From lchcmike@gmail.com Tue Aug 6 12:19:55 2013 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Tue, 6 Aug 2013 12:19:55 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: XCMA migration In-Reply-To: <3A2088BD5BE2834C8BBE0B01883195571421209A@XMAIL-MBX-BH2.AD.UCSD.EDU> References: <3A2088BD5BE2834C8BBE0B01883195571421209A@XMAIL-MBX-BH2.AD.UCSD.EDU> Message-ID: Thanks Silas! Lets hope that xmca, unlike humpty dumpty gets together again. :-) mike On Tue, Aug 6, 2013 at 12:14 PM, Horton, Silas wrote: > Hi everyone, > > I apologize for the blackout that occurred through the past few days. > There was a migration planned by the list owner but it didn't go so well > (he's on vacation now). I took access over the new list and subscribed > everyone. > > Please use xmca-l@ucsd.edu for email for the time > being. xmca@weber.ucsd.edu should forward to > this new list. I am working with our campus postmaster to setup an alias, > xmca@ucsd.edu. There will be no message archival > until the list owner returns from vacation next week, but it's working list. > > Best, > Silas Horton > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Tue Aug 6 20:54:10 2013 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Wed, 7 Aug 2013 04:54:10 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: XCMA migration In-Reply-To: <3A2088BD5BE2834C8BBE0B01883195571421209A@XMAIL-MBX-BH2.AD.UCSD.EDU> References: <3A2088BD5BE2834C8BBE0B01883195571421209A@XMAIL-MBX-BH2.AD.UCSD.EDU> Message-ID: Thanks for this, Silas. Huw On 6 August 2013 20:14, Horton, Silas wrote: > Hi everyone, > > I apologize for the blackout that occurred through the past few days. > There was a migration planned by the list owner but it didn't go so well > (he's on vacation now). I took access over the new list and subscribed > everyone. > > Please use xmca-l@ucsd.edu for email for the time > being. xmca@weber.ucsd.edu should forward to > this new list. I am working with our campus postmaster to setup an alias, > xmca@ucsd.edu. There will be no message archival > until the list owner returns from vacation next week, but it's working list. > > Best, > Silas Horton > From lchcmike@gmail.com Wed Aug 7 09:38:07 2013 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Wed, 7 Aug 2013 09:38:07 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Job opening and xmca-l mail Message-ID: I am still unclear if people are seeing and know to write to xmca-l@ucsd.eduwhile we seek to straighten out the local configurations of mail lists and servers at UCSD. Lots of dropped threads. meantime, here is a job for someone. mike ------------- The role: The University of Queensland School of Psychology is currently seeking a Lecturer in the field of Developmental Psychology to start in early 2014. The appointee will undertake undergraduate and postgraduate teaching, research supervision, and research in relevant areas. The successful applicant will be expected to develop an independent program of externally funded research. Course coordination and administrative service within the School will be required. School of Psychology: The School of Psychology is one of the largest and most prestigious schools of psychology in Australia, and its strong reputation is built on excellence in both research and teaching. There is a strong tradition of developmental psychology at the University of Queensland, spanning the discipline from basic research to applied and clinical work. The School hosts the Early Cognitive Development Centre, a dedicated facility for recruiting and testing infants and young children (http://www.psy.uq.edu.au/research/ecdc/). Also within the School is the Parenting and Family Support Centre, a research and training facility that focuses on understanding and ameliorating behavioural and emotional problems in children. The School has ongoing research links with local and state-wide primary schools, as well as a number of private educational institutions serving children with developmental disorders. The School also has continuing collaborative research relationships with paediatric researchers at several Brisbane hospitals. The person: Applicants will hold a PhD in the area of Developmental Psychology or a closely related discipline. The appointee will have an established research track record, as well as ability in teaching undergraduate and postgraduate programs in developmental psychology, and supervising honours and postgraduate students. Remuneration: The appointment will be made on a full-time, fixed term basis at Academic Level B for a period of 5 years. The remuneration package will be in the range of $81,857 to $97,205 p.a., plus employer superannuation contributions of up to 17% (total package will be in the range of $95,773 - $113,730 p.a.). Enquiries: To discuss this role please contact Professor Virginia Slaughter on +61 7 3365 6220 or hos@psy.uq.edu.au. From lchcmike@gmail.com Wed Aug 7 10:24:27 2013 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Wed, 7 Aug 2013 10:24:27 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [xmca] Educational neuroscience - from Mike Cole In-Reply-To: <51F7CEB8.5070105@mira.net> References: <51F72F94.2030405@mira.net> <51F73627.9050604@mira.net> <1375194373.69569.YahooMailNeo@web181205.mail.ne1.yahoo.com> <51F7CEB8.5070105@mira.net> Message-ID: "Mind is a non-accidental mosaic" ARLura, Nature of Human conflicts. On Tue, Jul 30, 2013 at 7:33 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Mozaic is fine by me. That was the kind of image I had in mind. > Andy > > Peg Griffin wrote: > >> As I see Luria?s dual stimulation, Andy, you have to go beyond the idea >> of sub-systems. It?s mosaics, I?m afraid. >> >> Two actions closely related yes. But, in fact, the first one has some >> hidden attributes (or maybe some hiding states) and so you barge in with >> the second closely related in some (maybe odd) way? seemingly abandoning >> the first ? and the hidden or hiding in the first can be made observable. >> So whether Luria thinks about a clinician or a diagnostician or an actively >> engaged patient, the dual stimulation method can serve one well. >> >> Zasetsky, for instance, learned a way to recognize printed letters/words >> (a picture visualization as I recall) in spite of massive brain damage but >> sometimes it failed (some part was hidden from use) so he?d appear to >> abandon the first stimulation and start up the second stimulation (maybe >> reciting the letters in some order). The second was so closely yoked to >> the first that sooner or later there?d be a sort of collision. Using the >> second stimulation, he?d sooner or later get to the letter that had been >> ?hiding? when he had been relying on his first stimulation so whoosh the >> second stimulation would now be interrupted and abandoned by the not really >> ever abandoned first simulation and he could go back to recognizing letters >> and getting the words in the print using his preferred first system. >> Maybe? >> >> >> >> ------------------------------**------------------------------** >> ------------ >> *From:* Andy Blunden >> *To:* "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >> *Sent:* Monday, July 29, 2013 11:42 PM >> *Subject:* Re: [xmca] Educational neuroscience - from Mike Cole >> >> >> So we have 4 distinct but interrelated concepts: system, model, unit of >> analysis and method. >> I will try to formulate a view on unit of analysis and method. >> The idea of "artefact-mediated (collaborative) action" as a unit of >> analysis (a generalisation of "word meaning") is the basis for the "method >> of dual stimulation," as I see it. >> Once you have a concept of that S - X - R triangle, as the unit of >> action, then it suggests a method of investigation based on offering the >> auxilliary stimulus, the artifact X, to the subject, S, to assist them to >> complete the task, R. By varying teh artefact X and the task R, >> investigation of S is possible. >> >> Likewise, let us suppose that you see the mind as a psychological system >> made up of functional subsystems each of which are interconnected, >> irrespective of whether the subsystem in question itself produces >> observable phenomena. This could be represented in a diagram, too, >> something like S -> Ssys1 ---> Ssys2 -> R, meaning that every subsystem >> (Ssys1) is connected with every other (Ssys2), and disturbance of Ssys1 >> will cause a disturbance to Ssys2, which may be manifeted in an observable >> response, R. >> So the implication of this is that the "unit of analysis" of an entire >> psychological system is two functional subsystems with an interconnection. >> Ssys1 --- Ssys2. >> This is not trivial, because much of Ssys1 will not be observable, and >> this unit of analysis allows the investigator to study Ssys1 by means of >> the observable responses via Ssys2. >> >> The unit of analysis suggests the method. >> >> Andy >> >> Andy Blunden wrote: >> > I think the issue is HOW one makes observable the "unintended motor >> responses", Andy. >> > The issue of whether the combined motor *method* is a unit of analysis. >> I think it is a method. >> > what whole is it the simplest instance of? It is a method for being >> able to identify with some degree of certainty what another person is >> thinking about. Help me get from there to what it is a unit of analysis of. >> > >> > mike >> > >> > ps- why is this not on xmca.... >> > (Andy mistakenly sent his previous message to Mike alone. This is just >> to put it all back on xmca) >> > >> > >> > >> > >> >> -- >> ------------------------------**------------------------------** >> ------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ >> Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts >> http://marxists.academia.edu/**AndyBlunden >> >> >> >> >> > -- > ------------------------------**------------------------------** > ------------ > *Andy Blunden* > Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts > http://marxists.academia.edu/**AndyBlunden > > > From lchcmike@gmail.com Wed Aug 7 10:24:27 2013 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Wed, 7 Aug 2013 10:24:27 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [xmca] Educational neuroscience - from Mike Cole In-Reply-To: <51F7CEB8.5070105@mira.net> References: <51F72F94.2030405@mira.net> <51F73627.9050604@mira.net> <1375194373.69569.YahooMailNeo@web181205.mail.ne1.yahoo.com> <51F7CEB8.5070105@mira.net> Message-ID: "Mind is a non-accidental mosaic" ARLura, Nature of Human conflicts. On Tue, Jul 30, 2013 at 7:33 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Mozaic is fine by me. That was the kind of image I had in mind. > Andy > > Peg Griffin wrote: > >> As I see Luria?s dual stimulation, Andy, you have to go beyond the idea >> of sub-systems. It?s mosaics, I?m afraid. >> >> Two actions closely related yes. But, in fact, the first one has some >> hidden attributes (or maybe some hiding states) and so you barge in with >> the second closely related in some (maybe odd) way? seemingly abandoning >> the first ? and the hidden or hiding in the first can be made observable. >> So whether Luria thinks about a clinician or a diagnostician or an actively >> engaged patient, the dual stimulation method can serve one well. >> >> Zasetsky, for instance, learned a way to recognize printed letters/words >> (a picture visualization as I recall) in spite of massive brain damage but >> sometimes it failed (some part was hidden from use) so he?d appear to >> abandon the first stimulation and start up the second stimulation (maybe >> reciting the letters in some order). The second was so closely yoked to >> the first that sooner or later there?d be a sort of collision. Using the >> second stimulation, he?d sooner or later get to the letter that had been >> ?hiding? when he had been relying on his first stimulation so whoosh the >> second stimulation would now be interrupted and abandoned by the not really >> ever abandoned first simulation and he could go back to recognizing letters >> and getting the words in the print using his preferred first system. >> Maybe? >> >> >> >> ------------------------------**------------------------------** >> ------------ >> *From:* Andy Blunden >> *To:* "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >> *Sent:* Monday, July 29, 2013 11:42 PM >> *Subject:* Re: [xmca] Educational neuroscience - from Mike Cole >> >> >> So we have 4 distinct but interrelated concepts: system, model, unit of >> analysis and method. >> I will try to formulate a view on unit of analysis and method. >> The idea of "artefact-mediated (collaborative) action" as a unit of >> analysis (a generalisation of "word meaning") is the basis for the "method >> of dual stimulation," as I see it. >> Once you have a concept of that S - X - R triangle, as the unit of >> action, then it suggests a method of investigation based on offering the >> auxilliary stimulus, the artifact X, to the subject, S, to assist them to >> complete the task, R. By varying teh artefact X and the task R, >> investigation of S is possible. >> >> Likewise, let us suppose that you see the mind as a psychological system >> made up of functional subsystems each of which are interconnected, >> irrespective of whether the subsystem in question itself produces >> observable phenomena. This could be represented in a diagram, too, >> something like S -> Ssys1 ---> Ssys2 -> R, meaning that every subsystem >> (Ssys1) is connected with every other (Ssys2), and disturbance of Ssys1 >> will cause a disturbance to Ssys2, which may be manifeted in an observable >> response, R. >> So the implication of this is that the "unit of analysis" of an entire >> psychological system is two functional subsystems with an interconnection. >> Ssys1 --- Ssys2. >> This is not trivial, because much of Ssys1 will not be observable, and >> this unit of analysis allows the investigator to study Ssys1 by means of >> the observable responses via Ssys2. >> >> The unit of analysis suggests the method. >> >> Andy >> >> Andy Blunden wrote: >> > I think the issue is HOW one makes observable the "unintended motor >> responses", Andy. >> > The issue of whether the combined motor *method* is a unit of analysis. >> I think it is a method. >> > what whole is it the simplest instance of? It is a method for being >> able to identify with some degree of certainty what another person is >> thinking about. Help me get from there to what it is a unit of analysis of. >> > >> > mike >> > >> > ps- why is this not on xmca.... >> > (Andy mistakenly sent his previous message to Mike alone. This is just >> to put it all back on xmca) >> > >> > >> > >> > >> >> -- >> ------------------------------**------------------------------** >> ------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ >> Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts >> http://marxists.academia.edu/**AndyBlunden >> >> >> >> >> > -- > ------------------------------**------------------------------** > ------------ > *Andy Blunden* > Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts > http://marxists.academia.edu/**AndyBlunden > > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Wed Aug 7 10:34:11 2013 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Wed, 7 Aug 2013 18:34:11 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] ping Message-ID: testing. From j.vadeboncoeur@ubc.ca Wed Aug 7 10:33:58 2013 From: j.vadeboncoeur@ubc.ca (Vadeboncoeur, Jennifer) Date: Wed, 7 Aug 2013 17:33:58 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Job opening and xmca-l mail In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <02B7D7BA-8361-4073-8B9B-E0908290589B@mail.ubc.ca> Hi Mike, Thanks for forwarding this, looks like XMCA is up again! Best - jen On 2013-08-07, at 9:38 AM, mike cole wrote: > I am still unclear if people are seeing and know to write to > xmca-l@ucsd.eduwhile we seek to straighten out > the local configurations of mail lists and servers at UCSD. Lots of dropped > threads. > > meantime, here is a job for someone. > mike > ------------- > > The role: The University of Queensland School of Psychology is currently > seeking a Lecturer in the field of Developmental Psychology to start in > early 2014. The appointee will undertake undergraduate and postgraduate > teaching, research supervision, and research in relevant areas. The > successful applicant will be expected to develop an independent program of > externally funded research. Course coordination and administrative service > within the School will be required. School of Psychology: The School of > Psychology is one of the largest and most prestigious schools of psychology > in Australia, and its strong reputation is built on excellence in both > research and teaching. There is a strong tradition of developmental > psychology at the University of Queensland, spanning the discipline from > basic research to applied and clinical work. The School hosts the Early > Cognitive Development Centre, a dedicated facility for recruiting and > testing infants and young children (http://www.psy.uq.edu.au/research/ecdc/). > Also within the School is the Parenting and Family Support Centre, a > research and training facility that focuses on understanding and > ameliorating behavioural and emotional problems in children. The School has > ongoing research links with local and state-wide primary schools, as well > as a number of private educational institutions serving children with > developmental disorders. The School also has continuing collaborative > research relationships with paediatric researchers at several Brisbane > hospitals. The person: Applicants will hold a PhD in the area of > Developmental Psychology or a closely related discipline. The appointee > will have an established research track record, as well as ability in > teaching undergraduate and postgraduate programs in developmental > psychology, and supervising honours and postgraduate students. > Remuneration: The appointment will be made on a full-time, fixed term basis > at Academic Level B for a period of 5 years. The remuneration package will > be in the range of $81,857 to $97,205 p.a., plus employer superannuation > contributions of up to 17% (total package will be in the range of $95,773 - > $113,730 p.a.). Enquiries: To discuss this role please contact Professor > Virginia Slaughter on +61 7 3365 6220 or hos@psy.uq.edu.au. From r.j.s.parsons@open.ac.uk Wed Aug 7 10:54:41 2013 From: r.j.s.parsons@open.ac.uk (rjsp2) Date: Wed, 7 Aug 2013 18:54:41 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: ping back In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <520289E1.4080006@open.ac.uk> dong... On 07/08/2013 18:34, Huw Lloyd wrote: > testing. -- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC 038302). From lchcmike@gmail.com Wed Aug 7 10:57:33 2013 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Wed, 7 Aug 2013 10:57:33 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: ping In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Seems we are up and ready for chatting. mike On Wed, Aug 7, 2013 at 10:34 AM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > testing. > From laires11@gmail.com Wed Aug 7 11:03:40 2013 From: laires11@gmail.com (Luisa Aires) Date: Wed, 7 Aug 2013 19:03:40 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: ping back In-Reply-To: <520289E1.4080006@open.ac.uk> References: <520289E1.4080006@open.ac.uk> Message-ID: And the Portuguese Open University (Universidade Aberta) is established in 1988 as the only institution of public higher education in Portugal of Distance Learning ;-) On 7 August 2013 18:54, rjsp2 wrote: > dong... > On 07/08/2013 18:34, Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> testing. >> > > -- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an > exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC > 038302). > > -- Lu?sa Aires Universidade Aberta, Porto R.Amial, n? 752 4200-055 Porto laires@uab.pt From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Wed Aug 7 11:05:55 2013 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Wed, 7 Aug 2013 19:05:55 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] operational def'n of UoA (was Re: Re: ping) Message-ID: Well I am currently looking for specific text on how leont'ev operationally defines a unit of analysis of activity, I'm sure I'll find details, but some pointers may help me get there faster. Thanks, Huw On 7 August 2013 18:57, mike cole wrote: > Seems we are up and ready for chatting. > mike > > On Wed, Aug 7, 2013 at 10:34 AM, Huw Lloyd >wrote: > > > testing. > > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Wed Aug 7 11:29:04 2013 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Wed, 7 Aug 2013 19:29:04 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] digest emails Message-ID: Bruce, Silas, There are probably other's, like David (see below), who wish to retain their digest emails. Best, Huw ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: David Spendlove Date: 7 August 2013 18:39 Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] ping To: "huw.softdesigns@gmail.com" Hi Hugh Not sure if you are the correct person to ask but I used to get a digest of XMCA mails as I can't cope with the number of emails. Is it possible that I can be switched back to a digest or if not can you unsubscribe me? Thanks David __________________________________________________ Dr David Spendlove Programme Director Manchester Institute of Education University of Manchester B4.6 Ellen Wilkinson Building Oxford Road Manchester M13 9PL B4. 6 Ellen Wilkinson Building Manchester M13 9PL http://davidspendlove.wordpress.com/ ____________________________________________________ This e-mail is intended solely for the addressee. If you are not the addressee please do not read, print, re-transmit, store or act in reliance on it or any attachments. Unless otherwise expressly agreed by the sender of this email, this communication may contain privileged or confidential information which may not be used or disclosed except for the purpose for which it has been sent. This email should not be forwarded or copied to others not originally in the distribution list without my permission > From: Huw Lloyd > Reply-To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Date: Wed, 7 Aug 2013 18:34:11 +0100 > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] ping > > testing. From shorton@ucsd.edu Wed Aug 7 12:08:32 2013 From: shorton@ucsd.edu (Horton, Silas) Date: Wed, 7 Aug 2013 19:08:32 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: digest emails In-Reply-To: References: <3A2088BD5BE2834C8BBE0B018831955714212787@XMAIL-MBX-BH2.AD.UCSD.EDU> Message-ID: <3A2088BD5BE2834C8BBE0B0188319557142127BF@XMAIL-MBX-BH2.AD.UCSD.EDU> Yes, this new list allows members to unsubscribe themselves or sign-up for digest. It's a two-step process (unless they already know their list password). Members will need go here and login (or obtain their password by email): https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/options/xmca-l Once they obtain their password and login, they can edit their membership options (change password, turn on digest, etc.). Best, Silas From: mike cole [mailto:lchcmike@gmail.com] Sent: Wednesday, August 7, 2013 12:01 PM To: Horton, Silas Cc: Huw Lloyd; Bruce Jones Subject: Re: digest emails The info about how to sign up for digest should be available to xmca members. Doable? mike On Wed, Aug 7, 2013 at 11:40 AM, Horton, Silas > wrote: Hi Huw, I am unsure of the digest settings that Bruce setup previously. I have left them at default for the time being (daily digest). I added David as a digest email. David, please contact me if the digest doesn't work. Thanks, Silas From: Huw Lloyd [mailto:huw.softdesigns@gmail.com] Sent: Wednesday, August 7, 2013 11:29 AM To: Bruce Jones; Horton, Silas; xmca-l@ucsd.edu Subject: digest emails Bruce, Silas, There are probably other's, like David (see below), who wish to retain their digest emails. Best, Huw ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: David Spendlove > Date: 7 August 2013 18:39 Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] ping To: "huw.softdesigns@gmail.com" > Hi Hugh Not sure if you are the correct person to ask but I used to get a digest of XMCA mails as I can't cope with the number of emails. Is it possible that I can be switched back to a digest or if not can you unsubscribe me? Thanks David __________________________________________________ Dr David Spendlove Programme Director Manchester Institute of Education University of Manchester B4.6 Ellen Wilkinson Building Oxford Road Manchester M13 9PL B4. 6 Ellen Wilkinson Building Manchester M13 9PL http://davidspendlove.wordpress.com/ ____________________________________________________ This e-mail is intended solely for the addressee. If you are not the addressee please do not read, print, re-transmit, store or act in reliance on it or any attachments. Unless otherwise expressly agreed by the sender of this email, this communication may contain privileged or confidential information which may not be used or disclosed except for the purpose for which it has been sent. This email should not be forwarded or copied to others not originally in the distribution list without my permission > From: Huw Lloyd > > Reply-To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > Date: Wed, 7 Aug 2013 18:34:11 +0100 > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > Subject: [Xmca-l] ping > > testing. From ablunden@mira.net Wed Aug 7 14:04:31 2013 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Thu, 08 Aug 2013 07:04:31 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: operational def'n of UoA (was Re: Re: ping) In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <5202B65F.80903@mira.net> From ablunden@mira.net Wed Aug 7 14:14:52 2013 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Thu, 08 Aug 2013 07:14:52 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> Leontyev says that an activity is defined by its motive. See "The Development of Mind," Leontyev 2009, p. 28-29 http://www.erythrospress.com/store/leontyev.html But Leontyev, in my opinion, does not adequately distinguish between "an activity" and "a type of activity," leading to confusion on this point. Plus the fact that the object or motive is given externally to the activity, underming his claim to have created an activity theory, rather than a theory of human needs. Andy ------------------------------- The specific processes that realise some vital, i.e. active, relation of the subject to reality we shall term processes of /activity/, in distinction to other processes. We shall also, accordingly, limit the concept of object. It is normally used in a dual sense: in the broadest one as a thing standing in some kind of relation to other things, i.e. as ?a thing having existence?; and in a narrower sense ? as something withstanding (German /Gegenstand/), resistant (Latin /objectum/), that to which an act is directed, i.e. as something to which precisely a living creature relates itself as the /object of its activity/ ? indifferently as outward or inward activity (e. g. /object of nutrition/, /object of labour/, /object of meditation/, etc.). >From now on we shall employ the term /object/ precisely in this narrower, special sense. Any activity of an organism is directed to some object or other; activity without an object is impossible. Consideration of activity therefore requires us to single out and distinguish that which is its real object, i.e. the object of an active relation of the organism. All lower filtrable organisms (certain larvae living in water, copepods, all Tunicata, etc.), for example, are capable, as we know, of altering their activity in connection with a change in the aqueous medium; in that connection it can sometimes be said with confidence that the change in the organism?s activity is specifically linked with a definite activating property of the medium, for example with a greater or less concentration of nutrients. Imagine, however, that we have artificially altered the medium, for example, of a daphnia, by putting it into water that lacks its nutrient, plankton but contains particles of some neutral inorganic substance; the daphnia would react to this by a slackening of the movements that create a flow of water to its ventral slit. Is the observed slackening of the water flea?s filtering movements a response to the absence of plankton in the water? Or is it, on the contrary, a response to the presence in it of unassimilable particles? Or does it, finally, depend on some other moments still, not considered by us? Only by answering these questions can we decide precisely /what/ property of the medium is the object of the daphnia?s activity, i.e. with what kind of a relation we are dealing with here. /Thus, the principal ?unit? of a vital process is an organism?s activity; the different activities that realise its diverse vital relations with the surrounding reality are essentially determined by their object; we shall therefore differentiate between separate types of activity according to the difference in their objects/. Huw Lloyd wrote: > Well I am currently looking for specific text on how leont'ev operationally > defines a unit of analysis of activity, I'm sure I'll find details, but > some pointers may help me get there faster. > > Thanks, > Huw > > On 7 August 2013 18:57, mike cole wrote: > > >> Seems we are up and ready for chatting. >> mike >> >> On Wed, Aug 7, 2013 at 10:34 AM, Huw Lloyd > >>> wrote: >>> >>> testing. >>> >>> > > -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts http://marxists.academia.edu/AndyBlunden From ablunden@mira.net Wed Aug 7 14:18:26 2013 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Thu, 08 Aug 2013 07:18:26 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: operational def'n of UoA (was Re: Re: ping) In-Reply-To: <5202B65F.80903@mira.net> References: <5202B65F.80903@mira.net> Message-ID: <5202B9A2.803@mira.net> Note that this message came over as blank because I did not set the format as "Plain Text" Andy Andy Blunden wrote: > > From lspopov@bgsu.edu Wed Aug 7 14:43:52 2013 From: lspopov@bgsu.edu (Lubomir Savov Popov) Date: Wed, 7 Aug 2013 17:43:52 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] FW: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> Message-ID: Dear Huw, Here is the first website I got with : http://www.igs.net/~pballan/AT.htm Look at the table that shows the structural levels of activity and the phenomena that direct them. Maybe a web search with a combination of those keywords will yield what you are looking for. I know there is a lot of material in Russian, but have no access to references. Best, Lubomir -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden Sent: Wednesday, August 07, 2013 5:15 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Leontyev's activities Leontyev says that an activity is defined by its motive. See "The Development of Mind," Leontyev 2009, p. 28-29 http://www.erythrospress.com/store/leontyev.html But Leontyev, in my opinion, does not adequately distinguish between "an activity" and "a type of activity," leading to confusion on this point. Plus the fact that the object or motive is given externally to the activity, underming his claim to have created an activity theory, rather than a theory of human needs. Andy ------------------------------- The specific processes that realise some vital, i.e. active, relation of the subject to reality we shall term processes of /activity/, in distinction to other processes. We shall also, accordingly, limit the concept of object. It is normally used in a dual sense: in the broadest one as a thing standing in some kind of relation to other things, i.e. as 'a thing having existence'; and in a narrower sense - as something withstanding (German /Gegenstand/), resistant (Latin /objectum/), that to which an act is directed, i.e. as something to which precisely a living creature relates itself as the /object of its activity/ - indifferently as outward or inward activity (e. g. /object of nutrition/, /object of labour/, /object of meditation/, etc.). >From now on we shall employ the term /object/ precisely in this narrower, special sense. Any activity of an organism is directed to some object or other; activity without an object is impossible. Consideration of activity therefore requires us to single out and distinguish that which is its real object, i.e. the object of an active relation of the organism. All lower filtrable organisms (certain larvae living in water, copepods, all Tunicata, etc.), for example, are capable, as we know, of altering their activity in connection with a change in the aqueous medium; in that connection it can sometimes be said with confidence that the change in the organism's activity is specifically linked with a definite activating property of the medium, for example with a greater or less concentration of nutrients. Imagine, however, that we have artificially altered the medium, for example, of a daphnia, by putting it into water that lacks its nutrient, plankton but contains particles of some neutral inorganic substance; the daphnia would react to this by a slackening of the movements that create a flow of water to its ventral slit. Is the observed slackening of the water flea's filtering movements a response to the absence of plankton in the water? Or is it, on the contrary, a response to the presence in it of unassimilable particles? Or does it, finally, depend on some other moments still, not considered by us? Only by answering these questions can we decide precisely /what/ property of the medium is the object of the daphnia's activity, i.e. with what kind of a relation we are dealing with here. /Thus, the principal 'unit' of a vital process is an organism's activity; the different activities that realise its diverse vital relations with the surrounding reality are essentially determined by their object; we shall therefore differentiate between separate types of activity according to the difference in their objects/. Huw Lloyd wrote: > Well I am currently looking for specific text on how leont'ev > operationally defines a unit of analysis of activity, I'm sure I'll > find details, but some pointers may help me get there faster. > > Thanks, > Huw > > On 7 August 2013 18:57, mike cole wrote: > > >> Seems we are up and ready for chatting. >> mike >> >> On Wed, Aug 7, 2013 at 10:34 AM, Huw Lloyd > >>> wrote: >>> >>> testing. >>> >>> > > -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts http://marxists.academia.edu/AndyBlunden From cunningh@indiana.edu Wed Aug 7 14:49:00 2013 From: cunningh@indiana.edu (Cunningham, Donald James) Date: Wed, 7 Aug 2013 21:49:00 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: XCMA migration In-Reply-To: <3A2088BD5BE2834C8BBE0B01883195571421209A@XMAIL-MBX-BH2.AD.UCSD.EDU> References: <3A2088BD5BE2834C8BBE0B01883195571421209A@XMAIL-MBX-BH2.AD.UCSD.EDU> Message-ID: Silas, I have not been an xmca member for many years and have just started receiving these message. Can you remove me please? Don Cunningham -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Horton, Silas Sent: Tuesday, August 06, 2013 3:15 PM To: xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] XCMA migration Hi everyone, I apologize for the blackout that occurred through the past few days. There was a migration planned by the list owner but it didn't go so well (he's on vacation now). I took access over the new list and subscribed everyone. Please use xmca-l@ucsd.edu for email for the time being. xmca@weber.ucsd.edu should forward to this new list. I am working with our campus postmaster to setup an alias, xmca@ucsd.edu. There will be no message archival until the list owner returns from vacation next week, but it's working list. Best, Silas Horton From lspopov@bgsu.edu Wed Aug 7 15:21:48 2013 From: lspopov@bgsu.edu (Lubomir Savov Popov) Date: Wed, 7 Aug 2013 18:21:48 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> Message-ID: Dear Andy, (sorry for typos, I type as I think) I agree in some way with your concerns about the model that you envisage in your mail. Although Leontiev is very disciplined in his logic, I have difficulty accepting some of the relationships there. http://www.igs.net/~pballan/AT.htm At this time, I cannot access articles that talk about this problem. Also, it is not very common to refer to that model as problematic. The Scandinavians talk about a problem, and their solution was to expand the original activity model to include the social environment and group action. Consider that the original activity model is created by psychologists, not social psychologists or sociologists. Even the Moscow Methodological Circle keeps with the Lentiev tradition, although have "on board" a lot of philosophers and sociologists. However, I accept Leontiev's model as general. That is why it has to be kept simple and straitforward. On the basis of this model, several other more specific models are developed. They might represent only one level selected from the general model. The problems I see are not that the motive is external to activity. The motive can be interpreted as internal to the subject, if necessary. However, the goal can be seen both at activity level and at operations level. The model doesn't talk about the Task. However, if you need models that incorporate Task, go to Ergonomics. Another problem that I see is that the directions at the higher levels are provided by teleological concepts. However, at operations level, the direction is provided by the Conditions. Conditions do exist at each level and do affect the trajectory/course at each level. There are many other variations as well. In Russian, they talk about deyatelnost and aktivnost. The best way to get into activity theory is to read Russian originals. There are a lot of problems when translating Russian concepts and terms in English. This comes with difficult to translate tatigkeit. Plus, the Russians have borrowed the word aktivnost and endowed it with their own meaning. For me, it was always a puzzle why they use Aktivnost, when in English is actually Activity. But that is the nature of the production of terminology. People just take a word and endow it with new meaning that they need for communicating their ideas. I haven't seen yet a global model of activity that models it at each level and that connects/relates all component concepts. I am not sure that this is possible. There are hundreds of model variations when we look in different disciplines. Each discipline envisages only one particular aspect and level. In the 1960s, Vladimir Lefevre, the founder (or one of them) of the Moscow Methodological Circle, had come with the idea of the Conceptual Configurator. It was supposed to be a model that presents all aspects and levels of a phenomenon in a coordinated way. Unfortunately, he didn't go beyond the idea. No one has ever created a conceptual configurator for activity, and I am not sure if this is possible at this time. All models are either general, at a very high level of abstraction like Leontiev's, or discipline specific, with very peculiar terminology and discriptory and explanatory capabilities. Best, Lubomir -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden Sent: Wednesday, August 07, 2013 5:15 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Leontyev's activities Leontyev says that an activity is defined by its motive. See "The Development of Mind," Leontyev 2009, p. 28-29 http://www.erythrospress.com/store/leontyev.html But Leontyev, in my opinion, does not adequately distinguish between "an activity" and "a type of activity," leading to confusion on this point. Plus the fact that the object or motive is given externally to the activity, underming his claim to have created an activity theory, rather than a theory of human needs. Andy ------------------------------- The specific processes that realise some vital, i.e. active, relation of the subject to reality we shall term processes of /activity/, in distinction to other processes. We shall also, accordingly, limit the concept of object. It is normally used in a dual sense: in the broadest one as a thing standing in some kind of relation to other things, i.e. as 'a thing having existence'; and in a narrower sense - as something withstanding (German /Gegenstand/), resistant (Latin /objectum/), that to which an act is directed, i.e. as something to which precisely a living creature relates itself as the /object of its activity/ - indifferently as outward or inward activity (e. g. /object of nutrition/, /object of labour/, /object of meditation/, etc.). >From now on we shall employ the term /object/ precisely in this narrower, special sense. Any activity of an organism is directed to some object or other; activity without an object is impossible. Consideration of activity therefore requires us to single out and distinguish that which is its real object, i.e. the object of an active relation of the organism. All lower filtrable organisms (certain larvae living in water, copepods, all Tunicata, etc.), for example, are capable, as we know, of altering their activity in connection with a change in the aqueous medium; in that connection it can sometimes be said with confidence that the change in the organism's activity is specifically linked with a definite activating property of the medium, for example with a greater or less concentration of nutrients. Imagine, however, that we have artificially altered the medium, for example, of a daphnia, by putting it into water that lacks its nutrient, plankton but contains particles of some neutral inorganic substance; the daphnia would react to this by a slackening of the movements that create a flow of water to its ventral slit. Is the observed slackening of the water flea's filtering movements a response to the absence of plankton in the water? Or is it, on the contrary, a response to the presence in it of unassimilable particles? Or does it, finally, depend on some other moments still, not considered by us? Only by answering these questions can we decide precisely /what/ property of the medium is the object of the daphnia's activity, i.e. with what kind of a relation we are dealing with here. /Thus, the principal 'unit' of a vital process is an organism's activity; the different activities that realise its diverse vital relations with the surrounding reality are essentially determined by their object; we shall therefore differentiate between separate types of activity according to the difference in their objects/. Huw Lloyd wrote: > Well I am currently looking for specific text on how leont'ev > operationally defines a unit of analysis of activity, I'm sure I'll > find details, but some pointers may help me get there faster. > > Thanks, > Huw > > On 7 August 2013 18:57, mike cole wrote: > > >> Seems we are up and ready for chatting. >> mike >> >> On Wed, Aug 7, 2013 at 10:34 AM, Huw Lloyd > >>> wrote: >>> >>> testing. >>> >>> > > -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts http://marxists.academia.edu/AndyBlunden From lchcmike@gmail.com Wed Aug 7 16:41:15 2013 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Wed, 7 Aug 2013 16:41:15 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Time of Transition Message-ID: Hi Don-- I apologize to you and any old timers who got caught up in the most recent snarl with XMCA. It will be fixed as soon as possible. Explanation: I went emeritus last month, a major computer guy who worked with me retired, and UCSD reconfigured its computers, partly efficiency, partly security. And then a key transition figure went on vacation. And then the trouble hit when MCA was caught part way between systems. In reconstituting the system, Silas came along late in the game and has been patching things together. The technical fix he implemented has various pluses (You can join and quite on your own and set preferences) but you have exposed a minus. A mixture of participants from different times are inconvenienced. If you have trouble disengaging, email me and I will seekto get it fixed. Meantime, just stick us in your spam filter! Miss your voice. mike On Wed, Aug 7, 2013 at 12:22 PM, UC San Diego Social Sciences < sse-connection@ad.ucsd.edu> wrote: > ** > > View this email in your browser > > Home > Division News > Giving Opportunities > > Anthropology > ? Cognitive Science > ? Communication > ? Economics > ? Education Studies > Ethnic Studies > ? Linguistics > ? Political Science > ? Psychology > ? Sociology > Critical Gender Studies > ? Human Development > ? International Studies > Latin American Studies > ? Urban Studies and Planning > Spotlight > > [image: Mike Cole] UC San Diego?s department of communication, > established in 1982, was the first department of its kind in the University > of California system and is now one of the best-known communication > departments in the world. Longtime faculty member Michael Cole ? who helped > shape the department ? is both an exemplar and an advocate of some of the > department?s most distinctive characteristics: scholarship and teaching > that deal with issues of democracy, diversity, justice and social change. Read > More > How to Be a Model Public University a letter from > Dean Jeff Elman > > This past year has been an exciting one for the campus. It has also been a > time of deep soul-searching. We ? faculty, staff and students, as well as > alumni and other members of UC San Diego?s extended community ? have been > seeking, in the words of Chancellor Pradeep K. Khosla, to ?establish a > unifying shared vision for our entire campus.? What has emerged clearly so > far is not only a renewed focus on education and the student experience but > also that the value of a public university lies in its impact on the > public. Read More > > > Social Sciences News > > Are you following the immigration debate? So is Tom K. Wong of Political > Science who blogsabout it at the Center for Comparative Immigration Studies. > > > > > ------------------------------ > > UC San Diego is playing a key role in President Obama?s BRAIN initiativeand has created the Center for Brain Activity Mapping. > > ------------------------------ > > Would a ban on large soda drinksbackfire? A UC San Diego psychology experiment says ?yes.? > > ------------------------------ > > Anthropologist Kathryn Woolard and linguist David Perlmutter have been > elected to the prestigious American Academy of Arts and Sciences > . > > ------------------------------ > > ?Game of Thrones? language consultant and linguistics alumnus David > Peterson discusses the art of constructing languages > . > > > > > ------------------------------ > > Is this the end of men? Not even close, says a reporton gender in the professions by Mary Blair-Loy of Sociology. > > ------------------------------ > > Social sciences students are breaking down barriersto online education with a free web app. > > ------------------------------ > > Political scientist Alan Houstonnamed UC San Diego?s Interim Vice Chancellor for Student Affairs. > ------------------------------ > > Political Science recently lost a valued, dear colleague ? Ellen Turkish > Comisso. > A pioneer in the study of East European political economy and a beloved > mentor, she will be missed by many. > Upcoming Events > > Economics Roundtable, August 9, 2013? ?How Can California Spend $146 Billion and Still Be Broke?? UC San Diego > political scientist Thad Kousser will discuss. Location: UC San Diego > Faculty Club. Time: 7:30 to 9 a.m. Cost: $50 general; $37.50 UC San Diego > faculty, staff or students; and $20 alumni, includes continental breakfast > and parking at the Faculty Club. > > Social Sciences Supper Club, October 23, 2013? Join Alan Daly of Education Studies as he discusses ?Improving Student > Outcomes in the San Diego Region: K-12 Educational Reform Efforts in a Post > No Child Left Behind Era.? Location: UC San Diego Faculty Club. Time: 5:30 > to 8 p.m. Cost: $65/person or $40/UC San Diego alumni; includes wine > reception, dinner and parking at the Faculty Club. For more information, > contact dpkurtz@ucsd.edu. > Alumni Updates > > Profile: Rick Mulloy, > Revelle ?95 (Political Science and History). Although juggling a career as > a high stakes patent litigator and being the father of five-year-old > triplets, Rick Mulloy continues to find ways to be involved with his alma > mater. > > > In Memoriam: Ben Horne, > Ph.D. ?13 (Economics) was awarded his Ph.D. posthumously and the Benjamin > C. Horne Memorial Prize has been established in his honor. Horne passed > away during a climbing trek in Peru in 2012. > > Lilia Fernandez, > Ph.D. ?05 (Ethnic Studies) is associate professor in the department of > history at The Ohio State University and has just published a book, "Brown > in the Windy City: Mexicans and Puerto Ricans in Postwar Chicago." Her book > was recently featured on Chicago Tonight, a public affairs news magazine on > the local Chicago PBS-affiliate. > > Paul Lanning, > Marshall '90 (Political Science) is the co-founder and managing partner of > a consulting firm advising education-based non-profit organizations on > capacity building, strategic and campaign planning, board development and > revenue diversification. He also writes a blog focused on philanthropy, and > teaches graduate courses in education administration at University of the > Pacific. > > To send your update and learn more about reconnecting with campus, please > contact Jenelle Dean at (858) 246-0232 or jmdean@ucsd.edu. > [image: UC San Diego logo] > *University of California, San Diego, Division of Social Sciences* > 9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla, CA 92093-0502 | (858) 534-6073 [image: > Division of Social Sciences Facebook Page] News > to share or thoughts about this newsletter, email us. > To unsubscribe, click here > . > UC San Diego Division of Social Sciences reserves the right to publish in > whole or in part any submissions received by us. > From lchcmike@gmail.com Wed Aug 7 16:41:15 2013 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Wed, 7 Aug 2013 16:41:15 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Time of Transition Message-ID: Hi Don-- I apologize to you and any old timers who got caught up in the most recent snarl with XMCA. It will be fixed as soon as possible. Explanation: I went emeritus last month, a major computer guy who worked with me retired, and UCSD reconfigured its computers, partly efficiency, partly security. And then a key transition figure went on vacation. And then the trouble hit when MCA was caught part way between systems. In reconstituting the system, Silas came along late in the game and has been patching things together. The technical fix he implemented has various pluses (You can join and quite on your own and set preferences) but you have exposed a minus. A mixture of participants from different times are inconvenienced. If you have trouble disengaging, email me and I will seekto get it fixed. Meantime, just stick us in your spam filter! Miss your voice. mike On Wed, Aug 7, 2013 at 12:22 PM, UC San Diego Social Sciences < sse-connection@ad.ucsd.edu> wrote: > ** > > View this email in your browser > > Home > Division News > Giving Opportunities > > Anthropology > ? Cognitive Science > ? Communication > ? Economics > ? Education Studies > Ethnic Studies > ? Linguistics > ? Political Science > ? Psychology > ? Sociology > Critical Gender Studies > ? Human Development > ? International Studies > Latin American Studies > ? Urban Studies and Planning > Spotlight > > [image: Mike Cole] UC San Diego?s department of communication, > established in 1982, was the first department of its kind in the University > of California system and is now one of the best-known communication > departments in the world. Longtime faculty member Michael Cole ? who helped > shape the department ? is both an exemplar and an advocate of some of the > department?s most distinctive characteristics: scholarship and teaching > that deal with issues of democracy, diversity, justice and social change. Read > More > How to Be a Model Public University a letter from > Dean Jeff Elman > > This past year has been an exciting one for the campus. It has also been a > time of deep soul-searching. We ? faculty, staff and students, as well as > alumni and other members of UC San Diego?s extended community ? have been > seeking, in the words of Chancellor Pradeep K. Khosla, to ?establish a > unifying shared vision for our entire campus.? What has emerged clearly so > far is not only a renewed focus on education and the student experience but > also that the value of a public university lies in its impact on the > public. Read More > > > Social Sciences News > > Are you following the immigration debate? So is Tom K. Wong of Political > Science who blogsabout it at the Center for Comparative Immigration Studies. > > > > > ------------------------------ > > UC San Diego is playing a key role in President Obama?s BRAIN initiativeand has created the Center for Brain Activity Mapping. > > ------------------------------ > > Would a ban on large soda drinksbackfire? A UC San Diego psychology experiment says ?yes.? > > ------------------------------ > > Anthropologist Kathryn Woolard and linguist David Perlmutter have been > elected to the prestigious American Academy of Arts and Sciences > . > > ------------------------------ > > ?Game of Thrones? language consultant and linguistics alumnus David > Peterson discusses the art of constructing languages > . > > > > > ------------------------------ > > Is this the end of men? Not even close, says a reporton gender in the professions by Mary Blair-Loy of Sociology. > > ------------------------------ > > Social sciences students are breaking down barriersto online education with a free web app. > > ------------------------------ > > Political scientist Alan Houstonnamed UC San Diego?s Interim Vice Chancellor for Student Affairs. > ------------------------------ > > Political Science recently lost a valued, dear colleague ? Ellen Turkish > Comisso. > A pioneer in the study of East European political economy and a beloved > mentor, she will be missed by many. > Upcoming Events > > Economics Roundtable, August 9, 2013? ?How Can California Spend $146 Billion and Still Be Broke?? UC San Diego > political scientist Thad Kousser will discuss. Location: UC San Diego > Faculty Club. Time: 7:30 to 9 a.m. Cost: $50 general; $37.50 UC San Diego > faculty, staff or students; and $20 alumni, includes continental breakfast > and parking at the Faculty Club. > > Social Sciences Supper Club, October 23, 2013? Join Alan Daly of Education Studies as he discusses ?Improving Student > Outcomes in the San Diego Region: K-12 Educational Reform Efforts in a Post > No Child Left Behind Era.? Location: UC San Diego Faculty Club. Time: 5:30 > to 8 p.m. Cost: $65/person or $40/UC San Diego alumni; includes wine > reception, dinner and parking at the Faculty Club. For more information, > contact dpkurtz@ucsd.edu. > Alumni Updates > > Profile: Rick Mulloy, > Revelle ?95 (Political Science and History). Although juggling a career as > a high stakes patent litigator and being the father of five-year-old > triplets, Rick Mulloy continues to find ways to be involved with his alma > mater. > > > In Memoriam: Ben Horne, > Ph.D. ?13 (Economics) was awarded his Ph.D. posthumously and the Benjamin > C. Horne Memorial Prize has been established in his honor. Horne passed > away during a climbing trek in Peru in 2012. > > Lilia Fernandez, > Ph.D. ?05 (Ethnic Studies) is associate professor in the department of > history at The Ohio State University and has just published a book, "Brown > in the Windy City: Mexicans and Puerto Ricans in Postwar Chicago." Her book > was recently featured on Chicago Tonight, a public affairs news magazine on > the local Chicago PBS-affiliate. > > Paul Lanning, > Marshall '90 (Political Science) is the co-founder and managing partner of > a consulting firm advising education-based non-profit organizations on > capacity building, strategic and campaign planning, board development and > revenue diversification. He also writes a blog focused on philanthropy, and > teaches graduate courses in education administration at University of the > Pacific. > > To send your update and learn more about reconnecting with campus, please > contact Jenelle Dean at (858) 246-0232 or jmdean@ucsd.edu. > [image: UC San Diego logo] > *University of California, San Diego, Division of Social Sciences* > 9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla, CA 92093-0502 | (858) 534-6073 [image: > Division of Social Sciences Facebook Page] News > to share or thoughts about this newsletter, email us. > To unsubscribe, click here > . > UC San Diego Division of Social Sciences reserves the right to publish in > whole or in part any submissions received by us. > From ablunden@mira.net Wed Aug 7 20:26:11 2013 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Thu, 08 Aug 2013 13:26:11 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> Message-ID: <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> Lubomir, I agree that AN:'s concept of an activity needs to be simmplied, not expanded a la Engestrom, if it is to be adequate as a foundational concept. I also agree that the problems in the conception of an activity are not visible from the point of view of psychologists but they do appear as serious problems for social theory. Further, I don't believe Activity Theory can fulfill its potential until the same concepts work at micro-, meso- and macrolevels. Otherwise, psychologists have to just take the tasks as given by some abstract "society" and social theorists take their subjects as given by some abstract human nature." Neither is sufficient. I don't agree though, that the alternative to taking the object as external to the activity (as defining it) is to take the object as internal to the subject, a.k.a. individual. At all. I think the work of the Moscow Methodological Circle began in the right direction, but to my eyes, it ended up locked into an "engineering" approach, somewhat symmetrical with the cognitivism which was popular in the US at the same time. In my view, the object is *immanent* in the activity, being realised by the activity. The subject/object problem (or dichotomy) is resolved not by choosing an objective motive or a subjective sense/meaning, but by following Hegel in using the individual/particular/universal relationship which he took to be the foundation of a concept (as the ideal object of an activity). I use the concept of "project" (I think I share this with the MMC) to represent the idea of an activity in which the object is imminant within the activity. Andy Lubomir Savov Popov wrote: > Dear Andy, > (sorry for typos, I type as I think) > > I agree in some way with your concerns about the model that you envisage in your mail. Although Leontiev is very disciplined in his logic, I have difficulty accepting some of the relationships there. http://www.igs.net/~pballan/AT.htm At this time, I cannot access articles that talk about this problem. Also, it is not very common to refer to that model as problematic. The Scandinavians talk about a problem, and their solution was to expand the original activity model to include the social environment and group action. Consider that the original activity model is created by psychologists, not social psychologists or sociologists. Even the Moscow Methodological Circle keeps with the Lentiev tradition, although have "on board" a lot of philosophers and sociologists. However, I accept Leontiev's model as general. That is why it has to be kept simple and straitforward. On the basis of this model, several other more specific models are developed. They might represent only one level selected from the general model. > > The problems I see are not that the motive is external to activity. The motive can be interpreted as internal to the subject, if necessary. However, the goal can be seen both at activity level and at operations level. The model doesn't talk about the Task. However, if you need models that incorporate Task, go to Ergonomics. Another problem that I see is that the directions at the higher levels are provided by teleological concepts. However, at operations level, the direction is provided by the Conditions. Conditions do exist at each level and do affect the trajectory/course at each level. There are many other variations as well. In Russian, they talk about deyatelnost and aktivnost. The best way to get into activity theory is to read Russian originals. There are a lot of problems when translating Russian concepts and terms in English. This comes with difficult to translate tatigkeit. Plus, the Russians have borrowed the word aktivnost and endowed it with their own meaning. For me, it was always a puzzle why they use Aktivnost, when in English is actually Activity. But that is the nature of the production of terminology. People just take a word and endow it with new meaning that they need for communicating their ideas. > > I haven't seen yet a global model of activity that models it at each level and that connects/relates all component concepts. I am not sure that this is possible. There are hundreds of model variations when we look in different disciplines. Each discipline envisages only one particular aspect and level. > > In the 1960s, Vladimir Lefevre, the founder (or one of them) of the Moscow Methodological Circle, had come with the idea of the Conceptual Configurator. It was supposed to be a model that presents all aspects and levels of a phenomenon in a coordinated way. Unfortunately, he didn't go beyond the idea. No one has ever created a conceptual configurator for activity, and I am not sure if this is possible at this time. All models are either general, at a very high level of abstraction like Leontiev's, or discipline specific, with very peculiar terminology and discriptory and explanatory capabilities. > > Best, > > Lubomir > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > Sent: Wednesday, August 07, 2013 5:15 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Leontyev's activities > > Leontyev says that an activity is defined by its motive. > See "The Development of Mind," Leontyev 2009, p. 28-29 http://www.erythrospress.com/store/leontyev.html > > But Leontyev, in my opinion, does not adequately distinguish between "an activity" and "a type of activity," leading to confusion on this point. > Plus the fact that the object or motive is given externally to the activity, underming his claim to have created an activity theory, rather than a theory of human needs. > > Andy > ------------------------------- > > The specific processes that realise some vital, i.e. active, relation of the subject to reality we shall term processes of /activity/, in distinction to other processes. > > We shall also, accordingly, limit the concept of object. It is normally used in a dual sense: in the broadest one as a thing standing in some kind of relation to other things, i.e. as 'a thing having existence'; and in a narrower sense - as something withstanding (German /Gegenstand/), resistant (Latin /objectum/), that to which an act is directed, i.e. as something to which precisely a living creature relates itself as the /object of its activity/ - indifferently as outward or inward activity (e. g. /object of nutrition/, /object of labour/, /object of meditation/, etc.). >From now on we shall employ the term /object/ precisely in this narrower, special sense. > > Any activity of an organism is directed to some object or other; activity without an object is impossible. Consideration of activity therefore requires us to single out and distinguish that which is its real object, i.e. the object of an active relation of the organism. > > All lower filtrable organisms (certain larvae living in water, copepods, all Tunicata, etc.), for example, are capable, as we know, of altering their activity in connection with a change in the aqueous medium; in that connection it can sometimes be said with confidence that the change in the organism's activity is specifically linked with a definite activating property of the medium, for example with a greater or less concentration of nutrients. Imagine, however, that we have artificially altered the medium, for example, of a daphnia, by putting it into water that lacks its nutrient, plankton but contains particles of some neutral inorganic substance; the daphnia would react to this by a slackening of the movements that create a flow of water to its ventral slit. Is the observed slackening of the water flea's filtering movements a response to the absence of plankton in the water? Or is it, on the contrary, a response to the presence in it of unassimilable particles? Or does it, finally, depend on some other moments still, not considered by us? Only by answering these questions can we decide precisely /what/ property of the medium is the object of the daphnia's activity, i.e. with what kind of a relation we are dealing with here. > > /Thus, the principal 'unit' of a vital process is an organism's activity; the different activities that realise its diverse vital relations with the surrounding reality are essentially determined by their object; we shall therefore differentiate between separate types of activity according to the difference in their objects/. > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> Well I am currently looking for specific text on how leont'ev >> operationally defines a unit of analysis of activity, I'm sure I'll >> find details, but some pointers may help me get there faster. >> >> Thanks, >> Huw >> >> On 7 August 2013 18:57, mike cole wrote: >> >> >> >>> Seems we are up and ready for chatting. >>> mike >>> >>> On Wed, Aug 7, 2013 at 10:34 AM, Huw Lloyd >> >>> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> testing. >>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> > > -- > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts > http://marxists.academia.edu/AndyBlunden > > > > > -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts http://marxists.academia.edu/AndyBlunden From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Thu Aug 8 09:09:35 2013 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (greg.a.thompson@gmail.com) Date: Thu, 8 Aug 2013 10:09:35 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy, could you give an example of what you mean when you say that the object is immanent in activity? -Greg Sent from my iPhone On Aug 7, 2013, at 9:26 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Lubomir, > I agree that AN:'s concept of an activity needs to be simmplied, not expanded a la Engestrom, if it is to be adequate as a foundational concept. I also agree that the problems in the conception of an activity are not visible from the point of view of psychologists but they do appear as serious problems for social theory. Further, I don't believe Activity Theory can fulfill its potential until the same concepts work at micro-, meso- and macrolevels. Otherwise, psychologists have to just take the tasks as given by some abstract "society" and social theorists take their subjects as given by some abstract human nature." Neither is sufficient. > > I don't agree though, that the alternative to taking the object as external to the activity (as defining it) is to take the object as internal to the subject, a.k.a. individual. At all. I think the work of the Moscow Methodological Circle began in the right direction, but to my eyes, it ended up locked into an "engineering" approach, somewhat symmetrical with the cognitivism which was popular in the US at the same time. > > In my view, the object is *immanent* in the activity, being realised by the activity. The subject/object problem (or dichotomy) is resolved not by choosing an objective motive or a subjective sense/meaning, but by following Hegel in using the individual/particular/universal relationship which he took to be the foundation of a concept (as the ideal object of an activity). I use the concept of "project" (I think I share this with the MMC) to represent the idea of an activity in which the object is imminant within the activity. > > Andy > > Lubomir Savov Popov wrote: >> Dear Andy, >> (sorry for typos, I type as I think) >> >> I agree in some way with your concerns about the model that you envisage in your mail. Although Leontiev is very disciplined in his logic, I have difficulty accepting some of the relationships there. http://www.igs.net/~pballan/AT.htm At this time, I cannot access articles that talk about this problem. Also, it is not very common to refer to that model as problematic. The Scandinavians talk about a problem, and their solution was to expand the original activity model to include the social environment and group action. Consider that the original activity model is created by psychologists, not social psychologists or sociologists. Even the Moscow Methodological Circle keeps with the Lentiev tradition, although have "on board" a lot of philosophers and sociologists. However, I accept Leontiev's model as general. That is why it has to be kept simple and straitforward. On the basis of this model, several other more specific models are developed. They might represent only one level selected from the general model. >> The problems I see are not that the motive is external to activity. The motive can be interpreted as internal to the subject, if necessary. However, the goal can be seen both at activity level and at operations level. The model doesn't talk about the Task. However, if you need models that incorporate Task, go to Ergonomics. Another problem that I see is that the directions at the higher levels are provided by teleological concepts. However, at operations level, the direction is provided by the Conditions. Conditions do exist at each level and do affect the trajectory/course at each level. There are many other variations as well. In Russian, they talk about deyatelnost and aktivnost. The best way to get into activity theory is to read Russian originals. There are a lot of problems when translating Russian concepts and terms in English. This comes with difficult to translate tatigkeit. Plus, the Russians have borrowed the word aktivnost and endowed it with their own meaning. For me, it was always a puzzle why they use Aktivnost, when in English is actually Activity. But that is the nature of the production of terminology. People just take a word and endow it with new meaning that they need for communicating their ideas. >> >> I haven't seen yet a global model of activity that models it at each level and that connects/relates all component concepts. I am not sure that this is possible. There are hundreds of model variations when we look in different disciplines. Each discipline envisages only one particular aspect and level. >> In the 1960s, Vladimir Lefevre, the founder (or one of them) of the Moscow Methodological Circle, had come with the idea of the Conceptual Configurator. It was supposed to be a model that presents all aspects and levels of a phenomenon in a coordinated way. Unfortunately, he didn't go beyond the idea. No one has ever created a conceptual configurator for activity, and I am not sure if this is possible at this time. All models are either general, at a very high level of abstraction like Leontiev's, or discipline specific, with very peculiar terminology and discriptory and explanatory capabilities. >> Best, >> >> Lubomir >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden >> Sent: Wednesday, August 07, 2013 5:15 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Leontyev's activities >> >> Leontyev says that an activity is defined by its motive. >> See "The Development of Mind," Leontyev 2009, p. 28-29 http://www.erythrospress.com/store/leontyev.html >> >> But Leontyev, in my opinion, does not adequately distinguish between "an activity" and "a type of activity," leading to confusion on this point. >> Plus the fact that the object or motive is given externally to the activity, underming his claim to have created an activity theory, rather than a theory of human needs. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------- >> >> The specific processes that realise some vital, i.e. active, relation of the subject to reality we shall term processes of /activity/, in distinction to other processes. >> >> We shall also, accordingly, limit the concept of object. It is normally used in a dual sense: in the broadest one as a thing standing in some kind of relation to other things, i.e. as 'a thing having existence'; and in a narrower sense - as something withstanding (German /Gegenstand/), resistant (Latin /objectum/), that to which an act is directed, i.e. as something to which precisely a living creature relates itself as the /object of its activity/ - indifferently as outward or inward activity (e. g. /object of nutrition/, /object of labour/, /object of meditation/, etc.). >From now on we shall employ the term /object/ precisely in this narrower, special sense. >> >> Any activity of an organism is directed to some object or other; activity without an object is impossible. Consideration of activity therefore requires us to single out and distinguish that which is its real object, i.e. the object of an active relation of the organism. >> >> All lower filtrable organisms (certain larvae living in water, copepods, all Tunicata, etc.), for example, are capable, as we know, of altering their activity in connection with a change in the aqueous medium; in that connection it can sometimes be said with confidence that the change in the organism's activity is specifically linked with a definite activating property of the medium, for example with a greater or less concentration of nutrients. Imagine, however, that we have artificially altered the medium, for example, of a daphnia, by putting it into water that lacks its nutrient, plankton but contains particles of some neutral inorganic substance; the daphnia would react to this by a slackening of the movements that create a flow of water to its ventral slit. Is the observed slackening of the water flea's filtering movements a response to the absence of plankton in the water? Or is it, on the contrary, a response to the presence in it of unassimilable particles? Or does it, finally, depend on some other moments still, not considered by us? Only by answering these questions can we decide precisely /what/ property of the medium is the object of the daphnia's activity, i.e. with what kind of a relation we are dealing with here. >> >> /Thus, the principal 'unit' of a vital process is an organism's activity; the different activities that realise its diverse vital relations with the surrounding reality are essentially determined by their object; we shall therefore differentiate between separate types of activity according to the difference in their objects/. >> >> >> Huw Lloyd wrote: >> >>> Well I am currently looking for specific text on how leont'ev operationally defines a unit of analysis of activity, I'm sure I'll find details, but some pointers may help me get there faster. >>> >>> Thanks, >>> Huw >>> >>> On 7 August 2013 18:57, mike cole wrote: >>> >>> >>>> Seems we are up and ready for chatting. >>>> mike >>>> >>>> On Wed, Aug 7, 2013 at 10:34 AM, Huw Lloyd >>> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> testing. >> >> -- >> ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ >> Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts >> http://marxists.academia.edu/AndyBlunden > > -- > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts > http://marxists.academia.edu/AndyBlunden > > > From lspopov@bgsu.edu Thu Aug 8 09:29:04 2013 From: lspopov@bgsu.edu (Lubomir Savov Popov) Date: Thu, 8 Aug 2013 12:29:04 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> Message-ID: Dear Andy, Thank you for the issues you raise. They are a lot and this is natural, considering the complexity of Activity as an object of study. I will share my views on selected issues. Activity is a concept with a very wide scope and range of abstractness. In this respect, it can be modeled in many ways. However, different models have different limitations, scope of applications, and so forth. When Activity is conceptualized as a universal explanatory principle, the model of activity can incorporate the subject. When Activity is used as one of the major principles of psychology (as in the textbooks by Leontiev and his students) it incorporates everything, even culture. This should not sound as a paradox or as a conundrum. I see it possible and productive in the methodological realm. I do admit that in this short space of time it is not possible to explain all other contradictions or to elaborate on details. I am also a bit conservative in the scope of my discussion so that I don't engage in needless incongruities. Regarding MMC: You are right that they were trying to do social engineering/social design (Socialnoe Proektirovanie). They took a very different direction than the ergonomists. And for the record, they were not serving the totalitarian government. On the contrary, they were dissidents and they paid for that with their staled careers. They envisaged themselves mostly like philosophers of technocracy and believed that society can be lead best by experts. Not by party leaders. They fused activity theory with philosophical thinking and created a new approach to solving social problems. My former boss had the ambition to develop a general theory of design, which should have the scope of a general theory of artification. It was intended to work as a theoretical foundation of general methodology of practical problem solving. The project was based on systems theory and activity theory. Basically, this was a sociotechnical systems engineering approach, but not like the approaches in ergonomics and human factors. That topic was very fashionable in the late 1970s and in the 1980s. The MMC activity models were designed for engineering, for intervention. In the late 1980s the MMC started working on "organizational games." I was quite perplexed how they came with that idea and how they had the guts to engage in management studies. Management studies were a restricted field for Party functionaries and their supporting research institutions. Just a few thoughts following your mail. Best wishes, Lubomir -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden Sent: Wednesday, August 07, 2013 11:26 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities Lubomir, I agree that AN:'s concept of an activity needs to be simmplied, not expanded a la Engestrom, if it is to be adequate as a foundational concept. I also agree that the problems in the conception of an activity are not visible from the point of view of psychologists but they do appear as serious problems for social theory. Further, I don't believe Activity Theory can fulfill its potential until the same concepts work at micro-, meso- and macrolevels. Otherwise, psychologists have to just take the tasks as given by some abstract "society" and social theorists take their subjects as given by some abstract human nature." Neither is sufficient. I don't agree though, that the alternative to taking the object as external to the activity (as defining it) is to take the object as internal to the subject, a.k.a. individual. At all. I think the work of the Moscow Methodological Circle began in the right direction, but to my eyes, it ended up locked into an "engineering" approach, somewhat symmetrical with the cognitivism which was popular in the US at the same time. In my view, the object is *immanent* in the activity, being realised by the activity. The subject/object problem (or dichotomy) is resolved not by choosing an objective motive or a subjective sense/meaning, but by following Hegel in using the individual/particular/universal relationship which he took to be the foundation of a concept (as the ideal object of an activity). I use the concept of "project" (I think I share this with the MMC) to represent the idea of an activity in which the object is imminant within the activity. Andy Lubomir Savov Popov wrote: > Dear Andy, > (sorry for typos, I type as I think) > > I agree in some way with your concerns about the model that you envisage in your mail. Although Leontiev is very disciplined in his logic, I have difficulty accepting some of the relationships there. http://www.igs.net/~pballan/AT.htm At this time, I cannot access articles that talk about this problem. Also, it is not very common to refer to that model as problematic. The Scandinavians talk about a problem, and their solution was to expand the original activity model to include the social environment and group action. Consider that the original activity model is created by psychologists, not social psychologists or sociologists. Even the Moscow Methodological Circle keeps with the Lentiev tradition, although have "on board" a lot of philosophers and sociologists. However, I accept Leontiev's model as general. That is why it has to be kept simple and straitforward. On the basis of this model, several other more specific models are developed. They might represent only one level selected from the general model. > > The problems I see are not that the motive is external to activity. The motive can be interpreted as internal to the subject, if necessary. However, the goal can be seen both at activity level and at operations level. The model doesn't talk about the Task. However, if you need models that incorporate Task, go to Ergonomics. Another problem that I see is that the directions at the higher levels are provided by teleological concepts. However, at operations level, the direction is provided by the Conditions. Conditions do exist at each level and do affect the trajectory/course at each level. There are many other variations as well. In Russian, they talk about deyatelnost and aktivnost. The best way to get into activity theory is to read Russian originals. There are a lot of problems when translating Russian concepts and terms in English. This comes with difficult to translate tatigkeit. Plus, the Russians have borrowed the word aktivnost and endowed it with their own meaning. For me, it was always a puzzle why they use Aktivnost, when in English is actually Activity. But that is the nature of the production of terminology. People just take a word and endow it with new meaning that they need for communicating their ideas. > > I haven't seen yet a global model of activity that models it at each level and that connects/relates all component concepts. I am not sure that this is possible. There are hundreds of model variations when we look in different disciplines. Each discipline envisages only one particular aspect and level. > > In the 1960s, Vladimir Lefevre, the founder (or one of them) of the Moscow Methodological Circle, had come with the idea of the Conceptual Configurator. It was supposed to be a model that presents all aspects and levels of a phenomenon in a coordinated way. Unfortunately, he didn't go beyond the idea. No one has ever created a conceptual configurator for activity, and I am not sure if this is possible at this time. All models are either general, at a very high level of abstraction like Leontiev's, or discipline specific, with very peculiar terminology and discriptory and explanatory capabilities. > > Best, > > Lubomir > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > Sent: Wednesday, August 07, 2013 5:15 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Leontyev's activities > > Leontyev says that an activity is defined by its motive. > See "The Development of Mind," Leontyev 2009, p. 28-29 > http://www.erythrospress.com/store/leontyev.html > > But Leontyev, in my opinion, does not adequately distinguish between "an activity" and "a type of activity," leading to confusion on this point. > Plus the fact that the object or motive is given externally to the activity, underming his claim to have created an activity theory, rather than a theory of human needs. > > Andy > ------------------------------- > > The specific processes that realise some vital, i.e. active, relation of the subject to reality we shall term processes of /activity/, in distinction to other processes. > > We shall also, accordingly, limit the concept of object. It is normally used in a dual sense: in the broadest one as a thing standing in some kind of relation to other things, i.e. as 'a thing having existence'; and in a narrower sense - as something withstanding (German /Gegenstand/), resistant (Latin /objectum/), that to which an act is directed, i.e. as something to which precisely a living creature relates itself as the /object of its activity/ - indifferently as outward or inward activity (e. g. /object of nutrition/, /object of labour/, /object of meditation/, etc.). >From now on we shall employ the term /object/ precisely in this narrower, special sense. > > Any activity of an organism is directed to some object or other; activity without an object is impossible. Consideration of activity therefore requires us to single out and distinguish that which is its real object, i.e. the object of an active relation of the organism. > > All lower filtrable organisms (certain larvae living in water, copepods, all Tunicata, etc.), for example, are capable, as we know, of altering their activity in connection with a change in the aqueous medium; in that connection it can sometimes be said with confidence that the change in the organism's activity is specifically linked with a definite activating property of the medium, for example with a greater or less concentration of nutrients. Imagine, however, that we have artificially altered the medium, for example, of a daphnia, by putting it into water that lacks its nutrient, plankton but contains particles of some neutral inorganic substance; the daphnia would react to this by a slackening of the movements that create a flow of water to its ventral slit. Is the observed slackening of the water flea's filtering movements a response to the absence of plankton in the water? Or is it, on the contrary, a response to the presence in it of unassimilable particles? Or does it, finally, depend on some other moments still, not considered by us? Only by answering these questions can we decide precisely /what/ property of the medium is the object of the daphnia's activity, i.e. with what kind of a relation we are dealing with here. > > /Thus, the principal 'unit' of a vital process is an organism's activity; the different activities that realise its diverse vital relations with the surrounding reality are essentially determined by their object; we shall therefore differentiate between separate types of activity according to the difference in their objects/. > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> Well I am currently looking for specific text on how leont'ev >> operationally defines a unit of analysis of activity, I'm sure I'll >> find details, but some pointers may help me get there faster. >> >> Thanks, >> Huw >> >> On 7 August 2013 18:57, mike cole wrote: >> >> >> >>> Seems we are up and ready for chatting. >>> mike >>> >>> On Wed, Aug 7, 2013 at 10:34 AM, Huw Lloyd >>> >> >>> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> testing. >>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> > > -- > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > -- > *Andy Blunden* > Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts > http://marxists.academia.edu/AndyBlunden > > > > > -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts http://marxists.academia.edu/AndyBlunden From rakahu@utu.fi Thu Aug 8 09:44:20 2013 From: rakahu@utu.fi (Rauno Huttunen) Date: Thu, 08 Aug 2013 16:44:20 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Educational Schizophrenia in Finland Message-ID: Hello, Professor Teuvo Teivanen has intersting short comment on Finnish higher education: ------------------- Educational Schizophrenia in Finland Posted on August 8, 2013 While the public nature of the secondary education in Finland is praised, the universities are under increasing privatization pressures. Finnish high schools have become world-famous for their lack of tuition fees, fairly non-hierarchic atmosphere and the relative freedom of teachers. For the universities, however, many key decision-makers have been offering privatization, tuition fees, army-style command structures and increasingly strict time control over teachers. I have a very simple hypothesis about one of the reasons for this tensions. It is the seeming incapacity to read rankings. This incapacity seems to characterize a significant number of the people in charge of the Finnish educational system. First they see the country of Finland high in the PISA rankings. Thus, they would therefore never dare to suggest that the secondary education of the country be privatized. Then they see individual Finnish universities with much lower status in the rankings. Only the University of Helsinki tends to hang among the top-100. So something surely needs to be done. Thus, many of them seem to conclude, let us start a privatization process of the universities. It took me a while to understand that this kind of sloppy reasoning does exist. The hypothesis is based on my conversations with various decision-makers in the Finnish educational sector. It is of course just a hypothesis for now. To the extent it holds, it is in any case only one reason behind the increasing eagerness to move toward an increasing privatization and commodification of Finnish universities. In the world there are many excellent private high schools. Thus, privatize Finnish high schools? For the universities, this seems to be the logic today. Perhaps in the future the educational thinking will be made more coherent by offering privatization all over the educational system. An alternative road to coherence could include paying attention to the strengths of the public dimensions of the university system of Finland, instead of being blinded by the rankings of individual universities. As medical analogies can be tricky, let me add that I use schitzophrenia in the title of this text in the very generic and metaphorical sense of ?splitting of the mind?. http://teivo.net/2013/08/08/edu-schizo/ ------------------------------ Rauno From smago@uga.edu Thu Aug 8 12:16:57 2013 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Thu, 8 Aug 2013 19:16:57 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] deaf thinking In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: I?m working with some colleagues in a small study group that is concerned with what we?re calling post-disability studies, i.e., research that eschews deficit labeling of people of difference (for me, mental health variation; for others, ADHD overclassification and deaf education). I was reading something that led me to pose the following question. Although LSV was in part motivated to take on defectological studies in response to the education of the deaf, I don?t think he ever gets into deaf cognition, especially in terms of how, in the absence of language/speech, thinking is mediated and represented. My question: Joe, one of the hallmarks of a Vygotskian approach is that thinking is tool mediated, principally by language/speech but through other means as well?images, sounds, etc. I?m wondering about people who have never heard speech. Has anyone ever documented what deaf thinking is comprised of/mediated by? Thx,p The answer from Joe Tobin: This is a hot topic in deaf studies. A group at Gallaudet called VL2 has a NSF grant to do a series of studies on deaf linguistics/thinking/brain development. http://vl2.gallaudet.edu/initiatives_and_projects.php Here is an example: http://vl2.gallaudet.edu/assets/section7/document163.pdf One paper also attached. Although I?m hardly a deaf education expert, I find this to be a fascinating question. Am I alone, or are others out there interested as well? Just don?t expect any definitive answers from me. Thx,Peter -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Singleton.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 325237 bytes Desc: Singleton.pdf Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20130808/04752aad/attachment.pdf From nataliag@sfu.ca Thu Aug 8 13:00:33 2013 From: nataliag@sfu.ca (Natalia Gajdamaschko) Date: Thu, 8 Aug 2013 13:00:33 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: deaf thinking In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <1729897181.17443019.1375992033484.JavaMail.root@jaguar9.sfu.ca> Hi Peter, I use video "Butterflies of Zagorsk" (BBC production) and Awakening to Life by A.Meshcheryakov (1974) in my Vygotsky seminar to illustrate those different ways of mediation for deaf and blind children. Cheers, Natalia. ----- Original Message ----- From: "Peter Smagorinsky" To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Thursday, August 8, 2013 12:16:57 PM Subject: [Xmca-l] deaf thinking I?m working with some colleagues in a small study group that is concerned with what we?re calling post-disability studies, i.e., research that eschews deficit labeling of people of difference (for me, mental health variation; for others, ADHD overclassification and deaf education). I was reading something that led me to pose the following question. Although LSV was in part motivated to take on defectological studies in response to the education of the deaf, I don?t think he ever gets into deaf cognition, especially in terms of how, in the absence of language/speech, thinking is mediated and represented. My question: Joe, one of the hallmarks of a Vygotskian approach is that thinking is tool mediated, principally by language/speech but through other means as well?images, sounds, etc. I?m wondering about people who have never heard speech. Has anyone ever documented what deaf thinking is comprised of/mediated by? Thx,p The answer from Joe Tobin: This is a hot topic in deaf studies. A group at Gallaudet called VL2 has a NSF grant to do a series of studies on deaf linguistics/thinking/brain development. http://vl2.gallaudet.edu/initiatives_and_projects.php Here is an example: http://vl2.gallaudet.edu/assets/section7/document163.pdf One paper also attached. Although I?m hardly a deaf education expert, I find this to be a fascinating question. Am I alone, or are others out there interested as well? Just don?t expect any definitive answers from me. Thx,Peter From nataliag@sfu.ca Thu Aug 8 13:00:33 2013 From: nataliag@sfu.ca (Natalia Gajdamaschko) Date: Thu, 8 Aug 2013 13:00:33 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: deaf thinking In-Reply-To: Message-ID: <1729897181.17443019.1375992033484.JavaMail.root@jaguar9.sfu.ca> Hi Peter, I use video "Butterflies of Zagorsk" (BBC production) and Awakening to Life by A.Meshcheryakov (1974) in my Vygotsky seminar to illustrate those different ways of mediation for deaf and blind children. Cheers, Natalia. ----- Original Message ----- From: "Peter Smagorinsky" To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Thursday, August 8, 2013 12:16:57 PM Subject: [Xmca-l] deaf thinking I?m working with some colleagues in a small study group that is concerned with what we?re calling post-disability studies, i.e., research that eschews deficit labeling of people of difference (for me, mental health variation; for others, ADHD overclassification and deaf education). I was reading something that led me to pose the following question. Although LSV was in part motivated to take on defectological studies in response to the education of the deaf, I don?t think he ever gets into deaf cognition, especially in terms of how, in the absence of language/speech, thinking is mediated and represented. My question: Joe, one of the hallmarks of a Vygotskian approach is that thinking is tool mediated, principally by language/speech but through other means as well?images, sounds, etc. I?m wondering about people who have never heard speech. Has anyone ever documented what deaf thinking is comprised of/mediated by? Thx,p The answer from Joe Tobin: This is a hot topic in deaf studies. A group at Gallaudet called VL2 has a NSF grant to do a series of studies on deaf linguistics/thinking/brain development. http://vl2.gallaudet.edu/initiatives_and_projects.php Here is an example: http://vl2.gallaudet.edu/assets/section7/document163.pdf One paper also attached. Although I?m hardly a deaf education expert, I find this to be a fascinating question. Am I alone, or are others out there interested as well? Just don?t expect any definitive answers from me. Thx,Peter From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Thu Aug 8 13:53:46 2013 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Thu, 8 Aug 2013 21:53:46 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> Message-ID: Thanks for these. They're interesting but I don't think they quite answer the question about operational definitions -- i.e. the experimental paradigms used to establish and measure the unit. On p. 364 Leontiev elaborates on an example with a student, in which he states that psychological testing needs to be done in order to find out what the current activity is for the subject. But this does not really bring any bearing onto "the very complex cross-links" (1977) between the individual and society. I am guessing that he uses leading activity as the means for setting the scope of societal practices for revealing the formation of new motives etc. I am partially interested in this for observing how the object is demonstrated objectively, and the relation of complex motives (e.g. doing work in an ethical way) to notions of a "single basis of development". Best, Huw On 7 August 2013 22:14, Andy Blunden wrote: > Leontyev says that an activity is defined by its motive. > See "The Development of Mind," Leontyev 2009, p. 28-29 > http://www.erythrospress.com/**store/leontyev.html > > But Leontyev, in my opinion, does not adequately distinguish between "an > activity" and "a type of activity," leading to confusion on this point. > Plus the fact that the object or motive is given externally to the > activity, underming his claim to have created an activity theory, rather > than a theory of human needs. > > Andy > ------------------------------**- > > The specific processes that realise some vital, i.e. active, relation of > the subject to reality we shall term processes of /activity/, in > distinction to other processes. > > We shall also, accordingly, limit the concept of object. It is normally > used in a dual sense: in the broadest one as a thing standing in some kind > of relation to other things, i.e. as ?a thing having existence?; and in a > narrower sense ? as something withstanding (German /Gegenstand/), resistant > (Latin /objectum/), that to which an act is directed, i.e. as something to > which precisely a living creature relates itself as the /object of its > activity/ ? indifferently as outward or inward activity (e. g. /object of > nutrition/, /object of labour/, /object of meditation/, etc.). >From now on > we shall employ the term /object/ precisely in this narrower, special sense. > > Any activity of an organism is directed to some object or other; activity > without an object is impossible. Consideration of activity therefore > requires us to single out and distinguish that which is its real object, > i.e. the object of an active relation of the organism. > > All lower filtrable organisms (certain larvae living in water, copepods, > all Tunicata, etc.), for example, are capable, as we know, of altering > their activity in connection with a change in the aqueous medium; in that > connection it can sometimes be said with confidence that the change in the > organism?s activity is specifically linked with a definite activating > property of the medium, for example with a greater or less concentration of > nutrients. Imagine, however, that we have artificially altered the medium, > for example, of a daphnia, by putting it into water that lacks its > nutrient, plankton but contains particles of some neutral inorganic > substance; the daphnia would react to this by a slackening of the movements > that create a flow of water to its ventral slit. Is the observed slackening > of the water flea?s filtering movements a response to the absence of > plankton in the water? Or is it, on the contrary, a response to the > presence in it of unassimilable particles? Or does it, finally, depend on > some other moments still, not considered by us? Only by answering these > questions can we decide precisely /what/ property of the medium is the > object of the daphnia?s activity, i.e. with what kind of a relation we are > dealing with here. > > /Thus, the principal ?unit? of a vital process is an organism?s activity; > the different activities that realise its diverse vital relations with the > surrounding reality are essentially determined by their object; we shall > therefore differentiate between separate types of activity according to the > difference in their objects/. > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> Well I am currently looking for specific text on how leont'ev >> operationally >> defines a unit of analysis of activity, I'm sure I'll find details, but >> some pointers may help me get there faster. >> >> Thanks, >> Huw >> >> On 7 August 2013 18:57, mike cole wrote: >> >> >> >>> Seems we are up and ready for chatting. >>> mike >>> >>> On Wed, Aug 7, 2013 at 10:34 AM, Huw Lloyd >> >>> >>>> wrote: >>>> testing. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >> >> > > -- > ------------------------------**------------------------------** > ------------ > *Andy Blunden* > Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts > http://marxists.academia.edu/**AndyBlunden > > From lholzman@eastsideinstitute.org Thu Aug 8 14:18:01 2013 From: lholzman@eastsideinstitute.org (Lois Holzman) Date: Thu, 8 Aug 2013 17:18:01 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: deaf thinking In-Reply-To: <1729897181.17443019.1375992033484.JavaMail.root@jaguar9.sfu.ca> References: <1729897181.17443019.1375992033484.JavaMail.root@jaguar9.sfu.ca> Message-ID: <32B316E5-C892-4046-90D7-750638C95967@eastsideinstitute.org> Me too. Lois On Aug 8, 2013, at 4:00 PM, Natalia Gajdamaschko wrote: > > Hi Peter, > I use video "Butterflies of Zagorsk" (BBC production) and Awakening to Life by A.Meshcheryakov (1974) in my Vygotsky seminar to illustrate those different ways of mediation for deaf and blind children. > Cheers, > Natalia. > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: "Peter Smagorinsky" > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Sent: Thursday, August 8, 2013 12:16:57 PM > Subject: [Xmca-l] deaf thinking > > I?m working with some colleagues in a small study group that is concerned with what we?re calling post-disability studies, i.e., research that eschews deficit labeling of people of difference (for me, mental health variation; for others, ADHD overclassification and deaf education). I was reading something that led me to pose the following question. Although LSV was in part motivated to take on defectological studies in response to the education of the deaf, I don?t think he ever gets into deaf cognition, especially in terms of how, in the absence of language/speech, thinking is mediated and represented. My question: > Joe, one of the hallmarks of a Vygotskian approach is that thinking is tool mediated, principally by language/speech but through other means as well?images, sounds, etc. I?m wondering about people who have never heard speech. Has anyone ever documented what deaf thinking is comprised of/mediated by? Thx,p > > The answer from Joe Tobin: > This is a hot topic in deaf studies. A group at Gallaudet called VL2 has a NSF grant to do a series of studies on deaf linguistics/thinking/brain development. http://vl2.gallaudet.edu/initiatives_and_projects.php > > Here is an example: > http://vl2.gallaudet.edu/assets/section7/document163.pdf > > One paper also attached. > > Although I?m hardly a deaf education expert, I find this to be a fascinating question. Am I alone, or are others out there interested as well? Just don?t expect any definitive answers from me. Thx,Peter > > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Thu Aug 8 14:38:55 2013 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Thu, 8 Aug 2013 22:38:55 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: deaf thinking In-Reply-To: <32B316E5-C892-4046-90D7-750638C95967@eastsideinstitute.org> References: <1729897181.17443019.1375992033484.JavaMail.root@jaguar9.sfu.ca> <32B316E5-C892-4046-90D7-750638C95967@eastsideinstitute.org> Message-ID: Do you know if there are English versions online? Best, Huw On 8 August 2013 22:18, Lois Holzman wrote: > Me too. > Lois > > > > > > On Aug 8, 2013, at 4:00 PM, Natalia Gajdamaschko wrote: > > > > > Hi Peter, > > I use video "Butterflies of Zagorsk" (BBC production) and Awakening to > Life by A.Meshcheryakov (1974) in my Vygotsky seminar to illustrate those > different ways of mediation for deaf and blind children. > > Cheers, > > Natalia. > > > > ----- Original Message ----- > > From: "Peter Smagorinsky" > > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > Sent: Thursday, August 8, 2013 12:16:57 PM > > Subject: [Xmca-l] deaf thinking > > > > I?m working with some colleagues in a small study group that is > concerned with what we?re calling post-disability studies, i.e., research > that eschews deficit labeling of people of difference (for me, mental > health variation; for others, ADHD overclassification and deaf education). > I was reading something that led me to pose the following question. > Although LSV was in part motivated to take on defectological studies in > response to the education of the deaf, I don?t think he ever gets into deaf > cognition, especially in terms of how, in the absence of language/speech, > thinking is mediated and represented. My question: > > Joe, one of the hallmarks of a Vygotskian approach is that thinking is > tool mediated, principally by language/speech but through other means as > well?images, sounds, etc. I?m wondering about people who have never heard > speech. Has anyone ever documented what deaf thinking is comprised > of/mediated by? Thx,p > > > > The answer from Joe Tobin: > > This is a hot topic in deaf studies. A group at Gallaudet called VL2 has > a NSF grant to do a series of studies on deaf linguistics/thinking/brain > development. http://vl2.gallaudet.edu/initiatives_and_projects.php > > > > Here is an example: > > http://vl2.gallaudet.edu/assets/section7/document163.pdf > > > > One paper also attached. > > > > Although I?m hardly a deaf education expert, I find this to be a > fascinating question. Am I alone, or are others out there interested as > well? Just don?t expect any definitive answers from me. Thx,Peter > > > > > > > > From nacho.montero@uam.es Thu Aug 8 14:51:12 2013 From: nacho.montero@uam.es (nacho.montero@uam.es) Date: Thu, 08 Aug 2013 23:51:12 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: deaf thinking In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20130808235112.Horde.rC4eESKzwZxSBBLQA4iBZUA@webmail.uam.es> Peter, Not sure you will be interested in but there was some empirical work on the issue of deaf people's use of private (egocentric) speech: Jamieson, J.R. (1995). Visible thought: deaf children?s use of signed and spoken private speech. Sign Language Studies, 86. 63-79. At the end of the nineties Elizabeth McCarthy finished her doctoral tesis on this issue too, at Stanford University, advised by Rafael D?az. Adam Winsler included some references in his review: Winsler, A. (2009). Still Talking to Ourselves After All These Years: A Review of Current Research on Private Speech. In A. Winsler, Ch. Fernyhough, & I. Montero (Eds.), Private speech, executive functioning, and the development of verbal self-regulation, (chp. 1). New York: Cambridge University Press. My best, NACHO. From lchcmike@gmail.com Thu Aug 8 15:55:45 2013 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Thu, 8 Aug 2013 15:55:45 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> Message-ID: I am unsure of how the term "operational" snuck into Leontiev discussion. Is this a word he actually uses? I would be looking at ways in which empirical work by people like Engestrom and Hedegaard (for example) warrant claims concerning the object of activity. mike On Thu, Aug 8, 2013 at 1:53 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > Thanks for these. They're interesting but I don't think they quite answer > the question about operational definitions -- i.e. the experimental > paradigms used to establish and measure the unit. > > On p. 364 Leontiev elaborates on an example with a student, in which he > states that psychological testing needs to be done in order to find out > what the current activity is for the subject. > > But this does not really bring any bearing onto "the very complex > cross-links" (1977) between the individual and society. > > I am guessing that he uses leading activity as the means for setting the > scope of societal practices for revealing the formation of new motives etc. > > I am partially interested in this for observing how the object is > demonstrated objectively, and the relation of complex motives (e.g. doing > work in an ethical way) to notions of a "single basis of development". > > Best, > Huw > > On 7 August 2013 22:14, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > Leontyev says that an activity is defined by its motive. > > See "The Development of Mind," Leontyev 2009, p. 28-29 > > http://www.erythrospress.com/**store/leontyev.html< > http://www.erythrospress.com/store/leontyev.html> > > > > But Leontyev, in my opinion, does not adequately distinguish between "an > > activity" and "a type of activity," leading to confusion on this point. > > Plus the fact that the object or motive is given externally to the > > activity, underming his claim to have created an activity theory, rather > > than a theory of human needs. > > > > Andy > > ------------------------------**- > > > > The specific processes that realise some vital, i.e. active, relation of > > the subject to reality we shall term processes of /activity/, in > > distinction to other processes. > > > > We shall also, accordingly, limit the concept of object. It is normally > > used in a dual sense: in the broadest one as a thing standing in some > kind > > of relation to other things, i.e. as ?a thing having existence?; and in a > > narrower sense ? as something withstanding (German /Gegenstand/), > resistant > > (Latin /objectum/), that to which an act is directed, i.e. as something > to > > which precisely a living creature relates itself as the /object of its > > activity/ ? indifferently as outward or inward activity (e. g. /object of > > nutrition/, /object of labour/, /object of meditation/, etc.). >From now > on > > we shall employ the term /object/ precisely in this narrower, special > sense. > > > > Any activity of an organism is directed to some object or other; activity > > without an object is impossible. Consideration of activity therefore > > requires us to single out and distinguish that which is its real object, > > i.e. the object of an active relation of the organism. > > > > All lower filtrable organisms (certain larvae living in water, copepods, > > all Tunicata, etc.), for example, are capable, as we know, of altering > > their activity in connection with a change in the aqueous medium; in that > > connection it can sometimes be said with confidence that the change in > the > > organism?s activity is specifically linked with a definite activating > > property of the medium, for example with a greater or less concentration > of > > nutrients. Imagine, however, that we have artificially altered the > medium, > > for example, of a daphnia, by putting it into water that lacks its > > nutrient, plankton but contains particles of some neutral inorganic > > substance; the daphnia would react to this by a slackening of the > movements > > that create a flow of water to its ventral slit. Is the observed > slackening > > of the water flea?s filtering movements a response to the absence of > > plankton in the water? Or is it, on the contrary, a response to the > > presence in it of unassimilable particles? Or does it, finally, depend on > > some other moments still, not considered by us? Only by answering these > > questions can we decide precisely /what/ property of the medium is the > > object of the daphnia?s activity, i.e. with what kind of a relation we > are > > dealing with here. > > > > /Thus, the principal ?unit? of a vital process is an organism?s activity; > > the different activities that realise its diverse vital relations with > the > > surrounding reality are essentially determined by their object; we shall > > therefore differentiate between separate types of activity according to > the > > difference in their objects/. > > > > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > >> Well I am currently looking for specific text on how leont'ev > >> operationally > >> defines a unit of analysis of activity, I'm sure I'll find details, but > >> some pointers may help me get there faster. > >> > >> Thanks, > >> Huw > >> > >> On 7 August 2013 18:57, mike cole wrote: > >> > >> > >> > >>> Seems we are up and ready for chatting. > >>> mike > >>> > >>> On Wed, Aug 7, 2013 at 10:34 AM, Huw Lloyd >>> > >>> > >>>> wrote: > >>>> testing. