and Al Greene's versions are quite powerful and as you say, evoke the personal as political and vice versa. How else can students develop agency if that is not true? Also I agree with you about the limits of technology which can only mimic algorithms. I think the most important aspect of Chomsky's work in linguistics is the centrality of imagination in *creating sentences that have never been uttered before.* This is in contrast to what someone wrote posted yesterday that the prevailing theory of language from the 1940's forward was language is acquired through a set of "habits'. *Robert Lake* On Mon, Dec 22, 2014 at 1:26 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Thanks Henry! > > Yes, it has to do with setting and placement in time. Language is > important, but how one says the word and where one says the word and why > one says the word and even IF one says the word seems to have more > importance than which word it is or where that word appears in a sentence. > Yes, I'm referring to context. > > Of course this is why I don't think computers will ever be able to speak > to us in conversations: they don't have bodies and they can only mimic, and > even if they have sensors on them that can detect place, will they ever be > able to detect mood or affect? I mean, it seems that we have our own issues > in addressing the pain of others (the reference to Susan Sontag is > accidental and intentional). Are we expecting computers to take care of > that for us? Like the babysitting television set? > > So I wondered if there is a way to capture environments and places in a > descriptive sense (? la Darwin) and to be able to note if there are any > interesting realities that emerge from that kind of study? In the same way > we learn something about the nature of movement from Muybridge's work, can > we learn something about the nature of setting in which locution happens? > > What patterns emerge? And how might these patterns be represented > visually? Can something be learned by going over older studies that would > offer new insights? > > Certainly this relates to power, it relates to the public vs the private, > it relates to growth and change, but what I hope to preserve when making > this proposition for a new language, is the unity we feel as human beings > with our environment, how connectedness is preserved vs how it is > adulterated. > > I echo something that Wittgenstein pondered, regarding the sense of > feeling perfectly safe. > > It is not only the ineffable that is unspoken, but those things that are > not represented and consequently can escape our notice. Just like the > horse's hooves up off the ground. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > -- *Robert Lake Ed.D.*Associate Professor Social Foundations of Education Dept. of Curriculum, Foundations, and Reading Georgia Southern University Secretary/Treasurer-AERA- Paulo Freire Special Interest Group P. O. Box 8144 Phone: (912) 478-0355 Fax: (912) 478-5382 Statesboro, GA 30460 From dkellogg60@gmail.com Mon Dec 22 13:31:19 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Tue, 23 Dec 2014 06:31:19 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Maths and science in Russia In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: I think in any language, big numbers are just an example of what Ribot was calling "combinatorial imagination" (see earlier thread on imagination). That is, all languages treat the most commonly used numbers as lexis and the larger numbers as grammar--so for example in English the numbers one through twelve are all "molar" in the sense that they are single morphemes, while Avagadro's number (six hundred and two hextillion, two hundred and fourteen quintillion, one hundred and fifty quandrillion) is decomposable into base ten units at every point. This is part of a the much more general property of language which means that the words which realize scientific concepts (e.g. "immersion") are morphologically complex while the ones which realize everyday concepts (e.g. "dunk") are morphologically simple. One of the problems with Chomsky's model of language (the one to which Roy Harris is pointing, actually) is that it places this kind of combinatorial imagination at the centre of the language system and considers fixed idioms to be epiphenomenal, while in everyday life, that is, in the vast majority of language uses, it's really the other way around: we use language as a set of fixed (but refixable) expressions and reserve our creativity for other problems. Engestr?m's book "Learning as Expanding" begins by attacking Gagne on combinatorial imagination; Engestr?m argues that all learning is essentially expansive and not combinatorial. I have always thought this a mistake: as Vygotsky says, development always means the introduction of something new, something not present even embryonically at the outset, and it's for this reason that a historical account of a process can only be teleological and cannot actually be predictive (we can't predict learning any more than we can predict evolution). So I can easily imagine that combinatorial imagination is a big step forward at one point in the development of the number system and then it becomes a fetter on the imagination because it focuses attention on how the number is composed rather than on what we can do with it (we actually don't use the long form of Avagadro's number when we talk about chemistry; we just say "Avagadro's number" or use a calculator). Here are two examples of number problems that I think require more than combinatorial imagination. The first is the one that I clumsily confused you with in my last post. Suppose a child is nine years and four months old, and I ask the child how old she is. She says "nine and...." And what? The adult way is to say nine and four months, but that doesn't tell us how many years old the child is, that is, how many fractions of a year lie between the child and the child's next or last birthday. In order to answer that question, the child has to convert months to twelfths of a year, and then try to convert these to thirds or decimals. This requires more than combinatorial imagination; it involves reframing the problem as one of the imperfection of the non-decimal system we use to calculate months. The second stems indirectly from the problem you raise. Although I think the difference between the Korean (actually, Sino-Korean) numbers between ten and twenty is negligible (it's just a matter of lexicalizing two numbers, eleven and twelve), there is a very serious problem that dogs even advanced learners of English here. The Korean won is a very small currency unit--there are about a thousand to the dollar at the moment. So to express the price of anything worth buying, you need to talk, in English, in units of ten to the third power (a cup of coffee costs thousands, salaries and rents are in millions, cars costs tens of millions, and real estate costs billions and trillions). But the Korean number system uses units of ten to the fourth bower ("man" means ten thousand, "ok" means a hundred million, and "cho" is a billion). So when you read statistics in the English press they are very often wrong by a factor of ten. This requires more than combinatorial imagination, because it involves realizing that the placement of commas in a large number is just a cultural convention corresponding to language and not to mathematics itself, and also involves "making strange" the way we do it, and thinking instead in terms of the way they do it. On Sunday our Vygotsky seminar met at my apartment to proof the galleys of our new book of Vygotsky's lectures on pedology, and during the lunch break some of my former students were looking at the paintings I did twenty years ago. At the time I was obsessed with "point of view", and all my paintings featured some intrusion of the artist's own body--usually an arm or a pair of spectacles. I guess the purpose of it was to "make strange" the act of looking at a painting and to instead force the viewer into my own viewpoint. But it also had the curious property of making strange the act of painting a painting, because I could never get over the fact that both the part of my own body and the rest of the painting were in equally sharp focus. That's not the way point of view really works! David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies Korean On 22 December 2014 at 08:29, Ed Wall wrote: > David > > This is quite interesting. Let me give some different takes on some > of what you write (I, by the way, am still unsure) > > Some say part of the fetters you refer to are in the manner in which > the equal sign is used (e.g. as compute) and the propensity for vertical > addition in the early grades. I have seen a US 3rd grade teacher complicate > things somewhat (she and the children were definitely working with > countable objects) in starting with an unknown quantity, remove a known > quantity, and, by obtaining a known quantity, figure out what the initial > whole was without too much trouble. That isn't too say that things might > not have proceeded more efficiently with another curricular starting point. > > There is an interesting different between Korean students and US > students in the early grades. US students have something called eleven and > twelve and Korean students have something translated, in effect, as ten-one > and ten-two. There has been speculation by some that these can be fetters > of a sort on the way to decimal number (there are also things called nickel > and quarter and five dollars not to mention inches, etc. which can also be > somewhat un-helpful). > > > On a different note, what is the adult system of determining how old > one is in years, exactly? I know how young children do this correctly, but > inexactly. > > Ed > > On Dec 21, 2014, at 4:50 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > Let me float a hypothesis, and see what Huw and Ulvi make of it. A > learning > > activity (any learning activity) is best described not as a synoptic > > hierarchy of molar units like operation, action and activity. Viewed > > diachronically, from the point of view of psychology, a learning activity > > is a non-hierarchical historical sequence, such that any given > > "method" eventually, in time, turns out to fetter progress and must be > > discarded, and the end result is not an inter-mental social form of > > activity but instead an intramental psychological one. > > > > Take the Schmittau work that Ulvi references as a concrete example. > > Schmittau showed that the American curriculum (like the Korean one) > > introduces the notion of number by counting separate objects. This allows > > the child to grasp the number very concretely and quickly. Groupings are > > then introduced, and this corresponds once again to what we see children > do > > naturally (see Chapter Eight of HDHMF). So at every point the American > > curriculum takes the line of least resistance. But that means that at a > > specific point, the notion of number based on concrete, separable objects > > becomes a fetter on the child's progress. Schmittau locates this point > > quite precisely: it's the moment when the child, accustomed to add known > > quantitites of physical objects together to obtain an unknown quantity, > is > > asked to start with an unknown quantity, remove a known quantity, and, by > > obtaining a known quantity, figure out what the initial whole was (e.g. > > "I made a bunch of snowballs and put them in the freezer. I threw one at > my > > big brother at a Christmas pary, and two at my friends when they teased > me > > at New Years. Now I have only half a dozen left for April Fools Day. How > > many snowballs did I make?") > > > > Chapter Eight of HDHMF asks the question of whether "arithmetical > figures" > > (that is, physical groupings of countable objects) will keep the child > back > > from learning the symbolic manipulations afforded by the decimal system > of > > writing digits, or whether they will naturally evolve into the decimal > > system (because the children will of their own will invent a physical > > grouping of ten objects). Interestingly, Vygotsky concludes that any > > experiment along these lines would be unethical (and THERE is a > > correspondence with Chomsky, who has often correctly noted how one of the > > things that keeps linguistics in a "paper and pencil" era corresponding > to > > sixteenth century physics is the immorality of experimentation on human > > subjects). But, like Chomsky, he resolves the question with paper and > > pencil (in Chapter Thirteen) with a very amusing MIS-reading of > Thorndike's > > "Psychology of Arithmetic". > > > > Thorndike is criticizing the way in which our parents and grandparents > were > > taught arithmetic as a symbolic system akin to language. Vygotsky > > apparently doesn't get Thorndike's irony, and thinks that Thorndike is > > lauding this culturally approved method over Lay's newfangled system > based > > on "arithmetical figures" (dominos, in fact). See the attachment: it > > involves analyzing a picture where there is one girl on a swing and > another > > on the ground ("How many girls are there?") a kitten on a stump and > another > > on the ground (which Vygotsky misremembers as dogs). And so, by a process > > of misreading and misremembering, Vygotsky turns Thorndike into a > > cognitivist. Thorndike would probably rather be a dog. > > > > Interestingly, the way Vygotsky resolves the whole dispute is > similar--that > > is, the child triumphs not through the adequacy of his or her own method > or > > through seeing the superiority of the adult method, but rather through > the > > inadequacies of both. For example (and this is my example), a child with > a > > notion of number based entirely on separable objects has a very hard time > > measuring how old he is in precise terms. On the other hand, the adult > > method of measuring years out in months is NOT a decimal method. The > child > > therefore has to grasp and perfect the adult system just in order to > answer > > the simple question--how old are you in years EXACTLY? > > > > David Kellogg > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > > > > > On 22 December 2014 at 07:01, Huw Lloyd > wrote: > > > >> Ulvi, > >> > >> The essential 'method' is to facilitate students' own experimentation > with > >> methods. This is called learning activity. > >> > >> Huw > >> > >> On 21 December 2014 at 12:15, Ulvi ??il wrote: > >>> > >>> Hello, > >>> > >>> I know there are some works comparing Russia (Davydov's curriculum) and > >> US, > >>> and even some works done in US with an application of Davydov's, e.g. > by > >>> Schmittau. > >>> > >>> I would like to know, not in detail, but just in general, which main > >>> factors lie behind this success in Russia, it is Davydov, or Zarkov or > >> any > >>> other scholar's method. > >>> > >>> Thanks in advance, > >>> > >>> Ulvi > >>> > >> > > > > > From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Dec 22 13:52:06 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Mon, 22 Dec 2014 21:52:06 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology In-Reply-To: <087c01d01e18$026b28d0$07417a70$@uic.edu> References: <039801d01a33$3db3c430$b91b4c90$@uic.edu> <38C43AE248831048B6AF57F364680D3C72A23DDA@OC11EXPO32.exchange.mit.edu> <040801d01a41$4b69dd90$e23d98b0$@uic.edu> <0CBE4C26-68FE-49F7-BE9F-00A0121B4CD8@uniandes.edu.co> <043e01d01a44$b15fac80$141f0580$@uic.edu> <1D18C3B0-9EA5-42E6-8764-A6973960B8B5@uniandes.edu.co> <050701d01a51$084de460$18e9ad20$@uic.edu> <38C43AE248831048B6AF57F364680D3C72A23F69@OC11EXPO32.exchange.mit.edu> <057001d01a5d$d743a640$85caf2c0$@uic.edu> , <061001d01d34$dc790d10$956b2730$@uic.edu> <1419187343939.81696@unm.edu>, <067901d01d55$b8a8f2d0$29fad870$@uic.edu> <1419205186894.59536@unm.edu>, <087c01d01e18$026b28d0$07417a70$@uic.edu> Message-ID: <1419285126065.70597@unm.edu> Hi Aria! Thanks for the next link in this chain of discourse! I'm afraid this post may be 2.5 screens, so I hope by non-conforming I'm not placed in the cemetery in Moscow. I wondered, Aria, if your reference to theories unique or not, true or false, had anything to do with my posts on Muybridge and stop-action photography? :) Our search for knowledge is not in question (even if it is a quest)! Then, it depends upon what we mean by knowledge! Do we mean knowledge in terms of convention? or in reaction to convention? or of knowledge of the world as it is? or something else? To address your complication of the question, "If it isn't all biology or genetics, what is it?" And the definition of what is biology and what is genetics? I think the matter is that we are more than matter. We are matter+! So do we have a biology? yes. Do we have genes? yes. It is impossible to fully understand what the biology is at this point in history! The key words there are "fully understand." We can't sit around and wait to determine what that biology is, how the genes interact. etc. This is not to say biology does not exist or is not important. It means it is a very hard problem to understand and in the meantime the world keeps spinning and problems must be solved. So what can we do about it now at this juncture? Let the biologists and the geneticists keep going, but we must keep going too. With regard to Koko, I believe Koko was not trained, she was taught. There is something of a consciousness there that suggests her agency. For example, how to explain her sadness when she learned that Robin Williams died? He was not in the room when she learned this news. She asked questions about why others were crying, I seem to recall, so she may not have remembered Williams, but she certainly detected emotion in others present (see: http://www.koko.org/koko-tribute-robin-williams). I have no urgency to be fooled by appearances just so I can say apes are like us, because we already know that they are like us in many ways! :) Sure, humans and apes are different too, by about 2%! There is biology that shows that we are who we are because of our ability to redirect with gesture in a more advanced manner than apes, that not only do we use tools like apes, but we go past that, making tools with other tools for example. One could argue that necessity did not require apes to do more than we do because the food they can eat was easily available in their environment. Apes possess two less proteins to digest carbs than we do, and perhaps because we have more digestive power we were able to move away from the equator and eat roots that were in the ground, and having an opposable thumb we could collect grains, all of which of course requires an ability to identify plants and to dig and eventually to farm these plants (and also pass this know-how on to the next generation). Moving away from the equator means different life challenges, like keeping warm, so it isn't just biology, it is also environmental *and* the help of your friends to make sure you can all dig up and safely store enough potatoes for winter solstice feasting! So there's a union of environment, society, and biology. When it comes to the differences between Chomsky and Vygotsky, I'd suggest the "incompatibility" that Vygotskians sense with Chomskians is the silence pertaining to the society, the culture, and the environment, and the tools (language being one tool of many). We don't dispute the importance of biology. We say biology *and* other important factors. We are interested in how these entities relate to one another. I have heard however, that Chomsky views Vygotsky as just another flavor of behaviorist, and this would be quite antagonistic to Camp Vygotsky. So there are two issues of incompatibility. Silence and superimposition. So we wait to hear something pertaining to that gap and to that overlap, both which sometimes feel like mistaken identity. Science after all is not a biological endeavor, it is a sociocultural endeavor, we use tools, we talk, we may do ideological battle, but I hope that in doing science we are attempting to find the meaning of ourselves in the world we find ourselves. Why? Because knowledge sets us free. As you so aptly point out, science as we know it, owes much to nonconformists, including Descartes, who dissembled conformity, which is likely the best nonconformist one can be if only to keep one's enemies close! :) The act of dividing the mind from the body was a trick against the Church. The problem is we have taken it too literally and have subsequently used this paradigm as a tool of oppression. Descartes was something like an older sibling protecting his younger brothers and sisters from an abusive parent. Mind/body split was a stopgap (emphasis upon the gap) to provide the space for intellectual freedom when there was none. If not for him, all of our brilliant non-conformists would be ash and we would never know much about them except that they were "pour encourager les autres." Well, Descartes was a master of language, which he used as a tool to obfuscate when it was urgently necessary to obfuscate. But you see, this was about 450 years ago! The time has come for us to find a means to unite the mind with the body and the body with other bodies and all these bodies with the world in which we live. In this quote, from the preface of his Meditations: "I doubt not, if you but condescend to pay so much regard to this Treatise as to be willing, in the first place, to correct it (for mindful not only of my humanity, but chiefly also of my ignorance, I do not affirm that it is free from errors); in the second place, to supply what is wanting in it, to perfect what is incomplete, and to give more ample illustration where it is demanded, or at least to indicate these defects to myself that I may endeavor to remedy them. (Descartes, 1641)" I cannot help but see this quote dripping in irony, in which I believe he was complicit. Thinking wrong thoughts were not only sinful back then, it was a capital offense. (Apparently, there is still this question of thinking wrong thoughts, but this has been answered by blanketing us all as sinners. Go figure.) This is to say, we needed him for our liberation from a powerful agent of conformity, however the division no longer serves us, we must unite the mind with the body and with everything else here. This is my view of the Vygotskian enterprise and it's a great one to participate in because no one has to do science alone hidden in a tower in threat of execution anymore, but out in the light in community with others. So this begs the answer to my original question, if Chomsky is not a Cartesian, then how does he unite mind with the body and then how does that unite with culture? with society? with tools? with history? This isn't clear to Camp Vygotsky. Kind regards, Annalisa From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Dec 22 13:54:43 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Mon, 22 Dec 2014 21:54:43 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors In-Reply-To: <14CDE7F4-2288-4A20-A63F-9D4451A4A19F@gmail.com> References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> <406FBE3B-E840-4DCB-AD45-AF67CDAAE5AF@gmail.com> <5495d416.c85a420a.7c5b.ffffd4b2@mx.google.com> , <14CDE7F4-2288-4A20-A63F-9D4451A4A19F@gmail.com> Message-ID: <1419285282814.53892@unm.edu> Henry, Sorry to be thick, but what exactly is a close test? Is there any documentation from that meeting between Oller, Charlton, and Vera by chance?? I would have loved to be a fly on the wall then. Kind regards, Annalisa From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Dec 22 15:15:27 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Mon, 22 Dec 2014 23:15:27 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors / Speaking of AAE In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: <1419290127448.93953@unm.edu> Perhaps now is the time to followup on the followup? From arazfar@uic.edu Mon Dec 22 15:35:22 2014 From: arazfar@uic.edu (Aria Razfar) Date: Mon, 22 Dec 2014 17:35:22 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology In-Reply-To: <1419285126065.70597@unm.edu> References: <039801d01a33$3db3c430$b91b4c90$@uic.edu> <38C43AE248831048B6AF57F364680D3C72A23DDA@OC11EXPO32.exchange.mit.edu> <040801d01a41$4b69dd90$e23d98b0$@uic.edu> <0CBE4C26-68FE-49F7-BE9F-00A0121B4CD8@uniandes.edu.co> <043e01d01a44$b15fac80$141f0580$@uic.edu> <1D18C3B0-9EA5-42E6-8764-A6973960B8B5@uniandes.edu.co> <050701d01a51$084de460$18e9ad20$@uic.edu> <38C43AE248831048B6AF57F364680D3C72A23F69@OC11EXPO32.exchange.mit.edu> <057001d01a5d$d743a640$85caf2c0$@uic.edu> , <061001d01d34$dc790d10$956b2730$@uic.edu> <1419187343939.81696@unm.edu>, <067901d01d55$b8a8f2d0$29fad870$@uic.edu> <1419205186894.59536@unm.edu>, <087c01d01e18$026b28d0$07417a70$@uic.edu> <1419285126065.70597@unm.edu> Message-ID: <09e001d01e3f$f5098880$df1c9980$@uic.edu> Annalisa, See comments below. Aria -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Annalisa Aguilar Sent: Monday, December 22, 2014 3:52 PM To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology Hi Aria! Thanks for the next link in this chain of discourse! I'm afraid this post may be 2.5 screens, so I hope by non-conforming I'm not placed in the cemetery in Moscow. I wondered, Aria, if your reference to theories unique or not, true or false, had anything to do with my posts on Muybridge and stop-action photography? :) [Nope] Our search for knowledge is not in question (even if it is a quest)! Then, it depends upon what we mean by knowledge! Do we mean knowledge in terms of convention? or in reaction to convention? or of knowledge of the world as it is? or something else? To address your complication of the question, "If it isn't all biology or genetics, what is it?" And the definition of what is biology and what is genetics. I think the matter is that we are more than matter. We are matter+! So do we have a biology? yes. Do we have genes? yes. It is impossible to fully understand what the biology is at this point in history! The key words there are "fully understand." [Please explain what 'more than matter' means. No one is claiming 'full understanding' of anything. We can only move toward a better understanding with science being a tool with its accepted limitations. Are suggesting non-matter or metaphysics?] We can't sit around and wait to determine what that biology is, how the genes interact. etc. This is not to say biology does not exist or is not important. It means it is a very hard problem to understand and in the meantime the world keeps spinning and problems must be solved. So what can we do about it now at this juncture? Let the biologists and the geneticists keep going, but we must keep going too. [The fact that we cannot "fully" understand how all of this work is precisely the nativist position. Biologists and geneticists, and there is quite a bit of variation within are attempting to solve problems and make sense. They are doing interpretive work.] With regard to Koko, I believe Koko was not trained, she was taught. There is something of a consciousness there that suggests her agency. For example, how to explain her sadness when she learned that Robin Williams died? He was not in the room when she learned this news. She asked questions about why others were crying, I seem to recall, so she may not have remembered Williams, but she certainly detected emotion in others present (see: http://www.koko.org/koko-tribute-robin-williams). [Interesting, but how do we know she was 'sad'? How do you make the link to consciousness and agency? On a side note there is no way to replicate what Patterson has done with regard to Koko's development. Patterson has refused to make the protocols public. This is a problem for strict empiricists.] I have no urgency to be fooled by appearances just so I can say apes are like us, because we already know that they are like us in many ways! :) Sure, humans and apes are different too, by about 2%! There is biology that shows that we are who we are because of our ability to redirect with gesture in a more advanced manner than apes, that not only do we use tools like apes, but we go past that, making tools with other tools for example. One could argue that necessity did not require apes to do more than we do because the food they can eat was easily available in their environment. Apes possess two less proteins to digest carbs than we do, and perhaps because we have more digestive power we were able to move away from the equator and eat roots that were in the ground, and having an opposable thumb we could collect grains, all of which of course requires an ability to identify plants and to dig and eventually to farm these plants (and also pass this know-how on to the next generation). Moving away from the equator means different life challenges, like keeping warm, so it isn't just biology, it is also environmental *and* the help of your friends to make sure you can all dig up and safely store enough potatoes for winter solstice feasting! So there's a union of environment, society, and biology. [Interesting information, but how does this help us understand the nature of language differences?] When it comes to the differences between Chomsky and Vygotsky, I'd suggest the "incompatibility" that Vygotskians sense with Chomskians is the silence pertaining to the society, the culture, and the environment, and the tools (language being one tool of many). We don't dispute the importance of biology. We say biology *and* other important factors. We are interested in how these entities relate to one another. [Silence would not constitute incompatibility. It could be 'incomplete' as Elinor Ochs argued years ago. To be fair, I have not seen this in any of Chomsky's writings nor am I aware of any nativist suggesting the non-importance of society, culture, and environment. If so, can you point me to some sources where the importance of society, culture, and environment is dismissed. In fact, Chomsky cites the existence of many languages as proof of the importance of the environment, society, and culture.] I have heard however, that Chomsky views Vygotsky as just another flavor of behaviorist, and this would be quite antagonistic to Camp Vygotsky. So there are two issues of incompatibility. Silence and superimposition. So we wait to hear something pertaining to that gap and to that overlap, both which sometimes feel like mistaken identity. [There is no evidence of this anywhere in the writings. If so, please provide a citation for further discussion.] Science after all is not a biological endeavor, it is a sociocultural endeavor, we use tools, we talk, we may do ideological battle, but I hope that in doing science we are attempting to find the meaning of ourselves in the world we find ourselves. Why? Because knowledge sets us free. [The nativists would agree that science is interpretive grounded in principles with many unanswerable mysteries, including the nature, function, and purpose of language. They restrict their claims to that which can be publicly scrutinized and evaluated.] As you so aptly point out, science as we know it, owes much to nonconformists, including Descartes, who dissembled conformity, which is likely the best nonconformist one can be if only to keep one's enemies close! :) The act of dividing the mind from the body was a trick against the Church. The problem is we have taken it too literally and have subsequently used this paradigm as a tool of oppression. Descartes was something like an older sibling protecting his younger brothers and sisters from an abusive parent. Mind/body split was a stopgap (emphasis upon the gap) to provide the space for intellectual freedom when there was none. If not for him, all of our brilliant non-conformists would be ash and we would never know much about them except that they were "pour encourager les autres." [Interesting take on Descartes and non-conformists. Any sources on this?] Well, Descartes was a master of language, which he used as a tool to obfuscate when it was urgently necessary to obfuscate. But you see, this was about 450 years ago! The time has come for us to find a means to unite the mind with the body and the body with other bodies and all these bodies with the world in which we live. [Not sure how this is known.] In this quote, from the preface of his Meditations: "I doubt not, if you but condescend to pay so much regard to this Treatise as to be willing, in the first place, to correct it (for mindful not only of my humanity, but chiefly also of my ignorance, I do not affirm that it is free from errors); in the second place, to supply what is wanting in it, to perfect what is incomplete, and to give more ample illustration where it is demanded, or at least to indicate these defects to myself that I may endeavor to remedy them. (Descartes, 1641)" I cannot help but see this quote dripping in irony, in which I believe he was complicit. Thinking wrong thoughts were not only sinful back then, it was a capital offense. (Apparently, there is still this question of thinking wrong thoughts, but this has been answered by blanketing us all as sinners. Go figure.) This is to say, we needed him for our liberation from a powerful agent of conformity, however the division no longer serves us, we must unite the mind with the body and with everything else here. This is my view of the Vygotskian enterprise and it's a great one to participate in because no one has to do science alone hidden in a tower in threat of execution anymore, but out in the light in community with others. So this begs the answer to my original question, if Chomsky is not a Cartesian, then how does he unite mind with the body and then how does that unite with culture? with society? with tools? with history? [If you reject Cartesian duality (at least in the literal form) then this isn't a problem, because it is all an integrated whole. Hence, the search for universals and 'whole language.' The mind is already united within the body (brain) and integrated with the environment. The separation is only imagined.] This isn't clear to Camp Vygotsky. [Maybe Camp Vygotsky and Camp Chomsky should go camping together.] Kind regards, Annalisa From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Dec 22 16:41:43 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 23 Dec 2014 00:41:43 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology In-Reply-To: <09e001d01e3f$f5098880$df1c9980$@uic.edu> References: <039801d01a33$3db3c430$b91b4c90$@uic.edu> <38C43AE248831048B6AF57F364680D3C72A23DDA@OC11EXPO32.exchange.mit.edu> <040801d01a41$4b69dd90$e23d98b0$@uic.edu> <0CBE4C26-68FE-49F7-BE9F-00A0121B4CD8@uniandes.edu.co> <043e01d01a44$b15fac80$141f0580$@uic.edu> <1D18C3B0-9EA5-42E6-8764-A6973960B8B5@uniandes.edu.co> <050701d01a51$084de460$18e9ad20$@uic.edu> <38C43AE248831048B6AF57F364680D3C72A23F69@OC11EXPO32.exchange.mit.edu> <057001d01a5d$d743a640$85caf2c0$@uic.edu> , <061001d01d34$dc790d10$956b2730$@uic.edu> <1419187343939.81696@unm.edu>, <067901d01d55$b8a8f2d0$29fad870$@uic.edu> <1419205186894.59536@unm.edu>, <087c01d01e18$026b28d0$07417a70$@uic.edu> <1419285126065.70597@unm.edu>, <09e001d01e3f$f5098880$df1c9980$@uic.edu> Message-ID: <1419295302455.71579@unm.edu> [Please explain what 'more than matter' means. No one is claiming 'full understanding' of anything. We can only move toward a better understanding with science being a tool with its accepted limitations. Are suggesting non-matter or metaphysics?] Sorry, I mean by "matter+" means bodies with minds using tools in society within culture in various histories; not metaphysical at all. [The fact that we cannot "fully" understand how all of this work is precisely the nativist position. Biologists and geneticists, and there is quite a bit of variation within are attempting to solve problems and make sense. They are doing interpretive work.] Who is doing interpretive work? And can interpretive work connect to how processes are formed? Or is everyone interpreting and just defying past conventions like fashion? [Interesting, but how do we know she was 'sad'? How do you make the link to consciousness and agency? On a side note there is no way to replicate what Patterson has done with regard to Koko's development. Patterson has refused to make the protocols public. This is a problem for strict empiricists.] It's true that Koko has its own challenges, and I don't mean to promote Koko as a poster child for agency or consciousness, because there are many interpretations about agency and consciousness. I was just curious how Chomsky would explain this, and from your answers it appears it is all behaviorist conditioning. But I make the connection to consciousness and agency because she is the one electing to communicate what she wants to communicate. One really cool moment is when she takes Robin William's glasses and puts them on and then goes to her room to look out the window. No one told her to do that. That was an act of agency as far as I can tell, and that she could conceive to look out the window with his glasses is a conscious act. But that is me. I found that to be a truly spontaneous act that defies conditioning. It was an act of play, of discovery, of childlike curiosity! [Interesting information, but how does this help us understand the nature of language differences?] Well, it may explain that different environments will generate different problems and these problems will generate different activities and these will also generate different words and different vocabularies, even different languages. And as we can see there is much diversity in what humankind does, including the languages we speak. So I see a direct connection. Your mileage may vary! [Silence would not constitute incompatibility. It could be 'incomplete' as Elinor Ochs argued years ago. To be fair, I have not seen this in any of Chomsky's writings nor am I aware of any nativist suggesting the non-importance of society, culture, and environment. If so, can you point me to some sources where the importance of society, culture, and environment is dismissed. In fact, Chomsky cites the existence of many languages as proof of the importance of the environment, society, and culture.] I did not mean to imply that silence was dismissal. But it is difficult to have a conversation with silence on one end of the conversation, you must admit. I didn't mean to imply any negativity, I only mean to reference the absence. [There is no evidence of this anywhere in the writings. If so, please provide a citation for further discussion.] Sorry, this is not going to be cited anywhere, it is anecdotal. I was told he said this in a lecture. I can't substantiate this claim at all. But if it is the case, it certainly isn't going to be received well, you must agree. [The nativists would agree that science is interpretive grounded in principles with many unanswerable mysteries, including the nature, function, and purpose of language. They restrict their claims to that which can be publicly scrutinized and evaluated.] So I'm curious, can the activity and environment and tools and culture and history in which language is spoken be publicly scrutinized or not? Or do these remain metaphysical mysteries? Can or does language link to other aspects of human experience beyond speech? Or is everything interpretive with no basis? No rules? no patterns of emergence? Sorry, I really don't mean to be obtuse or rude. Just trying to understand. Saying everything it interpretive is like saying everything is material. I'm not sure how far one can get with that. [Interesting take on Descartes and non-conformists. Any sources on this?] Nope no sources. Well actually? I can say, I am the source, which may not qualify, but I suppose if this list is a publication, you may cite me! :) Has anyone said this elsewhere? I'm not sure. I'd be curious if it has been said before and would enjoy to speak to anyone who said it! :) I don't think it's an unreasonable claim, when considering the social effects of surveillance, torture, and capital punishment and its effects upon intellectual freedom. I certainly don't feel I have damaged the legacy of Descartes at all. My assertion really is not to claim I can read Descartes's mind 450 years later, but only that history is a river of change and different measures are required to meet different challenges. I think he did a great thing to extricate the practice of science from the grip of the church. Now how much he was aware of what he was doing, is a matter for the philosophers and the historians, I suppose. I'm only remarking on the effects of his assertions, which enabled the Scientific Revolution. [Not sure how this is known.] Read the quote and then decide for yourself the context of that quote, who Descartes was, etc. You can certainly say I have interpreted the quote that way, and that would be true! We do know Descartes was terribly ironic. By the way, what do Chomskians say about irony anyway??? [If you reject Cartesian duality (at least in the literal form) then this isn't a problem, because it is all an integrated whole. Hence, the search for universals and 'whole language.' The mind is already united within the body (brain) and integrated with the environment. The separation is only imagined.] Well, whether you and I understand the separation to be imagined, that separation still exists in the minds of many people and practices today. It is an institutionalized imagination, which makes it a real problem based upon imaginings. My stance is (at this point) it's not about finding universals, because this is (to me) an ideal that can't be determined by language alone existing in a vacuum. I'm interested in what can be grounded in practice and in community. It's about understanding how language is used in contexts, relationships, and processes, and then determining what works in particular circumstances. [Maybe Camp Vygotsky and Camp Chomsky should go camping together.] Possibly. We can talk s'mores! :) What I sense, however, is that the interpretive stance (if I am being fair in referencing that as the Chomskian stance) is not so attractive to Camp Vygotsky, and I suspect language within plural sociocultural contexts is not attractive to Camp Chomsky. Maybe other Camper V's will pipe up and speak their minds on the matter+? Kind regards, Annalisa From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon Dec 22 16:52:33 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 22 Dec 2014 16:52:33 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors / Speaking of AAE In-Reply-To: <1419290127448.93953@unm.edu> References: <1419290127448.93953@unm.edu> Message-ID: too short for me to understand m On Mon, Dec 22, 2014 at 3:15 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Perhaps now is the time to followup on the followup? > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon Dec 22 16:52:04 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 22 Dec 2014 16:52:04 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Not too long and not too short Message-ID: ?Dear Colleagues--- A long time ago, maybe about week (?) there appeared to be a consensus that looooooooooooooooooooong note should be attached as docs. At the other end, messages that are too shrt, flip comments (of the sort I am fond of) are hard for many readers to place in the appropriate discourse context. Trying to read xmca on a cell phone in an airport cell phone lot reminded me of these issues. Would the powers that be please clarify the policy? In brief mike? -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Dec 22 17:01:14 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 23 Dec 2014 01:01:14 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Not too long and not too short In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1419296473895.52540@unm.edu> Apparently we need a Goldilocks section in the Newcomer's page! :) From ablunden@mira.net Mon Dec 22 17:24:00 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 23 Dec 2014 12:24:00 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Not too long and not too short In-Reply-To: <1419296473895.52540@unm.edu> References: <1419296473895.52540@unm.edu> Message-ID: <5498C430.9050306@mira.net> I would be interested to know what real-space activity people would take xmca to be "modelling" in cyberspace? Are we participating in a kind of scientific symposium or maybe a conference? or an after dinner conversation? (or maybe a staffroom conversation)? a formal decision making meeting, where we address the Chair, make amendments, etc.? a Occupy-type general meeting? Or is "none of the above" the only answer? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > Apparently we need a Goldilocks section in the Newcomer's page! > > :) > > > From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Dec 22 17:27:58 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 23 Dec 2014 01:27:58 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Not too long and not too short In-Reply-To: <5498C430.9050306@mira.net> References: <1419296473895.52540@unm.edu>,<5498C430.9050306@mira.net> Message-ID: <1419298077816.10149@unm.edu> Andy, My conception would be meaning-making, which is all and none of the above. Kind regards, Annalisa > a kind of scientific symposium or maybe a conference? > or an after dinner conversation? (or maybe a staffroom conversation)? > a formal decision making meeting, where we address the Chair, make amendments, etc.? > a Occupy-type general meeting? > Or is "none of the above" the only answer? From lpscholar2@gmail.com Mon Dec 22 20:26:08 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Mon, 22 Dec 2014 20:26:08 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: FW: Re: Chomsky, Vygotsky, and phenomenology In-Reply-To: <1419295302455.71579@unm.edu> References: <039801d01a33$3db3c430$b91b4c90$@uic.edu> <38C43AE248831048B6AF57F364680D3C72A23DDA@OC11EXPO32.exchange.mit.edu> <040801d01a41$4b69dd90$e23d98b0$@uic.edu> <0CBE4C26-68FE-49F7-BE9F-00A0121B4CD8@uniandes.edu.co> <043e01d01a44$b15fac80$141f0580$@uic.edu> <1D18C3B0-9EA5-42E6-8764-A6973960B8B5@uniandes.edu.co> <050701d01a51$084de460$18e9ad20$@uic.edu> <38C43AE248831048B6AF57F364680D3C72A23F69@OC11EXPO32.exchange.mit.edu> <057001d01a5d$d743a640$85caf2c0$@uic.edu> <061001d01d34$dc790d10$956b2730$@uic.edu> <1419187343939.81696@unm.edu> <067901d01d55$b8a8f2d0$29fad870$@uic.edu> <1419205186894.59536@unm.edu> <087c01d01e18$026b28d0$07417a70$@uic.edu> <1419285126065.70597@unm.edu> <09e001d01e3f$f5098880$df1c9980$@uic.edu> <1419295302455.71579@unm.edu> Message-ID: The dynamic that I experience [and look for] is what I call *question and answer*. I find myself listening for how the *author* is responding to the other. Until the response is performed IN RELATION to the other [as a question or quest] there is no meaning. Reading Vygotsky who is responding to other scholars. or listening to Andy and Martin explore the illusion of imagination. I find *meaning* in the *margins*. Think the margins of a book where comments are written to self [but also written to the author. THIS may be one particular *type* or *kind* of meaning, but it is what I see as a hybrid form[ing] Larry On Mon, Dec 22, 2014 at 4:41 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > [Please explain what 'more than matter' means. No one is claiming 'full > understanding' of anything. We can only move toward a better understanding > with science being a tool with its accepted limitations. Are suggesting > non-matter or metaphysics?] > > Sorry, I mean by "matter+" means bodies with minds using tools in society > within culture in various histories; not metaphysical at all. > > [The fact that we cannot "fully" understand how all of this work is > precisely the nativist position. Biologists and geneticists, and there is > quite a bit of variation within are attempting to solve problems and make > sense. They are doing interpretive work.] > > Who is doing interpretive work? And can interpretive work connect to how > processes are formed? Or is everyone interpreting and just defying past > conventions like fashion? > > [Interesting, but how do we know she was 'sad'? How do you make the link > to consciousness and agency? On a side note there is no way to replicate > what Patterson has done with regard to Koko's development. Patterson has > refused to make the protocols public. This is a problem for strict > empiricists.] > > It's true that Koko has its own challenges, and I don't mean to promote > Koko as a poster child for agency or consciousness, because there are many > interpretations about agency and consciousness. I was just curious how > Chomsky would explain this, and from your answers it appears it is all > behaviorist conditioning. > > But I make the connection to consciousness and agency because she is the > one electing to communicate what she wants to communicate. One really cool > moment is when she takes Robin William's glasses and puts them on and then > goes to her room to look out the window. No one told her to do that. That > was an act of agency as far as I can tell, and that she could conceive to > look out the window with his glasses is a conscious act. But that is me. I > found that to be a truly spontaneous act that defies conditioning. It was > an act of play, of discovery, of childlike curiosity! > > [Interesting information, but how does this help us understand the nature > of language differences?] > > Well, it may explain that different environments will generate different > problems and these problems will generate different activities and these > will also generate different words and different vocabularies, even > different languages. And as we can see there is much diversity in what > humankind does, including the languages we speak. So I see a direct > connection. Your mileage may vary! > > [Silence would not constitute incompatibility. It could be 'incomplete' as > Elinor Ochs argued years ago. To be fair, I have not seen this in any of > Chomsky's writings nor am I aware of any nativist suggesting the > non-importance of society, culture, and environment. If so, can you point > me to some sources where the importance of society, culture, and > environment is dismissed. In fact, Chomsky cites the existence of many > languages as proof of the importance of the environment, society, and > culture.] > > I did not mean to imply that silence was dismissal. But it is difficult to > have a conversation with silence on one end of the conversation, you must > admit. I didn't mean to imply any negativity, I only mean to reference the > absence. > > [There is no evidence of this anywhere in the writings. If so, please > provide a citation for further discussion.] > > Sorry, this is not going to be cited anywhere, it is anecdotal. I was told > he said this in a lecture. I can't substantiate this claim at all. But if > it is the case, it certainly isn't going to be received well, you must > agree. > > [The nativists would agree that science is interpretive grounded in > principles with many unanswerable mysteries, including the nature, > function, and purpose of language. They restrict their claims to that which > can be publicly scrutinized and evaluated.] > > So I'm curious, can the activity and environment and tools and culture and > history in which language is spoken be publicly scrutinized or not? Or do > these remain metaphysical mysteries? Can or does language link to other > aspects of human experience beyond speech? Or is everything interpretive > with no basis? No rules? no patterns of emergence? Sorry, I really don't > mean to be obtuse or rude. Just trying to understand. > > Saying everything it interpretive is like saying everything is material. > I'm not sure how far one can get with that. > > [Interesting take on Descartes and non-conformists. Any sources on this?] > > Nope no sources. Well actually? I can say, I am the source, which may not > qualify, but I suppose if this list is a publication, you may cite me! :) > Has anyone said this elsewhere? I'm not sure. I'd be curious if it has been > said before and would enjoy to speak to anyone who said it! :) > > I don't think it's an unreasonable claim, when considering the social > effects of surveillance, torture, and capital punishment and its effects > upon intellectual freedom. I certainly don't feel I have damaged the legacy > of Descartes at all. My assertion really is not to claim I can read > Descartes's mind 450 years later, but only that history is a river of > change and different measures are required to meet different challenges. I > think he did a great thing to extricate the practice of science from the > grip of the church. > > Now how much he was aware of what he was doing, is a matter for the > philosophers and the historians, I suppose. I'm only remarking on the > effects of his assertions, which enabled the Scientific Revolution. > > [Not sure how this is known.] > > Read the quote and then decide for yourself the context of that quote, who > Descartes was, etc. You can certainly say I have interpreted the quote that > way, and that would be true! We do know Descartes was terribly ironic. > > By the way, what do Chomskians say about irony anyway??? > > [If you reject Cartesian duality (at least in the literal form) then this > isn't a problem, because it is all an integrated whole. Hence, the search > for universals and 'whole language.' The mind is already united within the > body (brain) and integrated with the environment. The separation is only > imagined.] > > Well, whether you and I understand the separation to be imagined, that > separation still exists in the minds of many people and practices today. It > is an institutionalized imagination, which makes it a real problem based > upon imaginings. My stance is (at this point) it's not about finding > universals, because this is (to me) an ideal that can't be determined by > language alone existing in a vacuum. I'm interested in what can be grounded > in practice and in community. It's about understanding how language is used > in contexts, relationships, and processes, and then determining what works > in particular circumstances. > > [Maybe Camp Vygotsky and Camp Chomsky should go camping together.] > > Possibly. We can talk s'mores! :) > > What I sense, however, is that the interpretive stance (if I am being fair > in referencing that as the Chomskian stance) is not so attractive to Camp > Vygotsky, and I suspect language within plural sociocultural contexts is > not attractive to Camp Chomsky. > > Maybe other Camper V's will pipe up and speak their minds on the matter+? > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > From carolmacdon@gmail.com Mon Dec 22 21:30:12 2014 From: carolmacdon@gmail.com (Carol Macdonald) Date: Tue, 23 Dec 2014 07:30:12 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Not too long and not too short In-Reply-To: <1419298077816.10149@unm.edu> References: <1419296473895.52540@unm.edu> <5498C430.9050306@mira.net> <1419298077816.10149@unm.edu> Message-ID: Hi Naturally there is meaning making - what else could we be doing? I think we should seriously consider Andy'a alternatives. It offers us forms of discourse which have different rules for being. My take would be a symposium: we have short turns to present our positions, and then people have a chance to ask questions. This is always respectful (that is, at conferences it is). We could take turns to be the co-ordinator. I realise this might be too much for us at times, as we have busy professional lives. If that is too demanding, then an after dinner conversation in the Senior Common-room. People having a quiet chat, in good spirit. Elders helping newer members. But then no loooooong pieces and no flippant remarks either - in the way that Mike would prefer. Can we discuss this early in the New Year? Right now we are busy being distracted by the holidays. We can come back to it afresh in the New Year. *Compliments of the Season to all XMCA-ers!!* Kind regards Carol On 23 December 2014 at 03:27, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > Andy, > > My conception would be meaning-making, which is all and none of the above. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > a kind of scientific symposium or maybe a conference? > > or an after dinner conversation? (or maybe a staffroom conversation)? > > a formal decision making meeting, where we address the Chair, make > amendments, etc.? > > a Occupy-type general meeting? > > > Or is "none of the above" the only answer? > > -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From hshonerd@gmail.com Mon Dec 22 22:08:22 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Mon, 22 Dec 2014 22:08:22 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors In-Reply-To: <1419285282814.53892@unm.edu> References: <548CDC3D.7090509@mira.net> <9244428B-C13F-43E7-8028-4B16900C6F87@gmail.com> <5492A447.7030004@mira.net> <406FBE3B-E840-4DCB-AD45-AF67CDAAE5AF@gmail.com> <5495d416.c85a420a.7c5b.ffffd4b2@mx.google.com> <, > <14CDE7F4-2288-4A20-A63F-9D4451A4A19F@gmail.com> <1419285282814.53892@unm.edu> Message-ID: <4C47B931-34E3-4554-840E-5C8A04E4EB23@gmail.com> Annalisa, A CLOZE test is simply a fill-in-the-blank test. A gap. Documentation on the meeting with Oller, Charlton and Vera? I?ll look into it and let you know. Henry > On Dec 22, 2014, at 1:54 PM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > Henry, > > Sorry to be thick, but what exactly is a close test? > > Is there any documentation from that meeting between Oller, Charlton, and Vera by chance?? > > I would have loved to be a fly on the wall then. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Dec 22 22:26:14 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 23 Dec 2014 06:26:14 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Not too long and not too short In-Reply-To: References: <1419296473895.52540@unm.edu> <5498C430.9050306@mira.net> <1419298077816.10149@unm.edu>, Message-ID: <1419315974142.48507@unm.edu> I've never heard of trying to reproduce the real world onto a listserv. When I was in art school, there wasn't an expectation for people to draw the same things in the same form. Independence of thought was expressed not only in content, but form. I propose that we make this a gallery of thinking, with each post its own work of art. How about that? Kind regards, Annalisa P.S. I am not being flippant. From r.j.s.parsons@open.ac.uk Tue Dec 23 03:31:01 2014 From: r.j.s.parsons@open.ac.uk (rjsp2) Date: Tue, 23 Dec 2014 11:31:01 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Not too long and not too short In-Reply-To: <5498C430.9050306@mira.net> References: <1419296473895.52540@unm.edu> <5498C430.9050306@mira.net> Message-ID: <54995275.9020808@open.ac.uk> As a long time lurker and learner, my first reaction was if it ain't broke, don't fix it. My second reaction, after a night's sleep, was that my first reaction had something going for it. I've been following this list for several years now, always feeling both too ignorant and too pressed to contribute more than very occasionally. It is by a distance the most consistently academic and intensely illuminating forum I have ever been present in, and my thanks are due to many of you here for enriching my life and my academic endeavours. In Andy's terms, this has always struck me as a conversation. After dinner, if you will, but a conversation which follows its own twisty, windy path and always ends up somewhere unpredictable but valuable. That, I think, is the reason for its continuing quality; the conversation is not corralled at all. I haven't counted posts, but it does seem of late that the list has been much more busy. It has always impressed me how people have the time, and the quality of thinking, to write so many clear, well focussed, well argued and detailed messages here, and perhaps the growing pace is making some feel that it is all a bit too much. I suspect that if we leave it alone, the pace will slow down again, perhaps after a natural break for Christmas festivities. When I am not marking or trying to teach my students how to think, I occasionally dabble in knowledge management for a company that works in a number of different countries. One of the great lessons of knowledge management, and one unfortunately not learned by many with knowledge management in their job description, is that you can't manage knowledge. There is a lot that you can do with it. You can codify and transmit quite a lot, but ultimately, the most valuable knowledge refuses to be pinned down, and those who try simply destroy what they seek to contain. Perhaps it is important to let these conversations continue to be just conversations. (And finally, can I just briefly say I disagree with your characterisation of "real space" versus "cyberspace", Andy. Cyberspace is just as real as physical space.) Rob, just off out to buy sprouts (I particularly like the Newsthump headline from 2011 "Sales of ?any old shit? expected to treble as men start Christmas shopping") On 23/12/2014 01:24, Andy Blunden wrote: > I would be interested to know what real-space activity people would > take xmca to be "modelling" in cyberspace? > Are we participating in > > a kind of scientific symposium or maybe a conference? > or an after dinner conversation? (or maybe a staffroom conversation)? > a formal decision making meeting, where we address the Chair, make > amendments, etc.? > a Occupy-type general meeting? > > Or is "none of the above" the only answer? > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> Apparently we need a Goldilocks section in the Newcomer's page! >> >> :) >> >> > -- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC 038302). The Open University is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority. From glassman.13@osu.edu Tue Dec 23 05:44:20 2014 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Tue, 23 Dec 2014 13:44:20 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Not too long and not too short In-Reply-To: <1419298077816.10149@unm.edu> References: <1419296473895.52540@unm.edu>, <5498C430.9050306@mira.net>, <1419298077816.10149@unm.edu> Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9077DC5@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> I definitely agree that it should be place based space vs. cyberspace rather than real space vs. cyberspace. I would also say that most successful online endeavors are not transfers of place based activities to cyberspace - cyberspace activities are unique activities. Most successful virtual communities - and I feel comfortable saying I would consider lchc/xmca one of the more successful virtual communities/educational platforms in the short history of the Internet (really somebody should do a dissertation and/or write an article for WIRED on the listserv) - generally limit posts to approximately 20 lines. This is generally (almost always) what works for communities based on Bulletin Board System/conference communities which I think xmca is. Psychological reasons for this - I don't know, but there are definitely structural reasons which I won't go into (because it would shine a light on my own hypocrisy). If you move past that you are generally into another form of Internet posting - basically long form blogging. There are community blogging communities but xmca does not use that type of platform. In the time I have been on xmca there have been a few people who regularly posted very long messages but these were trusted users - this is not a title bestowed on anybody - it is a part of any successful virtual community and is part of overt or natural systems of online governance - lchc/xmca has always used an organic form of governance - don't ask me how that comes about, I also don't know, but I would point you to Howard Rheingold's writing on the WELL (Whole Earth Lectronic Link). This does not mean people should count their lines (which like an idiot I just did) but that the one screen rule is not arbitrary but may be instrumental for the community. Happy Holidays Michael (No the name does not count as a line!!!) ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Annalisa Aguilar [annalisa@unm.edu] Sent: Monday, December 22, 2014 8:27 PM To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Not too long and not too short Andy, My conception would be meaning-making, which is all and none of the above. Kind regards, Annalisa > a kind of scientific symposium or maybe a conference? > or an after dinner conversation? (or maybe a staffroom conversation)? > a formal decision making meeting, where we address the Chair, make amendments, etc.? > a Occupy-type general meeting? > Or is "none of the above" the only answer? From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Dec 23 09:38:32 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 23 Dec 2014 09:38:32 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Not too long and not too short In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9077DC5@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> References: <1419296473895.52540@unm.edu> <5498C430.9050306@mira.net> <1419298077816.10149@unm.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9077DC5@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: ?Seems like matters of message length will be regulated by conventions established by those who post, don't post, delete, read, ignore or participate. My "too long" comment was not original with me. It was made earlier and i (mistakenly) thought had been accepted as conventional. Clearly wrong! The too short came because I was feeling badly by a too-short message I had sent earlier and was totally confused by a message that was too short for me to know the reference and it turned out to be a response that pertained to something I had written (or at least I think so). Seems like no cure. But I have my handy delete key at the ready, along with a key inscribed with a ? :-) Rob-- I believe we are past the "its broken, fix it" discussion into the "its fine but it could be even finer" phase. By my reckoning, the incremental changes that have been undertaken lately, such as Annalisa's suggestion for a newcomers page, and the (I think!) agreement to try to keep threads as continuous as possible have been productive. At least I find navigation easier and appreciate explicit cross referencing such as David's discussion of imagination in the math in russia thread. In short Whatever! mike On Tue, Dec 23, 2014 at 5:44 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > I definitely agree that it should be place based space vs. cyberspace > rather than real space vs. cyberspace. I would also say that most > successful online endeavors are not transfers of place based activities to > cyberspace - cyberspace activities are unique activities. Most successful > virtual communities - and I feel comfortable saying I would consider > lchc/xmca one of the more successful virtual communities/educational > platforms in the short history of the Internet (really somebody should do a > dissertation and/or write an article for WIRED on the listserv) - generally > limit posts to approximately 20 lines. This is generally (almost always) > what works for communities based on Bulletin Board System/conference > communities which I think xmca is. Psychological reasons for this - I > don't know, but there are definitely structural reasons which I won't go > into (because it would shine a light on my own hypocrisy). If you move > past that you are generally into another form of Internet posting - > basically long form blogging. There are community blogging communities but > xmca does not use that type of platform. In the time I have been on xmca > there have been a few people who regularly posted very long messages but > these were trusted users - this is not a title bestowed on anybody - it is > a part of any successful virtual community and is part of overt or natural > systems of online governance - lchc/xmca has always used an organic form of > governance - don't ask me how that comes about, I also don't know, but I > would point you to Howard Rheingold's writing on the WELL (Whole Earth > Lectronic Link). This does not mean people should count their lines (which > like an idiot I just did) but that the one screen rule is not arbitrary but > may be instrumental for the community. > > Happy Holidays > > Michael (No the name does not count as a line!!!) > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > on behalf of Annalisa Aguilar [annalisa@unm.edu] > Sent: Monday, December 22, 2014 8:27 PM > To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Not too long and not too short > > Andy, > > My conception would be meaning-making, which is all and none of the above. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > a kind of scientific symposium or maybe a conference? > > or an after dinner conversation? (or maybe a staffroom conversation)? > > a formal decision making meeting, where we address the Chair, make > amendments, etc.? > > a Occupy-type general meeting? > > > Or is "none of the above" the only answer? > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From lpscholar2@gmail.com Tue Dec 23 09:54:14 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Tue, 23 Dec 2014 09:54:14 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] the genetic roots of thought and speech Message-ID: Francine asked us to re-read Chapter 4 "the Genetic Roots' of Thought and Speech. This paragraph was critical "we are forced to conclude that FUSION of thought and speech, in adults as well as in children, is a phenomenon limited to a CIRCUMSCRIBED area. Nonverbal thought and nonintellectual speech do NOT participate in THIS FUSION and are affected indirectly by the processes of verbal thought" [Vygotsky, page 48] Reading this opens for me the question of all the other functions of speech in the adult that are not directly influenced by thought and all the functions of thought that are not affected by speech. In particular are there forms of *imaging* that are thoughts but not functioning in speech. Do these paths of image and thought also develop and fuse? All the functions that Vygotsky explores in the primates and in children PRIOR to the reciprocal interweaving of thought and language continue to function in adults. For example the sounds of speech as offering "release from tension or anxiety" or the sounds as ways of *connecting* and *bonding*. It seems that to privilege the fusion of thought and language as dominant modes of designing places/spaces [such as the third space] makes the other functions [speech alone] [thought alone] nondominant modes when the necessity for connection may be prior to and dominant when reflecting on the fused mode of thought and language as a partial unity. In other words, the unit of analysis is the relation of thought alone AND speech alone AND image alone AND all their actual fusions as other partial modes. This as a multi-modal understanding. I hope this is the right length Larry From vygotsky@unm.edu Tue Dec 23 09:59:37 2014 From: vygotsky@unm.edu (Vera John-Steiner) Date: Tue, 23 Dec 2014 10:59:37 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Not too long and not too short In-Reply-To: References: <1419296473895.52540@unm.edu> <5498C430.9050306@mira.net> <1419298077816.10149@unm.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9077DC5@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: <000301d01eda$39ef6b00$adce4100$@edu> Annalisa, I think Mike expressed his appreciation for your efforts with the comment on the newcomers page.I don't think that indicates a desire to get you off the list. The gallery is a lovely idea, but I think conversations are more realistic. Most people write their messages very quickly. Keep up your good work. Love, Vera -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole Sent: Tuesday, December 23, 2014 10:39 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Not too long and not too short ?Seems like matters of message length will be regulated by conventions established by those who post, don't post, delete, read, ignore or participate. My "too long" comment was not original with me. It was made earlier and i (mistakenly) thought had been accepted as conventional. Clearly wrong! The too short came because I was feeling badly by a too-short message I had sent earlier and was totally confused by a message that was too short for me to know the reference and it turned out to be a response that pertained to something I had written (or at least I think so). Seems like no cure. But I have my handy delete key at the ready, along with a key inscribed with a ? :-) Rob-- I believe we are past the "its broken, fix it" discussion into the "its fine but it could be even finer" phase. By my reckoning, the incremental changes that have been undertaken lately, such as Annalisa's suggestion for a newcomers page, and the (I think!) agreement to try to keep threads as continuous as possible have been productive. At least I find navigation easier and appreciate explicit cross referencing such as David's discussion of imagination in the math in russia thread. In short Whatever! mike On Tue, Dec 23, 2014 at 5:44 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > I definitely agree that it should be place based space vs. cyberspace > rather than real space vs. cyberspace. I would also say that most > successful online endeavors are not transfers of place based > activities to cyberspace - cyberspace activities are unique > activities. Most successful virtual communities - and I feel > comfortable saying I would consider lchc/xmca one of the more > successful virtual communities/educational platforms in the short > history of the Internet (really somebody should do a dissertation > and/or write an article for WIRED on the listserv) - generally limit > posts to approximately 20 lines. This is generally (almost always) > what works for communities based on Bulletin Board System/conference > communities which I think xmca is. Psychological reasons for this - I > don't know, but there are definitely structural reasons which I won't > go into (because it would shine a light on my own hypocrisy). If you > move past that you are generally into another form of Internet posting - basically long form blogging. There are community blogging communities but > xmca does not use that type of platform. In the time I have been on xmca > there have been a few people who regularly posted very long messages > but these were trusted users - this is not a title bestowed on anybody > - it is a part of any successful virtual community and is part of > overt or natural systems of online governance - lchc/xmca has always > used an organic form of governance - don't ask me how that comes > about, I also don't know, but I would point you to Howard Rheingold's > writing on the WELL (Whole Earth Lectronic Link). This does not mean > people should count their lines (which like an idiot I just did) but > that the one screen rule is not arbitrary but may be instrumental for the community. > > Happy Holidays > > Michael (No the name does not count as a line!!!) > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Annalisa Aguilar > [annalisa@unm.edu] > Sent: Monday, December 22, 2014 8:27 PM > To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Not too long and not too short > > Andy, > > My conception would be meaning-making, which is all and none of the above. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > a kind of scientific symposium or maybe a conference? > > or an after dinner conversation? (or maybe a staffroom conversation)? > > a formal decision making meeting, where we address the Chair, > make amendments, etc.? > > a Occupy-type general meeting? > > > Or is "none of the above" the only answer? > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From arazfar@uic.edu Tue Dec 23 10:23:20 2014 From: arazfar@uic.edu (Aria Razfar) Date: Tue, 23 Dec 2014 12:23:20 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Not too long and not too short In-Reply-To: References: <1419296473895.52540@unm.edu> <5498C430.9050306@mira.net> <1419298077816.10149@unm.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9077DC5@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: <0b7501d01edd$885bfd00$9913f700$@uic.edu> Mike, I'm glad you contextualized your remarks regarding regulating word lengths and flip remarks. The self-regulating policy is much better. I don't think we can brush it off with a flip "whatever" though. From what I could see, Annalisa was clearly hurt by the very public corrective action and discussion of policy that appeared to single her out. I feel somewhat responsible for engaging one of her very long posts, which I appreciated. I think the right thing to do, and this should be noted for the future, is to handle such "corrections" in private, especially with newcomers. Annalisa, if our words, actions were in anyway hurtful please forgive us. Aria Aria Razfar, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Literacy, Language, and Culture Director of Graduate Studies, Curriculum and Instruction University of Illinois at Chicago 1040 W. Harrison St. M/C 147 Chicago, IL, 60607 Director of English Learning through Mathematics, Science and Action Research (ELMSA) www.elmsa.org Webpage: http://education.uic.edu/personnel/faculty/aria-razfar-phd Tel: 312-413-8373 Fax: 312-996-8134 -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole Sent: Tuesday, December 23, 2014 11:39 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Not too long and not too short ?Seems like matters of message length will be regulated by conventions established by those who post, don't post, delete, read, ignore or participate. My "too long" comment was not original with me. It was made earlier and i (mistakenly) thought had been accepted as conventional. Clearly wrong! The too short came because I was feeling badly by a too-short message I had sent earlier and was totally confused by a message that was too short for me to know the reference and it turned out to be a response that pertained to something I had written (or at least I think so). Seems like no cure. But I have my handy delete key at the ready, along with a key inscribed with a ? :-) Rob-- I believe we are past the "its broken, fix it" discussion into the "its fine but it could be even finer" phase. By my reckoning, the incremental changes that have been undertaken lately, such as Annalisa's suggestion for a newcomers page, and the (I think!) agreement to try to keep threads as continuous as possible have been productive. At least I find navigation easier and appreciate explicit cross referencing such as David's discussion of imagination in the math in russia thread. In short Whatever! mike On Tue, Dec 23, 2014 at 5:44 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > I definitely agree that it should be place based space vs. cyberspace > rather than real space vs. cyberspace. I would also say that most > successful online endeavors are not transfers of place based > activities to cyberspace - cyberspace activities are unique > activities. Most successful virtual communities - and I feel > comfortable saying I would consider lchc/xmca one of the more > successful virtual communities/educational platforms in the short > history of the Internet (really somebody should do a dissertation > and/or write an article for WIRED on the listserv) - generally limit > posts to approximately 20 lines. This is generally (almost always) > what works for communities based on Bulletin Board System/conference > communities which I think xmca is. Psychological reasons for this - I > don't know, but there are definitely structural reasons which I won't > go into (because it would shine a light on my own hypocrisy). If you > move past that you are generally into another form of Internet posting - basically long form blogging. There are community blogging communities but > xmca does not use that type of platform. In the time I have been on xmca > there have been a few people who regularly posted very long messages > but these were trusted users - this is not a title bestowed on anybody > - it is a part of any successful virtual community and is part of > overt or natural systems of online governance - lchc/xmca has always > used an organic form of governance - don't ask me how that comes > about, I also don't know, but I would point you to Howard Rheingold's > writing on the WELL (Whole Earth Lectronic Link). This does not mean > people should count their lines (which like an idiot I just did) but > that the one screen rule is not arbitrary but may be instrumental for the community. > > Happy Holidays > > Michael (No the name does not count as a line!!!) > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Annalisa Aguilar > [annalisa@unm.edu] > Sent: Monday, December 22, 2014 8:27 PM > To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Not too long and not too short > > Andy, > > My conception would be meaning-making, which is all and none of the above. > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa > > > a kind of scientific symposium or maybe a conference? > > or an after dinner conversation? (or maybe a staffroom conversation)? > > a formal decision making meeting, where we address the Chair, > make amendments, etc.? > > a Occupy-type general meeting? > > > Or is "none of the above" the only answer? > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Dec 23 10:34:58 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 23 Dec 2014 10:34:58 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Not too long and not too short In-Reply-To: <000301d01eda$39ef6b00$adce4100$@edu> References: <1419296473895.52540@unm.edu> <5498C430.9050306@mira.net> <1419298077816.10149@unm.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9077DC5@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <000301d01eda$39ef6b00$adce4100$@edu> Message-ID: I am not sure where this comment to Annalisa comes from, Vera, but in my view Annalisa has helped to reinvigorate the discussion and participation which has led to additional concerns -- the price of success. Apart from my own ignorance about alternative forum/discussion types, and Rob's (generally agreed to?) suggestion that its a bad idea to fix something that isn't broken) and the apparent agreement that things are not broken, but might be improved, THE major constraint on suggestions for improvement is the lack of resources for implementing a whole variety of suggestions that might otherwise be helpful. mike On Tue, Dec 23, 2014 at 9:59 AM, Vera John-Steiner wrote: > Annalisa, > > I think Mike expressed his appreciation for your efforts with the comment > on the newcomers page.I don't think that indicates a desire to > get you off the list. The gallery is a lovely idea, but I think > conversations are more realistic. Most people write their messages very > quickly. > Keep up your good work. > Love, > Vera > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole > Sent: Tuesday, December 23, 2014 10:39 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Not too long and not too short > > ?Seems like matters of message length will be regulated by conventions > established by those who post, don't post, delete, read, ignore or > participate. My "too long" comment was not original with me. It was made > earlier and i (mistakenly) thought had been accepted as conventional. > Clearly wrong! The too short came because I was feeling badly by a > too-short message I had sent earlier and was totally confused by a message > that was too short for me to know the reference and it turned out to be a > response that pertained to something I had written (or at least I think so). > > Seems like no cure. But I have my handy delete key at the ready, along > with a key inscribed with a ? :-) > > Rob-- I believe we are past the "its broken, fix it" discussion into the > "its fine but it could be even finer" phase. By my reckoning, the > incremental changes that have been undertaken lately, such as Annalisa's > suggestion for a newcomers page, and the (I think!) agreement to try to > keep threads as continuous as possible have been productive. At least I > find navigation easier and appreciate explicit cross referencing such as > David's discussion of imagination in the math in russia thread. > > In short > > Whatever! > mike > > On Tue, Dec 23, 2014 at 5:44 AM, Glassman, Michael > wrote: > > > I definitely agree that it should be place based space vs. cyberspace > > rather than real space vs. cyberspace. I would also say that most > > successful online endeavors are not transfers of place based > > activities to cyberspace - cyberspace activities are unique > > activities. Most successful virtual communities - and I feel > > comfortable saying I would consider lchc/xmca one of the more > > successful virtual communities/educational platforms in the short > > history of the Internet (really somebody should do a dissertation > > and/or write an article for WIRED on the listserv) - generally limit > > posts to approximately 20 lines. This is generally (almost always) > > what works for communities based on Bulletin Board System/conference > > communities which I think xmca is. Psychological reasons for this - I > > don't know, but there are definitely structural reasons which I won't > > go into (because it would shine a light on my own hypocrisy). If you > > move past that you are generally into another form of Internet posting - > basically long form blogging. There are community blogging communities but > > xmca does not use that type of platform. In the time I have been on > xmca > > there have been a few people who regularly posted very long messages > > but these were trusted users - this is not a title bestowed on anybody > > - it is a part of any successful virtual community and is part of > > overt or natural systems of online governance - lchc/xmca has always > > used an organic form of governance - don't ask me how that comes > > about, I also don't know, but I would point you to Howard Rheingold's > > writing on the WELL (Whole Earth Lectronic Link). This does not mean > > people should count their lines (which like an idiot I just did) but > > that the one screen rule is not arbitrary but may be instrumental for > the community. > > > > Happy Holidays > > > > Michael (No the name does not count as a line!!!) > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Annalisa Aguilar > > [annalisa@unm.edu] > > Sent: Monday, December 22, 2014 8:27 PM > > To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Not too long and not too short > > > > Andy, > > > > My conception would be meaning-making, which is all and none of the > above. > > > > Kind regards, > > > > Annalisa > > > > > a kind of scientific symposium or maybe a conference? > > > or an after dinner conversation? (or maybe a staffroom > conversation)? > > > a formal decision making meeting, where we address the Chair, > > make amendments, etc.? > > > a Occupy-type general meeting? > > > > > Or is "none of the above" the only answer? > > > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Dec 23 10:36:58 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 23 Dec 2014 10:36:58 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Not too long and not too short In-Reply-To: <0b7501d01edd$885bfd00$9913f700$@uic.edu> References: <1419296473895.52540@unm.edu> <5498C430.9050306@mira.net> <1419298077816.10149@unm.edu> <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F9077DC5@CIO-TNC-D2MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <0b7501d01edd$885bfd00$9913f700$@uic.edu> Message-ID: A message of mine crossed yours, Aria. I fully agree with the sentitments you expressed. mike On Tue, Dec 23, 2014 at 10:23 AM, Aria Razfar wrote: > Mike, > > I'm glad you contextualized your remarks regarding regulating word lengths > and flip remarks. The self-regulating policy is much better. I don't think > we can brush it off with a flip "whatever" though. From what I could see, > Annalisa was clearly hurt by the very public corrective action and > discussion of policy that appeared to single her out. I feel somewhat > responsible for engaging one of her very long posts, which I appreciated. I > think the right thing to do, and this should be noted for the future, is to > handle such "corrections" in private, especially with newcomers. Annalisa, > if our words, actions were in anyway hurtful please forgive us. > > Aria > > Aria Razfar, Ph.D. > Associate Professor of Literacy, Language, and Culture > Director of Graduate Studies, Curriculum and Instruction > University of Illinois at Chicago > 1040 W. Harrison St. M/C 147 > Chicago, IL, 60607 > > Director of English Learning through Mathematics, Science and Action > Research (ELMSA) > www.elmsa.org > > Webpage: http://education.uic.edu/personnel/faculty/aria-razfar-phd > Tel: 312-413-8373 > Fax: 312-996-8134 > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole > Sent: Tuesday, December 23, 2014 11:39 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Not too long and not too short > > ?Seems like matters of message length will be regulated by conventions > established by those who post, don't post, delete, read, ignore or > participate. My "too long" comment was not original with me. It was made > earlier and i (mistakenly) thought had been accepted as conventional. > Clearly wrong! The too short came because I was feeling badly by a > too-short message I had sent earlier and was totally confused by a message > that was too short for me to know the reference and it turned out to be a > response that pertained to something I had written (or at least I think so). > > Seems like no cure. But I have my handy delete key at the ready, along > with a key inscribed with a ? :-) > > Rob-- I believe we are past the "its broken, fix it" discussion into the > "its fine but it could be even finer" phase. By my reckoning, the > incremental changes that have been undertaken lately, such as Annalisa's > suggestion for a newcomers page, and the (I think!) agreement to try to > keep threads as continuous as possible have been productive. At least I > find navigation easier and appreciate explicit cross referencing such as > David's discussion of imagination in the math in russia thread. > > In short > > Whatever! > mike > > On Tue, Dec 23, 2014 at 5:44 AM, Glassman, Michael > wrote: > > > I definitely agree that it should be place based space vs. cyberspace > > rather than real space vs. cyberspace. I would also say that most > > successful online endeavors are not transfers of place based > > activities to cyberspace - cyberspace activities are unique > > activities. Most successful virtual communities - and I feel > > comfortable saying I would consider lchc/xmca one of the more > > successful virtual communities/educational platforms in the short > > history of the Internet (really somebody should do a dissertation > > and/or write an article for WIRED on the listserv) - generally limit > > posts to approximately 20 lines. This is generally (almost always) > > what works for communities based on Bulletin Board System/conference > > communities which I think xmca is. Psychological reasons for this - I > > don't know, but there are definitely structural reasons which I won't > > go into (because it would shine a light on my own hypocrisy). If you > > move past that you are generally into another form of Internet posting - > basically long form blogging. There are community blogging communities but > > xmca does not use that type of platform. In the time I have been on > xmca > > there have been a few people who regularly posted very long messages > > but these were trusted users - this is not a title bestowed on anybody > > - it is a part of any successful virtual community and is part of > > overt or natural systems of online governance - lchc/xmca has always > > used an organic form of governance - don't ask me how that comes > > about, I also don't know, but I would point you to Howard Rheingold's > > writing on the WELL (Whole Earth Lectronic Link). This does not mean > > people should count their lines (which like an idiot I just did) but > > that the one screen rule is not arbitrary but may be instrumental for > the community. > > > > Happy Holidays > > > > Michael (No the name does not count as a line!!!) > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Annalisa Aguilar > > [annalisa@unm.edu] > > Sent: Monday, December 22, 2014 8:27 PM > > To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Not too long and not too short > > > > Andy, > > > > My conception would be meaning-making, which is all and none of the > above. > > > > Kind regards, > > > > Annalisa > > > > > a kind of scientific symposium or maybe a conference? > > > or an after dinner conversation? (or maybe a staffroom > conversation)? > > > a formal decision making meeting, where we address the Chair, > > make amendments, etc.? > > > a Occupy-type general meeting? > > > > > Or is "none of the above" the only answer? > > > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From ablunden@mira.net Tue Dec 23 16:40:23 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Wed, 24 Dec 2014 11:40:23 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Not too long and not too short In-Reply-To: <009201d01ed0$81af8920$850e9b60$@att.net> References: <1419296473895.52540@unm.edu> <5498C430.9050306@mira.net> <009201d01ed0$81af8920$850e9b60$@att.net> Message-ID: <549A0B77.90408@mira.net> I use the concept of a group of people talking together in the same room as a germ-cell and unit of analysis for analysing organisations and broad social and political processes, so it seemed it might useful to think about it here. I'd describe my stance like that of a group of students or researchers all studying at their own desk in a hall, and every so often someone has a question, and calls it out and people call back answers. I agree with not-broken-don't-fix-it and I agree that rules and rulers are not for us. I also find xmca to be way out in front of all comparators in terms of intellectual depth and mutual respect. But I think if we were all aware of how each of us see participation in xmca it would help us to act accordingly. So, for example, if I happened into a study hall and witnessed people occasionally calling out and answering questions or occasionally sharing discoveries or news, I would try to figure out what the shared interest was and I would tend to stick to the Q&A&News modes myself. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Peg Griffin wrote: > Other candidates for options: > a MOOC -- including suggestions about participation in terms of comfort with > certain pre-req readings (of published articles/books and often some package > of prior curated XMCA post sequences) > a tourist stop shared coffee break -- with noticings, questioning, > questing, promoting, guessing, opining regardless of ordinary conventions of > academic discourse > > Someone had never heard of a modeling (maybe mapping) between on line and > f-t-f events? One of the earliest I ever saw (in the early 80's I think) > was a Japanese on-line group TEFL structured with, of course, Japanese > physical space referencing as well as rhetorical-discourse-genre units, > sensibilities, and customs. > > Maybe thinking about non-on-line would bring XMCA face to face with its > cultural diversity. > > A quirk in the occupy type general meeting is the omission of loudspeakers > and replacement by people repeating back what was said. Would an on-line > mapping of that occur and give folks the responsibility to write the "Re:" > before responding could be an interesting sporadic innovation replacing the > long message history tail? Maybe a once a week or once a month exercise of > it would be tolerable/fun/instructive? > PG > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > Sent: Monday, December 22, 2014 8:24 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Not too long and not too short > > I would be interested to know what real-space activity people would take > xmca to be "modelling" in cyberspace? > Are we participating in > > a kind of scientific symposium or maybe a conference? > or an after dinner conversation? (or maybe a staffroom conversation)? > a formal decision making meeting, where we address the Chair, make > amendments, etc.? > a Occupy-type general meeting? > > Or is "none of the above" the only answer? > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > >> Apparently we need a Goldilocks section in the Newcomer's page! >> >> :) >> >> >> >> > > > From lsmolucha@hotmail.com Tue Dec 23 16:59:36 2014 From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com (larry smolucha) Date: Tue, 23 Dec 2014 18:59:36 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: the genetic roots of thought and speech In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Message from Francine: This reminds me of a debate that I had with Greg Thompson over a year ago about hearing impaired people who do not have speech but use hand sign language. Hand sign language is a sensori-motor semiotic systems that communicates thoughts to others. This is a semiotic fusion that does not involve speech. Dance is another sensori-motor fusion with thought (which is itself based on sensori-motor experience). Visual symbols systems are another. My reading of Vygotsky is that only speech vocalizations that fuse with thought (based on sensori-motor experience) can produce 'word' meanings that are internalized as the inner speech that creates higher mental functions (consciously regulated thought processes). > Date: Tue, 23 Dec 2014 09:54:14 -0800 > From: lpscholar2@gmail.com > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] the genetic roots of thought and speech > > Francine asked us to re-read Chapter 4 "the Genetic Roots' of Thought and > Speech. > This paragraph was critical > > "we are forced to conclude that FUSION of thought and speech, in adults as > well as in children, is a phenomenon limited to a CIRCUMSCRIBED area. > Nonverbal thought and nonintellectual speech do NOT participate in THIS > FUSION and are affected indirectly by the processes of verbal thought" > [Vygotsky, page 48] > > Reading this opens for me the question of all the other functions of speech > in the adult that are not directly influenced by thought and all the > functions of thought that are not affected by speech. > In particular are there forms of *imaging* that are thoughts but not > functioning in speech. Do these paths of image and thought also develop and > fuse? > > All the functions that Vygotsky explores in the primates and in children > PRIOR to the reciprocal interweaving of thought and language continue to > function in adults. For example the sounds of speech as offering "release > from tension or anxiety" or the sounds as ways of *connecting* and > *bonding*. > It seems that to privilege the fusion of thought and language as dominant > modes of designing places/spaces [such as the third space] makes the other > functions [speech alone] [thought alone] nondominant modes when the > necessity for connection may be prior to and dominant when reflecting on > the fused mode of thought and language as a partial unity. > In other words, the unit of analysis is the relation of thought alone AND > speech alone AND image alone AND all their actual fusions as other partial > modes. > This as a multi-modal understanding. > I hope this is the right length > Larry From julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk Tue Dec 23 17:13:07 2014 From: julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk (Julian Williams) Date: Wed, 24 Dec 2014 01:13:07 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: the genetic roots of thought and speech In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: <3718F78D-AB5D-4B1B-9507-B7D62A4DD6F3@manchester.ac.uk> Lawry Don't agree with this at all... Sign language is surely mediated by gestures rather than vibrations of vocal chords, but still has all the hallmarks of semiotic mediation Vygotsky elaborated, including inner speech and higher cognitive functions (potentially). Julian On 24 Dec 2014, at 01:00, "larry smolucha" wrote: > Message from Francine: > > This reminds me of a debate that I had with Greg Thompson over a year ago > about hearing impaired people who do not have speech > but use hand sign language. Hand sign language is a sensori-motor semiotic > systems that communicates thoughts to others. This is a semiotic fusion that > does not involve speech. Dance is another sensori-motor fusion with thought > (which is itself based on sensori-motor experience). Visual symbols systems > are another. > > My reading of Vygotsky is that only speech vocalizations that fuse with thought > (based on sensori-motor experience) can produce 'word' meanings that are internalized > as the inner speech that creates higher mental functions (consciously regulated > thought processes). > >> Date: Tue, 23 Dec 2014 09:54:14 -0800 >> From: lpscholar2@gmail.com >> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >> Subject: [Xmca-l] the genetic roots of thought and speech >> >> Francine asked us to re-read Chapter 4 "the Genetic Roots' of Thought and >> Speech. >> This paragraph was critical >> >> "we are forced to conclude that FUSION of thought and speech, in adults as >> well as in children, is a phenomenon limited to a CIRCUMSCRIBED area. >> Nonverbal thought and nonintellectual speech do NOT participate in THIS >> FUSION and are affected indirectly by the processes of verbal thought" >> [Vygotsky, page 48] >> >> Reading this opens for me the question of all the other functions of speech >> in the adult that are not directly influenced by thought and all the >> functions of thought that are not affected by speech. >> In particular are there forms of *imaging* that are thoughts but not >> functioning in speech. Do these paths of image and thought also develop and >> fuse? >> >> All the functions that Vygotsky explores in the primates and in children >> PRIOR to the reciprocal interweaving of thought and language continue to >> function in adults. For example the sounds of speech as offering "release >> from tension or anxiety" or the sounds as ways of *connecting* and >> *bonding*. >> It seems that to privilege the fusion of thought and language as dominant >> modes of designing places/spaces [such as the third space] makes the other >> functions [speech alone] [thought alone] nondominant modes when the >> necessity for connection may be prior to and dominant when reflecting on >> the fused mode of thought and language as a partial unity. >> In other words, the unit of analysis is the relation of thought alone AND >> speech alone AND image alone AND all their actual fusions as other partial >> modes. >> This as a multi-modal understanding. >> I hope this is the right length >> Larry > From daviddpreiss@gmail.com Tue Dec 23 17:17:14 2014 From: daviddpreiss@gmail.com (David Preiss) Date: Tue, 23 Dec 2014 22:17:14 -0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Not too long and not too short In-Reply-To: <549A0B77.90408@mira.net> References: <1419296473895.52540@unm.edu> <5498C430.9050306@mira.net> <009201d01ed0$81af8920$850e9b60$@att.net> <549A0B77.90408@mira.net> Message-ID: <14C92E23-7950-48DA-A168-E3FE8988D385@gmail.com> This resonates with me. I have two concerns: somehow the relation between XMCA and MCA gets lost. May be that is not that important for the forum now. Yet I really loved the idea of exchanging ideas about just published papers in the journal. And I did learn a lot from those discussions. Second, the amount of threads going on simoultaneously is larger than the attention span of some of us and that truly makes difficult to engage and learn. Following Andy's metaphor it is like too many people talking at the same time in the hall passing on top of each other. Additionally we could add that not all of those people talk the same language. So my question is how can we keep learning from each other in a context where there are also offline things to attend to... David Enviado desde mi iPhone > El 23-12-2014, a las 21:40, Andy Blunden escribi?: > > I use the concept of a group of people talking together in the same room as a germ-cell and unit of analysis for analysing organisations and broad social and political processes, so it seemed it might useful to think about it here. I'd describe my stance like that of a group of students or researchers all studying at their own desk in a hall, and every so often someone has a question, and calls it out and people call back answers. > I agree with not-broken-don't-fix-it and I agree that rules and rulers are not for us. I also find xmca to be way out in front of all comparators in terms of intellectual depth and mutual respect. But I think if we were all aware of how each of us see participation in xmca it would help us to act accordingly. So, for example, if I happened into a study hall and witnessed people occasionally calling out and answering questions or occasionally sharing discoveries or news, I would try to figure out what the shared interest was and I would tend to stick to the Q&A&News modes myself. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Peg Griffin wrote: >> Other candidates for options: >> a MOOC -- including suggestions about participation in terms of comfort with >> certain pre-req readings (of published articles/books and often some package >> of prior curated XMCA post sequences) >> a tourist stop shared coffee break -- with noticings, questioning, >> questing, promoting, guessing, opining regardless of ordinary conventions of >> academic discourse >> Someone had never heard of a modeling (maybe mapping) between on line and >> f-t-f events? One of the earliest I ever saw (in the early 80's I think) >> was a Japanese on-line group TEFL structured with, of course, Japanese >> physical space referencing as well as rhetorical-discourse-genre units, >> sensibilities, and customs. >> >> Maybe thinking about non-on-line would bring XMCA face to face with its >> cultural diversity. >> >> A quirk in the occupy type general meeting is the omission of loudspeakers >> and replacement by people repeating back what was said. Would an on-line >> mapping of that occur and give folks the responsibility to write the "Re:" >> before responding could be an interesting sporadic innovation replacing the >> long message history tail? Maybe a once a week or once a month exercise of >> it would be tolerable/fun/instructive? PG >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >> Sent: Monday, December 22, 2014 8:24 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Not too long and not too short >> >> I would be interested to know what real-space activity people would take >> xmca to be "modelling" in cyberspace? >> Are we participating in >> >> a kind of scientific symposium or maybe a conference? >> or an after dinner conversation? (or maybe a staffroom conversation)? >> a formal decision making meeting, where we address the Chair, make >> amendments, etc.? >> a Occupy-type general meeting? >> >> Or is "none of the above" the only answer? >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >>> Apparently we need a Goldilocks section in the Newcomer's page! >>> >>> :) > From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Dec 23 17:16:47 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 23 Dec 2014 17:16:47 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: the genetic roots of thought and speech In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Francine. I am uncertain of how to interpret the following thought in this note: My reading of Vygotsky is that only speech vocalizations that fuse with thought (based on sensori-motor experience) can produce 'word' meanings that are internalized as the inner speech that creates higher mental functions (consciously regulated thought processes). Do you mean that Vygotsky erred in this conclusion? Clearly the Dean of our division of social sciences i capable of higher psychological functions. Following Vera and many others I really like a multi-modality meaning making interpretation of LSV, but I am an amateur in figuring out issues of language. Which is why I depend upon all of you! :-) mike On Tue, Dec 23, 2014 at 4:59 PM, larry smolucha wrote: > Message from Francine: > > This reminds me of a debate that I had with Greg Thompson over a year ago > about hearing impaired people who do not have speech > but use hand sign language. Hand sign language is a sensori-motor semiotic > systems that communicates thoughts to others. This is a semiotic fusion > that > does not involve speech. Dance is another sensori-motor fusion with thought > (which is itself based on sensori-motor experience). Visual symbols systems > are another. > > My reading of Vygotsky is that only speech vocalizations that fuse with > thought > (based on sensori-motor experience) can produce 'word' meanings that are > internalized > as the inner speech that creates higher mental functions (consciously > regulated > thought processes). > > > Date: Tue, 23 Dec 2014 09:54:14 -0800 > > From: lpscholar2@gmail.com > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > Subject: [Xmca-l] the genetic roots of thought and speech > > > > Francine asked us to re-read Chapter 4 "the Genetic Roots' of Thought and > > Speech. > > This paragraph was critical > > > > "we are forced to conclude that FUSION of thought and speech, in adults > as > > well as in children, is a phenomenon limited to a CIRCUMSCRIBED area. > > Nonverbal thought and nonintellectual speech do NOT participate in THIS > > FUSION and are affected indirectly by the processes of verbal thought" > > [Vygotsky, page 48] > > > > Reading this opens for me the question of all the other functions of > speech > > in the adult that are not directly influenced by thought and all the > > functions of thought that are not affected by speech. > > In particular are there forms of *imaging* that are thoughts but not > > functioning in speech. Do these paths of image and thought also develop > and > > fuse? > > > > All the functions that Vygotsky explores in the primates and in children > > PRIOR to the reciprocal interweaving of thought and language continue to > > function in adults. For example the sounds of speech as offering "release > > from tension or anxiety" or the sounds as ways of *connecting* and > > *bonding*. > > It seems that to privilege the fusion of thought and language as dominant > > modes of designing places/spaces [such as the third space] makes the > other > > functions [speech alone] [thought alone] nondominant modes when the > > necessity for connection may be prior to and dominant when reflecting on > > the fused mode of thought and language as a partial unity. > > In other words, the unit of analysis is the relation of thought alone AND > > speech alone AND image alone AND all their actual fusions as other > partial > > modes. > > This as a multi-modal understanding. > > I hope this is the right length > > Larry > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science as an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From annalisa@unm.edu Tue Dec 23 17:40:32 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Wed, 24 Dec 2014 01:40:32 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Not too long and not too short In-Reply-To: <549A0B77.90408@mira.net> References: <1419296473895.52540@unm.edu> <5498C430.9050306@mira.net> <009201d01ed0$81af8920$850e9b60$@att.net>,<549A0B77.90408@mira.net> Message-ID: <1419385231626.43342@unm.edu> Hi, In case the "someone" comment was directed to me, I suppose my adversity to reproducing the real world onto a listserv is that it is a form of projected utility overlap that is rife with problems, problems that can't be solved. I mean, we could all head over to Second Life, and I'd thought to make that comment but I figured that given the tone of late I would be seen as flippant. I didn't want to seem a technocrat. There are many wild and wondrous worlds at Second Life and each person has an avatar, which would likely provide a sense of direction and space to conversations. But is it really necessary? The problem I see, which I thought was kind of obvious and I don't mean to be condescending, is that every person will have the space of what is imagined as it appears for that person. I don't know how saying this list is a play-pen, a rodeo, the Old Globe, a bus stop, a paintball pit, a watering hole, a break room, Twitter, Facebook, Tinder, Foursquare, The New York Times, The Guardian, FOX News, Le Cage Aux Folles, a teddybear's tea party, or CERN's Large Hadron Collider will change the form and function of this email listserv. So do I inform people in the Newcomer's page: Imagine you are in a Parisian Cafe on Tuesdays, but on Wednesdays it's River Rafting, but on Saturday it's the Heavyweight World Championships! And if you transgress these rules, you will be knocked into next Wednesday to Your Room Without Any Supper And No One Will Talk to You. I would like to suggest that we leave people's imaginations alone and let each person bring and take from the list what they hope to bring and take. And if they want more, not to chastise them for uttering, "More please." The need to constrain the speech of others is very curious. I don't understand the purpose and where it comes from. As far as I know there is a 1st Amendment, and I'm glad for that because it breeds tolerance and I'm all for that. Given the nature of inequality as of late, I find the narrowing and censoring of speech to be the first step in inequality, and as far as I know, reproducing inequality is not the founding tenets of this list. But let me say, with utmost respect, if I have offended anyone in how I craft my speech, I suggest you make an email filter with my name and send my posts post-haste to the trash can. That way only the people who wish to engage with me will do so and those who don't won't know what they are missing! How's that for a compromise? What I find more problematic than long posts are the long trailing chains of previous emails that are not removed when hitting the reply button. I am guilty of this and I'm attempting to make it more a habit, but sometimes I fail. I can't find the feature in the web client that will stop that behavior. The posts get so chopped up and dismembered that all they do fabulously well is eat up computer disk space; I can't usually read them. I wondered if that is what people meant when they talk about long emails? Because I like to give people the benefit of the doubt, that's what I figured was intended. Anyway, for me the list is a gallery of thought, and so for me that is what it will be. Kind and gentle regards on a Tuesday in a Paris Cafe, Annalisa From ablunden@mira.net Tue Dec 23 18:14:04 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Wed, 24 Dec 2014 13:14:04 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: the genetic roots of thought and speech In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <549A216C.4080205@mira.net> I always thought that Vygotsky took speech as the archetype of language, and consequently, when he chose the spoken word as his germ cell/unit of analysis, the spoken word was taken as the archetype for the written word or the manual sign. Personally, I don't see any basis for a significant differentiation between any spoken language and ASL, AUSLAN or NSL, except that the spoken language is logically and historically prior to Sign Language. And despite what Vygotsky says about gestures and knots, I think he saw it that way too. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ mike cole wrote: > Francine. I am uncertain of how to interpret the following thought in this > note: > > My reading of Vygotsky is that only speech vocalizations that fuse with > thought > (based on sensori-motor experience) can produce 'word' meanings that are > internalized > as the inner speech that creates higher mental functions (consciously > regulated > thought processes). > > Do you mean that Vygotsky erred in this conclusion? Clearly the Dean of our > division of social sciences i capable of higher psychological functions. > Following Vera and many others I really like a multi-modality meaning > making interpretation of LSV, but I am an amateur in figuring out issues of > language. Which is why I depend upon all of you! :-) > mike > > > On Tue, Dec 23, 2014 at 4:59 PM, larry smolucha > wrote: > > >> Message from Francine: >> >> This reminds me of a debate that I had with Greg Thompson over a year ago >> about hearing impaired people who do not have speech >> but use hand sign language. Hand sign language is a sensori-motor semiotic >> systems that communicates thoughts to others. This is a semiotic fusion >> that >> does not involve speech. Dance is another sensori-motor fusion with thought >> (which is itself based on sensori-motor experience). Visual symbols systems >> are another. >> >> My reading of Vygotsky is that only speech vocalizations that fuse with >> thought >> (based on sensori-motor experience) can produce 'word' meanings that are >> internalized >> as the inner speech that creates higher mental functions (consciously >> regulated >> thought processes). >> >> >>> Date: Tue, 23 Dec 2014 09:54:14 -0800 >>> From: lpscholar2@gmail.com >>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] the genetic roots of thought and speech >>> >>> Francine asked us to re-read Chapter 4 "the Genetic Roots' of Thought and >>> Speech. >>> This paragraph was critical >>> >>> "we are forced to conclude that FUSION of thought and speech, in adults >>> >> as >> >>> well as in children, is a phenomenon limited to a CIRCUMSCRIBED area. >>> Nonverbal thought and nonintellectual speech do NOT participate in THIS >>> FUSION and are affected indirectly by the processes of verbal thought" >>> [Vygotsky, page 48] >>> >>> Reading this opens for me the question of all the other functions of >>> >> speech >> >>> in the adult that are not directly influenced by thought and all the >>> functions of thought that are not affected by speech. >>> In particular are there forms of *imaging* that are thoughts but not >>> functioning in speech. Do these paths of image and thought also develop >>> >> and >> >>> fuse? >>> >>> All the functions that Vygotsky explores in the primates and in children >>> PRIOR to the reciprocal interweaving of thought and language continue to >>> function in adults. For example the sounds of speech as offering "release >>> from tension or anxiety" or the sounds as ways of *connecting* and >>> *bonding*. >>> It seems that to privilege the fusion of thought and language as dominant >>> modes of designing places/spaces [such as the third space] makes the >>> >> other >> >>> functions [speech alone] [thought alone] nondominant modes when the >>> necessity for connection may be prior to and dominant when reflecting on >>> the fused mode of thought and language as a partial unity. >>> In other words, the unit of analysis is the relation of thought alone AND >>> speech alone AND image alone AND all their actual fusions as other >>> >> partial >> >>> modes. >>> This as a multi-modal understanding. >>> I hope this is the right length >>> Larry >>> > > > > > From hshonerd@gmail.com Tue Dec 23 18:49:25 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Tue, 23 Dec 2014 18:49:25 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: the genetic roots of thought and speech In-Reply-To: <549A216C.4080205@mira.net> References: <549A216C.4080205@mira.net> Message-ID: A conjecture, proposal and prediction: Gesture as a metaphor, a unit of analysis, for all modalities of human symbolizing. A suggestion: Consider forwarding your thoughts on listserv-wide posts to significant XMCA others before calling out to the whole listserv with a collaborative analysis. This would slow things down, but deepen, the dialog. Let there be eddies in the flow, so to speak. Henry > On Dec 23, 2014, at 6:14 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > I always thought that Vygotsky took speech as the archetype of language, and consequently, when he chose the spoken word as his germ cell/unit of analysis, the spoken word was taken as the archetype for the written word or the manual sign. Personally, I don't see any basis for a significant differentiation between any spoken language and ASL, AUSLAN or NSL, except that the spoken language is logically and historically prior to Sign Language. And despite what Vygotsky says about gestures and knots, I think he saw it that way too. > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > mike cole wrote: >> Francine. I am uncertain of how to interpret the following thought in this >> note: >> >> My reading of Vygotsky is that only speech vocalizations that fuse with >> thought >> (based on sensori-motor experience) can produce 'word' meanings that are >> internalized >> as the inner speech that creates higher mental functions (consciously >> regulated >> thought processes). >> >> Do you mean that Vygotsky erred in this conclusion? Clearly the Dean of our >> division of social sciences i capable of higher psychological functions. >> Following Vera and many others I really like a multi-modality meaning >> making interpretation of LSV, but I am an amateur in figuring out issues of >> language. Which is why I depend upon all of you! :-) >> mike >> >> >> On Tue, Dec 23, 2014 at 4:59 PM, larry smolucha >> wrote: >> >> >>> Message from Francine: >>> >>> This reminds me of a debate that I had with Greg Thompson over a year ago >>> about hearing impaired people who do not have speech >>> but use hand sign language. Hand sign language is a sensori-motor semiotic >>> systems that communicates thoughts to others. This is a semiotic fusion >>> that >>> does not involve speech. Dance is another sensori-motor fusion with thought >>> (which is itself based on sensori-motor experience). Visual symbols systems >>> are another. >>> >>> My reading of Vygotsky is that only speech vocalizations that fuse with >>> thought >>> (based on sensori-motor experience) can produce 'word' meanings that are >>> internalized >>> as the inner speech that creates higher mental functions (consciously >>> regulated >>> thought processes). >>> >>> >>>> Date: Tue, 23 Dec 2014 09:54:14 -0800 >>>> From: lpscholar2@gmail.com >>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] the genetic roots of thought and speech >>>> >>>> Francine asked us to re-read Chapter 4 "the Genetic Roots' of Thought and >>>> Speech. >>>> This paragraph was critical >>>> >>>> "we are forced to conclude that FUSION of thought and speech, in adults >>>> >>> as >>> >>>> well as in children, is a phenomenon limited to a CIRCUMSCRIBED area. >>>> Nonverbal thought and nonintellectual speech do NOT participate in THIS >>>> FUSION and are affected indirectly by the processes of verbal thought" >>>> [Vygotsky, page 48] >>>> >>>> Reading this opens for me the question of all the other functions of >>>> >>> speech >>> >>>> in the adult that are not directly influenced by thought and all the >>>> functions of thought that are not affected by speech. >>>> In particular are there forms of *imaging* that are thoughts but not >>>> functioning in speech. Do these paths of image and thought also develop >>>> >>> and >>> >>>> fuse? >>>> >>>> All the functions that Vygotsky explores in the primates and in children >>>> PRIOR to the reciprocal interweaving of thought and language continue to >>>> function in adults. For example the sounds of speech as offering "release >>>> from tension or anxiety" or the sounds as ways of *connecting* and >>>> *bonding*. >>>> It seems that to privilege the fusion of thought and language as dominant >>>> modes of designing places/spaces [such as the third space] makes the >>>> >>> other >>> >>>> functions [speech alone] [thought alone] nondominant modes when the >>>> necessity for connection may be prior to and dominant when reflecting on >>>> the fused mode of thought and language as a partial unity. >>>> In other words, the unit of analysis is the relation of thought alone AND >>>> speech alone AND image alone AND all their actual fusions as other >>>> >>> partial >>> >>>> modes. >>>> This as a multi-modal understanding. >>>> I hope this is the right length >>>> Larry >>>> >> >> >> >> >> > From ablunden@mira.net Tue Dec 23 18:53:11 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Wed, 24 Dec 2014 13:53:11 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: the genetic roots of thought and speech In-Reply-To: References: <549A216C.4080205@mira.net> Message-ID: <549A2A97.4080703@mira.net> I think that in Peircean terms, gestures are iconic or indexical, whereas the archetypal sign in a Deaf Sign Language is a Symbol. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ HENRY SHONERD wrote: > A conjecture, proposal and prediction: > Gesture as a metaphor, a unit of analysis, for all modalities of human symbolizing. > A suggestion: > Consider forwarding your thoughts on listserv-wide posts to significant XMCA others before calling out to the whole listserv with a collaborative analysis. This would slow things down, but deepen, the dialog. Let there be eddies in the flow, so to speak. > Henry > > > >> On Dec 23, 2014, at 6:14 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> I always thought that Vygotsky took speech as the archetype of language, and consequently, when he chose the spoken word as his germ cell/unit of analysis, the spoken word was taken as the archetype for the written word or the manual sign. Personally, I don't see any basis for a significant differentiation between any spoken language and ASL, AUSLAN or NSL, except that the spoken language is logically and historically prior to Sign Language. And despite what Vygotsky says about gestures and knots, I think he saw it that way too. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> mike cole wrote: >> >>> Francine. I am uncertain of how to interpret the following thought in this >>> note: >>> >>> My reading of Vygotsky is that only speech vocalizations that fuse with >>> thought >>> (based on sensori-motor experience) can produce 'word' meanings that are >>> internalized >>> as the inner speech that creates higher mental functions (consciously >>> regulated >>> thought processes). >>> >>> Do you mean that Vygotsky erred in this conclusion? Clearly the Dean of our >>> division of social sciences i capable of higher psychological functions. >>> Following Vera and many others I really like a multi-modality meaning >>> making interpretation of LSV, but I am an amateur in figuring out issues of >>> language. Which is why I depend upon all of you! :-) >>> mike >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Dec 23, 2014 at 4:59 PM, larry smolucha >>> wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>>> Message from Francine: >>>> >>>> This reminds me of a debate that I had with Greg Thompson over a year ago >>>> about hearing impaired people who do not have speech >>>> but use hand sign language. Hand sign language is a sensori-motor semiotic >>>> systems that communicates thoughts to others. This is a semiotic fusion >>>> that >>>> does not involve speech. Dance is another sensori-motor fusion with thought >>>> (which is itself based on sensori-motor experience). Visual symbols systems >>>> are another. >>>> >>>> My reading of Vygotsky is that only speech vocalizations that fuse with >>>> thought >>>> (based on sensori-motor experience) can produce 'word' meanings that are >>>> internalized >>>> as the inner speech that creates higher mental functions (consciously >>>> regulated >>>> thought processes). >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Date: Tue, 23 Dec 2014 09:54:14 -0800 >>>>> From: lpscholar2@gmail.com >>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] the genetic roots of thought and speech >>>>> >>>>> Francine asked us to re-read Chapter 4 "the Genetic Roots' of Thought and >>>>> Speech. >>>>> This paragraph was critical >>>>> >>>>> "we are forced to conclude that FUSION of thought and speech, in adults >>>>> >>>>> >>>> as >>>> >>>> >>>>> well as in children, is a phenomenon limited to a CIRCUMSCRIBED area. >>>>> Nonverbal thought and nonintellectual speech do NOT participate in THIS >>>>> FUSION and are affected indirectly by the processes of verbal thought" >>>>> [Vygotsky, page 48] >>>>> >>>>> Reading this opens for me the question of all the other functions of >>>>> >>>>> >>>> speech >>>> >>>> >>>>> in the adult that are not directly influenced by thought and all the >>>>> functions of thought that are not affected by speech. >>>>> In particular are there forms of *imaging* that are thoughts but not >>>>> functioning in speech. Do these paths of image and thought also develop >>>>> >>>>> >>>> and >>>> >>>> >>>>> fuse? >>>>> >>>>> All the functions that Vygotsky explores in the primates and in children >>>>> PRIOR to the reciprocal interweaving of thought and language continue to >>>>> function in adults. For example the sounds of speech as offering "release >>>>> from tension or anxiety" or the sounds as ways of *connecting* and >>>>> *bonding*. >>>>> It seems that to privilege the fusion of thought and language as dominant >>>>> modes of designing places/spaces [such as the third space] makes the >>>>> >>>>> >>>> other >>>> >>>> >>>>> functions [speech alone] [thought alone] nondominant modes when the >>>>> necessity for connection may be prior to and dominant when reflecting on >>>>> the fused mode of thought and language as a partial unity. >>>>> In other words, the unit of analysis is the relation of thought alone AND >>>>> speech alone AND image alone AND all their actual fusions as other >>>>> >>>>> >>>> partial >>>> >>>> >>>>> modes. >>>>> This as a multi-modal understanding. >>>>> I hope this is the right length >>>>> Larry >>>>> >>>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> > > > > From daviddpreiss@gmail.com Tue Dec 23 19:03:35 2014 From: daviddpreiss@gmail.com (David Preiss) Date: Wed, 24 Dec 2014 00:03:35 -0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Look At This: Demolished Message-ID: <2AD39FB7-5FDC-48DC-8C7F-75BFD5AEFCEE@gmail.com> This visual collection at NPR about the end of Chicago's public housing is full of cultural psychology implications. It is truly amazing. Take a few minutes to check it: http://apps.npr.org/lookatthis/posts/publichousing/ David From annalisa@unm.edu Tue Dec 23 22:17:50 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Wed, 24 Dec 2014 06:17:50 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Look At This: Demolished In-Reply-To: <2AD39FB7-5FDC-48DC-8C7F-75BFD5AEFCEE@gmail.com> References: <2AD39FB7-5FDC-48DC-8C7F-75BFD5AEFCEE@gmail.com> Message-ID: <1419401868712.91616@unm.edu> Hi David, I loved this photographic essay, and the browser presentation is compelling as the frame for the storytelling. One thing we are concerned with as photographers is how to interact respectfully with subjects, rather than treating them as objects to be fetishized in the frame. I imagine that this is a concern of all ethnographers too. For me the takeaway of this story is that change doesn't always come according to plan. I was sad to learn so many people got lost in the cracks. I liked that the photographer as able to reunite with the girl on the swing. That was really nice. Thanks so much for sharing it. Kind regards, Annalisa ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of David Preiss Sent: Tuesday, December 23, 2014 8:03 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Look At This: Demolished This visual collection at NPR about the end of Chicago's public housing is full of cultural psychology implications. It is truly amazing. Take a few minutes to check it: http://apps.npr.org/lookatthis/posts/publichousing/ David From lsmolucha@hotmail.com Tue Dec 23 22:25:47 2014 From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com (larry smolucha) Date: Wed, 24 Dec 2014 00:25:47 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: the genetic roots of thought and speech In-Reply-To: <3718F78D-AB5D-4B1B-9507-B7D62A4DD6F3@manchester.ac.uk> References: , , , <3718F78D-AB5D-4B1B-9507-B7D62A4DD6F3@manchester.ac.uk> Message-ID: Message from Francine: Keeping in mind that deafness alone does not mean one is mute. I have met many deaf people who speak, and also use sign language. But in Vygotsky's era, techniques for teaching the deaf how to speak were just being developed. There might be something in the Volume from the Collected Works on Defectology that would clarify Vygotsky's position on sign language as a non-vocalized form of speech, and whether Vygotsky thought it could be internalized and used to consciously direct one's thought processes. Afterall, didn't Vygotsky spend seven years (1917-1924) teaching how to teach the deaf (at a teacher's college in Gomel)? I recall a passage in Vygotsky's writings where he says that the problem with deaf education (in his time) was that sign language was only taught for the purpose of communicating with others (and not for self-regulation). Perhaps, his daughter Gita's work in deaf education developed ways to teach the use of sign language for self-regulation of thought processes. Please note: that defectology and deaf education are the terms that were used in Vygotsky's era. > From: julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Date: Wed, 24 Dec 2014 01:13:07 +0000 > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: the genetic roots of thought and speech > > Lawry > > Don't agree with this at all... Sign language is surely mediated by gestures rather than vibrations of vocal chords, but still has all the hallmarks of semiotic mediation Vygotsky elaborated, including inner speech and higher cognitive functions (potentially). > > Julian > > On 24 Dec 2014, at 01:00, "larry smolucha" wrote: > > > Message from Francine: > > > > This reminds me of a debate that I had with Greg Thompson over a year ago > > about hearing impaired people who do not have speech > > but use hand sign language. Hand sign language is a sensori-motor semiotic > > systems that communicates thoughts to others. This is a semiotic fusion that > > does not involve speech. Dance is another sensori-motor fusion with thought > > (which is itself based on sensori-motor experience). Visual symbols systems > > are another. > > > > My reading of Vygotsky is that only speech vocalizations that fuse with thought > > (based on sensori-motor experience) can produce 'word' meanings that are internalized > > as the inner speech that creates higher mental functions (consciously regulated > > thought processes). > > > >> Date: Tue, 23 Dec 2014 09:54:14 -0800 > >> From: lpscholar2@gmail.com > >> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] the genetic roots of thought and speech > >> > >> Francine asked us to re-read Chapter 4 "the Genetic Roots' of Thought and > >> Speech. > >> This paragraph was critical > >> > >> "we are forced to conclude that FUSION of thought and speech, in adults as > >> well as in children, is a phenomenon limited to a CIRCUMSCRIBED area. > >> Nonverbal thought and nonintellectual speech do NOT participate in THIS > >> FUSION and are affected indirectly by the processes of verbal thought" > >> [Vygotsky, page 48] > >> > >> Reading this opens for me the question of all the other functions of speech > >> in the adult that are not directly influenced by thought and all the > >> functions of thought that are not affected by speech. > >> In particular are there forms of *imaging* that are thoughts but not > >> functioning in speech. Do these paths of image and thought also develop and > >> fuse? > >> > >> All the functions that Vygotsky explores in the primates and in children > >> PRIOR to the reciprocal interweaving of thought and language continue to > >> function in adults. For example the sounds of speech as offering "release > >> from tension or anxiety" or the sounds as ways of *connecting* and > >> *bonding*. > >> It seems that to privilege the fusion of thought and language as dominant > >> modes of designing places/spaces [such as the third space] makes the other > >> functions [speech alone] [thought alone] nondominant modes when the > >> necessity for connection may be prior to and dominant when reflecting on > >> the fused mode of thought and language as a partial unity. > >> In other words, the unit of analysis is the relation of thought alone AND > >> speech alone AND image alone AND all their actual fusions as other partial > >> modes. > >> This as a multi-modal understanding. > >> I hope this is the right length > >> Larry > > > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Wed Dec 24 12:42:03 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Wed, 24 Dec 2014 13:42:03 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors / Speaking of AAE In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: ?(sorry for delay, been driving through winter storms from SLC to KC...). I find the piece by Cole, ?Dore, Hall, and Dowley to be an important development of Labov's work (and I stand corrected in my prior statement about nobody following up Labov's work). I think this piece points to two aspects that are centrally important for understanding language usage and which are critical for understanding language, namely, context and time. This research (arduous as it clearly was to conduct) shows very powerfully how different contexts can elicit different types of verbal performances (I am curious to see comparisons with other groups - e.g., mainstream middle class white kids - in order to see how their linguistic performances vary with context for that group - Anyone have any predications to make about this?). This concern with context of performance is one that many psychologists today seem to ignore. The ignorance of context is the basis for the heavy emphasis on "internal validity" that is purportedly the strength of psychological "experiments" that are assumed to measure some aspect of an individual's psychological functioning. (and in the U.S. at least, much of pedagogical policy and practice is driven by studies that are generally ignorant of context). Secondly, this study speaks to the temporal dimension by attending to the back and forth that happens in conversation (conversation analysis is good here, as is speech act theory, but these are more constrained notions of "activity"). Rather than merely attending to the utterances produced, Cole et al attend to what comes before the utterance. This seems to me to be one of the greatest strengths of CHAT - the attention to activity as it unfolds in time. Ok, that's one screen. -greg On Mon, Dec 22, 2014 at 9:33 AM, mike cole wrote: > > I am not in general following this thread, being waaaaaaaaaaaaaay behind on > the imagination thread, but I tripped over the exchange regarding Orr and > AAE. To keep it short, I attach two documents. > > The first is a draft segment from Cultural Psychology (1996) and the other > an empirical report of even greater activity. For those who do not know the > Labov work, the Word file might prove useful. for those of you for whom > this topic is of continuing interest, perhaps the published paper is of > more value. > > It is not true that no one followed up on Labov. It is probably true that > no one followed up on the followup. > mike > > On Mon, Dec 22, 2014 at 8:00 AM, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > > ?David Ki, > > No worries. No offense taken. But thanks for the just-in-case note. > > And yes, I agree to disagree. > > Respectfully, > > greg? > > > > On Mon, Dec 22, 2014 at 6:24 AM, David H Kirshner > wrote: > > > > > > Greg, > > > > > > I disagree with you that Orr could/should have taken a more culturally > > > sensitive approach to her studies of AAE speakers' difficulties in > > > classrooms dominated by standard English instruction. But I in no wise > > > intended to imply your wishing she had done so places you among those > who > > > consider her work as racist. I'm very sorry if my words suggested > > otherwise. > > > > > > David > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > > xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg > > Thompson > > > Sent: Sunday, December 21, 2014 9:36 AM > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors > > > > > > In the interests of following the recently suggested injunction not to > > > directly address specific interlocutors, I'll talk in generalities > (This > > > makes it a bit more challenging to have a conversation but it also > makes > > > one think about the extractable and generalizable point that is beyond > > the > > > immediate context). > > > > > > In my previous post (apologies for drawing on prior context), I neither > > > suggested nor intended to imply that Orr's work is racist (do > intentions > > > matter when it comes to meaning?). This speaks to some of the > > difficulties > > > of talking about issues of race. And in this connection let's not > forget > > > the fact that this list-serve is dominated by white men - that doesn't > > mean > > > that we are necessarily racist but it does mean that we are likely to > be > > > ignorant of many aspects of these issues. > > > > > > Nonetheless, I believe that we can overcome our ignorance through > > > education, by learning more about the issues - even when it comes to > > trying > > > to understand cultures and languages that we did not grow up with. And > > > while I think that there is good evidence for the linguistic relativity > > > hypothesis, I do not believe that language is a determining influence > in > > > ALL thinking (Whorf uses the term "habitual" to describe the type of > > > thinking that is most susceptible to the influence of language). That > > means > > > that even if you don't speak AAE, you can still study it and even come > to > > > understand how the grammatical forms lend themselves to particular ways > > of > > > understanding the world (this is what linguistic anthropology is all > > > about!). > > > > > > And this is my concern with Orr's work. With all academic work, I think > > it > > > is worth considering questions like "How would racists take up our > > > research?" In the case of Orr's work, my sense is that racists could > > easily > > > take up her research to argue (perhaps even by using the linguistic > > > relativity hypothesis) that AAE speakers are unable to do complex > > > mathematical thinking. This is why I would think that it is important > to > > > give a positive articulation of what AAE does as a language. It is > > > certainly important to understand what it CAN'T do (e.g., help one > learn > > > math in a particular way), but it is equally important to understand > what > > > it CAN do. > > > > > > As Paul points out, Labov has done some of the work addressing this. > But > > > note that Labov's work was done 40 years ago and no one has sought to > > > replicate or do any kind of similar work. What gives? > > > > > > -greg > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -greg > > > > > > On Sat, Dec 20, 2014 at 11:37 PM, David H Kirshner > > wrote: > > > > > > > Greg, > > > > > > > > I'm delighted that you're familiar with and appreciative of Orr's > work. > > > > > > > > Cleary she didn't provide "serious consideration of how AAE speakers > > > > actually use prepositions"--she couldn't have, as she was not a > native > > > > speaker of Black English dialect, and she was not a linguist. But I'm > > not > > > > sure how paying serious attention to technical nuances of Black > English > > > > grammar would have helped, as her analyses show that the African > > American > > > > students in her classes were not speaking either standard English or > > > Black > > > > English Vernacular, but rather a hybrid that arises from their > efforts > > to > > > > emulate standard English. > > > > > > > > Now, it's true her work didn't parallel the approach Gay and Cole > took > > to > > > > understanding what other psychologists were classifying as linguistic > > and > > > > cognitive deficits by carefully studying the native language and > > culture. > > > > On the other hand, she did something Gay and Cole didn't do, namely > > > > micro-analyze the linguistic miscues operating in the classroom, and > > the > > > > resultant dilemmas of comprehension this created for her African > > American > > > > students. > > > > > > > > As the excerpt copied below illustrates, Orr was scrupulously > attentive > > > to > > > > understanding her students' experience of distance and location given > > the > > > > different linguistic setting. And her analyses consistently point to > > the > > > > mismatch between the native dialect and the language of instruction > as > > > the > > > > source of the problems, not the native dialect, itself. To label this > > > work > > > > as implicitly racist, I think cedes too much to those who mistrust > > > science > > > > as a tool of the oppressor, and whose only locus of attention is the > > > > history and legacy of social injustice. Even now, in this discussion, > > we > > > > are missing the point. The major significance of Orr's work is not > that > > > > differences in grammatical structure have semantic implications. This > > is > > > > merely a window to the dramatic realization that semantics are > written > > > into > > > > grammatical form. > > > > > > > > David > > > > > > > > Excerpt from Orr (1987): > > > > > > > > "Jane gives us in these diagrams a glimpse into the kinds of mental > > > images > > > > she constructs when she is using the single symbol length, > representing > > > > both location and distance, as a tool with which to think. Even the > > > > diagrams Jane drew for problems 13 and 14 begin to be less > > > incomprehensible > > > > if one attempts to construct in one's own mind images of the > > information > > > > given in these problems, while adhering to the requirement that > length > > be > > > > used to represent both location and distance. They can be seen as > > > possible > > > > consequents or extensions of the symbol length when it is used to > > > represent > > > > both location and distance. Consider, for instance, the mental images > > one > > > > might construct in responding to problem 13: Two cities, both > > represented > > > > by line segments, are equal distances (that is, equal line segments) > > > closer > > > > to a third city (another line segment) than two other cities (line > > > > segments) are. The first two cities must be represented by equal line > > > > segments because they are equal distances closer to the third city > than > > > the > > > > other two cities are. And these other two cities must also be > > represented > > > > by equal line segments because they are equal distances from the > third > > > > city. One can see that Jane's diagrams are not as lacking in reason > as > > > they > > > > may initially have appeared to be. > > > > > > > > "Jane's diagrams suggest the possibility that when words, or symbols > > are > > > > used as instruments with which to think, the use in one language of a > > > > single symbol in contexts where a second language requires two or > more > > > can > > > > lead a speaker of the first language to arrive at a different mental > > > > construct of some given information from that arrived at by a speaker > > of > > > > the second language. Or, as in Jane's attempt to handle problem 14, > the > > > > result may be an inability to arrive at a workable mental construct > at > > > > all." (p. 25) > > > > > > > > [Note, this excerpt is part of a longer segment I emailed on Dec. 19 > > that > > > > shows Jane's diagrams that Orr is referring to.] > > > > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson > > > > Sent: Saturday, December 20, 2014 3:14 PM > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors > > > > > > > > The issues that are raised by Orr are indeed important ones. I am a > fan > > > of > > > > her work as it points to important differences in language usage > among > > > AAE > > > > speakers. I agree that she shouldn't have been condemned for pointing > > out > > > > these differences (particularly considering how important it is for > > > > teachers to understand the consequences of these differences). If you > > > want > > > > to help AAE speaking students do better on standardized tests, then > you > > > > absolutely need to pay attention to these differences. > > > > > > > > My one concern here is that I do feel like there is a problem of > > deficit > > > > thinking that is at least implied in her work (and maybe "implied" is > > too > > > > strong a term - maybe it's just that she doesn't provide evidence to > > > > discourage us from this view). What we don't see in this book is any > > > > serious consideration of how AAE speakers actually use prepositions - > > > e.g., > > > > the ways of using language that exist in the community of AAE > speakers. > > > > This gives Orr's work a feel somewhat like the studies of math among > > the > > > > Kpelle studied by Gay and Cole in the pre-early days of LCHC (see > wiki > > > for > > > > more: http://lchcfestschrift.wikispaces.com/Chapter+1). Before they > > > > showed > > > > up on the scene, everyone had assumed that the Kpelle (Liberia) > > couldn't > > > > comprehend basic math concepts b.c. they weren't learning it in the > > ways > > > > that it was being taught (and perhaps there were even linguistic > > > relativity > > > > arguments that pointed to this). Rather then continuing to pluck > these > > > > folks out of context and run them through various types of > experiments, > > > Gay > > > > and Cole "explicitly began with the assumption that ?we must know > more > > > > about the indigenous mathematics so that we can build effective > bridges > > > to > > > > the new mathematics that we are trying to introduce?" > > > > >From their research, they found that the Kpelle actually had high > > > > competence with complex mathematical problems (e.g., estimating > > volumes). > > > > As they write: > > > > "Overall, the data suggested that no generalized lack of > mathematical, > > > > perceptual, or problem solving abilities stood in the way of > > mathematics > > > > education. When the materials and procedures used in assessment tasks > > > were > > > > designed to match closely valued local practices, lack of ability > could > > > be > > > > replaced by apparent special ability. At the same time, schooling did > > > > appear to influence performance in tasks that were routinely used to > > > > measure cognitive development." > > > > So I think I would be more comfortable with Orr's work if she were to > > > have > > > > included this kind of rich understanding of usage in context and how > > > > prepositions actually are used among AAE speakers. > > > > > > > > This points to a larger question that might be irksome to some folks, > > but > > > > the question regards the extent to which mathematical language is > > > > predicated upon a particular form of what Whorf called "Standard > > Average > > > > European." In short, the idea here is that Math has a history and a > > > > culture. This doesn't mean that it is useless or a waste of time, > just > > > that > > > > it is a particular way of encountering the world that is good for > > > > particular things and not for others. > > > > > > > > I think we've gone round this mulberry bush before, but that was just > > > more > > > > grist for the mill (I prefer my metaphors mixed!). > > > > > > > > -greg > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 8:46 PM, David H Kirshner > > > > > dkirsh@lsu.edu>> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > The topic of how grammatical form relates to meaning calls to mind > > the > > > > > groundbreaking work of Eleanor Orr--whom you've probably never > heard > > of > > > > on > > > > > account of the fact that her work was condemned by a > > > politically-correct > > > > > faction of race-conscious sociolinguists who decided her analysis > of > > > > Black > > > > > English Vernacular could too easily be appropriated into racist > > > > discourses > > > > > about language deficiency. > > > > > > > > > > Orr was a Washington DC area teacher and principal in the 1970s and > > > > 1980s, > > > > > who traced math difficulties of her African American students to > > subtle > > > > > grammatical differences between Black English dialect and standard > > > > English. > > > > > Her 1987 book goes into compelling detail to support the thesis > that > > > the > > > > > meaning structure of basic mathematical terms is embedded in the > > > > > grammatical setting in which those terms are expressed. For > instance, > > > the > > > > > meaning of ?distance? is embedded in the grammatical structure > > > ?distance > > > > > from _________ to __________? where the place-holders hold > locations; > > > if > > > > > you don?t have that grammatical structure, and you're in a > linguistic > > > > > environment in which that structure is assumed, you're likely not > > going > > > > to > > > > > be able to gain full access to the concept. > > > > > > > > > > The attached excerpts from her book--ignore the Forward, unless > you'd > > > > like > > > > > some context--reveal some of her students' bizarre conceptions of > > > > distance > > > > > (and other basic mathematical concepts) as revealed in their > > diagrams. > > > > Her > > > > > approach involves linguistic analysis of sentences produced by her > > > > African > > > > > American students that she reads as collapsed versions of standard > > > > English > > > > > sentences, with differences in prepositional structure being > > > highlighted > > > > > (but other grammatical elements also are indicated). > > > > > > > > > > This work cuts against the grain of anything going on in > mathematics > > > > > education. The Piagetian view that dominates that field holds that > > > basic > > > > > concepts come about from reflection on our actions in our > engagement > > > with > > > > > the material world. When language enters the conversation, it's > with > > > > > respect to semantic structure; to my knowledge, nobody's ever > > > implicated > > > > > syntax directly in basic quantitative understanding. > > > > > > > > > > This work is particularly interesting to me in connection with my > > > > > 21-year-old son who is autistic, and whose grammatical function is > > > > severely > > > > > impaired. He has a decent vocabulary, but unless the setting for > the > > > > > conversation provides contextual clues, he can't piece together how > > the > > > > > semantic elements are linked to one another. It is only recently > that > > > it > > > > > occurred to me his lack of a secure sense of basic quantitative > terms > > > > like > > > > > ?more? and ?less? may be rooted in his grammatical incapacities. > > > > > > > > > > The XMCA discussion, thus far, has touched on grammar with respect > to > > > > > lexical items such as prepositions. But we've not yet tied that to > > the > > > > > grammatical forms that embed those lexical items. I'm very curious > as > > > to > > > > > whether that further connection can be made. > > > > > > > > > > David Kirshner > > > > > > > > > > Orr, E., W. (1987). Twice as less: Black English and the > performance > > of > > > > > black students in mathematics and science. New York: W. W. Norton & > > > > Company. > > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg > > > > > Sent: Friday, December 19, 2014 3:06 PM > > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors > > > > > > > > > > Yes, Haliday is essentially a Whorfian, and that's one of things > that > > > > > brings him close to Vygotsky. (Compare, for example, Chomsky, who > is > > > > > essentially anti-developmental in his ideas about language, and who > > now > > > > > rejects the leading role played by social communication and says > that > > > > > communication is epiphenomenal to language, whose original purpose > is > > > > > thought.) For Sapir, and for Whorf, in the beginning of every major > > > > > onotogenetic, sociogenetic, and even phylogenetic change in > language > > > > there > > > > > has to be some change in the nature of communication. > > > > > > > > > > So what Andy says about the lack of the basis of modern science in > > Hopi > > > > > applies perfectly well to English. When we read the scientific > > writings > > > > of > > > > > Chaucer on the astrolabe, for example, we do not see words like > > > > > "reflection", "refraction" or "alignment". Chaucer uses words like > > > > "bounce > > > > > off", "bend through", and "line up" (note the use of prepositions, > > > > > Helena!). Where did these words come from, and how did they make > > > > scientific > > > > > English possible? > > > > > > > > > > Most of us have no problem saying that Isaac Newton discovered the > > laws > > > > of > > > > > gravitation. But it's only a slight exaggeration to say that what > he > > > > really > > > > > discovered was the meaning potential of words like "gravitation". > > > Gravity > > > > > is, of course, not a thing at all; that is, it's not an entity, but > > > > rather > > > > > a process, the process of falling down, or falling in (preps, > > again!). > > > So > > > > > how and above all why does it become an entity? > > > > > > > > > > It's interesting to compare Newton's writings on optics with > > Chaucer's > > > on > > > > > the astrolabe. The "Opticks" has a fixed format that we recognize > > > almost > > > > > instantly today: Newton describes his equipment (the prism and the > > dark > > > > > room); he then narrates his method as a kind of recipe ("First, I > did > > > > this; > > > > > then I did that") and draws conclusions, which he then formulates > in > > > > > mathematical terms (this is essentially the format of Vygotsky's > > > lectures > > > > > on pedology, so much so that when translating them we had some > > trouble > > > > > determining the precise moment when Vygotsky turns to the > blackboard > > to > > > > > write his conclusion in the form of a law). > > > > > > > > > > In order to get them into mathematical shape, though, he has to > make > > > > > sentences that look a lot like equations. "The plumpness of the > lens > > > > yields > > > > > a greater refraction of the light", "The reflection of the light > from > > > the > > > > > glass results of the light striking the flatness of the glass" "The > > > > > curvature of the spectacle glass supplies the lacking plumpness of > > the > > > > > eye". In each of these, a quality or a process which would normally > > be > > > > > realized as an adjective or a verb is suddenly realized by a noun, > > > > creating > > > > > an imaginary entity. > > > > > > > > > > That's grammatical metaphor. Something that is "canonically" > realized > > > by > > > > a > > > > > verb ("to grow") is suddenly realized nominally ("growth"), or > > > something > > > > > that is canonically a quality ('red") is realized verbally > > ("redden"). > > > We > > > > > even find related clauses realized as verbs ("She did not know the > > > rules. > > > > > So she died" is realized by "Death was brought about through > > > ignorance", > > > > > all of these examples from Halliday). In fact, the Genetic Law that > > > > > Vygotsky formulates in "Mind in Society" ("Every higher mental > > function > > > > is > > > > > realized on two planes....") is really just one instance of > > grammatical > > > > > metaphor. > > > > > > > > > > One of Chomsky's best known arguments for the radical innateness > > > > > hypothesis is this. If I take a sentence like "Students who do not > do > > > > their > > > > > homework do not do well" and I want to make a question, how do I > know > > > > which > > > > > "do" to move to the front? Chomsky assumes that this knowledge is > > > > > essentially innate; it is part of universal grammar. But you can > see > > > that > > > > > "Do students who do not do their homework do well?" can be built up > > > > through > > > > > a process of what we might call "discourse metaphor"--whereby > clauses > > > > stand > > > > > for > > > > > exchanges: > > > > > > > > > > Mother: You did your homework, didn't you? > > > > > Child: No. > > > > > Mother: You didn't do your homework? Did you do well? > > > > > Child: No. > > > > > Mother: You didn't do well? > > > > > Child: No. > > > > > Mother: You didn't do you homework so you didn't do well. Do the > > other > > > > > students do well? > > > > > Child: Some of them. > > > > > Mother: Who does well? Do students who do not do their homework do > > > well? > > > > > > > > > > And this of course explains why wh-items like "who" and 'why" have > > two > > > > > functions--one inside a clause, where it expresses an intra-mental > > > > function > > > > > (grammar) and one between them where it expresses an inter-mental > > > > function > > > > > (discourse). > > > > > > > > > > I realize that grammatical metaphor will seem rather dry and > abstract > > > and > > > > > unpoetic to people who assume that metaphor is only of the lexical > > > kind. > > > > > But to me, and I think to most children, it is far far more > powerful > > > and > > > > > far more important developmentally. In some ways, it's the lexical > > > > metaphor > > > > > that is responsible for the disenchantment of the child's world, > > while > > > > the > > > > > grammatical metaphor infinitely expands it. (And here, I'm afraid, > I > > > must > > > > > stop--it's time for breakfast and anyway my one screen is used up!) > > > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > , or "the > > > > > > > > > > . He > > > > > > > > > > On 19 December 2014 at 15:15, Greg Thompson < > > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com > > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > Helena and David, > > > > > > I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the > > > so-called > > > > > > authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred > > tradition > > > > > > to > > > > > > Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi > > notion > > > > > > of "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including > > English) > > > > > > notion of "time" and how each of these languages offers different > > > > > > affordances of meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual > > > > > > understanding, English has a much more > reified/objectified/entified > > > > > > sense of time. (btw, I think the first paragraph is easier to > > follow > > > > > > than the second - and in that first paragraph you'll find our old > > > > friend > > > > > "imagination"). > > > > > > David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to? > > > > > > -greg > > > > > > > > > > > > Taken from: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/mousesite/Second > > > > > > ary/Whorfframe2.html > > > > > > > > > > > > " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, > sunset" > > > are > > > > > > with us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from > > > other > > > > > nouns. > > > > > > They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in > > > winter" > > > > > > just as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are > > pluralized > > > > > > and numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. > Our > > > > > > thought about the referents of such words hence becomes > > objectified. > > > > > > Without objectification, it would be a subjective experience of > > real > > > > > > time, i.e. of the consciousness of "becoming later and > > later"--simply > > > > > > a cyclic phase similar to an earlier phase in that > > > ever-later-becoming > > > > > > duration. Only by imagination can such a cyclic phase be set > beside > > > > > > another and another in the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually > > > > > > perceived) configuration. "But such is the power of linguistic > > > analogy > > > > > that we do so objectify cyclic phasing. > > > > > > We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g., > > > > > "phasing." > > > > > > And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting > > > > > > binomial formula of formless item plus form, is so general that > it > > is > > > > > > implicit for all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless > > items > > > > > > like "substance, matter," by which we can fill out the binomial > for > > > an > > > > > > enormously wide range of nouns. But even these are not quite > > > > > > generalized enough to take in our phase nouns. So for the phase > > nouns > > > > we > > > > > have made a formless item, "time." > > > > > > We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, > in > > > the > > > > > > pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" > in > > > > > > the pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can > > say > > > > > > and think "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." > Let > > > me > > > > > > again point out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of > > milk" > > > > > > or "a piece of cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a > > > > > > summer" actually contains or consists of such-and-such a quantity > > of > > > > > "time." > > > > > > > > > > > > In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., > are > > > not > > > > > > nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They > > are > > > a > > > > > > formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, > > and > > > > > > even other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a > > > > > > locative pattern, like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It > > contains > > > > > > no morpheme like one of "in the house" or "at the tree." It means > > > > > > "when it is morning" or "while morning-phase is occurring." These > > > > > > "temporal s" are not used as subjects or objects, or at all like > > > > > > nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" or "summer is hot"; > > > summer > > > > > > is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions are hot, WHEN heat > > occurs. > > > > > > One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or "summer > > > recently." > > > > > > There is no objectification, as a region, an extent, a quantity, > of > > > > > > the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested about time > > > > > > except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no > > basis > > > > > here for a formless item answering to our "time." " > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Helena Worthen > > > > > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to this: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that > > Newton > > > > > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to > > > create > > > > > > > sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly > > > > > > > productive, which is why they still form the basis of > scientific > > > > > > > writing and thinking today." > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I lose > you > > > > > > > when > > > > > > you > > > > > > > say "created to talk about gravity as an entity". > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Thank you, > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Helena > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Helena Worthen > > > > > > > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > As Helena points out, prepositions are from the "grammatical" > > end > > > > > > > > of > > > > > > what > > > > > > > > Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what > > > > > > > > Halliday > > > > > > calls > > > > > > > > "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they > > have > > > > > > > > three properties that words from the more "lexical" end do > not > > > > have: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You > > can, > > > > > > > actually, > > > > > > > > but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you invent a > > new > > > > > > > > name > > > > > > > or a > > > > > > > > new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can). > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific > > semantic > > > > > > > > field > > > > > > > (the > > > > > > > > way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of > > > > > > linguistics) > > > > > > > > but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are > used. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the > > same > > > > > > effect, > > > > > > > > which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your argument" > the > > > > "in" > > > > > > has > > > > > > > > more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in "there's a > > fly > > > > > > > > in > > > > > > your > > > > > > > > tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in Henry's > > > > > > > > hands, > > > > > > > refer > > > > > > > > to a book or even a footnote. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties > > pretty > > > > > > > > much define the difference between learning and development, > at > > > > > > > > least as I understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on > > > > > > > > functions indefinitely while development works by > reorganizing > > > the > > > > > > > > closed set of functions you already have into new systems. > > > > > > > > Learning is skill specific and local, while development is > > quite > > > > > global in its implications. > > > > > > > Learning > > > > > > > > is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new > > systems, > > > > > > > > while development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary > > (and > > > > > > > > forget it > > > > > > just > > > > > > > > as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes > > away. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of > blue > > > > > > > > that > > > > > > > people > > > > > > > > call the sky") are simply metaphors from the non-productive > end > > > of > > > > > > > > the lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are crisp, > > > > > > > > concrete, and vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the > > > > > > > > nominalizations that > > > > > > Newton > > > > > > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to > > > > > > > > create sentences that look like mathematical equations, are > > > highly > > > > > > > > productive, which is why they still form the basis of > > scientific > > > > > > > > writing and > > > > > > thinking > > > > > > > > today. For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical metaphor > is > > > the > > > > > > third > > > > > > > > great moment in child development (after the break into > mother > > > > > > > > tongue > > > > > > and > > > > > > > > the break into disciplinary language in school work). > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" > > implies > > > > > > > > zero dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two ("on > a > > > > > > > > line', 'on a > > > > > > > > plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because > they > > > are > > > > > > > > grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them with > > > time: > > > > > > > > 'at > > > > > > a > > > > > > > > point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. Compare: > > "at > > > > > > > > Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very day), > > and > > > > > > > > "in Christmas' (season). > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" > spatial > > > > > > > >> relationships from the concrete material world into the > > > > > > > >> conceptual imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 > > > common > > > > > > > >> ones, and > > > > > > > between 70 > > > > > > > >> and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as > far > > > as" > > > > > > > >> -- > > > > > > > this > > > > > > > >> is according to > > > > > > > >> https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm > > > > > > ). > > > > > > > >> We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. > > Apparently, > > > > > > > >> in English, they evolved from and did the job done by > > > inflections > > > > > > > >> in > > > > > > parent > > > > > > > >> languages, examples being cases and tenses. > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> But there is real difference in meaning between an > inflection > > > > > > > >> like the dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial > > > > > > > >> relationships > > > > > > > suggested > > > > > > > >> by contemporary prepositions. > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about > > this. > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> Helena Worthen > > > > > > > >> helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >>> I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are > clearly > > > > > > embodied, > > > > > > > >> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to > > > > > > > >> linguistics > > > > > > > (For > > > > > > > >> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused > on > > > > > > ?lexicon?: > > > > > > > >> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of > > prepositions, > > > > > > > >> being > > > > > > > part > > > > > > > >> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and > > > > > > > >> Halliday > > > > > > > see no > > > > > > > >> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, > > > > > lexico-grammar. > > > > > > > (Lo > > > > > > > >> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write > lexicon-grammar, > > > > > > > >> adding > > > > > > > the > > > > > > > >> ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word > coinings > > > are > > > > > > great > > > > > > > >> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of > > > > > > > >> that? In translation from Russian is word coining ever > > > practiced? > > > > > > > >>> Henry > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > >>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden < > > ablunden@mira.net > > > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > >>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the > > > > > > metaphorical > > > > > > > >> use of prepositions like: > > > > > > > >>>> - "there is some value IN your argument" > > > > > > > >>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again" > > > > > > > >>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" > > > > > > > >>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again" > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > >>>> and so on. > > > > > > > >>>> Andy > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > > > -------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > > > > ---- > > > > > > > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > > > > > > > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > >>>> larry smolucha wrote: > > > > > > > >>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself - > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic > > > > > > > possibilities: > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) > published > > > in > > > > > > > Thought > > > > > > > >>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated > > into > > > > > > English > > > > > > > >> 1962] > > > > > > > >>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the > > > 'additive' > > > > > > value > > > > > > > >> of the > > > > > > > >>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech > > > > > > > vocalization). > > > > > > > >>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements > > > that > > > > > > > >>>>> are > > > > > > > >> flammable > > > > > > > >>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither > flammable > > > nor > > > > > > > >>>>> a > > > > > > gas. > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century > > > > > > > >>>>> European > > > > > > > >> Developmental > > > > > > > >>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean > > 'developmental' > > > > > > > >>>>> hence > > > > > > > the > > > > > > > >>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case > of > > > > > > Piaget's > > > > > > > >> Genetic > > > > > > > >>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and > > > > > > > >>>>> synthesis > > > > > > > >> based on > > > > > > > >>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in > > > > > > > >>>>> Vygotsky's > > > > > > > >> example of H2O. > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com > > > > > > > >>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > > >>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 > > > > > > > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be > > > synergistic > > > > > > > >>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of > the > > > > > parts. > > > > > > > >>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing > more > > > > > > > >>>>>> than > > > > > > the > > > > > > > >>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new > > can > > > > > > > >>>>>> ever > > > > > > be > > > > > > > >> imagined" > > > > > > > >>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>> A couple things to consider: > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of > > imagination > > > > > > > >>>>>> as the > > > > > > > >> brain has > > > > > > > >>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the > > > > > > > >>>>>> simplest > > > > > > level > > > > > > > >> of the Gestalt > > > > > > > >>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). > > > > > > > >>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just > > > > > > photographic. > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to > > try > > > > > > > >>>>>> to > > > > > > > >> accurately reproduce > > > > > > > >>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. > > > Whereas, > > > > > > > >>>>>> the > > > > > > > >> goal of combinatory > > > > > > > >>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, > > > > > > > >>>>>> dreams, > > > > > > > >> musings, and even > > > > > > > >>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation > > of > > > > > > objects > > > > > > > >> and symbols. > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different > > > ways > > > > > > > >>>>>> that > > > > > > > >> things and concepts can be > > > > > > > >>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and > sugar > > > > > > > >>>>>> and > > > > > > > flour. > > > > > > > >>>>>> I can add water > > and > > > > > > > >>>>>> it > > > > > > > >> dissolves a bit > > > > > > > >>>>>> But adding heat > > > > > > > >>>>>> changes > > > > > > the > > > > > > > >> combination into a pancake. > > > > > > > >>>>>> [Is this synergistic?] > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of > more > > > > > > > >>>>>> examples > > > > > > > >> to put the discussion > > > > > > > >>>>>> in the metaphysical realm. > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 > > > > > > > >>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > > > > > >>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > > >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make > > the > > > > > > > >>>>>>> case > > > > > > > for > > > > > > > >>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. > I > > > > > > > >>>>>>> think > > > > > > it's > > > > > > > >> not > > > > > > > >>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are > > > > > > > >> associationists who > > > > > > > >>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary > > > > > > > >>>>>>> associationism > > > > > > > >> exists and > > > > > > > >>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as > > > > mediation. > > > > > > > >> Vygotsky > > > > > > > >>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking > > religion, > > > > > > explain > > > > > > > >> the > > > > > > > >>>>>>> uniqueness of our species? > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species > > feels > > > > > > > >>>>>>> for > > > > > > its > > > > > > > >> own > > > > > > > >>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a > > > > > > > >>>>>>> Piagetian perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian > > > > > > > >>>>>>> one--true maturity > > > > > > > as a > > > > > > > >>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing > > more > > > > > > > >>>>>>> to it > > > > > > > >> than > > > > > > > >>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of > > > > > > > >>>>>>> primate, > > > > > > > and > > > > > > > >> our > > > > > > > >>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled > > upon > > > > > > > >>>>>>> rocks > > > > > > > in > > > > > > > >> order > > > > > > > >>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be > judged > > > > > > > >>>>>>> the > > > > > > same > > > > > > > >> way as > > > > > > > >>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions > > and > > > > > > > >>>>>>> for > > > > > > > >> language is > > > > > > > >>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case > human > > > > > > > >> exceptionalism. > > > > > > > >>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case > for > > > > > > > >>>>>>> the > > > > > > > >> vanguard role > > > > > > > >>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other > > species, > > > > > > > prolonging > > > > > > > >>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking > after > > > > > > > >>>>>>> the > > > > > > sick > > > > > > > >> and the > > > > > > > >>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because > artificial > > > > > > > >>>>>>> organs > > > > > > > >> (tools) and > > > > > > > >>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important > > for > > > > > > > >>>>>>> our > > > > > > > >> species, it > > > > > > > >>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where > > these > > > > > > > >> "circuitous, > > > > > > > >>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced > that > > > > > > > >>>>>>> lead > > > > > > our > > > > > > > >>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth > > always > > > > > > > >>>>>>> been > > > > > > > >> short on > > > > > > > >>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for > > > > > > > >>>>>>> material > > > > > > > >> culture > > > > > > > >>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another > > > matter: > > > > > > > >> verily, here > > > > > > > >>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of > > > > > > > >>>>>>> attention is > > > > > > > >> simply the > > > > > > > >>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says > > > > > > > >>>>>>> there are > > > > > > > >> only two > > > > > > > >>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. > So > > > > > > > >> imagination is > > > > > > > >>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete > > > experiences, > > > > > > > >>>>>>> and > > > > > > > >> nothing > > > > > > > >>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, > > when > > > > > > > >>>>>>> you > > > > > > > hear > > > > > > > >> the > > > > > > > >>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been > > there > > > > > > > >>>>>>> to be > > > > > > > >> able to > > > > > > > >>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at > > work > > > > > > > >>>>>>> in > > > > > > word > > > > > > > >> meaning. > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, > > who > > > > > > > >>>>>>> was > > > > > > > given > > > > > > > >> a > > > > > > > >>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been > > > > > > > >>>>>>> mixed > > > > > > with > > > > > > > >> silver > > > > > > > >>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity > > of > > > > > gold. > > > > > > > >> Well, we > > > > > > > >>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's > not > > > > > > possible > > > > > > > to > > > > > > > >>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that > > > > > > > >>>>>>> precisely. The > > > > > > > >> method > > > > > > > >>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the > > > > > > > >>>>>>> "principal > > > > > > of > > > > > > > >>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes > > > > > > > >>>>>>> palimpsest, a > > > > > > > >> velum on > > > > > > > >>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each > > > other. > > > > > > > Because > > > > > > > >>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and > > > > > > > >>>>>>> written > > > > > > over > > > > > > > >> every > > > > > > > >>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was > > > soft, > > > > > > > >>>>>>> the > > > > > > > >> pressure > > > > > > > >>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new > > ones > > > > > > > >>>>>>> when > > > > > > > the > > > > > > > >> old > > > > > > > >>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the > > > only > > > > > > known > > > > > > > >> Greek > > > > > > > >>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor > > > their > > > > > > > >> relationship > > > > > > > >>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact > > they > > > > > > > >>>>>>> are > > > > > > > >> related to > > > > > > > >>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's > > > quite > > > > > > > similar > > > > > > > >> to the > > > > > > > >>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>> David Kellogg > > > > > > > >>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > >> wrote: > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an > > > > > > > associationist, > > > > > > > >> ?sees > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> Henry > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg < > > > > > > dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >> wrote: > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> division > > > > > > > >> between > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the > other, > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> because > > > > > > > >> Ribot is > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> an > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather > distal > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> form of > > > > > > > >> attention. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> transition > > > > > > from > > > > > > > >> forest > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> to > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the > > division > > > > > > between > > > > > > > >> the two > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> commonsensical > > > > > > > >> world of > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> the > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> prosaic > > > > > > uses > > > > > > > >> in life > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more > > > > > > > "imaginative" > > > > > > > >> (that > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the > > world > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> of the > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> farm,where > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where > long > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> winter > > > > > > > >> months are > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely > to > > > > > > encounter > > > > > > > >> talking > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> attention > > > > > > > has > > > > > > > >> to be > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> more voluntary. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has > a > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> very > > > > > > clear > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism > > > that > > > > > > > >> underpins > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> Ribot > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. > Vygotsky > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> points > > > > > > > out > > > > > > > >> the > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> practices > > > > > > > >> really > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> are > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of > > > > > > imagination, > > > > > > > >> there > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference > > between > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> human > > > > > > > and > > > > > > > >> animal > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> capable of > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> volitional > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than > > > humans). > > > > > > > Without > > > > > > > >> a > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> theory > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any > basis > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> for > > > > > > > Ribot's > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> functions at > > > > > > > >> all. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole < > > mcole@ucsd.edu > > > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination, > > > > > > > >> thanks to > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> all > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> influential > > > > > > > >> around the > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> time > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th > > century. > > > I > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> had > > > > > > > >> seen work > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> on > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> equal > > > > > > > >> reproductive? > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical > > studies > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> of > > > > > > > >> development > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> of > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost > > of > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> being > > > > > > a > > > > > > > >> relative > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > > > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> bucket > > > > > > list. > > > > > > > >> This > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal > musings > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> from > > > > > > some > > > > > > > >> weeks > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> in > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell > correct > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > > > > > >> segmented the > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met > > > > > aphorizing?. > > > > > > > >> Puns, > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward > Kant > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > > > they > > > > > > > >> are > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> doing > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and > > his > > > > > > > >> followers as an > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel, so > > > > > > > >> its of > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> course > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories > > emerge. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially > in > > > > > > > >> translation, > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> seems > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, > > > > "recollection" > > > > > > in > > > > > > > >> this > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> passage, > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in > counter > > > > > > > >> distinction to > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "memory." > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary > > > > > > > >> discourse > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out > > Russian > > > > > > > >> colleagues have > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something > from > > > > > > theorists > > > > > > > >> who > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> clearly > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when > it > > > was > > > > > > still > > > > > > > >> possible > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> to > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" > > which, > > > > > > > >> interestingly > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> links > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a > > > > > > "voluntary" > > > > > > > >> act. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Parts > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like > children > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> stuff > > > > > > > that > > > > > > > >> was > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> also > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the > > concepts > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > > > > >> creativity > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> and > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its > curious > > > to > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> see > > > > > > > >> that the > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> two > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he > > found > > > > > > himself > > > > > > > >> writing. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to > > which > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> pretty > > > > > > > old > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> approaches > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < > > > > > > > >> ablunden@mira.net> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively > > contemporary, > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> but it > > > > > > > >> may be > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> worth > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a > > prominent > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> place > > > > > > to > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Imagination > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating > between > > > > > > > >> Recollection and > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) > > Reproductive > > > > > > > >> Imagination, > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> (2) > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive > Imagination, > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> which > > > > > > he > > > > > > > >> says > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> leads > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive > Memory. > > In > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> other > > > > > > > >> words, > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> the > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect > is > > > > > > > >> accomplished > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> through > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > > > -- > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading > > > Strawson > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > > > > >> Williams. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists > > > whose > > > > > > work i > > > > > > > >> am > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> trying > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) > speak > > of > > > > > > > >> productive > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive > > > > > > imagination > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> develops. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive > > > implies > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that > > > > > > > >> there > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> must > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> be a > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive > > > imagination. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> But > > > > > > I > > > > > > > >> learned > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination > > > appears > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > > > is > > > > > > > >> linked > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> to > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable > > part > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > > > > >> anticipation > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD > < > > > > > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination > > > > > > > >> (starting > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> look, and > > > > > > > >> provides > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> a > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the > > socio-cultural > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as > > > > > > > fixed. > > > > > > > >> This, > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, > gives > > me > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a > > > > > > > ground > > > > > > > >> to > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> take > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> part > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I > start > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> preconceptions: > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> grammarian > > > > > > > >> Langacker on > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> domains, > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> particularly > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, > is > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> full of > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> imagination > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two > > aspects > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > > > > >> temporality: > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and > rhythmic > > > > > > > >> structure), which > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> I > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, > > for > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> both > > > > > > > >> individual > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and > feeling. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < > > > > > > > >> lpscholar2@gmail.com> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this > > topic. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the > > third > > > > > > *space* > > > > > > > >> and the > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams > > and > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> his > > > > > > > >> notion of > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This > notion > > > is > > > > > > > >> explored under > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a > > > *set* > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > > > > >> modalities > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a > form > > of > > > > > > knowing > > > > > > > >> that is > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [perceived??] > > > > > > if > > > > > > > >> we > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> think > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal > as > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *style* Larry On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> HENRY SHONERD < > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want > to > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> say how > > > > > > > >> jazzed up > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> I > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> am > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going > wild, > > > the > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind > > > > > > > as > > > > > > > >> Larry > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> various > > > > > > > >> triads, > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> finally > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notebooks > > > > > > > of > > > > > > > >> the > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> mind, as > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap > > > adentro, > > > > > > luega > > > > > > > >> pa? > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> fuera. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole < > > > > > > mcole@ucsd.edu> > > > > > > > >> wrote: > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination > > thread, > > > > > > attached > > > > > > > >> are two > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the > > issue. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of > > CHAT > > > > > > > theorists > > > > > > > >> like > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development > > of > > > > > > > >> imagination in a > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's > notion > > > of > > > > > > > >> productive > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and > have > > > no > > > > > > > >> intention of > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> doing > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as > > explicated > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the > > > > > > > >> attached > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these > > > > > > philosophers, > > > > > > > I > > > > > > > >> came > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> upon > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> closely > > > > > > > >> linked at > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> several > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our > > > naivete, > > > > > > > >> Ettienne and I > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier > > as > > > a > > > > > > means > > > > > > > of > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> access > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander > > > > > Suvorov. > > > > > > > >> Moreover, > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> such > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of > the > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have > > direct > > > > > > > relevance > > > > > > > >> to > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Kris's > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also > > speak > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to > > > > > > > >> concerns > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> about > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in > > > > > > development. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination > > > thread. > > > > > > > Perhaps > > > > > > > >> they > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> will > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal > with a > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural > > > > > > > >> science > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with an > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > Strawson.pdf> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> -- > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a > > natural > > > > > > science > > > > > > > >> with an > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> -- > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a > natural > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> science > > > > > > > >> with an > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > > > > Assistant Professor > > > > > > Department of Anthropology > > > > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > > > > Brigham Young University > > > > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > > Assistant Professor > > > > Department of Anthropology > > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > > Brigham Young University > > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > Assistant Professor > > > Department of Anthropology > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > Brigham Young University > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From dkellogg60@gmail.com Wed Dec 24 13:05:37 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Thu, 25 Dec 2014 06:05:37 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Help With Russian Message-ID: I'm afraid I need help again. I'm working on the second part of Vygotsky's lectures on pedology, which are the lectures he delivered at the Herzen Institute. He's obviously trying to finish up his book on Child Development at the same time, so what he has to say is similar to but not identical with "Problem of Age" in Volume Four of the Russian Collected Works (Vol. 5 of the English). Here's what he says: ?? ??? ??? ??????? ???????? ???????? ????????? ??????? ?????? ? ??????????? ??????? ? ???? ?????????? ?????????? ?? ????????? ??????? ???????? ?? ???????? ???????????? ????? ?????????????? ???????? ??????????? ? ?????????? ???????????? ???????, ???????????,??? ????? ??????????? ??????? ?? ??????????????? ???????? ????? ??????????? ?????? ???????? ??? ? ????????? ? ????????????? ??????????? ??????? ?? ????????? ???????. So this means something like: "But since the process of child development is intimately linked with the enculturation of the child and the articulation of enculturation into individual stages is based on a great deal of (prior?) practical experience (prioritizing??) the stages in the formation of enculturation of the child naturally means that disarticulating childhood according to pedagogical principles often brings us very close to the real and practical disarticulation of childhood into individual periods." I've got all of this except for the word ?????????????? which I can't find in my dictionary anywhere. It doesn't appear in the Collected Works either, and all of our Russian professors have gone home for the holidays. Help? David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies From annalisa@unm.edu Wed Dec 24 19:48:30 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Thu, 25 Dec 2014 03:48:30 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Help With Russian In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1419479310701.87550@unm.edu> Hi David, I do not know Russian, but I went to google translate and I got nowhere then I split the word and got "prior infusion" Does that work? Kind regards, Annalisa From nataliag@sfu.ca Wed Dec 24 20:23:26 2014 From: nataliag@sfu.ca (Natalia Gajdamaschko) Date: Wed, 24 Dec 2014 20:23:26 -0800 (PST) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Help With Russian In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <54768654.8131233.1419481406515.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> Hi David, The word is "???????????????", it is a noun, the correspondent verb for it is "????????????????," synonymous to "?????????????????" Translation: ???????????????? V FIT IN So, it means to fit in, adopt, conform, et cetera. Happy holidays, Natalia. ----- Original Message ----- From: "David Kellogg" To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Wednesday, December 24, 2014 1:05:37 PM Subject: [Xmca-l] Help With Russian I'm afraid I need help again. I'm working on the second part of Vygotsky's lectures on pedology, which are the lectures he delivered at the Herzen Institute. He's obviously trying to finish up his book on Child Development at the same time, so what he has to say is similar to but not identical with "Problem of Age" in Volume Four of the Russian Collected Works (Vol. 5 of the English). Here's what he says: ?? ??? ??? ??????? ???????? ???????? ????????? ??????? ?????? ? ??????????? ??????? ? ???? ?????????? ?????????? ?? ????????? ??????? ???????? ?? ???????? ???????????? ????? ?????????????? ???????? ??????????? ? ?????????? ???????????? ???????, ???????????,??? ????? ??????????? ??????? ?? ??????????????? ???????? ????? ??????????? ?????? ???????? ??? ? ????????? ? ????????????? ??????????? ??????? ?? ????????? ???????. So this means something like: "But since the process of child development is intimately linked with the enculturation of the child and the articulation of enculturation into individual stages is based on a great deal of (prior?) practical experience (prioritizing??) the stages in the formation of enculturation of the child naturally means that disarticulating childhood according to pedagogical principles often brings us very close to the real and practical disarticulation of childhood into individual periods." I've got all of this except for the word ?????????????? which I can't find in my dictionary anywhere. It doesn't appear in the Collected Works either, and all of our Russian professors have gone home for the holidays. Help? David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies From dkellogg60@gmail.com Wed Dec 24 20:52:13 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Thu, 25 Dec 2014 13:52:13 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Help With Russian In-Reply-To: <54768654.8131233.1419481406515.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> References: <54768654.8131233.1419481406515.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca> Message-ID: Dear Annalisa and Natalia: So! It's sort of a kind of an infusion--an "accomodating to": "But since the process of child development is intimately linked with the enculturation of the child and the articulation of enculturation into individual stages is based on a great deal of practical experience, accomodating the stages in the formation of enculturation of the child naturally means that dividing up childhood according to pedagogical principles often brings us very close to the real and practical division of childhood into individual periods. To this day, pedological periodization has retained the pedagogical designations of individual ages, which are named according to the stages of public education that take place for the child at given ages: preschool age, primary school age, etc" You see? It fits in perfectly. And that was all I wanted for Channukristmas. Many thanks to both of you, David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies . On 25 December 2014 at 13:23, Natalia Gajdamaschko wrote: > Hi David, > The word is "???????????????", it is a noun, the correspondent verb for it > is "????????????????," synonymous to "?????????????????" > Translation: ???????????????? > V FIT IN > > So, it means to fit in, adopt, conform, et cetera. > Happy holidays, > Natalia. > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "David Kellogg" > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Sent: Wednesday, December 24, 2014 1:05:37 PM > Subject: [Xmca-l] Help With Russian > > I'm afraid I need help again. I'm working on the second part of Vygotsky's > lectures on pedology, which are the lectures he delivered at the Herzen > Institute. He's obviously trying to finish up his book on Child Development > at the same time, so what he has to say is similar to but not identical > with "Problem of Age" in Volume Four of the Russian Collected Works (Vol. 5 > of the English). Here's what he says: > > ?? ??? ??? ??????? ???????? ???????? ????????? ??????? ?????? ? ??????????? > ??????? ? ???? ?????????? ?????????? ?? ????????? ??????? ???????? ?? > ???????? ???????????? ????? ?????????????? ???????? ??????????? ? > ?????????? ???????????? ???????, ???????????,??? ????? ??????????? ??????? > ?? ??????????????? ???????? ????? ??????????? ?????? ???????? ??? ? > ????????? ? ????????????? ??????????? ??????? ?? ????????? ???????. > > So this means something like: "But since the process of child development > is intimately linked with the enculturation of the child and the > articulation of enculturation into individual stages is based on a great > deal of (prior?) practical experience (prioritizing??) the stages in the > formation of enculturation of the child naturally means that > disarticulating childhood according to pedagogical principles often brings > us very close to the real and practical disarticulation of childhood into > individual periods." > > I've got all of this except for the word ?????????????? which I can't find > in my dictionary anywhere. It doesn't appear in the Collected Works either, > and all of our Russian professors have gone home for the holidays. Help? > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > From annalisa@unm.edu Wed Dec 24 20:57:58 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Thu, 25 Dec 2014 04:57:58 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Help With Russian In-Reply-To: References: <54768654.8131233.1419481406515.JavaMail.zimbra@sfu.ca>, Message-ID: <1419483477977.32971@unm.edu> Well it was "prior infusion" or "prior in Lebanon" ! :) Happy Channukristmas Annalisa From laires11@gmail.com Thu Dec 25 11:10:00 2014 From: laires11@gmail.com (Luisa Aires) Date: Thu, 25 Dec 2014 19:10:00 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Not too long and not too short In-Reply-To: <54995275.9020808@open.ac.uk> References: <1419296473895.52540@unm.edu> <5498C430.9050306@mira.net> <54995275.9020808@open.ac.uk> Message-ID: Dear Rob I absolutely agree with your comments; and you share them in a very clear discourse (I couldn?t do that). XMCA has been my proximal scientific "master" for a long time. In a fruitful conversational genre, theory has been developed in this community. I what concerns XMCA discussion, I think there are some practical ideas that could make easier our participation an I agree that one of them is the length of the posts. In a broader perspective, I would like to enhance Greg?s proposal, in the sense that we could link all of XMCA spaces (nodes of the network) in a common territory: we can participate in our Facebook page, we have videos on Vimeo, a wiki, a webpage. Why not link all of those spaces (Greg?s example: http://connectedcourses.net/), so that novices and elders we could feel easier the development of our sense of belonging? Happy holidays. Best, Lu?sa 2014-12-23 11:31 GMT+00:00 rjsp2 : > As a long time lurker and learner, my first reaction was if it ain't > broke, don't fix it. My second reaction, after a night's sleep, was that > my first reaction had something going for it. > > I've been following this list for several years now, always feeling both > too ignorant and too pressed to contribute more than very occasionally. > It is by a distance the most consistently academic and intensely > illuminating forum I have ever been present in, and my thanks are due to > many of you here for enriching my life and my academic endeavours. > > In Andy's terms, this has always struck me as a conversation. After > dinner, if you will, but a conversation which follows its own twisty, > windy path and always ends up somewhere unpredictable but valuable. > That, I think, is the reason for its continuing quality; the > conversation is not corralled at all. > > I haven't counted posts, but it does seem of late that the list has been > much more busy. It has always impressed me how people have the time, and > the quality of thinking, to write so many clear, well focussed, well > argued and detailed messages here, and perhaps the growing pace is > making some feel that it is all a bit too much. I suspect that if we > leave it alone, the pace will slow down again, perhaps after a natural > break for Christmas festivities. > > When I am not marking or trying to teach my students how to think, I > occasionally dabble in knowledge management for a company that works in > a number of different countries. One of the great lessons of knowledge > management, and one unfortunately not learned by many with knowledge > management in their job description, is that you can't manage knowledge. > There is a lot that you can do with it. You can codify and transmit > quite a lot, but ultimately, the most valuable knowledge refuses to be > pinned down, and those who try simply destroy what they seek to contain. > Perhaps it is important to let these conversations continue to be just > conversations. > > (And finally, can I just briefly say I disagree with your > characterisation of "real space" versus "cyberspace", Andy. Cyberspace > is just as real as physical space.) > > Rob, just off out to buy sprouts (I particularly like the Newsthump > headline from 2011 "Sales of ?any old shit? expected to treble as men > start Christmas shopping") > > > On 23/12/2014 01:24, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> I would be interested to know what real-space activity people would >> take xmca to be "modelling" in cyberspace? >> Are we participating in >> >> a kind of scientific symposium or maybe a conference? >> or an after dinner conversation? (or maybe a staffroom conversation)? >> a formal decision making meeting, where we address the Chair, make >> amendments, etc.? >> a Occupy-type general meeting? >> >> Or is "none of the above" the only answer? >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Annalisa Aguilar wrote: >> >>> Apparently we need a Goldilocks section in the Newcomer's page! >>> >>> :) >>> >>> >>> >> > -- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an > exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC > 038302). The Open University is authorised and regulated by the Financial > Conduct Authority. > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Thu Dec 25 12:27:12 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Thu, 25 Dec 2014 12:27:12 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Faculty Position in Developmental Psychology In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Cagla Aydin Date: Thu, Dec 25, 2014 at 1:00 AM Subject: [COGDEVSOC] Faculty Position in Developmental Psychology To: cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org The Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Sabanc? University, Istanbul, invites applications for a faculty position in Psychology. The position will begin on *August 31th, 2015*. It is for mid-career candidates as well as candidates who have recently completed their PhD or are near completion. Applicants in all areas of psychology, including areas that intersect with other research domains will be considered. However, we are particularly interested in candidates with research experience in *Social Psychology and/or Developmental Psychology*. Candidates must have a strong record and potential for top quality scholarly publications and should be able to sustain strong international academic and research connections. Sabanc? University is a private, innovative academic institution. It is strongly committed to interdisciplinary research and teaching both at the undergraduate and graduate levels. To meet this challenge, the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences is organized around multi-disciplinary degree programs including Psychology, Political Science, International Studies, Cultural Studies, Visual Arts and Visual Communication Design, and Economics and offers honors minor degree programs in Psychology, Philosophy, Art Theory and Criticism as well as Gender Studies. The university admits top-ranking students for its undergraduate programs through a centralized university entrance examination. Faculty members are provided with excellent research support as well as health insurance, housing facilities on its campus. Review of applications will begin on *January 5, 2015* and continue until the position is filled. Successful applicants must have completed their Ph.D. by August 2015. Applicants are asked to complete an online application form through the university website: https://crm.sabanciuniv.edu/acadcv/application.php Job ad: http://www.sabanciuniv.edu/en/faculty-position-in-psychology -- _______________________ ?a?la Ayd?n Faculty of Arts & Sciences Sabanc? University _______________________________________________ To post to the CDS listserv, send your message to: cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org (If you belong to the listserv and have not included any large attachments, your message will be posted without moderation--so be careful!) To subscribe or unsubscribe from the listserv, visit: http://lists.cogdevsoc.org/listinfo.cgi/cogdevsoc-cogdevsoc.org -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science as an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mcole@ucsd.edu Fri Dec 26 06:53:21 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Fri, 26 Dec 2014 06:53:21 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Postdocs in Psychology and Education at Cambridge In-Reply-To: <22B7FE06-F55C-40E8-A08C-DB8149D33344@cam.ac.uk> References: <22B7FE06-F55C-40E8-A08C-DB8149D33344@cam.ac.uk> Message-ID: ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: *Sara Baker* Date: Friday, December 26, 2014 Subject: [COGDEVSOC] Postdocs in Psychology and Education at Cambridge To: cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org Dear all, Please can you circulate the advertisement for 3 postdocs in Early Childhood Development (three-year appointments) to any potential candidates? Closing date is January 12. http://www.jobs.cam.ac.uk/job/5707/ All the best, Sara ***** We wish to appoint three Research Associates to join the newly established Centre for Research in Play, Learning and Development. This new centre, funded by the Lego Foundation, has been established to conduct rigorous, psychological and cross-disciplinary research into the role of play in young children's learning and development. Initially, three research strands will be pursued: Establishing a longitudinal study of children's playfulness: To investigate the development of playfulness in children and its relation to environmental experiences and to other key abilities which are known to most significantly impact upon cognitive and affective development and children's short and long-term well-being. Developing a measure of playfulness: To establish the essential characteristics of human playful behaviour and the psychological processes which underpin these, and to develop reliable and valid measures of playfulness in children. The development of both behavioural tasks and neuroscientific paradigms will make a crucial contribution to this project. Developing and evaluating play-based, educational interventions: To extend the recently completed PLaNS project, which focused on playful learning to support children's writing, it is planned to extend this work with a larger sample and across a wider range of early learning. The focus here is specifically on supporting children from disadvantaged backgrounds. Successful applicants will take day-to-day responsibility for running the research program in one of the research strands, under the guidance of the PI; review relevant literature, and report on that review; contribute to devising research studies and projects and to the development of tasks, coding frameworks and measurement instruments; be responsible for recruiting and communicating with participants; collect data generated by the studies and projects, and collate and analyse the data; direct the work of Research Assistants; contribute to the drafting of research publications; and carry out additional duties within the general scope and level of the post, including involvement in the many other planned activities of the Research Centre. You will need a PhD in Psychology, Education or a cognate area, or equivalent research training, experience and achievement, or be awaiting the result of a PhD submission; research experience with breadth/depth in a relevant field of study, and in methods and techniques of psychological research, including theory development, measurement design, data collection, data analysis and dissemination; experience of managing own workload, and of working with children; and good interpersonal skills. Experience of interdisciplinary working in psychology and education; proven ability to take day-to-day responsibility for project management; understanding of research on play, learning and development in children; and evidence of scholarly publications are desirable. Applicants may express a particular interest or preference for one of the three research strands, but this is not a requirement. Download the further particulars for fuller information. Fixed-term: The funds for each post are available for 3 years from the start date in the first instance. Once an offer of employment has been accepted, the successful candidate will be required to undergo a Disclosure and Barring Service check (enhanced with children's barred list). Informal enquiries should be made to Dr David Whitebread, (dgw1004@cam.ac.uk ) We plan to hold interviews on 29 January 2015. Please quote reference JR04937 on your application and in any correspondence about this vacancy. The University values diversity and is committed to equality of opportunity. The University has a responsibility to ensure that all employees are eligible to live and work in the UK. _______________________________________________ To post to the CDS listserv, send your message to: cogdevsoc@lists.cogdevsoc.org (If you belong to the listserv and have not included any large attachments, your message will be posted without moderation--so be careful!) To subscribe or unsubscribe from the listserv, visit: http://lists.cogdevsoc.org/listinfo.cgi/cogdevsoc-cogdevsoc.org -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science as an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Fri Dec 26 18:25:46 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Fri, 26 Dec 2014 19:25:46 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors / Speaking of AAE In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: A second response to the paper that Mike forwarded (and to Paul's post on the previous thread). There is a sticky problem here that has not yet been dealt with adequately, namely, if language forms do affect habitual thinking, then what are the effects of the linguistic forms that come with AAE? I'm thinking not just about pragmatics, but also about grammar (and perhaps semantics as well). One thing that many have noted about AAE is that passive voice and nominalizations are dispreferred by AAE speakers. The result is a way of speaking that encourages the naming of actors and agents. Thus, in AAE, it is difficult to carry on agent-less talk like: 1. "Our neighborhood has been negatively affected in the past few years." or, with nominalizations: 2. "Negative affectings have happened in our neighborhood in the past few years." Now these are perhaps terrible examples because although the first seems a reasonable locution, I think most of us would disprefer the second. Nonetheless, the second takes a form that is not uncommon in legal-ese and academic-ese (!!) as a way of obfuscating potentially responsible agents (one of the main tasks of the lawyer) and making processes into things (one of the tasks of the scientific academic...). Instead the preference in AAE is for active sentences like: "Somebody('s) been negatively affecting our neighborhood in the past few years." With this locution (as with any form), you win some and you lose some. On the one hand, the frequent use of active voice is a mark of good writing (notwithstanding the various other AAE grammatical inflections that are often understood as "bad grammar" by mainstream speakers - and I'll admit that the example offered here is not a good one either...). On the other hand, using predominately active voice can be marginalizing in "high-theoretical" academic writing and in legal writing. That's the way that I tend to think of relativity effects - with any language, you win some, you lose some. But I think attention to both sides, winning and losing, is important. What I've sketched here in a somewhat pathetic fashion is one answer to the question: "what do you "win" with AAE?" -greg p.s., that seems like too many screens (I just adjusted my font size bigger so maybe I can blame it on that...). On Mon, Dec 22, 2014 at 9:33 AM, mike cole wrote: > > I am not in general following this thread, being waaaaaaaaaaaaaay behind on > the imagination thread, but I tripped over the exchange regarding Orr and > AAE. To keep it short, I attach two documents. > > The first is a draft segment from Cultural Psychology (1996) and the other > an empirical report of even greater activity. For those who do not know the > Labov work, the Word file might prove useful. for those of you for whom > this topic is of continuing interest, perhaps the published paper is of > more value. > > It is not true that no one followed up on Labov. It is probably true that > no one followed up on the followup. > mike > > On Mon, Dec 22, 2014 at 8:00 AM, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > > ?David Ki, > > No worries. No offense taken. But thanks for the just-in-case note. > > And yes, I agree to disagree. > > Respectfully, > > greg? > > > > On Mon, Dec 22, 2014 at 6:24 AM, David H Kirshner > wrote: > > > > > > Greg, > > > > > > I disagree with you that Orr could/should have taken a more culturally > > > sensitive approach to her studies of AAE speakers' difficulties in > > > classrooms dominated by standard English instruction. But I in no wise > > > intended to imply your wishing she had done so places you among those > who > > > consider her work as racist. I'm very sorry if my words suggested > > otherwise. > > > > > > David > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > > xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg > > Thompson > > > Sent: Sunday, December 21, 2014 9:36 AM > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors > > > > > > In the interests of following the recently suggested injunction not to > > > directly address specific interlocutors, I'll talk in generalities > (This > > > makes it a bit more challenging to have a conversation but it also > makes > > > one think about the extractable and generalizable point that is beyond > > the > > > immediate context). > > > > > > In my previous post (apologies for drawing on prior context), I neither > > > suggested nor intended to imply that Orr's work is racist (do > intentions > > > matter when it comes to meaning?). This speaks to some of the > > difficulties > > > of talking about issues of race. And in this connection let's not > forget > > > the fact that this list-serve is dominated by white men - that doesn't > > mean > > > that we are necessarily racist but it does mean that we are likely to > be > > > ignorant of many aspects of these issues. > > > > > > Nonetheless, I believe that we can overcome our ignorance through > > > education, by learning more about the issues - even when it comes to > > trying > > > to understand cultures and languages that we did not grow up with. And > > > while I think that there is good evidence for the linguistic relativity > > > hypothesis, I do not believe that language is a determining influence > in > > > ALL thinking (Whorf uses the term "habitual" to describe the type of > > > thinking that is most susceptible to the influence of language). That > > means > > > that even if you don't speak AAE, you can still study it and even come > to > > > understand how the grammatical forms lend themselves to particular ways > > of > > > understanding the world (this is what linguistic anthropology is all > > > about!). > > > > > > And this is my concern with Orr's work. With all academic work, I think > > it > > > is worth considering questions like "How would racists take up our > > > research?" In the case of Orr's work, my sense is that racists could > > easily > > > take up her research to argue (perhaps even by using the linguistic > > > relativity hypothesis) that AAE speakers are unable to do complex > > > mathematical thinking. This is why I would think that it is important > to > > > give a positive articulation of what AAE does as a language. It is > > > certainly important to understand what it CAN'T do (e.g., help one > learn > > > math in a particular way), but it is equally important to understand > what > > > it CAN do. > > > > > > As Paul points out, Labov has done some of the work addressing this. > But > > > note that Labov's work was done 40 years ago and no one has sought to > > > replicate or do any kind of similar work. What gives? > > > > > > -greg > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -greg > > > > > > On Sat, Dec 20, 2014 at 11:37 PM, David H Kirshner > > wrote: > > > > > > > Greg, > > > > > > > > I'm delighted that you're familiar with and appreciative of Orr's > work. > > > > > > > > Cleary she didn't provide "serious consideration of how AAE speakers > > > > actually use prepositions"--she couldn't have, as she was not a > native > > > > speaker of Black English dialect, and she was not a linguist. But I'm > > not > > > > sure how paying serious attention to technical nuances of Black > English > > > > grammar would have helped, as her analyses show that the African > > American > > > > students in her classes were not speaking either standard English or > > > Black > > > > English Vernacular, but rather a hybrid that arises from their > efforts > > to > > > > emulate standard English. > > > > > > > > Now, it's true her work didn't parallel the approach Gay and Cole > took > > to > > > > understanding what other psychologists were classifying as linguistic > > and > > > > cognitive deficits by carefully studying the native language and > > culture. > > > > On the other hand, she did something Gay and Cole didn't do, namely > > > > micro-analyze the linguistic miscues operating in the classroom, and > > the > > > > resultant dilemmas of comprehension this created for her African > > American > > > > students. > > > > > > > > As the excerpt copied below illustrates, Orr was scrupulously > attentive > > > to > > > > understanding her students' experience of distance and location given > > the > > > > different linguistic setting. And her analyses consistently point to > > the > > > > mismatch between the native dialect and the language of instruction > as > > > the > > > > source of the problems, not the native dialect, itself. To label this > > > work > > > > as implicitly racist, I think cedes too much to those who mistrust > > > science > > > > as a tool of the oppressor, and whose only locus of attention is the > > > > history and legacy of social injustice. Even now, in this discussion, > > we > > > > are missing the point. The major significance of Orr's work is not > that > > > > differences in grammatical structure have semantic implications. This > > is > > > > merely a window to the dramatic realization that semantics are > written > > > into > > > > grammatical form. > > > > > > > > David > > > > > > > > Excerpt from Orr (1987): > > > > > > > > "Jane gives us in these diagrams a glimpse into the kinds of mental > > > images > > > > she constructs when she is using the single symbol length, > representing > > > > both location and distance, as a tool with which to think. Even the > > > > diagrams Jane drew for problems 13 and 14 begin to be less > > > incomprehensible > > > > if one attempts to construct in one's own mind images of the > > information > > > > given in these problems, while adhering to the requirement that > length > > be > > > > used to represent both location and distance. They can be seen as > > > possible > > > > consequents or extensions of the symbol length when it is used to > > > represent > > > > both location and distance. Consider, for instance, the mental images > > one > > > > might construct in responding to problem 13: Two cities, both > > represented > > > > by line segments, are equal distances (that is, equal line segments) > > > closer > > > > to a third city (another line segment) than two other cities (line > > > > segments) are. The first two cities must be represented by equal line > > > > segments because they are equal distances closer to the third city > than > > > the > > > > other two cities are. And these other two cities must also be > > represented > > > > by equal line segments because they are equal distances from the > third > > > > city. One can see that Jane's diagrams are not as lacking in reason > as > > > they > > > > may initially have appeared to be. > > > > > > > > "Jane's diagrams suggest the possibility that when words, or symbols > > are > > > > used as instruments with which to think, the use in one language of a > > > > single symbol in contexts where a second language requires two or > more > > > can > > > > lead a speaker of the first language to arrive at a different mental > > > > construct of some given information from that arrived at by a speaker > > of > > > > the second language. Or, as in Jane's attempt to handle problem 14, > the > > > > result may be an inability to arrive at a workable mental construct > at > > > > all." (p. 25) > > > > > > > > [Note, this excerpt is part of a longer segment I emailed on Dec. 19 > > that > > > > shows Jane's diagrams that Orr is referring to.] > > > > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson > > > > Sent: Saturday, December 20, 2014 3:14 PM > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors > > > > > > > > The issues that are raised by Orr are indeed important ones. I am a > fan > > > of > > > > her work as it points to important differences in language usage > among > > > AAE > > > > speakers. I agree that she shouldn't have been condemned for pointing > > out > > > > these differences (particularly considering how important it is for > > > > teachers to understand the consequences of these differences). If you > > > want > > > > to help AAE speaking students do better on standardized tests, then > you > > > > absolutely need to pay attention to these differences. > > > > > > > > My one concern here is that I do feel like there is a problem of > > deficit > > > > thinking that is at least implied in her work (and maybe "implied" is > > too > > > > strong a term - maybe it's just that she doesn't provide evidence to > > > > discourage us from this view). What we don't see in this book is any > > > > serious consideration of how AAE speakers actually use prepositions - > > > e.g., > > > > the ways of using language that exist in the community of AAE > speakers. > > > > This gives Orr's work a feel somewhat like the studies of math among > > the > > > > Kpelle studied by Gay and Cole in the pre-early days of LCHC (see > wiki > > > for > > > > more: http://lchcfestschrift.wikispaces.com/Chapter+1). Before they > > > > showed > > > > up on the scene, everyone had assumed that the Kpelle (Liberia) > > couldn't > > > > comprehend basic math concepts b.c. they weren't learning it in the > > ways > > > > that it was being taught (and perhaps there were even linguistic > > > relativity > > > > arguments that pointed to this). Rather then continuing to pluck > these > > > > folks out of context and run them through various types of > experiments, > > > Gay > > > > and Cole "explicitly began with the assumption that ?we must know > more > > > > about the indigenous mathematics so that we can build effective > bridges > > > to > > > > the new mathematics that we are trying to introduce?" > > > > >From their research, they found that the Kpelle actually had high > > > > competence with complex mathematical problems (e.g., estimating > > volumes). > > > > As they write: > > > > "Overall, the data suggested that no generalized lack of > mathematical, > > > > perceptual, or problem solving abilities stood in the way of > > mathematics > > > > education. When the materials and procedures used in assessment tasks > > > were > > > > designed to match closely valued local practices, lack of ability > could > > > be > > > > replaced by apparent special ability. At the same time, schooling did > > > > appear to influence performance in tasks that were routinely used to > > > > measure cognitive development." > > > > So I think I would be more comfortable with Orr's work if she were to > > > have > > > > included this kind of rich understanding of usage in context and how > > > > prepositions actually are used among AAE speakers. > > > > > > > > This points to a larger question that might be irksome to some folks, > > but > > > > the question regards the extent to which mathematical language is > > > > predicated upon a particular form of what Whorf called "Standard > > Average > > > > European." In short, the idea here is that Math has a history and a > > > > culture. This doesn't mean that it is useless or a waste of time, > just > > > that > > > > it is a particular way of encountering the world that is good for > > > > particular things and not for others. > > > > > > > > I think we've gone round this mulberry bush before, but that was just > > > more > > > > grist for the mill (I prefer my metaphors mixed!). > > > > > > > > -greg > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 8:46 PM, David H Kirshner > > > > > dkirsh@lsu.edu>> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > The topic of how grammatical form relates to meaning calls to mind > > the > > > > > groundbreaking work of Eleanor Orr--whom you've probably never > heard > > of > > > > on > > > > > account of the fact that her work was condemned by a > > > politically-correct > > > > > faction of race-conscious sociolinguists who decided her analysis > of > > > > Black > > > > > English Vernacular could too easily be appropriated into racist > > > > discourses > > > > > about language deficiency. > > > > > > > > > > Orr was a Washington DC area teacher and principal in the 1970s and > > > > 1980s, > > > > > who traced math difficulties of her African American students to > > subtle > > > > > grammatical differences between Black English dialect and standard > > > > English. > > > > > Her 1987 book goes into compelling detail to support the thesis > that > > > the > > > > > meaning structure of basic mathematical terms is embedded in the > > > > > grammatical setting in which those terms are expressed. For > instance, > > > the > > > > > meaning of ?distance? is embedded in the grammatical structure > > > ?distance > > > > > from _________ to __________? where the place-holders hold > locations; > > > if > > > > > you don?t have that grammatical structure, and you're in a > linguistic > > > > > environment in which that structure is assumed, you're likely not > > going > > > > to > > > > > be able to gain full access to the concept. > > > > > > > > > > The attached excerpts from her book--ignore the Forward, unless > you'd > > > > like > > > > > some context--reveal some of her students' bizarre conceptions of > > > > distance > > > > > (and other basic mathematical concepts) as revealed in their > > diagrams. > > > > Her > > > > > approach involves linguistic analysis of sentences produced by her > > > > African > > > > > American students that she reads as collapsed versions of standard > > > > English > > > > > sentences, with differences in prepositional structure being > > > highlighted > > > > > (but other grammatical elements also are indicated). > > > > > > > > > > This work cuts against the grain of anything going on in > mathematics > > > > > education. The Piagetian view that dominates that field holds that > > > basic > > > > > concepts come about from reflection on our actions in our > engagement > > > with > > > > > the material world. When language enters the conversation, it's > with > > > > > respect to semantic structure; to my knowledge, nobody's ever > > > implicated > > > > > syntax directly in basic quantitative understanding. > > > > > > > > > > This work is particularly interesting to me in connection with my > > > > > 21-year-old son who is autistic, and whose grammatical function is > > > > severely > > > > > impaired. He has a decent vocabulary, but unless the setting for > the > > > > > conversation provides contextual clues, he can't piece together how > > the > > > > > semantic elements are linked to one another. It is only recently > that > > > it > > > > > occurred to me his lack of a secure sense of basic quantitative > terms > > > > like > > > > > ?more? and ?less? may be rooted in his grammatical incapacities. > > > > > > > > > > The XMCA discussion, thus far, has touched on grammar with respect > to > > > > > lexical items such as prepositions. But we've not yet tied that to > > the > > > > > grammatical forms that embed those lexical items. I'm very curious > as > > > to > > > > > whether that further connection can be made. > > > > > > > > > > David Kirshner > > > > > > > > > > Orr, E., W. (1987). Twice as less: Black English and the > performance > > of > > > > > black students in mathematics and science. New York: W. W. Norton & > > > > Company. > > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg > > > > > Sent: Friday, December 19, 2014 3:06 PM > > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors > > > > > > > > > > Yes, Haliday is essentially a Whorfian, and that's one of things > that > > > > > brings him close to Vygotsky. (Compare, for example, Chomsky, who > is > > > > > essentially anti-developmental in his ideas about language, and who > > now > > > > > rejects the leading role played by social communication and says > that > > > > > communication is epiphenomenal to language, whose original purpose > is > > > > > thought.) For Sapir, and for Whorf, in the beginning of every major > > > > > onotogenetic, sociogenetic, and even phylogenetic change in > language > > > > there > > > > > has to be some change in the nature of communication. > > > > > > > > > > So what Andy says about the lack of the basis of modern science in > > Hopi > > > > > applies perfectly well to English. When we read the scientific > > writings > > > > of > > > > > Chaucer on the astrolabe, for example, we do not see words like > > > > > "reflection", "refraction" or "alignment". Chaucer uses words like > > > > "bounce > > > > > off", "bend through", and "line up" (note the use of prepositions, > > > > > Helena!). Where did these words come from, and how did they make > > > > scientific > > > > > English possible? > > > > > > > > > > Most of us have no problem saying that Isaac Newton discovered the > > laws > > > > of > > > > > gravitation. But it's only a slight exaggeration to say that what > he > > > > really > > > > > discovered was the meaning potential of words like "gravitation". > > > Gravity > > > > > is, of course, not a thing at all; that is, it's not an entity, but > > > > rather > > > > > a process, the process of falling down, or falling in (preps, > > again!). > > > So > > > > > how and above all why does it become an entity? > > > > > > > > > > It's interesting to compare Newton's writings on optics with > > Chaucer's > > > on > > > > > the astrolabe. The "Opticks" has a fixed format that we recognize > > > almost > > > > > instantly today: Newton describes his equipment (the prism and the > > dark > > > > > room); he then narrates his method as a kind of recipe ("First, I > did > > > > this; > > > > > then I did that") and draws conclusions, which he then formulates > in > > > > > mathematical terms (this is essentially the format of Vygotsky's > > > lectures > > > > > on pedology, so much so that when translating them we had some > > trouble > > > > > determining the precise moment when Vygotsky turns to the > blackboard > > to > > > > > write his conclusion in the form of a law). > > > > > > > > > > In order to get them into mathematical shape, though, he has to > make > > > > > sentences that look a lot like equations. "The plumpness of the > lens > > > > yields > > > > > a greater refraction of the light", "The reflection of the light > from > > > the > > > > > glass results of the light striking the flatness of the glass" "The > > > > > curvature of the spectacle glass supplies the lacking plumpness of > > the > > > > > eye". In each of these, a quality or a process which would normally > > be > > > > > realized as an adjective or a verb is suddenly realized by a noun, > > > > creating > > > > > an imaginary entity. > > > > > > > > > > That's grammatical metaphor. Something that is "canonically" > realized > > > by > > > > a > > > > > verb ("to grow") is suddenly realized nominally ("growth"), or > > > something > > > > > that is canonically a quality ('red") is realized verbally > > ("redden"). > > > We > > > > > even find related clauses realized as verbs ("She did not know the > > > rules. > > > > > So she died" is realized by "Death was brought about through > > > ignorance", > > > > > all of these examples from Halliday). In fact, the Genetic Law that > > > > > Vygotsky formulates in "Mind in Society" ("Every higher mental > > function > > > > is > > > > > realized on two planes....") is really just one instance of > > grammatical > > > > > metaphor. > > > > > > > > > > One of Chomsky's best known arguments for the radical innateness > > > > > hypothesis is this. If I take a sentence like "Students who do not > do > > > > their > > > > > homework do not do well" and I want to make a question, how do I > know > > > > which > > > > > "do" to move to the front? Chomsky assumes that this knowledge is > > > > > essentially innate; it is part of universal grammar. But you can > see > > > that > > > > > "Do students who do not do their homework do well?" can be built up > > > > through > > > > > a process of what we might call "discourse metaphor"--whereby > clauses > > > > stand > > > > > for > > > > > exchanges: > > > > > > > > > > Mother: You did your homework, didn't you? > > > > > Child: No. > > > > > Mother: You didn't do your homework? Did you do well? > > > > > Child: No. > > > > > Mother: You didn't do well? > > > > > Child: No. > > > > > Mother: You didn't do you homework so you didn't do well. Do the > > other > > > > > students do well? > > > > > Child: Some of them. > > > > > Mother: Who does well? Do students who do not do their homework do > > > well? > > > > > > > > > > And this of course explains why wh-items like "who" and 'why" have > > two > > > > > functions--one inside a clause, where it expresses an intra-mental > > > > function > > > > > (grammar) and one between them where it expresses an inter-mental > > > > function > > > > > (discourse). > > > > > > > > > > I realize that grammatical metaphor will seem rather dry and > abstract > > > and > > > > > unpoetic to people who assume that metaphor is only of the lexical > > > kind. > > > > > But to me, and I think to most children, it is far far more > powerful > > > and > > > > > far more important developmentally. In some ways, it's the lexical > > > > metaphor > > > > > that is responsible for the disenchantment of the child's world, > > while > > > > the > > > > > grammatical metaphor infinitely expands it. (And here, I'm afraid, > I > > > must > > > > > stop--it's time for breakfast and anyway my one screen is used up!) > > > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > , or "the > > > > > > > > > > . He > > > > > > > > > > On 19 December 2014 at 15:15, Greg Thompson < > > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com > > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > Helena and David, > > > > > > I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the > > > so-called > > > > > > authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred > > tradition > > > > > > to > > > > > > Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi > > notion > > > > > > of "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including > > English) > > > > > > notion of "time" and how each of these languages offers different > > > > > > affordances of meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual > > > > > > understanding, English has a much more > reified/objectified/entified > > > > > > sense of time. (btw, I think the first paragraph is easier to > > follow > > > > > > than the second - and in that first paragraph you'll find our old > > > > friend > > > > > "imagination"). > > > > > > David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to? > > > > > > -greg > > > > > > > > > > > > Taken from: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/mousesite/Second > > > > > > ary/Whorfframe2.html > > > > > > > > > > > > " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, > sunset" > > > are > > > > > > with us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from > > > other > > > > > nouns. > > > > > > They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in > > > winter" > > > > > > just as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are > > pluralized > > > > > > and numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. > Our > > > > > > thought about the referents of such words hence becomes > > objectified. > > > > > > Without objectification, it would be a subjective experience of > > real > > > > > > time, i.e. of the consciousness of "becoming later and > > later"--simply > > > > > > a cyclic phase similar to an earlier phase in that > > > ever-later-becoming > > > > > > duration. Only by imagination can such a cyclic phase be set > beside > > > > > > another and another in the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually > > > > > > perceived) configuration. "But such is the power of linguistic > > > analogy > > > > > that we do so objectify cyclic phasing. > > > > > > We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g., > > > > > "phasing." > > > > > > And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting > > > > > > binomial formula of formless item plus form, is so general that > it > > is > > > > > > implicit for all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless > > items > > > > > > like "substance, matter," by which we can fill out the binomial > for > > > an > > > > > > enormously wide range of nouns. But even these are not quite > > > > > > generalized enough to take in our phase nouns. So for the phase > > nouns > > > > we > > > > > have made a formless item, "time." > > > > > > We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, > in > > > the > > > > > > pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make "summer" > in > > > > > > the pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we can > > say > > > > > > and think "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." > Let > > > me > > > > > > again point out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of > > milk" > > > > > > or "a piece of cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a > > > > > > summer" actually contains or consists of such-and-such a quantity > > of > > > > > "time." > > > > > > > > > > > > In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., > are > > > not > > > > > > nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They > > are > > > a > > > > > > formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, > > and > > > > > > even other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a > > > > > > locative pattern, like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It > > contains > > > > > > no morpheme like one of "in the house" or "at the tree." It means > > > > > > "when it is morning" or "while morning-phase is occurring." These > > > > > > "temporal s" are not used as subjects or objects, or at all like > > > > > > nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" or "summer is hot"; > > > summer > > > > > > is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions are hot, WHEN heat > > occurs. > > > > > > One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or "summer > > > recently." > > > > > > There is no objectification, as a region, an extent, a quantity, > of > > > > > > the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested about time > > > > > > except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no > > basis > > > > > here for a formless item answering to our "time." " > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Helena Worthen > > > > > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to this: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that > > Newton > > > > > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to > > > create > > > > > > > sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly > > > > > > > productive, which is why they still form the basis of > scientific > > > > > > > writing and thinking today." > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I lose > you > > > > > > > when > > > > > > you > > > > > > > say "created to talk about gravity as an entity". > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Thank you, > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Helena > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Helena Worthen > > > > > > > helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > As Helena points out, prepositions are from the "grammatical" > > end > > > > > > > > of > > > > > > what > > > > > > > > Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what > > > > > > > > Halliday > > > > > > calls > > > > > > > > "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they > > have > > > > > > > > three properties that words from the more "lexical" end do > not > > > > have: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You > > can, > > > > > > > actually, > > > > > > > > but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you invent a > > new > > > > > > > > name > > > > > > > or a > > > > > > > > new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can). > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific > > semantic > > > > > > > > field > > > > > > > (the > > > > > > > > way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of > > > > > > linguistics) > > > > > > > > but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are > used. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the > > same > > > > > > effect, > > > > > > > > which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your argument" > the > > > > "in" > > > > > > has > > > > > > > > more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in "there's a > > fly > > > > > > > > in > > > > > > your > > > > > > > > tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in Henry's > > > > > > > > hands, > > > > > > > refer > > > > > > > > to a book or even a footnote. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties > > pretty > > > > > > > > much define the difference between learning and development, > at > > > > > > > > least as I understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on > > > > > > > > functions indefinitely while development works by > reorganizing > > > the > > > > > > > > closed set of functions you already have into new systems. > > > > > > > > Learning is skill specific and local, while development is > > quite > > > > > global in its implications. > > > > > > > Learning > > > > > > > > is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new > > systems, > > > > > > > > while development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary > > (and > > > > > > > > forget it > > > > > > just > > > > > > > > as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes > > away. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of > blue > > > > > > > > that > > > > > > > people > > > > > > > > call the sky") are simply metaphors from the non-productive > end > > > of > > > > > > > > the lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are crisp, > > > > > > > > concrete, and vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the > > > > > > > > nominalizations that > > > > > > Newton > > > > > > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to > > > > > > > > create sentences that look like mathematical equations, are > > > highly > > > > > > > > productive, which is why they still form the basis of > > scientific > > > > > > > > writing and > > > > > > thinking > > > > > > > > today. For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical metaphor > is > > > the > > > > > > third > > > > > > > > great moment in child development (after the break into > mother > > > > > > > > tongue > > > > > > and > > > > > > > > the break into disciplinary language in school work). > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" > > implies > > > > > > > > zero dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two ("on > a > > > > > > > > line', 'on a > > > > > > > > plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because > they > > > are > > > > > > > > grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them with > > > time: > > > > > > > > 'at > > > > > > a > > > > > > > > point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. Compare: > > "at > > > > > > > > Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very day), > > and > > > > > > > > "in Christmas' (season). > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > > > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" > spatial > > > > > > > >> relationships from the concrete material world into the > > > > > > > >> conceptual imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 > > > common > > > > > > > >> ones, and > > > > > > > between 70 > > > > > > > >> and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as > far > > > as" > > > > > > > >> -- > > > > > > > this > > > > > > > >> is according to > > > > > > > >> https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm > > > > > > ). > > > > > > > >> We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. > > Apparently, > > > > > > > >> in English, they evolved from and did the job done by > > > inflections > > > > > > > >> in > > > > > > parent > > > > > > > >> languages, examples being cases and tenses. > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> But there is real difference in meaning between an > inflection > > > > > > > >> like the dative or accusative cases in Latin and the spatial > > > > > > > >> relationships > > > > > > > suggested > > > > > > > >> by contemporary prepositions. > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about > > this. > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> Helena Worthen > > > > > > > >> helenaworthen@gmail.com > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >>> I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are > clearly > > > > > > embodied, > > > > > > > >> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to > > > > > > > >> linguistics > > > > > > > (For > > > > > > > >> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused > on > > > > > > ?lexicon?: > > > > > > > >> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of > > prepositions, > > > > > > > >> being > > > > > > > part > > > > > > > >> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and > > > > > > > >> Halliday > > > > > > > see no > > > > > > > >> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, > > > > > lexico-grammar. > > > > > > > (Lo > > > > > > > >> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write > lexicon-grammar, > > > > > > > >> adding > > > > > > > the > > > > > > > >> ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word > coinings > > > are > > > > > > great > > > > > > > >> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much of > > > > > > > >> that? In translation from Russian is word coining ever > > > practiced? > > > > > > > >>> Henry > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > >>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden < > > ablunden@mira.net > > > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > >>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the > > > > > > metaphorical > > > > > > > >> use of prepositions like: > > > > > > > >>>> - "there is some value IN your argument" > > > > > > > >>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again" > > > > > > > >>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" > > > > > > > >>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again" > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > >>>> and so on. > > > > > > > >>>> Andy > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > > > > -------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > > > > ---- > > > > > > > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > > > > > > > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > >>>> larry smolucha wrote: > > > > > > > >>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself - > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic > > > > > > > possibilities: > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) > published > > > in > > > > > > > Thought > > > > > > > >>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated > > into > > > > > > English > > > > > > > >> 1962] > > > > > > > >>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the > > > 'additive' > > > > > > value > > > > > > > >> of the > > > > > > > >>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech > > > > > > > vocalization). > > > > > > > >>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical elements > > > that > > > > > > > >>>>> are > > > > > > > >> flammable > > > > > > > >>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither > flammable > > > nor > > > > > > > >>>>> a > > > > > > gas. > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century > > > > > > > >>>>> European > > > > > > > >> Developmental > > > > > > > >>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean > > 'developmental' > > > > > > > >>>>> hence > > > > > > > the > > > > > > > >>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the case > of > > > > > > Piaget's > > > > > > > >> Genetic > > > > > > > >>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and > > > > > > > >>>>> synthesis > > > > > > > >> based on > > > > > > > >>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in > > > > > > > >>>>> Vygotsky's > > > > > > > >> example of H2O. > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com > > > > > > > >>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > > >>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 > > > > > > > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be > > > synergistic > > > > > > > >>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of > the > > > > > parts. > > > > > > > >>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing > more > > > > > > > >>>>>> than > > > > > > the > > > > > > > >>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new > > can > > > > > > > >>>>>> ever > > > > > > be > > > > > > > >> imagined" > > > > > > > >>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>> A couple things to consider: > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of > > imagination > > > > > > > >>>>>> as the > > > > > > > >> brain has > > > > > > > >>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the > > > > > > > >>>>>> simplest > > > > > > level > > > > > > > >> of the Gestalt > > > > > > > >>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). > > > > > > > >>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just > > > > > > photographic. > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to > > try > > > > > > > >>>>>> to > > > > > > > >> accurately reproduce > > > > > > > >>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. > > > Whereas, > > > > > > > >>>>>> the > > > > > > > >> goal of combinatory > > > > > > > >>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, > > > > > > > >>>>>> dreams, > > > > > > > >> musings, and even > > > > > > > >>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual manipulation > > of > > > > > > objects > > > > > > > >> and symbols. > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the different > > > ways > > > > > > > >>>>>> that > > > > > > > >> things and concepts can be > > > > > > > >>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and > sugar > > > > > > > >>>>>> and > > > > > > > flour. > > > > > > > >>>>>> I can add water > > and > > > > > > > >>>>>> it > > > > > > > >> dissolves a bit > > > > > > > >>>>>> But adding heat > > > > > > > >>>>>> changes > > > > > > the > > > > > > > >> combination into a pancake. > > > > > > > >>>>>> [Is this synergistic?] > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of > more > > > > > > > >>>>>> examples > > > > > > > >> to put the discussion > > > > > > > >>>>>> in the metaphysical realm. > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 > > > > > > > >>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > > > > > >>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > > > >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen limit--make > > the > > > > > > > >>>>>>> case > > > > > > > for > > > > > > > >>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting associationism. > I > > > > > > > >>>>>>> think > > > > > > it's > > > > > > > >> not > > > > > > > >>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are > > > > > > > >> associationists who > > > > > > > >>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary > > > > > > > >>>>>>> associationism > > > > > > > >> exists and > > > > > > > >>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as > > > > mediation. > > > > > > > >> Vygotsky > > > > > > > >>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking > > religion, > > > > > > explain > > > > > > > >> the > > > > > > > >>>>>>> uniqueness of our species? > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species > > feels > > > > > > > >>>>>>> for > > > > > > its > > > > > > > >> own > > > > > > > >>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a > > > > > > > >>>>>>> Piagetian perspective--and even from a strict Darwinian > > > > > > > >>>>>>> one--true maturity > > > > > > > as a > > > > > > > >>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing > > more > > > > > > > >>>>>>> to it > > > > > > > >> than > > > > > > > >>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety of > > > > > > > >>>>>>> primate, > > > > > > > and > > > > > > > >> our > > > > > > > >>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled > > upon > > > > > > > >>>>>>> rocks > > > > > > > in > > > > > > > >> order > > > > > > > >>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be > judged > > > > > > > >>>>>>> the > > > > > > same > > > > > > > >> way as > > > > > > > >>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions > > and > > > > > > > >>>>>>> for > > > > > > > >> language is > > > > > > > >>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case > human > > > > > > > >> exceptionalism. > > > > > > > >>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case > for > > > > > > > >>>>>>> the > > > > > > > >> vanguard role > > > > > > > >>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other > > species, > > > > > > > prolonging > > > > > > > >>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking > after > > > > > > > >>>>>>> the > > > > > > sick > > > > > > > >> and the > > > > > > > >>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because > artificial > > > > > > > >>>>>>> organs > > > > > > > >> (tools) and > > > > > > > >>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important > > for > > > > > > > >>>>>>> our > > > > > > > >> species, it > > > > > > > >>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where > > these > > > > > > > >> "circuitous, > > > > > > > >>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced > that > > > > > > > >>>>>>> lead > > > > > > our > > > > > > > >>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth > > always > > > > > > > >>>>>>> been > > > > > > > >> short on > > > > > > > >>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for > > > > > > > >>>>>>> material > > > > > > > >> culture > > > > > > > >>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another > > > matter: > > > > > > > >> verily, here > > > > > > > >>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of > > > > > > > >>>>>>> attention is > > > > > > > >> simply the > > > > > > > >>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he says > > > > > > > >>>>>>> there are > > > > > > > >> only two > > > > > > > >>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and recombinative. > So > > > > > > > >> imagination is > > > > > > > >>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete > > > experiences, > > > > > > > >>>>>>> and > > > > > > > >> nothing > > > > > > > >>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, > > when > > > > > > > >>>>>>> you > > > > > > > hear > > > > > > > >> the > > > > > > > >>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been > > there > > > > > > > >>>>>>> to be > > > > > > > >> able to > > > > > > > >>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at > > work > > > > > > > >>>>>>> in > > > > > > word > > > > > > > >> meaning. > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, > > who > > > > > > > >>>>>>> was > > > > > > > given > > > > > > > >> a > > > > > > > >>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had been > > > > > > > >>>>>>> mixed > > > > > > with > > > > > > > >> silver > > > > > > > >>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent quantity > > of > > > > > gold. > > > > > > > >> Well, we > > > > > > > >>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's > not > > > > > > possible > > > > > > > to > > > > > > > >>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that > > > > > > > >>>>>>> precisely. The > > > > > > > >> method > > > > > > > >>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the > > > > > > > >>>>>>> "principal > > > > > > of > > > > > > > >>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes > > > > > > > >>>>>>> palimpsest, a > > > > > > > >> velum on > > > > > > > >>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each > > > other. > > > > > > > Because > > > > > > > >>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and > > > > > > > >>>>>>> written > > > > > > over > > > > > > > >> every > > > > > > > >>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was > > > soft, > > > > > > > >>>>>>> the > > > > > > > >> pressure > > > > > > > >>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new > > ones > > > > > > > >>>>>>> when > > > > > > > the > > > > > > > >> old > > > > > > > >>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is the > > > only > > > > > > known > > > > > > > >> Greek > > > > > > > >>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor > > > their > > > > > > > >> relationship > > > > > > > >>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact > > they > > > > > > > >>>>>>> are > > > > > > > >> related to > > > > > > > >>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's > > > quite > > > > > > > similar > > > > > > > >> to the > > > > > > > >>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>> David Kellogg > > > > > > > >>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > > >> wrote: > > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an > > > > > > > associationist, > > > > > > > >> ?sees > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> Henry > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg < > > > > > > dkellogg60@gmail.com > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >> wrote: > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> division > > > > > > > >> between > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the > other, > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> because > > > > > > > >> Ribot is > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> an > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather > distal > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> form of > > > > > > > >> attention. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> transition > > > > > > from > > > > > > > >> forest > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> to > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the > > division > > > > > > between > > > > > > > >> the two > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> commonsensical > > > > > > > >> world of > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> the > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> prosaic > > > > > > uses > > > > > > > >> in life > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more > > > > > > > "imaginative" > > > > > > > >> (that > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the > > world > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> of the > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> farm,where > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where > long > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> winter > > > > > > > >> months are > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely > to > > > > > > encounter > > > > > > > >> talking > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> attention > > > > > > > has > > > > > > > >> to be > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> more voluntary. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he has > a > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> very > > > > > > clear > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian romanticism > > > that > > > > > > > >> underpins > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> Ribot > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. > Vygotsky > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> points > > > > > > > out > > > > > > > >> the > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these productive > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> practices > > > > > > > >> really > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> are > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of > > > > > > imagination, > > > > > > > >> there > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference > > between > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> human > > > > > > > and > > > > > > > >> animal > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> capable of > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> volitional > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than > > > humans). > > > > > > > Without > > > > > > > >> a > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> theory > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any > basis > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> for > > > > > > > Ribot's > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> functions at > > > > > > > >> all. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole < > > mcole@ucsd.edu > > > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination, > > > > > > > >> thanks to > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> all > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> influential > > > > > > > >> around the > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> time > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th > > century. > > > I > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> had > > > > > > > >> seen work > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> on > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and reflective > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> equal > > > > > > > >> reproductive? > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical > > studies > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> of > > > > > > > >> development > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> of > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The cost > > of > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> being > > > > > > a > > > > > > > >> relative > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > > > > > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> bucket > > > > > > list. > > > > > > > >> This > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal > musings > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> from > > > > > > some > > > > > > > >> weeks > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> in > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell > correct > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > > > > > >> segmented the > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met > > > > > aphorizing?. > > > > > > > >> Puns, > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. :) > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward > Kant > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > > > they > > > > > > > >> are > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> doing > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky and > > his > > > > > > > >> followers as an > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced by > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel, so > > > > > > > >> its of > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> course > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories > > emerge. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, especially > in > > > > > > > >> translation, > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> seems > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, > > > > "recollection" > > > > > > in > > > > > > > >> this > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> passage, > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in > counter > > > > > > > >> distinction to > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "memory." > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary > > > > > > > >> discourse > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out > > Russian > > > > > > > >> colleagues have > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something > from > > > > > > theorists > > > > > > > >> who > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> clearly > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when > it > > > was > > > > > > still > > > > > > > >> possible > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> to > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" > > which, > > > > > > > >> interestingly > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> links > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a > > > > > > "voluntary" > > > > > > > >> act. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Parts > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like > children > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> stuff > > > > > > > that > > > > > > > >> was > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> also > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the > > concepts > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > > > > >> creativity > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> and > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its > curious > > > to > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> see > > > > > > > >> that the > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> two > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he > > found > > > > > > himself > > > > > > > >> writing. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to > > which > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> pretty > > > > > > > old > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> approaches > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < > > > > > > > >> ablunden@mira.net> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively > > contemporary, > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> but it > > > > > > > >> may be > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> worth > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a > > prominent > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> place > > > > > > to > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Imagination > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating > between > > > > > > > >> Recollection and > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) > > Reproductive > > > > > > > >> Imagination, > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> (2) > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive > Imagination, > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> which > > > > > > he > > > > > > > >> says > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> leads > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive > Memory. > > In > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> other > > > > > > > >> words, > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> the > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to Intellect > is > > > > > > > >> accomplished > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> through > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > > > > > -- > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading > > > Strawson > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > > > > >> Williams. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists > > > whose > > > > > > work i > > > > > > > >> am > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> trying > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) > speak > > of > > > > > > > >> productive > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive > > > > > > imagination > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> develops. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive > > > implies > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that > > > > > > > >> there > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> must > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> be a > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive > > > imagination. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> But > > > > > > I > > > > > > > >> learned > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination > > > appears > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > > > is > > > > > > > >> linked > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> to > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable > > part > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > > > > >> anticipation > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY SHONERD > < > > > > > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination > > > > > > > >> (starting > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more contemporaneous > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> look, and > > > > > > > >> provides > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> a > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the > > socio-cultural > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as > > > > > > > fixed. > > > > > > > >> This, > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, > gives > > me > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a > > > > > > > ground > > > > > > > >> to > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> take > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> part > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I > start > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> preconceptions: > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> grammarian > > > > > > > >> Langacker on > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> domains, > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> particularly > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, > is > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> full of > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> imagination > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two > > aspects > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > > > > >> temporality: > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and > rhythmic > > > > > > > >> structure), which > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> I > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and creativity, > > for > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> both > > > > > > > >> individual > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and > feeling. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < > > > > > > > >> lpscholar2@gmail.com> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this > > topic. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the > > third > > > > > > *space* > > > > > > > >> and the > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to internet. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams > > and > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> his > > > > > > > >> notion of > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This > notion > > > is > > > > > > > >> explored under > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a > > > *set* > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > > > > > > > >> modalities > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a > form > > of > > > > > > knowing > > > > > > > >> that is > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [perceived??] > > > > > > if > > > > > > > >> we > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> think > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the imaginal > as > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *style* Larry On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 PM, > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> HENRY SHONERD < > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just want > to > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> say how > > > > > > > >> jazzed up > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> I > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> am > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going > wild, > > > the > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind > > > > > > > as > > > > > > > >> Larry > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, actually > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> various > > > > > > > >> triads, > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> finally > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of my > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notebooks > > > > > > > of > > > > > > > >> the > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> mind, as > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap > > > adentro, > > > > > > luega > > > > > > > >> pa? > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> fuera. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole < > > > > > > mcole@ucsd.edu> > > > > > > > >> wrote: > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination > > thread, > > > > > > attached > > > > > > > >> are two > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the > > issue. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of > > CHAT > > > > > > > theorists > > > > > > > >> like > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the development > > of > > > > > > > >> imagination in a > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's > notion > > > of > > > > > > > >> productive > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and > have > > > no > > > > > > > >> intention of > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> doing > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as > > explicated > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the > > > > > > > >> attached > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these > > > > > > philosophers, > > > > > > > I > > > > > > > >> came > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> upon > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> closely > > > > > > > >> linked at > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> several > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our > > > naivete, > > > > > > > >> Ettienne and I > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around earlier > > as > > > a > > > > > > means > > > > > > > of > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> access > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, Alexander > > > > > Suvorov. > > > > > > > >> Moreover, > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> such > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of > the > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have > > direct > > > > > > > relevance > > > > > > > >> to > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Kris's > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also > > speak > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to > > > > > > > >> concerns > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> about > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in > > > > > > development. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination > > > thread. > > > > > > > Perhaps > > > > > > > >> they > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> will > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal > with a > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural > > > > > > > >> science > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with an > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > Strawson.pdf> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> -- > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a > > natural > > > > > > science > > > > > > > >> with an > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> -- > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a > natural > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> science > > > > > > > >> with an > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>>> > > > > > > > >>>>> > > > > > > > >>>> > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > > > > Assistant Professor > > > > > > Department of Anthropology > > > > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > > > > Brigham Young University > > > > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > > Assistant Professor > > > > Department of Anthropology > > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > > Brigham Young University > > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > Assistant Professor > > > Department of Anthropology > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > Brigham Young University > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Fri Dec 26 18:43:00 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Fri, 26 Dec 2014 19:43:00 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors / Speaking of AAE In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: One last post - this one is about the larger question of AAE and linguistic relativity and was provoked by a recent conversation I had with John Lucy (a key proponent of the LRH - http://home.uchicago.edu/~johnlucy/ ). He is has been having a conversation about AAE and the LRH with John McWhorter, one of the top scholars of AAE (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_McWhorter), and McWhorter is not a fan of the LRH. At least part of this seems to be b.c. of the fact that it far too easily leads down the road of deficit thinking about AAE speakers. The argument goes: if language affects thought then speaking AAE will have an effect on how one is able to think. From there it is a short jump to the assumption that AAE leads to ways of thinking that are not conducive to learning complex intellectual concepts. Hopefully that provides some background to my comment about potential concerns with Orr's work. The concerns are not with her work per se. My concerns are rather with the body of scholarship on AAE and the LRH and the fact that, other than Labov's early work, there are no positive articulations of what the linguistic forms that define AAE actually do for those who speak this English dialect (as compared to another dialect). (I should add that I've since recalled that Geneva Smitherman's work is shot through with positive articulations of what AAE linguistic forms can do - her book Talkin and Testifyin' is a classic in this regard, but I wonder if the demonstrative style may be too difficult for speakers of mainstream English and/or academic-ese to understand!). Orr's work, in the wrong hands, can lead us down the path that McWhorter is concerned about - right to the conclusion that AAE is an intellectually problematic language because it interferes with a student's ability to understand mathematics. Hopefully that pulls some of the context of the larger conversation of which my post was only a small part. Cheers to all, greg On Fri, Dec 26, 2014 at 7:25 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > A second response to the paper that Mike forwarded (and to Paul's post on > the previous thread). > > There is a sticky problem here that has not yet been dealt with > adequately, namely, if language forms do affect habitual thinking, then > what are the effects of the linguistic forms that come with AAE? I'm > thinking not just about pragmatics, but also about grammar (and perhaps > semantics as well). > > One thing that many have noted about AAE is that passive voice and > nominalizations are dispreferred by AAE speakers. The result is a way of > speaking that encourages the naming of actors and agents. Thus, in AAE, it > is difficult to carry on agent-less talk like: > 1. "Our neighborhood has been negatively affected in the past few years." > or, with nominalizations: > 2. "Negative affectings have happened in our neighborhood in the past few > years." > > Now these are perhaps terrible examples because although the first seems a > reasonable locution, I think most of us would disprefer the second. > Nonetheless, the second takes a form that is not uncommon in legal-ese and > academic-ese (!!) as a way of obfuscating potentially responsible agents > (one of the main tasks of the lawyer) and making processes into things (one > of the tasks of the scientific academic...). > > Instead the preference in AAE is for active sentences like: > "Somebody('s) been negatively affecting our neighborhood in the past few > years." > > With this locution (as with any form), you win some and you lose some. > On the one hand, the frequent use of active voice is a mark of good > writing (notwithstanding the various other AAE grammatical inflections that > are often understood as "bad grammar" by mainstream speakers - and I'll > admit that the example offered here is not a good one either...). On the > other hand, using predominately active voice can be marginalizing in > "high-theoretical" academic writing and in legal writing. > > That's the way that I tend to think of relativity effects - with any > language, you win some, you lose some. But I think attention to both sides, > winning and losing, is important. What I've sketched here in a somewhat > pathetic fashion is one answer to the question: "what do you "win" with > AAE?" > > -greg > > p.s., that seems like too many screens (I just adjusted my font size > bigger so maybe I can blame it on that...). > > > > On Mon, Dec 22, 2014 at 9:33 AM, mike cole wrote: >> >> I am not in general following this thread, being waaaaaaaaaaaaaay behind >> on >> the imagination thread, but I tripped over the exchange regarding Orr and >> AAE. To keep it short, I attach two documents. >> >> The first is a draft segment from Cultural Psychology (1996) and the other >> an empirical report of even greater activity. For those who do not know >> the >> Labov work, the Word file might prove useful. for those of you for whom >> this topic is of continuing interest, perhaps the published paper is of >> more value. >> >> It is not true that no one followed up on Labov. It is probably true that >> no one followed up on the followup. >> mike >> >> On Mon, Dec 22, 2014 at 8:00 AM, Greg Thompson > > >> wrote: >> >> > ?David Ki, >> > No worries. No offense taken. But thanks for the just-in-case note. >> > And yes, I agree to disagree. >> > Respectfully, >> > greg? >> > >> > On Mon, Dec 22, 2014 at 6:24 AM, David H Kirshner >> wrote: >> > > >> > > Greg, >> > > >> > > I disagree with you that Orr could/should have taken a more culturally >> > > sensitive approach to her studies of AAE speakers' difficulties in >> > > classrooms dominated by standard English instruction. But I in no wise >> > > intended to imply your wishing she had done so places you among those >> who >> > > consider her work as racist. I'm very sorry if my words suggested >> > otherwise. >> > > >> > > David >> > > >> > > >> > > -----Original Message----- >> > > From: xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >> > > xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg >> > Thompson >> > > Sent: Sunday, December 21, 2014 9:36 AM >> > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors >> > > >> > > In the interests of following the recently suggested injunction not to >> > > directly address specific interlocutors, I'll talk in generalities >> (This >> > > makes it a bit more challenging to have a conversation but it also >> makes >> > > one think about the extractable and generalizable point that is beyond >> > the >> > > immediate context). >> > > >> > > In my previous post (apologies for drawing on prior context), I >> neither >> > > suggested nor intended to imply that Orr's work is racist (do >> intentions >> > > matter when it comes to meaning?). This speaks to some of the >> > difficulties >> > > of talking about issues of race. And in this connection let's not >> forget >> > > the fact that this list-serve is dominated by white men - that doesn't >> > mean >> > > that we are necessarily racist but it does mean that we are likely to >> be >> > > ignorant of many aspects of these issues. >> > > >> > > Nonetheless, I believe that we can overcome our ignorance through >> > > education, by learning more about the issues - even when it comes to >> > trying >> > > to understand cultures and languages that we did not grow up with. And >> > > while I think that there is good evidence for the linguistic >> relativity >> > > hypothesis, I do not believe that language is a determining influence >> in >> > > ALL thinking (Whorf uses the term "habitual" to describe the type of >> > > thinking that is most susceptible to the influence of language). That >> > means >> > > that even if you don't speak AAE, you can still study it and even >> come to >> > > understand how the grammatical forms lend themselves to particular >> ways >> > of >> > > understanding the world (this is what linguistic anthropology is all >> > > about!). >> > > >> > > And this is my concern with Orr's work. With all academic work, I >> think >> > it >> > > is worth considering questions like "How would racists take up our >> > > research?" In the case of Orr's work, my sense is that racists could >> > easily >> > > take up her research to argue (perhaps even by using the linguistic >> > > relativity hypothesis) that AAE speakers are unable to do complex >> > > mathematical thinking. This is why I would think that it is important >> to >> > > give a positive articulation of what AAE does as a language. It is >> > > certainly important to understand what it CAN'T do (e.g., help one >> learn >> > > math in a particular way), but it is equally important to understand >> what >> > > it CAN do. >> > > >> > > As Paul points out, Labov has done some of the work addressing this. >> But >> > > note that Labov's work was done 40 years ago and no one has sought to >> > > replicate or do any kind of similar work. What gives? >> > > >> > > -greg >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > -greg >> > > >> > > On Sat, Dec 20, 2014 at 11:37 PM, David H Kirshner >> > wrote: >> > > >> > > > Greg, >> > > > >> > > > I'm delighted that you're familiar with and appreciative of Orr's >> work. >> > > > >> > > > Cleary she didn't provide "serious consideration of how AAE speakers >> > > > actually use prepositions"--she couldn't have, as she was not a >> native >> > > > speaker of Black English dialect, and she was not a linguist. But >> I'm >> > not >> > > > sure how paying serious attention to technical nuances of Black >> English >> > > > grammar would have helped, as her analyses show that the African >> > American >> > > > students in her classes were not speaking either standard English or >> > > Black >> > > > English Vernacular, but rather a hybrid that arises from their >> efforts >> > to >> > > > emulate standard English. >> > > > >> > > > Now, it's true her work didn't parallel the approach Gay and Cole >> took >> > to >> > > > understanding what other psychologists were classifying as >> linguistic >> > and >> > > > cognitive deficits by carefully studying the native language and >> > culture. >> > > > On the other hand, she did something Gay and Cole didn't do, namely >> > > > micro-analyze the linguistic miscues operating in the classroom, and >> > the >> > > > resultant dilemmas of comprehension this created for her African >> > American >> > > > students. >> > > > >> > > > As the excerpt copied below illustrates, Orr was scrupulously >> attentive >> > > to >> > > > understanding her students' experience of distance and location >> given >> > the >> > > > different linguistic setting. And her analyses consistently point to >> > the >> > > > mismatch between the native dialect and the language of instruction >> as >> > > the >> > > > source of the problems, not the native dialect, itself. To label >> this >> > > work >> > > > as implicitly racist, I think cedes too much to those who mistrust >> > > science >> > > > as a tool of the oppressor, and whose only locus of attention is the >> > > > history and legacy of social injustice. Even now, in this >> discussion, >> > we >> > > > are missing the point. The major significance of Orr's work is not >> that >> > > > differences in grammatical structure have semantic implications. >> This >> > is >> > > > merely a window to the dramatic realization that semantics are >> written >> > > into >> > > > grammatical form. >> > > > >> > > > David >> > > > >> > > > Excerpt from Orr (1987): >> > > > >> > > > "Jane gives us in these diagrams a glimpse into the kinds of mental >> > > images >> > > > she constructs when she is using the single symbol length, >> representing >> > > > both location and distance, as a tool with which to think. Even the >> > > > diagrams Jane drew for problems 13 and 14 begin to be less >> > > incomprehensible >> > > > if one attempts to construct in one's own mind images of the >> > information >> > > > given in these problems, while adhering to the requirement that >> length >> > be >> > > > used to represent both location and distance. They can be seen as >> > > possible >> > > > consequents or extensions of the symbol length when it is used to >> > > represent >> > > > both location and distance. Consider, for instance, the mental >> images >> > one >> > > > might construct in responding to problem 13: Two cities, both >> > represented >> > > > by line segments, are equal distances (that is, equal line segments) >> > > closer >> > > > to a third city (another line segment) than two other cities (line >> > > > segments) are. The first two cities must be represented by equal >> line >> > > > segments because they are equal distances closer to the third city >> than >> > > the >> > > > other two cities are. And these other two cities must also be >> > represented >> > > > by equal line segments because they are equal distances from the >> third >> > > > city. One can see that Jane's diagrams are not as lacking in reason >> as >> > > they >> > > > may initially have appeared to be. >> > > > >> > > > "Jane's diagrams suggest the possibility that when words, or symbols >> > are >> > > > used as instruments with which to think, the use in one language of >> a >> > > > single symbol in contexts where a second language requires two or >> more >> > > can >> > > > lead a speaker of the first language to arrive at a different mental >> > > > construct of some given information from that arrived at by a >> speaker >> > of >> > > > the second language. Or, as in Jane's attempt to handle problem 14, >> the >> > > > result may be an inability to arrive at a workable mental construct >> at >> > > > all." (p. 25) >> > > > >> > > > [Note, this excerpt is part of a longer segment I emailed on Dec. 19 >> > that >> > > > shows Jane's diagrams that Orr is referring to.] >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > -----Original Message----- >> > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >> > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson >> > > > Sent: Saturday, December 20, 2014 3:14 PM >> > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors >> > > > >> > > > The issues that are raised by Orr are indeed important ones. I am a >> fan >> > > of >> > > > her work as it points to important differences in language usage >> among >> > > AAE >> > > > speakers. I agree that she shouldn't have been condemned for >> pointing >> > out >> > > > these differences (particularly considering how important it is for >> > > > teachers to understand the consequences of these differences). If >> you >> > > want >> > > > to help AAE speaking students do better on standardized tests, then >> you >> > > > absolutely need to pay attention to these differences. >> > > > >> > > > My one concern here is that I do feel like there is a problem of >> > deficit >> > > > thinking that is at least implied in her work (and maybe "implied" >> is >> > too >> > > > strong a term - maybe it's just that she doesn't provide evidence to >> > > > discourage us from this view). What we don't see in this book is any >> > > > serious consideration of how AAE speakers actually use prepositions >> - >> > > e.g., >> > > > the ways of using language that exist in the community of AAE >> speakers. >> > > > This gives Orr's work a feel somewhat like the studies of math among >> > the >> > > > Kpelle studied by Gay and Cole in the pre-early days of LCHC (see >> wiki >> > > for >> > > > more: http://lchcfestschrift.wikispaces.com/Chapter+1). Before >> they >> > > > showed >> > > > up on the scene, everyone had assumed that the Kpelle (Liberia) >> > couldn't >> > > > comprehend basic math concepts b.c. they weren't learning it in the >> > ways >> > > > that it was being taught (and perhaps there were even linguistic >> > > relativity >> > > > arguments that pointed to this). Rather then continuing to pluck >> these >> > > > folks out of context and run them through various types of >> experiments, >> > > Gay >> > > > and Cole "explicitly began with the assumption that ?we must know >> more >> > > > about the indigenous mathematics so that we can build effective >> bridges >> > > to >> > > > the new mathematics that we are trying to introduce?" >> > > > >From their research, they found that the Kpelle actually had high >> > > > competence with complex mathematical problems (e.g., estimating >> > volumes). >> > > > As they write: >> > > > "Overall, the data suggested that no generalized lack of >> mathematical, >> > > > perceptual, or problem solving abilities stood in the way of >> > mathematics >> > > > education. When the materials and procedures used in assessment >> tasks >> > > were >> > > > designed to match closely valued local practices, lack of ability >> could >> > > be >> > > > replaced by apparent special ability. At the same time, schooling >> did >> > > > appear to influence performance in tasks that were routinely used to >> > > > measure cognitive development." >> > > > So I think I would be more comfortable with Orr's work if she were >> to >> > > have >> > > > included this kind of rich understanding of usage in context and how >> > > > prepositions actually are used among AAE speakers. >> > > > >> > > > This points to a larger question that might be irksome to some >> folks, >> > but >> > > > the question regards the extent to which mathematical language is >> > > > predicated upon a particular form of what Whorf called "Standard >> > Average >> > > > European." In short, the idea here is that Math has a history and a >> > > > culture. This doesn't mean that it is useless or a waste of time, >> just >> > > that >> > > > it is a particular way of encountering the world that is good for >> > > > particular things and not for others. >> > > > >> > > > I think we've gone round this mulberry bush before, but that was >> just >> > > more >> > > > grist for the mill (I prefer my metaphors mixed!). >> > > > >> > > > -greg >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 8:46 PM, David H Kirshner > > > > > > > dkirsh@lsu.edu>> wrote: >> > > > > >> > > > > The topic of how grammatical form relates to meaning calls to mind >> > the >> > > > > groundbreaking work of Eleanor Orr--whom you've probably never >> heard >> > of >> > > > on >> > > > > account of the fact that her work was condemned by a >> > > politically-correct >> > > > > faction of race-conscious sociolinguists who decided her analysis >> of >> > > > Black >> > > > > English Vernacular could too easily be appropriated into racist >> > > > discourses >> > > > > about language deficiency. >> > > > > >> > > > > Orr was a Washington DC area teacher and principal in the 1970s >> and >> > > > 1980s, >> > > > > who traced math difficulties of her African American students to >> > subtle >> > > > > grammatical differences between Black English dialect and standard >> > > > English. >> > > > > Her 1987 book goes into compelling detail to support the thesis >> that >> > > the >> > > > > meaning structure of basic mathematical terms is embedded in the >> > > > > grammatical setting in which those terms are expressed. For >> instance, >> > > the >> > > > > meaning of ?distance? is embedded in the grammatical structure >> > > ?distance >> > > > > from _________ to __________? where the place-holders hold >> locations; >> > > if >> > > > > you don?t have that grammatical structure, and you're in a >> linguistic >> > > > > environment in which that structure is assumed, you're likely not >> > going >> > > > to >> > > > > be able to gain full access to the concept. >> > > > > >> > > > > The attached excerpts from her book--ignore the Forward, unless >> you'd >> > > > like >> > > > > some context--reveal some of her students' bizarre conceptions of >> > > > distance >> > > > > (and other basic mathematical concepts) as revealed in their >> > diagrams. >> > > > Her >> > > > > approach involves linguistic analysis of sentences produced by her >> > > > African >> > > > > American students that she reads as collapsed versions of standard >> > > > English >> > > > > sentences, with differences in prepositional structure being >> > > highlighted >> > > > > (but other grammatical elements also are indicated). >> > > > > >> > > > > This work cuts against the grain of anything going on in >> mathematics >> > > > > education. The Piagetian view that dominates that field holds that >> > > basic >> > > > > concepts come about from reflection on our actions in our >> engagement >> > > with >> > > > > the material world. When language enters the conversation, it's >> with >> > > > > respect to semantic structure; to my knowledge, nobody's ever >> > > implicated >> > > > > syntax directly in basic quantitative understanding. >> > > > > >> > > > > This work is particularly interesting to me in connection with my >> > > > > 21-year-old son who is autistic, and whose grammatical function is >> > > > severely >> > > > > impaired. He has a decent vocabulary, but unless the setting for >> the >> > > > > conversation provides contextual clues, he can't piece together >> how >> > the >> > > > > semantic elements are linked to one another. It is only recently >> that >> > > it >> > > > > occurred to me his lack of a secure sense of basic quantitative >> terms >> > > > like >> > > > > ?more? and ?less? may be rooted in his grammatical incapacities. >> > > > > >> > > > > The XMCA discussion, thus far, has touched on grammar with >> respect to >> > > > > lexical items such as prepositions. But we've not yet tied that to >> > the >> > > > > grammatical forms that embed those lexical items. I'm very >> curious as >> > > to >> > > > > whether that further connection can be made. >> > > > > >> > > > > David Kirshner >> > > > > >> > > > > Orr, E., W. (1987). Twice as less: Black English and the >> performance >> > of >> > > > > black students in mathematics and science. New York: W. W. Norton >> & >> > > > Company. >> > > > > >> > > > > -----Original Message----- >> > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >> > > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg >> > > > > Sent: Friday, December 19, 2014 3:06 PM >> > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors >> > > > > >> > > > > Yes, Haliday is essentially a Whorfian, and that's one of things >> that >> > > > > brings him close to Vygotsky. (Compare, for example, Chomsky, who >> is >> > > > > essentially anti-developmental in his ideas about language, and >> who >> > now >> > > > > rejects the leading role played by social communication and says >> that >> > > > > communication is epiphenomenal to language, whose original >> purpose is >> > > > > thought.) For Sapir, and for Whorf, in the beginning of every >> major >> > > > > onotogenetic, sociogenetic, and even phylogenetic change in >> language >> > > > there >> > > > > has to be some change in the nature of communication. >> > > > > >> > > > > So what Andy says about the lack of the basis of modern science in >> > Hopi >> > > > > applies perfectly well to English. When we read the scientific >> > writings >> > > > of >> > > > > Chaucer on the astrolabe, for example, we do not see words like >> > > > > "reflection", "refraction" or "alignment". Chaucer uses words like >> > > > "bounce >> > > > > off", "bend through", and "line up" (note the use of prepositions, >> > > > > Helena!). Where did these words come from, and how did they make >> > > > scientific >> > > > > English possible? >> > > > > >> > > > > Most of us have no problem saying that Isaac Newton discovered the >> > laws >> > > > of >> > > > > gravitation. But it's only a slight exaggeration to say that what >> he >> > > > really >> > > > > discovered was the meaning potential of words like "gravitation". >> > > Gravity >> > > > > is, of course, not a thing at all; that is, it's not an entity, >> but >> > > > rather >> > > > > a process, the process of falling down, or falling in (preps, >> > again!). >> > > So >> > > > > how and above all why does it become an entity? >> > > > > >> > > > > It's interesting to compare Newton's writings on optics with >> > Chaucer's >> > > on >> > > > > the astrolabe. The "Opticks" has a fixed format that we recognize >> > > almost >> > > > > instantly today: Newton describes his equipment (the prism and the >> > dark >> > > > > room); he then narrates his method as a kind of recipe ("First, I >> did >> > > > this; >> > > > > then I did that") and draws conclusions, which he then formulates >> in >> > > > > mathematical terms (this is essentially the format of Vygotsky's >> > > lectures >> > > > > on pedology, so much so that when translating them we had some >> > trouble >> > > > > determining the precise moment when Vygotsky turns to the >> blackboard >> > to >> > > > > write his conclusion in the form of a law). >> > > > > >> > > > > In order to get them into mathematical shape, though, he has to >> make >> > > > > sentences that look a lot like equations. "The plumpness of the >> lens >> > > > yields >> > > > > a greater refraction of the light", "The reflection of the light >> from >> > > the >> > > > > glass results of the light striking the flatness of the glass" >> "The >> > > > > curvature of the spectacle glass supplies the lacking plumpness of >> > the >> > > > > eye". In each of these, a quality or a process which would >> normally >> > be >> > > > > realized as an adjective or a verb is suddenly realized by a noun, >> > > > creating >> > > > > an imaginary entity. >> > > > > >> > > > > That's grammatical metaphor. Something that is "canonically" >> realized >> > > by >> > > > a >> > > > > verb ("to grow") is suddenly realized nominally ("growth"), or >> > > something >> > > > > that is canonically a quality ('red") is realized verbally >> > ("redden"). >> > > We >> > > > > even find related clauses realized as verbs ("She did not know the >> > > rules. >> > > > > So she died" is realized by "Death was brought about through >> > > ignorance", >> > > > > all of these examples from Halliday). In fact, the Genetic Law >> that >> > > > > Vygotsky formulates in "Mind in Society" ("Every higher mental >> > function >> > > > is >> > > > > realized on two planes....") is really just one instance of >> > grammatical >> > > > > metaphor. >> > > > > >> > > > > One of Chomsky's best known arguments for the radical innateness >> > > > > hypothesis is this. If I take a sentence like "Students who do >> not do >> > > > their >> > > > > homework do not do well" and I want to make a question, how do I >> know >> > > > which >> > > > > "do" to move to the front? Chomsky assumes that this knowledge is >> > > > > essentially innate; it is part of universal grammar. But you can >> see >> > > that >> > > > > "Do students who do not do their homework do well?" can be built >> up >> > > > through >> > > > > a process of what we might call "discourse metaphor"--whereby >> clauses >> > > > stand >> > > > > for >> > > > > exchanges: >> > > > > >> > > > > Mother: You did your homework, didn't you? >> > > > > Child: No. >> > > > > Mother: You didn't do your homework? Did you do well? >> > > > > Child: No. >> > > > > Mother: You didn't do well? >> > > > > Child: No. >> > > > > Mother: You didn't do you homework so you didn't do well. Do the >> > other >> > > > > students do well? >> > > > > Child: Some of them. >> > > > > Mother: Who does well? Do students who do not do their homework do >> > > well? >> > > > > >> > > > > And this of course explains why wh-items like "who" and 'why" have >> > two >> > > > > functions--one inside a clause, where it expresses an intra-mental >> > > > function >> > > > > (grammar) and one between them where it expresses an inter-mental >> > > > function >> > > > > (discourse). >> > > > > >> > > > > I realize that grammatical metaphor will seem rather dry and >> abstract >> > > and >> > > > > unpoetic to people who assume that metaphor is only of the lexical >> > > kind. >> > > > > But to me, and I think to most children, it is far far more >> powerful >> > > and >> > > > > far more important developmentally. In some ways, it's the lexical >> > > > metaphor >> > > > > that is responsible for the disenchantment of the child's world, >> > while >> > > > the >> > > > > grammatical metaphor infinitely expands it. (And here, I'm >> afraid, I >> > > must >> > > > > stop--it's time for breakfast and anyway my one screen is used >> up!) >> > > > > >> > > > > David Kellogg >> > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > , or "the >> > > > > >> > > > > . He >> > > > > >> > > > > On 19 December 2014 at 15:15, Greg Thompson < >> > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com >> > > > > >> > > > > wrote: >> > > > > >> > > > > > Helena and David, >> > > > > > I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the >> > > so-called >> > > > > > authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred >> > tradition >> > > > > > to >> > > > > > Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi >> > notion >> > > > > > of "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including >> > English) >> > > > > > notion of "time" and how each of these languages offers >> different >> > > > > > affordances of meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual >> > > > > > understanding, English has a much more >> reified/objectified/entified >> > > > > > sense of time. (btw, I think the first paragraph is easier to >> > follow >> > > > > > than the second - and in that first paragraph you'll find our >> old >> > > > friend >> > > > > "imagination"). >> > > > > > David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to? >> > > > > > -greg >> > > > > > >> > > > > > Taken from: >> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > >> http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/mousesite/Second >> > > > > > ary/Whorfframe2.html >> > > > > > >> > > > > > " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, >> sunset" >> > > are >> > > > > > with us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from >> > > other >> > > > > nouns. >> > > > > > They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in >> > > winter" >> > > > > > just as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are >> > pluralized >> > > > > > and numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. >> Our >> > > > > > thought about the referents of such words hence becomes >> > objectified. >> > > > > > Without objectification, it would be a subjective experience of >> > real >> > > > > > time, i.e. of the consciousness of "becoming later and >> > later"--simply >> > > > > > a cyclic phase similar to an earlier phase in that >> > > ever-later-becoming >> > > > > > duration. Only by imagination can such a cyclic phase be set >> beside >> > > > > > another and another in the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually >> > > > > > perceived) configuration. "But such is the power of linguistic >> > > analogy >> > > > > that we do so objectify cyclic phasing. >> > > > > > We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g., >> > > > > "phasing." >> > > > > > And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting >> > > > > > binomial formula of formless item plus form, is so general that >> it >> > is >> > > > > > implicit for all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless >> > items >> > > > > > like "substance, matter," by which we can fill out the binomial >> for >> > > an >> > > > > > enormously wide range of nouns. But even these are not quite >> > > > > > generalized enough to take in our phase nouns. So for the phase >> > nouns >> > > > we >> > > > > have made a formless item, "time." >> > > > > > We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, >> in >> > > the >> > > > > > pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make >> "summer" in >> > > > > > the pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we >> can >> > say >> > > > > > and think "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." >> Let >> > > me >> > > > > > again point out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of >> > milk" >> > > > > > or "a piece of cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a >> > > > > > summer" actually contains or consists of such-and-such a >> quantity >> > of >> > > > > "time." >> > > > > > >> > > > > > In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., >> are >> > > not >> > > > > > nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They >> > are >> > > a >> > > > > > formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, >> > and >> > > > > > even other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a >> > > > > > locative pattern, like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It >> > contains >> > > > > > no morpheme like one of "in the house" or "at the tree." It >> means >> > > > > > "when it is morning" or "while morning-phase is occurring." >> These >> > > > > > "temporal s" are not used as subjects or objects, or at all like >> > > > > > nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" or "summer is hot"; >> > > summer >> > > > > > is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions are hot, WHEN heat >> > occurs. >> > > > > > One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or "summer >> > > recently." >> > > > > > There is no objectification, as a region, an extent, a >> quantity, of >> > > > > > the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested about time >> > > > > > except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no >> > basis >> > > > > here for a formless item answering to our "time." " >> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Helena Worthen >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > wrote: >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > > David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to >> this: >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > > "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that >> > Newton >> > > > > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to >> > > create >> > > > > > > sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly >> > > > > > > productive, which is why they still form the basis of >> scientific >> > > > > > > writing and thinking today." >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > > Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I lose >> you >> > > > > > > when >> > > > > > you >> > > > > > > say "created to talk about gravity as an entity". >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > > Thank you, >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > > Helena >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > > Helena Worthen >> > > > > > > helenaworthen@gmail.com >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > > On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > As Helena points out, prepositions are from the >> "grammatical" >> > end >> > > > > > > > of >> > > > > > what >> > > > > > > > Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what >> > > > > > > > Halliday >> > > > > > calls >> > > > > > > > "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they >> > have >> > > > > > > > three properties that words from the more "lexical" end do >> not >> > > > have: >> > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You >> > can, >> > > > > > > actually, >> > > > > > > > but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you invent >> a >> > new >> > > > > > > > name >> > > > > > > or a >> > > > > > > > new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can). >> > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific >> > semantic >> > > > > > > > field >> > > > > > > (the >> > > > > > > > way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of >> > > > > > linguistics) >> > > > > > > > but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are >> used. >> > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the >> > same >> > > > > > effect, >> > > > > > > > which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your argument" >> the >> > > > "in" >> > > > > > has >> > > > > > > > more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in "there's >> a >> > fly >> > > > > > > > in >> > > > > > your >> > > > > > > > tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in >> Henry's >> > > > > > > > hands, >> > > > > > > refer >> > > > > > > > to a book or even a footnote. >> > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties >> > pretty >> > > > > > > > much define the difference between learning and >> development, at >> > > > > > > > least as I understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on >> > > > > > > > functions indefinitely while development works by >> reorganizing >> > > the >> > > > > > > > closed set of functions you already have into new systems. >> > > > > > > > Learning is skill specific and local, while development is >> > quite >> > > > > global in its implications. >> > > > > > > Learning >> > > > > > > > is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new >> > systems, >> > > > > > > > while development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary >> > (and >> > > > > > > > forget it >> > > > > > just >> > > > > > > > as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes >> > away. >> > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of >> blue >> > > > > > > > that >> > > > > > > people >> > > > > > > > call the sky") are simply metaphors from the non-productive >> end >> > > of >> > > > > > > > the lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are >> crisp, >> > > > > > > > concrete, and vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the >> > > > > > > > nominalizations that >> > > > > > Newton >> > > > > > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and >> to >> > > > > > > > create sentences that look like mathematical equations, are >> > > highly >> > > > > > > > productive, which is why they still form the basis of >> > scientific >> > > > > > > > writing and >> > > > > > thinking >> > > > > > > > today. For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical metaphor >> is >> > > the >> > > > > > third >> > > > > > > > great moment in child development (after the break into >> mother >> > > > > > > > tongue >> > > > > > and >> > > > > > > > the break into disciplinary language in school work). >> > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" >> > implies >> > > > > > > > zero dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two >> ("on a >> > > > > > > > line', 'on a >> > > > > > > > plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because >> they >> > > are >> > > > > > > > grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them with >> > > time: >> > > > > > > > 'at >> > > > > > a >> > > > > > > > point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. >> Compare: >> > "at >> > > > > > > > Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very day), >> > and >> > > > > > > > "in Christmas' (season). >> > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > David Kellogg >> > > > > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen >> > > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > wrote: >> > > > > > > >> >> > > > > > > >> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" >> spatial >> > > > > > > >> relationships from the concrete material world into the >> > > > > > > >> conceptual imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 >> > > common >> > > > > > > >> ones, and >> > > > > > > between 70 >> > > > > > > >> and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as >> far >> > > as" >> > > > > > > >> -- >> > > > > > > this >> > > > > > > >> is according to >> > > > > > > >> https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm >> > > > > > ). >> > > > > > > >> We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. >> > Apparently, >> > > > > > > >> in English, they evolved from and did the job done by >> > > inflections >> > > > > > > >> in >> > > > > > parent >> > > > > > > >> languages, examples being cases and tenses. >> > > > > > > >> >> > > > > > > >> But there is real difference in meaning between an >> inflection >> > > > > > > >> like the dative or accusative cases in Latin and the >> spatial >> > > > > > > >> relationships >> > > > > > > suggested >> > > > > > > >> by contemporary prepositions. >> > > > > > > >> >> > > > > > > >> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about >> > this. >> > > > > > > >> >> > > > > > > >> Helena Worthen >> > > > > > > >> helenaworthen@gmail.com >> > > > > > > >> >> > > > > > > >> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >> > > > > > > >> >> > > > > > > >>> I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are >> clearly >> > > > > > embodied, >> > > > > > > >> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to >> > > > > > > >> linguistics >> > > > > > > (For >> > > > > > > >> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused >> on >> > > > > > ?lexicon?: >> > > > > > > >> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of >> > prepositions, >> > > > > > > >> being >> > > > > > > part >> > > > > > > >> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and >> > > > > > > >> Halliday >> > > > > > > see no >> > > > > > > >> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, >> > > > > lexico-grammar. >> > > > > > > (Lo >> > > > > > > >> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write >> lexicon-grammar, >> > > > > > > >> adding >> > > > > > > the >> > > > > > > >> ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word >> coinings >> > > are >> > > > > > great >> > > > > > > >> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much >> of >> > > > > > > >> that? In translation from Russian is word coining ever >> > > practiced? >> > > > > > > >>> Henry >> > > > > > > >>> >> > > > > > > >>> >> > > > > > > >>> >> > > > > > > >>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden < >> > ablunden@mira.net >> > > > > >> > > > > > wrote: >> > > > > > > >>>> >> > > > > > > >>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the >> > > > > > metaphorical >> > > > > > > >> use of prepositions like: >> > > > > > > >>>> - "there is some value IN your argument" >> > > > > > > >>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again" >> > > > > > > >>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" >> > > > > > > >>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again" >> > > > > > > >>>> >> > > > > > > >>>> and so on. >> > > > > > > >>>> Andy >> > > > > > > >>>> >> > > > > > > >> > > -------------------------------------------------------------------- >> > > > > > > ---- >> > > > > > > >>>> *Andy Blunden* >> > > > > > > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> > > > > > > >>>> >> > > > > > > >>>> >> > > > > > > >>>> larry smolucha wrote: >> > > > > > > >>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >> > > > > > > >>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself - >> > > > > > > >>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic >> > > > > > > possibilities: >> > > > > > > >>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) >> published >> > > in >> > > > > > > Thought >> > > > > > > >>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated >> > into >> > > > > > English >> > > > > > > >> 1962] >> > > > > > > >>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the >> > > 'additive' >> > > > > > value >> > > > > > > >> of the >> > > > > > > >>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech >> > > > > > > vocalization). >> > > > > > > >>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical >> elements >> > > that >> > > > > > > >>>>> are >> > > > > > > >> flammable >> > > > > > > >>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither >> flammable >> > > nor >> > > > > > > >>>>> a >> > > > > > gas. >> > > > > > > >>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century >> > > > > > > >>>>> European >> > > > > > > >> Developmental >> > > > > > > >>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean >> > 'developmental' >> > > > > > > >>>>> hence >> > > > > > > the >> > > > > > > >>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the >> case of >> > > > > > Piaget's >> > > > > > > >> Genetic >> > > > > > > >>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. >> > > > > > > >>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and >> > > > > > > >>>>> synthesis >> > > > > > > >> based on >> > > > > > > >>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in >> > > > > > > >>>>> Vygotsky's >> > > > > > > >> example of H2O. >> > > > > > > >>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com >> > > > > > > >>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >> > > > > > > >>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 >> > > > > > > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >> > > > > > > >>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >> > > > > > > >>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be >> > > synergistic >> > > > > > > >>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of >> the >> > > > > parts. >> > > > > > > >>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing >> more >> > > > > > > >>>>>> than >> > > > > > the >> > > > > > > >>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new >> > can >> > > > > > > >>>>>> ever >> > > > > > be >> > > > > > > >> imagined" >> > > > > > > >>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) >> > > > > > > >>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>> A couple things to consider: >> > > > > > > >>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of >> > imagination >> > > > > > > >>>>>> as the >> > > > > > > >> brain has >> > > > > > > >>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the >> > > > > > > >>>>>> simplest >> > > > > > level >> > > > > > > >> of the Gestalt >> > > > > > > >>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). >> > > > > > > >>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just >> > > > > > photographic. >> > > > > > > >>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to >> > try >> > > > > > > >>>>>> to >> > > > > > > >> accurately reproduce >> > > > > > > >>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. >> > > Whereas, >> > > > > > > >>>>>> the >> > > > > > > >> goal of combinatory >> > > > > > > >>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, >> > > > > > > >>>>>> dreams, >> > > > > > > >> musings, and even >> > > > > > > >>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual >> manipulation >> > of >> > > > > > objects >> > > > > > > >> and symbols. >> > > > > > > >>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the >> different >> > > ways >> > > > > > > >>>>>> that >> > > > > > > >> things and concepts can be >> > > > > > > >>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and >> sugar >> > > > > > > >>>>>> and >> > > > > > > flour. >> > > > > > > >>>>>> I can add water >> > and >> > > > > > > >>>>>> it >> > > > > > > >> dissolves a bit >> > > > > > > >>>>>> But adding heat >> > > > > > > >>>>>> changes >> > > > > > the >> > > > > > > >> combination into a pancake. >> > > > > > > >>>>>> [Is this synergistic?] >> > > > > > > >>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of >> more >> > > > > > > >>>>>> examples >> > > > > > > >> to put the discussion >> > > > > > > >>>>>> in the metaphysical realm. >> > > > > > > >>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen >> limit--make >> > the >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> case >> > > > > > > for >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting >> associationism. I >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> think >> > > > > > it's >> > > > > > > >> not >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are >> > > > > > > >> associationists who >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> associationism >> > > > > > > >> exists and >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as >> > > > mediation. >> > > > > > > >> Vygotsky >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking >> > religion, >> > > > > > explain >> > > > > > > >> the >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> uniqueness of our species? >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species >> > feels >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> for >> > > > > > its >> > > > > > > >> own >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Piagetian perspective--and even from a strict >> Darwinian >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> one--true maturity >> > > > > > > as a >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing >> > more >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> to it >> > > > > > > >> than >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety >> of >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> primate, >> > > > > > > and >> > > > > > > >> our >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled >> > upon >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> rocks >> > > > > > > in >> > > > > > > >> order >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be >> judged >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> the >> > > > > > same >> > > > > > > >> way as >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions >> > and >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> for >> > > > > > > >> language is >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case >> human >> > > > > > > >> exceptionalism. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case >> for >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> the >> > > > > > > >> vanguard role >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other >> > species, >> > > > > > > prolonging >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking >> after >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> the >> > > > > > sick >> > > > > > > >> and the >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because >> artificial >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> organs >> > > > > > > >> (tools) and >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important >> > for >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> our >> > > > > > > >> species, it >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where >> > these >> > > > > > > >> "circuitous, >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced >> that >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> lead >> > > > > > our >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth >> > always >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> been >> > > > > > > >> short on >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> material >> > > > > > > >> culture >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another >> > > matter: >> > > > > > > >> verily, here >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> attention is >> > > > > > > >> simply the >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he >> says >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> there are >> > > > > > > >> only two >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and >> recombinative. So >> > > > > > > >> imagination is >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete >> > > experiences, >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> and >> > > > > > > >> nothing >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, >> > when >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> you >> > > > > > > hear >> > > > > > > >> the >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been >> > there >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> to be >> > > > > > > >> able to >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at >> > work >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> in >> > > > > > word >> > > > > > > >> meaning. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, >> > who >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> was >> > > > > > > given >> > > > > > > >> a >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had >> been >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> mixed >> > > > > > with >> > > > > > > >> silver >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent >> quantity >> > of >> > > > > gold. >> > > > > > > >> Well, we >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's >> not >> > > > > > possible >> > > > > > > to >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> precisely. The >> > > > > > > >> method >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> "principal >> > > > > > of >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> palimpsest, a >> > > > > > > >> velum on >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each >> > > other. >> > > > > > > Because >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> written >> > > > > > over >> > > > > > > >> every >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was >> > > soft, >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> the >> > > > > > > >> pressure >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new >> > ones >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> when >> > > > > > > the >> > > > > > > >> old >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is >> the >> > > only >> > > > > > known >> > > > > > > >> Greek >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor >> > > their >> > > > > > > >> relationship >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact >> > they >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> are >> > > > > > > >> related to >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's >> > > quite >> > > > > > > similar >> > > > > > > >> to the >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> David Kellogg >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >> wrote: >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an >> > > > > > > associationist, >> > > > > > > >> ?sees >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> Henry >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg < >> > > > > > dkellogg60@gmail.com >> > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> wrote: >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> division >> > > > > > > >> between >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the >> other, >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> because >> > > > > > > >> Ribot is >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> an >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather >> distal >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> form of >> > > > > > > >> attention. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> transition >> > > > > > from >> > > > > > > >> forest >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> to >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the >> > division >> > > > > > between >> > > > > > > >> the two >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> commonsensical >> > > > > > > >> world of >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> the >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> prosaic >> > > > > > uses >> > > > > > > >> in life >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more >> > > > > > > "imaginative" >> > > > > > > >> (that >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the >> > world >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> of the >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> farm,where >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where >> long >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> winter >> > > > > > > >> months are >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely >> to >> > > > > > encounter >> > > > > > > >> talking >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> attention >> > > > > > > has >> > > > > > > >> to be >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> more voluntary. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he >> has a >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> very >> > > > > > clear >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian >> romanticism >> > > that >> > > > > > > >> underpins >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> Ribot >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. >> Vygotsky >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> points >> > > > > > > out >> > > > > > > >> the >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these >> productive >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> practices >> > > > > > > >> really >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> are >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of >> > > > > > imagination, >> > > > > > > >> there >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference >> > between >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> human >> > > > > > > and >> > > > > > > >> animal >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> capable of >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> volitional >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than >> > > humans). >> > > > > > > Without >> > > > > > > >> a >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> theory >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any >> basis >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> for >> > > > > > > Ribot's >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> functions at >> > > > > > > >> all. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole < >> > mcole@ucsd.edu >> > > > > >> > > > > > wrote: >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination, >> > > > > > > >> thanks to >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> all >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> influential >> > > > > > > >> around the >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> time >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th >> > century. >> > > I >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> had >> > > > > > > >> seen work >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> on >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and >> reflective >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> equal >> > > > > > > >> reproductive? >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical >> > studies >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> of >> > > > > > > >> development >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> of >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The >> cost >> > of >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> being >> > > > > > a >> > > > > > > >> relative >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> mike >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >> > > > > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> bucket >> > > > > > list. >> > > > > > > >> This >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal >> musings >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> from >> > > > > > some >> > > > > > > >> weeks >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> in >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell >> correct >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that >> > > > > > > >> segmented the >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met >> > > > > aphorizing?. >> > > > > > > >> Puns, >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. >> :) >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Henry >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > wrote: >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward >> Kant >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> and >> > > > > > they >> > > > > > > >> are >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> doing >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky >> and >> > his >> > > > > > > >> followers as an >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced >> by >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel, so >> > > > > > > >> its of >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> course >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories >> > emerge. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, >> especially in >> > > > > > > >> translation, >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> seems >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, >> > > > "recollection" >> > > > > > in >> > > > > > > >> this >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> passage, >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in >> counter >> > > > > > > >> distinction to >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "memory." >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary >> > > > > > > >> discourse >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out >> > Russian >> > > > > > > >> colleagues have >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something >> from >> > > > > > theorists >> > > > > > > >> who >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> clearly >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when >> it >> > > was >> > > > > > still >> > > > > > > >> possible >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> to >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" >> > which, >> > > > > > > >> interestingly >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> links >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a >> > > > > > "voluntary" >> > > > > > > >> act. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Parts >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> of >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like >> children >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> stuff >> > > > > > > that >> > > > > > > >> was >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> also >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the >> > concepts >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> of >> > > > > > > >> creativity >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> and >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its >> curious >> > > to >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> see >> > > > > > > >> that the >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> two >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he >> > found >> > > > > > himself >> > > > > > > >> writing. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> mike >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to >> > which >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> pretty >> > > > > > > old >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> approaches >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < >> > > > > > > >> ablunden@mira.net> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively >> > contemporary, >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> but it >> > > > > > > >> may be >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> worth >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a >> > prominent >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> place >> > > > > > to >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Imagination >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating >> between >> > > > > > > >> Recollection and >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) >> > Reproductive >> > > > > > > >> Imagination, >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> (2) >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive >> Imagination, >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> which >> > > > > > he >> > > > > > > >> says >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> leads >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive >> Memory. >> > In >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> other >> > > > > > > >> words, >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> the >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to >> Intellect is >> > > > > > > >> accomplished >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> through >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >> >> > > > > > >> > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >> > > > > > -- >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading >> > > Strawson >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and >> > > > > > > >> Williams. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists >> > > whose >> > > > > > work i >> > > > > > > >> am >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> trying >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) >> speak >> > of >> > > > > > > >> productive >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive >> > > > > > imagination >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> develops. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive >> > > implies >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that >> > > > > > > >> there >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> must >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> be a >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive >> > > imagination. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> But >> > > > > > I >> > > > > > > >> learned >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination >> > > appears >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and >> > > > > > is >> > > > > > > >> linked >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> to >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable >> > part >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of >> > > > > > > >> anticipation >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY >> SHONERD < >> > > > > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination >> > > > > > > >> (starting >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more >> contemporaneous >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> look, and >> > > > > > > >> provides >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> a >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the >> > socio-cultural >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as >> > > > > > > fixed. >> > > > > > > >> This, >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, >> gives >> > me >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a >> > > > > > > ground >> > > > > > > >> to >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> take >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> part >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I >> start >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> preconceptions: >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> grammarian >> > > > > > > >> Langacker on >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> domains, >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> particularly >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, >> is >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> full of >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> imagination >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two >> > aspects >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of >> > > > > > > >> temporality: >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and >> rhythmic >> > > > > > > >> structure), which >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> I >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and >> creativity, >> > for >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> both >> > > > > > > >> individual >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and >> feeling. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < >> > > > > > > >> lpscholar2@gmail.com> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this >> > topic. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the >> > third >> > > > > > *space* >> > > > > > > >> and the >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to >> internet. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams >> > and >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> his >> > > > > > > >> notion of >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This >> notion >> > > is >> > > > > > > >> explored under >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a >> > > *set* >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of >> > > > > > > >> modalities >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a >> form >> > of >> > > > > > knowing >> > > > > > > >> that is >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [perceived??] >> > > > > > if >> > > > > > > >> we >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> think >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the >> imaginal as >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *style* Larry On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 >> PM, >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> HENRY SHONERD < >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just >> want to >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> say how >> > > > > > > >> jazzed up >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> I >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> am >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going >> wild, >> > > the >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind >> > > > > > > as >> > > > > > > >> Larry >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, >> actually >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> various >> > > > > > > >> triads, >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> finally >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of >> my >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notebooks >> > > > > > > of >> > > > > > > >> the >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> mind, as >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap >> > > adentro, >> > > > > > luega >> > > > > > > >> pa? >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> fuera. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole < >> > > > > > mcole@ucsd.edu> >> > > > > > > >> wrote: >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination >> > thread, >> > > > > > attached >> > > > > > > >> are two >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the >> > issue. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of >> > CHAT >> > > > > > > theorists >> > > > > > > >> like >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the >> development >> > of >> > > > > > > >> imagination in a >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's >> notion >> > > of >> > > > > > > >> productive >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and >> have >> > > no >> > > > > > > >> intention of >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> doing >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as >> > explicated >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the >> > > > > > > >> attached >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these >> > > > > > philosophers, >> > > > > > > I >> > > > > > > >> came >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> upon >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> closely >> > > > > > > >> linked at >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> several >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our >> > > naivete, >> > > > > > > >> Ettienne and I >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around >> earlier >> > as >> > > a >> > > > > > means >> > > > > > > of >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> access >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, >> Alexander >> > > > > Suvorov. >> > > > > > > >> Moreover, >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> such >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of >> the >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have >> > direct >> > > > > > > relevance >> > > > > > > >> to >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Kris's >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also >> > speak >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >> > > > > > > >> concerns >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> about >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in >> > > > > > development. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination >> > > thread. >> > > > > > > Perhaps >> > > > > > > >> they >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> will >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal >> with a >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural >> > > > > > > >> science >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with an >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > Strawson.pdf> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> -- >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a >> > natural >> > > > > > science >> > > > > > > >> with an >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> -- >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a >> natural >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> science >> > > > > > > >> with an >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>> >> > > > > > > >>> >> > > > > > > >> >> > > > > > > >> >> > > > > > > >> >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > -- >> > > > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> > > > > > Assistant Professor >> > > > > > Department of Anthropology >> > > > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> > > > > > Brigham Young University >> > > > > > Provo, UT 84602 >> > > > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> > > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > -- >> > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> > > > Assistant Professor >> > > > Department of Anthropology >> > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> > > > Brigham Young University >> > > > Provo, UT 84602 >> > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> > > > >> > > > >> > > >> > > >> > > -- >> > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> > > Assistant Professor >> > > Department of Anthropology >> > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> > > Brigham Young University >> > > Provo, UT 84602 >> > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > >> > -- >> > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> > Assistant Professor >> > Department of Anthropology >> > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> > Brigham Young University >> > Provo, UT 84602 >> > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> > >> >> >> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From dkirsh@lsu.edu Fri Dec 26 20:30:10 2014 From: dkirsh@lsu.edu (David H Kirshner) Date: Sat, 27 Dec 2014 04:30:10 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors / Speaking of AAE In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Greg, Thanks for these two further posts, both loaded with useful references and links. Pidgin languages built up as a means of communication between groups that do not have a language in common do tend to be grammatically simplified, not full languages. But as I understand the scholarship, AAE is fully recognized as a bona fide Creole language, not a pidgin. BUT, the students with whom Eleanor Orr worked weren't speaking AAE in her classes. They were speaking a hybrid intended to enable them to 'get by' in the SE classroom. And this hybrid really wreaked havoc with their math learning, in ways that Orr documented. Of course, you're right, "Orr's work, in the wrong hands, can lead us down the path ... of deficit thinking about AAE speakers." On the other hand, the price of suppressing Orr's work, which some sociolinguists have done, is the virtual certainty that the problems AAE speakers face in SE classrooms will never be dealt with. This may serve to protect AAE from spurious criticisms, but it virtually ensures that AAE speakers will be considered intellectually incapable, even as it prevents any serious steps being taken to remedy the problems. I wonder, what is the real motive behind those who would sacrifice AAE speakers to real harm in order to protect AAE from the possibility of spurious criticism? Is it pride or cowardice--not wanting to have to fight for the integrity of AAE were it to be attacked? Is it concern that the likely solution (not the only one) would be to make sure AAE speakers learn SE, which might erode African American culture (in some essentialist sense)? Is it to work for the emasculation of African Americans to the point that they take up arms against the master? In any case, Greg, you asked for "positive articulations of what the linguistic forms that define AAE actually do for those who speak this English dialect (as compared to another dialect)." Here's a beautiful example--can't remember if I got it from Orr's book, or elsewhere--of what might happen to SE speakers in a calculus course if AAE were the language of instruction: For AAE speakers there are two grammatical forms (A) The train'(s) traveling at 60 miles per hour, or (B) The train be traveling at 60 miles per hour that can be used to express what is a single sentence in SE (C) The train is traveling at 60 miles per hour. The AAE versions distinguish between average velocity and instantaneous velocity--key concepts of differential calculus. Roughly, (A) means 'the train is averaging 60 miles per hour' (over some time interval). (B) means 'the train's speed at this moment is 60 miles per hour.' I'm sure glad I didn't have to learn calculus from a teacher who assumed she/he was making a clear distinction that my dialect couldn't discern! David -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson Sent: Friday, December 26, 2014 8:43 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors / Speaking of AAE One last post - this one is about the larger question of AAE and linguistic relativity and was provoked by a recent conversation I had with John Lucy (a key proponent of the LRH - http://home.uchicago.edu/~johnlucy/ ). He is has been having a conversation about AAE and the LRH with John McWhorter, one of the top scholars of AAE (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_McWhorter), and McWhorter is not a fan of the LRH. At least part of this seems to be b.c. of the fact that it far too easily leads down the road of deficit thinking about AAE speakers. The argument goes: if language affects thought then speaking AAE will have an effect on how one is able to think. From there it is a short jump to the assumption that AAE leads to ways of thinking that are not conducive to learning complex intellectual concepts. Hopefully that provides some background to my comment about potential concerns with Orr's work. The concerns are not with her work per se. My concerns are rather with the body of scholarship on AAE and the LRH and the fact that, other than Labov's early work, there are no positive articulations of what the linguistic forms that define AAE actually do for those who speak this English dialect (as compared to another dialect). (I should add that I've since recalled that Geneva Smitherman's work is shot through with positive articulations of what AAE linguistic forms can do - her book Talkin and Testifyin' is a classic in this regard, but I wonder if the demonstrative style may be too difficult for speakers of mainstream English and/or academic-ese to understand!). Orr's work, in the wrong hands, can lead us down the path that McWhorter is concerned about - right to the conclusion that AAE is an intellectually problematic language because it interferes with a student's ability to understand mathematics. Hopefully that pulls some of the context of the larger conversation of which my post was only a small part. Cheers to all, greg On Fri, Dec 26, 2014 at 7:25 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > A second response to the paper that Mike forwarded (and to Paul's post on > the previous thread). > > There is a sticky problem here that has not yet been dealt with > adequately, namely, if language forms do affect habitual thinking, then > what are the effects of the linguistic forms that come with AAE? I'm > thinking not just about pragmatics, but also about grammar (and perhaps > semantics as well). > > One thing that many have noted about AAE is that passive voice and > nominalizations are dispreferred by AAE speakers. The result is a way of > speaking that encourages the naming of actors and agents. Thus, in AAE, it > is difficult to carry on agent-less talk like: > 1. "Our neighborhood has been negatively affected in the past few years." > or, with nominalizations: > 2. "Negative affectings have happened in our neighborhood in the past few > years." > > Now these are perhaps terrible examples because although the first seems a > reasonable locution, I think most of us would disprefer the second. > Nonetheless, the second takes a form that is not uncommon in legal-ese and > academic-ese (!!) as a way of obfuscating potentially responsible agents > (one of the main tasks of the lawyer) and making processes into things (one > of the tasks of the scientific academic...). > > Instead the preference in AAE is for active sentences like: > "Somebody('s) been negatively affecting our neighborhood in the past few > years." > > With this locution (as with any form), you win some and you lose some. > On the one hand, the frequent use of active voice is a mark of good > writing (notwithstanding the various other AAE grammatical inflections that > are often understood as "bad grammar" by mainstream speakers - and I'll > admit that the example offered here is not a good one either...). On the > other hand, using predominately active voice can be marginalizing in > "high-theoretical" academic writing and in legal writing. > > That's the way that I tend to think of relativity effects - with any > language, you win some, you lose some. But I think attention to both sides, > winning and losing, is important. What I've sketched here in a somewhat > pathetic fashion is one answer to the question: "what do you "win" with > AAE?" > > -greg > > p.s., that seems like too many screens (I just adjusted my font size > bigger so maybe I can blame it on that...). > > > > On Mon, Dec 22, 2014 at 9:33 AM, mike cole wrote: >> >> I am not in general following this thread, being waaaaaaaaaaaaaay behind >> on >> the imagination thread, but I tripped over the exchange regarding Orr and >> AAE. To keep it short, I attach two documents. >> >> The first is a draft segment from Cultural Psychology (1996) and the other >> an empirical report of even greater activity. For those who do not know >> the >> Labov work, the Word file might prove useful. for those of you for whom >> this topic is of continuing interest, perhaps the published paper is of >> more value. >> >> It is not true that no one followed up on Labov. It is probably true that >> no one followed up on the followup. >> mike >> >> On Mon, Dec 22, 2014 at 8:00 AM, Greg Thompson > > >> wrote: >> >> > ?David Ki, >> > No worries. No offense taken. But thanks for the just-in-case note. >> > And yes, I agree to disagree. >> > Respectfully, >> > greg? >> > >> > On Mon, Dec 22, 2014 at 6:24 AM, David H Kirshner >> wrote: >> > > >> > > Greg, >> > > >> > > I disagree with you that Orr could/should have taken a more culturally >> > > sensitive approach to her studies of AAE speakers' difficulties in >> > > classrooms dominated by standard English instruction. But I in no wise >> > > intended to imply your wishing she had done so places you among those >> who >> > > consider her work as racist. I'm very sorry if my words suggested >> > otherwise. >> > > >> > > David >> > > >> > > >> > > -----Original Message----- >> > > From: xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >> > > xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg >> > Thompson >> > > Sent: Sunday, December 21, 2014 9:36 AM >> > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors >> > > >> > > In the interests of following the recently suggested injunction not to >> > > directly address specific interlocutors, I'll talk in generalities >> (This >> > > makes it a bit more challenging to have a conversation but it also >> makes >> > > one think about the extractable and generalizable point that is beyond >> > the >> > > immediate context). >> > > >> > > In my previous post (apologies for drawing on prior context), I >> neither >> > > suggested nor intended to imply that Orr's work is racist (do >> intentions >> > > matter when it comes to meaning?). This speaks to some of the >> > difficulties >> > > of talking about issues of race. And in this connection let's not >> forget >> > > the fact that this list-serve is dominated by white men - that doesn't >> > mean >> > > that we are necessarily racist but it does mean that we are likely to >> be >> > > ignorant of many aspects of these issues. >> > > >> > > Nonetheless, I believe that we can overcome our ignorance through >> > > education, by learning more about the issues - even when it comes to >> > trying >> > > to understand cultures and languages that we did not grow up with. And >> > > while I think that there is good evidence for the linguistic >> relativity >> > > hypothesis, I do not believe that language is a determining influence >> in >> > > ALL thinking (Whorf uses the term "habitual" to describe the type of >> > > thinking that is most susceptible to the influence of language). That >> > means >> > > that even if you don't speak AAE, you can still study it and even >> come to >> > > understand how the grammatical forms lend themselves to particular >> ways >> > of >> > > understanding the world (this is what linguistic anthropology is all >> > > about!). >> > > >> > > And this is my concern with Orr's work. With all academic work, I >> think >> > it >> > > is worth considering questions like "How would racists take up our >> > > research?" In the case of Orr's work, my sense is that racists could >> > easily >> > > take up her research to argue (perhaps even by using the linguistic >> > > relativity hypothesis) that AAE speakers are unable to do complex >> > > mathematical thinking. This is why I would think that it is important >> to >> > > give a positive articulation of what AAE does as a language. It is >> > > certainly important to understand what it CAN'T do (e.g., help one >> learn >> > > math in a particular way), but it is equally important to understand >> what >> > > it CAN do. >> > > >> > > As Paul points out, Labov has done some of the work addressing this. >> But >> > > note that Labov's work was done 40 years ago and no one has sought to >> > > replicate or do any kind of similar work. What gives? >> > > >> > > -greg >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > -greg >> > > >> > > On Sat, Dec 20, 2014 at 11:37 PM, David H Kirshner >> > wrote: >> > > >> > > > Greg, >> > > > >> > > > I'm delighted that you're familiar with and appreciative of Orr's >> work. >> > > > >> > > > Cleary she didn't provide "serious consideration of how AAE speakers >> > > > actually use prepositions"--she couldn't have, as she was not a >> native >> > > > speaker of Black English dialect, and she was not a linguist. But >> I'm >> > not >> > > > sure how paying serious attention to technical nuances of Black >> English >> > > > grammar would have helped, as her analyses show that the African >> > American >> > > > students in her classes were not speaking either standard English or >> > > Black >> > > > English Vernacular, but rather a hybrid that arises from their >> efforts >> > to >> > > > emulate standard English. >> > > > >> > > > Now, it's true her work didn't parallel the approach Gay and Cole >> took >> > to >> > > > understanding what other psychologists were classifying as >> linguistic >> > and >> > > > cognitive deficits by carefully studying the native language and >> > culture. >> > > > On the other hand, she did something Gay and Cole didn't do, namely >> > > > micro-analyze the linguistic miscues operating in the classroom, and >> > the >> > > > resultant dilemmas of comprehension this created for her African >> > American >> > > > students. >> > > > >> > > > As the excerpt copied below illustrates, Orr was scrupulously >> attentive >> > > to >> > > > understanding her students' experience of distance and location >> given >> > the >> > > > different linguistic setting. And her analyses consistently point to >> > the >> > > > mismatch between the native dialect and the language of instruction >> as >> > > the >> > > > source of the problems, not the native dialect, itself. To label >> this >> > > work >> > > > as implicitly racist, I think cedes too much to those who mistrust >> > > science >> > > > as a tool of the oppressor, and whose only locus of attention is the >> > > > history and legacy of social injustice. Even now, in this >> discussion, >> > we >> > > > are missing the point. The major significance of Orr's work is not >> that >> > > > differences in grammatical structure have semantic implications. >> This >> > is >> > > > merely a window to the dramatic realization that semantics are >> written >> > > into >> > > > grammatical form. >> > > > >> > > > David >> > > > >> > > > Excerpt from Orr (1987): >> > > > >> > > > "Jane gives us in these diagrams a glimpse into the kinds of mental >> > > images >> > > > she constructs when she is using the single symbol length, >> representing >> > > > both location and distance, as a tool with which to think. Even the >> > > > diagrams Jane drew for problems 13 and 14 begin to be less >> > > incomprehensible >> > > > if one attempts to construct in one's own mind images of the >> > information >> > > > given in these problems, while adhering to the requirement that >> length >> > be >> > > > used to represent both location and distance. They can be seen as >> > > possible >> > > > consequents or extensions of the symbol length when it is used to >> > > represent >> > > > both location and distance. Consider, for instance, the mental >> images >> > one >> > > > might construct in responding to problem 13: Two cities, both >> > represented >> > > > by line segments, are equal distances (that is, equal line segments) >> > > closer >> > > > to a third city (another line segment) than two other cities (line >> > > > segments) are. The first two cities must be represented by equal >> line >> > > > segments because they are equal distances closer to the third city >> than >> > > the >> > > > other two cities are. And these other two cities must also be >> > represented >> > > > by equal line segments because they are equal distances from the >> third >> > > > city. One can see that Jane's diagrams are not as lacking in reason >> as >> > > they >> > > > may initially have appeared to be. >> > > > >> > > > "Jane's diagrams suggest the possibility that when words, or symbols >> > are >> > > > used as instruments with which to think, the use in one language of >> a >> > > > single symbol in contexts where a second language requires two or >> more >> > > can >> > > > lead a speaker of the first language to arrive at a different mental >> > > > construct of some given information from that arrived at by a >> speaker >> > of >> > > > the second language. Or, as in Jane's attempt to handle problem 14, >> the >> > > > result may be an inability to arrive at a workable mental construct >> at >> > > > all." (p. 25) >> > > > >> > > > [Note, this excerpt is part of a longer segment I emailed on Dec. 19 >> > that >> > > > shows Jane's diagrams that Orr is referring to.] >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > -----Original Message----- >> > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >> > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson >> > > > Sent: Saturday, December 20, 2014 3:14 PM >> > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors >> > > > >> > > > The issues that are raised by Orr are indeed important ones. I am a >> fan >> > > of >> > > > her work as it points to important differences in language usage >> among >> > > AAE >> > > > speakers. I agree that she shouldn't have been condemned for >> pointing >> > out >> > > > these differences (particularly considering how important it is for >> > > > teachers to understand the consequences of these differences). If >> you >> > > want >> > > > to help AAE speaking students do better on standardized tests, then >> you >> > > > absolutely need to pay attention to these differences. >> > > > >> > > > My one concern here is that I do feel like there is a problem of >> > deficit >> > > > thinking that is at least implied in her work (and maybe "implied" >> is >> > too >> > > > strong a term - maybe it's just that she doesn't provide evidence to >> > > > discourage us from this view). What we don't see in this book is any >> > > > serious consideration of how AAE speakers actually use prepositions >> - >> > > e.g., >> > > > the ways of using language that exist in the community of AAE >> speakers. >> > > > This gives Orr's work a feel somewhat like the studies of math among >> > the >> > > > Kpelle studied by Gay and Cole in the pre-early days of LCHC (see >> wiki >> > > for >> > > > more: http://lchcfestschrift.wikispaces.com/Chapter+1). Before >> they >> > > > showed >> > > > up on the scene, everyone had assumed that the Kpelle (Liberia) >> > couldn't >> > > > comprehend basic math concepts b.c. they weren't learning it in the >> > ways >> > > > that it was being taught (and perhaps there were even linguistic >> > > relativity >> > > > arguments that pointed to this). Rather then continuing to pluck >> these >> > > > folks out of context and run them through various types of >> experiments, >> > > Gay >> > > > and Cole "explicitly began with the assumption that ?we must know >> more >> > > > about the indigenous mathematics so that we can build effective >> bridges >> > > to >> > > > the new mathematics that we are trying to introduce?" >> > > > >From their research, they found that the Kpelle actually had high >> > > > competence with complex mathematical problems (e.g., estimating >> > volumes). >> > > > As they write: >> > > > "Overall, the data suggested that no generalized lack of >> mathematical, >> > > > perceptual, or problem solving abilities stood in the way of >> > mathematics >> > > > education. When the materials and procedures used in assessment >> tasks >> > > were >> > > > designed to match closely valued local practices, lack of ability >> could >> > > be >> > > > replaced by apparent special ability. At the same time, schooling >> did >> > > > appear to influence performance in tasks that were routinely used to >> > > > measure cognitive development." >> > > > So I think I would be more comfortable with Orr's work if she were >> to >> > > have >> > > > included this kind of rich understanding of usage in context and how >> > > > prepositions actually are used among AAE speakers. >> > > > >> > > > This points to a larger question that might be irksome to some >> folks, >> > but >> > > > the question regards the extent to which mathematical language is >> > > > predicated upon a particular form of what Whorf called "Standard >> > Average >> > > > European." In short, the idea here is that Math has a history and a >> > > > culture. This doesn't mean that it is useless or a waste of time, >> just >> > > that >> > > > it is a particular way of encountering the world that is good for >> > > > particular things and not for others. >> > > > >> > > > I think we've gone round this mulberry bush before, but that was >> just >> > > more >> > > > grist for the mill (I prefer my metaphors mixed!). >> > > > >> > > > -greg >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 8:46 PM, David H Kirshner > > > > > > > dkirsh@lsu.edu>> wrote: >> > > > > >> > > > > The topic of how grammatical form relates to meaning calls to mind >> > the >> > > > > groundbreaking work of Eleanor Orr--whom you've probably never >> heard >> > of >> > > > on >> > > > > account of the fact that her work was condemned by a >> > > politically-correct >> > > > > faction of race-conscious sociolinguists who decided her analysis >> of >> > > > Black >> > > > > English Vernacular could too easily be appropriated into racist >> > > > discourses >> > > > > about language deficiency. >> > > > > >> > > > > Orr was a Washington DC area teacher and principal in the 1970s >> and >> > > > 1980s, >> > > > > who traced math difficulties of her African American students to >> > subtle >> > > > > grammatical differences between Black English dialect and standard >> > > > English. >> > > > > Her 1987 book goes into compelling detail to support the thesis >> that >> > > the >> > > > > meaning structure of basic mathematical terms is embedded in the >> > > > > grammatical setting in which those terms are expressed. For >> instance, >> > > the >> > > > > meaning of ?distance? is embedded in the grammatical structure >> > > ?distance >> > > > > from _________ to __________? where the place-holders hold >> locations; >> > > if >> > > > > you don?t have that grammatical structure, and you're in a >> linguistic >> > > > > environment in which that structure is assumed, you're likely not >> > going >> > > > to >> > > > > be able to gain full access to the concept. >> > > > > >> > > > > The attached excerpts from her book--ignore the Forward, unless >> you'd >> > > > like >> > > > > some context--reveal some of her students' bizarre conceptions of >> > > > distance >> > > > > (and other basic mathematical concepts) as revealed in their >> > diagrams. >> > > > Her >> > > > > approach involves linguistic analysis of sentences produced by her >> > > > African >> > > > > American students that she reads as collapsed versions of standard >> > > > English >> > > > > sentences, with differences in prepositional structure being >> > > highlighted >> > > > > (but other grammatical elements also are indicated). >> > > > > >> > > > > This work cuts against the grain of anything going on in >> mathematics >> > > > > education. The Piagetian view that dominates that field holds that >> > > basic >> > > > > concepts come about from reflection on our actions in our >> engagement >> > > with >> > > > > the material world. When language enters the conversation, it's >> with >> > > > > respect to semantic structure; to my knowledge, nobody's ever >> > > implicated >> > > > > syntax directly in basic quantitative understanding. >> > > > > >> > > > > This work is particularly interesting to me in connection with my >> > > > > 21-year-old son who is autistic, and whose grammatical function is >> > > > severely >> > > > > impaired. He has a decent vocabulary, but unless the setting for >> the >> > > > > conversation provides contextual clues, he can't piece together >> how >> > the >> > > > > semantic elements are linked to one another. It is only recently >> that >> > > it >> > > > > occurred to me his lack of a secure sense of basic quantitative >> terms >> > > > like >> > > > > ?more? and ?less? may be rooted in his grammatical incapacities. >> > > > > >> > > > > The XMCA discussion, thus far, has touched on grammar with >> respect to >> > > > > lexical items such as prepositions. But we've not yet tied that to >> > the >> > > > > grammatical forms that embed those lexical items. I'm very >> curious as >> > > to >> > > > > whether that further connection can be made. >> > > > > >> > > > > David Kirshner >> > > > > >> > > > > Orr, E., W. (1987). Twice as less: Black English and the >> performance >> > of >> > > > > black students in mathematics and science. New York: W. W. Norton >> & >> > > > Company. >> > > > > >> > > > > -----Original Message----- >> > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >> > > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg >> > > > > Sent: Friday, December 19, 2014 3:06 PM >> > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors >> > > > > >> > > > > Yes, Haliday is essentially a Whorfian, and that's one of things >> that >> > > > > brings him close to Vygotsky. (Compare, for example, Chomsky, who >> is >> > > > > essentially anti-developmental in his ideas about language, and >> who >> > now >> > > > > rejects the leading role played by social communication and says >> that >> > > > > communication is epiphenomenal to language, whose original >> purpose is >> > > > > thought.) For Sapir, and for Whorf, in the beginning of every >> major >> > > > > onotogenetic, sociogenetic, and even phylogenetic change in >> language >> > > > there >> > > > > has to be some change in the nature of communication. >> > > > > >> > > > > So what Andy says about the lack of the basis of modern science in >> > Hopi >> > > > > applies perfectly well to English. When we read the scientific >> > writings >> > > > of >> > > > > Chaucer on the astrolabe, for example, we do not see words like >> > > > > "reflection", "refraction" or "alignment". Chaucer uses words like >> > > > "bounce >> > > > > off", "bend through", and "line up" (note the use of prepositions, >> > > > > Helena!). Where did these words come from, and how did they make >> > > > scientific >> > > > > English possible? >> > > > > >> > > > > Most of us have no problem saying that Isaac Newton discovered the >> > laws >> > > > of >> > > > > gravitation. But it's only a slight exaggeration to say that what >> he >> > > > really >> > > > > discovered was the meaning potential of words like "gravitation". >> > > Gravity >> > > > > is, of course, not a thing at all; that is, it's not an entity, >> but >> > > > rather >> > > > > a process, the process of falling down, or falling in (preps, >> > again!). >> > > So >> > > > > how and above all why does it become an entity? >> > > > > >> > > > > It's interesting to compare Newton's writings on optics with >> > Chaucer's >> > > on >> > > > > the astrolabe. The "Opticks" has a fixed format that we recognize >> > > almost >> > > > > instantly today: Newton describes his equipment (the prism and the >> > dark >> > > > > room); he then narrates his method as a kind of recipe ("First, I >> did >> > > > this; >> > > > > then I did that") and draws conclusions, which he then formulates >> in >> > > > > mathematical terms (this is essentially the format of Vygotsky's >> > > lectures >> > > > > on pedology, so much so that when translating them we had some >> > trouble >> > > > > determining the precise moment when Vygotsky turns to the >> blackboard >> > to >> > > > > write his conclusion in the form of a law). >> > > > > >> > > > > In order to get them into mathematical shape, though, he has to >> make >> > > > > sentences that look a lot like equations. "The plumpness of the >> lens >> > > > yields >> > > > > a greater refraction of the light", "The reflection of the light >> from >> > > the >> > > > > glass results of the light striking the flatness of the glass" >> "The >> > > > > curvature of the spectacle glass supplies the lacking plumpness of >> > the >> > > > > eye". In each of these, a quality or a process which would >> normally >> > be >> > > > > realized as an adjective or a verb is suddenly realized by a noun, >> > > > creating >> > > > > an imaginary entity. >> > > > > >> > > > > That's grammatical metaphor. Something that is "canonically" >> realized >> > > by >> > > > a >> > > > > verb ("to grow") is suddenly realized nominally ("growth"), or >> > > something >> > > > > that is canonically a quality ('red") is realized verbally >> > ("redden"). >> > > We >> > > > > even find related clauses realized as verbs ("She did not know the >> > > rules. >> > > > > So she died" is realized by "Death was brought about through >> > > ignorance", >> > > > > all of these examples from Halliday). In fact, the Genetic Law >> that >> > > > > Vygotsky formulates in "Mind in Society" ("Every higher mental >> > function >> > > > is >> > > > > realized on two planes....") is really just one instance of >> > grammatical >> > > > > metaphor. >> > > > > >> > > > > One of Chomsky's best known arguments for the radical innateness >> > > > > hypothesis is this. If I take a sentence like "Students who do >> not do >> > > > their >> > > > > homework do not do well" and I want to make a question, how do I >> know >> > > > which >> > > > > "do" to move to the front? Chomsky assumes that this knowledge is >> > > > > essentially innate; it is part of universal grammar. But you can >> see >> > > that >> > > > > "Do students who do not do their homework do well?" can be built >> up >> > > > through >> > > > > a process of what we might call "discourse metaphor"--whereby >> clauses >> > > > stand >> > > > > for >> > > > > exchanges: >> > > > > >> > > > > Mother: You did your homework, didn't you? >> > > > > Child: No. >> > > > > Mother: You didn't do your homework? Did you do well? >> > > > > Child: No. >> > > > > Mother: You didn't do well? >> > > > > Child: No. >> > > > > Mother: You didn't do you homework so you didn't do well. Do the >> > other >> > > > > students do well? >> > > > > Child: Some of them. >> > > > > Mother: Who does well? Do students who do not do their homework do >> > > well? >> > > > > >> > > > > And this of course explains why wh-items like "who" and 'why" have >> > two >> > > > > functions--one inside a clause, where it expresses an intra-mental >> > > > function >> > > > > (grammar) and one between them where it expresses an inter-mental >> > > > function >> > > > > (discourse). >> > > > > >> > > > > I realize that grammatical metaphor will seem rather dry and >> abstract >> > > and >> > > > > unpoetic to people who assume that metaphor is only of the lexical >> > > kind. >> > > > > But to me, and I think to most children, it is far far more >> powerful >> > > and >> > > > > far more important developmentally. In some ways, it's the lexical >> > > > metaphor >> > > > > that is responsible for the disenchantment of the child's world, >> > while >> > > > the >> > > > > grammatical metaphor infinitely expands it. (And here, I'm >> afraid, I >> > > must >> > > > > stop--it's time for breakfast and anyway my one screen is used >> up!) >> > > > > >> > > > > David Kellogg >> > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > , or "the >> > > > > >> > > > > . He >> > > > > >> > > > > On 19 December 2014 at 15:15, Greg Thompson < >> > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com >> > > > > >> > > > > wrote: >> > > > > >> > > > > > Helena and David, >> > > > > > I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the >> > > so-called >> > > > > > authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred >> > tradition >> > > > > > to >> > > > > > Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi >> > notion >> > > > > > of "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including >> > English) >> > > > > > notion of "time" and how each of these languages offers >> different >> > > > > > affordances of meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual >> > > > > > understanding, English has a much more >> reified/objectified/entified >> > > > > > sense of time. (btw, I think the first paragraph is easier to >> > follow >> > > > > > than the second - and in that first paragraph you'll find our >> old >> > > > friend >> > > > > "imagination"). >> > > > > > David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to? >> > > > > > -greg >> > > > > > >> > > > > > Taken from: >> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > >> http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/mousesite/Second >> > > > > > ary/Whorfframe2.html >> > > > > > >> > > > > > " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, >> sunset" >> > > are >> > > > > > with us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference from >> > > other >> > > > > nouns. >> > > > > > They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in >> > > winter" >> > > > > > just as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are >> > pluralized >> > > > > > and numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. >> Our >> > > > > > thought about the referents of such words hence becomes >> > objectified. >> > > > > > Without objectification, it would be a subjective experience of >> > real >> > > > > > time, i.e. of the consciousness of "becoming later and >> > later"--simply >> > > > > > a cyclic phase similar to an earlier phase in that >> > > ever-later-becoming >> > > > > > duration. Only by imagination can such a cyclic phase be set >> beside >> > > > > > another and another in the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually >> > > > > > perceived) configuration. "But such is the power of linguistic >> > > analogy >> > > > > that we do so objectify cyclic phasing. >> > > > > > We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g., >> > > > > "phasing." >> > > > > > And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the resulting >> > > > > > binomial formula of formless item plus form, is so general that >> it >> > is >> > > > > > implicit for all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless >> > items >> > > > > > like "substance, matter," by which we can fill out the binomial >> for >> > > an >> > > > > > enormously wide range of nouns. But even these are not quite >> > > > > > generalized enough to take in our phase nouns. So for the phase >> > nouns >> > > > we >> > > > > have made a formless item, "time." >> > > > > > We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a phase, >> in >> > > the >> > > > > > pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make >> "summer" in >> > > > > > the pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we >> can >> > say >> > > > > > and think "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of time." >> Let >> > > me >> > > > > > again point out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of >> > milk" >> > > > > > or "a piece of cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a >> > > > > > summer" actually contains or consists of such-and-such a >> quantity >> > of >> > > > > "time." >> > > > > > >> > > > > > In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., >> are >> > > not >> > > > > > nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. They >> > are >> > > a >> > > > > > formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, verbs, >> > and >> > > > > > even other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a >> > > > > > locative pattern, like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It >> > contains >> > > > > > no morpheme like one of "in the house" or "at the tree." It >> means >> > > > > > "when it is morning" or "while morning-phase is occurring." >> These >> > > > > > "temporal s" are not used as subjects or objects, or at all like >> > > > > > nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" or "summer is hot"; >> > > summer >> > > > > > is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions are hot, WHEN heat >> > occurs. >> > > > > > One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or "summer >> > > recently." >> > > > > > There is no objectification, as a region, an extent, a >> quantity, of >> > > > > > the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested about time >> > > > > > except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no >> > basis >> > > > > here for a formless item answering to our "time." " >> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Helena Worthen >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > wrote: >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > > David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to >> this: >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > > "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that >> > Newton >> > > > > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to >> > > create >> > > > > > > sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly >> > > > > > > productive, which is why they still form the basis of >> scientific >> > > > > > > writing and thinking today." >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > > Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I lose >> you >> > > > > > > when >> > > > > > you >> > > > > > > say "created to talk about gravity as an entity". >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > > Thank you, >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > > Helena >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > > Helena Worthen >> > > > > > > helenaworthen@gmail.com >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > > On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > As Helena points out, prepositions are from the >> "grammatical" >> > end >> > > > > > > > of >> > > > > > what >> > > > > > > > Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what >> > > > > > > > Halliday >> > > > > > calls >> > > > > > > > "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they >> > have >> > > > > > > > three properties that words from the more "lexical" end do >> not >> > > > have: >> > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You >> > can, >> > > > > > > actually, >> > > > > > > > but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you invent >> a >> > new >> > > > > > > > name >> > > > > > > or a >> > > > > > > > new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can). >> > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific >> > semantic >> > > > > > > > field >> > > > > > > (the >> > > > > > > > way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of >> > > > > > linguistics) >> > > > > > > > but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are >> used. >> > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the >> > same >> > > > > > effect, >> > > > > > > > which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your argument" >> the >> > > > "in" >> > > > > > has >> > > > > > > > more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in "there's >> a >> > fly >> > > > > > > > in >> > > > > > your >> > > > > > > > tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in >> Henry's >> > > > > > > > hands, >> > > > > > > refer >> > > > > > > > to a book or even a footnote. >> > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties >> > pretty >> > > > > > > > much define the difference between learning and >> development, at >> > > > > > > > least as I understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on >> > > > > > > > functions indefinitely while development works by >> reorganizing >> > > the >> > > > > > > > closed set of functions you already have into new systems. >> > > > > > > > Learning is skill specific and local, while development is >> > quite >> > > > > global in its implications. >> > > > > > > Learning >> > > > > > > > is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new >> > systems, >> > > > > > > > while development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary >> > (and >> > > > > > > > forget it >> > > > > > just >> > > > > > > > as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes >> > away. >> > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of >> blue >> > > > > > > > that >> > > > > > > people >> > > > > > > > call the sky") are simply metaphors from the non-productive >> end >> > > of >> > > > > > > > the lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are >> crisp, >> > > > > > > > concrete, and vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the >> > > > > > > > nominalizations that >> > > > > > Newton >> > > > > > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and >> to >> > > > > > > > create sentences that look like mathematical equations, are >> > > highly >> > > > > > > > productive, which is why they still form the basis of >> > scientific >> > > > > > > > writing and >> > > > > > thinking >> > > > > > > > today. For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical metaphor >> is >> > > the >> > > > > > third >> > > > > > > > great moment in child development (after the break into >> mother >> > > > > > > > tongue >> > > > > > and >> > > > > > > > the break into disciplinary language in school work). >> > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" >> > implies >> > > > > > > > zero dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two >> ("on a >> > > > > > > > line', 'on a >> > > > > > > > plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because >> they >> > > are >> > > > > > > > grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them with >> > > time: >> > > > > > > > 'at >> > > > > > a >> > > > > > > > point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. >> Compare: >> > "at >> > > > > > > > Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very day), >> > and >> > > > > > > > "in Christmas' (season). >> > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > David Kellogg >> > > > > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen >> > > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > wrote: >> > > > > > > >> >> > > > > > > >> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" >> spatial >> > > > > > > >> relationships from the concrete material world into the >> > > > > > > >> conceptual imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 >> > > common >> > > > > > > >> ones, and >> > > > > > > between 70 >> > > > > > > >> and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as >> far >> > > as" >> > > > > > > >> -- >> > > > > > > this >> > > > > > > >> is according to >> > > > > > > >> https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm >> > > > > > ). >> > > > > > > >> We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. >> > Apparently, >> > > > > > > >> in English, they evolved from and did the job done by >> > > inflections >> > > > > > > >> in >> > > > > > parent >> > > > > > > >> languages, examples being cases and tenses. >> > > > > > > >> >> > > > > > > >> But there is real difference in meaning between an >> inflection >> > > > > > > >> like the dative or accusative cases in Latin and the >> spatial >> > > > > > > >> relationships >> > > > > > > suggested >> > > > > > > >> by contemporary prepositions. >> > > > > > > >> >> > > > > > > >> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about >> > this. >> > > > > > > >> >> > > > > > > >> Helena Worthen >> > > > > > > >> helenaworthen@gmail.com >> > > > > > > >> >> > > > > > > >> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >> > > > > > > >> >> > > > > > > >>> I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are >> clearly >> > > > > > embodied, >> > > > > > > >> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to >> > > > > > > >> linguistics >> > > > > > > (For >> > > > > > > >> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is focused >> on >> > > > > > ?lexicon?: >> > > > > > > >> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of >> > prepositions, >> > > > > > > >> being >> > > > > > > part >> > > > > > > >> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker and >> > > > > > > >> Halliday >> > > > > > > see no >> > > > > > > >> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, >> > > > > lexico-grammar. >> > > > > > > (Lo >> > > > > > > >> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write >> lexicon-grammar, >> > > > > > > >> adding >> > > > > > > the >> > > > > > > >> ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word >> coinings >> > > are >> > > > > > great >> > > > > > > >> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much >> of >> > > > > > > >> that? In translation from Russian is word coining ever >> > > practiced? >> > > > > > > >>> Henry >> > > > > > > >>> >> > > > > > > >>> >> > > > > > > >>> >> > > > > > > >>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden < >> > ablunden@mira.net >> > > > > >> > > > > > wrote: >> > > > > > > >>>> >> > > > > > > >>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is the >> > > > > > metaphorical >> > > > > > > >> use of prepositions like: >> > > > > > > >>>> - "there is some value IN your argument" >> > > > > > > >>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again" >> > > > > > > >>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" >> > > > > > > >>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again" >> > > > > > > >>>> >> > > > > > > >>>> and so on. >> > > > > > > >>>> Andy >> > > > > > > >>>> >> > > > > > > >> > > -------------------------------------------------------------------- >> > > > > > > ---- >> > > > > > > >>>> *Andy Blunden* >> > > > > > > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> > > > > > > >>>> >> > > > > > > >>>> >> > > > > > > >>>> larry smolucha wrote: >> > > > > > > >>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >> > > > > > > >>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself - >> > > > > > > >>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the synergistic >> > > > > > > possibilities: >> > > > > > > >>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) >> published >> > > in >> > > > > > > Thought >> > > > > > > >>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as translated >> > into >> > > > > > English >> > > > > > > >> 1962] >> > > > > > > >>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the >> > > 'additive' >> > > > > > value >> > > > > > > >> of the >> > > > > > > >>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the speech >> > > > > > > vocalization). >> > > > > > > >>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical >> elements >> > > that >> > > > > > > >>>>> are >> > > > > > > >> flammable >> > > > > > > >>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither >> flammable >> > > nor >> > > > > > > >>>>> a >> > > > > > gas. >> > > > > > > >>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century >> > > > > > > >>>>> European >> > > > > > > >> Developmental >> > > > > > > >>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean >> > 'developmental' >> > > > > > > >>>>> hence >> > > > > > > the >> > > > > > > >>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the >> case of >> > > > > > Piaget's >> > > > > > > >> Genetic >> > > > > > > >>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. >> > > > > > > >>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and >> > > > > > > >>>>> synthesis >> > > > > > > >> based on >> > > > > > > >>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in >> > > > > > > >>>>> Vygotsky's >> > > > > > > >> example of H2O. >> > > > > > > >>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com >> > > > > > > >>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >> > > > > > > >>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 >> > > > > > > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >> > > > > > > >>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >> > > > > > > >>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be >> > > synergistic >> > > > > > > >>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum of >> the >> > > > > parts. >> > > > > > > >>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing >> more >> > > > > > > >>>>>> than >> > > > > > the >> > > > > > > >>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really new >> > can >> > > > > > > >>>>>> ever >> > > > > > be >> > > > > > > >> imagined" >> > > > > > > >>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) >> > > > > > > >>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>> A couple things to consider: >> > > > > > > >>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of >> > imagination >> > > > > > > >>>>>> as the >> > > > > > > >> brain has >> > > > > > > >>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the >> > > > > > > >>>>>> simplest >> > > > > > level >> > > > > > > >> of the Gestalt >> > > > > > > >>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). >> > > > > > > >>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just >> > > > > > photographic. >> > > > > > > >>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is to >> > try >> > > > > > > >>>>>> to >> > > > > > > >> accurately reproduce >> > > > > > > >>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. >> > > Whereas, >> > > > > > > >>>>>> the >> > > > > > > >> goal of combinatory >> > > > > > > >>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of memories, >> > > > > > > >>>>>> dreams, >> > > > > > > >> musings, and even >> > > > > > > >>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual >> manipulation >> > of >> > > > > > objects >> > > > > > > >> and symbols. >> > > > > > > >>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the >> different >> > > ways >> > > > > > > >>>>>> that >> > > > > > > >> things and concepts can be >> > > > > > > >>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and >> sugar >> > > > > > > >>>>>> and >> > > > > > > flour. >> > > > > > > >>>>>> I can add water >> > and >> > > > > > > >>>>>> it >> > > > > > > >> dissolves a bit >> > > > > > > >>>>>> But adding heat >> > > > > > > >>>>>> changes >> > > > > > the >> > > > > > > >> combination into a pancake. >> > > > > > > >>>>>> [Is this synergistic?] >> > > > > > > >>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of >> more >> > > > > > > >>>>>> examples >> > > > > > > >> to put the discussion >> > > > > > > >>>>>> in the metaphysical realm. >> > > > > > > >>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen >> limit--make >> > the >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> case >> > > > > > > for >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting >> associationism. I >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> think >> > > > > > it's >> > > > > > > >> not >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there are >> > > > > > > >> associationists who >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> associationism >> > > > > > > >> exists and >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as >> > > > mediation. >> > > > > > > >> Vygotsky >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking >> > religion, >> > > > > > explain >> > > > > > > >> the >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> uniqueness of our species? >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species >> > feels >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> for >> > > > > > its >> > > > > > > >> own >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from a >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Piagetian perspective--and even from a strict >> Darwinian >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> one--true maturity >> > > > > > > as a >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is nothing >> > more >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> to it >> > > > > > > >> than >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety >> of >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> primate, >> > > > > > > and >> > > > > > > >> our >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones piled >> > upon >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> rocks >> > > > > > > in >> > > > > > > >> order >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be >> judged >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> the >> > > > > > same >> > > > > > > >> way as >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological functions >> > and >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> for >> > > > > > > >> language is >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case >> human >> > > > > > > >> exceptionalism. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the case >> for >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> the >> > > > > > > >> vanguard role >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other >> > species, >> > > > > > > prolonging >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking >> after >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> the >> > > > > > sick >> > > > > > > >> and the >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because >> artificial >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> organs >> > > > > > > >> (tools) and >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so important >> > for >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> our >> > > > > > > >> species, it >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where >> > these >> > > > > > > >> "circuitous, >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced >> that >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> lead >> > > > > > our >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth >> > always >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> been >> > > > > > > >> short on >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal for >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> material >> > > > > > > >> culture >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another >> > > matter: >> > > > > > > >> verily, here >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> attention is >> > > > > > > >> simply the >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he >> says >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> there are >> > > > > > > >> only two >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and >> recombinative. So >> > > > > > > >> imagination is >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete >> > > experiences, >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> and >> > > > > > > >> nothing >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky says, >> > when >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> you >> > > > > > > hear >> > > > > > > >> the >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been >> > there >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> to be >> > > > > > > >> able to >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory at >> > work >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> in >> > > > > > word >> > > > > > > >> meaning. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about Archimedes, >> > who >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> was >> > > > > > > given >> > > > > > > >> a >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had >> been >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> mixed >> > > > > > with >> > > > > > > >> silver >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent >> quantity >> > of >> > > > > gold. >> > > > > > > >> Well, we >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: it's >> not >> > > > > > possible >> > > > > > > to >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> precisely. The >> > > > > > > >> method >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> "principal >> > > > > > of >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> palimpsest, a >> > > > > > > >> velum on >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to each >> > > other. >> > > > > > > Because >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> written >> > > > > > over >> > > > > > > >> every >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of was >> > > soft, >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> the >> > > > > > > >> pressure >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the new >> > ones >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> when >> > > > > > > the >> > > > > > > >> old >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is >> the >> > > only >> > > > > > known >> > > > > > > >> Greek >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning nor >> > > their >> > > > > > > >> relationship >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact >> > they >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> are >> > > > > > > >> related to >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But it's >> > > quite >> > > > > > > similar >> > > > > > > >> to the >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> David Kellogg >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >> wrote: >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an >> > > > > > > associationist, >> > > > > > > >> ?sees >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> Henry >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg < >> > > > > > dkellogg60@gmail.com >> > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> wrote: >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for the >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> division >> > > > > > > >> between >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the >> other, >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> because >> > > > > > > >> Ribot is >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> an >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather >> distal >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> form of >> > > > > > > >> attention. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> transition >> > > > > > from >> > > > > > > >> forest >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> to >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the >> > division >> > > > > > between >> > > > > > > >> the two >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> commonsensical >> > > > > > > >> world of >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> the >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to fairly >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> prosaic >> > > > > > uses >> > > > > > > >> in life >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much more >> > > > > > > "imaginative" >> > > > > > > >> (that >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the >> > world >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> of the >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> farm,where >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where >> long >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> winter >> > > > > > > >> months are >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more likely >> to >> > > > > > encounter >> > > > > > > >> talking >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). Here >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> attention >> > > > > > > has >> > > > > > > >> to be >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> more voluntary. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he >> has a >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> very >> > > > > > clear >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian >> romanticism >> > > that >> > > > > > > >> underpins >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> Ribot >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. >> Vygotsky >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> points >> > > > > > > out >> > > > > > > >> the >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these >> productive >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> practices >> > > > > > > >> really >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> are >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of >> > > > > > imagination, >> > > > > > > >> there >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference >> > between >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> human >> > > > > > > and >> > > > > > > >> animal >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are perfectly >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> capable of >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> volitional >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than >> > > humans). >> > > > > > > Without >> > > > > > > >> a >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> theory >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any >> basis >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> for >> > > > > > > Ribot's >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> functions at >> > > > > > > >> all. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole < >> > mcole@ucsd.edu >> > > > > >> > > > > > wrote: >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination, >> > > > > > > >> thanks to >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> all >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> influential >> > > > > > > >> around the >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> time >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th >> > century. >> > > I >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> had >> > > > > > > >> seen work >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> on >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and >> reflective >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> equal >> > > > > > > >> reproductive? >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical >> > studies >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> of >> > > > > > > >> development >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> of >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The >> cost >> > of >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> being >> > > > > > a >> > > > > > > >> relative >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> mike >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >> > > > > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on my >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> bucket >> > > > > > list. >> > > > > > > >> This >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal >> musings >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> from >> > > > > > some >> > > > > > > >> weeks >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> in >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell >> correct >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that >> > > > > > > >> segmented the >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met >> > > > > aphorizing?. >> > > > > > > >> Puns, >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. >> :) >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Henry >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > wrote: >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward >> Kant >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> and >> > > > > > they >> > > > > > > >> are >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> doing >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky >> and >> > his >> > > > > > > >> followers as an >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced >> by >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel, so >> > > > > > > >> its of >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> course >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories >> > emerge. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, >> especially in >> > > > > > > >> translation, >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> seems >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, >> > > > "recollection" >> > > > > > in >> > > > > > > >> this >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> passage, >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in >> counter >> > > > > > > >> distinction to >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "memory." >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary >> > > > > > > >> discourse >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out >> > Russian >> > > > > > > >> colleagues have >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something >> from >> > > > > > theorists >> > > > > > > >> who >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> clearly >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- when >> it >> > > was >> > > > > > still >> > > > > > > >> possible >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> to >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" >> > which, >> > > > > > > >> interestingly >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> links >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of a >> > > > > > "voluntary" >> > > > > > > >> act. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Parts >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> of >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like >> children >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> stuff >> > > > > > > that >> > > > > > > >> was >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> also >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the >> > concepts >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> of >> > > > > > > >> creativity >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> and >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its >> curious >> > > to >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> see >> > > > > > > >> that the >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> two >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he >> > found >> > > > > > himself >> > > > > > > >> writing. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> mike >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to >> > which >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> pretty >> > > > > > > old >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> approaches >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < >> > > > > > > >> ablunden@mira.net> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively >> > contemporary, >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> but it >> > > > > > > >> may be >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> worth >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a >> > prominent >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> place >> > > > > > to >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Imagination >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating >> between >> > > > > > > >> Recollection and >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) >> > Reproductive >> > > > > > > >> Imagination, >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> (2) >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive >> Imagination, >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> which >> > > > > > he >> > > > > > > >> says >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> leads >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive >> Memory. >> > In >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> other >> > > > > > > >> words, >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> the >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to >> Intellect is >> > > > > > > >> accomplished >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> through >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >> >> > > > > > >> > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >> > > > > > -- >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading >> > > Strawson >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and >> > > > > > > >> Williams. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian developmentalists >> > > whose >> > > > > > work i >> > > > > > > >> am >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> trying >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) >> speak >> > of >> > > > > > > >> productive >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that productive >> > > > > > imagination >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> develops. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive >> > > implies >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that >> > > > > > > >> there >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> must >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> be a >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive >> > > imagination. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> But >> > > > > > I >> > > > > > > >> learned >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination >> > > appears >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and >> > > > > > is >> > > > > > > >> linked >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> to >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an ineluctable >> > part >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of >> > > > > > > >> anticipation >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY >> SHONERD < >> > > > > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination >> > > > > > > >> (starting >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more >> contemporaneous >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> look, and >> > > > > > > >> provides >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> a >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the >> > socio-cultural >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as >> > > > > > > fixed. >> > > > > > > >> This, >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, >> gives >> > me >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a >> > > > > > > ground >> > > > > > > >> to >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> take >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> part >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I >> start >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> preconceptions: >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> grammarian >> > > > > > > >> Langacker on >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and cognitive >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> domains, >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> particularly >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to me, >> is >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> full of >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> imagination >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two >> > aspects >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of >> > > > > > > >> temporality: >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and >> rhythmic >> > > > > > > >> structure), which >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> I >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and >> creativity, >> > for >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> both >> > > > > > > >> individual >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and >> feeling. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < >> > > > > > > >> lpscholar2@gmail.com> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this >> > topic. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the >> > third >> > > > > > *space* >> > > > > > > >> and the >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to >> internet. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond Williams >> > and >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> his >> > > > > > > >> notion of >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This >> notion >> > > is >> > > > > > > >> explored under >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as a >> > > *set* >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of >> > > > > > > >> modalities >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a >> form >> > of >> > > > > > knowing >> > > > > > > >> that is >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [perceived??] >> > > > > > if >> > > > > > > >> we >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> think >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the >> imaginal as >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *style* Larry On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 >> PM, >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> HENRY SHONERD < >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just >> want to >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> say how >> > > > > > > >> jazzed up >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> I >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> am >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going >> wild, >> > > the >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind >> > > > > > > as >> > > > > > > >> Larry >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, >> actually >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> various >> > > > > > > >> triads, >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> finally >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of >> my >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notebooks >> > > > > > > of >> > > > > > > >> the >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> mind, as >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap >> > > adentro, >> > > > > > luega >> > > > > > > >> pa? >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> fuera. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole < >> > > > > > mcole@ucsd.edu> >> > > > > > > >> wrote: >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination >> > thread, >> > > > > > attached >> > > > > > > >> are two >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the >> > issue. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of >> > CHAT >> > > > > > > theorists >> > > > > > > >> like >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the >> development >> > of >> > > > > > > >> imagination in a >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's >> notion >> > > of >> > > > > > > >> productive >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and >> have >> > > no >> > > > > > > >> intention of >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> doing >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as >> > explicated >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the >> > > > > > > >> attached >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these >> > > > > > philosophers, >> > > > > > > I >> > > > > > > >> came >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> upon >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are very >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> closely >> > > > > > > >> linked at >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> several >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our >> > > naivete, >> > > > > > > >> Ettienne and I >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around >> earlier >> > as >> > > a >> > > > > > means >> > > > > > > of >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> access >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, >> Alexander >> > > > > Suvorov. >> > > > > > > >> Moreover, >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> such >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of >> the >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have >> > direct >> > > > > > > relevance >> > > > > > > >> to >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Kris's >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also >> > speak >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >> > > > > > > >> concerns >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> about >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play in >> > > > > > development. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination >> > > thread. >> > > > > > > Perhaps >> > > > > > > >> they >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> will >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal >> with a >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural >> > > > > > > >> science >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with an >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > Strawson.pdf> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> -- >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a >> > natural >> > > > > > science >> > > > > > > >> with an >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> -- >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a >> natural >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> science >> > > > > > > >> with an >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>>> >> > > > > > > >>>> >> > > > > > > >>> >> > > > > > > >> >> > > > > > > >> >> > > > > > > >> >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > -- >> > > > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> > > > > > Assistant Professor >> > > > > > Department of Anthropology >> > > > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> > > > > > Brigham Young University >> > > > > > Provo, UT 84602 >> > > > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> > > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > -- >> > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> > > > Assistant Professor >> > > > Department of Anthropology >> > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> > > > Brigham Young University >> > > > Provo, UT 84602 >> > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> > > > >> > > > >> > > >> > > >> > > -- >> > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> > > Assistant Professor >> > > Department of Anthropology >> > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> > > Brigham Young University >> > > Provo, UT 84602 >> > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > >> > -- >> > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> > Assistant Professor >> > Department of Anthropology >> > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> > Brigham Young University >> > Provo, UT 84602 >> > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> > >> >> >> >> -- >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >> > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Fri Dec 26 21:34:59 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Fri, 26 Dec 2014 22:34:59 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors / Speaking of AAE In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Apologies for the code, LRH = Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis, AAE = African-American English. -greg On Fri, Dec 26, 2014 at 7:43 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > > One last post - this one is about the larger question of AAE and > linguistic relativity and was provoked by a recent conversation I had with > John Lucy (a key proponent of the LRH - > http://home.uchicago.edu/~johnlucy/ ). He is has been having a > conversation about AAE and the LRH with John McWhorter, one of the top > scholars of AAE (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_McWhorter), and > McWhorter is not a fan of the LRH. At least part of this seems to be b.c. > of the fact that it far too easily leads down the road of deficit thinking > about AAE speakers. The argument goes: if language affects thought then > speaking AAE will have an effect on how one is able to think. From there it > is a short jump to the assumption that AAE leads to ways of thinking that > are not conducive to learning complex intellectual concepts. > > Hopefully that provides some background to my comment about potential > concerns with Orr's work. The concerns are not with her work per se. My > concerns are rather with the body of scholarship on AAE and the LRH and the > fact that, other than Labov's early work, there are no positive > articulations of what the linguistic forms that define AAE actually do for > those who speak this English dialect (as compared to another dialect). (I > should add that I've since recalled that Geneva Smitherman's work is shot > through with positive articulations of what AAE linguistic forms can do - > her book Talkin and Testifyin' is a classic in this regard, but I wonder if > the demonstrative style may be too difficult for speakers of mainstream > English and/or academic-ese to understand!). > > Orr's work, in the wrong hands, can lead us down the path that McWhorter > is concerned about - right to the conclusion that AAE is an intellectually > problematic language because it interferes with a student's ability to > understand mathematics. > > Hopefully that pulls some of the context of the larger conversation of > which my post was only a small part. > > Cheers to all, > greg > > > > > On Fri, Dec 26, 2014 at 7:25 PM, Greg Thompson > wrote: >> >> A second response to the paper that Mike forwarded (and to Paul's post on >> the previous thread). >> >> There is a sticky problem here that has not yet been dealt with >> adequately, namely, if language forms do affect habitual thinking, then >> what are the effects of the linguistic forms that come with AAE? I'm >> thinking not just about pragmatics, but also about grammar (and perhaps >> semantics as well). >> >> One thing that many have noted about AAE is that passive voice and >> nominalizations are dispreferred by AAE speakers. The result is a way of >> speaking that encourages the naming of actors and agents. Thus, in AAE, it >> is difficult to carry on agent-less talk like: >> 1. "Our neighborhood has been negatively affected in the past few years." >> or, with nominalizations: >> 2. "Negative affectings have happened in our neighborhood in the past few >> years." >> >> Now these are perhaps terrible examples because although the first seems >> a reasonable locution, I think most of us would disprefer the second. >> Nonetheless, the second takes a form that is not uncommon in legal-ese and >> academic-ese (!!) as a way of obfuscating potentially responsible agents >> (one of the main tasks of the lawyer) and making processes into things (one >> of the tasks of the scientific academic...). >> >> Instead the preference in AAE is for active sentences like: >> "Somebody('s) been negatively affecting our neighborhood in the past few >> years." >> >> With this locution (as with any form), you win some and you lose some. >> On the one hand, the frequent use of active voice is a mark of good >> writing (notwithstanding the various other AAE grammatical inflections that >> are often understood as "bad grammar" by mainstream speakers - and I'll >> admit that the example offered here is not a good one either...). On the >> other hand, using predominately active voice can be marginalizing in >> "high-theoretical" academic writing and in legal writing. >> >> That's the way that I tend to think of relativity effects - with any >> language, you win some, you lose some. But I think attention to both sides, >> winning and losing, is important. What I've sketched here in a somewhat >> pathetic fashion is one answer to the question: "what do you "win" with >> AAE?" >> >> -greg >> >> p.s., that seems like too many screens (I just adjusted my font size >> bigger so maybe I can blame it on that...). >> >> >> >> On Mon, Dec 22, 2014 at 9:33 AM, mike cole wrote: >>> >>> I am not in general following this thread, being waaaaaaaaaaaaaay behind >>> on >>> the imagination thread, but I tripped over the exchange regarding Orr and >>> AAE. To keep it short, I attach two documents. >>> >>> The first is a draft segment from Cultural Psychology (1996) and the >>> other >>> an empirical report of even greater activity. For those who do not know >>> the >>> Labov work, the Word file might prove useful. for those of you for whom >>> this topic is of continuing interest, perhaps the published paper is of >>> more value. >>> >>> It is not true that no one followed up on Labov. It is probably true that >>> no one followed up on the followup. >>> mike >>> >>> On Mon, Dec 22, 2014 at 8:00 AM, Greg Thompson < >>> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>> > ?David Ki, >>> > No worries. No offense taken. But thanks for the just-in-case note. >>> > And yes, I agree to disagree. >>> > Respectfully, >>> > greg? >>> > >>> > On Mon, Dec 22, 2014 at 6:24 AM, David H Kirshner >>> wrote: >>> > > >>> > > Greg, >>> > > >>> > > I disagree with you that Orr could/should have taken a more >>> culturally >>> > > sensitive approach to her studies of AAE speakers' difficulties in >>> > > classrooms dominated by standard English instruction. But I in no >>> wise >>> > > intended to imply your wishing she had done so places you among >>> those who >>> > > consider her work as racist. I'm very sorry if my words suggested >>> > otherwise. >>> > > >>> > > David >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > -----Original Message----- >>> > > From: xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >>> > > xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg >>> > Thompson >>> > > Sent: Sunday, December 21, 2014 9:36 AM >>> > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors >>> > > >>> > > In the interests of following the recently suggested injunction not >>> to >>> > > directly address specific interlocutors, I'll talk in generalities >>> (This >>> > > makes it a bit more challenging to have a conversation but it also >>> makes >>> > > one think about the extractable and generalizable point that is >>> beyond >>> > the >>> > > immediate context). >>> > > >>> > > In my previous post (apologies for drawing on prior context), I >>> neither >>> > > suggested nor intended to imply that Orr's work is racist (do >>> intentions >>> > > matter when it comes to meaning?). This speaks to some of the >>> > difficulties >>> > > of talking about issues of race. And in this connection let's not >>> forget >>> > > the fact that this list-serve is dominated by white men - that >>> doesn't >>> > mean >>> > > that we are necessarily racist but it does mean that we are likely >>> to be >>> > > ignorant of many aspects of these issues. >>> > > >>> > > Nonetheless, I believe that we can overcome our ignorance through >>> > > education, by learning more about the issues - even when it comes to >>> > trying >>> > > to understand cultures and languages that we did not grow up with. >>> And >>> > > while I think that there is good evidence for the linguistic >>> relativity >>> > > hypothesis, I do not believe that language is a determining >>> influence in >>> > > ALL thinking (Whorf uses the term "habitual" to describe the type of >>> > > thinking that is most susceptible to the influence of language). That >>> > means >>> > > that even if you don't speak AAE, you can still study it and even >>> come to >>> > > understand how the grammatical forms lend themselves to particular >>> ways >>> > of >>> > > understanding the world (this is what linguistic anthropology is all >>> > > about!). >>> > > >>> > > And this is my concern with Orr's work. With all academic work, I >>> think >>> > it >>> > > is worth considering questions like "How would racists take up our >>> > > research?" In the case of Orr's work, my sense is that racists could >>> > easily >>> > > take up her research to argue (perhaps even by using the linguistic >>> > > relativity hypothesis) that AAE speakers are unable to do complex >>> > > mathematical thinking. This is why I would think that it is >>> important to >>> > > give a positive articulation of what AAE does as a language. It is >>> > > certainly important to understand what it CAN'T do (e.g., help one >>> learn >>> > > math in a particular way), but it is equally important to understand >>> what >>> > > it CAN do. >>> > > >>> > > As Paul points out, Labov has done some of the work addressing this. >>> But >>> > > note that Labov's work was done 40 years ago and no one has sought to >>> > > replicate or do any kind of similar work. What gives? >>> > > >>> > > -greg >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > -greg >>> > > >>> > > On Sat, Dec 20, 2014 at 11:37 PM, David H Kirshner >>> > wrote: >>> > > >>> > > > Greg, >>> > > > >>> > > > I'm delighted that you're familiar with and appreciative of Orr's >>> work. >>> > > > >>> > > > Cleary she didn't provide "serious consideration of how AAE >>> speakers >>> > > > actually use prepositions"--she couldn't have, as she was not a >>> native >>> > > > speaker of Black English dialect, and she was not a linguist. But >>> I'm >>> > not >>> > > > sure how paying serious attention to technical nuances of Black >>> English >>> > > > grammar would have helped, as her analyses show that the African >>> > American >>> > > > students in her classes were not speaking either standard English >>> or >>> > > Black >>> > > > English Vernacular, but rather a hybrid that arises from their >>> efforts >>> > to >>> > > > emulate standard English. >>> > > > >>> > > > Now, it's true her work didn't parallel the approach Gay and Cole >>> took >>> > to >>> > > > understanding what other psychologists were classifying as >>> linguistic >>> > and >>> > > > cognitive deficits by carefully studying the native language and >>> > culture. >>> > > > On the other hand, she did something Gay and Cole didn't do, namely >>> > > > micro-analyze the linguistic miscues operating in the classroom, >>> and >>> > the >>> > > > resultant dilemmas of comprehension this created for her African >>> > American >>> > > > students. >>> > > > >>> > > > As the excerpt copied below illustrates, Orr was scrupulously >>> attentive >>> > > to >>> > > > understanding her students' experience of distance and location >>> given >>> > the >>> > > > different linguistic setting. And her analyses consistently point >>> to >>> > the >>> > > > mismatch between the native dialect and the language of >>> instruction as >>> > > the >>> > > > source of the problems, not the native dialect, itself. To label >>> this >>> > > work >>> > > > as implicitly racist, I think cedes too much to those who mistrust >>> > > science >>> > > > as a tool of the oppressor, and whose only locus of attention is >>> the >>> > > > history and legacy of social injustice. Even now, in this >>> discussion, >>> > we >>> > > > are missing the point. The major significance of Orr's work is not >>> that >>> > > > differences in grammatical structure have semantic implications. >>> This >>> > is >>> > > > merely a window to the dramatic realization that semantics are >>> written >>> > > into >>> > > > grammatical form. >>> > > > >>> > > > David >>> > > > >>> > > > Excerpt from Orr (1987): >>> > > > >>> > > > "Jane gives us in these diagrams a glimpse into the kinds of mental >>> > > images >>> > > > she constructs when she is using the single symbol length, >>> representing >>> > > > both location and distance, as a tool with which to think. Even the >>> > > > diagrams Jane drew for problems 13 and 14 begin to be less >>> > > incomprehensible >>> > > > if one attempts to construct in one's own mind images of the >>> > information >>> > > > given in these problems, while adhering to the requirement that >>> length >>> > be >>> > > > used to represent both location and distance. They can be seen as >>> > > possible >>> > > > consequents or extensions of the symbol length when it is used to >>> > > represent >>> > > > both location and distance. Consider, for instance, the mental >>> images >>> > one >>> > > > might construct in responding to problem 13: Two cities, both >>> > represented >>> > > > by line segments, are equal distances (that is, equal line >>> segments) >>> > > closer >>> > > > to a third city (another line segment) than two other cities (line >>> > > > segments) are. The first two cities must be represented by equal >>> line >>> > > > segments because they are equal distances closer to the third city >>> than >>> > > the >>> > > > other two cities are. And these other two cities must also be >>> > represented >>> > > > by equal line segments because they are equal distances from the >>> third >>> > > > city. One can see that Jane's diagrams are not as lacking in >>> reason as >>> > > they >>> > > > may initially have appeared to be. >>> > > > >>> > > > "Jane's diagrams suggest the possibility that when words, or >>> symbols >>> > are >>> > > > used as instruments with which to think, the use in one language >>> of a >>> > > > single symbol in contexts where a second language requires two or >>> more >>> > > can >>> > > > lead a speaker of the first language to arrive at a different >>> mental >>> > > > construct of some given information from that arrived at by a >>> speaker >>> > of >>> > > > the second language. Or, as in Jane's attempt to handle problem >>> 14, the >>> > > > result may be an inability to arrive at a workable mental >>> construct at >>> > > > all." (p. 25) >>> > > > >>> > > > [Note, this excerpt is part of a longer segment I emailed on Dec. >>> 19 >>> > that >>> > > > shows Jane's diagrams that Orr is referring to.] >>> > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > -----Original Message----- >>> > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >>> > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson >>> > > > Sent: Saturday, December 20, 2014 3:14 PM >>> > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors >>> > > > >>> > > > The issues that are raised by Orr are indeed important ones. I am >>> a fan >>> > > of >>> > > > her work as it points to important differences in language usage >>> among >>> > > AAE >>> > > > speakers. I agree that she shouldn't have been condemned for >>> pointing >>> > out >>> > > > these differences (particularly considering how important it is for >>> > > > teachers to understand the consequences of these differences). If >>> you >>> > > want >>> > > > to help AAE speaking students do better on standardized tests, >>> then you >>> > > > absolutely need to pay attention to these differences. >>> > > > >>> > > > My one concern here is that I do feel like there is a problem of >>> > deficit >>> > > > thinking that is at least implied in her work (and maybe "implied" >>> is >>> > too >>> > > > strong a term - maybe it's just that she doesn't provide evidence >>> to >>> > > > discourage us from this view). What we don't see in this book is >>> any >>> > > > serious consideration of how AAE speakers actually use >>> prepositions - >>> > > e.g., >>> > > > the ways of using language that exist in the community of AAE >>> speakers. >>> > > > This gives Orr's work a feel somewhat like the studies of math >>> among >>> > the >>> > > > Kpelle studied by Gay and Cole in the pre-early days of LCHC (see >>> wiki >>> > > for >>> > > > more: http://lchcfestschrift.wikispaces.com/Chapter+1). Before >>> they >>> > > > showed >>> > > > up on the scene, everyone had assumed that the Kpelle (Liberia) >>> > couldn't >>> > > > comprehend basic math concepts b.c. they weren't learning it in the >>> > ways >>> > > > that it was being taught (and perhaps there were even linguistic >>> > > relativity >>> > > > arguments that pointed to this). Rather then continuing to pluck >>> these >>> > > > folks out of context and run them through various types of >>> experiments, >>> > > Gay >>> > > > and Cole "explicitly began with the assumption that ?we must know >>> more >>> > > > about the indigenous mathematics so that we can build effective >>> bridges >>> > > to >>> > > > the new mathematics that we are trying to introduce?" >>> > > > >From their research, they found that the Kpelle actually had high >>> > > > competence with complex mathematical problems (e.g., estimating >>> > volumes). >>> > > > As they write: >>> > > > "Overall, the data suggested that no generalized lack of >>> mathematical, >>> > > > perceptual, or problem solving abilities stood in the way of >>> > mathematics >>> > > > education. When the materials and procedures used in assessment >>> tasks >>> > > were >>> > > > designed to match closely valued local practices, lack of ability >>> could >>> > > be >>> > > > replaced by apparent special ability. At the same time, schooling >>> did >>> > > > appear to influence performance in tasks that were routinely used >>> to >>> > > > measure cognitive development." >>> > > > So I think I would be more comfortable with Orr's work if she were >>> to >>> > > have >>> > > > included this kind of rich understanding of usage in context and >>> how >>> > > > prepositions actually are used among AAE speakers. >>> > > > >>> > > > This points to a larger question that might be irksome to some >>> folks, >>> > but >>> > > > the question regards the extent to which mathematical language is >>> > > > predicated upon a particular form of what Whorf called "Standard >>> > Average >>> > > > European." In short, the idea here is that Math has a history and a >>> > > > culture. This doesn't mean that it is useless or a waste of time, >>> just >>> > > that >>> > > > it is a particular way of encountering the world that is good for >>> > > > particular things and not for others. >>> > > > >>> > > > I think we've gone round this mulberry bush before, but that was >>> just >>> > > more >>> > > > grist for the mill (I prefer my metaphors mixed!). >>> > > > >>> > > > -greg >>> > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 8:46 PM, David H Kirshner >> > > >> > > > dkirsh@lsu.edu>> wrote: >>> > > > > >>> > > > > The topic of how grammatical form relates to meaning calls to >>> mind >>> > the >>> > > > > groundbreaking work of Eleanor Orr--whom you've probably never >>> heard >>> > of >>> > > > on >>> > > > > account of the fact that her work was condemned by a >>> > > politically-correct >>> > > > > faction of race-conscious sociolinguists who decided her >>> analysis of >>> > > > Black >>> > > > > English Vernacular could too easily be appropriated into racist >>> > > > discourses >>> > > > > about language deficiency. >>> > > > > >>> > > > > Orr was a Washington DC area teacher and principal in the 1970s >>> and >>> > > > 1980s, >>> > > > > who traced math difficulties of her African American students to >>> > subtle >>> > > > > grammatical differences between Black English dialect and >>> standard >>> > > > English. >>> > > > > Her 1987 book goes into compelling detail to support the thesis >>> that >>> > > the >>> > > > > meaning structure of basic mathematical terms is embedded in the >>> > > > > grammatical setting in which those terms are expressed. For >>> instance, >>> > > the >>> > > > > meaning of ?distance? is embedded in the grammatical structure >>> > > ?distance >>> > > > > from _________ to __________? where the place-holders hold >>> locations; >>> > > if >>> > > > > you don?t have that grammatical structure, and you're in a >>> linguistic >>> > > > > environment in which that structure is assumed, you're likely not >>> > going >>> > > > to >>> > > > > be able to gain full access to the concept. >>> > > > > >>> > > > > The attached excerpts from her book--ignore the Forward, unless >>> you'd >>> > > > like >>> > > > > some context--reveal some of her students' bizarre conceptions of >>> > > > distance >>> > > > > (and other basic mathematical concepts) as revealed in their >>> > diagrams. >>> > > > Her >>> > > > > approach involves linguistic analysis of sentences produced by >>> her >>> > > > African >>> > > > > American students that she reads as collapsed versions of >>> standard >>> > > > English >>> > > > > sentences, with differences in prepositional structure being >>> > > highlighted >>> > > > > (but other grammatical elements also are indicated). >>> > > > > >>> > > > > This work cuts against the grain of anything going on in >>> mathematics >>> > > > > education. The Piagetian view that dominates that field holds >>> that >>> > > basic >>> > > > > concepts come about from reflection on our actions in our >>> engagement >>> > > with >>> > > > > the material world. When language enters the conversation, it's >>> with >>> > > > > respect to semantic structure; to my knowledge, nobody's ever >>> > > implicated >>> > > > > syntax directly in basic quantitative understanding. >>> > > > > >>> > > > > This work is particularly interesting to me in connection with my >>> > > > > 21-year-old son who is autistic, and whose grammatical function >>> is >>> > > > severely >>> > > > > impaired. He has a decent vocabulary, but unless the setting for >>> the >>> > > > > conversation provides contextual clues, he can't piece together >>> how >>> > the >>> > > > > semantic elements are linked to one another. It is only recently >>> that >>> > > it >>> > > > > occurred to me his lack of a secure sense of basic quantitative >>> terms >>> > > > like >>> > > > > ?more? and ?less? may be rooted in his grammatical incapacities. >>> > > > > >>> > > > > The XMCA discussion, thus far, has touched on grammar with >>> respect to >>> > > > > lexical items such as prepositions. But we've not yet tied that >>> to >>> > the >>> > > > > grammatical forms that embed those lexical items. I'm very >>> curious as >>> > > to >>> > > > > whether that further connection can be made. >>> > > > > >>> > > > > David Kirshner >>> > > > > >>> > > > > Orr, E., W. (1987). Twice as less: Black English and the >>> performance >>> > of >>> > > > > black students in mathematics and science. New York: W. W. >>> Norton & >>> > > > Company. >>> > > > > >>> > > > > -----Original Message----- >>> > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: >>> > > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg >>> > > > > Sent: Friday, December 19, 2014 3:06 PM >>> > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors >>> > > > > >>> > > > > Yes, Haliday is essentially a Whorfian, and that's one of things >>> that >>> > > > > brings him close to Vygotsky. (Compare, for example, Chomsky, >>> who is >>> > > > > essentially anti-developmental in his ideas about language, and >>> who >>> > now >>> > > > > rejects the leading role played by social communication and says >>> that >>> > > > > communication is epiphenomenal to language, whose original >>> purpose is >>> > > > > thought.) For Sapir, and for Whorf, in the beginning of every >>> major >>> > > > > onotogenetic, sociogenetic, and even phylogenetic change in >>> language >>> > > > there >>> > > > > has to be some change in the nature of communication. >>> > > > > >>> > > > > So what Andy says about the lack of the basis of modern science >>> in >>> > Hopi >>> > > > > applies perfectly well to English. When we read the scientific >>> > writings >>> > > > of >>> > > > > Chaucer on the astrolabe, for example, we do not see words like >>> > > > > "reflection", "refraction" or "alignment". Chaucer uses words >>> like >>> > > > "bounce >>> > > > > off", "bend through", and "line up" (note the use of >>> prepositions, >>> > > > > Helena!). Where did these words come from, and how did they make >>> > > > scientific >>> > > > > English possible? >>> > > > > >>> > > > > Most of us have no problem saying that Isaac Newton discovered >>> the >>> > laws >>> > > > of >>> > > > > gravitation. But it's only a slight exaggeration to say that >>> what he >>> > > > really >>> > > > > discovered was the meaning potential of words like "gravitation". >>> > > Gravity >>> > > > > is, of course, not a thing at all; that is, it's not an entity, >>> but >>> > > > rather >>> > > > > a process, the process of falling down, or falling in (preps, >>> > again!). >>> > > So >>> > > > > how and above all why does it become an entity? >>> > > > > >>> > > > > It's interesting to compare Newton's writings on optics with >>> > Chaucer's >>> > > on >>> > > > > the astrolabe. The "Opticks" has a fixed format that we recognize >>> > > almost >>> > > > > instantly today: Newton describes his equipment (the prism and >>> the >>> > dark >>> > > > > room); he then narrates his method as a kind of recipe ("First, >>> I did >>> > > > this; >>> > > > > then I did that") and draws conclusions, which he then >>> formulates in >>> > > > > mathematical terms (this is essentially the format of Vygotsky's >>> > > lectures >>> > > > > on pedology, so much so that when translating them we had some >>> > trouble >>> > > > > determining the precise moment when Vygotsky turns to the >>> blackboard >>> > to >>> > > > > write his conclusion in the form of a law). >>> > > > > >>> > > > > In order to get them into mathematical shape, though, he has to >>> make >>> > > > > sentences that look a lot like equations. "The plumpness of the >>> lens >>> > > > yields >>> > > > > a greater refraction of the light", "The reflection of the light >>> from >>> > > the >>> > > > > glass results of the light striking the flatness of the glass" >>> "The >>> > > > > curvature of the spectacle glass supplies the lacking plumpness >>> of >>> > the >>> > > > > eye". In each of these, a quality or a process which would >>> normally >>> > be >>> > > > > realized as an adjective or a verb is suddenly realized by a >>> noun, >>> > > > creating >>> > > > > an imaginary entity. >>> > > > > >>> > > > > That's grammatical metaphor. Something that is "canonically" >>> realized >>> > > by >>> > > > a >>> > > > > verb ("to grow") is suddenly realized nominally ("growth"), or >>> > > something >>> > > > > that is canonically a quality ('red") is realized verbally >>> > ("redden"). >>> > > We >>> > > > > even find related clauses realized as verbs ("She did not know >>> the >>> > > rules. >>> > > > > So she died" is realized by "Death was brought about through >>> > > ignorance", >>> > > > > all of these examples from Halliday). In fact, the Genetic Law >>> that >>> > > > > Vygotsky formulates in "Mind in Society" ("Every higher mental >>> > function >>> > > > is >>> > > > > realized on two planes....") is really just one instance of >>> > grammatical >>> > > > > metaphor. >>> > > > > >>> > > > > One of Chomsky's best known arguments for the radical innateness >>> > > > > hypothesis is this. If I take a sentence like "Students who do >>> not do >>> > > > their >>> > > > > homework do not do well" and I want to make a question, how do I >>> know >>> > > > which >>> > > > > "do" to move to the front? Chomsky assumes that this knowledge is >>> > > > > essentially innate; it is part of universal grammar. But you can >>> see >>> > > that >>> > > > > "Do students who do not do their homework do well?" can be built >>> up >>> > > > through >>> > > > > a process of what we might call "discourse metaphor"--whereby >>> clauses >>> > > > stand >>> > > > > for >>> > > > > exchanges: >>> > > > > >>> > > > > Mother: You did your homework, didn't you? >>> > > > > Child: No. >>> > > > > Mother: You didn't do your homework? Did you do well? >>> > > > > Child: No. >>> > > > > Mother: You didn't do well? >>> > > > > Child: No. >>> > > > > Mother: You didn't do you homework so you didn't do well. Do the >>> > other >>> > > > > students do well? >>> > > > > Child: Some of them. >>> > > > > Mother: Who does well? Do students who do not do their homework >>> do >>> > > well? >>> > > > > >>> > > > > And this of course explains why wh-items like "who" and 'why" >>> have >>> > two >>> > > > > functions--one inside a clause, where it expresses an >>> intra-mental >>> > > > function >>> > > > > (grammar) and one between them where it expresses an inter-mental >>> > > > function >>> > > > > (discourse). >>> > > > > >>> > > > > I realize that grammatical metaphor will seem rather dry and >>> abstract >>> > > and >>> > > > > unpoetic to people who assume that metaphor is only of the >>> lexical >>> > > kind. >>> > > > > But to me, and I think to most children, it is far far more >>> powerful >>> > > and >>> > > > > far more important developmentally. In some ways, it's the >>> lexical >>> > > > metaphor >>> > > > > that is responsible for the disenchantment of the child's world, >>> > while >>> > > > the >>> > > > > grammatical metaphor infinitely expands it. (And here, I'm >>> afraid, I >>> > > must >>> > > > > stop--it's time for breakfast and anyway my one screen is used >>> up!) >>> > > > > >>> > > > > David Kellogg >>> > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > > , or "the >>> > > > > >>> > > > > . He >>> > > > > >>> > > > > On 19 December 2014 at 15:15, Greg Thompson < >>> > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com >>> > > > > >>> > > > > wrote: >>> > > > > >>> > > > > > Helena and David, >>> > > > > > I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the >>> > > so-called >>> > > > > > authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred >>> > tradition >>> > > > > > to >>> > > > > > Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi >>> > notion >>> > > > > > of "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including >>> > English) >>> > > > > > notion of "time" and how each of these languages offers >>> different >>> > > > > > affordances of meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more processual >>> > > > > > understanding, English has a much more >>> reified/objectified/entified >>> > > > > > sense of time. (btw, I think the first paragraph is easier to >>> > follow >>> > > > > > than the second - and in that first paragraph you'll find our >>> old >>> > > > friend >>> > > > > "imagination"). >>> > > > > > David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to? >>> > > > > > -greg >>> > > > > > >>> > > > > > Taken from: >>> > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> > > >>> http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/mousesite/Second >>> > > > > > ary/Whorfframe2.html >>> > > > > > >>> > > > > > " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, >>> sunset" >>> > > are >>> > > > > > with us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference >>> from >>> > > other >>> > > > > nouns. >>> > > > > > They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in >>> > > winter" >>> > > > > > just as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are >>> > pluralized >>> > > > > > and numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. >>> Our >>> > > > > > thought about the referents of such words hence becomes >>> > objectified. >>> > > > > > Without objectification, it would be a subjective experience of >>> > real >>> > > > > > time, i.e. of the consciousness of "becoming later and >>> > later"--simply >>> > > > > > a cyclic phase similar to an earlier phase in that >>> > > ever-later-becoming >>> > > > > > duration. Only by imagination can such a cyclic phase be set >>> beside >>> > > > > > another and another in the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually >>> > > > > > perceived) configuration. "But such is the power of linguistic >>> > > analogy >>> > > > > that we do so objectify cyclic phasing. >>> > > > > > We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of e.g., >>> > > > > "phasing." >>> > > > > > And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the >>> resulting >>> > > > > > binomial formula of formless item plus form, is so general >>> that it >>> > is >>> > > > > > implicit for all nouns, and hence our very generalized formless >>> > items >>> > > > > > like "substance, matter," by which we can fill out the >>> binomial for >>> > > an >>> > > > > > enormously wide range of nouns. But even these are not quite >>> > > > > > generalized enough to take in our phase nouns. So for the phase >>> > nouns >>> > > > we >>> > > > > have made a formless item, "time." >>> > > > > > We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a >>> phase, in >>> > > the >>> > > > > > pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make >>> "summer" in >>> > > > > > the pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we >>> can >>> > say >>> > > > > > and think "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of >>> time." Let >>> > > me >>> > > > > > again point out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle of >>> > milk" >>> > > > > > or "a piece of cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that "a >>> > > > > > summer" actually contains or consists of such-and-such a >>> quantity >>> > of >>> > > > > "time." >>> > > > > > >>> > > > > > In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., >>> are >>> > > not >>> > > > > > nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. >>> They >>> > are >>> > > a >>> > > > > > formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, >>> verbs, >>> > and >>> > > > > > even other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a >>> > > > > > locative pattern, like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It >>> > contains >>> > > > > > no morpheme like one of "in the house" or "at the tree." It >>> means >>> > > > > > "when it is morning" or "while morning-phase is occurring." >>> These >>> > > > > > "temporal s" are not used as subjects or objects, or at all >>> like >>> > > > > > nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" or "summer is hot"; >>> > > summer >>> > > > > > is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions are hot, WHEN heat >>> > occurs. >>> > > > > > One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or "summer >>> > > recently." >>> > > > > > There is no objectification, as a region, an extent, a >>> quantity, of >>> > > > > > the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested about >>> time >>> > > > > > except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no >>> > basis >>> > > > > here for a formless item answering to our "time." " >>> > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> > > > > > On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Helena Worthen >>> > > > > > > >>> > > > > > wrote: >>> > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to >>> this: >>> > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that >>> > Newton >>> > > > > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and to >>> > > create >>> > > > > > > sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly >>> > > > > > > productive, which is why they still form the basis of >>> scientific >>> > > > > > > writing and thinking today." >>> > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I >>> lose you >>> > > > > > > when >>> > > > > > you >>> > > > > > > say "created to talk about gravity as an entity". >>> > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > Thank you, >>> > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > Helena >>> > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > Helena Worthen >>> > > > > > > helenaworthen@gmail.com >>> > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>> > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > As Helena points out, prepositions are from the >>> "grammatical" >>> > end >>> > > > > > > > of >>> > > > > > what >>> > > > > > > > Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what >>> > > > > > > > Halliday >>> > > > > > calls >>> > > > > > > > "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that they >>> > have >>> > > > > > > > three properties that words from the more "lexical" end do >>> not >>> > > > have: >>> > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. (You >>> > can, >>> > > > > > > actually, >>> > > > > > > > but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you >>> invent a >>> > new >>> > > > > > > > name >>> > > > > > > or a >>> > > > > > > > new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can). >>> > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific >>> > semantic >>> > > > > > > > field >>> > > > > > > (the >>> > > > > > > > way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area of >>> > > > > > linguistics) >>> > > > > > > > but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are >>> used. >>> > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > c) They are proportional. They always have more or less the >>> > same >>> > > > > > effect, >>> > > > > > > > which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your >>> argument" the >>> > > > "in" >>> > > > > > has >>> > > > > > > > more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in >>> "there's a >>> > fly >>> > > > > > > > in >>> > > > > > your >>> > > > > > > > tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in >>> Henry's >>> > > > > > > > hands, >>> > > > > > > refer >>> > > > > > > > to a book or even a footnote. >>> > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties >>> > pretty >>> > > > > > > > much define the difference between learning and >>> development, at >>> > > > > > > > least as I understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding on >>> > > > > > > > functions indefinitely while development works by >>> reorganizing >>> > > the >>> > > > > > > > closed set of functions you already have into new systems. >>> > > > > > > > Learning is skill specific and local, while development is >>> > quite >>> > > > > global in its implications. >>> > > > > > > Learning >>> > > > > > > > is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new >>> > systems, >>> > > > > > > > while development does. And this is why we learn vocabulary >>> > (and >>> > > > > > > > forget it >>> > > > > > just >>> > > > > > > > as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never goes >>> > away. >>> > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of >>> blue >>> > > > > > > > that >>> > > > > > > people >>> > > > > > > > call the sky") are simply metaphors from the >>> non-productive end >>> > > of >>> > > > > > > > the lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are >>> crisp, >>> > > > > > > > concrete, and vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as the >>> > > > > > > > nominalizations that >>> > > > > > Newton >>> > > > > > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and >>> to >>> > > > > > > > create sentences that look like mathematical equations, are >>> > > highly >>> > > > > > > > productive, which is why they still form the basis of >>> > scientific >>> > > > > > > > writing and >>> > > > > > thinking >>> > > > > > > > today. For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical >>> metaphor is >>> > > the >>> > > > > > third >>> > > > > > > > great moment in child development (after the break into >>> mother >>> > > > > > > > tongue >>> > > > > > and >>> > > > > > > > the break into disciplinary language in school work). >>> > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" >>> > implies >>> > > > > > > > zero dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two >>> ("on a >>> > > > > > > > line', 'on a >>> > > > > > > > plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because >>> they >>> > > are >>> > > > > > > > grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them >>> with >>> > > time: >>> > > > > > > > 'at >>> > > > > > a >>> > > > > > > > point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. >>> Compare: >>> > "at >>> > > > > > > > Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very >>> day), >>> > and >>> > > > > > > > "in Christmas' (season). >>> > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > David Kellogg >>> > > > > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>> > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen >>> > > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > > wrote: >>> > > > > > > >> >>> > > > > > > >> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" >>> spatial >>> > > > > > > >> relationships from the concrete material world into the >>> > > > > > > >> conceptual imaginary world. There are not many of them (50 >>> > > common >>> > > > > > > >> ones, and >>> > > > > > > between 70 >>> > > > > > > >> and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as >>> far >>> > > as" >>> > > > > > > >> -- >>> > > > > > > this >>> > > > > > > >> is according to >>> > > > > > > >> https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm >>> > > > > > ). >>> > > > > > > >> We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. >>> > Apparently, >>> > > > > > > >> in English, they evolved from and did the job done by >>> > > inflections >>> > > > > > > >> in >>> > > > > > parent >>> > > > > > > >> languages, examples being cases and tenses. >>> > > > > > > >> >>> > > > > > > >> But there is real difference in meaning between an >>> inflection >>> > > > > > > >> like the dative or accusative cases in Latin and the >>> spatial >>> > > > > > > >> relationships >>> > > > > > > suggested >>> > > > > > > >> by contemporary prepositions. >>> > > > > > > >> >>> > > > > > > >> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about >>> > this. >>> > > > > > > >> >>> > > > > > > >> Helena Worthen >>> > > > > > > >> helenaworthen@gmail.com >>> > > > > > > >> >>> > > > > > > >> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: >>> > > > > > > >> >>> > > > > > > >>> I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are >>> clearly >>> > > > > > embodied, >>> > > > > > > >> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to >>> > > > > > > >> linguistics >>> > > > > > > (For >>> > > > > > > >> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is >>> focused on >>> > > > > > ?lexicon?: >>> > > > > > > >> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of >>> > prepositions, >>> > > > > > > >> being >>> > > > > > > part >>> > > > > > > >> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker >>> and >>> > > > > > > >> Halliday >>> > > > > > > see no >>> > > > > > > >> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, >>> > > > > lexico-grammar. >>> > > > > > > (Lo >>> > > > > > > >> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write >>> lexicon-grammar, >>> > > > > > > >> adding >>> > > > > > > the >>> > > > > > > >> ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word >>> coinings >>> > > are >>> > > > > > great >>> > > > > > > >> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much >>> of >>> > > > > > > >> that? In translation from Russian is word coining ever >>> > > practiced? >>> > > > > > > >>> Henry >>> > > > > > > >>> >>> > > > > > > >>> >>> > > > > > > >>> >>> > > > > > > >>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden < >>> > ablunden@mira.net >>> > > > > >>> > > > > > wrote: >>> > > > > > > >>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is >>> the >>> > > > > > metaphorical >>> > > > > > > >> use of prepositions like: >>> > > > > > > >>>> - "there is some value IN your argument" >>> > > > > > > >>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again" >>> > > > > > > >>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" >>> > > > > > > >>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again" >>> > > > > > > >>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>> and so on. >>> > > > > > > >>>> Andy >>> > > > > > > >>>> >>> > > > > > > >>> > > -------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> > > > > > > ---- >>> > > > > > > >>>> *Andy Blunden* >>> > > > > > > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> > > > > > > >>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>> larry smolucha wrote: >>> > > > > > > >>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >>> > > > > > > >>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself - >>> > > > > > > >>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the >>> synergistic >>> > > > > > > possibilities: >>> > > > > > > >>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) >>> published >>> > > in >>> > > > > > > Thought >>> > > > > > > >>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as >>> translated >>> > into >>> > > > > > English >>> > > > > > > >> 1962] >>> > > > > > > >>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the >>> > > 'additive' >>> > > > > > value >>> > > > > > > >> of the >>> > > > > > > >>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the >>> speech >>> > > > > > > vocalization). >>> > > > > > > >>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical >>> elements >>> > > that >>> > > > > > > >>>>> are >>> > > > > > > >> flammable >>> > > > > > > >>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither >>> flammable >>> > > nor >>> > > > > > > >>>>> a >>> > > > > > gas. >>> > > > > > > >>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century >>> > > > > > > >>>>> European >>> > > > > > > >> Developmental >>> > > > > > > >>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean >>> > 'developmental' >>> > > > > > > >>>>> hence >>> > > > > > > the >>> > > > > > > >>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the >>> case of >>> > > > > > Piaget's >>> > > > > > > >> Genetic >>> > > > > > > >>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. >>> > > > > > > >>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis and >>> > > > > > > >>>>> synthesis >>> > > > > > > >> based on >>> > > > > > > >>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in >>> > > > > > > >>>>> Vygotsky's >>> > > > > > > >> example of H2O. >>> > > > > > > >>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com >>> > > > > > > >>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> > > > > > > >>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 >>> > > > > > > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>> > > > > > > >>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: >>> > > > > > > >>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be >>> > > synergistic >>> > > > > > > >>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum >>> of the >>> > > > > parts. >>> > > > > > > >>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing >>> more >>> > > > > > > >>>>>> than >>> > > > > > the >>> > > > > > > >>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really >>> new >>> > can >>> > > > > > > >>>>>> ever >>> > > > > > be >>> > > > > > > >> imagined" >>> > > > > > > >>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) >>> > > > > > > >>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>> A couple things to consider: >>> > > > > > > >>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of >>> > imagination >>> > > > > > > >>>>>> as the >>> > > > > > > >> brain has >>> > > > > > > >>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the >>> > > > > > > >>>>>> simplest >>> > > > > > level >>> > > > > > > >> of the Gestalt >>> > > > > > > >>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). >>> > > > > > > >>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not just >>> > > > > > photographic. >>> > > > > > > >>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is >>> to >>> > try >>> > > > > > > >>>>>> to >>> > > > > > > >> accurately reproduce >>> > > > > > > >>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. >>> > > Whereas, >>> > > > > > > >>>>>> the >>> > > > > > > >> goal of combinatory >>> > > > > > > >>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of >>> memories, >>> > > > > > > >>>>>> dreams, >>> > > > > > > >> musings, and even >>> > > > > > > >>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual >>> manipulation >>> > of >>> > > > > > objects >>> > > > > > > >> and symbols. >>> > > > > > > >>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the >>> different >>> > > ways >>> > > > > > > >>>>>> that >>> > > > > > > >> things and concepts can be >>> > > > > > > >>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and >>> sugar >>> > > > > > > >>>>>> and >>> > > > > > > flour. >>> > > > > > > >>>>>> I can add >>> water >>> > and >>> > > > > > > >>>>>> it >>> > > > > > > >> dissolves a bit >>> > > > > > > >>>>>> But adding >>> heat >>> > > > > > > >>>>>> changes >>> > > > > > the >>> > > > > > > >> combination into a pancake. >>> > > > > > > >>>>>> [Is this synergistic?] >>> > > > > > > >>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of >>> more >>> > > > > > > >>>>>> examples >>> > > > > > > >> to put the discussion >>> > > > > > > >>>>>> in the metaphysical realm. >>> > > > > > > >>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen >>> limit--make >>> > the >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> case >>> > > > > > > for >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting >>> associationism. I >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> think >>> > > > > > it's >>> > > > > > > >> not >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there >>> are >>> > > > > > > >> associationists who >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> associationism >>> > > > > > > >> exists and >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as >>> > > > mediation. >>> > > > > > > >> Vygotsky >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking >>> > religion, >>> > > > > > explain >>> > > > > > > >> the >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> uniqueness of our species? >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every species >>> > feels >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> for >>> > > > > > its >>> > > > > > > >> own >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and from >>> a >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Piagetian perspective--and even from a strict >>> Darwinian >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> one--true maturity >>> > > > > > > as a >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is >>> nothing >>> > more >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> to it >>> > > > > > > >> than >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety >>> of >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> primate, >>> > > > > > > and >>> > > > > > > >> our >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones >>> piled >>> > upon >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> rocks >>> > > > > > > in >>> > > > > > > >> order >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be >>> judged >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> the >>> > > > > > same >>> > > > > > > >> way as >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological >>> functions >>> > and >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> for >>> > > > > > > >> language is >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case >>> human >>> > > > > > > >> exceptionalism. >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the >>> case for >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> the >>> > > > > > > >> vanguard role >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other >>> > species, >>> > > > > > > prolonging >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking >>> after >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> the >>> > > > > > sick >>> > > > > > > >> and the >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because >>> artificial >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> organs >>> > > > > > > >> (tools) and >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so >>> important >>> > for >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> our >>> > > > > > > >> species, it >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where >>> > these >>> > > > > > > >> "circuitous, >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced >>> that >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> lead >>> > > > > > our >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth >>> > always >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> been >>> > > > > > > >> short on >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal >>> for >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> material >>> > > > > > > >> culture >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite another >>> > > matter: >>> > > > > > > >> verily, here >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> attention is >>> > > > > > > >> simply the >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he >>> says >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> there are >>> > > > > > > >> only two >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and >>> recombinative. So >>> > > > > > > >> imagination is >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete >>> > > experiences, >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> and >>> > > > > > > >> nothing >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky >>> says, >>> > when >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> you >>> > > > > > > hear >>> > > > > > > >> the >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually been >>> > there >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> to be >>> > > > > > > >> able to >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory >>> at >>> > work >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> in >>> > > > > > word >>> > > > > > > >> meaning. >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about >>> Archimedes, >>> > who >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> was >>> > > > > > > given >>> > > > > > > >> a >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had >>> been >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> mixed >>> > > > > > with >>> > > > > > > >> silver >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent >>> quantity >>> > of >>> > > > > gold. >>> > > > > > > >> Well, we >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: >>> it's not >>> > > > > > possible >>> > > > > > > to >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> precisely. The >>> > > > > > > >> method >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> "principal >>> > > > > > of >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> palimpsest, a >>> > > > > > > >> velum on >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to >>> each >>> > > other. >>> > > > > > > Because >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped and >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> written >>> > > > > > over >>> > > > > > > >> every >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of >>> was >>> > > soft, >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> the >>> > > > > > > >> pressure >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the >>> new >>> > ones >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> when >>> > > > > > > the >>> > > > > > > >> old >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is >>> the >>> > > only >>> > > > > > known >>> > > > > > > >> Greek >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning >>> nor >>> > > their >>> > > > > > > >> relationship >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in fact >>> > they >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> are >>> > > > > > > >> related to >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But >>> it's >>> > > quite >>> > > > > > > similar >>> > > > > > > >> to the >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> David Kellogg >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> > >>> > > > > > > >> wrote: >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an >>> > > > > > > associationist, >>> > > > > > > >> ?sees >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> Henry >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg < >>> > > > > > dkellogg60@gmail.com >>> > > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > >> wrote: >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for >>> the >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> division >>> > > > > > > >> between >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the >>> other, >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> because >>> > > > > > > >> Ribot is >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> an >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather >>> distal >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> form of >>> > > > > > > >> attention. >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> transition >>> > > > > > from >>> > > > > > > >> forest >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> to >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the >>> > division >>> > > > > > between >>> > > > > > > >> the two >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> commonsensical >>> > > > > > > >> world of >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> the >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to >>> fairly >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> prosaic >>> > > > > > uses >>> > > > > > > >> in life >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much >>> more >>> > > > > > > "imaginative" >>> > > > > > > >> (that >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the >>> > world >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> of the >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> farm,where >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where >>> long >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> winter >>> > > > > > > >> months are >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more >>> likely to >>> > > > > > encounter >>> > > > > > > >> talking >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). >>> Here >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> attention >>> > > > > > > has >>> > > > > > > >> to be >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> more voluntary. >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he >>> has a >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> very >>> > > > > > clear >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian >>> romanticism >>> > > that >>> > > > > > > >> underpins >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> Ribot >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. >>> Vygotsky >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> points >>> > > > > > > out >>> > > > > > > >> the >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these >>> productive >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> practices >>> > > > > > > >> really >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> are >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus of >>> > > > > > imagination, >>> > > > > > > >> there >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference >>> > between >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> human >>> > > > > > > and >>> > > > > > > >> animal >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are >>> perfectly >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> capable of >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> volitional >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than >>> > > humans). >>> > > > > > > Without >>> > > > > > > >> a >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> theory >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any >>> basis >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> for >>> > > > > > > Ribot's >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> functions at >>> > > > > > > >> all. >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> David Kellogg >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole < >>> > mcole@ucsd.edu >>> > > > > >>> > > > > > wrote: >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination, >>> > > > > > > >> thanks to >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> all >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought. >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> influential >>> > > > > > > >> around the >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> time >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th >>> > century. >>> > > I >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> had >>> > > > > > > >> seen work >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> on >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and >>> reflective >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> equal >>> > > > > > > >> reproductive? >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical >>> > studies >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> of >>> > > > > > > >> development >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> of >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The >>> cost >>> > of >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> being >>> > > > > > a >>> > > > > > > >> relative >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> mike >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < >>> > > > > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on >>> my >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> bucket >>> > > > > > list. >>> > > > > > > >> This >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal >>> musings >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> from >>> > > > > > some >>> > > > > > > >> weeks >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> in >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell >>> correct >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that >>> > > > > > > >> segmented the >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met >>> > > > > aphorizing?. >>> > > > > > > >> Puns, >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. >>> :) >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >>> > > > > > > wrote: >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward >>> Kant >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> and >>> > > > > > they >>> > > > > > > >> are >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> doing >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky >>> and >>> > his >>> > > > > > > >> followers as an >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced >>> by >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel, so >>> > > > > > > >> its of >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> course >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories >>> > emerge. >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, >>> especially in >>> > > > > > > >> translation, >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> seems >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, >>> > > > "recollection" >>> > > > > > in >>> > > > > > > >> this >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> passage, >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in >>> counter >>> > > > > > > >> distinction to >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "memory." >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary >>> > > > > > > >> discourse >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out >>> > Russian >>> > > > > > > >> colleagues have >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated. >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something >>> from >>> > > > > > theorists >>> > > > > > > >> who >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> clearly >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- >>> when it >>> > > was >>> > > > > > still >>> > > > > > > >> possible >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> to >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" >>> > which, >>> > > > > > > >> interestingly >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> links >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning of >>> a >>> > > > > > "voluntary" >>> > > > > > > >> act. >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Parts >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> of >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like >>> children >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> stuff >>> > > > > > > that >>> > > > > > > >> was >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> also >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the >>> > concepts >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> of >>> > > > > > > >> creativity >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> and >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its >>> curious >>> > > to >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> see >>> > > > > > > >> that the >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> two >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he >>> > found >>> > > > > > himself >>> > > > > > > >> writing. >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to >>> > which >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> pretty >>> > > > > > > old >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> approaches >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < >>> > > > > > > >> ablunden@mira.net> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively >>> > contemporary, >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> but it >>> > > > > > > >> may be >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> worth >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a >>> > prominent >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> place >>> > > > > > to >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Imagination >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating >>> between >>> > > > > > > >> Recollection and >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) >>> > Reproductive >>> > > > > > > >> Imagination, >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> (2) >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive >>> Imagination, >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> which >>> > > > > > he >>> > > > > > > >> says >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> leads >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive >>> Memory. >>> > In >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> other >>> > > > > > > >> words, >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> the >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to >>> Intellect is >>> > > > > > > >> accomplished >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> through >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >> >>> > > > > > >>> > > >>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> > > > > > -- >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading >>> > > Strawson >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and >>> > > > > > > >> Williams. >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian >>> developmentalists >>> > > whose >>> > > > > > work i >>> > > > > > > >> am >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> trying >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) >>> speak >>> > of >>> > > > > > > >> productive >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that >>> productive >>> > > > > > imagination >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> develops. >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive >>> > > implies >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that >>> > > > > > > >> there >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> must >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> be a >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive >>> > > imagination. >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> But >>> > > > > > I >>> > > > > > > >> learned >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination >>> > > appears >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and >>> > > > > > is >>> > > > > > > >> linked >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> to >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an >>> ineluctable >>> > part >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of >>> > > > > > > >> anticipation >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY >>> SHONERD < >>> > > > > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically on >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination >>> > > > > > > >> (starting >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more >>> contemporaneous >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> look, and >>> > > > > > > >> provides >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> a >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the >>> > socio-cultural >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as >>> > > > > > > fixed. >>> > > > > > > >> This, >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, >>> gives >>> > me >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a >>> > > > > > > ground >>> > > > > > > >> to >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> take >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> part >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I >>> start >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> preconceptions: >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> grammarian >>> > > > > > > >> Langacker on >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and >>> cognitive >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> domains, >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> particularly >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to >>> me, is >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> full of >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> imagination >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two >>> > aspects >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of >>> > > > > > > >> temporality: >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and >>> rhythmic >>> > > > > > > >> structure), which >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> I >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and >>> creativity, >>> > for >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> both >>> > > > > > > >> individual >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and >>> feeling. >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < >>> > > > > > > >> lpscholar2@gmail.com> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this >>> > topic. >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of the >>> > third >>> > > > > > *space* >>> > > > > > > >> and the >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to >>> internet. >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond >>> Williams >>> > and >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> his >>> > > > > > > >> notion of >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This >>> notion >>> > > is >>> > > > > > > >> explored under >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist as >>> a >>> > > *set* >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of >>> > > > > > > >> modalities >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a >>> form >>> > of >>> > > > > > knowing >>> > > > > > > >> that is >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [perceived??] >>> > > > > > if >>> > > > > > > >> we >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> think >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the >>> imaginal as >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *style* Larry On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 >>> PM, >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> HENRY SHONERD < >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just >>> want to >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> say how >>> > > > > > > >> jazzed up >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> I >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> am >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going >>> wild, >>> > > the >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind >>> > > > > > > as >>> > > > > > > >> Larry >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, >>> actually >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> various >>> > > > > > > >> triads, >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> finally >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of >>> my >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notebooks >>> > > > > > > of >>> > > > > > > >> the >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> mind, as >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap >>> > > adentro, >>> > > > > > luega >>> > > > > > > >> pa? >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> fuera. >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole < >>> > > > > > mcole@ucsd.edu> >>> > > > > > > >> wrote: >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination >>> > thread, >>> > > > > > attached >>> > > > > > > >> are two >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the >>> > issue. >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work of >>> > CHAT >>> > > > > > > theorists >>> > > > > > > >> like >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the >>> development >>> > of >>> > > > > > > >> imagination in a >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's >>> notion >>> > > of >>> > > > > > > >> productive >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and >>> have >>> > > no >>> > > > > > > >> intention of >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> doing >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as >>> > explicated >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the >>> > > > > > > >> attached >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these >>> > > > > > philosophers, >>> > > > > > > I >>> > > > > > > >> came >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> upon >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are >>> very >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> closely >>> > > > > > > >> linked at >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> several >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our >>> > > naivete, >>> > > > > > > >> Ettienne and I >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around >>> earlier >>> > as >>> > > a >>> > > > > > means >>> > > > > > > of >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> access >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, >>> Alexander >>> > > > > Suvorov. >>> > > > > > > >> Moreover, >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> such >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of >>> the >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have >>> > direct >>> > > > > > > relevance >>> > > > > > > >> to >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Kris's >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also >>> > speak >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to >>> > > > > > > >> concerns >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> about >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play >>> in >>> > > > > > development. >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination >>> > > thread. >>> > > > > > > Perhaps >>> > > > > > > >> they >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> will >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal >>> with a >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural >>> > > > > > > >> science >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with an >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > Strawson.pdf> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a >>> > natural >>> > > > > > science >>> > > > > > > >> with an >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> -- >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a >>> natural >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> science >>> > > > > > > >> with an >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>>> >>> > > > > > > >>>> >>> > > > > > > >>> >>> > > > > > > >> >>> > > > > > > >> >>> > > > > > > >> >>> > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > >>> > > > > > > >>> > > > > > >>> > > > > > -- >>> > > > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>> > > > > > Assistant Professor >>> > > > > > Department of Anthropology >>> > > > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>> > > > > > Brigham Young University >>> > > > > > Provo, UT 84602 >>> > > > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>> > > > > > >>> > > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > >>> > > > -- >>> > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>> > > > Assistant Professor >>> > > > Department of Anthropology >>> > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>> > > > Brigham Young University >>> > > > Provo, UT 84602 >>> > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>> > > > >>> > > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > -- >>> > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>> > > Assistant Professor >>> > > Department of Anthropology >>> > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>> > > Brigham Young University >>> > > Provo, UT 84602 >>> > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > >>> > -- >>> > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>> > Assistant Professor >>> > Department of Anthropology >>> > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>> > Brigham Young University >>> > Provo, UT 84602 >>> > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >>> > >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an >>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. >>> >> >> >> -- >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> Assistant Professor >> Department of Anthropology >> 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> Brigham Young University >> Provo, UT 84602 >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Fri Dec 26 21:47:18 2014 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Fri, 26 Dec 2014 22:47:18 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors / Speaking of AAE In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: David Ki, Thanks for the fantastic example. And I'm in full support of your strong argument that Orr's work should not be suppressed. Amen to that! -greg On Fri, Dec 26, 2014 at 9:30 PM, David H Kirshner wrote: > > Greg, > > Thanks for these two further posts, both loaded with useful references and > links. > > Pidgin languages built up as a means of communication between groups that > do not have a language in common do tend to be grammatically simplified, > not full languages. But as I understand the scholarship, AAE is fully > recognized as a bona fide Creole language, not a pidgin. > > BUT, the students with whom Eleanor Orr worked weren't speaking AAE in her > classes. They were speaking a hybrid intended to enable them to 'get by' in > the SE classroom. And this hybrid really wreaked havoc with their math > learning, in ways that Orr documented. > > Of course, you're right, "Orr's work, in the wrong hands, can lead us down > the path ... of deficit thinking about AAE speakers." > On the other hand, the price of suppressing Orr's work, which some > sociolinguists have done, is the virtual certainty that the problems AAE > speakers face in SE classrooms will never be dealt with. This may serve to > protect AAE from spurious criticisms, but it virtually ensures that AAE > speakers will be considered intellectually incapable, even as it prevents > any serious steps being taken to remedy the problems. > > I wonder, what is the real motive behind those who would sacrifice AAE > speakers to real harm in order to protect AAE from the possibility of > spurious criticism? Is it pride or cowardice--not wanting to have to fight > for the integrity of AAE were it to be attacked? Is it concern that the > likely solution (not the only one) would be to make sure AAE speakers learn > SE, which might erode African American culture (in some essentialist > sense)? Is it to work for the emasculation of African Americans to the > point that they take up arms against the master? > > In any case, Greg, you asked for "positive articulations of what the > linguistic forms that define AAE actually do for those who speak this > English dialect (as compared to another dialect)." Here's a beautiful > example--can't remember if I got it from Orr's book, or elsewhere--of what > might happen to SE speakers in a calculus course if AAE were the language > of instruction: > > For AAE speakers there are two grammatical forms > (A) The train'(s) traveling at 60 miles per hour, or > (B) The train be traveling at 60 miles per hour > > that can be used to express what is a single sentence in SE > (C) The train is traveling at 60 miles per hour. > > The AAE versions distinguish between average velocity and instantaneous > velocity--key concepts of differential calculus. > > Roughly, (A) means 'the train is averaging 60 miles per hour' (over some > time interval). > (B) means 'the train's speed at this moment is 60 miles per hour.' > > I'm sure glad I didn't have to learn calculus from a teacher who assumed > she/he was making a clear distinction that my dialect couldn't discern! > > David > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson > Sent: Friday, December 26, 2014 8:43 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors / Speaking of AAE > > One last post - this one is about the larger question of AAE and linguistic > relativity and was provoked by a recent conversation I had with John Lucy > (a key proponent of the LRH - http://home.uchicago.edu/~johnlucy/ ). He is > has been having a conversation about AAE and the LRH with John McWhorter, > one of the top scholars of AAE ( > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_McWhorter), > and McWhorter is not a fan of the LRH. At least part of this seems to be > b.c. of the fact that it far too easily leads down the road of deficit > thinking about AAE speakers. The argument goes: if language affects thought > then speaking AAE will have an effect on how one is able to think. From > there it is a short jump to the assumption that AAE leads to ways of > thinking that are not conducive to learning complex intellectual concepts. > > Hopefully that provides some background to my comment about potential > concerns with Orr's work. The concerns are not with her work per se. My > concerns are rather with the body of scholarship on AAE and the LRH and the > fact that, other than Labov's early work, there are no positive > articulations of what the linguistic forms that define AAE actually do for > those who speak this English dialect (as compared to another dialect). (I > should add that I've since recalled that Geneva Smitherman's work is shot > through with positive articulations of what AAE linguistic forms can do - > her book Talkin and Testifyin' is a classic in this regard, but I wonder if > the demonstrative style may be too difficult for speakers of mainstream > English and/or academic-ese to understand!). > > Orr's work, in the wrong hands, can lead us down the path that McWhorter is > concerned about - right to the conclusion that AAE is an intellectually > problematic language because it interferes with a student's ability to > understand mathematics. > > Hopefully that pulls some of the context of the larger conversation of > which my post was only a small part. > > Cheers to all, > greg > > > > > On Fri, Dec 26, 2014 at 7:25 PM, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > > > A second response to the paper that Mike forwarded (and to Paul's post on > > the previous thread). > > > > There is a sticky problem here that has not yet been dealt with > > adequately, namely, if language forms do affect habitual thinking, then > > what are the effects of the linguistic forms that come with AAE? I'm > > thinking not just about pragmatics, but also about grammar (and perhaps > > semantics as well). > > > > One thing that many have noted about AAE is that passive voice and > > nominalizations are dispreferred by AAE speakers. The result is a way of > > speaking that encourages the naming of actors and agents. Thus, in AAE, > it > > is difficult to carry on agent-less talk like: > > 1. "Our neighborhood has been negatively affected in the past few years." > > or, with nominalizations: > > 2. "Negative affectings have happened in our neighborhood in the past few > > years." > > > > Now these are perhaps terrible examples because although the first seems > a > > reasonable locution, I think most of us would disprefer the second. > > Nonetheless, the second takes a form that is not uncommon in legal-ese > and > > academic-ese (!!) as a way of obfuscating potentially responsible agents > > (one of the main tasks of the lawyer) and making processes into things > (one > > of the tasks of the scientific academic...). > > > > Instead the preference in AAE is for active sentences like: > > "Somebody('s) been negatively affecting our neighborhood in the past few > > years." > > > > With this locution (as with any form), you win some and you lose some. > > On the one hand, the frequent use of active voice is a mark of good > > writing (notwithstanding the various other AAE grammatical inflections > that > > are often understood as "bad grammar" by mainstream speakers - and I'll > > admit that the example offered here is not a good one either...). On the > > other hand, using predominately active voice can be marginalizing in > > "high-theoretical" academic writing and in legal writing. > > > > That's the way that I tend to think of relativity effects - with any > > language, you win some, you lose some. But I think attention to both > sides, > > winning and losing, is important. What I've sketched here in a somewhat > > pathetic fashion is one answer to the question: "what do you "win" with > > AAE?" > > > > -greg > > > > p.s., that seems like too many screens (I just adjusted my font size > > bigger so maybe I can blame it on that...). > > > > > > > > On Mon, Dec 22, 2014 at 9:33 AM, mike cole wrote: > >> > >> I am not in general following this thread, being waaaaaaaaaaaaaay behind > >> on > >> the imagination thread, but I tripped over the exchange regarding Orr > and > >> AAE. To keep it short, I attach two documents. > >> > >> The first is a draft segment from Cultural Psychology (1996) and the > other > >> an empirical report of even greater activity. For those who do not know > >> the > >> Labov work, the Word file might prove useful. for those of you for whom > >> this topic is of continuing interest, perhaps the published paper is of > >> more value. > >> > >> It is not true that no one followed up on Labov. It is probably true > that > >> no one followed up on the followup. > >> mike > >> > >> On Mon, Dec 22, 2014 at 8:00 AM, Greg Thompson < > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com > >> > > >> wrote: > >> > >> > ?David Ki, > >> > No worries. No offense taken. But thanks for the just-in-case note. > >> > And yes, I agree to disagree. > >> > Respectfully, > >> > greg? > >> > > >> > On Mon, Dec 22, 2014 at 6:24 AM, David H Kirshner > >> wrote: > >> > > > >> > > Greg, > >> > > > >> > > I disagree with you that Orr could/should have taken a more > culturally > >> > > sensitive approach to her studies of AAE speakers' difficulties in > >> > > classrooms dominated by standard English instruction. But I in no > wise > >> > > intended to imply your wishing she had done so places you among > those > >> who > >> > > consider her work as racist. I'm very sorry if my words suggested > >> > otherwise. > >> > > > >> > > David > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > -----Original Message----- > >> > > From: xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > >> > > xmca-l-bounces+dkirsh=lsu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg > >> > Thompson > >> > > Sent: Sunday, December 21, 2014 9:36 AM > >> > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors > >> > > > >> > > In the interests of following the recently suggested injunction not > to > >> > > directly address specific interlocutors, I'll talk in generalities > >> (This > >> > > makes it a bit more challenging to have a conversation but it also > >> makes > >> > > one think about the extractable and generalizable point that is > beyond > >> > the > >> > > immediate context). > >> > > > >> > > In my previous post (apologies for drawing on prior context), I > >> neither > >> > > suggested nor intended to imply that Orr's work is racist (do > >> intentions > >> > > matter when it comes to meaning?). This speaks to some of the > >> > difficulties > >> > > of talking about issues of race. And in this connection let's not > >> forget > >> > > the fact that this list-serve is dominated by white men - that > doesn't > >> > mean > >> > > that we are necessarily racist but it does mean that we are likely > to > >> be > >> > > ignorant of many aspects of these issues. > >> > > > >> > > Nonetheless, I believe that we can overcome our ignorance through > >> > > education, by learning more about the issues - even when it comes to > >> > trying > >> > > to understand cultures and languages that we did not grow up with. > And > >> > > while I think that there is good evidence for the linguistic > >> relativity > >> > > hypothesis, I do not believe that language is a determining > influence > >> in > >> > > ALL thinking (Whorf uses the term "habitual" to describe the type of > >> > > thinking that is most susceptible to the influence of language). > That > >> > means > >> > > that even if you don't speak AAE, you can still study it and even > >> come to > >> > > understand how the grammatical forms lend themselves to particular > >> ways > >> > of > >> > > understanding the world (this is what linguistic anthropology is all > >> > > about!). > >> > > > >> > > And this is my concern with Orr's work. With all academic work, I > >> think > >> > it > >> > > is worth considering questions like "How would racists take up our > >> > > research?" In the case of Orr's work, my sense is that racists could > >> > easily > >> > > take up her research to argue (perhaps even by using the linguistic > >> > > relativity hypothesis) that AAE speakers are unable to do complex > >> > > mathematical thinking. This is why I would think that it is > important > >> to > >> > > give a positive articulation of what AAE does as a language. It is > >> > > certainly important to understand what it CAN'T do (e.g., help one > >> learn > >> > > math in a particular way), but it is equally important to understand > >> what > >> > > it CAN do. > >> > > > >> > > As Paul points out, Labov has done some of the work addressing this. > >> But > >> > > note that Labov's work was done 40 years ago and no one has sought > to > >> > > replicate or do any kind of similar work. What gives? > >> > > > >> > > -greg > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > -greg > >> > > > >> > > On Sat, Dec 20, 2014 at 11:37 PM, David H Kirshner > >> > wrote: > >> > > > >> > > > Greg, > >> > > > > >> > > > I'm delighted that you're familiar with and appreciative of Orr's > >> work. > >> > > > > >> > > > Cleary she didn't provide "serious consideration of how AAE > speakers > >> > > > actually use prepositions"--she couldn't have, as she was not a > >> native > >> > > > speaker of Black English dialect, and she was not a linguist. But > >> I'm > >> > not > >> > > > sure how paying serious attention to technical nuances of Black > >> English > >> > > > grammar would have helped, as her analyses show that the African > >> > American > >> > > > students in her classes were not speaking either standard English > or > >> > > Black > >> > > > English Vernacular, but rather a hybrid that arises from their > >> efforts > >> > to > >> > > > emulate standard English. > >> > > > > >> > > > Now, it's true her work didn't parallel the approach Gay and Cole > >> took > >> > to > >> > > > understanding what other psychologists were classifying as > >> linguistic > >> > and > >> > > > cognitive deficits by carefully studying the native language and > >> > culture. > >> > > > On the other hand, she did something Gay and Cole didn't do, > namely > >> > > > micro-analyze the linguistic miscues operating in the classroom, > and > >> > the > >> > > > resultant dilemmas of comprehension this created for her African > >> > American > >> > > > students. > >> > > > > >> > > > As the excerpt copied below illustrates, Orr was scrupulously > >> attentive > >> > > to > >> > > > understanding her students' experience of distance and location > >> given > >> > the > >> > > > different linguistic setting. And her analyses consistently point > to > >> > the > >> > > > mismatch between the native dialect and the language of > instruction > >> as > >> > > the > >> > > > source of the problems, not the native dialect, itself. To label > >> this > >> > > work > >> > > > as implicitly racist, I think cedes too much to those who mistrust > >> > > science > >> > > > as a tool of the oppressor, and whose only locus of attention is > the > >> > > > history and legacy of social injustice. Even now, in this > >> discussion, > >> > we > >> > > > are missing the point. The major significance of Orr's work is not > >> that > >> > > > differences in grammatical structure have semantic implications. > >> This > >> > is > >> > > > merely a window to the dramatic realization that semantics are > >> written > >> > > into > >> > > > grammatical form. > >> > > > > >> > > > David > >> > > > > >> > > > Excerpt from Orr (1987): > >> > > > > >> > > > "Jane gives us in these diagrams a glimpse into the kinds of > mental > >> > > images > >> > > > she constructs when she is using the single symbol length, > >> representing > >> > > > both location and distance, as a tool with which to think. Even > the > >> > > > diagrams Jane drew for problems 13 and 14 begin to be less > >> > > incomprehensible > >> > > > if one attempts to construct in one's own mind images of the > >> > information > >> > > > given in these problems, while adhering to the requirement that > >> length > >> > be > >> > > > used to represent both location and distance. They can be seen as > >> > > possible > >> > > > consequents or extensions of the symbol length when it is used to > >> > > represent > >> > > > both location and distance. Consider, for instance, the mental > >> images > >> > one > >> > > > might construct in responding to problem 13: Two cities, both > >> > represented > >> > > > by line segments, are equal distances (that is, equal line > segments) > >> > > closer > >> > > > to a third city (another line segment) than two other cities (line > >> > > > segments) are. The first two cities must be represented by equal > >> line > >> > > > segments because they are equal distances closer to the third city > >> than > >> > > the > >> > > > other two cities are. And these other two cities must also be > >> > represented > >> > > > by equal line segments because they are equal distances from the > >> third > >> > > > city. One can see that Jane's diagrams are not as lacking in > reason > >> as > >> > > they > >> > > > may initially have appeared to be. > >> > > > > >> > > > "Jane's diagrams suggest the possibility that when words, or > symbols > >> > are > >> > > > used as instruments with which to think, the use in one language > of > >> a > >> > > > single symbol in contexts where a second language requires two or > >> more > >> > > can > >> > > > lead a speaker of the first language to arrive at a different > mental > >> > > > construct of some given information from that arrived at by a > >> speaker > >> > of > >> > > > the second language. Or, as in Jane's attempt to handle problem > 14, > >> the > >> > > > result may be an inability to arrive at a workable mental > construct > >> at > >> > > > all." (p. 25) > >> > > > > >> > > > [Note, this excerpt is part of a longer segment I emailed on Dec. > 19 > >> > that > >> > > > shows Jane's diagrams that Orr is referring to.] > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > -----Original Message----- > >> > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > >> > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson > >> > > > Sent: Saturday, December 20, 2014 3:14 PM > >> > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors > >> > > > > >> > > > The issues that are raised by Orr are indeed important ones. I am > a > >> fan > >> > > of > >> > > > her work as it points to important differences in language usage > >> among > >> > > AAE > >> > > > speakers. I agree that she shouldn't have been condemned for > >> pointing > >> > out > >> > > > these differences (particularly considering how important it is > for > >> > > > teachers to understand the consequences of these differences). If > >> you > >> > > want > >> > > > to help AAE speaking students do better on standardized tests, > then > >> you > >> > > > absolutely need to pay attention to these differences. > >> > > > > >> > > > My one concern here is that I do feel like there is a problem of > >> > deficit > >> > > > thinking that is at least implied in her work (and maybe "implied" > >> is > >> > too > >> > > > strong a term - maybe it's just that she doesn't provide evidence > to > >> > > > discourage us from this view). What we don't see in this book is > any > >> > > > serious consideration of how AAE speakers actually use > prepositions > >> - > >> > > e.g., > >> > > > the ways of using language that exist in the community of AAE > >> speakers. > >> > > > This gives Orr's work a feel somewhat like the studies of math > among > >> > the > >> > > > Kpelle studied by Gay and Cole in the pre-early days of LCHC (see > >> wiki > >> > > for > >> > > > more: http://lchcfestschrift.wikispaces.com/Chapter+1). Before > >> they > >> > > > showed > >> > > > up on the scene, everyone had assumed that the Kpelle (Liberia) > >> > couldn't > >> > > > comprehend basic math concepts b.c. they weren't learning it in > the > >> > ways > >> > > > that it was being taught (and perhaps there were even linguistic > >> > > relativity > >> > > > arguments that pointed to this). Rather then continuing to pluck > >> these > >> > > > folks out of context and run them through various types of > >> experiments, > >> > > Gay > >> > > > and Cole "explicitly began with the assumption that ?we must know > >> more > >> > > > about the indigenous mathematics so that we can build effective > >> bridges > >> > > to > >> > > > the new mathematics that we are trying to introduce?" > >> > > > >From their research, they found that the Kpelle actually had high > >> > > > competence with complex mathematical problems (e.g., estimating > >> > volumes). > >> > > > As they write: > >> > > > "Overall, the data suggested that no generalized lack of > >> mathematical, > >> > > > perceptual, or problem solving abilities stood in the way of > >> > mathematics > >> > > > education. When the materials and procedures used in assessment > >> tasks > >> > > were > >> > > > designed to match closely valued local practices, lack of ability > >> could > >> > > be > >> > > > replaced by apparent special ability. At the same time, schooling > >> did > >> > > > appear to influence performance in tasks that were routinely used > to > >> > > > measure cognitive development." > >> > > > So I think I would be more comfortable with Orr's work if she were > >> to > >> > > have > >> > > > included this kind of rich understanding of usage in context and > how > >> > > > prepositions actually are used among AAE speakers. > >> > > > > >> > > > This points to a larger question that might be irksome to some > >> folks, > >> > but > >> > > > the question regards the extent to which mathematical language is > >> > > > predicated upon a particular form of what Whorf called "Standard > >> > Average > >> > > > European." In short, the idea here is that Math has a history and > a > >> > > > culture. This doesn't mean that it is useless or a waste of time, > >> just > >> > > that > >> > > > it is a particular way of encountering the world that is good for > >> > > > particular things and not for others. > >> > > > > >> > > > I think we've gone round this mulberry bush before, but that was > >> just > >> > > more > >> > > > grist for the mill (I prefer my metaphors mixed!). > >> > > > > >> > > > -greg > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > On Fri, Dec 19, 2014 at 8:46 PM, David H Kirshner >> > > >> > > > dkirsh@lsu.edu>> wrote: > >> > > > > > >> > > > > The topic of how grammatical form relates to meaning calls to > mind > >> > the > >> > > > > groundbreaking work of Eleanor Orr--whom you've probably never > >> heard > >> > of > >> > > > on > >> > > > > account of the fact that her work was condemned by a > >> > > politically-correct > >> > > > > faction of race-conscious sociolinguists who decided her > analysis > >> of > >> > > > Black > >> > > > > English Vernacular could too easily be appropriated into racist > >> > > > discourses > >> > > > > about language deficiency. > >> > > > > > >> > > > > Orr was a Washington DC area teacher and principal in the 1970s > >> and > >> > > > 1980s, > >> > > > > who traced math difficulties of her African American students to > >> > subtle > >> > > > > grammatical differences between Black English dialect and > standard > >> > > > English. > >> > > > > Her 1987 book goes into compelling detail to support the thesis > >> that > >> > > the > >> > > > > meaning structure of basic mathematical terms is embedded in the > >> > > > > grammatical setting in which those terms are expressed. For > >> instance, > >> > > the > >> > > > > meaning of ?distance? is embedded in the grammatical structure > >> > > ?distance > >> > > > > from _________ to __________? where the place-holders hold > >> locations; > >> > > if > >> > > > > you don?t have that grammatical structure, and you're in a > >> linguistic > >> > > > > environment in which that structure is assumed, you're likely > not > >> > going > >> > > > to > >> > > > > be able to gain full access to the concept. > >> > > > > > >> > > > > The attached excerpts from her book--ignore the Forward, unless > >> you'd > >> > > > like > >> > > > > some context--reveal some of her students' bizarre conceptions > of > >> > > > distance > >> > > > > (and other basic mathematical concepts) as revealed in their > >> > diagrams. > >> > > > Her > >> > > > > approach involves linguistic analysis of sentences produced by > her > >> > > > African > >> > > > > American students that she reads as collapsed versions of > standard > >> > > > English > >> > > > > sentences, with differences in prepositional structure being > >> > > highlighted > >> > > > > (but other grammatical elements also are indicated). > >> > > > > > >> > > > > This work cuts against the grain of anything going on in > >> mathematics > >> > > > > education. The Piagetian view that dominates that field holds > that > >> > > basic > >> > > > > concepts come about from reflection on our actions in our > >> engagement > >> > > with > >> > > > > the material world. When language enters the conversation, it's > >> with > >> > > > > respect to semantic structure; to my knowledge, nobody's ever > >> > > implicated > >> > > > > syntax directly in basic quantitative understanding. > >> > > > > > >> > > > > This work is particularly interesting to me in connection with > my > >> > > > > 21-year-old son who is autistic, and whose grammatical function > is > >> > > > severely > >> > > > > impaired. He has a decent vocabulary, but unless the setting for > >> the > >> > > > > conversation provides contextual clues, he can't piece together > >> how > >> > the > >> > > > > semantic elements are linked to one another. It is only recently > >> that > >> > > it > >> > > > > occurred to me his lack of a secure sense of basic quantitative > >> terms > >> > > > like > >> > > > > ?more? and ?less? may be rooted in his grammatical incapacities. > >> > > > > > >> > > > > The XMCA discussion, thus far, has touched on grammar with > >> respect to > >> > > > > lexical items such as prepositions. But we've not yet tied that > to > >> > the > >> > > > > grammatical forms that embed those lexical items. I'm very > >> curious as > >> > > to > >> > > > > whether that further connection can be made. > >> > > > > > >> > > > > David Kirshner > >> > > > > > >> > > > > Orr, E., W. (1987). Twice as less: Black English and the > >> performance > >> > of > >> > > > > black students in mathematics and science. New York: W. W. > Norton > >> & > >> > > > Company. > >> > > > > > >> > > > > -----Original Message----- > >> > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > >> > > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of David Kellogg > >> > > > > Sent: Friday, December 19, 2014 3:06 PM > >> > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Metaphors > >> > > > > > >> > > > > Yes, Haliday is essentially a Whorfian, and that's one of things > >> that > >> > > > > brings him close to Vygotsky. (Compare, for example, Chomsky, > who > >> is > >> > > > > essentially anti-developmental in his ideas about language, and > >> who > >> > now > >> > > > > rejects the leading role played by social communication and says > >> that > >> > > > > communication is epiphenomenal to language, whose original > >> purpose is > >> > > > > thought.) For Sapir, and for Whorf, in the beginning of every > >> major > >> > > > > onotogenetic, sociogenetic, and even phylogenetic change in > >> language > >> > > > there > >> > > > > has to be some change in the nature of communication. > >> > > > > > >> > > > > So what Andy says about the lack of the basis of modern science > in > >> > Hopi > >> > > > > applies perfectly well to English. When we read the scientific > >> > writings > >> > > > of > >> > > > > Chaucer on the astrolabe, for example, we do not see words like > >> > > > > "reflection", "refraction" or "alignment". Chaucer uses words > like > >> > > > "bounce > >> > > > > off", "bend through", and "line up" (note the use of > prepositions, > >> > > > > Helena!). Where did these words come from, and how did they make > >> > > > scientific > >> > > > > English possible? > >> > > > > > >> > > > > Most of us have no problem saying that Isaac Newton discovered > the > >> > laws > >> > > > of > >> > > > > gravitation. But it's only a slight exaggeration to say that > what > >> he > >> > > > really > >> > > > > discovered was the meaning potential of words like > "gravitation". > >> > > Gravity > >> > > > > is, of course, not a thing at all; that is, it's not an entity, > >> but > >> > > > rather > >> > > > > a process, the process of falling down, or falling in (preps, > >> > again!). > >> > > So > >> > > > > how and above all why does it become an entity? > >> > > > > > >> > > > > It's interesting to compare Newton's writings on optics with > >> > Chaucer's > >> > > on > >> > > > > the astrolabe. The "Opticks" has a fixed format that we > recognize > >> > > almost > >> > > > > instantly today: Newton describes his equipment (the prism and > the > >> > dark > >> > > > > room); he then narrates his method as a kind of recipe ("First, > I > >> did > >> > > > this; > >> > > > > then I did that") and draws conclusions, which he then > formulates > >> in > >> > > > > mathematical terms (this is essentially the format of Vygotsky's > >> > > lectures > >> > > > > on pedology, so much so that when translating them we had some > >> > trouble > >> > > > > determining the precise moment when Vygotsky turns to the > >> blackboard > >> > to > >> > > > > write his conclusion in the form of a law). > >> > > > > > >> > > > > In order to get them into mathematical shape, though, he has to > >> make > >> > > > > sentences that look a lot like equations. "The plumpness of the > >> lens > >> > > > yields > >> > > > > a greater refraction of the light", "The reflection of the light > >> from > >> > > the > >> > > > > glass results of the light striking the flatness of the glass" > >> "The > >> > > > > curvature of the spectacle glass supplies the lacking plumpness > of > >> > the > >> > > > > eye". In each of these, a quality or a process which would > >> normally > >> > be > >> > > > > realized as an adjective or a verb is suddenly realized by a > noun, > >> > > > creating > >> > > > > an imaginary entity. > >> > > > > > >> > > > > That's grammatical metaphor. Something that is "canonically" > >> realized > >> > > by > >> > > > a > >> > > > > verb ("to grow") is suddenly realized nominally ("growth"), or > >> > > something > >> > > > > that is canonically a quality ('red") is realized verbally > >> > ("redden"). > >> > > We > >> > > > > even find related clauses realized as verbs ("She did not know > the > >> > > rules. > >> > > > > So she died" is realized by "Death was brought about through > >> > > ignorance", > >> > > > > all of these examples from Halliday). In fact, the Genetic Law > >> that > >> > > > > Vygotsky formulates in "Mind in Society" ("Every higher mental > >> > function > >> > > > is > >> > > > > realized on two planes....") is really just one instance of > >> > grammatical > >> > > > > metaphor. > >> > > > > > >> > > > > One of Chomsky's best known arguments for the radical innateness > >> > > > > hypothesis is this. If I take a sentence like "Students who do > >> not do > >> > > > their > >> > > > > homework do not do well" and I want to make a question, how do I > >> know > >> > > > which > >> > > > > "do" to move to the front? Chomsky assumes that this knowledge > is > >> > > > > essentially innate; it is part of universal grammar. But you can > >> see > >> > > that > >> > > > > "Do students who do not do their homework do well?" can be built > >> up > >> > > > through > >> > > > > a process of what we might call "discourse metaphor"--whereby > >> clauses > >> > > > stand > >> > > > > for > >> > > > > exchanges: > >> > > > > > >> > > > > Mother: You did your homework, didn't you? > >> > > > > Child: No. > >> > > > > Mother: You didn't do your homework? Did you do well? > >> > > > > Child: No. > >> > > > > Mother: You didn't do well? > >> > > > > Child: No. > >> > > > > Mother: You didn't do you homework so you didn't do well. Do the > >> > other > >> > > > > students do well? > >> > > > > Child: Some of them. > >> > > > > Mother: Who does well? Do students who do not do their homework > do > >> > > well? > >> > > > > > >> > > > > And this of course explains why wh-items like "who" and 'why" > have > >> > two > >> > > > > functions--one inside a clause, where it expresses an > intra-mental > >> > > > function > >> > > > > (grammar) and one between them where it expresses an > inter-mental > >> > > > function > >> > > > > (discourse). > >> > > > > > >> > > > > I realize that grammatical metaphor will seem rather dry and > >> abstract > >> > > and > >> > > > > unpoetic to people who assume that metaphor is only of the > lexical > >> > > kind. > >> > > > > But to me, and I think to most children, it is far far more > >> powerful > >> > > and > >> > > > > far more important developmentally. In some ways, it's the > lexical > >> > > > metaphor > >> > > > > that is responsible for the disenchantment of the child's world, > >> > while > >> > > > the > >> > > > > grammatical metaphor infinitely expands it. (And here, I'm > >> afraid, I > >> > > must > >> > > > > stop--it's time for breakfast and anyway my one screen is used > >> up!) > >> > > > > > >> > > > > David Kellogg > >> > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > , or "the > >> > > > > > >> > > > > . He > >> > > > > > >> > > > > On 19 December 2014 at 15:15, Greg Thompson < > >> > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com > >> > > > > > >> > > > > wrote: > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > Helena and David, > >> > > > > > I wonder if this quote below from Benjamin Whorf (one of the > >> > > so-called > >> > > > > > authors of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis - a kindred > >> > tradition > >> > > > > > to > >> > > > > > Vygotsky's) might be useful. In it Whorf is comparing the Hopi > >> > notion > >> > > > > > of "time" to the SAE (Standard Average European - including > >> > English) > >> > > > > > notion of "time" and how each of these languages offers > >> different > >> > > > > > affordances of meaning. Whereas Hopi has a much more > processual > >> > > > > > understanding, English has a much more > >> reified/objectified/entified > >> > > > > > sense of time. (btw, I think the first paragraph is easier to > >> > follow > >> > > > > > than the second - and in that first paragraph you'll find our > >> old > >> > > > friend > >> > > > > "imagination"). > >> > > > > > David, does this jibe with what you were pointing to? > >> > > > > > -greg > >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > Taken from: > >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> > > > >> http://web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/mousesite/Second > >> > > > > > ary/Whorfframe2.html > >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > " "Such terms as summer, winter, September, morning, noon, > >> sunset" > >> > > are > >> > > > > > with us nouns, and have little formal linguistic difference > from > >> > > other > >> > > > > nouns. > >> > > > > > They can be subjects or objects, and we say "at sunset" or "in > >> > > winter" > >> > > > > > just as we say "at a corner" or "in an orchard." They are > >> > pluralized > >> > > > > > and numerated like nouns of physical objects, as we have seen. > >> Our > >> > > > > > thought about the referents of such words hence becomes > >> > objectified. > >> > > > > > Without objectification, it would be a subjective experience > of > >> > real > >> > > > > > time, i.e. of the consciousness of "becoming later and > >> > later"--simply > >> > > > > > a cyclic phase similar to an earlier phase in that > >> > > ever-later-becoming > >> > > > > > duration. Only by imagination can such a cyclic phase be set > >> beside > >> > > > > > another and another in the manner of a spatial (i.e. visually > >> > > > > > perceived) configuration. "But such is the power of linguistic > >> > > analogy > >> > > > > that we do so objectify cyclic phasing. > >> > > > > > We do it even by saying "a phase" and "phases" instead of > e.g., > >> > > > > "phasing." > >> > > > > > And the pattern of individual and mass nouns, with the > resulting > >> > > > > > binomial formula of formless item plus form, is so general > that > >> it > >> > is > >> > > > > > implicit for all nouns, and hence our very generalized > formless > >> > items > >> > > > > > like "substance, matter," by which we can fill out the > binomial > >> for > >> > > an > >> > > > > > enormously wide range of nouns. But even these are not quite > >> > > > > > generalized enough to take in our phase nouns. So for the > phase > >> > nouns > >> > > > we > >> > > > > have made a formless item, "time." > >> > > > > > We have made it by using "a time," i.e. an occasion or a > phase, > >> in > >> > > the > >> > > > > > pattern of a mass noun, just as from "a summer" we make > >> "summer" in > >> > > > > > the pattern of a mass noun. Thus with our binomial formula we > >> can > >> > say > >> > > > > > and think "a moment of time, a second of time, a year of > time." > >> Let > >> > > me > >> > > > > > again point out that the pattern is simply that of "a bottle > of > >> > milk" > >> > > > > > or "a piece of cheese." Thus we are assisted to imagine that > "a > >> > > > > > summer" actually contains or consists of such-and-such a > >> quantity > >> > of > >> > > > > "time." > >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > In Hopi however all phase terms, like "summer, morning," etc., > >> are > >> > > not > >> > > > > > nouns but a kind of adverb, to use the nearest SAE analogy. > They > >> > are > >> > > a > >> > > > > > formal part of speech by themselves, distinct from nouns, > verbs, > >> > and > >> > > > > > even other Hopi "adverbs." Such a word is not a case form or a > >> > > > > > locative pattern, like "des Abends" or "in the morning." It > >> > contains > >> > > > > > no morpheme like one of "in the house" or "at the tree." It > >> means > >> > > > > > "when it is morning" or "while morning-phase is occurring." > >> These > >> > > > > > "temporal s" are not used as subjects or objects, or at all > like > >> > > > > > nouns. One does not say "it's a hot summer" or "summer is > hot"; > >> > > summer > >> > > > > > is not hot, summer is only WHEN conditions are hot, WHEN heat > >> > occurs. > >> > > > > > One does not say "THIS summer," but "summer now" or "summer > >> > > recently." > >> > > > > > There is no objectification, as a region, an extent, a > >> quantity, of > >> > > > > > the subjective duration feeling. Nothing is suggested about > time > >> > > > > > except the perpetual "getting later" of it. And so there is no > >> > basis > >> > > > > here for a formless item answering to our "time." " > >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > On Thu, Dec 18, 2014 at 3:12 PM, Helena Worthen > >> > > > > > > > >> > > > > > wrote: > >> > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > David, I am with you and etremeley interested right up to > >> this: > >> > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > "But grammatical metaphors, such as the nominalizations that > >> > Newton > >> > > > > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and > to > >> > > create > >> > > > > > > sentences that look like mathematical equations, are highly > >> > > > > > > productive, which is why they still form the basis of > >> scientific > >> > > > > > > writing and thinking today." > >> > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > Can you slow down for a moment and give some examples? I > lose > >> you > >> > > > > > > when > >> > > > > > you > >> > > > > > > say "created to talk about gravity as an entity". > >> > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > Thank you, > >> > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > Helena > >> > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > Helena Worthen > >> > > > > > > helenaworthen@gmail.com > >> > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > On Dec 18, 2014, at 1:59 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > >> > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > As Helena points out, prepositions are from the > >> "grammatical" > >> > end > >> > > > > > > > of > >> > > > > > what > >> > > > > > > > Henry has called the "lexicon-grammar" continuum (and what > >> > > > > > > > Halliday > >> > > > > > calls > >> > > > > > > > "wording" or "lexicogrammar"). What that means is that > they > >> > have > >> > > > > > > > three properties that words from the more "lexical" end do > >> not > >> > > > have: > >> > > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > a) They are a closed class. You can't invent new ones. > (You > >> > can, > >> > > > > > > actually, > >> > > > > > > > but you can't teach people to use it, whereas if you > invent > >> a > >> > new > >> > > > > > > > name > >> > > > > > > or a > >> > > > > > > > new noun like "lexicogrammar", you can). > >> > > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > b) They are systemic. They are not liimited to specific > >> > semantic > >> > > > > > > > field > >> > > > > > > (the > >> > > > > > > > way that "lexicogrammar" is limited to a particular area > of > >> > > > > > linguistics) > >> > > > > > > > but can be used wherever nouns and adverbial phrases are > >> used. > >> > > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > c) They are proportional. They always have more or less > the > >> > same > >> > > > > > effect, > >> > > > > > > > which is why when you say "there's a flaw in your > argument" > >> the > >> > > > "in" > >> > > > > > has > >> > > > > > > > more or less the same feeling to it as the "in" in > "there's > >> a > >> > fly > >> > > > > > > > in > >> > > > > > your > >> > > > > > > > tea". In contrast, the word "lexicogrammar" MIGHT, in > >> Henry's > >> > > > > > > > hands, > >> > > > > > > refer > >> > > > > > > > to a book or even a footnote. > >> > > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > Now, the interesting thing for me is that these properties > >> > pretty > >> > > > > > > > much define the difference between learning and > >> development, at > >> > > > > > > > least as I understand it from Koffka. Learning is adding > on > >> > > > > > > > functions indefinitely while development works by > >> reorganizing > >> > > the > >> > > > > > > > closed set of functions you already have into new systems. > >> > > > > > > > Learning is skill specific and local, while development is > >> > quite > >> > > > > global in its implications. > >> > > > > > > Learning > >> > > > > > > > is non-proportional and doesn't generalize to create new > >> > systems, > >> > > > > > > > while development does. And this is why we learn > vocabulary > >> > (and > >> > > > > > > > forget it > >> > > > > > just > >> > > > > > > > as readily) but grammar seems to grow on you and never > goes > >> > away. > >> > > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > For Halliday, lexical metaphors (e.g. "that little tent of > >> blue > >> > > > > > > > that > >> > > > > > > people > >> > > > > > > > call the sky") are simply metaphors from the > non-productive > >> end > >> > > of > >> > > > > > > > the lexicogrammatical continuum, which is why they are > >> crisp, > >> > > > > > > > concrete, and vivid. But grammatical metaphors, such as > the > >> > > > > > > > nominalizations that > >> > > > > > Newton > >> > > > > > > > and Galileo created to talk about gravity as an entity and > >> to > >> > > > > > > > create sentences that look like mathematical equations, > are > >> > > highly > >> > > > > > > > productive, which is why they still form the basis of > >> > scientific > >> > > > > > > > writing and > >> > > > > > thinking > >> > > > > > > > today. For Halliday, the "break" into grammatical > metaphor > >> is > >> > > the > >> > > > > > third > >> > > > > > > > great moment in child development (after the break into > >> mother > >> > > > > > > > tongue > >> > > > > > and > >> > > > > > > > the break into disciplinary language in school work). > >> > > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > Prepositions, of course, encode geometrical notions: "at" > >> > implies > >> > > > > > > > zero dimensions ('at a point'), "on' implies one or two > >> ("on a > >> > > > > > > > line', 'on a > >> > > > > > > > plane') and "in" impies three ('in a space'). But because > >> they > >> > > are > >> > > > > > > > grammatical, and therefore productive, we also use them > with > >> > > time: > >> > > > > > > > 'at > >> > > > > > a > >> > > > > > > > point in time', 'on a morning/afternoon', 'in 2015'. > >> Compare: > >> > "at > >> > > > > > > > Christmas' (a specific time), "on Christmas' (the very > day), > >> > and > >> > > > > > > > "in Christmas' (season). > >> > > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > David Kellogg > >> > > > > > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >> > > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > On 19 December 2014 at 04:32, Helena Worthen > >> > > > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > wrote: > >> > > > > > > >> > >> > > > > > > >> Yes to prepositions as metaphors. They "carry across" > >> spatial > >> > > > > > > >> relationships from the concrete material world into the > >> > > > > > > >> conceptual imaginary world. There are not many of them > (50 > >> > > common > >> > > > > > > >> ones, and > >> > > > > > > between 70 > >> > > > > > > >> and 150 total, including multi-word prepositions like "as > >> far > >> > > as" > >> > > > > > > >> -- > >> > > > > > > this > >> > > > > > > >> is according to > >> > > > > > > >> https://www.englishclub.com/grammar/prepositions.htm > >> > > > > > ). > >> > > > > > > >> We don't make up new ones. They don't have synonyms. > >> > Apparently, > >> > > > > > > >> in English, they evolved from and did the job done by > >> > > inflections > >> > > > > > > >> in > >> > > > > > parent > >> > > > > > > >> languages, examples being cases and tenses. > >> > > > > > > >> > >> > > > > > > >> But there is real difference in meaning between an > >> inflection > >> > > > > > > >> like the dative or accusative cases in Latin and the > >> spatial > >> > > > > > > >> relationships > >> > > > > > > suggested > >> > > > > > > >> by contemporary prepositions. > >> > > > > > > >> > >> > > > > > > >> I'll bet someone else on this list knows a lot more about > >> > this. > >> > > > > > > >> > >> > > > > > > >> Helena Worthen > >> > > > > > > >> helenaworthen@gmail.com > >> > > > > > > >> > >> > > > > > > >> On Dec 18, 2014, at 9:58 AM, HENRY SHONERD wrote: > >> > > > > > > >> > >> > > > > > > >>> I?m with Andy on prepositions as metaphors. They are > >> clearly > >> > > > > > embodied, > >> > > > > > > >> proprioceptive, symbolic, meaningful. A standard intro to > >> > > > > > > >> linguistics > >> > > > > > > (For > >> > > > > > > >> example, Yule, The Study of Language) semantics is > focused > >> on > >> > > > > > ?lexicon?: > >> > > > > > > >> nouns, verbs, adjectives, absolutely no mention of > >> > prepositions, > >> > > > > > > >> being > >> > > > > > > part > >> > > > > > > >> of grammar, as it is traditionally construed. Langacker > and > >> > > > > > > >> Halliday > >> > > > > > > see no > >> > > > > > > >> clear demarcation between lexicon and grammar, hence, > >> > > > > lexico-grammar. > >> > > > > > > (Lo > >> > > > > > > >> and behold, my spell check wanted me to write > >> lexicon-grammar, > >> > > > > > > >> adding > >> > > > > > > the > >> > > > > > > >> ?n?. The traditions holds! Keep them separate!) Word > >> coinings > >> > > are > >> > > > > > great > >> > > > > > > >> data for imagination and creativity. Did Vygotsky do much > >> of > >> > > > > > > >> that? In translation from Russian is word coining ever > >> > > practiced? > >> > > > > > > >>> Henry > >> > > > > > > >>> > >> > > > > > > >>> > >> > > > > > > >>> > >> > > > > > > >>>> On Dec 18, 2014, at 2:54 AM, Andy Blunden < > >> > ablunden@mira.net > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > wrote: > >> > > > > > > >>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>> the kind of metaphor which I find most interesting is > the > >> > > > > > metaphorical > >> > > > > > > >> use of prepositions like: > >> > > > > > > >>>> - "there is some value IN your argument" > >> > > > > > > >>>> - "I'd like to go OVER that again" > >> > > > > > > >>>> - "I'd don't see what is BEHIND that line of thinking" > >> > > > > > > >>>> - "Let's go THROUGH that again" > >> > > > > > > >>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>> and so on. > >> > > > > > > >>>> Andy > >> > > > > > > >>>> > >> > > > > > > > >> > > -------------------------------------------------------------------- > >> > > > > > > ---- > >> > > > > > > >>>> *Andy Blunden* > >> > > > > > > >>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > > > > > > >>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>> larry smolucha wrote: > >> > > > > > > >>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > >> > > > > > > >>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>> Forgive me for replying to myself - > >> > > > > > > >>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>> In regard to combinatory imagination and the > synergistic > >> > > > > > > possibilities: > >> > > > > > > >>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>> In the Genetic Roots of Thought and Speech (1929) > >> published > >> > > in > >> > > > > > > Thought > >> > > > > > > >>>>> and Speech (1934) [or Thought and Language as > translated > >> > into > >> > > > > > English > >> > > > > > > >> 1962] > >> > > > > > > >>>>> Vygotsky discussed how word meaning is more than the > >> > > 'additive' > >> > > > > > value > >> > > > > > > >> of the > >> > > > > > > >>>>> two components (the sensory-motor thought and the > speech > >> > > > > > > vocalization). > >> > > > > > > >>>>> He used the analogy of H2O in which two chemical > >> elements > >> > > that > >> > > > > > > >>>>> are > >> > > > > > > >> flammable > >> > > > > > > >>>>> gases combine to produce water, which is neither > >> flammable > >> > > nor > >> > > > > > > >>>>> a > >> > > > > > gas. > >> > > > > > > >>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>> [Just a note for Newcomers - in the early 20th century > >> > > > > > > >>>>> European > >> > > > > > > >> Developmental > >> > > > > > > >>>>> Psychologists used the word 'genetic' to mean > >> > 'developmental' > >> > > > > > > >>>>> hence > >> > > > > > > the > >> > > > > > > >>>>> Developmental Roots of Thought and Speech or in the > >> case of > >> > > > > > Piaget's > >> > > > > > > >> Genetic > >> > > > > > > >>>>> Epistemology read as Developmental Epistemology. > >> > > > > > > >>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>> And to those XMCARs who mentioned earlier synthesis > and > >> > > > > > > >>>>> synthesis > >> > > > > > > >> based on > >> > > > > > > >>>>> metaphoric thinking - definitely - we even see this in > >> > > > > > > >>>>> Vygotsky's > >> > > > > > > >> example of H2O. > >> > > > > > > >>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>> From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com > >> > > > > > > >>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >> > > > > > > >>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 16:18:07 -0600 > >> > > > > > > >>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > >> > > > > > > >>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>> Message from Francine Smolucha: > >> > > > > > > >>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>> Combinatory or recombinative imagination could be > >> > > synergistic > >> > > > > > > >>>>>> and produce something new that is more than the sum > of > >> the > >> > > > > parts. > >> > > > > > > >>>>>> It does not have to mean that "imagination is nothing > >> more > >> > > > > > > >>>>>> than > >> > > > > > the > >> > > > > > > >>>>>> recombining of concrete experiences, nothing really > new > >> > can > >> > > > > > > >>>>>> ever > >> > > > > > be > >> > > > > > > >> imagined" > >> > > > > > > >>>>>> (David Kellogg's most recent email.) > >> > > > > > > >>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>> A couple things to consider: > >> > > > > > > >>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>> (1) Sensory perception involves some element of > >> > imagination > >> > > > > > > >>>>>> as the > >> > > > > > > >> brain has > >> > > > > > > >>>>>> to organize incoming data into a pattern (even at the > >> > > > > > > >>>>>> simplest > >> > > > > > level > >> > > > > > > >> of the Gestalt > >> > > > > > > >>>>>> Law of Closure or Figure/Ground Images). > >> > > > > > > >>>>>> (2) Memories themselves are reconstructed and not > just > >> > > > > > photographic. > >> > > > > > > >>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>> (3) The goal of reproductive imagination (memory) is > to > >> > try > >> > > > > > > >>>>>> to > >> > > > > > > >> accurately reproduce > >> > > > > > > >>>>>> the sensory-motor experience of some external event. > >> > > Whereas, > >> > > > > > > >>>>>> the > >> > > > > > > >> goal of combinatory > >> > > > > > > >>>>>> imagination is to create something new out of > memories, > >> > > > > > > >>>>>> dreams, > >> > > > > > > >> musings, and even > >> > > > > > > >>>>>> sensory motor activity involving the actual > >> manipulation > >> > of > >> > > > > > objects > >> > > > > > > >> and symbols. > >> > > > > > > >>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>> (4) I think it would be useful to think of the > >> different > >> > > ways > >> > > > > > > >>>>>> that > >> > > > > > > >> things and concepts can be > >> > > > > > > >>>>>> combines. For example, I could just combine salt and > >> sugar > >> > > > > > > >>>>>> and > >> > > > > > > flour. > >> > > > > > > >>>>>> I can add > water > >> > and > >> > > > > > > >>>>>> it > >> > > > > > > >> dissolves a bit > >> > > > > > > >>>>>> But adding > heat > >> > > > > > > >>>>>> changes > >> > > > > > the > >> > > > > > > >> combination into a pancake. > >> > > > > > > >>>>>> [Is this synergistic?] > >> > > > > > > >>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>> Sorry I have to go now - I am thinking of > >> more > >> > > > > > > >>>>>> examples > >> > > > > > > >> to put the discussion > >> > > > > > > >>>>>> in the metaphysical realm. > >> > > > > > > >>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 20:05:49 +0900 > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> From: dkellogg60@gmail.com > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Imagination > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Let me--while keeping within the two screen > >> limit--make > >> > the > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> case > >> > > > > > > for > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Vygotsky's obsession with discrediting > >> associationism. I > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> think > >> > > > > > it's > >> > > > > > > >> not > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> just about mediation; as Michael points out, there > are > >> > > > > > > >> associationists who > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> are willing to accept that a kind of intermediary > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> associationism > >> > > > > > > >> exists and > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> some mediationists who are willing to accept that as > >> > > > mediation. > >> > > > > > > >> Vygotsky > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> has far more in mind. How do we, without invoking > >> > religion, > >> > > > > > explain > >> > > > > > > >> the > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> uniqueness of our species? > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Is it just the natural egocentrism that every > species > >> > feels > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> for > >> > > > > > its > >> > > > > > > >> own > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> kind? From an associationist point of view, and > from a > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Piagetian perspective--and even from a strict > >> Darwinian > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> one--true maturity > >> > > > > > > as a > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> species comes with acknowledging that there is > nothing > >> > more > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> to it > >> > > > > > > >> than > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> that: we are simply a singularly maladaptive variety > >> of > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> primate, > >> > > > > > > and > >> > > > > > > >> our > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> solemn temples and clouded towers are but stones > piled > >> > upon > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> rocks > >> > > > > > > in > >> > > > > > > >> order > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> to hide this. The value of our cultures have to be > >> judged > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> the > >> > > > > > same > >> > > > > > > >> way as > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> any other adaptation: in terms of survival value. > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Making the case for the higher psychological > functions > >> > and > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> for > >> > > > > > > >> language is > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> not simply a matter of making a NON-religious case > >> human > >> > > > > > > >> exceptionalism. > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> It's also, in a strange way, a way of making the > case > >> for > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> the > >> > > > > > > >> vanguard role > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> of the lower classes in human progress. For other > >> > species, > >> > > > > > > prolonging > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> childhood is giving hostages to fortune,and looking > >> after > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> the > >> > > > > > sick > >> > > > > > > >> and the > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> elderly is tantamount to suicide. But because > >> artificial > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> organs > >> > > > > > > >> (tools) and > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> even artificial intelligences (signs) are so > important > >> > for > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> our > >> > > > > > > >> species, it > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> is in the societies and the sectors of society where > >> > these > >> > > > > > > >> "circuitous, > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> compensatory means of development" are most advanced > >> that > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> lead > >> > > > > > our > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> development as a species. The wretched of the earth > >> > always > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> been > >> > > > > > > >> short on > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> rocks and stones to pile up and on the wherewithal > for > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> material > >> > > > > > > >> culture > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> generally. But language and ideology is quite > another > >> > > matter: > >> > > > > > > >> verily, here > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> the first shall be last and the last shall be first. > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> I think the idea of imagination is a distal form of > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> attention is > >> > > > > > > >> simply the > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> logical result of Ribot's model of imagination: he > >> says > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> there are > >> > > > > > > >> only two > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> kinds of imagination: reproductive, and > >> recombinative. So > >> > > > > > > >> imagination is > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> nothing more than the recombination of concrete > >> > > experiences, > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> and > >> > > > > > > >> nothing > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> really new can ever be imagined. But as Vygotsky > says, > >> > when > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> you > >> > > > > > > hear > >> > > > > > > >> the > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> name of a place, you don't have to have actually > been > >> > there > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> to be > >> > > > > > > >> able to > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> imagine it. So there must be some artificial memory > at > >> > work > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> in > >> > > > > > word > >> > > > > > > >> meaning. > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> You probably know the hoary old tale about > Archimedes, > >> > who > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> was > >> > > > > > > given > >> > > > > > > >> a > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> crown of gold and who discovered that the gold had > >> been > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> mixed > >> > > > > > with > >> > > > > > > >> silver > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> by measuring the displacement of an equivalent > >> quantity > >> > of > >> > > > > gold. > >> > > > > > > >> Well, we > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> now know that this method doesn't actually work: > it's > >> not > >> > > > > > possible > >> > > > > > > to > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> measure the differences in water displacement that > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> precisely. The > >> > > > > > > >> method > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> that Archimedes actually used was much closer to the > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> "principal > >> > > > > > of > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> buoyancy" which Vygotsky always talks about. > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> And how do we know this? Because of the Archimedes > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> palimpsest, a > >> > > > > > > >> velum on > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> which seven texts were written at right angles to > each > >> > > other. > >> > > > > > > Because > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> parchment was so expensive, the velum was scraped > and > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> written > >> > > > > > over > >> > > > > > > >> every > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> century or so, but because the skin it was made of > was > >> > > soft, > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> the > >> > > > > > > >> pressure > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> of the writing preserved the older texts below the > new > >> > ones > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> when > >> > > > > > > the > >> > > > > > > >> old > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> text was scraped off. And one of the lower texts is > >> the > >> > > only > >> > > > > > known > >> > > > > > > >> Greek > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> copy of Archimedes' "On Floating Bodies". > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Neither the relationship of these texts to meaning > nor > >> > > their > >> > > > > > > >> relationship > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> to each other is a matter of association (and in > fact > >> > they > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> are > >> > > > > > > >> related to > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> each other by a kind of failed dissociation). But > it's > >> > > quite > >> > > > > > > similar > >> > > > > > > >> to the > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> way that word meanings are reused and develop anew. > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> (Did I do it? Is this two screens?) > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> David Kellogg > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 14:24, HENRY SHONERD > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> > > >> > > > > > > >> wrote: > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> I meant to ask: What does it mean that Ribot, as an > >> > > > > > > associationist, > >> > > > > > > >> ?sees > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> imagination as a rather distal form of attention?? > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> Henry > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> On Dec 15, 2014, at 5:19 PM, David Kellogg < > >> > > > > > dkellogg60@gmail.com > >> > > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> wrote: > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> On the one hand, Ribot is really responsible for > the > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> division > >> > > > > > > >> between > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> higher and lower psychological functions. On the > >> other, > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> because > >> > > > > > > >> Ribot is > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> an > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> associationist, he sees imagination as a rather > >> distal > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> form of > >> > > > > > > >> attention. > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> And, as Mike says, he does associate it with the > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> transition > >> > > > > > from > >> > > > > > > >> forest > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> to > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> farm, so in that sense he is responsible for the > >> > division > >> > > > > > between > >> > > > > > > >> the two > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> great periods of semio-history: the literal and > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> commonsensical > >> > > > > > > >> world of > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> the > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> forest where attention has to be harnessed to > fairly > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> prosaic > >> > > > > > uses > >> > > > > > > >> in life > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> and death struggles for existence, and the much > more > >> > > > > > > "imaginative" > >> > > > > > > >> (that > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> is, image based) forms of attention we find in the > >> > world > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> of the > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> farm,where > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> written accounts (e.g. calendars) are kept, where > >> long > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> winter > >> > > > > > > >> months are > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> wiled away with fables, and we are much more > likely > >> to > >> > > > > > encounter > >> > > > > > > >> talking > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> animals (but much more rarely talking plants!). > Here > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> attention > >> > > > > > > has > >> > > > > > > >> to be > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> more voluntary. > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> Vygotsky rejects all this, of course. I think he > >> has a > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> very > >> > > > > > clear > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> understanding of the kind of Rousseauvian > >> romanticism > >> > > that > >> > > > > > > >> underpins > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> Ribot > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> here, but above all he rejects associationism. > >> Vygotsky > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> points > >> > > > > > > out > >> > > > > > > >> the > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> LOGICAL flaw in Ribot's argument: if these > >> productive > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> practices > >> > > > > > > >> really > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> are > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> the true source of volitional attention and thus > of > >> > > > > > imagination, > >> > > > > > > >> there > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> isn't any reason to see a qualitative difference > >> > between > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> human > >> > > > > > > and > >> > > > > > > >> animal > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> imagination, because of course animals are > perfectly > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> capable of > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> volitional > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> attention (and in some ways are better at it than > >> > > humans). > >> > > > > > > Without > >> > > > > > > >> a > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> theory > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> of the difference language makes, there isn't any > >> basis > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> for > >> > > > > > > Ribot's > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> distinction between higher and lower psychological > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> functions at > >> > > > > > > >> all. > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> David Kellogg > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> On 16 December 2014 at 01:02, mike cole < > >> > mcole@ucsd.edu > >> > > > > > >> > > > > > wrote: > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Lots of interesting suggestions of new kinds of > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination, > >> > > > > > > >> thanks to > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> all > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> for the food for thought. > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Ribot, not Robot, Henry. He was apparently very > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> influential > >> > > > > > > >> around the > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> time > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> emprical psychology got going in the late 19th > >> > century. > >> > > I > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> had > >> > > > > > > >> seen work > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> on > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> memory before, but not imagination. > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Robert- Does generative = productive and > >> reflective > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> equal > >> > > > > > > >> reproductive? > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Overall I am pondering how to link up empirical > >> > studies > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> of > >> > > > > > > >> development > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> of > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> imagination to these various categories --- The > >> cost > >> > of > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> being > >> > > > > > a > >> > > > > > > >> relative > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> newcomer to the topic. > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> mike > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> On Sun, Dec 14, 2014 at 10:19 PM, HENRY SHONERD < > >> > > > > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Forgive me coming late to this! Robot is now on > my > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> bucket > >> > > > > > list. > >> > > > > > > >> This > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> business of movement recycles our cross-modal > >> musings > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> from > >> > > > > > some > >> > > > > > > >> weeks > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> in > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> our metaphorizing. (I just got an auto spell > >> correct > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > >> > > > > > > >> segmented the > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> last two words of the previous sentence as ?met > >> > > > > aphorizing?. > >> > > > > > > >> Puns, > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> according to my Wikipedia is a kind of metaphor. > >> :) > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Henry > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 14, 2014, at 10:57 AM, mike cole > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > > >> > > > > > > wrote: > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Andy- It was the Russians who pointed me toward > >> Kant > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> and > >> > > > > > they > >> > > > > > > >> are > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> doing > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary work in which they claim Vygotsky > >> and > >> > his > >> > > > > > > >> followers as an > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> inspiration. Some think that LSV was influenced > >> by > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Hegel, so > >> > > > > > > >> its of > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> course > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> interesting to see those additional categories > >> > emerge. > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> 19th Century psychological vocabulary, > >> especially in > >> > > > > > > >> translation, > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> seems > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> awfully slippery territory to me. The word, > >> > > > "recollection" > >> > > > > > in > >> > > > > > > >> this > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> passage, > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> for example, is not a currently used term in > >> counter > >> > > > > > > >> distinction to > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "memory." > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Normal problems. There are serious problems in > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> contemporary > >> > > > > > > >> discourse > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> across languages as our explorations with out > >> > Russian > >> > > > > > > >> colleagues have > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> illustrated. > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> That said, I feel as if I am learning something > >> from > >> > > > > > theorists > >> > > > > > > >> who > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> clearly > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> influenced Vygotsky and early psychology -- > when > >> it > >> > > was > >> > > > > > still > >> > > > > > > >> possible > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> to > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> include culture in it. > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Ribot has a book called "Creative Imagination" > >> > which, > >> > > > > > > >> interestingly > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> links > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination to both movement and the meaning > of a > >> > > > > > "voluntary" > >> > > > > > > >> act. > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Parts > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> of > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> it are offputting, primitives thinking like > >> children > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> stuff > >> > > > > > > that > >> > > > > > > >> was > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> also > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> "in the air" for example. But at present the > >> > concepts > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> of > >> > > > > > > >> creativity > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> and > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> imagination are thoroughly entangled, so its > >> curious > >> > > to > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> see > >> > > > > > > >> that the > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> two > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> concepts are linked. > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Just cause its old doesn't mean its useless, he > >> > found > >> > > > > > himself > >> > > > > > > >> writing. > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> mike > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> Its difficult, of course, to know the extent to > >> > which > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> pretty > >> > > > > > > old > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> approaches > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> to a pesum > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 4:39 PM, Andy Blunden < > >> > > > > > > >> ablunden@mira.net> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> I know we want to keep this relatively > >> > contemporary, > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> but it > >> > > > > > > >> may be > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> worth > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> noting that Hegel's Psychology also gave a > >> > prominent > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> place > >> > > > > > to > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> Imagination > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> in the section on Representation, mediating > >> between > >> > > > > > > >> Recollection and > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Memory. He structured Imagination as (1) > >> > Reproductive > >> > > > > > > >> Imagination, > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> (2) > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Associative Imagination (3) Productive > >> Imagination, > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> which > >> > > > > > he > >> > > > > > > >> says > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> leads > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> the Sign, which he describes as Productive > >> Memory. > >> > In > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> other > >> > > > > > > >> words, > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> the > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> transition from immediate sensation to > >> Intellect is > >> > > > > > > >> accomplished > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> through > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> these three grades of Imagination. > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> Andy > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >> > >> > > > > > > >> > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > >> > > > > > -- > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> mike cole wrote: > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Here are some questions I have after reading > >> > > Strawson > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > >> > > > > > > >> Williams. > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Kant et al (including Russian > developmentalists > >> > > whose > >> > > > > > work i > >> > > > > > > >> am > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> trying > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mine for empirical > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> strategies and already-accumulated results) > >> speak > >> > of > >> > > > > > > >> productive > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. The Russians write that > productive > >> > > > > > imagination > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> develops. > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> At first I thought that the use of productive > >> > > implies > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> that > >> > > > > > > >> there > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> must > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> be a > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> kind of ?imagination called UNproductive > >> > > imagination. > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> But > >> > > > > > I > >> > > > > > > >> learned > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> instead the idea of RE-productive imagination > >> > > appears > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> and > >> > > > > > is > >> > > > > > > >> linked > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> to > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, it seems that imagination is an > ineluctable > >> > part > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > >> > > > > > > >> anticipation > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> memory. > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Imagine that! > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Sat, Dec 13, 2014 at 12:16 PM, HENRY > >> SHONERD < > >> > > > > > > >> hshonerd@gmail.com > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Strawson provides a long view historically > on > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination > >> > > > > > > >> (starting > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Hume and Kant), Williams a more > >> contemporaneous > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> look, and > >> > > > > > > >> provides > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> a > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> space > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for imagination not afforded by the > >> > socio-cultural > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as > >> > > > > > > fixed. > >> > > > > > > >> This, > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> coupled > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with Pelaprat and Cole on Gap/Imagination, > >> gives > >> > me > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a > >> > > > > > > ground > >> > > > > > > >> to > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> take > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> part > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the thread on imagination. Of course, I > >> start > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> preconceptions: > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> on creative collaboration and the cognitive > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> grammarian > >> > > > > > > >> Langacker on > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> symbolic assemblies in discourse and > cognitive > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> domains, > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> particularly > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal. Everyday discourse, it seems to > me, > >> is > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> full of > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> imagination > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> creativity. I am terribly interested in two > >> > aspects > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > >> > > > > > > >> temporality: > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sequence and rhythm (including tempo and > >> rhythmic > >> > > > > > > >> structure), which > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> I > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> think > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> must both figure in imagination and > >> creativity, > >> > for > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> both > >> > > > > > > >> individual > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> and > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distributed construals of cognition and > >> feeling. > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 13, 2014, at 12:01 PM, Larry Purss < > >> > > > > > > >> lpscholar2@gmail.com> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry, Mike, and others interested in this > >> > topic. > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I too see the affinities with notions of > the > >> > third > >> > > > > > *space* > >> > > > > > > >> and the > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> analogy > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to *gap-filling* > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am on holiday so limited access to > >> internet. > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> However, I wanted to mention Raymond > Williams > >> > and > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> his > >> > > > > > > >> notion of > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "structures > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of feeling" that David K references. This > >> notion > >> > > is > >> > > > > > > >> explored under > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of historical *styles* that exist > as a > >> > > *set* > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of > >> > > > > > > >> modalities > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> that > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> hang > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> together. This notion suggests there is a > >> form > >> > of > >> > > > > > knowing > >> > > > > > > >> that is > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> forming > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> but has not yet formed [but can be "felt" > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> [perceived??] > >> > > > > > if > >> > > > > > > >> we > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> think > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imaginatively. Raymond explores the > >> imaginal as > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *style* Larry On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 4:38 > >> PM, > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> HENRY SHONERD < > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> hshonerd@gmail.com > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> wrote: > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mike and Larry, > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I promise to read your profer, but just > >> want to > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> say how > >> > > > > > > >> jazzed up > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> I > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> am > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> now > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> about this thread. My mind has been going > >> wild, > >> > > the > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mind > >> > > > > > > as > >> > > > > > > >> Larry > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> construes > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> it. I ended up just now with a triad, > >> actually > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> various > >> > > > > > > >> triads, > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> finally > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> found my old friend Serpinski. Part now of > >> my > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> notebooks > >> > > > > > > of > >> > > > > > > >> the > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> mind, as > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Vera would construe it. I?ll be back! Gap > >> > > adentro, > >> > > > > > luega > >> > > > > > > >> pa? > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> fuera. > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Fractally yours, > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Henry > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Dec 12, 2014, at 5:09 PM, mike cole < > >> > > > > > mcole@ucsd.edu> > >> > > > > > > >> wrote: > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For those interested in the imagination > >> > thread, > >> > > > > > attached > >> > > > > > > >> are two > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> articles > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by philosophers who have worried about the > >> > issue. > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> My current interest stems from the work > of > >> > CHAT > >> > > > > > > theorists > >> > > > > > > >> like > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Zaporozhets > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and his students who studied the > >> development > >> > of > >> > > > > > > >> imagination in a > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> manner > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that, it turns out, goes back to Kant's > >> notion > >> > > of > >> > > > > > > >> productive > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> imagination. I > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> am not advocating going back to Kant, and > >> have > >> > > no > >> > > > > > > >> intention of > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> doing > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> so. > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> But these ideas seem worth pursuing as > >> > explicated > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in the > >> > > > > > > >> attached > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> texts. > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Through reading the Russians and then these > >> > > > > > philosophers, > >> > > > > > > I > >> > > > > > > >> came > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> upon > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> idea that perception and imagination are > very > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> closely > >> > > > > > > >> linked at > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> several > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> levels of analysis. This is what, in our > >> > > naivete, > >> > > > > > > >> Ettienne and I > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> argued > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> our paper on imagination sent around > >> earlier > >> > as > >> > > a > >> > > > > > means > >> > > > > > > of > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> access > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> to > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> work of the blind-deaf psychologist, > >> Alexander > >> > > > > Suvorov. > >> > > > > > > >> Moreover, > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> such > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> views emphasize the future orientation of > >> the > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> perception/imagination > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> process. I believe that these views have > >> > direct > >> > > > > > > relevance > >> > > > > > > >> to > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> Kris's > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> paper > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to be found on the KrisRRQ thread, and also > >> > speak > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to > >> > > > > > > >> concerns > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> about > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> the > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> role of different forms of symbolic play > in > >> > > > > > development. > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So here are the papers on the imagination > >> > > thread. > >> > > > > > > Perhaps > >> > > > > > > >> they > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> will > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> prove > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> useful for those interested. > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> mike > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal > >> with a > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> natural > >> > > > > > > >> science > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> with an > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst > Boesch. > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >> > > Strawson.pdf> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> -- > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a > >> > natural > >> > > > > > science > >> > > > > > > >> with an > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> -- > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a > >> natural > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> science > >> > > > > > > >> with an > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>>> > >> > > > > > > >>>> > >> > > > > > > >>> > >> > > > > > > >> > >> > > > > > > >> > >> > > > > > > >> > >> > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > > >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > -- > >> > > > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >> > > > > > Assistant Professor > >> > > > > > Department of Anthropology > >> > > > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >> > > > > > Brigham Young University > >> > > > > > Provo, UT 84602 > >> > > > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >> > > > > > > >> > > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > -- > >> > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >> > > > Assistant Professor > >> > > > Department of Anthropology > >> > > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >> > > > Brigham Young University > >> > > > Provo, UT 84602 > >> > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > -- > >> > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >> > > Assistant Professor > >> > > Department of Anthropology > >> > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >> > > Brigham Young University > >> > > Provo, UT 84602 > >> > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > >> > -- > >> > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >> > Assistant Professor > >> > Department of Anthropology > >> > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >> > Brigham Young University > >> > Provo, UT 84602 > >> > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >> > > >> > >> > >> > >> -- > >> It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science with an > >> object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > >> > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 880 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From ablunden@mira.net Sat Dec 27 02:02:51 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sat, 27 Dec 2014 21:02:51 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] no primitive language? Message-ID: <549E83CB.60802@mira.net> I have heard, and I believe it to be the case, that there is no such thing as a "primitive language." I am not talking about the "language" of children raised in isolation, or the "home sign" of deaf children, I mean among the languages of actual historical peoples. I would just appreciate that if this is wrong, could someone on this list who knows about this kind of thing disabuse me. Otherwise I will assume this to be factual. Thanks Andy -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ From carolmacdon@gmail.com Sat Dec 27 02:07:21 2014 From: carolmacdon@gmail.com (Carol Macdonald) Date: Sat, 27 Dec 2014 12:07:21 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: no primitive language? In-Reply-To: <549E83CB.60802@mira.net> References: <549E83CB.60802@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy It's true. Languages all share key characteristics. Carol On 27 December 2014 at 12:02, Andy Blunden wrote: > > I have heard, and I believe it to be the case, that there is no such thing > as a "primitive language." > I am not talking about the "language" of children raised in isolation, or > the "home sign" of deaf children, I mean among the languages of actual > historical peoples. > I would just appreciate that if this is wrong, could someone on this list > who knows about this kind of thing disabuse me. Otherwise I will assume > this to be factual. > > Thanks > Andy > -- > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) Developmental psycholinguist Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa From ablunden@mira.net Sat Dec 27 02:10:53 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sat, 27 Dec 2014 21:10:53 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: no primitive language? In-Reply-To: References: <549E83CB.60802@mira.net> Message-ID: <549E85AD.5040702@mira.net> Thanks, Carol. Can those "key characteristics" be given in a few lines? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Carol Macdonald wrote: > Andy > > It's true. Languages all share key characteristics. > > Carol > > On 27 December 2014 at 12:02, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > I have heard, and I believe it to be the case, that there is no > such thing as a "primitive language." > I am not talking about the "language" of children raised in > isolation, or the "home sign" of deaf children, I mean among the > languages of actual historical peoples. > I would just appreciate that if this is wrong, could someone on > this list who knows about this kind of thing disabuse me. > Otherwise I will assume this to be factual. > > Thanks > Andy > -- > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > -- > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Sat Dec 27 02:14:36 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sat, 27 Dec 2014 21:14:36 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: no primitive language? In-Reply-To: References: <549E83CB.60802@mira.net> <549E85AD.5040702@mira.net> Message-ID: <549E868C.2020809@mira.net> Thanks, Carol. :) I am OK from here then. Much appreciated. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Carol Macdonald wrote: > Syntax, semantics. pragmatics, phonology, discourse orientation: they > just give their own version of these aspects. > > On 27 December 2014 at 12:10, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > Thanks, Carol. > Can those "key characteristics" be given in a few lines? > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > Carol Macdonald wrote: > > Andy > > It's true. Languages all share key characteristics. > > Carol > > On 27 December 2014 at 12:02, Andy Blunden >> wrote: > > I have heard, and I believe it to be the case, that there > is no > such thing as a "primitive language." > I am not talking about the "language" of children raised in > isolation, or the "home sign" of deaf children, I mean > among the > languages of actual historical peoples. > I would just appreciate that if this is wrong, could > someone on > this list who knows about this kind of thing disabuse me. > Otherwise I will assume this to be factual. > > Thanks > Andy > -- > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > > > > -- > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: > Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > > > > > > -- > Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > Developmental psycholinguist > Academic, Researcher, and Editor > Honorary Research Fellow: Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sat Dec 27 02:35:09 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sat, 27 Dec 2014 19:35:09 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: no primitive language? In-Reply-To: <549E868C.2020809@mira.net> References: <549E83CB.60802@mira.net> <549E85AD.5040702@mira.net> <549E868C.2020809@mira.net> Message-ID: Well, of course Carol's really right, Andy. We need to say what we mean by primitive. Does it mean that the language is historically young? In that case, the most primitive language is probably modern Hebrew. Does it mean that the language is grammatically simple? Which aspect of the grammar? Let's take case, since this is Vygotsky's model for linguistic complexity in the Lectures. Annaluisa will tell you about Sanskrit's eight cases; modern Tamil has seven; Greek and Latin had about six. Tsez, in the mountains of the Caucasus, has 64 cases (mostly locatives). English is probably the most primitive languages in the world from this point of view; it has a distinction between "I" and "me" and "he" and "him" but that's about it. David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 27 December 2014 at 19:14, Andy Blunden wrote: > Thanks, Carol. :) > I am OK from here then. > Much appreciated. > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > Carol Macdonald wrote: > >> Syntax, semantics. pragmatics, phonology, discourse orientation: they >> just give their own version of these aspects. >> >> On 27 December 2014 at 12:10, Andy Blunden > ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >> >> Thanks, Carol. >> Can those "key characteristics" be given in a few lines? >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------ >> ------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> Carol Macdonald wrote: >> >> Andy >> >> It's true. Languages all share key characteristics. >> >> Carol >> >> On 27 December 2014 at 12:02, Andy Blunden > > >> wrote: >> >> I have heard, and I believe it to be the case, that there >> is no >> such thing as a "primitive language." >> I am not talking about the "language" of children raised in >> isolation, or the "home sign" of deaf children, I mean >> among the >> languages of actual historical peoples. >> I would just appreciate that if this is wrong, could >> someone on >> this list who knows about this kind of thing disabuse me. >> Otherwise I will assume this to be factual. >> >> Thanks >> Andy >> -- ------------------------------ >> ------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> >> >> >> -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >> Developmental psycholinguist >> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: >> Department of Linguistics, Unisa >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >> Developmental psycholinguist >> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of >> Linguistics, Unisa >> >> >> >> > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Sat Dec 27 03:57:34 2014 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Sat, 27 Dec 2014 11:57:34 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: no primitive language? In-Reply-To: References: <549E83CB.60802@mira.net> <549E85AD.5040702@mira.net> <549E868C.2020809@mira.net> Message-ID: <6F1EE308-E173-4D4B-B54E-B7D1D59865E6@uniandes.edu.co> David, I know you know more about this than I know.... but the debate today centers on the Pirah?, no? Do they have color terms? Do they have number terms? Do they have recursion? Martin On Dec 27, 2014, at 5:35 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > Well, of course Carol's really right, Andy. We need to say what we mean by > primitive. Does it mean that the language is historically young? In that > case, the most primitive language is probably modern Hebrew. Does it mean > that the language is grammatically simple? Which aspect of the grammar? > > Let's take case, since this is Vygotsky's model for linguistic complexity > in the Lectures. Annaluisa will tell you about Sanskrit's eight cases; > modern Tamil has seven; Greek and Latin had about six. Tsez, in the > mountains of the Caucasus, has 64 cases (mostly locatives). > > English is probably the most primitive languages in the world from this > point of view; it has a distinction between "I" and "me" and "he" and "him" > but that's about it. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > On 27 December 2014 at 19:14, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> Thanks, Carol. :) >> I am OK from here then. >> Much appreciated. >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Carol Macdonald wrote: >> >>> Syntax, semantics. pragmatics, phonology, discourse orientation: they >>> just give their own version of these aspects. >>> >>> On 27 December 2014 at 12:10, Andy Blunden >> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>> >>> Thanks, Carol. >>> Can those "key characteristics" be given in a few lines? >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> ------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >>> Carol Macdonald wrote: >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> It's true. Languages all share key characteristics. >>> >>> Carol >>> >>> On 27 December 2014 at 12:02, Andy Blunden >> >> >> wrote: >>> >>> I have heard, and I believe it to be the case, that there >>> is no >>> such thing as a "primitive language." >>> I am not talking about the "language" of children raised in >>> isolation, or the "home sign" of deaf children, I mean >>> among the >>> languages of actual historical peoples. >>> I would just appreciate that if this is wrong, could >>> someone on >>> this list who knows about this kind of thing disabuse me. >>> Otherwise I will assume this to be factual. >>> >>> Thanks >>> Andy >>> -- ------------------------------ >>> ------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>> Developmental psycholinguist >>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: >>> Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>> Developmental psycholinguist >>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of >>> Linguistics, Unisa >>> >>> >>> >>> >> From ewall@umich.edu Sat Dec 27 10:48:17 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Sat, 27 Dec 2014 12:48:17 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Maths and science in Korea In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: David Interesting what you say here about 'combinatorial imagination' and number. There is a mathematical sense, in which even relatively small numbers scan be treated as grammar, for instance, sixty. That is, besides its notation in base-ten, it has importantly the factors of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 12, 15, 20, 30. 60. I can see that one might think that within physics the combinatorial aspect of number might become a fetter (although the primes seem to have a sort of importance). However, the combinatorial properties of number are of more than a little important within modern technology and, of course, modern mathematics (and even calculators - smile). Anyway, I agree there is a sense in which larger numbers seem more complex (an interesting question might be whether 60 is more complex than 100000000000000001). I appreciate your age example but there is a problem. The months do not name the same number of days and hence, I would hope that neither a child or an adult would convert to 'fractional' months to give an 'exact' answer. However, if one was to convert to weeks, fractions would make sense. I don't think many adults I know would convert to fractions if I asked them to be exact (and I don't think any hesitation would be due to difficulties with making fractions from months). What I tend to do (and I suspect you will find this peculiar) is to subtract the year I was born from the current year (I remember those - smile) then treating a year as an interval divided roughly in fourths, give a rough fraction (saying about). This, by the way, is roughly what younger students do although they count up rather than subtract (and there is much discussion as to how one counts the year of birth) and use "just", "one-half", and "almost." Fractions are, more or less, a consequent of the multiplicative properties of numbers and, in a way, they still may be within the sphere of 'combinatorial imagination'; e.g. the importance of the factors of 60 in early arithmetics. However, I am more than sure I imperfectly understand this notion so this is just a wondering. Yes, I left off the Sino- as I was interested in local variations and I agree that eleven and twelve is a matter of lexis although all the numbers between 9 and 20 (and they are more than critical for the operations of arithmetic) need, in a sense, to be lexicalized. The problem seems to be students need to learn these structural exceptions and that takes, one might say, precious time. There is also the possibility that the structure of the base-ten number system is eventually weakly grasped and that what remains tentative is passed over in the rush of instruction. I do know there is a lot of evidence that elementary school teachers in the US have a weak grasp of the structure of the base-ten number system. Oh, they can count and do all the operations fine, but are actually fairly unsure what it is all about (and, of course, this may be the case with Korean elementary school teachers also). Reading your second example reminds me that I don't quite understanding how you are using combinatorial (I may be mathematizing it too much). I agree that people tend to misrepresent large powers of ten (and most have even greater problems with 'large negative' powers of ten). As I have a reasonable background in the physical science and biological science, I have tended to interpret this as, of the most part, a lack of context or, perhaps, experience (However, I may be quite wrong). Anyway, I see a thousand as 10^3, a million as 10^3 x 10^3 and so on so the commas actually mark the naming. Thus I see the naming as cultural, but corresponding to mathematical notation. Anyway, I agree with your point about 'making strange the way they do it.' For example, I remember a third grade classroom where a young boy remarked, in essence, that our characterization of the numbers 6, 10, 12, 14, etc. in terms of even was strange. However, his reasons were combinatorial. Perhaps, you are saying that merely having the ability to perform or notice the combinatorial is insufficient guarantee that this move of 'strangeness' can be performed. I find this quite interesting and I would definitely agree (I remember when I first consciously realized this). I have struggled for years to inculcate such tendencies in my students. However, I've so far been unable to sufficiently frame what I seem to be chasing. Ed On Dec 22, 2014, at 3:31 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > I think in any language, big numbers are just an example of what Ribot was > calling "combinatorial imagination" (see earlier thread on imagination). > That is, all languages treat the most commonly used numbers as lexis and > the larger numbers as grammar--so for example in English the numbers one > through twelve are all "molar" in the sense that they are single morphemes, > while Avagadro's number (six hundred and two hextillion, two hundred and > fourteen quintillion, one hundred and fifty quandrillion) is decomposable > into base ten units at every point. This is part of a the much more general > property of language which means that the words which realize scientific > concepts (e.g. "immersion") are morphologically complex while the ones > which realize everyday concepts (e.g. "dunk") are morphologically simple. > One of the problems with Chomsky's model of language (the one to which Roy > Harris is pointing, actually) is that it places this kind of combinatorial > imagination at the centre of the language system and considers fixed idioms > to be epiphenomenal, while in everyday life, that is, in the vast majority > of language uses, it's really the other way around: we use language as a > set of fixed (but refixable) expressions and reserve our creativity for > other problems. > > Engestr?m's book "Learning as Expanding" begins by attacking Gagne on > combinatorial imagination; Engestr?m argues that all learning is > essentially expansive and not combinatorial. I have always thought this a > mistake: as Vygotsky says, development always means the introduction of > something new, something not present even embryonically at the outset, and > it's for this reason that a historical account of a process can only be > teleological and cannot actually be predictive (we can't predict learning > any more than we can predict evolution). So I can easily imagine that > combinatorial imagination is a big step forward at one point in the > development of the number system and then it becomes a fetter on the > imagination because it focuses attention on how the number is composed > rather than on what we can do with it (we actually don't use the long form > of Avagadro's number when we talk about chemistry; we just say "Avagadro's > number" or use a calculator). > > Here are two examples of number problems that I think require more than > combinatorial imagination. The first is the one that I clumsily confused > you with in my last post. Suppose a child is nine years and four months > old, and I ask the child how old she is. She says "nine and...." And what? > The adult way is to say nine and four months, but that doesn't tell us how > many years old the child is, that is, how many fractions of a year lie > between the child and the child's next or last birthday. In order to answer > that question, the child has to convert months to twelfths of a year, and > then try to convert these to thirds or decimals. This requires more than > combinatorial imagination; it involves reframing the problem as one of the > imperfection of the non-decimal system we use to calculate months. > > The second stems indirectly from the problem you raise. Although I think > the difference between the Korean (actually, Sino-Korean) numbers between > ten and twenty is negligible (it's just a matter of lexicalizing two > numbers, eleven and twelve), there is a very serious problem that dogs even > advanced learners of English here. The Korean won is a very small currency > unit--there are about a thousand to the dollar at the moment. So to express > the price of anything worth buying, you need to talk, in English, in units > of ten to the third power (a cup of coffee costs thousands, salaries and > rents are in millions, cars costs tens of millions, and real estate costs > billions and trillions). But the Korean number system uses units of ten to > the fourth bower ("man" means ten thousand, "ok" means a hundred million, > and "cho" is a billion). So when you read statistics in the English press > they are very often wrong by a factor of ten. This requires more than > combinatorial imagination, because it involves realizing that the placement > of commas in a large number is just a cultural convention corresponding to > language and not to mathematics itself, and also involves "making strange" > the way we do it, and thinking instead in terms of the way they do it. > > On Sunday our Vygotsky seminar met at my apartment to proof the galleys of > our new book of Vygotsky's lectures on pedology, and during the lunch break > some of my former students were looking at the paintings I did twenty years > ago. At the time I was obsessed with "point of view", and all my paintings > featured some intrusion of the artist's own body--usually an arm or a pair > of spectacles. I guess the purpose of it was to "make strange" the act of > looking at a painting and to instead force the viewer into my own > viewpoint. But it also had the curious property of making strange the act > of painting a painting, because I could never get over the fact that both > the part of my own body and the rest of the painting were in equally sharp > focus. That's not the way point of view really works! > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > Korean > > > On 22 December 2014 at 08:29, Ed Wall wrote: > >> David >> >> This is quite interesting. Let me give some different takes on some >> of what you write (I, by the way, am still unsure) >> >> Some say part of the fetters you refer to are in the manner in which >> the equal sign is used (e.g. as compute) and the propensity for vertical >> addition in the early grades. I have seen a US 3rd grade teacher complicate >> things somewhat (she and the children were definitely working with >> countable objects) in starting with an unknown quantity, remove a known >> quantity, and, by obtaining a known quantity, figure out what the initial >> whole was without too much trouble. That isn't too say that things might >> not have proceeded more efficiently with another curricular starting point. >> >> There is an interesting different between Korean students and US >> students in the early grades. US students have something called eleven and >> twelve and Korean students have something translated, in effect, as ten-one >> and ten-two. There has been speculation by some that these can be fetters >> of a sort on the way to decimal number (there are also things called nickel >> and quarter and five dollars not to mention inches, etc. which can also be >> somewhat un-helpful). >> >> >> On a different note, what is the adult system of determining how old >> one is in years, exactly? I know how young children do this correctly, but >> inexactly. >> >> Ed >> >> On Dec 21, 2014, at 4:50 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >> >>> Let me float a hypothesis, and see what Huw and Ulvi make of it. A >> learning >>> activity (any learning activity) is best described not as a synoptic >>> hierarchy of molar units like operation, action and activity. Viewed >>> diachronically, from the point of view of psychology, a learning activity >>> is a non-hierarchical historical sequence, such that any given >>> "method" eventually, in time, turns out to fetter progress and must be >>> discarded, and the end result is not an inter-mental social form of >>> activity but instead an intramental psychological one. >>> >>> Take the Schmittau work that Ulvi references as a concrete example. >>> Schmittau showed that the American curriculum (like the Korean one) >>> introduces the notion of number by counting separate objects. This allows >>> the child to grasp the number very concretely and quickly. Groupings are >>> then introduced, and this corresponds once again to what we see children >> do >>> naturally (see Chapter Eight of HDHMF). So at every point the American >>> curriculum takes the line of least resistance. But that means that at a >>> specific point, the notion of number based on concrete, separable objects >>> becomes a fetter on the child's progress. Schmittau locates this point >>> quite precisely: it's the moment when the child, accustomed to add known >>> quantitites of physical objects together to obtain an unknown quantity, >> is >>> asked to start with an unknown quantity, remove a known quantity, and, by >>> obtaining a known quantity, figure out what the initial whole was (e.g. >>> "I made a bunch of snowballs and put them in the freezer. I threw one at >> my >>> big brother at a Christmas pary, and two at my friends when they teased >> me >>> at New Years. Now I have only half a dozen left for April Fools Day. How >>> many snowballs did I make?") >>> >>> Chapter Eight of HDHMF asks the question of whether "arithmetical >> figures" >>> (that is, physical groupings of countable objects) will keep the child >> back >>> from learning the symbolic manipulations afforded by the decimal system >> of >>> writing digits, or whether they will naturally evolve into the decimal >>> system (because the children will of their own will invent a physical >>> grouping of ten objects). Interestingly, Vygotsky concludes that any >>> experiment along these lines would be unethical (and THERE is a >>> correspondence with Chomsky, who has often correctly noted how one of the >>> things that keeps linguistics in a "paper and pencil" era corresponding >> to >>> sixteenth century physics is the immorality of experimentation on human >>> subjects). But, like Chomsky, he resolves the question with paper and >>> pencil (in Chapter Thirteen) with a very amusing MIS-reading of >> Thorndike's >>> "Psychology of Arithmetic". >>> >>> Thorndike is criticizing the way in which our parents and grandparents >> were >>> taught arithmetic as a symbolic system akin to language. Vygotsky >>> apparently doesn't get Thorndike's irony, and thinks that Thorndike is >>> lauding this culturally approved method over Lay's newfangled system >> based >>> on "arithmetical figures" (dominos, in fact). See the attachment: it >>> involves analyzing a picture where there is one girl on a swing and >> another >>> on the ground ("How many girls are there?") a kitten on a stump and >> another >>> on the ground (which Vygotsky misremembers as dogs). And so, by a process >>> of misreading and misremembering, Vygotsky turns Thorndike into a >>> cognitivist. Thorndike would probably rather be a dog. >>> >>> Interestingly, the way Vygotsky resolves the whole dispute is >> similar--that >>> is, the child triumphs not through the adequacy of his or her own method >> or >>> through seeing the superiority of the adult method, but rather through >> the >>> inadequacies of both. For example (and this is my example), a child with >> a >>> notion of number based entirely on separable objects has a very hard time >>> measuring how old he is in precise terms. On the other hand, the adult >>> method of measuring years out in months is NOT a decimal method. The >> child >>> therefore has to grasp and perfect the adult system just in order to >> answer >>> the simple question--how old are you in years EXACTLY? >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On 22 December 2014 at 07:01, Huw Lloyd >> wrote: >>> >>>> Ulvi, >>>> >>>> The essential 'method' is to facilitate students' own experimentation >> with >>>> methods. This is called learning activity. >>>> >>>> Huw >>>> >>>> On 21 December 2014 at 12:15, Ulvi ??il wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Hello, >>>>> >>>>> I know there are some works comparing Russia (Davydov's curriculum) and >>>> US, >>>>> and even some works done in US with an application of Davydov's, e.g. >> by >>>>> Schmittau. >>>>> >>>>> I would like to know, not in detail, but just in general, which main >>>>> factors lie behind this success in Russia, it is Davydov, or Zarkov or >>>> any >>>>> other scholar's method. >>>>> >>>>> Thanks in advance, >>>>> >>>>> Ulvi >>>>> >>>> >>> >> >> >> From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sat Dec 27 12:23:27 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (lpscholar2@gmail.com) Date: Sat, 27 Dec 2014 20:23:27 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: =?utf-8?q?no_primitive_language=3F?= In-Reply-To: <6F1EE308-E173-4D4B-B54E-B7D1D59865E6@uniandes.edu.co> References: <549E83CB.60802@mira.net> <549E85AD.5040702@mira.net> <549E868C.2020809@mira.net> , <6F1EE308-E173-4D4B-B54E-B7D1D59865E6@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <549f1710.0167460a.12bb.7111@mx.google.com> I wrote out a section of an article by Franson Manjali exploring the *social* and the *cognitive* in Saussure?s understanding of language. It may add to this conversation on the lexical and the grammatical aspects of language. It is only one page I quoted but the article is fascinating exploring the themes of more and less arbitrary systems of language and its regularity. Annalisa, the beginning of the article explores Saussure?s debt to the Vedic scholars of language. The article is published at [Texto! Volume XVll, number 3, (2012). I could add more if others are interested, or the linguists among us could answer Franson Manjali reading of the *social* Larry Sent from Windows Mail From: Martin John Packer Sent: ?Saturday?, ?December? ?27?, ?2014 ?3?:?57? ?AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity David, I know you know more about this than I know.... but the debate today centers on the Pirah?, no? Do they have color terms? Do they have number terms? Do they have recursion? Martin On Dec 27, 2014, at 5:35 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > Well, of course Carol's really right, Andy. We need to say what we mean by > primitive. Does it mean that the language is historically young? In that > case, the most primitive language is probably modern Hebrew. Does it mean > that the language is grammatically simple? Which aspect of the grammar? > > Let's take case, since this is Vygotsky's model for linguistic complexity > in the Lectures. Annaluisa will tell you about Sanskrit's eight cases; > modern Tamil has seven; Greek and Latin had about six. Tsez, in the > mountains of the Caucasus, has 64 cases (mostly locatives). > > English is probably the most primitive languages in the world from this > point of view; it has a distinction between "I" and "me" and "he" and "him" > but that's about it. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > On 27 December 2014 at 19:14, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> Thanks, Carol. :) >> I am OK from here then. >> Much appreciated. >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> Carol Macdonald wrote: >> >>> Syntax, semantics. pragmatics, phonology, discourse orientation: they >>> just give their own version of these aspects. >>> >>> On 27 December 2014 at 12:10, Andy Blunden >> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>> >>> Thanks, Carol. >>> Can those "key characteristics" be given in a few lines? >>> Andy >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> ------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >>> Carol Macdonald wrote: >>> >>> Andy >>> >>> It's true. Languages all share key characteristics. >>> >>> Carol >>> >>> On 27 December 2014 at 12:02, Andy Blunden >> >> >> wrote: >>> >>> I have heard, and I believe it to be the case, that there >>> is no >>> such thing as a "primitive language." >>> I am not talking about the "language" of children raised in >>> isolation, or the "home sign" of deaf children, I mean >>> among the >>> languages of actual historical peoples. >>> I would just appreciate that if this is wrong, could >>> someone on >>> this list who knows about this kind of thing disabuse me. >>> Otherwise I will assume this to be factual. >>> >>> Thanks >>> Andy >>> -- ------------------------------ >>> ------------------------------------------ >>> *Andy Blunden* >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>> Developmental psycholinguist >>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: >>> Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>> Developmental psycholinguist >>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department of >>> Linguistics, Unisa >>> >>> >>> >>> >> -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: DECEMBER 27 2014 MANJALI FRANSON The Social and the Cognitive in Language.docx Type: application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document Size: 12690 bytes Desc: =?utf-8?Q?DECEMBER_27_2014_MANJALI_FRANSON_The_Social_and_the_Cognitive_i?= =?utf-8?Q?n_Language.docx?= Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141227/7dbfd501/attachment.bin From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sat Dec 27 13:20:51 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sun, 28 Dec 2014 06:20:51 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Maths and science in Korea In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: In English systems, all large numbers are expressed as ten raised to some power of 3n. So for example a thousand is ten to the third, a million is ten to the (3x2), a billion is ten to the (3x3), etc. That's why we put the commas in every three zeros, and why when we say the numbers we pause there to give the units (one hundred and eleven trillion, one hundred and eleven billion, one hundred and eleven million, one hundred and eleven thousand, one hundred and eleven). But in Chinese systems, all large numbers are expressed as ten raised to some power of 4n. So for example "wan" is ten to the fourth (ten thousand, in English notation), "yi" is ten to the eighth, etc. The population of China, when I lived there, was not one billion--it was ten "yi". That's why we do NOT put a comma in with every three zeros in Chinese. Even Korea, where the English notation is quite powerful because we are a small country occupied by American troops, we find an interesting compromise. Here are some real estate prices from today's newspaper: ??? 30,780?? ??? 34,380?? ??? 40,000?? As you can see, they are all expressed as tens of thousands, followed by a character ? ("man" or in Chinese "wan" which means ten thousand, so the first one is three hundred and seven million, eight hundred thousand won, the second is 343 million eight hundred thousand, etc. I don't believe in "combinatorial imagination" either, but Vygotsky uses the term in his popular science writing on imagination ("Imagination and Creativity in the Child",1930/2004). It's from Ribot. It means that you create new structures by combining parts of old ones, so the example Vygotsky gives is the house of Baba Yaga, a small cottage which stands on chicken legs. The child knows what chicken legs are from direct experience, and sees many cottages, but the child has never seen a house on chicken legs. How can the child then understand what the house of Baba Yaga looks like? Through combinatorial imagination, or so the theory goes. (Vygotsky later decimates precisely this theory in his work on imagination in adolescence and his work on the development of imagination in childhood). So my point was this: we do not have any direct experience of very large numbers--none of us have the patience to count up as far as ten thousand, still less to a million or a billion. So how can we understand real estate prices like the ones listed above? This IS actually one of the conundrums Vygotsky tackles in his work on Imagination in the Adolescent, where he uses the example of Jacob Wassermann's novel the Marizius Case, a story about an adolescent who tries to imagine the number of days in the prison sentence of an innocent man. The answer Ribot would give is combinatorial imagination: we do it by combining experiences we do have, such as tens, hundreds and thousands. But of course this idea is nonsense--the relationship is not one of addition at all. It's another relationship altogether, one I would call grammatical, because the value of each component depends on its place in a line of components (unlike, say, the WORDS "eleven", or "seven", which unlike their digital notations are not decomposable into units whose value depend on order). The latter I would call lexical, because here value is really a one-off affair, it is not systemic (the way millions and billions are) and it is not proportional ("en" does not realize the same meaning in "seven" as it does in "eleven"). But that brings us to the difference between phonetics, phonology, lexis, grammar, semantics, pragmatics and consequently to the other thread! A spinning wheel moans forth its threads Its threads become a tangled skein The tangled skein a world of dreams. (Kim Ok, one of our national poets who disappeared in the Korean War) David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 28 December 2014 at 03:48, Ed Wall wrote: > David > > Interesting what you say here about 'combinatorial imagination' and > number. There is a mathematical sense, in which even relatively small > numbers scan be treated as grammar, for instance, sixty. That is, besides > its notation in base-ten, it has importantly the factors of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, > 6, 10, 12, 15, 20, 30. 60. I can see that one might think that within > physics the combinatorial aspect of number might become a fetter (although > the primes seem to have a sort of importance). However, the combinatorial > properties of number are of more than a little important within modern > technology and, of course, modern mathematics (and even calculators - > smile). Anyway, I agree there is a sense in which larger numbers seem more > complex (an interesting question might be whether 60 is more complex than > 100000000000000001). > I appreciate your age example but there is a problem. The months do > not name the same number of days and hence, I would hope that neither a > child or an adult would convert to 'fractional' months to give an 'exact' > answer. However, if one was to convert to weeks, fractions would make > sense. I don't think many adults I know would convert to fractions if I > asked them to be exact (and I don't think any hesitation would be due to > difficulties with making fractions from months). What I tend to do (and I > suspect you will find this peculiar) is to subtract the year I was born > from the current year (I remember those - smile) then treating a year as an > interval divided roughly in fourths, give a rough fraction (saying about). > This, by the way, is roughly what younger students do although they count > up rather than subtract (and there is much discussion as to how one counts > the year of birth) and use "just", "one-half", and "almost." Fractions are, > more or less, a consequent of the multiplicative properties of numbers and, > in a way, they still may be within the sphere of 'combinatorial > imagination'; e.g. the importance of the factors of 60 in early > arithmetics. However, I am more than sure I imperfectly understand this > notion so this is just a wondering. > Yes, I left off the Sino- as I was interested in local variations > and I agree that eleven and twelve is a matter of lexis although all the > numbers between 9 and 20 (and they are more than critical for the > operations of arithmetic) need, in a sense, to be lexicalized. The problem > seems to be students need to learn these structural exceptions and that > takes, one might say, precious time. There is also the possibility that the > structure of the base-ten number system is eventually weakly grasped and > that what remains tentative is passed over in the rush of instruction. I do > know there is a lot of evidence that elementary school teachers in the US > have a weak grasp of the structure of the base-ten number system. Oh, they > can count and do all the operations fine, but are actually fairly unsure > what it is all about (and, of course, this may be the case with Korean > elementary school teachers also). > Reading your second example reminds me that I don't quite > understanding how you are using combinatorial (I may be mathematizing it > too much). I agree that people tend to misrepresent large powers of ten > (and most have even greater problems with 'large negative' powers of ten). > As I have a reasonable background in the physical science and biological > science, I have tended to interpret this as, of the most part, a lack of > context or, perhaps, experience (However, I may be quite wrong). Anyway, I > see a thousand as 10^3, a million as 10^3 x 10^3 and so on so the commas > actually mark the naming. Thus I see the naming as cultural, but > corresponding to mathematical notation. > Anyway, I agree with your point about 'making strange the way they do > it.' For example, I remember a third grade classroom where a young boy > remarked, in essence, that our characterization of the numbers 6, 10, 12, > 14, etc. in terms of even was strange. However, his reasons were > combinatorial. Perhaps, you are saying that merely having the ability to > perform or notice the combinatorial is insufficient guarantee that this > move of 'strangeness' can be performed. I find this quite interesting and > I would definitely agree (I remember when I first consciously realized > this). I have struggled for years to inculcate such tendencies in my > students. However, I've so far been unable to sufficiently frame what I > seem to be chasing. > > Ed > > On Dec 22, 2014, at 3:31 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > I think in any language, big numbers are just an example of what Ribot > was > > calling "combinatorial imagination" (see earlier thread on imagination). > > That is, all languages treat the most commonly used numbers as lexis and > > the larger numbers as grammar--so for example in English the numbers one > > through twelve are all "molar" in the sense that they are single > morphemes, > > while Avagadro's number (six hundred and two hextillion, two hundred and > > fourteen quintillion, one hundred and fifty quandrillion) is decomposable > > into base ten units at every point. This is part of a the much more > general > > property of language which means that the words which realize scientific > > concepts (e.g. "immersion") are morphologically complex while the ones > > which realize everyday concepts (e.g. "dunk") are morphologically simple. > > One of the problems with Chomsky's model of language (the one to which > Roy > > Harris is pointing, actually) is that it places this kind of > combinatorial > > imagination at the centre of the language system and considers fixed > idioms > > to be epiphenomenal, while in everyday life, that is, in the vast > majority > > of language uses, it's really the other way around: we use language as a > > set of fixed (but refixable) expressions and reserve our creativity for > > other problems. > > > > Engestr?m's book "Learning as Expanding" begins by attacking Gagne on > > combinatorial imagination; Engestr?m argues that all learning is > > essentially expansive and not combinatorial. I have always thought this a > > mistake: as Vygotsky says, development always means the introduction of > > something new, something not present even embryonically at the outset, > and > > it's for this reason that a historical account of a process can only be > > teleological and cannot actually be predictive (we can't predict learning > > any more than we can predict evolution). So I can easily imagine that > > combinatorial imagination is a big step forward at one point in the > > development of the number system and then it becomes a fetter on the > > imagination because it focuses attention on how the number is composed > > rather than on what we can do with it (we actually don't use the long > form > > of Avagadro's number when we talk about chemistry; we just say > "Avagadro's > > number" or use a calculator). > > > > Here are two examples of number problems that I think require more than > > combinatorial imagination. The first is the one that I clumsily confused > > you with in my last post. Suppose a child is nine years and four months > > old, and I ask the child how old she is. She says "nine and...." And > what? > > The adult way is to say nine and four months, but that doesn't tell us > how > > many years old the child is, that is, how many fractions of a year lie > > between the child and the child's next or last birthday. In order to > answer > > that question, the child has to convert months to twelfths of a year, and > > then try to convert these to thirds or decimals. This requires more than > > combinatorial imagination; it involves reframing the problem as one of > the > > imperfection of the non-decimal system we use to calculate months. > > > > The second stems indirectly from the problem you raise. Although I think > > the difference between the Korean (actually, Sino-Korean) numbers between > > ten and twenty is negligible (it's just a matter of lexicalizing two > > numbers, eleven and twelve), there is a very serious problem that dogs > even > > advanced learners of English here. The Korean won is a very small > currency > > unit--there are about a thousand to the dollar at the moment. So to > express > > the price of anything worth buying, you need to talk, in English, in > units > > of ten to the third power (a cup of coffee costs thousands, salaries and > > rents are in millions, cars costs tens of millions, and real estate costs > > billions and trillions). But the Korean number system uses units of ten > to > > the fourth bower ("man" means ten thousand, "ok" means a hundred million, > > and "cho" is a billion). So when you read statistics in the English press > > they are very often wrong by a factor of ten. This requires more than > > combinatorial imagination, because it involves realizing that the > placement > > of commas in a large number is just a cultural convention corresponding > to > > language and not to mathematics itself, and also involves "making > strange" > > the way we do it, and thinking instead in terms of the way they do it. > > > > On Sunday our Vygotsky seminar met at my apartment to proof the galleys > of > > our new book of Vygotsky's lectures on pedology, and during the lunch > break > > some of my former students were looking at the paintings I did twenty > years > > ago. At the time I was obsessed with "point of view", and all my > paintings > > featured some intrusion of the artist's own body--usually an arm or a > pair > > of spectacles. I guess the purpose of it was to "make strange" the act of > > looking at a painting and to instead force the viewer into my own > > viewpoint. But it also had the curious property of making strange the act > > of painting a painting, because I could never get over the fact that both > > the part of my own body and the rest of the painting were in equally > sharp > > focus. That's not the way point of view really works! > > > > David Kellogg > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > Korean > > > > > > On 22 December 2014 at 08:29, Ed Wall wrote: > > > >> David > >> > >> This is quite interesting. Let me give some different takes on some > >> of what you write (I, by the way, am still unsure) > >> > >> Some say part of the fetters you refer to are in the manner in which > >> the equal sign is used (e.g. as compute) and the propensity for vertical > >> addition in the early grades. I have seen a US 3rd grade teacher > complicate > >> things somewhat (she and the children were definitely working with > >> countable objects) in starting with an unknown quantity, remove a known > >> quantity, and, by obtaining a known quantity, figure out what the > initial > >> whole was without too much trouble. That isn't too say that things might > >> not have proceeded more efficiently with another curricular starting > point. > >> > >> There is an interesting different between Korean students and US > >> students in the early grades. US students have something called eleven > and > >> twelve and Korean students have something translated, in effect, as > ten-one > >> and ten-two. There has been speculation by some that these can be > fetters > >> of a sort on the way to decimal number (there are also things called > nickel > >> and quarter and five dollars not to mention inches, etc. which can also > be > >> somewhat un-helpful). > >> > >> > >> On a different note, what is the adult system of determining how old > >> one is in years, exactly? I know how young children do this correctly, > but > >> inexactly. > >> > >> Ed > >> > >> On Dec 21, 2014, at 4:50 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > >> > >>> Let me float a hypothesis, and see what Huw and Ulvi make of it. A > >> learning > >>> activity (any learning activity) is best described not as a synoptic > >>> hierarchy of molar units like operation, action and activity. Viewed > >>> diachronically, from the point of view of psychology, a learning > activity > >>> is a non-hierarchical historical sequence, such that any given > >>> "method" eventually, in time, turns out to fetter progress and must be > >>> discarded, and the end result is not an inter-mental social form of > >>> activity but instead an intramental psychological one. > >>> > >>> Take the Schmittau work that Ulvi references as a concrete example. > >>> Schmittau showed that the American curriculum (like the Korean one) > >>> introduces the notion of number by counting separate objects. This > allows > >>> the child to grasp the number very concretely and quickly. Groupings > are > >>> then introduced, and this corresponds once again to what we see > children > >> do > >>> naturally (see Chapter Eight of HDHMF). So at every point the American > >>> curriculum takes the line of least resistance. But that means that at a > >>> specific point, the notion of number based on concrete, separable > objects > >>> becomes a fetter on the child's progress. Schmittau locates this point > >>> quite precisely: it's the moment when the child, accustomed to add > known > >>> quantitites of physical objects together to obtain an unknown quantity, > >> is > >>> asked to start with an unknown quantity, remove a known quantity, and, > by > >>> obtaining a known quantity, figure out what the initial whole was (e.g. > >>> "I made a bunch of snowballs and put them in the freezer. I threw one > at > >> my > >>> big brother at a Christmas pary, and two at my friends when they teased > >> me > >>> at New Years. Now I have only half a dozen left for April Fools Day. > How > >>> many snowballs did I make?") > >>> > >>> Chapter Eight of HDHMF asks the question of whether "arithmetical > >> figures" > >>> (that is, physical groupings of countable objects) will keep the child > >> back > >>> from learning the symbolic manipulations afforded by the decimal system > >> of > >>> writing digits, or whether they will naturally evolve into the decimal > >>> system (because the children will of their own will invent a physical > >>> grouping of ten objects). Interestingly, Vygotsky concludes that any > >>> experiment along these lines would be unethical (and THERE is a > >>> correspondence with Chomsky, who has often correctly noted how one of > the > >>> things that keeps linguistics in a "paper and pencil" era corresponding > >> to > >>> sixteenth century physics is the immorality of experimentation on human > >>> subjects). But, like Chomsky, he resolves the question with paper and > >>> pencil (in Chapter Thirteen) with a very amusing MIS-reading of > >> Thorndike's > >>> "Psychology of Arithmetic". > >>> > >>> Thorndike is criticizing the way in which our parents and grandparents > >> were > >>> taught arithmetic as a symbolic system akin to language. Vygotsky > >>> apparently doesn't get Thorndike's irony, and thinks that Thorndike is > >>> lauding this culturally approved method over Lay's newfangled system > >> based > >>> on "arithmetical figures" (dominos, in fact). See the attachment: it > >>> involves analyzing a picture where there is one girl on a swing and > >> another > >>> on the ground ("How many girls are there?") a kitten on a stump and > >> another > >>> on the ground (which Vygotsky misremembers as dogs). And so, by a > process > >>> of misreading and misremembering, Vygotsky turns Thorndike into a > >>> cognitivist. Thorndike would probably rather be a dog. > >>> > >>> Interestingly, the way Vygotsky resolves the whole dispute is > >> similar--that > >>> is, the child triumphs not through the adequacy of his or her own > method > >> or > >>> through seeing the superiority of the adult method, but rather through > >> the > >>> inadequacies of both. For example (and this is my example), a child > with > >> a > >>> notion of number based entirely on separable objects has a very hard > time > >>> measuring how old he is in precise terms. On the other hand, the adult > >>> method of measuring years out in months is NOT a decimal method. The > >> child > >>> therefore has to grasp and perfect the adult system just in order to > >> answer > >>> the simple question--how old are you in years EXACTLY? > >>> > >>> David Kellogg > >>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> On 22 December 2014 at 07:01, Huw Lloyd > >> wrote: > >>> > >>>> Ulvi, > >>>> > >>>> The essential 'method' is to facilitate students' own experimentation > >> with > >>>> methods. This is called learning activity. > >>>> > >>>> Huw > >>>> > >>>> On 21 December 2014 at 12:15, Ulvi ??il wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> Hello, > >>>>> > >>>>> I know there are some works comparing Russia (Davydov's curriculum) > and > >>>> US, > >>>>> and even some works done in US with an application of Davydov's, e.g. > >> by > >>>>> Schmittau. > >>>>> > >>>>> I would like to know, not in detail, but just in general, which main > >>>>> factors lie behind this success in Russia, it is Davydov, or Zarkov > or > >>>> any > >>>>> other scholar's method. > >>>>> > >>>>> Thanks in advance, > >>>>> > >>>>> Ulvi > >>>>> > >>>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> > > > From ewall@umich.edu Sat Dec 27 13:57:59 2014 From: ewall@umich.edu (Ed Wall) Date: Sat, 27 Dec 2014 15:57:59 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Maths and science in Korea In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <3EAC2DD3-97AE-4904-827B-B7EEFD344D3A@umich.edu> David Apologies. I somehow read past the statement that you were talking about units of powers of 4n. In addition, your examples nicely illustrates the potentialities for misinterpretation. I agree that knowing large numbers additively is doubtful. I guess the question I was raising can one know large numbers multiplicatively. Interestingly, there seem to be numbers you cannot know 'multiplicatively.' Your points about lexis and grammar are quite interesting. I must admit, however (and this is no reflection on your arguments), that things seem, to me, somewhat more tangled and whether it is phonetics, phonology, lexis, grammar, semantics, or pragmatics I'm not sure 'strangeness' is captured. Ed On Dec 27, 2014, at 3:20 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > In English systems, all large numbers are expressed as ten raised to some > power of 3n. So for example a thousand is ten to the third, a million is > ten to the (3x2), a billion is ten to the (3x3), etc. That's why we put the > commas in every three zeros, and why when we say the numbers we pause there > to give the units (one hundred and eleven trillion, one hundred and eleven > billion, one hundred and eleven million, one hundred and eleven thousand, > one hundred and eleven). > > But in Chinese systems, all large numbers are expressed as ten raised to > some power of 4n. So for example "wan" is ten to the fourth (ten thousand, > in English notation), "yi" is ten to the eighth, etc. The population of > China, when I lived there, was not one billion--it was ten "yi". That's why > we do NOT put a comma in with every three zeros in Chinese. Even Korea, > where the English notation is quite powerful because we are a small country > occupied by American troops, we find an interesting compromise. Here are > some real estate prices from today's newspaper: > > ??? 30,780?? > ??? 34,380?? > ??? 40,000?? > > As you can see, they are all expressed as tens of thousands, followed by a > character ? ("man" or in Chinese "wan" which means ten thousand, so the > first one is three hundred and seven million, eight hundred thousand won, > the second is 343 million eight hundred thousand, etc. > > I don't believe in "combinatorial imagination" either, but Vygotsky uses > the term in his popular science writing on imagination ("Imagination and > Creativity in the Child",1930/2004). It's from Ribot. It means that you > create new structures by combining parts of old ones, so the example > Vygotsky gives is the house of Baba Yaga, a small cottage which stands on > chicken legs. The child knows what chicken legs are from direct experience, > and sees many cottages, but the child has never seen a house on chicken > legs. How can the child then understand what the house of Baba Yaga looks > like? Through combinatorial imagination, or so the theory goes. (Vygotsky > later decimates precisely this theory in his work on imagination in > adolescence and his work on the development of imagination in childhood). > > So my point was this: we do not have any direct experience of very large > numbers--none of us have the patience to count up as far as ten thousand, > still less to a million or a billion. So how can we understand real estate > prices like the ones listed above? This IS actually one of the conundrums > Vygotsky tackles in his work on Imagination in the Adolescent, where he > uses the example of Jacob Wassermann's novel the Marizius Case, a story > about an adolescent who tries to imagine the number of days in the prison > sentence of an innocent man. > > The answer Ribot would give is combinatorial imagination: we do it by > combining experiences we do have, such as tens, hundreds and thousands. But > of course this idea is nonsense--the relationship is not one of addition at > all. It's another relationship altogether, one I would call grammatical, > because the value of each component depends on its place in a line of > components (unlike, say, the WORDS "eleven", or "seven", which unlike their > digital notations are not decomposable into units whose value depend on > order). The latter I would call lexical, because here value is really a > one-off affair, it is not systemic (the way millions and billions are) and > it is not proportional ("en" does not realize the same meaning in "seven" > as it does in "eleven"). > > But that brings us to the difference between phonetics, phonology, lexis, > grammar, semantics, pragmatics and consequently to the other thread! > > A spinning wheel moans forth its threads > Its threads become a tangled skein > The tangled skein a world of dreams. > > (Kim Ok, one of our national poets who disappeared in the Korean War) > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > On 28 December 2014 at 03:48, Ed Wall wrote: > >> David >> >> Interesting what you say here about 'combinatorial imagination' and >> number. There is a mathematical sense, in which even relatively small >> numbers scan be treated as grammar, for instance, sixty. That is, besides >> its notation in base-ten, it has importantly the factors of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, >> 6, 10, 12, 15, 20, 30. 60. I can see that one might think that within >> physics the combinatorial aspect of number might become a fetter (although >> the primes seem to have a sort of importance). However, the combinatorial >> properties of number are of more than a little important within modern >> technology and, of course, modern mathematics (and even calculators - >> smile). Anyway, I agree there is a sense in which larger numbers seem more >> complex (an interesting question might be whether 60 is more complex than >> 100000000000000001). >> I appreciate your age example but there is a problem. The months do >> not name the same number of days and hence, I would hope that neither a >> child or an adult would convert to 'fractional' months to give an 'exact' >> answer. However, if one was to convert to weeks, fractions would make >> sense. I don't think many adults I know would convert to fractions if I >> asked them to be exact (and I don't think any hesitation would be due to >> difficulties with making fractions from months). What I tend to do (and I >> suspect you will find this peculiar) is to subtract the year I was born >> from the current year (I remember those - smile) then treating a year as an >> interval divided roughly in fourths, give a rough fraction (saying about). >> This, by the way, is roughly what younger students do although they count >> up rather than subtract (and there is much discussion as to how one counts >> the year of birth) and use "just", "one-half", and "almost." Fractions are, >> more or less, a consequent of the multiplicative properties of numbers and, >> in a way, they still may be within the sphere of 'combinatorial >> imagination'; e.g. the importance of the factors of 60 in early >> arithmetics. However, I am more than sure I imperfectly understand this >> notion so this is just a wondering. >> Yes, I left off the Sino- as I was interested in local variations >> and I agree that eleven and twelve is a matter of lexis although all the >> numbers between 9 and 20 (and they are more than critical for the >> operations of arithmetic) need, in a sense, to be lexicalized. The problem >> seems to be students need to learn these structural exceptions and that >> takes, one might say, precious time. There is also the possibility that the >> structure of the base-ten number system is eventually weakly grasped and >> that what remains tentative is passed over in the rush of instruction. I do >> know there is a lot of evidence that elementary school teachers in the US >> have a weak grasp of the structure of the base-ten number system. Oh, they >> can count and do all the operations fine, but are actually fairly unsure >> what it is all about (and, of course, this may be the case with Korean >> elementary school teachers also). >> Reading your second example reminds me that I don't quite >> understanding how you are using combinatorial (I may be mathematizing it >> too much). I agree that people tend to misrepresent large powers of ten >> (and most have even greater problems with 'large negative' powers of ten). >> As I have a reasonable background in the physical science and biological >> science, I have tended to interpret this as, of the most part, a lack of >> context or, perhaps, experience (However, I may be quite wrong). Anyway, I >> see a thousand as 10^3, a million as 10^3 x 10^3 and so on so the commas >> actually mark the naming. Thus I see the naming as cultural, but >> corresponding to mathematical notation. >> Anyway, I agree with your point about 'making strange the way they do >> it.' For example, I remember a third grade classroom where a young boy >> remarked, in essence, that our characterization of the numbers 6, 10, 12, >> 14, etc. in terms of even was strange. However, his reasons were >> combinatorial. Perhaps, you are saying that merely having the ability to >> perform or notice the combinatorial is insufficient guarantee that this >> move of 'strangeness' can be performed. I find this quite interesting and >> I would definitely agree (I remember when I first consciously realized >> this). I have struggled for years to inculcate such tendencies in my >> students. However, I've so far been unable to sufficiently frame what I >> seem to be chasing. >> >> Ed >> >> On Dec 22, 2014, at 3:31 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >> >>> I think in any language, big numbers are just an example of what Ribot >> was >>> calling "combinatorial imagination" (see earlier thread on imagination). >>> That is, all languages treat the most commonly used numbers as lexis and >>> the larger numbers as grammar--so for example in English the numbers one >>> through twelve are all "molar" in the sense that they are single >> morphemes, >>> while Avagadro's number (six hundred and two hextillion, two hundred and >>> fourteen quintillion, one hundred and fifty quandrillion) is decomposable >>> into base ten units at every point. This is part of a the much more >> general >>> property of language which means that the words which realize scientific >>> concepts (e.g. "immersion") are morphologically complex while the ones >>> which realize everyday concepts (e.g. "dunk") are morphologically simple. >>> One of the problems with Chomsky's model of language (the one to which >> Roy >>> Harris is pointing, actually) is that it places this kind of >> combinatorial >>> imagination at the centre of the language system and considers fixed >> idioms >>> to be epiphenomenal, while in everyday life, that is, in the vast >> majority >>> of language uses, it's really the other way around: we use language as a >>> set of fixed (but refixable) expressions and reserve our creativity for >>> other problems. >>> >>> Engestr?m's book "Learning as Expanding" begins by attacking Gagne on >>> combinatorial imagination; Engestr?m argues that all learning is >>> essentially expansive and not combinatorial. I have always thought this a >>> mistake: as Vygotsky says, development always means the introduction of >>> something new, something not present even embryonically at the outset, >> and >>> it's for this reason that a historical account of a process can only be >>> teleological and cannot actually be predictive (we can't predict learning >>> any more than we can predict evolution). So I can easily imagine that >>> combinatorial imagination is a big step forward at one point in the >>> development of the number system and then it becomes a fetter on the >>> imagination because it focuses attention on how the number is composed >>> rather than on what we can do with it (we actually don't use the long >> form >>> of Avagadro's number when we talk about chemistry; we just say >> "Avagadro's >>> number" or use a calculator). >>> >>> Here are two examples of number problems that I think require more than >>> combinatorial imagination. The first is the one that I clumsily confused >>> you with in my last post. Suppose a child is nine years and four months >>> old, and I ask the child how old she is. She says "nine and...." And >> what? >>> The adult way is to say nine and four months, but that doesn't tell us >> how >>> many years old the child is, that is, how many fractions of a year lie >>> between the child and the child's next or last birthday. In order to >> answer >>> that question, the child has to convert months to twelfths of a year, and >>> then try to convert these to thirds or decimals. This requires more than >>> combinatorial imagination; it involves reframing the problem as one of >> the >>> imperfection of the non-decimal system we use to calculate months. >>> >>> The second stems indirectly from the problem you raise. Although I think >>> the difference between the Korean (actually, Sino-Korean) numbers between >>> ten and twenty is negligible (it's just a matter of lexicalizing two >>> numbers, eleven and twelve), there is a very serious problem that dogs >> even >>> advanced learners of English here. The Korean won is a very small >> currency >>> unit--there are about a thousand to the dollar at the moment. So to >> express >>> the price of anything worth buying, you need to talk, in English, in >> units >>> of ten to the third power (a cup of coffee costs thousands, salaries and >>> rents are in millions, cars costs tens of millions, and real estate costs >>> billions and trillions). But the Korean number system uses units of ten >> to >>> the fourth bower ("man" means ten thousand, "ok" means a hundred million, >>> and "cho" is a billion). So when you read statistics in the English press >>> they are very often wrong by a factor of ten. This requires more than >>> combinatorial imagination, because it involves realizing that the >> placement >>> of commas in a large number is just a cultural convention corresponding >> to >>> language and not to mathematics itself, and also involves "making >> strange" >>> the way we do it, and thinking instead in terms of the way they do it. >>> >>> On Sunday our Vygotsky seminar met at my apartment to proof the galleys >> of >>> our new book of Vygotsky's lectures on pedology, and during the lunch >> break >>> some of my former students were looking at the paintings I did twenty >> years >>> ago. At the time I was obsessed with "point of view", and all my >> paintings >>> featured some intrusion of the artist's own body--usually an arm or a >> pair >>> of spectacles. I guess the purpose of it was to "make strange" the act of >>> looking at a painting and to instead force the viewer into my own >>> viewpoint. But it also had the curious property of making strange the act >>> of painting a painting, because I could never get over the fact that both >>> the part of my own body and the rest of the painting were in equally >> sharp >>> focus. That's not the way point of view really works! >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>> >>> Korean >>> >>> >>> On 22 December 2014 at 08:29, Ed Wall wrote: >>> >>>> David >>>> >>>> This is quite interesting. Let me give some different takes on some >>>> of what you write (I, by the way, am still unsure) >>>> >>>> Some say part of the fetters you refer to are in the manner in which >>>> the equal sign is used (e.g. as compute) and the propensity for vertical >>>> addition in the early grades. I have seen a US 3rd grade teacher >> complicate >>>> things somewhat (she and the children were definitely working with >>>> countable objects) in starting with an unknown quantity, remove a known >>>> quantity, and, by obtaining a known quantity, figure out what the >> initial >>>> whole was without too much trouble. That isn't too say that things might >>>> not have proceeded more efficiently with another curricular starting >> point. >>>> >>>> There is an interesting different between Korean students and US >>>> students in the early grades. US students have something called eleven >> and >>>> twelve and Korean students have something translated, in effect, as >> ten-one >>>> and ten-two. There has been speculation by some that these can be >> fetters >>>> of a sort on the way to decimal number (there are also things called >> nickel >>>> and quarter and five dollars not to mention inches, etc. which can also >> be >>>> somewhat un-helpful). >>>> >>>> >>>> On a different note, what is the adult system of determining how old >>>> one is in years, exactly? I know how young children do this correctly, >> but >>>> inexactly. >>>> >>>> Ed >>>> >>>> On Dec 21, 2014, at 4:50 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>> >>>>> Let me float a hypothesis, and see what Huw and Ulvi make of it. A >>>> learning >>>>> activity (any learning activity) is best described not as a synoptic >>>>> hierarchy of molar units like operation, action and activity. Viewed >>>>> diachronically, from the point of view of psychology, a learning >> activity >>>>> is a non-hierarchical historical sequence, such that any given >>>>> "method" eventually, in time, turns out to fetter progress and must be >>>>> discarded, and the end result is not an inter-mental social form of >>>>> activity but instead an intramental psychological one. >>>>> >>>>> Take the Schmittau work that Ulvi references as a concrete example. >>>>> Schmittau showed that the American curriculum (like the Korean one) >>>>> introduces the notion of number by counting separate objects. This >> allows >>>>> the child to grasp the number very concretely and quickly. Groupings >> are >>>>> then introduced, and this corresponds once again to what we see >> children >>>> do >>>>> naturally (see Chapter Eight of HDHMF). So at every point the American >>>>> curriculum takes the line of least resistance. But that means that at a >>>>> specific point, the notion of number based on concrete, separable >> objects >>>>> becomes a fetter on the child's progress. Schmittau locates this point >>>>> quite precisely: it's the moment when the child, accustomed to add >> known >>>>> quantitites of physical objects together to obtain an unknown quantity, >>>> is >>>>> asked to start with an unknown quantity, remove a known quantity, and, >> by >>>>> obtaining a known quantity, figure out what the initial whole was (e.g. >>>>> "I made a bunch of snowballs and put them in the freezer. I threw one >> at >>>> my >>>>> big brother at a Christmas pary, and two at my friends when they teased >>>> me >>>>> at New Years. Now I have only half a dozen left for April Fools Day. >> How >>>>> many snowballs did I make?") >>>>> >>>>> Chapter Eight of HDHMF asks the question of whether "arithmetical >>>> figures" >>>>> (that is, physical groupings of countable objects) will keep the child >>>> back >>>>> from learning the symbolic manipulations afforded by the decimal system >>>> of >>>>> writing digits, or whether they will naturally evolve into the decimal >>>>> system (because the children will of their own will invent a physical >>>>> grouping of ten objects). Interestingly, Vygotsky concludes that any >>>>> experiment along these lines would be unethical (and THERE is a >>>>> correspondence with Chomsky, who has often correctly noted how one of >> the >>>>> things that keeps linguistics in a "paper and pencil" era corresponding >>>> to >>>>> sixteenth century physics is the immorality of experimentation on human >>>>> subjects). But, like Chomsky, he resolves the question with paper and >>>>> pencil (in Chapter Thirteen) with a very amusing MIS-reading of >>>> Thorndike's >>>>> "Psychology of Arithmetic". >>>>> >>>>> Thorndike is criticizing the way in which our parents and grandparents >>>> were >>>>> taught arithmetic as a symbolic system akin to language. Vygotsky >>>>> apparently doesn't get Thorndike's irony, and thinks that Thorndike is >>>>> lauding this culturally approved method over Lay's newfangled system >>>> based >>>>> on "arithmetical figures" (dominos, in fact). See the attachment: it >>>>> involves analyzing a picture where there is one girl on a swing and >>>> another >>>>> on the ground ("How many girls are there?") a kitten on a stump and >>>> another >>>>> on the ground (which Vygotsky misremembers as dogs). And so, by a >> process >>>>> of misreading and misremembering, Vygotsky turns Thorndike into a >>>>> cognitivist. Thorndike would probably rather be a dog. >>>>> >>>>> Interestingly, the way Vygotsky resolves the whole dispute is >>>> similar--that >>>>> is, the child triumphs not through the adequacy of his or her own >> method >>>> or >>>>> through seeing the superiority of the adult method, but rather through >>>> the >>>>> inadequacies of both. For example (and this is my example), a child >> with >>>> a >>>>> notion of number based entirely on separable objects has a very hard >> time >>>>> measuring how old he is in precise terms. On the other hand, the adult >>>>> method of measuring years out in months is NOT a decimal method. The >>>> child >>>>> therefore has to grasp and perfect the adult system just in order to >>>> answer >>>>> the simple question--how old are you in years EXACTLY? >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 22 December 2014 at 07:01, Huw Lloyd >>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Ulvi, >>>>>> >>>>>> The essential 'method' is to facilitate students' own experimentation >>>> with >>>>>> methods. This is called learning activity. >>>>>> >>>>>> Huw >>>>>> >>>>>> On 21 December 2014 at 12:15, Ulvi ??il wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Hello, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I know there are some works comparing Russia (Davydov's curriculum) >> and >>>>>> US, >>>>>>> and even some works done in US with an application of Davydov's, e.g. >>>> by >>>>>>> Schmittau. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I would like to know, not in detail, but just in general, which main >>>>>>> factors lie behind this success in Russia, it is Davydov, or Zarkov >> or >>>>>> any >>>>>>> other scholar's method. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Thanks in advance, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Ulvi >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> >> From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sat Dec 27 14:00:22 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sun, 28 Dec 2014 07:00:22 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: no primitive language? In-Reply-To: <549f1710.0167460a.12bb.7111@mx.google.com> References: <549E83CB.60802@mira.net> <549E85AD.5040702@mira.net> <549E868C.2020809@mira.net> <6F1EE308-E173-4D4B-B54E-B7D1D59865E6@uniandes.edu.co> <549f1710.0167460a.12bb.7111@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Verily, the good men do is oft interred with their bones.... Saussure was a brilliant historical linguist, who made amazing contributions to the reconstruction of proto-Indo-european, the language which ties our own tongues to Sanskrit. As part of these contributions, he was faced with the task of working out the vowel and consonant system of a language that nobody had spoken for thousands of years. How did he do it? By inventing structuralism. He figured out, quite correctly, that in order to be comprehensible, phonological systems had to have perceptible oppositions. So if you had a high front vowel like "i" at one end of your mouth you had to have a low back vowel like "ou" at the other end. By working backwards from the sounds we use today, Saussure was able to reconstruct a whole system of laryngeal contrasts that probably haven't been used in two thousand years. Fifty years AFTER his death, Hittite texts were discovered that show that his guess was probably right. Now, here's the mystery. After a brilliant career as a historical linguist, Saussure suddenly declared war on history and decided to try to construct a linguistics that was, rather like the extant ideas of mathematics, a purely abstract and timeless system. Not ony sounds but also words and even grammatical features like tense were to be understood in relation to each other, not in relation to any actual human needs. This turns out to explain the relationship of SOUNDING to WORDING quite well. But as Larry points out (and as Vygotsky points out in his discussion of why you can call a dog a cow and a cow a dog but you can't call a blackbird a redwing and vice versa) it is a really terrible way to think about the relationship of WORDING to MEANING. In other words, arbitrariness is a good way to talk about phonology, and a terrible way to talk about grammar. There's a very good reason why verbs have tenses and nouns have plurals. You can do it the other way around if you really want (and in fact English, unlike Korean, does have the annoying property of using "s" on singular VERBS and then using 's' on plural NOUNS). But not so much and not for long: the relationship of wording to meaning is just not conventional in the way that the relationship of wording to sounding is. And that brings us back to Andy's question. We can argue, as Saussure did, that there are certain sounds that are "primitive" (Saussure believed that laryngeal sounds were energy consuming and died out as a result, and I suppose you could make the same argument for click languages like isiXhosa). But when we make this argument we should be clear that what we are calling "primitive" is really the baroque--a kind of extravagance that some societies choose to lavish on language and others prefer to expend on furniture. It is much harder to argue that some words are more primitive than others simply because wordings evolve in social settings (anybody who has tried to cook Chinese food in an English speaking environment will tell you that English, despite its very rich vocabulary for roasting, baking, grilling, etc, is not a good language for frying , while Chinese is exactly the opposite, and it's easy to imagine that our vocabulary would be rather primitive for describing hunting conditions in the Kalahari). And at the level of grammar, which is by its very nature systemic, this argument is simply impossible. Here is the kernel of truth in Chomsky's idea that all languages, on an abstract level, have the same grammar, and Derrida's comment that we all speak only one language but the language we speak is not one. As Butzkamm puts it, you learn language exactly once; it just takes your whole life to get it right. And getting linguistics right takes a lot more than just one life. Saussure "corrected" his brilliant work on historical linguistics by utterly turning his back on culture and on history, and in so doing invented twentieth century structuralism. In his defense, he did tell his wife and his students to burn the mansuscript of his General Course and not to publish it; Bally and Sechehaye disobeyed his dying wishes. As Larry's article suggests, he tried, too late, to correct his correction. And so the evil men do lives after them. David Kelllogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 28 December 2014 at 05:23, wrote: > I wrote out a section of an article by Franson Manjali exploring the > *social* and the *cognitive* in Saussure?s understanding of language. It > may add to this conversation on the lexical and the grammatical aspects of > language. It is only one page I quoted but the article is fascinating > exploring the themes of more and less arbitrary systems of language and its > regularity. > > Annalisa, the beginning of the article explores Saussure?s debt to the > Vedic scholars of language. > > > The article is published at [Texto! Volume XVll, number 3, (2012). I could > add more if others are interested, or the linguists among us could answer > Franson Manjali reading of the *social* > > Larry > > > > > > > Sent from Windows Mail > > > > > > From: Martin John Packer > Sent: ?Saturday?, ?December? ?27?, ?2014 ?3?:?57? ?AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > > > David, I know you know more about this than I know.... but the debate > today centers on the Pirah?, no? Do they have color terms? Do they have > number terms? Do they have recursion? > > Martin > > On Dec 27, 2014, at 5:35 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > Well, of course Carol's really right, Andy. We need to say what we mean > by > > primitive. Does it mean that the language is historically young? In that > > case, the most primitive language is probably modern Hebrew. Does it mean > > that the language is grammatically simple? Which aspect of the grammar? > > > > Let's take case, since this is Vygotsky's model for linguistic complexity > > in the Lectures. Annaluisa will tell you about Sanskrit's eight cases; > > modern Tamil has seven; Greek and Latin had about six. Tsez, in the > > mountains of the Caucasus, has 64 cases (mostly locatives). > > > > English is probably the most primitive languages in the world from this > > point of view; it has a distinction between "I" and "me" and "he" and > "him" > > but that's about it. > > > > David Kellogg > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 27 December 2014 at 19:14, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > >> Thanks, Carol. :) > >> I am OK from here then. > >> Much appreciated. > >> Andy > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> > >> Carol Macdonald wrote: > >> > >>> Syntax, semantics. pragmatics, phonology, discourse orientation: they > >>> just give their own version of these aspects. > >>> > >>> On 27 December 2014 at 12:10, Andy Blunden >>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: > >>> > >>> Thanks, Carol. > >>> Can those "key characteristics" be given in a few lines? > >>> Andy > >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>> ------------ > >>> *Andy Blunden* > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> Carol Macdonald wrote: > >>> > >>> Andy > >>> > >>> It's true. Languages all share key characteristics. > >>> > >>> Carol > >>> > >>> On 27 December 2014 at 12:02, Andy Blunden >>> >>> >> wrote: > >>> > >>> I have heard, and I believe it to be the case, that there > >>> is no > >>> such thing as a "primitive language." > >>> I am not talking about the "language" of children raised in > >>> isolation, or the "home sign" of deaf children, I mean > >>> among the > >>> languages of actual historical peoples. > >>> I would just appreciate that if this is wrong, could > >>> someone on > >>> this list who knows about this kind of thing disabuse me. > >>> Otherwise I will assume this to be factual. > >>> > >>> Thanks > >>> Andy > >>> -- ------------------------------ > >>> ------------------------------------------ > >>> *Andy Blunden* > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > >>> Developmental psycholinguist > >>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: > >>> Department of Linguistics, Unisa > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> -- > >>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > >>> Developmental psycholinguist > >>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department > of > >>> Linguistics, Unisa > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> From dkellogg60@gmail.com Sat Dec 27 14:45:42 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Sun, 28 Dec 2014 07:45:42 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: no primitive language? In-Reply-To: <6F1EE308-E173-4D4B-B54E-B7D1D59865E6@uniandes.edu.co> References: <549E83CB.60802@mira.net> <549E85AD.5040702@mira.net> <549E868C.2020809@mira.net> <6F1EE308-E173-4D4B-B54E-B7D1D59865E6@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Martin: I think you do know more about this than I do, but none of us knows enough. The whole problem with the Piraha debate is that the data is just not accessible to us, because there are so few people who understand Piraha and who understand some other language, and there are--as far as I can figure out--no people who both understand Piraha and some other language and understand that the distinction between morphemes and words is a conventional one based on Standard Average European, and so is the distinction between words and clauses. Even if there were such persons, there are none who understand that the distinction between a clause and a turn in a dialogue is largely an artifact of written language. As far as I know, nobody is claiming that Piraha is not dialogically recursive--that is, nobody is saying that you cannot refer to what someone just said in Piraha. That is enough, for me, to prove that Piraha is recursive: that, had we world enough and time, Piraha can say anything that needs to be said in Piraha. So Piraha is a language which (like Hawaiian) has a rather austere and economical sound system, a lexicon perfectly adapted to its environment, and the ability to produce an infinitely long dialogue we call culture. Can infinity ever be called primitive? David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 27 December 2014 at 20:57, Martin John Packer wrote: > David, I know you know more about this than I know.... but the debate > today centers on the Pirah?, no? Do they have color terms? Do they have > number terms? Do they have recursion? > > Martin > > On Dec 27, 2014, at 5:35 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > Well, of course Carol's really right, Andy. We need to say what we mean > by > > primitive. Does it mean that the language is historically young? In that > > case, the most primitive language is probably modern Hebrew. Does it mean > > that the language is grammatically simple? Which aspect of the grammar? > > > > Let's take case, since this is Vygotsky's model for linguistic complexity > > in the Lectures. Annaluisa will tell you about Sanskrit's eight cases; > > modern Tamil has seven; Greek and Latin had about six. Tsez, in the > > mountains of the Caucasus, has 64 cases (mostly locatives). > > > > English is probably the most primitive languages in the world from this > > point of view; it has a distinction between "I" and "me" and "he" and > "him" > > but that's about it. > > > > David Kellogg > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 27 December 2014 at 19:14, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > >> Thanks, Carol. :) > >> I am OK from here then. > >> Much appreciated. > >> Andy > >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >> > >> > >> Carol Macdonald wrote: > >> > >>> Syntax, semantics. pragmatics, phonology, discourse orientation: they > >>> just give their own version of these aspects. > >>> > >>> On 27 December 2014 at 12:10, Andy Blunden >>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: > >>> > >>> Thanks, Carol. > >>> Can those "key characteristics" be given in a few lines? > >>> Andy > >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > >>> ------------ > >>> *Andy Blunden* > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> Carol Macdonald wrote: > >>> > >>> Andy > >>> > >>> It's true. Languages all share key characteristics. > >>> > >>> Carol > >>> > >>> On 27 December 2014 at 12:02, Andy Blunden >>> >>> >> wrote: > >>> > >>> I have heard, and I believe it to be the case, that there > >>> is no > >>> such thing as a "primitive language." > >>> I am not talking about the "language" of children raised in > >>> isolation, or the "home sign" of deaf children, I mean > >>> among the > >>> languages of actual historical peoples. > >>> I would just appreciate that if this is wrong, could > >>> someone on > >>> this list who knows about this kind of thing disabuse me. > >>> Otherwise I will assume this to be factual. > >>> > >>> Thanks > >>> Andy > >>> -- ------------------------------ > >>> ------------------------------------------ > >>> *Andy Blunden* > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > >>> Developmental psycholinguist > >>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: > >>> Department of Linguistics, Unisa > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> -- > >>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > >>> Developmental psycholinguist > >>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: Department > of > >>> Linguistics, Unisa > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Sat Dec 27 15:31:09 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Sat, 27 Dec 2014 15:31:09 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: no primitive language? In-Reply-To: References: <549E83CB.60802@mira.net> <549E85AD.5040702@mira.net> <549E868C.2020809@mira.net> <6F1EE308-E173-4D4B-B54E-B7D1D59865E6@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Perhaps of interest with respect to Piraha? mike ------------------------ http://www.ascentofhumanity.com/chapter2-7.php On Sat, Dec 27, 2014 at 2:45 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > Martin: > > I think you do know more about this than I do, but none of us knows enough. > The whole problem with the Piraha debate is that the data is just not > accessible to us, because there are so few people who understand Piraha and > who understand some other language, and there are--as far as I can figure > out--no people who both understand Piraha and some other language and > understand that the distinction between morphemes and words is a > conventional one based on Standard Average European, and so is the > distinction between words and clauses. Even if there were such persons, > there are none who understand that the distinction between a clause and a > turn in a dialogue is largely an artifact of written language. > > As far as I know, nobody is claiming that Piraha is not dialogically > recursive--that is, nobody is saying that you cannot refer to what someone > just said in Piraha. That is enough, for me, to prove that Piraha is > recursive: that, had we world enough and time, Piraha can say anything that > needs to be said in Piraha. So Piraha is a language which (like Hawaiian) > has a rather austere and economical sound system, a lexicon perfectly > adapted to its environment, and the ability to produce an infinitely long > dialogue we call culture. Can infinity ever be called primitive? > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > On 27 December 2014 at 20:57, Martin John Packer > wrote: > > > David, I know you know more about this than I know.... but the debate > > today centers on the Pirah?, no? Do they have color terms? Do they have > > number terms? Do they have recursion? > > > > Martin > > > > On Dec 27, 2014, at 5:35 AM, David Kellogg wrote: > > > > > Well, of course Carol's really right, Andy. We need to say what we mean > > by > > > primitive. Does it mean that the language is historically young? In > that > > > case, the most primitive language is probably modern Hebrew. Does it > mean > > > that the language is grammatically simple? Which aspect of the grammar? > > > > > > Let's take case, since this is Vygotsky's model for linguistic > complexity > > > in the Lectures. Annaluisa will tell you about Sanskrit's eight cases; > > > modern Tamil has seven; Greek and Latin had about six. Tsez, in the > > > mountains of the Caucasus, has 64 cases (mostly locatives). > > > > > > English is probably the most primitive languages in the world from this > > > point of view; it has a distinction between "I" and "me" and "he" and > > "him" > > > but that's about it. > > > > > > David Kellogg > > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On 27 December 2014 at 19:14, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > > > >> Thanks, Carol. :) > > >> I am OK from here then. > > >> Much appreciated. > > >> Andy > > >> > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > >> *Andy Blunden* > > >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >> > > >> > > >> Carol Macdonald wrote: > > >> > > >>> Syntax, semantics. pragmatics, phonology, discourse orientation: they > > >>> just give their own version of these aspects. > > >>> > > >>> On 27 December 2014 at 12:10, Andy Blunden > >>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: > > >>> > > >>> Thanks, Carol. > > >>> Can those "key characteristics" be given in a few lines? > > >>> Andy > > >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ > > >>> ------------ > > >>> *Andy Blunden* > > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> Carol Macdonald wrote: > > >>> > > >>> Andy > > >>> > > >>> It's true. Languages all share key characteristics. > > >>> > > >>> Carol > > >>> > > >>> On 27 December 2014 at 12:02, Andy Blunden > >>> > >>> >> wrote: > > >>> > > >>> I have heard, and I believe it to be the case, that there > > >>> is no > > >>> such thing as a "primitive language." > > >>> I am not talking about the "language" of children raised > in > > >>> isolation, or the "home sign" of deaf children, I mean > > >>> among the > > >>> languages of actual historical peoples. > > >>> I would just appreciate that if this is wrong, could > > >>> someone on > > >>> this list who knows about this kind of thing disabuse me. > > >>> Otherwise I will assume this to be factual. > > >>> > > >>> Thanks > > >>> Andy > > >>> -- ------------------------------ > > >>> ------------------------------------------ > > >>> *Andy Blunden* > > >>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > > >>> Developmental psycholinguist > > >>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: > > >>> Department of Linguistics, Unisa > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> -- > > >>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) > > >>> Developmental psycholinguist > > >>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: > Department > > of > > >>> Linguistics, Unisa > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >> > > > > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science as an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Pirahanumbercognition.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 312616 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141227/72191b1a/attachment.pdf From ablunden@mira.net Sat Dec 27 18:46:24 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sun, 28 Dec 2014 13:46:24 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: no primitive language? In-Reply-To: References: <549E83CB.60802@mira.net> <549E85AD.5040702@mira.net> <549E868C.2020809@mira.net> <6F1EE308-E173-4D4B-B54E-B7D1D59865E6@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <549F6F00.70708@mira.net> Thank you all for your authoritative responses to my question. I have a follow up. Do we know if there any ancient culture which does not have some kind metaphysics, religion - polytheistic or monotheistic or practical, or other like system of making sense of the universe? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ mike cole wrote: > Perhaps of interest with respect to Piraha? > mike > > ------------------------ > http://www.ascentofhumanity.com/chapter2-7.php > > On Sat, Dec 27, 2014 at 2:45 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > >> Martin: >> >> I think you do know more about this than I do, but none of us knows enough. >> The whole problem with the Piraha debate is that the data is just not >> accessible to us, because there are so few people who understand Piraha and >> who understand some other language, and there are--as far as I can figure >> out--no people who both understand Piraha and some other language and >> understand that the distinction between morphemes and words is a >> conventional one based on Standard Average European, and so is the >> distinction between words and clauses. Even if there were such persons, >> there are none who understand that the distinction between a clause and a >> turn in a dialogue is largely an artifact of written language. >> >> As far as I know, nobody is claiming that Piraha is not dialogically >> recursive--that is, nobody is saying that you cannot refer to what someone >> just said in Piraha. That is enough, for me, to prove that Piraha is >> recursive: that, had we world enough and time, Piraha can say anything that >> needs to be said in Piraha. So Piraha is a language which (like Hawaiian) >> has a rather austere and economical sound system, a lexicon perfectly >> adapted to its environment, and the ability to produce an infinitely long >> dialogue we call culture. Can infinity ever be called primitive? >> >> David Kellogg >> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >> >> On 27 December 2014 at 20:57, Martin John Packer >> wrote: >> >> >>> David, I know you know more about this than I know.... but the debate >>> today centers on the Pirah?, no? Do they have color terms? Do they have >>> number terms? Do they have recursion? >>> >>> Martin >>> >>> On Dec 27, 2014, at 5:35 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >>> >>> >>>> Well, of course Carol's really right, Andy. We need to say what we mean >>>> >>> by >>> >>>> primitive. Does it mean that the language is historically young? In >>>> >> that >> >>>> case, the most primitive language is probably modern Hebrew. Does it >>>> >> mean >> >>>> that the language is grammatically simple? Which aspect of the grammar? >>>> >>>> Let's take case, since this is Vygotsky's model for linguistic >>>> >> complexity >> >>>> in the Lectures. Annaluisa will tell you about Sanskrit's eight cases; >>>> modern Tamil has seven; Greek and Latin had about six. Tsez, in the >>>> mountains of the Caucasus, has 64 cases (mostly locatives). >>>> >>>> English is probably the most primitive languages in the world from this >>>> point of view; it has a distinction between "I" and "me" and "he" and >>>> >>> "him" >>> >>>> but that's about it. >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 27 December 2014 at 19:14, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> Thanks, Carol. :) >>>>> I am OK from here then. >>>>> Much appreciated. >>>>> Andy >>>>> >>>>> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> >>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Carol Macdonald wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Syntax, semantics. pragmatics, phonology, discourse orientation: they >>>>>> just give their own version of these aspects. >>>>>> >>>>>> On 27 December 2014 at 12:10, Andy Blunden >>>>> >> > >>>>>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Thanks, Carol. >>>>>> Can those "key characteristics" be given in a few lines? >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>> ------------ >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Carol Macdonald wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> >>>>>> It's true. Languages all share key characteristics. >>>>>> >>>>>> Carol >>>>>> >>>>>> On 27 December 2014 at 12:02, Andy Blunden >>>>> >>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> I have heard, and I believe it to be the case, that there >>>>>> is no >>>>>> such thing as a "primitive language." >>>>>> I am not talking about the "language" of children raised >>>>>> >> in >> >>>>>> isolation, or the "home sign" of deaf children, I mean >>>>>> among the >>>>>> languages of actual historical peoples. >>>>>> I would just appreciate that if this is wrong, could >>>>>> someone on >>>>>> this list who knows about this kind of thing disabuse me. >>>>>> Otherwise I will assume this to be factual. >>>>>> >>>>>> Thanks >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> -- ------------------------------ >>>>>> ------------------------------------------ >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: >>>>>> Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: >>>>>> >> Department >> >>> of >>> >>>>>> Linguistics, Unisa >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>> >>> > > > > From hshonerd@gmail.com Sun Dec 28 00:08:03 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Sun, 28 Dec 2014 00:08:03 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: no primitive language? In-Reply-To: <549F6F00.70708@mira.net> References: <549E83CB.60802@mira.net> <549E85AD.5040702@mira.net> <549E868C.2020809@mira.net> <6F1EE308-E173-4D4B-B54E-B7D1D59865E6@uniandes.edu.co> <549F6F00.70708@mira.net> Message-ID: I am assuming that Andy?s question does not represent a new thread, that it is about properties of human language. So, I wonder if the attached article by Deacon is relevant and convincing. I hope this does not violate etiquette to introduce a reading. Perhaps someone on the chat is familiar with Deacon. I got the articles from Holbrook and found it very interesting. Henry -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: religion.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 220010 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141228/d87997e2/attachment.pdf -------------- next part -------------- > On Dec 27, 2014, at 6:46 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > Thank you all for your authoritative responses to my question. > I have a follow up. > Do we know if there any ancient culture which does not have some kind metaphysics, religion - polytheistic or monotheistic or practical, or other like system of making sense of the universe? > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > mike cole wrote: >> Perhaps of interest with respect to Piraha? >> mike >> >> ------------------------ >> http://www.ascentofhumanity.com/chapter2-7.php >> >> On Sat, Dec 27, 2014 at 2:45 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >> >> >>> Martin: >>> >>> I think you do know more about this than I do, but none of us knows enough. >>> The whole problem with the Piraha debate is that the data is just not >>> accessible to us, because there are so few people who understand Piraha and >>> who understand some other language, and there are--as far as I can figure >>> out--no people who both understand Piraha and some other language and >>> understand that the distinction between morphemes and words is a >>> conventional one based on Standard Average European, and so is the >>> distinction between words and clauses. Even if there were such persons, >>> there are none who understand that the distinction between a clause and a >>> turn in a dialogue is largely an artifact of written language. >>> >>> As far as I know, nobody is claiming that Piraha is not dialogically >>> recursive--that is, nobody is saying that you cannot refer to what someone >>> just said in Piraha. That is enough, for me, to prove that Piraha is >>> recursive: that, had we world enough and time, Piraha can say anything that >>> needs to be said in Piraha. So Piraha is a language which (like Hawaiian) >>> has a rather austere and economical sound system, a lexicon perfectly >>> adapted to its environment, and the ability to produce an infinitely long >>> dialogue we call culture. Can infinity ever be called primitive? >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>> >>> On 27 December 2014 at 20:57, Martin John Packer >>> wrote: >>> >>> >>>> David, I know you know more about this than I know.... but the debate >>>> today centers on the Pirah?, no? Do they have color terms? Do they have >>>> number terms? Do they have recursion? >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> On Dec 27, 2014, at 5:35 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> Well, of course Carol's really right, Andy. We need to say what we mean >>>>> >>>> by >>>> >>>>> primitive. Does it mean that the language is historically young? In >>>>> >>> that >>> >>>>> case, the most primitive language is probably modern Hebrew. Does it >>>>> >>> mean >>> >>>>> that the language is grammatically simple? Which aspect of the grammar? >>>>> >>>>> Let's take case, since this is Vygotsky's model for linguistic >>>>> >>> complexity >>> >>>>> in the Lectures. Annaluisa will tell you about Sanskrit's eight cases; >>>>> modern Tamil has seven; Greek and Latin had about six. Tsez, in the >>>>> mountains of the Caucasus, has 64 cases (mostly locatives). >>>>> >>>>> English is probably the most primitive languages in the world from this >>>>> point of view; it has a distinction between "I" and "me" and "he" and >>>>> >>>> "him" >>>> >>>>> but that's about it. >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 27 December 2014 at 19:14, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Thanks, Carol. :) >>>>>> I am OK from here then. >>>>>> Much appreciated. >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> >>>>>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Carol Macdonald wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> Syntax, semantics. pragmatics, phonology, discourse orientation: they >>>>>>> just give their own version of these aspects. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 27 December 2014 at 12:10, Andy Blunden >>>>>> >>> >> >>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Thanks, Carol. >>>>>>> Can those "key characteristics" be given in a few lines? >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>> ------------ >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Carol Macdonald wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> >>>>>>> It's true. Languages all share key characteristics. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Carol >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 27 December 2014 at 12:02, Andy Blunden >>>>>> >>>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I have heard, and I believe it to be the case, that there >>>>>>> is no >>>>>>> such thing as a "primitive language." >>>>>>> I am not talking about the "language" of children raised >>>>>>> >>> in >>> >>>>>>> isolation, or the "home sign" of deaf children, I mean >>>>>>> among the >>>>>>> languages of actual historical peoples. >>>>>>> I would just appreciate that if this is wrong, could >>>>>>> someone on >>>>>>> this list who knows about this kind of thing disabuse me. >>>>>>> Otherwise I will assume this to be factual. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Thanks >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> -- ------------------------------ >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------ >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: >>>>>>> Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: >>>>>>> >>> Department >>> >>>> of >>>> >>>>>>> Linguistics, Unisa >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> >> >> > From hshonerd@gmail.com Sun Dec 28 00:44:14 2014 From: hshonerd@gmail.com (HENRY SHONERD) Date: Sun, 28 Dec 2014 00:44:14 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Maths and science in Korea In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <42BC154C-50C7-49AC-8755-5A336DF7D7D7@gmail.com> Thread?>Skein?>Dream. Synthesis with language, where longer and longer units are made up of smaller ones. In language development it is often the reverse, whereby the child discovers smaller grammatical units within the holophrastic units of an earlier stage of her language development. Just the opposite of chunking. Is this creative? Does this kind of (re)analysis of ?strings? happen with math as well? One way to learn how to weave is to take apart something already woven. Henry > On Dec 27, 2014, at 1:20 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > > In English systems, all large numbers are expressed as ten raised to some > power of 3n. So for example a thousand is ten to the third, a million is > ten to the (3x2), a billion is ten to the (3x3), etc. That's why we put the > commas in every three zeros, and why when we say the numbers we pause there > to give the units (one hundred and eleven trillion, one hundred and eleven > billion, one hundred and eleven million, one hundred and eleven thousand, > one hundred and eleven). > > But in Chinese systems, all large numbers are expressed as ten raised to > some power of 4n. So for example "wan" is ten to the fourth (ten thousand, > in English notation), "yi" is ten to the eighth, etc. The population of > China, when I lived there, was not one billion--it was ten "yi". That's why > we do NOT put a comma in with every three zeros in Chinese. Even Korea, > where the English notation is quite powerful because we are a small country > occupied by American troops, we find an interesting compromise. Here are > some real estate prices from today's newspaper: > > ??? 30,780?? > ??? 34,380?? > ??? 40,000?? > > As you can see, they are all expressed as tens of thousands, followed by a > character ? ("man" or in Chinese "wan" which means ten thousand, so the > first one is three hundred and seven million, eight hundred thousand won, > the second is 343 million eight hundred thousand, etc. > > I don't believe in "combinatorial imagination" either, but Vygotsky uses > the term in his popular science writing on imagination ("Imagination and > Creativity in the Child",1930/2004). It's from Ribot. It means that you > create new structures by combining parts of old ones, so the example > Vygotsky gives is the house of Baba Yaga, a small cottage which stands on > chicken legs. The child knows what chicken legs are from direct experience, > and sees many cottages, but the child has never seen a house on chicken > legs. How can the child then understand what the house of Baba Yaga looks > like? Through combinatorial imagination, or so the theory goes. (Vygotsky > later decimates precisely this theory in his work on imagination in > adolescence and his work on the development of imagination in childhood). > > So my point was this: we do not have any direct experience of very large > numbers--none of us have the patience to count up as far as ten thousand, > still less to a million or a billion. So how can we understand real estate > prices like the ones listed above? This IS actually one of the conundrums > Vygotsky tackles in his work on Imagination in the Adolescent, where he > uses the example of Jacob Wassermann's novel the Marizius Case, a story > about an adolescent who tries to imagine the number of days in the prison > sentence of an innocent man. > > The answer Ribot would give is combinatorial imagination: we do it by > combining experiences we do have, such as tens, hundreds and thousands. But > of course this idea is nonsense--the relationship is not one of addition at > all. It's another relationship altogether, one I would call grammatical, > because the value of each component depends on its place in a line of > components (unlike, say, the WORDS "eleven", or "seven", which unlike their > digital notations are not decomposable into units whose value depend on > order). The latter I would call lexical, because here value is really a > one-off affair, it is not systemic (the way millions and billions are) and > it is not proportional ("en" does not realize the same meaning in "seven" > as it does in "eleven"). > > But that brings us to the difference between phonetics, phonology, lexis, > grammar, semantics, pragmatics and consequently to the other thread! > > A spinning wheel moans forth its threads > Its threads become a tangled skein > The tangled skein a world of dreams. > > (Kim Ok, one of our national poets who disappeared in the Korean War) > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > On 28 December 2014 at 03:48, Ed Wall wrote: > >> David >> >> Interesting what you say here about 'combinatorial imagination' and >> number. There is a mathematical sense, in which even relatively small >> numbers scan be treated as grammar, for instance, sixty. That is, besides >> its notation in base-ten, it has importantly the factors of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, >> 6, 10, 12, 15, 20, 30. 