[Xmca-l] Re: meaning and sense

Larry Purss lpscholar2@gmail.com
Thu Aug 22 07:12:33 PDT 2013


Andy,

Thanks for keepin
Thanks for keeping this topic of sense and meaning alive.
Mike also is drawing our attention to the mystery of the creative process
with this comment: "I agree, very clearly statements of the sense/meaning
relation, along with the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I wanted
to say, and thought, unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows."
Thought, unembodied, returns to the hall of shadows.
I have been reflecting on the phenomenological method or *bias* to
prioritize *showing* as an action which brings thoughts from the shadows.
The concept or term "metaphor" which can itself be considered a metaphor.
Metaphor is derived from the verb *metapherein" which means "to transfer"
which originally described a CONCRETE reality [Ernesto Grassi].
Therefore *presenting* a new metaphor IS an argument or a reason [a showing
in phenomenological discourse]
The question is if presenting [as a showing or gesture] a metaphor is
presenting a *vehicle* or an "egg" which "carries" thoughts from speaker to
hearer [which suggests the word is then decoded and RE-presented in the
listener's "mind"
Or, on the other hand, is presenting a metaphor actually metapherein [a
verb] which "transfers" [shifts, turns] knowing in a phenomenological "aha"
moment? Metaphor AS showing or presenting [FORMING sense], not metaphor as
a *carrier* of thought which *represents* the sense of the speaker.
I am "over my head" in these realms and my "logic" may be faulty, but the
power of metaphor as "hinge" or "pivot" seems central.
Peter Jones made a comment on literacy and "representation"
Ernesto Grassi is making the point that presenting [showing] a new metaphor
IS an argument producing a type of knowledge [sense]
Can metapherein be *seen* [picture language] as new and novel ways of
acting as transfering *sense* to *pictures* as a *psychological instrument*
and thus as a cultural resource? The ACT of 'transfer' as presentation
within metaphor [something AS something else] understood as a psychological
and cultural tool, a PRACTICAL intersubjective resource with which [and
THROUGH which we think, act, and perceive.
Sense AS perception & action mediated through felt experience which is
"presented" [shown] through *turning* objects to present other sides and
therefore to perceive other aspects. Polysemy through metepherein as one
*way* of knowing as argumentation.
This is questioning the relation between *forming* as presentation/showing
&
*formed* as representation of what was previously presented.
Merleau-Ponty's dynamic between sedimentation/spontaneityg this topic of
sense and meaning alive.

Mike also is drawing our attention to the mystery of the creative process
with this comment: "I agree, very clearly statements of the sense/meaning
relation, along with the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I wanted
to say, and thought, unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows."

Thought, unembodied, returns to the hall of shadows.
I have been reflecting on the phenomenological method or *bias* to
prioritize *showing* as an action which brings thoughts from the shadows.

The concept or term "metaphor" which can itself be considered a metaphor.
Metaphor is derived from the verb *metapherein" which means "to transfer"
which originally described a CONCRETE reality [Ernesto Grassi].
Therefore *presenting* a new metaphor IS an argument or a reason [a showing
in phenomenological discourse]
The question is if presenting [as a showing or gesture] a metaphor is
presenting a *vehicle* or an "egg" which "carries" thoughts from speaker to
hearer [which suggests the word is then decoded and RE-presented in the
listener's "mind"
Or, on the other hand, is presenting a metaphor actually metapherein [a
verb] which "transfers" [shifts, turns] knowing in a phenomenological "aha"
moment? Metaphor AS showing or presenting [FORMING sense], not metaphor as
a *carrier* of thought which *represents* the sense of the speaker.
I am "over my head" in these realms and my "logic" may be faulty, but the
power of metaphor as "hinge" or "pivot" seems central.
Peter Jones made a comment on literacy and "representation"
Ernesto Grassi is making the point that presenting [showing] a new metaphor
IS an argument producing a type of knowledge [sense]
Can metapherein be *seen* [picture language] as new and novel ways of
acting as transfering *sense* by showing and creating metaphors
as *pictures* as a *psychological instrument* and thus as a cultural
resource? The ACT of 'transfer' as presentation within metaphor [something
AS something else] understood as a psychological and cultural tool, a
PRACTICAL intersubjective resource with which [and THROUGH which] we think,
act, and perceive.
Greg, I wonder if this showing is always volitional [under our control] or
if we spontaneously "respond" intersubjectively?

 Sense AS perception & action mediated through felt experience which is
"presented" [shown] through *turning* objects to present other sides and
therefore to perceive other aspects. Polysemy through metepherein as one
*way* of knowing as argumentation. Intersubjective not subjective.
This is questioning the relation between
 *forming* as presentation/showing
&
 *formed* as representation of what was previously presented.

Merleau-Ponty's dynamic between sedimentation/spontaneity as expressive
cognition.

I hope I am making sense in my drawing attention to the relation between
thoughts and shadows.
Huw, asked if there is a question here? I would say the question is the
models of "sense" as presentations [showings] and representations.
Merleau-Ponty understood words AS GESTURES.
Is there any "truth" to this notion?
Larry


On Wed, Aug 21, 2013 at 11:24 PM, Andy Blunden <ablunden@mira.net> wrote:

> I was just looking into this business about Vygotsky imputing excessive
> stablility to word meaning. The following key passage from Chapter 7 of
> "Thinking and Speech" does not, it appers to me, to imply such stability:
>
>    "First, in inner speech, we find a predominance of the word’s sense
>    over its meaning. Paulhan significantly advanced the psychological
>    analysis of speech by introducing the distinction between a word’s
>    sense and meaning. A word’s sense is the aggregate of all the
>    psychological facts that arise in our consciousness as a result of
>    the word. Sense is a dynamic, fluid, and complex formation which has
>    several zones that vary in their stability. Meaning is only one of
>    these zones of the sense that the word acquires in the context of
>    speech. It is the most stable, unified, and precise of these zones.
>    In different contexts, a word’s sense changes. In contrast, meaning
>    is a comparatively fixed and stable point, one that remains constant
>    with all the changes of the word’s sense that are associated with
>    its use in various contexts. Change in the word’s sense is a basic
>    factor in the semantic analysis of speech. The actual meaning of the
>    word is inconstant. In one operation, the word emerges with one
>    meaning; in another, another is acquired. The dynamic nature of
>    meaning leads us to Paulhan’s problem, to the problem of the
>    relationship between meaning and sense. Isolated in the lexicon, the
>    word has only one meaning. However, this meaning is nothing more
>    than a potential that can only be realized in living speech, and in
>    living speech meaning is only a cornerstone in the edifice of sense."
>
> As I read this, the stability of meaning is merely relative to that of
> sense, i.e., in the context of speech, rather than "teh aggregate of all
> psychological facts." He is not at all denying the fact of polysemy or the
> cultural and historical migration of meaning.
>
> Andy
> mike cole wrote:
>
>> I agree, very clearly statements of the sense/meaning relation, along with
>> the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I wanted to say, and thought,
>> unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows."
>>
>> In the quote here, I think LSV is somewhat overstating the stability of
>> meaning across contexts; yes relative to the microgenetic processes of
>> sense making capturable with
>> modern technologies, but not totally "context independent." Even
>> dictionary
>> meanings change, as LSV was well aware from his interest in the history of
>> words in relation to their appearance in children's vocabularies in
>> ontogeny.
>>
>> Keeping the simultaneous relevance of several time scales in mind in these
>> discussions seems really important, as hard as it is to do.
>> mike
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
>


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