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >> > >> > > > > -- > > ------------------------------**------------------------------** > > ------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > > Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts > > http://marxists.academia.edu/**AndyBlunden< > http://marxists.academia.edu/AndyBlunden> > > > > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Thu Aug 8 16:08:20 2013 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Fri, 9 Aug 2013 00:08:20 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> Message-ID: On 8 August 2013 23:55, mike cole wrote: > I am unsure of how the term "operational" snuck into Leontiev discussion. > Is this a > word he actually uses? > No. But one needs to translate a conceptual definition of activity when studying it experimentally. I think I am using it from Ratner (1997). > > I would be looking at ways in which empirical work by people like Engestrom > and > Hedegaard (for example) warrant claims concerning the object of activity. > Their indexing of development is different, I believe. Thanks, Huw > > mike > > On Thu, Aug 8, 2013 at 1:53 PM, Huw Lloyd > wrote: > > > Thanks for these. They're interesting but I don't think they quite > answer > > the question about operational definitions -- i.e. the experimental > > paradigms used to establish and measure the unit. > > > > On p. 364 Leontiev elaborates on an example with a student, in which he > > states that psychological testing needs to be done in order to find out > > what the current activity is for the subject. > > > > But this does not really bring any bearing onto "the very complex > > cross-links" (1977) between the individual and society. > > > > I am guessing that he uses leading activity as the means for setting the > > scope of societal practices for revealing the formation of new motives > etc. > > > > I am partially interested in this for observing how the object is > > demonstrated objectively, and the relation of complex motives (e.g. doing > > work in an ethical way) to notions of a "single basis of development". > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > On 7 August 2013 22:14, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > > > Leontyev says that an activity is defined by its motive. > > > See "The Development of Mind," Leontyev 2009, p. 28-29 > > > http://www.erythrospress.com/**store/leontyev.html< > > http://www.erythrospress.com/store/leontyev.html> > > > > > > But Leontyev, in my opinion, does not adequately distinguish between > "an > > > activity" and "a type of activity," leading to confusion on this point. > > > Plus the fact that the object or motive is given externally to the > > > activity, underming his claim to have created an activity theory, > rather > > > than a theory of human needs. > > > > > > Andy > > > ------------------------------**- > > > > > > The specific processes that realise some vital, i.e. active, relation > of > > > the subject to reality we shall term processes of /activity/, in > > > distinction to other processes. > > > > > > We shall also, accordingly, limit the concept of object. It is normally > > > used in a dual sense: in the broadest one as a thing standing in some > > kind > > > of relation to other things, i.e. as ?a thing having existence?; and > in a > > > narrower sense ? as something withstanding (German /Gegenstand/), > > resistant > > > (Latin /objectum/), that to which an act is directed, i.e. as something > > to > > > which precisely a living creature relates itself as the /object of its > > > activity/ ? indifferently as outward or inward activity (e. g. /object > of > > > nutrition/, /object of labour/, /object of meditation/, etc.). >From > now > > on > > > we shall employ the term /object/ precisely in this narrower, special > > sense. > > > > > > Any activity of an organism is directed to some object or other; > activity > > > without an object is impossible. Consideration of activity therefore > > > requires us to single out and distinguish that which is its real > object, > > > i.e. the object of an active relation of the organism. > > > > > > All lower filtrable organisms (certain larvae living in water, > copepods, > > > all Tunicata, etc.), for example, are capable, as we know, of altering > > > their activity in connection with a change in the aqueous medium; in > that > > > connection it can sometimes be said with confidence that the change in > > the > > > organism?s activity is specifically linked with a definite activating > > > property of the medium, for example with a greater or less > concentration > > of > > > nutrients. Imagine, however, that we have artificially altered the > > medium, > > > for example, of a daphnia, by putting it into water that lacks its > > > nutrient, plankton but contains particles of some neutral inorganic > > > substance; the daphnia would react to this by a slackening of the > > movements > > > that create a flow of water to its ventral slit. Is the observed > > slackening > > > of the water flea?s filtering movements a response to the absence of > > > plankton in the water? Or is it, on the contrary, a response to the > > > presence in it of unassimilable particles? Or does it, finally, depend > on > > > some other moments still, not considered by us? Only by answering these > > > questions can we decide precisely /what/ property of the medium is the > > > object of the daphnia?s activity, i.e. with what kind of a relation we > > are > > > dealing with here. > > > > > > /Thus, the principal ?unit? of a vital process is an organism?s > activity; > > > the different activities that realise its diverse vital relations with > > the > > > surrounding reality are essentially determined by their object; we > shall > > > therefore differentiate between separate types of activity according to > > the > > > difference in their objects/. > > > > > > > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > > > >> Well I am currently looking for specific text on how leont'ev > > >> operationally > > >> defines a unit of analysis of activity, I'm sure I'll find details, > but > > >> some pointers may help me get there faster. > > >> > > >> Thanks, > > >> Huw > > >> > > >> On 7 August 2013 18:57, mike cole wrote: > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >>> Seems we are up and ready for chatting. > > >>> mike > > >>> > > >>> On Wed, Aug 7, 2013 at 10:34 AM, Huw Lloyd < > huw.softdesigns@gmail.com > > >>> > > >>> > > >>>> wrote: > > >>>> testing. > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>> > > >> > > >> > > > > > > -- > > > ------------------------------**------------------------------** > > > ------------ > > > *Andy Blunden* > > > Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > > > Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts > > > http://marxists.academia.edu/**AndyBlunden< > > http://marxists.academia.edu/AndyBlunden> > > > > > > > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Thu Aug 8 16:26:29 2013 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin Packer) Date: Thu, 8 Aug 2013 19:26:29 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> Message-ID: <6A8D8FEB-0696-495D-976D-21855A767E20@uniandes.edu.co> Huw, I dont know how literally you're using the term, but the notion of "operational definition" is very much part of theory of science of logical positivism. I don't think you're going to find much of that in Leontyev. Martin On Aug 8, 2013, at 4:53 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > Thanks for these. They're interesting but I don't think they quite answer > the question about operational definitions -- i.e. the experimental > paradigms used to establish and measure the unit. > > On p. 364 Leontiev elaborates on an example with a student, in which he > states that psychological testing needs to be done in order to find out > what the current activity is for the subject. > > But this does not really bring any bearing onto "the very complex > cross-links" (1977) between the individual and society. > > I am guessing that he uses leading activity as the means for setting the > scope of societal practices for revealing the formation of new motives etc. > > I am partially interested in this for observing how the object is > demonstrated objectively, and the relation of complex motives (e.g. doing > work in an ethical way) to notions of a "single basis of development". > > Best, > Huw > > On 7 August 2013 22:14, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> Leontyev says that an activity is defined by its motive. >> See "The Development of Mind," Leontyev 2009, p. 28-29 >> http://www.erythrospress.com/**store/leontyev.html >> >> But Leontyev, in my opinion, does not adequately distinguish between "an >> activity" and "a type of activity," leading to confusion on this point. >> Plus the fact that the object or motive is given externally to the >> activity, underming his claim to have created an activity theory, rather >> than a theory of human needs. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------**- >> >> The specific processes that realise some vital, i.e. active, relation of >> the subject to reality we shall term processes of /activity/, in >> distinction to other processes. From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Thu Aug 8 16:51:43 2013 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Fri, 9 Aug 2013 00:51:43 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: <6A8D8FEB-0696-495D-976D-21855A767E20@uniandes.edu.co> References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <6A8D8FEB-0696-495D-976D-21855A767E20@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: On 9 August 2013 00:26, Martin Packer wrote: > Huw, > > I dont know how literally you're using the term, but the notion of > "operational definition" is very much part of theory of science of logical > positivism. I don't think you're going to find much of that in Leontyev. > > Martin > > I mean simply how the experimental paradigm(s) reflects the concept. Seems odd to eschew a phrase that yields additional ways of knowing, e.g. a working definition, a test based definition, conceptual, etc. Best, Huw > On Aug 8, 2013, at 4:53 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > Thanks for these. They're interesting but I don't think they quite > answer > > the question about operational definitions -- i.e. the experimental > > paradigms used to establish and measure the unit. > > > > On p. 364 Leontiev elaborates on an example with a student, in which he > > states that psychological testing needs to be done in order to find out > > what the current activity is for the subject. > > > > But this does not really bring any bearing onto "the very complex > > cross-links" (1977) between the individual and society. > > > > I am guessing that he uses leading activity as the means for setting the > > scope of societal practices for revealing the formation of new motives > etc. > > > > I am partially interested in this for observing how the object is > > demonstrated objectively, and the relation of complex motives (e.g. doing > > work in an ethical way) to notions of a "single basis of development". > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > On 7 August 2013 22:14, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > >> Leontyev says that an activity is defined by its motive. > >> See "The Development of Mind," Leontyev 2009, p. 28-29 > >> http://www.erythrospress.com/**store/leontyev.html< > http://www.erythrospress.com/store/leontyev.html> > >> > >> But Leontyev, in my opinion, does not adequately distinguish between "an > >> activity" and "a type of activity," leading to confusion on this point. > >> Plus the fact that the object or motive is given externally to the > >> activity, underming his claim to have created an activity theory, rather > >> than a theory of human needs. > >> > >> Andy > >> ------------------------------**- > >> > >> The specific processes that realise some vital, i.e. active, relation of > >> the subject to reality we shall term processes of /activity/, in > >> distinction to other processes. > > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Thu Aug 8 17:13:59 2013 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Fri, 9 Aug 2013 01:13:59 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> Message-ID: On 8 August 2013 04:26, Andy Blunden wrote: > Lubomir, > I agree that AN:'s concept of an activity needs to be simmplied, not > expanded a la Engestrom, if it is to be adequate as a foundational concept. > I also agree that the problems in the conception of an activity are not > visible from the point of view of psychologists but they do appear as > serious problems for social theory. Further, I don't believe Activity > Theory can fulfill its potential until the same concepts work at micro-, > meso- and macrolevels. Otherwise, psychologists have to just take the tasks > as given by some abstract "society" and social theorists take their > subjects as given by some abstract human nature." Neither is sufficient. > > I don't agree though, that the alternative to taking the object as > external to the activity (as defining it) is to take the object as internal > to the subject, a.k.a. individual. At all. I think the work of the Moscow > Methodological Circle began in the right direction, but to my eyes, it > ended up locked into an "engineering" approach, somewhat symmetrical with > the cognitivism which was popular in the US at the same time. > > In my view, the object is *immanent* in the activity, being realised by > the activity. The subject/object problem (or dichotomy) is resolved not by > choosing an objective motive or a subjective sense/meaning, but by > following Hegel in using the individual/particular/**universal > relationship which he took to be the foundation of a concept (as the ideal > object of an activity). I use the concept of "project" (I think I share > this with the MMC) to represent the idea of an activity in which the object > is imminant within the activity. > > Andy > > I suspect there is significant scope for communicative errors on such a point (writing/translation etc.) E.g. the object construed by the parent presented to the child etc. "[Activity] can be thought of, roughly, as a kind of dynamic envelope enclosing both subject and object." Re theory of human needs, needs seem fairly integral to studying activity developmentally, no? Best, Huw > > Lubomir Savov Popov wrote: > >> Dear Andy, >> (sorry for typos, I type as I think) >> >> I agree in some way with your concerns about the model that you envisage >> in your mail. Although Leontiev is very disciplined in his logic, I have >> difficulty accepting some of the relationships there. >> http://www.igs.net/~pballan/**AT.htm At this time, I cannot access articles that talk about this problem. >> Also, it is not very common to refer to that model as problematic. The >> Scandinavians talk about a problem, and their solution was to expand the >> original activity model to include the social environment and group action. >> Consider that the original activity model is created by psychologists, not >> social psychologists or sociologists. Even the Moscow Methodological Circle >> keeps with the Lentiev tradition, although have "on board" a lot of >> philosophers and sociologists. However, I accept Leontiev's model as >> general. That is why it has to be kept simple and straitforward. On the >> basis of this model, several other more specific models are developed. They >> might represent only one level selected from the general model. >> The problems I see are not that the motive is external to activity. The >> motive can be interpreted as internal to the subject, if necessary. >> However, the goal can be seen both at activity level and at operations >> level. The model doesn't talk about the Task. However, if you need models >> that incorporate Task, go to Ergonomics. Another problem that I see is that >> the directions at the higher levels are provided by teleological concepts. >> However, at operations level, the direction is provided by the Conditions. >> Conditions do exist at each level and do affect the trajectory/course at >> each level. There are many other variations as well. In Russian, they talk >> about deyatelnost and aktivnost. The best way to get into activity theory >> is to read Russian originals. There are a lot of problems when translating >> Russian concepts and terms in English. This comes with difficult to >> translate tatigkeit. Plus, the Russians have borrowed the word aktivnost >> and endowed it with their own meaning. For me, it was always a puzzle why >> they use Aktivnost, when in English is actually Activity. But that is the >> nature of the production of terminology. People just take a word and endow >> it with new meaning that they need for communicating their ideas. >> >> I haven't seen yet a global model of activity that models it at each >> level and that connects/relates all component concepts. I am not sure that >> this is possible. There are hundreds of model variations when we look in >> different disciplines. Each discipline envisages only one particular aspect >> and level. >> In the 1960s, Vladimir Lefevre, the founder (or one of them) of the >> Moscow Methodological Circle, had come with the idea of the Conceptual >> Configurator. It was supposed to be a model that presents all aspects and >> levels of a phenomenon in a coordinated way. Unfortunately, he didn't go >> beyond the idea. No one has ever created a conceptual configurator for >> activity, and I am not sure if this is possible at this time. All models >> are either general, at a very high level of abstraction like Leontiev's, or >> discipline specific, with very peculiar terminology and discriptory and >> explanatory capabilities. >> Best, >> >> Lubomir >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.**edu [mailto: >> xmca-l-bounces@**mailman.ucsd.edu ] On >> Behalf Of Andy Blunden >> Sent: Wednesday, August 07, 2013 5:15 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Leontyev's activities >> >> Leontyev says that an activity is defined by its motive. >> See "The Development of Mind," Leontyev 2009, p. 28-29 >> http://www.erythrospress.com/**store/leontyev.html >> >> But Leontyev, in my opinion, does not adequately distinguish between "an >> activity" and "a type of activity," leading to confusion on this point. >> Plus the fact that the object or motive is given externally to the >> activity, underming his claim to have created an activity theory, rather >> than a theory of human needs. >> >> Andy >> ------------------------------**- >> >> The specific processes that realise some vital, i.e. active, relation of >> the subject to reality we shall term processes of /activity/, in >> distinction to other processes. >> >> We shall also, accordingly, limit the concept of object. It is normally >> used in a dual sense: in the broadest one as a thing standing in some kind >> of relation to other things, i.e. as 'a thing having existence'; and in a >> narrower sense - as something withstanding (German /Gegenstand/), resistant >> (Latin /objectum/), that to which an act is directed, i.e. as something to >> which precisely a living creature relates itself as the /object of its >> activity/ - indifferently as outward or inward activity (e. g. /object of >> nutrition/, /object of labour/, /object of meditation/, etc.). >From now on >> we shall employ the term /object/ precisely in this narrower, special sense. >> >> Any activity of an organism is directed to some object or other; activity >> without an object is impossible. Consideration of activity therefore >> requires us to single out and distinguish that which is its real object, >> i.e. the object of an active relation of the organism. >> >> All lower filtrable organisms (certain larvae living in water, copepods, >> all Tunicata, etc.), for example, are capable, as we know, of altering >> their activity in connection with a change in the aqueous medium; in that >> connection it can sometimes be said with confidence that the change in the >> organism's activity is specifically linked with a definite activating >> property of the medium, for example with a greater or less concentration of >> nutrients. Imagine, however, that we have artificially altered the medium, >> for example, of a daphnia, by putting it into water that lacks its >> nutrient, plankton but contains particles of some neutral inorganic >> substance; the daphnia would react to this by a slackening of the movements >> that create a flow of water to its ventral slit. Is the observed slackening >> of the water flea's filtering movements a response to the absence of >> plankton in the water? Or is it, on the contrary, a response to the >> presence in it of unassimilable particles? Or does it, finally, depend on >> some other moments still, not considered by us? Only by answering these >> questions can we decide precisely /what/ property of the medium is the >> object of the daphnia's activity, i.e. with what kind of a relation we are >> dealing with here. >> >> /Thus, the principal 'unit' of a vital process is an organism's activity; >> the different activities that realise its diverse vital relations with the >> surrounding reality are essentially determined by their object; we shall >> therefore differentiate between separate types of activity according to the >> difference in their objects/. >> >> >> Huw Lloyd wrote: >> >> >>> Well I am currently looking for specific text on how leont'ev >>> operationally defines a unit of analysis of activity, I'm sure I'll find >>> details, but some pointers may help me get there faster. >>> >>> Thanks, >>> Huw >>> >>> On 7 August 2013 18:57, mike cole wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>>> Seems we are up and ready for chatting. >>>> mike >>>> >>>> On Wed, Aug 7, 2013 at 10:34 AM, Huw Lloyd >>> >>>> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> testing. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >> >> -- >> ------------------------------**------------------------------** >> ------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ >> Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts >> http://marxists.academia.edu/**AndyBlunden >> >> >> >> >> >> > > -- > ------------------------------**------------------------------** > ------------ > *Andy Blunden* > Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts > http://marxists.academia.edu/**AndyBlunden > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Thu Aug 8 17:50:35 2013 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 09 Aug 2013 10:50:35 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: deaf thinking In-Reply-To: References: <1729897181.17443019.1375992033484.JavaMail.root@jaguar9.sfu.ca> <32B316E5-C892-4046-90D7-750638C95967@eastsideinstitute.org> Message-ID: <52043CDB.80205@mira.net> http://www.marxists.org/archive/meshcheryakov/awakening/index.htm has Mescheryakov's book in HTML, or a link to buy the book in hard copy. Andy Huw Lloyd wrote: > Do you know if there are English versions online? > > Best, > Huw > > From ablunden@mira.net Thu Aug 8 17:59:53 2013 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 09 Aug 2013 10:59:53 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <6A8D8FEB-0696-495D-976D-21855A767E20@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <52043F09.7060703@mira.net> So far as I know we are indebted to Percy Bridgman for the idea of the requirement of "opeational definition" of concepts. http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/bridgman.htm If you search for "operation" in Einstein's reply to criticisms (from Bridgman): http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/einstein/works/1940s/reply.htm I think this is a view which the Marxist Leontyev would agree with. Molecules existed in chemical and physical theory long before one could speak of an "operational definition" of a molecule. Andy Huw Lloyd wrote: > On 9 August 2013 00:26, Martin Packer wrote: > > >> Huw, >> >> I dont know how literally you're using the term, but the notion of >> "operational definition" is very much part of theory of science of logical >> positivism. I don't think you're going to find much of that in Leontyev. >> >> Martin >> >> >> > I mean simply how the experimental paradigm(s) reflects the concept. > > Seems odd to eschew a phrase that yields additional ways of knowing, e.g. > a working definition, a test based definition, conceptual, etc. > > Best, > Huw > > From ablunden@mira.net Thu Aug 8 18:03:37 2013 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 09 Aug 2013 11:03:37 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> Message-ID: <52043FE9.5090109@mira.net> Integral yes. But as ANL himself points out *human* needs are themseleves *products* of human acitivity. People only need hammers because someone has produced nails. In circular processes like this, the question is: what concept is fundamental? Cf Dewey on the reflex arc. Andy Huw Lloyd wrote: > ... > Re theory of human needs, needs seem fairly integral to studying > activity developmentally, no? > > Best, > Huw > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Thu Aug 8 18:16:22 2013 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin Packer) Date: Thu, 8 Aug 2013 21:16:22 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: <52043F09.7060703@mira.net> References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <6A8D8FEB-0696-495D-976D-21855A767E20@uniandes.edu.co> <52043F09.7060703@mira.net> Message-ID: <2B862D6C-9FE5-42AC-868A-467AD668A73F@uniandes.edu.co> Bridgman, yes. But what are defined operationally are variables - defined in terms of their measurement operations - not entities, such as a molecule. In Einsteinian physics durations and lengths are precisely defined in terms of observations of clocks and rulers. Martin On Aug 8, 2013, at 8:59 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > So far as I know we are indebted to Percy Bridgman for the idea of the requirement of "opeational definition" of concepts. > http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/bridgman.htm > If you search for "operation" in Einstein's reply to criticisms (from Bridgman): > http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/einstein/works/1940s/reply.htm > I think this is a view which the Marxist Leontyev would agree with. > Molecules existed in chemical and physical theory long before one could speak of an "operational definition" of a molecule. > > Andy > > Huw Lloyd wrote: >> On 9 August 2013 00:26, Martin Packer wrote: >> >> >>> Huw, >>> >>> I dont know how literally you're using the term, but the notion of >>> "operational definition" is very much part of theory of science of logical >>> positivism. I don't think you're going to find much of that in Leontyev. >>> >>> Martin >> I mean simply how the experimental paradigm(s) reflects the concept. >> >> Seems odd to eschew a phrase that yields additional ways of knowing, e.g. >> a working definition, a test based definition, conceptual, etc. >> >> Best, >> Huw > > > From ablunden@mira.net Thu Aug 8 18:24:10 2013 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 09 Aug 2013 11:24:10 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> Message-ID: <520444BA.2000808@mira.net> Greg, as Marx said: "Communism is the riddle of history solved," (1844). http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/comm.htm#44CC4 This discussion is an example. We each enter this discussion for different reasons (maybe not the same reason Mike created it for), maybe to find the answer to some question, but as we participate, the object of our activity broadens and deepens, and we find ourselves pursuing different questions. And xcma develops "according to its own logic" as they say. An activity (generally) exists. Individuals join it (with their own motives). The object of the activity develops as people join it, participate in it, and find disappointment or enlightenment, etc., in so doing and modify the activity accordingly. A number of people joined the Bolshevik Party in 1903 with the aim of Socialism, but it didn't turn out like that despite their intentions and personal motives, but maybe the outcome (Stalin, USSR, Comintern, etc.) was there in the way they set about fighting for "socialism"? City planners see certain problems in the city's operations and instead of building public transport, they build freeways for cars. 100 years later (as Jane Jacobs showed) the problems are even worse, and they haver a different kind of city. Things don't always work out, but the outcome is *immanent* in the project itself, and is only realised in the outcome. A group of workers get the union in to solve oppressive problems at work. After years of fighting, they are all worn out, disillusioned and most of them fired. But the workplace is unionised and the next generation of workers enjoy the benefits. Andy http://www.academia.edu/2947516/The_Fine_Granules_of_Historys_Sediment greg.a.thompson@gmail.com wrote: > Andy, could you give an example of what you mean when you say that the object is immanent in activity? > -Greg > > From ablunden@mira.net Thu Aug 8 18:41:08 2013 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 09 Aug 2013 11:41:08 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> Message-ID: <520448B4.1000109@mira.net> Huw, I think we have to widen the scope of the subject matter beyond child development here to appreciate the extent of the concept of "an activity." Children, after all, grow into a society (community, nation state, world market) of adults, and "activities" are the units for understanding the dynamics (development) of that adult life-world. In that context, I think "leading activity" is a concept which needs qualification. A mature adult is always committed to a number of projects, in different ways; some side-by-side, some "nested" and some in conflict. This was Vasilyuk's insight I think. Personal development of the adult is tied up with how the different projects to which one is committed in one's life conflict with or reinforce one another, or come up against objective barriers or fail to fulfill themself for a person. I don't know that Leontyev looked into those "very complex cross-links." For that I turn to Vasilyuk's 1984 book (not his current writing!). Andy Huw Lloyd wrote: > Thanks for these. They're interesting but I don't think they quite > answer the question about operational definitions -- i.e. the > experimental paradigms used to establish and measure the unit. > > On p. 364 Leontiev elaborates on an example with a student, in which > he states that psychological testing needs to be done in order to find > out what the current activity is for the subject. > > But this does not really bring any bearing onto "the very complex > cross-links" (1977) between the individual and society. > > I am guessing that he uses leading activity as the means for setting > the scope of societal practices for revealing the formation of new > motives etc. > > I am partially interested in this for observing how the object is > demonstrated objectively, and the relation of complex motives (e.g. > doing work in an ethical way) to notions of a "single basis of > development". > > Best, > Huw From ablunden@mira.net Thu Aug 8 18:51:38 2013 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 09 Aug 2013 11:51:38 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> Message-ID: <52044B2A.2090507@mira.net> Thanks you, Lubomir. We are very nearly in agreement on all this. For me the task is to form a *simple* concept, asyou suggest, which functions *both* as a "universal explanatory princple" (the substance of human life), and a major principle of psychology. In my view, Hegel provided us the key to"all the other contradictions" and "needless incongruities" in his Logic. Andy Lubomir Savov Popov wrote: > ... > > Activity is a concept with a very wide scope and range of abstractness. In this respect, it can be modeled in many ways. However, different models have different limitations, scope of applications, and so forth. When Activity is conceptualized as a universal explanatory principle, the model of activity can incorporate the subject. When Activity is used as one of the major principles of psychology (as in the textbooks by Leontiev and his students) it incorporates everything, even culture. This should not sound as a paradox or as a conundrum. I see it possible and productive in the methodological realm. I do admit that in this short space of time it is not possible to explain all other contradictions or to elaborate on details. I am also a bit conservative in the scope of my discussion so that I don't engage in needless incongruities. > > ... From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Thu Aug 8 19:51:13 2013 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Thu, 8 Aug 2013 20:51:13 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: <520444BA.2000808@mira.net> References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> <520444BA.2000808@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy, I think I need still more help. I got lost at, well, "an activity (generally) exists". Wondering what this could mean. Then the middle part seems to make some sense for me: activities don't simply and reasonably follow the intentions of their participants, but then lost you again at the end, with "the outcome in '*immanent* in the project itself". Not sure what exactly that means either. And as a bigger question, I am trying to figure out "where" the activity exists? And "who" is a part of it? For example, with XMCA, is each thread or discussion an activity? What about all the intersections and overlaps with previous and soon-to-be discussions? Or is the whole history of XMCA an activity? And as to "who", is it just the people talking (i.e. writing!), or are the "lurkers" part of the activity? And are non-XMCA folks with whom the writers and lurkers speak, and who have significantly influenced the writers' ideas - are they a part of the activity? In short, what are the bounds of an activity? (oh, and where does a "project" fit into all of this?) -greg On Thu, Aug 8, 2013 at 7:24 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Greg, as Marx said: "Communism is the riddle of history solved," (1844). > http://www.marxists.org/**archive/marx/works/1844/** > manuscripts/comm.htm#44CC4 > > This discussion is an example. We each enter this discussion for different > reasons (maybe not the same reason Mike created it for), maybe to find the > answer to some question, but as we participate, the object of our activity > broadens and deepens, and we find ourselves pursuing different questions. > And xcma develops "according to its own logic" as they say. > > An activity (generally) exists. Individuals join it (with their own > motives). The object of the activity develops as people join it, > participate in it, and find disappointment or enlightenment, etc., in so > doing and modify the activity accordingly. A number of people joined the > Bolshevik Party in 1903 with the aim of Socialism, but it didn't turn out > like that despite their intentions and personal motives, but maybe the > outcome (Stalin, USSR, Comintern, etc.) was there in the way they set about > fighting for "socialism"? City planners see certain problems in the city's > operations and instead of building public transport, they build freeways > for cars. 100 years later (as Jane Jacobs showed) the problems are even > worse, and they haver a different kind of city. Things don't always work > out, but the outcome is *immanent* in the project itself, and is only > realised in the outcome. A group of workers get the union in to solve > oppressive problems at work. After years of fighting, they are all worn > out, disillusioned and most of them fired. But the workplace is unionised > and the next generation of workers enjoy the benefits. > > Andy > http://www.academia.edu/**2947516/The_Fine_Granules_of_**Historys_Sediment > > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com wrote: > >> Andy, could you give an example of what you mean when you say that the >> object is immanent in activity? >> -Greg >> >> >> > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Visiting Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From ablunden@mira.net Thu Aug 8 20:24:32 2013 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 09 Aug 2013 13:24:32 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> <520444BA.2000808@mira.net> Message-ID: <520460F0.5030506@mira.net> Greg Thompson wrote: > Andy, > I think I need still more help. > > I got lost at, well, "an activity (generally) exists". > Wondering what this could mean. xmca didn't exist when Mike Cole launched it. But for the many thousands who have joined it since, it *existed*. Thus is "generally" exists. On the whole, we *join* rather than create activities (projects). > Then the middle part seems to make some sense for me: activities don't > simply and reasonably follow the intentions of their participants, but > then lost you again at the end, with "the outcome in '*immanent* in > the project itself". Not sure what exactly that means either. As Vygotsky says somewhere, the problem which stimulates the activity (the development of the concept) cannot in itself account for the project (or concept). The *means* utilised, which corresponds to how the problem or task is conceived by the agents, is what is crucial. I.e., not the problem or task as such, but the conception of the task, constitutes the ideal. But what this ideal is, is *only realised by the work of the project itself*. > > And as a bigger question, I am trying to figure out "where" the > activity exists? And "who" is a part of it? OK, but just don't expect to find an abstract empirical (logical positivist) answer to that. An activity (or project) is an aggregate of *actions* not *people*. These actions are the fundamental (micro) unit of an activity, which is a molar unit of human life as a whole. So an activity exists in its artefact-mediated actions, not a group of people. > For example, with XMCA, is each thread or discussion an activity? > What about all the intersections and overlaps with previous and > soon-to-be discussions? Or is the whole history of XMCA an activity? > And as to "who", is it just the people talking (i.e. writing!), or are > the "lurkers" part of the activity? And are non-XMCA folks with whom > the writers and lurkers speak, and who have significantly influenced > the writers' ideas - are they a part of the activity? (1) Like all the concepts which are part of a science, projects are *nested*. An aggregate of actions may have ideal or object which makes sense only as part of one or more larger projects. All the concepts of a science obviously have complex interactions and interdependncies. No clear boundaries or lines of demarcation. Their truth is part of the *whole*. (2) The question of "who" is part of it is the wrong question. An activity is an aggregate of actions, not individual persons. Also, a project is the particular of a concept. As a particular, the project has a relatively definite location in time and space. But it is an instance realising a concept which is a unit of an entire social formation. So the scope of a project, being part of a family of such projects, may be larger than the immediate participating actions. > > In short, what are the bounds of an activity? > (oh, and where does a "project" fit into all of this?) Boundary questions are the royal road to confusion. The question is what is the concept (or in common parlance the "essence") of a project. "A project" is just another word for "an activity." But it has its own history and connotations in our culture. (BTW "project" and "design" are the same word in Russian: "proyekt" and the etymology of "de-sign" is interesting too) and also, by using a different word I can get away from the orthodoxy of what ANL or someone else says is the case for "an activity." So if I say that the object of a project is immanent within the project, I am not directly contradicting an Activity Theorist for whom the Object or motive is given for the Activity. I want to re-discuss all the concepts of Activity Theory without being stumped by orthodoxy, so a new word helps. Andy > -greg From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Fri Aug 9 06:29:34 2013 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Fri, 9 Aug 2013 14:29:34 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: <52043FE9.5090109@mira.net> References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> <52043FE9.5090109@mira.net> Message-ID: On 9 August 2013 02:03, Andy Blunden wrote: > Integral yes. But as ANL himself points out *human* needs are themseleves > *products* of human acitivity. People only need hammers because someone has > produced nails. In circular processes like this, the question is: what > concept is fundamental? Cf Dewey on the reflex arc. > > Are needs produced? Or is this simply different objects to fashion new motives that address the need? i.e. social change could expose new needs, but that's not the same as creating them. And why is fundamental necessary? Do you mean what came (comes) first? Best, Huw > Andy > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> ... >> >> Re theory of human needs, needs seem fairly integral to studying activity >> developmentally, no? >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> > > > From eksner@gmail.com Fri Aug 9 06:38:14 2013 From: eksner@gmail.com (Eksner) Date: Fri, 9 Aug 2013 15:38:14 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] please unsubscribe me from listserv In-Reply-To: References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> <52043FE9.5090109@mira.net> Message-ID: <76302141-ACE3-4552-819C-47250D699DFA@gmail.com> --- Julia Eksner, Ph.D. Free University of Berlin Faculty of Political and Social Sciences Department of Anthropology Landoltweg 9-11 14195 Berlin eMail: julia.eksner@fu-berlin.de Tel. +49-(0)1573-7560038 On 9 Aug 2013, at 15:29, Huw Lloyd wrote: On 9 August 2013 02:03, Andy Blunden wrote: > Integral yes. But as ANL himself points out *human* needs are themseleves > *products* of human acitivity. People only need hammers because someone has > produced nails. In circular processes like this, the question is: what > concept is fundamental? Cf Dewey on the reflex arc. > > Are needs produced? Or is this simply different objects to fashion new motives that address the need? i.e. social change could expose new needs, but that's not the same as creating them. And why is fundamental necessary? Do you mean what came (comes) first? Best, Huw > Andy > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> ... >> >> Re theory of human needs, needs seem fairly integral to studying activity >> developmentally, no? >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> > > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Fri Aug 9 06:38:31 2013 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Fri, 9 Aug 2013 14:38:31 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: deaf thinking In-Reply-To: <52043CDB.80205@mira.net> References: <1729897181.17443019.1375992033484.JavaMail.root@jaguar9.sfu.ca> <32B316E5-C892-4046-90D7-750638C95967@eastsideinstitute.org> <52043CDB.80205@mira.net> Message-ID: On 9 August 2013 01:50, Andy Blunden wrote: > http://www.marxists.org/**archive/meshcheryakov/**awakening/index.htm > has Mescheryakov's book in HTML, or a link to buy the book in hard copy. > > Andy > > Thank you. Huw > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> Do you know if there are English versions online? >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Fri Aug 9 10:06:16 2013 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Fri, 9 Aug 2013 10:06:16 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: deaf thinking In-Reply-To: References: <1729897181.17443019.1375992033484.JavaMail.root@jaguar9.sfu.ca> <32B316E5-C892-4046-90D7-750638C95967@eastsideinstitute.org> <52043CDB.80205@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy, I will find time to read these links. I have wanted to know more on this theme Thanks, Larry PS I hope others follow up on your answer on activity, actions, that will not be helpful within *positivist* understandings. The comment about *people* was provocative. On Fri, Aug 9, 2013 at 6:38 AM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > On 9 August 2013 01:50, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > http://www.marxists.org/**archive/meshcheryakov/**awakening/index.htm< > http://www.marxists.org/archive/meshcheryakov/awakening/index.htm> > > has Mescheryakov's book in HTML, or a link to buy the book in hard copy. > > > > Andy > > > > > Thank you. > > Huw > > > > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > >> Do you know if there are English versions online? > >> > >> Best, > >> Huw > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > > From lchcmike@gmail.com Fri Aug 9 13:33:48 2013 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Fri, 9 Aug 2013 13:33:48 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Permission Request (Clifford R. O'Donnell) In-Reply-To: References: <4DE0161C-0BCB-4FD8-A3A5-A4894680AB39@hawaii.edu> <8D43867349DDAC4BAA502DA13C1882A152DD5C70@senldogo0428.springer-sbm.com> <9599FEE2-5762-43B9-9DB7-28F6BE3108F8@hawaii.edu> <8D43867349DDAC4BAA502DA13C1882A152DD60DD@senldogo0428.springer-sbm.com> <2D6F44BD-E70E-4997-9223-070AC2E1C9F1@hawaii.edu> <8D43867349DDAC4BAA502DA13C1882A152DD6A7A@senldogo0428.springer-sbm.com> Message-ID: Dear Colleagues. Attached is an article by Cliff O'Donnell Roland Tharp that I thought of potential interest to XMCA members. It is being distributed to all after Cliff checked out that it would be ok with the publishers. The topic is community psychology and chat. The article is open for discussion. Some of you will remember that we had a special issue of MCA devoted to the work of Seymour Sarason, an important figure in community psychology. There were some replies of interest as well (1997, Vol 4, no. 3). When I came across Cliff's article, I thought that perhaps it would be a way to continue that conversation. It is written for community psychologists and perhaps a similar article for MCA-o-philes could be produced if of sufficient interest. Here is how Cliff introduces the piece:"The article for discussion is the final version that was submitted to the American Journal of Community Psychology and subsequently published in March 2012. The link to the publisher's version is http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10464-011-9434-1. The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com. The article advocates a greater integration of the concepts of culture and community by means of adopting key concepts from CHAT. The authors, O'Donnell and Tharp, welcome your reactions and comments. I am ccing some additional folks who do not read xmca so far as I know, but might like to join the conversation -- as well as the authors of course. mike From ablunden@mira.net Fri Aug 9 17:33:50 2013 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sat, 10 Aug 2013 10:33:50 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Permission Request (Clifford R. O'Donnell) In-Reply-To: References: <4DE0161C-0BCB-4FD8-A3A5-A4894680AB39@hawaii.edu> <8D43867349DDAC4BAA502DA13C1882A152DD5C70@senldogo0428.springer-sbm.com> <9599FEE2-5762-43B9-9DB7-28F6BE3108F8@hawaii.edu> <8D43867349DDAC4BAA502DA13C1882A152DD60DD@senldogo0428.springer-sbm.com> <2D6F44BD-E70E-4997-9223-070AC2E1C9F1@hawaii.edu> <8D43867349DDAC4BAA502DA13C1882A152DD6A7A@senldogo0428.springer-sbm.com> Message-ID: <52058A6E.6030701@mira.net> So far as I can see I have to pay US$40 to read the article. What is the plan to share it? Andy mike cole wrote: > Dear Colleagues. Attached is an article by Cliff O'Donnell Roland Tharp > that I thought of potential interest to XMCA members. It is being > distributed to all after Cliff checked out that it would be ok with the > publishers. > > The topic is community psychology and chat. The article is open for > discussion. > > Some of you will remember that we had a special issue of MCA devoted to the > work of > Seymour Sarason, an important figure in community psychology. There were > some replies > of interest as well (1997, Vol 4, no. 3). > > When I came across Cliff's article, I thought that perhaps it would be a > way to continue > that conversation. It is written for community psychologists and perhaps a > similar article > for MCA-o-philes could be produced if of sufficient interest. > > Here is how Cliff introduces the piece:"The article for discussion is the > final version that was submitted to the American Journal of Community > Psychology and subsequently published in March 2012. The link to the > publisher's version is > http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10464-011-9434-1. The original > publication is available at www.springerlink.com. The article advocates a > greater integration of the concepts of culture and community by means of > adopting key concepts from CHAT. The authors, O'Donnell and Tharp, welcome > your reactions and comments. > > I am ccing some additional folks who do not read xmca so far as I know, but > might like > to join the conversation -- as well as the authors of course. > mike > > -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts http://marxists.academia.edu/AndyBlunden From ablunden@mira.net Fri Aug 9 17:33:50 2013 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sat, 10 Aug 2013 10:33:50 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Permission Request (Clifford R. O'Donnell) In-Reply-To: References: <4DE0161C-0BCB-4FD8-A3A5-A4894680AB39@hawaii.edu> <8D43867349DDAC4BAA502DA13C1882A152DD5C70@senldogo0428.springer-sbm.com> <9599FEE2-5762-43B9-9DB7-28F6BE3108F8@hawaii.edu> <8D43867349DDAC4BAA502DA13C1882A152DD60DD@senldogo0428.springer-sbm.com> <2D6F44BD-E70E-4997-9223-070AC2E1C9F1@hawaii.edu> <8D43867349DDAC4BAA502DA13C1882A152DD6A7A@senldogo0428.springer-sbm.com> Message-ID: <52058A6E.6030701@mira.net> So far as I can see I have to pay US$40 to read the article. What is the plan to share it? Andy mike cole wrote: > Dear Colleagues. Attached is an article by Cliff O'Donnell Roland Tharp > that I thought of potential interest to XMCA members. It is being > distributed to all after Cliff checked out that it would be ok with the > publishers. > > The topic is community psychology and chat. The article is open for > discussion. > > Some of you will remember that we had a special issue of MCA devoted to the > work of > Seymour Sarason, an important figure in community psychology. There were > some replies > of interest as well (1997, Vol 4, no. 3). > > When I came across Cliff's article, I thought that perhaps it would be a > way to continue > that conversation. It is written for community psychologists and perhaps a > similar article > for MCA-o-philes could be produced if of sufficient interest. > > Here is how Cliff introduces the piece:"The article for discussion is the > final version that was submitted to the American Journal of Community > Psychology and subsequently published in March 2012. The link to the > publisher's version is > http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10464-011-9434-1. The original > publication is available at www.springerlink.com. The article advocates a > greater integration of the concepts of culture and community by means of > adopting key concepts from CHAT. The authors, O'Donnell and Tharp, welcome > your reactions and comments. > > I am ccing some additional folks who do not read xmca so far as I know, but > might like > to join the conversation -- as well as the authors of course. > mike > > -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts http://marxists.academia.edu/AndyBlunden From lchcmike@gmail.com Fri Aug 9 18:51:40 2013 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Fri, 9 Aug 2013 18:51:40 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] paper attached: community psych/chat Message-ID: It appears that my attempt to repair my ommision of the community psych paper failed. Attached. I think. mike -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: AJCP Manuscript.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 196187 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20130809/1879f459/attachment.pdf From lchcmike@gmail.com Fri Aug 9 18:51:40 2013 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Fri, 9 Aug 2013 18:51:40 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] paper attached: community psych/chat Message-ID: It appears that my attempt to repair my ommision of the community psych paper failed. Attached. I think. mike -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: AJCP Manuscript.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 196187 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20130809/1879f459/attachment-0003.pdf From ablunden@mira.net Sat Aug 10 00:58:19 2013 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sat, 10 Aug 2013 17:58:19 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] CHAT and Community Psychology In-Reply-To: References: <4DE0161C-0BCB-4FD8-A3A5-A4894680AB39@hawaii.edu> <8D43867349DDAC4BAA502DA13C1882A152DD5C70@senldogo0428.springer-sbm.com> <9599FEE2-5762-43B9-9DB7-28F6BE3108F8@hawaii.edu> <8D43867349DDAC4BAA502DA13C1882A152DD60DD@senldogo0428.springer-sbm.com> <2D6F44BD-E70E-4997-9223-070AC2E1C9F1@hawaii.edu> <8D43867349DDAC4BAA502DA13C1882A152DD6A7A@senldogo0428.springer-sbm.com> Message-ID: <5205F29B.9070505@mira.net> Thanks for sharing that very interesting paper, Mike. From what I see, there is little justification for the dislocation between these two research communities - CHAT and Community Psychology. Their aims, sources and methods seem so similar and compatible. I would just like to ask the authors a couple of questions. * Do you take "activity setting" to be the optimal conception of "context"? * What exactly do they understand by "activity setting"? You cite Vygotsky in a book edited by Wertsch, but I do not have that book. I associate "activity setting" with the current of CHAT around Mariane Hedegaard. It seems to me to be similar in meaning to "institution". Thus I quetion the efficacy of this concept for grasping social change, as opposed to just child development. * Is "mutual understanding" is what you mean by "intersubjectivity"? * I agree that participation in shared activities is the necessary condition for peope to achieve mutual understanding. But this is not necessarily the outcome, is it? It depends on the type of collaboration within the activity. EG White slaveowners and black slaves collaborated in the production of cotton in the Confederate States of America for many years, but this did not result in mutual understanding. So it seems that the notion of "shared actvities" needs further specification. Yes? thanks Andy mike cole wrote: > Dear Colleagues. Attached is an article by Cliff O'Donnell Roland Tharp > that I thought of potential interest to XMCA members. It is being > distributed to all after Cliff checked out that it would be ok with the > publishers. > > The topic is community psychology and chat. The article is open for > discussion. > > Some of you will remember that we had a special issue of MCA devoted to the > work of > Seymour Sarason, an important figure in community psychology. There were > some replies > of interest as well (1997, Vol 4, no. 3). > > When I came across Cliff's article, I thought that perhaps it would be a > way to continue > that conversation. It is written for community psychologists and perhaps a > similar article > for MCA-o-philes could be produced if of sufficient interest. > > Here is how Cliff introduces the piece:"The article for discussion is the > final version that was submitted to the American Journal of Community > Psychology and subsequently published in March 2012. The link to the > publisher's version is > http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10464-011-9434-1. The original > publication is available at www.springerlink.com. The article advocates a > greater integration of the concepts of culture and community by means of > adopting key concepts from CHAT. The authors, O'Donnell and Tharp, welcome > your reactions and comments. > > I am ccing some additional folks who do not read xmca so far as I know, but > might like > to join the conversation -- as well as the authors of course. > mike > > -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts http://marxists.academia.edu/AndyBlunden From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Sat Aug 10 02:22:32 2013 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Sat, 10 Aug 2013 10:22:32 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: <5204F544.5040707@mira.net> References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> <52043FE9.5090109@mira.net> <5204F544.5040707@mira.net> Message-ID: On 9 August 2013 14:57, Andy Blunden wrote: > I don't have any doubt that needs are produced. 25 years ago no-one needed > a computer. Now it seems that everyone needs them. I don't see you r > objection to this, Huw? > > Well, if you consider needs as primal (vital) such things as computers and the languages people speak are simply ways to meet such needs. >From a Marxian social perspective computing is interesting in this respect in that the needs met by the first generation workers is qualitatively different to the management saturated situation we have now. i.e. on the cusp of technological practice workers are more free from the tyranny of alienation. > Yes, I mean "what comes first." "From what must science begin?" has long > been the fundamental question for science. Your conceptual starting point > determines, to a great extent, what you can produce, so long as you proceed > logically, of course. I am talking here about the reconstruction of reality > in science, of course, not the perception of reality or reality itself, > which are entirely different questions. > ok > > Andy > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > > >> >> On 9 August 2013 02:03, Andy Blunden > ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >> >> Integral yes. But as ANL himself points out *human* needs are >> themseleves *products* of human acitivity. People only need >> hammers because someone has produced nails. In circular processes >> like this, the question is: what concept is fundamental? Cf Dewey >> on the reflex arc. >> >> >> Are needs produced? Or is this simply different objects to fashion new >> motives that address the need? i.e. social change could expose new needs, >> but that's not the same as creating them. >> >> And why is fundamental necessary? Do you mean what came (comes) first? >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> Andy >> >> Huw Lloyd wrote: >> >> ... >> >> Re theory of human needs, needs seem fairly integral to >> studying activity developmentally, no? >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> >> >> > -- > ------------------------------**------------------------------** > ------------ > *Andy Blunden* > Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts > http://marxists.academia.edu/**AndyBlunden > > From smago@uga.edu Sat Aug 10 06:16:16 2013 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Sat, 10 Aug 2013 13:16:16 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] The development of social and practical concepts in learning to teach: A synthesis and extension of Vygotsky's conception Message-ID: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2210656113000482 those who are interested in concepts might wish to read this pre-publication pdf of something I've got in-press with Learning, Culture, and Social Interaction, a relatively new MCA-esque journal in Europe edited by Harry Daniels, Anne Edwards, and Roger S?lj?f. You need access to Elsevier's system to get a copy, and I don't have this access myself, but if you do, help yourself. p Peter Smagorinsky Distinguished Research Professor of English Education Department of Language and Literacy Education The University of Georgia 315 Aderhold Hall Athens, GA 30602 [Description: http://jolle.coe.uga.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/JoLLE_logo_MECHlores1.jpg] Advisor, Journal of Language and Literacy Education Follow JoLLE on twitter @Jolle_uga -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: image001.jpg Type: image/jpeg Size: 605134 bytes Desc: image001.jpg Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20130810/9cc6f662/attachment.jpg From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Sat Aug 10 06:17:47 2013 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Sat, 10 Aug 2013 14:17:47 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Summary of methods used by Davydov & co in the 60's? Message-ID: In Soviet Studies in Mathematics Education (v.2, pp. 348-349) Davydov cites 25 papers in relation to the experimental work undertaken contributing towards this educational programme. These papers don't appear to be online and it's not clear whether any have been translated. Have the methods used in these studies been summarised anywhere? The abstract of one of these papers (Gal'perin, 1966, I believe) refers to imitation and the use of the zoped as a principal method. Whereas in later papers (e.g. Bugrimenko & Elkonin, 2002) we have statements such as "the dominant experimental method in our child psychology, a method worked out in detail as a functional-genetic model"). Part of the puzzle is that of the Davydov I have read, he does not refer to the functional-genetic model (or to the experimental methods). Thanks, Huw From ablunden@mira.net Sat Aug 10 07:12:16 2013 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sun, 11 Aug 2013 00:12:16 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> <52043FE9.5090109@mira.net> <5204F544.5040707@mira.net> Message-ID: <52064A40.9000103@mira.net> Well Huw, I didn't mean to introduce a diversion by taking computers as an example. I could have taken a stone tool just as well. It seems, Huw, that in responding to my challenge you have made a start at developing a theory of human needs. Viz., that there are certain "vital" needs, and all other "needs" are merely means to meet these vital needs. I don't imagine that I am going to be able to refute the claims for a theory of human needs in a single message, it is after simply the claim for the existence of human nature - a concept with a very long history! (Aristotle built his theory of biology on the basis of a theory of needs.) But "vital" human needs are very elastic and other than in very general terms are quite indefinable. But as we change our world, what you need to live in that world are very real and very specific, and those needs arise directly out of participation in that life-world. Which of the thousand different ways that there are to meet the "vital" need of, say, nutrition, becomes a real need for a person, is determined by the cultural context of a person's life and their activity. So I prefer Activity Theory, in which needs are the product of activity, while, as conceived in any given activity, they provide the motive for that activity. Andy Huw Lloyd wrote: > On 9 August 2013 14:57, Andy Blunden wrote: > > >> I don't have any doubt that needs are produced. 25 years ago no-one needed >> a computer. Now it seems that everyone needs them. I don't see you r >> objection to this, Huw? >> >> >> > Well, if you consider needs as primal (vital) such things as computers and > the languages people speak are simply ways to meet such needs. > > From a Marxian social perspective computing is interesting in this respect > in that the needs met by the first generation workers is qualitatively > different to the management saturated situation we have now. i.e. on the > cusp of technological practice workers are more free from the tyranny of > alienation. > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Sat Aug 10 07:24:10 2013 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Sat, 10 Aug 2013 15:24:10 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: <52064A40.9000103@mira.net> References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> <52043FE9.5090109@mira.net> <5204F544.5040707@mira.net> <52064A40.9000103@mira.net> Message-ID: On 10 August 2013 15:12, Andy Blunden wrote: > Well Huw, I didn't mean to introduce a diversion by taking computers as an > example. I could have taken a stone tool just as well. > Yes. > It seems, Huw, that in responding to my challenge you have made a start at > developing a theory of human needs. 'fraid not. Simply asking the question. > Viz., that there are certain "vital" needs, and all other "needs" are > merely means to meet these vital needs. I don't imagine that I am going to > be able to refute the claims for a theory of human needs in a single > message, it is after simply the claim for the existence of human nature - a > concept with a very long history! (Aristotle built his theory of biology on > the basis of a theory of needs.) But "vital" human needs are very elastic > and other than in very general terms are quite indefinable. But as we > change our world, what you need to live in that world are very real and > very specific, and those needs arise directly out of participation in that > life-world. Which of the thousand different ways that there are to meet the > "vital" need of, say, nutrition, becomes a real need for a person, is > determined by the cultural context of a person's life and their activity. > > But these "real needs" are known needs. Which Leontyev calls motives, does he not? > So I prefer Activity Theory, in which needs are the product of activity, > while, as conceived in any given activity, they provide the motive for that > activity. So it seems that we do not know whether needs are produced, or whether they are exposed. Did Leontyev make such a distinction? Best, Huw > > Andy > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> On 9 August 2013 14:57, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> >> >>> I don't have any doubt that needs are produced. 25 years ago no-one >>> needed >>> a computer. Now it seems that everyone needs them. I don't see you r >>> objection to this, Huw? >>> >>> >>> >>> >> Well, if you consider needs as primal (vital) such things as computers and >> the languages people speak are simply ways to meet such needs. >> >> From a Marxian social perspective computing is interesting in this respect >> in that the needs met by the first generation workers is qualitatively >> different to the management saturated situation we have now. i.e. on the >> cusp of technological practice workers are more free from the tyranny of >> alienation. >> >> > > > From Brechttie.DeSmet@UGent.be Sat Aug 10 07:43:42 2013 From: Brechttie.DeSmet@UGent.be (Brecht De Smet) Date: Sat, 10 Aug 2013 16:43:42 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: <52064A40.9000103@mira.net> References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> <52043FE9.5090109@mira.net> <5204F544.5040707@mira.net> <52064A40.9000103@mira.net> Message-ID: <20130810164342.Horde.vIANLYVVNVdSBlGeDoUwNsA@webmail.ugent.be> Perhaps some confusion also stems from the fact that there exists "human activity" in a general sense and specific "human activities". Secondly,?Marx discusses the materialist premisses of human activity from a "needs"-perspective in the German Ideology (History: Fundamental Conditions), but immediately emphasizes that these "vital", primary needs in turn create secondary and tertiary needs. Although we can discern certain "vital" needs for the biological reproduction of our species, our activity as social creatures cannot be reduced to these needs. There are needs which are external and a priori to the existence of a collaborative project that is constituted to satisfy these needs (a teleological motivation), but from the (development of) the activity of collaboration itself emerge new needs, goals, and motivations that push the rationale of the project beyond its original scope and meaning (an immanent motivation).? b. ? Quoting Andy Blunden : > Well Huw, I didn't mean to introduce a diversion by taking computers > as an example. I could have taken a stone tool just as well. > It seems, Huw, that in responding to my challenge you have made a > start at developing a theory of human needs. Viz., that there are > certain "vital" needs, and all other "needs" are merely means to > meet these vital needs. I don't imagine that I am going to be able > to refute the claims for a theory of human needs in a single > message, it is after simply the claim for the existence of human > nature - a concept with a very long history! (Aristotle built his > theory of biology on the basis of a theory of needs.) But "vital" > human needs are very elastic and other than in very general terms > are quite indefinable. But as we change our world, what you need to > live in that world are very real and very specific, and those needs > arise directly out of participation in that life-world. Which of the > thousand different ways that there are to meet the "vital" need of, > say, nutrition, becomes a real need for a person, is determined by > the cultural context of a person's life and their activity. > > So I prefer Activity Theory, in which needs are the product of > activity, while, as conceived in any given activity, they provide > the motive for that activity. > > Andy > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > On 9 August 2013 14:57, Andy Blunden > wrote: >> >>> I don't have any doubt that needs are produced. 25 years ago no-one needed >>> a computer. Now it seems that everyone needs them. I don't see you r >>> objection to this, Huw? >>> >>> ? >> Well, if you consider needs as primal (vital) such things as >> computers and >> the languages people speak are simply ways to meet such needs. >> >> From a Marxian social perspective computing is interesting in >> this respect >> in that the needs met by the first generation workers is qualitatively >> different to the management saturated situation we have now.? i.e. on the >> cusp of technological practice workers are more free from the tyranny of >> alienation. > > ? From peg.griffin@att.net Sat Aug 10 07:46:46 2013 From: peg.griffin@att.net (Peg Griffin) Date: Sat, 10 Aug 2013 07:46:46 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> <52043FE9.5090109@mira.net> <5204F544.5040707@mira.net> <52064A40.9000103@mira.net> Message-ID: <1376146006.50554.YahooMailNeo@web181203.mail.ne1.yahoo.com> It might be interesting to remember that in his Problems book, Leontiev has two systems, really.? One is a truncated system (activity and operations but no action level) and a full blown system (in which actions and goals emerge -- and mind!).? Maybe the truncated system motives are substantially centrally different types?? Not so specifically human/societal/cultural, etc...? ________________________________ From: Huw Lloyd To: ablunden@mira.net; "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Saturday, August 10, 2013 10:24 AM Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities On 10 August 2013 15:12, Andy Blunden wrote: > Well Huw, I didn't mean to introduce a diversion by taking computers as an > example. I could have taken a stone tool just as well. > Yes. > It seems, Huw, that in responding to my challenge you have made a start at > developing a theory of human needs. 'fraid not.? Simply asking the question. > Viz., that there are certain "vital" needs, and all other "needs" are > merely means to meet these vital needs. I don't imagine that I am going to > be able to refute the claims for a theory of human needs in a single > message, it is after simply the claim for the existence of human nature - a > concept with a very long history! (Aristotle built his theory of biology on > the basis of a theory of needs.) But "vital" human needs are very elastic > and other than in very general terms are quite indefinable. But as we > change our world, what you need to live in that world are very real and > very specific, and those needs arise directly out of participation in that > life-world. Which of the thousand different ways that there are to meet the > "vital" need of, say, nutrition, becomes a real need for a person, is > determined by the cultural context of a person's life and their activity. > > But these "real needs" are known needs.? Which Leontyev calls motives, does he not? > So I prefer Activity Theory, in which needs are the product of activity, > while, as conceived in any given activity, they provide the motive for that > activity. So it seems that we do not know whether needs are produced, or whether they are exposed.? Did Leontyev make such a distinction? Best, Huw > > Andy > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> On 9 August 2013 14:57, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> >> >>> I don't have any doubt that needs are produced. 25 years ago no-one >>> needed >>> a computer. Now it seems that everyone needs them. I don't see you r >>> objection to this, Huw? >>> >>> >>> >>> >> Well, if you consider needs as primal (vital) such things as computers and >> the languages people speak are simply ways to meet such needs. >> >> From a Marxian social perspective computing is interesting in this respect >> in that the needs met by the first generation workers is qualitatively >> different to the management saturated situation we have now.? i.e. on the >> cusp of technological practice workers are more free from the tyranny of >> alienation. >> >> > > > From ablunden@mira.net Sat Aug 10 08:01:56 2013 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sun, 11 Aug 2013 01:01:56 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> <52043FE9.5090109@mira.net> <5204F544.5040707@mira.net> <52064A40.9000103@mira.net> Message-ID: <520655E4.9050204@mira.net> Huw, Leontyev is quite specific that needs are the product of activity. One of the distinctions he makes between human life and non-human life is that human beings produce their own needs, historically, as a community, whereas for an animal its needs are given. So we have a kind of duplicated world: needs and the means of their satisfaction (labour). Like stimulus and response: which comes first? or do we need a new concept which avoids this duplication of the world. There are different interpretations of Leontyev; as I read him, the motive (let's use this word rather than "need") is objective for a person, that is the motive of the activity, as opposed to the actions of an individual person who participates in the activity, who may have other motives. Even though the motive of the activity is produced culturally and historically, it is in the world, objective. It has always been a problem for me what on Earth can be an objective need (other than those elusive "vital" needs). Like, you work in a gun factory; your motive is to earn a wage so as to look after your family. But you know the motive of the work is to produce guns. But why does the community need guns? Where did that come from? And does the factory owner really care whether he is selling guns or toys, so long as he makes a profit. Others may do better justice to Leontyev's argument here, but I have trouble with this. Peg: yes, Leontyev starts off with single-cell creatures and works his way up. There *is* a big leap though, with tasks that are completed by multiple actions, potentially by different individuals, and most imporantly, the production of tools, means which become themselves needs. Tracing mind from its origins in non-human life is OK, but I have trouble with ANL's concept of "subject", which could be a microbe equally as a human. Andy Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > On 10 August 2013 15:12, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > Well Huw, I didn't mean to introduce a diversion by taking > computers as an example. I could have taken a stone tool just as well. > > > Yes. > > > It seems, Huw, that in responding to my challenge you have made a > start at developing a theory of human needs. > > > 'fraid not. Simply asking the question. > > > Viz., that there are certain "vital" needs, and all other "needs" > are merely means to meet these vital needs. I don't imagine that I > am going to be able to refute the claims for a theory of human > needs in a single message, it is after simply the claim for the > existence of human nature - a concept with a very long history! > (Aristotle built his theory of biology on the basis of a theory of > needs.) But "vital" human needs are very elastic and other than in > very general terms are quite indefinable. But as we change our > world, what you need to live in that world are very real and very > specific, and those needs arise directly out of participation in > that life-world. Which of the thousand different ways that there > are to meet the "vital" need of, say, nutrition, becomes a real > need for a person, is determined by the cultural context of a > person's life and their activity. > > > But these "real needs" are known needs. Which Leontyev calls motives, > does he not? > > > So I prefer Activity Theory, in which needs are the product of > activity, while, as conceived in any given activity, they provide > the motive for that activity. > > > So it seems that we do not know whether needs are produced, or whether > they are exposed. Did Leontyev make such a distinction? > > Best, > Huw > > > > Andy > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > > On 9 August 2013 14:57, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > > > I don't have any doubt that needs are produced. 25 years > ago no-one needed > a computer. Now it seems that everyone needs them. I don't > see you r > objection to this, Huw? > > > > > Well, if you consider needs as primal (vital) such things as > computers and > the languages people speak are simply ways to meet such needs. > > >From a Marxian social perspective computing is interesting in > this respect > in that the needs met by the first generation workers is > qualitatively > different to the management saturated situation we have now. > i.e. on the > cusp of technological practice workers are more free from the > tyranny of > alienation. > > > > > -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts http://marxists.academia.edu/AndyBlunden From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Sat Aug 10 08:13:14 2013 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Sat, 10 Aug 2013 16:13:14 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: <52065364.1090300@mira.net> References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> <52043FE9.5090109@mira.net> <5204F544.5040707@mira.net> <52064A40.9000103@mira.net> <52065364.1090300@mira.net> Message-ID: ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Andy Blunden Date: 10 August 2013 15:51 Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities To: Huw Lloyd Huw, Leontyev is quite specific that needs are the product of activity. One of the distinctions he makes between human life and non-human life is that human beings produce their own needs, historically, as a community, whereas for an animal its needs are given. So we have a kind of duplicated world: needs and the means of their satisfaction (labour). Like stimulus and response: which comes first? or do we need a new concept which avoids this duplication of the world. There are different interpretations of Leontyev; as I read him, the motive (let's use this word rather than "need") is objective for a person, that is the motive of the activity, as opposed to the actions of an individual person who participates in the activity, who may have other motives. Even though the motive of the activity is produced culturally and historically, it is in the world, objective. It has always been a problem for me what on Earth can be an objective need (other than those elusive "vital" needs). Like, you work in a gun factory; your motive is to earn a wage so as to look after your family. But you know the motive of the work is to produce guns. But why does the community need guns? Where did that come from? And does the factory owner really care whether he is selling guns or toys, so long as he makes a profit. Others may do better justice to Leontyev's argument here, but I have trouble with this. Peg: yes, Leontyev starts off with single-cell creatures and works his way up. There *is* a big leap though, with tasks that are completed by multiple actions, potentially by different individuals, and most imporantly, the production of tools, means which become themselves needs. Tracing mind from its origins in non-human life is OK, but I have trouble with ANL's concept of "subject", which could be a microbe equally as a human. Andy Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > On 10 August 2013 15:12, Andy Blunden ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: > > Well Huw, I didn't mean to introduce a diversion by taking > computers as an example. I could have taken a stone tool just as well. > > > Yes. > > It seems, Huw, that in responding to my challenge you have made a > start at developing a theory of human needs. > > > 'fraid not. Simply asking the question. > > Viz., that there are certain "vital" needs, and all other "needs" > are merely means to meet these vital needs. I don't imagine that I > am going to be able to refute the claims for a theory of human > needs in a single message, it is after simply the claim for the > existence of human nature - a concept with a very long history! > (Aristotle built his theory of biology on the basis of a theory of > needs.) But "vital" human needs are very elastic and other than in > very general terms are quite indefinable. But as we change our > world, what you need to live in that world are very real and very > specific, and those needs arise directly out of participation in > that life-world. Which of the thousand different ways that there > are to meet the "vital" need of, say, nutrition, becomes a real > need for a person, is determined by the cultural context of a > person's life and their activity. > > > But these "real needs" are known needs. Which Leontyev calls motives, > does he not? > > So I prefer Activity Theory, in which needs are the product of > activity, while, as conceived in any given activity, they provide > the motive for that activity. > > > So it seems that we do not know whether needs are produced, or whether > they are exposed. Did Leontyev make such a distinction? > > Best, > Huw > > > > Andy > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > > On 9 August 2013 14:57, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > > I don't have any doubt that needs are produced. 25 years > ago no-one needed > a computer. Now it seems that everyone needs them. I don't > see you r > objection to this, Huw? > > > > Well, if you consider needs as primal (vital) such things as > computers and > the languages people speak are simply ways to meet such needs. > > >From a Marxian social perspective computing is interesting in > this respect > in that the needs met by the first generation workers is > qualitatively > different to the management saturated situation we have now. > i.e. on the > cusp of technological practice workers are more free from the > tyranny of > alienation. > > > > > -- ------------------------------**------------------------------**------------ *Andy Blunden* Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts http://marxists.academia.edu/**AndyBlunden From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Sat Aug 10 08:43:32 2013 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Sat, 10 Aug 2013 16:43:32 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> <52043FE9.5090109@mira.net> <5204F544.5040707@mira.net> <52064A40.9000103@mira.net> <52065364.1090300@mira.net> Message-ID: On 10 August 2013 16:13, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: Andy Blunden > Date: 10 August 2013 15:51 > Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities > To: Huw Lloyd > > > Huw, Leontyev is quite specific that needs are the product of activity. > One of the distinctions he makes between human life and non-human life is > that human beings produce their own needs, historically, as a community, > whereas for an animal its needs are given. So we have a kind of duplicated > world: needs and the means of their satisfaction (labour). Like stimulus > and response: which comes first? or do we need a new concept which avoids > this duplication of the world. > I would say it quite obvious which comes first for the new-born. I guess if one wants to put activity within a framework of a single fundamental concept, then one is going to have preference for defining needs in terms of activity. But the contingency of putting something on a single basis is that one does not broach into natural phenomena (unless one is taking an Engels like route). >From a natural science perspective (i.e. genetic domains etc) it does not really matter whether needs are entirely contingent on activity. But from a dialectic theoretical perspective, perhaps it is. Thoughts? > > There are different interpretations of Leontyev; as I read him, the motive > (let's use this word rather than "need") is objective for a person, that is > the motive of the activity, as opposed to the actions of an individual > person who participates in the activity, who may have other motives. Even > though the motive of the activity is produced culturally and historically, > it is in the world, objective. It has always been a problem for me what on > Earth can be an objective need (other than those elusive "vital" needs). > Like, you work in a gun factory; your motive is to earn a wage so as to > look after your family. But you know the motive of the work is to produce > guns. But why does the community need guns? Where did that come from? And > does the factory owner really care whether he is selling guns or toys, so > long as he makes a profit. Others may do better justice to Leontyev's > argument here, but I have trouble with this. > My reading of activity was that it all of these subtleties were manifest within the activity, i.e. the motive having qualitative influence. The object is the subject's construction, and from my incomplete reading could be distributed across various things. The object is only objective in that is has objective qualities to it. The distinctness of things to us is their social object quality. Best, Huw > > Peg: yes, Leontyev starts off with single-cell creatures and works his way > up. There *is* a big leap though, with tasks that are completed by multiple > actions, potentially by different individuals, and most imporantly, the > production of tools, means which become themselves needs. Tracing mind from > its origins in non-human life is OK, but I have trouble with ANL's concept > of "subject", which could be a microbe equally as a human. > > Andy > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> >> >> On 10 August 2013 15:12, Andy Blunden > ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >> >> Well Huw, I didn't mean to introduce a diversion by taking >> computers as an example. I could have taken a stone tool just as well. >> >> >> Yes. >> >> It seems, Huw, that in responding to my challenge you have made a >> start at developing a theory of human needs. >> >> >> 'fraid not. Simply asking the question. >> >> Viz., that there are certain "vital" needs, and all other "needs" >> are merely means to meet these vital needs. I don't imagine that I >> am going to be able to refute the claims for a theory of human >> needs in a single message, it is after simply the claim for the >> existence of human nature - a concept with a very long history! >> (Aristotle built his theory of biology on the basis of a theory of >> needs.) But "vital" human needs are very elastic and other than in >> very general terms are quite indefinable. But as we change our >> world, what you need to live in that world are very real and very >> specific, and those needs arise directly out of participation in >> that life-world. Which of the thousand different ways that there >> are to meet the "vital" need of, say, nutrition, becomes a real >> need for a person, is determined by the cultural context of a >> person's life and their activity. >> >> >> But these "real needs" are known needs. Which Leontyev calls motives, >> does he not? >> >> So I prefer Activity Theory, in which needs are the product of >> activity, while, as conceived in any given activity, they provide >> the motive for that activity. >> >> >> So it seems that we do not know whether needs are produced, or whether >> they are exposed. Did Leontyev make such a distinction? >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> >> Andy >> >> >> Huw Lloyd wrote: >> >> On 9 August 2013 14:57, Andy Blunden > > wrote: >> >> >> I don't have any doubt that needs are produced. 25 years >> ago no-one needed >> a computer. Now it seems that everyone needs them. I don't >> see you r >> objection to this, Huw? >> >> >> >> Well, if you consider needs as primal (vital) such things as >> computers and >> the languages people speak are simply ways to meet such needs. >> >> >From a Marxian social perspective computing is interesting in >> this respect >> in that the needs met by the first generation workers is >> qualitatively >> different to the management saturated situation we have now. >> i.e. on the >> cusp of technological practice workers are more free from the >> tyranny of >> alienation. >> >> >> >> >> > -- > ------------------------------**------------------------------** > ------------ > *Andy Blunden* > Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts > http://marxists.academia.edu/**AndyBlunden > > > From lspopov@bgsu.edu Sat Aug 10 10:21:40 2013 From: lspopov@bgsu.edu (Lubomir Savov Popov) Date: Sat, 10 Aug 2013 13:21:40 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities --NEEDS Message-ID: Hi Huw, Regarding the production of needs: I might be a bit scholastic in this mail, but I will refer directly to historical materialism and traditional activity theorists. Over there, it is an axiom that needs are emergent and they are a product of the interaction of the individual and his/her context/environment (in the process of activity). This definition is quite simplified in order to serve as a principle. There are definitions with a number of ramifications to take all influences into consideration. >From a particular aspect/point of view, it is OK to say that a need is a product of environment. However, historical materialists are very considerate about the human individual and the activity. One of the problems with different definitions is that they are designed to work at different levels of abstraction and for different purposes, which means different disciplines. Psychologists tend to see needs as foundations for developing the motives. However, in some fields of economics and design, needs can be viewed as objects that satisfy needs (what objects you need) or the features of the objects (I need a mid-size car). In design, needs are seen as functions (what functions you need). Depending on the discipline, one and the same phenomenon might be seen as a need, a function, or a motive, etc. It is difficult to find consistent treatise on needs, in particular, outside of psychology. My problem is that in psychology needs are treated like motives. At that point, substantial differences emerge in the types of definitions, classifications, and archeologies of the phenomena. Just a few thoughts, Lubomir -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Huw Lloyd Sent: Saturday, August 10, 2013 11:44 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities On 10 August 2013 16:13, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: Andy Blunden > Date: 10 August 2013 15:51 > Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities > To: Huw Lloyd > > > Huw, Leontyev is quite specific that needs are the product of activity. > One of the distinctions he makes between human life and non-human life > is that human beings produce their own needs, historically, as a > community, whereas for an animal its needs are given. So we have a > kind of duplicated > world: needs and the means of their satisfaction (labour). Like > stimulus and response: which comes first? or do we need a new concept > which avoids this duplication of the world. > I would say it quite obvious which comes first for the new-born. I guess if one wants to put activity within a framework of a single fundamental concept, then one is going to have preference for defining needs in terms of activity. But the contingency of putting something on a single basis is that one does not broach into natural phenomena (unless one is taking an Engels like route). >From a natural science perspective (i.e. genetic domains etc) it does >not really matter whether needs are entirely contingent on activity. But from a dialectic theoretical perspective, perhaps it is. Thoughts? > > There are different interpretations of Leontyev; as I read him, the > motive (let's use this word rather than "need") is objective for a > person, that is the motive of the activity, as opposed to the actions > of an individual person who participates in the activity, who may have > other motives. Even though the motive of the activity is produced > culturally and historically, it is in the world, objective. It has > always been a problem for me what on Earth can be an objective need (other than those elusive "vital" needs). > Like, you work in a gun factory; your motive is to earn a wage so as > to look after your family. But you know the motive of the work is to > produce guns. But why does the community need guns? Where did that > come from? And does the factory owner really care whether he is > selling guns or toys, so long as he makes a profit. Others may do > better justice to Leontyev's argument here, but I have trouble with this. > My reading of activity was that it all of these subtleties were manifest within the activity, i.e. the motive having qualitative influence. The object is the subject's construction, and from my incomplete reading could be distributed across various things. The object is only objective in that is has objective qualities to it. The distinctness of things to us is their social object quality. Best, Huw > > Peg: yes, Leontyev starts off with single-cell creatures and works his > way up. There *is* a big leap though, with tasks that are completed by > multiple actions, potentially by different individuals, and most > imporantly, the production of tools, means which become themselves > needs. Tracing mind from its origins in non-human life is OK, but I > have trouble with ANL's concept of "subject", which could be a microbe equally as a human. > > Andy > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> >> >> On 10 August 2013 15:12, Andy Blunden > ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >> >> Well Huw, I didn't mean to introduce a diversion by taking >> computers as an example. I could have taken a stone tool just as well. >> >> >> Yes. >> >> It seems, Huw, that in responding to my challenge you have made a >> start at developing a theory of human needs. >> >> >> 'fraid not. Simply asking the question. >> >> Viz., that there are certain "vital" needs, and all other "needs" >> are merely means to meet these vital needs. I don't imagine that I >> am going to be able to refute the claims for a theory of human >> needs in a single message, it is after simply the claim for the >> existence of human nature - a concept with a very long history! >> (Aristotle built his theory of biology on the basis of a theory of >> needs.) But "vital" human needs are very elastic and other than in >> very general terms are quite indefinable. But as we change our >> world, what you need to live in that world are very real and very >> specific, and those needs arise directly out of participation in >> that life-world. Which of the thousand different ways that there >> are to meet the "vital" need of, say, nutrition, becomes a real >> need for a person, is determined by the cultural context of a >> person's life and their activity. >> >> >> But these "real needs" are known needs. Which Leontyev calls >> motives, does he not? >> >> So I prefer Activity Theory, in which needs are the product of >> activity, while, as conceived in any given activity, they provide >> the motive for that activity. >> >> >> So it seems that we do not know whether needs are produced, or whether >> they are exposed. Did Leontyev make such a distinction? >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> >> Andy >> >> >> Huw Lloyd wrote: >> >> On 9 August 2013 14:57, Andy Blunden > > wrote: >> >> >> I don't have any doubt that needs are produced. 25 years >> ago no-one needed >> a computer. Now it seems that everyone needs them. I don't >> see you r >> objection to this, Huw? >> >> >> >> Well, if you consider needs as primal (vital) such things as >> computers and >> the languages people speak are simply ways to meet such needs. >> >> >From a Marxian social perspective computing is interesting in >> this respect >> in that the needs met by the first generation workers is >> qualitatively >> different to the management saturated situation we have now. >> i.e. on the >> cusp of technological practice workers are more free from the >> tyranny of >> alienation. >> >> >> >> >> > -- > ------------------------------**------------------------------** > ------------ > *Andy Blunden* > Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts > http://marxists.academia.edu/**AndyBlunden u/AndyBlunden> > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sat Aug 10 11:41:11 2013 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Sat, 10 Aug 2013 11:41:11 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: paper attached: community psych/chat In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Mike, Thanks for this paper by Roland Tharp and Clifford O'Donnell. The topic of *intersubjectivity* is a key term they develop in relation to shared experiences within activity settings. They emphasize inter-subjectivity is a *result* or derived from shared experiences. The psychological result of these shared experiences is intersubjectivity. At the end of the article discourse and discursive practices was mentioned This one paragraph is indicating including this topic within the notion of *community*. With that brief introduction to *conversation* I would like to shift the emphasis of *intersubjectivity* to a particular type of activity, *conversation* as developed by John Shotter. John is interested in the particular character or quality of conversationally developed and developing relations and the events AND AFFECTIVE TONE occurring WITHIN these conversations. John suggests these communicative activities occurring within conversations "are coming to be seen as of much greater importance than THE SHARED IDEAS to which they might [or might not] give rise" I am not sure if this is just a shift in emphasis or exploring another quality of *intersubjectivity* John is questioning the focus on shared meanings presented to us as if *visually*, as if we see bounded, material objects in an instant. John is exploring other metaphors or figurations that are more dialogical or conversationally presented as if *presented* by the *voice* of another. Thus, instead of visual and ocular metaphors John is exploring metaphors drawn from the realm of talk ITSELF. Not *seeing* talk as an observer or spectator activity about talk occurring in contexts but *hearing* talk WITHIN contexts. Intersubjectivity not formed [past tense] as a result of having participated in shared activities and meanings BUT intersubjectivity forming [present tense] within conversational contexts. I may be *mis-reading* the emphasis in the article on shared meanings produced as foundational and intersubjectivity as a derived second order accomplishment. Communication is mentioned as an aspect of *belonging* as shared meaning which is a key concept within community and cultural psychology. I was wondering if John Shotter's approach may add another dimension to the exploration of *context* and activity settings by foregrounding *conversational realities* as intersubjectivty as primary. The concept *intersubjectivity* is a polyphonic concept with multiple shared meanings. Is *conversation* merely one type or phase within activity settings, or is conversation a more fundamental type of activity forming intersubjectivity which may have greater importance than the result of having shared ideas as formed prior to intersubjectivity as derived. John Shotter focuses more on *rhetorical-responsiveness of voice* metaphors as forming intersubjective contexts WITHIN on-going conversations. I am drawing attention to the one paragraph in the article that mentioned this focus. Thanks for the opportunity to respond. Larry On Fri, Aug 9, 2013 at 6:51 PM, mike cole wrote: > It appears that my attempt to repair my ommision of the community psych > paper failed. Attached. I think. > mike > From ablunden@mira.net Sat Aug 10 16:43:37 2013 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sun, 11 Aug 2013 09:43:37 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> <52043FE9.5090109@mira.net> <5204F544.5040707@mira.net> <52064A40.9000103@mira.net> <52065364.1090300@mira.net> Message-ID: <5206D029.4090901@mira.net> But a new born has none of the capacities, etc., which make us human other than DNA. It is interaction with carers in a social situation which makes them human and a particular kind of human. And that surely, is where the interest lies for us (despite the contemporary fashion to ascribe everything to DNA). ... and yes of course, the subject-object relation is a complex one, as Lubomir indicates, for example. It is equally unsatisfactory to say simply that the object is a construction of the subject (meaning an individual person). Hegel's solution was to begin from a concept such as "formation of consciousness" a.k.a. "social formation" or Vygotsky's "social situation" or "perezhivanie" which is undifferentiated subject-and-object, and trace the differentiating-out of subject and object from there. Andy Huw Lloyd wrote: >> From: Andy Blunden >> ... which comes first? or do we need a new concept which avoids >> this duplication of the world. >> >> > > I would say it quite obvious which comes first for the new-born. > > ... The object is the subject's construction, and from my incomplete reading > could be distributed across various things. The object is only objective > in that is has objective qualities to it. The distinctness of things to us > is their social object quality. > > Best, > Huw > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Sun Aug 11 07:28:44 2013 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Sun, 11 Aug 2013 15:28:44 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: <520460F0.5030506@mira.net> References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> <520444BA.2000808@mira.net> <520460F0.5030506@mira.net> Message-ID: FYI, Greg. Activity is defined by its object. See p. 363 in The Development of Mind (Problems of Dev.) Huw On 9 August 2013 04:24, Andy Blunden wrote: > Greg Thompson wrote: > >> Andy, I think I need still more help. >> >> I got lost at, well, "an activity (generally) exists". Wondering what >> this could mean. >> > > xmca didn't exist when Mike Cole launched it. But for the many > thousands who have joined it since, it *existed*. Thus is > "generally" exists. On the whole, we *join* rather than create > activities (projects). > > > Then the middle part seems to make some sense for me: activities don't >> simply and reasonably follow the intentions of their participants, but then >> lost you again at the end, with "the outcome in '*immanent* in the project >> itself". Not sure what exactly that means either. >> > > As Vygotsky says somewhere, the problem which stimulates the > activity (the development of the concept) cannot in itself account > for the project (or concept). The *means* utilised, which > corresponds to how the problem or task is conceived by the agents, > is what is crucial. I.e., not the problem or task as such, but the > conception of the task, constitutes the ideal. But what this ideal > is, is *only realised by the work of the project itself*. > > > >> And as a bigger question, I am trying to figure out "where" the activity >> exists? And "who" is a part of it? >> > > OK, but just don't expect to find an abstract empirical (logical > positivist) answer to that. An activity (or project) is an aggregate > of *actions* not *people*. These actions are the fundamental (micro) > unit of an activity, which is a molar unit of human life as a whole. > So an activity exists in its artefact-mediated actions, not a group > of people. > > > For example, with XMCA, is each thread or discussion an activity? What >> about all the intersections and overlaps with previous and soon-to-be >> discussions? Or is the whole history of XMCA an activity? >> And as to "who", is it just the people talking (i.e. writing!), or are >> the "lurkers" part of the activity? And are non-XMCA folks with whom the >> writers and lurkers speak, and who have significantly influenced the >> writers' ideas - are they a part of the activity? >> > > (1) Like all the concepts which are part of a science, projects are > *nested*. An aggregate of actions may have ideal or object which > makes sense only as part of one or more larger projects. All the > concepts of a science obviously have complex interactions and > interdependncies. No clear boundaries or lines of demarcation. Their > truth is part of the *whole*. (2) The question of "who" is part of > it is the wrong question. An activity is an aggregate of actions, > not individual persons. Also, a project is the particular of a > concept. As a particular, the project has a relatively definite > location in time and space. But it is an instance realising a > concept which is a unit of an entire social formation. So the scope > of a project, being part of a family of such projects, may be larger > than the immediate participating actions. > > > >> In short, what are the bounds of an activity? >> (oh, and where does a "project" fit into all of this?) >> > > Boundary questions are the royal road to confusion. The question is > what is the concept (or in common parlance the "essence") of a project. > "A project" is just another word for "an activity." But it has its > own history and connotations in our culture. (BTW "project" and > "design" are the same word in Russian: "proyekt" and the etymology > of "de-sign" is interesting too) and also, by using a different word > I can get away from the orthodoxy of what ANL or someone else says > is the case for "an activity." So if I say that the object of a > project is immanent within the project, I am not directly > contradicting an Activity Theorist for whom the Object or motive is > given for the Activity. I want to re-discuss all the concepts of > Activity Theory without being stumped by orthodoxy, so a new word helps. > > Andy > > -greg >> > > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Sun Aug 11 07:42:02 2013 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Sun, 11 Aug 2013 15:42:02 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities --NEEDS In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 10 August 2013 18:21, Lubomir Savov Popov wrote: > Hi Huw, > > Regarding the production of needs: I might be a bit scholastic in this > mail, but I will refer directly to historical materialism and traditional > activity theorists. Over there, it is an axiom that needs are emergent and > they are a product of the interaction of the individual and his/her > context/environment (in the process of activity). This definition is quite > simplified in order to serve as a principle. There are definitions with a > number of ramifications to take all influences into consideration. > Thank you, Lubomir. That assertion/confirmation tidies things up a little bit (in terms of expectations). > > >From a particular aspect/point of view, it is OK to say that a need is a > product of environment. However, historical materialists are very > considerate about the human individual and the activity. One of the > problems with different definitions is that they are designed to work at > different levels of abstraction and for different purposes, which means > different disciplines. > > Psychologists tend to see needs as foundations for developing the motives. > However, in some fields of economics and design, needs can be viewed as > objects that satisfy needs (what objects you need) or the features of the > objects (I need a mid-size car). In design, needs are seen as functions > (what functions you need). Depending on the discipline, one and the same > phenomenon might be seen as a need, a function, or a motive, etc. > > Well these various interpretations on need are all contingent on the localised pursuits. E.g. the needs of "the development of mind" are not typically considered with respect to technological design. Yet (rather obviously) their lack of attention does not mean that they are not pertinent. > It is difficult to find consistent treatise on needs, in particular, > outside of psychology. My problem is that in psychology needs are treated > like motives. At that point, substantial differences emerge in the types of > definitions, classifications, and archeologies of the phenomena. > > Just a few thoughts, > Thank you for these, Lubomir. Best, Huw > > Lubomir > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Huw Lloyd > Sent: Saturday, August 10, 2013 11:44 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities > > On 10 August 2013 16:13, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > > > > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > > From: Andy Blunden > > Date: 10 August 2013 15:51 > > Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities > > To: Huw Lloyd > > > > > > Huw, Leontyev is quite specific that needs are the product of activity. > > One of the distinctions he makes between human life and non-human life > > is that human beings produce their own needs, historically, as a > > community, whereas for an animal its needs are given. So we have a > > kind of duplicated > > world: needs and the means of their satisfaction (labour). Like > > stimulus and response: which comes first? or do we need a new concept > > which avoids this duplication of the world. > > > > I would say it quite obvious which comes first for the new-born. > > I guess if one wants to put activity within a framework of a single > fundamental concept, then one is going to have preference for defining > needs in terms of activity. > > But the contingency of putting something on a single basis is that one > does not broach into natural phenomena (unless one is taking an Engels like > route). > > >From a natural science perspective (i.e. genetic domains etc) it does > >not > really matter whether needs are entirely contingent on activity. But from > a dialectic theoretical perspective, perhaps it is. Thoughts? > > > > > > There are different interpretations of Leontyev; as I read him, the > > motive (let's use this word rather than "need") is objective for a > > person, that is the motive of the activity, as opposed to the actions > > of an individual person who participates in the activity, who may have > > other motives. Even though the motive of the activity is produced > > culturally and historically, it is in the world, objective. It has > > always been a problem for me what on Earth can be an objective need > (other than those elusive "vital" needs). > > Like, you work in a gun factory; your motive is to earn a wage so as > > to look after your family. But you know the motive of the work is to > > produce guns. But why does the community need guns? Where did that > > come from? And does the factory owner really care whether he is > > selling guns or toys, so long as he makes a profit. Others may do > > better justice to Leontyev's argument here, but I have trouble with this. > > > > My reading of activity was that it all of these subtleties were manifest > within the activity, i.e. the motive having qualitative influence. > > The object is the subject's construction, and from my incomplete reading > could be distributed across various things. The object is only objective > in that is has objective qualities to it. The distinctness of things to us > is their social object quality. > > Best, > Huw > > > > > > Peg: yes, Leontyev starts off with single-cell creatures and works his > > way up. There *is* a big leap though, with tasks that are completed by > > multiple actions, potentially by different individuals, and most > > imporantly, the production of tools, means which become themselves > > needs. Tracing mind from its origins in non-human life is OK, but I > > have trouble with ANL's concept of "subject", which could be a microbe > equally as a human. > > > > Andy > > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > >> > >> > >> On 10 August 2013 15:12, Andy Blunden >> ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: > >> > >> Well Huw, I didn't mean to introduce a diversion by taking > >> computers as an example. I could have taken a stone tool just as > well. > >> > >> > >> Yes. > >> > >> It seems, Huw, that in responding to my challenge you have made a > >> start at developing a theory of human needs. > >> > >> > >> 'fraid not. Simply asking the question. > >> > >> Viz., that there are certain "vital" needs, and all other "needs" > >> are merely means to meet these vital needs. I don't imagine that I > >> am going to be able to refute the claims for a theory of human > >> needs in a single message, it is after simply the claim for the > >> existence of human nature - a concept with a very long history! > >> (Aristotle built his theory of biology on the basis of a theory of > >> needs.) But "vital" human needs are very elastic and other than in > >> very general terms are quite indefinable. But as we change our > >> world, what you need to live in that world are very real and very > >> specific, and those needs arise directly out of participation in > >> that life-world. Which of the thousand different ways that there > >> are to meet the "vital" need of, say, nutrition, becomes a real > >> need for a person, is determined by the cultural context of a > >> person's life and their activity. > >> > >> > >> But these "real needs" are known needs. Which Leontyev calls > >> motives, does he not? > >> > >> So I prefer Activity Theory, in which needs are the product of > >> activity, while, as conceived in any given activity, they provide > >> the motive for that activity. > >> > >> > >> So it seems that we do not know whether needs are produced, or whether > >> they are exposed. Did Leontyev make such a distinction? > >> > >> Best, > >> Huw > >> > >> > >> > >> Andy > >> > >> > >> Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> > >> On 9 August 2013 14:57, Andy Blunden >> > wrote: > >> > >> > >> I don't have any doubt that needs are produced. 