60. I can see that one might think that within >> physics the combinatorial aspect of number might become a fetter (although >> the primes seem to have a sort of importance). However, the combinatorial >> properties of number are of more than a little important within modern >> technology and, of course, modern mathematics (and even calculators - >> smile). Anyway, I agree there is a sense in which larger numbers seem more >> complex (an interesting question might be whether 60 is more complex than >> 100000000000000001). >> I appreciate your age example but there is a problem. The months do >> not name the same number of days and hence, I would hope that neither a >> child or an adult would convert to 'fractional' months to give an 'exact' >> answer. However, if one was to convert to weeks, fractions would make >> sense. I don't think many adults I know would convert to fractions if I >> asked them to be exact (and I don't think any hesitation would be due to >> difficulties with making fractions from months). What I tend to do (and I >> suspect you will find this peculiar) is to subtract the year I was born >> from the current year (I remember those - smile) then treating a year as an >> interval divided roughly in fourths, give a rough fraction (saying about). >> This, by the way, is roughly what younger students do although they count >> up rather than subtract (and there is much discussion as to how one counts >> the year of birth) and use "just", "one-half", and "almost." Fractions are, >> more or less, a consequent of the multiplicative properties of numbers and, >> in a way, they still may be within the sphere of 'combinatorial >> imagination'; e.g. the importance of the factors of 60 in early >> arithmetics. However, I am more than sure I imperfectly understand this >> notion so this is just a wondering. >> Yes, I left off the Sino- as I was interested in local variations >> and I agree that eleven and twelve is a matter of lexis although all the >> numbers between 9 and 20 (and they are more than critical for the >> operations of arithmetic) need, in a sense, to be lexicalized. The problem >> seems to be students need to learn these structural exceptions and that >> takes, one might say, precious time. There is also the possibility that the >> structure of the base-ten number system is eventually weakly grasped and >> that what remains tentative is passed over in the rush of instruction. I do >> know there is a lot of evidence that elementary school teachers in the US >> have a weak grasp of the structure of the base-ten number system. Oh, they >> can count and do all the operations fine, but are actually fairly unsure >> what it is all about (and, of course, this may be the case with Korean >> elementary school teachers also). >> Reading your second example reminds me that I don't quite >> understanding how you are using combinatorial (I may be mathematizing it >> too much). I agree that people tend to misrepresent large powers of ten >> (and most have even greater problems with 'large negative' powers of ten). >> As I have a reasonable background in the physical science and biological >> science, I have tended to interpret this as, of the most part, a lack of >> context or, perhaps, experience (However, I may be quite wrong). Anyway, I >> see a thousand as 10^3, a million as 10^3 x 10^3 and so on so the commas >> actually mark the naming. Thus I see the naming as cultural, but >> corresponding to mathematical notation. >> Anyway, I agree with your point about 'making strange the way they do >> it.' For example, I remember a third grade classroom where a young boy >> remarked, in essence, that our characterization of the numbers 6, 10, 12, >> 14, etc. in terms of even was strange. However, his reasons were >> combinatorial. Perhaps, you are saying that merely having the ability to >> perform or notice the combinatorial is insufficient guarantee that this >> move of 'strangeness' can be performed. I find this quite interesting and >> I would definitely agree (I remember when I first consciously realized >> this). I have struggled for years to inculcate such tendencies in my >> students. However, I've so far been unable to sufficiently frame what I >> seem to be chasing. >> >> Ed >> >> On Dec 22, 2014, at 3:31 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >> >>> I think in any language, big numbers are just an example of what Ribot >> was >>> calling "combinatorial imagination" (see earlier thread on imagination). >>> That is, all languages treat the most commonly used numbers as lexis and >>> the larger numbers as grammar--so for example in English the numbers one >>> through twelve are all "molar" in the sense that they are single >> morphemes, >>> while Avagadro's number (six hundred and two hextillion, two hundred and >>> fourteen quintillion, one hundred and fifty quandrillion) is decomposable >>> into base ten units at every point. This is part of a the much more >> general >>> property of language which means that the words which realize scientific >>> concepts (e.g. "immersion") are morphologically complex while the ones >>> which realize everyday concepts (e.g. "dunk") are morphologically simple. >>> One of the problems with Chomsky's model of language (the one to which >> Roy >>> Harris is pointing, actually) is that it places this kind of >> combinatorial >>> imagination at the centre of the language system and considers fixed >> idioms >>> to be epiphenomenal, while in everyday life, that is, in the vast >> majority >>> of language uses, it's really the other way around: we use language as a >>> set of fixed (but refixable) expressions and reserve our creativity for >>> other problems. >>> >>> Engestr?m's book "Learning as Expanding" begins by attacking Gagne on >>> combinatorial imagination; Engestr?m argues that all learning is >>> essentially expansive and not combinatorial. I have always thought this a >>> mistake: as Vygotsky says, development always means the introduction of >>> something new, something not present even embryonically at the outset, >> and >>> it's for this reason that a historical account of a process can only be >>> teleological and cannot actually be predictive (we can't predict learning >>> any more than we can predict evolution). So I can easily imagine that >>> combinatorial imagination is a big step forward at one point in the >>> development of the number system and then it becomes a fetter on the >>> imagination because it focuses attention on how the number is composed >>> rather than on what we can do with it (we actually don't use the long >> form >>> of Avagadro's number when we talk about chemistry; we just say >> "Avagadro's >>> number" or use a calculator). >>> >>> Here are two examples of number problems that I think require more than >>> combinatorial imagination. The first is the one that I clumsily confused >>> you with in my last post. Suppose a child is nine years and four months >>> old, and I ask the child how old she is. She says "nine and...." And >> what? >>> The adult way is to say nine and four months, but that doesn't tell us >> how >>> many years old the child is, that is, how many fractions of a year lie >>> between the child and the child's next or last birthday. In order to >> answer >>> that question, the child has to convert months to twelfths of a year, and >>> then try to convert these to thirds or decimals. This requires more than >>> combinatorial imagination; it involves reframing the problem as one of >> the >>> imperfection of the non-decimal system we use to calculate months. >>> >>> The second stems indirectly from the problem you raise. Although I think >>> the difference between the Korean (actually, Sino-Korean) numbers between >>> ten and twenty is negligible (it's just a matter of lexicalizing two >>> numbers, eleven and twelve), there is a very serious problem that dogs >> even >>> advanced learners of English here. The Korean won is a very small >> currency >>> unit--there are about a thousand to the dollar at the moment. So to >> express >>> the price of anything worth buying, you need to talk, in English, in >> units >>> of ten to the third power (a cup of coffee costs thousands, salaries and >>> rents are in millions, cars costs tens of millions, and real estate costs >>> billions and trillions). But the Korean number system uses units of ten >> to >>> the fourth bower ("man" means ten thousand, "ok" means a hundred million, >>> and "cho" is a billion). So when you read statistics in the English press >>> they are very often wrong by a factor of ten. This requires more than >>> combinatorial imagination, because it involves realizing that the >> placement >>> of commas in a large number is just a cultural convention corresponding >> to >>> language and not to mathematics itself, and also involves "making >> strange" >>> the way we do it, and thinking instead in terms of the way they do it. >>> >>> On Sunday our Vygotsky seminar met at my apartment to proof the galleys >> of >>> our new book of Vygotsky's lectures on pedology, and during the lunch >> break >>> some of my former students were looking at the paintings I did twenty >> years >>> ago. At the time I was obsessed with "point of view", and all my >> paintings >>> featured some intrusion of the artist's own body--usually an arm or a >> pair >>> of spectacles. I guess the purpose of it was to "make strange" the act of >>> looking at a painting and to instead force the viewer into my own >>> viewpoint. But it also had the curious property of making strange the act >>> of painting a painting, because I could never get over the fact that both >>> the part of my own body and the rest of the painting were in equally >> sharp >>> focus. That's not the way point of view really works! >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>> >>> Korean >>> >>> >>> On 22 December 2014 at 08:29, Ed Wall wrote: >>> >>>> David >>>> >>>> This is quite interesting. Let me give some different takes on some >>>> of what you write (I, by the way, am still unsure) >>>> >>>> Some say part of the fetters you refer to are in the manner in which >>>> the equal sign is used (e.g. as compute) and the propensity for vertical >>>> addition in the early grades. I have seen a US 3rd grade teacher >> complicate >>>> things somewhat (she and the children were definitely working with >>>> countable objects) in starting with an unknown quantity, remove a known >>>> quantity, and, by obtaining a known quantity, figure out what the >> initial >>>> whole was without too much trouble. That isn't too say that things might >>>> not have proceeded more efficiently with another curricular starting >> point. >>>> >>>> There is an interesting different between Korean students and US >>>> students in the early grades. US students have something called eleven >> and >>>> twelve and Korean students have something translated, in effect, as >> ten-one >>>> and ten-two. There has been speculation by some that these can be >> fetters >>>> of a sort on the way to decimal number (there are also things called >> nickel >>>> and quarter and five dollars not to mention inches, etc. which can also >> be >>>> somewhat un-helpful). >>>> >>>> >>>> On a different note, what is the adult system of determining how old >>>> one is in years, exactly? I know how young children do this correctly, >> but >>>> inexactly. >>>> >>>> Ed >>>> >>>> On Dec 21, 2014, at 4:50 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>> >>>>> Let me float a hypothesis, and see what Huw and Ulvi make of it. A >>>> learning >>>>> activity (any learning activity) is best described not as a synoptic >>>>> hierarchy of molar units like operation, action and activity. Viewed >>>>> diachronically, from the point of view of psychology, a learning >> activity >>>>> is a non-hierarchical historical sequence, such that any given >>>>> "method" eventually, in time, turns out to fetter progress and must be >>>>> discarded, and the end result is not an inter-mental social form of >>>>> activity but instead an intramental psychological one. >>>>> >>>>> Take the Schmittau work that Ulvi references as a concrete example. >>>>> Schmittau showed that the American curriculum (like the Korean one) >>>>> introduces the notion of number by counting separate objects. This >> allows >>>>> the child to grasp the number very concretely and quickly. Groupings >> are >>>>> then introduced, and this corresponds once again to what we see >> children >>>> do >>>>> naturally (see Chapter Eight of HDHMF). So at every point the American >>>>> curriculum takes the line of least resistance. But that means that at a >>>>> specific point, the notion of number based on concrete, separable >> objects >>>>> becomes a fetter on the child's progress. Schmittau locates this point >>>>> quite precisely: it's the moment when the child, accustomed to add >> known >>>>> quantitites of physical objects together to obtain an unknown quantity, >>>> is >>>>> asked to start with an unknown quantity, remove a known quantity, and, >> by >>>>> obtaining a known quantity, figure out what the initial whole was (e.g. >>>>> "I made a bunch of snowballs and put them in the freezer. I threw one >> at >>>> my >>>>> big brother at a Christmas pary, and two at my friends when they teased >>>> me >>>>> at New Years. Now I have only half a dozen left for April Fools Day. >> How >>>>> many snowballs did I make?") >>>>> >>>>> Chapter Eight of HDHMF asks the question of whether "arithmetical >>>> figures" >>>>> (that is, physical groupings of countable objects) will keep the child >>>> back >>>>> from learning the symbolic manipulations afforded by the decimal system >>>> of >>>>> writing digits, or whether they will naturally evolve into the decimal >>>>> system (because the children will of their own will invent a physical >>>>> grouping of ten objects). Interestingly, Vygotsky concludes that any >>>>> experiment along these lines would be unethical (and THERE is a >>>>> correspondence with Chomsky, who has often correctly noted how one of >> the >>>>> things that keeps linguistics in a "paper and pencil" era corresponding >>>> to >>>>> sixteenth century physics is the immorality of experimentation on human >>>>> subjects). But, like Chomsky, he resolves the question with paper and >>>>> pencil (in Chapter Thirteen) with a very amusing MIS-reading of >>>> Thorndike's >>>>> "Psychology of Arithmetic". >>>>> >>>>> Thorndike is criticizing the way in which our parents and grandparents >>>> were >>>>> taught arithmetic as a symbolic system akin to language. Vygotsky >>>>> apparently doesn't get Thorndike's irony, and thinks that Thorndike is >>>>> lauding this culturally approved method over Lay's newfangled system >>>> based >>>>> on "arithmetical figures" (dominos, in fact). See the attachment: it >>>>> involves analyzing a picture where there is one girl on a swing and >>>> another >>>>> on the ground ("How many girls are there?") a kitten on a stump and >>>> another >>>>> on the ground (which Vygotsky misremembers as dogs). And so, by a >> process >>>>> of misreading and misremembering, Vygotsky turns Thorndike into a >>>>> cognitivist. Thorndike would probably rather be a dog. >>>>> >>>>> Interestingly, the way Vygotsky resolves the whole dispute is >>>> similar--that >>>>> is, the child triumphs not through the adequacy of his or her own >> method >>>> or >>>>> through seeing the superiority of the adult method, but rather through >>>> the >>>>> inadequacies of both. For example (and this is my example), a child >> with >>>> a >>>>> notion of number based entirely on separable objects has a very hard >> time >>>>> measuring how old he is in precise terms. On the other hand, the adult >>>>> method of measuring years out in months is NOT a decimal method. The >>>> child >>>>> therefore has to grasp and perfect the adult system just in order to >>>> answer >>>>> the simple question--how old are you in years EXACTLY? >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 22 December 2014 at 07:01, Huw Lloyd >>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Ulvi, >>>>>> >>>>>> The essential 'method' is to facilitate students' own experimentation >>>> with >>>>>> methods. This is called learning activity. >>>>>> >>>>>> Huw >>>>>> >>>>>> On 21 December 2014 at 12:15, Ulvi ??il wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Hello, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I know there are some works comparing Russia (Davydov's curriculum) >> and >>>>>> US, >>>>>>> and even some works done in US with an application of Davydov's, e.g. >>>> by >>>>>>> Schmittau. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I would like to know, not in detail, but just in general, which main >>>>>>> factors lie behind this success in Russia, it is Davydov, or Zarkov >> or >>>>>> any >>>>>>> other scholar's method. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Thanks in advance, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Ulvi >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> >> From ablunden@mira.net Sun Dec 28 00:55:45 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sun, 28 Dec 2014 19:55:45 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: no primitive language? In-Reply-To: References: <549E83CB.60802@mira.net> <549E85AD.5040702@mira.net> <549E868C.2020809@mira.net> <6F1EE308-E173-4D4B-B54E-B7D1D59865E6@uniandes.edu.co> <549F6F00.70708@mira.net> Message-ID: <549FC591.6050003@mira.net> Your most and the attachment is remarkably pertinent, Henry. Thank you! I think from a list-protocol point of view, I think that (1) As Luisa suggested, providing links and documents supporting a thread is to be encouraged, and (2) More or less as Martin suggested, when introducing a work or writer to a thread, one ought to provide a synopsis or what it says or what it proves. So I have copied the abstract below. "We argue that the evolution of symbolic capacity has resulted in three unprecedented modifications of hominid cognitive and emotional predispositions that are particularly relevant for explaining some of the more distinctive and enigmatic characteristics of religion: (1) a predisposition to understand worldly events and one?s own identity and place within the world in narrative terms; (2) a predisposition to conceive of the world as two-layered, so that some objects and events of mundane experience are like signs expressing meanings that concern a hidden and more fundamental level of existence; and (3) a capacity for what we describe as emergent emotional experiences that are of a higher order than primary evolved emotions, and which are in turn the source of transcendent forms of experience?often considered to be the most exalted aspects of a spiritual life." Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ HENRY SHONERD wrote: > I am assuming that Andy?s question does not represent a new thread, that it is about properties of human language. So, I wonder if the attached article by Deacon is relevant and convincing. I hope this does not violate etiquette to introduce a reading. Perhaps someone on the chat is familiar with Deacon. I got the articles from Holbrook and found it very interesting. > Henry > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > > >> On Dec 27, 2014, at 6:46 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> Thank you all for your authoritative responses to my question. >> I have a follow up. >> Do we know if there any ancient culture which does not have some kind metaphysics, religion - polytheistic or monotheistic or practical, or other like system of making sense of the universe? >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >> >> >> mike cole wrote: >> >>> Perhaps of interest with respect to Piraha? >>> mike >>> >>> ------------------------ >>> http://www.ascentofhumanity.com/chapter2-7.php >>> >>> On Sat, Dec 27, 2014 at 2:45 PM, David Kellogg wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>>> Martin: >>>> >>>> I think you do know more about this than I do, but none of us knows enough. >>>> The whole problem with the Piraha debate is that the data is just not >>>> accessible to us, because there are so few people who understand Piraha and >>>> who understand some other language, and there are--as far as I can figure >>>> out--no people who both understand Piraha and some other language and >>>> understand that the distinction between morphemes and words is a >>>> conventional one based on Standard Average European, and so is the >>>> distinction between words and clauses. Even if there were such persons, >>>> there are none who understand that the distinction between a clause and a >>>> turn in a dialogue is largely an artifact of written language. >>>> >>>> As far as I know, nobody is claiming that Piraha is not dialogically >>>> recursive--that is, nobody is saying that you cannot refer to what someone >>>> just said in Piraha. That is enough, for me, to prove that Piraha is >>>> recursive: that, had we world enough and time, Piraha can say anything that >>>> needs to be said in Piraha. So Piraha is a language which (like Hawaiian) >>>> has a rather austere and economical sound system, a lexicon perfectly >>>> adapted to its environment, and the ability to produce an infinitely long >>>> dialogue we call culture. Can infinity ever be called primitive? >>>> >>>> David Kellogg >>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>> >>>> On 27 December 2014 at 20:57, Martin John Packer >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> David, I know you know more about this than I know.... but the debate >>>>> today centers on the Pirah?, no? Do they have color terms? Do they have >>>>> number terms? Do they have recursion? >>>>> >>>>> Martin >>>>> >>>>> On Dec 27, 2014, at 5:35 AM, David Kellogg wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Well, of course Carol's really right, Andy. We need to say what we mean >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> by >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> primitive. Does it mean that the language is historically young? In >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>> that >>>> >>>> >>>>>> case, the most primitive language is probably modern Hebrew. Does it >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>> mean >>>> >>>> >>>>>> that the language is grammatically simple? Which aspect of the grammar? >>>>>> >>>>>> Let's take case, since this is Vygotsky's model for linguistic >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>> complexity >>>> >>>> >>>>>> in the Lectures. Annaluisa will tell you about Sanskrit's eight cases; >>>>>> modern Tamil has seven; Greek and Latin had about six. Tsez, in the >>>>>> mountains of the Caucasus, has 64 cases (mostly locatives). >>>>>> >>>>>> English is probably the most primitive languages in the world from this >>>>>> point of view; it has a distinction between "I" and "me" and "he" and >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> "him" >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> but that's about it. >>>>>> >>>>>> David Kellogg >>>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 27 December 2014 at 19:14, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> Thanks, Carol. :) >>>>>>> I am OK from here then. >>>>>>> Much appreciated. >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> >>>> >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Carol Macdonald wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Syntax, semantics. pragmatics, phonology, discourse orientation: they >>>>>>>> just give their own version of these aspects. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 27 December 2014 at 12:10, Andy Blunden >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>> >>> >>>> >>>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Thanks, Carol. >>>>>>>> Can those "key characteristics" be given in a few lines? >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>> ------------ >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Carol Macdonald wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> It's true. Languages all share key characteristics. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Carol >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 27 December 2014 at 12:02, Andy Blunden >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I have heard, and I believe it to be the case, that there >>>>>>>> is no >>>>>>>> such thing as a "primitive language." >>>>>>>> I am not talking about the "language" of children raised >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>> in >>>> >>>> >>>>>>>> isolation, or the "home sign" of deaf children, I mean >>>>>>>> among the >>>>>>>> languages of actual historical peoples. >>>>>>>> I would just appreciate that if this is wrong, could >>>>>>>> someone on >>>>>>>> this list who knows about this kind of thing disabuse me. >>>>>>>> Otherwise I will assume this to be factual. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Thanks >>>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>>> -- ------------------------------ >>>>>>>> ------------------------------------------ >>>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: >>>>>>>> Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>> Department >>>> >>>> >>>>> of >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>>>> Linguistics, Unisa >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>> >>> >>> > > From bella.kotik@gmail.com Sun Dec 28 04:34:27 2014 From: bella.kotik@gmail.com (Bella Kotik-Friedgut) Date: Sun, 28 Dec 2014 14:34:27 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: the genetic roots of thought and speech In-Reply-To: References: <3718F78D-AB5D-4B1B-9507-B7D62A4DD6F3@manchester.ac.uk> Message-ID: If the passage cited is the end of paragraph 3, then I have to correct translation: we (are forced to) CAN conclude that FUSION of thought and speech, in adults as well as in children, is a phenomenon limited to a CIRCUMSCRIBED area OF VERBAL THOUGHT, WHILE OTHER AREAS OF Nonverbal thought and nonintellectual speech STAY ONLY UNDER A WEEK, DISTANT NON IMMEDIATE INFLUENCE OF THIS FUSION AND ARE NOT RELATED TO IT CASUALLY. do NOT participate in THIS FUSION and are affected indirectly by the processes of verbal thought" SEEMS IT HAS SOME DIFFERENT INTERPRETATION. Sincerely yours Bella Kotik-Friedgut On Wed, Dec 24, 2014 at 8:25 AM, larry smolucha wrote: > Message from Francine: > > Keeping in mind that deafness alone does not mean one is mute. > I have met many deaf people who speak, and also use sign language. > But in Vygotsky's era, techniques for teaching the deaf how to speak were > just being developed. > > There might be something in the Volume from the Collected Works on > Defectology that would clarify Vygotsky's position on sign language as > a non-vocalized form of speech, and whether Vygotsky thought it could be > internalized and used to consciously direct one's thought processes. > Afterall, didn't Vygotsky spend seven years (1917-1924) teaching how > to teach the deaf (at a teacher's college in Gomel)? > > I recall a passage in Vygotsky's writings where he says that the problem > with > deaf education (in his time) was that sign language was only taught for the > purpose of communicating with others (and not for self-regulation). > Perhaps, his daughter Gita's work in deaf education developed ways to teach > the use of sign language for self-regulation of thought processes. > > Please note: that defectology and deaf education are the terms that were > used in > Vygotsky's era. > > > > > From: julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > Date: Wed, 24 Dec 2014 01:13:07 +0000 > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: the genetic roots of thought and speech > > > > Lawry > > > > Don't agree with this at all... Sign language is surely mediated by > gestures rather than vibrations of vocal chords, but still has all the > hallmarks of semiotic mediation Vygotsky elaborated, including inner speech > and higher cognitive functions (potentially). > > > > Julian > > > > On 24 Dec 2014, at 01:00, "larry smolucha" > wrote: > > > > > Message from Francine: > > > > > > This reminds me of a debate that I had with Greg Thompson over a year > ago > > > about hearing impaired people who do not have speech > > > but use hand sign language. Hand sign language is a sensori-motor > semiotic > > > systems that communicates thoughts to others. This is a semiotic > fusion that > > > does not involve speech. Dance is another sensori-motor fusion with > thought > > > (which is itself based on sensori-motor experience). Visual symbols > systems > > > are another. > > > > > > My reading of Vygotsky is that only speech vocalizations that fuse > with thought > > > (based on sensori-motor experience) can produce 'word' meanings that > are internalized > > > as the inner speech that creates higher mental functions (consciously > regulated > > > thought processes). > > > > > >> Date: Tue, 23 Dec 2014 09:54:14 -0800 > > >> From: lpscholar2@gmail.com > > >> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] the genetic roots of thought and speech > > >> > > >> Francine asked us to re-read Chapter 4 "the Genetic Roots' of Thought > and > > >> Speech. > > >> This paragraph was critical > > >> > > >> "we are forced to conclude that FUSION of thought and speech, in > adults as > > >> well as in children, is a phenomenon limited to a CIRCUMSCRIBED area. > > >> Nonverbal thought and nonintellectual speech do NOT participate in > THIS > > >> FUSION and are affected indirectly by the processes of verbal thought" > > >> [Vygotsky, page 48] > > >> > > >> Reading this opens for me the question of all the other functions of > speech > > >> in the adult that are not directly influenced by thought and all the > > >> functions of thought that are not affected by speech. > > >> In particular are there forms of *imaging* that are thoughts but not > > >> functioning in speech. Do these paths of image and thought also > develop and > > >> fuse? > > >> > > >> All the functions that Vygotsky explores in the primates and in > children > > >> PRIOR to the reciprocal interweaving of thought and language continue > to > > >> function in adults. For example the sounds of speech as offering > "release > > >> from tension or anxiety" or the sounds as ways of *connecting* and > > >> *bonding*. > > >> It seems that to privilege the fusion of thought and language as > dominant > > >> modes of designing places/spaces [such as the third space] makes the > other > > >> functions [speech alone] [thought alone] nondominant modes when the > > >> necessity for connection may be prior to and dominant when reflecting > on > > >> the fused mode of thought and language as a partial unity. > > >> In other words, the unit of analysis is the relation of thought alone > AND > > >> speech alone AND image alone AND all their actual fusions as other > partial > > >> modes. > > >> This as a multi-modal understanding. > > >> I hope this is the right length > > >> Larry > > > > > > > From annalisa@unm.edu Sun Dec 28 12:05:04 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Sun, 28 Dec 2014 20:05:04 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] In case you are listening to the virtue of the ignorant Message-ID: <1419797107605.67217@unm.edu> Hello all! Of course virtue doesn't make a sound, nor does it speak, but I figured the subject line might grab your attention. If so, then... voil?! I found this very short article on Farnam Street about Einstein that may interest xmca folks: http://www.farnamstreetblog.com/2014/12/albert-einstein-simplicity/ by S. Parrish 12/17/14 What I like about the article is the necessity for Einstein to examine much variety in order to learn to discern what was possible to discard and what was important to regard. I disagree more than a little with Charles Munger, because one man's folly is another man's gold. Or woman, as the case may be... Kind regards, Annalisa P.S. As my year-end gift to the list I offer a link to Duke Ellington's Sugar Rum Cherry, so... merry merry merry clinks to overlaps and gaps! :) http://grooveshark.com/#!/s/Sugar+Rum+Cherry+Dance+Of+The+Sugar+Plum+Fairy/2SSUsJ?src=5 Enjoy the Plum!? From ablunden@mira.net Sun Dec 28 17:50:54 2014 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 29 Dec 2014 12:50:54 +1100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: no primitive language? In-Reply-To: <549F6F00.70708@mira.net> References: <549E83CB.60802@mira.net> <549E85AD.5040702@mira.net> <549E868C.2020809@mira.net> <6F1EE308-E173-4D4B-B54E-B7D1D59865E6@uniandes.edu.co> <549F6F00.70708@mira.net> Message-ID: <54A0B37E.5090408@mira.net> OK, so we are in agreement that there is no ancient culture that did not have some kind of metaphysics. The thing about having a metaphysics is that people leave material traces of their metaphysical beliefs, and as I understand it (I am open to correction here too), the traces of burial rituals, cave paintings, decorative objects d'art, and so on, go back before homo sapiens sapiens. Or is it not that far? Is it possible to tell from fossil evidence at what point hominids had sufficient development around the larynx and so on to make complex speech? I am sure there are lots of people on this list who know about this sort of stuff. On the basis of religious artefacts and hominid fossils, what do we know about which came first and do both go back before homo sapiens sapiens. Because we don't know what spoken languages were like in those days; we only have fossils and solid artefacts. I know I am being lazy here. I could be using Google. But it is the holiday season and I am sure no-one minds. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ Andy Blunden wrote: > Thank you all for your authoritative responses to my question. > I have a follow up. > Do we know if there any ancient culture which does not have some kind > metaphysics, religion - polytheistic or monotheistic or practical, or > other like system of making sense of the universe? > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ > > > mike cole wrote: >> Perhaps of interest with respect to Piraha? >> mike >> >> ------------------------ >> http://www.ascentofhumanity.com/chapter2-7.php >> >> On Sat, Dec 27, 2014 at 2:45 PM, David Kellogg >> wrote: >> >> >>> Martin: >>> >>> I think you do know more about this than I do, but none of us knows >>> enough. >>> The whole problem with the Piraha debate is that the data is just not >>> accessible to us, because there are so few people who understand >>> Piraha and >>> who understand some other language, and there are--as far as I can >>> figure >>> out--no people who both understand Piraha and some other language and >>> understand that the distinction between morphemes and words is a >>> conventional one based on Standard Average European, and so is the >>> distinction between words and clauses. Even if there were such persons, >>> there are none who understand that the distinction between a clause >>> and a >>> turn in a dialogue is largely an artifact of written language. >>> >>> As far as I know, nobody is claiming that Piraha is not dialogically >>> recursive--that is, nobody is saying that you cannot refer to what >>> someone >>> just said in Piraha. That is enough, for me, to prove that Piraha is >>> recursive: that, had we world enough and time, Piraha can say >>> anything that >>> needs to be said in Piraha. So Piraha is a language which (like >>> Hawaiian) >>> has a rather austere and economical sound system, a lexicon perfectly >>> adapted to its environment, and the ability to produce an infinitely >>> long >>> dialogue we call culture. Can infinity ever be called primitive? >>> >>> David Kellogg >>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>> >>> On 27 December 2014 at 20:57, Martin John Packer >>> >>> wrote: >>> >>> >>>> David, I know you know more about this than I know.... but the debate >>>> today centers on the Pirah?, no? Do they have color terms? Do they >>>> have >>>> number terms? Do they have recursion? >>>> >>>> Martin >>>> >>>> On Dec 27, 2014, at 5:35 AM, David Kellogg >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> Well, of course Carol's really right, Andy. We need to say what we >>>>> mean >>>>> >>>> by >>>> >>>>> primitive. Does it mean that the language is historically young? In >>>>> >>> that >>> >>>>> case, the most primitive language is probably modern Hebrew. Does it >>>>> >>> mean >>> >>>>> that the language is grammatically simple? Which aspect of the >>>>> grammar? >>>>> >>>>> Let's take case, since this is Vygotsky's model for linguistic >>>>> >>> complexity >>> >>>>> in the Lectures. Annaluisa will tell you about Sanskrit's eight >>>>> cases; >>>>> modern Tamil has seven; Greek and Latin had about six. Tsez, in the >>>>> mountains of the Caucasus, has 64 cases (mostly locatives). >>>>> >>>>> English is probably the most primitive languages in the world from >>>>> this >>>>> point of view; it has a distinction between "I" and "me" and "he" and >>>>> >>>> "him" >>>> >>>>> but that's about it. >>>>> >>>>> David Kellogg >>>>> Hankuk University of Foreign Studies >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 27 December 2014 at 19:14, Andy Blunden wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Thanks, Carol. :) >>>>>> I am OK from here then. >>>>>> Much appreciated. >>>>>> Andy >>>>>> >>>>>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> >>> >>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Carol Macdonald wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> Syntax, semantics. pragmatics, phonology, discourse orientation: >>>>>>> they >>>>>>> just give their own version of these aspects. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 27 December 2014 at 12:10, Andy Blunden >>>>>> >>> >> >>>>>>> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Thanks, Carol. >>>>>>> Can those "key characteristics" be given in a few lines? >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>>>> ------------ >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Carol Macdonald wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> >>>>>>> It's true. Languages all share key characteristics. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Carol >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 27 December 2014 at 12:02, Andy Blunden >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I have heard, and I believe it to be the case, that >>>>>>> there >>>>>>> is no >>>>>>> such thing as a "primitive language." >>>>>>> I am not talking about the "language" of children raised >>>>>>> >>> in >>> >>>>>>> isolation, or the "home sign" of deaf children, I mean >>>>>>> among the >>>>>>> languages of actual historical peoples. >>>>>>> I would just appreciate that if this is wrong, could >>>>>>> someone on >>>>>>> this list who knows about this kind of thing disabuse >>>>>>> me. >>>>>>> Otherwise I will assume this to be factual. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Thanks >>>>>>> Andy >>>>>>> -- ------------------------------ >>>>>>> ------------------------------------------ >>>>>>> *Andy Blunden* >>>>>>> http://home.pacific.net.au/~andy/ >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: >>>>>>> Department of Linguistics, Unisa >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> -- >>>>>>> Carol A Macdonald Ph D (Edin) >>>>>>> Developmental psycholinguist >>>>>>> Academic, Researcher, and Editor Honorary Research Fellow: >>>>>>> >>> Department >>> >>>> of >>>> >>>>>>> Linguistics, Unisa >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> >> >> > > > From annalisa@unm.edu Sun Dec 28 19:32:37 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Mon, 29 Dec 2014 03:32:37 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] In case you are listening to the virtue of the ignorant In-Reply-To: <1419797107605.67217@unm.edu> References: <1419797107605.67217@unm.edu> Message-ID: <1419823955397.82575@unm.edu> Hello all! Despite the possibility I will not be forgiven for replying to myself, I thought I would add this article about a very interesting letter that Einstein wrote to Marie Curie, also by Shane Parrish and appearing in Farnam Street this month: http://www.farnamstreetblog.com/2014/12/albert-einstein-to-marie-curie/ This seems to logically follow my earlier comment on folly? Subsequently, to create a sense of a parallelogram in the form of a listserv post, may I add another link from Ellington's Three Suites Album, "The Peanut Brittle Brigade" ? http://grooveshark.com/#!/s/Peanut+Brittle+Brigade+March/3IaSVc?src=5 Just to add some nuts to the fruit! :) From vygotsky@unm.edu Sun Dec 28 20:36:45 2014 From: vygotsky@unm.edu (Vera John-Steiner) Date: Sun, 28 Dec 2014 21:36:45 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: In case you are listening to the virtue of the ignorant In-Reply-To: <1419823955397.82575@unm.edu> References: <1419797107605.67217@unm.edu> <1419823955397.82575@unm.edu> Message-ID: <000c01d02321$12c5a4e0$3850eea0$@edu> I am so glad Einstein provided support to Madame Curie when she really needed it. Vera -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Annalisa Aguilar Sent: Sunday, December 28, 2014 8:33 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] In case you are listening to the virtue of the ignorant Hello all! Despite the possibility I will not be forgiven for replying to myself, I thought I would add this article about a very interesting letter that Einstein wrote to Marie Curie, also by Shane Parrish and appearing in Farnam Street this month: http://www.farnamstreetblog.com/2014/12/albert-einstein-to-marie-curie/ This seems to logically follow my earlier comment on folly. Subsequently, to create a sense of a parallelogram in the form of a listserv post, may I add another link from Ellington's Three Suites Album, "The Peanut Brittle Brigade" ? http://grooveshark.com/#!/s/Peanut+Brittle+Brigade+March/3IaSVc?src=5 Just to add some nuts to the fruit! :) From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Dec 29 10:14:49 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Mon, 29 Dec 2014 18:14:49 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] The Culture Filter is in The Mind Message-ID: <1419876888698.8057@unm.edu> Hello world! Apparently the culture filter is being used in Silicon Valley to replicate previous incarnations of privilege: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/27/opinion/joe-nocera-silicon-valleys-mirror-effect.html What is annoying is that it is also being called a meritocracy. Also see: http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/12/23/us/gender-gaps-stanford-94.html? Perhaps the mind has more control on tool creation and tool use than we think? Kind regards, Annalisa From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon Dec 29 11:30:55 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 29 Dec 2014 11:30:55 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: the genetic roots of thought and speech In-Reply-To: References: <3718F78D-AB5D-4B1B-9507-B7D62A4DD6F3@manchester.ac.uk> Message-ID: David, Larry, Bella et al-- I, too, have been reading ch4 of T&L, but in the 1987 edition, where the passage in question is at the bottom of p. 115. Earlier, on p. 114 of this edition LSV writes that the expressive function of egocentric speech that accompanies a child's activity becomes thinking "in the true sense of the term" when it "assumes that function of a planning operation or the function of resolving a problem that arises in behavior." In the sentence right before the quoted/discussed passage he refers to "intellectual activity in the true sense of the word." I am finding this re-reading very thought provoking and in places puzzling. The idea that "there is no sharp metaphysical boundary between the external and internal in behavior" caught my attention with respect to issue of whether or not LSV was a closet dualist. Bella-- What do you think the significance of the variations in translation concerning the area of overlap of thinking and speech vis a vis "verbal thinking" portends for our understanding? mike On Sun, Dec 28, 2014 at 4:34 AM, Bella Kotik-Friedgut wrote: > If the passage cited is the end of paragraph 3, then I have to correct > translation: > > we (are forced to) CAN conclude that FUSION of thought and speech, in > adults as > well as in children, is a phenomenon limited to a CIRCUMSCRIBED area OF > VERBAL THOUGHT, WHILE OTHER AREAS OF > Nonverbal thought and nonintellectual speech STAY ONLY UNDER A WEEK, > DISTANT NON IMMEDIATE INFLUENCE OF THIS FUSION AND ARE NOT RELATED TO IT > CASUALLY. > do NOT participate in THIS > FUSION and are affected indirectly by the processes of verbal thought" > > SEEMS IT HAS SOME DIFFERENT INTERPRETATION. > > Sincerely yours Bella Kotik-Friedgut > > On Wed, Dec 24, 2014 at 8:25 AM, larry smolucha > wrote: > > > Message from Francine: > > > > Keeping in mind that deafness alone does not mean one is mute. > > I have met many deaf people who speak, and also use sign language. > > But in Vygotsky's era, techniques for teaching the deaf how to speak were > > just being developed. > > > > There might be something in the Volume from the Collected Works on > > Defectology that would clarify Vygotsky's position on sign language as > > a non-vocalized form of speech, and whether Vygotsky thought it could be > > internalized and used to consciously direct one's thought processes. > > Afterall, didn't Vygotsky spend seven years (1917-1924) teaching how > > to teach the deaf (at a teacher's college in Gomel)? > > > > I recall a passage in Vygotsky's writings where he says that the problem > > with > > deaf education (in his time) was that sign language was only taught for > the > > purpose of communicating with others (and not for self-regulation). > > Perhaps, his daughter Gita's work in deaf education developed ways to > teach > > the use of sign language for self-regulation of thought processes. > > > > Please note: that defectology and deaf education are the terms that were > > used in > > Vygotsky's era. > > > > > > > > > From: julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk > > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > Date: Wed, 24 Dec 2014 01:13:07 +0000 > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: the genetic roots of thought and speech > > > > > > Lawry > > > > > > Don't agree with this at all... Sign language is surely mediated by > > gestures rather than vibrations of vocal chords, but still has all the > > hallmarks of semiotic mediation Vygotsky elaborated, including inner > speech > > and higher cognitive functions (potentially). > > > > > > Julian > > > > > > On 24 Dec 2014, at 01:00, "larry smolucha" > > wrote: > > > > > > > Message from Francine: > > > > > > > > This reminds me of a debate that I had with Greg Thompson over a year > > ago > > > > about hearing impaired people who do not have speech > > > > but use hand sign language. Hand sign language is a sensori-motor > > semiotic > > > > systems that communicates thoughts to others. This is a semiotic > > fusion that > > > > does not involve speech. Dance is another sensori-motor fusion with > > thought > > > > (which is itself based on sensori-motor experience). Visual symbols > > systems > > > > are another. > > > > > > > > My reading of Vygotsky is that only speech vocalizations that fuse > > with thought > > > > (based on sensori-motor experience) can produce 'word' meanings that > > are internalized > > > > as the inner speech that creates higher mental functions (consciously > > regulated > > > > thought processes). > > > > > > > >> Date: Tue, 23 Dec 2014 09:54:14 -0800 > > > >> From: lpscholar2@gmail.com > > > >> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] the genetic roots of thought and speech > > > >> > > > >> Francine asked us to re-read Chapter 4 "the Genetic Roots' of > Thought > > and > > > >> Speech. > > > >> This paragraph was critical > > > >> > > > >> "we are forced to conclude that FUSION of thought and speech, in > > adults as > > > >> well as in children, is a phenomenon limited to a CIRCUMSCRIBED > area. > > > >> Nonverbal thought and nonintellectual speech do NOT participate in > > THIS > > > >> FUSION and are affected indirectly by the processes of verbal > thought" > > > >> [Vygotsky, page 48] > > > >> > > > >> Reading this opens for me the question of all the other functions of > > speech > > > >> in the adult that are not directly influenced by thought and all the > > > >> functions of thought that are not affected by speech. > > > >> In particular are there forms of *imaging* that are thoughts but not > > > >> functioning in speech. Do these paths of image and thought also > > develop and > > > >> fuse? > > > >> > > > >> All the functions that Vygotsky explores in the primates and in > > children > > > >> PRIOR to the reciprocal interweaving of thought and language > continue > > to > > > >> function in adults. For example the sounds of speech as offering > > "release > > > >> from tension or anxiety" or the sounds as ways of *connecting* and > > > >> *bonding*. > > > >> It seems that to privilege the fusion of thought and language as > > dominant > > > >> modes of designing places/spaces [such as the third space] makes the > > other > > > >> functions [speech alone] [thought alone] nondominant modes when the > > > >> necessity for connection may be prior to and dominant when > reflecting > > on > > > >> the fused mode of thought and language as a partial unity. > > > >> In other words, the unit of analysis is the relation of thought > alone > > AND > > > >> speech alone AND image alone AND all their actual fusions as other > > partial > > > >> modes. > > > >> This as a multi-modal understanding. > > > >> I hope this is the right length > > > >> Larry > > > > > > > > > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science as an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mcole@ucsd.edu Mon Dec 29 12:19:44 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Mon, 29 Dec 2014 12:19:44 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? In-Reply-To: References: <1417397991972.17078@unm.edu> Message-ID: I am responding here to David Ke's message of Nov 30th in which he recommends an article by Robert Pepperell relevant to the topic of imagination (as I imagine it!). I found a lot to think about and recommend the article to those interested in the topic. Pepperell's interest seems relevant to the topic of imagination because he deliberately creates images that incite the viewer to identify objects but are, in so far as possible, devoid of objects ("indeterminant stimuli"). Such paintings, he reports, induce active efforts to make sense of the painting in terms of something the person has encountered before. He reports that not only are particular loci in the brain recruited in response to indeterminate stimuli, but that the attempt to decipher such stimuli leads to enhanced overall coordination in brain activity: ?This suggests that V4 plays a key role in resolving indeterminate visual inputs by coordinated interaction between bottom-up and top-down processing streams? (p. 275). The word, imagination, comes up only once in the article, in connection with the work of Gombrich..... but a lot of the studies and discussion in the paper seem quite relevant to this topic. One additional issue came up that has me thinking. David wrote: for Wundt and his disciples, everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated that many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically anterior to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would not have time or ability to process complex problems in real time. My question. Aren't mental images processes? If not, what are they? mike On Sun, Nov 30, 2014 at 10:53 PM, David Kellogg wrote: > Larry, Annalisa: > > People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" when we > met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of anything > except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe available > for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember > whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the > beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a > non-image based mental representation. > > As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations are > images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. In > fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against Titchener > and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, > everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated that > many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically anterior > to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would not have > time or ability to process complex problems in real time. > > I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are > genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more reading > to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than I am > (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels like > she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do NOT read > this article--instead, look at Figure 11. > > http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ > > The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure of > Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any actual > images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural experience > associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then deliberately > frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any > recognizable figures upon which to focus. > > However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine Chapel fresco > for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He or she > can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting and > wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not notice > the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in it. > > David Kellogg > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > > Hi Larry and David, > > > > Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! > > > > I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are at the root > of all thinking. > > > > Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, based upon > previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in > combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a phrase I like > a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it by the > same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it. > > > > With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as Hackett > describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have you already > given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be willing to > take a look. > > > > As I understand, the topic of mental representations is controversial. > It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone says "this > is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble observation. > > > > It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever that > process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at hand? Just a > thought. > > > > What is it that appeals to you about this model, metaphoricity? > > > > (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) > > > > Kind regards, > > > > Annalisa > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of Larry Purss > > Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? > > > > David K > > I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. My reason > for > > exploring these authors is I have been following a path pursuing a basic > > question. > > > > Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? > > > > Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic guiding > images > > upon which thinking rests" > > > > The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring appearances and > > illusions was also exploring this theme. > > > > Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new phenomenological path > > that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names this process > > *metaphoricity*. > > > > Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible image-character of > the > > *spontaneous event* of meaning. > > > > He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he brackets - > > finds itself implicated in this guiding image. > > > > AND > > > > it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* finds the > > meaning of its very self. > > > > Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this > > image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of metaphor > can > > invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated in > > *objectivity* > > > > This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. > > > > Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of itself *in* > the > > mode [path] of the concept > > occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding images has > been > > established. > > > > In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the path of > > conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived from the > > image-character of the guiding image. > > > > I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial this topic > may > > become [again] > > > > However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this basic > > question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these images as > > occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images emerge > > spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. > > > > This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is transcendental] and is > > not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. It seems to > > have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. > > > > I also realize this question may already be answered in Vygotsky's > writings > > and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of XMCA. I > > personally am following this path for now. > > > > Larry > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science as an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From Manuel.Espinoza@ucdenver.edu Mon Dec 29 16:53:22 2014 From: Manuel.Espinoza@ucdenver.edu (Espinoza, Manuel) Date: Tue, 30 Dec 2014 00:53:22 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Sociocritical Literacies and more context Message-ID: Hello everyone, Hope this note finds you all well. Just adding to the conversation on literacies, social dreaming, the Migrant Program at UCLA (I was one of many that served the students during the early 2000s) and testimonio. The idea of testimonio as an aspect of the "concrete" is cool. To my mind, within that realm of really rich Soviet/Russian thinking, testimonio can be thought of as one way that human beings remake social life guided by intellect and heart. (Think of what testimonio accomplished in the context of 1980s Central America or mid-1990s South Africa.) But the idea of testimonio as an aspect of the "abstract" seems right on as well. Testimonio is also meaningful and comprehensive thought that explains reality better than what we had before. Testimonio in the Migrant Program seemed to be both. Thus, as the beloved Rusos teach us, you can ascend to both abstract and concrete. I think about the time and effort that went into creating the autobiographies (a form of testimonio) that Profe Guti?rrez references. They were a culmination for us as a scholarly community. And they left people altered. (Another cool insight inspired by Hegel and Marx - when humans learn, they become altered matter. Living, breathing matter, capable of experiencing. And in the words of Piaget, I believe, experiencing our experiences.) The versatility, the many facets of testimonio are beautiful to ruminate on. Given my life experience, I rejoice in thinking about the ways that testimonio - bearing witness to life via narrative - can give historical depth to a person's actions, to a community's actions. To illustrate, I remember putting together the reader for the program. We would stay all night in Moore Hall with making copies and feeling energized in thinking about migrant families sending their high school-aged children to reside and study with us for a month. The way I pictured those families - and this is key for people like Marx Wartofsky who cared deeply about the actual look of our imaginations - was through a long corridor of experience. It was just me at 2am extending the look down the hallway, but instead of a wall at the far end, I pictured families I knew, and imagined the ones I didn't know. I could see them and they could see me. Our work was similar in that instant: preparing the way for the youth. At times, it was incredibly vivid, but that grew over time and through the many testimonios we fostered and experienced. Even the testimonio requires witness for it to live on. (See: Carolyn Forch? and her "poetry of witness.") And that, too, had to be learned to an extent. Who showed me? Hector ?lvarez, Carlos Tejeda, Profe Guti?rrez, Miguel Zavala, Shirin Vossoughi, the migrant parents, and others. Now, that was a scholarly community. Forgive the somewhat long message. I been looking to post for years, but in the words of the Ents from Middle Earth, I wanted to say something that took time to say. See you again in 2018 :) Respetuosamente, Manuel Luis Espinoza Manuel From annalisa@unm.edu Mon Dec 29 21:05:24 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 30 Dec 2014 05:05:24 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <1419915923891.35774@unm.edu> What a beautiful post, Miguel! So many links and pathways to other thoughts and byways. I hope we won't have to wait until 2018 to hear from you again! Kind regards, Annalisa From laires11@gmail.com Tue Dec 30 08:30:57 2014 From: laires11@gmail.com (Luisa Aires) Date: Tue, 30 Dec 2014 16:30:57 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Hi Manuel Thank for your enlightening post. Is it correct to state that "testimonios" and "narratives of life experience" are synonymous research techniques? Best, Lu?sa A. 2014-12-30 0:53 GMT+00:00 Espinoza, Manuel : > Hello everyone, > > Hope this note finds you all well. Just adding to the conversation on > literacies, social dreaming, the Migrant Program at UCLA (I was one of many > that served the students during the early 2000s) and testimonio. > > The idea of testimonio as an aspect of the "concrete" is cool. To my > mind, within that realm of really rich Soviet/Russian thinking, testimonio > can be thought of as one way that human beings remake social life guided > by intellect and heart. (Think of what testimonio accomplished in the > context of 1980s Central America or mid-1990s South Africa.) But the idea > of testimonio as an aspect of the "abstract" seems right on as well. > Testimonio is also meaningful and comprehensive thought that explains > reality better than what we had before. Testimonio in the Migrant Program > seemed to be both. Thus, as the beloved Rusos teach us, you can ascend to > both abstract and concrete. > > I think about the time and effort that went into creating the > autobiographies (a form of testimonio) that Profe Guti?rrez references. > They were a culmination for us as a scholarly community. And they left > people altered. (Another cool insight inspired by Hegel and Marx - when > humans learn, they become altered matter. Living, breathing matter, > capable of experiencing. And in the words of Piaget, I believe, > experiencing our experiences.) The versatility, the many facets of > testimonio are beautiful to ruminate on. Given my life experience, I > rejoice in thinking about the ways that testimonio - bearing witness to > life via narrative - can give historical depth to a person's actions, to a > community's actions. > To illustrate, I remember putting together the reader for the program. We > would stay all night in Moore Hall with making copies and feeling energized > in thinking about migrant families sending their high school-aged children > to reside and study with us for a month. The way I pictured those families > - and this is key for people like Marx Wartofsky who cared deeply about the > actual look of our imaginations - was through a long corridor of > experience. It was just me at 2am extending the look down the hallway, but > instead of a wall at the far end, I pictured families I knew, and imagined > the ones I didn't know. I could see them and they could see me. Our work > was similar in that instant: preparing the way for the youth. At times, it > was incredibly vivid, but that grew over time and through the many > testimonios we fostered and experienced. Even the testimonio requires > witness for it to live on. (See: Carolyn Forch? and her "poetry of > witness.") And that, too, had to be learned to an extent. Who showed me? > Hector ?lvarez, Carlos Tejeda, Profe Guti?rrez, Miguel Zavala, Shirin > Vossoughi, the migrant parents, and others. Now, that was a scholarly > community. > > Forgive the somewhat long message. I been looking to post for years, but > in the words of the Ents from Middle Earth, I wanted to say something that > took time to say. See you again in 2018 :) > > Respetuosamente, > > Manuel Luis Espinoza > > > Manuel > > > > > -- Department of Education and Distance Learning, Universidade Aberta Centre of Studies on Migrations and Intercultural Relations (CEMRI) R. Amial, n? 752, 4200-055 Porto, Portugal laires@uab.pt www.uab.pt From glassman.13@osu.edu Tue Dec 30 09:03:21 2014 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Tue, 30 Dec 2014 17:03:21 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F907E885@CIO-KRC-D2MBX08.osuad.osu.edu> Are either research techniques at all in the traditional sense? And do we kind of confuse things by using the traditional phrase to describe it. Research in traditional academics is done to know and change might some day come from knowledge. Are approaches like "testimonios" and "narratives of life experience" done more to change, and change will lead to a new type of knowing. Is it better to think of it as re-search in a more literal sense, to go through the process of finding again. Michael ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Luisa Aires [laires11@gmail.com] Sent: Tuesday, December 30, 2014 11:30 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context Hi Manuel Thank for your enlightening post. Is it correct to state that "testimonios" and "narratives of life experience" are synonymous research techniques? Best, Lu?sa A. 2014-12-30 0:53 GMT+00:00 Espinoza, Manuel : > Hello everyone, > > Hope this note finds you all well. Just adding to the conversation on > literacies, social dreaming, the Migrant Program at UCLA (I was one of many > that served the students during the early 2000s) and testimonio. > > The idea of testimonio as an aspect of the "concrete" is cool. To my > mind, within that realm of really rich Soviet/Russian thinking, testimonio > can be thought of as one way that human beings remake social life guided > by intellect and heart. (Think of what testimonio accomplished in the > context of 1980s Central America or mid-1990s South Africa.) But the idea > of testimonio as an aspect of the "abstract" seems right on as well. > Testimonio is also meaningful and comprehensive thought that explains > reality better than what we had before. Testimonio in the Migrant Program > seemed to be both. Thus, as the beloved Rusos teach us, you can ascend to > both abstract and concrete. > > I think about the time and effort that went into creating the > autobiographies (a form of testimonio) that Profe Guti?rrez references. > They were a culmination for us as a scholarly community. And they left > people altered. (Another cool insight inspired by Hegel and Marx - when > humans learn, they become altered matter. Living, breathing matter, > capable of experiencing. And in the words of Piaget, I believe, > experiencing our experiences.) The versatility, the many facets of > testimonio are beautiful to ruminate on. Given my life experience, I > rejoice in thinking about the ways that testimonio - bearing witness to > life via narrative - can give historical depth to a person's actions, to a > community's actions. > To illustrate, I remember putting together the reader for the program. We > would stay all night in Moore Hall with making copies and feeling energized > in thinking about migrant families sending their high school-aged children > to reside and study with us for a month. The way I pictured those families > - and this is key for people like Marx Wartofsky who cared deeply about the > actual look of our imaginations - was through a long corridor of > experience. It was just me at 2am extending the look down the hallway, but > instead of a wall at the far end, I pictured families I knew, and imagined > the ones I didn't know. I could see them and they could see me. Our work > was similar in that instant: preparing the way for the youth. At times, it > was incredibly vivid, but that grew over time and through the many > testimonios we fostered and experienced. Even the testimonio requires > witness for it to live on. (See: Carolyn Forch? and her "poetry of > witness.") And that, too, had to be learned to an extent. Who showed me? > Hector ?lvarez, Carlos Tejeda, Profe Guti?rrez, Miguel Zavala, Shirin > Vossoughi, the migrant parents, and others. Now, that was a scholarly > community. > > Forgive the somewhat long message. I been looking to post for years, but > in the words of the Ents from Middle Earth, I wanted to say something that > took time to say. See you again in 2018 :) > > Respetuosamente, > > Manuel Luis Espinoza > > > Manuel > > > > > -- Department of Education and Distance Learning, Universidade Aberta Centre of Studies on Migrations and Intercultural Relations (CEMRI) R. Amial, n? 752, 4200-055 Porto, Portugal laires@uab.pt www.uab.pt From annalisa@unm.edu Tue Dec 30 09:24:18 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 30 Dec 2014 17:24:18 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F907E885@CIO-KRC-D2MBX08.osuad.osu.edu> References: , , <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F907E885@CIO-KRC-D2MBX08.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: <1419960258533.46515@unm.edu> Hi Michael, Luisa, Miguel and all, Is it possible to see testimonios as data points? But to the point, far more than a data point, perhaps a cell of meaning? or a node that connects to other nodes, and that over the space of time and place that a larger picture starts to emerge that reveals a deeper-anchored democracy of meanings? What appeals to me is that Miguel's "method" of testimonio remains in connection with affect (and subjective identity) and thereby retains a compassionate unity with formations of "data collection." Since it is difficult to leave the heart in the filing cabinet, wouldn't that be a fair method to connect to research and subsequently to knowledge? Just wondering? Kind regards, Annalisa From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Dec 30 09:29:33 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 30 Dec 2014 09:29:33 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F907E885@CIO-KRC-D2MBX08.osuad.osu.edu> References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F907E885@CIO-KRC-D2MBX08.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: Miguel- My eye was caught by this phrase in your note: Even the testimonio requires witness for it to live on. Put me right in mind of LSV quoting Mandelshtam-- I forgot the word I wanted to say, and thought, unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows. Michael-- I think this is part of the answer to your question about research, but it would be best to refer to fuller treatments of the methodology of the program. The testimonio, as I understand it, was a part of a larger, interconnected set of practices that create a collective zoped. Perhaps Miguel or another participant can expand on this issue. Also, I am a big advocate of thinking of research as re-searching.... searching for an answer to a question you have searched for repeatedly without success. For example, a re-search question might be --- how canyou organized a relatively short term intervention in the lives of marginalized migrant youth that will lead to a qualitative change in their academic engagement (which requires lots of coordinated changes in many life domains almost for sure..... such as sense of self and agency. Mike On Tue, Dec 30, 2014 at 9:03 AM, Glassman, Michael wrote: > Are either research techniques at all in the traditional sense? And do we > kind of confuse things by using the traditional phrase to describe it. > Research in traditional academics is done to know and change might some day > come from knowledge. Are approaches like "testimonios" and "narratives of > life experience" done more to change, and change will lead to a new type of > knowing. Is it better to think of it as re-search in a more literal sense, > to go through the process of finding again. > > Michael > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > [xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Luisa > Aires [laires11@gmail.com] > Sent: Tuesday, December 30, 2014 11:30 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context > > Hi Manuel > > Thank for your enlightening post. > Is it correct to state that "testimonios" and "narratives of life > experience" are synonymous research techniques? > > Best, > Lu?sa A. > > 2014-12-30 0:53 GMT+00:00 Espinoza, Manuel : > > > Hello everyone, > > > > Hope this note finds you all well. Just adding to the conversation on > > literacies, social dreaming, the Migrant Program at UCLA (I was one of > many > > that served the students during the early 2000s) and testimonio. > > > > The idea of testimonio as an aspect of the "concrete" is cool. To my > > mind, within that realm of really rich Soviet/Russian thinking, > testimonio > > can be thought of as one way that human beings remake social life guided > > by intellect and heart. (Think of what testimonio accomplished in the > > context of 1980s Central America or mid-1990s South Africa.) But the > idea > > of testimonio as an aspect of the "abstract" seems right on as well. > > Testimonio is also meaningful and comprehensive thought that explains > > reality better than what we had before. Testimonio in the Migrant > Program > > seemed to be both. Thus, as the beloved Rusos teach us, you can ascend > to > > both abstract and concrete. > > > > I think about the time and effort that went into creating the > > autobiographies (a form of testimonio) that Profe Guti?rrez references. > > They were a culmination for us as a scholarly community. And they left > > people altered. (Another cool insight inspired by Hegel and Marx - when > > humans learn, they become altered matter. Living, breathing matter, > > capable of experiencing. And in the words of Piaget, I believe, > > experiencing our experiences.) The versatility, the many facets of > > testimonio are beautiful to ruminate on. Given my life experience, I > > rejoice in thinking about the ways that testimonio - bearing witness to > > life via narrative - can give historical depth to a person's actions, to > a > > community's actions. > > To illustrate, I remember putting together the reader for the program. > We > > would stay all night in Moore Hall with making copies and feeling > energized > > in thinking about migrant families sending their high school-aged > children > > to reside and study with us for a month. The way I pictured those > families > > - and this is key for people like Marx Wartofsky who cared deeply about > the > > actual look of our imaginations - was through a long corridor of > > experience. It was just me at 2am extending the look down the hallway, > but > > instead of a wall at the far end, I pictured families I knew, and > imagined > > the ones I didn't know. I could see them and they could see me. Our > work > > was similar in that instant: preparing the way for the youth. At times, > it > > was incredibly vivid, but that grew over time and through the many > > testimonios we fostered and experienced. Even the testimonio requires > > witness for it to live on. (See: Carolyn Forch? and her "poetry of > > witness.") And that, too, had to be learned to an extent. Who showed > me? > > Hector ?lvarez, Carlos Tejeda, Profe Guti?rrez, Miguel Zavala, Shirin > > Vossoughi, the migrant parents, and others. Now, that was a scholarly > > community. > > > > Forgive the somewhat long message. I been looking to post for years, but > > in the words of the Ents from Middle Earth, I wanted to say something > that > > took time to say. See you again in 2018 :) > > > > Respetuosamente, > > > > Manuel Luis Espinoza > > > > > > Manuel > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > Department of Education and Distance Learning, Universidade Aberta > Centre of Studies on Migrations and Intercultural Relations (CEMRI) > R. Amial, n? 752, 4200-055 Porto, Portugal > laires@uab.pt > www.uab.pt > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science as an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From annalisa@unm.edu Tue Dec 30 09:50:49 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 30 Dec 2014 17:50:49 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context In-Reply-To: References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F907E885@CIO-KRC-D2MBX08.osuad.osu.edu>, Message-ID: <1419961849204.99@unm.edu> Hello! Sorry for being silly here, but I couldn't help but see that so far on this thread, there have been appearances by: mike, Annalisa, Michael, Luisa, and Miguel! From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Dec 30 09:59:18 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 30 Dec 2014 09:59:18 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Manuel! My apologies for referring to you as Miguel. Got twisted in the thread. Hope the comments/question on testimonio made more sense. mike On Mon, Dec 29, 2014 at 4:53 PM, Espinoza, Manuel < Manuel.Espinoza@ucdenver.edu> wrote: > Hello everyone, > > Hope this note finds you all well. Just adding to the conversation on > literacies, social dreaming, the Migrant Program at UCLA (I was one of many > that served the students during the early 2000s) and testimonio. > > The idea of testimonio as an aspect of the "concrete" is cool. To my > mind, within that realm of really rich Soviet/Russian thinking, testimonio > can be thought of as one way that human beings remake social life guided > by intellect and heart. (Think of what testimonio accomplished in the > context of 1980s Central America or mid-1990s South Africa.) But the idea > of testimonio as an aspect of the "abstract" seems right on as well. > Testimonio is also meaningful and comprehensive thought that explains > reality better than what we had before. Testimonio in the Migrant Program > seemed to be both. Thus, as the beloved Rusos teach us, you can ascend to > both abstract and concrete. > > I think about the time and effort that went into creating the > autobiographies (a form of testimonio) that Profe Guti?rrez references. > They were a culmination for us as a scholarly community. And they left > people altered. (Another cool insight inspired by Hegel and Marx - when > humans learn, they become altered matter. Living, breathing matter, > capable of experiencing. And in the words of Piaget, I believe, > experiencing our experiences.) The versatility, the many facets of > testimonio are beautiful to ruminate on. Given my life experience, I > rejoice in thinking about the ways that testimonio - bearing witness to > life via narrative - can give historical depth to a person's actions, to a > community's actions. > To illustrate, I remember putting together the reader for the program. We > would stay all night in Moore Hall with making copies and feeling energized > in thinking about migrant families sending their high school-aged children > to reside and study with us for a month. The way I pictured those families > - and this is key for people like Marx Wartofsky who cared deeply about the > actual look of our imaginations - was through a long corridor of > experience. It was just me at 2am extending the look down the hallway, but > instead of a wall at the far end, I pictured families I knew, and imagined > the ones I didn't know. I could see them and they could see me. Our work > was similar in that instant: preparing the way for the youth. At times, it > was incredibly vivid, but that grew over time and through the many > testimonios we fostered and experienced. Even the testimonio requires > witness for it to live on. (See: Carolyn Forch? and her "poetry of > witness.") And that, too, had to be learned to an extent. Who showed me? > Hector ?lvarez, Carlos Tejeda, Profe Guti?rrez, Miguel Zavala, Shirin > Vossoughi, the migrant parents, and others. Now, that was a scholarly > community. > > Forgive the somewhat long message. I been looking to post for years, but > in the words of the Ents from Middle Earth, I wanted to say something that > took time to say. See you again in 2018 :) > > Respetuosamente, > > Manuel Luis Espinoza > > > Manuel > > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science as an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From annalisa@unm.edu Tue Dec 30 10:18:44 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 30 Dec 2014 18:18:44 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context In-Reply-To: References: , Message-ID: <1419963524295.48699@unm.edu> I fear, Manuel, that the original mistake is mine! People frequently botch my name and I know how that can be! Please forgive me! Annalisa From arazfar@uic.edu Tue Dec 30 10:29:36 2014 From: arazfar@uic.edu (Aria Razfar) Date: Tue, 30 Dec 2014 12:29:36 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <007f01d0245e$91960c40$b4c224c0$@uic.edu> Miguel is just another way to say Mike. It's ok to see yourself in the other. It shows you're trying real hard to hear. This is the difference between "testimonio" and research techniques. Aria Aria Razfar, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Literacy, Language, and Culture Director of Graduate Studies, Curriculum and Instruction University of Illinois at Chicago 1040 W. Harrison St. M/C 147 Chicago, IL, 60607 Director of English Learning through Mathematics, Science and Action Research (ELMSA) www.elmsa.org Webpage: http://education.uic.edu/personnel/faculty/aria-razfar-phd Tel: 312-413-8373 Fax: 312-996-8134 -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole Sent: Tuesday, December 30, 2014 11:59 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context Manuel! My apologies for referring to you as Miguel. Got twisted in the thread. Hope the comments/question on testimonio made more sense. mike On Mon, Dec 29, 2014 at 4:53 PM, Espinoza, Manuel < Manuel.Espinoza@ucdenver.edu> wrote: > Hello everyone, > > Hope this note finds you all well. Just adding to the conversation on > literacies, social dreaming, the Migrant Program at UCLA (I was one of > many that served the students during the early 2000s) and testimonio. > > The idea of testimonio as an aspect of the "concrete" is cool. To my > mind, within that realm of really rich Soviet/Russian thinking, > testimonio can be thought of as one way that human beings remake > social life guided by intellect and heart. (Think of what testimonio > accomplished in the context of 1980s Central America or mid-1990s > South Africa.) But the idea of testimonio as an aspect of the "abstract" seems right on as well. > Testimonio is also meaningful and comprehensive thought that explains > reality better than what we had before. Testimonio in the Migrant > Program seemed to be both. Thus, as the beloved Rusos teach us, you > can ascend to both abstract and concrete. > > I think about the time and effort that went into creating the > autobiographies (a form of testimonio) that Profe Guti?rrez references. > They were a culmination for us as a scholarly community. And they > left people altered. (Another cool insight inspired by Hegel and Marx > - when humans learn, they become altered matter. Living, breathing > matter, capable of experiencing. And in the words of Piaget, I > believe, experiencing our experiences.) The versatility, the many > facets of testimonio are beautiful to ruminate on. Given my life > experience, I rejoice in thinking about the ways that testimonio - > bearing witness to life via narrative - can give historical depth to a > person's actions, to a community's actions. > To illustrate, I remember putting together the reader for the program. > We would stay all night in Moore Hall with making copies and feeling > energized in thinking about migrant families sending their high > school-aged children to reside and study with us for a month. The way > I pictured those families > - and this is key for people like Marx Wartofsky who cared deeply > about the actual look of our imaginations - was through a long > corridor of experience. It was just me at 2am extending the look down > the hallway, but instead of a wall at the far end, I pictured families > I knew, and imagined the ones I didn't know. I could see them and > they could see me. Our work was similar in that instant: preparing > the way for the youth. At times, it was incredibly vivid, but that > grew over time and through the many testimonios we fostered and > experienced. Even the testimonio requires witness for it to live on. > (See: Carolyn Forch? and her "poetry of > witness.") And that, too, had to be learned to an extent. Who showed me? > Hector ?lvarez, Carlos Tejeda, Profe Guti?rrez, Miguel Zavala, Shirin > Vossoughi, the migrant parents, and others. Now, that was a scholarly > community. > > Forgive the somewhat long message. I been looking to post for years, > but in the words of the Ents from Middle Earth, I wanted to say > something that took time to say. See you again in 2018 :) > > Respetuosamente, > > Manuel Luis Espinoza > > > Manuel > > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science as an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From annalisa@unm.edu Tue Dec 30 10:37:04 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Tue, 30 Dec 2014 18:37:04 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context In-Reply-To: <007f01d0245e$91960c40$b4c224c0$@uic.edu> References: , <007f01d0245e$91960c40$b4c224c0$@uic.edu> Message-ID: <1419964624331.58551@unm.edu> Um, I think the mistake was mine, Aria! And again I'm sorry for doing that. I see I made my reply around 9:00pm so likely I was tired and bleary-eyed. It's interesting to see how the mistake kept replicating. Not because of the failure of others but because of the tool extending past the original post! But I do not mean to divert the mind of the thread and I hope we can continue to discuss Manuel's post. I fear we are mere hobbits to his entish ways! Kind regards, Annalisa From laires11@gmail.com Tue Dec 30 10:43:11 2014 From: laires11@gmail.com (Luisa Aires) Date: Tue, 30 Dec 2014 18:43:11 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context In-Reply-To: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F907E885@CIO-KRC-D2MBX08.osuad.osu.edu> References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F907E885@CIO-KRC-D2MBX08.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: I absolutely agree, Michael. My approach is proximal to what you consider "to think of it as re-search in a more literal sense, to go through the process of finding again". But sometimes, we need to catch more conventional words to create common understandings ;-) Mike, I am wondering to find more information about colletive zoped. Where can we find it? Best, Lu?sa 2014-12-30 17:03 GMT+00:00 Glassman, Michael : > Are either research techniques at all in the traditional sense? And do we > kind of confuse things by using the traditional phrase to describe it. > Research in traditional academics is done to know and change might some day > come from knowledge. Are approaches like "testimonios" and "narratives of > life experience" done more to change, and change will lead to a new type of > knowing. Is it better to think of it as re-search in a more literal sense, > to go through the process of finding again. > > Michael > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > [xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Luisa > Aires [laires11@gmail.com] > Sent: Tuesday, December 30, 2014 11:30 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context > > Hi Manuel > > Thank for your enlightening post. > Is it correct to state that "testimonios" and "narratives of life > experience" are synonymous research techniques? > > Best, > Lu?sa A. > > 2014-12-30 0:53 GMT+00:00 Espinoza, Manuel : > > > Hello everyone, > > > > Hope this note finds you all well. Just adding to the conversation on > > literacies, social dreaming, the Migrant Program at UCLA (I was one of > many > > that served the students during the early 2000s) and testimonio. > > > > The idea of testimonio as an aspect of the "concrete" is cool. To my > > mind, within that realm of really rich Soviet/Russian thinking, > testimonio > > can be thought of as one way that human beings remake social life guided > > by intellect and heart. (Think of what testimonio accomplished in the > > context of 1980s Central America or mid-1990s South Africa.) But the > idea > > of testimonio as an aspect of the "abstract" seems right on as well. > > Testimonio is also meaningful and comprehensive thought that explains > > reality better than what we had before. Testimonio in the Migrant > Program > > seemed to be both. Thus, as the beloved Rusos teach us, you can ascend > to > > both abstract and concrete. > > > > I think about the time and effort that went into creating the > > autobiographies (a form of testimonio) that Profe Guti?rrez references. > > They were a culmination for us as a scholarly community. And they left > > people altered. (Another cool insight inspired by Hegel and Marx - when > > humans learn, they become altered matter. Living, breathing matter, > > capable of experiencing. And in the words of Piaget, I believe, > > experiencing our experiences.) The versatility, the many facets of > > testimonio are beautiful to ruminate on. Given my life experience, I > > rejoice in thinking about the ways that testimonio - bearing witness to > > life via narrative - can give historical depth to a person's actions, to > a > > community's actions. > > To illustrate, I remember putting together the reader for the program. > We > > would stay all night in Moore Hall with making copies and feeling > energized > > in thinking about migrant families sending their high school-aged > children > > to reside and study with us for a month. The way I pictured those > families > > - and this is key for people like Marx Wartofsky who cared deeply about > the > > actual look of our imaginations - was through a long corridor of > > experience. It was just me at 2am extending the look down the hallway, > but > > instead of a wall at the far end, I pictured families I knew, and > imagined > > the ones I didn't know. I could see them and they could see me. Our > work > > was similar in that instant: preparing the way for the youth. At times, > it > > was incredibly vivid, but that grew over time and through the many > > testimonios we fostered and experienced. Even the testimonio requires > > witness for it to live on. (See: Carolyn Forch? and her "poetry of > > witness.") And that, too, had to be learned to an extent. Who showed > me? > > Hector ?lvarez, Carlos Tejeda, Profe Guti?rrez, Miguel Zavala, Shirin > > Vossoughi, the migrant parents, and others. Now, that was a scholarly > > community. > > > > Forgive the somewhat long message. I been looking to post for years, but > > in the words of the Ents from Middle Earth, I wanted to say something > that > > took time to say. See you again in 2018 :) > > > > Respetuosamente, > > > > Manuel Luis Espinoza > > > > > > Manuel > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > Department of Education and Distance Learning, Universidade Aberta > Centre of Studies on Migrations and Intercultural Relations (CEMRI) > R. Amial, n? 752, 4200-055 Porto, Portugal > laires@uab.pt > www.uab.pt > > -- Department of Education and Distance Learning, Universidade Aberta Centre of Studies on Migrations and Intercultural Relations (CEMRI) R. Amial, n? 752, 4200-055 Porto, Portugal laires@uab.pt www.uab.pt From r.j.s.parsons@open.ac.uk Tue Dec 30 10:54:43 2014 From: r.j.s.parsons@open.ac.uk (rjsp2) Date: Tue, 30 Dec 2014 18:54:43 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context In-Reply-To: References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F907E885@CIO-KRC-D2MBX08.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: <54A2F4F3.8080403@open.ac.uk> Can I piggyback a request on this one about collective zoped. i've been thinking lately about the possible relationship between zoped and "comfort zone" - is there any work on that? Rob On 30/12/2014 18:43, Luisa Aires wrote: > I absolutely agree, Michael. My approach is proximal to what you consider > "to think of it as re-search in a more literal sense, to go through the > process of finding again". But sometimes, we need to catch more > conventional words to create common understandings ;-) > > Mike, I am wondering to find more information about colletive zoped. Where > can we find it? > > Best, > Lu?sa > > 2014-12-30 17:03 GMT+00:00 Glassman, Michael : > >> Are either research techniques at all in the traditional sense? And do we >> kind of confuse things by using the traditional phrase to describe it. >> Research in traditional academics is done to know and change might some day >> come from knowledge. Are approaches like "testimonios" and "narratives of >> life experience" done more to change, and change will lead to a new type of >> knowing. Is it better to think of it as re-search in a more literal sense, >> to go through the process of finding again. >> >> Michael >> ________________________________________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Luisa >> Aires [laires11@gmail.com] >> Sent: Tuesday, December 30, 2014 11:30 AM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context >> >> Hi Manuel >> >> Thank for your enlightening post. >> Is it correct to state that "testimonios" and "narratives of life >> experience" are synonymous research techniques? >> >> Best, >> Lu?sa A. >> >> 2014-12-30 0:53 GMT+00:00 Espinoza, Manuel : >> >>> Hello everyone, >>> >>> Hope this note finds you all well. Just adding to the conversation on >>> literacies, social dreaming, the Migrant Program at UCLA (I was one of >> many >>> that served the students during the early 2000s) and testimonio. >>> >>> The idea of testimonio as an aspect of the "concrete" is cool. To my >>> mind, within that realm of really rich Soviet/Russian thinking, >> testimonio >>> can be thought of as one way that human beings remake social life guided >>> by intellect and heart. (Think of what testimonio accomplished in the >>> context of 1980s Central America or mid-1990s South Africa.) But the >> idea >>> of testimonio as an aspect of the "abstract" seems right on as well. >>> Testimonio is also meaningful and comprehensive thought that explains >>> reality better than what we had before. Testimonio in the Migrant >> Program >>> seemed to be both. Thus, as the beloved Rusos teach us, you can ascend >> to >>> both abstract and concrete. >>> >>> I think about the time and effort that went into creating the >>> autobiographies (a form of testimonio) that Profe Guti?rrez references. >>> They were a culmination for us as a scholarly community. And they left >>> people altered. (Another cool insight inspired by Hegel and Marx - when >>> humans learn, they become altered matter. Living, breathing matter, >>> capable of experiencing. And in the words of Piaget, I believe, >>> experiencing our experiences.) The versatility, the many facets of >>> testimonio are beautiful to ruminate on. Given my life experience, I >>> rejoice in thinking about the ways that testimonio - bearing witness to >>> life via narrative - can give historical depth to a person's actions, to >> a >>> community's actions. >>> To illustrate, I remember putting together the reader for the program. >> We >>> would stay all night in Moore Hall with making copies and feeling >> energized >>> in thinking about migrant families sending their high school-aged >> children >>> to reside and study with us for a month. The way I pictured those >> families >>> - and this is key for people like Marx Wartofsky who cared deeply about >> the >>> actual look of our imaginations - was through a long corridor of >>> experience. It was just me at 2am extending the look down the hallway, >> but >>> instead of a wall at the far end, I pictured families I knew, and >> imagined >>> the ones I didn't know. I could see them and they could see me. Our >> work >>> was similar in that instant: preparing the way for the youth. At times, >> it >>> was incredibly vivid, but that grew over time and through the many >>> testimonios we fostered and experienced. Even the testimonio requires >>> witness for it to live on. (See: Carolyn Forch? and her "poetry of >>> witness.") And that, too, had to be learned to an extent. Who showed >> me? >>> Hector ?lvarez, Carlos Tejeda, Profe Guti?rrez, Miguel Zavala, Shirin >>> Vossoughi, the migrant parents, and others. Now, that was a scholarly >>> community. >>> >>> Forgive the somewhat long message. I been looking to post for years, but >>> in the words of the Ents from Middle Earth, I wanted to say something >> that >>> took time to say. See you again in 2018 :) >>> >>> Respetuosamente, >>> >>> Manuel Luis Espinoza >>> >>> >>> Manuel >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> -- >> Department of Education and Distance Learning, Universidade Aberta >> Centre of Studies on Migrations and Intercultural Relations (CEMRI) >> R. Amial, n? 752, 4200-055 Porto, Portugal >> laires@uab.pt >> www.uab.pt >> >> > -- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC 038302). The Open University is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority. From lsmolucha@hotmail.com Tue Dec 30 11:51:51 2014 From: lsmolucha@hotmail.com (larry smolucha) Date: Tue, 30 Dec 2014 13:51:51 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context In-Reply-To: <1419960258533.46515@unm.edu> References: , , , , <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F907E885@CIO-KRC-D2MBX08.osuad.osu.edu>, <1419960258533.46515@unm.edu> Message-ID: Message from Francine: Dr. Stevan Weine, a psychiatrist at the University of Illinois at Chicago has a qualitative research model that he has used in researching testimonials. He has worked with both migrants and refugees. In 2004, I was enrolled in a four week seminar that he gave at UIC using a software package called ATLAS. > From: annalisa@unm.edu > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > Date: Tue, 30 Dec 2014 17:24:18 +0000 > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context > > Hi Michael, Luisa, Miguel and all, > > Is it possible to see testimonios as data points? But to the point, far more than a data point, perhaps a cell of meaning? or a node that connects to other nodes, and that over the space of time and place that a larger picture starts to emerge that reveals a deeper-anchored democracy of meanings? > > What appeals to me is that Miguel's "method" of testimonio remains in connection with affect (and subjective identity) and thereby retains a compassionate unity with formations of "data collection." > > Since it is difficult to leave the heart in the filing cabinet, wouldn't that be a fair method to connect to research and subsequently to knowledge? > > Just wondering? > > > Kind regards, > > Annalisa From helenaworthen@gmail.com Tue Dec 30 12:25:05 2014 From: helenaworthen@gmail.com (Helena Worthen) Date: Tue, 30 Dec 2014 12:25:05 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context In-Reply-To: <54A2F4F3.8080403@open.ac.uk> References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F907E885@CIO-KRC-D2MBX08.osuad.osu.edu> <54A2F4F3.8080403@open.ac.uk> Message-ID: How about Jean Lave's idea of community of practice? Non-school, collective learning in an apprenticeship relationship, inn which the "teacher" is the whole community of practice. Helena Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com hworthen@illinois.edu On Dec 30, 2014, at 10:54 AM, rjsp2 wrote: > Can I piggyback a request on this one about collective zoped. i've been > thinking lately about the possible relationship between zoped and > "comfort zone" - is there any work on that? > > Rob > > On 30/12/2014 18:43, Luisa Aires wrote: >> I absolutely agree, Michael. My approach is proximal to what you consider >> "to think of it as re-search in a more literal sense, to go through the >> process of finding again". But sometimes, we need to catch more >> conventional words to create common understandings ;-) >> >> Mike, I am wondering to find more information about colletive zoped. Where >> can we find it? >> >> Best, >> Lu?sa >> >> 2014-12-30 17:03 GMT+00:00 Glassman, Michael : >> >>> Are either research techniques at all in the traditional sense? And do we >>> kind of confuse things by using the traditional phrase to describe it. >>> Research in traditional academics is done to know and change might some day >>> come from knowledge. Are approaches like "testimonios" and "narratives of >>> life experience" done more to change, and change will lead to a new type of >>> knowing. Is it better to think of it as re-search in a more literal sense, >>> to go through the process of finding again. >>> >>> Michael >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> [xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Luisa >>> Aires [laires11@gmail.com] >>> Sent: Tuesday, December 30, 2014 11:30 AM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context >>> >>> Hi Manuel >>> >>> Thank for your enlightening post. >>> Is it correct to state that "testimonios" and "narratives of life >>> experience" are synonymous research techniques? >>> >>> Best, >>> Lu?sa A. >>> >>> 2014-12-30 0:53 GMT+00:00 Espinoza, Manuel : >>> >>>> Hello everyone, >>>> >>>> Hope this note finds you all well. Just adding to the conversation on >>>> literacies, social dreaming, the Migrant Program at UCLA (I was one of >>> many >>>> that served the students during the early 2000s) and testimonio. >>>> >>>> The idea of testimonio as an aspect of the "concrete" is cool. To my >>>> mind, within that realm of really rich Soviet/Russian thinking, >>> testimonio >>>> can be thought of as one way that human beings remake social life guided >>>> by intellect and heart. (Think of what testimonio accomplished in the >>>> context of 1980s Central America or mid-1990s South Africa.) But the >>> idea >>>> of testimonio as an aspect of the "abstract" seems right on as well. >>>> Testimonio is also meaningful and comprehensive thought that explains >>>> reality better than what we had before. Testimonio in the Migrant >>> Program >>>> seemed to be both. Thus, as the beloved Rusos teach us, you can ascend >>> to >>>> both abstract and concrete. >>>> >>>> I think about the time and effort that went into creating the >>>> autobiographies (a form of testimonio) that Profe Guti?rrez references. >>>> They were a culmination for us as a scholarly community. And they left >>>> people altered. (Another cool insight inspired by Hegel and Marx - when >>>> humans learn, they become altered matter. Living, breathing matter, >>>> capable of experiencing. And in the words of Piaget, I believe, >>>> experiencing our experiences.) The versatility, the many facets of >>>> testimonio are beautiful to ruminate on. Given my life experience, I >>>> rejoice in thinking about the ways that testimonio - bearing witness to >>>> life via narrative - can give historical depth to a person's actions, to >>> a >>>> community's actions. >>>> To illustrate, I remember putting together the reader for the program. >>> We >>>> would stay all night in Moore Hall with making copies and feeling >>> energized >>>> in thinking about migrant families sending their high school-aged >>> children >>>> to reside and study with us for a month. The way I pictured those >>> families >>>> - and this is key for people like Marx Wartofsky who cared deeply about >>> the >>>> actual look of our imaginations - was through a long corridor of >>>> experience. It was just me at 2am extending the look down the hallway, >>> but >>>> instead of a wall at the far end, I pictured families I knew, and >>> imagined >>>> the ones I didn't know. I could see them and they could see me. Our >>> work >>>> was similar in that instant: preparing the way for the youth. At times, >>> it >>>> was incredibly vivid, but that grew over time and through the many >>>> testimonios we fostered and experienced. Even the testimonio requires >>>> witness for it to live on. (See: Carolyn Forch? and her "poetry of >>>> witness.") And that, too, had to be learned to an extent. Who showed >>> me? >>>> Hector ?lvarez, Carlos Tejeda, Profe Guti?rrez, Miguel Zavala, Shirin >>>> Vossoughi, the migrant parents, and others. Now, that was a scholarly >>>> community. >>>> >>>> Forgive the somewhat long message. I been looking to post for years, but >>>> in the words of the Ents from Middle Earth, I wanted to say something >>> that >>>> took time to say. See you again in 2018 :) >>>> >>>> Respetuosamente, >>>> >>>> Manuel Luis Espinoza >>>> >>>> >>>> Manuel >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> -- >>> Department of Education and Distance Learning, Universidade Aberta >>> Centre of Studies on Migrations and Intercultural Relations (CEMRI) >>> R. Amial, n? 752, 4200-055 Porto, Portugal >>> laires@uab.pt >>> www.uab.pt >>> >>> >> > > -- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC 038302). The Open University is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority. > From mcole@ucsd.edu Tue Dec 30 12:28:39 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Tue, 30 Dec 2014 12:28:39 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context In-Reply-To: References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F907E885@CIO-KRC-D2MBX08.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: Luisa - Yrjo wrote about collective zopeds in Learning by Expanding in his story of the seven brothers. I may have used the same term in writing about the 5thDimension. Rob -- I am not sure about how to relate comfort zones to zopeds. Meanings of both terms are, of course, as they say, open to interpretation. :-) However, you might find the following article about resistance and zopeds useful. mike On Tue, Dec 30, 2014 at 10:43 AM, Luisa Aires wrote: > I absolutely agree, Michael. My approach is proximal to what you consider > "to think of it as re-search in a more literal sense, to go through the > process of finding again". But sometimes, we need to catch more > conventional words to create common understandings ;-) > > Mike, I am wondering to find more information about colletive zoped. Where > can we find it? > > Best, > Lu?sa > > 2014-12-30 17:03 GMT+00:00 Glassman, Michael : > > > Are either research techniques at all in the traditional sense? And do > we > > kind of confuse things by using the traditional phrase to describe it. > > Research in traditional academics is done to know and change might some > day > > come from knowledge. Are approaches like "testimonios" and "narratives > of > > life experience" done more to change, and change will lead to a new type > of > > knowing. Is it better to think of it as re-search in a more literal > sense, > > to go through the process of finding again. > > > > Michael > > ________________________________________ > > From: xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu > > [xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Luisa > > Aires [laires11@gmail.com] > > Sent: Tuesday, December 30, 2014 11:30 AM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context > > > > Hi Manuel > > > > Thank for your enlightening post. > > Is it correct to state that "testimonios" and "narratives of life > > experience" are synonymous research techniques? > > > > Best, > > Lu?sa A. > > > > 2014-12-30 0:53 GMT+00:00 Espinoza, Manuel >: > > > > > Hello everyone, > > > > > > Hope this note finds you all well. Just adding to the conversation on > > > literacies, social dreaming, the Migrant Program at UCLA (I was one of > > many > > > that served the students during the early 2000s) and testimonio. > > > > > > The idea of testimonio as an aspect of the "concrete" is cool. To my > > > mind, within that realm of really rich Soviet/Russian thinking, > > testimonio > > > can be thought of as one way that human beings remake social life > guided > > > by intellect and heart. (Think of what testimonio accomplished in the > > > context of 1980s Central America or mid-1990s South Africa.) But the > > idea > > > of testimonio as an aspect of the "abstract" seems right on as well. > > > Testimonio is also meaningful and comprehensive thought that explains > > > reality better than what we had before. Testimonio in the Migrant > > Program > > > seemed to be both. Thus, as the beloved Rusos teach us, you can ascend > > to > > > both abstract and concrete. > > > > > > I think about the time and effort that went into creating the > > > autobiographies (a form of testimonio) that Profe Guti?rrez references. > > > They were a culmination for us as a scholarly community. And they left > > > people altered. (Another cool insight inspired by Hegel and Marx - > when > > > humans learn, they become altered matter. Living, breathing matter, > > > capable of experiencing. And in the words of Piaget, I believe, > > > experiencing our experiences.) The versatility, the many facets of > > > testimonio are beautiful to ruminate on. Given my life experience, I > > > rejoice in thinking about the ways that testimonio - bearing witness to > > > life via narrative - can give historical depth to a person's actions, > to > > a > > > community's actions. > > > To illustrate, I remember putting together the reader for the program. > > We > > > would stay all night in Moore Hall with making copies and feeling > > energized > > > in thinking about migrant families sending their high school-aged > > children > > > to reside and study with us for a month. The way I pictured those > > families > > > - and this is key for people like Marx Wartofsky who cared deeply about > > the > > > actual look of our imaginations - was through a long corridor of > > > experience. It was just me at 2am extending the look down the hallway, > > but > > > instead of a wall at the far end, I pictured families I knew, and > > imagined > > > the ones I didn't know. I could see them and they could see me. Our > > work > > > was similar in that instant: preparing the way for the youth. At > times, > > it > > > was incredibly vivid, but that grew over time and through the many > > > testimonios we fostered and experienced. Even the testimonio requires > > > witness for it to live on. (See: Carolyn Forch? and her "poetry of > > > witness.") And that, too, had to be learned to an extent. Who showed > > me? > > > Hector ?lvarez, Carlos Tejeda, Profe Guti?rrez, Miguel Zavala, Shirin > > > Vossoughi, the migrant parents, and others. Now, that was a scholarly > > > community. > > > > > > Forgive the somewhat long message. I been looking to post for years, > but > > > in the words of the Ents from Middle Earth, I wanted to say something > > that > > > took time to say. See you again in 2018 :) > > > > > > Respetuosamente, > > > > > > Manuel Luis Espinoza > > > > > > > > > Manuel > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Department of Education and Distance Learning, Universidade Aberta > > Centre of Studies on Migrations and Intercultural Relations (CEMRI) > > R. Amial, n? 752, 4200-055 Porto, Portugal > > laires@uab.pt > > www.uab.pt > > > > > > > -- > Department of Education and Distance Learning, Universidade Aberta > Centre of Studies on Migrations and Intercultural Relations (CEMRI) > R. Amial, n? 752, 4200-055 Porto, Portugal > laires@uab.pt > www.uab.pt > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science as an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From glassman.13@osu.edu Tue Dec 30 12:32:46 2014 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Tue, 30 Dec 2014 20:32:46 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context In-Reply-To: References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F907E885@CIO-KRC-D2MBX08.osuad.osu.edu> <54A2F4F3.8080403@open.ac.uk>, Message-ID: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F907F9E1@CIO-KRC-D2MBX08.osuad.osu.edu> I am wondering - just an idea, half baked (a phrase that used to show up on the list quite a bit - half baked ideas not all the way there) is it possible to see narratives of life experience as two conflicting forces. A collective zoped as mentioned, pulling you towards a community of practice - but also a process of conscientization as Freire proposes, a chance to see and understand who you are and break free of practices that have been imposed upon you. Centripetal and centrifugal forces working together. Michael ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Helena Worthen [helenaworthen@gmail.com] Sent: Tuesday, December 30, 2014 3:25 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context How about Jean Lave's idea of community of practice? Non-school, collective learning in an apprenticeship relationship, inn which the "teacher" is the whole community of practice. Helena Helena Worthen helenaworthen@gmail.com hworthen@illinois.edu On Dec 30, 2014, at 10:54 AM, rjsp2 wrote: > Can I piggyback a request on this one about collective zoped. i've been > thinking lately about the possible relationship between zoped and > "comfort zone" - is there any work on that? > > Rob > > On 30/12/2014 18:43, Luisa Aires wrote: >> I absolutely agree, Michael. My approach is proximal to what you consider >> "to think of it as re-search in a more literal sense, to go through the >> process of finding again". But sometimes, we need to catch more >> conventional words to create common understandings ;-) >> >> Mike, I am wondering to find more information about colletive zoped. Where >> can we find it? >> >> Best, >> Lu?sa >> >> 2014-12-30 17:03 GMT+00:00 Glassman, Michael : >> >>> Are either research techniques at all in the traditional sense? And do we >>> kind of confuse things by using the traditional phrase to describe it. >>> Research in traditional academics is done to know and change might some day >>> come from knowledge. Are approaches like "testimonios" and "narratives of >>> life experience" done more to change, and change will lead to a new type of >>> knowing. Is it better to think of it as re-search in a more literal sense, >>> to go through the process of finding again. >>> >>> Michael >>> ________________________________________ >>> From: xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >>> [xmca-l-bounces+glassman.13=osu.