25 years > >> ago no-one needed > >> a computer. Now it seems that everyone needs them. I don't > >> see you r > >> objection to this, Huw? > >> > >> > >> > >> Well, if you consider needs as primal (vital) such things as > >> computers and > >> the languages people speak are simply ways to meet such needs. > >> > >> >From a Marxian social perspective computing is interesting in > >> this respect > >> in that the needs met by the first generation workers is > >> qualitatively > >> different to the management saturated situation we have now. > >> i.e. on the > >> cusp of technological practice workers are more free from the > >> tyranny of > >> alienation. > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > -- > > ------------------------------**------------------------------** > > ------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > > Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts > > http://marxists.academia.edu/**AndyBlunden > u/AndyBlunden> > > > > > > > > > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Sun Aug 11 08:48:48 2013 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Sun, 11 Aug 2013 16:48:48 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] understanding & Leontyev's activities Message-ID: It seems to me that the meanings of understanding were not quite brought to the fore (p.366, development of mind), footnote 2. "Does the art of upbringing and education not consist in general in creating a proper combination of 'understandable' and 'really effective' motives, and at the same time in knowing how, in good time, to attach greater significance to the successful result of activity so as to ensure a transition to a higher type of the real motives governing the individual's life?" Whereby, it seems to me, that to have an under-standing is, effectively, to appreciate a situation from a social standing, whereby the symbolic rationale starts to take effect. Or perhaps this was a bit too plum for the translator? Best, Huw From ablunden@mira.net Sun Aug 11 22:03:46 2013 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2013 15:03:46 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: understanding & Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <52086CB2.4050807@mira.net> Thanks for reminding me of that wonderful chapter, Huw, which I hadn't read since laying it out for printing 4 years ago! I have made that chapter generally available on line here: http://www.marxists.org/archive/leontev/works/1945/childs-psyche.pdf I think the point you make is correct enough, but the word "only" (or "merely") is omitted. As I understand it, Leontyev's point it that at a certain point the child does understand that doing the homework is necessary in order to become later a useful member of society, but he *only* "understands" it. It does not have the psychological force of, for example, just being allowed to go out and play because he has completed his homework - the "really effective motive". So this was not intended as an explanation of "understanding" but rather is about the psychological force which the real motive of the activity has for the child at that stage of their development. But I still think you are making a correct point, i.e., your "understanding" of a task is the psychological force it has for you as appropriate to your social situation. Loeontyev is then talking about how the child may make a transition from "merely understanding the reaon for doing homework, to that motive becoming the really effective motive for the child's study, i.e., they are effectively motivated to learn to become a more productive member of society by mastering the material being studied. (We would not put it that way in our times, though, I think) Maybe Peg Griffin, who helped us a lot back in May 2011 with this same material, can help? Andy Huw Lloyd wrote: > It seems to me that the meanings of understanding were not quite brought to > the fore (p.366, development of mind), footnote 2. > > "Does the art of upbringing and education not consist in general in > creating a proper combination of 'understandable' and 'really effective' > motives, and at the same time in knowing how, in good time, to attach > greater significance to the successful result of activity so as to ensure a > transition to a higher type of the real motives governing the individual's > life?" > > Whereby, it seems to me, that to have an under-standing is, effectively, to > appreciate a situation from a social standing, whereby the symbolic > rationale starts to take effect. > > Or perhaps this was a bit too plum for the translator? > > Best, > Huw > > -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts http://marxists.academia.edu/AndyBlunden From wagner.schmit@gmail.com Mon Aug 12 02:25:25 2013 From: wagner.schmit@gmail.com (Wagner Luiz Schmit) Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2013 18:25:25 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: deaf thinking In-Reply-To: References: <1729897181.17443019.1375992033484.JavaMail.root@jaguar9.sfu.ca> <32B316E5-C892-4046-90D7-750638C95967@eastsideinstitute.org> <52043CDB.80205@mira.net> Message-ID: Hello, In Brazil I also used the ""Butterflies of Zagorsk", but I only could find it in Portuguese with very bad quality. Does anyone have it in English or better quality? It is not available in the BBC site also. Wagner On Sat, Aug 10, 2013 at 2:06 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > Andy, > I will find time to read these links. I have wanted to know more on this > theme > Thanks, > Larry > PS I hope others follow up on your answer on activity, actions, that will > not be helpful within *positivist* understandings. > The comment about *people* was provocative. > > > > On Fri, Aug 9, 2013 at 6:38 AM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> On 9 August 2013 01:50, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> > http://www.marxists.org/**archive/meshcheryakov/**awakening/index.htm< >> http://www.marxists.org/archive/meshcheryakov/awakening/index.htm> >> > has Mescheryakov's book in HTML, or a link to buy the book in hard copy. >> > >> > Andy >> > >> > >> Thank you. >> >> Huw >> >> >> > >> > Huw Lloyd wrote: >> > >> >> Do you know if there are English versions online? >> >> >> >> Best, >> >> Huw >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > >> > >> > >> From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Mon Aug 12 04:37:21 2013 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2013 12:37:21 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] activity and Davydov Message-ID: Davydov's use of activity seems to be used in a way whereby the object of activity is held constant (e.g. quantity in Problems of Developmental Instruction, pp. 147-154). I don't recall reading Davydov explaining this however. My inference is that it is the problems (contradictions) presented by the teacher that establish this constant basis of activity, i.e. that the object of the activity is given in terms of the problem. Has this been documented anywhere? Thanks, Huw From ablunden@mira.net Mon Aug 12 06:55:14 2013 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2013 23:55:14 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT and Community Psychology In-Reply-To: References: <4DE0161C-0BCB-4FD8-A3A5-A4894680AB39@hawaii.edu> <8D43867349DDAC4BAA502DA13C1882A152DD5C70@senldogo0428.springer-sbm.com> <9599FEE2-5762-43B9-9DB7-28F6BE3108F8@hawaii.edu> <8D43867349DDAC4BAA502DA13C1882A152DD60DD@senldogo0428.springer-sbm.com> <2D6F44BD-E70E-4997-9223-070AC2E1C9F1@hawaii.edu> <8D43867349DDAC4BAA502DA13C1882A152DD6A7A@senldogo0428.springer-sbm.com> <5205F29B.9070505@mira.net> Message-ID: <5208E942.9090708@mira.net> Thank you very much for your considered response, Roland and Cliff. Just a couple of follow ups, because I think healing an interdisciplinary gap requires the maximum possible clarity over shared concepts. (1) I am still not clear about the meaning of "acitivity setting." I have read Wertsch, and I have nothing at all against him, but I am just not as familiar with his work as I would like to be. But I have read a lot of Vygotsky and never came across the term "activity setting" in Vygotsky's writing. There may be an issue of different translations possibly. I wonder if you could perhaps scan a page of a book where Vygotsky explains his meaning or at least uses the term. I have generally come across the term used to indicate, for example, the school, or family or a specific workplace, and the norms and rules and expectations prevailing in those settings. I gather you take "setting" to refer to a particular, rather than a general, such as "family" or "school." So "Sandy Bay Elementary" would be an activity setting, but not "school," which would be just a type of activity setting. I see that "activity setting" is an activity, but includes the particulars, such as the participating individuals and the physical surroundings. It seems such an important concept for you, as Community Psychologists, I would appreciate more specification. (2) By me taking an extreme example (slavery) we quickly achieved agreement that further specification of "shared activities" is needed for an understanding of how mutual understanding arises. (Of course it did to an extent under slavery too). I categorise forms of collaboration into 3 modes: direction (line management, command-and-obey, as pertains in the normal capitalist firm or public service department), exchange (purchase and sale, customer-service provider, as pertains in the market place) and collaboration as such (mutual criticism, shared attribution and decision-making). It seems to me that distinctions like these are important. Being a teacher or boss in a community, especially if you are otherwise an outsider, can be problematic, even though you are engaged in a "shared activity" with the locals. I was really impressed by the examples you cited, so obviously you have thought these issues through. What is the anatomy of an "activity setting" then? (3) What other ways do you conceptualise "context"? Thanks, Andy (and please not "Professor," I am an independent scholar, retired.) Roland Tharp wrote: > Professor Blunden, > > Please find our responses to your questions attached. Thank you for > your interest. > > Roland Tharp > Cliff O'Donnell > > On Sat, Aug 10, 2013 at 3:58 AM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > Thanks for sharing that very interesting paper, Mike. From what I > see, there is little justification for the dislocation between > these two research communities - CHAT and Community Psychology. > Their aims, sources and methods seem so similar and compatible. > > I would just like to ask the authors a couple of questions. > > * Do you take "activity setting" to be the optimal conception of > "context"? > > * What exactly do they understand by "activity setting"? You cite > Vygotsky in a book edited by Wertsch, but I do not have that book. > I associate "activity setting" with the current of CHAT around > Mariane Hedegaard. It seems to me to be similar in meaning to > "institution". Thus I quetion the efficacy of this concept for > grasping social change, as opposed to just child development. > > * Is "mutual understanding" is what you mean by "intersubjectivity"? > > * I agree that participation in shared activities is the necessary > condition for peope to achieve mutual understanding. But this is > not necessarily the outcome, is it? It depends on the type of > collaboration within the activity. EG White slaveowners and black > slaves collaborated in the production of cotton in the Confederate > States of America for many years, but this did not result in > mutual understanding. So it seems that the notion of "shared > actvities" needs further specification. Yes? > > thanks > Andy > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Mon Aug 12 08:09:50 2013 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (greg.a.thompson@gmail.com) Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2013 08:09:50 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> <520444BA.2000808@mira.net> <520460F0.5030506@mira.net> Message-ID: <19E63C50-A0D2-4A0F-BBA7-63853414FDAA@gmail.com> Huw, Pardon my ignorance on this issue (I can assure you this is more than just pretense!), but if conversation is activity, what is the object of this activity? Greg Sent from my iPhone On Aug 11, 2013, at 7:28 AM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > FYI, Greg. > > Activity is defined by its object. See p. 363 in The Development of Mind > (Problems of Dev.) > > Huw > > > > On 9 August 2013 04:24, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> Greg Thompson wrote: >> >>> Andy, I think I need still more help. >>> >>> I got lost at, well, "an activity (generally) exists". Wondering what >>> this could mean. >> >> xmca didn't exist when Mike Cole launched it. But for the many >> thousands who have joined it since, it *existed*. Thus is >> "generally" exists. On the whole, we *join* rather than create >> activities (projects). >> >> >> Then the middle part seems to make some sense for me: activities don't >>> simply and reasonably follow the intentions of their participants, but then >>> lost you again at the end, with "the outcome in '*immanent* in the project >>> itself". Not sure what exactly that means either. >> >> As Vygotsky says somewhere, the problem which stimulates the >> activity (the development of the concept) cannot in itself account >> for the project (or concept). The *means* utilised, which >> corresponds to how the problem or task is conceived by the agents, >> is what is crucial. I.e., not the problem or task as such, but the >> conception of the task, constitutes the ideal. But what this ideal >> is, is *only realised by the work of the project itself*. >> >> >> >>> And as a bigger question, I am trying to figure out "where" the activity >>> exists? And "who" is a part of it? >> >> OK, but just don't expect to find an abstract empirical (logical >> positivist) answer to that. An activity (or project) is an aggregate >> of *actions* not *people*. These actions are the fundamental (micro) >> unit of an activity, which is a molar unit of human life as a whole. >> So an activity exists in its artefact-mediated actions, not a group >> of people. >> >> >> For example, with XMCA, is each thread or discussion an activity? What >>> about all the intersections and overlaps with previous and soon-to-be >>> discussions? Or is the whole history of XMCA an activity? >>> And as to "who", is it just the people talking (i.e. writing!), or are >>> the "lurkers" part of the activity? And are non-XMCA folks with whom the >>> writers and lurkers speak, and who have significantly influenced the >>> writers' ideas - are they a part of the activity? >> >> (1) Like all the concepts which are part of a science, projects are >> *nested*. An aggregate of actions may have ideal or object which >> makes sense only as part of one or more larger projects. All the >> concepts of a science obviously have complex interactions and >> interdependncies. No clear boundaries or lines of demarcation. Their >> truth is part of the *whole*. (2) The question of "who" is part of >> it is the wrong question. An activity is an aggregate of actions, >> not individual persons. Also, a project is the particular of a >> concept. As a particular, the project has a relatively definite >> location in time and space. But it is an instance realising a >> concept which is a unit of an entire social formation. So the scope >> of a project, being part of a family of such projects, may be larger >> than the immediate participating actions. >> >> >> >>> In short, what are the bounds of an activity? >>> (oh, and where does a "project" fit into all of this?) >> >> Boundary questions are the royal road to confusion. The question is >> what is the concept (or in common parlance the "essence") of a project. >> "A project" is just another word for "an activity." But it has its >> own history and connotations in our culture. (BTW "project" and >> "design" are the same word in Russian: "proyekt" and the etymology >> of "de-sign" is interesting too) and also, by using a different word >> I can get away from the orthodoxy of what ANL or someone else says >> is the case for "an activity." So if I say that the object of a >> project is immanent within the project, I am not directly >> contradicting an Activity Theorist for whom the Object or motive is >> given for the Activity. I want to re-discuss all the concepts of >> Activity Theory without being stumped by orthodoxy, so a new word helps. >> >> Andy >> >> -greg >> >> >> From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Mon Aug 12 08:24:35 2013 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2013 16:24:35 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: <19E63C50-A0D2-4A0F-BBA7-63853414FDAA@gmail.com> References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> <520444BA.2000808@mira.net> <520460F0.5030506@mira.net> <19E63C50-A0D2-4A0F-BBA7-63853414FDAA@gmail.com> Message-ID: On 12 August 2013 16:09, wrote: > Huw, > Pardon my ignorance on this issue (I can assure you this is more than just > pretense!), but if conversation is activity, what is the object of this > activity? > It is your purpose(s) in conversing. Simple, eh? Best, Huw > Greg > > Sent from my iPhone > > On Aug 11, 2013, at 7:28 AM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > FYI, Greg. > > > > Activity is defined by its object. See p. 363 in The Development of Mind > > (Problems of Dev.) > > > > Huw > > > > > > > > On 9 August 2013 04:24, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > >> Greg Thompson wrote: > >> > >>> Andy, I think I need still more help. > >>> > >>> I got lost at, well, "an activity (generally) exists". Wondering what > >>> this could mean. > >> > >> xmca didn't exist when Mike Cole launched it. But for the many > >> thousands who have joined it since, it *existed*. Thus is > >> "generally" exists. On the whole, we *join* rather than create > >> activities (projects). > >> > >> > >> Then the middle part seems to make some sense for me: activities don't > >>> simply and reasonably follow the intentions of their participants, but > then > >>> lost you again at the end, with "the outcome in '*immanent* in the > project > >>> itself". Not sure what exactly that means either. > >> > >> As Vygotsky says somewhere, the problem which stimulates the > >> activity (the development of the concept) cannot in itself account > >> for the project (or concept). The *means* utilised, which > >> corresponds to how the problem or task is conceived by the agents, > >> is what is crucial. I.e., not the problem or task as such, but the > >> conception of the task, constitutes the ideal. But what this ideal > >> is, is *only realised by the work of the project itself*. > >> > >> > >> > >>> And as a bigger question, I am trying to figure out "where" the > activity > >>> exists? And "who" is a part of it? > >> > >> OK, but just don't expect to find an abstract empirical (logical > >> positivist) answer to that. An activity (or project) is an aggregate > >> of *actions* not *people*. These actions are the fundamental (micro) > >> unit of an activity, which is a molar unit of human life as a whole. > >> So an activity exists in its artefact-mediated actions, not a group > >> of people. > >> > >> > >> For example, with XMCA, is each thread or discussion an activity? What > >>> about all the intersections and overlaps with previous and soon-to-be > >>> discussions? Or is the whole history of XMCA an activity? > >>> And as to "who", is it just the people talking (i.e. writing!), or are > >>> the "lurkers" part of the activity? And are non-XMCA folks with whom > the > >>> writers and lurkers speak, and who have significantly influenced the > >>> writers' ideas - are they a part of the activity? > >> > >> (1) Like all the concepts which are part of a science, projects are > >> *nested*. An aggregate of actions may have ideal or object which > >> makes sense only as part of one or more larger projects. All the > >> concepts of a science obviously have complex interactions and > >> interdependncies. No clear boundaries or lines of demarcation. Their > >> truth is part of the *whole*. (2) The question of "who" is part of > >> it is the wrong question. An activity is an aggregate of actions, > >> not individual persons. Also, a project is the particular of a > >> concept. As a particular, the project has a relatively definite > >> location in time and space. But it is an instance realising a > >> concept which is a unit of an entire social formation. So the scope > >> of a project, being part of a family of such projects, may be larger > >> than the immediate participating actions. > >> > >> > >> > >>> In short, what are the bounds of an activity? > >>> (oh, and where does a "project" fit into all of this?) > >> > >> Boundary questions are the royal road to confusion. The question is > >> what is the concept (or in common parlance the "essence") of a > project. > >> "A project" is just another word for "an activity." But it has its > >> own history and connotations in our culture. (BTW "project" and > >> "design" are the same word in Russian: "proyekt" and the etymology > >> of "de-sign" is interesting too) and also, by using a different word > >> I can get away from the orthodoxy of what ANL or someone else says > >> is the case for "an activity." So if I say that the object of a > >> project is immanent within the project, I am not directly > >> contradicting an Activity Theorist for whom the Object or motive is > >> given for the Activity. I want to re-discuss all the concepts of > >> Activity Theory without being stumped by orthodoxy, so a new word > helps. > >> > >> Andy > >> > >> -greg > >> > >> > >> > > From Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu Mon Aug 12 09:11:42 2013 From: Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu (White, Phillip) Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2013 10:11:42 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: <19E63C50-A0D2-4A0F-BBA7-63853414FDAA@gmail.com> References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> <520444BA.2000808@mira.net> <520460F0.5030506@mira.net> , <19E63C50-A0D2-4A0F-BBA7-63853414FDAA@gmail.com> Message-ID: perhaps, following the work of Gregory Bateson, Greg, xmca is a a series of symmetrical schismogenesis sequences with the object of level II learning. and occasionally it slides into complimentary schismogenesis in which dominance/submission or exhibition/spectatorship becomes the primary object ( which marxist historians have used as an explanatory process, though bateson suggests they too often exagerate.) just a thought. there are other batesonians on this list who i am sure have greater insight into this theory of communication than i do. phillip Phillip White, PhD Urban Community Teacher Education Program Site Coordinator Montview Elementary, Aurora, CO phillip.white@ucdenver.edu or pawhite@aps.k12.co.us ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+phillip.white=ucdenver.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces+phillip.white=ucdenver.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of greg.a.thompson@gmail.com [greg.a.thompson@gmail.com] Sent: Monday, August 12, 2013 9:09 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities Huw, Pardon my ignorance on this issue (I can assure you this is more than just pretense!), but if conversation is activity, what is the object of this activity? Greg Sent from my iPhone On Aug 11, 2013, at 7:28 AM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > FYI, Greg. > > Activity is defined by its object. See p. 363 in The Development of Mind > (Problems of Dev.) > > Huw > > > > On 9 August 2013 04:24, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> Greg Thompson wrote: >> >>> Andy, I think I need still more help. >>> >>> I got lost at, well, "an activity (generally) exists". Wondering what >>> this could mean. >> >> xmca didn't exist when Mike Cole launched it. But for the many >> thousands who have joined it since, it *existed*. Thus is >> "generally" exists. On the whole, we *join* rather than create >> activities (projects). >> >> >> Then the middle part seems to make some sense for me: activities don't >>> simply and reasonably follow the intentions of their participants, but then >>> lost you again at the end, with "the outcome in '*immanent* in the project >>> itself". Not sure what exactly that means either. >> >> As Vygotsky says somewhere, the problem which stimulates the >> activity (the development of the concept) cannot in itself account >> for the project (or concept). The *means* utilised, which >> corresponds to how the problem or task is conceived by the agents, >> is what is crucial. I.e., not the problem or task as such, but the >> conception of the task, constitutes the ideal. But what this ideal >> is, is *only realised by the work of the project itself*. >> >> >> >>> And as a bigger question, I am trying to figure out "where" the activity >>> exists? And "who" is a part of it? >> >> OK, but just don't expect to find an abstract empirical (logical >> positivist) answer to that. An activity (or project) is an aggregate >> of *actions* not *people*. These actions are the fundamental (micro) >> unit of an activity, which is a molar unit of human life as a whole. >> So an activity exists in its artefact-mediated actions, not a group >> of people. >> >> >> For example, with XMCA, is each thread or discussion an activity? What >>> about all the intersections and overlaps with previous and soon-to-be >>> discussions? Or is the whole history of XMCA an activity? >>> And as to "who", is it just the people talking (i.e. writing!), or are >>> the "lurkers" part of the activity? And are non-XMCA folks with whom the >>> writers and lurkers speak, and who have significantly influenced the >>> writers' ideas - are they a part of the activity? >> >> (1) Like all the concepts which are part of a science, projects are >> *nested*. An aggregate of actions may have ideal or object which >> makes sense only as part of one or more larger projects. All the >> concepts of a science obviously have complex interactions and >> interdependncies. No clear boundaries or lines of demarcation. Their >> truth is part of the *whole*. (2) The question of "who" is part of >> it is the wrong question. An activity is an aggregate of actions, >> not individual persons. Also, a project is the particular of a >> concept. As a particular, the project has a relatively definite >> location in time and space. But it is an instance realising a >> concept which is a unit of an entire social formation. So the scope >> of a project, being part of a family of such projects, may be larger >> than the immediate participating actions. >> >> >> >>> In short, what are the bounds of an activity? >>> (oh, and where does a "project" fit into all of this?) >> >> Boundary questions are the royal road to confusion. The question is >> what is the concept (or in common parlance the "essence") of a project. >> "A project" is just another word for "an activity." But it has its >> own history and connotations in our culture. (BTW "project" and >> "design" are the same word in Russian: "proyekt" and the etymology >> of "de-sign" is interesting too) and also, by using a different word >> I can get away from the orthodoxy of what ANL or someone else says >> is the case for "an activity." So if I say that the object of a >> project is immanent within the project, I am not directly >> contradicting an Activity Theorist for whom the Object or motive is >> given for the Activity. I want to re-discuss all the concepts of >> Activity Theory without being stumped by orthodoxy, so a new word helps. >> >> Andy >> >> -greg >> >> >> From carolmacdon@gmail.com Mon Aug 12 09:42:25 2013 From: carolmacdon@gmail.com (carolmacdon@gmail.com) Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2013 16:42:25 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> <520444BA.2000808@mira.net> <520460F0.5030506@mira.net> , <19E63C50-A0D2-4A0F-BBA7-63853414FDAA@gmail.com> Message-ID: <647795825-1376325739-cardhu_decombobulator_blackberry.rim.net-1185772373-@b2.c11.bise7.blackberry> Well, now we know. We did realize, of course, about the "showing off" posts and yours counts as one, Phillip :-)) Carol Sent via my BlackBerry from Vodacom - let your email find you! -----Original Message----- From: "White, Phillip" Sender: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2013 10:11:42 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Reply-To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities perhaps, following the work of Gregory Bateson, Greg, xmca is a a series of symmetrical schismogenesis sequences with the object of level II learning. and occasionally it slides into complimentary schismogenesis in which dominance/submission or exhibition/spectatorship becomes the primary object ( which marxist historians have used as an explanatory process, though bateson suggests they too often exagerate.) just a thought. there are other batesonians on this list who i am sure have greater insight into this theory of communication than i do. phillip Phillip White, PhD Urban Community Teacher Education Program Site Coordinator Montview Elementary, Aurora, CO phillip.white@ucdenver.edu or pawhite@aps.k12.co.us ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+phillip.white=ucdenver.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces+phillip.white=ucdenver.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of greg.a.thompson@gmail.com [greg.a.thompson@gmail.com] Sent: Monday, August 12, 2013 9:09 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities Huw, Pardon my ignorance on this issue (I can assure you this is more than just pretense!), but if conversation is activity, what is the object of this activity? Greg Sent from my iPhone On Aug 11, 2013, at 7:28 AM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > FYI, Greg. > > Activity is defined by its object. See p. 363 in The Development of Mind > (Problems of Dev.) > > Huw > > > > On 9 August 2013 04:24, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> Greg Thompson wrote: >> >>> Andy, I think I need still more help. >>> >>> I got lost at, well, "an activity (generally) exists". Wondering what >>> this could mean. >> >> xmca didn't exist when Mike Cole launched it. But for the many >> thousands who have joined it since, it *existed*. Thus is >> "generally" exists. On the whole, we *join* rather than create >> activities (projects). >> >> >> Then the middle part seems to make some sense for me: activities don't >>> simply and reasonably follow the intentions of their participants, but then >>> lost you again at the end, with "the outcome in '*immanent* in the project >>> itself". Not sure what exactly that means either. >> >> As Vygotsky says somewhere, the problem which stimulates the >> activity (the development of the concept) cannot in itself account >> for the project (or concept). The *means* utilised, which >> corresponds to how the problem or task is conceived by the agents, >> is what is crucial. I.e., not the problem or task as such, but the >> conception of the task, constitutes the ideal. But what this ideal >> is, is *only realised by the work of the project itself*. >> >> >> >>> And as a bigger question, I am trying to figure out "where" the activity >>> exists? And "who" is a part of it? >> >> OK, but just don't expect to find an abstract empirical (logical >> positivist) answer to that. An activity (or project) is an aggregate >> of *actions* not *people*. These actions are the fundamental (micro) >> unit of an activity, which is a molar unit of human life as a whole. >> So an activity exists in its artefact-mediated actions, not a group >> of people. >> >> >> For example, with XMCA, is each thread or discussion an activity? What >>> about all the intersections and overlaps with previous and soon-to-be >>> discussions? Or is the whole history of XMCA an activity? >>> And as to "who", is it just the people talking (i.e. writing!), or are >>> the "lurkers" part of the activity? And are non-XMCA folks with whom the >>> writers and lurkers speak, and who have significantly influenced the >>> writers' ideas - are they a part of the activity? >> >> (1) Like all the concepts which are part of a science, projects are >> *nested*. An aggregate of actions may have ideal or object which >> makes sense only as part of one or more larger projects. All the >> concepts of a science obviously have complex interactions and >> interdependncies. No clear boundaries or lines of demarcation. Their >> truth is part of the *whole*. (2) The question of "who" is part of >> it is the wrong question. An activity is an aggregate of actions, >> not individual persons. Also, a project is the particular of a >> concept. As a particular, the project has a relatively definite >> location in time and space. But it is an instance realising a >> concept which is a unit of an entire social formation. So the scope >> of a project, being part of a family of such projects, may be larger >> than the immediate participating actions. >> >> >> >>> In short, what are the bounds of an activity? >>> (oh, and where does a "project" fit into all of this?) >> >> Boundary questions are the royal road to confusion. The question is >> what is the concept (or in common parlance the "essence") of a project. >> "A project" is just another word for "an activity." But it has its >> own history and connotations in our culture. (BTW "project" and >> "design" are the same word in Russian: "proyekt" and the etymology >> of "de-sign" is interesting too) and also, by using a different word >> I can get away from the orthodoxy of what ANL or someone else says >> is the case for "an activity." So if I say that the object of a >> project is immanent within the project, I am not directly >> contradicting an Activity Theorist for whom the Object or motive is >> given for the Activity. I want to re-discuss all the concepts of >> Activity Theory without being stumped by orthodoxy, so a new word helps. >> >> Andy >> >> -greg >> >> >> From lspopov@bgsu.edu Mon Aug 12 10:12:29 2013 From: lspopov@bgsu.edu (Lubomir Savov Popov) Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2013 13:12:29 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Activity Setting Message-ID: Hi Andy, I am also interested to find the term "activity setting" in Vigotsky's writings or those of his followers, including everyone in the East European activity theory tradition. I would appreciate articles or specific references and page numbers. I need this to anchor some ideas and to pay tribute to earlier theorists if they have worked on this. I am also interested if there are people on this list who work on the development of the concept of activity setting or on activity theory in relation to the planning and design of built environment. They can contact me at the e-mail below my signature or via this list, whichever is more convenient. I was going to make such a request on this list some time ago, but now is a good occasion for this. To my knowledge, no one in the East European activity theory tradition has used the term "activity setting," at least till the late 1980s. If I have missed something, it is good to catch up. I personally work (on and off) on the concept of activity setting since the early 1980s. However, I develop it as a methodological category for the study of built environment. I have to acknowledge that I got the idea for activity setting from Roger Barker's "behavior setting." At that time, in East Europe, the concept of behavior was considered one-sided and with less explanatory power than the concept of activity. There was no way to introduce the behavior setting concept without setting the reaction of mainstream social scientists. Even if someone dared to suggest the behavior setting concept in an article, the reviewers will automatically recommend to rework it as "activity setting." In East European social science of that time, behavior referred mostly to the visible, mechanistic aspects of activity or in the sense of "demeanor." Bob Bechtel has done a good work in the early 1980 expanding on Barker's behavior setting, operationalizing his ideas for the field of Environment and Behavior (Architecture and Human Behavior; Man-Environment Systems). However, this work didn't continue. On the other hand, at that time, it was too early to talk about activity settings in the USA. It is early even now, in particular in the field of Environment and Behavior. Many people in that field resent the idea of ditching behavior for activity. They believe that the concept of behavior setting is good enough and there is no need to introduce one more concept of similar kind. In relation to the field of Environment and Behavior, I personally believe that Barker has offered very useful ideas and they can become a stepping stone for developing the concept of activity setting. The activity setting concept will allow us to use the apparatus of activity theory which is more powerful than the concept of behavior. I also believe that the development of the activity setting theory for the fields of teaching or management or social work and community building will be somewhat different. Their focus will be different and this will lead to working on different details. As usual, it is not possible to study everything about one object of study. We have to make difficult choices regarding aspects and depth: what to study first, what to defer, and what to skip. Barker had a lot of conflicts with main stream psychologists (not activity theorists). I have heard from Bob Bechtel (a student of Barker) that psychologists were telling Barker: Roger, you think just like a sociologist, which in psychological parlance meant Roger, you are a SOB. This illustrates the disciplinary biases and divisions. Best wishes, Lubomir Lubomir Popov, Ph.D. School of Family and Consumer Sciences American Culture Studies Affiliated Faculty Bowling Green State University 309 Johnston Hall, Bowling Green, Ohio 43403-0059 Lspopov@bgsu.edu 419.372.7835 -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden Sent: Monday, August 12, 2013 9:55 AM To: Roland Tharp; Cliff O'Donnell Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT and Community Psychology Thank you very much for your considered response, Roland and Cliff. Just a couple of follow ups, because I think healing an interdisciplinary gap requires the maximum possible clarity over shared concepts. (1) I am still not clear about the meaning of "acitivity setting." I have read Wertsch, and I have nothing at all against him, but I am just not as familiar with his work as I would like to be. But I have read a lot of Vygotsky and never came across the term "activity setting" in Vygotsky's writing. There may be an issue of different translations possibly. I wonder if you could perhaps scan a page of a book where Vygotsky explains his meaning or at least uses the term. I have generally come across the term used to indicate, for example, the school, or family or a specific workplace, and the norms and rules and expectations prevailing in those settings. I gather you take "setting" to refer to a particular, rather than a general, such as "family" or "school." So "Sandy Bay Elementary" would be an activity setting, but not "school," which would be just a type of activity setting. I see that "activity setting" is an activity, but includes the particulars, such as the participating individuals and the physical surroundings. It seems such an important concept for you, as Community Psychologists, I would appreciate more specification. (2) By me taking an extreme example (slavery) we quickly achieved agreement that further specification of "shared activities" is needed for an understanding of how mutual understanding arises. (Of course it did to an extent under slavery too). I categorise forms of collaboration into 3 modes: direction (line management, command-and-obey, as pertains in the normal capitalist firm or public service department), exchange (purchase and sale, customer-service provider, as pertains in the market place) and collaboration as such (mutual criticism, shared attribution and decision-making). It seems to me that distinctions like these are important. Being a teacher or boss in a community, especially if you are otherwise an outsider, can be problematic, even though you are engaged in a "shared activity" with the locals. I was really impressed by the examples you cited, so obviously you have thought these issues through. What is the anatomy of an "activity setting" then? (3) What other ways do you conceptualise "context"? Thanks, Andy (and please not "Professor," I am an independent scholar, retired.) Roland Tharp wrote: > Professor Blunden, > > Please find our responses to your questions attached. Thank you for > your interest. > > Roland Tharp > Cliff O'Donnell > > On Sat, Aug 10, 2013 at 3:58 AM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > Thanks for sharing that very interesting paper, Mike. From what I > see, there is little justification for the dislocation between > these two research communities - CHAT and Community Psychology. > Their aims, sources and methods seem so similar and compatible. > > I would just like to ask the authors a couple of questions. > > * Do you take "activity setting" to be the optimal conception of > "context"? > > * What exactly do they understand by "activity setting"? You cite > Vygotsky in a book edited by Wertsch, but I do not have that book. > I associate "activity setting" with the current of CHAT around > Mariane Hedegaard. It seems to me to be similar in meaning to > "institution". Thus I quetion the efficacy of this concept for > grasping social change, as opposed to just child development. > > * Is "mutual understanding" is what you mean by "intersubjectivity"? > > * I agree that participation in shared activities is the necessary > condition for peope to achieve mutual understanding. But this is > not necessarily the outcome, is it? It depends on the type of > collaboration within the activity. EG White slaveowners and black > slaves collaborated in the production of cotton in the Confederate > States of America for many years, but this did not result in > mutual understanding. So it seems that the notion of "shared > actvities" needs further specification. Yes? > > thanks > Andy > From Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu Mon Aug 12 10:35:44 2013 From: Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu (White, Phillip) Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2013 11:35:44 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: <647795825-1376325739-cardhu_decombobulator_blackberry.rim.net-1185772373-@b2.c11.bise7.blackberry> References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> <520444BA.2000808@mira.net> <520460F0.5030506@mira.net> , <19E63C50-A0D2-4A0F-BBA7-63853414FDAA@gmail.com> , <647795825-1376325739-cardhu_decombobulator_blackberry.rim.net-1185772373-@b2.c11.bise7.blackberry> Message-ID: i chortled with amused pleasure at your response, Carole, to my email regarding bateson's work - of course, seriously, don't you think that exhibitionism is a part of the participation at xmca for all of us? identifying motive is not easy since it's such a complexity of psychological processes. phillip ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of carolmacdon@gmail.com [carolmacdon@gmail.com] Sent: Monday, August 12, 2013 10:42 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities Well, now we know. We did realize, of course, about the "showing off" posts and yours counts as one, Phillip :-)) Carol Sent via my BlackBerry from Vodacom - let your email find you! From bjones@weber.ucsd.edu Mon Aug 12 10:56:41 2013 From: bjones@weber.ucsd.edu (Bruce Jones) Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2013 10:56:41 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [Xmca-l] Digest subscriptions to xmca-l Message-ID: <20130812175641.5CF9810AE01@weber.ucsd.edu> Hello, Before the name change from xmca@weber.ucsd.edu to xmca-l@ucsd.edu, many of you were getting the mailing list messages from xmca in digest version.* After the change, many of you who had been getting the messages in digest version found yourselves getting them as individual messates. I just finished going through the old list and fixing the digest subscriptions of all of you who were getting the digest version under the old regime. This should take effect by tomorrow at the latest. If you were getting the digest version before, and are still getting individual messages after today, please contact me. If you were getting individual messages before and are now getting the digest version, it will mean that I made a mistake. Please let me know about this as soon as possible so I can fix the problem. I have been on vacation and was outside the range of email for the past 10 days. Now that I'm back, I will be working to get the new mailing list (xmca-l@ucsd.edu) working properly. If you have any other concerns, please contact me directly. Thanks ______________ * one message per day with all the day's traffic in that message, instead of individual messages each time someone submitted something to the list. From lchcmike@gmail.com Mon Aug 12 11:09:45 2013 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2013 11:09:45 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Luria/Leontiev as inspirations for design Message-ID: I have been looking for text where Peg Griffen wrote about the Leontiev discussion of understanding and motivation. While looking, I checked out our old, never published monograph on the organization of reading instruction. There is a section there, beginning on about p. 25, that has our application of the combined motor method and Leontiev's ideas as well. Perhaps raw material to rip up and throw away, perhaps of use to current discussion on these issues. Here is the url mike http://lchc.ucsd.edu/People/NEWTECHN.pdf From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Mon Aug 12 12:01:46 2013 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2013 20:01:46 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Activity Setting In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 12 August 2013 18:12, Lubomir Savov Popov wrote: > Hi Andy, > > I am also interested to find the term "activity setting" in Vigotsky's > writings or those of his followers, including everyone in the East European > activity theory tradition. I would appreciate articles or specific > references and page numbers. I need this to anchor some ideas and to pay > tribute to earlier theorists if they have worked on this. > > I am also interested if there are people on this list who work on the > development of the concept of activity setting or on activity theory in > relation to the planning and design of built environment. They can contact > me at the e-mail below my signature or via this list, whichever is more > convenient. I was going to make such a request on this list some time ago, > but now is a good occasion for this. > Hi Lubomier Jan Derry's philosophical work on educational design, e.g. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1365-2729.2007.00246.x/abstract Harry Daniels& James Wertschon implicit mediation is relevant. A popular historical on buildings (Stuart Brand): http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AvEqfg2sIH0 My personal favourite (for buildings) is Christopher Alexander's original works: A synthesis of form and the 3 volume pattern language (life affirming architecture). If one subscribes to the notions of Conway's law then one should also be studying the activity of the designers and the influence of the environment. I have more design centric references (without reference to Activity theory) if want them. Best, Huw > > To my knowledge, no one in the East European activity theory tradition has > used the term "activity setting," at least till the late 1980s. If I have > missed something, it is good to catch up. > > I personally work (on and off) on the concept of activity setting since > the early 1980s. However, I develop it as a methodological category for the > study of built environment. I have to acknowledge that I got the idea for > activity setting from Roger Barker's "behavior setting." At that time, in > East Europe, the concept of behavior was considered one-sided and with less > explanatory power than the concept of activity. There was no way to > introduce the behavior setting concept without setting the reaction of > mainstream social scientists. Even if someone dared to suggest the behavior > setting concept in an article, the reviewers will automatically recommend > to rework it as "activity setting." In East European social science of that > time, behavior referred mostly to the visible, mechanistic aspects of > activity or in the sense of "demeanor." > > Bob Bechtel has done a good work in the early 1980 expanding on Barker's > behavior setting, operationalizing his ideas for the field of Environment > and Behavior (Architecture and Human Behavior; Man-Environment Systems). > However, this work didn't continue. On the other hand, at that time, it > was too early to talk about activity settings in the USA. It is early even > now, in particular in the field of Environment and Behavior. Many people in > that field resent the idea of ditching behavior for activity. They believe > that the concept of behavior setting is good enough and there is no need to > introduce one more concept of similar kind. > > In relation to the field of Environment and Behavior, I personally believe > that Barker has offered very useful ideas and they can become a stepping > stone for developing the concept of activity setting. The activity setting > concept will allow us to use the apparatus of activity theory which is more > powerful than the concept of behavior. I also believe that the development > of the activity setting theory for the fields of teaching or management or > social work and community building will be somewhat different. Their focus > will be different and this will lead to working on different details. As > usual, it is not possible to study everything about one object of study. We > have to make difficult choices regarding aspects and depth: what to study > first, what to defer, and what to skip. > > Barker had a lot of conflicts with main stream psychologists (not activity > theorists). I have heard from Bob Bechtel (a student of Barker) that > psychologists were telling Barker: Roger, you think just like a > sociologist, which in psychological parlance meant Roger, you are a SOB. > This illustrates the disciplinary biases and divisions. > > Best wishes, > > Lubomir > > Lubomir Popov, Ph.D. > School of Family and Consumer Sciences > American Culture Studies Affiliated Faculty > Bowling Green State University > 309 Johnston Hall, > Bowling Green, Ohio 43403-0059 > Lspopov@bgsu.edu > 419.372.7835 > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > Sent: Monday, August 12, 2013 9:55 AM > To: Roland Tharp; Cliff O'Donnell > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT and Community Psychology > > Thank you very much for your considered response, Roland and Cliff. > > Just a couple of follow ups, because I think healing an interdisciplinary > gap requires the maximum possible clarity over shared concepts. > > (1) I am still not clear about the meaning of "acitivity setting." I have > read Wertsch, and I have nothing at all against him, but I am just not as > familiar with his work as I would like to be. But I have read a lot of > Vygotsky and never came across the term "activity setting" in Vygotsky's > writing. There may be an issue of different translations possibly. I wonder > if you could perhaps scan a page of a book where Vygotsky explains his > meaning or at least uses the term. > I have generally come across the term used to indicate, for example, the > school, or family or a specific workplace, and the norms and rules and > expectations prevailing in those settings. I gather you take "setting" > to refer to a particular, rather than a general, such as "family" or > "school." So "Sandy Bay Elementary" would be an activity setting, but not > "school," which would be just a type of activity setting. I see that > "activity setting" is an activity, but includes the particulars, such as > the participating individuals and the physical surroundings. It seems such > an important concept for you, as Community Psychologists, I would > appreciate more specification. > > (2) By me taking an extreme example (slavery) we quickly achieved > agreement that further specification of "shared activities" is needed for > an understanding of how mutual understanding arises. (Of course it did to > an extent under slavery too). I categorise forms of collaboration into 3 > modes: direction (line management, command-and-obey, as pertains in the > normal capitalist firm or public service department), exchange (purchase > and sale, customer-service provider, as pertains in the market > place) and collaboration as such (mutual criticism, shared attribution and > decision-making). It seems to me that distinctions like these are > important. Being a teacher or boss in a community, especially if you are > otherwise an outsider, can be problematic, even though you are engaged in a > "shared activity" with the locals. I was really impressed by the examples > you cited, so obviously you have thought these issues through. > What is the anatomy of an "activity setting" then? > > (3) What other ways do you conceptualise "context"? > > Thanks, > Andy > (and please not "Professor," I am an independent scholar, retired.) > > > Roland Tharp wrote: > > Professor Blunden, > > > > Please find our responses to your questions attached. Thank you for > > your interest. > > > > Roland Tharp > > Cliff O'Donnell > > > > On Sat, Aug 10, 2013 at 3:58 AM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > > > Thanks for sharing that very interesting paper, Mike. From what I > > see, there is little justification for the dislocation between > > these two research communities - CHAT and Community Psychology. > > Their aims, sources and methods seem so similar and compatible. > > > > I would just like to ask the authors a couple of questions. > > > > * Do you take "activity setting" to be the optimal conception of > > "context"? > > > > * What exactly do they understand by "activity setting"? You cite > > Vygotsky in a book edited by Wertsch, but I do not have that book. > > I associate "activity setting" with the current of CHAT around > > Mariane Hedegaard. It seems to me to be similar in meaning to > > "institution". Thus I quetion the efficacy of this concept for > > grasping social change, as opposed to just child development. > > > > * Is "mutual understanding" is what you mean by "intersubjectivity"? > > > > * I agree that participation in shared activities is the necessary > > condition for peope to achieve mutual understanding. But this is > > not necessarily the outcome, is it? It depends on the type of > > collaboration within the activity. EG White slaveowners and black > > slaves collaborated in the production of cotton in the Confederate > > States of America for many years, but this did not result in > > mutual understanding. So it seems that the notion of "shared > > actvities" needs further specification. Yes? > > > > thanks > > Andy > > > > > > > > From lchcmike@gmail.com Mon Aug 12 12:03:40 2013 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2013 12:03:40 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT and Community Psychology In-Reply-To: <5208E942.9090708@mira.net> References: <4DE0161C-0BCB-4FD8-A3A5-A4894680AB39@hawaii.edu> <8D43867349DDAC4BAA502DA13C1882A152DD5C70@senldogo0428.springer-sbm.com> <9599FEE2-5762-43B9-9DB7-28F6BE3108F8@hawaii.edu> <8D43867349DDAC4BAA502DA13C1882A152DD60DD@senldogo0428.springer-sbm.com> <2D6F44BD-E70E-4997-9223-070AC2E1C9F1@hawaii.edu> <8D43867349DDAC4BAA502DA13C1882A152DD6A7A@senldogo0428.springer-sbm.com> <5205F29B.9070505@mira.net> <5208E942.9090708@mira.net> Message-ID: Lovely, Gentlemen, but the attachments did not make it from Andy to XMCA so far as I can tell. Roland and Cliff, you might want to join xmca long enough for this discussion. The signup is at http://lchc-resources.org/xmca/ On Mon, Aug 12, 2013 at 6:55 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Thank you very much for your considered response, Roland and Cliff. > > Just a couple of follow ups, because I think healing an interdisciplinary > gap requires the maximum possible clarity over shared concepts. > > (1) I am still not clear about the meaning of "acitivity setting." I have > read Wertsch, and I have nothing at all against him, but I am just not as > familiar with his work as I would like to be. But I have read a lot of > Vygotsky and never came across the term "activity setting" in Vygotsky's > writing. There may be an issue of different translations possibly. I wonder > if you could perhaps scan a page of a book where Vygotsky explains his > meaning or at least uses the term. > I have generally come across the term used to indicate, for example, the > school, or family or a specific workplace, and the norms and rules and > expectations prevailing in those settings. I gather you take "setting" to > refer to a particular, rather than a general, such as "family" or "school." > So "Sandy Bay Elementary" would be an activity setting, but not "school," > which would be just a type of activity setting. I see that "activity > setting" is an activity, but includes the particulars, such as the > participating individuals and the physical surroundings. It seems such an > important concept for you, as Community Psychologists, I would appreciate > more specification. > > (2) By me taking an extreme example (slavery) we quickly achieved > agreement that further specification of "shared activities" is needed for > an understanding of how mutual understanding arises. (Of course it did to > an extent under slavery too). I categorise forms of collaboration into 3 > modes: direction (line management, command-and-obey, as pertains in the > normal capitalist firm or public service department), exchange (purchase > and sale, customer-service provider, as pertains in the market place) and > collaboration as such (mutual criticism, shared attribution and > decision-making). It seems to me that distinctions like these are > important. Being a teacher or boss in a community, especially if you are > otherwise an outsider, can be problematic, even though you are engaged in a > "shared activity" with the locals. I was really impressed by the examples > you cited, so obviously you have thought these issues through. What is the > anatomy of an "activity setting" then? > > (3) What other ways do you conceptualise "context"? > > Thanks, > Andy > (and please not "Professor," I am an independent scholar, retired.) > > > Roland Tharp wrote: > >> Professor Blunden, >> >> Please find our responses to your questions attached. Thank you for your >> interest. >> >> Roland Tharp >> Cliff O'Donnell >> >> On Sat, Aug 10, 2013 at 3:58 AM, Andy Blunden > ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >> >> Thanks for sharing that very interesting paper, Mike. From what I >> see, there is little justification for the dislocation between >> these two research communities - CHAT and Community Psychology. >> Their aims, sources and methods seem so similar and compatible. >> >> I would just like to ask the authors a couple of questions. >> >> * Do you take "activity setting" to be the optimal conception of >> "context"? >> >> * What exactly do they understand by "activity setting"? You cite >> Vygotsky in a book edited by Wertsch, but I do not have that book. >> I associate "activity setting" with the current of CHAT around >> Mariane Hedegaard. It seems to me to be similar in meaning to >> "institution". Thus I quetion the efficacy of this concept for >> grasping social change, as opposed to just child development. >> >> * Is "mutual understanding" is what you mean by "intersubjectivity"? >> >> * I agree that participation in shared activities is the necessary >> condition for peope to achieve mutual understanding. But this is >> not necessarily the outcome, is it? It depends on the type of >> collaboration within the activity. EG White slaveowners and black >> slaves collaborated in the production of cotton in the Confederate >> States of America for many years, but this did not result in >> mutual understanding. So it seems that the notion of "shared >> actvities" needs further specification. Yes? >> >> thanks >> Andy >> >> > > From lspopov@bgsu.edu Mon Aug 12 12:47:38 2013 From: lspopov@bgsu.edu (Lubomir Savov Popov) Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2013 15:47:38 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Luria/Leontiev as inspirations for design In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Thank you Mike, This is a very interesting text. I just read it quickly, but will put more time for a detailed study. Best wishes, Lubomir -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole Sent: Monday, August 12, 2013 2:10 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture,Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Luria/Leontiev as inspirations for design I have been looking for text where Peg Griffen wrote about the Leontiev discussion of understanding and motivation. While looking, I checked out our old, never published monograph on the organization of reading instruction. There is a section there, beginning on about p. 25, that has our application of the combined motor method and Leontiev's ideas as well. Perhaps raw material to rip up and throw away, perhaps of use to current discussion on these issues. Here is the url mike http://lchc.ucsd.edu/People/NEWTECHN.pdf From lspopov@bgsu.edu Mon Aug 12 12:47:38 2013 From: lspopov@bgsu.edu (Lubomir Savov Popov) Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2013 15:47:38 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Luria/Leontiev as inspirations for design In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Thank you Mike, This is a very interesting text. I just read it quickly, but will put more time for a detailed study. Best wishes, Lubomir -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole Sent: Monday, August 12, 2013 2:10 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture,Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Luria/Leontiev as inspirations for design I have been looking for text where Peg Griffen wrote about the Leontiev discussion of understanding and motivation. While looking, I checked out our old, never published monograph on the organization of reading instruction. There is a section there, beginning on about p. 25, that has our application of the combined motor method and Leontiev's ideas as well. Perhaps raw material to rip up and throw away, perhaps of use to current discussion on these issues. Here is the url mike http://lchc.ucsd.edu/People/NEWTECHN.pdf From lspopov@bgsu.edu Mon Aug 12 12:48:42 2013 From: lspopov@bgsu.edu (Lubomir Savov Popov) Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2013 15:48:42 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Activity Setting In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Thank you Rolland, I appreciate your suggestions. Lubomir From: Roland Tharp [mailto:tharp@hawaii.edu] Sent: Monday, August 12, 2013 3:03 PM To: Lubomir Savov Popov Cc: ablunden@mira.net; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Cliff O'Donnell Subject: Re: Activity Setting Hello All, I did not mean to imply that activity settings is attributable to Vygotsky himself. I know of no evidence for that. My first discussion of AS was in Rousing Minds to Life in 1988; my citation for the concept was Wertsch, 1985. He was writing a lot during that period, and may have discussed the concept elsewhere as well. Mike Cole would certainly know more than I about what Jim Wertsch was reading and writing then. Roland Tharp On Mon, Aug 12, 2013 at 1:12 PM, Lubomir Savov Popov > wrote: Hi Andy, I am also interested to find the term "activity setting" in Vigotsky's writings or those of his followers, including everyone in the East European activity theory tradition. I would appreciate articles or specific references and page numbers. I need this to anchor some ideas and to pay tribute to earlier theorists if they have worked on this. I am also interested if there are people on this list who work on the development of the concept of activity setting or on activity theory in relation to the planning and design of built environment. They can contact me at the e-mail below my signature or via this list, whichever is more convenient. I was going to make such a request on this list some time ago, but now is a good occasion for this. To my knowledge, no one in the East European activity theory tradition has used the term "activity setting," at least till the late 1980s. If I have missed something, it is good to catch up. I personally work (on and off) on the concept of activity setting since the early 1980s. However, I develop it as a methodological category for the study of built environment. I have to acknowledge that I got the idea for activity setting from Roger Barker's "behavior setting." At that time, in East Europe, the concept of behavior was considered one-sided and with less explanatory power than the concept of activity. There was no way to introduce the behavior setting concept without setting the reaction of mainstream social scientists. Even if someone dared to suggest the behavior setting concept in an article, the reviewers will automatically recommend to rework it as "activity setting." In East European social science of that time, behavior referred mostly to the visible, mechanistic aspects of activity or in the sense of "demeanor." Bob Bechtel has done a good work in the early 1980 expanding on Barker's behavior setting, operationalizing his ideas for the field of Environment and Behavior (Architecture and Human Behavior; Man-Environment Systems). However, this work didn't continue. On the other hand, at that time, it was too early to talk about activity settings in the USA. It is early even now, in particular in the field of Environment and Behavior. Many people in that field resent the idea of ditching behavior for activity. They believe that the concept of behavior setting is good enough and there is no need to introduce one more concept of similar kind. In relation to the field of Environment and Behavior, I personally believe that Barker has offered very useful ideas and they can become a stepping stone for developing the concept of activity setting. The activity setting concept will allow us to use the apparatus of activity theory which is more powerful than the concept of behavior. I also believe that the development of the activity setting theory for the fields of teaching or management or social work and community building will be somewhat different. Their focus will be different and this will lead to working on different details. As usual, it is not possible to study everything about one object of study. We have to make difficult choices regarding aspects and depth: what to study first, what to defer, and what to skip. Barker had a lot of conflicts with main stream psychologists (not activity theorists). I have heard from Bob Bechtel (a student of Barker) that psychologists were telling Barker: Roger, you think just like a sociologist, which in psychological parlance meant Roger, you are a SOB. This illustrates the disciplinary biases and divisions. Best wishes, Lubomir Lubomir Popov, Ph.D. School of Family and Consumer Sciences American Culture Studies Affiliated Faculty Bowling Green State University 309 Johnston Hall, Bowling Green, Ohio 43403-0059 Lspopov@bgsu.edu 419.372.7835 -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden Sent: Monday, August 12, 2013 9:55 AM To: Roland Tharp; Cliff O'Donnell Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT and Community Psychology Thank you very much for your considered response, Roland and Cliff. Just a couple of follow ups, because I think healing an interdisciplinary gap requires the maximum possible clarity over shared concepts. (1) I am still not clear about the meaning of "acitivity setting." I have read Wertsch, and I have nothing at all against him, but I am just not as familiar with his work as I would like to be. But I have read a lot of Vygotsky and never came across the term "activity setting" in Vygotsky's writing. There may be an issue of different translations possibly. I wonder if you could perhaps scan a page of a book where Vygotsky explains his meaning or at least uses the term. I have generally come across the term used to indicate, for example, the school, or family or a specific workplace, and the norms and rules and expectations prevailing in those settings. I gather you take "setting" to refer to a particular, rather than a general, such as "family" or "school." So "Sandy Bay Elementary" would be an activity setting, but not "school," which would be just a type of activity setting. I see that "activity setting" is an activity, but includes the particulars, such as the participating individuals and the physical surroundings. It seems such an important concept for you, as Community Psychologists, I would appreciate more specification. (2) By me taking an extreme example (slavery) we quickly achieved agreement that further specification of "shared activities" is needed for an understanding of how mutual understanding arises. (Of course it did to an extent under slavery too). I categorise forms of collaboration into 3 modes: direction (line management, command-and-obey, as pertains in the normal capitalist firm or public service department), exchange (purchase and sale, customer-service provider, as pertains in the market place) and collaboration as such (mutual criticism, shared attribution and decision-making). It seems to me that distinctions like these are important. Being a teacher or boss in a community, especially if you are otherwise an outsider, can be problematic, even though you are engaged in a "shared activity" with the locals. I was really impressed by the examples you cited, so obviously you have thought these issues through. What is the anatomy of an "activity setting" then? (3) What other ways do you conceptualise "context"? Thanks, Andy (and please not "Professor," I am an independent scholar, retired.) Roland Tharp wrote: > Professor Blunden, > > Please find our responses to your questions attached. Thank you for > your interest. > > Roland Tharp > Cliff O'Donnell > > On Sat, Aug 10, 2013 at 3:58 AM, Andy Blunden > >> wrote: > > Thanks for sharing that very interesting paper, Mike. From what I > see, there is little justification for the dislocation between > these two research communities - CHAT and Community Psychology. > Their aims, sources and methods seem so similar and compatible. > > I would just like to ask the authors a couple of questions. > > * Do you take "activity setting" to be the optimal conception of > "context"? > > * What exactly do they understand by "activity setting"? You cite > Vygotsky in a book edited by Wertsch, but I do not have that book. > I associate "activity setting" with the current of CHAT around > Mariane Hedegaard. It seems to me to be similar in meaning to > "institution". Thus I quetion the efficacy of this concept for > grasping social change, as opposed to just child development. > > * Is "mutual understanding" is what you mean by "intersubjectivity"? > > * I agree that participation in shared activities is the necessary > condition for peope to achieve mutual understanding. But this is > not necessarily the outcome, is it? It depends on the type of > collaboration within the activity. EG White slaveowners and black > slaves collaborated in the production of cotton in the Confederate > States of America for many years, but this did not result in > mutual understanding. So it seems that the notion of "shared > actvities" needs further specification. Yes? > > thanks > Andy > From lspopov@bgsu.edu Mon Aug 12 12:51:18 2013 From: lspopov@bgsu.edu (Lubomir Savov Popov) Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2013 15:51:18 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Activity Setting In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Dear Huw, What a wonderful collection of sources! I will go through them. Alexander is an old "acquaintance." I mean I started with him as soon as he published his Pattern Language books and followed his work thereafter. Best, Lubomir -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Huw Lloyd Sent: Monday, August 12, 2013 3:02 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Cc: Cliff O'Donnell; Roland Tharp Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Activity Setting On 12 August 2013 18:12, Lubomir Savov Popov wrote: > Hi Andy, > > I am also interested to find the term "activity setting" in Vigotsky's > writings or those of his followers, including everyone in the East > European activity theory tradition. I would appreciate articles or > specific references and page numbers. I need this to anchor some ideas > and to pay tribute to earlier theorists if they have worked on this. > > I am also interested if there are people on this list who work on the > development of the concept of activity setting or on activity theory > in relation to the planning and design of built environment. They can > contact me at the e-mail below my signature or via this list, > whichever is more convenient. I was going to make such a request on > this list some time ago, but now is a good occasion for this. > Hi Lubomier Jan Derry's philosophical work on educational design, e.g. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1365-2729.2007.00246.x/abstract Harry Daniels& James Wertschon implicit mediation is relevant. A popular historical on buildings (Stuart Brand): http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AvEqfg2sIH0 My personal favourite (for buildings) is Christopher Alexander's original works: A synthesis of form and the 3 volume pattern language (life affirming architecture). If one subscribes to the notions of Conway's law then one should also be studying the activity of the designers and the influence of the environment. I have more design centric references (without reference to Activity theory) if want them. Best, Huw > > To my knowledge, no one in the East European activity theory tradition > has used the term "activity setting," at least till the late 1980s. If > I have missed something, it is good to catch up. > > I personally work (on and off) on the concept of activity setting > since the early 1980s. However, I develop it as a methodological > category for the study of built environment. I have to acknowledge > that I got the idea for activity setting from Roger Barker's "behavior > setting." At that time, in East Europe, the concept of behavior was > considered one-sided and with less explanatory power than the concept > of activity. There was no way to introduce the behavior setting > concept without setting the reaction of mainstream social scientists. > Even if someone dared to suggest the behavior setting concept in an > article, the reviewers will automatically recommend to rework it as > "activity setting." In East European social science of that time, > behavior referred mostly to the visible, mechanistic aspects of activity or in the sense of "demeanor." > > Bob Bechtel has done a good work in the early 1980 expanding on > Barker's behavior setting, operationalizing his ideas for the field of > Environment and Behavior (Architecture and Human Behavior; Man-Environment Systems). > However, this work didn't continue. On the other hand, at that time, > it was too early to talk about activity settings in the USA. It is > early even now, in particular in the field of Environment and > Behavior. Many people in that field resent the idea of ditching > behavior for activity. They believe that the concept of behavior > setting is good enough and there is no need to introduce one more concept of similar kind. > > In relation to the field of Environment and Behavior, I personally > believe that Barker has offered very useful ideas and they can become > a stepping stone for developing the concept of activity setting. The > activity setting concept will allow us to use the apparatus of > activity theory which is more powerful than the concept of behavior. I > also believe that the development of the activity setting theory for > the fields of teaching or management or social work and community > building will be somewhat different. Their focus will be different and > this will lead to working on different details. As usual, it is not > possible to study everything about one object of study. We have to > make difficult choices regarding aspects and depth: what to study first, what to defer, and what to skip. > > Barker had a lot of conflicts with main stream psychologists (not > activity theorists). I have heard from Bob Bechtel (a student of > Barker) that psychologists were telling Barker: Roger, you think just > like a sociologist, which in psychological parlance meant Roger, you are a SOB. > This illustrates the disciplinary biases and divisions. > > Best wishes, > > Lubomir > > Lubomir Popov, Ph.D. > School of Family and Consumer Sciences American Culture Studies > Affiliated Faculty Bowling Green State University > 309 Johnston Hall, > Bowling Green, Ohio 43403-0059 > Lspopov@bgsu.edu > 419.372.7835 > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > Sent: Monday, August 12, 2013 9:55 AM > To: Roland Tharp; Cliff O'Donnell > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT and Community Psychology > > Thank you very much for your considered response, Roland and Cliff. > > Just a couple of follow ups, because I think healing an > interdisciplinary gap requires the maximum possible clarity over shared concepts. > > (1) I am still not clear about the meaning of "acitivity setting." I > have read Wertsch, and I have nothing at all against him, but I am > just not as familiar with his work as I would like to be. But I have > read a lot of Vygotsky and never came across the term "activity > setting" in Vygotsky's writing. There may be an issue of different > translations possibly. I wonder if you could perhaps scan a page of a > book where Vygotsky explains his meaning or at least uses the term. > I have generally come across the term used to indicate, for example, > the school, or family or a specific workplace, and the norms and rules > and expectations prevailing in those settings. I gather you take "setting" > to refer to a particular, rather than a general, such as "family" or > "school." So "Sandy Bay Elementary" would be an activity setting, but > not "school," which would be just a type of activity setting. I see > that "activity setting" is an activity, but includes the particulars, > such as the participating individuals and the physical surroundings. > It seems such an important concept for you, as Community > Psychologists, I would appreciate more specification. > > (2) By me taking an extreme example (slavery) we quickly achieved > agreement that further specification of "shared activities" is needed > for an understanding of how mutual understanding arises. (Of course it > did to an extent under slavery too). I categorise forms of > collaboration into 3 > modes: direction (line management, command-and-obey, as pertains in > the normal capitalist firm or public service department), exchange > (purchase and sale, customer-service provider, as pertains in the > market > place) and collaboration as such (mutual criticism, shared attribution > and decision-making). It seems to me that distinctions like these are > important. Being a teacher or boss in a community, especially if you > are otherwise an outsider, can be problematic, even though you are > engaged in a "shared activity" with the locals. I was really impressed > by the examples you cited, so obviously you have thought these issues through. > What is the anatomy of an "activity setting" then? > > (3) What other ways do you conceptualise "context"? > > Thanks, > Andy > (and please not "Professor," I am an independent scholar, retired.) > > > Roland Tharp wrote: > > Professor Blunden, > > > > Please find our responses to your questions attached. Thank you for > > your interest. > > > > Roland Tharp > > Cliff O'Donnell > > > > On Sat, Aug 10, 2013 at 3:58 AM, Andy Blunden > > wrote: > > > > Thanks for sharing that very interesting paper, Mike. From what I > > see, there is little justification for the dislocation between > > these two research communities - CHAT and Community Psychology. > > Their aims, sources and methods seem so similar and compatible. > > > > I would just like to ask the authors a couple of questions. > > > > * Do you take "activity setting" to be the optimal conception of > > "context"? > > > > * What exactly do they understand by "activity setting"? You cite > > Vygotsky in a book edited by Wertsch, but I do not have that book. > > I associate "activity setting" with the current of CHAT around > > Mariane Hedegaard. It seems to me to be similar in meaning to > > "institution". Thus I quetion the efficacy of this concept for > > grasping social change, as opposed to just child development. > > > > * Is "mutual understanding" is what you mean by "intersubjectivity"? > > > > * I agree that participation in shared activities is the necessary > > condition for peope to achieve mutual understanding. But this is > > not necessarily the outcome, is it? It depends on the type of > > collaboration within the activity. EG White slaveowners and black > > slaves collaborated in the production of cotton in the Confederate > > States of America for many years, but this did not result in > > mutual understanding. So it seems that the notion of "shared > > actvities" needs further specification. Yes? > > > > thanks > > Andy > > > > > > > > From Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu Mon Aug 12 12:59:12 2013 From: Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu (White, Phillip) Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2013 13:59:12 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] (no subject) Message-ID: <20130812195912.5378190.72094.2113@ucdenver.edu> Y Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone. From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Mon Aug 12 14:36:39 2013 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2013 22:36:39 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Activity Setting In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: You're most welcome, Lubomir. A few more books off the top of my head: I assume you have read LSV's The Psychology of Art? And if you know about Alexander's QWAN/Zen, then Bateson's ecological writings may be good. (Steps to An Ecology of Mind). Wertsch's book on Mediation is nice too. Though if you read Derry there are reasonable objects to the use of "affordance". If you do the mental work on inferentialism/representation (see Derry again) then Beer's notion of variety may be very powerful too (e.g. see Designing Freedom). Oh, and Seymour Papert's general notions about readable artefacts is nice too. David Pye, Nature of Art and Workmanship. C.H. Waddington, Tools for Thought. I could give you plenty of software design environment examples. Perhaps that's too specialised. Best, Huw On 12 August 2013 20:51, Lubomir Savov Popov wrote: > Dear Huw, > > What a wonderful collection of sources! I will go through them. Alexander > is an old "acquaintance." I mean I started with him as soon as he published > his Pattern Language books and followed his work thereafter. > > Best, > > Lubomir > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Huw Lloyd > Sent: Monday, August 12, 2013 3:02 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Cc: Cliff O'Donnell; Roland Tharp > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Activity Setting > > On 12 August 2013 18:12, Lubomir Savov Popov wrote: > > > Hi Andy, > > > > I am also interested to find the term "activity setting" in Vigotsky's > > writings or those of his followers, including everyone in the East > > European activity theory tradition. I would appreciate articles or > > specific references and page numbers. I need this to anchor some ideas > > and to pay tribute to earlier theorists if they have worked on this. > > > > I am also interested if there are people on this list who work on the > > development of the concept of activity setting or on activity theory > > in relation to the planning and design of built environment. They can > > contact me at the e-mail below my signature or via this list, > > whichever is more convenient. I was going to make such a request on > > this list some time ago, but now is a good occasion for this. > > > > Hi Lubomier > > Jan Derry's philosophical work on educational design, e.g. > > http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1365-2729.2007.00246.x/abstract > > Harry Daniels< > http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=4fKt9MU9w_cC&pg=PT4&dq=Harry+Daniels+2010&hl=en&sa=X&ei=-C8JUtz2NKya1AXk04H4Dw&ved=0CDkQ6AEwAjgK#v=onepage&q=Harry%20Daniels%202010&f=false > >& > James > Wertsch< > http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=pn3S9TEjvUAC&pg=PA180&lpg=PA180&dq=implicit+mediation+companion+to+vygotsky&source=bl&ots=CMtGYR6cDR&sig=rwVa0RCxGXg6uvgU08WaVHbs8VI&hl=en&sa=X&ei=eC8JUt6lCOWI0AXG34HYBQ&ved=0CDEQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=implicit%20mediation%20companion%20to%20vygotsky&f=false > >on > implicit mediation is relevant. > > A popular historical on buildings (Stuart Brand): > http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AvEqfg2sIH0 > > My personal favourite (for buildings) is Christopher Alexander's original > works: A synthesis of form and the 3 volume pattern language (life > affirming architecture). > > If one subscribes to the notions of Conway's law< > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conway's_law> then one should also be > studying the activity of the designers and the influence of the environment. > > I have more design centric references (without reference to Activity > theory) if want them. > > Best, > Huw > > > > > > To my knowledge, no one in the East European activity theory tradition > > has used the term "activity setting," at least till the late 1980s. If > > I have missed something, it is good to catch up. > > > > I personally work (on and off) on the concept of activity setting > > since the early 1980s. However, I develop it as a methodological > > category for the study of built environment. I have to acknowledge > > that I got the idea for activity setting from Roger Barker's "behavior > > setting." At that time, in East Europe, the concept of behavior was > > considered one-sided and with less explanatory power than the concept > > of activity. There was no way to introduce the behavior setting > > concept without setting the reaction of mainstream social scientists. > > Even if someone dared to suggest the behavior setting concept in an > > article, the reviewers will automatically recommend to rework it as > > "activity setting." In East European social science of that time, > > behavior referred mostly to the visible, mechanistic aspects of activity > or in the sense of "demeanor." > > > > Bob Bechtel has done a good work in the early 1980 expanding on > > Barker's behavior setting, operationalizing his ideas for the field of > > Environment and Behavior (Architecture and Human Behavior; > Man-Environment Systems). > > However, this work didn't continue. On the other hand, at that time, > > it was too early to talk about activity settings in the USA. It is > > early even now, in particular in the field of Environment and > > Behavior. Many people in that field resent the idea of ditching > > behavior for activity. They believe that the concept of behavior > > setting is good enough and there is no need to introduce one more > concept of similar kind. > > > > In relation to the field of Environment and Behavior, I personally > > believe that Barker has offered very useful ideas and they can become > > a stepping stone for developing the concept of activity setting. The > > activity setting concept will allow us to use the apparatus of > > activity theory which is more powerful than the concept of behavior. I > > also believe that the development of the activity setting theory for > > the fields of teaching or management or social work and community > > building will be somewhat different. Their focus will be different and > > this will lead to working on different details. As usual, it is not > > possible to study everything about one object of study. We have to > > make difficult choices regarding aspects and depth: what to study first, > what to defer, and what to skip. > > > > Barker had a lot of conflicts with main stream psychologists (not > > activity theorists). I have heard from Bob Bechtel (a student of > > Barker) that psychologists were telling Barker: Roger, you think just > > like a sociologist, which in psychological parlance meant Roger, you are > a SOB. > > This illustrates the disciplinary biases and divisions. > > > > Best wishes, > > > > Lubomir > > > > Lubomir Popov, Ph.D. > > School of Family and Consumer Sciences American Culture Studies > > Affiliated Faculty Bowling Green State University > > 309 Johnston Hall, > > Bowling Green, Ohio 43403-0059 > > Lspopov@bgsu.edu > > 419.372.7835 > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden > > Sent: Monday, August 12, 2013 9:55 AM > > To: Roland Tharp; Cliff O'Donnell > > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: CHAT and Community Psychology > > > > Thank you very much for your considered response, Roland and Cliff. > > > > Just a couple of follow ups, because I think healing an > > interdisciplinary gap requires the maximum possible clarity over shared > concepts. > > > > (1) I am still not clear about the meaning of "acitivity setting." I > > have read Wertsch, and I have nothing at all against him, but I am > > just not as familiar with his work as I would like to be. But I have > > read a lot of Vygotsky and never came across the term "activity > > setting" in Vygotsky's writing. There may be an issue of different > > translations possibly. I wonder if you could perhaps scan a page of a > > book where Vygotsky explains his meaning or at least uses the term. > > I have generally come across the term used to indicate, for example, > > the school, or family or a specific workplace, and the norms and rules > > and expectations prevailing in those settings. I gather you take > "setting" > > to refer to a particular, rather than a general, such as "family" or > > "school." So "Sandy Bay Elementary" would be an activity setting, but > > not "school," which would be just a type of activity setting. I see > > that "activity setting" is an activity, but includes the particulars, > > such as the participating individuals and the physical surroundings. > > It seems such an important concept for you, as Community > > Psychologists, I would appreciate more specification. > > > > (2) By me taking an extreme example (slavery) we quickly achieved > > agreement that further specification of "shared activities" is needed > > for an understanding of how mutual understanding arises. (Of course it > > did to an extent under slavery too). I categorise forms of > > collaboration into 3 > > modes: direction (line management, command-and-obey, as pertains in > > the normal capitalist firm or public service department), exchange > > (purchase and sale, customer-service provider, as pertains in the > > market > > place) and collaboration as such (mutual criticism, shared attribution > > and decision-making). It seems to me that distinctions like these are > > important. Being a teacher or boss in a community, especially if you > > are otherwise an outsider, can be problematic, even though you are > > engaged in a "shared activity" with the locals. I was really impressed > > by the examples you cited, so obviously you have thought these issues > through. > > What is the anatomy of an "activity setting" then? > > > > (3) What other ways do you conceptualise "context"? > > > > Thanks, > > Andy > > (and please not "Professor," I am an independent scholar, retired.) > > > > > > Roland Tharp wrote: > > > Professor Blunden, > > > > > > Please find our responses to your questions attached. Thank you for > > > your interest. > > > > > > Roland Tharp > > > Cliff O'Donnell > > > > > > On Sat, Aug 10, 2013 at 3:58 AM, Andy Blunden > > > wrote: > > > > > > Thanks for sharing that very interesting paper, Mike. From what I > > > see, there is little justification for the dislocation between > > > these two research communities - CHAT and Community Psychology. > > > Their aims, sources and methods seem so similar and compatible. > > > > > > I would just like to ask the authors a couple of questions. > > > > > > * Do you take "activity setting" to be the optimal conception of > > > "context"? > > > > > > * What exactly do they understand by "activity setting"? You cite > > > Vygotsky in a book edited by Wertsch, but I do not have that book. > > > I associate "activity setting" with the current of CHAT around > > > Mariane Hedegaard. It seems to me to be similar in meaning to > > > "institution". Thus I quetion the efficacy of this concept for > > > grasping social change, as opposed to just child development. > > > > > > * Is "mutual understanding" is what you mean by > "intersubjectivity"? > > > > > > * I agree that participation in shared activities is the necessary > > > condition for peope to achieve mutual understanding. But this is > > > not necessarily the outcome, is it? It depends on the type of > > > collaboration within the activity. EG White slaveowners and black > > > slaves collaborated in the production of cotton in the Confederate > > > States of America for many years, but this did not result in > > > mutual understanding. So it seems that the notion of "shared > > > actvities" needs further specification. Yes? > > > > > > thanks > > > Andy > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu Mon Aug 12 16:40:22 2013 From: Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu (White, Phillip) Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2013 17:40:22 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Luria/Leontiev as inspirations for design In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: the paper, "A Model Systems Approach to Reading Instruction and the Diagnosis of Reading Disabilities", is, for me, a pleasing cultural artifact. the conclusions at the end of A Model Systems Approach regarding the Question Asking Reading activity are strongly supported by what i see as daily reading practices at the elementary school i'm placed in. in fact, the reading program employed by all teachers at my school utilizes reciprocal reading activities as originally worked out by Brown and Palincsar - and this program is in fact a fairly mainstream reading program which is grounded in socio-cultural activity theory. this also bears witness to the supposition that it takes about thirty years for research in education to finally impact the practices within the classroom. at the same time as this work was being done in your part of the world, Mike, Marie Clay was doing her work in New Zealand, which emerged as reading recovery - in fact, it was in the mid-1980's that Ohio State brought reading recovery to the states - Clay's theory was also a socio-cultural activity based practice - and her goal was to develop the practices of reading from an intersubjective social activity to an intrasubjective activity - and in my own experience is strongly effective both one-on-one (for which it was developed) as well as within small groups, as illustrated in your Q R A activity. i wish that the Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition had had the research connections with Ohio State - it would have been a stronger, more widely communicated approach to successfully teaching reading to all students. thanks for the article. phillip ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole [lchcmike@gmail.com] Sent: Monday, August 12, 2013 12:09 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture,Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Luria/Leontiev as inspirations for design I have been looking for text where Peg Griffen wrote about the Leontiev discussion of understanding and motivation. While looking, I checked out our old, never published monograph on the organization of reading instruction. There is a section there, beginning on about p. 25, that has our application of the combined motor method and Leontiev's ideas as well. Perhaps raw material to rip up and throw away, perhaps of use to current discussion on these issues. Here is the url mike http://lchc.ucsd.edu/People/NEWTECHN.pdf From lchcmike@gmail.com Mon Aug 12 17:11:23 2013 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2013 17:11:23 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Luria/Leontiev as inspirations for design In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: I am glad the paper as a whole still has relevance for you, Phillip. And it is very interesting to know that reciprocal teaching/learning has spread. Its a good practice implemented with some "feeling for the organism." There may be various social ecologies for QAR. I have used it to great effect in distance classes where we share some reading and students take the various roles, slightly modified to make them age/ability appropriate. My local reason for posting the note was to point to what I think are pretty clear expositions of the key idea of the combined motor method and how it can be used, along with the method of dual stimulation, both to provide an environment in which pretty good diagnostic info comes to the instructor in the process of teaching/learning that is the putative object of the activity. For us at the time, the issue of Leontiev's "two kinds of motives" that could be recruited in classrooms were part of the design of QAR. The overall daily script stated with snacks and chatter about "what do you want to do when you grow up" based on everyday news stories and popular culture. The ensuing discussions provided merely understandable motives for engaging in our somewhat bizarre game/stage play.But the reward for passing several session-ending quizes with a perfect score and you could graduate and become a Wizard's assisant and "help with the computers." That was a really effective/proximal motive. It seems reasonable or at leas "pragmatically justified" to assume that the kids are not motivated to sit around reading during the afterschool hours after failing at reading for the previous 6+ hours because they want to grow up to be a fireman or a press agent. I *think* this is a good early example of a theory and practice version of chat. Or maybe a prehistoric relic except for the old timers. :-) mike On Mon, Aug 12, 2013 at 4:40 PM, White, Phillip wrote: > the paper, "A Model Systems Approach to Reading Instruction and the > Diagnosis of Reading Disabilities", is, for me, a pleasing cultural > artifact. > > the conclusions at the end of A Model Systems Approach regarding the > Question Asking Reading activity are strongly supported by what i see as > daily reading practices at the elementary school i'm placed in. > > in fact, the reading program employed by all teachers at my school > utilizes reciprocal reading activities as originally worked out by Brown > and Palincsar - and this program is in fact a fairly mainstream reading > program which is grounded in socio-cultural activity theory. > > this also bears witness to the supposition that it takes about thirty > years for research in education to finally impact the practices within the > classroom. > > at the same time as this work was being done in your part of the world, > Mike, Marie Clay was doing her work in New Zealand, which emerged as > reading recovery - in fact, it was in the mid-1980's that Ohio State > brought reading recovery to the states - Clay's theory was also a > socio-cultural activity based practice - and her goal was to develop the > practices of reading from an intersubjective social activity to an > intrasubjective activity - and in my own experience is strongly effective > both one-on-one (for which it was developed) as well as within small > groups, as illustrated in your Q R A activity. > > i wish that the Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition had had the > research connections with Ohio State - it would have been a stronger, more > widely communicated approach to successfully teaching reading to all > students. > > thanks for the article. > > phillip > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > On Behalf Of mike cole [lchcmike@gmail.com] > Sent: Monday, August 12, 2013 12:09 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture,Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Luria/Leontiev as inspirations for design > > I have been looking for text where Peg Griffen wrote about the Leontiev > discussion of understanding and motivation. > While looking, I checked out our old, never published monograph on the > organization of reading instruction. There is a section there, beginning on > about p. 25, that has our application of the combined motor method and > Leontiev's > ideas as well. > > Perhaps raw material to rip up and throw away, perhaps of use to current > discussion on these issues. > > Here is the url > mike > > http://lchc.ucsd.edu/People/NEWTECHN.pdf > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Mon Aug 12 17:14:40 2013 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Tue, 13 Aug 2013 01:14:40 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Luria/Leontiev as inspirations for design In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: It is a nice paper. I like the way it integrates influences from various strands to bring together a practical approach for the "unstable" circumstances. Possibly it is a shame that it wasn't published. No doubt it would draw some criticism (zoped use, social situations explored). But in the right context/project such criticism would serve to strengthen and build on the approach, which obviously require resources and time. Best, Huw On 13 August 2013 00:40, White, Phillip wrote: > the paper, "A Model Systems Approach to Reading Instruction and the > Diagnosis of Reading Disabilities", is, for me, a pleasing cultural > artifact. > > the conclusions at the end of A Model Systems Approach regarding the > Question Asking Reading activity are strongly supported by what i see as > daily reading practices at the elementary school i'm placed in. > > in fact, the reading program employed by all teachers at my school > utilizes reciprocal reading activities as originally worked out by Brown > and Palincsar - and this program is in fact a fairly mainstream reading > program which is grounded in socio-cultural activity theory. > > this also bears witness to the supposition that it takes about thirty > years for research in education to finally impact the practices within the > classroom. > > at the same time as this work was being done in your part of the world, > Mike, Marie Clay was doing her work in New Zealand, which emerged as > reading recovery - in fact, it was in the mid-1980's that Ohio State > brought reading recovery to the states - Clay's theory was also a > socio-cultural activity based practice - and her goal was to develop the > practices of reading from an intersubjective social activity to an > intrasubjective activity - and in my own experience is strongly effective > both one-on-one (for which it was developed) as well as within small > groups, as illustrated in your Q R A activity. > > i wish that the Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition had had the > research connections with Ohio State - it would have been a stronger, more > widely communicated approach to successfully teaching reading to all > students. > > thanks for the article. > > phillip > > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] > On Behalf Of mike cole [lchcmike@gmail.com] > Sent: Monday, August 12, 2013 12:09 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture,Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Luria/Leontiev as inspirations for design > > I have been looking for text where Peg Griffen wrote about the Leontiev > discussion of understanding and motivation. > While looking, I checked out our old, never published monograph on the > organization of reading instruction. There is a section there, beginning on > about p. 25, that has our application of the combined motor method and > Leontiev's > ideas as well. > > Perhaps raw material to rip up and throw away, perhaps of use to current > discussion on these issues. > > Here is the url > mike > > http://lchc.ucsd.edu/People/NEWTECHN.pdf > > From lchcmike@gmail.com Mon Aug 12 17:23:23 2013 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2013 17:23:23 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [COGDEVSOC] Position in Developmental Psychology, University of Waterloo In-Reply-To: <934276B236733B46A9217024FCB6755A71AEFC20@connmbx> References: <934276B236733B46A9217024FCB6755A71AEFC13@connmbx> <934276B236733B46A9217024FCB6755A71AEFC20@connmbx> Message-ID: Down to earth job hunters, take note. On Mon, Aug 12, 2013 at 4:09 PM, Katherine White wrote: > POSITION IN DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY - UNIVERSITY OF WATERLOO > > Applications are being accepted for a position at the level of Assistant > or Associate Professor (tenure-track or tenured) in *Developmental > Psychology *at the University of Waterloo, Canada. The successful > candidate will be expected to maintain an active research and teaching > program and to supervise graduate and undergraduate students. The > successful candidate must have a PhD in Developmental Psychology or a > related field and a demonstrated record of published research. Information > about the Department of Psychology and the program in Developmental > Psychology can be found at http://www.psychology.uwaterloo.ca. > Information regarding Waterloo region can be found at: > http://www.region.waterloo.on.ca. The anticipated start date for the > position is July 1, 2014. We will begin reviewing applications on October > 15, 2013 and continue until the position is filled. Applicants should > electronically submit a curriculum vitae, a statement of research and > teaching interests, reprints or preprints of recent papers, and the names > and contact information for three referees (including their email > addresses) to: devposition@psychology.uwaterloo.ca. The University of > Waterloo encourages applications from all qualified individuals, including > women, members of visible minorities, native peoples, and persons with > disabilities. All qualified candidates are encouraged to apply; however, > Canadians and permanent residents will be given priority. > > =========== > To post to the CDS listserv, send your message to: cogdevsoc@virginia.edu > (If you belong to the listserv and have not included any large > attachments, your > message will be posted without moderation--so be careful!) > > To leave the CDS listserv, send a message to sympa@virginia.edu. > The subject line should read: "unsubscribe cogdevsoc" (no quotes). > Leave the message body blank. > > For other information about the listserv, including how to update your > email > address and how to subscribe, visit http://www.cogdevsoc.org/listserv.php > ============ > > > > > > From lchcmike@gmail.com Mon Aug 12 17:32:30 2013 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2013 17:32:30 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Cliff and Roland CC please Message-ID: All-- In the shifts in computer configurations here at UCSD, LCHC's odd assortment of lists got incompletely moved from its working configuration to a tangle that folks are trying to work out as i write. Meantime, for purposes of building on the discussion of overlaps and special insights of Community Psychology and Chat, please selfconscious hit reply all. We will signal when the problem is solved. The patient patient. mike From ablunden@mira.net Mon Aug 12 17:42:33 2013 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 13 Aug 2013 10:42:33 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: Response, CHAT and Community Psychology Message-ID: <520980F9.7060202@mira.net> In case this didn't make it to the list ... -------- Original Message -------- Subject: Re: CHAT and Community Psychology Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2013 10:06:38 -1000 From: Cliff O'Donnell To: ablunden@mira.net CC: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity , Roland Tharp References: Mike said the attachment in our reply to Andy didn't make it to XMCA. Hopefully, now that we've signed up for XMCA this attachment will work. Roland Tharp Cliff O'Donnell -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts http://marxists.academia.edu/AndyBlunden -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Response to Andy Blunden.docx Type: application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document Size: 15539 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20130813/eb8035b4/attachment.bin From ablunden@mira.net Mon Aug 12 17:43:57 2013 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 13 Aug 2013 10:43:57 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: Re: Activity Setting Message-ID: <5209814D.7010606@mira.net> Again, in case this didn't reach the list. Andy -------- Original Message -------- Subject: Re: Activity Setting Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2013 15:02:34 -0400 From: Roland Tharp To: Lubomir Savov Popov CC: ablunden@mira.net , eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity , Cliff O'Donnell References: Hello All, I did not mean to imply that activity settings is attributable to Vygotsky himself. I know of no evidence for that. My first discussion of AS was in Rousing Minds to Life in 1988; my citation for the concept was Wertsch, 1985. He was writing a lot during that period, and may have discussed the concept elsewhere as well. Mike Cole would certainly know more than I about what Jim Wertsch was reading and writing then. Roland Tharp From ablunden@mira.net Mon Aug 12 19:04:07 2013 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 13 Aug 2013 12:04:07 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Activity Setting In-Reply-To: <5209814D.7010606@mira.net> References: <5209814D.7010606@mira.net> Message-ID: <52099417.5010308@mira.net> Roland, as you can see from Lubomir's response, "activity setting" is ambiguous. Lubomir takes "setting" to be significantly indicative of the physical space forming the setting. Words like "environment" and "space" tend to be used in psychology, especially educational psychology, in the mathematical or metaphorical sense, as in "social space." Lubomir did not get her concept of activity setting from Wertsch, but by appropriating "behaviour setting". My contact with the concept was with Hedegaard, where, so far as I know, physical space is not involved. Could you perhaps share your 1988 paper or an excerpt explaining this concept, or alternatively an excerpt from Wertsch's paper which was your source? Andy Roland Tharp wrote: > Hello All, > > I did not mean to imply that activity settings is attributable to > Vygotsky himself. I know of no evidence for > that. My first discussion of AS was in Rousing Minds to Life in 1988; > my citation for the concept was > Wertsch, 1985. He was writing a lot during that period, and may have > discussed the concept elsewhere as well. > Mike Cole would certainly know more than I about what Jim Wertsch was > reading and writing then. > Roland Tharp From ablunden@mira.net Mon Aug 12 21:07:27 2013 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 13 Aug 2013 14:07:27 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Activity Setting In-Reply-To: <52099417.5010308@mira.net> References: <5209814D.7010606@mira.net> <52099417.5010308@mira.net> Message-ID: <5209B0FF.7010301@mira.net> Actually, I found a copy of "Rousing Minds to Life" on the internet. It is attached. Andy > Roland Tharp wrote: >> Hello All, >> >> I did not mean to imply that activity settings is attributable to >> Vygotsky himself. I know of no evidence for >> that. My first discussion of AS was in Rousing Minds to Life in >> 1988; my citation for the concept was >> Wertsch, 1985. He was writing a lot during that period, and may have >> discussed the concept elsewhere as well. >> Mike Cole would certainly know more than I about what Jim Wertsch was >> reading and writing then. >> Roland Tharp > > > > -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts http://marxists.academia.edu/AndyBlunden -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: tharp-rousing.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 624382 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20130813/b6d90f7a/attachment.pdf From lchcmike@gmail.com Mon Aug 12 21:09:50 2013 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2013 21:09:50 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Activity Setting In-Reply-To: <52099417.5010308@mira.net> References: <5209814D.7010606@mira.net> <52099417.5010308@mira.net> Message-ID: Behavior setting is a term used extensively by Roger Barker and in common use in ecological psychology I believe. It seems that one point of intersection between chat and community psych is ecological psychology. There is a strong link there between, for example, Zaporozhets and Gibson. In our discussions over the past couple of years, Roland, the anthropologist Tim Ingold has been influential for some of us in linking different, apparently related, world views of a socio-cultural-historical-activity sort. a conjecture. mike On Mon, Aug 12, 2013 at 7:04 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Roland, as you can see from Lubomir's response, "activity setting" is > ambiguous. Lubomir takes "setting" to be significantly indicative of the > physical space forming the setting. Words like "environment" and "space" > tend to be used in psychology, especially educational psychology, in the > mathematical or metaphorical sense, as in "social space." Lubomir did not > get her concept of activity setting from Wertsch, but by appropriating > "behaviour setting". My contact with the concept was with Hedegaard, where, > so far as I know, physical space is not involved. > > Could you perhaps share your 1988 paper or an excerpt explaining this > concept, or alternatively an excerpt from Wertsch's paper which was your > source? > Andy > > > Roland Tharp wrote: > >> Hello All, >> >> I did not mean to imply that activity settings is attributable to >> Vygotsky himself. I know of no evidence for >> that. My first discussion of AS was in Rousing Minds to Life in 1988; my >> citation for the concept was >> Wertsch, 1985. He was writing a lot during that period, and may have >> discussed the concept elsewhere as well. >> Mike Cole would certainly know more than I about what Jim Wertsch was >> reading and writing then. >> Roland Tharp >> > > > From lchcmike@gmail.com Mon Aug 12 21:15:22 2013 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2013 21:15:22 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] From Cliff O'D Message-ID: Not sure what is getting through where, but pasting this message into the email and ccing. mike ------------ In response to Andy message: *???s fromAndy Blunden* * Do you take "activity setting" to be the optimal conception of "context"? No. Activity settings are contextual, but not all contexts are activity settings. See the 5th paragraph of our article for references to other uses of context. ** What exactly do they understand by "activity setting"? You cite Vygotsky in a book edited by Wertsch, but I do not have that book. I associate "activity setting" with the current of CHAT around Mariane Hedegaard. It seems to me to be similar in meaning to "institution". Thus I quetion the efficacy of this concept for grasping social change, as opposed to just child development.* We mean by ?activity setting? the concept drawn from Vygotsky and activity theorists, and most directly influenced by the writing and translations of James Wertsch and his students, all working closely and derivatively with the original translators of the Russian under the general aegis of the M. Cole group. Activity setting is the unified concept incorporating the *who*, the *where*, the *when*, the *why*, and *what *specific activity is being performed (see our references below). As in Vygotsky, intersubjectivity flowing from shared activity depends on accompanying semiotics (ordinarily but not necessarily verbal). Because of the sharing of tasks and language, the activity setting is smaller rather than larger, such as ?institutions?. Institutions typically have many activity settings. ** Is "mutual understanding" what you mean by "intersubjectivity"?* Partly, certainly. It is the condition of like-minded interpretation and valuation of events. Intersubjectivity is created through shared activity with conversation, and intersubjectivity in turn fosters felt affinity. ** I agree that participation in shared activities is the necessary condition for people to achieve mutual understanding. But this is not necessarily the outcome, is it? It depends on the type of collaboration within the activity. EG White slave-owners and black slaves collaborated in the production of cotton in the Confederate States of America for many years, but this did not result in mutual understanding. So it seems that the notion of "shared activities" needs further specification. Yes?* * * Yes, specific instances require close observation. In your example of slaves and owners, we would argue that such instances of shared activity were extremely rare and considered inappropriate. The giving and receiving of orders, or providing demonstrations, does not constitute joint activity. This distinction is quite clear in the papers of Thomas Jefferson, for example. Jefferson, however, did apparently violate the propriety with certain slaves, particularly some young females. The historical evidence seems to indicate some resultant intersubjectivity, but severely restricted. Overall, the activity settings of slaves and slave-owners were dramatically different. Thus we agree that the practical design of activity settings (and their evaluations) require full specification, as you suggest. References: Tharp, R. G. (2012). *Delta Theory and Psychosocial Systems:* * The Practice of Influence and Change**.* Cambridge University Press. Tharp, R. G., Estrada, P., Dalton, S. S., & Yamauchi, L.A. (2000). * Teaching transformed: Achieving excellence, fairness, inclusion and harmony. *Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Tharp, R. G. & Gallimore, R. (1989). *Rousing minds to life: Teaching and learning in social context.* New York: Cambridge University Press. Rivera, H. H., Tharp, R. G., Youpa, D., Dalton, S. S., Guardino, G. M. & Lasky, S. (1999). *ASOS: Activity Setting Observation System Coding & Rule Book.* 54 pp. Center for Research on Education, Diversity & Excellence, University of California, Santa Cruz CA 95064. http://repositories.cdlib.org/crede/rsrchrpts/ASOS http://escholarship.org/uc/item/5010t7g4 Rivera, H. & Tharp, R. G. (2004). Socio-cultural Activity Settings in the Classroom: A Study of a Classroom Observation System. In H. Waxman & R.G.Tharp & R. S. Hilberg (Eds.), *Observational Research in U.S. classrooms: New approaches for understanding cultural and linguistic diversity.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. O'Donnell, C. R. & Tharp, R. G. (1990). Community intervention guided by theoretical development. In: Bellack, A. S., Hersen, M., & Kazdin, A. E. (Eds.),* International handbook of behavior modification and therapy, *2nd Ed., (Pp. 251-266). New York: Plenum Press. O'Donnell, C. R., Tharp, R. G., & Wilson, K. (1993). Activity settings as the unit of analysis: A theoretical basis for community intervention and development. *American Journal of Community Psychology, 21*, 501-520. O'Donnell, C. R. (1995). The right to a family environment in Pacific Island cultures. *The International Journal of Children?s Rights, 3*, 87-99. O?Donnell, C. R. (Ed.) (2003). *Culture, peers, and delinquency*. New York: Haworth Press. O'Donnell. C. R. (2006). Beyond diversity: Toward a cultural community psychology. *American Journal of Community Psychology*, *37*, 1-7. doi: * 10.1007/s10464-005-9010-7* . From cliffo@hawaii.edu Mon Aug 12 23:01:55 2013 From: cliffo@hawaii.edu (Cliff O'Donnell) Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2013 20:01:55 -1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Activity Setting In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <393FDE85-EFCF-48E6-96E0-6ED970A4DD80@hawaii.edu> Thank you for your response, Lubomir. Roger Barker was an important influence on my thinking earlier in my career. His work is highly respected in community psychology. Quoting from our article, here is the distinction we see between behavior setting and activity setting: "The subjective focus of activity settings distinguishes them from the behavior settings developed by Barker (1960 , 1968 ). In behavior settings, the focus is on objective molar behavior specified by time and place. Behaviors are defined by the roles or positions of people in the setting and activity is used to coordinate their behaviors. Suggestions have been made to alter behavior setting theory to include a wider range of individual behaviors, cognitions, and interventions in the setting (e.g., Luke et al. 1991 ; Schoggen 1989 ; Wicker 1987 ). In contrast, activity setting theory unifies the objective and subjective by showing how activity is influenced and intersubjectivity developed. Rather than a collection of individual behaviors and cognitions, intersubjectivity develops as a setting characteristic that becomes the shared meanings of culture and provides the basis for cultural community psychology." (p. 24) For a more thorough presentation of our use of the concept of activity setting, please see: O'Donnell, C. R. & Tharp, R. G. (1990). Community intervention guided by theoretical developments. In A. S. Bellack, M. Hersen, & A. E. Kazdin (Eds.), International handbook of behavior modification and therapy, 2nd Edition (pp. 251-266). New York: Plenum Press. Cliff Clifford R. O'Donnell, Ph.D. Professor Emeritus Past-President, Society for Community Research and Action (APA Division 27) University of Hawai?i Department of Psychology 2530 Dole Street Honolulu, HI 96822 On Aug 12, 2013, at 7:12 AM, Lubomir Savov Popov wrote: > Hi Andy, > > I am also interested to find the term "activity setting" in > Vigotsky's writings or those of his followers, including everyone in > the East European activity theory tradition. I would appreciate > articles or specific references and page numbers. I need this to > anchor some ideas and to pay tribute to earlier theorists if they > have worked on this. > > I am also interested if there are people on this list who work on > the development of the concept of activity setting or on activity > theory in relation to the planning and design of built environment. > They can contact me at the e-mail below my signature or via this > list, whichever is more convenient. I was going to make such a > request on this list some time ago, but now is a good occasion for > this. > > To my knowledge, no one in the East European activity theory > tradition has used the term "activity setting," at least till the > late 1980s. If I have missed something, it is good to catch up. > > I personally work (on and off) on the concept of activity setting > since the early 1980s. However, I develop it as a methodological > category for the study of built environment. I have to acknowledge > that I got the idea for activity setting from Roger Barker's > "behavior setting." At that time, in East Europe, the concept of > behavior was considered one-sided and with less explanatory power > than the concept of activity. There was no way to introduce the > behavior setting concept without setting the reaction of mainstream > social scientists. Even if someone dared to suggest the behavior > setting concept in an article, the reviewers will automatically > recommend to rework it as "activity setting." In East European > social science of that time, behavior referred mostly to the > visible, mechanistic aspects of activity or in the sense of > "demeanor." > > Bob Bechtel has done a good work in the early 1980 expanding on > Barker's behavior setting, operationalizing his ideas for the field > of Environment and Behavior (Architecture and Human Behavior; Man- > Environment Systems). However, this work didn't continue. On the > other hand, at that time, it was too early to talk about activity > settings in the USA. It is early even now, in particular in the > field of Environment and Behavior. Many people in that field resent > the idea of ditching behavior for activity. They believe that the > concept of behavior setting is good enough and there is no need to > introduce one more concept of similar kind. > > In relation to the field of Environment and Behavior, I personally > believe that Barker has offered very useful ideas and they can > become a stepping stone for developing the concept of activity > setting. The activity setting concept will allow us to use the > apparatus of activity theory which is more powerful than the concept > of behavior. I also believe that the development of the activity > setting theory for the fields of teaching or management or social > work and community building will be somewhat different. Their focus > will be different and this will lead to working on different > details. As usual, it is not possible to study everything about one > object of study. We have to make difficult choices regarding aspects > and depth: what to study first, what to defer, and what to skip. > > Barker had a lot of conflicts with main stream psychologists (not > activity theorists). I have heard from Bob Bechtel (a student of > Barker) that psychologists were telling Barker: Roger, you think > just like a sociologist, which in psychological parlance meant > Roger, you are a SOB. This illustrates the disciplinary biases and > divisions. > > Best wishes, > > Lubomir > > Lubomir Popov, Ph.D. > School of Family and Consumer Sciences > American Culture Studies Affiliated Faculty > Bowling Green State University > 309 Johnston Hall, > Bowling Green, Ohio 43403-0059 > Lspopov@bgsu.edu > 419.372.7835 From carolmacdon@gmail.com Tue Aug 13 02:39:40 2013 From: carolmacdon@gmail.com (carolmacdon@gmail.com) Date: Tue, 13 Aug 2013 09:39:40 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Activity Setting In-Reply-To: <393FDE85-EFCF-48E6-96E0-6ED970A4DD80@hawaii.edu> References: <393FDE85-EFCF-48E6-96E0-6ED970A4DD80@hawaii.edu> Message-ID: <948143242-1376386778-cardhu_decombobulator_blackberry.rim.net-181483051-@b2.c11.bise7.blackberry> Cliff I have had a student who used Tharp and Gallimore's "activity setting" and for one, Andy rather liked it. Good to see it thriving. Carol Sent via my BlackBerry from Vodacom - let your email find you! -----Original Message----- From: "Cliff O'Donnell" Sender: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2013 20:01:55 To: Lubomir Savov Popov Reply-To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Activity Setting Thank you for your response, Lubomir. Roger Barker was an important influence on my thinking earlier in my career. His work is highly respected in community psychology. Quoting from our article, here is the distinction we see between behavior setting and activity setting: "The subjective focus of activity settings distinguishes them from the behavior settings developed by Barker (1960 , 1968 ). In behavior settings, the focus is on objective molar behavior specified by time and place. Behaviors are defined by the roles or positions of people in the setting and activity is used to coordinate their behaviors. Suggestions have been made to alter behavior setting theory to include a wider range of individual behaviors, cognitions, and interventions in the setting (e.g., Luke et al. 1991 ; Schoggen 1989 ; Wicker 1987 ). In contrast, activity setting theory unifies the objective and subjective by showing how activity is influenced and intersubjectivity developed. Rather than a collection of individual behaviors and cognitions, intersubjectivity develops as a setting characteristic that becomes the shared meanings of culture and provides the basis for cultural community psychology." (p. 24) For a more thorough presentation of our use of the concept of activity setting, please see: O'Donnell, C. R. & Tharp, R. G. (1990). Community intervention guided by theoretical developments. In A. S. Bellack, M. Hersen, & A. E. Kazdin (Eds.), International handbook of behavior modification and therapy, 2nd Edition (pp. 251-266). New York: Plenum Press. Cliff Clifford R. O'Donnell, Ph.D. Professor Emeritus Past-President, Society for Community Research and Action (APA Division 27) University of Hawai?i Department of Psychology 2530 Dole Street Honolulu, HI 96822 On Aug 12, 2013, at 7:12 AM, Lubomir Savov Popov wrote: > Hi Andy, > > I am also interested to find the term "activity setting" in > Vigotsky's writings or those of his followers, including everyone in > the East European activity theory tradition. I would appreciate > articles or specific references and page numbers. I need this to > anchor some ideas and to pay tribute to earlier theorists if they > have worked on this. > > I am also interested if there are people on this list who work on > the development of the concept of activity setting or on activity > theory in relation to the planning and design of built environment. > They can contact me at the e-mail below my signature or via this > list, whichever is more convenient. I was going to make such a > request on this list some time ago, but now is a good occasion for > this. > > To my knowledge, no one in the East European activity theory > tradition has used the term "activity setting," at least till the > late 1980s. If I have missed something, it is good to catch up. > > I personally work (on and off) on the concept of activity setting > since the early 1980s. However, I develop it as a methodological > category for the study of built environment. I have to acknowledge > that I got the idea for activity setting from Roger Barker's > "behavior setting." At that time, in East Europe, the concept of > behavior was considered one-sided and with less explanatory power > than the concept of activity. There was no way to introduce the > behavior setting concept without setting the reaction of mainstream > social scientists. Even if someone dared to suggest the behavior > setting concept in an article, the reviewers will automatically > recommend to rework it as "activity setting." In East European > social science of that time, behavior referred mostly to the > visible, mechanistic aspects of activity or in the sense of > "demeanor." > > Bob Bechtel has done a good work in the early 1980 expanding on > Barker's behavior setting, operationalizing his ideas for the field > of Environment and Behavior (Architecture and Human Behavior; Man- > Environment Systems). However, this work didn't continue. On the > other hand, at that time, it was too early to talk about activity > settings in the USA. It is early even now, in particular in the > field of Environment and Behavior. Many people in that field resent > the idea of ditching behavior for activity. They believe that the > concept of behavior setting is good enough and there is no need to > introduce one more concept of similar kind. > > In relation to the field of Environment and Behavior, I personally > believe that Barker has offered very useful ideas and they can > become a stepping stone for developing the concept of activity > setting. The activity setting concept will allow us to use the > apparatus of activity theory which is more powerful than the concept > of behavior. I also believe that the development of the activity > setting theory for the fields of teaching or management or social > work and community building will be somewhat different. Their focus > will be different and this will lead to working on different > details. As usual, it is not possible to study everything about one > object of study. We have to make difficult choices regarding aspects > and depth: what to study first, what to defer, and what to skip. > > Barker had a lot of conflicts with main stream psychologists (not > activity theorists). I have heard from Bob Bechtel (a student of > Barker) that psychologists were telling Barker: Roger, you think > just like a sociologist, which in psychological parlance meant > Roger, you are a SOB. This illustrates the disciplinary biases and > divisions. > > Best wishes, > > Lubomir > > Lubomir Popov, Ph.D. > School of Family and Consumer Sciences > American Culture Studies Affiliated Faculty > Bowling Green State University > 309 Johnston Hall, > Bowling Green, Ohio 43403-0059 > Lspopov@bgsu.edu > 419.372.7835 From ablunden@mira.net Tue Aug 13 03:11:23 2013 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 13 Aug 2013 20:11:23 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] [Fwd: Re: Activity Setting] from Cliff O'Donell Message-ID: <520A064B.3000002@mira.net> In case this didn't reach the list ... -------- Original Message -------- Subject: Re: Activity Setting Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2013 20:01:55 -1000 From: Cliff O'Donnell To: Lubomir Savov Popov CC: ablunden@mira.net , eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity , Roland Tharp Thank you for your response, Lubomir. Roger Barker was an important influence on my thinking earlier in my career. His work is highly respected in community psychology. Quoting from our article, here is the distinction we see between behavior setting and activity setting: "The subjective focus of activity settings distinguishes them from the behavior settings developed by Barker (1960 , 1968 ). In behavior settings, the focus is on objective molar behavior specified by time and place. Behaviors are defined by the roles or positions of people in the setting and activity is used to coordinate their behaviors. Suggestions have been made to alter behavior setting theory to include a wider range of individual behaviors, cognitions, and interventions in the setting (e.g., Luke et al. 1991 ; Schoggen 1989 ; Wicker 1987 ). In contrast, activity setting theory unifies the objective and subjective by showing how activity is influenced and intersubjectivity developed. Rather than a collection of individual behaviors and cognitions, intersubjectivity develops as a setting characteristic that becomes the shared meanings of culture and provides the basis for cultural community psychology." (p. 24) For a more thorough presentation of our use of the concept of activity setting, please see: O'Donnell, C. R. & Tharp, R. G. (1990). Community intervention guided by theoretical developments. In A. S. Bellack, M. Hersen, & A. E. Kazdin (Eds.), International handbook of behavior modification and therapy, 2nd Edition (pp. 251-266). New York: Plenum Press. Cliff Clifford R. O'Donnell, Ph.D. Professor Emeritus Past-President, Society for Community Research and Action (APA Division 27) University of Hawai?i Department of Psychology 2530 Dole Street Honolulu, HI 96822 On Aug 12, 2013, at 7:12 AM, Lubomir Savov Popov wrote: > Hi Andy, > > I am also interested to find the term "activity setting" in > Vigotsky's writings or those of his followers, including everyone in > the East European activity theory tradition. I would appreciate > articles or specific references and page numbers. I need this to > anchor some ideas and to pay tribute to earlier theorists if they > have worked on this. > > I am also interested if there are people on this list who work on > the development of the concept of activity setting or on activity > theory in relation to the planning and design of built environment. > They can contact me at the e-mail below my signature or via this > list, whichever is more convenient. I was going to make such a > request on this list some time ago, but now is a good occasion for > this. > > To my knowledge, no one in the East European activity theory > tradition has used the term "activity setting," at least till the > late 1980s. If I have missed something, it is good to catch up. > > I personally work (on and off) on the concept of activity setting > since the early 1980s. However, I develop it as a methodological > category for the study of built environment. I have to acknowledge > that I got the idea for activity setting from Roger Barker's > "behavior setting." At that time, in East Europe, the concept of > behavior was considered one-sided and with less explanatory power > than the concept of activity. There was no way to introduce the > behavior setting concept without setting the reaction of mainstream > social scientists. Even if someone dared to suggest the behavior > setting concept in an article, the reviewers will automatically > recommend to rework it as "activity setting." In East European > social science of that time, behavior referred mostly to the > visible, mechanistic aspects of activity or in the sense of > "demeanor." > > Bob Bechtel has done a good work in the early 1980 expanding on > Barker's behavior setting, operationalizing his ideas for the field > of Environment and Behavior (Architecture and Human Behavior; Man- > Environment Systems). However, this work didn't continue. On the > other hand, at that time, it was too early to talk about activity > settings in the USA. It is early even now, in particular in the > field of Environment and Behavior. Many people in that field resent > the idea of ditching behavior for activity. They believe that the > concept of behavior setting is good enough and there is no need to > introduce one more concept of similar kind. > > In relation to the field of Environment and Behavior, I personally > believe that Barker has offered very useful ideas and they can > become a stepping stone for developing the concept of activity > setting. The activity setting concept will allow us to use the > apparatus of activity theory which is more powerful than the concept > of behavior. I also believe that the development of the activity > setting theory for the fields of teaching or management or social > work and community building will be somewhat different. Their focus > will be different and this will lead to working on different > details. As usual, it is not possible to study everything about one > object of study. We have to make difficult choices regarding aspects > and depth: what to study first, what to defer, and what to skip. > > Barker had a lot of conflicts with main stream psychologists (not > activity theorists). I have heard from Bob Bechtel (a student of > Barker) that psychologists were telling Barker: Roger, you think > just like a sociologist, which in psychological parlance meant > Roger, you are a SOB. This illustrates the disciplinary biases and > divisions. > > Best wishes, > > Lubomir > > Lubomir Popov, Ph.D. > School of Family and Consumer Sciences > American Culture Studies Affiliated Faculty > Bowling Green State University > 309 Johnston Hall, > Bowling Green, Ohio 43403-0059 > Lspopov@bgsu.edu > 419.372.7835 From ablunden@mira.net Tue Aug 13 03:18:43 2013 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 13 Aug 2013 20:18:43 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Activity Setting In-Reply-To: <948143242-1376386778-cardhu_decombobulator_blackberry.rim.net-181483051-@b2.c11.bise7.blackberry> References: <393FDE85-EFCF-48E6-96E0-6ED970A4DD80@hawaii.edu> <948143242-1376386778-cardhu_decombobulator_blackberry.rim.net-181483051-@b2.c11.bise7.blackberry> Message-ID: <520A0803.9010008@mira.net> I am still trying to get clear on exactly what concept of "activity setting" this is though, Carol. It seems the term is a little polysemous. Unfortunately that web page only had the Introduction, but Amazon allowed me to read most of pp 72-81 on activity settings. Here is a key passage for how you define "activity settings" there: "Contexts in which collaboralive interaction, intersubjectivity, and assisted performance occur - in which teaching occurs - are referred to as activity settings. What are these activity settings, and how can they be considered, evaluated, and designed? Although activity settings can be subject to abstract theorectical analysis, such as that to come in this chapter and that of Wertsch (1985b, pp. 210-216), they are as homely and familiar as old shoes and the front porch. They are the social furniture of our family, community, and work lives. They are the events and people of our work and relations to one another. They are the who, what, when, where, and why, the small recurrent dramas of everyday life, played on the stages of home school, community and workplace - the father and daughter collaborating to find lost shoes, the preschooler recounting a folk tale with sensitive questioning by an adult, the child who plays a board game through the help of a patient brother, the Navajo girl who assists her mother's weaving and who eventually becomes a master weaver herself. We can plot our lives as traces of the things we do, in dissolving and recombining social groups and energy knots. Those are activity settings." It seems to me that "activity settings" is the sum total of all the relations of a person to everything in the time and place where and when the relevant activities occur. As a concept of Activity Theory, it differs radically from "behaviour settings" because it is concerned with meaning and the significance of things for the person and their perception of them, not just the bare, external things and objective relations. But later, p. 77, it looks more like what I would call "an activity". The following paragraph resonates with the discussion we just had about Leontyev's distinction between the motive an activity and the "really effective" motive of a child participant: "Why an activity setting exists and functions may be described in terms of two facets:the motivation and the meaning. "The goal of an activity setting usually provides its motivational impetus. If the goal is canoe building, the canoe itself - which may be important for the subsistence of the family and group - carries within it the motivation for the activity, at least for the more powerful authorities who sanction it and who make available the needed resources.This is not necessarily the motive for participation by every member of the activity setting: Some may join in because their friends are participating; less powerful members, such as children, may participate only under threat by their parents, or because they like the society of the uncles who are carving." I see also a lot of references to power relations within the activity which remind me of Jean Lave's conception of a "practice" and "situated learnng." Do these excerpts do just to the concept, Cliff? Andy carolmacdon@gmail.com wrote: > Cliff > > I have had a student who used Tharp and Gallimore's "activity setting" and for one, Andy rather liked it. Good to see it thriving. > > Carol > Sent via my BlackBerry from Vodacom - let your email find you! > > -----Original Message----- > From: "Cliff O'Donnell" > Sender: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2013 20:01:55 > To: Lubomir Savov Popov > Reply-To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Activity Setting > > Thank you for your response, Lubomir. Roger Barker was an important > influence on my thinking earlier in my career. His work is highly > respected in community psychology. Quoting from our article, here is > the distinction we see between behavior setting and activity setting: > > "The subjective focus of activity settings distinguishes > them from the behavior settings developed by Barker > (1960 , 1968 ). In behavior settings, the focus is on objective > molar behavior specified by time and place. Behaviors are > defined by the roles or positions of people in the setting and > activity is used to coordinate their behaviors. Suggestions > have been made to alter behavior setting theory to include a > wider range of individual behaviors, cognitions, and > interventions in the setting (e.g., Luke et al. 1991 ; Schoggen > 1989 ; Wicker 1987 ). In contrast, activity setting theory > unifies the objective and subjective by showing how > activity is influenced and intersubjectivity developed. > Rather than a collection of individual behaviors and cognitions, > intersubjectivity develops as a setting characteristic > that becomes the shared meanings of culture and provides > the basis for cultural community psychology." (p. 24) > > For a more thorough presentation of our use of the concept of activity > setting, please see: > > O'Donnell, C. R. & Tharp, R. G. (1990). Community intervention guided > by theoretical developments. In A. S. Bellack, M. Hersen, & A. E. > Kazdin (Eds.), International handbook of behavior modification and > therapy, 2nd Edition (pp. 251-266). New York: Plenum Press. > > Cliff > > Clifford R. O'Donnell, Ph.D. > Professor Emeritus > Past-President, Society for Community Research and Action (APA > Division 27) > > University of Hawai?i > Department of Psychology > 2530 Dole Street > Honolulu, HI 96822 > > On Aug 12, 2013, at 7:12 AM, Lubomir Savov Popov wrote: > > >> Hi Andy, >> >> I am also interested to find the term "activity setting" in >> Vigotsky's writings or those of his followers, including everyone in >> the East European activity theory tradition. I would appreciate >> articles or specific references and page numbers. I need this to >> anchor some ideas and to pay tribute to earlier theorists if they >> have worked on this. >> >> I am also interested if there are people on this list who work on >> the development of the concept of activity setting or on activity >> theory in relation to the planning and design of built environment. >> They can contact me at the e-mail below my signature or via this >> list, whichever is more convenient. I was going to make such a >> request on this list some time ago, but now is a good occasion for >> this. >> >> To my knowledge, no one in the East European activity theory >> tradition has used the term "activity setting," at least till the >> late 1980s. If I have missed something, it is good to catch up. >> >> I personally work (on and off) on the concept of activity setting >> since the early 1980s. However, I develop it as a methodological >> category for the study of built environment. I have to acknowledge >> that I got the idea for activity setting from Roger Barker's >> "behavior setting." At that time, in East Europe, the concept of >> behavior was considered one-sided and with less explanatory power >> than the concept of activity. There was no way to introduce the >> behavior setting concept without setting the reaction of mainstream >> social scientists. Even if someone dared to suggest the behavior >> setting concept in an article, the reviewers will automatically >> recommend to rework it as "activity setting." In East European >> social science of that time, behavior referred mostly to the >> visible, mechanistic aspects of activity or in the sense of >> "demeanor." >> >> Bob Bechtel has done a good work in the early 1980 expanding on >> Barker's behavior setting, operationalizing his ideas for the field >> of Environment and Behavior (Architecture and Human Behavior; Man- >> Environment Systems). However, this work didn't continue. On the >> other hand, at that time, it was too early to talk about activity >> settings in the USA. It is early even now, in particular in the >> field of Environment and Behavior. Many people in that field resent >> the idea of ditching behavior for activity. They believe that the >> concept of behavior setting is good enough and there is no need to >> introduce one more concept of similar kind. >> >> In relation to the field of Environment and Behavior, I personally >> believe that Barker has offered very useful ideas and they can >> become a stepping stone for developing the concept of activity >> setting. The activity setting concept will allow us to use the >> apparatus of activity theory which is more powerful than the concept >> of behavior. I also believe that the development of the activity >> setting theory for the fields of teaching or management or social >> work and community building will be somewhat different. Their focus >> will be different and this will lead to working on different >> details. As usual, it is not possible to study everything about one >> object of study. We have to make difficult choices regarding aspects >> and depth: what to study first, what to defer, and what to skip. >> >> Barker had a lot of conflicts with main stream psychologists (not >> activity theorists). I have heard from Bob Bechtel (a student of >> Barker) that psychologists were telling Barker: Roger, you think >> just like a sociologist, which in psychological parlance meant >> Roger, you are a SOB. This illustrates the disciplinary biases and >> divisions. >> >> Best wishes, >> >> Lubomir >> >> Lubomir Popov, Ph.D. >> School of Family and Consumer Sciences >> American Culture Studies Affiliated Faculty >> Bowling Green State University >> 309 Johnston Hall, >> Bowling Green, Ohio 43403-0059 >> Lspopov@bgsu.edu >> 419.372.7835 >> > > > > > > > > -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts http://marxists.academia.edu/AndyBlunden From ablunden@mira.net Tue Aug 13 04:14:33 2013 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 13 Aug 2013 21:14:33 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Activity Setting In-Reply-To: <520A0803.9010008@mira.net> References: <393FDE85-EFCF-48E6-96E0-6ED970A4DD80@hawaii.edu> <948143242-1376386778-cardhu_decombobulator_blackberry.rim.net-181483051-@b2.c11.bise7.blackberry> <520A0803.9010008@mira.net> Message-ID: <520A1519.4060301@mira.net> Fortunately, the book by Wertsch which Cliff and Roland cite in this article is one I have read and have on my shelf. So, I have scanned the pages cited (Vygotsky and the Social Formation of Mind, Wertsch 1985, pp. 210-216) and they are attached. It seems to me that as Wertsch defines "activity setting" it simply means the activity within which a relevant action is situated. Wertsch rightly includes within this conception of activity all the artefacts (such as built forms) which mediate the actions and conditions the operations of which the activity is composed. This is in fact the dominant conception of "context" within Activity Theory. Andy Andy Blunden wrote: > I am still trying to get clear on exactly what concept of "activity > setting" this is though, Carol. It seems the term is a little polysemous. > Unfortunately that web page only had the Introduction, but Amazon > allowed me to read most of pp 72-81 on activity settings. Here is a > key passage for how you define "activity settings" there: > > "Contexts in which collaboralive interaction, intersubjectivity, and > assisted performance occur - in which teaching occurs - are > referred to as activity settings. What are these activity settings, > and how can they be considered, evaluated, and designed? Although > activity settings can be subject to abstract theorectical analysis, > such as that to come in this chapter and that of Wertsch (1985b, pp. > 210-216), they are as homely and familiar as old shoes and the front > porch. They are the social furniture of our family, community, and > work lives. They are the events and people of our work and relations > to one another. They are the who, what, when, where, and why, the > small recurrent dramas of everyday life, played on the stages of > home school, community and workplace - the father and daughter > collaborating to find lost shoes, the preschooler recounting a folk > tale with sensitive questioning by an adult, the child who plays a > board game through the help of a patient brother, the Navajo girl > who assists her mother's weaving and who eventually becomes a master > weaver herself. We can plot our lives as traces of the things we do, > in dissolving and recombining social groups and energy knots. Those > are activity settings." > > It seems to me that "activity settings" is the sum total of all the > relations of a person to everything in the time and place where and > when the relevant activities occur. As a concept of Activity Theory, > it differs radically from "behaviour settings" because it is concerned > with meaning and the significance of things for the person and their > perception of them, not just the bare, external things and objective > relations. > > But later, p. 77, it looks more like what I would call "an activity". > The following paragraph resonates with the discussion we just had > about Leontyev's distinction between the motive an activity and the > "really effective" motive of a child participant: > > "Why an activity setting exists and functions may be described in > terms of two facets:the motivation and the meaning. > > "The goal of an activity setting usually provides its motivational > impetus. If the goal is canoe building, the canoe itself - which may > be important for the subsistence of the family and group - carries > within it the motivation for the activity, at least for the more > powerful authorities who sanction it and who make available the > needed resources.This is not necessarily the motive for > participation by every member of the activity setting: Some may join > in because their friends are participating; less powerful members, > such as children, may participate only under threat by their > parents, or because they like the society of the uncles who are > carving." > > I see also a lot of references to power relations within the activity > which remind me of Jean Lave's conception of a "practice" and "situated > learnng." > > Do these excerpts do just to the concept, Cliff? > > Andy > > carolmacdon@gmail.com wrote: >> Cliff >> >> I have had a student who used Tharp and Gallimore's "activity >> setting" and for one, Andy rather liked it. Good to see it thriving. >> Carol >> Sent via my BlackBerry from Vodacom - let your email find you! >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: "Cliff O'Donnell" >> Sender: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu >> Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2013 20:01:55 To: Lubomir Savov >> Popov >> Reply-To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >> Cc: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Activity Setting >> >> Thank you for your response, Lubomir. Roger Barker was an important >> influence on my thinking earlier in my career. His work is highly >> respected in community psychology. Quoting from our article, here is >> the distinction we see between behavior setting and activity setting: >> >> "The subjective focus of activity settings distinguishes >> them from the behavior settings developed by Barker >> (1960 , 1968 ). In behavior settings, the focus is on objective >> molar behavior specified by time and place. Behaviors are >> defined by the roles or positions of people in the setting and >> activity is used to coordinate their behaviors. Suggestions >> have been made to alter behavior setting theory to include a >> wider range of individual behaviors, cognitions, and >> interventions in the setting (e.g., Luke et al. 1991 ; Schoggen >> 1989 ; Wicker 1987 ). In contrast, activity setting theory >> unifies the objective and subjective by showing how >> activity is influenced and intersubjectivity developed. >> Rather than a collection of individual behaviors and cognitions, >> intersubjectivity develops as a setting characteristic >> that becomes the shared meanings of culture and provides >> the basis for cultural community psychology." (p. 24) >> >> For a more thorough presentation of our use of the concept of >> activity setting, please see: >> >> O'Donnell, C. R. & Tharp, R. G. (1990). Community intervention >> guided by theoretical developments. In A. S. Bellack, M. Hersen, & >> A. E. Kazdin (Eds.), International handbook of behavior modification >> and therapy, 2nd Edition (pp. 251-266). New York: Plenum Press. >> >> Cliff >> >> Clifford R. O'Donnell, Ph.D. >> Professor Emeritus >> Past-President, Society for Community Research and Action (APA >> Division 27) >> >> University of Hawai?i >> Department of Psychology >> 2530 Dole Street >> Honolulu, HI 96822 >> >> On Aug 12, 2013, at 7:12 AM, Lubomir Savov Popov wrote: >> >> >>> Hi Andy, >>> >>> I am also interested to find the term "activity setting" in >>> Vigotsky's writings or those of his followers, including everyone >>> in the East European activity theory tradition. I would appreciate >>> articles or specific references and page numbers. I need this to >>> anchor some ideas and to pay tribute to earlier theorists if they >>> have worked on this. >>> >>> I am also interested if there are people on this list who work on >>> the development of the concept of activity setting or on activity >>> theory in relation to the planning and design of built environment. >>> They can contact me at the e-mail below my signature or via this >>> list, whichever is more convenient. I was going to make such a >>> request on this list some time ago, but now is a good occasion for >>> this. >>> >>> To my knowledge, no one in the East European activity theory >>> tradition has used the term "activity setting," at least till the >>> late 1980s. If I have missed something, it is good to catch up. >>> >>> I personally work (on and off) on the concept of activity setting >>> since the early 1980s. However, I develop it as a methodological >>> category for the study of built environment. I have to acknowledge >>> that I got the idea for activity setting from Roger Barker's >>> "behavior setting." At that time, in East Europe, the concept of >>> behavior was considered one-sided and with less explanatory power >>> than the concept of activity. There was no way to introduce the >>> behavior setting concept without setting the reaction of mainstream >>> social scientists. Even if someone dared to suggest the behavior >>> setting concept in an article, the reviewers will automatically >>> recommend to rework it as "activity setting." In East European >>> social science of that time, behavior referred mostly to the >>> visible, mechanistic aspects of activity or in the sense of >>> "demeanor." >>> >>> Bob Bechtel has done a good work in the early 1980 expanding on >>> Barker's behavior setting, operationalizing his ideas for the field >>> of Environment and Behavior (Architecture and Human Behavior; Man- >>> Environment Systems). However, this work didn't continue. On the >>> other hand, at that time, it was too early to talk about activity >>> settings in the USA. It is early even now, in particular in the >>> field of Environment and Behavior. Many people in that field resent >>> the idea of ditching behavior for activity. They believe that the >>> concept of behavior setting is good enough and there is no need to >>> introduce one more concept of similar kind. >>> >>> In relation to the field of Environment and Behavior, I personally >>> believe that Barker has offered very useful ideas and they can >>> become a stepping stone for developing the concept of activity >>> setting. The activity setting concept will allow us to use the >>> apparatus of activity theory which is more powerful than the >>> concept of behavior. I also believe that the development of the >>> activity setting theory for the fields of teaching or management or >>> social work and community building will be somewhat different. >>> Their focus will be different and this will lead to working on >>> different details. As usual, it is not possible to study everything >>> about one object of study. We have to make difficult choices >>> regarding aspects and depth: what to study first, what to defer, >>> and what to skip. >>> >>> Barker had a lot of conflicts with main stream psychologists (not >>> activity theorists). I have heard from Bob Bechtel (a student of >>> Barker) that psychologists were telling Barker: Roger, you think >>> just like a sociologist, which in psychological parlance meant >>> Roger, you are a SOB. This illustrates the disciplinary biases and >>> divisions. >>> >>> Best wishes, >>> >>> Lubomir >>> >>> Lubomir Popov, Ph.D. >>> School of Family and Consumer Sciences >>> American Culture Studies Affiliated Faculty >>> Bowling Green State University >>> 309 Johnston Hall, >>> Bowling Green, Ohio 43403-0059 >>> Lspopov@bgsu.edu >>> 419.372.7835 >>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts http://marxists.academia.edu/AndyBlunden -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: wertsch.doc Type: application/msword Size: 50176 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20130813/e5544aea/attachment-0001.doc From lspopov@bgsu.edu Tue Aug 13 09:18:59 2013 From: lspopov@bgsu.edu (Lubomir Savov Popov) Date: Tue, 13 Aug 2013 12:18:59 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [Fwd: Re: Activity Setting] from Cliff O'Donell In-Reply-To: <520A064B.3000002@mira.net> References: <520A064B.3000002@mira.net> Message-ID: Thank you Cliff, I just got your mail. Evidently it has been hanging somewhere in the servers. It helps me in anchoring my ideas. I will keep in touch, Lubomir -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Andy Blunden Sent: Tuesday, August 13, 2013 6:11 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] [Fwd: Re: Activity Setting] from Cliff O'Donell In case this didn't reach the list ... -------- Original Message -------- Subject: Re: Activity Setting Date: Mon, 12 Aug 2013 20:01:55 -1000 From: Cliff O'Donnell To: Lubomir Savov Popov CC: ablunden@mira.net , eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity , Roland Tharp Thank you for your response, Lubomir. Roger Barker was an important influence on my thinking earlier in my career. His work is highly respected in community psychology. Quoting from our article, here is the distinction we see between behavior setting and activity setting: "The subjective focus of activity settings distinguishes them from the behavior settings developed by Barker (1960 , 1968 ). In behavior settings, the focus is on objective molar behavior specified by time and place. Behaviors are defined by the roles or positions of people in the setting and activity is used to coordinate their behaviors. Suggestions have been made to alter behavior setting theory to include a wider range of individual behaviors, cognitions, and interventions in the setting (e.g., Luke et al. 1991 ; Schoggen 1989 ; Wicker 1987 ). In contrast, activity setting theory unifies the objective and subjective by showing how activity is influenced and intersubjectivity developed. Rather than a collection of individual behaviors and cognitions, intersubjectivity develops as a setting characteristic that becomes the shared meanings of culture and provides the basis for cultural community psychology." (p. 24) For a more thorough presentation of our use of the concept of activity setting, please see: O'Donnell, C. R. & Tharp, R. G. (1990). Community intervention guided by theoretical developments. In A. S. Bellack, M. Hersen, & A. E. Kazdin (Eds.), International handbook of behavior modification and therapy, 2nd Edition (pp. 251-266). New York: Plenum Press. Cliff Clifford R. O'Donnell, Ph.D. Professor Emeritus Past-President, Society for Community Research and Action (APA Division 27) University of Hawai'i Department of Psychology 2530 Dole Street Honolulu, HI 96822 On Aug 12, 2013, at 7:12 AM, Lubomir Savov Popov wrote: > Hi Andy, > > I am also interested to find the term "activity setting" in Vigotsky's > writings or those of his followers, including everyone in the East > European activity theory tradition. I would appreciate articles or > specific references and page numbers. I need this to anchor some ideas > and to pay tribute to earlier theorists if they have worked on this. > > I am also interested if there are people on this list who work on the > development of the concept of activity setting or on activity theory > in relation to the planning and design of built environment. > They can contact me at the e-mail below my signature or via this list, > whichever is more convenient. I was going to make such a request on > this list some time ago, but now is a good occasion for this. > > To my knowledge, no one in the East European activity theory tradition > has used the term "activity setting," at least till the late 1980s. If > I have missed something, it is good to catch up. > > I personally work (on and off) on the concept of activity setting > since the early 1980s. However, I develop it as a methodological > category for the study of built environment. I have to acknowledge > that I got the idea for activity setting from Roger Barker's "behavior > setting." At that time, in East Europe, the concept of behavior was > considered one-sided and with less explanatory power than the concept > of activity. There was no way to introduce the behavior setting > concept without setting the reaction of mainstream social scientists. > Even if someone dared to suggest the behavior setting concept in an > article, the reviewers will automatically recommend to rework it as > "activity setting." In East European social science of that time, > behavior referred mostly to the visible, mechanistic aspects of > activity or in the sense of "demeanor." > > Bob Bechtel has done a good work in the early 1980 expanding on > Barker's behavior setting, operationalizing his ideas for the field of > Environment and Behavior (Architecture and Human Behavior; Man- > Environment Systems). However, this work didn't continue. On the > other hand, at that time, it was too early to talk about activity > settings in the USA. It is early even now, in particular in the field > of Environment and Behavior. Many people in that field resent the idea > of ditching behavior for activity. They believe that the concept of > behavior setting is good enough and there is no need to introduce one > more concept of similar kind. > > In relation to the field of Environment and Behavior, I personally > believe that Barker has offered very useful ideas and they can become > a stepping stone for developing the concept of activity setting. The > activity setting concept will allow us to use the apparatus of > activity theory which is more powerful than the concept of behavior. I > also believe that the development of the activity setting theory for > the fields of teaching or management or social work and community > building will be somewhat different. Their focus will be different and > this will lead to working on different details. As usual, it is not > possible to study everything about one object of study. We have to > make difficult choices regarding aspects and depth: what to study > first, what to defer, and what to skip. > > Barker had a lot of conflicts with main stream psychologists (not > activity theorists). I have heard from Bob Bechtel (a student of > Barker) that psychologists were telling Barker: Roger, you think just > like a sociologist, which in psychological parlance meant Roger, you > are a SOB. This illustrates the disciplinary biases and divisions. > > Best wishes, > > Lubomir > > Lubomir Popov, Ph.D. > School of Family and Consumer Sciences American Culture Studies > Affiliated Faculty Bowling Green State University > 309 Johnston Hall, > Bowling Green, Ohio 43403-0059 > Lspopov@bgsu.edu > 419.372.7835 From lpscholar2@gmail.com Tue Aug 13 10:36:06 2013 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Tue, 13 Aug 2013 10:36:06 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Activity Setting In-Reply-To: <393FDE85-EFCF-48E6-96E0-6ED970A4DD80@hawaii.edu> References: <393FDE85-EFCF-48E6-96E0-6ED970A4DD80@hawaii.edu> Message-ID: Cliff, The shift from the individual TO *intersubjective* within activity settings seems central. As we explore activity settings, *inter-subjectivity* is also a central term Larry On Mon, Aug 12, 2013 at 11:01 PM, Cliff O'Donnell wrote: > Thank you for your response, Lubomir. Roger Barker was an important > influence on my thinking earlier in my career. His work is highly respected > in community psychology. Quoting from our article, here is the distinction > we see between behavior setting and activity setting: > > "The subjective focus of activity settings distinguishes > them from the behavior settings developed by Barker > (1960 , 1968 ). In behavior settings, the focus is on objective > molar behavior specified by time and place. Behaviors are > defined by the roles or positions of people in the setting and > activity is used to coordinate their behaviors. Suggestions > have been made to alter behavior setting theory to include a > wider range of individual behaviors, cognitions, and > interventions in the setting (e.g., Luke et al. 1991 ; Schoggen > 1989 ; Wicker 1987 ). In contrast, activity setting theory > unifies the objective and subjective by showing how > activity is influenced and intersubjectivity developed. > Rather than a collection of individual behaviors and cognitions, > intersubjectivity develops as a setting characteristic > that becomes the shared meanings of culture and provides > the basis for cultural community psychology." (p. 24) > > For a more thorough presentation of our use of the concept of activity > setting, please see: > > O'Donnell, C. R. & Tharp, R. G. (1990). Community intervention guided by > theoretical developments. In A. S. Bellack, M. Hersen, & A. E. Kazdin > (Eds.), International handbook of behavior modification and therapy, 2nd > Edition (pp. 251-266). New York: Plenum Press. > > Cliff > > Clifford R. O'Donnell, Ph.D. > Professor Emeritus > Past-President, Society for Community Research and Action (APA Division 27) > > University of Hawai?i > Department of Psychology > 2530 Dole Street > Honolulu, HI 96822 > > > On Aug 12, 2013, at 7:12 AM, Lubomir Savov Popov wrote: > > Hi Andy, >> >> I am also interested to find the term "activity setting" in Vigotsky's >> writings or those of his followers, including everyone in the East European >> activity theory tradition. I would appreciate articles or specific >> references and page numbers. I need this to anchor some ideas and to pay >> tribute to earlier theorists if they have worked on this. >> >> I am also interested if there are people on this list who work on the >> development of the concept of activity setting or on activity theory in >> relation to the planning and design of built environment. They can contact >> me at the e-mail below my signature or via this list, whichever is more >> convenient. I was going to make such a request on this list some time ago, >> but now is a good occasion for this. >> >> To my knowledge, no one in the East European activity theory tradition >> has used the term "activity setting," at least till the late 1980s. If I >> have missed something, it is good to catch up. >> >> I personally work (on and off) on the concept of activity setting since >> the early 1980s. However, I develop it as a methodological category for the >> study of built environment. I have to acknowledge that I got the idea for >> activity setting from Roger Barker's "behavior setting." At that time, in >> East Europe, the concept of behavior was considered one-sided and with less >> explanatory power than the concept of activity. There was no way to >> introduce the behavior setting concept without setting the reaction of >> mainstream social scientists. Even if someone dared to suggest the behavior >> setting concept in an article, the reviewers will automatically recommend >> to rework it as "activity setting." In East European social science of that >> time, behavior referred mostly to the visible, mechanistic aspects of >> activity or in the sense of "demeanor." >> >> Bob Bechtel has done a good work in the early 1980 expanding on Barker's >> behavior setting, operationalizing his ideas for the field of Environment >> and Behavior (Architecture and Human Behavior; Man-Environment Systems). >> However, this work didn't continue. On the other hand, at that time, it >> was too early to talk about activity settings in the USA. It is early even >> now, in particular in the field of Environment and Behavior. Many people in >> that field resent the idea of ditching behavior for activity. They believe >> that the concept of behavior setting is good enough and there is no need to >> introduce one more concept of similar kind. >> >> In relation to the field of Environment and Behavior, I personally >> believe that Barker has offered very useful ideas and they can become a >> stepping stone for developing the concept of activity setting. The activity >> setting concept will allow us to use the apparatus of activity theory which >> is more powerful than the concept of behavior. I also believe that the >> development of the activity setting theory for the fields of teaching or >> management or social work and community building will be somewhat >> different. Their focus will be different and this will lead to working on >> different details. As usual, it is not possible to study everything about >> one object of study. We have to make difficult choices regarding aspects >> and depth: what to study first, what to defer, and what to skip. >> >> Barker had a lot of conflicts with main stream psychologists (not >> activity theorists). I have heard from Bob Bechtel (a student of Barker) >> that psychologists were telling Barker: Roger, you think just like a >> sociologist, which in psychological parlance meant Roger, you are a SOB. >> This illustrates the disciplinary biases and divisions. >> >> Best wishes, >> >> Lubomir >> >> Lubomir Popov, Ph.D. >> School of Family and Consumer Sciences >> American Culture Studies Affiliated Faculty >> Bowling Green State University >> 309 Johnston Hall, >> Bowling Green, Ohio 43403-0059 >> Lspopov@bgsu.edu >> 419.372.7835 >> > > > > > From cliffo@hawaii.edu Tue Aug 13 11:06:05 2013 From: cliffo@hawaii.edu (Cliff O'Donnell) Date: Tue, 13 Aug 2013 08:06:05 -1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Activity Setting In-Reply-To: References: <393FDE85-EFCF-48E6-96E0-6ED970A4DD80@hawaii.edu> Message-ID: Thanks, Larry. You are highlighting a key point in our article. Quoting again, "If we define community by shared activity and culture by shared meanings, the basis for a theoretical integration of the concepts of community and culture into cultural community psychology becomes apparent. The key concept needed for such integration is one that can show how shared meanings develop from shared activities. That key concept is intersubjectivity." (p. 23) Following up on that point, we would greatly appreciate the thoughts of the XMCA group on the value of integrating the concepts of culture and community. Our article presents the implications of doing so for cultural community psychology. What implications does the XMCA group see for CHAT? Cliff On Aug 13, 2013, at 7:36 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > Cliff, > The shift from the individual TO *intersubjective* within activity > settings > seems central. > As we explore activity settings, *inter-subjectivity* is also a > central term > Larry > > > On Mon, Aug 12, 2013 at 11:01 PM, Cliff O'Donnell > wrote: > >> Thank you for your response, Lubomir. Roger Barker was an important >> influence on my thinking earlier in my career. His work is highly >> respected >> in community psychology. Quoting from our article, here is the >> distinction >> we see between behavior setting and activity setting: >> >> "The subjective focus of activity settings distinguishes >> them from the behavior settings developed by Barker >> (1960 , 1968 ). In behavior settings, the focus is on objective >> molar behavior specified by time and place. Behaviors are >> defined by the roles or positions of people in the setting and >> activity is used to coordinate their behaviors. Suggestions >> have been made to alter behavior setting theory to include a >> wider range of individual behaviors, cognitions, and >> interventions in the setting (e.g., Luke et al. 1991 ; Schoggen >> 1989 ; Wicker 1987 ). In contrast, activity setting theory >> unifies the objective and subjective by showing how >> activity is influenced and intersubjectivity developed. >> Rather than a collection of individual behaviors and cognitions, >> intersubjectivity develops as a setting characteristic >> that becomes the shared meanings of culture and provides >> the basis for cultural community psychology." (p. 24) >> >> For a more thorough presentation of our use of the concept of >> activity >> setting, please see: >> >> O'Donnell, C. R. & Tharp, R. G. (1990). Community intervention >> guided by >> theoretical developments. In A. S. Bellack, M. Hersen, & A. E. Kazdin >> (Eds.), International handbook of behavior modification and >> therapy, 2nd >> Edition (pp. 251-266). New York: Plenum Press. >> >> Cliff >> >> Clifford R. O'Donnell, Ph.D. >> Professor Emeritus >> Past-President, Society for Community Research and Action (APA >> Division 27) >> >> University of Hawai?i >> Department of Psychology >> 2530 Dole Street >> Honolulu, HI 96822 >> >> >> On Aug 12, 2013, at 7:12 AM, Lubomir Savov Popov wrote: >> >> Hi Andy, >>> >>> I am also interested to find the term "activity setting" in >>> Vigotsky's >>> writings or those of his followers, including everyone in the East >>> European >>> activity theory tradition. I would appreciate articles or specific >>> references and page numbers. I need this to anchor some ideas and >>> to pay >>> tribute to earlier theorists if they have worked on this. >>> >>> I am also interested if there are people on this list who work on >>> the >>> development of the concept of activity setting or on activity >>> theory in >>> relation to the planning and design of built environment. They can >>> contact >>> me at the e-mail below my signature or via this list, whichever is >>> more >>> convenient. I was going to make such a request on this list some >>> time ago, >>> but now is a good occasion for this. >>> >>> To my knowledge, no one in the East European activity theory >>> tradition >>> has used the term "activity setting," at least till the late >>> 1980s. If I >>> have missed something, it is good to catch up. >>> >>> I personally work (on and off) on the concept of activity setting >>> since >>> the early 1980s. However, I develop it as a methodological >>> category for the >>> study of built environment. I have to acknowledge that I got the >>> idea for >>> activity setting from Roger Barker's "behavior setting." At that >>> time, in >>> East Europe, the concept of behavior was considered one-sided and >>> with less >>> explanatory power than the concept of activity. There was no way to >>> introduce the behavior setting concept without setting the >>> reaction of >>> mainstream social scientists. Even if someone dared to suggest the >>> behavior >>> setting concept in an article, the reviewers will automatically >>> recommend >>> to rework it as "activity setting." In East European social >>> science of that >>> time, behavior referred mostly to the visible, mechanistic aspects >>> of >>> activity or in the sense of "demeanor." >>> >>> Bob Bechtel has done a good work in the early 1980 expanding on >>> Barker's >>> behavior setting, operationalizing his ideas for the field of >>> Environment >>> and Behavior (Architecture and Human Behavior; Man-Environment >>> Systems). >>> However, this work didn't continue. On the other hand, at that >>> time, it >>> was too early to talk about activity settings in the USA. It is >>> early even >>> now, in particular in the field of Environment and Behavior. Many >>> people in >>> that field resent the idea of ditching behavior for activity. They >>> believe >>> that the concept of behavior setting is good enough and there is >>> no need to >>> introduce one more concept of similar kind. >>> >>> In relation to the field of Environment and Behavior, I personally >>> believe that Barker has offered very useful ideas and they can >>> become a >>> stepping stone for developing the concept of activity setting. The >>> activity >>> setting concept will allow us to use the apparatus of activity >>> theory which >>> is more powerful than the concept of behavior. I also believe that >>> the >>> development of the activity setting theory for the fields of >>> teaching or >>> management or social work and community building will be somewhat >>> different. Their focus will be different and this will lead to >>> working on >>> different details. As usual, it is not possible to study >>> everything about >>> one object of study. We have to make difficult choices regarding >>> aspects >>> and depth: what to study first, what to defer, and what to skip. >>> >>> Barker had a lot of conflicts with main stream psychologists (not >>> activity theorists). I have heard from Bob Bechtel (a student of >>> Barker) >>> that psychologists were telling Barker: Roger, you think just like a >>> sociologist, which in psychological parlance meant Roger, you are >>> a SOB. >>> This illustrates the disciplinary biases and divisions. >>> >>> Best wishes, >>> >>> Lubomir >>> >>> Lubomir Popov, Ph.D. >>> School of Family and Consumer Sciences >>> American Culture Studies Affiliated Faculty >>> Bowling Green State University >>> 309 Johnston Hall, >>> Bowling Green, Ohio 43403-0059 >>> Lspopov@bgsu.edu >>> 419.372.7835 >>> >> >> >> >> >> Clifford R. O'Donnell, Ph.D. Professor Emeritus Past-President, Society for Community Research and Action (APA Division 27) University of Hawai?i Department of Psychology 2530 Dole Street Honolulu, HI 96822 From lspopov@bgsu.edu Tue Aug 13 11:25:27 2013 From: lspopov@bgsu.edu (Lubomir Savov Popov) Date: Tue, 13 Aug 2013 14:25:27 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Activity Setting In-Reply-To: References: <393FDE85-EFCF-48E6-96E0-6ED970A4DD80@hawaii.edu> Message-ID: Dear Cliff, Just to respond to your request: You have good grounds for the integration of culture and community. In sociology and anthropology, it is pretty common to treat a community as a culture. On the other hand, a culture can or might define a community, build cohesion, we-feeling, etc. Of course, the definition/conceptualization of community is very complex, but I am talking only in respect to the question you formulated. Culture can be conceptualized in the framework of the subject; in the framework of activity, and as on object of study by itself. Culture is also materialized in the object of activity, but this forms a different plane of study. Other options are possible too. I need to keep short here. Community can be conceptualized as an activity system, as a culture, as a social group, etc., depending on the scholarly objectives. When community is conceptualized as an activity system, culture can be treated as an inherent component of activity. However, this is not the only way to treat culture in this situation. I just mention this one. Culture is about shared meanings, but it is also more than shared meanings. Of course, you can keep that shared meaning definition if you interpret many other components as shared or shared meanings. You focus on the development of shared meanings in shared activities. However, the concept of community can be delineated with different foci depending on the scholarly objectives. We cannot describe or analyze all aspects of a phenomenon. We have to select several. I mean when we are interdisciplinary. Otherwise, we select only one aspect that is core for a particular discipline or a research goal. Community is a very complex category. It stands for many types of social groups and also for many other social and cultural phenomena. I will stop here. Best wishes, Lubomir -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Cliff O'Donnell Sent: Tuesday, August 13, 2013 2:06 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Activity Setting Thanks, Larry. You are highlighting a key point in our article. Quoting again, "If we define community by shared activity and culture by shared meanings, the basis for a theoretical integration of the concepts of community and culture into cultural community psychology becomes apparent. The key concept needed for such integration is one that can show how shared meanings develop from shared activities. That key concept is intersubjectivity." (p. 23) Following up on that point, we would greatly appreciate the thoughts of the XMCA group on the value of integrating the concepts of culture and community. Our article presents the implications of doing so for cultural community psychology. What implications does the XMCA group see for CHAT? Cliff On Aug 13, 2013, at 7:36 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > Cliff, > The shift from the individual TO *intersubjective* within activity > settings > seems central. > As we explore activity settings, *inter-subjectivity* is also a > central term > Larry > > > On Mon, Aug 12, 2013 at 11:01 PM, Cliff O'Donnell > wrote: > >> Thank you for your response, Lubomir. Roger Barker was an important >> influence on my thinking earlier in my career. His work is highly >> respected >> in community psychology. Quoting from our article, here is the >> distinction >> we see between behavior setting and activity setting: >> >> "The subjective focus of activity settings distinguishes >> them from the behavior settings developed by Barker >> (1960 , 1968 ). In behavior settings, the focus is on objective >> molar behavior specified by time and place. Behaviors are >> defined by the roles or positions of people in the setting and >> activity is used to coordinate their behaviors. Suggestions >> have been made to alter behavior setting theory to include a >> wider range of individual behaviors, cognitions, and >> interventions in the setting (e.g., Luke et al. 1991 ; Schoggen >> 1989 ; Wicker 1987 ). In contrast, activity setting theory >> unifies the objective and subjective by showing how >> activity is influenced and intersubjectivity developed. >> Rather than a collection of individual behaviors and cognitions, >> intersubjectivity develops as a setting characteristic >> that becomes the shared meanings of culture and provides >> the basis for cultural community psychology." (p. 24) >> >> For a more thorough presentation of our use of the concept of >> activity >> setting, please see: >> >> O'Donnell, C. R. & Tharp, R. G. (1990). Community intervention >> guided by >> theoretical developments. In A. S. Bellack, M. Hersen, & A. E. Kazdin >> (Eds.), International handbook of behavior modification and >> therapy, 2nd >> Edition (pp. 251-266). New York: Plenum Press. >> >> Cliff >> >> Clifford R. O'Donnell, Ph.D. >> Professor Emeritus >> Past-President, Society for Community Research and Action (APA >> Division 27) >> >> University of Hawai'i >> Department of Psychology >> 2530 Dole Street >> Honolulu, HI 96822 >> >> >> On Aug 12, 2013, at 7:12 AM, Lubomir Savov Popov wrote: >> >> Hi Andy, >>> >>> I am also interested to find the term "activity setting" in >>> Vigotsky's >>> writings or those of his followers, including everyone in the East >>> European >>> activity theory tradition. I would appreciate articles or specific >>> references and page numbers. I need this to anchor some ideas and >>> to pay >>> tribute to earlier theorists if they have worked on this. >>> >>> I am also interested if there are people on this list who work on >>> the >>> development of the concept of activity setting or on activity >>> theory in >>> relation to the planning and design of built environment. They can >>> contact >>> me at the e-mail below my signature or via this list, whichever is >>> more >>> convenient. I was going to make such a request on this list some >>> time ago, >>> but now is a good occasion for this. >>> >>> To my knowledge, no one in the East European activity theory >>> tradition >>> has used the term "activity setting," at least till the late >>> 1980s. If I >>> have missed something, it is good to catch up. >>> >>> I personally work (on and off) on the concept of activity setting >>> since >>> the early 1980s. However, I develop it as a methodological >>> category for the >>> study of built environment. I have to acknowledge that I got the >>> idea for >>> activity setting from Roger Barker's "behavior setting." At that >>> time, in >>> East Europe, the concept of behavior was considered one-sided and >>> with less >>> explanatory power than the concept of activity. There was no way to >>> introduce the behavior setting concept without setting the >>> reaction of >>> mainstream social scientists. Even if someone dared to suggest the >>> behavior >>> setting concept in an article, the reviewers will automatically >>> recommend >>> to rework it as "activity setting." In East European social >>> science of that >>> time, behavior referred mostly to the visible, mechanistic aspects >>> of >>> activity or in the sense of "demeanor." >>> >>> Bob Bechtel has done a good work in the early 1980 expanding on >>> Barker's >>> behavior setting, operationalizing his ideas for the field of >>> Environment >>> and Behavior (Architecture and Human Behavior; Man-Environment >>> Systems). >>> However, this work didn't continue. On the other hand, at that >>> time, it >>> was too early to talk about activity settings in the USA. It is >>> early even >>> now, in particular in the field of Environment and Behavior. Many >>> people in >>> that field resent the idea of ditching behavior for activity. They >>> believe >>> that the concept of behavior setting is good enough and there is >>> no need to >>> introduce one more concept of similar kind. >>> >>> In relation to the field of Environment and Behavior, I personally >>> believe that Barker has offered very useful ideas and they can >>> become a >>> stepping stone for developing the concept of activity setting. The >>> activity >>> setting concept will allow us to use the apparatus of activity >>> theory which >>> is more powerful than the concept of behavior. I also believe that >>> the >>> development of the activity setting theory for the fields of >>> teaching or >>> management or social work and community building will be somewhat >>> different. Their focus will be different and this will lead to >>> working on >>> different details. As usual, it is not possible to study >>> everything about >>> one object of study. We have to make difficult choices regarding >>> aspects >>> and depth: what to study first, what to defer, and what to skip. >>> >>> Barker had a lot of conflicts with main stream psychologists (not >>> activity theorists). I have heard from Bob Bechtel (a student of >>> Barker) >>> that psychologists were telling Barker: Roger, you think just like a >>> sociologist, which in psychological parlance meant Roger, you are >>> a SOB. >>> This illustrates the disciplinary biases and divisions. >>> >>> Best wishes, >>> >>> Lubomir >>> >>> Lubomir Popov, Ph.D. >>> School of Family and Consumer Sciences >>> American Culture Studies Affiliated Faculty >>> Bowling Green State University >>> 309 Johnston Hall, >>> Bowling Green, Ohio 43403-0059 >>> Lspopov@bgsu.edu >>> 419.372.7835 >>> >> >> >> >> >> Clifford R. O'Donnell, Ph.D. Professor Emeritus Past-President, Society for Community Research and Action (APA Division 27) University of Hawai'i Department of Psychology 2530 Dole Street Honolulu, HI 96822 From dkirsh@lsu.edu Tue Aug 13 14:50:07 2013 From: dkirsh@lsu.edu (David H Kirshner) Date: Tue, 13 Aug 2013 21:50:07 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Activity Setting: Shared Meaning Message-ID: <1F3A303FB8B8A9429CE2720B7C8D4B7338148913@BY2PRD0610MB354.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> Just to add a thought on the tricky notion of "shared meaning" that Lubomir focusses on in discussion of culture and community; it seems important to differentiate shared meaning from shared understanding. What is shared in a culture or community are categories of meaning. Individuals who are participants in the culture, or members of the community, may draw quite differently from the shared categories in constructing personal understandings. To push this a bit further, we might say that a culture may be comprised of (or may encompass) a range of discrete categories or paradigms of meaning. Cultures can be distinguished from one another by substantially different constellations of categories. However, communities, as more local entities constituted within cultures, are defined in terms of a politics of interpretation. Personal understandings within a community are bounded by community norms regarding appropriate categories of meaning that can be drawn upon with respect to those critical matters of interest that define the community. David -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Lubomir Savov Popov Sent: Tuesday, August 13, 2013 1:25 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Activity Setting Dear Cliff, Just to respond to your request: You have good grounds for the integration of culture and community. In sociology and anthropology, it is pretty common to treat a community as a culture. On the other hand, a culture can or might define a community, build cohesion, we-feeling, etc. Of course, the definition/conceptualization of community is very complex, but I am talking only in respect to the question you formulated. Culture can be conceptualized in the framework of the subject; in the framework of activity, and as on object of study by itself. Culture is also materialized in the object of activity, but this forms a different plane of study. Other options are possible too. I need to keep short here. Community can be conceptualized as an activity system, as a culture, as a social group, etc., depending on the scholarly objectives. When community is conceptualized as an activity system, culture can be treated as an inherent component of activity. However, this is not the only way to treat culture in this situation. I just mention this one. Culture is about shared meanings, but it is also more than shared meanings. Of course, you can keep that shared meaning definition if you interpret many other components as shared or shared meanings. You focus on the development of shared meanings in shared activities. However, the concept of community can be delineated with different foci depending on the scholarly objectives. We cannot describe or analyze all aspects of a phenomenon. We have to select several. I mean when we are interdisciplinary. Otherwise, we select only one aspect that is core for a particular discipline or a research goal. Community is a very complex category. It stands for many types of social groups and also for many other social and cultural phenomena. I will stop here. Best wishes, Lubomir -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Cliff O'Donnell Sent: Tuesday, August 13, 2013 2:06 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Activity Setting Thanks, Larry. You are highlighting a key point in our article. Quoting again, "If we define community by shared activity and culture by shared meanings, the basis for a theoretical integration of the concepts of community and culture into cultural community psychology becomes apparent. The key concept needed for such integration is one that can show how shared meanings develop from shared activities. That key concept is intersubjectivity." (p. 23) Following up on that point, we would greatly appreciate the thoughts of the XMCA group on the value of integrating the concepts of culture and community. Our article presents the implications of doing so for cultural community psychology. What implications does the XMCA group see for CHAT? Cliff On Aug 13, 2013, at 7:36 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > Cliff, > The shift from the individual TO *intersubjective* within activity > settings seems central. > As we explore activity settings, *inter-subjectivity* is also a > central term Larry > > > On Mon, Aug 12, 2013 at 11:01 PM, Cliff O'Donnell > wrote: > >> Thank you for your response, Lubomir. Roger Barker was an important >> influence on my thinking earlier in my career. His work is highly >> respected in community psychology. Quoting from our article, here is >> the distinction we see between behavior setting and activity setting: >> >> "The subjective focus of activity settings distinguishes them from >> the behavior settings developed by Barker >> (1960 , 1968 ). In behavior settings, the focus is on objective molar >> behavior specified by time and place. Behaviors are defined by the >> roles or positions of people in the setting and activity is used to >> coordinate their behaviors. Suggestions have been made to alter >> behavior setting theory to include a wider range of individual >> behaviors, cognitions, and interventions in the setting (e.g., Luke >> et al. 1991 ; Schoggen >> 1989 ; Wicker 1987 ). In contrast, activity setting theory unifies >> the objective and subjective by showing how activity is influenced >> and intersubjectivity developed. >> Rather than a collection of individual behaviors and cognitions, >> intersubjectivity develops as a setting characteristic that becomes >> the shared meanings of culture and provides the basis for cultural >> community psychology." (p. 24) >> >> For a more thorough presentation of our use of the concept of >> activity setting, please see: >> >> O'Donnell, C. R. & Tharp, R. G. (1990). Community intervention guided >> by theoretical developments. In A. S. Bellack, M. Hersen, & A. E. >> Kazdin (Eds.), International handbook of behavior modification and >> therapy, 2nd Edition (pp. 251-266). New York: Plenum Press. >> >> Cliff >> >> Clifford R. O'Donnell, Ph.D. >> Professor Emeritus >> Past-President, Society for Community Research and Action (APA >> Division 27) >> >> University of Hawai'i >> Department of Psychology >> 2530 Dole Street >> Honolulu, HI 96822 >> >> >> On Aug 12, 2013, at 7:12 AM, Lubomir Savov Popov wrote: >> >> Hi Andy, >>> >>> I am also interested to find the term "activity setting" in >>> Vigotsky's writings or those of his followers, including everyone in >>> the East European activity theory tradition. I would appreciate >>> articles or specific references and page numbers. I need this to >>> anchor some ideas and to pay tribute to earlier theorists if they >>> have worked on this. >>> >>> I am also interested if there are people on this list who work on >>> the development of the concept of activity setting or on activity >>> theory in relation to the planning and design of built environment. >>> They can contact me at the e-mail below my signature or via this >>> list, whichever is more convenient. I was going to make such a >>> request on this list some time ago, but now is a good occasion for >>> this. >>> >>> To my knowledge, no one in the East European activity theory >>> tradition has used the term "activity setting," at least till the >>> late 1980s. If I have missed something, it is good to catch up. >>> >>> I personally work (on and off) on the concept of activity setting >>> since the early 1980s. However, I develop it as a methodological >>> category for the study of built environment. I have to acknowledge >>> that I got the idea for activity setting from Roger Barker's >>> "behavior setting." At that time, in East Europe, the concept of >>> behavior was considered one-sided and with less explanatory power >>> than the concept of activity. There was no way to introduce the >>> behavior setting concept without setting the reaction of mainstream >>> social scientists. Even if someone dared to suggest the behavior >>> setting concept in an article, the reviewers will automatically >>> recommend to rework it as "activity setting." In East European >>> social science of that time, behavior referred mostly to the >>> visible, mechanistic aspects of activity or in the sense of >>> "demeanor." >>> >>> Bob Bechtel has done a good work in the early 1980 expanding on >>> Barker's behavior setting, operationalizing his ideas for the field >>> of Environment and Behavior (Architecture and Human Behavior; >>> Man-Environment Systems). >>> However, this work didn't continue. On the other hand, at that time, >>> it was too early to talk about activity settings in the USA. It is >>> early even now, in particular in the field of Environment and >>> Behavior. Many people in that field resent the idea of ditching >>> behavior for activity. They believe that the concept of behavior >>> setting is good enough and there is no need to introduce one more >>> concept of similar kind. >>> >>> In relation to the field of Environment and Behavior, I personally >>> believe that Barker has offered very useful ideas and they can >>> become a stepping stone for developing the concept of activity >>> setting. The activity setting concept will allow us to use the >>> apparatus of activity theory which is more powerful than the concept >>> of behavior. I also believe that the development of the activity >>> setting theory for the fields of teaching or management or social >>> work and community building will be somewhat different. Their focus >>> will be different and this will lead to working on different >>> details. As usual, it is not possible to study everything about one >>> object of study. We have to make difficult choices regarding aspects >>> and depth: what to study first, what to defer, and what to skip. >>> >>> Barker had a lot of conflicts with main stream psychologists (not >>> activity theorists). I have heard from Bob Bechtel (a student of >>> Barker) >>> that psychologists were telling Barker: Roger, you think just like a >>> sociologist, which in psychological parlance meant Roger, you are a >>> SOB. >>> This illustrates the disciplinary biases and divisions. >>> >>> Best wishes, >>> >>> Lubomir >>> >>> Lubomir Popov, Ph.D. >>> School of Family and Consumer Sciences American Culture Studies >>> Affiliated Faculty Bowling Green State University >>> 309 Johnston Hall, >>> Bowling Green, Ohio 43403-0059 >>> Lspopov@bgsu.edu >>> 419.372.7835 >>> >> >> >> >> >> Clifford R. O'Donnell, Ph.D. Professor Emeritus Past-President, Society for Community Research and Action (APA Division 27) University of Hawai'i Department of Psychology 2530 Dole Street Honolulu, HI 96822 From ablunden@mira.net Tue Aug 13 18:48:54 2013 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2013 11:48:54 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Activity Setting In-Reply-To: References: <393FDE85-EFCF-48E6-96E0-6ED970A4DD80@hawaii.edu> Message-ID: <520AE206.9030105@mira.net> I agree with Lubomir here. Both these concepts, but especially "culture," are subject to such widely different meanings in different contexts and theoretical frames, it is simply not viable to work without allowing one's own use of the term to index a range of different interrelated concepts. For me, as a CHAT person, "culture" is essentially the constellation of material artefacts which people (transcending immediate relations), use to mediate their labour and interactions. Although words, including spoken words, are instances of such material artefacts, I note that in Cliff's definition the material artefacts are never named as part of culture, focussing instead on shared meanings. This is probably a more widespread norm for the meaning of "culture" and of course we all have to understand this as a meaning for the word. When the implications of sharing the same constellations of artefacts for mediating actions is unfolded, it does lead to shared activities and shared meanings, the activity which stitches the artefacts into a "constellation" in fact. But the importance of "culture" to me is that it is objectified in a constellatiton of perfectly material artefacts, not only texts and language, but land and buildings, means of production, money and means of exchange, etc., and human bodies themselves. The material foundation of collaboration is a very important aspect of activity. I guess I take "community" as indexing all the people sharing that culture through shared activities. Andy Lubomir Savov Popov wrote: > Dear Cliff, > > Just to respond to your request: > You have good grounds for the integration of culture and community. In sociology and anthropology, it is pretty common to treat a community as a culture. On the other hand, a culture can or might define a community, build cohesion, we-feeling, etc. Of course, the definition/conceptualization of community is very complex, but I am talking only in respect to the question you formulated. > > Culture can be conceptualized in the framework of the subject; in the framework of activity, and as on object of study by itself. Culture is also materialized in the object of activity, but this forms a different plane of study. Other options are possible too. I need to keep short here. > > Community can be conceptualized as an activity system, as a culture, as a social group, etc., depending on the scholarly objectives. When community is conceptualized as an activity system, culture can be treated as an inherent component of activity. However, this is not the only way to treat culture in this situation. I just mention this one. Culture is about shared meanings, but it is also more than shared meanings. Of course, you can keep that shared meaning definition if you interpret many other components as shared or shared meanings. > > You focus on the development of shared meanings in shared activities. However, the concept of community can be delineated with different foci depending on the scholarly objectives. We cannot describe or analyze all aspects of a phenomenon. We have to select several. I mean when we are interdisciplinary. Otherwise, we select only one aspect that is core for a particular discipline or a research goal. > > Community is a very complex category. It stands for many types of social groups and also for many other social and cultural phenomena. I will stop here. > > Best wishes, > > Lubomir > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Cliff O'Donnell > Sent: Tuesday, August 13, 2013 2:06 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Activity Setting > > Thanks, Larry. You are highlighting a key point in our article. > Quoting again, > > "If we define community by shared activity and culture by shared meanings, the basis for a theoretical integration of the concepts of community and culture into cultural community psychology becomes apparent. The key concept needed for such integration is one that can show how shared meanings develop from shared activities. That key concept is intersubjectivity." (p. 23) > > Following up on that point, we would greatly appreciate the thoughts of the XMCA group on the value of integrating the concepts of culture and community. Our article presents the implications of doing so for cultural community psychology. What implications does the XMCA group see for CHAT? > > Cliff > > On Aug 13, 2013, at 7:36 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > > >> Cliff, >> The shift from the individual TO *intersubjective* within activity >> settings >> seems central. >> As we explore activity settings, *inter-subjectivity* is also a >> central term >> Larry >> >> >> On Mon, Aug 12, 2013 at 11:01 PM, Cliff O'Donnell >> wrote: >> >> >>> Thank you for your response, Lubomir. Roger Barker was an important >>> influence on my thinking earlier in my career. His work is highly >>> respected >>> in community psychology. Quoting from our article, here is the >>> distinction >>> we see between behavior setting and activity setting: >>> >>> "The subjective focus of activity settings distinguishes >>> them from the behavior settings developed by Barker >>> (1960 , 1968 ). In behavior settings, the focus is on objective >>> molar behavior specified by time and place. Behaviors are >>> defined by the roles or positions of people in the setting and >>> activity is used to coordinate their behaviors. Suggestions >>> have been made to alter behavior setting theory to include a >>> wider range of individual behaviors, cognitions, and >>> interventions in the setting (e.g., Luke et al. 1991 ; Schoggen >>> 1989 ; Wicker 1987 ). In contrast, activity setting theory >>> unifies the objective and subjective by showing how >>> activity is influenced and intersubjectivity developed. >>> Rather than a collection of individual behaviors and cognitions, >>> intersubjectivity develops as a setting characteristic >>> that becomes the shared meanings of culture and provides >>> the basis for cultural community psychology." (p. 24) >>> >>> For a more thorough presentation of our use of the concept of >>> activity >>> setting, please see: >>> >>> O'Donnell, C. R. & Tharp, R. G. (1990). Community intervention >>> guided by >>> theoretical developments. In A. S. Bellack, M. Hersen, & A. E. Kazdin >>> (Eds.), International handbook of behavior modification and >>> therapy, 2nd >>> Edition (pp. 251-266). New York: Plenum Press. >>> >>> Cliff >>> >>> Clifford R. O'Donnell, Ph.D. >>> Professor Emeritus >>> Past-President, Society for Community Research and Action (APA >>> Division 27) >>> >>> University of Hawai'i >>> Department of Psychology >>> 2530 Dole Street >>> Honolulu, HI 96822 >>> >>> >>> On Aug 12, 2013, at 7:12 AM, Lubomir Savov Popov wrote: >>> >>> Hi Andy, >>> >>>> I am also interested to find the term "activity setting" in >>>> Vigotsky's >>>> writings or those of his followers, including everyone in the East >>>> European >>>> activity theory tradition. I would appreciate articles or specific >>>> references and page numbers. I need this to anchor some ideas and >>>> to pay >>>> tribute to earlier theorists if they have worked on this. >>>> >>>> I am also interested if there are people on this list who work on >>>> the >>>> development of the concept of activity setting or on activity >>>> theory in >>>> relation to the planning and design of built environment. They can >>>> contact >>>> me at the e-mail below my signature or via this list, whichever is >>>> more >>>> convenient. I was going to make such a request on this list some >>>> time ago, >>>> but now is a good occasion for this. >>>> >>>> To my knowledge, no one in the East European activity theory >>>> tradition >>>> has used the term "activity setting," at least till the late >>>> 1980s. If I >>>> have missed something, it is good to catch up. >>>> >>>> I personally work (on and off) on the concept of activity setting >>>> since >>>> the early 1980s. However, I develop it as a methodological >>>> category for the >>>> study of built environment. I have to acknowledge that I got the >>>> idea for >>>> activity setting from Roger Barker's "behavior setting." At that >>>> time, in >>>> East Europe, the concept of behavior was considered one-sided and >>>> with less >>>> explanatory power than the concept of activity. There was no way to >>>> introduce the behavior setting concept without setting the >>>> reaction of >>>> mainstream social scientists. Even if someone dared to suggest the >>>> behavior >>>> setting concept in an article, the reviewers will automatically >>>> recommend >>>> to rework it as "activity setting." In East European social >>>> science of that >>>> time, behavior referred mostly to the visible, mechanistic aspects >>>> of >>>> activity or in the sense of "demeanor." >>>> >>>> Bob Bechtel has done a good work in the early 1980 expanding on >>>> Barker's >>>> behavior setting, operationalizing his ideas for the field of >>>> Environment >>>> and Behavior (Architecture and Human Behavior; Man-Environment >>>> Systems). >>>> However, this work didn't continue. On the other hand, at that >>>> time, it >>>> was too early to talk about activity settings in the USA. It is >>>> early even >>>> now, in particular in the field of Environment and Behavior. Many >>>> people in >>>> that field resent the idea of ditching behavior for activity. They >>>> believe >>>> that the concept of behavior setting is good enough and there is >>>> no need to >>>> introduce one more concept of similar kind. >>>> >>>> In relation to the field of Environment and Behavior, I personally >>>> believe that Barker has offered very useful ideas and they can >>>> become a >>>> stepping stone for developing the concept of activity setting. The >>>> activity >>>> setting concept will allow us to use the apparatus of activity >>>> theory which >>>> is more powerful than the concept of behavior. I also believe that >>>> the >>>> development of the activity setting theory for the fields of >>>> teaching or >>>> management or social work and community building will be somewhat >>>> different. Their focus will be different and this will lead to >>>> working on >>>> different details. As usual, it is not possible to study >>>> everything about >>>> one object of study. We have to make difficult choices regarding >>>> aspects >>>> and depth: what to study first, what to defer, and what to skip. >>>> >>>> Barker had a lot of conflicts with main stream psychologists (not >>>> activity theorists). I have heard from Bob Bechtel (a student of >>>> Barker) >>>> that psychologists were telling Barker: Roger, you think just like a >>>> sociologist, which in psychological parlance meant Roger, you are >>>> a SOB. >>>> This illustrates the disciplinary biases and divisions. >>>> >>>> Best wishes, >>>> >>>> Lubomir >>>> >>>> Lubomir Popov, Ph.D. >>>> School of Family and Consumer Sciences >>>> American Culture Studies Affiliated Faculty >>>> Bowling Green State University >>>> 309 Johnston Hall, >>>> Bowling Green, Ohio 43403-0059 >>>> Lspopov@bgsu.edu >>>> 419.372.7835 >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> > > Clifford R. O'Donnell, Ph.D. > Professor Emeritus > Past-President, Society for Community Research and Action (APA > Division 27) > > University of Hawai'i > Department of Psychology > 2530 Dole Street > Honolulu, HI 96822 > > > > > > > -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts http://marxists.academia.edu/AndyBlunden From cliffo@hawaii.edu Tue Aug 13 19:21:02 2013 From: cliffo@hawaii.edu (Cliff O'Donnell) Date: Tue, 13 Aug 2013 16:21:02 -1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Activity Setting: Shared Meaning In-Reply-To: <1F3A303FB8B8A9429CE2720B7C8D4B7338148913@BY2PRD0610MB354.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> References: <1F3A303FB8B8A9429CE2720B7C8D4B7338148913@BY2PRD0610MB354.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: Thanks for your thoughts, Lubomir and David. We agree that community and culture can be defined many ways for different purposes. One of the purposes of our article was to invite others to offer ways that they would unite the concepts. We also agree that individuals in the same cultural community may differ in their personal understanding of the shared meanings of the cultural community, just as individuals differ in their skills, thoughts, experiences, and emotions. All of us are a combination of the cultures of gender, age, ethnicity, sexual orientation, social economic status, etc. In our formulation, defining community by shared activities allows the assessment of communities by the degree and attributes of the activities they share. Also, defining culture by shared meanings allows the assessment of cultures by the meanings they share. In our example of the youth and adults in a Native American community, the activities and meanings of those activities differed dramatically between the youth and adults. The difference was so pronounced that the groups formed different cultural communities, even though they all lived in the same small town and were all from the same Native American tribe. Knowledge of their activities and shared meanings was essential in developing an intervention plan and is an example of cultural community psychology using CHAT concepts. Thanks again for your contributions to this discussion. Cliff On Aug 13, 2013, at 11:50 AM, David H Kirshner wrote: > Just to add a thought on the tricky notion of "shared meaning" that > Lubomir focusses on in discussion of culture and community; it seems > important to differentiate shared meaning from shared understanding. > What is shared in a culture or community are categories of meaning. > Individuals who are participants in the culture, or members of the > community, may draw quite differently from the shared categories in > constructing personal understandings. To push this a bit further, we > might say that a culture may be comprised of (or may encompass) a > range of discrete categories or paradigms of meaning. Cultures can > be distinguished from one another by substantially different > constellations of categories. However, communities, as more local > entities constituted within cultures, are defined in terms of a > politics of interpretation. Personal understandings within a > community are bounded by community norms regarding appropriate > categories of meaning that can be drawn upon with respect to those > critical matters of interest that define the community. > > David > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > ] On Behalf Of Lubomir Savov Popov > Sent: Tuesday, August 13, 2013 1:25 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Activity Setting > > Dear Cliff, > > Just to respond to your request: > You have good grounds for the integration of culture and community. > In sociology and anthropology, it is pretty common to treat a > community as a culture. On the other hand, a culture can or might > define a community, build cohesion, we-feeling, etc. Of course, the > definition/conceptualization of community is very complex, but I am > talking only in respect to the question you formulated. > > Culture can be conceptualized in the framework of the subject; in > the framework of activity, and as on object of study by itself. > Culture is also materialized in the object of activity, but this > forms a different plane of study. Other options are possible too. I > need to keep short here. > > Community can be conceptualized as an activity system, as a culture, > as a social group, etc., depending on the scholarly objectives. When > community is conceptualized as an activity system, culture can be > treated as an inherent component of activity. However, this is not > the only way to treat culture in this situation. I just mention this > one. Culture is about shared meanings, but it is also more than > shared meanings. Of course, you can keep that shared meaning > definition if you interpret many other components as shared or > shared meanings. > > You focus on the development of shared meanings in shared > activities. However, the concept of community can be delineated with > different foci depending on the scholarly objectives. We cannot > describe or analyze all aspects of a phenomenon. We have to select > several. I mean when we are interdisciplinary. Otherwise, we select > only one aspect that is core for a particular discipline or a > research goal. > > Community is a very complex category. It stands for many types of > social groups and also for many other social and cultural phenomena. > I will stop here. > > Best wishes, > > Lubomir > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > ] On Behalf Of Cliff O'Donnell > Sent: Tuesday, August 13, 2013 2:06 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Activity Setting > > Thanks, Larry. You are highlighting a key point in our article. > Quoting again, > > "If we define community by shared activity and culture by shared > meanings, the basis for a theoretical integration of the concepts of > community and culture into cultural community psychology becomes > apparent. The key concept needed for such integration is one that > can show how shared meanings develop from shared activities. That > key concept is intersubjectivity." (p. 23) > > Following up on that point, we would greatly appreciate the thoughts > of the XMCA group on the value of integrating the concepts of > culture and community. Our article presents the implications of > doing so for cultural community psychology. What implications does > the XMCA group see for CHAT? > > Cliff > > On Aug 13, 2013, at 7:36 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > >> Cliff, >> The shift from the individual TO *intersubjective* within activity >> settings seems central. >> As we explore activity settings, *inter-subjectivity* is also a >> central term Larry >> >> >> On Mon, Aug 12, 2013 at 11:01 PM, Cliff O'Donnell >> wrote: >> >>> Thank you for your response, Lubomir. Roger Barker was an important >>> influence on my thinking earlier in my career. His work is highly >>> respected in community psychology. Quoting from our article, here is >>> the distinction we see between behavior setting and activity >>> setting: >>> >>> "The subjective focus of activity settings distinguishes them from >>> the behavior settings developed by Barker >>> (1960 , 1968 ). In behavior settings, the focus is on objective >>> molar >>> behavior specified by time and place. Behaviors are defined by the >>> roles or positions of people in the setting and activity is used to >>> coordinate their behaviors. Suggestions have been made to alter >>> behavior setting theory to include a wider range of individual >>> behaviors, cognitions, and interventions in the setting (e.g., Luke >>> et al. 1991 ; Schoggen >>> 1989 ; Wicker 1987 ). In contrast, activity setting theory unifies >>> the objective and subjective by showing how activity is influenced >>> and intersubjectivity developed. >>> Rather than a collection of individual behaviors and cognitions, >>> intersubjectivity develops as a setting characteristic that becomes >>> the shared meanings of culture and provides the basis for cultural >>> community psychology." (p. 24) >>> >>> For a more thorough presentation of our use of the concept of >>> activity setting, please see: >>> >>> O'Donnell, C. R. & Tharp, R. G. (1990). Community intervention >>> guided >>> by theoretical developments. In A. S. Bellack, M. Hersen, & A. E. >>> Kazdin (Eds.), International handbook of behavior modification and >>> therapy, 2nd Edition (pp. 251-266). New York: Plenum Press. >>> >>> Cliff >>> >>> Clifford R. O'Donnell, Ph.D. >>> Professor Emeritus >>> Past-President, Society for Community Research and Action (APA >>> Division 27) >>> >>> University of Hawai'i >>> Department of Psychology >>> 2530 Dole Street >>> Honolulu, HI 96822 >>> >>> >>> On Aug 12, 2013, at 7:12 AM, Lubomir Savov Popov wrote: >>> >>> Hi Andy, >>>> >>>> I am also interested to find the term "activity setting" in >>>> Vigotsky's writings or those of his followers, including everyone >>>> in >>>> the East European activity theory tradition. I would appreciate >>>> articles or specific references and page numbers. I need this to >>>> anchor some ideas and to pay tribute to earlier theorists if they >>>> have worked on this. >>>> >>>> I am also interested if there are people on this list who work on >>>> the development of the concept of activity setting or on activity >>>> theory in relation to the planning and design of built environment. >>>> They can contact me at the e-mail below my signature or via this >>>> list, whichever is more convenient. I was going to make such a >>>> request on this list some time ago, but now is a good occasion for >>>> this. >>>> >>>> To my knowledge, no one in the East European activity theory >>>> tradition has used the term "activity setting," at least till the >>>> late 1980s. If I have missed something, it is good to catch up. >>>> >>>> I personally work (on and off) on the concept of activity setting >>>> since the early 1980s. However, I develop it as a methodological >>>> category for the study of built environment. I have to acknowledge >>>> that I got the idea for activity setting from Roger Barker's >>>> "behavior setting." At that time, in East Europe, the concept of >>>> behavior was considered one-sided and with less explanatory power >>>> than the concept of activity. There was no way to introduce the >>>> behavior setting concept without setting the reaction of mainstream >>>> social scientists. Even if someone dared to suggest the behavior >>>> setting concept in an article, the reviewers will automatically >>>> recommend to rework it as "activity setting." In East European >>>> social science of that time, behavior referred mostly to the >>>> visible, mechanistic aspects of activity or in the sense of >>>> "demeanor." >>>> >>>> Bob Bechtel has done a good work in the early 1980 expanding on >>>> Barker's behavior setting, operationalizing his ideas for the field >>>> of Environment and Behavior (Architecture and Human Behavior; >>>> Man-Environment Systems). >>>> However, this work didn't continue. On the other hand, at that >>>> time, >>>> it was too early to talk about activity settings in the USA. It is >>>> early even now, in particular in the field of Environment and >>>> Behavior. Many people in that field resent the idea of ditching >>>> behavior for activity. They believe that the concept of behavior >>>> setting is good enough and there is no need to introduce one more >>>> concept of similar kind. >>>> >>>> In relation to the field of Environment and Behavior, I personally >>>> believe that Barker has offered very useful ideas and they can >>>> become a stepping stone for developing the concept of activity >>>> setting. The activity setting concept will allow us to use the >>>> apparatus of activity theory which is more powerful than the >>>> concept >>>> of behavior. I also believe that the development of the activity >>>> setting theory for the fields of teaching or management or social >>>> work and community building will be somewhat different. Their focus >>>> will be different and this will lead to working on different >>>> details. As usual, it is not possible to study everything about one >>>> object of study. We have to make difficult choices regarding >>>> aspects >>>> and depth: what to study first, what to defer, and what to skip. >>>> >>>> Barker had a lot of conflicts with main stream psychologists (not >>>> activity theorists). I have heard from Bob Bechtel (a student of >>>> Barker) >>>> that psychologists were telling Barker: Roger, you think just >>>> like a >>>> sociologist, which in psychological parlance meant Roger, you are a >>>> SOB. >>>> This illustrates the disciplinary biases and divisions. >>>> >>>> Best wishes, >>>> >>>> Lubomir >>>> >>>> Lubomir Popov, Ph.D. >>>> School of Family and Consumer Sciences American Culture Studies >>>> Affiliated Faculty Bowling Green State University >>>> 309 Johnston Hall, >>>> Bowling Green, Ohio 43403-0059 >>>> Lspopov@bgsu.edu >>>> 419.372.7835 >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> > > Clifford R. O'Donnell, Ph.D. > Professor Emeritus > Past-President, Society for Community Research and Action (APA > Division 27) > > University of Hawai'i > Department of Psychology > 2530 Dole Street > Honolulu, HI 96822 > > > > > > > > Clifford R. O'Donnell, Ph.D. Professor Emeritus Past-President, Society for Community Research and Action (APA Division 27) University of Hawai?i Department of Psychology 2530 Dole Street Honolulu, HI 96822 From cliffo@hawaii.edu Tue Aug 13 19:57:28 2013 From: cliffo@hawaii.edu (Cliff O'Donnell) Date: Tue, 13 Aug 2013 16:57:28 -1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Activity Setting In-Reply-To: <520AE206.9030105@mira.net> References: <393FDE85-EFCF-48E6-96E0-6ED970A4DD80@hawaii.edu> <520AE206.9030105@mira.net> Message-ID: <677393EE-FCF8-4A94-8F11-E2922F308E28@hawaii.edu> Andy, regarding your points about material artifacts: > I note that in Cliff's definition the material artefacts are never > named as part of culture, focussing instead on shared meanings. Please see the inclusion of artifacts on page 23 of our article: "Culture is expressed in language, speech patterns, artifacts, music, values, and behavioral norms. Different cultural patterns can be considered variations displaying arrays of human characteristics (Tharp 2007 ?2008). ??Culture, then, is not about groups of people? Rather, the focus should be on the implicit and explicit patterns of meanings, practices, and artifacts distributed throughout the contexts in which people participate, and on how people are engaged,? or changed?? (Markus and Hamedani 2007 , pp. 11?12). Cultural communities, of course, are not static and shared meanings evolve with changes in history and social, political, and economic systems." > The material foundation of collaboration is a very important aspect > of activity. No one is suggesting an absence of a material foundation in activity settings. They must exist in a physical environment. In the 1990 chapter I referenced earlier, we analyzed activity settings "in terms of six components: a physical environment, time, funds, positions, people, and symbols. These components are the resources among which the activity of the setting is generated, maintained, and centered." > I guess I take "community" as indexing all the people sharing that > culture through shared activities. On that point, we agree. We define community by shared activities. Cliff Clifford R. O'Donnell, Ph.D. Professor Emeritus Past-President, Society for Community Research and Action (APA Division 27) University of Hawai?i Department of Psychology 2530 Dole Street Honolulu, HI 96822 From lpscholar2@gmail.com Tue Aug 13 20:30:08 2013 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Tue, 13 Aug 2013 20:30:08 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Activity Setting: Shared Meaning In-Reply-To: References: <1F3A303FB8B8A9429CE2720B7C8D4B7338148913@BY2PRD0610MB354.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: Cliff, To further reflect on the other central term *intersubjectivity* within the article. In the native community the adults observed the youth and reflected from a distance and composed reasons [within the adult conversations] ABOUT the youth. John Shotter would describe that type of knowing [knowing-that] The youth also reflected on the adults and composed reasons why they were turning away from the adult community [knowing-that] Shotter is drawing our attention to a realm of intersubjectity which occurs as [knowing from within]. This is not an intersubjectivity that is formed [past tense as reflected intersubjectivity]. It is an intersubjectivity forming within our ways of talking as direct conversation [con=with] This is reminiscent of Mead's conception of "calling out the response of the other" Alfred Schultz also explored *intersubjectivity* as a situation of elliptical communicative practices: one situation, two subjective perspectives. Schultz assumed the two subjects within the situation if sharing complementary or common purposes would relegate the coexisting individual differences to the background as the communicative common situation *constitutes* a "we-relationship. Notice the highlighting of the relational we-relationship as primaryand not highlighting the *I* or the *other*. Schultz said it was in the face to face TURNING towards the other [and the other responding by turning] which constituted the *we-relationship* within the action of intentionally turning toward the other. I read Mead, Schultz, Shotter, exploring a different realm of forming intersubjectivity in contrast to formed intersubjectivity. Schultz used the term *intercommunication* to draw attention to the contrast of focusing on one way communication [knowing-that, or knowing-how] on the one hand, TOWARDS what he, Mead, and Shotter are privileging as *knowing-within* as we-relationship. The act of each turning toward the other as reciprocal intersubjective forming within conversation contrasts with the reflective [past] awareness of formed intersubjectivity as we come to share common meanings and goals. The quality Mead is presenting [calling out the response of the other by turning toward the other] I read as a *moral question* about how we ought to respond to the call of the other. This is an intersubjective conception but may emphasize another aspect of intersubjectivity. Community and culture within this understanding of intersubjectivity must include both shared meanings, shared activities, but also include how culture and community encourage calling out and turning towards the call and responding. Cliff, the question of intersubjectivity [forming and formed] within activity settings, which brings in other discourses [genres] exploring intersubjectivity may be my own idiosyncratic perspective. Shared meaning may form when perception and action are mediated TROUGH affective turning towards the other, as well as shared activities where activity develops shared meanings. I sense the forming and formed intersubjectivity as complementary but wanted to bring to the fore another realm of knowing. What Shotter calls knowing of a third kind [knowing from within as a moral activity] Larry On Tue, Aug 13, 2013 at 7:21 PM, Cliff O'Donnell wrote: > Thanks for your thoughts, Lubomir and David. We agree that community and > culture can be defined many ways for different purposes. One of the > purposes of our article was to invite others to offer ways that they would > unite the concepts. We also agree that individuals in the same cultural > community may differ in their personal understanding of the shared meanings > of the cultural community, just as individuals differ in their skills, > thoughts, experiences, and emotions. All of us are a combination of the > cultures of gender, age, ethnicity, sexual orientation, social economic > status, etc. > > In our formulation, defining community by shared activities allows the > assessment of communities by the degree and attributes of the activities > they share. Also, defining culture by shared meanings allows the assessment > of cultures by the meanings they share. In our example of the youth and > adults in a Native American community, the activities and meanings of those > activities differed dramatically between the youth and adults. The > difference was so pronounced that the groups formed different cultural > communities, even though they all lived in the same small town and were all > from the same Native American tribe. Knowledge of their activities and > shared meanings was essential in developing an intervention plan and is an > example of cultural community psychology using CHAT concepts. > > Thanks again for your contributions to this discussion. > > Cliff > > > On Aug 13, 2013, at 11:50 AM, David H Kirshner wrote: > > Just to add a thought on the tricky notion of "shared meaning" that >> Lubomir focusses on in discussion of culture and community; it seems >> important to differentiate shared meaning from shared understanding. What >> is shared in a culture or community are categories of meaning. Individuals >> who are participants in the culture, or members of the community, may draw >> quite differently from the shared categories in constructing personal >> understandings. To push this a bit further, we might say that a culture may >> be comprised of (or may encompass) a range of discrete categories or >> paradigms of meaning. Cultures can be distinguished from one another by >> substantially different constellations of categories. However, communities, >> as more local entities constituted within cultures, are defined in terms of >> a politics of interpretation. Personal understandings within a community >> are bounded by community norms regarding appropriate categories of meaning >> that can be drawn upon with respect to those critical matters of interest >> that define the community. >> >> David >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.**edu [mailto: >> xmca-l-bounces@**mailman.ucsd.edu ] On >> Behalf Of Lubomir Savov Popov >> Sent: Tuesday, August 13, 2013 1:25 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Activity Setting >> >> Dear Cliff, >> >> Just to respond to your request: >> You have good grounds for the integration of culture and community. In >> sociology and anthropology, it is pretty common to treat a community as a >> culture. On the other hand, a culture can or might define a community, >> build cohesion, we-feeling, etc. Of course, the >> definition/conceptualization of community is very complex, but I am talking >> only in respect to the question you formulated. >> >> Culture can be conceptualized in the framework of the subject; in the >> framework of activity, and as on object of study by itself. Culture is also >> materialized in the object of activity, but this forms a different plane of >> study. Other options are possible too. I need to keep short here. >> >> Community can be conceptualized as an activity system, as a culture, as a >> social group, etc., depending on the scholarly objectives. When community >> is conceptualized as an activity system, culture can be treated as an >> inherent component of activity. However, this is not the only way to treat >> culture in this situation. I just mention this one. Culture is about shared >> meanings, but it is also more than shared meanings. Of course, you can keep >> that shared meaning definition if you interpret many other components as >> shared or shared meanings. >> >> You focus on the development of shared meanings in shared activities. >> However, the concept of community can be delineated with different foci >> depending on the scholarly objectives. We cannot describe or analyze all >> aspects of a phenomenon. We have to select several. I mean when we are >> interdisciplinary. Otherwise, we select only one aspect that is core for a >> particular discipline or a research goal. >> >> Community is a very complex category. It stands for many types of social >> groups and also for many other social and cultural phenomena. I will stop >> here. >> >> Best wishes, >> >> Lubomir >> >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.