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Luisa >>> Aires [laires11@gmail.com] >>> Sent: Tuesday, December 30, 2014 11:30 AM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context >>> >>> Hi Manuel >>> >>> Thank for your enlightening post. >>> Is it correct to state that "testimonios" and "narratives of life >>> experience" are synonymous research techniques? >>> >>> Best, >>> Lu?sa A. >>> >>> 2014-12-30 0:53 GMT+00:00 Espinoza, Manuel : >>> >>>> Hello everyone, >>>> >>>> Hope this note finds you all well. Just adding to the conversation on >>>> literacies, social dreaming, the Migrant Program at UCLA (I was one of >>> many >>>> that served the students during the early 2000s) and testimonio. >>>> >>>> The idea of testimonio as an aspect of the "concrete" is cool. To my >>>> mind, within that realm of really rich Soviet/Russian thinking, >>> testimonio >>>> can be thought of as one way that human beings remake social life guided >>>> by intellect and heart. (Think of what testimonio accomplished in the >>>> context of 1980s Central America or mid-1990s South Africa.) But the >>> idea >>>> of testimonio as an aspect of the "abstract" seems right on as well. >>>> Testimonio is also meaningful and comprehensive thought that explains >>>> reality better than what we had before. Testimonio in the Migrant >>> Program >>>> seemed to be both. Thus, as the beloved Rusos teach us, you can ascend >>> to >>>> both abstract and concrete. >>>> >>>> I think about the time and effort that went into creating the >>>> autobiographies (a form of testimonio) that Profe Guti?rrez references. >>>> They were a culmination for us as a scholarly community. And they left >>>> people altered. (Another cool insight inspired by Hegel and Marx - when >>>> humans learn, they become altered matter. Living, breathing matter, >>>> capable of experiencing. And in the words of Piaget, I believe, >>>> experiencing our experiences.) The versatility, the many facets of >>>> testimonio are beautiful to ruminate on. Given my life experience, I >>>> rejoice in thinking about the ways that testimonio - bearing witness to >>>> life via narrative - can give historical depth to a person's actions, to >>> a >>>> community's actions. >>>> To illustrate, I remember putting together the reader for the program. >>> We >>>> would stay all night in Moore Hall with making copies and feeling >>> energized >>>> in thinking about migrant families sending their high school-aged >>> children >>>> to reside and study with us for a month. The way I pictured those >>> families >>>> - and this is key for people like Marx Wartofsky who cared deeply about >>> the >>>> actual look of our imaginations - was through a long corridor of >>>> experience. It was just me at 2am extending the look down the hallway, >>> but >>>> instead of a wall at the far end, I pictured families I knew, and >>> imagined >>>> the ones I didn't know. I could see them and they could see me. Our >>> work >>>> was similar in that instant: preparing the way for the youth. At times, >>> it >>>> was incredibly vivid, but that grew over time and through the many >>>> testimonios we fostered and experienced. Even the testimonio requires >>>> witness for it to live on. (See: Carolyn Forch? and her "poetry of >>>> witness.") And that, too, had to be learned to an extent. Who showed >>> me? >>>> Hector ?lvarez, Carlos Tejeda, Profe Guti?rrez, Miguel Zavala, Shirin >>>> Vossoughi, the migrant parents, and others. Now, that was a scholarly >>>> community. >>>> >>>> Forgive the somewhat long message. I been looking to post for years, but >>>> in the words of the Ents from Middle Earth, I wanted to say something >>> that >>>> took time to say. See you again in 2018 :) >>>> >>>> Respetuosamente, >>>> >>>> Manuel Luis Espinoza >>>> >>>> >>>> Manuel >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> -- >>> Department of Education and Distance Learning, Universidade Aberta >>> Centre of Studies on Migrations and Intercultural Relations (CEMRI) >>> R. Amial, n? 752, 4200-055 Porto, Portugal >>> laires@uab.pt >>> www.uab.pt >>> >>> >> > > -- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC 038302). The Open University is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority. > From gutierkd@gmail.com Tue Dec 30 12:56:05 2014 From: gutierkd@gmail.com (Kris Gutierrez) Date: Tue, 30 Dec 2014 12:56:05 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context In-Reply-To: <1419961849204.99@unm.edu> References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F907E885@CIO-KRC-D2MBX08.osuad.osu.edu> <, > <1419961849204.99@unm.edu> Message-ID: <7334DDE3-FF9A-45E1-8E4C-1D23EF114C72@gmail.com> Annalisa, Manuel initiated the last uptake. (I think others have clarified that now :) Mike C., Miguel Zavala, Larry Purss and I posted some thoughts before the holidays. For me it is useful to connect Manuel?s recent post to those earlier thoughts/conversations. Some very quick very unedited thoughts following up on Manuel?s post: Michael G., Mike C. correctly points out that the testimonios/autobiographies were not research techniques but generative tools that were indeed a part of the interconnected set of practices that created a collective zoped?a third space if you will. I try to elaborate this idea in the Scribner Lecture piece (sociocritical literacies). My own work on Third Space, the collective work of the instructional team of MSI, ongoing conversations with Mike C. and Yrjo over the years at the lab, and their work certainly informed this idea of a collective zoped, collective third space (See Engestr?m, 1987, 1994 in particular; Nicolopoulou & Cole, 1993; Tuomi-Gr?hn & Engestr?m, 2003; Tuomi- Gr?hn, Engestr?m, & Young, 2003; Chaiklin, 2003, Moll, 1990; Moll & Greenberg, 1990 as key examples that certainly inform this work as well. And LSV and Bakhtin are ever present). These, I think, are useful references, all cited in the article. Shirin Vossoughi?s recent MCA piece also is very relevant to this discussion. Some relevant excerpts from the sociocritical article, "To illustrate these points and their relation to a collective Third Space, let us examine the MSLI more closely. The activity system, the MSLI, has a specific internal logic organized around expanding the students? sociohistorical and educational ecology through the collective imagining of a new educational and sociopolitical future. To avoid the ?interactional reductionism implicit in much Vygotskian-inspired research? (Nicolopoulou & Cole, 1993, p. 284), the specific interactions and practices of the MSLI are understood as what Nicolopoulou and Cole call a ?genuinely collective reality? (p. 284). Here we see the [Migrant] institute as an example of the Third Space, a collective zo-ped, at the larger level of activity the object of which is the sociohistorical reconstruction of what it means to be a migrant student. This movement involves a process of becoming conscious ?historical actors? (Espinoza, 2003) who invoke the past in order to re-mediate it so that it becomes a resource for current and future action (p. 154)." Testimonios and their embodiment in Teatro del Oprimido (Boal?s Theatre of the Oppressed that Manuel introduced to us and the program and that he and Vossoughi elaborated) were key means of developing/inciting a new social and pedagogical imagination and for imagining new futures with/for the migrant students, their communities, and indeed for all of us, as Manuel so thoughtfully writes. Teatro served as a collective problem-solving space?a space where the playful imagination helped to make inequities and the roots of social problems visible, while providing an opportunity to re-frame events, re-mediate and enact an imagined future collectively (such as flying collectively/social dreaming). I hope Manuel and Shirin jump in and elaborate these thoughts. Re: Research design: For me, Migrant was in Yrjo and Mike's approach, a formative experiment; what I term social design experiments?a designed based research approach that foregrounds equity, diversity, historicity, and re-mediation, for example. As Susan Jurow and I wrote and presented at the ICLS conference this summer (a piece that we expect will be part of a larger set of papers with Mike C., Yrjo and Annalisa, and Bill Penuel), social design experiments: aim to make possible a sustainable and dignified life for all humans; address the challenges of leveraging cultural diversity and reducing social inequality; and call for the co-design of new tools and futures with members of non-dominant communities, as but a few key design principles. Absolutely, research as re-searching?searching for the answer to a question you have searched for repeatedly without success! Well said, Miguel Cole! Thanks, for your thoughts, Michael Glassman! more on sociocritical literacies, later. kris Kris Gutierrez gutierkd@gmail.com Kris D. Guti?rrez Professor Graduate School of Education 5629 Tolman Hall #1670 University of California, Berkeley Berkeley CA 94720-1670 Distinguished Professor Learning Sciences and Literacy School of Education University of Colorado, Boulder > On Dec 30, 2014, at 9:50 AM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > Hello! > > Sorry for being silly here, but I couldn't help but see that so far on this thread, there have been appearances by: > > mike, Annalisa, Michael, Luisa, and Miguel! > > From arazfar@uic.edu Tue Dec 30 14:00:09 2014 From: arazfar@uic.edu (Aria Razfar) Date: Tue, 30 Dec 2014 16:00:09 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context In-Reply-To: <7334DDE3-FF9A-45E1-8E4C-1D23EF114C72@gmail.com> References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F907E885@CIO-KRC-D2MBX08.osuad.osu.edu> <, > <1419961849204.99@unm.edu> <7334DDE3-FF9A-45E1-8E4C-1D23EF114C72@gmail.com> Message-ID: <00d601d0247b$fb0599d0$f110cd70$@uic.edu> For those of us working with Kris' sociocritical perspective, third space has been a valuable construct for thinking about collective learning zopeds and consciousness for that matter. It is important to clarify what is meant by "third space" and its analogous concepts in various schools of thought (e.g., liminality, double consciousness, third place, etc.). The post-colonial uptake of third space (e.g., Said, Bhaba, Spivak) within the sociocultural theory is a very specific stance and this might be the moment for that conversation as well. Aria Aria Razfar, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Literacy, Language, and Culture Director of Graduate Studies, Curriculum and Instruction University of Illinois at Chicago 1040 W. Harrison St. M/C 147 Chicago, IL, 60607 Director of English Learning through Mathematics, Science and Action Research (ELMSA) www.elmsa.org Webpage: http://education.uic.edu/personnel/faculty/aria-razfar-phd Tel: 312-413-8373 Fax: 312-996-8134 -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Kris Gutierrez Sent: Tuesday, December 30, 2014 2:56 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context Annalisa, Manuel initiated the last uptake. (I think others have clarified that now :) Mike C., Miguel Zavala, Larry Purss and I posted some thoughts before the holidays. For me it is useful to connect Manuel?s recent post to those earlier thoughts/conversations. Some very quick very unedited thoughts following up on Manuel?s post: Michael G., Mike C. correctly points out that the testimonios/autobiographies were not research techniques but generative tools that were indeed a part of the interconnected set of practices that created a collective zoped?a third space if you will. I try to elaborate this idea in the Scribner Lecture piece (sociocritical literacies). My own work on Third Space, the collective work of the instructional team of MSI, ongoing conversations with Mike C. and Yrjo over the years at the lab, and their work certainly informed this idea of a collective zoped, collective third space (See Engestr?m, 1987, 1994 in particular; Nicolopoulou & Cole, 1993; Tuomi-Gr?hn & Engestr?m, 2003; Tuomi- Gr?hn, Engestr?m, & Young, 2003; Chaiklin, 2003, Moll, 1990; Moll & Greenberg, 1990 as key examples that certainly inform this work as well. And LSV and Bakhtin are ever present). These, I think, are useful references, all cited in the article. Shirin Vossoughi?s recent MCA piece also is very relevant to this discussion. Some relevant excerpts from the sociocritical article, "To illustrate these points and their relation to a collective Third Space, let us examine the MSLI more closely. The activity system, the MSLI, has a specific internal logic organized around expanding the students? sociohistorical and educational ecology through the collective imagining of a new educational and sociopolitical future. To avoid the ?interactional reductionism implicit in much Vygotskian-inspired research? (Nicolopoulou & Cole, 1993, p. 284), the specific interactions and practices of the MSLI are understood as what Nicolopoulou and Cole call a ?genuinely collective reality? (p. 284). Here we see the [Migrant] institute as an example of the Third Space, a collective zo-ped, at the larger level of activity the object of which is the sociohistorical reconstruction of what it means to be a migrant student. This movement involves a process of becoming conscious ?historical actors? (Espinoza, 2003) who invoke the past in order to re-mediate it so that it becomes a resource for current and future action (p. 154)." Testimonios and their embodiment in Teatro del Oprimido (Boal?s Theatre of the Oppressed that Manuel introduced to us and the program and that he and Vossoughi elaborated) were key means of developing/inciting a new social and pedagogical imagination and for imagining new futures with/for the migrant students, their communities, and indeed for all of us, as Manuel so thoughtfully writes. Teatro served as a collective problem-solving space?a space where the playful imagination helped to make inequities and the roots of social problems visible, while providing an opportunity to re-frame events, re-mediate and enact an imagined future collectively (such as flying collectively/social dreaming). I hope Manuel and Shirin jump in and elaborate these thoughts. Re: Research design: For me, Migrant was in Yrjo and Mike's approach, a formative experiment; what I term social design experiments?a designed based research approach that foregrounds equity, diversity, historicity, and re-mediation, for example. As Susan Jurow and I wrote and presented at the ICLS conference this summer (a piece that we expect will be part of a larger set of papers with Mike C., Yrjo and Annalisa, and Bill Penuel), social design experiments: aim to make possible a sustainable and dignified life for all humans; address the challenges of leveraging cultural diversity and reducing social inequality; and call for the co-design of new tools and futures with members of non-dominant communities, as but a few key design principles. Absolutely, research as re-searching?searching for the answer to a question you have searched for repeatedly without success! Well said, Miguel Cole! Thanks, for your thoughts, Michael Glassman! more on sociocritical literacies, later. kris Kris Gutierrez gutierkd@gmail.com Kris D. Guti?rrez Professor Graduate School of Education 5629 Tolman Hall #1670 University of California, Berkeley Berkeley CA 94720-1670 Distinguished Professor Learning Sciences and Literacy School of Education University of Colorado, Boulder > On Dec 30, 2014, at 9:50 AM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > Hello! > > Sorry for being silly here, but I couldn't help but see that so far on this thread, there have been appearances by: > > mike, Annalisa, Michael, Luisa, and Miguel! > > From bella.kotik@gmail.com Tue Dec 30 14:06:49 2014 From: bella.kotik@gmail.com (Bella Kotik-Friedgut) Date: Wed, 31 Dec 2014 00:06:49 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: the genetic roots of thought and speech In-Reply-To: References: <3718F78D-AB5D-4B1B-9507-B7D62A4DD6F3@manchester.ac.uk> Message-ID: I Just thought that for the purpose of re-reading and re-thinking we need a more close translation. Sincerely yours Bella Kotik-Friedgut On Mon, Dec 29, 2014 at 9:30 PM, mike cole wrote: > David, Larry, Bella et al-- > > I, too, have been reading ch4 of T&L, but in the 1987 edition, where the > passage in question is at the bottom of p. 115. > > Earlier, on p. 114 of this edition LSV writes that the expressive function > of egocentric speech that accompanies a child's activity becomes thinking > "in the true sense of the term" when it "assumes that function of a > planning operation or the function of resolving a problem that arises in > behavior." > > In the sentence right before the quoted/discussed passage he refers to > "intellectual activity in the true sense of the word." > > I am finding this re-reading very thought provoking and in places puzzling. > The idea that "there is no sharp metaphysical boundary between the external > and internal in behavior" caught my attention with respect to issue of > whether or not LSV was a closet dualist. > > Bella-- What do you think the significance of the variations in translation > concerning the area of overlap of thinking and speech vis a vis "verbal > thinking" portends for our understanding? > > mike > > On Sun, Dec 28, 2014 at 4:34 AM, Bella Kotik-Friedgut < > bella.kotik@gmail.com > > wrote: > > > If the passage cited is the end of paragraph 3, then I have to correct > > translation: > > > > we (are forced to) CAN conclude that FUSION of thought and speech, in > > adults as > > well as in children, is a phenomenon limited to a CIRCUMSCRIBED area OF > > VERBAL THOUGHT, WHILE OTHER AREAS OF > > Nonverbal thought and nonintellectual speech STAY ONLY UNDER A WEEK, > > DISTANT NON IMMEDIATE INFLUENCE OF THIS FUSION AND ARE NOT RELATED TO IT > > CASUALLY. > > do NOT participate in THIS > > FUSION and are affected indirectly by the processes of verbal thought" > > > > SEEMS IT HAS SOME DIFFERENT INTERPRETATION. > > > > Sincerely yours Bella Kotik-Friedgut > > > > On Wed, Dec 24, 2014 at 8:25 AM, larry smolucha > > wrote: > > > > > Message from Francine: > > > > > > Keeping in mind that deafness alone does not mean one is mute. > > > I have met many deaf people who speak, and also use sign language. > > > But in Vygotsky's era, techniques for teaching the deaf how to speak > were > > > just being developed. > > > > > > There might be something in the Volume from the Collected Works on > > > Defectology that would clarify Vygotsky's position on sign language as > > > a non-vocalized form of speech, and whether Vygotsky thought it could > be > > > internalized and used to consciously direct one's thought processes. > > > Afterall, didn't Vygotsky spend seven years (1917-1924) teaching how > > > to teach the deaf (at a teacher's college in Gomel)? > > > > > > I recall a passage in Vygotsky's writings where he says that the > problem > > > with > > > deaf education (in his time) was that sign language was only taught for > > the > > > purpose of communicating with others (and not for self-regulation). > > > Perhaps, his daughter Gita's work in deaf education developed ways to > > teach > > > the use of sign language for self-regulation of thought processes. > > > > > > Please note: that defectology and deaf education are the terms that > were > > > used in > > > Vygotsky's era. > > > > > > > > > > > > > From: julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk > > > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > Date: Wed, 24 Dec 2014 01:13:07 +0000 > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: the genetic roots of thought and speech > > > > > > > > Lawry > > > > > > > > Don't agree with this at all... Sign language is surely mediated by > > > gestures rather than vibrations of vocal chords, but still has all the > > > hallmarks of semiotic mediation Vygotsky elaborated, including inner > > speech > > > and higher cognitive functions (potentially). > > > > > > > > Julian > > > > > > > > On 24 Dec 2014, at 01:00, "larry smolucha" > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > Message from Francine: > > > > > > > > > > This reminds me of a debate that I had with Greg Thompson over a > year > > > ago > > > > > about hearing impaired people who do not have speech > > > > > but use hand sign language. Hand sign language is a sensori-motor > > > semiotic > > > > > systems that communicates thoughts to others. This is a semiotic > > > fusion that > > > > > does not involve speech. Dance is another sensori-motor fusion with > > > thought > > > > > (which is itself based on sensori-motor experience). Visual symbols > > > systems > > > > > are another. > > > > > > > > > > My reading of Vygotsky is that only speech vocalizations that fuse > > > with thought > > > > > (based on sensori-motor experience) can produce 'word' meanings > that > > > are internalized > > > > > as the inner speech that creates higher mental functions > (consciously > > > regulated > > > > > thought processes). > > > > > > > > > >> Date: Tue, 23 Dec 2014 09:54:14 -0800 > > > > >> From: lpscholar2@gmail.com > > > > >> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] the genetic roots of thought and speech > > > > >> > > > > >> Francine asked us to re-read Chapter 4 "the Genetic Roots' of > > Thought > > > and > > > > >> Speech. > > > > >> This paragraph was critical > > > > >> > > > > >> "we are forced to conclude that FUSION of thought and speech, in > > > adults as > > > > >> well as in children, is a phenomenon limited to a CIRCUMSCRIBED > > area. > > > > >> Nonverbal thought and nonintellectual speech do NOT participate in > > > THIS > > > > >> FUSION and are affected indirectly by the processes of verbal > > thought" > > > > >> [Vygotsky, page 48] > > > > >> > > > > >> Reading this opens for me the question of all the other functions > of > > > speech > > > > >> in the adult that are not directly influenced by thought and all > the > > > > >> functions of thought that are not affected by speech. > > > > >> In particular are there forms of *imaging* that are thoughts but > not > > > > >> functioning in speech. Do these paths of image and thought also > > > develop and > > > > >> fuse? > > > > >> > > > > >> All the functions that Vygotsky explores in the primates and in > > > children > > > > >> PRIOR to the reciprocal interweaving of thought and language > > continue > > > to > > > > >> function in adults. For example the sounds of speech as offering > > > "release > > > > >> from tension or anxiety" or the sounds as ways of *connecting* and > > > > >> *bonding*. > > > > >> It seems that to privilege the fusion of thought and language as > > > dominant > > > > >> modes of designing places/spaces [such as the third space] makes > the > > > other > > > > >> functions [speech alone] [thought alone] nondominant modes when > the > > > > >> necessity for connection may be prior to and dominant when > > reflecting > > > on > > > > >> the fused mode of thought and language as a partial unity. > > > > >> In other words, the unit of analysis is the relation of thought > > alone > > > AND > > > > >> speech alone AND image alone AND all their actual fusions as other > > > partial > > > > >> modes. > > > > >> This as a multi-modal understanding. > > > > >> I hope this is the right length > > > > >> Larry > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science as an object > that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Tue Dec 30 16:11:00 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Tue, 30 Dec 2014 14:11:00 -1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: the genetic roots of thought and speech In-Reply-To: References: <3718F78D-AB5D-4B1B-9507-B7D62A4DD6F3@manchester.ac.uk> Message-ID: Mike, Bella My re-reading opens up the question of "verbal-thinking" as being actually "circumscribed" which indicates "modes" of functioning that are "beyond" thinking "in the true sense of the word". These other modes would possibly include the verbal gestures which are expressive of our being gregarious [and similar to orangatuns. If this is a central way to "be" then the first year of life when the vocal apparatus when used for this gregarious function may be central to the trajectory of development. This is pointing to the literature on "attachment" and connection and bonding that pre-exists the formation of verbal thinking. I understand that the mother is operating through verbal thinking, but the question is how central is this other verbal function that pre-existsverbal thought. If verbal thought is *circumscribed* does the other function of the verbal as gesture also offer key insights to our development? Larry On Tue, Dec 30, 2014 at 12:06 PM, Bella Kotik-Friedgut < bella.kotik@gmail.com> wrote: > I Just thought that for the purpose of re-reading and re-thinking we need a > more close translation. > > Sincerely yours Bella Kotik-Friedgut > > On Mon, Dec 29, 2014 at 9:30 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > David, Larry, Bella et al-- > > > > I, too, have been reading ch4 of T&L, but in the 1987 edition, where the > > passage in question is at the bottom of p. 115. > > > > Earlier, on p. 114 of this edition LSV writes that the expressive > function > > of egocentric speech that accompanies a child's activity becomes thinking > > "in the true sense of the term" when it "assumes that function of a > > planning operation or the function of resolving a problem that arises in > > behavior." > > > > In the sentence right before the quoted/discussed passage he refers to > > "intellectual activity in the true sense of the word." > > > > I am finding this re-reading very thought provoking and in places > puzzling. > > The idea that "there is no sharp metaphysical boundary between the > external > > and internal in behavior" caught my attention with respect to issue of > > whether or not LSV was a closet dualist. > > > > Bella-- What do you think the significance of the variations in > translation > > concerning the area of overlap of thinking and speech vis a vis "verbal > > thinking" portends for our understanding? > > > > mike > > > > On Sun, Dec 28, 2014 at 4:34 AM, Bella Kotik-Friedgut < > > bella.kotik@gmail.com > > > wrote: > > > > > If the passage cited is the end of paragraph 3, then I have to correct > > > translation: > > > > > > we (are forced to) CAN conclude that FUSION of thought and speech, in > > > adults as > > > well as in children, is a phenomenon limited to a CIRCUMSCRIBED area OF > > > VERBAL THOUGHT, WHILE OTHER AREAS OF > > > Nonverbal thought and nonintellectual speech STAY ONLY UNDER A WEEK, > > > DISTANT NON IMMEDIATE INFLUENCE OF THIS FUSION AND ARE NOT RELATED TO > IT > > > CASUALLY. > > > do NOT participate in THIS > > > FUSION and are affected indirectly by the processes of verbal thought" > > > > > > SEEMS IT HAS SOME DIFFERENT INTERPRETATION. > > > > > > Sincerely yours Bella Kotik-Friedgut > > > > > > On Wed, Dec 24, 2014 at 8:25 AM, larry smolucha > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > Message from Francine: > > > > > > > > Keeping in mind that deafness alone does not mean one is mute. > > > > I have met many deaf people who speak, and also use sign language. > > > > But in Vygotsky's era, techniques for teaching the deaf how to speak > > were > > > > just being developed. > > > > > > > > There might be something in the Volume from the Collected Works on > > > > Defectology that would clarify Vygotsky's position on sign language > as > > > > a non-vocalized form of speech, and whether Vygotsky thought it could > > be > > > > internalized and used to consciously direct one's thought processes. > > > > Afterall, didn't Vygotsky spend seven years (1917-1924) teaching how > > > > to teach the deaf (at a teacher's college in Gomel)? > > > > > > > > I recall a passage in Vygotsky's writings where he says that the > > problem > > > > with > > > > deaf education (in his time) was that sign language was only taught > for > > > the > > > > purpose of communicating with others (and not for self-regulation). > > > > Perhaps, his daughter Gita's work in deaf education developed ways to > > > teach > > > > the use of sign language for self-regulation of thought processes. > > > > > > > > Please note: that defectology and deaf education are the terms that > > were > > > > used in > > > > Vygotsky's era. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From: julian.williams@manchester.ac.uk > > > > > To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > Date: Wed, 24 Dec 2014 01:13:07 +0000 > > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: the genetic roots of thought and speech > > > > > > > > > > Lawry > > > > > > > > > > Don't agree with this at all... Sign language is surely mediated by > > > > gestures rather than vibrations of vocal chords, but still has all > the > > > > hallmarks of semiotic mediation Vygotsky elaborated, including inner > > > speech > > > > and higher cognitive functions (potentially). > > > > > > > > > > Julian > > > > > > > > > > On 24 Dec 2014, at 01:00, "larry smolucha" > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > Message from Francine: > > > > > > > > > > > > This reminds me of a debate that I had with Greg Thompson over a > > year > > > > ago > > > > > > about hearing impaired people who do not have speech > > > > > > but use hand sign language. Hand sign language is a sensori-motor > > > > semiotic > > > > > > systems that communicates thoughts to others. This is a semiotic > > > > fusion that > > > > > > does not involve speech. Dance is another sensori-motor fusion > with > > > > thought > > > > > > (which is itself based on sensori-motor experience). Visual > symbols > > > > systems > > > > > > are another. > > > > > > > > > > > > My reading of Vygotsky is that only speech vocalizations that > fuse > > > > with thought > > > > > > (based on sensori-motor experience) can produce 'word' meanings > > that > > > > are internalized > > > > > > as the inner speech that creates higher mental functions > > (consciously > > > > regulated > > > > > > thought processes). > > > > > > > > > > > >> Date: Tue, 23 Dec 2014 09:54:14 -0800 > > > > > >> From: lpscholar2@gmail.com > > > > > >> To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > > > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] the genetic roots of thought and speech > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Francine asked us to re-read Chapter 4 "the Genetic Roots' of > > > Thought > > > > and > > > > > >> Speech. > > > > > >> This paragraph was critical > > > > > >> > > > > > >> "we are forced to conclude that FUSION of thought and speech, in > > > > adults as > > > > > >> well as in children, is a phenomenon limited to a CIRCUMSCRIBED > > > area. > > > > > >> Nonverbal thought and nonintellectual speech do NOT participate > in > > > > THIS > > > > > >> FUSION and are affected indirectly by the processes of verbal > > > thought" > > > > > >> [Vygotsky, page 48] > > > > > >> > > > > > >> Reading this opens for me the question of all the other > functions > > of > > > > speech > > > > > >> in the adult that are not directly influenced by thought and all > > the > > > > > >> functions of thought that are not affected by speech. > > > > > >> In particular are there forms of *imaging* that are thoughts but > > not > > > > > >> functioning in speech. Do these paths of image and thought also > > > > develop and > > > > > >> fuse? > > > > > >> > > > > > >> All the functions that Vygotsky explores in the primates and in > > > > children > > > > > >> PRIOR to the reciprocal interweaving of thought and language > > > continue > > > > to > > > > > >> function in adults. For example the sounds of speech as offering > > > > "release > > > > > >> from tension or anxiety" or the sounds as ways of *connecting* > and > > > > > >> *bonding*. > > > > > >> It seems that to privilege the fusion of thought and language as > > > > dominant > > > > > >> modes of designing places/spaces [such as the third space] makes > > the > > > > other > > > > > >> functions [speech alone] [thought alone] nondominant modes when > > the > > > > > >> necessity for connection may be prior to and dominant when > > > reflecting > > > > on > > > > > >> the fused mode of thought and language as a partial unity. > > > > > >> In other words, the unit of analysis is the relation of thought > > > alone > > > > AND > > > > > >> speech alone AND image alone AND all their actual fusions as > other > > > > partial > > > > > >> modes. > > > > > >> This as a multi-modal understanding. > > > > > >> I hope this is the right length > > > > > >> Larry > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science as an > object > > that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > From annalisa@unm.edu Tue Dec 30 19:43:52 2014 From: annalisa@unm.edu (Annalisa Aguilar) Date: Wed, 31 Dec 2014 03:43:52 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Technopolitics and apartheid Message-ID: <1419997432054.70400@unm.edu> ??Hello, This paper was mailed to me from another list, and it seemed relevant to ours with regards to culture and tools (technology) and replications... I have been thinking for some years about the connection between worldviews/philosophies and the models/interactions created or caused by them. I see created as being purposeful, while caused as being accidental. This paper seems to illustrate something about that reading.? Would be curious what your reflections are, my dear listees. Does anyone remember this happening? Kind regards, Annalisa -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: EdwardsHecht_History Technopolitics Identity_2010.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 198150 bytes Desc: EdwardsHecht_History Technopolitics Identity_2010.pdf Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141231/db732ac2/attachment.pdf From lpscholar2@gmail.com Tue Dec 30 20:08:12 2014 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Tue, 30 Dec 2014 18:08:12 -1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context In-Reply-To: <00d601d0247b$fb0599d0$f110cd70$@uic.edu> References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F907E885@CIO-KRC-D2MBX08.osuad.osu.edu> <1419961849204.99@unm.edu> <7334DDE3-FF9A-45E1-8E4C-1D23EF114C72@gmail.com> <00d601d0247b$fb0599d0$f110cd70$@uic.edu> Message-ID: Aria, I want to repeat and amplify your suggestion : It is important to clarify what is meant by "third space" and its analogous concepts in various schools of thought (e.g., liminality, double consciousness, third place, etc.). The post-colonial uptake of third space (e.g., Said, Bhaba, Spivak) within the sociocultural theory is a very specific stance and this might be the moment for that conversation as well. To focus on the *third space* as a VERY SPECIFIC stance. I would like to become clear on the centrality of *witnessing* as central or the re-search fades away. Also terms such as *mutuality* contrasted with *reciprocity* or *transactions*. Testimonios as neither subjective [alone] or objective [alone] but a hybrid MODE that is a form of witnessing. I would also suggest the theme of *gift* as more than transaction or echange [in continental philosophy traditions] is relevant. There is a *spirit* and a moral virtue within this form of witnessing as *third space* that plays around with notions of *trans* as moving across forms [horizons] as trans-versals [or trans-verse-als] . I have an intuition that this type of witnessing is radical, going to the roots of our being human together. Aria, I look forward to further re-search Larry On Tue, Dec 30, 2014 at 12:00 PM, Aria Razfar wrote: > For those of us working with Kris' sociocritical perspective, third space > has been a valuable construct for thinking about collective learning zopeds > and consciousness for that matter. It is important to clarify what is meant > by "third space" and its analogous concepts in various schools of thought > (e.g., liminality, double consciousness, third place, etc.). The > post-colonial uptake of third space (e.g., Said, Bhaba, Spivak) within the > sociocultural theory is a very specific stance and this might be the moment > for that conversation as well. > > Aria > > Aria Razfar, Ph.D. > Associate Professor of Literacy, Language, and Culture > Director of Graduate Studies, Curriculum and Instruction > University of Illinois at Chicago > 1040 W. Harrison St. M/C 147 > Chicago, IL, 60607 > > Director of English Learning through Mathematics, Science and Action > Research (ELMSA) > www.elmsa.org > > Webpage: http://education.uic.edu/personnel/faculty/aria-razfar-phd > Tel: 312-413-8373 > Fax: 312-996-8134 > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Kris Gutierrez > Sent: Tuesday, December 30, 2014 2:56 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context > > Annalisa, Manuel initiated the last uptake. (I think others have clarified > that now :) > > Mike C., Miguel Zavala, Larry Purss and I posted some thoughts before the > holidays. For me it is useful to connect Manuel?s recent post to those > earlier thoughts/conversations. > > Some very quick very unedited thoughts following up on Manuel?s post: > > Michael G., Mike C. correctly points out that the > testimonios/autobiographies were not research techniques but generative > tools that were indeed a part of the interconnected set of practices that > created a collective zoped?a third space if you will. I try to elaborate > this idea in the Scribner Lecture piece (sociocritical literacies). My own > work on Third Space, the collective work of the instructional team of MSI, > ongoing conversations with Mike C. and Yrjo over the years at the lab, and > their work certainly informed this idea of a collective zoped, collective > third space (See Engestr?m, 1987, 1994 in particular; Nicolopoulou & Cole, > 1993; Tuomi-Gr?hn & Engestr?m, 2003; Tuomi- Gr?hn, Engestr?m, & Young, > 2003; > Chaiklin, 2003, Moll, 1990; Moll & Greenberg, 1990 as key examples that > certainly inform this work as well. And LSV and Bakhtin are ever present). > These, I think, are useful references, all cited in the article. Shirin > Vossoughi?s recent MCA piece also is very relevant to this discussion. > > Some relevant excerpts from the sociocritical article, > > "To illustrate these points and their relation to a collective Third Space, > let us examine the MSLI more closely. > The activity system, the MSLI, has a specific internal logic organized > around expanding the students? sociohistorical and educational ecology > through the collective imagining of a new educational and sociopolitical > future. > To avoid the ?interactional reductionism implicit in much > Vygotskian-inspired research? (Nicolopoulou & Cole, 1993, p. 284), the > specific interactions and practices of the MSLI are understood as what > Nicolopoulou and Cole call a ?genuinely collective reality? (p. 284). > > Here we see the [Migrant] institute as an example of the Third Space, a > collective zo-ped, at the larger level of activity the object of which is > the sociohistorical reconstruction of what it means to be a migrant > student. > This movement involves a process of becoming conscious ?historical actors? > (Espinoza, 2003) who invoke the past in order to re-mediate it so that it > becomes a resource for current and future action (p. 154)." > > Testimonios and their embodiment in Teatro del Oprimido (Boal?s Theatre of > the Oppressed that Manuel introduced to us and the program and that he and > Vossoughi elaborated) were key means of developing/inciting a new social > and > pedagogical imagination and for imagining new futures with/for the migrant > students, their communities, and indeed for all of us, as Manuel so > thoughtfully writes. Teatro served as a collective problem-solving space?a > space where the playful imagination helped to make inequities and the roots > of social problems visible, while providing an opportunity to re-frame > events, re-mediate and enact an imagined future collectively (such as > flying > collectively/social dreaming). I hope Manuel and Shirin jump in and > elaborate these thoughts. > > Re: Research design: For me, Migrant was in Yrjo and Mike's approach, a > formative experiment; what I term social design experiments?a designed > based > research approach that foregrounds equity, diversity, historicity, and > re-mediation, for example. As Susan Jurow and I wrote and presented at the > ICLS conference this summer (a piece that we expect will be part of a > larger > set of papers with Mike C., Yrjo and Annalisa, and Bill Penuel), social > design experiments: aim to make possible a sustainable and dignified life > for all humans; address the challenges of leveraging cultural diversity and > reducing social inequality; and call for the co-design of new tools and > futures with members of non-dominant communities, as but a few key design > principles. > > Absolutely, research as re-searching?searching for the answer to a > question you have searched for repeatedly without success! Well said, > Miguel > Cole! Thanks, for your thoughts, Michael Glassman! > > more on sociocritical literacies, later. kris > > > > > > > > Kris Gutierrez > gutierkd@gmail.com > > Kris D. Guti?rrez > Professor > Graduate School of Education > 5629 Tolman Hall #1670 > University of California, Berkeley > Berkeley CA 94720-1670 > > Distinguished Professor > Learning Sciences and Literacy > School of Education > University of Colorado, Boulder > > > > On Dec 30, 2014, at 9:50 AM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > > Hello! > > > > Sorry for being silly here, but I couldn't help but see that so far on > this thread, there have been appearances by: > > > > mike, Annalisa, Michael, Luisa, and Miguel! > > > > > > > > From dkellogg60@gmail.com Wed Dec 31 01:25:53 2014 From: dkellogg60@gmail.com (David Kellogg) Date: Wed, 31 Dec 2014 18:25:53 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: How *basic* are images? In-Reply-To: References: <1417397991972.17078@unm.edu> Message-ID: Mike: I'm afraid I'm thinking like a painter. As soon as a painting is a finished image, it's finished; it's not the object of painting but the result of painting. I sometimes gawk at my own paintings, but it produces a rather disagreeable feeling, like sitting on a toilet in a dirty outhouse staring at a fly speckled ceiling, and I hope that the feeling for people looking at the painting is very different, So here's the idea. Imagination is a process...the process of forming an image from things that are not images, or at least not the kind of image we are interested in forming. Of course, in some cases, you form an image from another image, by looking at a live model and trying to paint it. But even these limit cases, where an imagined image is created from a perceived image, involve considerably more than "combinatorial" imagination; the resulting image is not a kind of Galton photograph of many different perceptions of the object. What we are really doing is realizing an intention, and that intention almost by definition involves something that is not reducible to perceptions or experiences. I think the Gestaltists believed in structures, but that only Vygotsky believed that the structures were essentially neoformations along the lines of linguistic productions: entirely novel structures built of resources that were simultaneously ideal and material. They weren't neoformations out of nothing, and they weren't neoformations out of the lower functions either; they were assisted by cultural productions, for sure, else they could not take the obviously verbal forms that they do; e.g. Michelangelo's struggle between the angels is, at bottom, a story handed down from the Bible. But they aren't reducible to cultural productions either, else the child couldn't stare up at Michelangelo's ceiling and still make some sense of his or her own out of it without knowing the Bible story. (My wife, growing up in China, had no access to Bible stories at all. She then read the King James Bible as part of her training in seventeenth century English literatures, alongide Shakespeare, Marlowe, and Ben Jonson. Then, one day in Venice, we were in the Cathedral at San Marco, and they turned the ceiling lights on, so you could see the ceiling mosaics, and she could see Noah, drunken and abandoned by his two sons, and the tree of life, and all the rest, and she turned to me and muttered in Chinese that this is what the ancients had in mind. She meant that quite literally, or rather non-literally; this was how cultural functions were transmitted to illiterates when only perception could be used.) David Kellogg Hankuk University of Foreign Studies On 30 December 2014 at 05:19, mike cole wrote: > I am responding here to David Ke's message of Nov 30th in which he > recommends an article by Robert Pepperell relevant to the topic of > imagination (as I imagine it!). I found a lot to think about and recommend > the article to those interested in the topic. > > Pepperell's interest seems relevant to the topic of imagination because he > deliberately creates images that incite the viewer to identify objects but > are, in so far as possible, devoid of objects ("indeterminant stimuli"). > Such paintings, he reports, induce active efforts to make sense of the > painting in terms of something the person has encountered before. He > reports that > > not only are particular loci in the brain recruited in response to > indeterminate stimuli, but that the attempt to decipher such stimuli leads > to enhanced overall coordination in brain activity: ?This suggests that V4 > plays a key role in resolving indeterminate visual inputs by coordinated > interaction between bottom-up and top-down processing streams? (p. 275). > > The word, imagination, comes up only once in the article, in connection > with the work of Gombrich..... but a lot of the studies and discussion in > the paper seem quite relevant to this topic. > > > One additional issue came up that has me thinking. David wrote: > > for Wundt and his disciples, everything was image based, and the > Gestaltists demonstrated that many, if not most, of our mental > operations are genetically anterior to images, and have more to do > with processes, else we would not have > time or ability to process complex problems in real time. > > My question. Aren't mental images processes? If not, what are they? > > mike > > > On Sun, Nov 30, 2014 at 10:53 PM, David Kellogg > wrote: > > > Larry, Annalisa: > > > > People sometimes ask my wife if it was "love at first sight" when we > > met. She answers--quite truthfully--that she has no memory of anything > > except the price of the shoes that I wore (a kind of shoe available > > for a standard price all over China) She does not even remember > > whether they were new or old (they were pretty new; it was the > > beginning of the semester). I think I would describe this as a > > non-image based mental representation. > > > > As Larry says, the issue of whether all mental representations are > > images was a very hot one--back in the late nineteenth century. In > > fact, it was the key issue for the Gestaltist revolt against Titchener > > and against Wundtian psychology: for Wundt and his disciples, > > everything was image based, and the Gestaltists demonstrated that > > many, if not most, of our mental operations are genetically anterior > > to images, and have more to do with processes, else we would not have > > time or ability to process complex problems in real time. > > > > I think it is even more true that of forms of thinking that are > > genetically posterior to images. I hesitate to recommend more reading > > to anybody, because of course Larry is far more well read than I am > > (particularly on phenomenology) and Annalisa sometimes feels like > > she's being sent to sit facing the corner with a book. So do NOT read > > this article--instead, look at Figure 11. > > > > http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3157022/ > > > > The artist, Robert Pepperell, uses the general color structure of > > Michelangelo?s painting to suggest images without using any actual > > images: by color and shape, which some part of our cultural experience > > associates with Renaissance paintings. Pepperell then deliberately > > frustrates these guiding images by refusing to give them any > > recognizable figures upon which to focus. > > > > However, the child staring up at Michelangelo?s Sistine Chapel fresco > > for the first time finds himself in the opposite situation. He or she > > can discern quite clearly the fighting figures in the painting and > > wonders who they are and why they are fighting, but does not notice > > the color structure or see anything particularly meaningful in it. > > > > David Kellogg > > Hankuk University of Foreign Studies > > > > On 1 December 2014 at 10:39, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > > > > Hi Larry and David, > > > > > > Am I butting in? I hope if I am, it is a welcome butting in! > > > > > > I don't know that we can say that "basic guiding images" are at the > root > > of all thinking. > > > > > > Perhaps it is safer to say that people think differently, based upon > > previous conditioning and interactions with their caretakers, in > > combination with their biological makeup? Vera has a coined a phrase I > like > > a lot called "Cognitive pluralism." She has written a paper on it by the > > same title and you may find interesting it if you don't know it. > > > > > > With this in mind, it is possible that _some_ people think as Hackett > > describes, but I don't know if it is how all people think. Have you > already > > given an example of Hackett's work that you recommend? I'd be willing to > > take a look. > > > > > > As I understand, the topic of mental representations is controversial. > > It is likely controversial because no one likes it when someone says > "this > > is how all humans think." Of course, that is just my humble observation. > > > > > > It may just be that thinking is a dynamic process and whatever that > > process is, is particular to the necessity to the situation at hand? > Just a > > thought. > > > > > > What is it that appeals to you about this model, metaphoricity? > > > > > > (BTW, a metaphor need not be image based!) > > > > > > Kind regards, > > > > > > Annalisa > > > > > > > > > ________________________________________ > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > on behalf of Larry Purss > > > Sent: Sunday, November 30, 2014 11:33 AM > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] How *basic* are images? > > > > > > David K > > > I mentioned Chris Hackett, and I recently referenced Peirce. My reason > > for > > > exploring these authors is I have been following a path pursuing a > basic > > > question. > > > > > > Are basic guiding images at the root of all thinking? > > > > > > Chris Hackett's answer is: "thinking never EXCEEDS the basic guiding > > images > > > upon which thinking rests" > > > > > > The recent dialogue between Andy and Martin exploring appearances and > > > illusions was also exploring this theme. > > > > > > Hackett is outlining what he understands as a new phenomenological path > > > that places guiding images at the root of thinking. He names this > process > > > *metaphoricity*. > > > > > > Hackett believes metaphoricity names the irreducible image-character of > > the > > > *spontaneous event* of meaning. > > > > > > He goes on to suggest that the "intending subject" - which he brackets > - > > > finds itself implicated in this guiding image. > > > > > > AND > > > > > > it is *in* this guiding image that the *intending subject* finds the > > > meaning of its very self. > > > > > > Exploring the notion of "first things* Hackett proposes this > > > image-character IS a new *objectivity* that only the notion of metaphor > > can > > > invoke. In other words the notion of *seeing as* is implicated in > > > *objectivity* > > > > > > This new objectivity for Hackett is the root of thinking. > > > > > > Reason at the point of becoming conscious and in command of itself *in* > > the > > > mode [path] of the concept > > > occurs AFTER the *constitution* of meaning through guiding images has > > been > > > established. > > > > > > In other words meaning through guiding images mediates the path of > > > conscious verbal thought in command of itself which is derived from > the > > > image-character of the guiding image. > > > > > > I hesitate to open this thread because of how controversial this topic > > may > > > become [again] > > > > > > However I will take the risk as I continue to be held by this basic > > > question. I want to repeat that Hackett is exploring these images as > > > occurring as *events* and in his speculations the images emerge > > > spontaneously prior to intentional consciousness. > > > > > > This is not the phenomenology of Husserl [which is transcendental] and > is > > > not the phenomenology of Heidegger [which is hermeneutical]. It seems > to > > > have an affinity with Peirce and speculative musings. > > > > > > I also realize this question may already be answered in Vygotsky's > > writings > > > and may be pulling us away from the historical concerns of XMCA. I > > > personally am following this path for now. > > > > > > Larry > > > > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science as an object > that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > From shirinvossoughi@gmail.com Wed Dec 31 09:52:09 2014 From: shirinvossoughi@gmail.com (Shirin Vossoughi) Date: Wed, 31 Dec 2014 11:52:09 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context In-Reply-To: References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F907E885@CIO-KRC-D2MBX08.osuad.osu.edu> <1419961849204.99@unm.edu> <7334DDE3-FF9A-45E1-8E4C-1D23EF114C72@gmail.com> <00d601d0247b$fb0599d0$f110cd70$@uic.edu> Message-ID: Dear all, Thank you for this discussion. And thank you to Kris, Carlos Tejeda, Miguel and Manuel for being my mentors and bringing me back to the places in my mind where the sights and sounds of Moore Hall during the summer months are kept, and treasured. In my experience and through conversations with students that attended MSLI, I have come to see that one of the ways the abstract and the concrete intermingle is in the creation of experiences that generate lasting meanings and hold a certain kind of experiential power. MSLI was definately such an experience for me personally -- the kind that one comes back to as a sort of grounding or conceptual/pedagogical home-base while learning to navigate, shape and participate in new spaces. This is related (in my mind) to the notion of play as both an imaginary context and a concrete experience that, as Manuel described, alters participants. Teatro was definately a space within the program where we collectively experimented with this idea. Perhaps a sort of autobiography or testimonio *in motion*. Looking back, this was one of the ways social analysis and change were enfleshed -- not just in the mind but in the body. I am attaching a piece on teatro where Manuel and I sought to describe some of this by looking at the Migrant program alongside another educational setting with Iranian youth. When I think back to both of these settings, I remember both the deep thinking young people were participating in *and *the palpable sense of joy and laughter. This too feels important both to imagination and the notion of a collective ZPD. On the theme of play and in reference to Kris' earlier post, I had the opportunity during those years (alongside others) to move between MSLI in the summer and the 5th Dimension/Education 194 course, during the year. (Kris I would love to hear how you thought about and designed for this back-and-forth). Looking back, I can see how 194 was a sort of extended definition of the ZPD, with play serving as a central organizing concept. The ways I was invited to work on and dig into these ideas by people like Kris, Manuel, Miguel and Jolynn Asato felt a lot like re-searching. Here were these exalted texts and ideas, carrying the scent of history, explicitly traced back to Hegel and Marx. While the mentorship I received and subsequently worked to offer undergraduate students involved explicating these texts for the meaning they were intended to generate, I was simultaneously invited to critique, re-interpret and re-imagine what these concepts could offer both in our discussions and in our everyday practice with under-graduate students, high school aged migrant students and the elementary aged children at the 5th dimension after-school program. This type of reading was not unlike the ways we invited students in MSLI to read Galeano, Freire, Anzaldua, Du Bois, Ana Castillo, etc. So there is a connection in my mind between the "re-search" approach to educational inquiry and the kind of reading, writing and social analysis we were working to develop with students (similar to Edward Said's notion of critique as "restlessly self-clarifying.") Mike mentioned the notion of "searching for an answer to a question you have searched for repeatedly without success" and I would add to that the notion of continuing to search for an answer when you do have "success" in the sense of new questions arising and the proverbial horizon that moves as one approaches it. This intellectual disposition feels particularly important in the context of political education, which can have both emancipatory and dogmatic tendencies. With regards to the collective ZPD and Helena's post on Communities of practice, my experience of MSLI was that there was a heavy emphasis on the quality of design and mediation. In this space, collective ZPDs had a pedagogical architecture that was, on the one hand, deeply planned, re-hearsed and (based on history, study and experience) anticipated. I remember standing outside one of the dorms with Manuel before helping lead the introductory lecture for MSLI one summer (a role I had been carefully and generously apprenticed into over time, in large part by watching Carlos teach). I had conceptual notes, stories and metaphors written in my notebook and was practicing how I might actually do the lecture with Manuel listening and offering encouragement and feedback. In a similar vein, I remember Manuel inviting us to watch videos of master orators and stand-up comedians during breaks before teaching, warming up intellectually, emotionally, spiritually. At the same time, I think collective ZPD's are radically open and improvisatory spaces. There is or can be a generative dialectic between the overt pedagogical goals and plans and the inevitable, desirable and unanticipated questions, interruptions, critiques and ideas that students bring to the table. This is always where things got interesting and where new productive problems arose that required collective thought, action and perhaps, growth. So although the forms of apprenticeship among instructional staff and students definately reflected the fluidity of expert/novice roles, intent participation and expanding responsibility over time characteristic of communities of practices, the explicit attention to pedagogy/mediation both in practice and in the research on MSLI is one of the ways I think it may also differ. Direct teaching (what Carlos [drawing on Bakhtin] defined as "Dialogue-1" - distinct from Monologue) was re-imagined as an art or craft that had a central though not singular role to play in the everyday development of collective ZPDs. This is not to say that problems of teacher script vs. students script and the concrete challenges of creating third spaces did not arise, as they always do. (And as working within the activity system of academia also created its own problems and contradictions). But that moving away from pedagogy was not the spirit of the context - one tasked with the historical responsibility of supporting students to analyze and work to transform social problems that directly effected themselves and their families while developing academic skills they have been systematically denied. I spent some time in my dissertation trying to articulate the uniquely collective approach to learning in MSLI and would be happy to share the chapter. At the time I referred to the phenomenon I was analyzing as "collective mind" which I now see as having its strengths and weaknesses as a frame. The layers I sought to analyze included the intersubjective, distributed and radically inclusive quality of epistemic production, the performative role of language and listening, and the open, experimental tone of assistance. Fred Erickson's work on zones of proximal development was invaluable here (see attached article on "going for the zone" and particularly the notion of the ZPD as an interactional phenomenon). I am thankful for the space to re-reflect on these experiences and ideas, and am very interested in the conversation about socio-cultural and post-colonial definitions of third space that Aria raised in case people have any suggested references along those lines. Respectfully, Shirin -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: FE_Going.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 1399265 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141231/e2ace7c7/attachment-0002.pdf -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Boal's Children .pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 568155 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20141231/e2ace7c7/attachment-0003.pdf From arazfar@uic.edu Wed Dec 31 10:31:41 2014 From: arazfar@uic.edu (Aria Razfar) Date: Wed, 31 Dec 2014 12:31:41 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context In-Reply-To: References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F907E885@CIO-KRC-D2MBX08.osuad.osu.edu> <1419961849204.99@unm.edu> <7334DDE3-FF9A-45E1-8E4C-1D23EF114C72@gmail.com> <00d601d0247b$fb0599d0$f110cd70$@uic.edu> Message-ID: <01fb01d02528$065026a0$12f073e0$@uic.edu> Larry, The specific stance that is amplified by the intersections of "third space" post-colonial theory, sociocultural theory, and "testimonio" is somewhat apparent in the language choice. There is no English equivalent because there cannot be an English equivalent. At least, there cannot be an "English-Only" equivalent. It represents a movement toward an indigenous stance on voice, agency, knowledge, certainty, validity, language choice, and learning. I say a "movement toward" because Spanish itself carries similar baggage especially within the Latin American context. This is the rationale for why some use the Aztec idea of Nepantla instead of "Third Space" (e.g., Rochelle Guiterrez, Gloria Anzaldua). "Testimonio" further complicates what it means for "subalterns" to "reclaim voice" through the dominant voice. This is the heart-wrenching question raised by Spivak, "Can the subaltern speak?" Both the altern and the subaltern need to "step outside" the inscribed institutional roles, together in order to move "to the roots of our being human together." Spivak was specfically critiqueing "the Western intellectual" voice wondering if it truly could be a tool of liberation. It seems like a "core" identity question as we move through various historical entanglements seeking answers to ontological questions of self in relation to other. Also looking forward to this type of re-search. Aria Aria Razfar, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Literacy, Language, and Culture Director of Graduate Studies, Curriculum and Instruction University of Illinois at Chicago 1040 W. Harrison St. M/C 147 Chicago, IL, 60607 Director of English Learning through Mathematics, Science and Action Research (ELMSA) www.elmsa.org Webpage: http://education.uic.edu/personnel/faculty/aria-razfar-phd Tel: 312-413-8373 Fax: 312-996-8134 This is the heart-wrenching question raised by Spivak, "Can the subaltern speak?" Both the altern and the subaltern need to "step outside" the inscribed roles, together in order to move "to the roots of our being human together." It seems like a "core" identity question as we move through various historical entanglements seeking answers to ontological questions of self in relation to other. Also looking forward to this type of re-search. Aria -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+arazfar=uic.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+arazfar=uic.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry Purss Sent: Tuesday, December 30, 2014 10:08 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context Aria, I want to repeat and amplify your suggestion : It is important to clarify what is meant by "third space" and its analogous concepts in various schools of thought (e.g., liminality, double consciousness, third place, etc.). The post-colonial uptake of third space (e.g., Said, Bhaba, Spivak) within the sociocultural theory is a very specific stance and this might be the moment for that conversation as well. To focus on the *third space* as a VERY SPECIFIC stance. I would like to become clear on the centrality of *witnessing* as central or the re-search fades away. Also terms such as *mutuality* contrasted with *reciprocity* or *transactions*. Testimonios as neither subjective [alone] or objective [alone] but a hybrid MODE that is a form of witnessing. I would also suggest the theme of *gift* as more than transaction or echange [in continental philosophy traditions] is relevant. There is a *spirit* and a moral virtue within this form of witnessing as *third space* that plays around with notions of *trans* as moving across forms [horizons] as trans-versals [or trans-verse-als] . I have an intuition that this type of witnessing is radical, going to the roots of our being human together. Aria, I look forward to further re-search Larry On Tue, Dec 30, 2014 at 12:00 PM, Aria Razfar wrote: > For those of us working with Kris' sociocritical perspective, third > space has been a valuable construct for thinking about collective > learning zopeds and consciousness for that matter. It is important to > clarify what is meant by "third space" and its analogous concepts in > various schools of thought (e.g., liminality, double consciousness, > third place, etc.). The post-colonial uptake of third space (e.g., > Said, Bhaba, Spivak) within the sociocultural theory is a very > specific stance and this might be the moment for that conversation as well. > > Aria > > Aria Razfar, Ph.D. > Associate Professor of Literacy, Language, and Culture Director of > Graduate Studies, Curriculum and Instruction University of Illinois at > Chicago > 1040 W. Harrison St. M/C 147 > Chicago, IL, 60607 > > Director of English Learning through Mathematics, Science and Action > Research (ELMSA) www.elmsa.org > > Webpage: http://education.uic.edu/personnel/faculty/aria-razfar-phd > Tel: 312-413-8373 > Fax: 312-996-8134 > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Kris Gutierrez > Sent: Tuesday, December 30, 2014 2:56 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context > > Annalisa, Manuel initiated the last uptake. (I think others have > clarified that now :) > > Mike C., Miguel Zavala, Larry Purss and I posted some thoughts before > the holidays. For me it is useful to connect Manuel?s recent post to > those earlier thoughts/conversations. > > Some very quick very unedited thoughts following up on Manuel?s post: > > Michael G., Mike C. correctly points out that the > testimonios/autobiographies were not research techniques but > generative tools that were indeed a part of the interconnected set of > practices that created a collective zoped?a third space if you will. > I try to elaborate this idea in the Scribner Lecture piece > (sociocritical literacies). My own work on Third Space, the > collective work of the instructional team of MSI, ongoing > conversations with Mike C. and Yrjo over the years at the lab, and > their work certainly informed this idea of a collective zoped, > collective third space (See Engestr?m, 1987, 1994 in particular; > Nicolopoulou & Cole, 1993; Tuomi-Gr?hn & Engestr?m, 2003; Tuomi- > Gr?hn, Engestr?m, & Young, 2003; Chaiklin, 2003, Moll, 1990; Moll & > Greenberg, 1990 as key examples that certainly inform this work as well. And LSV and Bakhtin are ever present). > These, I think, are useful references, all cited in the article. > Shirin Vossoughi?s recent MCA piece also is very relevant to this discussion. > > Some relevant excerpts from the sociocritical article, > > "To illustrate these points and their relation to a collective Third > Space, let us examine the MSLI more closely. > The activity system, the MSLI, has a specific internal logic organized > around expanding the students? sociohistorical and educational ecology > through the collective imagining of a new educational and > sociopolitical future. > To avoid the ?interactional reductionism implicit in much > Vygotskian-inspired research? (Nicolopoulou & Cole, 1993, p. 284), the > specific interactions and practices of the MSLI are understood as what > Nicolopoulou and Cole call a ?genuinely collective reality? (p. 284). > > Here we see the [Migrant] institute as an example of the Third Space, > a collective zo-ped, at the larger level of activity the object of > which is the sociohistorical reconstruction of what it means to be a > migrant student. > This movement involves a process of becoming conscious ?historical actors? > (Espinoza, 2003) who invoke the past in order to re-mediate it so that > it becomes a resource for current and future action (p. 154)." > > Testimonios and their embodiment in Teatro del Oprimido (Boal?s > Theatre of the Oppressed that Manuel introduced to us and the program > and that he and Vossoughi elaborated) were key means of > developing/inciting a new social and pedagogical imagination and for > imagining new futures with/for the migrant students, their > communities, and indeed for all of us, as Manuel so thoughtfully > writes. Teatro served as a collective problem-solving space?a space > where the playful imagination helped to make inequities and the roots > of social problems visible, while providing an opportunity to re-frame > events, re-mediate and enact an imagined future collectively (such as > flying collectively/social dreaming). I hope Manuel and Shirin jump > in and elaborate these thoughts. > > Re: Research design: For me, Migrant was in Yrjo and Mike's approach, > a formative experiment; what I term social design experiments?a > designed based research approach that foregrounds equity, diversity, > historicity, and re-mediation, for example. As Susan Jurow and I wrote > and presented at the ICLS conference this summer (a piece that we > expect will be part of a larger set of papers with Mike C., Yrjo and > Annalisa, and Bill Penuel), social design experiments: aim to make > possible a sustainable and dignified life for all humans; address the > challenges of leveraging cultural diversity and reducing social > inequality; and call for the co-design of new tools and futures with > members of non-dominant communities, as but a few key design > principles. > > Absolutely, research as re-searching?searching for the answer to > a question you have searched for repeatedly without success! Well > said, Miguel Cole! Thanks, for your thoughts, Michael Glassman! > > more on sociocritical literacies, later. kris > > > > > > > > Kris Gutierrez > gutierkd@gmail.com > > Kris D. Guti?rrez > Professor > Graduate School of Education > 5629 Tolman Hall #1670 > University of California, Berkeley > Berkeley CA 94720-1670 > > Distinguished Professor > Learning Sciences and Literacy > School of Education > University of Colorado, Boulder > > > > On Dec 30, 2014, at 9:50 AM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > > Hello! > > > > Sorry for being silly here, but I couldn't help but see that so far > > on > this thread, there have been appearances by: > > > > mike, Annalisa, Michael, Luisa, and Miguel! > > > > > > > > From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Dec 31 11:07:24 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 31 Dec 2014 11:07:24 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context In-Reply-To: <01fb01d02528$065026a0$12f073e0$@uic.edu> References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F907E885@CIO-KRC-D2MBX08.osuad.osu.edu> <1419961849204.99@unm.edu> <7334DDE3-FF9A-45E1-8E4C-1D23EF114C72@gmail.com> <00d601d0247b$fb0599d0$f110cd70$@uic.edu> <01fb01d02528$065026a0$12f073e0$@uic.edu> Message-ID: Aria--- I had not read the Spivak article, although the question she asks is one I have been asking myself for half a century. And, I would add, under what conditions? I found the article here in case others share my ignorance. mike http://www.mcgill.ca/files/crclaw-discourse/Can_the_subaltern_speak.pdf On Wed, Dec 31, 2014 at 10:31 AM, Aria Razfar wrote: > Larry, > > The specific stance that is amplified by the intersections of "third > space" post-colonial theory, sociocultural theory, and "testimonio" is > somewhat apparent in the language choice. There is no English equivalent > because there cannot be an English equivalent. At least, there cannot be an > "English-Only" equivalent. It represents a movement toward an indigenous > stance on voice, agency, knowledge, certainty, validity, language choice, > and learning. I say a "movement toward" because Spanish itself carries > similar baggage especially within the Latin American context. This is the > rationale for why some use the Aztec idea of Nepantla instead of "Third > Space" (e.g., Rochelle Guiterrez, Gloria Anzaldua). "Testimonio" further > complicates what it means for "subalterns" to "reclaim voice" through the > dominant voice. This is the heart-wrenching question raised by Spivak, "Can > the subaltern speak?" Both the altern and the subaltern need to "step > outside" the inscribed institutional roles, together in order to move "to > the roots of our being human together." Spivak was specfically critiqueing > "the Western intellectual" voice wondering if it truly could be a tool of > liberation. It seems like a "core" identity question as we move through > various historical entanglements seeking answers to ontological questions > of self in relation to other. Also looking forward to this type of > re-search. > > Aria > > > > > > Aria Razfar, Ph.D. > Associate Professor of Literacy, Language, and Culture > Director of Graduate Studies, Curriculum and Instruction > University of Illinois at Chicago > 1040 W. Harrison St. M/C 147 > Chicago, IL, 60607 > > Director of English Learning through Mathematics, Science and Action > Research (ELMSA) > www.elmsa.org > > Webpage: http://education.uic.edu/personnel/faculty/aria-razfar-phd > Tel: 312-413-8373 > Fax: 312-996-8134 > > This is the heart-wrenching question raised by Spivak, "Can the subaltern > speak?" Both the altern and the subaltern need to "step outside" the > inscribed roles, together in order to move "to the roots of our being human > together." It seems like a "core" identity question as we move through > various historical entanglements seeking answers to ontological questions > of self in relation to other. Also looking forward to this type of > re-search. > > Aria > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+arazfar=uic.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces+arazfar=uic.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry Purss > Sent: Tuesday, December 30, 2014 10:08 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context > > Aria, > I want to repeat and amplify your suggestion : > > It is important to clarify what is meant by "third space" and its > analogous concepts in various schools of thought (e.g., liminality, double > consciousness, third place, etc.). The post-colonial uptake of third space > (e.g., Said, Bhaba, Spivak) within the sociocultural theory is a very > specific stance and this might be the moment for that conversation as well. > > To focus on the *third space* as a VERY SPECIFIC stance. > I would like to become clear on the centrality of *witnessing* as central > or the re-search fades away. > Also terms such as *mutuality* contrasted with *reciprocity* or > *transactions*. > > Testimonios as neither subjective [alone] or objective [alone] but a > hybrid MODE that is a form of witnessing. > I would also suggest the theme of *gift* as more than transaction or > echange [in continental philosophy traditions] is relevant. > > There is a *spirit* and a moral virtue within this form of witnessing as > *third space* that plays around with notions of *trans* as moving across > forms [horizons] as trans-versals [or trans-verse-als] . > I have an intuition that this type of witnessing is radical, going to the > roots of our being human together. > > Aria, I look forward to further re-search Larry > > On Tue, Dec 30, 2014 at 12:00 PM, Aria Razfar wrote: > > > For those of us working with Kris' sociocritical perspective, third > > space has been a valuable construct for thinking about collective > > learning zopeds and consciousness for that matter. It is important to > > clarify what is meant by "third space" and its analogous concepts in > > various schools of thought (e.g., liminality, double consciousness, > > third place, etc.). The post-colonial uptake of third space (e.g., > > Said, Bhaba, Spivak) within the sociocultural theory is a very > > specific stance and this might be the moment for that conversation as > well. > > > > Aria > > > > Aria Razfar, Ph.D. > > Associate Professor of Literacy, Language, and Culture Director of > > Graduate Studies, Curriculum and Instruction University of Illinois at > > Chicago > > 1040 W. Harrison St. M/C 147 > > Chicago, IL, 60607 > > > > Director of English Learning through Mathematics, Science and Action > > Research (ELMSA) www.elmsa.org > > > > Webpage: http://education.uic.edu/personnel/faculty/aria-razfar-phd > > Tel: 312-413-8373 > > Fax: 312-996-8134 > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Kris Gutierrez > > Sent: Tuesday, December 30, 2014 2:56 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context > > > > Annalisa, Manuel initiated the last uptake. (I think others have > > clarified that now :) > > > > Mike C., Miguel Zavala, Larry Purss and I posted some thoughts before > > the holidays. For me it is useful to connect Manuel?s recent post to > > those earlier thoughts/conversations. > > > > Some very quick very unedited thoughts following up on Manuel?s post: > > > > Michael G., Mike C. correctly points out that the > > testimonios/autobiographies were not research techniques but > > generative tools that were indeed a part of the interconnected set of > > practices that created a collective zoped?a third space if you will. > > I try to elaborate this idea in the Scribner Lecture piece > > (sociocritical literacies). My own work on Third Space, the > > collective work of the instructional team of MSI, ongoing > > conversations with Mike C. and Yrjo over the years at the lab, and > > their work certainly informed this idea of a collective zoped, > > collective third space (See Engestr?m, 1987, 1994 in particular; > > Nicolopoulou & Cole, 1993; Tuomi-Gr?hn & Engestr?m, 2003; Tuomi- > > Gr?hn, Engestr?m, & Young, 2003; Chaiklin, 2003, Moll, 1990; Moll & > > Greenberg, 1990 as key examples that certainly inform this work as well. > And LSV and Bakhtin are ever present). > > These, I think, are useful references, all cited in the article. > > Shirin Vossoughi?s recent MCA piece also is very relevant to this > discussion. > > > > Some relevant excerpts from the sociocritical article, > > > > "To illustrate these points and their relation to a collective Third > > Space, let us examine the MSLI more closely. > > The activity system, the MSLI, has a specific internal logic organized > > around expanding the students? sociohistorical and educational ecology > > through the collective imagining of a new educational and > > sociopolitical future. > > To avoid the ?interactional reductionism implicit in much > > Vygotskian-inspired research? (Nicolopoulou & Cole, 1993, p. 284), the > > specific interactions and practices of the MSLI are understood as what > > Nicolopoulou and Cole call a ?genuinely collective reality? (p. 284). > > > > Here we see the [Migrant] institute as an example of the Third Space, > > a collective zo-ped, at the larger level of activity the object of > > which is the sociohistorical reconstruction of what it means to be a > > migrant student. > > This movement involves a process of becoming conscious ?historical > actors? > > (Espinoza, 2003) who invoke the past in order to re-mediate it so that > > it becomes a resource for current and future action (p. 154)." > > > > Testimonios and their embodiment in Teatro del Oprimido (Boal?s > > Theatre of the Oppressed that Manuel introduced to us and the program > > and that he and Vossoughi elaborated) were key means of > > developing/inciting a new social and pedagogical imagination and for > > imagining new futures with/for the migrant students, their > > communities, and indeed for all of us, as Manuel so thoughtfully > > writes. Teatro served as a collective problem-solving space?a space > > where the playful imagination helped to make inequities and the roots > > of social problems visible, while providing an opportunity to re-frame > > events, re-mediate and enact an imagined future collectively (such as > > flying collectively/social dreaming). I hope Manuel and Shirin jump > > in and elaborate these thoughts. > > > > Re: Research design: For me, Migrant was in Yrjo and Mike's approach, > > a formative experiment; what I term social design experiments?a > > designed based research approach that foregrounds equity, diversity, > > historicity, and re-mediation, for example. As Susan Jurow and I wrote > > and presented at the ICLS conference this summer (a piece that we > > expect will be part of a larger set of papers with Mike C., Yrjo and > > Annalisa, and Bill Penuel), social design experiments: aim to make > > possible a sustainable and dignified life for all humans; address the > > challenges of leveraging cultural diversity and reducing social > > inequality; and call for the co-design of new tools and futures with > > members of non-dominant communities, as but a few key design > > principles. > > > > Absolutely, research as re-searching?searching for the answer to > > a question you have searched for repeatedly without success! Well > > said, Miguel Cole! Thanks, for your thoughts, Michael Glassman! > > > > more on sociocritical literacies, later. kris > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Kris Gutierrez > > gutierkd@gmail.com > > > > Kris D. Guti?rrez > > Professor > > Graduate School of Education > > 5629 Tolman Hall #1670 > > University of California, Berkeley > > Berkeley CA 94720-1670 > > > > Distinguished Professor > > Learning Sciences and Literacy > > School of Education > > University of Colorado, Boulder > > > > > > > On Dec 30, 2014, at 9:50 AM, Annalisa Aguilar > wrote: > > > > > > Hello! > > > > > > Sorry for being silly here, but I couldn't help but see that so far > > > on > > this thread, there have been appearances by: > > > > > > mike, Annalisa, Michael, Luisa, and Miguel! > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science as an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From smago@uga.edu Wed Dec 31 11:30:17 2014 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Wed, 31 Dec 2014 19:30:17 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context In-Reply-To: <01fb01d02528$065026a0$12f073e0$@uic.edu> References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F907E885@CIO-KRC-D2MBX08.osuad.osu.edu> <1419961849204.99@unm.edu> <7334DDE3-FF9A-45E1-8E4C-1D23EF114C72@gmail.com> <00d601d0247b$fb0599d0$f110cd70$@uic.edu> <01fb01d02528$065026a0$12f073e0$@uic.edu> Message-ID: There's probably way too much going on here already for me to find a comfortable niche. One complication I'd like to add concerns a distinction I recently learned of from an indigenous scholar, that between postcolonialism and decolonialism. There's a good rudimentary distinction at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Decoloniality . The goals are relatively similar, but the perspective is not. Decolonialists consider postcolonialism to be the province of Western academicians, rather than arising from indigenous people themselves. I find both perspectives compelling, although suspect that postcolonialism is the only one to which I have access as a Western male academician. Nothing wrong with that, since I've learned a lot from reading this literature and using it for a study (currently in review with a journal, so not something I should be public about at this point). But it's a distinction worth making on a listserv in which cultural practices and associated worldviews have primacy. I've also had problems attempting to use "third space" in some studies, because there's disagreement on what it means. There's an article at http://dpj.pitt.edu/ojs/index.php/dpj1/article/view/73/55 that I coauthored recently that involves a hybrid classroom space for interpreting Hamlet via spoken work poetry using rap conventions. In our initial drafts sent to review, reviewers excoriated our description of these hybrid spaces as third spaces, using Kris Gutierrez's work to assert that third spaces necessarily involve resistance against hegemonic classroom practices and structures. We read a lot of Kris's work, and ultimately agreed with that criticism, the main problem being that others (e.g., Elizabeth Moje) doing literacy research don't necessarily require resistance in the construction of hybrid spaces. So, I think that the term really needs to be parsed out in terms of its ideological roots and the research that produced the conception. In our work, we elected to go with hybrid, which is less politically charged, than third space, which at least in Kris's conception is heavily political and oriented to whose power gets asserted. I know Kris is out there and perhaps can clarify. It took me quite a while to read enough to arrive at the perspective I've briefly outlined here, so the issues are not trivial and they are challenging. But they are worth sorting out, I think. p -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Aria Razfar Sent: Wednesday, December 31, 2014 1:32 PM To: 'eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity' Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context Larry, The specific stance that is amplified by the intersections of "third space" post-colonial theory, sociocultural theory, and "testimonio" is somewhat apparent in the language choice. There is no English equivalent because there cannot be an English equivalent. At least, there cannot be an "English-Only" equivalent. It represents a movement toward an indigenous stance on voice, agency, knowledge, certainty, validity, language choice, and learning. I say a "movement toward" because Spanish itself carries similar baggage especially within the Latin American context. This is the rationale for why some use the Aztec idea of Nepantla instead of "Third Space" (e.g., Rochelle Guiterrez, Gloria Anzaldua). "Testimonio" further complicates what it means for "subalterns" to "reclaim voice" through the dominant voice. This is the heart-wrenching question raised by Spivak, "Can the subaltern speak?" Both the altern and the subaltern need to "step outside" the inscribed institutional roles, together in order to move "to the roots of our being human together." Spivak was specfically critiqueing "the Western intellectual" voice wondering if it truly could be a tool of liberation. It seems like a "core" identity question as we move through various historical entanglements seeking answers to ontological questions of self in relation to other. Also looking forward to this type of re-search. Aria Aria Razfar, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Literacy, Language, and Culture Director of Graduate Studies, Curriculum and Instruction University of Illinois at Chicago 1040 W. Harrison St. M/C 147 Chicago, IL, 60607 Director of English Learning through Mathematics, Science and Action Research (ELMSA) www.elmsa.org Webpage: http://education.uic.edu/personnel/faculty/aria-razfar-phd Tel: 312-413-8373 Fax: 312-996-8134 This is the heart-wrenching question raised by Spivak, "Can the subaltern speak?" Both the altern and the subaltern need to "step outside" the inscribed roles, together in order to move "to the roots of our being human together." It seems like a "core" identity question as we move through various historical entanglements seeking answers to ontological questions of self in relation to other. Also looking forward to this type of re-search. Aria -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces+arazfar=uic.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces+arazfar=uic.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry Purss Sent: Tuesday, December 30, 2014 10:08 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context Aria, I want to repeat and amplify your suggestion : It is important to clarify what is meant by "third space" and its analogous concepts in various schools of thought (e.g., liminality, double consciousness, third place, etc.). The post-colonial uptake of third space (e.g., Said, Bhaba, Spivak) within the sociocultural theory is a very specific stance and this might be the moment for that conversation as well. To focus on the *third space* as a VERY SPECIFIC stance. I would like to become clear on the centrality of *witnessing* as central or the re-search fades away. Also terms such as *mutuality* contrasted with *reciprocity* or *transactions*. Testimonios as neither subjective [alone] or objective [alone] but a hybrid MODE that is a form of witnessing. I would also suggest the theme of *gift* as more than transaction or echange [in continental philosophy traditions] is relevant. There is a *spirit* and a moral virtue within this form of witnessing as *third space* that plays around with notions of *trans* as moving across forms [horizons] as trans-versals [or trans-verse-als] . I have an intuition that this type of witnessing is radical, going to the roots of our being human together. Aria, I look forward to further re-search Larry On Tue, Dec 30, 2014 at 12:00 PM, Aria Razfar wrote: > For those of us working with Kris' sociocritical perspective, third > space has been a valuable construct for thinking about collective > learning zopeds and consciousness for that matter. It is important to > clarify what is meant by "third space" and its analogous concepts in > various schools of thought (e.g., liminality, double consciousness, > third place, etc.). The post-colonial uptake of third space (e.g., > Said, Bhaba, Spivak) within the sociocultural theory is a very > specific stance and this might be the moment for that conversation as well. > > Aria > > Aria Razfar, Ph.D. > Associate Professor of Literacy, Language, and Culture Director of > Graduate Studies, Curriculum and Instruction University of Illinois at > Chicago > 1040 W. Harrison St. M/C 147 > Chicago, IL, 60607 > > Director of English Learning through Mathematics, Science and Action > Research (ELMSA) www.elmsa.org > > Webpage: http://education.uic.edu/personnel/faculty/aria-razfar-phd > Tel: 312-413-8373 > Fax: 312-996-8134 > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Kris Gutierrez > Sent: Tuesday, December 30, 2014 2:56 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context > > Annalisa, Manuel initiated the last uptake. (I think others have > clarified that now :) > > Mike C., Miguel Zavala, Larry Purss and I posted some thoughts before > the holidays. For me it is useful to connect Manuel?s recent post to > those earlier thoughts/conversations. > > Some very quick very unedited thoughts following up on Manuel?s post: > > Michael G., Mike C. correctly points out that the > testimonios/autobiographies were not research techniques but > generative tools that were indeed a part of the interconnected set of > practices that created a collective zoped?a third space if you will. > I try to elaborate this idea in the Scribner Lecture piece > (sociocritical literacies). My own work on Third Space, the > collective work of the instructional team of MSI, ongoing > conversations with Mike C. and Yrjo over the years at the lab, and > their work certainly informed this idea of a collective zoped, > collective third space (See Engestr?m, 1987, 1994 in particular; > Nicolopoulou & Cole, 1993; Tuomi-Gr?hn & Engestr?m, 2003; Tuomi- > Gr?hn, Engestr?m, & Young, 2003; Chaiklin, 2003, Moll, 1990; Moll & > Greenberg, 1990 as key examples that certainly inform this work as well. And LSV and Bakhtin are ever present). > These, I think, are useful references, all cited in the article. > Shirin Vossoughi?s recent MCA piece also is very relevant to this discussion. > > Some relevant excerpts from the sociocritical article, > > "To illustrate these points and their relation to a collective Third > Space, let us examine the MSLI more closely. > The activity system, the MSLI, has a specific internal logic organized > around expanding the students? sociohistorical and educational ecology > through the collective imagining of a new educational and > sociopolitical future. > To avoid the ?interactional reductionism implicit in much > Vygotskian-inspired research? (Nicolopoulou & Cole, 1993, p. 284), the > specific interactions and practices of the MSLI are understood as what > Nicolopoulou and Cole call a ?genuinely collective reality? (p. 284). > > Here we see the [Migrant] institute as an example of the Third Space, > a collective zo-ped, at the larger level of activity the object of > which is the sociohistorical reconstruction of what it means to be a > migrant student. > This movement involves a process of becoming conscious ?historical actors? > (Espinoza, 2003) who invoke the past in order to re-mediate it so that > it becomes a resource for current and future action (p. 154)." > > Testimonios and their embodiment in Teatro del Oprimido (Boal?s > Theatre of the Oppressed that Manuel introduced to us and the program > and that he and Vossoughi elaborated) were key means of > developing/inciting a new social and pedagogical imagination and for > imagining new futures with/for the migrant students, their > communities, and indeed for all of us, as Manuel so thoughtfully > writes. Teatro served as a collective problem-solving space?a space > where the playful imagination helped to make inequities and the roots > of social problems visible, while providing an opportunity to re-frame > events, re-mediate and enact an imagined future collectively (such as > flying collectively/social dreaming). I hope Manuel and Shirin jump > in and elaborate these thoughts. > > Re: Research design: For me, Migrant was in Yrjo and Mike's approach, > a formative experiment; what I term social design experiments?a > designed based research approach that foregrounds equity, diversity, > historicity, and re-mediation, for example. As Susan Jurow and I wrote > and presented at the ICLS conference this summer (a piece that we > expect will be part of a larger set of papers with Mike C., Yrjo and > Annalisa, and Bill Penuel), social design experiments: aim to make > possible a sustainable and dignified life for all humans; address the > challenges of leveraging cultural diversity and reducing social > inequality; and call for the co-design of new tools and futures with > members of non-dominant communities, as but a few key design > principles. > > Absolutely, research as re-searching?searching for the answer to > a question you have searched for repeatedly without success! Well > said, Miguel Cole! Thanks, for your thoughts, Michael Glassman! > > more on sociocritical literacies, later. kris > > > > > > > > Kris Gutierrez > gutierkd@gmail.com > > Kris D. Guti?rrez > Professor > Graduate School of Education > 5629 Tolman Hall #1670 > University of California, Berkeley > Berkeley CA 94720-1670 > > Distinguished Professor > Learning Sciences and Literacy > School of Education > University of Colorado, Boulder > > > > On Dec 30, 2014, at 9:50 AM, Annalisa Aguilar wrote: > > > > Hello! > > > > Sorry for being silly here, but I couldn't help but see that so far > > on > this thread, there have been appearances by: > > > > mike, Annalisa, Michael, Luisa, and Miguel! > > > > > > > > From mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu Wed Dec 31 11:44:30 2014 From: mizavala@exchange.fullerton.edu (Zavala, Miguel) Date: Wed, 31 Dec 2014 19:44:30 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context In-Reply-To: <01fb01d02528$065026a0$12f073e0$@uic.edu> Message-ID: Aria and Larry, I want to add to your inquiry on testimonio. The discussion reminds me of the nuances of such a term (as concept, experience, expression, etc.). *Witnessing* can be construed as passive but I believe it also involves what Freire termed a particular kind of "naming". One of the (many) central problems raised by testimonio, which I also find in standpoint theory (Harding), is the question/tension/exploration of individual AND collective voicing. I will stretch the analysis here a bit and dare say that testimonio is more than a meditational tool--it is a collective object (*achievement* as standpoint theorists would say) that closes spaces (resolves contradictions, primary, secondary, tertiary, even contrarieties)-- it is perhaps an unmediated relation between self and other. It is indeed "radical, going to the roots of our being human together." -Miguel On 12/31/14 10:31 AM, "Aria Razfar" wrote: >Larry, > >The specific stance that is amplified by the intersections of "third >space" post-colonial theory, sociocultural theory, and "testimonio" is >somewhat apparent in the language choice. There is no English equivalent >because there cannot be an English equivalent. At least, there cannot be >an "English-Only" equivalent. It represents a movement toward an >indigenous stance on voice, agency, knowledge, certainty, validity, >language choice, and learning. I say a "movement toward" because Spanish >itself carries similar baggage especially within the Latin American >context. This is the rationale for why some use the Aztec idea of >Nepantla instead of "Third Space" (e.g., Rochelle Guiterrez, Gloria >Anzaldua). "Testimonio" further complicates what it means for >"subalterns" to "reclaim voice" through the dominant voice. This is the >heart-wrenching question raised by Spivak, "Can the subaltern speak?" >Both the altern and the subaltern need to "step outside" the inscribed >institutional roles, together in order to move "to the roots of our being >human together." Spivak was specfically critiqueing "the Western >intellectual" voice wondering if it truly could be a tool of liberation. >It seems like a "core" identity question as we move through various >historical entanglements seeking answers to ontological questions of self >in relation to other. Also looking forward to this type of re-search. > > >Aria > > > > > >Aria Razfar, Ph.D. >Associate Professor of Literacy, Language, and Culture >Director of Graduate Studies, Curriculum and Instruction >University of Illinois at Chicago >1040 W. Harrison St. M/C 147 >Chicago, IL, 60607 > >Director of English Learning through Mathematics, Science and Action >Research (ELMSA) >www.elmsa.org > >Webpage: http://education.uic.edu/personnel/faculty/aria-razfar-phd >Tel: 312-413-8373 >Fax: 312-996-8134 > >This is the heart-wrenching question raised by Spivak, "Can the subaltern >speak?" Both the altern and the subaltern need to "step outside" the >inscribed roles, together in order to move "to the roots of our being >human together." It seems like a "core" identity question as we move >through various historical entanglements seeking answers to ontological >questions of self in relation to other. Also looking forward to this type >of re-search. > >Aria > > >-----Original Message----- >From: xmca-l-bounces+arazfar=uic.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu >[mailto:xmca-l-bounces+arazfar=uic.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of >Larry Purss >Sent: Tuesday, December 30, 2014 10:08 PM >To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context > >Aria, >I want to repeat and amplify your suggestion : > >It is important to clarify what is meant by "third space" and its >analogous concepts in various schools of thought (e.g., liminality, >double consciousness, third place, etc.). The post-colonial uptake of >third space (e.g., Said, Bhaba, Spivak) within the sociocultural theory >is a very specific stance and this might be the moment for that >conversation as well. > >To focus on the *third space* as a VERY SPECIFIC stance. >I would like to become clear on the centrality of *witnessing* as central >or the re-search fades away. >Also terms such as *mutuality* contrasted with *reciprocity* or >*transactions*. > >Testimonios as neither subjective [alone] or objective [alone] but a >hybrid MODE that is a form of witnessing. >I would also suggest the theme of *gift* as more than transaction or >echange [in continental philosophy traditions] is relevant. > >There is a *spirit* and a moral virtue within this form of witnessing as >*third space* that plays around with notions of *trans* as moving across >forms [horizons] as trans-versals [or trans-verse-als] . >I have an intuition that this type of witnessing is radical, going to the >roots of our being human together. > >Aria, I look forward to further re-search Larry > >On Tue, Dec 30, 2014 at 12:00 PM, Aria Razfar wrote: > >> For those of us working with Kris' sociocritical perspective, third >> space has been a valuable construct for thinking about collective >> learning zopeds and consciousness for that matter. It is important to >> clarify what is meant by "third space" and its analogous concepts in >> various schools of thought (e.g., liminality, double consciousness, >> third place, etc.). The post-colonial uptake of third space (e.g., >> Said, Bhaba, Spivak) within the sociocultural theory is a very >> specific stance and this might be the moment for that conversation as >>well. >> >> Aria >> >> Aria Razfar, Ph.D. >> Associate Professor of Literacy, Language, and Culture Director of >> Graduate Studies, Curriculum and Instruction University of Illinois at >> Chicago >> 1040 W. Harrison St. M/C 147 >> Chicago, IL, 60607 >> >> Director of English Learning through Mathematics, Science and Action >> Research (ELMSA) www.elmsa.org >> >> Webpage: http://education.uic.edu/personnel/faculty/aria-razfar-phd >> Tel: 312-413-8373 >> Fax: 312-996-8134 >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Kris Gutierrez >> Sent: Tuesday, December 30, 2014 2:56 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context >> >> Annalisa, Manuel initiated the last uptake. (I think others have >> clarified that now :) >> >> Mike C., Miguel Zavala, Larry Purss and I posted some thoughts before >> the holidays. For me it is useful to connect Manuel?s recent post to >> those earlier thoughts/conversations. >> >> Some very quick very unedited thoughts following up on Manuel?s post: >> >> Michael G., Mike C. correctly points out that the >> testimonios/autobiographies were not research techniques but >> generative tools that were indeed a part of the interconnected set of >> practices that created a collective zoped?a third space if you will. >> I try to elaborate this idea in the Scribner Lecture piece >> (sociocritical literacies). My own work on Third Space, the >> collective work of the instructional team of MSI, ongoing >> conversations with Mike C. and Yrjo over the years at the lab, and >> their work certainly informed this idea of a collective zoped, >> collective third space (See Engestr?m, 1987, 1994 in particular; >> Nicolopoulou & Cole, 1993; Tuomi-Gr?hn & Engestr?m, 2003; Tuomi- >> Gr?hn, Engestr?m, & Young, 2003; Chaiklin, 2003, Moll, 1990; Moll & >> Greenberg, 1990 as key examples that certainly inform this work as >>well. And LSV and Bakhtin are ever present). >> These, I think, are useful references, all cited in the article. >> Shirin Vossoughi?s recent MCA piece also is very relevant to this >>discussion. >> >> Some relevant excerpts from the sociocritical article, >> >> "To illustrate these points and their relation to a collective Third >> Space, let us examine the MSLI more closely. >> The activity system, the MSLI, has a specific internal logic organized >> around expanding the students? sociohistorical and educational ecology >> through the collective imagining of a new educational and >> sociopolitical future. >> To avoid the ?interactional reductionism implicit in much >> Vygotskian-inspired research? (Nicolopoulou & Cole, 1993, p. 284), the >> specific interactions and practices of the MSLI are understood as what >> Nicolopoulou and Cole call a ?genuinely collective reality? (p. 284). >> >> Here we see the [Migrant] institute as an example of the Third Space, >> a collective zo-ped, at the larger level of activity the object of >> which is the sociohistorical reconstruction of what it means to be a >> migrant student. >> This movement involves a process of becoming conscious ?historical >>actors? >> (Espinoza, 2003) who invoke the past in order to re-mediate it so that >> it becomes a resource for current and future action (p. 154)." >> >> Testimonios and their embodiment in Teatro del Oprimido (Boal?s >> Theatre of the Oppressed that Manuel introduced to us and the program >> and that he and Vossoughi elaborated) were key means of >> developing/inciting a new social and pedagogical imagination and for >> imagining new futures with/for the migrant students, their >> communities, and indeed for all of us, as Manuel so thoughtfully >> writes. Teatro served as a collective problem-solving space?a space >> where the playful imagination helped to make inequities and the roots >> of social problems visible, while providing an opportunity to re-frame >> events, re-mediate and enact an imagined future collectively (such as >> flying collectively/social dreaming). I hope Manuel and Shirin jump >> in and elaborate these thoughts. >> >> Re: Research design: For me, Migrant was in Yrjo and Mike's approach, >> a formative experiment; what I term social design experiments?a >> designed based research approach that foregrounds equity, diversity, >> historicity, and re-mediation, for example. As Susan Jurow and I wrote >> and presented at the ICLS conference this summer (a piece that we >> expect will be part of a larger set of papers with Mike C., Yrjo and >> Annalisa, and Bill Penuel), social design experiments: aim to make >> possible a sustainable and dignified life for all humans; address the >> challenges of leveraging cultural diversity and reducing social >> inequality; and call for the co-design of new tools and futures with >> members of non-dominant communities, as but a few key design >> principles. >> >> Absolutely, research as re-searching?searching for the answer to >> a question you have searched for repeatedly without success! Well >> said, Miguel Cole! Thanks, for your thoughts, Michael Glassman! >> >> more on sociocritical literacies, later. kris >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Kris Gutierrez >> gutierkd@gmail.com >> >> Kris D. Guti?rrez >> Professor >> Graduate School of Education >> 5629 Tolman Hall #1670 >> University of California, Berkeley >> Berkeley CA 94720-1670 >> >> Distinguished Professor >> Learning Sciences and Literacy >> School of Education >> University of Colorado, Boulder >> >> >> > On Dec 30, 2014, at 9:50 AM, Annalisa Aguilar >>wrote: >> > >> > Hello! >> > >> > Sorry for being silly here, but I couldn't help but see that so far >> > on >> this thread, there have been appearances by: >> > >> > mike, Annalisa, Michael, Luisa, and Miguel! >> > >> > >> >> >> >> > > From arazfar@uic.edu Wed Dec 31 11:49:53 2014 From: arazfar@uic.edu (Aria Razfar) Date: Wed, 31 Dec 2014 13:49:53 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context In-Reply-To: References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F907E885@CIO-KRC-D2MBX08.osuad.osu.edu> <1419961849204.99@unm.edu> <7334DDE3-FF9A-45E1-8E4C-1D23EF114C72@gmail.com> <00d601d0247b$fb0599d0$f110cd70$@uic.edu> <01fb01d02528$065026a0$12f073e0$@uic.edu> Message-ID: <022e01d02532$f2f85d60$d8e91820$@uic.edu> Mike, would you say that you have been seeking answers to these questions by "going East"? I think Spivak would agree with the second question. In "Translating into English" she talks about how "generations of empiricist English translators have missed the point with Marx's philosophical presuppositions, translated 'inhaltslos' as 'slight in content' and thus made nonsense out of the entire discussion of value. You may have had a smiliar experience translating Vygotsky. Here it is: http://przeklad.nazwa.pl/schowek/spivak2.pdf Aria -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole Sent: Wednesday, December 31, 2014 1:07 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context Aria--- I had not read the Spivak article, although the question she asks is one I have been asking myself for half a century. And, I would add, under what conditions? I found the article here in case others share my ignorance. mike http://www.mcgill.ca/files/crclaw-discourse/Can_the_subaltern_speak.pdf On Wed, Dec 31, 2014 at 10:31 AM, Aria Razfar wrote: > Larry, > > The specific stance that is amplified by the intersections of "third > space" post-colonial theory, sociocultural theory, and "testimonio" is > somewhat apparent in the language choice. There is no English > equivalent because there cannot be an English equivalent. At least, > there cannot be an "English-Only" equivalent. It represents a movement > toward an indigenous stance on voice, agency, knowledge, certainty, > validity, language choice, and learning. I say a "movement toward" > because Spanish itself carries similar baggage especially within the > Latin American context. This is the rationale for why some use the > Aztec idea of Nepantla instead of "Third Space" (e.g., Rochelle > Guiterrez, Gloria Anzaldua). "Testimonio" further complicates what it > means for "subalterns" to "reclaim voice" through the dominant voice. > This is the heart-wrenching question raised by Spivak, "Can the > subaltern speak?" Both the altern and the subaltern need to "step > outside" the inscribed institutional roles, together in order to move > "to the roots of our being human together." Spivak was specfically > critiqueing "the Western intellectual" voice wondering if it truly > could be a tool of liberation. It seems like a "core" identity > question as we move through various historical entanglements seeking > answers to ontological questions of self in relation to other. Also looking forward to this type of re-search. > > Aria > > > > > > Aria Razfar, Ph.D. > Associate Professor of Literacy, Language, and Culture Director of > Graduate Studies, Curriculum and Instruction University of Illinois at > Chicago > 1040 W. Harrison St. M/C 147 > Chicago, IL, 60607 > > Director of English Learning through Mathematics, Science and Action > Research (ELMSA) www.elmsa.org > > Webpage: http://education.uic.edu/personnel/faculty/aria-razfar-phd > Tel: 312-413-8373 > Fax: 312-996-8134 > > This is the heart-wrenching question raised by Spivak, "Can the > subaltern speak?" Both the altern and the subaltern need to "step > outside" the inscribed roles, together in order to move "to the roots > of our being human together." It seems like a "core" identity question > as we move through various historical entanglements seeking answers to > ontological questions of self in relation to other. Also looking > forward to this type of re-search. > > Aria > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces+arazfar=uic.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces+arazfar=uic.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry > xmca-l-bounces+Purss > Sent: Tuesday, December 30, 2014 10:08 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context > > Aria, > I want to repeat and amplify your suggestion : > > It is important to clarify what is meant by "third space" and its > analogous concepts in various schools of thought (e.g., liminality, > double consciousness, third place, etc.). The post-colonial uptake of > third space (e.g., Said, Bhaba, Spivak) within the sociocultural > theory is a very specific stance and this might be the moment for that conversation as well. > > To focus on the *third space* as a VERY SPECIFIC stance. > I would like to become clear on the centrality of *witnessing* as > central or the re-search fades away. > Also terms such as *mutuality* contrasted with *reciprocity* or > *transactions*. > > Testimonios as neither subjective [alone] or objective [alone] but a > hybrid MODE that is a form of witnessing. > I would also suggest the theme of *gift* as more than transaction or > echange [in continental philosophy traditions] is relevant. > > There is a *spirit* and a moral virtue within this form of witnessing > as *third space* that plays around with notions of *trans* as moving > across forms [horizons] as trans-versals [or trans-verse-als] . > I have an intuition that this type of witnessing is radical, going to > the roots of our being human together. > > Aria, I look forward to further re-search Larry > > On Tue, Dec 30, 2014 at 12:00 PM, Aria Razfar wrote: > > > For those of us working with Kris' sociocritical perspective, third > > space has been a valuable construct for thinking about collective > > learning zopeds and consciousness for that matter. It is important > > to clarify what is meant by "third space" and its analogous concepts > > in various schools of thought (e.g., liminality, double > > consciousness, third place, etc.). The post-colonial uptake of third > > space (e.g., Said, Bhaba, Spivak) within the sociocultural theory is > > a very specific stance and this might be the moment for that > > conversation as > well. > > > > Aria > > > > Aria Razfar, Ph.D. > > Associate Professor of Literacy, Language, and Culture Director of > > Graduate Studies, Curriculum and Instruction University of Illinois > > at Chicago > > 1040 W. Harrison St. M/C 147 > > Chicago, IL, 60607 > > > > Director of English Learning through Mathematics, Science and Action > > Research (ELMSA) www.elmsa.org > > > > Webpage: http://education.uic.edu/personnel/faculty/aria-razfar-phd > > Tel: 312-413-8373 > > Fax: 312-996-8134 > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Kris Gutierrez > > Sent: Tuesday, December 30, 2014 2:56 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context > > > > Annalisa, Manuel initiated the last uptake. (I think others have > > clarified that now :) > > > > Mike C., Miguel Zavala, Larry Purss and I posted some thoughts > > before the holidays. For me it is useful to connect Manuel?s recent > > post to those earlier thoughts/conversations. > > > > Some very quick very unedited thoughts following up on Manuel?s post: > > > > Michael G., Mike C. correctly points out that the > > testimonios/autobiographies were not research techniques but > > generative tools that were indeed a part of the interconnected set > > of practices that created a collective zoped?a third space if you will. > > I try to elaborate this idea in the Scribner Lecture piece > > (sociocritical literacies). My own work on Third Space, the > > collective work of the instructional team of MSI, ongoing > > conversations with Mike C. and Yrjo over the years at the lab, and > > their work certainly informed this idea of a collective zoped, > > collective third space (See Engestr?m, 1987, 1994 in particular; > > Nicolopoulou & Cole, 1993; Tuomi-Gr?hn & Engestr?m, 2003; Tuomi- > > Gr?hn, Engestr?m, & Young, 2003; Chaiklin, 2003, Moll, 1990; Moll & > > Greenberg, 1990 as key examples that certainly inform this work as well. > And LSV and Bakhtin are ever present). > > These, I think, are useful references, all cited in the article. > > Shirin Vossoughi?s recent MCA piece also is very relevant to this > discussion. > > > > Some relevant excerpts from the sociocritical article, > > > > "To illustrate these points and their relation to a collective Third > > Space, let us examine the MSLI more closely. > > The activity system, the MSLI, has a specific internal logic > > organized around expanding the students? sociohistorical and > > educational ecology through the collective imagining of a new > > educational and sociopolitical future. > > To avoid the ?interactional reductionism implicit in much > > Vygotskian-inspired research? (Nicolopoulou & Cole, 1993, p. 284), > > the specific interactions and practices of the MSLI are understood > > as what Nicolopoulou and Cole call a ?genuinely collective reality? (p. 284). > > > > Here we see the [Migrant] institute as an example of the Third > > Space, a collective zo-ped, at the larger level of activity the > > object of which is the sociohistorical reconstruction of what it > > means to be a migrant student. > > This movement involves a process of becoming conscious ?historical > actors? > > (Espinoza, 2003) who invoke the past in order to re-mediate it so > > that it becomes a resource for current and future action (p. 154)." > > > > Testimonios and their embodiment in Teatro del Oprimido (Boal?s > > Theatre of the Oppressed that Manuel introduced to us and the > > program and that he and Vossoughi elaborated) were key means of > > developing/inciting a new social and pedagogical imagination and for > > imagining new futures with/for the migrant students, their > > communities, and indeed for all of us, as Manuel so thoughtfully > > writes. Teatro served as a collective problem-solving space?a space > > where the playful imagination helped to make inequities and the > > roots of social problems visible, while providing an opportunity to > > re-frame events, re-mediate and enact an imagined future > > collectively (such as flying collectively/social dreaming). I hope > > Manuel and Shirin jump in and elaborate these thoughts. > > > > Re: Research design: For me, Migrant was in Yrjo and Mike's > > approach, a formative experiment; what I term social design > > experiments?a designed based research approach that foregrounds > > equity, diversity, historicity, and re-mediation, for example. As > > Susan Jurow and I wrote and presented at the ICLS conference this > > summer (a piece that we expect will be part of a larger set of > > papers with Mike C., Yrjo and Annalisa, and Bill Penuel), social > > design experiments: aim to make possible a sustainable and dignified > > life for all humans; address the challenges of leveraging cultural > > diversity and reducing social inequality; and call for the co-design > > of new tools and futures with members of non-dominant communities, > > as but a few key design principles. > > > > Absolutely, research as re-searching?searching for the answer > > to a question you have searched for repeatedly without success! Well > > said, Miguel Cole! Thanks, for your thoughts, Michael Glassman! > > > > more on sociocritical literacies, later. kris > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Kris Gutierrez > > gutierkd@gmail.com > > > > Kris D. Guti?rrez > > Professor > > Graduate School of Education > > 5629 Tolman Hall #1670 > > University of California, Berkeley > > Berkeley CA 94720-1670 > > > > Distinguished Professor > > Learning Sciences and Literacy > > School of Education > > University of Colorado, Boulder > > > > > > > On Dec 30, 2014, at 9:50 AM, Annalisa Aguilar > wrote: > > > > > > Hello! > > > > > > Sorry for being silly here, but I couldn't help but see that so > > > far on > > this thread, there have been appearances by: > > > > > > mike, Annalisa, Michael, Luisa, and Miguel! > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science as an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From mcole@ucsd.edu Wed Dec 31 12:22:50 2014 From: mcole@ucsd.edu (mike cole) Date: Wed, 31 Dec 2014 12:22:50 -0800 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context In-Reply-To: <022e01d02532$f2f85d60$d8e91820$@uic.edu> References: <3B91542B0D4F274D871B38AA48E991F907E885@CIO-KRC-D2MBX08.osuad.osu.edu> <1419961849204.99@unm.edu> <7334DDE3-FF9A-45E1-8E4C-1D23EF114C72@gmail.com> <00d601d0247b$fb0599d0$f110cd70$@uic.edu> <01fb01d02528$065026a0$12f073e0$@uic.edu> <022e01d02532$f2f85d60$d8e91820$@uic.edu> Message-ID: I inherited such questions as part of my family history and my coming to age during the period of post world war II decolonization, Aria, well before I travelled East, as you suggest. Interestingly, it was in going in East that I discovered Dewey.... such was the form of education that led to my phd. Concerning misleading translations. I have PLENTY of problems with issues of translating Vygotsky, in words and in practice! Ask any Russian or scholar whose knowledge of Russian was acquired after the age of 20! (Plenty right here on xmca, one I can see logged into gmail right now). There is a piece in MCA a while back on the perils of translating a key term involving eaching/learning/instruction that is part of an ongoing set of questions about the meaning of the term, zone of proximal development. Peter's note with the distinction between decolonial/postcolonial seems to pick up on some of the themes that various folks who participated in the Migrant program are making. Gotta check out wikipedia on third spaces. The metaphor sure has a lot of homes in a lot of discourse communities and I suspect that some translation will be needed! mike On Wed, Dec 31, 2014 at 11:49 AM, Aria Razfar wrote: > > Mike, would you say that you have been seeking answers to these questions > by "going East"? I think Spivak would agree with the second question. In > "Translating into English" she talks about how "generations of empiricist > English translators have missed the point with Marx's philosophical > presuppositions, translated 'inhaltslos' as 'slight in content' and thus > made nonsense out of the entire discussion of value. You may have had a > smiliar experience translating Vygotsky. > > Here it is: > > http://przeklad.nazwa.pl/schowek/spivak2.pdf > > Aria > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole > Sent: Wednesday, December 31, 2014 1:07 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context > > Aria--- I had not read the Spivak article, although the question she asks > is one I have been asking myself for half a century. And, I would add, > under what conditions? > > I found the article here in case others share my ignorance. > mike > > http://www.mcgill.ca/files/crclaw-discourse/Can_the_subaltern_speak.pdf > > On Wed, Dec 31, 2014 at 10:31 AM, Aria Razfar wrote: > > > Larry, > > > > The specific stance that is amplified by the intersections of "third > > space" post-colonial theory, sociocultural theory, and "testimonio" is > > somewhat apparent in the language choice. There is no English > > equivalent because there cannot be an English equivalent. At least, > > there cannot be an "English-Only" equivalent. It represents a movement > > toward an indigenous stance on voice, agency, knowledge, certainty, > > validity, language choice, and learning. I say a "movement toward" > > because Spanish itself carries similar baggage especially within the > > Latin American context. This is the rationale for why some use the > > Aztec idea of Nepantla instead of "Third Space" (e.g., Rochelle > > Guiterrez, Gloria Anzaldua). "Testimonio" further complicates what it > > means for "subalterns" to "reclaim voice" through the dominant voice. > > This is the heart-wrenching question raised by Spivak, "Can the > > subaltern speak?" Both the altern and the subaltern need to "step > > outside" the inscribed institutional roles, together in order to move > > "to the roots of our being human together." Spivak was specfically > > critiqueing "the Western intellectual" voice wondering if it truly > > could be a tool of liberation. It seems like a "core" identity > > question as we move through various historical entanglements seeking > > answers to ontological questions of self in relation to other. Also > looking forward to this type of re-search. > > > > Aria > > > > > > > > > > > > Aria Razfar, Ph.D. > > Associate Professor of Literacy, Language, and Culture Director of > > Graduate Studies, Curriculum and Instruction University of Illinois at > > Chicago > > 1040 W. Harrison St. M/C 147 > > Chicago, IL, 60607 > > > > Director of English Learning through Mathematics, Science and Action > > Research (ELMSA) www.elmsa.org > > > > Webpage: http://education.uic.edu/personnel/faculty/aria-razfar-phd > > Tel: 312-413-8373 > > Fax: 312-996-8134 > > > > This is the heart-wrenching question raised by Spivak, "Can the > > subaltern speak?" Both the altern and the subaltern need to "step > > outside" the inscribed roles, together in order to move "to the roots > > of our being human together." It seems like a "core" identity question > > as we move through various historical entanglements seeking answers to > > ontological questions of self in relation to other. Also looking > > forward to this type of re-search. > > > > Aria > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces+arazfar=uic.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > xmca-l-bounces+arazfar=uic.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry > > xmca-l-bounces+Purss > > Sent: Tuesday, December 30, 2014 10:08 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context > > > > Aria, > > I want to repeat and amplify your suggestion : > > > > It is important to clarify what is meant by "third space" and its > > analogous concepts in various schools of thought (e.g., liminality, > > double consciousness, third place, etc.). The post-colonial uptake of > > third space (e.g., Said, Bhaba, Spivak) within the sociocultural > > theory is a very specific stance and this might be the moment for that > conversation as well. > > > > To focus on the *third space* as a VERY SPECIFIC stance. > > I would like to become clear on the centrality of *witnessing* as > > central or the re-search fades away. > > Also terms such as *mutuality* contrasted with *reciprocity* or > > *transactions*. > > > > Testimonios as neither subjective [alone] or objective [alone] but a > > hybrid MODE that is a form of witnessing. > > I would also suggest the theme of *gift* as more than transaction or > > echange [in continental philosophy traditions] is relevant. > > > > There is a *spirit* and a moral virtue within this form of witnessing > > as *third space* that plays around with notions of *trans* as moving > > across forms [horizons] as trans-versals [or trans-verse-als] . > > I have an intuition that this type of witnessing is radical, going to > > the roots of our being human together. > > > > Aria, I look forward to further re-search Larry > > > > On Tue, Dec 30, 2014 at 12:00 PM, Aria Razfar wrote: > > > > > For those of us working with Kris' sociocritical perspective, third > > > space has been a valuable construct for thinking about collective > > > learning zopeds and consciousness for that matter. It is important > > > to clarify what is meant by "third space" and its analogous concepts > > > in various schools of thought (e.g., liminality, double > > > consciousness, third place, etc.). The post-colonial uptake of third > > > space (e.g., Said, Bhaba, Spivak) within the sociocultural theory is > > > a very specific stance and this might be the moment for that > > > conversation as > > well. > > > > > > Aria > > > > > > Aria Razfar, Ph.D. > > > Associate Professor of Literacy, Language, and Culture Director of > > > Graduate Studies, Curriculum and Instruction University of Illinois > > > at Chicago > > > 1040 W. Harrison St. M/C 147 > > > Chicago, IL, 60607 > > > > > > Director of English Learning through Mathematics, Science and Action > > > Research (ELMSA) www.elmsa.org > > > > > > Webpage: http://education.uic.edu/personnel/faculty/aria-razfar-phd > > > Tel: 312-413-8373 > > > Fax: 312-996-8134 > > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Kris Gutierrez > > > Sent: Tuesday, December 30, 2014 2:56 PM > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Sociocritical Literacies and more context > > > > > > Annalisa, Manuel initiated the last uptake. (I think others have > > > clarified that now :) > > > > > > Mike C., Miguel Zavala, Larry Purss and I posted some thoughts > > > before the holidays. For me it is useful to connect Manuel?s recent > > > post to those earlier thoughts/conversations. > > > > > > Some very quick very unedited thoughts following up on Manuel?s post: > > > > > > Michael G., Mike C. correctly points out that the > > > testimonios/autobiographies were not research techniques but > > > generative tools that were indeed a part of the interconnected set > > > of practices that created a collective zoped?a third space if you will. > > > I try to elaborate this idea in the Scribner Lecture piece > > > (sociocritical literacies). My own work on Third Space, the > > > collective work of the instructional team of MSI, ongoing > > > conversations with Mike C. and Yrjo over the years at the lab, and > > > their work certainly informed this idea of a collective zoped, > > > collective third space (See Engestr?m, 1987, 1994 in particular; > > > Nicolopoulou & Cole, 1993; Tuomi-Gr?hn & Engestr?m, 2003; Tuomi- > > > Gr?hn, Engestr?m, & Young, 2003; Chaiklin, 2003, Moll, 1990; Moll & > > > Greenberg, 1990 as key examples that certainly inform this work as > well. > > And LSV and Bakhtin are ever present). > > > These, I think, are useful references, all cited in the article. > > > Shirin Vossoughi?s recent MCA piece also is very relevant to this > > discussion. > > > > > > Some relevant excerpts from the sociocritical article, > > > > > > "To illustrate these points and their relation to a collective Third > > > Space, let us examine the MSLI more closely. > > > The activity system, the MSLI, has a specific internal logic > > > organized around expanding the students? sociohistorical and > > > educational ecology through the collective imagining of a new > > > educational and sociopolitical future. > > > To avoid the ?interactional reductionism implicit in much > > > Vygotskian-inspired research? (Nicolopoulou & Cole, 1993, p. 284), > > > the specific interactions and practices of the MSLI are understood > > > as what Nicolopoulou and Cole call a ?genuinely collective reality? > (p. 284). > > > > > > Here we see the [Migrant] institute as an example of the Third > > > Space, a collective zo-ped, at the larger level of activity the > > > object of which is the sociohistorical reconstruction of what it > > > means to be a migrant student. > > > This movement involves a process of becoming conscious ?historical > > actors? > > > (Espinoza, 2003) who invoke the past in order to re-mediate it so > > > that it becomes a resource for current and future action (p. 154)." > > > > > > Testimonios and their embodiment in Teatro del Oprimido (Boal?s > > > Theatre of the Oppressed that Manuel introduced to us and the > > > program and that he and Vossoughi elaborated) were key means of > > > developing/inciting a new social and pedagogical imagination and for > > > imagining new futures with/for the migrant students, their > > > communities, and indeed for all of us, as Manuel so thoughtfully > > > writes. Teatro served as a collective problem-solving space?a space > > > where the playful imagination helped to make inequities and the > > > roots of social problems visible, while providing an opportunity to > > > re-frame events, re-mediate and enact an imagined future > > > collectively (such as flying collectively/social dreaming). I hope > > > Manuel and Shirin jump in and elaborate these thoughts. > > > > > > Re: Research design: For me, Migrant was in Yrjo and Mike's > > > approach, a formative experiment; what I term social design > > > experiments?a designed based research approach that foregrounds > > > equity, diversity, historicity, and re-mediation, for example. As > > > Susan Jurow and I wrote and presented at the ICLS conference this > > > summer (a piece that we expect will be part of a larger set of > > > papers with Mike C., Yrjo and Annalisa, and Bill Penuel), social > > > design experiments: aim to make possible a sustainable and dignified > > > life for all humans; address the challenges of leveraging cultural > > > diversity and reducing social inequality; and call for the co-design > > > of new tools and futures with members of non-dominant communities, > > > as but a few key design principles. > > > > > > Absolutely, research as re-searching?searching for the answer > > > to a question you have searched for repeatedly without success! Well > > > said, Miguel Cole! Thanks, for your thoughts, Michael Glassman! > > > > > > more on sociocritical literacies, later. kris > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Kris Gutierrez > > > gutierkd@gmail.com > > > > > > Kris D. Guti?rrez > > > Professor > > > Graduate School of Education > > > 5629 Tolman Hall #1670 > > > University of California, Berkeley > > > Berkeley CA 94720-1670 > > > > > > Distinguished Professor > > > Learning Sciences and Literacy > > > School of Education > > > University of Colorado, Boulder > > > > > > > > > > On Dec 30, 2014, at 9:50 AM, Annalisa Aguilar > > wrote: > > > > > > > > Hello! > > > > > > > > Sorry for being silly here, but I couldn't help but see that so > > > > far on > > > this thread, there have been appearances by: > > > > > > > > mike, Annalisa, Michael, Luisa, and Miguel! > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science as an > object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. > > > -- It is the dilemma of psychology to deal with a natural science as an object that creates history. Ernst Boesch. From anamshane@gmail.com Wed Dec 31 19:07:00 2014 From: anamshane@gmail.com (Ana Marjanovic-Shane) Date: Wed, 31 Dec 2014 22:07:00 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Happy New Year Message-ID: Dear Friends, Happy New 2015 Year! Let it be much better than the old one! May all people find peace, prosperity and joy among friends and family! See you next year! Ana ____________________________________ Ana Marjanovic-Shane Deputy Editor-in-Chief, Dialogic Pedagogy Journal Associate Professor of Education Chestnut Hill College Emails: anamshane@gmail.com shaneam@chc.edu Phone: 267-334-2905 From daniel.a.hyman.0@gmail.com Wed Dec 31 22:06:19 2014 From: daniel.a.hyman.0@gmail.com (Daniel Hyman) Date: Thu, 1 Jan 2015 01:06:19 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Happy New Year In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Amen to that - warm regards! All best, Dan and Elina On Wednesday, December 31, 2014, Ana Marjanovic-Shane wrote: > Dear Friends, > > Happy New 2015 Year! > > Let it be much better than the old one! > May all people find peace, prosperity and joy among friends and family! > > See you next year! > > Ana > > > > ____________________________________ > Ana Marjanovic-Shane > Deputy Editor-in-Chief, Dialogic Pedagogy Journal > Associate Professor of Education > Chestnut Hill College > Emails: anamshane@gmail.com > shaneam@chc.edu > Phone: 267-334-2905 > > > > > > > > > >