**edu [mailto: >> xmca-l-bounces@**mailman.ucsd.edu ] On >> Behalf Of Cliff O'Donnell >> Sent: Tuesday, August 13, 2013 2:06 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Activity Setting >> >> Thanks, Larry. You are highlighting a key point in our article. >> Quoting again, >> >> "If we define community by shared activity and culture by shared >> meanings, the basis for a theoretical integration of the concepts of >> community and culture into cultural community psychology becomes apparent. >> The key concept needed for such integration is one that can show how shared >> meanings develop from shared activities. That key concept is >> intersubjectivity." (p. 23) >> >> Following up on that point, we would greatly appreciate the thoughts of >> the XMCA group on the value of integrating the concepts of culture and >> community. Our article presents the implications of doing so for cultural >> community psychology. What implications does the XMCA group see for CHAT? >> >> Cliff >> >> On Aug 13, 2013, at 7:36 AM, Larry Purss wrote: >> >> Cliff, >>> The shift from the individual TO *intersubjective* within activity >>> settings seems central. >>> As we explore activity settings, *inter-subjectivity* is also a >>> central term Larry >>> >>> >>> On Mon, Aug 12, 2013 at 11:01 PM, Cliff O'Donnell >>> wrote: >>> >>> Thank you for your response, Lubomir. Roger Barker was an important >>>> influence on my thinking earlier in my career. His work is highly >>>> respected in community psychology. Quoting from our article, here is >>>> the distinction we see between behavior setting and activity setting: >>>> >>>> "The subjective focus of activity settings distinguishes them from >>>> the behavior settings developed by Barker >>>> (1960 , 1968 ). In behavior settings, the focus is on objective molar >>>> behavior specified by time and place. Behaviors are defined by the >>>> roles or positions of people in the setting and activity is used to >>>> coordinate their behaviors. Suggestions have been made to alter >>>> behavior setting theory to include a wider range of individual >>>> behaviors, cognitions, and interventions in the setting (e.g., Luke >>>> et al. 1991 ; Schoggen >>>> 1989 ; Wicker 1987 ). In contrast, activity setting theory unifies >>>> the objective and subjective by showing how activity is influenced >>>> and intersubjectivity developed. >>>> Rather than a collection of individual behaviors and cognitions, >>>> intersubjectivity develops as a setting characteristic that becomes >>>> the shared meanings of culture and provides the basis for cultural >>>> community psychology." (p. 24) >>>> >>>> For a more thorough presentation of our use of the concept of >>>> activity setting, please see: >>>> >>>> O'Donnell, C. R. & Tharp, R. G. (1990). Community intervention guided >>>> by theoretical developments. In A. S. Bellack, M. Hersen, & A. E. >>>> Kazdin (Eds.), International handbook of behavior modification and >>>> therapy, 2nd Edition (pp. 251-266). New York: Plenum Press. >>>> >>>> Cliff >>>> >>>> Clifford R. O'Donnell, Ph.D. >>>> Professor Emeritus >>>> Past-President, Society for Community Research and Action (APA >>>> Division 27) >>>> >>>> University of Hawai'i >>>> Department of Psychology >>>> 2530 Dole Street >>>> Honolulu, HI 96822 >>>> >>>> >>>> On Aug 12, 2013, at 7:12 AM, Lubomir Savov Popov wrote: >>>> >>>> Hi Andy, >>>> >>>>> >>>>> I am also interested to find the term "activity setting" in >>>>> Vigotsky's writings or those of his followers, including everyone in >>>>> the East European activity theory tradition. I would appreciate >>>>> articles or specific references and page numbers. I need this to >>>>> anchor some ideas and to pay tribute to earlier theorists if they >>>>> have worked on this. >>>>> >>>>> I am also interested if there are people on this list who work on >>>>> the development of the concept of activity setting or on activity >>>>> theory in relation to the planning and design of built environment. >>>>> They can contact me at the e-mail below my signature or via this >>>>> list, whichever is more convenient. I was going to make such a >>>>> request on this list some time ago, but now is a good occasion for >>>>> this. >>>>> >>>>> To my knowledge, no one in the East European activity theory >>>>> tradition has used the term "activity setting," at least till the >>>>> late 1980s. If I have missed something, it is good to catch up. >>>>> >>>>> I personally work (on and off) on the concept of activity setting >>>>> since the early 1980s. However, I develop it as a methodological >>>>> category for the study of built environment. I have to acknowledge >>>>> that I got the idea for activity setting from Roger Barker's >>>>> "behavior setting." At that time, in East Europe, the concept of >>>>> behavior was considered one-sided and with less explanatory power >>>>> than the concept of activity. There was no way to introduce the >>>>> behavior setting concept without setting the reaction of mainstream >>>>> social scientists. Even if someone dared to suggest the behavior >>>>> setting concept in an article, the reviewers will automatically >>>>> recommend to rework it as "activity setting." In East European >>>>> social science of that time, behavior referred mostly to the >>>>> visible, mechanistic aspects of activity or in the sense of >>>>> "demeanor." >>>>> >>>>> Bob Bechtel has done a good work in the early 1980 expanding on >>>>> Barker's behavior setting, operationalizing his ideas for the field >>>>> of Environment and Behavior (Architecture and Human Behavior; >>>>> Man-Environment Systems). >>>>> However, this work didn't continue. On the other hand, at that time, >>>>> it was too early to talk about activity settings in the USA. It is >>>>> early even now, in particular in the field of Environment and >>>>> Behavior. Many people in that field resent the idea of ditching >>>>> behavior for activity. They believe that the concept of behavior >>>>> setting is good enough and there is no need to introduce one more >>>>> concept of similar kind. >>>>> >>>>> In relation to the field of Environment and Behavior, I personally >>>>> believe that Barker has offered very useful ideas and they can >>>>> become a stepping stone for developing the concept of activity >>>>> setting. The activity setting concept will allow us to use the >>>>> apparatus of activity theory which is more powerful than the concept >>>>> of behavior. I also believe that the development of the activity >>>>> setting theory for the fields of teaching or management or social >>>>> work and community building will be somewhat different. Their focus >>>>> will be different and this will lead to working on different >>>>> details. As usual, it is not possible to study everything about one >>>>> object of study. We have to make difficult choices regarding aspects >>>>> and depth: what to study first, what to defer, and what to skip. >>>>> >>>>> Barker had a lot of conflicts with main stream psychologists (not >>>>> activity theorists). I have heard from Bob Bechtel (a student of >>>>> Barker) >>>>> that psychologists were telling Barker: Roger, you think just like a >>>>> sociologist, which in psychological parlance meant Roger, you are a >>>>> SOB. >>>>> This illustrates the disciplinary biases and divisions. >>>>> >>>>> Best wishes, >>>>> >>>>> Lubomir >>>>> >>>>> Lubomir Popov, Ph.D. >>>>> School of Family and Consumer Sciences American Culture Studies >>>>> Affiliated Faculty Bowling Green State University >>>>> 309 Johnston Hall, >>>>> Bowling Green, Ohio 43403-0059 >>>>> Lspopov@bgsu.edu >>>>> 419.372.7835 >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >> Clifford R. O'Donnell, Ph.D. >> Professor Emeritus >> Past-President, Society for Community Research and Action (APA >> Division 27) >> >> University of Hawai'i >> Department of Psychology >> 2530 Dole Street >> Honolulu, HI 96822 >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > Clifford R. O'Donnell, Ph.D. > Professor Emeritus > Past-President, Society for Community Research and Action (APA Division 27) > > University of Hawai?i > Department of Psychology > 2530 Dole Street > Honolulu, HI 96822 > > > From ablunden@mira.net Tue Aug 13 20:54:21 2013 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2013 13:54:21 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Activity Setting In-Reply-To: <677393EE-FCF8-4A94-8F11-E2922F308E28@hawaii.edu> References: <393FDE85-EFCF-48E6-96E0-6ED970A4DD80@hawaii.edu> <520AE206.9030105@mira.net> <677393EE-FCF8-4A94-8F11-E2922F308E28@hawaii.edu> Message-ID: <520AFF6D.5090608@mira.net> Oh! I stand corrected, Cliff. In the context of the extreme polysemny of "culture" I don't think you could have done better in that definition. What I am left wondering about is your observation in the context of the intervention in the American Indigenous community that "the groups (adults on one hand and youth on the other) formed different cultural communities." Is the "cultural" qualification to "communities" the operative word in this surprising claim? I.e., they belong to the same community, but not the same "cultural community"? It is quite the norm, isn't it, for such chisms to exist within communities. Andy Cliff O'Donnell wrote: > Andy, regarding your points about material artifacts: > >> I note that in Cliff's definition the material artefacts are never >> named as part of culture, focussing instead on shared meanings. > > Please see the inclusion of artifacts on page 23 of our article: > > "Culture is expressed in language, speech patterns, artifacts, > music, values, and behavioral norms. Different cultural > patterns can be considered variations displaying arrays of > human characteristics (Tharp 2007 ?2008). ??Culture, then, > is not about groups of people? Rather, the focus should be > on the implicit and explicit patterns of meanings, practices, > and artifacts distributed throughout the contexts in which > people participate, and on how people are engaged,? or > changed?? (Markus and Hamedani 2007 , pp. 11?12). Cultural > communities, of course, are not static and shared > meanings evolve with changes in history and social, > political, and economic systems." > >> The material foundation of collaboration is a very important aspect >> of activity. > > No one is suggesting an absence of a material foundation in > activity settings. They must exist in a physical environment. In the > 1990 chapter I referenced earlier, we analyzed activity settings "in > terms of six components: a physical environment, time, funds, > positions, people, and symbols. These components are the resources > among which the activity of the setting is generated, maintained, and > centered." > >> I guess I take "community" as indexing all the people sharing that >> culture through shared activities. > > On that point, we agree. We define community by shared activities. > > Cliff > > Clifford R. O'Donnell, Ph.D. > Professor Emeritus > Past-President, Society for Community Research and Action (APA > Division 27) > > University of Hawai?i > Department of Psychology > 2530 Dole Street > Honolulu, HI 96822 > > > -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts http://marxists.academia.edu/AndyBlunden From cliffo@hawaii.edu Tue Aug 13 21:33:04 2013 From: cliffo@hawaii.edu (Cliff O'Donnell) Date: Tue, 13 Aug 2013 18:33:04 -1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Activity Setting: Shared Meaning In-Reply-To: References: <1F3A303FB8B8A9429CE2720B7C8D4B7338148913@BY2PRD0610MB354.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: I appreciate your contribution to this discussion, Larry. Putting on my community psychology hat, help me understand whether we would have developed a different intervention plan if we used forming instead of formed intersubjectivity. Or if not in that situation, are there other interventions where it would make a difference? Cliff On Aug 13, 2013, at 5:30 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > Cliff, > > To further reflect on the other central term *intersubjectivity* > within the > article. In the native community the adults observed the youth and > reflected from a distance and composed reasons [within the adult > conversations] ABOUT the youth. John Shotter would describe that > type of > knowing [knowing-that] The youth also reflected on the adults and > composed > reasons why they were turning away from the adult community [knowing- > that] > Shotter is drawing our attention to a realm of intersubjectity which > occurs > as [knowing from within]. This is not an intersubjectivity that is > formed > [past tense as reflected intersubjectivity]. It is an > intersubjectivity > forming within our ways of talking as direct conversation [con=with] > This is reminiscent of Mead's conception of "calling out the > response of > the other" > Alfred Schultz also explored *intersubjectivity* as a situation of > elliptical communicative practices: one situation, two subjective > perspectives. Schultz assumed the two subjects within the situation if > sharing complementary or common purposes would relegate the coexisting > individual differences to the background as the communicative common > situation *constitutes* a "we-relationship. Notice the highlighting > of the > relational we-relationship as primaryand not highlighting the *I* or > the > *other*. > Schultz said it was in the face to face TURNING towards the other > [and the > other responding by turning] which constituted the *we-relationship* > within > the action of intentionally turning toward the other. > I read Mead, Schultz, Shotter, exploring a different realm of forming > intersubjectivity in contrast to formed intersubjectivity. > > Schultz used the term *intercommunication* to draw attention to the > contrast of focusing on one way communication [knowing-that, or > knowing-how] on the one hand, TOWARDS what he, Mead, and Shotter are > privileging as *knowing-within* as we-relationship. > > The act of each turning toward the other as reciprocal > intersubjective > forming within conversation contrasts with the reflective [past] > awareness > of formed intersubjectivity as we come to share common meanings and > goals. > > The quality Mead is presenting [calling out the response of the > other by > turning toward the other] I read as a *moral question* about how we > ought > to respond to the call of the other. This is an intersubjective > conception > but may emphasize another aspect of intersubjectivity. > > Community and culture within this understanding of intersubjectivity > must > include both shared meanings, shared activities, but also include how > culture and community encourage calling out and turning towards the > call > and responding. > > Cliff, the question of intersubjectivity [forming and formed] within > activity settings, which brings in other discourses [genres] exploring > intersubjectivity may be my own idiosyncratic perspective. Shared > meaning > may form when perception and action are mediated TROUGH affective > turning > towards the other, as well as shared activities where activity > develops > shared meanings. I sense the forming and formed intersubjectivity as > complementary but wanted to bring to the fore another realm of > knowing. > What Shotter calls knowing of a third kind [knowing from within as a > moral > activity] > Larry > > > > > On Tue, Aug 13, 2013 at 7:21 PM, Cliff O'Donnell > wrote: > >> Thanks for your thoughts, Lubomir and David. We agree that >> community and >> culture can be defined many ways for different purposes. One of the >> purposes of our article was to invite others to offer ways that >> they would >> unite the concepts. We also agree that individuals in the same >> cultural >> community may differ in their personal understanding of the shared >> meanings >> of the cultural community, just as individuals differ in their >> skills, >> thoughts, experiences, and emotions. All of us are a combination of >> the >> cultures of gender, age, ethnicity, sexual orientation, social >> economic >> status, etc. >> >> In our formulation, defining community by shared activities allows >> the >> assessment of communities by the degree and attributes of the >> activities >> they share. Also, defining culture by shared meanings allows the >> assessment >> of cultures by the meanings they share. In our example of the youth >> and >> adults in a Native American community, the activities and meanings >> of those >> activities differed dramatically between the youth and adults. The >> difference was so pronounced that the groups formed different >> cultural >> communities, even though they all lived in the same small town and >> were all >> from the same Native American tribe. Knowledge of their activities >> and >> shared meanings was essential in developing an intervention plan >> and is an >> example of cultural community psychology using CHAT concepts. >> >> Thanks again for your contributions to this discussion. >> >> Cliff >> >> >> On Aug 13, 2013, at 11:50 AM, David H Kirshner wrote: >> >> Just to add a thought on the tricky notion of "shared meaning" that >>> Lubomir focusses on in discussion of culture and community; it seems >>> important to differentiate shared meaning from shared >>> understanding. What >>> is shared in a culture or community are categories of meaning. >>> Individuals >>> who are participants in the culture, or members of the community, >>> may draw >>> quite differently from the shared categories in constructing >>> personal >>> understandings. To push this a bit further, we might say that a >>> culture may >>> be comprised of (or may encompass) a range of discrete categories or >>> paradigms of meaning. Cultures can be distinguished from one >>> another by >>> substantially different constellations of categories. However, >>> communities, >>> as more local entities constituted within cultures, are defined in >>> terms of >>> a politics of interpretation. Personal understandings within a >>> community >>> are bounded by community norms regarding appropriate categories of >>> meaning >>> that can be drawn upon with respect to those critical matters of >>> interest >>> that define the community. >>> >>> David >>> >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.**edu >> >[mailto: >>> xmca-l-bounces@**mailman.ucsd.edu >> bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>] On >>> Behalf Of Lubomir Savov Popov >>> Sent: Tuesday, August 13, 2013 1:25 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Activity Setting >>> >>> Dear Cliff, >>> >>> Just to respond to your request: >>> You have good grounds for the integration of culture and >>> community. In >>> sociology and anthropology, it is pretty common to treat a >>> community as a >>> culture. On the other hand, a culture can or might define a >>> community, >>> build cohesion, we-feeling, etc. Of course, the >>> definition/conceptualization of community is very complex, but I >>> am talking >>> only in respect to the question you formulated. >>> >>> Culture can be conceptualized in the framework of the subject; in >>> the >>> framework of activity, and as on object of study by itself. >>> Culture is also >>> materialized in the object of activity, but this forms a different >>> plane of >>> study. Other options are possible too. I need to keep short here. >>> >>> Community can be conceptualized as an activity system, as a >>> culture, as a >>> social group, etc., depending on the scholarly objectives. When >>> community >>> is conceptualized as an activity system, culture can be treated as >>> an >>> inherent component of activity. However, this is not the only way >>> to treat >>> culture in this situation. I just mention this one. Culture is >>> about shared >>> meanings, but it is also more than shared meanings. Of course, you >>> can keep >>> that shared meaning definition if you interpret many other >>> components as >>> shared or shared meanings. >>> >>> You focus on the development of shared meanings in shared >>> activities. >>> However, the concept of community can be delineated with different >>> foci >>> depending on the scholarly objectives. We cannot describe or >>> analyze all >>> aspects of a phenomenon. We have to select several. I mean when we >>> are >>> interdisciplinary. Otherwise, we select only one aspect that is >>> core for a >>> particular discipline or a research goal. >>> >>> Community is a very complex category. It stands for many types of >>> social >>> groups and also for many other social and cultural phenomena. I >>> will stop >>> here. >>> >>> Best wishes, >>> >>> Lubomir >>> >>> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.**edu >> >[mailto: >>> xmca-l-bounces@**mailman.ucsd.edu >> bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>] On >>> Behalf Of Cliff O'Donnell >>> Sent: Tuesday, August 13, 2013 2:06 PM >>> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >>> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Activity Setting >>> >>> Thanks, Larry. You are highlighting a key point in our article. >>> Quoting again, >>> >>> "If we define community by shared activity and culture by shared >>> meanings, the basis for a theoretical integration of the concepts of >>> community and culture into cultural community psychology becomes >>> apparent. >>> The key concept needed for such integration is one that can show >>> how shared >>> meanings develop from shared activities. That key concept is >>> intersubjectivity." (p. 23) >>> >>> Following up on that point, we would greatly appreciate the >>> thoughts of >>> the XMCA group on the value of integrating the concepts of culture >>> and >>> community. Our article presents the implications of doing so for >>> cultural >>> community psychology. What implications does the XMCA group see >>> for CHAT? >>> >>> Cliff >>> >>> On Aug 13, 2013, at 7:36 AM, Larry Purss wrote: >>> >>> Cliff, >>>> The shift from the individual TO *intersubjective* within activity >>>> settings seems central. >>>> As we explore activity settings, *inter-subjectivity* is also a >>>> central term Larry >>>> >>>> >>>> On Mon, Aug 12, 2013 at 11:01 PM, Cliff O'Donnell >>> > >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Thank you for your response, Lubomir. Roger Barker was an important >>>>> influence on my thinking earlier in my career. His work is highly >>>>> respected in community psychology. Quoting from our article, >>>>> here is >>>>> the distinction we see between behavior setting and activity >>>>> setting: >>>>> >>>>> "The subjective focus of activity settings distinguishes them from >>>>> the behavior settings developed by Barker >>>>> (1960 , 1968 ). In behavior settings, the focus is on objective >>>>> molar >>>>> behavior specified by time and place. Behaviors are defined by the >>>>> roles or positions of people in the setting and activity is used >>>>> to >>>>> coordinate their behaviors. Suggestions have been made to alter >>>>> behavior setting theory to include a wider range of individual >>>>> behaviors, cognitions, and interventions in the setting (e.g., >>>>> Luke >>>>> et al. 1991 ; Schoggen >>>>> 1989 ; Wicker 1987 ). In contrast, activity setting theory unifies >>>>> the objective and subjective by showing how activity is influenced >>>>> and intersubjectivity developed. >>>>> Rather than a collection of individual behaviors and cognitions, >>>>> intersubjectivity develops as a setting characteristic that >>>>> becomes >>>>> the shared meanings of culture and provides the basis for cultural >>>>> community psychology." (p. 24) >>>>> >>>>> For a more thorough presentation of our use of the concept of >>>>> activity setting, please see: >>>>> >>>>> O'Donnell, C. R. & Tharp, R. G. (1990). Community intervention >>>>> guided >>>>> by theoretical developments. In A. S. Bellack, M. Hersen, & A. E. >>>>> Kazdin (Eds.), International handbook of behavior modification and >>>>> therapy, 2nd Edition (pp. 251-266). New York: Plenum Press. >>>>> >>>>> Cliff >>>>> >>>>> Clifford R. O'Donnell, Ph.D. >>>>> Professor Emeritus >>>>> Past-President, Society for Community Research and Action (APA >>>>> Division 27) >>>>> >>>>> University of Hawai'i >>>>> Department of Psychology >>>>> 2530 Dole Street >>>>> Honolulu, HI 96822 >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Aug 12, 2013, at 7:12 AM, Lubomir Savov Popov wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Hi Andy, >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> I am also interested to find the term "activity setting" in >>>>>> Vigotsky's writings or those of his followers, including >>>>>> everyone in >>>>>> the East European activity theory tradition. I would appreciate >>>>>> articles or specific references and page numbers. I need this to >>>>>> anchor some ideas and to pay tribute to earlier theorists if they >>>>>> have worked on this. >>>>>> >>>>>> I am also interested if there are people on this list who work on >>>>>> the development of the concept of activity setting or on activity >>>>>> theory in relation to the planning and design of built >>>>>> environment. >>>>>> They can contact me at the e-mail below my signature or via this >>>>>> list, whichever is more convenient. I was going to make such a >>>>>> request on this list some time ago, but now is a good occasion >>>>>> for >>>>>> this. >>>>>> >>>>>> To my knowledge, no one in the East European activity theory >>>>>> tradition has used the term "activity setting," at least till the >>>>>> late 1980s. If I have missed something, it is good to catch up. >>>>>> >>>>>> I personally work (on and off) on the concept of activity setting >>>>>> since the early 1980s. However, I develop it as a methodological >>>>>> category for the study of built environment. I have to >>>>>> acknowledge >>>>>> that I got the idea for activity setting from Roger Barker's >>>>>> "behavior setting." At that time, in East Europe, the concept of >>>>>> behavior was considered one-sided and with less explanatory power >>>>>> than the concept of activity. There was no way to introduce the >>>>>> behavior setting concept without setting the reaction of >>>>>> mainstream >>>>>> social scientists. Even if someone dared to suggest the behavior >>>>>> setting concept in an article, the reviewers will automatically >>>>>> recommend to rework it as "activity setting." In East European >>>>>> social science of that time, behavior referred mostly to the >>>>>> visible, mechanistic aspects of activity or in the sense of >>>>>> "demeanor." >>>>>> >>>>>> Bob Bechtel has done a good work in the early 1980 expanding on >>>>>> Barker's behavior setting, operationalizing his ideas for the >>>>>> field >>>>>> of Environment and Behavior (Architecture and Human Behavior; >>>>>> Man-Environment Systems). >>>>>> However, this work didn't continue. On the other hand, at that >>>>>> time, >>>>>> it was too early to talk about activity settings in the USA. It >>>>>> is >>>>>> early even now, in particular in the field of Environment and >>>>>> Behavior. Many people in that field resent the idea of ditching >>>>>> behavior for activity. They believe that the concept of behavior >>>>>> setting is good enough and there is no need to introduce one more >>>>>> concept of similar kind. >>>>>> >>>>>> In relation to the field of Environment and Behavior, I >>>>>> personally >>>>>> believe that Barker has offered very useful ideas and they can >>>>>> become a stepping stone for developing the concept of activity >>>>>> setting. The activity setting concept will allow us to use the >>>>>> apparatus of activity theory which is more powerful than the >>>>>> concept >>>>>> of behavior. I also believe that the development of the activity >>>>>> setting theory for the fields of teaching or management or social >>>>>> work and community building will be somewhat different. Their >>>>>> focus >>>>>> will be different and this will lead to working on different >>>>>> details. As usual, it is not possible to study everything about >>>>>> one >>>>>> object of study. We have to make difficult choices regarding >>>>>> aspects >>>>>> and depth: what to study first, what to defer, and what to skip. >>>>>> >>>>>> Barker had a lot of conflicts with main stream psychologists (not >>>>>> activity theorists). I have heard from Bob Bechtel (a student of >>>>>> Barker) >>>>>> that psychologists were telling Barker: Roger, you think just >>>>>> like a >>>>>> sociologist, which in psychological parlance meant Roger, you >>>>>> are a >>>>>> SOB. >>>>>> This illustrates the disciplinary biases and divisions. >>>>>> >>>>>> Best wishes, >>>>>> >>>>>> Lubomir >>>>>> >>>>>> Lubomir Popov, Ph.D. >>>>>> School of Family and Consumer Sciences American Culture Studies >>>>>> Affiliated Faculty Bowling Green State University >>>>>> 309 Johnston Hall, >>>>>> Bowling Green, Ohio 43403-0059 >>>>>> Lspopov@bgsu.edu >>>>>> 419.372.7835 >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>> Clifford R. O'Donnell, Ph.D. >>> Professor Emeritus >>> Past-President, Society for Community Research and Action (APA >>> Division 27) >>> >>> University of Hawai'i >>> Department of Psychology >>> 2530 Dole Street >>> Honolulu, HI 96822 >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> Clifford R. O'Donnell, Ph.D. >> Professor Emeritus >> Past-President, Society for Community Research and Action (APA >> Division 27) >> >> University of Hawai?i >> Department of Psychology >> 2530 Dole Street >> Honolulu, HI 96822 >> >> >> Clifford R. O'Donnell, Ph.D. Professor Emeritus Past-President, Society for Community Research and Action (APA Division 27) University of Hawai?i Department of Psychology 2530 Dole Street Honolulu, HI 96822 From cliffo@hawaii.edu Tue Aug 13 21:48:14 2013 From: cliffo@hawaii.edu (Cliff O'Donnell) Date: Tue, 13 Aug 2013 18:48:14 -1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Activity Setting In-Reply-To: <520AFF6D.5090608@mira.net> References: <393FDE85-EFCF-48E6-96E0-6ED970A4DD80@hawaii.edu> <520AE206.9030105@mira.net> <677393EE-FCF8-4A94-8F11-E2922F308E28@hawaii.edu> <520AFF6D.5090608@mira.net> Message-ID: <94019118-330E-4A70-8FC5-AC7186A4331C@hawaii.edu> > What I am left wondering about is your observation in the context of > the intervention in the American Indigenous community that "the > groups (adults on one hand and youth on the other) formed different > cultural communities." Is the "cultural" qualification to > "communities" the operative word in this surprising claim? I.e., > they belong to the same community, but not the same "cultural > community"? They belong to, i.e. live in, the same town, but not the same cultural communities. They participate in mostly different activity settings and have developed different shared meanings. Even when they are participating in the same general activity, say a birthday party, they still group with their own youth/adults and often have a different shared meaning of the event (as when female youth see adult men becoming intoxicated at the party and expect sexual abuse to follow). > It is quite the norm, isn't it, for such chisms to exist within > communities. Yes, it is common for different groups to vary, sometimes dramatically, in the activity settings in which they participate. This phenomena can then be useful as an indicator of different cultural communities within the same town, high school, etc. Cliff Clifford R. O'Donnell, Ph.D. Professor Emeritus Past-President, Society for Community Research and Action (APA Division 27) University of Hawai?i Department of Psychology 2530 Dole Street Honolulu, HI 96822 From carolmacdon@gmail.com Tue Aug 13 22:17:50 2013 From: carolmacdon@gmail.com (carolmacdon@gmail.com) Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2013 05:17:50 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Activity Setting In-Reply-To: <94019118-330E-4A70-8FC5-AC7186A4331C@hawaii.edu> References: <393FDE85-EFCF-48E6-96E0-6ED970A4DD80@hawaii.edu> <520AE206.9030105@mira.net> <677393EE-FCF8-4A94-8F11-E2922F308E28@hawaii.edu> <520AFF6D.5090608@mira.net> <94019118-330E-4A70-8FC5-AC7186A4331C@hawaii.edu> Message-ID: <650486391-1376457468-cardhu_decombobulator_blackberry.rim.net-828212652-@b2.c11.bise7.blackberry> Cliff They share the concept of birthday party so for Andy that would count as shared meaning in a culture. Sure they see it differently but there is an overlap. Carol Sent via my BlackBerry from Vodacom - let your email find you! -----Original Message----- From: "Cliff O'Donnell" Sender: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu Date: Tue, 13 Aug 2013 18:48:14 To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Reply-To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Activity Setting > What I am left wondering about is your observation in the context of > the intervention in the American Indigenous community that "the > groups (adults on one hand and youth on the other) formed different > cultural communities." Is the "cultural" qualification to > "communities" the operative word in this surprising claim? I.e., > they belong to the same community, but not the same "cultural > community"? They belong to, i.e. live in, the same town, but not the same cultural communities. They participate in mostly different activity settings and have developed different shared meanings. Even when they are participating in the same general activity, say a birthday party, they still group with their own youth/adults and often have a different shared meaning of the event (as when female youth see adult men becoming intoxicated at the party and expect sexual abuse to follow). > It is quite the norm, isn't it, for such chisms to exist within > communities. Yes, it is common for different groups to vary, sometimes dramatically, in the activity settings in which they participate. This phenomena can then be useful as an indicator of different cultural communities within the same town, high school, etc. Cliff Clifford R. O'Donnell, Ph.D. Professor Emeritus Past-President, Society for Community Research and Action (APA Division 27) University of Hawai?i Department of Psychology 2530 Dole Street Honolulu, HI 96822 From ablunden@mira.net Tue Aug 13 23:03:30 2013 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2013 16:03:30 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Activity Setting In-Reply-To: <650486391-1376457468-cardhu_decombobulator_blackberry.rim.net-828212652-@b2.c11.bise7.blackberry> References: <393FDE85-EFCF-48E6-96E0-6ED970A4DD80@hawaii.edu> <520AE206.9030105@mira.net> <677393EE-FCF8-4A94-8F11-E2922F308E28@hawaii.edu> <520AFF6D.5090608@mira.net> <94019118-330E-4A70-8FC5-AC7186A4331C@hawaii.edu> <650486391-1376457468-cardhu_decombobulator_blackberry.rim.net-828212652-@b2.c11.bise7.blackberry> Message-ID: <520B1DB2.8040606@mira.net> Overlapping is OK, but I am intrigued by the problem of the conditions which give rise to failure of mutual understanding. Cliff, are you familiar with Jean Lave's book "Situated Learning"? In that she looks at several different traditional systems of apprenticeship. With the meat-trade apprentices, the masters assign the apprentices to completely different, low-skill tasks, located in a different space from where they do the high-skill, valued work of their trade. This contrasts, obviously, with other forms of apprenticeship which facilitate graduated introduction to the skilled work, including lots of opportunity for observation and partial participation. Her observations tend to support your thesis. On the other hand, there are plenty of examples in all kinds of hierarchical institutions from school classrooms to line-management organisations to the Church, the family and voluntary organisations, where participation in the same activity is presaged on very unequal power relations being normalised in the activity. Now I think that in our discussion of slavery we agreed that even with such an extreme imbalance of power, some kind of understanding of the other is achieved by each party, but I don't know if this would really count as what you call "intersubjectivity." Ask a victim of sexual abuse by Catholic priests. It seems to me that "shared" participation in an activity is a precondition for attaining shared semantic, theoretical and practical norms, but not sufficient. It also depends on the social positions adopted by participants in the activity. Andy carolmacdon@gmail.com wrote: > Cliff > They share the concept of birthday party so for Andy that would count as shared meaning in a culture. Sure they see it differently but there is an overlap. > Carol > Sent via my BlackBerry from Vodacom - let your email find you! > > -----Original Message----- > From: "Cliff O'Donnell" > Sender: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > Date: Tue, 13 Aug 2013 18:48:14 > To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Reply-To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Activity Setting > > >> What I am left wondering about is your observation in the context of >> the intervention in the American Indigenous community that "the >> groups (adults on one hand and youth on the other) formed different >> cultural communities." Is the "cultural" qualification to >> "communities" the operative word in this surprising claim? I.e., >> they belong to the same community, but not the same "cultural >> community"? >> > > They belong to, i.e. live in, the same town, but not the same > cultural communities. They participate in mostly different activity > settings and have developed different shared meanings. Even when they > are participating in the same general activity, say a birthday party, > they still group with their own youth/adults and often have a > different shared meaning of the event (as when female youth see adult > men becoming intoxicated at the party and expect sexual abuse to > follow). > > >> It is quite the norm, isn't it, for such chisms to exist within >> communities. >> > > Yes, it is common for different groups to vary, sometimes > dramatically, in the activity settings in which they participate. This > phenomena can then be useful as an indicator of different cultural > communities within the same town, high school, etc. > > Cliff > > Clifford R. O'Donnell, Ph.D. > Professor Emeritus > Past-President, Society for Community Research and Action (APA > Division 27) > > University of Hawai?i > Department of Psychology > 2530 Dole Street > Honolulu, HI 96822 > > > -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts http://marxists.academia.edu/AndyBlunden From wagner.schmit@gmail.com Wed Aug 14 02:03:05 2013 From: wagner.schmit@gmail.com (Wagner Luiz Schmit) Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2013 18:03:05 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Book about history Message-ID: Following Vygotsky's idea that to comprehend human development Ontogenesis, it is important to comprehend it from a Phylogenesis and, as put by Andy Blunden, Ethnogenesis and Sociogenesis (I think Vygotsky used Cultural) perspective also, I am waiting for the arrival of my copy of "A people's history of the world" by Chris Harman. I was also pointed out to this: http://www.counterfire.org/index.php/articles/212-books/16337-a-marxist-history-of-the-world-from-neanderthals-to-neoliberals Any one knows this work? Any reviews? critics? It is avaliable online here: http://www.counterfire.org/index.php/articles/a-marxist-history-of-the-world?start=100 Thank you very much Wagner From Brett.Bligh@nottingham.ac.uk Wed Aug 14 03:29:26 2013 From: Brett.Bligh@nottingham.ac.uk (Brett Bligh) Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2013 11:29:26 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Book about history In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <69EBE05A4BFEE840A8103DD2C84AF30F2011CA1122@EXCHANGE1.ad.nottingham.ac.uk> Dear Wagner, The main point of controversy I am aware of regarding Harman and those around him is his pretty total rejection of the Marxist arguments arising from Engels' book The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State. Harman and others around him dismiss Marxist anthropology arising from that as almost completely bunk (and as pretty embarrassing). Yet prominent Marxist anthropologists would suggest that Engels' book is merely *inaccurately formulated* in light of more recent evidence, and that it nonetheless contains much that is very valuable. For an alternative view of this, I would suggest Chris Knight's very thick volume "Blood Relations", or look around http://www.radicalanthropologygroup.org to get more of a general feel. I'm not familiar with the more recent book by Faulkner that you provide a link to. Brett -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Wagner Luiz Schmit Sent: 14 August 2013 10:03 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Book about history Following Vygotsky's idea that to comprehend human development Ontogenesis, it is important to comprehend it from a Phylogenesis and, as put by Andy Blunden, Ethnogenesis and Sociogenesis (I think Vygotsky used Cultural) perspective also, I am waiting for the arrival of my copy of "A people's history of the world" by Chris Harman. I was also pointed out to this: http://www.counterfire.org/index.php/articles/212-books/16337-a-marxist-history-of-the-world-from-neanderthals-to-neoliberals Any one knows this work? Any reviews? critics? It is avaliable online here: http://www.counterfire.org/index.php/articles/a-marxist-history-of-the-world?start=100 Thank you very much Wagner This message and any attachment are intended solely for the addressee and may contain confidential information. If you have received this message in error, please send it back to me, and immediately delete it. Please do not use, copy or disclose the information contained in this message or in any attachment. Any views or opinions expressed by the author of this email do not necessarily reflect the views of the University of Nottingham. This message has been checked for viruses but the contents of an attachment may still contain software viruses which could damage your computer system, you are advised to perform your own checks. Email communications with the University of Nottingham may be monitored as permitted by UK legislation. From wagner.schmit@gmail.com Wed Aug 14 03:34:31 2013 From: wagner.schmit@gmail.com (Wagner Luiz Schmit) Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2013 19:34:31 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Book about history In-Reply-To: <69EBE05A4BFEE840A8103DD2C84AF30F2011CA1122@EXCHANGE1.ad.nottingham.ac.uk> References: <69EBE05A4BFEE840A8103DD2C84AF30F2011CA1122@EXCHANGE1.ad.nottingham.ac.uk> Message-ID: Thank you very much Brett Wagner On Wed, Aug 14, 2013 at 7:29 PM, Brett Bligh wrote: > Dear Wagner, > > The main point of controversy I am aware of regarding Harman and those around him is his pretty total rejection of the Marxist arguments arising from Engels' book The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State. > > Harman and others around him dismiss Marxist anthropology arising from that as almost completely bunk (and as pretty embarrassing). Yet prominent Marxist anthropologists would suggest that Engels' book is merely *inaccurately formulated* in light of more recent evidence, and that it nonetheless contains much that is very valuable. > > For an alternative view of this, I would suggest Chris Knight's very thick volume "Blood Relations", or look around http://www.radicalanthropologygroup.org to get more of a general feel. > > I'm not familiar with the more recent book by Faulkner that you provide a link to. > > Brett > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Wagner Luiz Schmit > Sent: 14 August 2013 10:03 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Book about history > > Following Vygotsky's idea that to comprehend human development Ontogenesis, it is important to comprehend it from a Phylogenesis and, as put by Andy Blunden, Ethnogenesis and Sociogenesis (I think Vygotsky used Cultural) perspective also, I am waiting for the arrival of my copy of "A people's history of the world" by Chris Harman. > > I was also pointed out to this: > http://www.counterfire.org/index.php/articles/212-books/16337-a-marxist-history-of-the-world-from-neanderthals-to-neoliberals > > Any one knows this work? Any reviews? critics? > > It is avaliable online here: > http://www.counterfire.org/index.php/articles/a-marxist-history-of-the-world?start=100 > > Thank you very much > > Wagner > This message and any attachment are intended solely for the addressee and may contain confidential information. If you have received this message in error, please send it back to me, and immediately delete it. Please do not use, copy or disclose the information contained in this message or in any attachment. Any views or opinions expressed by the author of this email do not necessarily reflect the views of the University of Nottingham. > > This message has been checked for viruses but the contents of an attachment > may still contain software viruses which could damage your computer system, you are advised to perform your own checks. Email communications with the University of Nottingham may be monitored as permitted by UK legislation. > > > > > From C.Barker@mmu.ac.uk Wed Aug 14 04:20:08 2013 From: C.Barker@mmu.ac.uk (C Barker) Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2013 11:20:08 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Book about history In-Reply-To: <69EBE05A4BFEE840A8103DD2C84AF30F2011CA1122@EXCHANGE1.ad.nottingham.ac.uk> References: , <69EBE05A4BFEE840A8103DD2C84AF30F2011CA1122@EXCHANGE1.ad.nottingham.ac.uk> Message-ID: <43D64DEFED150742AAEBE9D668275880B95D3CA7@EXMB2.ad.mmu.ac.uk> Chris Harman?s ?A People?s History of the World? is a lot more interesting than Brett Bligh suggests. Here is what BB calls his ?pretty total rejection of the Marxist arguments...?: ?Why did people who had not previously exploited and oppressed others suddenly start doing so, and why did the rest of society put up with this new exploitation and oppression?.... The only account of human society which comes to terms with the change is that outlined by Karl Marx in the 1840s and 1850s and further elaborated by Frederick Engels.? (Harman 1999, p 24) Colin Barker ___________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Brett Bligh [Brett.Bligh@nottingham.ac.uk] Sent: 14 August 2013 11:29 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Book about history Dear Wagner, The main point of controversy I am aware of regarding Harman and those around him is his pretty total rejection of the Marxist arguments arising from Engels' book The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State. Harman and others around him dismiss Marxist anthropology arising from that as almost completely bunk (and as pretty embarrassing). Yet prominent Marxist anthropologists would suggest that Engels' book is merely *inaccurately formulated* in light of more recent evidence, and that it nonetheless contains much that is very valuable. For an alternative view of this, I would suggest Chris Knight's very thick volume "Blood Relations", or look around http://www.radicalanthropologygroup.org to get more of a general feel. I'm not familiar with the more recent book by Faulkner that you provide a link to. Brett -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Wagner Luiz Schmit Sent: 14 August 2013 10:03 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Book about history Following Vygotsky's idea that to comprehend human development Ontogenesis, it is important to comprehend it from a Phylogenesis and, as put by Andy Blunden, Ethnogenesis and Sociogenesis (I think Vygotsky used Cultural) perspective also, I am waiting for the arrival of my copy of "A people's history of the world" by Chris Harman. I was also pointed out to this: http://www.counterfire.org/index.php/articles/212-books/16337-a-marxist-history-of-the-world-from-neanderthals-to-neoliberals Any one knows this work? Any reviews? critics? It is avaliable online here: http://www.counterfire.org/index.php/articles/a-marxist-history-of-the-world?start=100 Thank you very much Wagner This message and any attachment are intended solely for the addressee and may contain confidential information. If you have received this message in error, please send it back to me, and immediately delete it. Please do not use, copy or disclose the information contained in this message or in any attachment. Any views or opinions expressed by the author of this email do not necessarily reflect the views of the University of Nottingham. This message has been checked for viruses but the contents of an attachment may still contain software viruses which could damage your computer system, you are advised to perform your own checks. Email communications with the University of Nottingham may be monitored as permitted by UK legislation. "Before acting on this email or opening any attachments you should read the Manchester Metropolitan University email disclaimer available on its website http://www.mmu.ac.uk/emaildisclaimer " From Brett.Bligh@nottingham.ac.uk Wed Aug 14 03:29:26 2013 From: Brett.Bligh@nottingham.ac.uk (Brett Bligh) Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2013 11:29:26 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Book about history In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <69EBE05A4BFEE840A8103DD2C84AF30F2011CA1122@EXCHANGE1.ad.nottingham.ac.uk> Dear Wagner, The main point of controversy I am aware of regarding Harman and those around him is his pretty total rejection of the Marxist arguments arising from Engels' book The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State. Harman and others around him dismiss Marxist anthropology arising from that as almost completely bunk (and as pretty embarrassing). Yet prominent Marxist anthropologists would suggest that Engels' book is merely *inaccurately formulated* in light of more recent evidence, and that it nonetheless contains much that is very valuable. For an alternative view of this, I would suggest Chris Knight's very thick volume "Blood Relations", or look around http://www.radicalanthropologygroup.org to get more of a general feel. I'm not familiar with the more recent book by Faulkner that you provide a link to. Brett -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Wagner Luiz Schmit Sent: 14 August 2013 10:03 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Book about history Following Vygotsky's idea that to comprehend human development Ontogenesis, it is important to comprehend it from a Phylogenesis and, as put by Andy Blunden, Ethnogenesis and Sociogenesis (I think Vygotsky used Cultural) perspective also, I am waiting for the arrival of my copy of "A people's history of the world" by Chris Harman. I was also pointed out to this: http://www.counterfire.org/index.php/articles/212-books/16337-a-marxist-history-of-the-world-from-neanderthals-to-neoliberals Any one knows this work? Any reviews? critics? It is avaliable online here: http://www.counterfire.org/index.php/articles/a-marxist-history-of-the-world?start=100 Thank you very much Wagner This message and any attachment are intended solely for the addressee and may contain confidential information. If you have received this message in error, please send it back to me, and immediately delete it. Please do not use, copy or disclose the information contained in this message or in any attachment. Any views or opinions expressed by the author of this email do not necessarily reflect the views of the University of Nottingham. This message has been checked for viruses but the contents of an attachment may still contain software viruses which could damage your computer system, you are advised to perform your own checks. Email communications with the University of Nottingham may be monitored as permitted by UK legislation. From wagner.schmit@gmail.com Wed Aug 14 02:03:05 2013 From: wagner.schmit@gmail.com (Wagner Luiz Schmit) Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2013 18:03:05 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Book about history Message-ID: Following Vygotsky's idea that to comprehend human development Ontogenesis, it is important to comprehend it from a Phylogenesis and, as put by Andy Blunden, Ethnogenesis and Sociogenesis (I think Vygotsky used Cultural) perspective also, I am waiting for the arrival of my copy of "A people's history of the world" by Chris Harman. I was also pointed out to this: http://www.counterfire.org/index.php/articles/212-books/16337-a-marxist-history-of-the-world-from-neanderthals-to-neoliberals Any one knows this work? Any reviews? critics? It is avaliable online here: http://www.counterfire.org/index.php/articles/a-marxist-history-of-the-world?start=100 Thank you very much Wagner From goncu@uic.edu Wed Aug 14 08:31:32 2013 From: goncu@uic.edu (Goncu, Artin) Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2013 10:31:32 -0500 Subject: [Xmca-l] [Fwd: Cognitive Position -- UIC Psychology] Message-ID: <4f4a110a563f20470b083493f85f14f6.squirrel@webmail.uic.edu> forwarding.. ---------------------------- Original Message ---------------------------- Subject: Cognitive Position -- UIC Psychology From: "Jim Pellegrino" Date: Wed, August 14, 2013 8:29 am To: EDFAC@LISTSERV.UIC.EDU -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Please pass this position announcement along to colleagues who might know candidates with qualifications and an interest in this position. Application information is available at https://jobs.uic.edu/job-board/job-details?jobID=34682&job=assistant-professor-cognitive-psychology Jim Pellegrino pellegjw@uic.edu Artin Goncu, Ph.D Professor, Educational Psychology College of Education M/C 147 1040 W. Harrison St. Chicago, IL 60607 http://education.uic.edu/epsy/browseour%20faculty.cfm (312) 996-5259 -------------- next part -------------- An embedded and charset-unspecified text was scrubbed... Name: untitled-[2.1] Url: https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20130814/ec445d4e/attachment.ksh -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: Screen shot 2013-08-14 at 8.27.19 AM.png Type: image/png Size: 214153 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20130814/ec445d4e/attachment.png From wagner.schmit@gmail.com Wed Aug 14 03:34:31 2013 From: wagner.schmit@gmail.com (Wagner Luiz Schmit) Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2013 19:34:31 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Book about history In-Reply-To: <69EBE05A4BFEE840A8103DD2C84AF30F2011CA1122@EXCHANGE1.ad.nottingham.ac.uk> References: <69EBE05A4BFEE840A8103DD2C84AF30F2011CA1122@EXCHANGE1.ad.nottingham.ac.uk> Message-ID: Thank you very much Brett Wagner On Wed, Aug 14, 2013 at 7:29 PM, Brett Bligh wrote: > Dear Wagner, > > The main point of controversy I am aware of regarding Harman and those around him is his pretty total rejection of the Marxist arguments arising from Engels' book The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State. > > Harman and others around him dismiss Marxist anthropology arising from that as almost completely bunk (and as pretty embarrassing). Yet prominent Marxist anthropologists would suggest that Engels' book is merely *inaccurately formulated* in light of more recent evidence, and that it nonetheless contains much that is very valuable. > > For an alternative view of this, I would suggest Chris Knight's very thick volume "Blood Relations", or look around http://www.radicalanthropologygroup.org to get more of a general feel. > > I'm not familiar with the more recent book by Faulkner that you provide a link to. > > Brett > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Wagner Luiz Schmit > Sent: 14 August 2013 10:03 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Book about history > > Following Vygotsky's idea that to comprehend human development Ontogenesis, it is important to comprehend it from a Phylogenesis and, as put by Andy Blunden, Ethnogenesis and Sociogenesis (I think Vygotsky used Cultural) perspective also, I am waiting for the arrival of my copy of "A people's history of the world" by Chris Harman. > > I was also pointed out to this: > http://www.counterfire.org/index.php/articles/212-books/16337-a-marxist-history-of-the-world-from-neanderthals-to-neoliberals > > Any one knows this work? Any reviews? critics? > > It is avaliable online here: > http://www.counterfire.org/index.php/articles/a-marxist-history-of-the-world?start=100 > > Thank you very much > > Wagner > This message and any attachment are intended solely for the addressee and may contain confidential information. If you have received this message in error, please send it back to me, and immediately delete it. Please do not use, copy or disclose the information contained in this message or in any attachment. Any views or opinions expressed by the author of this email do not necessarily reflect the views of the University of Nottingham. > > This message has been checked for viruses but the contents of an attachment > may still contain software viruses which could damage your computer system, you are advised to perform your own checks. Email communications with the University of Nottingham may be monitored as permitted by UK legislation. > > > > > From lchcmike@gmail.com Wed Aug 14 09:26:56 2013 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2013 09:26:56 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: activity and Davydov In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Huw and Others-- Could you provide pdf's or url's for Davydov? If you do not have them, I can get access, I believe, to the large part of one of his book on developmental education. I also recommend the work of Jean Schmittau. I am pretty sure that VVD would not attribute stability of the object to the problems presented by the teacher, but to the constraints provided by the conceptual core of the germ cell. What does Yrjo write on this topic? He uses VVD a lot. mike On Mon, Aug 12, 2013 at 4:37 AM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > Davydov's use of activity seems to be used in a way whereby the object of > activity is held constant (e.g. quantity in Problems of Developmental > Instruction, pp. 147-154). > > I don't recall reading Davydov explaining this however. My inference is > that it is the problems (contradictions) presented by the teacher that > establish this constant basis of activity, i.e. that the object of the > activity is given in terms of the problem. > > Has this been documented anywhere? > > Thanks, > Huw > From lchcmike@gmail.com Wed Aug 14 10:06:35 2013 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2013 10:06:35 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Activity Setting In-Reply-To: <520B1DB2.8040606@mira.net> References: <393FDE85-EFCF-48E6-96E0-6ED970A4DD80@hawaii.edu> <520AE206.9030105@mira.net> <677393EE-FCF8-4A94-8F11-E2922F308E28@hawaii.edu> <520AFF6D.5090608@mira.net> <94019118-330E-4A70-8FC5-AC7186A4331C@hawaii.edu> <650486391-1376457468-cardhu_decombobulator_blackberry.rim.net-828212652-@b2.c11.bise7.blackberry> <520B1DB2.8040606@mira.net> Message-ID: All concerned with this thread. I am uncertain of anywhere that Vygotsky uses the term, "activity setting" and most of the time when he uses the term, it seems that he does so in a common sense way, not as a technical term. Examples from text with citations would help here. In our research in recent years we have worked with people who live in a subsidized housing project. When saying what we do to curious colleagues, we refer to "university- community partnerships/projects. But among ourselves, there is an ongoing discussion and considerable uneasiness in our promiscuous use of the term, community. One thing about Cliff and Roland's article that I found myself wondering about is their use of the term, community. Culture is quite explicitly defined. Why not community? My guess is that the polysemy noted for activity and culture will reign here too, but I am a neophyte looking for direction which is why this article is interesting to me. I have downloaded two articles from a special issue of J Community Psychology from a special issue in 1996 that take on the notion of "sense of community" which is traced back to Sarason in Nelson and Prilleltiensky's text on Community Psychology. If people are interested, email me directly. Concerning statements about culture, meaning, sense and understanding in the article an some of the comments here. The following kind of statement strikes me as ambiguous and potentially a source of misunderstanding, as reasonable as it appears (David's recent note is relevant here): "culture is concerned with questions of shared *social *meanings, that is, the various ways we make sense of the world." I believe that Vygotsky distinguished sense and meaning, with meaning being "the most stable pole" of sense. To reduce culture to stable meanings runs the danger of losing the idea of culture as a process. At the same time, the notion that any word in any language has a meaning entirely held in common by all members of the social group involved seems really doubtful. The term, "shared" could use some reflection in this regard. Reading with interest while dodging deadlines. :-) mike On Tue, Aug 13, 2013 at 11:03 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Overlapping is OK, but I am intrigued by the problem of the conditions > which give rise to failure of mutual understanding. > > Cliff, are you familiar with Jean Lave's book "Situated Learning"? In that > she looks at several different traditional systems of apprenticeship. With > the meat-trade apprentices, the masters assign the apprentices to > completely different, low-skill tasks, located in a different space from > where they do the high-skill, valued work of their trade. This contrasts, > obviously, with other forms of apprenticeship which facilitate graduated > introduction to the skilled work, including lots of opportunity for > observation and partial participation. Her observations tend to support > your thesis. > > On the other hand, there are plenty of examples in all kinds of > hierarchical institutions from school classrooms to line-management > organisations to the Church, the family and voluntary organisations, where > participation in the same activity is presaged on very unequal power > relations being normalised in the activity. Now I think that in our > discussion of slavery we agreed that even with such an extreme imbalance of > power, some kind of understanding of the other is achieved by each party, > but I don't know if this would really count as what you call > "intersubjectivity." Ask a victim of sexual abuse by Catholic priests. > > It seems to me that "shared" participation in an activity is a > precondition for attaining shared semantic, theoretical and practical > norms, but not sufficient. It also depends on the social positions adopted > by participants in the activity. > > Andy > > > carolmacdon@gmail.com wrote: > >> Cliff >> They share the concept of birthday party so for Andy that would count as >> shared meaning in a culture. Sure they see it differently but there is an >> overlap. >> Carol >> Sent via my BlackBerry from Vodacom - let your email find you! >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: "Cliff O'Donnell" >> Sender: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.**edu >> Date: Tue, 13 Aug 2013 18:48:14 To: Andy Blunden; >> eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> > >> Reply-To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Activity Setting >> >> >> >>> What I am left wondering about is your observation in the context of >>> the intervention in the American Indigenous community that "the groups >>> (adults on one hand and youth on the other) formed different cultural >>> communities." Is the "cultural" qualification to "communities" the >>> operative word in this surprising claim? I.e., they belong to the same >>> community, but not the same "cultural community"? >>> >>> >> >> They belong to, i.e. live in, the same town, but not the same >> cultural communities. They participate in mostly different activity >> settings and have developed different shared meanings. Even when they are >> participating in the same general activity, say a birthday party, they >> still group with their own youth/adults and often have a different shared >> meaning of the event (as when female youth see adult men becoming >> intoxicated at the party and expect sexual abuse to follow). >> >> >> >>> It is quite the norm, isn't it, for such chisms to exist within >>> communities. >>> >>> >> >> Yes, it is common for different groups to vary, sometimes >> dramatically, in the activity settings in which they participate. This >> phenomena can then be useful as an indicator of different cultural >> communities within the same town, high school, etc. >> >> Cliff >> >> Clifford R. O'Donnell, Ph.D. >> Professor Emeritus >> Past-President, Society for Community Research and Action (APA Division >> 27) >> >> University of Hawai?i >> Department of Psychology >> 2530 Dole Street >> Honolulu, HI 96822 >> >> >> >> > > -- > ------------------------------**------------------------------** > ------------ > *Andy Blunden* > Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts > http://marxists.academia.edu/**AndyBlunden > > From lspopov@bgsu.edu Wed Aug 14 11:29:25 2013 From: lspopov@bgsu.edu (Lubomir Savov Popov) Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2013 18:29:25 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Activity Setting In-Reply-To: References: <393FDE85-EFCF-48E6-96E0-6ED970A4DD80@hawaii.edu> <520AE206.9030105@mira.net> <677393EE-FCF8-4A94-8F11-E2922F308E28@hawaii.edu> <520AFF6D.5090608@mira.net> <94019118-330E-4A70-8FC5-AC7186A4331C@hawaii.edu> <650486391-1376457468-cardhu_decombobulator_blackberry.rim.net-828212652-@b2.c11.bise7.blackberry> <520B1DB2.8040606@mira.net> Message-ID: <4DF034EF2396694597A7D328E23F09E1C6C9@BY2PRD0510MB353.namprd05.prod.outlook.com> Thank you Mike, I appreciate your expertise about the term "activity setting" in respect to the writings of Vigotsky. Considering your knowledge of Vigotsky, I am very comfortable with this situation. Best wishes, Lubomir -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole Sent: Wednesday, August 14, 2013 1:07 PM To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Activity Setting All concerned with this thread. I am uncertain of anywhere that Vygotsky uses the term, "activity setting" and most of the time when he uses the term, it seems that he does so in a common sense way, not as a technical term. Examples from text with citations would help here. In our research in recent years we have worked with people who live in a subsidized housing project. When saying what we do to curious colleagues, we refer to "university- community partnerships/projects. But among ourselves, there is an ongoing discussion and considerable uneasiness in our promiscuous use of the term, community. One thing about Cliff and Roland's article that I found myself wondering about is their use of the term, community. Culture is quite explicitly defined. Why not community? My guess is that the polysemy noted for activity and culture will reign here too, but I am a neophyte looking for direction which is why this article is interesting to me. I have downloaded two articles from a special issue of J Community Psychology from a special issue in 1996 that take on the notion of "sense of community" which is traced back to Sarason in Nelson and Prilleltiensky's text on Community Psychology. If people are interested, email me directly. Concerning statements about culture, meaning, sense and understanding in the article an some of the comments here. The following kind of statement strikes me as ambiguous and potentially a source of misunderstanding, as reasonable as it appears (David's recent note is relevant here): "culture is concerned with questions of shared *social *meanings, that is, the various ways we make sense of the world." I believe that Vygotsky distinguished sense and meaning, with meaning being "the most stable pole" of sense. To reduce culture to stable meanings runs the danger of losing the idea of culture as a process. At the same time, the notion that any word in any language has a meaning entirely held in common by all members of the social group involved seems really doubtful. The term, "shared" could use some reflection in this regard. Reading with interest while dodging deadlines. :-) mike On Tue, Aug 13, 2013 at 11:03 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Overlapping is OK, but I am intrigued by the problem of the conditions > which give rise to failure of mutual understanding. > > Cliff, are you familiar with Jean Lave's book "Situated Learning"? In > that she looks at several different traditional systems of > apprenticeship. With the meat-trade apprentices, the masters assign > the apprentices to completely different, low-skill tasks, located in a > different space from where they do the high-skill, valued work of > their trade. This contrasts, obviously, with other forms of > apprenticeship which facilitate graduated introduction to the skilled > work, including lots of opportunity for observation and partial > participation. Her observations tend to support your thesis. > > On the other hand, there are plenty of examples in all kinds of > hierarchical institutions from school classrooms to line-management > organisations to the Church, the family and voluntary organisations, > where participation in the same activity is presaged on very unequal > power relations being normalised in the activity. Now I think that in > our discussion of slavery we agreed that even with such an extreme > imbalance of power, some kind of understanding of the other is > achieved by each party, but I don't know if this would really count as > what you call "intersubjectivity." Ask a victim of sexual abuse by Catholic priests. > > It seems to me that "shared" participation in an activity is a > precondition for attaining shared semantic, theoretical and practical > norms, but not sufficient. It also depends on the social positions > adopted by participants in the activity. > > Andy > > > carolmacdon@gmail.com wrote: > >> Cliff >> They share the concept of birthday party so for Andy that would count >> as shared meaning in a culture. Sure they see it differently but >> there is an overlap. >> Carol >> Sent via my BlackBerry from Vodacom - let your email find you! >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: "Cliff O'Donnell" >> Sender: >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.**edu >> Date: Tue, 13 Aug 2013 18:48:14 To: Andy Blunden; >> eXtended Mind, Culture, >> Activity >> > >> Reply-To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >> >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Activity Setting >> >> >> >>> What I am left wondering about is your observation in the context of >>> the intervention in the American Indigenous community that "the >>> groups (adults on one hand and youth on the other) formed different >>> cultural communities." Is the "cultural" qualification to >>> "communities" the operative word in this surprising claim? I.e., >>> they belong to the same community, but not the same "cultural community"? >>> >>> >> >> They belong to, i.e. live in, the same town, but not the same >> cultural communities. They participate in mostly different activity >> settings and have developed different shared meanings. Even when they >> are participating in the same general activity, say a birthday party, >> they still group with their own youth/adults and often have a >> different shared meaning of the event (as when female youth see adult >> men becoming intoxicated at the party and expect sexual abuse to follow). >> >> >> >>> It is quite the norm, isn't it, for such chisms to exist within >>> communities. >>> >>> >> >> Yes, it is common for different groups to vary, sometimes >> dramatically, in the activity settings in which they participate. >> This phenomena can then be useful as an indicator of different >> cultural communities within the same town, high school, etc. >> >> Cliff >> >> Clifford R. O'Donnell, Ph.D. >> Professor Emeritus >> Past-President, Society for Community Research and Action (APA >> Division >> 27) >> >> University of Hawai'i >> Department of Psychology >> 2530 Dole Street >> Honolulu, HI 96822 >> >> >> >> > > -- > ------------------------------**------------------------------** > ------------ > *Andy Blunden* > Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts > http://marxists.academia.edu/**AndyBlunden u/AndyBlunden> > > From lchcmike@gmail.com Wed Aug 14 11:35:57 2013 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2013 11:35:57 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Activity Setting In-Reply-To: <4DF034EF2396694597A7D328E23F09E1C6C9@BY2PRD0510MB353.namprd05.prod.outlook.com> References: <393FDE85-EFCF-48E6-96E0-6ED970A4DD80@hawaii.edu> <520AE206.9030105@mira.net> <677393EE-FCF8-4A94-8F11-E2922F308E28@hawaii.edu> <520AFF6D.5090608@mira.net> <94019118-330E-4A70-8FC5-AC7186A4331C@hawaii.edu> <650486391-1376457468-cardhu_decombobulator_blackberry.rim.net-828212652-@b2.c11.bise7.blackberry> <520B1DB2.8040606@mira.net> <4DF034EF2396694597A7D328E23F09E1C6C9@BY2PRD0510MB353.namprd05.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: Glad you are comfortable, Lubomir -- I wish I were!! Lots of ambiguities to deal with. Providing examples helps, but its time consuming. On Wed, Aug 14, 2013 at 11:29 AM, Lubomir Savov Popov wrote: > Thank you Mike, > > I appreciate your expertise about the term "activity setting" in respect > to the writings of Vigotsky. Considering your knowledge of Vigotsky, I am > very comfortable with this situation. > > Best wishes, > > Lubomir > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole > Sent: Wednesday, August 14, 2013 1:07 PM > To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Activity Setting > > All concerned with this thread. > > I am uncertain of anywhere that Vygotsky uses the term, "activity setting" > and most of the time when he uses the term, it seems that he does so in a > common sense way, not as a technical term. Examples from text with > citations would help here. > > In our research in recent years we have worked with people who live in a > subsidized housing project. When saying what we do to curious colleagues, > we refer to "university- community partnerships/projects. But among > ourselves, there is an ongoing discussion and considerable uneasiness in > our promiscuous use of the term, community. > > One thing about Cliff and Roland's article that I found myself wondering > about is their use of the term, community. Culture is quite explicitly > defined. Why not community? My guess is that the polysemy noted for > activity and culture will reign here too, but I am a neophyte looking for > direction which is why this article is interesting to me. I have downloaded > two articles from a special issue of J Community Psychology from a special > issue in 1996 that take on the notion of "sense of community" which is > traced back to Sarason in Nelson and Prilleltiensky's text on Community > Psychology. If people are interested, email me directly. > > Concerning statements about culture, meaning, sense and understanding in > the article an some of the comments here. The following kind of statement > strikes me as ambiguous and potentially a source of misunderstanding, as > reasonable as it appears (David's recent note is relevant here): > > "culture is concerned with questions of shared *social *meanings, that is, > the various > > ways we make sense of the world." > I believe that Vygotsky distinguished sense and meaning, with meaning > being "the most stable pole" of sense. To reduce culture to stable meanings > runs the danger of losing the idea of culture as a process. At the same > time, the notion that any word in any language has a meaning entirely held > in common by all members of the social group involved seems really > doubtful. The term, "shared" could use some reflection in this regard. > > Reading with interest while dodging deadlines. :-) mike > > > On Tue, Aug 13, 2013 at 11:03 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > Overlapping is OK, but I am intrigued by the problem of the conditions > > which give rise to failure of mutual understanding. > > > > Cliff, are you familiar with Jean Lave's book "Situated Learning"? In > > that she looks at several different traditional systems of > > apprenticeship. With the meat-trade apprentices, the masters assign > > the apprentices to completely different, low-skill tasks, located in a > > different space from where they do the high-skill, valued work of > > their trade. This contrasts, obviously, with other forms of > > apprenticeship which facilitate graduated introduction to the skilled > > work, including lots of opportunity for observation and partial > > participation. Her observations tend to support your thesis. > > > > On the other hand, there are plenty of examples in all kinds of > > hierarchical institutions from school classrooms to line-management > > organisations to the Church, the family and voluntary organisations, > > where participation in the same activity is presaged on very unequal > > power relations being normalised in the activity. Now I think that in > > our discussion of slavery we agreed that even with such an extreme > > imbalance of power, some kind of understanding of the other is > > achieved by each party, but I don't know if this would really count as > > what you call "intersubjectivity." Ask a victim of sexual abuse by > Catholic priests. > > > > It seems to me that "shared" participation in an activity is a > > precondition for attaining shared semantic, theoretical and practical > > norms, but not sufficient. It also depends on the social positions > > adopted by participants in the activity. > > > > Andy > > > > > > carolmacdon@gmail.com wrote: > > > >> Cliff > >> They share the concept of birthday party so for Andy that would count > >> as shared meaning in a culture. Sure they see it differently but > >> there is an overlap. > >> Carol > >> Sent via my BlackBerry from Vodacom - let your email find you! > >> > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: "Cliff O'Donnell" > >> Sender: > >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.**edu > >> Date: Tue, 13 Aug 2013 18:48:14 To: Andy Blunden; > >> eXtended Mind, Culture, > >> Activity > >> > > >> Reply-To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > >> > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Activity Setting > >> > >> > >> > >>> What I am left wondering about is your observation in the context of > >>> the intervention in the American Indigenous community that "the > >>> groups (adults on one hand and youth on the other) formed different > >>> cultural communities." Is the "cultural" qualification to > >>> "communities" the operative word in this surprising claim? I.e., > >>> they belong to the same community, but not the same "cultural > community"? > >>> > >>> > >> > >> They belong to, i.e. live in, the same town, but not the same > >> cultural communities. They participate in mostly different activity > >> settings and have developed different shared meanings. Even when they > >> are participating in the same general activity, say a birthday party, > >> they still group with their own youth/adults and often have a > >> different shared meaning of the event (as when female youth see adult > >> men becoming intoxicated at the party and expect sexual abuse to > follow). > >> > >> > >> > >>> It is quite the norm, isn't it, for such chisms to exist within > >>> communities. > >>> > >>> > >> > >> Yes, it is common for different groups to vary, sometimes > >> dramatically, in the activity settings in which they participate. > >> This phenomena can then be useful as an indicator of different > >> cultural communities within the same town, high school, etc. > >> > >> Cliff > >> > >> Clifford R. O'Donnell, Ph.D. > >> Professor Emeritus > >> Past-President, Society for Community Research and Action (APA > >> Division > >> 27) > >> > >> University of Hawai'i > >> Department of Psychology > >> 2530 Dole Street > >> Honolulu, HI 96822 > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > > -- > > ------------------------------**------------------------------** > > ------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > > Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts > > http://marxists.academia.edu/**AndyBlunden > u/AndyBlunden> > > > > > > > > From lspopov@bgsu.edu Wed Aug 14 11:55:34 2013 From: lspopov@bgsu.edu (Lubomir Savov Popov) Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2013 18:55:34 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Activity theory approach to conceptualizing Community Message-ID: <4DF034EF2396694597A7D328E23F09E1C70F@BY2PRD0510MB353.namprd05.prod.outlook.com> Regarding the polysemy of the term Community, it might be useful to see the interpretations in Urban Planning and relate them to the conceptualizations in Urban Sociology. I am talking about territorial communities VS virtual communities. In my opinion, the activity theory approach is very productive in conceptualizing, analyzing and developing territorial communities. In such cases, communities are presented as activity systems. The subjects and the culture become components or aspects of the system(s). Of course there are many other aspects that can be integrated in one whole through the activity system. In this case the concept of activity works as a conceptual configurator that provides a framework for integrating all aspects and levels. The whole society can be represented as an activity system with a number of major subsystems. Then each subsystem can be sub-sub- "divided." Best, Lubomir -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole Sent: Wednesday, August 14, 2013 1:07 PM To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Activity Setting All concerned with this thread. I am uncertain of anywhere that Vygotsky uses the term, "activity setting" and most of the time when he uses the term, it seems that he does so in a common sense way, not as a technical term. Examples from text with citations would help here. In our research in recent years we have worked with people who live in a subsidized housing project. When saying what we do to curious colleagues, we refer to "university- community partnerships/projects. But among ourselves, there is an ongoing discussion and considerable uneasiness in our promiscuous use of the term, community. One thing about Cliff and Roland's article that I found myself wondering about is their use of the term, community. Culture is quite explicitly defined. Why not community? My guess is that the polysemy noted for activity and culture will reign here too, but I am a neophyte looking for direction which is why this article is interesting to me. I have downloaded two articles from a special issue of J Community Psychology from a special issue in 1996 that take on the notion of "sense of community" which is traced back to Sarason in Nelson and Prilleltiensky's text on Community Psychology. If people are interested, email me directly. Concerning statements about culture, meaning, sense and understanding in the article an some of the comments here. The following kind of statement strikes me as ambiguous and potentially a source of misunderstanding, as reasonable as it appears (David's recent note is relevant here): "culture is concerned with questions of shared *social *meanings, that is, the various ways we make sense of the world." I believe that Vygotsky distinguished sense and meaning, with meaning being "the most stable pole" of sense. To reduce culture to stable meanings runs the danger of losing the idea of culture as a process. At the same time, the notion that any word in any language has a meaning entirely held in common by all members of the social group involved seems really doubtful. The term, "shared" could use some reflection in this regard. Reading with interest while dodging deadlines. :-) mike On Tue, Aug 13, 2013 at 11:03 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Overlapping is OK, but I am intrigued by the problem of the conditions > which give rise to failure of mutual understanding. > > Cliff, are you familiar with Jean Lave's book "Situated Learning"? In > that she looks at several different traditional systems of > apprenticeship. With the meat-trade apprentices, the masters assign > the apprentices to completely different, low-skill tasks, located in a > different space from where they do the high-skill, valued work of > their trade. This contrasts, obviously, with other forms of > apprenticeship which facilitate graduated introduction to the skilled > work, including lots of opportunity for observation and partial > participation. Her observations tend to support your thesis. > > On the other hand, there are plenty of examples in all kinds of > hierarchical institutions from school classrooms to line-management > organisations to the Church, the family and voluntary organisations, > where participation in the same activity is presaged on very unequal > power relations being normalised in the activity. Now I think that in > our discussion of slavery we agreed that even with such an extreme > imbalance of power, some kind of understanding of the other is > achieved by each party, but I don't know if this would really count as > what you call "intersubjectivity." Ask a victim of sexual abuse by Catholic priests. > > It seems to me that "shared" participation in an activity is a > precondition for attaining shared semantic, theoretical and practical > norms, but not sufficient. It also depends on the social positions > adopted by participants in the activity. > > Andy > > > carolmacdon@gmail.com wrote: > >> Cliff >> They share the concept of birthday party so for Andy that would count >> as shared meaning in a culture. Sure they see it differently but >> there is an overlap. >> Carol >> Sent via my BlackBerry from Vodacom - let your email find you! >> >> -----Original Message----- >> From: "Cliff O'Donnell" >> Sender: >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.**edu >> Date: Tue, 13 Aug 2013 18:48:14 To: Andy Blunden; >> eXtended Mind, Culture, >> Activity >> > >> Reply-To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >> >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Activity Setting >> >> >> >>> What I am left wondering about is your observation in the context of >>> the intervention in the American Indigenous community that "the >>> groups (adults on one hand and youth on the other) formed different >>> cultural communities." Is the "cultural" qualification to >>> "communities" the operative word in this surprising claim? I.e., >>> they belong to the same community, but not the same "cultural community"? >>> >>> >> >> They belong to, i.e. live in, the same town, but not the same >> cultural communities. They participate in mostly different activity >> settings and have developed different shared meanings. Even when they >> are participating in the same general activity, say a birthday party, >> they still group with their own youth/adults and often have a >> different shared meaning of the event (as when female youth see adult >> men becoming intoxicated at the party and expect sexual abuse to follow). >> >> >> >>> It is quite the norm, isn't it, for such chisms to exist within >>> communities. >>> >>> >> >> Yes, it is common for different groups to vary, sometimes >> dramatically, in the activity settings in which they participate. >> This phenomena can then be useful as an indicator of different >> cultural communities within the same town, high school, etc. >> >> Cliff >> >> Clifford R. O'Donnell, Ph.D. >> Professor Emeritus >> Past-President, Society for Community Research and Action (APA >> Division >> 27) >> >> University of Hawai'i >> Department of Psychology >> 2530 Dole Street >> Honolulu, HI 96822 >> >> >> >> > > -- > ------------------------------**------------------------------** > ------------ > *Andy Blunden* > Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts > http://marxists.academia.edu/**AndyBlunden u/AndyBlunden> > > From lchcmike@gmail.com Wed Aug 14 12:44:32 2013 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2013 12:44:32 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Faculty Position - DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY California State University, San Bernardino In-Reply-To: <900C03378304F4479D4C547E0AFCC98C3E92603B@EXCHSTORE3.csusb.edu> References: <900C03378304F4479D4C547E0AFCC98C3E92603B@EXCHSTORE3.csusb.edu> Message-ID: ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Jason Reimer Date: Wed, Aug 14, 2013 at 12:35 PM Subject: [COGDEVSOC] Faculty Position - DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY California State University, San Bernardino To: "cogdevsoc@virginia.edu" Please post to the CDS listserv:**** * * *Assistant Professor in Developmental Psychology/Human Development. *We seek an assistant professor with a Ph.D. in developmental psychology or human development. Area of concentration is open, but the Department is particularly interested in individuals with a specialization in human developmental neuroscience or developmental neuropsychology. The successful candidate would be able to teach undergraduate and graduate courses in developmental psychology, one or more age-specific areas (e.g., infancy, child, or adolescence), cognitive and/or social development, developmental psychobiology, and advanced seminar in developmental psychology. The opportunity to teach other courses of the candidate?s choosing is available as well. Successful candidates will have demonstrated excellence in teaching and show potential for securing extramural funding. Additionally, the candidate is expected to supervise, mentor, and involve undergraduate and graduate students in research. A Ph.D. is required at the time of appointment.**** * * *DEADLINE AND APPLICATION PROCESS*: Review of applications will begin *December 1*, 2013 and continue until the position is filled. Hiring for this position is dependent on budgetary approval. Submit a vita and a letter of application that includes a statement on teaching philosophy and strategies and research/professional accomplishments and goals. Have three letters of recommendation sent to the address below; an electronic version of a letter of recommendation is acceptable provided it is sent directly by the referee and is on appropriate letterhead. Also submit the names, telephone and fax numbers, and Email addresses of your referees, and an official copy of your doctoral transcripts. Direct inquiries and applications to: Dr. Robert Ricco, Department of Psychology, California State University, San Bernardino, 5500 University Parkway, San Bernardino, CA 92407?2397, or rricco@csusb.edu. California State University, San Bernardino is an Equal Opportunity Employer, and has a strong institutional commitment to the principle of diversity in all areas.**** ** ** ****************************************** Jason F. Reimer, Ph.D.**** Professor of Psychology**** Director, Child Development M.A. Program**** California State University, San Bernardino**** 5500 University Parkway**** San Bernardino, CA 92407**** **** Phone: 909-537-5578**** Fax: 909-537-7003**** ****************************************** ** ** =========== To post to the CDS listserv, send your message to: cogdevsoc@virginia.edu (If you belong to the listserv and have not included any large attachments, your message will be posted without moderation--so be careful!) To leave the CDS listserv, send a message to sympa@virginia.edu. The subject line should read: "unsubscribe cogdevsoc" (no quotes). Leave the message body blank. 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For other information about the listserv, including how to update your email address and how to subscribe, visit http://www.cogdevsoc.org/listserv.php ============ From cliffo@hawaii.edu Wed Aug 14 13:11:25 2013 From: cliffo@hawaii.edu (Cliff O'Donnell) Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2013 10:11:25 -1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Activity Setting In-Reply-To: <520B1DB2.8040606@mira.net> References: <393FDE85-EFCF-48E6-96E0-6ED970A4DD80@hawaii.edu> <520AE206.9030105@mira.net> <677393EE-FCF8-4A94-8F11-E2922F308E28@hawaii.edu> <520AFF6D.5090608@mira.net> <94019118-330E-4A70-8FC5-AC7186A4331C@hawaii.edu> <650486391-1376457468-cardhu_decombobulator_blackberry.rim.net-828212652-@b2.c11.bise7.blackberry> <520B1DB2.8040606@mira.net> Message-ID: <7D1E70BB-A3FA-418E-BF2E-EFCFE897719E@hawaii.edu> > Cliff, are you familiar with Jean Lave's book "Situated Learning"? I'm not, but it sounds like one I should take a look at. > It seems to me that "shared" participation in an activity is a > precondition for attaining shared semantic, theoretical and > practical norms, but not sufficient. It also depends on the social > positions adopted by participants in the activity. Yes, social positions are an important aspect of activity settings. As I mentioned previously, positions are one of the six components of activity settings we analyzed in the 1990 chapter. I would be most interested in any comments you have on that analysis. The purpose of the analysis was to show how these components could be used in community intervention. Cliff Clifford R. O'Donnell, Ph.D. Professor Emeritus Past-President, Society for Community Research and Action (APA Division 27) University of Hawai?i Department of Psychology 2530 Dole Street Honolulu, HI 96822 From cliffo@hawaii.edu Wed Aug 14 13:40:27 2013 From: cliffo@hawaii.edu (Cliff O'Donnell) Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2013 10:40:27 -1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Activity theory approach to conceptualizing Community In-Reply-To: <4DF034EF2396694597A7D328E23F09E1C70F@BY2PRD0510MB353.namprd05.prod.outlook.com> References: <4DF034EF2396694597A7D328E23F09E1C70F@BY2PRD0510MB353.namprd05.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: <78826595-F1D6-4715-BF64-622582F831DA@hawaii.edu> The term community is indeed polysemous. Sense of community has been influential in community psychology (see the Fisher, et al. and Sarason references in our article), but it is one of many uses of the term community. We agree with "communities presented as activity systems." In our view community is defined by activity settings, which in turn can be interrelated in larger systems. We didn't mean to imply that any word is held in common by all members of a group. Intersubjectivity and their shared meanings don't imply uniformity. In our view, these ambiguities are best resolved empirically, e.g., in interventions ("no speculation about underlying processes occurs without asking about its action implications.?? Price and Behrens, 2003, p. 222). That is a important reason for greater unification of CHAT and Cultural Community Psychology. Cliff On Aug 14, 2013, at 8:55 AM, Lubomir Savov Popov wrote: > Regarding the polysemy of the term Community, it might be useful to > see the interpretations in Urban Planning and relate them to the > conceptualizations in Urban Sociology. I am talking about > territorial communities VS virtual communities. > > In my opinion, the activity theory approach is very productive in > conceptualizing, analyzing and developing territorial communities. > In such cases, communities are presented as activity systems. The > subjects and the culture become components or aspects of the > system(s). Of course there are many other aspects that can be > integrated in one whole through the activity system. In this case > the concept of activity works as a conceptual configurator that > provides a framework for integrating all aspects and levels. The > whole society can be represented as an activity system with a number > of major subsystems. Then each subsystem can be sub-sub- "divided." > > Best, > > Lubomir > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > ] On Behalf Of mike cole > Sent: Wednesday, August 14, 2013 1:07 PM > To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Activity Setting > > All concerned with this thread. > > I am uncertain of anywhere that Vygotsky uses the term, "activity > setting" > and most of the time when he uses the term, it seems that he does so > in a common sense way, not as a technical term. Examples from text > with citations would help here. > > In our research in recent years we have worked with people who live > in a subsidized housing project. When saying what we do to curious > colleagues, we refer to "university- community partnerships/ > projects. But among ourselves, there is an ongoing discussion and > considerable uneasiness in our promiscuous use of the term, community. > > One thing about Cliff and Roland's article that I found myself > wondering about is their use of the term, community. Culture is > quite explicitly defined. Why not community? My guess is that the > polysemy noted for activity and culture will reign here too, but I > am a neophyte looking for direction which is why this article is > interesting to me. I have downloaded two articles from a special > issue of J Community Psychology from a special issue in 1996 that > take on the notion of "sense of community" which is traced back to > Sarason in Nelson and Prilleltiensky's text on Community Psychology. > If people are interested, email me directly. > > Concerning statements about culture, meaning, sense and > understanding in the article an some of the comments here. The > following kind of statement strikes me as ambiguous and potentially > a source of misunderstanding, as reasonable as it appears (David's > recent note is relevant here): > > "culture is concerned with questions of shared *social *meanings, > that is, the various > > ways we make sense of the world." > I believe that Vygotsky distinguished sense and meaning, with > meaning being "the most stable pole" of sense. To reduce culture to > stable meanings runs the danger of losing the idea of culture as a > process. At the same time, the notion that any word in any language > has a meaning entirely held in common by all members of the social > group involved seems really doubtful. The term, "shared" could use > some reflection in this regard. > > Reading with interest while dodging deadlines. :-) mike > > > On Tue, Aug 13, 2013 at 11:03 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > >> Overlapping is OK, but I am intrigued by the problem of the >> conditions >> which give rise to failure of mutual understanding. >> >> Cliff, are you familiar with Jean Lave's book "Situated Learning"? In >> that she looks at several different traditional systems of >> apprenticeship. With the meat-trade apprentices, the masters assign >> the apprentices to completely different, low-skill tasks, located >> in a >> different space from where they do the high-skill, valued work of >> their trade. This contrasts, obviously, with other forms of >> apprenticeship which facilitate graduated introduction to the skilled >> work, including lots of opportunity for observation and partial >> participation. Her observations tend to support your thesis. >> >> On the other hand, there are plenty of examples in all kinds of >> hierarchical institutions from school classrooms to line-management >> organisations to the Church, the family and voluntary organisations, >> where participation in the same activity is presaged on very unequal >> power relations being normalised in the activity. Now I think that in >> our discussion of slavery we agreed that even with such an extreme >> imbalance of power, some kind of understanding of the other is >> achieved by each party, but I don't know if this would really count >> as >> what you call "intersubjectivity." Ask a victim of sexual abuse by >> Catholic priests. >> >> It seems to me that "shared" participation in an activity is a >> precondition for attaining shared semantic, theoretical and practical >> norms, but not sufficient. It also depends on the social positions >> adopted by participants in the activity. >> >> Andy From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Wed Aug 14 15:10:34 2013 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2013 16:10:34 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: <520ADCDD.9000406@mira.net> References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> <520444BA.2000808@mira.net> <520460F0.5030506@mira.net> <19E63C50-A0D2-4A0F-BBA7-63853414FDAA@gmail.com> <4195A368-C7B9-4AB0-AAA5-A244135DC331@gmail.com> <520ADCDD.9000406@mira.net> Message-ID: Apparently this conversation didn't go to the group - or maybe parts of it did. So here is a recap of the thread: Huw commented that an activity is defined by its object. I inquired about what the "object" is when *conversation* is the activity. Huw responded "the object of the conversation is the subject's purpose". Andy added: "There are important differences in the methodological implication which go to the collection and interpretation of empirical data, Huw. These mainly arise from the idea of the continuity of a project as it passes through different formations, as the motive undergoes immanent change and the forms of collaboration and objectification change. But as a momentary snap-shot of an activity, the two conceptions coincide, yes." And here is my (as yet unsent! Hot off the presses!) response to Huw and Andy: "Motive" seems a slippery concept to rest too much on. Andy I'm wondering how you answer the question you put to Roland, namely whether or not master and slave are participating in the same activity/project? Or, what about a golfer and caddy? And so on down to, as Phillip and Carol point out - the different participants in a discussion on XMCA. I'm rather fond of Goffman's question "what is it that is going on here?" as a way of thinking about "activity". As Goffman notes, the golfer and caddy have different "motivational relevancies" (1973, p. 8), but this doesn't mean that they are "doing" different activities. In the end I think Goffman is really working out a practice theory that treat's John Austin's famous question of how it is that we can "do things with words" (although his lectures, of course, were titled as the answer to the question - How to do Things with Words). Goffman is trying to figure out how Austin's primary performatives are accomplished, joked, faked, imitated, fabricated, etc. in actual practice. What is it that goes into making an instance of talk an instance of an "insult" or a "compliment" or an "argument"? And how do these become consequential in practice. This, it seems, is Bateson's point in "This is Play"; it is a life and death matter for the animal to know whether or not an instance of interaction is play or serious. Maybe not quite so consequential (immediately) for us humans, but it can certainly be the difference between getting a laugh and getting a punch in the nose. Goffman's answer is interesting in that he doesn't rely on the motives (motivational relevancies) of the participants, but rather creates a notion of the local context as a "frame" that exists somewhere between participants. No one person can dictate the frame (even dictators have to deal with the possibility of duplicitousness - the word with a side-wards glance - hence irony is a powerful weapon of the weak - even if James Scott didn't recognize this, Bakhtin clearly did). Frames emerge as participants take parts in the unfolding play of some event or happening, and, to a certain extent, without regard to alignment of the motives of the participants. Every once in a while the motives of all participants create a frame may be relatively closely aligned, but it seems much more common that frames are built out of a plethora of motives. I should add that I wonder if Susan Leigh Star's concept of Boundary Objects might be useful here as well. These are objects that emerge despite a plurality of motivations. Building on Latour's notion of interessement (and From Star and Griesemer, boundary objects are: ?objects which are both plastic enough to adapt to local needs and the constraints of the several parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a common identity across sites...The objects may by abstract or concrete.? Etienne Wenger seems to offer a start in this direction. But only a start. Can we imagine "activity" (or whatever we want to call it - "project," "frame," "social doing," etc.) as a boundary object - something that captures a relation BETWEEN persons. Activity always as "inter-activity." So then, how do we tell "what it is that is going on here?" where "here" is the "current" temporally displaced moment of me writing and you reading this. Is this just me being a show-off? Is this me trying to work through some of my ideas in order to publish a paper (with the real motivation to simply keep my job)? Is this just me musing with friends about ideas about which I feel very strongly? Or is something altogether different happening here? I take Goffman's answer to this to be: it's up to you - or better, to the relation that will emerge BETWEEN us. Who's to say what that will be. -greg On Tue, Aug 13, 2013 at 7:26 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > There are important differences in the methodological implication which go > to the collection and interpretation of empirical data, Huw. These mainly > arise from the idea of the continuity of a project as it passes through > different formations, as the motive undergoes immanent change and the forms > of collaboration and objectification change. But as a momentary shap-shot > of an activity, the two conceptions coincide, yes. > > Andy > > Is this going to go back on the list? > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> >> On 13 August 2013 16:55, > greg.a.thompson@gmail.**com >> wrote: >> >> Thanks huw, sorry i missed your response - I must have missed it >> amid the flurry of activity about activity!! >> So does this mean that you have a different take than Andy? Seems >> like he was arguing against a motive-based definition of activity. >> >> >> Well, as far as I know I have a similar interpretation to Andy regarding >> the interpretation/reading of these texts. Andy has reasons to elaborate >> something different he calls a project. >> My personal inference was that this has more to do with preferred methods >> rather than empirical based disagreements with Leontyev's formulation. >> >> Does that help? >> >> Best, >> Huw >> >> >> Just trying to sort out what this word means for everybody. >> (And I cc'd Andy on this to get his thoughts) >> Cheers, >> Greg >> >> Sent from my iPhone >> >> On Aug 13, 2013, at 7:53 AM, Huw Lloyd > >> >> wrote: >> >> Hi Greg, >>> >>> Yes. My response (that I sent to xmca-l) was "the object of the >>> conversation is the subject's purpose(s)". >>> >>> You can gchat me or gvideo if you wish. >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> >>> >>> On 13 August 2013 15:47, Greg Thompson >> >> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Huw, >>> Did you get this question I posted to XMCA? I meant it >>> in all sincerity. As someone interested in >>> discourse, this kind of thing really matters to me. And I >>> think it is where things start to get a little messy with >>> defining activity. But I may be wrong about that! >>> Looking forward to hearing more. >>> Very best, >>> greg >>> >>> >>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >>> From: >> >>> >> >>> Date: Mon, Aug 12, 2013 at 9:09 AM >>> Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities >>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>> >>> >> >>> >>> >>> Huw, >>> Pardon my ignorance on this issue (I can assure you this is >>> more than just pretense!), but if conversation is activity, >>> what is the object of this activity? >>> Greg >>> >>> Sent from my iPhone >>> >>> On Aug 11, 2013, at 7:28 AM, Huw Lloyd >>> >> >> >>> wrote: >>> >>> > FYI, Greg. >>> > >>> > Activity is defined by its object. See p. 363 in The >>> Development of Mind >>> > (Problems of Dev.) >>> > >>> > Huw >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > On 9 August 2013 04:24, Andy Blunden >> > wrote: >>> > >>> >> Greg Thompson wrote: >>> >> >>> >>> Andy, I think I need still more help. >>> >>> >>> >>> I got lost at, well, "an activity (generally) exists". >>> Wondering what >>> >>> this could mean. >>> >> >>> >> xmca didn't exist when Mike Cole launched it. But for >>> the many >>> >> thousands who have joined it since, it *existed*. Thus is >>> >> "generally" exists. On the whole, we *join* rather than >>> create >>> >> activities (projects). >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> Then the middle part seems to make some sense for me: >>> activities don't >>> >>> simply and reasonably follow the intentions of their >>> participants, but then >>> >>> lost you again at the end, with "the outcome in >>> '*immanent* in the project >>> >>> itself". Not sure what exactly that means either. >>> >> >>> >> As Vygotsky says somewhere, the problem which stimulates the >>> >> activity (the development of the concept) cannot in >>> itself account >>> >> for the project (or concept). The *means* utilised, which >>> >> corresponds to how the problem or task is conceived by >>> the agents, >>> >> is what is crucial. I.e., not the problem or task as >>> such, but the >>> >> conception of the task, constitutes the ideal. But what >>> this ideal >>> >> is, is *only realised by the work of the project itself*. >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> And as a bigger question, I am trying to figure out >>> "where" the activity >>> >>> exists? And "who" is a part of it? >>> >> >>> >> OK, but just don't expect to find an abstract empirical >>> (logical >>> >> positivist) answer to that. An activity (or project) is >>> an aggregate >>> >> of *actions* not *people*. These actions are the >>> fundamental (micro) >>> >> unit of an activity, which is a molar unit of human life >>> as a whole. >>> >> So an activity exists in its artefact-mediated actions, >>> not a group >>> >> of people. >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> For example, with XMCA, is each thread or discussion an >>> activity? What >>> >>> about all the intersections and overlaps with previous >>> and soon-to-be >>> >>> discussions? Or is the whole history of XMCA an activity? >>> >>> And as to "who", is it just the people talking (i.e. >>> writing!), or are >>> >>> the "lurkers" part of the activity? And are non-XMCA >>> folks with whom the >>> >>> writers and lurkers speak, and who have significantly >>> influenced the >>> >>> writers' ideas - are they a part of the activity? >>> >> >>> >> (1) Like all the concepts which are part of a science, >>> projects are >>> >> *nested*. An aggregate of actions may have ideal or >>> object which >>> >> makes sense only as part of one or more larger projects. >>> All the >>> >> concepts of a science obviously have complex >>> interactions and >>> >> interdependncies. No clear boundaries or lines of >>> demarcation. Their >>> >> truth is part of the *whole*. (2) The question of "who" >>> is part of >>> >> it is the wrong question. An activity is an aggregate >>> of actions, >>> >> not individual persons. Also, a project is the >>> particular of a >>> >> concept. As a particular, the project has a relatively >>> definite >>> >> location in time and space. But it is an instance >>> realising a >>> >> concept which is a unit of an entire social formation. >>> So the scope >>> >> of a project, being part of a family of such projects, >>> may be larger >>> >> than the immediate participating actions. >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> In short, what are the bounds of an activity? >>> >>> (oh, and where does a "project" fit into all of this?) >>> >> >>> >> Boundary questions are the royal road to confusion. The >>> question is >>> >> what is the concept (or in common parlance the >>> "essence") of a project. >>> >> "A project" is just another word for "an activity." But >>> it has its >>> >> own history and connotations in our culture. (BTW >>> "project" and >>> >> "design" are the same word in Russian: "proyekt" and the >>> etymology >>> >> of "de-sign" is interesting too) and also, by using a >>> different word >>> >> I can get away from the orthodoxy of what ANL or someone >>> else says >>> >> is the case for "an activity." So if I say that the >>> object of a >>> >> project is immanent within the project, I am not directly >>> >> contradicting an Activity Theorist for whom the Object >>> or motive is >>> >> given for the Activity. I want to re-discuss all the >>> concepts of >>> >> Activity Theory without being stumped by orthodoxy, so a >>> new word helps. >>> >> >>> >> Andy >>> >> >>> >> -greg >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>> Visiting Assistant Professor >>> Department of Anthropology >>> 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>> Brigham Young University >>> Provo, UT 84602 >>> http://byu.academia.edu/**GregoryThompson >>> >>> >>> >> > -- > ------------------------------**------------------------------** > ------------ > *Andy Blunden* > Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts > http://marxists.academia.edu/**AndyBlunden > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Visiting Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Wed Aug 14 16:21:49 2013 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Thu, 15 Aug 2013 00:21:49 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> <520444BA.2000808@mira.net> <520460F0.5030506@mira.net> <19E63C50-A0D2-4A0F-BBA7-63853414FDAA@gmail.com> <4195A368-C7B9-4AB0-AAA5-A244135DC331@gmail.com> <520ADCDD.9000406@mira.net> Message-ID: On 14 August 2013 23:10, Greg Thompson wrote: > Apparently this conversation didn't go to the group - or maybe parts of it > did. So here is a recap of the thread: > > Huw commented that an activity is defined by its object. > > I inquired about what the "object" is when *conversation* is the activity. > > Huw responded "the object of the conversation is the subject's purpose". > > Andy added: > "There are important differences in the methodological implication which > go to the collection and interpretation of empirical data, Huw. These > mainly arise from the idea of the continuity of a project as it passes > through different formations, as the motive undergoes immanent change and > the forms of collaboration and objectification change. But as a momentary > snap-shot of an activity, the two conceptions coincide, yes." > This was with respect to Leontyev's concept of Activity and Andy's concept of project. Regarding interaction, and without having to go beyond classic texts, the notions of leading activity and ZPD are such boundary concepts that you allude to, Greg. As I see it, Leontyev's activity is principally a psychologically oriented concept. With respect to Goffman, for me motive and goals have a profound bearing upon the social situation, but perhaps I am rather goal oriented? But in many situations there are implicit demands (such as professional commercial work) where one is not expected to bring one's pet motives/projects to the table. Note that the performative with the word is the doing, as is the notion of "this is play". "Thus, meanings refract the world in man's consciousness. The vehicle of meaning is language, but language is not the demiurge of meaning." Best, Huw > And here is my (as yet unsent! Hot off the presses!) response to Huw and > Andy: > > "Motive" seems a slippery concept to rest too much on. Andy I'm wondering > how you answer the question you put to Roland, namely whether or not master > and slave are participating in the same activity/project? Or, what about a > golfer and caddy? And so on down to, as Phillip and Carol point out - the > different participants in a discussion on XMCA. > > I'm rather fond of Goffman's question "what is it that is going on here?" > as a way of thinking about "activity". As Goffman notes, the golfer and > caddy have different "motivational relevancies" (1973, p. 8), but this > doesn't mean that they are "doing" different activities. In the end I think > Goffman is really working out a practice theory that treat's John Austin's > famous question of how it is that we can "do things with words" (although > his lectures, of course, were titled as the answer to the question - How to > do Things with Words). Goffman is trying to figure out how Austin's primary > performatives are accomplished, joked, faked, imitated, fabricated, etc. in > actual practice. What is it that goes into making an instance of talk an > instance of an "insult" or a "compliment" or an "argument"? And how do > these become consequential in practice. This, it seems, is Bateson's point > in "This is Play"; it is a life and death matter for the animal to know > whether or not an instance of interaction is play or serious. Maybe not > quite so consequential (immediately) for us humans, but it can certainly be > the difference between getting a laugh and getting a punch in the nose. > > Goffman's answer is interesting in that he doesn't rely on the motives > (motivational relevancies) of the participants, but rather creates a notion > of the local context as a "frame" that exists somewhere between > participants. No one person can dictate the frame (even dictators have to > deal with the possibility of duplicitousness - the word with a side-wards > glance - hence irony is a powerful weapon of the weak - even if James Scott > didn't recognize this, Bakhtin clearly did). Frames emerge as participants > take parts in the unfolding play of some event or happening, and, to a > certain extent, without regard to alignment of the motives of the > participants. Every once in a while the motives of all participants create > a frame may be relatively closely aligned, but it seems much more common > that frames are built out of a plethora of motives. > > I should add that I wonder if Susan Leigh Star's concept of Boundary > Objects might be useful here as well. These are objects that emerge despite > a plurality of motivations. Building on Latour's notion of interessement > (and From Star and Griesemer, boundary objects are: ?objects which are > both plastic enough to adapt to local needs and the constraints of the > several parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a common > identity across sites...The objects may by abstract or concrete.? > > Etienne Wenger seems to offer a start in this direction. But only a start. > > Can we imagine "activity" (or whatever we want to call it - "project," > "frame," "social doing," etc.) as a boundary object - something that > captures a relation BETWEEN persons. Activity always as "inter-activity." > > So then, how do we tell "what it is that is going on here?" where "here" > is the "current" temporally displaced moment of me writing and you reading > this. Is this just me being a show-off? Is this me trying to work through > some of my ideas in order to publish a paper (with the real motivation to > simply keep my job)? Is this just me musing with friends about ideas about > which I feel very strongly? Or is something altogether different happening > here? > > I take Goffman's answer to this to be: it's up to you - or better, to the > relation that will emerge BETWEEN us. Who's to say what that will be. > > -greg > > > On Tue, Aug 13, 2013 at 7:26 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> There are important differences in the methodological implication which >> go to the collection and interpretation of empirical data, Huw. These >> mainly arise from the idea of the continuity of a project as it passes >> through different formations, as the motive undergoes immanent change and >> the forms of collaboration and objectification change. But as a momentary >> shap-shot of an activity, the two conceptions coincide, yes. >> >> Andy >> >> Is this going to go back on the list? >> >> Huw Lloyd wrote: >> >>> >>> On 13 August 2013 16:55, >> greg.a.thompson@gmail.**com >> wrote: >>> >>> Thanks huw, sorry i missed your response - I must have missed it >>> amid the flurry of activity about activity!! >>> So does this mean that you have a different take than Andy? Seems >>> like he was arguing against a motive-based definition of activity. >>> >>> >>> Well, as far as I know I have a similar interpretation to Andy regarding >>> the interpretation/reading of these texts. Andy has reasons to elaborate >>> something different he calls a project. >>> My personal inference was that this has more to do with preferred >>> methods rather than empirical based disagreements with Leontyev's >>> formulation. >>> >>> Does that help? >>> >>> Best, >>> Huw >>> >>> >>> Just trying to sort out what this word means for everybody. >>> (And I cc'd Andy on this to get his thoughts) >>> Cheers, >>> Greg >>> >>> Sent from my iPhone >>> >>> On Aug 13, 2013, at 7:53 AM, Huw Lloyd >> >> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Hi Greg, >>>> >>>> Yes. My response (that I sent to xmca-l) was "the object of the >>>> conversation is the subject's purpose(s)". >>>> >>>> You can gchat me or gvideo if you wish. >>>> Best, >>>> Huw >>>> >>>> >>>> On 13 August 2013 15:47, Greg Thompson >>> >> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> Huw, >>>> Did you get this question I posted to XMCA? I meant it >>>> in all sincerity. As someone interested in >>>> discourse, this kind of thing really matters to me. And I >>>> think it is where things start to get a little messy with >>>> defining activity. But I may be wrong about that! >>>> Looking forward to hearing more. >>>> Very best, >>>> greg >>>> >>>> >>>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- >>>> From: >>> >>>> >> >>>> Date: Mon, Aug 12, 2013 at 9:09 AM >>>> Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities >>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" >>>> >>>> >> >>>> >>>> >>>> Huw, >>>> Pardon my ignorance on this issue (I can assure you this is >>>> more than just pretense!), but if conversation is activity, >>>> what is the object of this activity? >>>> Greg >>>> >>>> Sent from my iPhone >>>> >>>> On Aug 11, 2013, at 7:28 AM, Huw Lloyd >>>> >>> >> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> > FYI, Greg. >>>> > >>>> > Activity is defined by its object. See p. 363 in The >>>> Development of Mind >>>> > (Problems of Dev.) >>>> > >>>> > Huw >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > On 9 August 2013 04:24, Andy Blunden >>> > wrote: >>>> > >>>> >> Greg Thompson wrote: >>>> >> >>>> >>> Andy, I think I need still more help. >>>> >>> >>>> >>> I got lost at, well, "an activity (generally) exists". >>>> Wondering what >>>> >>> this could mean. >>>> >> >>>> >> xmca didn't exist when Mike Cole launched it. But for >>>> the many >>>> >> thousands who have joined it since, it *existed*. Thus is >>>> >> "generally" exists. On the whole, we *join* rather than >>>> create >>>> >> activities (projects). >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> Then the middle part seems to make some sense for me: >>>> activities don't >>>> >>> simply and reasonably follow the intentions of their >>>> participants, but then >>>> >>> lost you again at the end, with "the outcome in >>>> '*immanent* in the project >>>> >>> itself". Not sure what exactly that means either. >>>> >> >>>> >> As Vygotsky says somewhere, the problem which stimulates >>>> the >>>> >> activity (the development of the concept) cannot in >>>> itself account >>>> >> for the project (or concept). The *means* utilised, which >>>> >> corresponds to how the problem or task is conceived by >>>> the agents, >>>> >> is what is crucial. I.e., not the problem or task as >>>> such, but the >>>> >> conception of the task, constitutes the ideal. But what >>>> this ideal >>>> >> is, is *only realised by the work of the project itself*. >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >>> And as a bigger question, I am trying to figure out >>>> "where" the activity >>>> >>> exists? And "who" is a part of it? >>>> >> >>>> >> OK, but just don't expect to find an abstract empirical >>>> (logical >>>> >> positivist) answer to that. An activity (or project) is >>>> an aggregate >>>> >> of *actions* not *people*. These actions are the >>>> fundamental (micro) >>>> >> unit of an activity, which is a molar unit of human life >>>> as a whole. >>>> >> So an activity exists in its artefact-mediated actions, >>>> not a group >>>> >> of people. >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> For example, with XMCA, is each thread or discussion an >>>> activity? What >>>> >>> about all the intersections and overlaps with previous >>>> and soon-to-be >>>> >>> discussions? Or is the whole history of XMCA an activity? >>>> >>> And as to "who", is it just the people talking (i.e. >>>> writing!), or are >>>> >>> the "lurkers" part of the activity? And are non-XMCA >>>> folks with whom the >>>> >>> writers and lurkers speak, and who have significantly >>>> influenced the >>>> >>> writers' ideas - are they a part of the activity? >>>> >> >>>> >> (1) Like all the concepts which are part of a science, >>>> projects are >>>> >> *nested*. An aggregate of actions may have ideal or >>>> object which >>>> >> makes sense only as part of one or more larger projects. >>>> All the >>>> >> concepts of a science obviously have complex >>>> interactions and >>>> >> interdependncies. No clear boundaries or lines of >>>> demarcation. Their >>>> >> truth is part of the *whole*. (2) The question of "who" >>>> is part of >>>> >> it is the wrong question. An activity is an aggregate >>>> of actions, >>>> >> not individual persons. Also, a project is the >>>> particular of a >>>> >> concept. As a particular, the project has a relatively >>>> definite >>>> >> location in time and space. But it is an instance >>>> realising a >>>> >> concept which is a unit of an entire social formation. >>>> So the scope >>>> >> of a project, being part of a family of such projects, >>>> may be larger >>>> >> than the immediate participating actions. >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >>> In short, what are the bounds of an activity? >>>> >>> (oh, and where does a "project" fit into all of this?) >>>> >> >>>> >> Boundary questions are the royal road to confusion. The >>>> question is >>>> >> what is the concept (or in common parlance the >>>> "essence") of a project. >>>> >> "A project" is just another word for "an activity." But >>>> it has its >>>> >> own history and connotations in our culture. (BTW >>>> "project" and >>>> >> "design" are the same word in Russian: "proyekt" and the >>>> etymology >>>> >> of "de-sign" is interesting too) and also, by using a >>>> different word >>>> >> I can get away from the orthodoxy of what ANL or someone >>>> else says >>>> >> is the case for "an activity." So if I say that the >>>> object of a >>>> >> project is immanent within the project, I am not directly >>>> >> contradicting an Activity Theorist for whom the Object >>>> or motive is >>>> >> given for the Activity. I want to re-discuss all the >>>> concepts of >>>> >> Activity Theory without being stumped by orthodoxy, so a >>>> new word helps. >>>> >> >>>> >> Andy >>>> >> >>>> >> -greg >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >>>> Visiting Assistant Professor >>>> Department of Anthropology >>>> 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >>>> Brigham Young University >>>> Provo, UT 84602 >>>> http://byu.academia.edu/**GregoryThompson >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >> -- >> ------------------------------**------------------------------** >> ------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ >> Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts >> http://marxists.academia.edu/**AndyBlunden >> >> > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Visiting Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed Aug 14 17:08:36 2013 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2013 17:08:36 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> <520444BA.2000808@mira.net> <520460F0.5030506@mira.net> <19E63C50-A0D2-4A0F-BBA7-63853414FDAA@gmail.com> <4195A368-C7B9-4AB0-AAA5-A244135DC331@gmail.com> <520ADCDD.9000406@mira.net> Message-ID: Greg, Your exploration of boundary *object* as actually a boundary *relation* I believe has the capability of drawing our attention to the fluid nature of boundary. I believe Gadamer would shift the emphasis to boundary *affinity*. The notion of the boundary as having *plastic* qualities and only coming into existence within communication processes [more than linguistic] focuses on the notion of *between*. If you want to elaborate this way of reflection further I see real potential. As an aside, John Shotter suggests *motives* develop or are secondary phenomena emerging WITHIN our ways of talking [about motives] Larry On Wed, Aug 14, 2013 at 3:10 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Apparently this conversation didn't go to the group - or maybe parts of it > did. So here is a recap of the thread: > > Huw commented that an activity is defined by its object. > > I inquired about what the "object" is when *conversation* is the activity. > > Huw responded "the object of the conversation is the subject's purpose". > > Andy added: > "There are important differences in the methodological implication which go > to the collection and interpretation of empirical data, Huw. These mainly > arise from the idea of the continuity of a project as it passes through > different formations, as the motive undergoes immanent change and the forms > of collaboration and objectification change. But as a momentary snap-shot > of an activity, the two conceptions coincide, yes." > > And here is my (as yet unsent! Hot off the presses!) response to Huw and > Andy: > > "Motive" seems a slippery concept to rest too much on. Andy I'm wondering > how you answer the question you put to Roland, namely whether or not master > and slave are participating in the same activity/project? Or, what about a > golfer and caddy? And so on down to, as Phillip and Carol point out - the > different participants in a discussion on XMCA. > > I'm rather fond of Goffman's question "what is it that is going on here?" > as a way of thinking about "activity". As Goffman notes, the golfer and > caddy have different "motivational relevancies" (1973, p. 8), but this > doesn't mean that they are "doing" different activities. In the end I think > Goffman is really working out a practice theory that treat's John Austin's > famous question of how it is that we can "do things with words" (although > his lectures, of course, were titled as the answer to the question - How to > do Things with Words). Goffman is trying to figure out how Austin's primary > performatives are accomplished, joked, faked, imitated, fabricated, etc. in > actual practice. What is it that goes into making an instance of talk an > instance of an "insult" or a "compliment" or an "argument"? And how do > these become consequential in practice. This, it seems, is Bateson's point > in "This is Play"; it is a life and death matter for the animal to know > whether or not an instance of interaction is play or serious. Maybe not > quite so consequential (immediately) for us humans, but it can certainly be > the difference between getting a laugh and getting a punch in the nose. > > Goffman's answer is interesting in that he doesn't rely on the motives > (motivational relevancies) of the participants, but rather creates a notion > of the local context as a "frame" that exists somewhere between > participants. No one person can dictate the frame (even dictators have to > deal with the possibility of duplicitousness - the word with a side-wards > glance - hence irony is a powerful weapon of the weak - even if James Scott > didn't recognize this, Bakhtin clearly did). Frames emerge as participants > take parts in the unfolding play of some event or happening, and, to a > certain extent, without regard to alignment of the motives of the > participants. Every once in a while the motives of all participants create > a frame may be relatively closely aligned, but it seems much more common > that frames are built out of a plethora of motives. > > I should add that I wonder if Susan Leigh Star's concept of Boundary > Objects might be useful here as well. These are objects that emerge despite > a plurality of motivations. Building on Latour's notion of interessement > (and From Star and Griesemer, boundary objects are: ?objects which are both > plastic enough to adapt to local needs and the constraints of the several > parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a common identity > across sites...The objects may by abstract or concrete.? > > Etienne Wenger seems to offer a start in this direction. But only a start. > > Can we imagine "activity" (or whatever we want to call it - "project," > "frame," "social doing," etc.) as a boundary object - something that > captures a relation BETWEEN persons. Activity always as "inter-activity." > > So then, how do we tell "what it is that is going on here?" where "here" is > the "current" temporally displaced moment of me writing and you reading > this. Is this just me being a show-off? Is this me trying to work through > some of my ideas in order to publish a paper (with the real motivation to > simply keep my job)? Is this just me musing with friends about ideas about > which I feel very strongly? Or is something altogether different happening > here? > > I take Goffman's answer to this to be: it's up to you - or better, to the > relation that will emerge BETWEEN us. Who's to say what that will be. > > -greg > > > On Tue, Aug 13, 2013 at 7:26 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > There are important differences in the methodological implication which > go > > to the collection and interpretation of empirical data, Huw. These mainly > > arise from the idea of the continuity of a project as it passes through > > different formations, as the motive undergoes immanent change and the > forms > > of collaboration and objectification change. But as a momentary shap-shot > > of an activity, the two conceptions coincide, yes. > > > > Andy > > > > Is this going to go back on the list? > > > > Huw Lloyd wrote: > > > >> > >> On 13 August 2013 16:55, >> greg.a.thompson@gmail.**com >> wrote: > >> > >> Thanks huw, sorry i missed your response - I must have missed it > >> amid the flurry of activity about activity!! > >> So does this mean that you have a different take than Andy? Seems > >> like he was arguing against a motive-based definition of activity. > >> > >> > >> Well, as far as I know I have a similar interpretation to Andy regarding > >> the interpretation/reading of these texts. Andy has reasons to > elaborate > >> something different he calls a project. > >> My personal inference was that this has more to do with preferred > methods > >> rather than empirical based disagreements with Leontyev's formulation. > >> > >> Does that help? > >> > >> Best, > >> Huw > >> > >> > >> Just trying to sort out what this word means for everybody. > >> (And I cc'd Andy on this to get his thoughts) > >> Cheers, > >> Greg > >> > >> Sent from my iPhone > >> > >> On Aug 13, 2013, at 7:53 AM, Huw Lloyd >> >> > >> wrote: > >> > >> Hi Greg, > >>> > >>> Yes. My response (that I sent to xmca-l) was "the object of the > >>> conversation is the subject's purpose(s)". > >>> > >>> You can gchat me or gvideo if you wish. > >>> Best, > >>> Huw > >>> > >>> > >>> On 13 August 2013 15:47, Greg Thompson >>> >> > >>> wrote: > >>> > >>> Huw, > >>> Did you get this question I posted to XMCA? I meant it > >>> in all sincerity. As someone interested in > >>> discourse, this kind of thing really matters to me. And I > >>> think it is where things start to get a little messy with > >>> defining activity. But I may be wrong about that! > >>> Looking forward to hearing more. > >>> Very best, > >>> greg > >>> > >>> > >>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > >>> From: >>> > > >>> >> > >>> Date: Mon, Aug 12, 2013 at 9:09 AM > >>> Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities > >>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > >>> xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> > >>> >> > >>> > >>> > >>> Huw, > >>> Pardon my ignorance on this issue (I can assure you this is > >>> more than just pretense!), but if conversation is activity, > >>> what is the object of this activity? > >>> Greg > >>> > >>> Sent from my iPhone > >>> > >>> On Aug 11, 2013, at 7:28 AM, Huw Lloyd > >>> >>> >>> > >>> wrote: > >>> > >>> > FYI, Greg. > >>> > > >>> > Activity is defined by its object. See p. 363 in The > >>> Development of Mind > >>> > (Problems of Dev.) > >>> > > >>> > Huw > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > > >>> > On 9 August 2013 04:24, Andy Blunden >>> > wrote: > >>> > > >>> >> Greg Thompson wrote: > >>> >> > >>> >>> Andy, I think I need still more help. > >>> >>> > >>> >>> I got lost at, well, "an activity (generally) exists". > >>> Wondering what > >>> >>> this could mean. > >>> >> > >>> >> xmca didn't exist when Mike Cole launched it. But for > >>> the many > >>> >> thousands who have joined it since, it *existed*. Thus is > >>> >> "generally" exists. On the whole, we *join* rather than > >>> create > >>> >> activities (projects). > >>> >> > >>> >> > >>> >> Then the middle part seems to make some sense for me: > >>> activities don't > >>> >>> simply and reasonably follow the intentions of their > >>> participants, but then > >>> >>> lost you again at the end, with "the outcome in > >>> '*immanent* in the project > >>> >>> itself". Not sure what exactly that means either. > >>> >> > >>> >> As Vygotsky says somewhere, the problem which stimulates > the > >>> >> activity (the development of the concept) cannot in > >>> itself account > >>> >> for the project (or concept). The *means* utilised, which > >>> >> corresponds to how the problem or task is conceived by > >>> the agents, > >>> >> is what is crucial. I.e., not the problem or task as > >>> such, but the > >>> >> conception of the task, constitutes the ideal. But what > >>> this ideal > >>> >> is, is *only realised by the work of the project itself*. > >>> >> > >>> >> > >>> >> > >>> >>> And as a bigger question, I am trying to figure out > >>> "where" the activity > >>> >>> exists? And "who" is a part of it? > >>> >> > >>> >> OK, but just don't expect to find an abstract empirical > >>> (logical > >>> >> positivist) answer to that. An activity (or project) is > >>> an aggregate > >>> >> of *actions* not *people*. These actions are the > >>> fundamental (micro) > >>> >> unit of an activity, which is a molar unit of human life > >>> as a whole. > >>> >> So an activity exists in its artefact-mediated actions, > >>> not a group > >>> >> of people. > >>> >> > >>> >> > >>> >> For example, with XMCA, is each thread or discussion an > >>> activity? What > >>> >>> about all the intersections and overlaps with previous > >>> and soon-to-be > >>> >>> discussions? Or is the whole history of XMCA an activity? > >>> >>> And as to "who", is it just the people talking (i.e. > >>> writing!), or are > >>> >>> the "lurkers" part of the activity? And are non-XMCA > >>> folks with whom the > >>> >>> writers and lurkers speak, and who have significantly > >>> influenced the > >>> >>> writers' ideas - are they a part of the activity? > >>> >> > >>> >> (1) Like all the concepts which are part of a science, > >>> projects are > >>> >> *nested*. An aggregate of actions may have ideal or > >>> object which > >>> >> makes sense only as part of one or more larger projects. > >>> All the > >>> >> concepts of a science obviously have complex > >>> interactions and > >>> >> interdependncies. No clear boundaries or lines of > >>> demarcation. Their > >>> >> truth is part of the *whole*. (2) The question of "who" > >>> is part of > >>> >> it is the wrong question. An activity is an aggregate > >>> of actions, > >>> >> not individual persons. Also, a project is the > >>> particular of a > >>> >> concept. As a particular, the project has a relatively > >>> definite > >>> >> location in time and space. But it is an instance > >>> realising a > >>> >> concept which is a unit of an entire social formation. > >>> So the scope > >>> >> of a project, being part of a family of such projects, > >>> may be larger > >>> >> than the immediate participating actions. > >>> >> > >>> >> > >>> >> > >>> >>> In short, what are the bounds of an activity? > >>> >>> (oh, and where does a "project" fit into all of this?) > >>> >> > >>> >> Boundary questions are the royal road to confusion. The > >>> question is > >>> >> what is the concept (or in common parlance the > >>> "essence") of a project. > >>> >> "A project" is just another word for "an activity." But > >>> it has its > >>> >> own history and connotations in our culture. (BTW > >>> "project" and > >>> >> "design" are the same word in Russian: "proyekt" and the > >>> etymology > >>> >> of "de-sign" is interesting too) and also, by using a > >>> different word > >>> >> I can get away from the orthodoxy of what ANL or someone > >>> else says > >>> >> is the case for "an activity." So if I say that the > >>> object of a > >>> >> project is immanent within the project, I am not directly > >>> >> contradicting an Activity Theorist for whom the Object > >>> or motive is > >>> >> given for the Activity. I want to re-discuss all the > >>> concepts of > >>> >> Activity Theory without being stumped by orthodoxy, so a > >>> new word helps. > >>> >> > >>> >> Andy > >>> >> > >>> >> -greg > >>> >> > >>> >> > >>> >> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>> -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >>> Visiting Assistant Professor > >>> Department of Anthropology > >>> 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >>> Brigham Young University > >>> Provo, UT 84602 > >>> http://byu.academia.edu/**GregoryThompson< > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > > -- > > ------------------------------**------------------------------** > > ------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > > Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts > > http://marxists.academia.edu/**AndyBlunden< > http://marxists.academia.edu/AndyBlunden> > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Visiting Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > From lchcmike@gmail.com Wed Aug 14 17:18:17 2013 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2013 17:18:17 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> <520444BA.2000808@mira.net> <520460F0.5030506@mira.net> <19E63C50-A0D2-4A0F-BBA7-63853414FDAA@gmail.com> <4195A368-C7B9-4AB0-AAA5-A244135DC331@gmail.com> <520ADCDD.9000406@mira.net> Message-ID: I am finding this conversation especially hard to follow because of the huge train of headers and repititions. This problem has arisen before with no solution. Anyone have a practical suggestion for how to limit the length of history that replies contain other than what the writer specifically is referring to?? mike On Wed, Aug 14, 2013 at 4:21 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > On 14 August 2013 23:10, Greg Thompson wrote: > > > Apparently this conversation didn't go to the group - or maybe parts of > it > > did. So here is a recap of the thread: > > > > Huw commented that an activity is defined by its object. > > > > I inquired about what the "object" is when *conversation* is the > activity. > > > > Huw responded "the object of the conversation is the subject's purpose". > > > > Andy added: > > "There are important differences in the methodological implication which > > go to the collection and interpretation of empirical data, Huw. These > > mainly arise from the idea of the continuity of a project as it passes > > through different formations, as the motive undergoes immanent change and > > the forms of collaboration and objectification change. But as a momentary > > snap-shot of an activity, the two conceptions coincide, yes." > > > > This was with respect to Leontyev's concept of Activity and Andy's concept > of project. > > Regarding interaction, and without having to go beyond classic texts, the > notions of leading activity and ZPD are such boundary concepts that you > allude to, Greg. > > As I see it, Leontyev's activity is principally a psychologically oriented > concept. > > With respect to Goffman, for me motive and goals have a profound bearing > upon the social situation, but perhaps I am rather goal oriented? But in > many situations there are implicit demands (such as professional commercial > work) where one is not expected to bring one's pet motives/projects to the > table. > > Note that the performative with the word is the doing, as is the notion of > "this is play". > > "Thus, meanings refract the world in man's consciousness. The vehicle of > meaning is language, but language is not the demiurge of meaning." > > Best, > Huw > > > > And here is my (as yet unsent! Hot off the presses!) response to Huw and > > Andy: > > > > "Motive" seems a slippery concept to rest too much on. Andy I'm wondering > > how you answer the question you put to Roland, namely whether or not > master > > and slave are participating in the same activity/project? Or, what about > a > > golfer and caddy? And so on down to, as Phillip and Carol point out - the > > different participants in a discussion on XMCA. > > > > I'm rather fond of Goffman's question "what is it that is going on here?" > > as a way of thinking about "activity". As Goffman notes, the golfer and > > caddy have different "motivational relevancies" (1973, p. 8), but this > > doesn't mean that they are "doing" different activities. In the end I > think > > Goffman is really working out a practice theory that treat's John > Austin's > > famous question of how it is that we can "do things with words" (although > > his lectures, of course, were titled as the answer to the question - How > to > > do Things with Words). Goffman is trying to figure out how Austin's > primary > > performatives are accomplished, joked, faked, imitated, fabricated, etc. > in > > actual practice. What is it that goes into making an instance of talk an > > instance of an "insult" or a "compliment" or an "argument"? And how do > > these become consequential in practice. This, it seems, is Bateson's > point > > in "This is Play"; it is a life and death matter for the animal to know > > whether or not an instance of interaction is play or serious. Maybe not > > quite so consequential (immediately) for us humans, but it can certainly > be > > the difference between getting a laugh and getting a punch in the nose. > > > > Goffman's answer is interesting in that he doesn't rely on the motives > > (motivational relevancies) of the participants, but rather creates a > notion > > of the local context as a "frame" that exists somewhere between > > participants. No one person can dictate the frame (even dictators have to > > deal with the possibility of duplicitousness - the word with a side-wards > > glance - hence irony is a powerful weapon of the weak - even if James > Scott > > didn't recognize this, Bakhtin clearly did). Frames emerge as > participants > > take parts in the unfolding play of some event or happening, and, to a > > certain extent, without regard to alignment of the motives of the > > participants. Every once in a while the motives of all participants > create > > a frame may be relatively closely aligned, but it seems much more common > > that frames are built out of a plethora of motives. > > > > I should add that I wonder if Susan Leigh Star's concept of Boundary > > Objects might be useful here as well. These are objects that emerge > despite > > a plurality of motivations. Building on Latour's notion of interessement > > (and From Star and Griesemer, boundary objects are: ?objects which are > > both plastic enough to adapt to local needs and the constraints of the > > several parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a common > > identity across sites...The objects may by abstract or concrete.? > > > > Etienne Wenger seems to offer a start in this direction. But only a > start. > > > > Can we imagine "activity" (or whatever we want to call it - "project," > > "frame," "social doing," etc.) as a boundary object - something that > > captures a relation BETWEEN persons. Activity always as "inter-activity." > > > > So then, how do we tell "what it is that is going on here?" where "here" > > is the "current" temporally displaced moment of me writing and you > reading > > this. Is this just me being a show-off? Is this me trying to work through > > some of my ideas in order to publish a paper (with the real motivation to > > simply keep my job)? Is this just me musing with friends about ideas > about > > which I feel very strongly? Or is something altogether different > happening > > here? > > > > I take Goffman's answer to this to be: it's up to you - or better, to the > > relation that will emerge BETWEEN us. Who's to say what that will be. > > > > -greg > > > > > > On Tue, Aug 13, 2013 at 7:26 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > >> There are important differences in the methodological implication which > >> go to the collection and interpretation of empirical data, Huw. These > >> mainly arise from the idea of the continuity of a project as it passes > >> through different formations, as the motive undergoes immanent change > and > >> the forms of collaboration and objectification change. But as a > momentary > >> shap-shot of an activity, the two conceptions coincide, yes. > >> > >> Andy > >> > >> Is this going to go back on the list? > >> > >> Huw Lloyd wrote: > >> > >>> > >>> On 13 August 2013 16:55, >>> greg.a.thompson@gmail.**com >> wrote: > >>> > >>> Thanks huw, sorry i missed your response - I must have missed it > >>> amid the flurry of activity about activity!! > >>> So does this mean that you have a different take than Andy? Seems > >>> like he was arguing against a motive-based definition of activity. > >>> > >>> > >>> Well, as far as I know I have a similar interpretation to Andy > regarding > >>> the interpretation/reading of these texts. Andy has reasons to > elaborate > >>> something different he calls a project. > >>> My personal inference was that this has more to do with preferred > >>> methods rather than empirical based disagreements with Leontyev's > >>> formulation. > >>> > >>> Does that help? > >>> > >>> Best, > >>> Huw > >>> > >>> > >>> Just trying to sort out what this word means for everybody. > >>> (And I cc'd Andy on this to get his thoughts) > >>> Cheers, > >>> Greg > >>> > >>> Sent from my iPhone > >>> > >>> On Aug 13, 2013, at 7:53 AM, Huw Lloyd >>> >> > >>> wrote: > >>> > >>> Hi Greg, > >>>> > >>>> Yes. My response (that I sent to xmca-l) was "the object of the > >>>> conversation is the subject's purpose(s)". > >>>> > >>>> You can gchat me or gvideo if you wish. > >>>> Best, > >>>> Huw > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> On 13 August 2013 15:47, Greg Thompson >>>> >> > >>>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>> Huw, > >>>> Did you get this question I posted to XMCA? I meant it > >>>> in all sincerity. As someone interested in > >>>> discourse, this kind of thing really matters to me. And I > >>>> think it is where things start to get a little messy with > >>>> defining activity. But I may be wrong about that! > >>>> Looking forward to hearing more. > >>>> Very best, > >>>> greg > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > >>>> From: >>>> greg.a.thompson@gmail.com> > >>>> >> > >>>> Date: Mon, Aug 12, 2013 at 9:09 AM > >>>> Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities > >>>> To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > >>>> xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> > >>>> >> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> Huw, > >>>> Pardon my ignorance on this issue (I can assure you this is > >>>> more than just pretense!), but if conversation is activity, > >>>> what is the object of this activity? > >>>> Greg > >>>> > >>>> Sent from my iPhone > >>>> > >>>> On Aug 11, 2013, at 7:28 AM, Huw Lloyd > >>>> >>>> huw.softdesigns@gmail.com>>> > >>>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>> > FYI, Greg. > >>>> > > >>>> > Activity is defined by its object. See p. 363 in The > >>>> Development of Mind > >>>> > (Problems of Dev.) > >>>> > > >>>> > Huw > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > > >>>> > On 9 August 2013 04:24, Andy Blunden >>>> > wrote: > >>>> > > >>>> >> Greg Thompson wrote: > >>>> >> > >>>> >>> Andy, I think I need still more help. > >>>> >>> > >>>> >>> I got lost at, well, "an activity (generally) exists". > >>>> Wondering what > >>>> >>> this could mean. > >>>> >> > >>>> >> xmca didn't exist when Mike Cole launched it. But for > >>>> the many > >>>> >> thousands who have joined it since, it *existed*. Thus is > >>>> >> "generally" exists. On the whole, we *join* rather than > >>>> create > >>>> >> activities (projects). > >>>> >> > >>>> >> > >>>> >> Then the middle part seems to make some sense for me: > >>>> activities don't > >>>> >>> simply and reasonably follow the intentions of their > >>>> participants, but then > >>>> >>> lost you again at the end, with "the outcome in > >>>> '*immanent* in the project > >>>> >>> itself". Not sure what exactly that means either. > >>>> >> > >>>> >> As Vygotsky says somewhere, the problem which stimulates > >>>> the > >>>> >> activity (the development of the concept) cannot in > >>>> itself account > >>>> >> for the project (or concept). The *means* utilised, which > >>>> >> corresponds to how the problem or task is conceived by > >>>> the agents, > >>>> >> is what is crucial. I.e., not the problem or task as > >>>> such, but the > >>>> >> conception of the task, constitutes the ideal. But what > >>>> this ideal > >>>> >> is, is *only realised by the work of the project itself*. > >>>> >> > >>>> >> > >>>> >> > >>>> >>> And as a bigger question, I am trying to figure out > >>>> "where" the activity > >>>> >>> exists? And "who" is a part of it? > >>>> >> > >>>> >> OK, but just don't expect to find an abstract empirical > >>>> (logical > >>>> >> positivist) answer to that. An activity (or project) is > >>>> an aggregate > >>>> >> of *actions* not *people*. These actions are the > >>>> fundamental (micro) > >>>> >> unit of an activity, which is a molar unit of human life > >>>> as a whole. > >>>> >> So an activity exists in its artefact-mediated actions, > >>>> not a group > >>>> >> of people. > >>>> >> > >>>> >> > >>>> >> For example, with XMCA, is each thread or discussion an > >>>> activity? What > >>>> >>> about all the intersections and overlaps with previous > >>>> and soon-to-be > >>>> >>> discussions? Or is the whole history of XMCA an activity? > >>>> >>> And as to "who", is it just the people talking (i.e. > >>>> writing!), or are > >>>> >>> the "lurkers" part of the activity? And are non-XMCA > >>>> folks with whom the > >>>> >>> writers and lurkers speak, and who have significantly > >>>> influenced the > >>>> >>> writers' ideas - are they a part of the activity? > >>>> >> > >>>> >> (1) Like all the concepts which are part of a science, > >>>> projects are > >>>> >> *nested*. An aggregate of actions may have ideal or > >>>> object which > >>>> >> makes sense only as part of one or more larger projects. > >>>> All the > >>>> >> concepts of a science obviously have complex > >>>> interactions and > >>>> >> interdependncies. No clear boundaries or lines of > >>>> demarcation. Their > >>>> >> truth is part of the *whole*. (2) The question of "who" > >>>> is part of > >>>> >> it is the wrong question. An activity is an aggregate > >>>> of actions, > >>>> >> not individual persons. Also, a project is the > >>>> particular of a > >>>> >> concept. As a particular, the project has a relatively > >>>> definite > >>>> >> location in time and space. But it is an instance > >>>> realising a > >>>> >> concept which is a unit of an entire social formation. > >>>> So the scope > >>>> >> of a project, being part of a family of such projects, > >>>> may be larger > >>>> >> than the immediate participating actions. > >>>> >> > >>>> >> > >>>> >> > >>>> >>> In short, what are the bounds of an activity? > >>>> >>> (oh, and where does a "project" fit into all of this?) > >>>> >> > >>>> >> Boundary questions are the royal road to confusion. The > >>>> question is > >>>> >> what is the concept (or in common parlance the > >>>> "essence") of a project. > >>>> >> "A project" is just another word for "an activity." But > >>>> it has its > >>>> >> own history and connotations in our culture. (BTW > >>>> "project" and > >>>> >> "design" are the same word in Russian: "proyekt" and the > >>>> etymology > >>>> >> of "de-sign" is interesting too) and also, by using a > >>>> different word > >>>> >> I can get away from the orthodoxy of what ANL or someone > >>>> else says > >>>> >> is the case for "an activity." So if I say that the > >>>> object of a > >>>> >> project is immanent within the project, I am not directly > >>>> >> contradicting an Activity Theorist for whom the Object > >>>> or motive is > >>>> >> given for the Activity. I want to re-discuss all the > >>>> concepts of > >>>> >> Activity Theory without being stumped by orthodoxy, so a > >>>> new word helps. > >>>> >> > >>>> >> Andy > >>>> >> > >>>> >> -greg > >>>> >> > >>>> >> > >>>> >> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >>>> Visiting Assistant Professor > >>>> Department of Anthropology > >>>> 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >>>> Brigham Young University > >>>> Provo, UT 84602 > >>>> http://byu.academia.edu/**GregoryThompson< > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>> > >> -- > >> ------------------------------**------------------------------** > >> ------------ > >> *Andy Blunden* > >> Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > >> Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts > >> http://marxists.academia.edu/**AndyBlunden< > http://marxists.academia.edu/AndyBlunden> > >> > >> > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Visiting Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > From lspopov@bgsu.edu Wed Aug 14 17:23:25 2013 From: lspopov@bgsu.edu (Lubomir Savov Popov) Date: Thu, 15 Aug 2013 00:23:25 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities Message-ID: <4DF034EF2396694597A7D328E23F09E1CA81@BY2PRD0510MB353.namprd05.prod.outlook.com> Hi Greg, Thank you very much for this extensive report. It is really useful to have such recaps. I appreciate your experience with Goffman's approach to activity phenomena. By chance, I also have preferences for such an approach, whether it is faithfully Goffmanian, or a pragmatic Symbolic Interactionist version, or some kind of other interpretative method. A few things that I would like to share: To hinge on Huw, Leont'ev's (or classic activity theory approach, AT) is pertinent to the analysis of individual activity. If we want to apply it to social activity, we will find that we need to adapt it. Erj? Engestr?m had to do a lot of work in this respect. The terms Individual activity and Social activity are pretty common in Historical Materialist social sciences. The term social activity might be used with somewhat different meanings and the phenomena are modeled differently at different levels/scales of social reality. However, I would like to mention the term Obschenie (Russ.) that might be translated roughly like communication/interaction. Most authors treat it as a separate category. It is different from social activity. I personally prefer to treat it as activity, at least for the purposes of my scholarly pursuits. Obschenie is a parallel layer in each social activity. Goffman's approach can be conceptualized as sociological. It is very strong for unraveling social interactions and the ensuing production of meaning and social relationships. Of course, it has a number of other advantages. I personally have tried to fuse AT or MMC's AT approach with Goffman and the Symbolic Interactionists. I am interested how this can be done. I am interested to see examples/publications. For me, classic activity theory hasn't worked much for the study of sociospatial interactions (in architecture, not in ergonomics) with the purpose of understanding user needs and cultural patterns. A pragmatic interpretativist approach with a very strong descriptive component has worked much better. At least, I get better descriptions of activities and needs, with more details. By the way, I am more interested in describing sociospatial interactions rather than finding causal relationships or explaining particular phenomena. My problem is that I cannot use Goffman in conjunction with activity theory. When I look back, this has been a problem of mine since the beginning. I attribute the difficulties to paradigmatic difference. After the attempts to put together AT and Goffman, I experienced firsthand the incompatibility of different paradigms, or at least of some paradigms. That is how I become a paradigmatic purist. In some way, it is much easier to interface Parson's General Theory of Action with AT ways of thinking, in particular at societal level, although there are paradigmatic differences between them that lead to a number of difficulties. However, Parsons can be incorporated much better in a project performed with AT. Or at least, it is possible to borrow more from Parsons and similar texts. Just a few thoughts, Lubomir -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson Sent: Wednesday, August 14, 2013 6:11 PM To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities Apparently this conversation didn't go to the group - or maybe parts of it did. So here is a recap of the thread: Huw commented that an activity is defined by its object. I inquired about what the "object" is when *conversation* is the activity. Huw responded "the object of the conversation is the subject's purpose". Andy added: "There are important differences in the methodological implication which go to the collection and interpretation of empirical data, Huw. These mainly arise from the idea of the continuity of a project as it passes through different formations, as the motive undergoes immanent change and the forms of collaboration and objectification change. But as a momentary snap-shot of an activity, the two conceptions coincide, yes." And here is my (as yet unsent! Hot off the presses!) response to Huw and Andy: "Motive" seems a slippery concept to rest too much on. Andy I'm wondering how you answer the question you put to Roland, namely whether or not master and slave are participating in the same activity/project? Or, what about a golfer and caddy? And so on down to, as Phillip and Carol point out - the different participants in a discussion on XMCA. I'm rather fond of Goffman's question "what is it that is going on here?" as a way of thinking about "activity". As Goffman notes, the golfer and caddy have different "motivational relevancies" (1973, p. 8), but this doesn't mean that they are "doing" different activities. In the end I think Goffman is really working out a practice theory that treat's John Austin's famous question of how it is that we can "do things with words" (although his lectures, of course, were titled as the answer to the question - How to do Things with Words). Goffman is trying to figure out how Austin's primary performatives are accomplished, joked, faked, imitated, fabricated, etc. in actual practice. What is it that goes into making an instance of talk an instance of an "insult" or a "compliment" or an "argument"? And how do these become consequential in practice. This, it seems, is Bateson's point in "This is Play"; it is a life and death matter for the animal to know whether or not an instance of interaction is play or serious. Maybe not quite so consequential (immediately) for us humans, but it can certainly be the difference between getting a laugh and getting a punch in the nose. Goffman's answer is interesting in that he doesn't rely on the motives (motivational relevancies) of the participants, but rather creates a notion of the local context as a "frame" that exists somewhere between participants. No one person can dictate the frame (even dictators have to deal with the possibility of duplicitousness - the word with a side-wards glance - hence irony is a powerful weapon of the weak - even if James Scott didn't recognize this, Bakhtin clearly did). Frames emerge as participants take parts in the unfolding play of some event or happening, and, to a certain extent, without regard to alignment of the motives of the participants. Every once in a while the motives of all participants create a frame may be relatively closely aligned, but it seems much more common that frames are built out of a plethora of motives. I should add that I wonder if Susan Leigh Star's concept of Boundary Objects might be useful here as well. These are objects that emerge despite a plurality of motivations. Building on Latour's notion of interessement (and From Star and Griesemer, boundary objects are: "objects which are both plastic enough to adapt to local needs and the constraints of the several parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a common identity across sites...The objects may by abstract or concrete." Etienne Wenger seems to offer a start in this direction. But only a start. Can we imagine "activity" (or whatever we want to call it - "project," "frame," "social doing," etc.) as a boundary object - something that captures a relation BETWEEN persons. Activity always as "inter-activity." So then, how do we tell "what it is that is going on here?" where "here" is the "current" temporally displaced moment of me writing and you reading this. Is this just me being a show-off? Is this me trying to work through some of my ideas in order to publish a paper (with the real motivation to simply keep my job)? Is this just me musing with friends about ideas about which I feel very strongly? Or is something altogether different happening here? I take Goffman's answer to this to be: it's up to you - or better, to the relation that will emerge BETWEEN us. Who's to say what that will be. -greg From ablunden@mira.net Wed Aug 14 19:14:08 2013 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Thu, 15 Aug 2013 12:14:08 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> <520444BA.2000808@mira.net> <520460F0.5030506@mira.net> <19E63C50-A0D2-4A0F-BBA7-63853414FDAA@gmail.com> <4195A368-C7B9-4AB0-AAA5-A244135DC331@gmail.com> <520ADCDD.9000406@mira.net> Message-ID: <520C3970.6000803@mira.net> Two things Greg. Firstly, most definitely the caddy and the player are involved in the same project or activity. Self-evidently. Each are also involved in other activities, and reflecting on these other activities may shed light on how they come to be collaborating in the shared project of the player's game. Like master and servant, people always collaborate in a particular mode. The archetypes of these modes of collaboration are master-servant, customer-provider and collaboration per se. It is important to recognise these different modes of collaboration because otherwise we tend to force *all* collaboration into the same mode, which may cause us to misconstrue some relations. The fact that different participants have different social positions within a project means that they each are bound by different sides of the same norms. That is, the norms of meaning, belief and action prevailing in the project mandate different meanings, beliefs and actions for different participants. The tensions arising from these asymmetrical relationships is one of the motors of change. Secondly, no, projects do not exist *between* persons, persons exist *between* projects. This is just another effort by you, Greg, to make the unit of analysis the individual person. The relevants units of analysis of Activity Theory are operation, action and activity. :) Andy Greg Thompson wrote: > ... > > "Motive" seems a slippery concept to rest too much on. Andy I'm > wondering how you answer the question you put to Roland, namely > whether or not master and slave are participating in the same > activity/project? Or, what about a golfer and caddy? And so on down > to, as Phillip and Carol point out - the different participants in a > discussion on XMCA. > > ... > > Goffman's answer is interesting in that he doesn't rely on the motives > (motivational relevancies) of the participants, but rather creates a > notion of the local context as a "frame" that exists somewhere between > participants. No one person can dictate the frame (even dictators have > to deal with the possibility of duplicitousness - the word with a > side-wards glance - hence irony is a powerful weapon of the weak - > even if James Scott didn't recognize this, Bakhtin clearly did). > Frames emerge as participants take parts in the unfolding play of some > event or happening, and, to a certain extent, without regard to > alignment of the motives of the participants. Every once in a while > the motives of all participants create a frame may be relatively > closely aligned, but it seems much more common that frames are built > out of a plethora of motives. > From ablunden@mira.net Wed Aug 14 20:01:45 2013 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Thu, 15 Aug 2013 13:01:45 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Polysemy of "Community" In-Reply-To: References: <393FDE85-EFCF-48E6-96E0-6ED970A4DD80@hawaii.edu> <520AE206.9030105@mira.net> <677393EE-FCF8-4A94-8F11-E2922F308E28@hawaii.edu> <520AFF6D.5090608@mira.net> <94019118-330E-4A70-8FC5-AC7186A4331C@hawaii.edu> <650486391-1376457468-cardhu_decombobulator_blackberry.rim.net-828212652-@b2.c11.bise7.blackberry> <520B1DB2.8040606@mira.net> Message-ID: <520C4499.7020607@mira.net> "Community" is most definitely a polysemous word! Orthodox Marxism has alwzys rejected it as a "bad concept" because "community" obfuscates "class," but I don't think such an orthodox position is quite right. "Community" is polysemous because it is *relative*. One common meaning for "community" is all those people sharing a bit of ground and the associated built infrastructure. Clearly this is in the main an abstract construct, as the actual relations tying those people together may be very thin indeed, and the community may be fraught by sharp conflicts. But still, those conflicts arise over the use of the shared artefacts (i.e., land, roads, buildings, etc.) and these are after shared activities. Sometimes "community" references a nation state. Clearly, the citizens of a nation state share a great range of artefacts, all of which are used in mediating their actions, and at the same time, nation-states are projects within which considerable conflict takes place. Collaboration always, essentially, contains such elements of conflict. A newspaper or radio station might also be the artefact which defines a "community." So I can see a problem with making "community" the subject matter, or "unit of analysis" for a study; one would have to first select an artefact or combination of artefacts, (such as language and land) which serves to define the basis of the said "community." The point then is that the "community" is *not* defined by shared *meanings*; in fact, different components of the "community" may attach diametrically opposite meanings to a given artefact (word, symbol, tool, ...) or even use it in ways which are quite incommensurable. But! the material form of the artefact is *universal* in what ever way it is used, meant or interpreted. The *materiality* of artefacts is the foundation was what is *universal* in human life. Projects give us what is *particular* in human life (ascribing different meanings to one and the same artefact), and actions (not persons) give us what is *individual* in human life, for the purposes of theoretical analysis. That's how I see it anyway, from my Hegelian point of view. Andy mike cole wrote: > ... > > One thing about Cliff and Roland's article that I found myself > wondering about is their > use of the term, community. Culture is quite explicitly defined. Why > not community? My guess is that the polysemy noted for activity and > culture will reign here too, but I am a neophyte looking for direction > which is why this article is interesting to me. I have downloaded two > articles from a special issue of J Community Psychology from a special > issue in 1996 that take on the notion of "sense of community" which is > traced back to Sarason in Nelson and Prilleltiensky's text on > Community Psychology. If people are interested, email me directly. From cliffo@hawaii.edu Wed Aug 14 20:35:48 2013 From: cliffo@hawaii.edu (Cliff O'Donnell) Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2013 17:35:48 -1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Polysemy of "Community" In-Reply-To: <520C4499.7020607@mira.net> References: <393FDE85-EFCF-48E6-96E0-6ED970A4DD80@hawaii.edu> <520AE206.9030105@mira.net> <677393EE-FCF8-4A94-8F11-E2922F308E28@hawaii.edu> <520AFF6D.5090608@mira.net> <94019118-330E-4A70-8FC5-AC7186A4331C@hawaii.edu> <650486391-1376457468-cardhu_decombobulator_blackberry.rim.net-828212652-@b2.c11.bise7.blackberry> <520B1DB2.8040606@mira.net> <520C4499.7020607@mira.net> Message-ID: <9C3E0B46-1122-49B6-86B8-3E1AE8B1C016@hawaii.edu> > So I can see a problem with making "community" the subject matter, > or "unit of analysis" for a study; We agree. That is why activity settings are the units of analysis we use. > one would have to first select an artefact or combination of > artefacts, (such as language and land) which serves to define the > basis of the said "community." The point then is that the > "community" is *not* defined by shared *meanings*; So why define community by artifacts? Why not by shared meanings? > in fact, different components of the "community" may attach > diametrically opposite meanings to a given artefact (word, symbol, > tool, ...) or even use it in ways which are quite incommensurable. If community is defined by shared meanings, those with "diametrically opposite meanings" would by definition belong to different cultural communities (even if they did live in the same geographical unit). > But! the material form of the artefact is *universal* in what ever > way it is used, meant or interpreted. The *materiality* of artefacts > is the foundation was what is *universal* in human life. Projects > give us what is *particular* in human life (ascribing different > meanings to one and the same artefact), and actions (not persons) > give us what is *individual* in human life, for the purposes of > theoretical analysis. The material form of an artifact may be universal in the sense that we may all agree on the label for it. However, the artifact may have very different meanings for us and these meanings may lead to quite different actions and, as you point out, be the basis for conflict. Cliff From ablunden@mira.net Wed Aug 14 21:16:41 2013 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Thu, 15 Aug 2013 14:16:41 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Polysemy of "Community" In-Reply-To: <9C3E0B46-1122-49B6-86B8-3E1AE8B1C016@hawaii.edu> References: <393FDE85-EFCF-48E6-96E0-6ED970A4DD80@hawaii.edu> <520AE206.9030105@mira.net> <677393EE-FCF8-4A94-8F11-E2922F308E28@hawaii.edu> <520AFF6D.5090608@mira.net> <94019118-330E-4A70-8FC5-AC7186A4331C@hawaii.edu> <650486391-1376457468-cardhu_decombobulator_blackberry.rim.net-828212652-@b2.c11.bise7.blackberry> <520B1DB2.8040606@mira.net> <520C4499.7020607@mira.net> <9C3E0B46-1122-49B6-86B8-3E1AE8B1C016@hawaii.edu> Message-ID: <520C5629.8050607@mira.net> That's an alternative way to go, Cliff, define "community" by "shared meanings," but the upshot of that way is the counter-intuitive conclusion that kids and their parents belong to different "cultural communities." There is one point which I must clarify though from your last words below: "The material form of an artifact may be universal in the sense that we may all agree on the label for it. However, the artifact may have very different meanings for us." No. The artefacts have a universal material form despite us having "different labels" for it. The foundation of natural science is that matter exist independently of human activity, obedient to natural laws which are knowable. And natural science has a right to exist; it is not a giant mistake. We *do* of course ascribe different meanings to one and the same material form or object, but that is thanks to human activity. The matter exists independently of our interpretation of it. This is why I know I can rely on artefacts to provide a sound, universal foundation for "community," and I leave it entirely open that a multiplicity of meanings and actions are in conflict within the community. Andy Cliff O'Donnell wrote: >> So I can see a problem with making "community" the subject matter, or >> "unit of analysis" for a study; > > We agree. That is why activity settings are the units of analysis > we use. > >> one would have to first select an artefact or combination of >> artefacts, (such as language and land) which serves to define the >> basis of the said "community." The point then is that the "community" >> is *not* defined by shared *meanings*; > > So why define community by artifacts? Why not by shared meanings? > >> in fact, different components of the "community" may attach >> diametrically opposite meanings to a given artefact (word, symbol, >> tool, ...) or even use it in ways which are quite incommensurable. > > If community is defined by shared meanings, those with > "diametrically opposite meanings" would by definition belong to > different cultural communities (even if they did live in the same > geographical unit). > >> But! the material form of the artefact is *universal* in what ever >> way it is used, meant or interpreted. The *materiality* of artefacts >> is the foundation was what is *universal* in human life. Projects >> give us what is *particular* in human life (ascribing different >> meanings to one and the same artefact), and actions (not persons) >> give us what is *individual* in human life, for the purposes of >> theoretical analysis. > > The material form of an artifact may be universal in the sense > that we may all agree on the label for it. However, the artifact may > have very different meanings for us and these meanings may lead to > quite different actions and, as you point out, be the basis for conflict. > > Cliff > > -- From lchcmike@gmail.com Wed Aug 14 21:59:03 2013 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2013 21:59:03 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Polysemy of "Community" In-Reply-To: <520C5629.8050607@mira.net> References: <393FDE85-EFCF-48E6-96E0-6ED970A4DD80@hawaii.edu> <520AE206.9030105@mira.net> <677393EE-FCF8-4A94-8F11-E2922F308E28@hawaii.edu> <520AFF6D.5090608@mira.net> <94019118-330E-4A70-8FC5-AC7186A4331C@hawaii.edu> <650486391-1376457468-cardhu_decombobulator_blackberry.rim.net-828212652-@b2.c11.bise7.blackberry> <520B1DB2.8040606@mira.net> <520C4499.7020607@mira.net> <9C3E0B46-1122-49B6-86B8-3E1AE8B1C016@hawaii.edu> <520C5629.8050607@mira.net> Message-ID: Colleagues-- Is there perhaps some relationship between the notions of "shared artifacts" and "shared meanings?" If Mandelshtam forgot the word he wanted to say, and thought, unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows" what is the form of the embodiment if not in something human-created, a paricular, historically sedimented, materialized configuration of the human voice that, dare we consider it, ART-i-ficial? perhaps? mike On Wed, Aug 14, 2013 at 9:16 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > That's an alternative way to go, Cliff, define "community" by "shared > meanings," but the upshot of that way is the counter-intuitive conclusion > that kids and their parents belong to different "cultural communities." > > There is one point which I must clarify though from your last words below: > "The material form of an artifact may be universal in the sense that we may > all agree on the label for it. However, the artifact may have very > different meanings for us." No. The artefacts have a universal material > form despite us having "different labels" for it. The foundation of natural > science is that matter exist independently of human activity, obedient to > natural laws which are knowable. And natural science has a right to exist; > it is not a giant mistake. We *do* of course ascribe different meanings to > one and the same material form or object, but that is thanks to human > activity. The matter exists independently of our interpretation of it. This > is why I know I can rely on artefacts to provide a sound, universal > foundation for "community," and I leave it entirely open that a > multiplicity of meanings and actions are in conflict within the community. > > Andy > > > Cliff O'Donnell wrote: > >> So I can see a problem with making "community" the subject matter, or >>> "unit of analysis" for a study; >>> >> >> We agree. That is why activity settings are the units of analysis we >> use. >> >> one would have to first select an artefact or combination of artefacts, >>> (such as language and land) which serves to define the basis of the said >>> "community." The point then is that the "community" is *not* defined by >>> shared *meanings*; >>> >> >> So why define community by artifacts? Why not by shared meanings? >> >> in fact, different components of the "community" may attach >>> diametrically opposite meanings to a given artefact (word, symbol, tool, >>> ...) or even use it in ways which are quite incommensurable. >>> >> >> If community is defined by shared meanings, those with "diametrically >> opposite meanings" would by definition belong to different cultural >> communities (even if they did live in the same geographical unit). >> >> But! the material form of the artefact is *universal* in what ever way >>> it is used, meant or interpreted. The *materiality* of artefacts is the >>> foundation was what is *universal* in human life. Projects give us what is >>> *particular* in human life (ascribing different meanings to one and the >>> same artefact), and actions (not persons) give us what is *individual* in >>> human life, for the purposes of theoretical analysis. >>> >> >> The material form of an artifact may be universal in the sense that >> we may all agree on the label for it. However, the artifact may have very >> different meanings for us and these meanings may lead to quite different >> actions and, as you point out, be the basis for conflict. >> >> Cliff >> >> >> > -- > > From cliffo@hawaii.edu Wed Aug 14 22:17:33 2013 From: cliffo@hawaii.edu (Cliff O'Donnell) Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2013 19:17:33 -1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Polysemy of "Community" In-Reply-To: <520C5629.8050607@mira.net> References: <393FDE85-EFCF-48E6-96E0-6ED970A4DD80@hawaii.edu> <520AE206.9030105@mira.net> <677393EE-FCF8-4A94-8F11-E2922F308E28@hawaii.edu> <520AFF6D.5090608@mira.net> <94019118-330E-4A70-8FC5-AC7186A4331C@hawaii.edu> <650486391-1376457468-cardhu_decombobulator_blackberry.rim.net-828212652-@b2.c11.bise7.blackberry> <520B1DB2.8040606@mira.net> <520C4499.7020607@mira.net> <9C3E0B46-1122-49B6-86B8-3E1AE8B1C016@hawaii.edu> <520C5629.8050607@mira.net> Message-ID: <413D4535-202D-40BD-B04C-51F9C939DE44@hawaii.edu> > That's an alternative way to go, Cliff, define "community" by > "shared meanings," but the upshot of that way is the counter- > intuitive conclusion that kids and their parents belong to different > "cultural communities." Many do. And many kids (teens) and their parents, but far from all, would not find that counter-intuitive given their experience. > There is one point which I must clarify though from your last words > below: "The material form of an artifact may be universal in the > sense that we may all agree on the label for it. However, the > artifact may have very different meanings for us." No. The artefacts > have a universal material form despite us having "different labels" > for it. The foundation of natural science is that matter exist > independently of human activity, obedient to natural laws which are > knowable. And natural science has a right to exist; it is not a > giant mistake. Sure, although we can only assume that through our human activity (including the means that leads to natural laws). > We *do* of course ascribe different meanings to one and the same > material form or object, but that is thanks to human activity. Exactly. And isn't human activity what is of most importance to us? (Including the human activity that may affect the natural world). > The matter exists independently of our interpretation of it. This is > why I know I can rely on artefacts to provide a sound, universal > foundation for "community," and I leave it entirely open that a > multiplicity of meanings and actions are in conflict within the > community. But your "sound, universal foundation" is built on the meanings you have for those artifacts. Cliff From cliffo@hawaii.edu Wed Aug 14 22:45:42 2013 From: cliffo@hawaii.edu (Cliff O'Donnell) Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2013 19:45:42 -1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Polysemy of "Community" In-Reply-To: References: <393FDE85-EFCF-48E6-96E0-6ED970A4DD80@hawaii.edu> <520AE206.9030105@mira.net> <677393EE-FCF8-4A94-8F11-E2922F308E28@hawaii.edu> <520AFF6D.5090608@mira.net> <94019118-330E-4A70-8FC5-AC7186A4331C@hawaii.edu> <650486391-1376457468-cardhu_decombobulator_blackberry.rim.net-828212652-@b2.c11.bise7.blackberry> <520B1DB2.8040606@mira.net> <520C4499.7020607@mira.net> <9C3E0B46-1122-49B6-86B8-3E1AE8B1C016@hawaii.edu> <520C5629.8050607@mira.net> Message-ID: <6FB34CC0-1670-4BE3-9E87-028F6CD4D61B@hawaii.edu> Yes, the embodiment is "not the precondition of man?s formation but its product." Cliff On Aug 14, 2013, at 6:59 PM, mike cole wrote: > Colleagues-- Is there perhaps some relationship between the notions of > "shared artifacts" and "shared meanings?" If Mandelshtam forgot the > word he > wanted to say, and thought, > unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows" what is the form of the > embodiment if not in something human-created, a paricular, > historically > sedimented, materialized configuration of the human voice that, dare > we > consider it, ART-i-ficial? > > perhaps? > mike > > > > > On Wed, Aug 14, 2013 at 9:16 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > >> That's an alternative way to go, Cliff, define "community" by "shared >> meanings," but the upshot of that way is the counter-intuitive >> conclusion >> that kids and their parents belong to different "cultural >> communities." >> >> There is one point which I must clarify though from your last words >> below: >> "The material form of an artifact may be universal in the sense >> that we may >> all agree on the label for it. However, the artifact may have very >> different meanings for us." No. The artefacts have a universal >> material >> form despite us having "different labels" for it. The foundation of >> natural >> science is that matter exist independently of human activity, >> obedient to >> natural laws which are knowable. And natural science has a right to >> exist; >> it is not a giant mistake. We *do* of course ascribe different >> meanings to >> one and the same material form or object, but that is thanks to human >> activity. The matter exists independently of our interpretation of >> it. This >> is why I know I can rely on artefacts to provide a sound, universal >> foundation for "community," and I leave it entirely open that a >> multiplicity of meanings and actions are in conflict within the >> community. >> >> Andy >> >> >> Cliff O'Donnell wrote: >> >>> So I can see a problem with making "community" the subject matter, >>> or >>>> "unit of analysis" for a study; >>>> >>> >>> We agree. That is why activity settings are the units of >>> analysis we >>> use. >>> >>> one would have to first select an artefact or combination of >>> artefacts, >>>> (such as language and land) which serves to define the basis of >>>> the said >>>> "community." The point then is that the "community" is *not* >>>> defined by >>>> shared *meanings*; >>>> >>> >>> So why define community by artifacts? Why not by shared meanings? >>> >>> in fact, different components of the "community" may attach >>>> diametrically opposite meanings to a given artefact (word, >>>> symbol, tool, >>>> ...) or even use it in ways which are quite incommensurable. >>>> >>> >>> If community is defined by shared meanings, those with >>> "diametrically >>> opposite meanings" would by definition belong to different cultural >>> communities (even if they did live in the same geographical unit). >>> >>> But! the material form of the artefact is *universal* in what ever >>> way >>>> it is used, meant or interpreted. The *materiality* of artefacts >>>> is the >>>> foundation was what is *universal* in human life. Projects give >>>> us what is >>>> *particular* in human life (ascribing different meanings to one >>>> and the >>>> same artefact), and actions (not persons) give us what is >>>> *individual* in >>>> human life, for the purposes of theoretical analysis. >>>> >>> >>> The material form of an artifact may be universal in the sense >>> that >>> we may all agree on the label for it. However, the artifact may >>> have very >>> different meanings for us and these meanings may lead to quite >>> different >>> actions and, as you point out, be the basis for conflict. >>> >>> Cliff >>> >>> >>> >> -- >> >> Clifford R. O'Donnell, Ph.D. Professor Emeritus Past-President, Society for Community Research and Action (APA Division 27) University of Hawai?i Department of Psychology 2530 Dole Street Honolulu, HI 96822 From ablunden@mira.net Wed Aug 14 22:49:48 2013 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Thu, 15 Aug 2013 15:49:48 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Polysemy of "Community" In-Reply-To: <413D4535-202D-40BD-B04C-51F9C939DE44@hawaii.edu> References: <393FDE85-EFCF-48E6-96E0-6ED970A4DD80@hawaii.edu> <520AE206.9030105@mira.net> <677393EE-FCF8-4A94-8F11-E2922F308E28@hawaii.edu> <520AFF6D.5090608@mira.net> <94019118-330E-4A70-8FC5-AC7186A4331C@hawaii.edu> <650486391-1376457468-cardhu_decombobulator_blackberry.rim.net-828212652-@b2.c11.bise7.blackberry> <520B1DB2.8040606@mira.net> <520C4499.7020607@mira.net> <9C3E0B46-1122-49B6-86B8-3E1AE8B1C016@hawaii.edu> <520C5629.8050607@mira.net> <413D4535-202D-40BD-B04C-51F9C939DE44@hawaii.edu> Message-ID: <520C6BFC.8030705@mira.net> We are at a point of real technicalities now, Cliff. But anyway ... You say that we can "only assume" the independent existence of a material world "through our activity." I think "only assume" is a tad understated, though I don't want to rehearse the arguments against subjective idealism here. It is certainly true that what we know about it we know only thanks to and through our activity. Vygotsky was most certainly of the view that the material world existed independently of our activity through which it is endowed with meaning. ("Historical Meaning etc ...." s. 13) My point is that we cannot restrict ourselves to Activity, to the extent that we marginalise the significance of the objective existence of the artefacts mediating the actions making up activity or the actions themselves. The material conditions of life (including the human body) are an essential, irreducible part of human life. And that requires not just a nod, but real attention. But let's move on. Cliff, the meaning you attach to "*intersubjectivity*" is not one I have come across in CHAT. For CHAT writers, "intersubjectivity" simply refers to the sum total of interactions between individuals, not any particular state or attributes of that process. What does it mean for you? Andy Cliff O'Donnell wrote: >> That's an alternative way to go, Cliff, define "community" by "shared >> meanings," but the upshot of that way is the counter-intuitive >> conclusion that kids and their parents belong to different "cultural >> communities." > > Many do. And many kids (teens) and their parents, but far from > all, would not find that counter-intuitive given their experience. > >> There is one point which I must clarify though from your last words >> below: "The material form of an artifact may be universal in the >> sense that we may all agree on the label for it. However, the >> artifact may have very different meanings for us." No. The artefacts >> have a universal material form despite us having "different labels" >> for it. The foundation of natural science is that matter exist >> independently of human activity, obedient to natural laws which are >> knowable. And natural science has a right to exist; it is not a giant >> mistake. > > Sure, although we can only assume that through our human activity > (including the means that leads to natural laws). > >> We *do* of course ascribe different meanings to one and the same >> material form or object, but that is thanks to human activity. > > Exactly. And isn't human activity what is of most importance to > us? (Including the human activity that may affect the natural world). > >> The matter exists independently of our interpretation of it. This is >> why I know I can rely on artefacts to provide a sound, universal >> foundation for "community," and I leave it entirely open that a >> multiplicity of meanings and actions are in conflict within the >> community. > > But your "sound, universal foundation" is built on the meanings > you have for those artifacts. > > Cliff From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed Aug 14 23:04:51 2013 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2013 23:04:51 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Polysemy of "Community" In-Reply-To: References: <393FDE85-EFCF-48E6-96E0-6ED970A4DD80@hawaii.edu> <520AE206.9030105@mira.net> <677393EE-FCF8-4A94-8F11-E2922F308E28@hawaii.edu> <520AFF6D.5090608@mira.net> <94019118-330E-4A70-8FC5-AC7186A4331C@hawaii.edu> <650486391-1376457468-cardhu_decombobulator_blackberry.rim.net-828212652-@b2.c11.bise7.blackberry> <520B1DB2.8040606@mira.net> <520C4499.7020607@mira.net> <9C3E0B46-1122-49B6-86B8-3E1AE8B1C016@hawaii.edu> <520C5629.8050607@mira.net> Message-ID: Mike, Your phrase, "human -created, a particular historically sedimented, materialized configuration of the human VOICE, that, dare we consider, it ART-I-facial. I feel you have covered a lot of *ground* that tra-verses and foregrounds key concepts. However, there is one other term that is very fluid but I believe is basic and needs to be fore-grounded. That is *imaginal [not imaginary] realms. Charles Taylors *social imaginary* implying that community *meaning* and community *voice* are fundamentally *imaginal*. This concept is polyphonic and within history has a development which can be traced often crisscrossing with reason and rationality as concepts [a chiasmus as crisscrossing] The phrase "in the beginning was the deed" crisscrossing with the phrase "in the beginning was the word". In Merleau-Ponty's terms the *word made flesh* [flesh as gesturing to material artifacts, words, AS LIVING WITHIN interhuman realms. The *gap* as receptive and the imaginal coming into form. This is linking in another *tradition* but in this other tradition the imaginal is NOT understanding the imaginal as located inside a private mind, or in a transcendental beyond. The imaginal as art-fully calling the other into *voice* within historical con-scientia. This process can be *perceived* moving THROUGH ^history^ and moving through ^self^. I used * ^ * as a symbol to suggest that the concepts *self* and *history* are imaginal concepts which imaginally come into *voice through words and deeds. Yes, actions within activity settings but understood within the interhuman imaginal realms [and how we understand and voice and art-fully con-figure imaginal con-figurations. If I have taken a step too far into the imaginal which has crisscrossed rational reasoning just ignore this commentary. Larry On Wed, Aug 14, 2013 at 9:59 PM, mike cole wrote: > Colleagues-- Is there perhaps some relationship between the notions of > "shared artifacts" and "shared meanings?" If Mandelshtam forgot the word he > wanted to say, and thought, > unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows" what is the form of the > embodiment if not in something human-created, a paricular, historically > sedimented, materialized configuration of the human voice that, dare we > consider it, ART-i-ficial? > > perhaps? > mike > > > > > On Wed, Aug 14, 2013 at 9:16 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > That's an alternative way to go, Cliff, define "community" by "shared > > meanings," but the upshot of that way is the counter-intuitive conclusion > > that kids and their parents belong to different "cultural communities." > > > > There is one point which I must clarify though from your last words > below: > > "The material form of an artifact may be universal in the sense that we > may > > all agree on the label for it. However, the artifact may have very > > different meanings for us." No. The artefacts have a universal material > > form despite us having "different labels" for it. The foundation of > natural > > science is that matter exist independently of human activity, obedient to > > natural laws which are knowable. And natural science has a right to > exist; > > it is not a giant mistake. We *do* of course ascribe different meanings > to > > one and the same material form or object, but that is thanks to human > > activity. The matter exists independently of our interpretation of it. > This > > is why I know I can rely on artefacts to provide a sound, universal > > foundation for "community," and I leave it entirely open that a > > multiplicity of meanings and actions are in conflict within the > community. > > > > Andy > > > > > > Cliff O'Donnell wrote: > > > >> So I can see a problem with making "community" the subject matter, or > >>> "unit of analysis" for a study; > >>> > >> > >> We agree. That is why activity settings are the units of analysis we > >> use. > >> > >> one would have to first select an artefact or combination of artefacts, > >>> (such as language and land) which serves to define the basis of the > said > >>> "community." The point then is that the "community" is *not* defined by > >>> shared *meanings*; > >>> > >> > >> So why define community by artifacts? Why not by shared meanings? > >> > >> in fact, different components of the "community" may attach > >>> diametrically opposite meanings to a given artefact (word, symbol, > tool, > >>> ...) or even use it in ways which are quite incommensurable. > >>> > >> > >> If community is defined by shared meanings, those with > "diametrically > >> opposite meanings" would by definition belong to different cultural > >> communities (even if they did live in the same geographical unit). > >> > >> But! the material form of the artefact is *universal* in what ever way > >>> it is used, meant or interpreted. The *materiality* of artefacts is the > >>> foundation was what is *universal* in human life. Projects give us > what is > >>> *particular* in human life (ascribing different meanings to one and the > >>> same artefact), and actions (not persons) give us what is *individual* > in > >>> human life, for the purposes of theoretical analysis. > >>> > >> > >> The material form of an artifact may be universal in the sense that > >> we may all agree on the label for it. However, the artifact may have > very > >> different meanings for us and these meanings may lead to quite different > >> actions and, as you point out, be the basis for conflict. > >> > >> Cliff > >> > >> > >> > > -- > > > > > From cliffo@hawaii.edu Wed Aug 14 23:43:19 2013 From: cliffo@hawaii.edu (Cliff O'Donnell) Date: Wed, 14 Aug 2013 20:43:19 -1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Polysemy of "Community" In-Reply-To: <520C6BFC.8030705@mira.net> References: <393FDE85-EFCF-48E6-96E0-6ED970A4DD80@hawaii.edu> <520AE206.9030105@mira.net> <677393EE-FCF8-4A94-8F11-E2922F308E28@hawaii.edu> <520AFF6D.5090608@mira.net> <94019118-330E-4A70-8FC5-AC7186A4331C@hawaii.edu> <650486391-1376457468-cardhu_decombobulator_blackberry.rim.net-828212652-@b2.c11.bise7.blackberry> <520B1DB2.8040606@mira.net> <520C4499.7020607@mira.net> <9C3E0B46-1122-49B6-86B8-3E1AE8B1C016@hawaii.edu> <520C5629.8050607@mira.net> <413D4535-202D-40BD-B04C-51F9C939DE44@hawaii.edu> <520C6BFC.8030705@mira.net> Message-ID: > It is certainly true that what we know about it we know only thanks > to and through our activity. On that we agree. > Vygotsky was most certainly of the view that the material world > existed independently of our activity through which it is endowed > with meaning. ("Historical Meaning etc ...." s. 13) I'm also of the same view, but it is that meaning which I think matters (and is the basis for community intervention). > My point is that we cannot restrict ourselves to Activity, to the > extent that we marginalise the significance of the objective > existence of the artefacts mediating the actions making up activity > or the actions themselves. The material conditions of life > (including the human body) are an essential, irreducible part of > human life. And that requires not just a nod, but real attention. Perhaps our 1990 chapter would address your concern with "the objective existence of artifacts" that integrated CHAT concepts of activity settings, joint activity, and intersubjectivity with behavioral means of influence to influence the activity of a setting and form a guide to community intervention. > But let's move on. Cliff, the meaning you attach to > "*intersubjectivity*" is not one I have come across in CHAT. For > CHAT writers, "intersubjectivity" simply refers to the sum total of > interactions between individuals, not any particular state or > attributes of that process. What does it mean for you? Quoting from our article: "intersubjectivity develops in activity settings during joint productive activity, facilitates the activity, and becomes the shared meanings of culture through semiotic processes (largely linguistic) that accompany the members? shared activity. Intersubjectivity results from the shared experiences among people engaged in collaborative interaction: their history, values, thoughts, emotions, and interpretations of their world. Intersubjectivity is the psychological commonality that provides meaning in their lives. As intersubjectivity is developed, their activities are facilitated and culture propagated (Cole 1985 ; O?Donnell and Tharp 1990 ; Vygotsky 1981)." Cliff From P.E.Jones@shu.ac.uk Thu Aug 15 01:14:12 2013 From: P.E.Jones@shu.ac.uk (Jones, Peter) Date: Thu, 15 Aug 2013 08:14:12 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Time of Transition In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <32B7F54BB5C0854D9718700ACD93A3EC70790788@kidney.hallam.shu.ac.uk> Hi Mike and xmca-ers! While I'm very grateful to be included once more in the posts from this list, I wonder if you could for the time being remove me just due to the sheer volume of posts that I just don't have the time to engage with right now? All very best wishes P -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole Sent: 08 August 2013 00:41 To: Cunningham, Donald James Cc: xmca-l@ucsd.edu; eXtended Mind, Culture,Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Time of Transition Hi Don-- I apologize to you and any old timers who got caught up in the most recent snarl with XMCA. It will be fixed as soon as possible. Explanation: I went emeritus last month, a major computer guy who worked with me retired, and UCSD reconfigured its computers, partly efficiency, partly security. And then a key transition figure went on vacation. And then the trouble hit when MCA was caught part way between systems. In reconstituting the system, Silas came along late in the game and has been patching things together. The technical fix he implemented has various pluses (You can join and quite on your own and set preferences) but you have exposed a minus. A mixture of participants from different times are inconvenienced. If you have trouble disengaging, email me and I will seekto get it fixed. Meantime, just stick us in your spam filter! Miss your voice. mike On Wed, Aug 7, 2013 at 12:22 PM, UC San Diego Social Sciences < sse-connection@ad.ucsd.edu> wrote: > ** > > View this email in your > browser id=8d4ebec2cb&e=31a743a737> > > Home 9f750ff&id=223de3ce05&e=31a743a737> > Division > News 9f750ff&id=05575b3b64&e=31a743a737> > Giving > Opportunities cf5cd23639f750ff&id=8755964b87&e=31a743a737> > > > Anthropology f5cd23639f750ff&id=f2b07f933c&e=31a743a737> > * Cognitive > Science 639f750ff&id=d4e772fc57&e=31a743a737> > * > Communication f5cd23639f750ff&id=e0f5cc63f4&e=31a743a737> > * > Economics d23639f750ff&id=e75f937875&e=31a743a737> > * Education > Studies 639f750ff&id=935b95184c&e=31a743a737> > Ethnic > Studies 639f750ff&id=ada8fb912b&e=31a743a737> > * > Linguistics cd23639f750ff&id=7e5403e60f&e=31a743a737> > * Political > Science 3639f750ff&id=73273d0713&e=31a743a737> > * > Psychology d23639f750ff&id=870a6bb231&e=31a743a737> > * > Sociology 23639f750ff&id=e4ea2e3210&e=31a743a737> > Critical Gender > Studies 639f750ff&id=1933badb7e&e=31a743a737> > * Human > Development 5cd23639f750ff&id=f784a83aa0&e=31a743a737> > * International > Studies 639f750ff&id=eaec7e178f&e=31a743a737> > Latin American > Studies 639f750ff&id=f7ae6aaf8e&e=31a743a737> > * Urban Studies and Planning > Spotlight > > [image: Mike Cole] UC San Diego's department of communication, > established in 1982, was the first department of its kind in the > University of California system and is now one of the best-known > communication departments in the world. Longtime faculty member > Michael Cole - who helped shape the department - is both an exemplar > and an advocate of some of the department's most distinctive > characteristics: scholarship and teaching that deal with issues of > democracy, diversity, justice and social change. Read More > How to Be a Model Public University a letter > from Dean Jeff Elman > > This past year has been an exciting one for the campus. It has also > been a time of deep soul-searching. We - faculty, staff and students, > as well as alumni and other members of UC San Diego's extended > community - have been seeking, in the words of Chancellor Pradeep K. > Khosla, to "establish a unifying shared vision for our entire campus." > What has emerged clearly so far is not only a renewed focus on > education and the student experience but also that the value of a > public university lies in its impact on the public. Read > More f750ff&id=3ef9fa7121&e=31a743a737> > > > Social Sciences News > > Are you following the immigration debate? So is Tom K. Wong of > Political Science who blogsabout it at the Center for Comparative Immigration Studies. > > > > > ------------------------------ > > UC San Diego is playing a key role in President Obama's BRAIN initiativeand has created the Center for Brain Activity Mapping. > > ------------------------------ > > Would a ban on large soda drinksbackfire? A UC San Diego psychology experiment says "yes." > > ------------------------------ > > Anthropologist Kathryn Woolard and linguist David Perlmutter have been > elected to the prestigious American Academy of Arts and > Sciences 3639f750ff&id=d032bbd155&e=31a743a737> > . > > ------------------------------ > > "Game of Thrones" language consultant and linguistics alumnus David > Peterson discusses the art of constructing > languages d23639f750ff&id=09289e150e&e=31a743a737> > . > > > > > ------------------------------ > > Is this the end of men? Not even close, says a reporton gender in the professions by Mary Blair-Loy of Sociology. > > ------------------------------ > > Social sciences students are breaking down barriersto online education with a free web app. > > ------------------------------ > > Political scientist Alan Houstonnamed UC San Diego's Interim Vice Chancellor for Student Affairs. > ------------------------------ > > Political Science recently lost a valued, dear colleague - Ellen > Turkish Comisso. > A pioneer in the study of East European political economy and a > beloved mentor, she will be missed by many. > Upcoming Events > > Economics Roundtable, August 9, > 2013 f750ff&id=bf82243cdd&e=31a743a737>- "How Can California Spend $146 > Billion and Still Be Broke?" UC San Diego political scientist Thad > Kousser will discuss. Location: UC San Diego Faculty Club. Time: 7:30 to 9 a.m. Cost: $50 general; $37.50 UC San Diego faculty, staff or students; and $20 alumni, includes continental breakfast and parking at the Faculty Club. > > Social Sciences Supper Club, October 23, > 2013 f750ff&id=1a868119a3&e=31a743a737>- Join Alan Daly of Education > Studies as he discusses "Improving Student Outcomes in the San Diego > Region: K-12 Educational Reform Efforts in a Post No Child Left Behind > Era." Location: UC San Diego Faculty Club. Time: 5:30 to 8 p.m. Cost: $65/person or $40/UC San Diego alumni; includes wine reception, dinner and parking at the Faculty Club. For more information, contact dpkurtz@ucsd.edu. > Alumni Updates > > Profile: Rick > Mulloy 639f750ff&id=4374d8174d&e=31a743a737>, > Revelle '95 (Political Science and History). Although juggling a > career as a high stakes patent litigator and being the father of > five-year-old triplets, Rick Mulloy continues to find ways to be > involved with his alma mater. > > > In Memoriam: Ben > Horne 39f750ff&id=a83aa42d7d&e=31a743a737>, > Ph.D. '13 (Economics) was awarded his Ph.D. posthumously and the > Benjamin C. Horne Memorial Prize has been established in his honor. > Horne passed away during a climbing trek in Peru in 2012. > > Lilia > Fernandez 23639f750ff&id=d55dd0187b&e=31a743a737>, > Ph.D. '05 (Ethnic Studies) is associate professor in the department of > history at The Ohio State University and has just published a book, > "Brown in the Windy City: Mexicans and Puerto Ricans in Postwar > Chicago." Her book was recently featured on Chicago Tonight, a public > affairs news magazine on the local Chicago PBS-affiliate. > > Paul > Lanning 639f750ff&id=b0753651b6&e=31a743a737>, > Marshall '90 (Political Science) is the co-founder and managing > partner of a consulting firm advising education-based non-profit > organizations on capacity building, strategic and campaign planning, > board development and revenue diversification. He also writes a blog > focused on philanthropy, and teaches graduate courses in education > administration at University of the Pacific. > > To send your update and learn more about reconnecting with campus, > please contact Jenelle Dean at (858) 246-0232 or jmdean@ucsd.edu. > [image: UC San Diego > logo] 9f750ff&id=821c894b2c&e=31a743a737> > *University of California, San Diego, Division of Social Sciences* > 9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla, CA 92093-0502 | (858) 534-6073 [image: > Division of Social Sciences Facebook Page] News > to share or thoughts about this newsletter, email us. > To unsubscribe, click > here f750ff&id=a144c31d29&e=31a743a737&c=8d4ebec2cb> > . > UC San Diego Division of Social Sciences reserves the right to publish > in whole or in part any submissions received by us. > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Thu Aug 15 07:44:49 2013 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Thu, 15 Aug 2013 08:44:49 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> <520444BA.2000808@mira.net> <520460F0.5030506@mira.net> <19E63C50-A0D2-4A0F-BBA7-63853414FDAA@gmail.com> <4195A368-C7B9-4AB0-AAA5-A244135DC331@gmail.com> <520ADCDD.9000406@mira.net> Message-ID: Larry, Yes, I'm fond generally of the Shotter approach to emotions, and I think that explains some of my difficulties with engaging AT and also points to the kinds of problems of paradigm that Lubomir is pointing to. But it seems that Activity Theory could be broad enough to encompass alternative, non-substantialist or at least non-essentialist notions of motive (I think Martin was making a similar argument with respect to emotions not too long ago here on XMCA). And that is at the heart of my concern with Austin-derived theories of meaning (e.g. John Searle's or Grice's developments). These views often resort to what I like to call a Horton Hears a Who model of meaning. Horton is a Dr. Seuss children's book character who says "I meant what I said and I said what I meant..." I think that meaning can't be simply pegged to intention and motive. Individual intention and motive certainly has something to do with meaning, but, imho, meaning is, first and foremost, distributed. As Bakhtin says, the word is shot through with the intentions of others. Distributed intentionality? Larry, I think you are right about the potential for development. Still hesitating on committing to Gadamer - these big figures require a big commitment - you can't just read a little here or there b.c. there are landmines placed everywhere in the literature.., Many thanks, greg . p.s., I deleted previous responses in the thread as per Mike's request. But I pasted Larry's response below since the above responds to it. Greg, Your exploration of boundary *object* as actually a boundary *relation* I believe has the capability of drawing our attention to the fluid nature of boundary. I believe Gadamer would shift the emphasis to boundary *affinity*. The notion of the boundary as having *plastic* qualities and only coming into existence within communication processes [more than linguistic] focuses on the notion of *between*. If you want to elaborate this way of reflection further I see real potential. As an aside, John Shotter suggests *motives* develop or are secondary phenomena emerging WITHIN our ways of talking [about motives] Larry From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Thu Aug 15 07:49:01 2013 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Thu, 15 Aug 2013 15:49:01 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: <4DF034EF2396694597A7D328E23F09E1CA81@BY2PRD0510MB353.namprd05.prod.outlook.com> References: <4DF034EF2396694597A7D328E23F09E1CA81@BY2PRD0510MB353.namprd05.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: Not that I am suggesting this is your situation, Lubomir. But my reading of the tone here of "getting it work" and "fitting it together" brought to mind the notion that a theory is not a tool. But from the perspective of someone with an empirical job to do, one can see how it is convenient to use it as a tool. In case it has not cropped up on your radar, on descriptive approaches to designed artefacts Suchman's "plans and situated actions" was influential, also Koschmann is a rich mine on design & collaboration. Best, Huw On 15 August 2013 01:23, Lubomir Savov Popov wrote: > [...] > > For me, classic activity theory hasn't worked much for the study of > sociospatial interactions (in architecture, not in ergonomics) with the > purpose of understanding user needs and cultural patterns. A pragmatic > interpretativist approach with a very strong descriptive component has > worked much better. At least, I get better descriptions of activities and > needs, with more details. By the way, I am more interested in describing > sociospatial interactions rather than finding causal relationships or > explaining particular phenomena. My problem is that I cannot use Goffman > in conjunction with activity theory. When I look back, this has been a > problem of mine since the beginning. I attribute the difficulties to > paradigmatic difference. After the attempts to put together AT and Goffman, > I experienced firsthand the incompatibility of different paradigms, or at > least of some paradigms. That is how I become a paradigmatic purist. > > In some way, it is much easier to interface Parson's General Theory of > Action with AT ways of thinking, in particular at societal level, although > there are paradigmatic differences between them that lead to a number of > difficulties. However, Parsons can be incorporated much better in a project > performed with AT. Or at least, it is possible to borrow more from Parsons > and similar texts. > > Just a few thoughts, > > Lubomir > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson > Sent: Wednesday, August 14, 2013 6:11 PM > To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities > > Apparently this conversation didn't go to the group - or maybe parts of it > did. So here is a recap of the thread: > > Huw commented that an activity is defined by its object. > > I inquired about what the "object" is when *conversation* is the activity. > > Huw responded "the object of the conversation is the subject's purpose". > > Andy added: > "There are important differences in the methodological implication which > go to the collection and interpretation of empirical data, Huw. These > mainly arise from the idea of the continuity of a project as it passes > through different formations, as the motive undergoes immanent change and > the forms of collaboration and objectification change. But as a momentary > snap-shot of an activity, the two conceptions coincide, yes." > > And here is my (as yet unsent! Hot off the presses!) response to Huw and > Andy: > > "Motive" seems a slippery concept to rest too much on. Andy I'm wondering > how you answer the question you put to Roland, namely whether or not master > and slave are participating in the same activity/project? Or, what about a > golfer and caddy? And so on down to, as Phillip and Carol point out - the > different participants in a discussion on XMCA. > > I'm rather fond of Goffman's question "what is it that is going on here?" > as a way of thinking about "activity". As Goffman notes, the golfer and > caddy have different "motivational relevancies" (1973, p. 8), but this > doesn't mean that they are "doing" different activities. In the end I think > Goffman is really working out a practice theory that treat's John Austin's > famous question of how it is that we can "do things with words" (although > his lectures, of course, were titled as the answer to the question - How to > do Things with Words). Goffman is trying to figure out how Austin's primary > performatives are accomplished, joked, faked, imitated, fabricated, etc. in > actual practice. What is it that goes into making an instance of talk an > instance of an "insult" or a "compliment" or an "argument"? And how do > these become consequential in practice. This, it seems, is Bateson's point > in "This is Play"; it is a life and death matter for the animal to know > whether or not an instance of interaction is play or serious. Maybe not > quite so consequential (immediately) for us humans, but it can certainly be > the difference between getting a laugh and getting a punch in the nose. > > Goffman's answer is interesting in that he doesn't rely on the motives > (motivational relevancies) of the participants, but rather creates a notion > of the local context as a "frame" that exists somewhere between > participants. No one person can dictate the frame (even dictators have to > deal with the possibility of duplicitousness - the word with a side-wards > glance - hence irony is a powerful weapon of the weak - even if James Scott > didn't recognize this, Bakhtin clearly did). Frames emerge as participants > take parts in the unfolding play of some event or happening, and, to a > certain extent, without regard to alignment of the motives of the > participants. Every once in a while the motives of all participants create > a frame may be relatively closely aligned, but it seems much more common > that frames are built out of a plethora of motives. > > I should add that I wonder if Susan Leigh Star's concept of Boundary > Objects might be useful here as well. These are objects that emerge despite > a plurality of motivations. Building on Latour's notion of interessement > (and From Star and Griesemer, boundary objects are: "objects which are both > plastic enough to adapt to local needs and the constraints of the several > parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a common identity > across sites...The objects may by abstract or concrete." > > Etienne Wenger seems to offer a start in this direction. But only a start. > > Can we imagine "activity" (or whatever we want to call it - "project," > "frame," "social doing," etc.) as a boundary object - something that > captures a relation BETWEEN persons. Activity always as "inter-activity." > > So then, how do we tell "what it is that is going on here?" where "here" > is the "current" temporally displaced moment of me writing and you reading > this. Is this just me being a show-off? Is this me trying to work through > some of my ideas in order to publish a paper (with the real motivation to > simply keep my job)? Is this just me musing with friends about ideas about > which I feel very strongly? Or is something altogether different happening > here? > > I take Goffman's answer to this to be: it's up to you - or better, to the > relation that will emerge BETWEEN us. Who's to say what that will be. > > -greg > > > > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Thu Aug 15 08:06:11 2013 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Thu, 15 Aug 2013 09:06:11 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: <4DF034EF2396694597A7D328E23F09E1CA81@BY2PRD0510MB353.namprd05.prod.outlook.com> References: <4DF034EF2396694597A7D328E23F09E1CA81@BY2PRD0510MB353.namprd05.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: Lubomir, As I'm sure you are aware, there have been a few folks who have noted links between Mead and Vygotsky: For those not familiar, here are the links: Winter and Goldfield 1991 in Symbolic Interaction: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1525/si.1991.14.4.433/abstract and 2 chapters in the Cambridge Companion to Vygotsky: http://www.amazon.com/Cambridge-Companion-Vygotsky-Harry-Daniels/dp/0521537878 Did you know of others that develop links between Symbolic Interaction (SI) and Vygotsky? or maybe between Parsons and Vygotsky? (I see a better link between Meadian/Durkheimian SI and Vygotsky since both seem to share an Hegelian root). I'll also mention that Antti Rajala, an XMCA participant, has been doing some work trying to use Vygotsky together with Goffman. His ideas are still developing, so I don't know that he is ready to share. But Antti, maybe you have some suggestions in this regard? I also think that there are some peripheral players in the AT world on the sociological side who seem to open possibilities of linking AT and SI, folks like Courtney Cazden and Hugh Mehan, maybe also Ray McDermott? I guess my take on this is that, however incommensurable SI and AT may be (and I think the Hegelian roots suggest that maybe just branches of the same tree...), it seems like each lacks something that the other has. SI has a very rich understanding of the definition of the situation, and AT has a way of tracking concept development across time. But this certainly needs more developing, so I'm open to any and all suggestions. -greg. On Wed, Aug 14, 2013 at 6:23 PM, Lubomir Savov Popov wrote: > Hi Greg, > > Thank you very much for this extensive report. It is really useful to have > such recaps. > > I appreciate your experience with Goffman's approach to activity > phenomena. By chance, I also have preferences for such an approach, whether > it is faithfully Goffmanian, or a pragmatic Symbolic Interactionist > version, or some kind of other interpretative method. > > A few things that I would like to share: > > To hinge on Huw, Leont'ev's (or classic activity theory approach, AT) is > pertinent to the analysis of individual activity. If we want to apply it to > social activity, we will find that we need to adapt it. Erj? Engestr?m had > to do a lot of work in this respect. The terms Individual activity and > Social activity are pretty common in Historical Materialist social > sciences. The term social activity might be used with somewhat different > meanings and the phenomena are modeled differently at different > levels/scales of social reality. However, I would like to mention the term > Obschenie (Russ.) that might be translated roughly like > communication/interaction. Most authors treat it as a separate category. > It is different from social activity. I personally prefer to treat it as > activity, at least for the purposes of my scholarly pursuits. Obschenie is > a parallel layer in each social activity. > > Goffman's approach can be conceptualized as sociological. It is very > strong for unraveling social interactions and the ensuing production of > meaning and social relationships. Of course, it has a number of other > advantages. I personally have tried to fuse AT or MMC's AT approach with > Goffman and the Symbolic Interactionists. I am interested how this can be > done. I am interested to see examples/publications. > > For me, classic activity theory hasn't worked much for the study of > sociospatial interactions (in architecture, not in ergonomics) with the > purpose of understanding user needs and cultural patterns. A pragmatic > interpretativist approach with a very strong descriptive component has > worked much better. At least, I get better descriptions of activities and > needs, with more details. By the way, I am more interested in describing > sociospatial interactions rather than finding causal relationships or > explaining particular phenomena. My problem is that I cannot use Goffman > in conjunction with activity theory. When I look back, this has been a > problem of mine since the beginning. I attribute the difficulties to > paradigmatic difference. After the attempts to put together AT and Goffman, > I experienced firsthand the incompatibility of different paradigms, or at > least of some paradigms. That is how I become a paradigmatic purist. > > In some way, it is much easier to interface Parson's General Theory of > Action with AT ways of thinking, in particular at societal level, although > there are paradigmatic differences between them that lead to a number of > difficulties. However, Parsons can be incorporated much better in a project > performed with AT. Or at least, it is possible to borrow more from Parsons > and similar texts. > > Just a few thoughts, > > Lubomir > > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Greg Thompson > Sent: Wednesday, August 14, 2013 6:11 PM > To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities > > Apparently this conversation didn't go to the group - or maybe parts of it > did. So here is a recap of the thread: > > Huw commented that an activity is defined by its object. > > I inquired about what the "object" is when *conversation* is the activity. > > Huw responded "the object of the conversation is the subject's purpose". > > Andy added: > "There are important differences in the methodological implication which > go to the collection and interpretation of empirical data, Huw. These > mainly arise from the idea of the continuity of a project as it passes > through different formations, as the motive undergoes immanent change and > the forms of collaboration and objectification change. But as a momentary > snap-shot of an activity, the two conceptions coincide, yes." > > And here is my (as yet unsent! Hot off the presses!) response to Huw and > Andy: > > "Motive" seems a slippery concept to rest too much on. Andy I'm wondering > how you answer the question you put to Roland, namely whether or not master > and slave are participating in the same activity/project? Or, what about a > golfer and caddy? And so on down to, as Phillip and Carol point out - the > different participants in a discussion on XMCA. > > I'm rather fond of Goffman's question "what is it that is going on here?" > as a way of thinking about "activity". As Goffman notes, the golfer and > caddy have different "motivational relevancies" (1973, p. 8), but this > doesn't mean that they are "doing" different activities. In the end I think > Goffman is really working out a practice theory that treat's John Austin's > famous question of how it is that we can "do things with words" (although > his lectures, of course, were titled as the answer to the question - How to > do Things with Words). Goffman is trying to figure out how Austin's primary > performatives are accomplished, joked, faked, imitated, fabricated, etc. in > actual practice. What is it that goes into making an instance of talk an > instance of an "insult" or a "compliment" or an "argument"? And how do > these become consequential in practice. This, it seems, is Bateson's point > in "This is Play"; it is a life and death matter for the animal to know > whether or not an instance of interaction is play or serious. Maybe not > quite so consequential (immediately) for us humans, but it can certainly be > the difference between getting a laugh and getting a punch in the nose. > > Goffman's answer is interesting in that he doesn't rely on the motives > (motivational relevancies) of the participants, but rather creates a notion > of the local context as a "frame" that exists somewhere between > participants. No one person can dictate the frame (even dictators have to > deal with the possibility of duplicitousness - the word with a side-wards > glance - hence irony is a powerful weapon of the weak - even if James Scott > didn't recognize this, Bakhtin clearly did). Frames emerge as participants > take parts in the unfolding play of some event or happening, and, to a > certain extent, without regard to alignment of the motives of the > participants. Every once in a while the motives of all participants create > a frame may be relatively closely aligned, but it seems much more common > that frames are built out of a plethora of motives. > > I should add that I wonder if Susan Leigh Star's concept of Boundary > Objects might be useful here as well. These are objects that emerge despite > a plurality of motivations. Building on Latour's notion of interessement > (and From Star and Griesemer, boundary objects are: "objects which are both > plastic enough to adapt to local needs and the constraints of the several > parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a common identity > across sites...The objects may by abstract or concrete." > > Etienne Wenger seems to offer a start in this direction. But only a start. > > Can we imagine "activity" (or whatever we want to call it - "project," > "frame," "social doing," etc.) as a boundary object - something that > captures a relation BETWEEN persons. Activity always as "inter-activity." > > So then, how do we tell "what it is that is going on here?" where "here" > is the "current" temporally displaced moment of me writing and you reading > this. Is this just me being a show-off? Is this me trying to work through > some of my ideas in order to publish a paper (with the real motivation to > simply keep my job)? Is this just me musing with friends about ideas about > which I feel very strongly? Or is something altogether different happening > here? > > I take Goffman's answer to this to be: it's up to you - or better, to the > relation that will emerge BETWEEN us. Who's to say what that will be. > > -greg > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Visiting Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From lpscholar2@gmail.com Thu Aug 15 08:22:47 2013 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Thu, 15 Aug 2013 08:22:47 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: <520C3970.6000803@mira.net> References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> <520444BA.2000808@mira.net> <520460F0.5030506@mira.net> <19E63C50-A0D2-4A0F-BBA7-63853414FDAA@gmail.com> <4195A368-C7B9-4AB0-AAA5-A244135DC331@gmail.com> <520ADCDD.9000406@mira.net> <520C3970.6000803@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy, I was hoping you could elaborate on the two terms *modes* and *archeTYPES* when discussing collaboration within projects [activities] *modes* seem related to *models* *media* *medium* *mediation*. *Actions* when *operationalized* are ALWAYS WITHIN modes of collaboration. What phenomena are not included within human processes that are beyond activities? Shotter, exploring social life says, "different people in different positions at different moments live in different realities." In other words "reality" we must re-think "reality" as being differentiated, consisting in different regions and moments all with different properties to these realities. Shotter adds, "WE can begin to think of social reality at large as a turbulent flow of continuous social activity, containing within it [reality] two BASIC KINDS of activity: 1] a set of relatively stable centers of well ordered, self-reproducing activity sustained by those WITHIN them being accountable to each other for their actions ... - but with the forms of justification used being themselves open to contest (Billig, McIntyre) 2] with these diverse regions or moments of institutionalized order being separated from each other by zones of much more disorderly, unaccountable, chaotic activity. It is in these unaccountable, marginal regions - on the edge of chaos, away from the orderly centers of social life - that the events of interest to us occur" Shotter is suggesting the *models* we specify to help us understand the uncertainty, vagueness, and ambiguity [REAL features of much of the world in which we live] influence the nature of our future lives together. To return to collaboration operating WITHIN *modes* [as archeTYPES]. The 3 types [master/servant - customer/provider - and collaboration per se]. Can *we* through *education* develop *dis-positions* which *turn* away from the first two archetypes and *turn* towards collaboration per se? Can we also through education envision a turn towards the *interhuman* as a *model* that is a general archetype for understanding collaboration per se? Is Shotter's composition of two basic KINDS of activity [sedimented and disorderly] helpful in understanding community forming within types or modes of communication [collaboration]. I struggle with the ambivalence of *addressing* my audience. This is a CHAT forum and I have a tendency to *turn* the conversation. I will close by re-focusing on the dialectic of meaning and *sense*. Sense involves [revolves?] perception AND action mediated THROUGH felt experience. I believe Shotter's conVERSEational "realities* as collaborations per se may contribute to our interhuman understandings as a way to turn away from master/slave and customer/provider activity settings. Larry Larry Thanks Andy On Wed, Aug 14, 2013 at 7:14 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Two things Greg. > > Firstly, most definitely the caddy and the player are involved in the same > project or activity. Self-evidently. Each are also involved in other > activities, and reflecting on these other activities may shed light on how > they come to be collaborating in the shared project of the player's game. > Like master and servant, people always collaborate in a particular mode. > The archetypes of these modes of collaboration are master-servant, > customer-provider and collaboration per se. It is important to recognise > these different modes of collaboration because otherwise we tend to force > *all* collaboration into the same mode, which may cause us to misconstrue > some relations. The fact that different participants have different social > positions within a project means that they each are bound by different > sides of the same norms. That is, the norms of meaning, belief and action > prevailing in the project mandate different meanings, beliefs and actions > for different participants. The tensions arising from these asymmetrical > relationships is one of the motors of change. > > Secondly, no, projects do not exist *between* persons, persons exist > *between* projects. This is just another effort by you, Greg, to make the > unit of analysis the individual person. The relevants units of analysis of > Activity Theory are operation, action and activity. :) > > Andy > > Greg Thompson wrote: > >> ... >> >> >> "Motive" seems a slippery concept to rest too much on. Andy I'm wondering >> how you answer the question you put to Roland, namely whether or not master >> and slave are participating in the same activity/project? Or, what about a >> golfer and caddy? And so on down to, as Phillip and Carol point out - the >> different participants in a discussion on XMCA. >> >> ... >> >> >> Goffman's answer is interesting in that he doesn't rely on the motives >> (motivational relevancies) of the participants, but rather creates a notion >> of the local context as a "frame" that exists somewhere between >> participants. No one person can dictate the frame (even dictators have to >> deal with the possibility of duplicitousness - the word with a side-wards >> glance - hence irony is a powerful weapon of the weak - even if James Scott >> didn't recognize this, Bakhtin clearly did). Frames emerge as participants >> take parts in the unfolding play of some event or happening, and, to a >> certain extent, without regard to alignment of the motives of the >> participants. Every once in a while the motives of all participants create >> a frame may be relatively closely aligned, but it seems much more common >> that frames are built out of a plethora of motives. >> >> > > From bazerman@education.ucsb.edu Thu Aug 15 09:09:26 2013 From: bazerman@education.ucsb.edu (Charles Bazerman) Date: Thu, 15 Aug 2013 09:09:26 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Polysemy of "Community" In-Reply-To: References: <393FDE85-EFCF-48E6-96E0-6ED970A4DD80@hawaii.edu> <520AE206.9030105@mira.net> <677393EE-FCF8-4A94-8F11-E2922F308E28@hawaii.edu> <520AFF6D.5090608@mira.net> <94019118-330E-4A70-8FC5-AC7186A4331C@hawaii.edu> <650486391-1376457468-cardhu_decombobulator_blackberry.rim.net-828212652-@b2.c11.bise7.blackberry> <520B1DB2.8040606@mira.net> <520C4499.7020607@mira.net> <9C3E0B46-1122-49B6-86B8-3E1AE8B1C016@hawaii.edu> <520C5629.8050607@mira.net> Message-ID: Absolutely. At least considered from the perspective of writing, at least in the Mid-East invention (separate from independent inventions in several other places). It all started with stones used to count agricultural products, which then transformed into little clay pebbles of various shapes, into impressions on a clay matrix, into cuneiform letters. These little stones of no particular meaning to anybody had to come to have shared meanings for the objects to be able to use them for communicative purposes, and not just individual mnemonic purposes--but that too means assigning meaning to the object,; it is just not yet shared. In the practices of coming to share assigning meaning to ever more elaborate artfully produced signs among groups using texts in pursuit of their activities is the history of literacy. How is that for placing written language right in the heart of Vygotsky's and CHAT's experimental line? ----- Original Message ----- From: mike cole Date: Wednesday, August 14, 2013 10:00 pm Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Polysemy of "Community" To: Andy Blunden , "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Colleagues-- Is there perhaps some relationship between the notions of > "shared artifacts" and "shared meanings?" If Mandelshtam forgot the > word he > wanted to say, and thought, > unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows" what is the form of the > embodiment if not in something human-created, a paricular, historically > sedimented, materialized configuration of the human voice that, dare we > consider it, ART-i-ficial? > > perhaps? > mike > > > > > On Wed, Aug 14, 2013 at 9:16 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > That's an alternative way to go, Cliff, define "community" by "shared > > meanings," but the upshot of that way is the counter-intuitive conclusion > > that kids and their parents belong to different "cultural communities." > > > > There is one point which I must clarify though from your last words > below: > > "The material form of an artifact may be universal in the sense that > we may > > all agree on the label for it. However, the artifact may have very > > different meanings for us." No. The artefacts have a universal material > > form despite us having "different labels" for it. The foundation of > natural > > science is that matter exist independently of human activity, > obedient to > > natural laws which are knowable. And natural science has a right to > exist; > > it is not a giant mistake. We *do* of course ascribe different > meanings to > > one and the same material form or object, but that is thanks to human > > activity. The matter exists independently of our interpretation of > it. This > > is why I know I can rely on artefacts to provide a sound, universal > > foundation for "community," and I leave it entirely open that a > > multiplicity of meanings and actions are in conflict within the community. > > > > Andy > > > > > > Cliff O'Donnell wrote: > > > >> So I can see a problem with making "community" the subject matter, > or > >>> "unit of analysis" for a study; > >>> > >> > >> We agree. That is why activity settings are the units of > analysis we > >> use. > >> > >> one would have to first select an artefact or combination of artefacts, > >>> (such as language and land) which serves to define the basis of > the said > >>> "community." The point then is that the "community" is *not* > defined by > >>> shared *meanings*; > >>> > >> > >> So why define community by artifacts? Why not by shared meanings? > >> > >> in fact, different components of the "community" may attach > >>> diametrically opposite meanings to a given artefact (word, symbol, > tool, > >>> ...) or even use it in ways which are quite incommensurable. > >>> > >> > >> If community is defined by shared meanings, those with "diametrically > >> opposite meanings" would by definition belong to different cultural > >> communities (even if they did live in the same geographical unit). > >> > >> But! the material form of the artefact is *universal* in what ever > way > >>> it is used, meant or interpreted. The *materiality* of artefacts > is the > >>> foundation was what is *universal* in human life. Projects give us > what is > >>> *particular* in human life (ascribing different meanings to one > and the > >>> same artefact), and actions (not persons) give us what is > *individual* in > >>> human life, for the purposes of theoretical analysis. > >>> > >> > >> The material form of an artifact may be universal in the sense > that > >> we may all agree on the label for it. However, the artifact may > have very > >> different meanings for us and these meanings may lead to quite different > >> actions and, as you point out, be the basis for conflict. > >> > >> Cliff > >> > >> > >> > > -- > > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Thu Aug 15 09:39:36 2013 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Thu, 15 Aug 2013 09:39:36 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Polysemy of "Community" In-Reply-To: References: <393FDE85-EFCF-48E6-96E0-6ED970A4DD80@hawaii.edu> <520AE206.9030105@mira.net> <677393EE-FCF8-4A94-8F11-E2922F308E28@hawaii.edu> <520AFF6D.5090608@mira.net> <94019118-330E-4A70-8FC5-AC7186A4331C@hawaii.edu> <650486391-1376457468-cardhu_decombobulator_blackberry.rim.net-828212652-@b2.c11.bise7.blackberry> <520B1DB2.8040606@mira.net> <520C4499.7020607@mira.net> <9C3E0B46-1122-49B6-86B8-3E1AE8B1C016@hawaii.edu> <520C5629.8050607@mira.net> Message-ID: Charles, And this returns us to Mike and Sylvia's "The Psychology of Literacy" and their introductory chapter. This book [along with David Olson's project exploring the world on paper] was my introduction to CHAT. If interested in this theme I recommend returning to the introduction of this wonderful book. Larry On Thu, Aug 15, 2013 at 9:09 AM, Charles Bazerman < bazerman@education.ucsb.edu> wrote: > Absolutely. At least considered from the perspective of writing, at least > in the Mid-East invention (separate from independent inventions in several > other places). It all started with stones used to count agricultural > products, which then transformed into little clay pebbles of various > shapes, into impressions on a clay matrix, into cuneiform letters. These > little stones of no particular meaning to anybody had to come to have > shared meanings for the objects to be able to use them for communicative > purposes, and not just individual mnemonic purposes--but that too means > assigning meaning to the object,; it is just not yet shared. In the > practices of coming to share assigning meaning to ever more elaborate > artfully produced signs among groups using texts in pursuit of their > activities is the history of literacy. > How is that for placing written language right in the heart of Vygotsky's > and CHAT's experimental line? > > > ----- Original Message ----- > From: mike cole > Date: Wednesday, August 14, 2013 10:00 pm > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Polysemy of "Community" > To: Andy Blunden , "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" < > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> > > > Colleagues-- Is there perhaps some relationship between the notions of > > "shared artifacts" and "shared meanings?" If Mandelshtam forgot the > > word he > > wanted to say, and thought, > > unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows" what is the form of the > > embodiment if not in something human-created, a paricular, historically > > sedimented, materialized configuration of the human voice that, dare we > > consider it, ART-i-ficial? > > > > perhaps? > > mike > > > > > > > > > > On Wed, Aug 14, 2013 at 9:16 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > > > That's an alternative way to go, Cliff, define "community" by "shared > > > meanings," but the upshot of that way is the counter-intuitive > conclusion > > > that kids and their parents belong to different "cultural communities." > > > > > > There is one point which I must clarify though from your last words > > below: > > > "The material form of an artifact may be universal in the sense that > > we may > > > all agree on the label for it. However, the artifact may have very > > > different meanings for us." No. The artefacts have a universal material > > > form despite us having "different labels" for it. The foundation of > > natural > > > science is that matter exist independently of human activity, > > obedient to > > > natural laws which are knowable. And natural science has a right to > > exist; > > > it is not a giant mistake. We *do* of course ascribe different > > meanings to > > > one and the same material form or object, but that is thanks to human > > > activity. The matter exists independently of our interpretation of > > it. This > > > is why I know I can rely on artefacts to provide a sound, universal > > > foundation for "community," and I leave it entirely open that a > > > multiplicity of meanings and actions are in conflict within the > community. > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > > > > Cliff O'Donnell wrote: > > > > > >> So I can see a problem with making "community" the subject matter, > > or > > >>> "unit of analysis" for a study; > > >>> > > >> > > >> We agree. That is why activity settings are the units of > > analysis we > > >> use. > > >> > > >> one would have to first select an artefact or combination of > artefacts, > > >>> (such as language and land) which serves to define the basis of > > the said > > >>> "community." The point then is that the "community" is *not* > > defined by > > >>> shared *meanings*; > > >>> > > >> > > >> So why define community by artifacts? Why not by shared meanings? > > >> > > >> in fact, different components of the "community" may attach > > >>> diametrically opposite meanings to a given artefact (word, symbol, > > tool, > > >>> ...) or even use it in ways which are quite incommensurable. > > >>> > > >> > > >> If community is defined by shared meanings, those with > "diametrically > > >> opposite meanings" would by definition belong to different cultural > > >> communities (even if they did live in the same geographical unit). > > >> > > >> But! the material form of the artefact is *universal* in what ever > > way > > >>> it is used, meant or interpreted. The *materiality* of artefacts > > is the > > >>> foundation was what is *universal* in human life. Projects give us > > what is > > >>> *particular* in human life (ascribing different meanings to one > > and the > > >>> same artefact), and actions (not persons) give us what is > > *individual* in > > >>> human life, for the purposes of theoretical analysis. > > >>> > > >> > > >> The material form of an artifact may be universal in the sense > > that > > >> we may all agree on the label for it. However, the artifact may > > have very > > >> different meanings for us and these meanings may lead to quite > different > > >> actions and, as you point out, be the basis for conflict. > > >> > > >> Cliff > > >> > > >> > > >> > > > -- > > > > > > > From smago@uga.edu Thu Aug 15 10:26:03 2013 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Thu, 15 Aug 2013 17:26:03 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] FW: Elliot Eisner SIG In-Reply-To: <54877DC6-0D4B-47F4-8040-0B4668D2D9B0@gsu.edu> References: <54877DC6-0D4B-47F4-8040-0B4668D2D9B0@gsu.edu> Message-ID: THIS IS A FORWARDED MESSAGE. PLEASE DO NOT REPLY TO THE SENDER. READ THE MESSAGE CAREFULLY FOR INFORMATION ON THE ORIGINAL SENDER Dear Colleagues, We are spreading the word about a new AERA Special Interest Group (SIG) dedicated to the scholarship of Elliot Eisner, Emeritus Professor of Art and Education at the Stanford Graduate School of Education. Our aim is to create an inclusive community whose work reaches into many areas of the educational enterprise. The Eisner SIG will champion, challenge, reinvigorate, and further the ideas of Elliot Eisner in a number of domains, including qualitative inquiry, cognitive pluralism, the arts, creativity, the ecology of schooling, and developing theories for contemporary educational practice. We hope you will support these collective efforts by following this link and signing our petition to start this SIG: https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/B2P99YC. We would also appreciate your forwarding this information to others who may be interested. For those of you wishing for a review of Elliot Eisner's work, you can find a recent bio (and more) here. Or, for a refreshing viewpoint on the humanistic side of teaching, see Larry Cuban's recent blog post of Eisner's commencement talk, "On Teaching", here (both links included below for reference). Sincerely, Eisner SIG Team Bradley Conrad, Capital University, bconrad634@capital.edu Derek Gottlieb, University of Basel, dgderekgottlieb@gmail.com Ben Ingman, University of Denver, bingman@du.edu Christy M. Moroye, University of Northern Colorado, Christine.moroye@unco.edu P. Bruce Uhrmacher, University of Denver, bruce.uhrmacher@du.edu http://insidetheacademy.asu.edu/elliot-eisner http://larrycuban.wordpress.com/2013/06/18/on-teaching-elliot-eisner/ From lchcmike@gmail.com Thu Aug 15 13:22:25 2013 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Thu, 15 Aug 2013 13:22:25 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Concerning the origins of writing Message-ID: Chuck is pointing at the work of Denise Schmandt-Besserat. I agree on its central importance and it is included in stuff on my web page. The work is not uncontroversial, but I like the story a lot. For a quick and accessible summary see http://www.austinchronicle.com/books/1999-12-10/74962/ mike From cliffo@hawaii.edu Thu Aug 15 13:33:33 2013 From: cliffo@hawaii.edu (Cliff O'Donnell) Date: Thu, 15 Aug 2013 10:33:33 -1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Translating Ideas to Intervention Message-ID: <05782797-5037-4360-8BA6-E841EB40557A@hawaii.edu> Thanks to the XMCA group for all of the ideas you have presented this week. Your thoughts on how to translate those ideas to an intervention plan would be most welcome. You could use the example in our article on the plan we developed to address the concerns about youth gangs in a small rural community (pages 10-13). How would our plan differ if we used any of the ideas you articulated? Cliff Clifford R. O'Donnell, Ph.D. Professor Emeritus Past-President, Society for Community Research and Action (APA Division 27) University of Hawai?i Department of Psychology 2530 Dole Street Honolulu, HI 96822 From ablunden@mira.net Thu Aug 15 18:09:29 2013 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 16 Aug 2013 11:09:29 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Translating Ideas to Intervention In-Reply-To: <05782797-5037-4360-8BA6-E841EB40557A@hawaii.edu> References: <05782797-5037-4360-8BA6-E841EB40557A@hawaii.edu> Message-ID: <520D7BC9.4070607@mira.net> Cliff, I was impressed by that example and have no suggestions how you miight have done differently. Your concepts, your word meanings and your practices are evidently well aligned. My concern was primarily to clarify your concepts and word meanings relative to those I am familiar with, that's all. If you have an intervention which was *not* successful, then perhaps that would be an occasion to revisit concepts and discuss alterntive interventions? Andy Cliff O'Donnell wrote: > Thanks to the XMCA group for all of the ideas you have presented this > week. Your thoughts on how to translate those ideas to an intervention > plan would be most welcome. You could use the example in our article > on the plan we developed to address the concerns about youth gangs in > a small rural community (pages 10-13). How would our plan differ if we > used any of the ideas you articulated? > > Cliff > > Clifford R. O'Donnell, Ph.D. > Professor Emeritus > Past-President, Society for Community Research and Action (APA > Division 27) > > University of Hawai?i > Department of Psychology > 2530 Dole Street > Honolulu, HI 96822 From lpscholar2@gmail.com Thu Aug 15 19:41:07 2013 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Thu, 15 Aug 2013 19:41:07 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Concerning the origins of writing In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Mike, The concepts *meaning* and *sense* have been discussed as central to CHAT. Your exploration of literacy as a mode or media showed how literacy transforms how we think. In that spirit I offer a translation of *meaning* that may or may not be helpful as it refers to the history of the concept of *meaning* When translating the term *hermeneuetai* from ancient Greek to modern English the term *meaning* is used. In other words *meaning* is a synonym for interpreting or understanding (as). Gerald Burns suggests, "Normally we would not think of using the the word *meaning* as a synonym for *interpretation* - yet, on reflection, that is exactly what our modern conception of meaning was made for, namely, to stand in place of interpretation and, in effect, to OBJECTIFY the way a word or phrase can be taken by FIGURING it (the way it is taken) AS a textual entity; something that inhabits a text INDEPENDENTLY rather than in virtue of any understanding of it. The concept of meaning, after all, is just what is required as soon as one begins IMAGINING texts AS objects towards which one is to adopt an analytical attitude." [from The Problem of Figuration in Antiquity, 1984] I may again be wandering off topic and just ignore this if it is not relevant. I saw a link with the dialectic of meaning and sense. Bruns is making a case that *meaning* transforms [turns] the *as structure* [something understood as something else] into an objective *mode* of knowing as the concept of *meaning*. It may have some relevance. Larry On Thu, Aug 15, 2013 at 1:22 PM, mike cole wrote: > Chuck is pointing at the work of Denise Schmandt-Besserat. I agree on its > central importance and it is included in stuff on my web page. > The work is not uncontroversial, but I like the story a lot. > > For a quick and accessible summary see > > http://www.austinchronicle.com/books/1999-12-10/74962/ > > mike > From cliffo@hawaii.edu Thu Aug 15 19:50:57 2013 From: cliffo@hawaii.edu (Cliff O'Donnell) Date: Thu, 15 Aug 2013 16:50:57 -1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Translating Ideas to Intervention In-Reply-To: <520D7BC9.4070607@mira.net> References: <05782797-5037-4360-8BA6-E841EB40557A@hawaii.edu> <520D7BC9.4070607@mira.net> Message-ID: Many thanks, Andy. I've appreciated all of your messages, comments, and clarifications! In our work, we try to adhere to the advice of Price and Behrens (2003 , p. 222): ??where no action step is contemplated without questioning about its theoretical significance and no speculation about underlying processes occurs without asking about its action implications." So the purpose of my question to the XMCA group was to ask about the action implications of the ideas they presented. Cliff On Aug 15, 2013, at 3:09 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Cliff, I was impressed by that example and have no suggestions how > you miight have done differently. Your concepts, your word meanings > and your practices are evidently well aligned. My concern was > primarily to clarify your concepts and word meanings relative to > those I am familiar with, that's all. If you have an intervention > which was *not* successful, then perhaps that would be an occasion > to revisit concepts and discuss alterntive interventions? > > Andy From ablunden@mira.net Thu Aug 15 20:08:09 2013 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Fri, 16 Aug 2013 13:08:09 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Translating Ideas to Intervention In-Reply-To: References: <05782797-5037-4360-8BA6-E841EB40557A@hawaii.edu> <520D7BC9.4070607@mira.net> Message-ID: <520D9799.9090502@mira.net> Cliff, the kind of distinctions which I was teasing out are important for *my* work, but I also know that other practices use different constellations of concepts, adapted to their objectives and context. The nuances and shades of meaning which characterise your distinctive approach are well within the spread of views and theories gathered under the banner of CHAT. Andy Cliff O'Donnell wrote: > Many thanks, Andy. I've appreciated all of your messages, comments, > and clarifications! > In our work, we try to adhere to the advice of Price and Behrens > (2003 , p. 222): > > ??where no action step is contemplated without questioning about its > theoretical significance > and no speculation about underlying processes occurs without asking > about its action > implications." > > So the purpose of my question to the XMCA group was to ask about the > action implications of the ideas they presented. > > Cliff > > On Aug 15, 2013, at 3:09 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> Cliff, I was impressed by that example and have no suggestions how >> you miight have done differently. Your concepts, your word meanings >> and your practices are evidently well aligned. My concern was >> primarily to clarify your concepts and word meanings relative to >> those I am familiar with, that's all. If you have an intervention >> which was *not* successful, then perhaps that would be an occasion to >> revisit concepts and discuss alterntive interventions? >> >> Andy > > > > -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts http://marxists.academia.edu/AndyBlunden From P.E.Jones@shu.ac.uk Fri Aug 16 00:52:07 2013 From: P.E.Jones@shu.ac.uk (Jones, Peter) Date: Fri, 16 Aug 2013 07:52:07 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Concerning the origins of writing In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <32B7F54BB5C0854D9718700ACD93A3EC70790B8D@kidney.hallam.shu.ac.uk> Dear all If you read one book on writing, I would recommend Roy Harris's 'The Origins of Writing', quite remarkable and a powerful contrast to the usual view (including Vygotsky's) of writing as a representation of spoken language. Best wishes P ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of mike cole [lchcmike@gmail.com] Sent: 15 August 2013 21:22 To: xmca-l@ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Concerning the origins of writing Chuck is pointing at the work of Denise Schmandt-Besserat. I agree on its central importance and it is included in stuff on my web page. The work is not uncontroversial, but I like the story a lot. For a quick and accessible summary see http://www.austinchronicle.com/books/1999-12-10/74962/ mike From P.E.Jones@shu.ac.uk Fri Aug 16 00:52:07 2013 From: P.E.Jones@shu.ac.uk (Jones, Peter) Date: Fri, 16 Aug 2013 07:52:07 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Concerning the origins of writing In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <32B7F54BB5C0854D9718700ACD93A3EC70790B8D@kidney.hallam.shu.ac.uk> Dear all If you read one book on writing, I would recommend Roy Harris's 'The Origins of Writing', quite remarkable and a powerful contrast to the usual view (including Vygotsky's) of writing as a representation of spoken language. Best wishes P ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of mike cole [lchcmike@gmail.com] Sent: 15 August 2013 21:22 To: xmca-l@ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Concerning the origins of writing Chuck is pointing at the work of Denise Schmandt-Besserat. I agree on its central importance and it is included in stuff on my web page. The work is not uncontroversial, but I like the story a lot. For a quick and accessible summary see http://www.austinchronicle.com/books/1999-12-10/74962/ mike From ajrajala@gmail.com Fri Aug 16 05:21:46 2013 From: ajrajala@gmail.com (Antti Rajala) Date: Fri, 16 Aug 2013 15:21:46 +0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> <520444BA.2000808@mira.net> <520460F0.5030506@mira.net> <19E63C50-A0D2-4A0F-BBA7-63853414FDAA@gmail.com> <4195A368-C7B9-4AB0-AAA5-A244135DC331@gmail.com> <520ADCDD.9000406@mira.net> <520C3970.6000803@mira.net> Message-ID: Greg, Thanks for inviting me to the discussion and for your nice introduction to Goffman's work. I indeed found these reflections about the relationships between Goffman and AT very useful. My project in which I am considering using Goffman's concept of frame together with Leontjev's theory of activity is still at a very initial stage (I had to postpone this project for a while to engage in another project meanwhile). My take into the discussion is that I am interested to analyze sensory aspects of students' actions (of observing birds) in bird-watching school fieldtrip. Like Larry, I have previously worked with concepts of personal sense and meaning, and now I found very interesting Leontjev's explication of the structure of consciousness in terms of three dialectically interrelated elements (or moments), personal sense, meaning, and sensory fabric. Yet, Leontiev seems not to have written much that would help me to analyze embodied interactions from video. I think that I need to incorporate concepts from elsewhere to capture the evolving moment-to-moment interactions. Here, I was turning to Goffman's frame analysis, and the work of his students M. and C. Goodwin may be interesting, too. I have talked to many colleagues in CHAT and so far everyone has encouraged me to explore the connections between frames and Leontiev (even though a lot of work needs to be done). In this connection, I found interesting Lubomir's opinion of the incompatibility between the two. I add Gutierrez to Greg's list of scholars who connect Goffman and Leontiev. Gutierrez and colleagues have used defined their well-known notion of script in terms of the notion of frame. In their article (1995, Script, counterscript and underlife in the classroom; http://lchc.ucsd.edu/mca/Paper/kris.pdf) they write: "Nevertheless, the teacher's script is hardly interrupted by student re-keyings, his script (or "frame" in Goffman's terms) has ..." (p. 460). Gutierrez and colleagues also use other Goffman's concepts such as keying and underlife. One connection to Greg's reflection about motives and frames. To me, it seems that there are some connections between the notions of personal sense and framing. "Sense expresses the relation of motive of activity to immediate goal of action" (Leontiev, 1978, p. 171). For a participant of an activity, explication of this relation between motive and goal seems to amount to asking: "what it is that is going on here?", that is, what is the frame? I would also like to ask the list, if you think that involving the notion of sensory fabric in an observational study of naturally occuring interactions is too far fetched. After all, Leontiev's own studies employed exprimental research methods. I am considering dropping Leontiev altogether and use work like Goodwin's professional vision instead. Antti On Thu, Aug 15, 2013 at 6:22 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > Andy, > I was hoping you could elaborate on the two terms *modes* and *archeTYPES* > when discussing collaboration within projects [activities] > *modes* seem related to *models* *media* *medium* *mediation*. > *Actions* when *operationalized* are ALWAYS WITHIN modes of collaboration. > What phenomena are not included within human processes that are beyond > activities? > Shotter, exploring social life says, > "different people in different positions at different moments live in > different realities." > In other words "reality" we must re-think "reality" as being > differentiated, consisting in different regions and moments all with > different properties to these realities. > Shotter adds, > "WE can begin to think of social reality at large as a turbulent flow of > continuous social activity, containing within it [reality] two BASIC KINDS > of activity: > 1] a set of relatively stable centers of well ordered, self-reproducing > activity sustained by those WITHIN them being accountable to each other for > their actions ... - but with the forms of justification used being > themselves open to contest (Billig, McIntyre) > 2] with these diverse regions or moments of institutionalized order being > separated from each other by zones of much more disorderly, unaccountable, > chaotic activity. > It is in these unaccountable, marginal regions - on the edge of chaos, away > from the orderly centers of social life - that the events of interest to us > occur" > > Shotter is suggesting the *models* we specify to help us understand the > uncertainty, vagueness, and ambiguity [REAL features of much of the world > in which we live] influence the nature of our future lives together. > > To return to collaboration operating WITHIN *modes* [as archeTYPES]. The 3 > types [master/servant - customer/provider - and collaboration per se]. Can > *we* through *education* develop *dis-positions* which *turn* away from the > first two archetypes and *turn* towards collaboration per se? Can we also > through education envision a turn towards the *interhuman* as a *model* > that is a general archetype for understanding collaboration per se? > Is Shotter's composition of two basic KINDS of activity [sedimented and > disorderly] helpful in understanding community forming within types or > modes of communication [collaboration]. > > I struggle with the ambivalence of *addressing* my audience. This is a CHAT > forum and I have a tendency to *turn* the conversation. I will close by > re-focusing on the dialectic of meaning and *sense*. > Sense involves [revolves?] perception AND action mediated THROUGH felt > experience. I believe Shotter's conVERSEational "realities* as > collaborations per se may contribute to our interhuman understandings as a > way to turn away from master/slave and customer/provider activity settings. > Larry > Larry > > > > Thanks Andy > On Wed, Aug 14, 2013 at 7:14 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > Two things Greg. > > > > Firstly, most definitely the caddy and the player are involved in the > same > > project or activity. Self-evidently. Each are also involved in other > > activities, and reflecting on these other activities may shed light on > how > > they come to be collaborating in the shared project of the player's game. > > Like master and servant, people always collaborate in a particular mode. > > The archetypes of these modes of collaboration are master-servant, > > customer-provider and collaboration per se. It is important to recognise > > these different modes of collaboration because otherwise we tend to force > > *all* collaboration into the same mode, which may cause us to misconstrue > > some relations. The fact that different participants have different > social > > positions within a project means that they each are bound by different > > sides of the same norms. That is, the norms of meaning, belief and action > > prevailing in the project mandate different meanings, beliefs and actions > > for different participants. The tensions arising from these asymmetrical > > relationships is one of the motors of change. > > > > Secondly, no, projects do not exist *between* persons, persons exist > > *between* projects. This is just another effort by you, Greg, to make the > > unit of analysis the individual person. The relevants units of analysis > of > > Activity Theory are operation, action and activity. :) > > > > Andy > > > > Greg Thompson wrote: > > > >> ... > >> > >> > >> "Motive" seems a slippery concept to rest too much on. Andy I'm > wondering > >> how you answer the question you put to Roland, namely whether or not > master > >> and slave are participating in the same activity/project? Or, what > about a > >> golfer and caddy? And so on down to, as Phillip and Carol point out - > the > >> different participants in a discussion on XMCA. > >> > >> ... > >> > >> > >> Goffman's answer is interesting in that he doesn't rely on the motives > >> (motivational relevancies) of the participants, but rather creates a > notion > >> of the local context as a "frame" that exists somewhere between > >> participants. No one person can dictate the frame (even dictators have > to > >> deal with the possibility of duplicitousness - the word with a > side-wards > >> glance - hence irony is a powerful weapon of the weak - even if James > Scott > >> didn't recognize this, Bakhtin clearly did). Frames emerge as > participants > >> take parts in the unfolding play of some event or happening, and, to a > >> certain extent, without regard to alignment of the motives of the > >> participants. Every once in a while the motives of all participants > create > >> a frame may be relatively closely aligned, but it seems much more common > >> that frames are built out of a plethora of motives. > >> > >> > > > > > From lchcmike@gmail.com Sat Aug 17 10:29:32 2013 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Sat, 17 Aug 2013 10:29:32 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Mystery progressive educator? Message-ID: Ran across the following interesting statement by accident and was surprised a little at the authorship. I thought others might be interested in it as well. I'll leave off authorship because part of what I found interesting was in figuring out who it was. mike --------------- Children should be led to make their own investigations, and to draw this won inferences. They should to *told* as little as possible, and indeed to *discover *as much as possible. Humanity has progressed solely by self-instruction; From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Sat Aug 17 10:36:20 2013 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Sat, 17 Aug 2013 11:36:20 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> <520444BA.2000808@mira.net> <520460F0.5030506@mira.net> <19E63C50-A0D2-4A0F-BBA7-63853414FDAA@gmail.com> <4195A368-C7B9-4AB0-AAA5-A244135DC331@gmail.com> <520ADCDD.9000406@mira.net> <520C3970.6000803@mira.net> Message-ID: Antti and other inter-Actants, I think that the notion of sensory fabric in an observational study of naturally occurring interactions is NOT too far fetched. Seems like something like this is absolutely needed. And I'd be interested to hear how you would plan to use Goodwin's Professional Vision article - it is a personal favorite (so maybe offline if others aren't interested). Also, Antti, in your work, I like your attention to the role of the physical body in making frames. (see also John Rae on body posture and framing, e.g. see: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1207/S15327973RLSI34-2_4#.Ug7fiJLiiM4 and maybe more central in this regard is Adam Kendon's work on body posture). I might add to this that Goffman speaks of the way in which motivations are, to a certain extent, entailed by frames (yes, "to a certain extent" - this does not mean the frames determine them!). Thus, frames bring with them motivational relevancies as much as individuals do! We could speak of the way that frames create certain affordances that solicit various types of behavior (whether "cognitive", "emotional", or some other emically named type). When we are in certain types of interactions, it suddenly becomes possible to *feel* a certain way that one couldn't otherwise have felt. Similarly, one can be a head taller than oneself when in certain interactions. And, conversely, one can find oneself becoming quite smaller in others! I think that this role of context is important and can be easily overlooked if you start from the motives of individuals. In addition to Goffman, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty also point in this direction with their notions of "calling forth" and "affordances/solicitations", respectively. These approaches to understanding people result in a reduction of the perceived agency of the individual (and hence a reduced role for intentionality, motive, and even conscious reflection), and I think many people often chafe at these ideas (esp. in American where the individual is king! Sovereign Lords - all of us!). But, imho, there is still an agent in all of these accounts - perhaps a bit smaller than in other accounts, but present nonetheless. And, as the phenomenologists like to say, this account is truer to the phenomena. [and I don't know whether this is relevant or not, but it seems to me that this account accords well with my reading of Marx]. At the end of the day, I think the central issue that all of this turns on is our ontology of *the mental*. Phenomenologists like to suggest that others subscribe to "a myth of the mental" (see Hubert Dreyfus's paper The Return of the Myth of the Mental: http://www.sjsu.edu/people/anand.vaidya/courses/c2/s1/The_Return_Myth_Mental_Dreyfus-1.pdf). This is a pervasive belief and perhaps there is some justification for it, but I happen to find the phenomenologists' position compelling. I further wonder if CHAT tends to subscribe to the myth of the mental? Do our concepts of concepts involve reifications of mental processes that perhaps are not warranted? If the phenomenologists' position hold water, and admittedly it's a lot of water to swallow, then the question is really Lubomir's question of whether or not CHAT can integrate other perspectives, here the phenomenological perspective (and it seems like some say yes, some say no), or whether you will necessarily have to go somewhere else to get that perspective. So, is this an ontological commitment of CHAT? Can there be some middle ground? It seems like Shotter and others (e.g., Martin Packer here on XMCA) have been marking out this space, but perhaps what remains to be seen is whether or not this space falls within the bounds of CHAT. Who decides that? -greg On Fri, Aug 16, 2013 at 6:21 AM, Antti Rajala wrote: > Greg, > > Thanks for inviting me to the discussion and for your nice introduction to > Goffman's work. I indeed found these reflections about the relationships > between Goffman and AT very useful. My project in which I am considering > using Goffman's concept of frame together with Leontjev's theory of > activity is still at a very initial stage (I had to postpone this project > for a while to engage in another project meanwhile). > > My take into the discussion is that I am interested to analyze sensory > aspects of students' actions (of observing birds) in bird-watching school > fieldtrip. Like Larry, I have previously worked with concepts of personal > sense and meaning, and now I found very interesting Leontjev's explication > of the structure of consciousness in terms of three dialectically > interrelated elements (or moments), personal sense, meaning, and sensory > fabric. Yet, Leontiev seems not to have written much that would help me to > analyze embodied interactions from video. I think that I need to > incorporate concepts from elsewhere to capture the evolving > moment-to-moment interactions. Here, I was turning to Goffman's frame > analysis, and the work of his students M. and C. Goodwin may be > interesting, too. > > I have talked to many colleagues in CHAT and so far everyone has encouraged > me to explore the connections between frames and Leontiev (even though a > lot of work needs to be done). In this connection, I found interesting > Lubomir's opinion of the incompatibility between the two. I add Gutierrez > to Greg's list of scholars who connect Goffman and Leontiev. > > Gutierrez and colleagues have used defined their well-known notion of > script in terms of the notion of frame. In their article (1995, Script, > counterscript and underlife in the classroom; > http://lchc.ucsd.edu/mca/Paper/kris.pdf) they write: "Nevertheless, the > teacher's script is hardly interrupted by student re-keyings, his script > (or "frame" in Goffman's terms) has ..." (p. 460). Gutierrez and colleagues > also use other Goffman's concepts such as keying and underlife. > > One connection to Greg's reflection about motives and frames. To me, it > seems that there are some connections between the notions of personal sense > and framing. "Sense expresses the relation of motive of activity to > immediate goal of action" (Leontiev, 1978, p. 171). For a participant of an > activity, explication of this relation between motive and goal seems to > amount to asking: "what it is that is going on here?", that is, what is the > frame? > > I would also like to ask the list, if you think that involving the notion > of sensory fabric in an observational study of naturally occuring > interactions is too far fetched. After all, Leontiev's own studies employed > exprimental research methods. I am considering dropping Leontiev altogether > and use work like Goodwin's professional vision instead. > > Antti > > > On Thu, Aug 15, 2013 at 6:22 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > Andy, > > I was hoping you could elaborate on the two terms *modes* and > *archeTYPES* > > when discussing collaboration within projects [activities] > > *modes* seem related to *models* *media* *medium* *mediation*. > > *Actions* when *operationalized* are ALWAYS WITHIN modes of > collaboration. > > What phenomena are not included within human processes that are beyond > > activities? > > Shotter, exploring social life says, > > "different people in different positions at different moments live in > > different realities." > > In other words "reality" we must re-think "reality" as being > > differentiated, consisting in different regions and moments all with > > different properties to these realities. > > Shotter adds, > > "WE can begin to think of social reality at large as a turbulent flow of > > continuous social activity, containing within it [reality] two BASIC > KINDS > > of activity: > > 1] a set of relatively stable centers of well ordered, self-reproducing > > activity sustained by those WITHIN them being accountable to each other > for > > their actions ... - but with the forms of justification used being > > themselves open to contest (Billig, McIntyre) > > 2] with these diverse regions or moments of institutionalized order being > > separated from each other by zones of much more disorderly, > unaccountable, > > chaotic activity. > > It is in these unaccountable, marginal regions - on the edge of chaos, > away > > from the orderly centers of social life - that the events of interest to > us > > occur" > > > > Shotter is suggesting the *models* we specify to help us understand the > > uncertainty, vagueness, and ambiguity [REAL features of much of the world > > in which we live] influence the nature of our future lives together. > > > > To return to collaboration operating WITHIN *modes* [as archeTYPES]. The > 3 > > types [master/servant - customer/provider - and collaboration per se]. > Can > > *we* through *education* develop *dis-positions* which *turn* away from > the > > first two archetypes and *turn* towards collaboration per se? Can we also > > through education envision a turn towards the *interhuman* as a *model* > > that is a general archetype for understanding collaboration per se? > > Is Shotter's composition of two basic KINDS of activity [sedimented and > > disorderly] helpful in understanding community forming within types or > > modes of communication [collaboration]. > > > > I struggle with the ambivalence of *addressing* my audience. This is a > CHAT > > forum and I have a tendency to *turn* the conversation. I will close by > > re-focusing on the dialectic of meaning and *sense*. > > Sense involves [revolves?] perception AND action mediated THROUGH felt > > experience. I believe Shotter's conVERSEational "realities* as > > collaborations per se may contribute to our interhuman understandings as > a > > way to turn away from master/slave and customer/provider activity > settings. > > Larry > > Larry > > > > > > > > Thanks Andy > > On Wed, Aug 14, 2013 at 7:14 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > > > Two things Greg. > > > > > > Firstly, most definitely the caddy and the player are involved in the > > same > > > project or activity. Self-evidently. Each are also involved in other > > > activities, and reflecting on these other activities may shed light on > > how > > > they come to be collaborating in the shared project of the player's > game. > > > Like master and servant, people always collaborate in a particular > mode. > > > The archetypes of these modes of collaboration are master-servant, > > > customer-provider and collaboration per se. It is important to > recognise > > > these different modes of collaboration because otherwise we tend to > force > > > *all* collaboration into the same mode, which may cause us to > misconstrue > > > some relations. The fact that different participants have different > > social > > > positions within a project means that they each are bound by different > > > sides of the same norms. That is, the norms of meaning, belief and > action > > > prevailing in the project mandate different meanings, beliefs and > actions > > > for different participants. The tensions arising from these > asymmetrical > > > relationships is one of the motors of change. > > > > > > Secondly, no, projects do not exist *between* persons, persons exist > > > *between* projects. This is just another effort by you, Greg, to make > the > > > unit of analysis the individual person. The relevants units of analysis > > of > > > Activity Theory are operation, action and activity. :) > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > Greg Thompson wrote: > > > > > >> ... > > >> > > >> > > >> "Motive" seems a slippery concept to rest too much on. Andy I'm > > wondering > > >> how you answer the question you put to Roland, namely whether or not > > master > > >> and slave are participating in the same activity/project? Or, what > > about a > > >> golfer and caddy? And so on down to, as Phillip and Carol point out - > > the > > >> different participants in a discussion on XMCA. > > >> > > >> ... > > >> > > >> > > >> Goffman's answer is interesting in that he doesn't rely on the motives > > >> (motivational relevancies) of the participants, but rather creates a > > notion > > >> of the local context as a "frame" that exists somewhere between > > >> participants. No one person can dictate the frame (even dictators have > > to > > >> deal with the possibility of duplicitousness - the word with a > > side-wards > > >> glance - hence irony is a powerful weapon of the weak - even if James > > Scott > > >> didn't recognize this, Bakhtin clearly did). Frames emerge as > > participants > > >> take parts in the unfolding play of some event or happening, and, to a > > >> certain extent, without regard to alignment of the motives of the > > >> participants. Every once in a while the motives of all participants > > create > > >> a frame may be relatively closely aligned, but it seems much more > common > > >> that frames are built out of a plethora of motives. > > >> > > >> > > > > > > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Visiting Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From smago@uga.edu Sat Aug 17 11:48:08 2013 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Sat, 17 Aug 2013 18:48:08 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mystery progressive educator? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: http://archive.org/stream/teachingoforalen00bolerich/teachingoforalen00bolerich_djvu.txt includes the quote as its framing perspective, so it must have impressed a few people. Note that the book is from 1914, the year before Vygotsky began his work on The Psychology of Art. -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole Sent: Saturday, August 17, 2013 1:30 PM To: xmca-l@ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Mystery progressive educator? Ran across the following interesting statement by accident and was surprised a little at the authorship. I thought others might be interested in it as well. I'll leave off authorship because part of what I found interesting was in figuring out who it was. mike --------------- Children should be led to make their own investigations, and to draw this won inferences. They should to *told* as little as possible, and indeed to *discover *as much as possible. Humanity has progressed solely by self-instruction; From smago@uga.edu Sat Aug 17 11:52:52 2013 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Sat, 17 Aug 2013 18:52:52 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mystery progressive educator? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: And, in 1896, http://www.gutenberg.org/files/20513/20513-h/20513-h.htm -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Peter Smagorinsky Sent: Saturday, August 17, 2013 2:48 PM To: lchcmike@gmail.com; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mystery progressive educator? http://archive.org/stream/teachingoforalen00bolerich/teachingoforalen00bolerich_djvu.txt includes the quote as its framing perspective, so it must have impressed a few people. Note that the book is from 1914, the year before Vygotsky began his work on The Psychology of Art. -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole Sent: Saturday, August 17, 2013 1:30 PM To: xmca-l@ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Mystery progressive educator? Ran across the following interesting statement by accident and was surprised a little at the authorship. I thought others might be interested in it as well. I'll leave off authorship because part of what I found interesting was in figuring out who it was. mike --------------- Children should be led to make their own investigations, and to draw this won inferences. They should to *told* as little as possible, and indeed to *discover *as much as possible. Humanity has progressed solely by self-instruction; From Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu Sat Aug 17 12:24:44 2013 From: Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu (White, Phillip) Date: Sat, 17 Aug 2013 13:24:44 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mystery progressive educator? In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <20130817192444.5415055.78491.2299@ucdenver.edu> Even earlier, Herbert Spencer, 1870's. Phillip Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone. From: Peter Smagorinsky Sent: Saturday, August 17, 2013 12:54 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Reply To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mystery progressive educator? And, in 1896, http://www.gutenberg.org/files/20513/20513-h/20513-h.htm -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Peter Smagorinsky Sent: Saturday, August 17, 2013 2:48 PM To: lchcmike@gmail.com; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mystery progressive educator? http://archive.org/stream/teachingoforalen00bolerich/teachingoforalen00bolerich_djvu.txt includes the quote as its framing perspective, so it must have impressed a few people. Note that the book is from 1914, the year before Vygotsky began his work on The Psychology of Art. -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole Sent: Saturday, August 17, 2013 1:30 PM To: xmca-l@ucsd.edu Subject: [Xmca-l] Mystery progressive educator? Ran across the following interesting statement by accident and was surprised a little at the authorship. I thought others might be interested in it as well. I'll leave off authorship because part of what I found interesting was in figuring out who it was. mike --------------- Children should be led to make their own investigations, and to draw this won inferences. They should to *told* as little as possible, and indeed to *discover *as much as possible. Humanity has progressed solely by self-instruction; From bazerman@education.ucsb.edu Sat Aug 17 12:38:44 2013 From: bazerman@education.ucsb.edu (Charles Bazerman) Date: Sat, 17 Aug 2013 12:38:44 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mystery progressive educator? In-Reply-To: <20130817192444.5415055.78491.2299@ucdenver.edu> References: <20130817192444.5415055.78491.2299@ucdenver.edu> Message-ID: While Herbert'soriginal passage praises Pestalozzi, (moving from concrete to abstract, student pleasure, etc.) Herbert expresses reservations--then note the kicker in the last phrase of Mike's redaction Though it does not appear in the version I found (http://psycnet.apa.org/index.cfm?fa=buy.optionToBuy&id=2008-18628-002) "Humanity has progressed solely by self-instruction..." How easily student centered education gets enlisted into ego-centric! Chuck ----- Original Message ----- From: "White, Phillip" Date: Saturday, August 17, 2013 12:25 pm Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mystery progressive educator? To: "xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu" > Even earlier, Herbert Spencer, 1870's. > > Phillip > > Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone. > From: Peter Smagorinsky > Sent: Saturday, August 17, 2013 12:54 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Reply To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mystery progressive educator? > > > And, in 1896, http://www.gutenberg.org/files/20513/20513-h/20513-h.htm > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Peter Smagorinsky > Sent: Saturday, August 17, 2013 2:48 PM > To: lchcmike@gmail.com; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mystery progressive educator? > > http://archive.org/stream/teachingoforalen00bolerich/teachingoforalen00bolerich_djvu.txt > includes the quote as its framing perspective, so it must have > impressed a few people. Note that the book is from 1914, the year > before Vygotsky began his work on The Psychology of Art. > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole > Sent: Saturday, August 17, 2013 1:30 PM > To: xmca-l@ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Mystery progressive educator? > > Ran across the following interesting statement by accident and was > surprised a little at the authorship. I thought others might be > interested in it as well. I'll leave off authorship because part of > what I found interesting was in figuring out who it was. > > > mike > --------------- > > Children should be led to make their own investigations, and to draw > this won inferences. They should to *told* as little as possible, and > indeed to *discover *as much as possible. Humanity has progressed > solely by self-instruction; > > > > > > From Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu Sat Aug 17 12:46:47 2013 From: Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu (White, Phillip) Date: Sat, 17 Aug 2013 13:46:47 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mystery progressive educator? In-Reply-To: References: <20130817192444.5415055.78491.2299@ucdenver.edu> Message-ID: <20130817194647.5415055.32554.2303@ucdenver.edu> Spencer's father was an advocate of Pestalozzi. P Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone. From: Charles Bazerman Sent: Saturday, August 17, 2013 1:43 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Reply To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mystery progressive educator? While Herbert'soriginal passage praises Pestalozzi, (moving from concrete to abstract, student pleasure, etc.) Herbert expresses reservations--then note the kicker in the last phrase of Mike's redaction Though it does not appear in the version I found (http://psycnet.apa.org/index.cfm?fa=buy.optionToBuy&id=2008-18628-002) "Humanity has progressed solely by self-instruction..." How easily student centered education gets enlisted into ego-centric! Chuck ----- Original Message ----- From: "White, Phillip" Date: Saturday, August 17, 2013 12:25 pm Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mystery progressive educator? To: "xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu" > Even earlier, Herbert Spencer, 1870's. > > Phillip > > Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone. > From: Peter Smagorinsky > Sent: Saturday, August 17, 2013 12:54 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Reply To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mystery progressive educator? > > > And, in 1896, http://www.gutenberg.org/files/20513/20513-h/20513-h.htm > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Peter Smagorinsky > Sent: Saturday, August 17, 2013 2:48 PM > To: lchcmike@gmail.com; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mystery progressive educator? > > http://archive.org/stream/teachingoforalen00bolerich/teachingoforalen00bolerich_djvu.txt > includes the quote as its framing perspective, so it must have > impressed a few people. Note that the book is from 1914, the year > before Vygotsky began his work on The Psychology of Art. > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole > Sent: Saturday, August 17, 2013 1:30 PM > To: xmca-l@ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Mystery progressive educator? > > Ran across the following interesting statement by accident and was > surprised a little at the authorship. I thought others might be > interested in it as well. I'll leave off authorship because part of > what I found interesting was in figuring out who it was. > > > mike > --------------- > > Children should be led to make their own investigations, and to draw > this won inferences. They should to *told* as little as possible, and > indeed to *discover *as much as possible. Humanity has progressed > solely by self-instruction; > > > > > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Sat Aug 17 12:47:07 2013 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Sat, 17 Aug 2013 19:47:07 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mystery progressive educator? In-Reply-To: <20130817192444.5415055.78491.2299@ucdenver.edu> References: <20130817192444.5415055.78491.2299@ucdenver.edu> Message-ID: <6A508340-CDE3-4840-BC07-8B3AB025CE98@uniandes.edu.co> Who also coined "the survival of the fittest," so perhaps it's no great surprise. Martin On Aug 17, 2013, at 2:24 PM, "White, Phillip" wrote: > > Even earlier, Herbert Spencer, 1870's. > > Phillip > > Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone. > From: Peter Smagorinsky > Sent: Saturday, August 17, 2013 12:54 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Reply To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mystery progressive educator? > > > And, in 1896, http://www.gutenberg.org/files/20513/20513-h/20513-h.htm > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Peter Smagorinsky > Sent: Saturday, August 17, 2013 2:48 PM > To: lchcmike@gmail.com; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mystery progressive educator? > > http://archive.org/stream/teachingoforalen00bolerich/teachingoforalen00bolerich_djvu.txt includes the quote as its framing perspective, so it must have impressed a few people. Note that the book is from 1914, the year before Vygotsky began his work on The Psychology of Art. > > -----Original Message----- > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole > Sent: Saturday, August 17, 2013 1:30 PM > To: xmca-l@ucsd.edu > Subject: [Xmca-l] Mystery progressive educator? > > Ran across the following interesting statement by accident and was surprised a little at the authorship. I thought others might be interested in it as well. I'll leave off authorship because part of what I found interesting was in figuring out who it was. > > > mike > --------------- > > Children should be led to make their own investigations, and to draw this won inferences. They should to *told* as little as possible, and indeed to *discover *as much as possible. Humanity has progressed solely by self-instruction; > > > > > > > From lspopov@bgsu.edu Sat Aug 17 12:46:43 2013 From: lspopov@bgsu.edu (Lubomir Savov Popov) Date: Sat, 17 Aug 2013 19:46:43 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> <520444BA.2000808@mira.net> <520460F0.5030506@mira.net> <19E63C50-A0D2-4A0F-BBA7-63853414FDAA@gmail.com> <4195A368-C7B9-4AB0-AAA5-A244135DC331@gmail.com> <520ADCDD.9000406@mira.net> <520C3970.6000803@mira.net> Message-ID: <4DF034EF2396694597A7D328E23F09E1D4E4@BY2PRD0510MB353.namprd05.prod.outlook.com> Dear Greg and Antti, It seems to me that SI might provide a platform for integrating knowledge from several paradigms. SI is pragmatic and has a history of assimilating knowledge produced in other communities. Some of the leading figures in SSSI emphasize this pragmatism as a constructive way to integrate knowledge from different fields and paradigms. In my humble opinion, in comparison to its initial stages, SI has moved strongly towards the side of the humanist paradigms. However, in my own practice, I still haven't achieved this. When I go interpretative, I move into an intellectual world that follows its own logic and doesn't connect that readily with Historic Materialism. One major problem is that when I immerse in SI or other humanistic paradigm texts, I intuitively adjust my scientific norms, criteria, and objectives, and have hard time accepting knowledge from the objectivist paradigms. One of the problems is that different paradigms focus on different objects of study, different aspects, and different topics. They use different rationality and ways of thinking and expressing, leading to terminological conundrums and risks of misinterpretation. I am interested to see how others do that. I use activity theory as a methodology and depend to a large degree on the current accomplishments of our community. I cannot afford to put all my time in advancing activity research, although periodically I feel pressed to engage in such projects in order to support my focal research. If no one has done it, I have to do it, or I should simply stop my core project till better times. Best wishes, Lubo From: Greg Thompson [mailto:greg.a.thompson@gmail.com] Sent: Saturday, August 17, 2013 1:36 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity; Mart?n John Packer; Lubomir Savov Popov Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities Antti and other inter-Actants, I think that the notion of sensory fabric in an observational study of naturally occurring interactions is NOT too far fetched. Seems like something like this is absolutely needed. And I'd be interested to hear how you would plan to use Goodwin's Professional Vision article - it is a personal favorite (so maybe offline if others aren't interested). Also, Antti, in your work, I like your attention to the role of the physical body in making frames. (see also John Rae on body posture and framing, e.g. see: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1207/S15327973RLSI34-2_4#.Ug7fiJLiiM4 and maybe more central in this regard is Adam Kendon's work on body posture). I might add to this that Goffman speaks of the way in which motivations are, to a certain extent, entailed by frames (yes, "to a certain extent" - this does not mean the frames determine them!). Thus, frames bring with them motivational relevancies as much as individuals do! We could speak of the way that frames create certain affordances that solicit various types of behavior (whether "cognitive", "emotional", or some other emically named type). When we are in certain types of interactions, it suddenly becomes possible to feel a certain way that one couldn't otherwise have felt. Similarly, one can be a head taller than oneself when in certain interactions. And, conversely, one can find oneself becoming quite smaller in others! I think that this role of context is important and can be easily overlooked if you start from the motives of individuals. In addition to Goffman, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty also point in this direction with their notions of "calling forth" and "affordances/solicitations", respectively. These approaches to understanding people result in a reduction of the perceived agency of the individual (and hence a reduced role for intentionality, motive, and even conscious reflection), and I think many people often chafe at these ideas (esp. in American where the individual is king! Sovereign Lords - all of us!). But, imho, there is still an agent in all of these accounts - perhaps a bit smaller than in other accounts, but present nonetheless. And, as the phenomenologists like to say, this account is truer to the phenomena. [and I don't know whether this is relevant or not, but it seems to me that this account accords well with my reading of Marx]. At the end of the day, I think the central issue that all of this turns on is our ontology of the mental. Phenomenologists like to suggest that others subscribe to "a myth of the mental" (see Hubert Dreyfus's paper The Return of the Myth of the Mental: http://www.sjsu.edu/people/anand.vaidya/courses/c2/s1/The_Return_Myth_Mental_Dreyfus-1.pdf). This is a pervasive belief and perhaps there is some justification for it, but I happen to find the phenomenologists' position compelling. I further wonder if CHAT tends to subscribe to the myth of the mental? Do our concepts of concepts involve reifications of mental processes that perhaps are not warranted? If the phenomenologists' position hold water, and admittedly it's a lot of water to swallow, then the question is really Lubomir's question of whether or not CHAT can integrate other perspectives, here the phenomenological perspective (and it seems like some say yes, some say no), or whether you will necessarily have to go somewhere else to get that perspective. So, is this an ontological commitment of CHAT? Can there be some middle ground? It seems like Shotter and others (e.g., Martin Packer here on XMCA) have been marking out this space, but perhaps what remains to be seen is whether or not this space falls within the bounds of CHAT. Who decides that? -greg On Fri, Aug 16, 2013 at 6:21 AM, Antti Rajala > wrote: Greg, Thanks for inviting me to the discussion and for your nice introduction to Goffman's work. I indeed found these reflections about the relationships between Goffman and AT very useful. My project in which I am considering using Goffman's concept of frame together with Leontjev's theory of activity is still at a very initial stage (I had to postpone this project for a while to engage in another project meanwhile). My take into the discussion is that I am interested to analyze sensory aspects of students' actions (of observing birds) in bird-watching school fieldtrip. Like Larry, I have previously worked with concepts of personal sense and meaning, and now I found very interesting Leontjev's explication of the structure of consciousness in terms of three dialectically interrelated elements (or moments), personal sense, meaning, and sensory fabric. Yet, Leontiev seems not to have written much that would help me to analyze embodied interactions from video. I think that I need to incorporate concepts from elsewhere to capture the evolving moment-to-moment interactions. Here, I was turning to Goffman's frame analysis, and the work of his students M. and C. Goodwin may be interesting, too. I have talked to many colleagues in CHAT and so far everyone has encouraged me to explore the connections between frames and Leontiev (even though a lot of work needs to be done). In this connection, I found interesting Lubomir's opinion of the incompatibility between the two. I add Gutierrez to Greg's list of scholars who connect Goffman and Leontiev. Gutierrez and colleagues have used defined their well-known notion of script in terms of the notion of frame. In their article (1995, Script, counterscript and underlife in the classroom; http://lchc.ucsd.edu/mca/Paper/kris.pdf) they write: "Nevertheless, the teacher's script is hardly interrupted by student re-keyings, his script (or "frame" in Goffman's terms) has ..." (p. 460). Gutierrez and colleagues also use other Goffman's concepts such as keying and underlife. One connection to Greg's reflection about motives and frames. To me, it seems that there are some connections between the notions of personal sense and framing. "Sense expresses the relation of motive of activity to immediate goal of action" (Leontiev, 1978, p. 171). For a participant of an activity, explication of this relation between motive and goal seems to amount to asking: "what it is that is going on here?", that is, what is the frame? I would also like to ask the list, if you think that involving the notion of sensory fabric in an observational study of naturally occuring interactions is too far fetched. After all, Leontiev's own studies employed exprimental research methods. I am considering dropping Leontiev altogether and use work like Goodwin's professional vision instead. Antti On Thu, Aug 15, 2013 at 6:22 PM, Larry Purss > wrote: > Andy, > I was hoping you could elaborate on the two terms *modes* and *archeTYPES* > when discussing collaboration within projects [activities] > *modes* seem related to *models* *media* *medium* *mediation*. > *Actions* when *operationalized* are ALWAYS WITHIN modes of collaboration. > What phenomena are not included within human processes that are beyond > activities? > Shotter, exploring social life says, > "different people in different positions at different moments live in > different realities." > In other words "reality" we must re-think "reality" as being > differentiated, consisting in different regions and moments all with > different properties to these realities. > Shotter adds, > "WE can begin to think of social reality at large as a turbulent flow of > continuous social activity, containing within it [reality] two BASIC KINDS > of activity: > 1] a set of relatively stable centers of well ordered, self-reproducing > activity sustained by those WITHIN them being accountable to each other for > their actions ... - but with the forms of justification used being > themselves open to contest (Billig, McIntyre) > 2] with these diverse regions or moments of institutionalized order being > separated from each other by zones of much more disorderly, unaccountable, > chaotic activity. > It is in these unaccountable, marginal regions - on the edge of chaos, away > from the orderly centers of social life - that the events of interest to us > occur" > > Shotter is suggesting the *models* we specify to help us understand the > uncertainty, vagueness, and ambiguity [REAL features of much of the world > in which we live] influence the nature of our future lives together. > > To return to collaboration operating WITHIN *modes* [as archeTYPES]. The 3 > types [master/servant - customer/provider - and collaboration per se]. Can > *we* through *education* develop *dis-positions* which *turn* away from the > first two archetypes and *turn* towards collaboration per se? Can we also > through education envision a turn towards the *interhuman* as a *model* > that is a general archetype for understanding collaboration per se? > Is Shotter's composition of two basic KINDS of activity [sedimented and > disorderly] helpful in understanding community forming within types or > modes of communication [collaboration]. > > I struggle with the ambivalence of *addressing* my audience. This is a CHAT > forum and I have a tendency to *turn* the conversation. I will close by > re-focusing on the dialectic of meaning and *sense*. > Sense involves [revolves?] perception AND action mediated THROUGH felt > experience. I believe Shotter's conVERSEational "realities* as > collaborations per se may contribute to our interhuman understandings as a > way to turn away from master/slave and customer/provider activity settings. > Larry > Larry > > > > Thanks Andy > On Wed, Aug 14, 2013 at 7:14 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > > Two things Greg. > > > > Firstly, most definitely the caddy and the player are involved in the > same > > project or activity. Self-evidently. Each are also involved in other > > activities, and reflecting on these other activities may shed light on > how > > they come to be collaborating in the shared project of the player's game. > > Like master and servant, people always collaborate in a particular mode. > > The archetypes of these modes of collaboration are master-servant, > > customer-provider and collaboration per se. It is important to recognise > > these different modes of collaboration because otherwise we tend to force > > *all* collaboration into the same mode, which may cause us to misconstrue > > some relations. The fact that different participants have different > social > > positions within a project means that they each are bound by different > > sides of the same norms. That is, the norms of meaning, belief and action > > prevailing in the project mandate different meanings, beliefs and actions > > for different participants. The tensions arising from these asymmetrical > > relationships is one of the motors of change. > > > > Secondly, no, projects do not exist *between* persons, persons exist > > *between* projects. This is just another effort by you, Greg, to make the > > unit of analysis the individual person. The relevants units of analysis > of > > Activity Theory are operation, action and activity. :) > > > > Andy > > > > Greg Thompson wrote: > > > >> ... > >> > >> > >> "Motive" seems a slippery concept to rest too much on. Andy I'm > wondering > >> how you answer the question you put to Roland, namely whether or not > master > >> and slave are participating in the same activity/project? Or, what > about a > >> golfer and caddy? And so on down to, as Phillip and Carol point out - > the > >> different participants in a discussion on XMCA. > >> > >> ... > >> > >> > >> Goffman's answer is interesting in that he doesn't rely on the motives > >> (motivational relevancies) of the participants, but rather creates a > notion > >> of the local context as a "frame" that exists somewhere between > >> participants. No one person can dictate the frame (even dictators have > to > >> deal with the possibility of duplicitousness - the word with a > side-wards > >> glance - hence irony is a powerful weapon of the weak - even if James > Scott > >> didn't recognize this, Bakhtin clearly did). Frames emerge as > participants > >> take parts in the unfolding play of some event or happening, and, to a > >> certain extent, without regard to alignment of the motives of the > >> participants. Every once in a while the motives of all participants > create > >> a frame may be relatively closely aligned, but it seems much more common > >> that frames are built out of a plethora of motives. > >> > >> > > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Visiting Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sat Aug 17 13:44:31 2013 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Sat, 17 Aug 2013 13:44:31 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> <520444BA.2000808@mira.net> <520460F0.5030506@mira.net> <19E63C50-A0D2-4A0F-BBA7-63853414FDAA@gmail.com> <4195A368-C7B9-4AB0-AAA5-A244135DC331@gmail.com> <520ADCDD.9000406@mira.net> <520C3970.6000803@mira.net> Message-ID: Greg, I fully endorse the *felt* understanding of this post. You have summarized the possibility of integrating phenomenological accounts into CHAT. My understanding of *phenomenology* is the focus on *givenness* Husserl tried to locate *givenness within perception. Others try to locate *givenness in action. Still others try to locate *givenness* in events [beyond agency] My reading of phenomenology is they are now giving accounts of *as* [something as something else] as *givenness*. This reading *turns* the conversation to how we compose accounts as given. Greg, an side the word sovereign comes from *superannus* so Freud may have been articulating a type of character formation which made *common* sense* in Vienna at the turn of the 19th century to the 20th. I also see a place for an *agency* that is partially intentional and also an agency within *frames* or *windows* Phenomenology is NOT grounded in perception which is a secondary or derived phenomena. It is not grounded in language. It is *grounded* in *AS* phenomena. Moving back to *meaning* & *sense* which is central to our accounts. Meaning AS *objects* is one account. Meaning as *affinities* is an alternative account. WITHIN affinities the participants speak FROM WITHIN common accounts [Shotter] He is participating in developing a rhetorical-RESPONSIVE psychology which he calls psychology AS *joint action* His turning to Vygotsky to extend his psychology may be helpful in response to your proposal [and question] Shorter wrote: In shifting debates in psychology to the nature of our psychological nature Vygostky focused on accounts AS *instructive* In Shotter's words, "I want to call upon aspects of Vygotsky's important account of words AS *psychological tools or instruments* Words function in this instrumental fashion when, for instance, others make use of various FORMS of talk, to draw our attention to featurs of our circumstances that otherwise would escape our notice, or, how to conduct ourselves in certain circumstances; they can instruct us in HOW to manage or organize our WAYS OF perceiving and acting. AS Vygotsky [1978:32] comments, in learning to coordinate their actions linguistically with those around them, "the child begins to PERCEIVE the world not only through his eyes but also THROUGH his speech." Shorter adds, Vygotsky goes on to show how the ways in which others first verbally instruct us, can later become our own; AS they verbally instructed us, so we can come to verbally come to instruct ourselves. [in Conversational Realities:35] Greg, if phenomenology is seen as not privileging perception AS GIVEN [a fallacy] but rather positing {as} as *givenness* then their may be a way to link phenomenology as currently understood [not as Husserl posited perception AS *given*] This *turns* to Vygotsky exploring *sense* AS perception & action MEDIATED THROUGH FELT experience[as Dewey understood experience] FELT experience is the medium through which perception & action are mediated. Greg, I am not sure if this is clarifying [or confusing] your proposal. *Boundary objects* as liminal and dynamic WITHIN felt *frames* as showing *agency* Larry On Sat, Aug 17, 2013 at 10:36 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Antti and other inter-Actants, > I think that the notion of sensory fabric in an observational study of > naturally occurring interactions is NOT too far fetched. Seems like > something like this is absolutely needed. And I'd be interested to hear how > you would plan to use Goodwin's Professional Vision article - it is a > personal favorite (so maybe offline if others aren't interested). > > Also, Antti, in your work, I like your attention to the role of the > physical body in making frames. > (see also John Rae on body posture and framing, e.g. see: > http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1207/S15327973RLSI34-2_4#.Ug7fiJLiiM4and > maybe more central in this regard is Adam Kendon's work on body posture). > > I might add to this that Goffman speaks of the way in which motivations > are, to a certain extent, entailed by frames (yes, "to a certain extent" - > this does not mean the frames determine them!). Thus, frames bring with > them motivational relevancies as much as individuals do! > > We could speak of the way that frames create certain affordances that > solicit various types of behavior (whether "cognitive", "emotional", or > some other emically named type). When we are in certain types of > interactions, it suddenly becomes possible to *feel* a certain way that one > couldn't otherwise have felt. Similarly, one can be a head taller than > oneself when in certain interactions. And, conversely, one can find oneself > becoming quite smaller in others! > > I think that this role of context is important and can be easily overlooked > if you start from the motives of individuals. > > In addition to Goffman, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty also point in this > direction with their notions of "calling forth" and > "affordances/solicitations", respectively. These approaches to > understanding people result in a reduction of the perceived agency of the > individual (and hence a reduced role for intentionality, motive, and even > conscious reflection), and I think many people often chafe at these ideas > (esp. in American where the individual is king! Sovereign Lords - all of > us!). > > But, imho, there is still an agent in all of these accounts - perhaps a bit > smaller than in other accounts, but present nonetheless. And, as the > phenomenologists like to say, this account is truer to the phenomena. [and > I don't know whether this is relevant or not, but it seems to me that this > account accords well with my reading of Marx]. > > At the end of the day, I think the central issue that all of this turns on > is our ontology of *the mental*. Phenomenologists like to suggest that > others subscribe to "a myth of the mental" (see Hubert Dreyfus's paper The > Return of the Myth of the Mental: > > http://www.sjsu.edu/people/anand.vaidya/courses/c2/s1/The_Return_Myth_Mental_Dreyfus-1.pdf > ). > This is a pervasive belief and perhaps there is some justification for it, > but I happen to find the phenomenologists' position compelling. I further > wonder if CHAT tends to subscribe to the myth of the mental? Do our > concepts of concepts involve reifications of mental processes that perhaps > are not warranted? > > If the phenomenologists' position hold water, and admittedly it's a lot of > water to swallow, then the question is really Lubomir's question of whether > or not CHAT can integrate other perspectives, here the phenomenological > perspective (and it seems like some say yes, some say no), or whether you > will necessarily have to go somewhere else to get that perspective. So, is > this an ontological commitment of CHAT? Can there be some middle ground? > > It seems like Shotter and others (e.g., Martin Packer here on XMCA) have > been marking out this space, but perhaps what remains to be seen is whether > or not this space falls within > the bounds of CHAT. > Who decides that? > -greg > > > > On Fri, Aug 16, 2013 at 6:21 AM, Antti Rajala wrote: > > > Greg, > > > > Thanks for inviting me to the discussion and for your nice introduction > to > > Goffman's work. I indeed found these reflections about the relationships > > between Goffman and AT very useful. My project in which I am considering > > using Goffman's concept of frame together with Leontjev's theory of > > activity is still at a very initial stage (I had to postpone this project > > for a while to engage in another project meanwhile). > > > > My take into the discussion is that I am interested to analyze sensory > > aspects of students' actions (of observing birds) in bird-watching school > > fieldtrip. Like Larry, I have previously worked with concepts of personal > > sense and meaning, and now I found very interesting Leontjev's > explication > > of the structure of consciousness in terms of three dialectically > > interrelated elements (or moments), personal sense, meaning, and sensory > > fabric. Yet, Leontiev seems not to have written much that would help me > to > > analyze embodied interactions from video. I think that I need to > > incorporate concepts from elsewhere to capture the evolving > > moment-to-moment interactions. Here, I was turning to Goffman's frame > > analysis, and the work of his students M. and C. Goodwin may be > > interesting, too. > > > > I have talked to many colleagues in CHAT and so far everyone has > encouraged > > me to explore the connections between frames and Leontiev (even though a > > lot of work needs to be done). In this connection, I found interesting > > Lubomir's opinion of the incompatibility between the two. I add Gutierrez > > to Greg's list of scholars who connect Goffman and Leontiev. > > > > Gutierrez and colleagues have used defined their well-known notion of > > script in terms of the notion of frame. In their article (1995, Script, > > counterscript and underlife in the classroom; > > http://lchc.ucsd.edu/mca/Paper/kris.pdf) they write: "Nevertheless, the > > teacher's script is hardly interrupted by student re-keyings, his script > > (or "frame" in Goffman's terms) has ..." (p. 460). Gutierrez and > colleagues > > also use other Goffman's concepts such as keying and underlife. > > > > One connection to Greg's reflection about motives and frames. To me, it > > seems that there are some connections between the notions of personal > sense > > and framing. "Sense expresses the relation of motive of activity to > > immediate goal of action" (Leontiev, 1978, p. 171). For a participant of > an > > activity, explication of this relation between motive and goal seems to > > amount to asking: "what it is that is going on here?", that is, what is > the > > frame? > > > > I would also like to ask the list, if you think that involving the notion > > of sensory fabric in an observational study of naturally occuring > > interactions is too far fetched. After all, Leontiev's own studies > employed > > exprimental research methods. I am considering dropping Leontiev > altogether > > and use work like Goodwin's professional vision instead. > > > > Antti > > > > > > On Thu, Aug 15, 2013 at 6:22 PM, Larry Purss > wrote: > > > > > Andy, > > > I was hoping you could elaborate on the two terms *modes* and > > *archeTYPES* > > > when discussing collaboration within projects [activities] > > > *modes* seem related to *models* *media* *medium* *mediation*. > > > *Actions* when *operationalized* are ALWAYS WITHIN modes of > > collaboration. > > > What phenomena are not included within human processes that are beyond > > > activities? > > > Shotter, exploring social life says, > > > "different people in different positions at different moments live in > > > different realities." > > > In other words "reality" we must re-think "reality" as being > > > differentiated, consisting in different regions and moments all with > > > different properties to these realities. > > > Shotter adds, > > > "WE can begin to think of social reality at large as a turbulent flow > of > > > continuous social activity, containing within it [reality] two BASIC > > KINDS > > > of activity: > > > 1] a set of relatively stable centers of well ordered, self-reproducing > > > activity sustained by those WITHIN them being accountable to each other > > for > > > their actions ... - but with the forms of justification used being > > > themselves open to contest (Billig, McIntyre) > > > 2] with these diverse regions or moments of institutionalized order > being > > > separated from each other by zones of much more disorderly, > > unaccountable, > > > chaotic activity. > > > It is in these unaccountable, marginal regions - on the edge of chaos, > > away > > > from the orderly centers of social life - that the events of interest > to > > us > > > occur" > > > > > > Shotter is suggesting the *models* we specify to help us understand the > > > uncertainty, vagueness, and ambiguity [REAL features of much of the > world > > > in which we live] influence the nature of our future lives together. > > > > > > To return to collaboration operating WITHIN *modes* [as archeTYPES]. > The > > 3 > > > types [master/servant - customer/provider - and collaboration per se]. > > Can > > > *we* through *education* develop *dis-positions* which *turn* away from > > the > > > first two archetypes and *turn* towards collaboration per se? Can we > also > > > through education envision a turn towards the *interhuman* as a *model* > > > that is a general archetype for understanding collaboration per se? > > > Is Shotter's composition of two basic KINDS of activity [sedimented and > > > disorderly] helpful in understanding community forming within types or > > > modes of communication [collaboration]. > > > > > > I struggle with the ambivalence of *addressing* my audience. This is a > > CHAT > > > forum and I have a tendency to *turn* the conversation. I will close > by > > > re-focusing on the dialectic of meaning and *sense*. > > > Sense involves [revolves?] perception AND action mediated THROUGH felt > > > experience. I believe Shotter's conVERSEational "realities* as > > > collaborations per se may contribute to our interhuman understandings > as > > a > > > way to turn away from master/slave and customer/provider activity > > settings. > > > Larry > > > Larry > > > > > > > > > > > > Thanks Andy > > > On Wed, Aug 14, 2013 at 7:14 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > > > > > > Two things Greg. > > > > > > > > Firstly, most definitely the caddy and the player are involved in the > > > same > > > > project or activity. Self-evidently. Each are also involved in other > > > > activities, and reflecting on these other activities may shed light > on > > > how > > > > they come to be collaborating in the shared project of the player's > > game. > > > > Like master and servant, people always collaborate in a particular > > mode. > > > > The archetypes of these modes of collaboration are master-servant, > > > > customer-provider and collaboration per se. It is important to > > recognise > > > > these different modes of collaboration because otherwise we tend to > > force > > > > *all* collaboration into the same mode, which may cause us to > > misconstrue > > > > some relations. The fact that different participants have different > > > social > > > > positions within a project means that they each are bound by > different > > > > sides of the same norms. That is, the norms of meaning, belief and > > action > > > > prevailing in the project mandate different meanings, beliefs and > > actions > > > > for different participants. The tensions arising from these > > asymmetrical > > > > relationships is one of the motors of change. > > > > > > > > Secondly, no, projects do not exist *between* persons, persons exist > > > > *between* projects. This is just another effort by you, Greg, to make > > the > > > > unit of analysis the individual person. The relevants units of > analysis > > > of > > > > Activity Theory are operation, action and activity. :) > > > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > > > Greg Thompson wrote: > > > > > > > >> ... > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> "Motive" seems a slippery concept to rest too much on. Andy I'm > > > wondering > > > >> how you answer the question you put to Roland, namely whether or not > > > master > > > >> and slave are participating in the same activity/project? Or, what > > > about a > > > >> golfer and caddy? And so on down to, as Phillip and Carol point out > - > > > the > > > >> different participants in a discussion on XMCA. > > > >> > > > >> ... > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> Goffman's answer is interesting in that he doesn't rely on the > motives > > > >> (motivational relevancies) of the participants, but rather creates a > > > notion > > > >> of the local context as a "frame" that exists somewhere between > > > >> participants. No one person can dictate the frame (even dictators > have > > > to > > > >> deal with the possibility of duplicitousness - the word with a > > > side-wards > > > >> glance - hence irony is a powerful weapon of the weak - even if > James > > > Scott > > > >> didn't recognize this, Bakhtin clearly did). Frames emerge as > > > participants > > > >> take parts in the unfolding play of some event or happening, and, > to a > > > >> certain extent, without regard to alignment of the motives of the > > > >> participants. Every once in a while the motives of all participants > > > create > > > >> a frame may be relatively closely aligned, but it seems much more > > common > > > >> that frames are built out of a plethora of motives. > > > >> > > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Visiting Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Sat Aug 17 15:18:53 2013 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Sat, 17 Aug 2013 23:18:53 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mystery progressive educator? In-Reply-To: <6A508340-CDE3-4840-BC07-8B3AB025CE98@uniandes.edu.co> References: <20130817192444.5415055.78491.2299@ucdenver.edu> <6A508340-CDE3-4840-BC07-8B3AB025CE98@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Most of the discord is in the terms rather than the meaning, I think. For me, the main problem is his "simple to complex", I would say, rather, "the simple within the complex". Given the importance of the introduction to problems, "self evolution" hardly seems appropriate. Presumably "instruction" had a fairly unambiguous meaning in the 19th century. But I don't think things have changed that much. But this continues to be a thought provoking puzzle: to the degree that a student is guided, they are not exercising their own skill in orienting to the task. Spencer, it seems, is suggesting guidance is best resumed when the student loses their appreciation for the task. So where do we locate the tenacity to accommodate unresolved problems etc? But then Spencer was a philosopher, which locates him amongst those who chose thinking as a way of life... I recall reading recently that the development of personality was acknowledged by Danish legislative governance for education. In reading Davydov it seems he had considerable success in raising a population of students who were doing something resembling intensive thinking... But for those who do not value thought etc. in quite the same way, schooling provides a different, more immediate, need. It seems to me that in all forms of instruction the question is implicated -- what kind of development (personality) am I working with/ supporting? Huw On 17 August 2013 20:47, Martin John Packer wrote: > Who also coined "the survival of the fittest," so perhaps it's no great > surprise. > > Martin > > On Aug 17, 2013, at 2:24 PM, "White, Phillip" > wrote: > > > > > Even earlier, Herbert Spencer, 1870's. > > > > Phillip > > > > Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone. > > From: Peter Smagorinsky > > Sent: Saturday, August 17, 2013 12:54 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Reply To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mystery progressive educator? > > > > > > And, in 1896, http://www.gutenberg.org/files/20513/20513-h/20513-h.htm > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Peter Smagorinsky > > Sent: Saturday, August 17, 2013 2:48 PM > > To: lchcmike@gmail.com; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mystery progressive educator? > > > > > http://archive.org/stream/teachingoforalen00bolerich/teachingoforalen00bolerich_djvu.txtincludes the quote as its framing perspective, so it must have impressed a > few people. Note that the book is from 1914, the year before Vygotsky began > his work on The Psychology of Art. > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole > > Sent: Saturday, August 17, 2013 1:30 PM > > To: xmca-l@ucsd.edu > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Mystery progressive educator? > > > > Ran across the following interesting statement by accident and was > surprised a little at the authorship. I thought others might be interested > in it as well. I'll leave off authorship because part of what I found > interesting was in figuring out who it was. > > > > > > mike > > --------------- > > > > Children should be led to make their own investigations, and to draw > this won inferences. They should to *told* as little as possible, and > indeed to *discover *as much as possible. Humanity has progressed solely by > self-instruction; > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sat Aug 17 19:15:16 2013 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Sat, 17 Aug 2013 19:15:16 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> <520444BA.2000808@mira.net> <520460F0.5030506@mira.net> <19E63C50-A0D2-4A0F-BBA7-63853414FDAA@gmail.com> <4195A368-C7B9-4AB0-AAA5-A244135DC331@gmail.com> <520ADCDD.9000406@mira.net> <520C3970.6000803@mira.net> Message-ID: Here are two excerpts from Thought and Language which may support Greg's proposal. "A word acquires its sense from the context in which it appears.; in different contexts it changes its sense. Meaning remains stable throughout the changes of sense The dictionary meaning of a word is no more than a stone in the edifice of sense; no more than a potentiality that finds diversified REALIZATION in speech."[245] Here is another more specific excerpt to support Greg's proposal. "Thought is not merely expressed in words; it comes into EXISTENCE THROUGH them. Every thought tends to connect SOMETHING WITH SOMETHING else, to establish a relation between things." [218] In my reading of these two excerpts I experience a family resemblance with the basic *givenness* of phenomenology that thought comes into existence within *AS* structure. [something AS something else] Greg invites us to consider some *affinities* between these alternativeways of talking [which may make common *sense*] in developing the "edifice of sense* Sense AS including both perception and action mediated through *felt* existence. Phenomenology uses the language of primordial givenness [which may as a term for historical reasons produce reaction rather than resonance]. Larry On Sat, Aug 17, 2013 at 1:44 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > Greg, > I fully endorse the *felt* understanding of this post. > You have summarized the possibility of integrating phenomenological > accounts into CHAT. > My understanding of *phenomenology* is the focus on *givenness* > Husserl tried to locate *givenness within perception. Others try to locate > *givenness in action. Still others try to locate *givenness* in events > [beyond agency] > My reading of phenomenology is they are now giving accounts of *as* > [something as something else] as *givenness*. > This reading *turns* the conversation to how we compose accounts as given. > Greg, an side the word sovereign comes from *superannus* so Freud may have > been articulating a type of character formation which made *common* sense* > in Vienna at the turn of the 19th century to the 20th. > > I also see a place for an *agency* that is partially intentional and also > an agency within *frames* or *windows* > > Phenomenology is NOT grounded in perception which is a secondary or > derived phenomena. > It is not grounded in language. > It is *grounded* in *AS* phenomena. > > Moving back to *meaning* & *sense* which is central to our accounts. > Meaning AS *objects* is one account. Meaning as *affinities* is an > alternative account. WITHIN affinities the participants speak FROM WITHIN > common accounts [Shotter] > He is participating in developing a rhetorical-RESPONSIVE psychology which > he calls psychology AS *joint action* > > His turning to Vygotsky to extend his psychology may be helpful in > response to your proposal [and question] > Shorter wrote: > In shifting debates in psychology to the nature of our psychological > nature Vygostky focused on accounts AS *instructive* > In Shotter's words, > "I want to call upon aspects of Vygotsky's important account of words AS > *psychological tools or instruments* Words function in this instrumental > fashion when, for instance, others make use of various FORMS of talk, to > draw our attention to featurs of our circumstances that otherwise would > escape our notice, or, how to conduct ourselves in certain circumstances; > they can instruct us in HOW to manage or organize our WAYS OF perceiving > and acting. AS Vygotsky [1978:32] comments, in learning to coordinate their > actions linguistically with those around them, "the child begins to > PERCEIVE the world not only through his eyes but also THROUGH his speech." > Shorter adds, > Vygotsky goes on to show how the ways in which others first verbally > instruct us, can later become our own; AS they verbally instructed us, so > we can come to verbally come to instruct ourselves. > [in Conversational Realities:35] > > Greg, if phenomenology is seen as not privileging perception AS GIVEN [a > fallacy] but rather positing {as} as *givenness* then their may be a way to > link phenomenology as currently understood [not as Husserl posited > perception AS *given*] > > This *turns* to Vygotsky exploring *sense* AS perception & action MEDIATED > THROUGH FELT experience[as Dewey understood experience] > > FELT experience is the medium through which perception & action are > mediated. > > Greg, I am not sure if this is clarifying [or confusing] your proposal. > *Boundary objects* as liminal and dynamic WITHIN felt *frames* as showing > *agency* > Larry > > > > > On Sat, Aug 17, 2013 at 10:36 AM, Greg Thompson > wrote: > >> Antti and other inter-Actants, >> I think that the notion of sensory fabric in an observational study of >> naturally occurring interactions is NOT too far fetched. Seems like >> something like this is absolutely needed. And I'd be interested to hear >> how >> you would plan to use Goodwin's Professional Vision article - it is a >> personal favorite (so maybe offline if others aren't interested). >> >> Also, Antti, in your work, I like your attention to the role of the >> physical body in making frames. >> (see also John Rae on body posture and framing, e.g. see: >> >> http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1207/S15327973RLSI34-2_4#.Ug7fiJLiiM4and >> maybe more central in this regard is Adam Kendon's work on body posture). >> >> I might add to this that Goffman speaks of the way in which motivations >> are, to a certain extent, entailed by frames (yes, "to a certain extent" - >> this does not mean the frames determine them!). Thus, frames bring with >> them motivational relevancies as much as individuals do! >> >> We could speak of the way that frames create certain affordances that >> solicit various types of behavior (whether "cognitive", "emotional", or >> some other emically named type). When we are in certain types of >> interactions, it suddenly becomes possible to *feel* a certain way that >> one >> couldn't otherwise have felt. Similarly, one can be a head taller than >> oneself when in certain interactions. And, conversely, one can find >> oneself >> becoming quite smaller in others! >> >> I think that this role of context is important and can be easily >> overlooked >> if you start from the motives of individuals. >> >> In addition to Goffman, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty also point in this >> direction with their notions of "calling forth" and >> "affordances/solicitations", respectively. These approaches to >> understanding people result in a reduction of the perceived agency of the >> individual (and hence a reduced role for intentionality, motive, and even >> conscious reflection), and I think many people often chafe at these ideas >> (esp. in American where the individual is king! Sovereign Lords - all of >> us!). >> >> But, imho, there is still an agent in all of these accounts - perhaps a >> bit >> smaller than in other accounts, but present nonetheless. And, as the >> phenomenologists like to say, this account is truer to the phenomena. [and >> I don't know whether this is relevant or not, but it seems to me that this >> account accords well with my reading of Marx]. >> >> At the end of the day, I think the central issue that all of this turns on >> is our ontology of *the mental*. Phenomenologists like to suggest that >> others subscribe to "a myth of the mental" (see Hubert Dreyfus's paper The >> Return of the Myth of the Mental: >> >> http://www.sjsu.edu/people/anand.vaidya/courses/c2/s1/The_Return_Myth_Mental_Dreyfus-1.pdf >> ). >> This is a pervasive belief and perhaps there is some justification for it, >> but I happen to find the phenomenologists' position compelling. I further >> wonder if CHAT tends to subscribe to the myth of the mental? Do our >> concepts of concepts involve reifications of mental processes that perhaps >> are not warranted? >> >> If the phenomenologists' position hold water, and admittedly it's a lot of >> water to swallow, then the question is really Lubomir's question of >> whether >> or not CHAT can integrate other perspectives, here the phenomenological >> perspective (and it seems like some say yes, some say no), or whether you >> will necessarily have to go somewhere else to get that perspective. So, is >> this an ontological commitment of CHAT? Can there be some middle ground? >> >> It seems like Shotter and others (e.g., Martin Packer here on XMCA) have >> been marking out this space, but perhaps what remains to be seen is >> whether >> or not this space falls within >> the bounds of CHAT. >> Who decides that? >> -greg >> >> >> >> On Fri, Aug 16, 2013 at 6:21 AM, Antti Rajala wrote: >> >> > Greg, >> > >> > Thanks for inviting me to the discussion and for your nice introduction >> to >> > Goffman's work. I indeed found these reflections about the relationships >> > between Goffman and AT very useful. My project in which I am considering >> > using Goffman's concept of frame together with Leontjev's theory of >> > activity is still at a very initial stage (I had to postpone this >> project >> > for a while to engage in another project meanwhile). >> > >> > My take into the discussion is that I am interested to analyze sensory >> > aspects of students' actions (of observing birds) in bird-watching >> school >> > fieldtrip. Like Larry, I have previously worked with concepts of >> personal >> > sense and meaning, and now I found very interesting Leontjev's >> explication >> > of the structure of consciousness in terms of three dialectically >> > interrelated elements (or moments), personal sense, meaning, and sensory >> > fabric. Yet, Leontiev seems not to have written much that would help me >> to >> > analyze embodied interactions from video. I think that I need to >> > incorporate concepts from elsewhere to capture the evolving >> > moment-to-moment interactions. Here, I was turning to Goffman's frame >> > analysis, and the work of his students M. and C. Goodwin may be >> > interesting, too. >> > >> > I have talked to many colleagues in CHAT and so far everyone has >> encouraged >> > me to explore the connections between frames and Leontiev (even though a >> > lot of work needs to be done). In this connection, I found interesting >> > Lubomir's opinion of the incompatibility between the two. I add >> Gutierrez >> > to Greg's list of scholars who connect Goffman and Leontiev. >> > >> > Gutierrez and colleagues have used defined their well-known notion of >> > script in terms of the notion of frame. In their article (1995, Script, >> > counterscript and underlife in the classroom; >> > http://lchc.ucsd.edu/mca/Paper/kris.pdf) they write: "Nevertheless, the >> > teacher's script is hardly interrupted by student re-keyings, his script >> > (or "frame" in Goffman's terms) has ..." (p. 460). Gutierrez and >> colleagues >> > also use other Goffman's concepts such as keying and underlife. >> > >> > One connection to Greg's reflection about motives and frames. To me, it >> > seems that there are some connections between the notions of personal >> sense >> > and framing. "Sense expresses the relation of motive of activity to >> > immediate goal of action" (Leontiev, 1978, p. 171). For a participant >> of an >> > activity, explication of this relation between motive and goal seems to >> > amount to asking: "what it is that is going on here?", that is, what is >> the >> > frame? >> > >> > I would also like to ask the list, if you think that involving the >> notion >> > of sensory fabric in an observational study of naturally occuring >> > interactions is too far fetched. After all, Leontiev's own studies >> employed >> > exprimental research methods. I am considering dropping Leontiev >> altogether >> > and use work like Goodwin's professional vision instead. >> > >> > Antti >> > >> > >> > On Thu, Aug 15, 2013 at 6:22 PM, Larry Purss >> wrote: >> > >> > > Andy, >> > > I was hoping you could elaborate on the two terms *modes* and >> > *archeTYPES* >> > > when discussing collaboration within projects [activities] >> > > *modes* seem related to *models* *media* *medium* *mediation*. >> > > *Actions* when *operationalized* are ALWAYS WITHIN modes of >> > collaboration. >> > > What phenomena are not included within human processes that are beyond >> > > activities? >> > > Shotter, exploring social life says, >> > > "different people in different positions at different moments live in >> > > different realities." >> > > In other words "reality" we must re-think "reality" as being >> > > differentiated, consisting in different regions and moments all with >> > > different properties to these realities. >> > > Shotter adds, >> > > "WE can begin to think of social reality at large as a turbulent flow >> of >> > > continuous social activity, containing within it [reality] two BASIC >> > KINDS >> > > of activity: >> > > 1] a set of relatively stable centers of well ordered, >> self-reproducing >> > > activity sustained by those WITHIN them being accountable to each >> other >> > for >> > > their actions ... - but with the forms of justification used being >> > > themselves open to contest (Billig, McIntyre) >> > > 2] with these diverse regions or moments of institutionalized order >> being >> > > separated from each other by zones of much more disorderly, >> > unaccountable, >> > > chaotic activity. >> > > It is in these unaccountable, marginal regions - on the edge of chaos, >> > away >> > > from the orderly centers of social life - that the events of interest >> to >> > us >> > > occur" >> > > >> > > Shotter is suggesting the *models* we specify to help us understand >> the >> > > uncertainty, vagueness, and ambiguity [REAL features of much of the >> world >> > > in which we live] influence the nature of our future lives together. >> > > >> > > To return to collaboration operating WITHIN *modes* [as archeTYPES]. >> The >> > 3 >> > > types [master/servant - customer/provider - and collaboration per se]. >> > Can >> > > *we* through *education* develop *dis-positions* which *turn* away >> from >> > the >> > > first two archetypes and *turn* towards collaboration per se? Can we >> also >> > > through education envision a turn towards the *interhuman* as a >> *model* >> > > that is a general archetype for understanding collaboration per se? >> > > Is Shotter's composition of two basic KINDS of activity [sedimented >> and >> > > disorderly] helpful in understanding community forming within types or >> > > modes of communication [collaboration]. >> > > >> > > I struggle with the ambivalence of *addressing* my audience. This is a >> > CHAT >> > > forum and I have a tendency to *turn* the conversation. I will close >> by >> > > re-focusing on the dialectic of meaning and *sense*. >> > > Sense involves [revolves?] perception AND action mediated THROUGH >> felt >> > > experience. I believe Shotter's conVERSEational "realities* as >> > > collaborations per se may contribute to our interhuman understandings >> as >> > a >> > > way to turn away from master/slave and customer/provider activity >> > settings. >> > > Larry >> > > Larry >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > Thanks Andy >> > > On Wed, Aug 14, 2013 at 7:14 PM, Andy Blunden >> wrote: >> > > >> > > > Two things Greg. >> > > > >> > > > Firstly, most definitely the caddy and the player are involved in >> the >> > > same >> > > > project or activity. Self-evidently. Each are also involved in other >> > > > activities, and reflecting on these other activities may shed light >> on >> > > how >> > > > they come to be collaborating in the shared project of the player's >> > game. >> > > > Like master and servant, people always collaborate in a particular >> > mode. >> > > > The archetypes of these modes of collaboration are master-servant, >> > > > customer-provider and collaboration per se. It is important to >> > recognise >> > > > these different modes of collaboration because otherwise we tend to >> > force >> > > > *all* collaboration into the same mode, which may cause us to >> > misconstrue >> > > > some relations. The fact that different participants have different >> > > social >> > > > positions within a project means that they each are bound by >> different >> > > > sides of the same norms. That is, the norms of meaning, belief and >> > action >> > > > prevailing in the project mandate different meanings, beliefs and >> > actions >> > > > for different participants. The tensions arising from these >> > asymmetrical >> > > > relationships is one of the motors of change. >> > > > >> > > > Secondly, no, projects do not exist *between* persons, persons exist >> > > > *between* projects. This is just another effort by you, Greg, to >> make >> > the >> > > > unit of analysis the individual person. The relevants units of >> analysis >> > > of >> > > > Activity Theory are operation, action and activity. :) >> > > > >> > > > Andy >> > > > >> > > > Greg Thompson wrote: >> > > > >> > > >> ... >> > > >> >> > > >> >> > > >> "Motive" seems a slippery concept to rest too much on. Andy I'm >> > > wondering >> > > >> how you answer the question you put to Roland, namely whether or >> not >> > > master >> > > >> and slave are participating in the same activity/project? Or, what >> > > about a >> > > >> golfer and caddy? And so on down to, as Phillip and Carol point >> out - >> > > the >> > > >> different participants in a discussion on XMCA. >> > > >> >> > > >> ... >> > > >> >> > > >> >> > > >> Goffman's answer is interesting in that he doesn't rely on the >> motives >> > > >> (motivational relevancies) of the participants, but rather creates >> a >> > > notion >> > > >> of the local context as a "frame" that exists somewhere between >> > > >> participants. No one person can dictate the frame (even dictators >> have >> > > to >> > > >> deal with the possibility of duplicitousness - the word with a >> > > side-wards >> > > >> glance - hence irony is a powerful weapon of the weak - even if >> James >> > > Scott >> > > >> didn't recognize this, Bakhtin clearly did). Frames emerge as >> > > participants >> > > >> take parts in the unfolding play of some event or happening, and, >> to a >> > > >> certain extent, without regard to alignment of the motives of the >> > > >> participants. Every once in a while the motives of all participants >> > > create >> > > >> a frame may be relatively closely aligned, but it seems much more >> > common >> > > >> that frames are built out of a plethora of motives. >> > > >> >> > > >> >> > > > >> > > > >> > > >> > >> >> >> >> -- >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. >> Visiting Assistant Professor >> Department of Anthropology >> 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower >> Brigham Young University >> Provo, UT 84602 >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson >> > > From carolmacdon@gmail.com Sun Aug 18 13:54:35 2013 From: carolmacdon@gmail.com (carolmacdon@gmail.com) Date: Sun, 18 Aug 2013 20:54:35 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mystery progressive educator? In-Reply-To: References: <20130817192444.5415055.78491.2299@ucdenver.edu> <6A508340-CDE3-4840-BC07-8B3AB025CE98@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: <1286171999-1376859269-cardhu_decombobulator_blackberry.rim.net-379191111-@b2.c11.bise7.blackberry> Hi Hugh + thread Shame on you guys. Mike gave us a genuine puzzle and we could spent happy hours surmising who this might be, and now the puzzle is flattened by google. Instant gratification! I think it is the complex within the simple, Huw? Carol Sent via my BlackBerry from Vodacom - let your email find you! -----Original Message----- From: Huw Lloyd Sender: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu Date: Sat, 17 Aug 2013 23:18:53 To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Reply-To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mystery progressive educator? Most of the discord is in the terms rather than the meaning, I think. For me, the main problem is his "simple to complex", I would say, rather, "the simple within the complex". Given the importance of the introduction to problems, "self evolution" hardly seems appropriate. Presumably "instruction" had a fairly unambiguous meaning in the 19th century. But I don't think things have changed that much. But this continues to be a thought provoking puzzle: to the degree that a student is guided, they are not exercising their own skill in orienting to the task. Spencer, it seems, is suggesting guidance is best resumed when the student loses their appreciation for the task. So where do we locate the tenacity to accommodate unresolved problems etc? But then Spencer was a philosopher, which locates him amongst those who chose thinking as a way of life... I recall reading recently that the development of personality was acknowledged by Danish legislative governance for education. In reading Davydov it seems he had considerable success in raising a population of students who were doing something resembling intensive thinking... But for those who do not value thought etc. in quite the same way, schooling provides a different, more immediate, need. It seems to me that in all forms of instruction the question is implicated -- what kind of development (personality) am I working with/ supporting? Huw On 17 August 2013 20:47, Martin John Packer wrote: > Who also coined "the survival of the fittest," so perhaps it's no great > surprise. > > Martin > > On Aug 17, 2013, at 2:24 PM, "White, Phillip" > wrote: > > > > > Even earlier, Herbert Spencer, 1870's. > > > > Phillip > > > > Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone. > > From: Peter Smagorinsky > > Sent: Saturday, August 17, 2013 12:54 PM > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Reply To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mystery progressive educator? > > > > > > And, in 1896, http://www.gutenberg.org/files/20513/20513-h/20513-h.htm > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Peter Smagorinsky > > Sent: Saturday, August 17, 2013 2:48 PM > > To: lchcmike@gmail.com; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mystery progressive educator? > > > > > http://archive.org/stream/teachingoforalen00bolerich/teachingoforalen00bolerich_djvu.txtincludes the quote as its framing perspective, so it must have impressed a > few people. Note that the book is from 1914, the year before Vygotsky began > his work on The Psychology of Art. > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole > > Sent: Saturday, August 17, 2013 1:30 PM > > To: xmca-l@ucsd.edu > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Mystery progressive educator? > > > > Ran across the following interesting statement by accident and was > surprised a little at the authorship. I thought others might be interested > in it as well. I'll leave off authorship because part of what I found > interesting was in figuring out who it was. > > > > > > mike > > --------------- > > > > Children should be led to make their own investigations, and to draw > this won inferences. They should to *told* as little as possible, and > indeed to *discover *as much as possible. Humanity has progressed solely by > self-instruction; > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Sun Aug 18 16:07:26 2013 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Mon, 19 Aug 2013 00:07:26 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mystery progressive educator? In-Reply-To: <1286171999-1376859269-cardhu_decombobulator_blackberry.rim.net-379191111-@b2.c11.bise7.blackberry> References: <20130817192444.5415055.78491.2299@ucdenver.edu> <6A508340-CDE3-4840-BC07-8B3AB025CE98@uniandes.edu.co> <1286171999-1376859269-cardhu_decombobulator_blackberry.rim.net-379191111-@b2.c11.bise7.blackberry> Message-ID: On 18 August 2013 21:54, wrote: > Hi Hugh + thread > > Shame on you guys. Mike gave us a genuine puzzle and we could spent happy > hours surmising who this might be, and now the puzzle is flattened by > google. Instant gratification! > > I think it is the complex within the simple, Huw? > Ah, I had a spatial metaphor in mind, Carol. Domain as a map. As such, one may go beyond the simple, that is carefully revealed within the complex by domain/historical analysis, to discover the complex. Huw > Carol > > Sent via my BlackBerry from Vodacom - let your email find you! > > -----Original Message----- > From: Huw Lloyd > Sender: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > Date: Sat, 17 Aug 2013 23:18:53 > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Reply-To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mystery progressive educator? > > Most of the discord is in the terms rather than the meaning, I think. > > For me, the main problem is his "simple to complex", I would say, rather, > "the simple within the complex". > > Given the importance of the introduction to problems, "self evolution" > hardly seems appropriate. Presumably "instruction" had a fairly > unambiguous meaning in the 19th century. But I don't think things have > changed that much. > > But this continues to be a thought provoking puzzle: to the degree that a > student is guided, they are not exercising their own skill in orienting to > the task. Spencer, it seems, is suggesting guidance is best resumed when > the student loses their appreciation for the task. So where do we locate > the tenacity to accommodate unresolved problems etc? > > But then Spencer was a philosopher, which locates him amongst those who > chose thinking as a way of life... > > I recall reading recently that the development of personality was > acknowledged by Danish legislative governance for education. In reading > Davydov it seems he had considerable success in raising a population of > students who were doing something resembling intensive thinking... > > But for those who do not value thought etc. in quite the same way, > schooling provides a different, more immediate, need. It seems to me that > in all forms of instruction the question is implicated -- what kind of > development (personality) am I working with/ supporting? > > Huw > > > > On 17 August 2013 20:47, Martin John Packer > wrote: > > > Who also coined "the survival of the fittest," so perhaps it's no great > > surprise. > > > > Martin > > > > On Aug 17, 2013, at 2:24 PM, "White, Phillip" < > Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu> > > wrote: > > > > > > > > Even earlier, Herbert Spencer, 1870's. > > > > > > Phillip > > > > > > Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone. > > > From: Peter Smagorinsky > > > Sent: Saturday, August 17, 2013 12:54 PM > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Reply To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mystery progressive educator? > > > > > > > > > And, in 1896, http://www.gutenberg.org/files/20513/20513-h/20513-h.htm > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Peter Smagorinsky > > > Sent: Saturday, August 17, 2013 2:48 PM > > > To: lchcmike@gmail.com; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mystery progressive educator? > > > > > > > > > http://archive.org/stream/teachingoforalen00bolerich/teachingoforalen00bolerich_djvu.txtincludesthe quote as its framing perspective, so it must have impressed a > > few people. Note that the book is from 1914, the year before Vygotsky > began > > his work on The Psychology of Art. > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole > > > Sent: Saturday, August 17, 2013 1:30 PM > > > To: xmca-l@ucsd.edu > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Mystery progressive educator? > > > > > > Ran across the following interesting statement by accident and was > > surprised a little at the authorship. I thought others might be > interested > > in it as well. I'll leave off authorship because part of what I found > > interesting was in figuring out who it was. > > > > > > > > > mike > > > --------------- > > > > > > Children should be led to make their own investigations, and to draw > > this won inferences. They should to *told* as little as possible, and > > indeed to *discover *as much as possible. Humanity has progressed solely > by > > self-instruction; > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From lchcmike@gmail.com Sun Aug 18 16:50:33 2013 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Sun, 18 Aug 2013 16:50:33 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mystery progressive educator? In-Reply-To: References: <20130817192444.5415055.78491.2299@ucdenver.edu> <6A508340-CDE3-4840-BC07-8B3AB025CE98@uniandes.edu.co> <1286171999-1376859269-cardhu_decombobulator_blackberry.rim.net-379191111-@b2.c11.bise7.blackberry> Message-ID: So, two, intertwined conversation here, at least. 1. How to think of going from the "simple" to the "complex" a la Spencer vs Davydov and 2. Why is that quotation by Herbert Spencer (found in a footnote to a book by Ushinsky that I decided would survive the holocaust of moving offices) interesting and what does it imply for ideas we often discuss here. Spencer plays an important role in the 19th Century debates about cultural difference and evolution of society that part of the home ground of the cultural-historical psychologists in Russia and Germany, and elsewhere among old time scholars we draw upon. For a summary of our consideration of his views on education fit with his view of social progress and social darwinism, see the first couple of pages of lchc's 1983 article on culture and cognitive development at http://lchc.ucsd.edu/Pubs/Culture-CognitiveDev.pdf I wonder how Thorndike draws upon Spencer, in contrast with, say, Dewey? As to finding the quotation on the internet, I thought that was what would happen. I tested it out. But I decided it was still worth getting people to think about its origins, and how its origins are connected to our own. mike On Sun, Aug 18, 2013 at 4:07 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > On 18 August 2013 21:54, wrote: > > > Hi Hugh + thread > > > > Shame on you guys. Mike gave us a genuine puzzle and we could spent happy > > hours surmising who this might be, and now the puzzle is flattened by > > google. Instant gratification! > > > > I think it is the complex within the simple, Huw? > > > > Ah, I had a spatial metaphor in mind, Carol. Domain as a map. As such, > one may go beyond the simple, that is carefully revealed within the complex > by domain/historical analysis, to discover the complex. > > Huw > > > > > Carol > > > > Sent via my BlackBerry from Vodacom - let your email find you! > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Huw Lloyd > > Sender: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > > Date: Sat, 17 Aug 2013 23:18:53 > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > Reply-To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mystery progressive educator? > > > > Most of the discord is in the terms rather than the meaning, I think. > > > > For me, the main problem is his "simple to complex", I would say, rather, > > "the simple within the complex". > > > > Given the importance of the introduction to problems, "self evolution" > > hardly seems appropriate. Presumably "instruction" had a fairly > > unambiguous meaning in the 19th century. But I don't think things have > > changed that much. > > > > But this continues to be a thought provoking puzzle: to the degree that a > > student is guided, they are not exercising their own skill in orienting > to > > the task. Spencer, it seems, is suggesting guidance is best resumed when > > the student loses their appreciation for the task. So where do we locate > > the tenacity to accommodate unresolved problems etc? > > > > But then Spencer was a philosopher, which locates him amongst those who > > chose thinking as a way of life... > > > > I recall reading recently that the development of personality was > > acknowledged by Danish legislative governance for education. In reading > > Davydov it seems he had considerable success in raising a population of > > students who were doing something resembling intensive thinking... > > > > But for those who do not value thought etc. in quite the same way, > > schooling provides a different, more immediate, need. It seems to me that > > in all forms of instruction the question is implicated -- what kind of > > development (personality) am I working with/ supporting? > > > > Huw > > > > > > > > On 17 August 2013 20:47, Martin John Packer > > wrote: > > > > > Who also coined "the survival of the fittest," so perhaps it's no great > > > surprise. > > > > > > Martin > > > > > > On Aug 17, 2013, at 2:24 PM, "White, Phillip" < > > Phillip.White@ucdenver.edu> > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > Even earlier, Herbert Spencer, 1870's. > > > > > > > > Phillip > > > > > > > > Sent from my BlackBerry 10 smartphone. > > > > From: Peter Smagorinsky > > > > Sent: Saturday, August 17, 2013 12:54 PM > > > > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > Reply To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mystery progressive educator? > > > > > > > > > > > > And, in 1896, > http://www.gutenberg.org/files/20513/20513-h/20513-h.htm > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Peter Smagorinsky > > > > Sent: Saturday, August 17, 2013 2:48 PM > > > > To: lchcmike@gmail.com; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Mystery progressive educator? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > http://archive.org/stream/teachingoforalen00bolerich/teachingoforalen00bolerich_djvu.txtincludesthequote as its framing perspective, so it must have impressed a > > > few people. Note that the book is from 1914, the year before Vygotsky > > began > > > his work on The Psychology of Art. > > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto: > > > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of mike cole > > > > Sent: Saturday, August 17, 2013 1:30 PM > > > > To: xmca-l@ucsd.edu > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Mystery progressive educator? > > > > > > > > Ran across the following interesting statement by accident and was > > > surprised a little at the authorship. I thought others might be > > interested > > > in it as well. I'll leave off authorship because part of what I found > > > interesting was in figuring out who it was. > > > > > > > > > > > > mike > > > > --------------- > > > > > > > > Children should be led to make their own investigations, and to draw > > > this won inferences. They should to *told* as little as possible, and > > > indeed to *discover *as much as possible. Humanity has progressed > solely > > by > > > self-instruction; > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > From lchcmike@gmail.com Sun Aug 18 17:01:27 2013 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Sun, 18 Aug 2013 17:01:27 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> <520444BA.2000808@mira.net> <520460F0.5030506@mira.net> <19E63C50-A0D2-4A0F-BBA7-63853414FDAA@gmail.com> <4195A368-C7B9-4AB0-AAA5-A244135DC331@gmail.com> <520ADCDD.9000406@mira.net> <520C3970.6000803@mira.net> Message-ID: I agree, very clearly statements of the sense/meaning relation, along with the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I wanted to say, and thought, unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows." In the quote here, I think LSV is somewhat overstating the stability of meaning across contexts; yes relative to the microgenetic processes of sense making capturable with modern technologies, but not totally "context independent." Even dictionary meanings change, as LSV was well aware from his interest in the history of words in relation to their appearance in children's vocabularies in ontogeny. Keeping the simultaneous relevance of several time scales in mind in these discussions seems really important, as hard as it is to do. mike On Sat, Aug 17, 2013 at 7:15 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > Here are two excerpts from Thought and Language which may support Greg's > proposal. > "A word acquires its sense from the context in which it appears.; in > different contexts it changes its sense. Meaning remains stable throughout > the changes of sense The dictionary meaning of a word is no more than a > stone in the edifice of sense; no more than a potentiality that finds > diversified REALIZATION in speech."[245] > > Here is another more specific excerpt to support Greg's proposal. > > "Thought is not merely expressed in words; it comes into EXISTENCE THROUGH > them. Every thought tends to connect SOMETHING WITH SOMETHING else, to > establish a relation between things." [218] > > In my reading of these two excerpts I experience a family resemblance with > the basic *givenness* of phenomenology that thought comes into existence > within *AS* structure. [something AS something else] > > Greg invites us to consider some *affinities* between these alternativeways > of talking [which may make common *sense*] in developing the "edifice of > sense* > Sense AS including both perception and action mediated through *felt* > existence. > > Phenomenology uses the language of primordial givenness [which may as a > term for historical reasons produce reaction rather than resonance]. > > Larry > > > > > On Sat, Aug 17, 2013 at 1:44 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > Greg, > > I fully endorse the *felt* understanding of this post. > > You have summarized the possibility of integrating phenomenological > > accounts into CHAT. > > My understanding of *phenomenology* is the focus on *givenness* > > Husserl tried to locate *givenness within perception. Others try to > locate > > *givenness in action. Still others try to locate *givenness* in events > > [beyond agency] > > My reading of phenomenology is they are now giving accounts of *as* > > [something as something else] as *givenness*. > > This reading *turns* the conversation to how we compose accounts as > given. > > Greg, an side the word sovereign comes from *superannus* so Freud may > have > > been articulating a type of character formation which made *common* > sense* > > in Vienna at the turn of the 19th century to the 20th. > > > > I also see a place for an *agency* that is partially intentional and also > > an agency within *frames* or *windows* > > > > Phenomenology is NOT grounded in perception which is a secondary or > > derived phenomena. > > It is not grounded in language. > > It is *grounded* in *AS* phenomena. > > > > Moving back to *meaning* & *sense* which is central to our accounts. > > Meaning AS *objects* is one account. Meaning as *affinities* is an > > alternative account. WITHIN affinities the participants speak FROM > WITHIN > > common accounts [Shotter] > > He is participating in developing a rhetorical-RESPONSIVE psychology > which > > he calls psychology AS *joint action* > > > > His turning to Vygotsky to extend his psychology may be helpful in > > response to your proposal [and question] > > Shorter wrote: > > In shifting debates in psychology to the nature of our psychological > > nature Vygostky focused on accounts AS *instructive* > > In Shotter's words, > > "I want to call upon aspects of Vygotsky's important account of words AS > > *psychological tools or instruments* Words function in this instrumental > > fashion when, for instance, others make use of various FORMS of talk, to > > draw our attention to featurs of our circumstances that otherwise would > > escape our notice, or, how to conduct ourselves in certain circumstances; > > they can instruct us in HOW to manage or organize our WAYS OF perceiving > > and acting. AS Vygotsky [1978:32] comments, in learning to coordinate > their > > actions linguistically with those around them, "the child begins to > > PERCEIVE the world not only through his eyes but also THROUGH his > speech." > > Shorter adds, > > Vygotsky goes on to show how the ways in which others first verbally > > instruct us, can later become our own; AS they verbally instructed us, so > > we can come to verbally come to instruct ourselves. > > [in Conversational Realities:35] > > > > Greg, if phenomenology is seen as not privileging perception AS GIVEN [a > > fallacy] but rather positing {as} as *givenness* then their may be a way > to > > link phenomenology as currently understood [not as Husserl posited > > perception AS *given*] > > > > This *turns* to Vygotsky exploring *sense* AS perception & action > MEDIATED > > THROUGH FELT experience[as Dewey understood experience] > > > > FELT experience is the medium through which perception & action are > > mediated. > > > > Greg, I am not sure if this is clarifying [or confusing] your proposal. > > *Boundary objects* as liminal and dynamic WITHIN felt *frames* as showing > > *agency* > > Larry > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, Aug 17, 2013 at 10:36 AM, Greg Thompson < > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com > > > wrote: > > > >> Antti and other inter-Actants, > >> I think that the notion of sensory fabric in an observational study of > >> naturally occurring interactions is NOT too far fetched. Seems like > >> something like this is absolutely needed. And I'd be interested to hear > >> how > >> you would plan to use Goodwin's Professional Vision article - it is a > >> personal favorite (so maybe offline if others aren't interested). > >> > >> Also, Antti, in your work, I like your attention to the role of the > >> physical body in making frames. > >> (see also John Rae on body posture and framing, e.g. see: > >> > >> > http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1207/S15327973RLSI34-2_4#.Ug7fiJLiiM4and > >> maybe more central in this regard is Adam Kendon's work on body > posture). > >> > >> I might add to this that Goffman speaks of the way in which motivations > >> are, to a certain extent, entailed by frames (yes, "to a certain > extent" - > >> this does not mean the frames determine them!). Thus, frames bring with > >> them motivational relevancies as much as individuals do! > >> > >> We could speak of the way that frames create certain affordances that > >> solicit various types of behavior (whether "cognitive", "emotional", or > >> some other emically named type). When we are in certain types of > >> interactions, it suddenly becomes possible to *feel* a certain way that > >> one > >> couldn't otherwise have felt. Similarly, one can be a head taller than > >> oneself when in certain interactions. And, conversely, one can find > >> oneself > >> becoming quite smaller in others! > >> > >> I think that this role of context is important and can be easily > >> overlooked > >> if you start from the motives of individuals. > >> > >> In addition to Goffman, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty also point in this > >> direction with their notions of "calling forth" and > >> "affordances/solicitations", respectively. These approaches to > >> understanding people result in a reduction of the perceived agency of > the > >> individual (and hence a reduced role for intentionality, motive, and > even > >> conscious reflection), and I think many people often chafe at these > ideas > >> (esp. in American where the individual is king! Sovereign Lords - all of > >> us!). > >> > >> But, imho, there is still an agent in all of these accounts - perhaps a > >> bit > >> smaller than in other accounts, but present nonetheless. And, as the > >> phenomenologists like to say, this account is truer to the phenomena. > [and > >> I don't know whether this is relevant or not, but it seems to me that > this > >> account accords well with my reading of Marx]. > >> > >> At the end of the day, I think the central issue that all of this turns > on > >> is our ontology of *the mental*. Phenomenologists like to suggest that > >> others subscribe to "a myth of the mental" (see Hubert Dreyfus's paper > The > >> Return of the Myth of the Mental: > >> > >> > http://www.sjsu.edu/people/anand.vaidya/courses/c2/s1/The_Return_Myth_Mental_Dreyfus-1.pdf > >> ). > >> This is a pervasive belief and perhaps there is some justification for > it, > >> but I happen to find the phenomenologists' position compelling. I > further > >> wonder if CHAT tends to subscribe to the myth of the mental? Do our > >> concepts of concepts involve reifications of mental processes that > perhaps > >> are not warranted? > >> > >> If the phenomenologists' position hold water, and admittedly it's a lot > of > >> water to swallow, then the question is really Lubomir's question of > >> whether > >> or not CHAT can integrate other perspectives, here the phenomenological > >> perspective (and it seems like some say yes, some say no), or whether > you > >> will necessarily have to go somewhere else to get that perspective. So, > is > >> this an ontological commitment of CHAT? Can there be some middle ground? > >> > >> It seems like Shotter and others (e.g., Martin Packer here on XMCA) have > >> been marking out this space, but perhaps what remains to be seen is > >> whether > >> or not this space falls within > >> the bounds of CHAT. > >> Who decides that? > >> -greg > >> > >> > >> > >> On Fri, Aug 16, 2013 at 6:21 AM, Antti Rajala > wrote: > >> > >> > Greg, > >> > > >> > Thanks for inviting me to the discussion and for your nice > introduction > >> to > >> > Goffman's work. I indeed found these reflections about the > relationships > >> > between Goffman and AT very useful. My project in which I am > considering > >> > using Goffman's concept of frame together with Leontjev's theory of > >> > activity is still at a very initial stage (I had to postpone this > >> project > >> > for a while to engage in another project meanwhile). > >> > > >> > My take into the discussion is that I am interested to analyze sensory > >> > aspects of students' actions (of observing birds) in bird-watching > >> school > >> > fieldtrip. Like Larry, I have previously worked with concepts of > >> personal > >> > sense and meaning, and now I found very interesting Leontjev's > >> explication > >> > of the structure of consciousness in terms of three dialectically > >> > interrelated elements (or moments), personal sense, meaning, and > sensory > >> > fabric. Yet, Leontiev seems not to have written much that would help > me > >> to > >> > analyze embodied interactions from video. I think that I need to > >> > incorporate concepts from elsewhere to capture the evolving > >> > moment-to-moment interactions. Here, I was turning to Goffman's frame > >> > analysis, and the work of his students M. and C. Goodwin may be > >> > interesting, too. > >> > > >> > I have talked to many colleagues in CHAT and so far everyone has > >> encouraged > >> > me to explore the connections between frames and Leontiev (even > though a > >> > lot of work needs to be done). In this connection, I found interesting > >> > Lubomir's opinion of the incompatibility between the two. I add > >> Gutierrez > >> > to Greg's list of scholars who connect Goffman and Leontiev. > >> > > >> > Gutierrez and colleagues have used defined their well-known notion of > >> > script in terms of the notion of frame. In their article (1995, > Script, > >> > counterscript and underlife in the classroom; > >> > http://lchc.ucsd.edu/mca/Paper/kris.pdf) they write: "Nevertheless, > the > >> > teacher's script is hardly interrupted by student re-keyings, his > script > >> > (or "frame" in Goffman's terms) has ..." (p. 460). Gutierrez and > >> colleagues > >> > also use other Goffman's concepts such as keying and underlife. > >> > > >> > One connection to Greg's reflection about motives and frames. To me, > it > >> > seems that there are some connections between the notions of personal > >> sense > >> > and framing. "Sense expresses the relation of motive of activity to > >> > immediate goal of action" (Leontiev, 1978, p. 171). For a participant > >> of an > >> > activity, explication of this relation between motive and goal seems > to > >> > amount to asking: "what it is that is going on here?", that is, what > is > >> the > >> > frame? > >> > > >> > I would also like to ask the list, if you think that involving the > >> notion > >> > of sensory fabric in an observational study of naturally occuring > >> > interactions is too far fetched. After all, Leontiev's own studies > >> employed > >> > exprimental research methods. I am considering dropping Leontiev > >> altogether > >> > and use work like Goodwin's professional vision instead. > >> > > >> > Antti > >> > > >> > > >> > On Thu, Aug 15, 2013 at 6:22 PM, Larry Purss > >> wrote: > >> > > >> > > Andy, > >> > > I was hoping you could elaborate on the two terms *modes* and > >> > *archeTYPES* > >> > > when discussing collaboration within projects [activities] > >> > > *modes* seem related to *models* *media* *medium* *mediation*. > >> > > *Actions* when *operationalized* are ALWAYS WITHIN modes of > >> > collaboration. > >> > > What phenomena are not included within human processes that are > beyond > >> > > activities? > >> > > Shotter, exploring social life says, > >> > > "different people in different positions at different moments live > in > >> > > different realities." > >> > > In other words "reality" we must re-think "reality" as being > >> > > differentiated, consisting in different regions and moments all with > >> > > different properties to these realities. > >> > > Shotter adds, > >> > > "WE can begin to think of social reality at large as a turbulent > flow > >> of > >> > > continuous social activity, containing within it [reality] two BASIC > >> > KINDS > >> > > of activity: > >> > > 1] a set of relatively stable centers of well ordered, > >> self-reproducing > >> > > activity sustained by those WITHIN them being accountable to each > >> other > >> > for > >> > > their actions ... - but with the forms of justification used being > >> > > themselves open to contest (Billig, McIntyre) > >> > > 2] with these diverse regions or moments of institutionalized order > >> being > >> > > separated from each other by zones of much more disorderly, > >> > unaccountable, > >> > > chaotic activity. > >> > > It is in these unaccountable, marginal regions - on the edge of > chaos, > >> > away > >> > > from the orderly centers of social life - that the events of > interest > >> to > >> > us > >> > > occur" > >> > > > >> > > Shotter is suggesting the *models* we specify to help us understand > >> the > >> > > uncertainty, vagueness, and ambiguity [REAL features of much of the > >> world > >> > > in which we live] influence the nature of our future lives together. > >> > > > >> > > To return to collaboration operating WITHIN *modes* [as archeTYPES]. > >> The > >> > 3 > >> > > types [master/servant - customer/provider - and collaboration per > se]. > >> > Can > >> > > *we* through *education* develop *dis-positions* which *turn* away > >> from > >> > the > >> > > first two archetypes and *turn* towards collaboration per se? Can we > >> also > >> > > through education envision a turn towards the *interhuman* as a > >> *model* > >> > > that is a general archetype for understanding collaboration per se? > >> > > Is Shotter's composition of two basic KINDS of activity [sedimented > >> and > >> > > disorderly] helpful in understanding community forming within types > or > >> > > modes of communication [collaboration]. > >> > > > >> > > I struggle with the ambivalence of *addressing* my audience. This > is a > >> > CHAT > >> > > forum and I have a tendency to *turn* the conversation. I will > close > >> by > >> > > re-focusing on the dialectic of meaning and *sense*. > >> > > Sense involves [revolves?] perception AND action mediated THROUGH > >> felt > >> > > experience. I believe Shotter's conVERSEational "realities* as > >> > > collaborations per se may contribute to our interhuman > understandings > >> as > >> > a > >> > > way to turn away from master/slave and customer/provider activity > >> > settings. > >> > > Larry > >> > > Larry > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > Thanks Andy > >> > > On Wed, Aug 14, 2013 at 7:14 PM, Andy Blunden > >> wrote: > >> > > > >> > > > Two things Greg. > >> > > > > >> > > > Firstly, most definitely the caddy and the player are involved in > >> the > >> > > same > >> > > > project or activity. Self-evidently. Each are also involved in > other > >> > > > activities, and reflecting on these other activities may shed > light > >> on > >> > > how > >> > > > they come to be collaborating in the shared project of the > player's > >> > game. > >> > > > Like master and servant, people always collaborate in a particular > >> > mode. > >> > > > The archetypes of these modes of collaboration are master-servant, > >> > > > customer-provider and collaboration per se. It is important to > >> > recognise > >> > > > these different modes of collaboration because otherwise we tend > to > >> > force > >> > > > *all* collaboration into the same mode, which may cause us to > >> > misconstrue > >> > > > some relations. The fact that different participants have > different > >> > > social > >> > > > positions within a project means that they each are bound by > >> different > >> > > > sides of the same norms. That is, the norms of meaning, belief and > >> > action > >> > > > prevailing in the project mandate different meanings, beliefs and > >> > actions > >> > > > for different participants. The tensions arising from these > >> > asymmetrical > >> > > > relationships is one of the motors of change. > >> > > > > >> > > > Secondly, no, projects do not exist *between* persons, persons > exist > >> > > > *between* projects. This is just another effort by you, Greg, to > >> make > >> > the > >> > > > unit of analysis the individual person. The relevants units of > >> analysis > >> > > of > >> > > > Activity Theory are operation, action and activity. :) > >> > > > > >> > > > Andy > >> > > > > >> > > > Greg Thompson wrote: > >> > > > > >> > > >> ... > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > >> "Motive" seems a slippery concept to rest too much on. Andy I'm > >> > > wondering > >> > > >> how you answer the question you put to Roland, namely whether or > >> not > >> > > master > >> > > >> and slave are participating in the same activity/project? Or, > what > >> > > about a > >> > > >> golfer and caddy? And so on down to, as Phillip and Carol point > >> out - > >> > > the > >> > > >> different participants in a discussion on XMCA. > >> > > >> > >> > > >> ... > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > >> Goffman's answer is interesting in that he doesn't rely on the > >> motives > >> > > >> (motivational relevancies) of the participants, but rather > creates > >> a > >> > > notion > >> > > >> of the local context as a "frame" that exists somewhere between > >> > > >> participants. No one person can dictate the frame (even dictators > >> have > >> > > to > >> > > >> deal with the possibility of duplicitousness - the word with a > >> > > side-wards > >> > > >> glance - hence irony is a powerful weapon of the weak - even if > >> James > >> > > Scott > >> > > >> didn't recognize this, Bakhtin clearly did). Frames emerge as > >> > > participants > >> > > >> take parts in the unfolding play of some event or happening, and, > >> to a > >> > > >> certain extent, without regard to alignment of the motives of the > >> > > >> participants. Every once in a while the motives of all > participants > >> > > create > >> > > >> a frame may be relatively closely aligned, but it seems much more > >> > common > >> > > >> that frames are built out of a plethora of motives. > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > >> > > >> > >> > >> > >> -- > >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >> Visiting Assistant Professor > >> Department of Anthropology > >> 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >> Brigham Young University > >> Provo, UT 84602 > >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >> > > > > > From smago@uga.edu Mon Aug 19 05:37:44 2013 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Mon, 19 Aug 2013 12:37:44 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] FW: Position Ad- Please circulate: Methodology, Diversity, and Equity (University of Michigan School of Education) In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: THIS IS A FORWARDED MESSAGE. PLEASE DO NOT REPLY TO THE SENDER. READ THE MESSAGE CAREFULLY FOR INFORMATION ON THE ORIGINAL SENDER Dear Colleagues- I hope all is well with you. Would you please circulate the following position announcement from the University of Michigan School of Education to your AERA SIG membership? http://www.soe.umich.edu/news_events/news/article/methodology_in_research_on_diversity_and_equity_faculty_position/ The focus of the position search is Methodology in Research on Diversity and Equity, which we hope may be of interest to a number of your members. The goal is to hire several colleagues -senior and junior level and representing a range of methodological approaches- who bring methodological strength and expertise to the study of diversity and equity issues/processes relevant to education. Ideally, the recruited candidates would have the ability/potential to engage in graduate teaching and research training around their methodological and scholarly expertise areas. We are especially interested in strong candidates who can contribute - through their research, teaching, and service - to the overall diversity and excellence of our academic community. So, your support in helping us build a rich and diverse candidate pool would be greatly appreciated! Thank you for your time, and feel free to contact me with any questions or for more information. Best- Tabbye ----------------------------------- Tabbye M. Chavous, Ph.D. Professor of Education and Psychology 610 E. University Ave, Rm 1404 Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1259 Phone: 734-615-1268 Associate Dean of Academic Programs and Initiatives Rackham Graduate School University of Michigan 915 E. Washington St. Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1070 Phone: 734-615-3654 Email: tchavous@umich.edu An American Educational Research Association List If you need assistance with this list, please send an email to listadmin@aera.net. From ajrajala@gmail.com Mon Aug 19 07:32:35 2013 From: ajrajala@gmail.com (Antti Rajala) Date: Mon, 19 Aug 2013 17:32:35 +0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> <520444BA.2000808@mira.net> <520460F0.5030506@mira.net> <19E63C50-A0D2-4A0F-BBA7-63853414FDAA@gmail.com> <4195A368-C7B9-4AB0-AAA5-A244135DC331@gmail.com> <520ADCDD.9000406@mira.net> <520C3970.6000803@mira.net> Message-ID: Lubomir, thanks for suggesting symbolic interactionism as a frame of incorporating these ideas. Anna-Maija Puroila discusses the legacies of Goffman in her dissertation (in Finnish) and mentions that there are many competing and contested interpretation's of Goffman's work. Some say that his work was structuralist but more often he is associated with symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology, or phenomenological sociology. Where would activity theory fit in among these? To me Goffman's student's Goodwin's ethno-methdological approach seems partly compatible with CHAT. In his paper, Action and embodiment within situated human interaction (2000), Goodwin writes: "This emphasis on cognition as a public, social process embedded within an historically shaped material world is quite consistent with both Vygotskian perspectives and recent work in the social and anthropological study of scientific and workplace practice ..., but adds to such perspectives an equally strong focus on the details of language use and conversational organization." Like Goodwin, I believe that this attention to details of language use and conversational organization, and to embodied interactions, in particular, can enrich CHAT analyses. After all, in many classical CHAT work, we mainly see analyses of spoken interaction. Greg, to me Goodwin's work on professional vision gives an elaborate account on the relationships between meanings and sensory fabric. In particular, in my case of students in a bird-watching field trip the way he analyzes expert-novice interaction is very valuable. I can, for example, see lots of highlighting on the part of the bird expert. Goodwin's focus on the practices of seeing seems to me very compatible with Leontiev's theorizing of sensory fabric as constituting and being constituted of action. Yet, in Goodwin's work the socio-emotional issues brought in with the Leontiev's personal sense - in line with what Larry has written - seems to be given less attention in Goodwin. I wonder whether Goodwin's approach contradicts Leontiev's approach that emphasizes such internal issues as goals and motives. In my understanding ethnomethdologists do not usually focus on goals and such. The Gothenburg center lead by Roger S?lj? has explored ethnomethodological inspired aspects of Goffman in relation to their version of sociocultural perspective. See e.g the dissertation of Annika Lantz-Andersson: https://gupea.ub.gu.se/bitstream/2077/19736/1/gupea_2077_19736_1.pdf Greg, Greeno has theorized the ways in which frames "create certain affordances that solicit various types of behavior (whether 'cognitive', 'emotional', or some other emically named type)." To my knowledge Greeno's work here focuses more on cognitive aspects and not that much on emotional aspects. He uses the notion of positioning in association with frames (which he relates to Goffman). "This refers to ways in which an individual is entitled, expected, or perhaps obligated to participate in interactions of an activity system, such as a classroom or an experimental session involving interaction with a computer program." (see, A Theory Bite on Contextualizing, Framing, and Positioning: A Companion to Son and Goldstone, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07370000903014386) Greg wrote: "I might add to this that Goffman speaks of the way in which motivations are, to a certain extent, entailed by frames (yes, "to a certain extent" - this does not mean the frames determine them!). Thus, frames bring with them motivational relevancies as much as individuals do!" I wonder if this interplay between collective frames and individuals can be conceptualized with meaning and sense. Object of an activity is framed in terms of collectively shared meanings. Yet, each individual develops a personal relationship to the object, that is, a personal sense. By the way, thanks Mike for pointing out this overstatement of stability with respect to meanings. This has bothered me a lot, too. A colleague of mine even asserts that sense is never shared enough to become legitimately called a shared meaning in Vygotsky/Leontiev sense. Antti On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 3:01 AM, mike cole wrote: > I agree, very clearly statements of the sense/meaning relation, along with > the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I wanted to say, and thought, > unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows." > > In the quote here, I think LSV is somewhat overstating the stability of > meaning across contexts; yes relative to the microgenetic processes of > sense making capturable with > modern technologies, but not totally "context independent." Even dictionary > meanings change, as LSV was well aware from his interest in the history of > words in relation to their appearance in children's vocabularies in > ontogeny. > > Keeping the simultaneous relevance of several time scales in mind in these > discussions seems really important, as hard as it is to do. > mike > > > From ajrajala@gmail.com Mon Aug 19 09:10:52 2013 From: ajrajala@gmail.com (Antti Rajala) Date: Mon, 19 Aug 2013 19:10:52 +0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> <520444BA.2000808@mira.net> <520460F0.5030506@mira.net> <19E63C50-A0D2-4A0F-BBA7-63853414FDAA@gmail.com> <4195A368-C7B9-4AB0-AAA5-A244135DC331@gmail.com> <520ADCDD.9000406@mira.net> <520C3970.6000803@mira.net> Message-ID: On a second thought, maybe Goodwin addresses issues similar to personal sense implicitly in his article. The perception of the defence attorney is of course shaped by the personal sense stemming from his job of defending the policemen, whereas the motivation implied by the jury members' job shapes their perception differently. Antti On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 5:32 PM, Antti Rajala wrote: > Lubomir, thanks for suggesting symbolic interactionism as a frame of > incorporating these ideas. Anna-Maija Puroila discusses the legacies of > Goffman in her dissertation (in Finnish) and mentions that there are many > competing and contested interpretation's of Goffman's work. Some say that > his work was structuralist but more often he is associated with symbolic > interactionism, ethnomethodology, or phenomenological sociology. Where > would activity theory fit in among these? > > To me Goffman's student's Goodwin's ethno-methdological approach seems > partly compatible with CHAT. In his paper, Action and embodiment within > situated human interaction (2000), Goodwin writes: > > "This emphasis on cognition as a public, social process embedded within an > historically > shaped material world is quite consistent with both Vygotskian > perspectives and > recent work in the social and anthropological study of scientific and > workplace practice > ..., but adds to such perspectives an equally strong focus on the details > of language > use and conversational organization." > > Like Goodwin, I believe that this attention to details of language use and > conversational organization, and to embodied interactions, in particular, > can enrich CHAT analyses. After all, in many classical CHAT work, we mainly > see analyses of spoken interaction. Greg, to me Goodwin's work on > professional vision gives an elaborate account on the relationships between > meanings and sensory fabric. In particular, in my case of students in a > bird-watching field trip the way he analyzes expert-novice interaction is > very valuable. I can, for example, see lots of highlighting on the part of > the bird expert. > > Goodwin's focus on the practices of seeing seems to me very compatible > with Leontiev's theorizing of sensory fabric as constituting and being > constituted of action. Yet, in Goodwin's work the socio-emotional issues > brought in with the Leontiev's personal sense - in line with what Larry has > written - seems to be given less attention in Goodwin. I wonder whether > Goodwin's approach contradicts Leontiev's approach that emphasizes such > internal issues as goals and motives. In my understanding > ethnomethdologists do not usually focus on goals and such. > > The Gothenburg center lead by Roger S?lj? has explored ethnomethodological > inspired aspects of Goffman in relation to their version of sociocultural > perspective. See e.g the dissertation of Annika Lantz-Andersson: > https://gupea.ub.gu.se/bitstream/2077/19736/1/gupea_2077_19736_1.pdf > > Greg, Greeno has theorized the ways in which frames "create certain > affordances that solicit various types of behavior (whether 'cognitive', > 'emotional', or some other emically named type)." To my knowledge Greeno's > work here focuses more on cognitive aspects and not that much on emotional > aspects. He uses the notion of positioning in association with frames > (which he relates to Goffman). "This refers to ways in which an individual > is > entitled, expected, or perhaps obligated to participate in interactions of > an activity system, such as a classroom or an experimental session > involving interaction with a computer program." (see, A Theory Bite on > Contextualizing, Framing, and Positioning: A Companion to Son and > Goldstone, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07370000903014386) > > Greg wrote: > "I might add to this that Goffman speaks of the way in which motivations > are, to a certain extent, entailed by frames (yes, "to a certain extent" - > this does not mean the frames determine them!). Thus, frames bring with > them motivational relevancies as much as individuals do!" > > I wonder if this interplay between collective frames and individuals can > be conceptualized with meaning and sense. Object of an activity is framed > in terms of collectively shared meanings. Yet, each individual develops a > personal relationship to the object, that is, a personal sense. > > By the way, thanks Mike for pointing out this overstatement of stability > with respect to meanings. This has bothered me a lot, too. A colleague of > mine even asserts that sense is never shared enough to become legitimately > called a shared meaning in Vygotsky/Leontiev sense. > > Antti > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 3:01 AM, mike cole wrote: > >> I agree, very clearly statements of the sense/meaning relation, along with >> the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I wanted to say, and thought, >> unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows." >> >> In the quote here, I think LSV is somewhat overstating the stability of >> meaning across contexts; yes relative to the microgenetic processes of >> sense making capturable with >> modern technologies, but not totally "context independent." Even >> dictionary >> meanings change, as LSV was well aware from his interest in the history of >> words in relation to their appearance in children's vocabularies in >> ontogeny. >> >> Keeping the simultaneous relevance of several time scales in mind in these >> discussions seems really important, as hard as it is to do. >> mike >> >> >> From lspopov@bgsu.edu Mon Aug 19 09:44:31 2013 From: lspopov@bgsu.edu (Lubomir Savov Popov) Date: Mon, 19 Aug 2013 16:44:31 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> <520444BA.2000808@mira.net> <520460F0.5030506@mira.net> <19E63C50-A0D2-4A0F-BBA7-63853414FDAA@gmail.com> <4195A368-C7B9-4AB0-AAA5-A244135DC331@gmail.com> <520ADCDD.9000406@mira.net> <520C3970.6000803@mira.net> Message-ID: <4DF034EF2396694597A7D328E23F09E1012653@BY2PRD0510MB353.namprd05.prod.outlook.com> Dear Antti, Thank you for the ideas and suggestions. At this point, I cannot say anything new about possible directions and outcomes. I will need some time to think over your post. But even then, my answers will probably be somewhat general. I am eager to see explorations in all directions. As I mentioned before, my strategy is not to develop new activity models, but to apply existing ones in my line of research. My biggest problem is that I don't see models that I can apply. The problem might be that there are no such models created up to now, or that I might not be able to find a way to use them. The option to create a new customized model of activity for my research needs is open and I might pursue it depending on my time. One reason for my posts on this topic is to create a community of scholars who have similar interests. In some domains, there are only a few people that work on a particular problem and there is no critical mass for making a breakthrough. Best wishes, Lubomir -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Antti Rajala Sent: Monday, August 19, 2013 10:33 AM To: Mike Cole; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities Lubomir, thanks for suggesting symbolic interactionism as a frame of incorporating these ideas. Anna-Maija Puroila discusses the legacies of Goffman in her dissertation (in Finnish) and mentions that there are many competing and contested interpretation's of Goffman's work. Some say that his work was structuralist but more often he is associated with symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology, or phenomenological sociology. Where would activity theory fit in among these? To me Goffman's student's Goodwin's ethno-methdological approach seems partly compatible with CHAT. In his paper, Action and embodiment within situated human interaction (2000), Goodwin writes: "This emphasis on cognition as a public, social process embedded within an historically shaped material world is quite consistent with both Vygotskian perspectives and recent work in the social and anthropological study of scientific and workplace practice ..., but adds to such perspectives an equally strong focus on the details of language use and conversational organization." Like Goodwin, I believe that this attention to details of language use and conversational organization, and to embodied interactions, in particular, can enrich CHAT analyses. After all, in many classical CHAT work, we mainly see analyses of spoken interaction. Greg, to me Goodwin's work on professional vision gives an elaborate account on the relationships between meanings and sensory fabric. In particular, in my case of students in a bird-watching field trip the way he analyzes expert-novice interaction is very valuable. I can, for example, see lots of highlighting on the part of the bird expert. Goodwin's focus on the practices of seeing seems to me very compatible with Leontiev's theorizing of sensory fabric as constituting and being constituted of action. Yet, in Goodwin's work the socio-emotional issues brought in with the Leontiev's personal sense - in line with what Larry has written - seems to be given less attention in Goodwin. I wonder whether Goodwin's approach contradicts Leontiev's approach that emphasizes such internal issues as goals and motives. In my understanding ethnomethdologists do not usually focus on goals and such. The Gothenburg center lead by Roger S?lj? has explored ethnomethodological inspired aspects of Goffman in relation to their version of sociocultural perspective. See e.g the dissertation of Annika Lantz-Andersson: https://gupea.ub.gu.se/bitstream/2077/19736/1/gupea_2077_19736_1.pdf Greg, Greeno has theorized the ways in which frames "create certain affordances that solicit various types of behavior (whether 'cognitive', 'emotional', or some other emically named type)." To my knowledge Greeno's work here focuses more on cognitive aspects and not that much on emotional aspects. He uses the notion of positioning in association with frames (which he relates to Goffman). "This refers to ways in which an individual is entitled, expected, or perhaps obligated to participate in interactions of an activity system, such as a classroom or an experimental session involving interaction with a computer program." (see, A Theory Bite on Contextualizing, Framing, and Positioning: A Companion to Son and Goldstone, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07370000903014386) Greg wrote: "I might add to this that Goffman speaks of the way in which motivations are, to a certain extent, entailed by frames (yes, "to a certain extent" - this does not mean the frames determine them!). Thus, frames bring with them motivational relevancies as much as individuals do!" I wonder if this interplay between collective frames and individuals can be conceptualized with meaning and sense. Object of an activity is framed in terms of collectively shared meanings. Yet, each individual develops a personal relationship to the object, that is, a personal sense. By the way, thanks Mike for pointing out this overstatement of stability with respect to meanings. This has bothered me a lot, too. A colleague of mine even asserts that sense is never shared enough to become legitimately called a shared meaning in Vygotsky/Leontiev sense. Antti On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 3:01 AM, mike cole wrote: > I agree, very clearly statements of the sense/meaning relation, along > with the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I wanted to say, and > thought, unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows." > > In the quote here, I think LSV is somewhat overstating the stability > of meaning across contexts; yes relative to the microgenetic processes > of sense making capturable with modern technologies, but not totally > "context independent." Even dictionary meanings change, as LSV was > well aware from his interest in the history of words in relation to > their appearance in children's vocabularies in ontogeny. > > Keeping the simultaneous relevance of several time scales in mind in > these discussions seems really important, as hard as it is to do. > mike > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Mon Aug 19 10:06:17 2013 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Mon, 19 Aug 2013 10:06:17 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> <520444BA.2000808@mira.net> <520460F0.5030506@mira.net> <19E63C50-A0D2-4A0F-BBA7-63853414FDAA@gmail.com> <4195A368-C7B9-4AB0-AAA5-A244135DC331@gmail.com> <520ADCDD.9000406@mira.net> <520C3970.6000803@mira.net> Message-ID: Anti, I have downloaded Annika's paper and will listen to how she weaves together CHAT and frame analysis. Two quick comments. Greg asked about how we understand *agency* and if there are alternatives to *sovereign possessive agency* that continue to confirm *agency* but a less emphatic agency more receptive to emerging and participating within conversations. He also asked if settings or contexts also exhibit *agency* I believe this concept of agency has relevance. 2nd Metaphors may not be merely *vehicles* to carry *sense*. Metaphors may actually *be* ways of thinking [as modes, genres, tropes, or kinds]. Therefore Goffman's metaphor of *framing* biases us to modes of *seeing* and *perceiving* what PREVIOUSLY FORMED and this framing guides our anticipations going forward. John Shorter is *turning* our attention away from *framing* [not as misleading but as biased to understand as picturing] He is suggesting there is another realm [what he calls a third realm] that has remained invisible in plain sight. He calls this realm *conversational realities* which he suggests is entered through alternative metaphors AS *talking*. The central metaphor of *voice* as distinct from the metaphor of *framing*. Voice as metaphor moves to Bahktin and dialogue as emerging within micro processes. Mike cautions we are referring to different time scales. Shorter is also calling our attention to what is hidden in plain view. When talking we pay attention to processes of collaboration [Andy's 3 types]. I find Shotter's turning our attention to this third realm [captured in the metaphor of voice] adding a realm to Goffman's metaphor of framing [as previously FORMED frames] If these two alternative metaphors are making distinct a difference then a gap opens within which agency may enter as creative reflection. Question 1 on agency I hope can be further elaborated Larry On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 7:32 AM, Antti Rajala wrote: > Lubomir, thanks for suggesting symbolic interactionism as a frame of > incorporating these ideas. Anna-Maija Puroila discusses the legacies of > Goffman in her dissertation (in Finnish) and mentions that there are many > competing and contested interpretation's of Goffman's work. Some say that > his work was structuralist but more often he is associated with symbolic > interactionism, ethnomethodology, or phenomenological sociology. Where > would activity theory fit in among these? > > To me Goffman's student's Goodwin's ethno-methdological approach seems > partly compatible with CHAT. In his paper, Action and embodiment within > situated human interaction (2000), Goodwin writes: > > "This emphasis on cognition as a public, social process embedded within an > historically > shaped material world is quite consistent with both Vygotskian perspectives > and > recent work in the social and anthropological study of scientific and > workplace practice > ..., but adds to such perspectives an equally strong focus on the details > of language > use and conversational organization." > > Like Goodwin, I believe that this attention to details of language use and > conversational organization, and to embodied interactions, in particular, > can enrich CHAT analyses. After all, in many classical CHAT work, we mainly > see analyses of spoken interaction. Greg, to me Goodwin's work on > professional vision gives an elaborate account on the relationships between > meanings and sensory fabric. In particular, in my case of students in a > bird-watching field trip the way he analyzes expert-novice interaction is > very valuable. I can, for example, see lots of highlighting on the part of > the bird expert. > > Goodwin's focus on the practices of seeing seems to me very compatible with > Leontiev's theorizing of sensory fabric as constituting and being > constituted of action. Yet, in Goodwin's work the socio-emotional issues > brought in with the Leontiev's personal sense - in line with what Larry has > written - seems to be given less attention in Goodwin. I wonder whether > Goodwin's approach contradicts Leontiev's approach that emphasizes such > internal issues as goals and motives. In my understanding > ethnomethdologists do not usually focus on goals and such. > > The Gothenburg center lead by Roger S?lj? has explored ethnomethodological > inspired aspects of Goffman in relation to their version of sociocultural > perspective. See e.g the dissertation of Annika Lantz-Andersson: > https://gupea.ub.gu.se/bitstream/2077/19736/1/gupea_2077_19736_1.pdf > > Greg, Greeno has theorized the ways in which frames "create certain > affordances that solicit various types of behavior (whether 'cognitive', > 'emotional', or some other emically named type)." To my knowledge Greeno's > work here focuses more on cognitive aspects and not that much on emotional > aspects. He uses the notion of positioning in association with frames > (which he relates to Goffman). "This refers to ways in which an individual > is > entitled, expected, or perhaps obligated to participate in interactions of > an activity system, such as a classroom or an experimental session > involving interaction with a computer program." (see, A Theory Bite on > Contextualizing, Framing, and Positioning: A Companion to Son and > Goldstone, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07370000903014386) > > Greg wrote: > "I might add to this that Goffman speaks of the way in which motivations > are, to a certain extent, entailed by frames (yes, "to a certain extent" - > this does not mean the frames determine them!). Thus, frames bring with > them motivational relevancies as much as individuals do!" > > I wonder if this interplay between collective frames and individuals can be > conceptualized with meaning and sense. Object of an activity is framed in > terms of collectively shared meanings. Yet, each individual develops a > personal relationship to the object, that is, a personal sense. > > By the way, thanks Mike for pointing out this overstatement of stability > with respect to meanings. This has bothered me a lot, too. A colleague of > mine even asserts that sense is never shared enough to become legitimately > called a shared meaning in Vygotsky/Leontiev sense. > > Antti > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 3:01 AM, mike cole wrote: > > > I agree, very clearly statements of the sense/meaning relation, along > with > > the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I wanted to say, and > thought, > > unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows." > > > > In the quote here, I think LSV is somewhat overstating the stability of > > meaning across contexts; yes relative to the microgenetic processes of > > sense making capturable with > > modern technologies, but not totally "context independent." Even > dictionary > > meanings change, as LSV was well aware from his interest in the history > of > > words in relation to their appearance in children's vocabularies in > > ontogeny. > > > > Keeping the simultaneous relevance of several time scales in mind in > these > > discussions seems really important, as hard as it is to do. > > mike > > > > > > > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Mon Aug 19 11:19:16 2013 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Mon, 19 Aug 2013 12:19:16 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> <520444BA.2000808@mira.net> <520460F0.5030506@mira.net> <19E63C50-A0D2-4A0F-BBA7-63853414FDAA@gmail.com> <4195A368-C7B9-4AB0-AAA5-A244135DC331@gmail.com> <520ADCDD.9000406@mira.net> <520C3970.6000803@mira.net> Message-ID: Larry, Many thanks for this. These are wonderful connections. Don't know if I have the Shotter you are referring to. Do you have a cite? or perhaps could email me a paper offline? Also, I'm wondering if you could say more about Shotter's idea of a third realm. Again, I'm a little slow here - I didn't catch what the first and second realms were? And finally, could you elaborate a bit on what the third realm is? Thanks, -greg On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 11:06 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > Anti, > I have downloaded Annika's paper and will listen to how she weaves together > CHAT and frame analysis. > Two quick comments. > Greg asked about how we understand *agency* and if there are alternatives > to *sovereign possessive agency* that continue to confirm *agency* but a > less emphatic agency more receptive to emerging and participating within > conversations. He also asked if settings or contexts also exhibit *agency* > I believe this concept of agency has relevance. > 2nd > Metaphors may not be merely *vehicles* to carry *sense*. Metaphors may > actually *be* ways of thinking [as modes, genres, tropes, or kinds]. > Therefore Goffman's metaphor of *framing* biases us to modes of *seeing* > and *perceiving* what PREVIOUSLY FORMED and this framing guides our > anticipations going forward. > > John Shorter is *turning* our attention away from *framing* [not as > misleading but as biased to understand as picturing] > He is suggesting there is another realm [what he calls a third realm] that > has remained invisible in plain sight. > He calls this realm *conversational realities* which he suggests is entered > through alternative metaphors AS *talking*. > The central metaphor of *voice* as distinct from the metaphor of *framing*. > Voice as metaphor moves to Bahktin and dialogue as emerging within micro > processes. Mike cautions we are referring to different time scales. > Shorter is also calling our attention to what is hidden in plain view. When > talking we pay attention to processes of collaboration [Andy's 3 types]. I > find Shotter's turning our attention to this third realm [captured in the > metaphor of voice] adding a realm to Goffman's metaphor of framing [as > previously FORMED frames] > > If these two alternative metaphors are making distinct a difference then a > gap opens within which agency may enter as creative reflection. > Question 1 on agency I hope can be further elaborated > Larry > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 7:32 AM, Antti Rajala wrote: > > > Lubomir, thanks for suggesting symbolic interactionism as a frame of > > incorporating these ideas. Anna-Maija Puroila discusses the legacies of > > Goffman in her dissertation (in Finnish) and mentions that there are many > > competing and contested interpretation's of Goffman's work. Some say that > > his work was structuralist but more often he is associated with symbolic > > interactionism, ethnomethodology, or phenomenological sociology. Where > > would activity theory fit in among these? > > > > To me Goffman's student's Goodwin's ethno-methdological approach seems > > partly compatible with CHAT. In his paper, Action and embodiment within > > situated human interaction (2000), Goodwin writes: > > > > "This emphasis on cognition as a public, social process embedded within > an > > historically > > shaped material world is quite consistent with both Vygotskian > perspectives > > and > > recent work in the social and anthropological study of scientific and > > workplace practice > > ..., but adds to such perspectives an equally strong focus on the details > > of language > > use and conversational organization." > > > > Like Goodwin, I believe that this attention to details of language use > and > > conversational organization, and to embodied interactions, in particular, > > can enrich CHAT analyses. After all, in many classical CHAT work, we > mainly > > see analyses of spoken interaction. Greg, to me Goodwin's work on > > professional vision gives an elaborate account on the relationships > between > > meanings and sensory fabric. In particular, in my case of students in a > > bird-watching field trip the way he analyzes expert-novice interaction is > > very valuable. I can, for example, see lots of highlighting on the part > of > > the bird expert. > > > > Goodwin's focus on the practices of seeing seems to me very compatible > with > > Leontiev's theorizing of sensory fabric as constituting and being > > constituted of action. Yet, in Goodwin's work the socio-emotional issues > > brought in with the Leontiev's personal sense - in line with what Larry > has > > written - seems to be given less attention in Goodwin. I wonder whether > > Goodwin's approach contradicts Leontiev's approach that emphasizes such > > internal issues as goals and motives. In my understanding > > ethnomethdologists do not usually focus on goals and such. > > > > The Gothenburg center lead by Roger S?lj? has explored > ethnomethodological > > inspired aspects of Goffman in relation to their version of sociocultural > > perspective. See e.g the dissertation of Annika Lantz-Andersson: > > https://gupea.ub.gu.se/bitstream/2077/19736/1/gupea_2077_19736_1.pdf > > > > Greg, Greeno has theorized the ways in which frames "create certain > > affordances that solicit various types of behavior (whether 'cognitive', > > 'emotional', or some other emically named type)." To my knowledge > Greeno's > > work here focuses more on cognitive aspects and not that much on > emotional > > aspects. He uses the notion of positioning in association with frames > > (which he relates to Goffman). "This refers to ways in which an > individual > > is > > entitled, expected, or perhaps obligated to participate in interactions > of > > an activity system, such as a classroom or an experimental session > > involving interaction with a computer program." (see, A Theory Bite on > > Contextualizing, Framing, and Positioning: A Companion to Son and > > Goldstone, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07370000903014386) > > > > Greg wrote: > > "I might add to this that Goffman speaks of the way in which motivations > > are, to a certain extent, entailed by frames (yes, "to a certain extent" > - > > this does not mean the frames determine them!). Thus, frames bring with > > them motivational relevancies as much as individuals do!" > > > > I wonder if this interplay between collective frames and individuals can > be > > conceptualized with meaning and sense. Object of an activity is framed in > > terms of collectively shared meanings. Yet, each individual develops a > > personal relationship to the object, that is, a personal sense. > > > > By the way, thanks Mike for pointing out this overstatement of stability > > with respect to meanings. This has bothered me a lot, too. A colleague of > > mine even asserts that sense is never shared enough to become > legitimately > > called a shared meaning in Vygotsky/Leontiev sense. > > > > Antti > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 3:01 AM, mike cole wrote: > > > > > I agree, very clearly statements of the sense/meaning relation, along > > with > > > the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I wanted to say, and > > thought, > > > unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows." > > > > > > In the quote here, I think LSV is somewhat overstating the stability of > > > meaning across contexts; yes relative to the microgenetic processes of > > > sense making capturable with > > > modern technologies, but not totally "context independent." Even > > dictionary > > > meanings change, as LSV was well aware from his interest in the history > > of > > > words in relation to their appearance in children's vocabularies in > > > ontogeny. > > > > > > Keeping the simultaneous relevance of several time scales in mind in > > these > > > discussions seems really important, as hard as it is to do. > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Visiting Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From ajrajala@gmail.com Mon Aug 19 11:52:34 2013 From: ajrajala@gmail.com (Antti Rajala) Date: Mon, 19 Aug 2013 21:52:34 +0300 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> <520444BA.2000808@mira.net> <520460F0.5030506@mira.net> <19E63C50-A0D2-4A0F-BBA7-63853414FDAA@gmail.com> <4195A368-C7B9-4AB0-AAA5-A244135DC331@gmail.com> <520ADCDD.9000406@mira.net> <520C3970.6000803@mira.net> Message-ID: Larry, I am just reading Margaret Archer's wonderful book about agency: Being human. Archer reviews thoroughly four positions on agency. The first is enlightment's detached agent that reduces social structure to individual. The second is post modern social constructionist agency that reduces everything to social structures. She also refutes whar she calls the central conflationist position of Giddens that starts from the middle, seeing individual and social as constituted in relations. Her own critical realist position gives primacy to the causative powers of both individuals and social structure that are inter-related. Her writings bring to my mind a xmca debate about Billig's article a few years back. I guess chat people would pick a position similar to either third or fourth position on agency. I myself prefer the third one but I am sympatethic to the fourth one as well. Antti From smago@uga.edu Mon Aug 19 11:53:07 2013 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Mon, 19 Aug 2013 18:53:07 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] FW: An introduction to BOOC In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Dan has published from a Vygotskian perspective in the past: Dear Peter, I'm writing you today to tell you about a new online education project I've been working on this summer. With the help of a grant from Google, I've been developing a Big Open Online Course, or BOOC. BOOCs are free and open, similar to MOOCs, however, they use current Learning Sciences methods to offer more interactive and personalized experiences and deliver more efficient learning outcomes. Starting September 9th, I will be offering a BOOC called ?Educational Assessment: Practices, Principles, and Policies?. This eleven-week course builds on the ?Assessment in Schools? course I have been teaching online for many years. The BOOC will help teachers, faculty, administrators, researchers and others address the challenges of assessing student learning in classrooms, online, and in informal settings. Participants will learn (a) to select and use common formative and summative assessment formats, (b) key principles, like validity and reliability, and (c) current and enduring assessment policy issues. Those involved with K-12 schools in the US will be able learn about the new Common Core educational standards and Race to the Top accountability policies. My IU colleague, Cassandra Guarino, will share her expertise with the new ?value-added? teaching evaluation models that are now being introduced across the country. This BOOC will utilize Google's "Coursebuilder" app, which is part of Google's larger suite of online tools. In order to offer a highly interactive course involving up to 500 students, I've hired a team to develop custom User Interface, API and platform widgets. The BOOC will award digital ?expertise? badges for completing each section and an ?assessment expert? badge for completing the course via Mozilla?s Open Badges Initiative. Participants who need evidence for professional development purposes will be able to request an instructor-verified certificate that validates participation for 30 hours. There is also an option of enrolling in a regular 3-credit graduate-level course at Indiana University (requires tuition and includes additional assignments and weekly interaction with me). Please consider this email as my formal invitation to join us for our first BOOC starting September 9, 2013, and it is my request that you share this invitation with anyone who might be interested. With anticipation of accommodating all those who are interested, we have created a "Pre-Registration" system that allows us to invite people before the course starts. Because the BOOC is capped at 500 official participants, Pre-Registering will guarantee we will notify you when " Registration Confirmation" is open, which is required by all those interested in taking the course. You can visit: https://booc-iu.appspot.com/register to sign up. For more information on the course, our website is: www.indiana.edu/~booc [https://gallery.mailchimp.com/a66faf3753b5fd612b2103d4f/images/Banner_WebRes.jpg] Sincerely, Daniel T. Hickey, PhD [http://cdn-images.mailchimp.com/icons/social-block/color-link-128.png] Course [http://cdn-images.mailchimp.com/icons/social-block/color-facebook-128.png] Facebook [http://cdn-images.mailchimp.com/icons/social-block/color-twitter-128.png] Twitter [http://cdn-images.mailchimp.com/icons/social-block/color-forwardtofriend-128.png] Email Us [http://cdn-images.mailchimp.com/icons/social-block/color-link-128.png] BOOC Website [BOOC - Big Open Online Courses by Daniel Hickey] Copyright ? 2013 BOOC in Center for Research on Learning & Technology, All rights reserved. You are receiving this email because you are a colleague of Dr. Daniel T. Hickey. Our mailing address is: BOOC in Center for Research on Learning & Technology 1900 East Tenth Street, Bloomington, IN Indiana University Bloomington, IN 47408 Add us to your address book unsubscribe from this list update subscription preferences From lpscholar2@gmail.com Mon Aug 19 12:23:48 2013 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Mon, 19 Aug 2013 12:23:48 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> <520444BA.2000808@mira.net> <520460F0.5030506@mira.net> <19E63C50-A0D2-4A0F-BBA7-63853414FDAA@gmail.com> <4195A368-C7B9-4AB0-AAA5-A244135DC331@gmail.com> <520ADCDD.9000406@mira.net> <520C3970.6000803@mira.net> Message-ID: Greg, John, wrote a book titled *Conversational Realities* He suggests three realms of knowing. 1] knowing that 2] knowing how 3] knowing from or knowing within. Here is a comment from Annika's paper describing *learning activity*. "Learning activity as a concept REFERS to the meaning making AS how students engage in collaborative tasks and not what they learn." Greg, I *read* this explanation as a form of conversational knowing addressing knowing as a knowing HOW. John would say this explanation is composed in a *referential-representational* mode of knowing. Knowing of the second kind. On page 18 of John's book in a section titled "knowing of the third kind: Knowing from WITHIN" he elaborates the distinction between realms. Knowing how is participating and collaborating and instituting various centers of institutionalized social life and knowing how is knowing the permitted forms of talk within the institution [discursive discourses] John argues there are many other forms of talk currently without a *voice* which have their own properties. If these modes of talking were to gain a *voice* it could transform our lives. This special kind of *unvoiced* knowledge is NOT formalized into theoretical knowledge. [Knowing that in Ryle's term for theoretical knowledge.] This *unvoiced* knowledge is knowledge of a third kind that cannot be reduced to either knowing-that or knowing-how [skillful knowing]. This third kind of knowledge is knowing FROM-WITHIN a situation, institution or society. Greg, John Shotter's book explores the various implications of giving this knowing from-within a clear and distinct voice. Wittgenstein used the metaphor of *crisscrossing* to explore the *language-games* that have developed within the relatively bounded and sedimented multiple CENTERS of institutionalized discourse as already FORMED. [framed analysis of formed knowing-how]. John is fascinated by the disorganized, uncertain, unformulated ways of talking that are negotiated as common *sense* beyond the centers of already formed discourse. He is suggesting this is a rhetorical-RESPONSIVE third realm of practical knowing [Gadamer's phronesis]. It is the realm of *voice* distinct from the realm of *framing*. John suggests it is within this third realm of *joint action* that the FELT MOVEMENT [experienced as vitality] emerges within perception and action. Greg, I hope this was clear? His book also has a section on *Vico* and the concept of *communis sensus* A section on Bahktin and dialogue. And a section on Vygotsky. All contributing to bring to *voice* knowing FROM WITHIN joint action. Larry On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 11:19 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Larry, > Many thanks for this. These are wonderful connections. > Don't know if I have the Shotter you are referring to. Do you have a cite? > or perhaps could email me a paper offline? > Also, I'm wondering if you could say more about Shotter's idea of a third > realm. Again, I'm a little slow here - I didn't catch what the first and > second realms were? > And finally, could you elaborate a bit on what the third realm is? > Thanks, > -greg > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 11:06 AM, Larry Purss > wrote: > > > Anti, > > I have downloaded Annika's paper and will listen to how she weaves > together > > CHAT and frame analysis. > > Two quick comments. > > Greg asked about how we understand *agency* and if there are alternatives > > to *sovereign possessive agency* that continue to confirm *agency* but a > > less emphatic agency more receptive to emerging and participating within > > conversations. He also asked if settings or contexts also exhibit > *agency* > > I believe this concept of agency has relevance. > > 2nd > > Metaphors may not be merely *vehicles* to carry *sense*. Metaphors may > > actually *be* ways of thinking [as modes, genres, tropes, or kinds]. > > Therefore Goffman's metaphor of *framing* biases us to modes of *seeing* > > and *perceiving* what PREVIOUSLY FORMED and this framing guides our > > anticipations going forward. > > > > John Shorter is *turning* our attention away from *framing* [not as > > misleading but as biased to understand as picturing] > > He is suggesting there is another realm [what he calls a third realm] > that > > has remained invisible in plain sight. > > He calls this realm *conversational realities* which he suggests is > entered > > through alternative metaphors AS *talking*. > > The central metaphor of *voice* as distinct from the metaphor of > *framing*. > > Voice as metaphor moves to Bahktin and dialogue as emerging within micro > > processes. Mike cautions we are referring to different time scales. > > Shorter is also calling our attention to what is hidden in plain view. > When > > talking we pay attention to processes of collaboration [Andy's 3 types]. > I > > find Shotter's turning our attention to this third realm [captured in the > > metaphor of voice] adding a realm to Goffman's metaphor of framing [as > > previously FORMED frames] > > > > If these two alternative metaphors are making distinct a difference then > a > > gap opens within which agency may enter as creative reflection. > > Question 1 on agency I hope can be further elaborated > > Larry > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 7:32 AM, Antti Rajala > wrote: > > > > > Lubomir, thanks for suggesting symbolic interactionism as a frame of > > > incorporating these ideas. Anna-Maija Puroila discusses the legacies of > > > Goffman in her dissertation (in Finnish) and mentions that there are > many > > > competing and contested interpretation's of Goffman's work. Some say > that > > > his work was structuralist but more often he is associated with > symbolic > > > interactionism, ethnomethodology, or phenomenological sociology. Where > > > would activity theory fit in among these? > > > > > > To me Goffman's student's Goodwin's ethno-methdological approach seems > > > partly compatible with CHAT. In his paper, Action and embodiment within > > > situated human interaction (2000), Goodwin writes: > > > > > > "This emphasis on cognition as a public, social process embedded within > > an > > > historically > > > shaped material world is quite consistent with both Vygotskian > > perspectives > > > and > > > recent work in the social and anthropological study of scientific and > > > workplace practice > > > ..., but adds to such perspectives an equally strong focus on the > details > > > of language > > > use and conversational organization." > > > > > > Like Goodwin, I believe that this attention to details of language use > > and > > > conversational organization, and to embodied interactions, in > particular, > > > can enrich CHAT analyses. After all, in many classical CHAT work, we > > mainly > > > see analyses of spoken interaction. Greg, to me Goodwin's work on > > > professional vision gives an elaborate account on the relationships > > between > > > meanings and sensory fabric. In particular, in my case of students in a > > > bird-watching field trip the way he analyzes expert-novice interaction > is > > > very valuable. I can, for example, see lots of highlighting on the part > > of > > > the bird expert. > > > > > > Goodwin's focus on the practices of seeing seems to me very compatible > > with > > > Leontiev's theorizing of sensory fabric as constituting and being > > > constituted of action. Yet, in Goodwin's work the socio-emotional > issues > > > brought in with the Leontiev's personal sense - in line with what Larry > > has > > > written - seems to be given less attention in Goodwin. I wonder whether > > > Goodwin's approach contradicts Leontiev's approach that emphasizes such > > > internal issues as goals and motives. In my understanding > > > ethnomethdologists do not usually focus on goals and such. > > > > > > The Gothenburg center lead by Roger S?lj? has explored > > ethnomethodological > > > inspired aspects of Goffman in relation to their version of > sociocultural > > > perspective. See e.g the dissertation of Annika Lantz-Andersson: > > > https://gupea.ub.gu.se/bitstream/2077/19736/1/gupea_2077_19736_1.pdf > > > > > > Greg, Greeno has theorized the ways in which frames "create certain > > > affordances that solicit various types of behavior (whether > 'cognitive', > > > 'emotional', or some other emically named type)." To my knowledge > > Greeno's > > > work here focuses more on cognitive aspects and not that much on > > emotional > > > aspects. He uses the notion of positioning in association with frames > > > (which he relates to Goffman). "This refers to ways in which an > > individual > > > is > > > entitled, expected, or perhaps obligated to participate in interactions > > of > > > an activity system, such as a classroom or an experimental session > > > involving interaction with a computer program." (see, A Theory Bite on > > > Contextualizing, Framing, and Positioning: A Companion to Son and > > > Goldstone, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07370000903014386) > > > > > > Greg wrote: > > > "I might add to this that Goffman speaks of the way in which > motivations > > > are, to a certain extent, entailed by frames (yes, "to a certain > extent" > > - > > > this does not mean the frames determine them!). Thus, frames bring with > > > them motivational relevancies as much as individuals do!" > > > > > > I wonder if this interplay between collective frames and individuals > can > > be > > > conceptualized with meaning and sense. Object of an activity is framed > in > > > terms of collectively shared meanings. Yet, each individual develops a > > > personal relationship to the object, that is, a personal sense. > > > > > > By the way, thanks Mike for pointing out this overstatement of > stability > > > with respect to meanings. This has bothered me a lot, too. A colleague > of > > > mine even asserts that sense is never shared enough to become > > legitimately > > > called a shared meaning in Vygotsky/Leontiev sense. > > > > > > Antti > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 3:01 AM, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > > I agree, very clearly statements of the sense/meaning relation, along > > > with > > > > the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I wanted to say, and > > > thought, > > > > unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows." > > > > > > > > In the quote here, I think LSV is somewhat overstating the stability > of > > > > meaning across contexts; yes relative to the microgenetic processes > of > > > > sense making capturable with > > > > modern technologies, but not totally "context independent." Even > > > dictionary > > > > meanings change, as LSV was well aware from his interest in the > history > > > of > > > > words in relation to their appearance in children's vocabularies in > > > > ontogeny. > > > > > > > > Keeping the simultaneous relevance of several time scales in mind in > > > these > > > > discussions seems really important, as hard as it is to do. > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Visiting Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Mon Aug 19 13:27:20 2013 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Mon, 19 Aug 2013 14:27:20 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> <520444BA.2000808@mira.net> <520460F0.5030506@mira.net> <19E63C50-A0D2-4A0F-BBA7-63853414FDAA@gmail.com> <4195A368-C7B9-4AB0-AAA5-A244135DC331@gmail.com> <520ADCDD.9000406@mira.net> <520C3970.6000803@mira.net> Message-ID: Larry, This is great. So I'm still a little confused at the notion of voice. You write: "John argues there are many other forms of talk currently without a *voice* which have their own properties. If these modes of talking were to gain a *voice* it could transform our lives. This special kind of *unvoiced* knowledge is NOT formalized into theoretical knowledge. [Knowing that in Ryle's term for theoretical knowledge.]" In the first sentence, did you mean to say that forms of talk have a "voice"? That kind of threw me. I'm used to people talking about people having voices or people being able to call upon voices that exist in some cultural real. If forms of talk can have "voices", then I'd certainly like to hear more about that. What exactly does Shotter mean by "voice"? -greg p.s. I'm wondering if this conversation should move off the list since this is probably review (or of little relevance) for many people on the list. On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 1:23 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > Greg, > John, wrote a book titled *Conversational Realities* > He suggests three realms of knowing. > 1] knowing that > 2] knowing how > 3] knowing from or knowing within. > > Here is a comment from Annika's paper describing *learning activity*. > "Learning activity as a concept REFERS to the meaning making AS how > students engage in collaborative tasks and not what they learn." > > Greg, I *read* this explanation as a form of conversational knowing > addressing knowing as a knowing HOW. > John would say this explanation is composed in a > *referential-representational* mode of knowing. Knowing of the second kind. > > On page 18 of John's book in a section titled "knowing of the third kind: > Knowing from WITHIN" he elaborates the distinction between realms. Knowing > how is participating and collaborating and instituting various centers of > institutionalized social life and knowing how is knowing the permitted > forms of talk within the institution [discursive discourses] > > John argues there are many other forms of talk currently without a *voice* > which have their own properties. If these modes of talking were to gain a > *voice* it could transform our lives. This special kind of *unvoiced* > knowledge is NOT formalized into theoretical knowledge. [Knowing that in > Ryle's term for theoretical knowledge.] > > This *unvoiced* knowledge is knowledge of a third kind that cannot be > reduced to either knowing-that or knowing-how [skillful knowing]. This > third kind of knowledge is knowing FROM-WITHIN a situation, institution or > society. > Greg, John Shotter's book explores the various implications of giving this > knowing from-within a clear and distinct voice. > Wittgenstein used the metaphor of *crisscrossing* to explore the > *language-games* that have developed within the relatively bounded and > sedimented multiple CENTERS of institutionalized discourse as already > FORMED. [framed analysis of formed knowing-how]. John is fascinated by the > disorganized, uncertain, unformulated ways of talking that are negotiated > as common *sense* beyond the centers of already formed discourse. > He is suggesting this is a rhetorical-RESPONSIVE third realm of practical > knowing [Gadamer's phronesis]. It is the realm of *voice* distinct from the > realm of *framing*. > John suggests it is within this third realm of *joint action* that the FELT > MOVEMENT [experienced as vitality] emerges within perception and action. > > Greg, I hope this was clear? > His book also has a section on *Vico* and the concept of *communis sensus* > A section on Bahktin and dialogue. > And a section on Vygotsky. > > All contributing to bring to *voice* knowing FROM WITHIN joint action. > > Larry > > > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 11:19 AM, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > > Larry, > > Many thanks for this. These are wonderful connections. > > Don't know if I have the Shotter you are referring to. Do you have a > cite? > > or perhaps could email me a paper offline? > > Also, I'm wondering if you could say more about Shotter's idea of a third > > realm. Again, I'm a little slow here - I didn't catch what the first and > > second realms were? > > And finally, could you elaborate a bit on what the third realm is? > > Thanks, > > -greg > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 11:06 AM, Larry Purss > > wrote: > > > > > Anti, > > > I have downloaded Annika's paper and will listen to how she weaves > > together > > > CHAT and frame analysis. > > > Two quick comments. > > > Greg asked about how we understand *agency* and if there are > alternatives > > > to *sovereign possessive agency* that continue to confirm *agency* but > a > > > less emphatic agency more receptive to emerging and participating > within > > > conversations. He also asked if settings or contexts also exhibit > > *agency* > > > I believe this concept of agency has relevance. > > > 2nd > > > Metaphors may not be merely *vehicles* to carry *sense*. Metaphors may > > > actually *be* ways of thinking [as modes, genres, tropes, or kinds]. > > > Therefore Goffman's metaphor of *framing* biases us to modes of > *seeing* > > > and *perceiving* what PREVIOUSLY FORMED and this framing guides our > > > anticipations going forward. > > > > > > John Shorter is *turning* our attention away from *framing* [not as > > > misleading but as biased to understand as picturing] > > > He is suggesting there is another realm [what he calls a third realm] > > that > > > has remained invisible in plain sight. > > > He calls this realm *conversational realities* which he suggests is > > entered > > > through alternative metaphors AS *talking*. > > > The central metaphor of *voice* as distinct from the metaphor of > > *framing*. > > > Voice as metaphor moves to Bahktin and dialogue as emerging within > micro > > > processes. Mike cautions we are referring to different time scales. > > > Shorter is also calling our attention to what is hidden in plain view. > > When > > > talking we pay attention to processes of collaboration [Andy's 3 > types]. > > I > > > find Shotter's turning our attention to this third realm [captured in > the > > > metaphor of voice] adding a realm to Goffman's metaphor of framing [as > > > previously FORMED frames] > > > > > > If these two alternative metaphors are making distinct a difference > then > > a > > > gap opens within which agency may enter as creative reflection. > > > Question 1 on agency I hope can be further elaborated > > > Larry > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 7:32 AM, Antti Rajala > > wrote: > > > > > > > Lubomir, thanks for suggesting symbolic interactionism as a frame of > > > > incorporating these ideas. Anna-Maija Puroila discusses the legacies > of > > > > Goffman in her dissertation (in Finnish) and mentions that there are > > many > > > > competing and contested interpretation's of Goffman's work. Some say > > that > > > > his work was structuralist but more often he is associated with > > symbolic > > > > interactionism, ethnomethodology, or phenomenological sociology. > Where > > > > would activity theory fit in among these? > > > > > > > > To me Goffman's student's Goodwin's ethno-methdological approach > seems > > > > partly compatible with CHAT. In his paper, Action and embodiment > within > > > > situated human interaction (2000), Goodwin writes: > > > > > > > > "This emphasis on cognition as a public, social process embedded > within > > > an > > > > historically > > > > shaped material world is quite consistent with both Vygotskian > > > perspectives > > > > and > > > > recent work in the social and anthropological study of scientific and > > > > workplace practice > > > > ..., but adds to such perspectives an equally strong focus on the > > details > > > > of language > > > > use and conversational organization." > > > > > > > > Like Goodwin, I believe that this attention to details of language > use > > > and > > > > conversational organization, and to embodied interactions, in > > particular, > > > > can enrich CHAT analyses. After all, in many classical CHAT work, we > > > mainly > > > > see analyses of spoken interaction. Greg, to me Goodwin's work on > > > > professional vision gives an elaborate account on the relationships > > > between > > > > meanings and sensory fabric. In particular, in my case of students > in a > > > > bird-watching field trip the way he analyzes expert-novice > interaction > > is > > > > very valuable. I can, for example, see lots of highlighting on the > part > > > of > > > > the bird expert. > > > > > > > > Goodwin's focus on the practices of seeing seems to me very > compatible > > > with > > > > Leontiev's theorizing of sensory fabric as constituting and being > > > > constituted of action. Yet, in Goodwin's work the socio-emotional > > issues > > > > brought in with the Leontiev's personal sense - in line with what > Larry > > > has > > > > written - seems to be given less attention in Goodwin. I wonder > whether > > > > Goodwin's approach contradicts Leontiev's approach that emphasizes > such > > > > internal issues as goals and motives. In my understanding > > > > ethnomethdologists do not usually focus on goals and such. > > > > > > > > The Gothenburg center lead by Roger S?lj? has explored > > > ethnomethodological > > > > inspired aspects of Goffman in relation to their version of > > sociocultural > > > > perspective. See e.g the dissertation of Annika Lantz-Andersson: > > > > https://gupea.ub.gu.se/bitstream/2077/19736/1/gupea_2077_19736_1.pdf > > > > > > > > Greg, Greeno has theorized the ways in which frames "create certain > > > > affordances that solicit various types of behavior (whether > > 'cognitive', > > > > 'emotional', or some other emically named type)." To my knowledge > > > Greeno's > > > > work here focuses more on cognitive aspects and not that much on > > > emotional > > > > aspects. He uses the notion of positioning in association with frames > > > > (which he relates to Goffman). "This refers to ways in which an > > > individual > > > > is > > > > entitled, expected, or perhaps obligated to participate in > interactions > > > of > > > > an activity system, such as a classroom or an experimental session > > > > involving interaction with a computer program." (see, A Theory Bite > on > > > > Contextualizing, Framing, and Positioning: A Companion to Son and > > > > Goldstone, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07370000903014386) > > > > > > > > Greg wrote: > > > > "I might add to this that Goffman speaks of the way in which > > motivations > > > > are, to a certain extent, entailed by frames (yes, "to a certain > > extent" > > > - > > > > this does not mean the frames determine them!). Thus, frames bring > with > > > > them motivational relevancies as much as individuals do!" > > > > > > > > I wonder if this interplay between collective frames and individuals > > can > > > be > > > > conceptualized with meaning and sense. Object of an activity is > framed > > in > > > > terms of collectively shared meanings. Yet, each individual develops > a > > > > personal relationship to the object, that is, a personal sense. > > > > > > > > By the way, thanks Mike for pointing out this overstatement of > > stability > > > > with respect to meanings. This has bothered me a lot, too. A > colleague > > of > > > > mine even asserts that sense is never shared enough to become > > > legitimately > > > > called a shared meaning in Vygotsky/Leontiev sense. > > > > > > > > Antti > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 3:01 AM, mike cole > wrote: > > > > > > > > > I agree, very clearly statements of the sense/meaning relation, > along > > > > with > > > > > the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I wanted to say, and > > > > thought, > > > > > unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows." > > > > > > > > > > In the quote here, I think LSV is somewhat overstating the > stability > > of > > > > > meaning across contexts; yes relative to the microgenetic processes > > of > > > > > sense making capturable with > > > > > modern technologies, but not totally "context independent." Even > > > > dictionary > > > > > meanings change, as LSV was well aware from his interest in the > > history > > > > of > > > > > words in relation to their appearance in children's vocabularies in > > > > > ontogeny. > > > > > > > > > > Keeping the simultaneous relevance of several time scales in mind > in > > > > these > > > > > discussions seems really important, as hard as it is to do. > > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Visiting Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Visiting Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From lspopov@bgsu.edu Mon Aug 19 13:32:10 2013 From: lspopov@bgsu.edu (Lubomir Savov Popov) Date: Mon, 19 Aug 2013 20:32:10 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> <520444BA.2000808@mira.net> <520460F0.5030506@mira.net> <19E63C50-A0D2-4A0F-BBA7-63853414FDAA@gmail.com> <4195A368-C7B9-4AB0-AAA5-A244135DC331@gmail.com> <520ADCDD.9000406@mira.net> <520C3970.6000803@mira.net> Message-ID: <4DF034EF2396694597A7D328E23F09E10127DF@BY2PRD0510MB353.namprd05.prod.outlook.com> Hi Larry and Greg, After we start searching for clarifications, let's explore one more option: How is KNOWING WITHIN different from tacit knowledge/tacit knowing, intuitive ways of knowing, and the umbrella concept of personal knowledge? I see here different paradigmatic translations of similar ideas that will lead to different discourses. They will bring forward different major issues. And they will utilize different languages. Etc. Also, about VOICE. This concept brings particular paradigmatic expectations and directions for the type of discourse we have to follow. But that discourse is different from the typical AT discourse. The challenge is how to put them together. Will this lead to a new paradigm? Where should we search for a solution? Which are the boundaries of the solution space? And so forth. Best, Lubomir -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry Purss Sent: Monday, August 19, 2013 3:24 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities Greg, John, wrote a book titled *Conversational Realities* He suggests three realms of knowing. 1] knowing that 2] knowing how 3] knowing from or knowing within. Here is a comment from Annika's paper describing *learning activity*. "Learning activity as a concept REFERS to the meaning making AS how students engage in collaborative tasks and not what they learn." Greg, I *read* this explanation as a form of conversational knowing addressing knowing as a knowing HOW. John would say this explanation is composed in a *referential-representational* mode of knowing. Knowing of the second kind. On page 18 of John's book in a section titled "knowing of the third kind: Knowing from WITHIN" he elaborates the distinction between realms. Knowing how is participating and collaborating and instituting various centers of institutionalized social life and knowing how is knowing the permitted forms of talk within the institution [discursive discourses] John argues there are many other forms of talk currently without a *voice* which have their own properties. If these modes of talking were to gain a *voice* it could transform our lives. This special kind of *unvoiced* knowledge is NOT formalized into theoretical knowledge. [Knowing that in Ryle's term for theoretical knowledge.] This *unvoiced* knowledge is knowledge of a third kind that cannot be reduced to either knowing-that or knowing-how [skillful knowing]. This third kind of knowledge is knowing FROM-WITHIN a situation, institution or society. Greg, John Shotter's book explores the various implications of giving this knowing from-within a clear and distinct voice. Wittgenstein used the metaphor of *crisscrossing* to explore the *language-games* that have developed within the relatively bounded and sedimented multiple CENTERS of institutionalized discourse as already FORMED. [framed analysis of formed knowing-how]. John is fascinated by the disorganized, uncertain, unformulated ways of talking that are negotiated as common *sense* beyond the centers of already formed discourse. He is suggesting this is a rhetorical-RESPONSIVE third realm of practical knowing [Gadamer's phronesis]. It is the realm of *voice* distinct from the realm of *framing*. John suggests it is within this third realm of *joint action* that the FELT MOVEMENT [experienced as vitality] emerges within perception and action. Greg, I hope this was clear? His book also has a section on *Vico* and the concept of *communis sensus* A section on Bahktin and dialogue. And a section on Vygotsky. All contributing to bring to *voice* knowing FROM WITHIN joint action. Larry On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 11:19 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Larry, > Many thanks for this. These are wonderful connections. > Don't know if I have the Shotter you are referring to. Do you have a cite? > or perhaps could email me a paper offline? > Also, I'm wondering if you could say more about Shotter's idea of a > third realm. Again, I'm a little slow here - I didn't catch what the > first and second realms were? > And finally, could you elaborate a bit on what the third realm is? > Thanks, > -greg > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 11:06 AM, Larry Purss > wrote: > > > Anti, > > I have downloaded Annika's paper and will listen to how she weaves > together > > CHAT and frame analysis. > > Two quick comments. > > Greg asked about how we understand *agency* and if there are > > alternatives to *sovereign possessive agency* that continue to > > confirm *agency* but a less emphatic agency more receptive to > > emerging and participating within conversations. He also asked if > > settings or contexts also exhibit > *agency* > > I believe this concept of agency has relevance. > > 2nd > > Metaphors may not be merely *vehicles* to carry *sense*. Metaphors > > may actually *be* ways of thinking [as modes, genres, tropes, or kinds]. > > Therefore Goffman's metaphor of *framing* biases us to modes of > > *seeing* and *perceiving* what PREVIOUSLY FORMED and this framing > > guides our anticipations going forward. > > > > John Shorter is *turning* our attention away from *framing* [not as > > misleading but as biased to understand as picturing] He is > > suggesting there is another realm [what he calls a third realm] > that > > has remained invisible in plain sight. > > He calls this realm *conversational realities* which he suggests is > entered > > through alternative metaphors AS *talking*. > > The central metaphor of *voice* as distinct from the metaphor of > *framing*. > > Voice as metaphor moves to Bahktin and dialogue as emerging within > > micro processes. Mike cautions we are referring to different time scales. > > Shorter is also calling our attention to what is hidden in plain view. > When > > talking we pay attention to processes of collaboration [Andy's 3 types]. > I > > find Shotter's turning our attention to this third realm [captured > > in the metaphor of voice] adding a realm to Goffman's metaphor of > > framing [as previously FORMED frames] > > > > If these two alternative metaphors are making distinct a difference > > then > a > > gap opens within which agency may enter as creative reflection. > > Question 1 on agency I hope can be further elaborated Larry > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 7:32 AM, Antti Rajala > wrote: > > > > > Lubomir, thanks for suggesting symbolic interactionism as a frame of > > > incorporating these ideas. Anna-Maija Puroila discusses the legacies of > > > Goffman in her dissertation (in Finnish) and mentions that there are > many > > > competing and contested interpretation's of Goffman's work. Some say > that > > > his work was structuralist but more often he is associated with > symbolic > > > interactionism, ethnomethodology, or phenomenological sociology. Where > > > would activity theory fit in among these? > > > > > > To me Goffman's student's Goodwin's ethno-methdological approach seems > > > partly compatible with CHAT. In his paper, Action and embodiment within > > > situated human interaction (2000), Goodwin writes: > > > > > > "This emphasis on cognition as a public, social process embedded within > > an > > > historically > > > shaped material world is quite consistent with both Vygotskian > > perspectives > > > and > > > recent work in the social and anthropological study of scientific and > > > workplace practice > > > ..., but adds to such perspectives an equally strong focus on the > details > > > of language > > > use and conversational organization." > > > > > > Like Goodwin, I believe that this attention to details of language use > > and > > > conversational organization, and to embodied interactions, in > particular, > > > can enrich CHAT analyses. After all, in many classical CHAT work, we > > mainly > > > see analyses of spoken interaction. Greg, to me Goodwin's work on > > > professional vision gives an elaborate account on the relationships > > between > > > meanings and sensory fabric. In particular, in my case of students in a > > > bird-watching field trip the way he analyzes expert-novice interaction > is > > > very valuable. I can, for example, see lots of highlighting on the part > > of > > > the bird expert. > > > > > > Goodwin's focus on the practices of seeing seems to me very compatible > > with > > > Leontiev's theorizing of sensory fabric as constituting and being > > > constituted of action. Yet, in Goodwin's work the socio-emotional > issues > > > brought in with the Leontiev's personal sense - in line with what Larry > > has > > > written - seems to be given less attention in Goodwin. I wonder whether > > > Goodwin's approach contradicts Leontiev's approach that emphasizes such > > > internal issues as goals and motives. In my understanding > > > ethnomethdologists do not usually focus on goals and such. > > > > > > The Gothenburg center lead by Roger S?lj? has explored > > ethnomethodological > > > inspired aspects of Goffman in relation to their version of > sociocultural > > > perspective. See e.g the dissertation of Annika Lantz-Andersson: > > > https://gupea.ub.gu.se/bitstream/2077/19736/1/gupea_2077_19736_1.pdf > > > > > > Greg, Greeno has theorized the ways in which frames "create certain > > > affordances that solicit various types of behavior (whether > 'cognitive', > > > 'emotional', or some other emically named type)." To my knowledge > > Greeno's > > > work here focuses more on cognitive aspects and not that much on > > emotional > > > aspects. He uses the notion of positioning in association with frames > > > (which he relates to Goffman). "This refers to ways in which an > > individual > > > is > > > entitled, expected, or perhaps obligated to participate in interactions > > of > > > an activity system, such as a classroom or an experimental session > > > involving interaction with a computer program." (see, A Theory Bite on > > > Contextualizing, Framing, and Positioning: A Companion to Son and > > > Goldstone, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07370000903014386) > > > > > > Greg wrote: > > > "I might add to this that Goffman speaks of the way in which > motivations > > > are, to a certain extent, entailed by frames (yes, "to a certain > extent" > > - > > > this does not mean the frames determine them!). Thus, frames bring with > > > them motivational relevancies as much as individuals do!" > > > > > > I wonder if this interplay between collective frames and individuals > can > > be > > > conceptualized with meaning and sense. Object of an activity is framed > in > > > terms of collectively shared meanings. Yet, each individual develops a > > > personal relationship to the object, that is, a personal sense. > > > > > > By the way, thanks Mike for pointing out this overstatement of > stability > > > with respect to meanings. This has bothered me a lot, too. A colleague > of > > > mine even asserts that sense is never shared enough to become > > legitimately > > > called a shared meaning in Vygotsky/Leontiev sense. > > > > > > Antti > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 3:01 AM, mike cole wrote: > > > > > > > I agree, very clearly statements of the sense/meaning relation, along > > > with > > > > the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I wanted to say, and > > > thought, > > > > unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows." > > > > > > > > In the quote here, I think LSV is somewhat overstating the stability > of > > > > meaning across contexts; yes relative to the microgenetic processes > of > > > > sense making capturable with > > > > modern technologies, but not totally "context independent." Even > > > dictionary > > > > meanings change, as LSV was well aware from his interest in the > history > > > of > > > > words in relation to their appearance in children's vocabularies in > > > > ontogeny. > > > > > > > > Keeping the simultaneous relevance of several time scales in mind in > > > these > > > > discussions seems really important, as hard as it is to do. > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Visiting Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Mon Aug 19 13:34:55 2013 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Mon, 19 Aug 2013 21:34:55 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> <520444BA.2000808@mira.net> <520460F0.5030506@mira.net> <19E63C50-A0D2-4A0F-BBA7-63853414FDAA@gmail.com> <4195A368-C7B9-4AB0-AAA5-A244135DC331@gmail.com> <520ADCDD.9000406@mira.net> <520C3970.6000803@mira.net> Message-ID: I don't mind the chatter. :) But I am not clear on what you're trying to achieve. Is there something you wish to reveal or analyse, or is this more about understanding social situations. Huw On 19 August 2013 21:27, Greg Thompson wrote: > Larry, > This is great. > So I'm still a little confused at the notion of voice. You write: > "John argues there are many other forms of talk currently without a *voice* > which have their own properties. If these modes of talking were to gain a > *voice* it could transform our lives. This special kind of *unvoiced* > knowledge is NOT formalized into theoretical knowledge. [Knowing that in > Ryle's term for theoretical knowledge.]" > > In the first sentence, did you mean to say that forms of talk have a > "voice"? That kind of threw me. I'm used to people talking about people > having voices or people being able to call upon voices that exist in some > cultural real. If forms of talk can have "voices", then I'd certainly like > to hear more about that. What exactly does Shotter mean by "voice"? > > -greg > p.s. I'm wondering if this conversation should move off the list since this > is probably review (or of little relevance) for many people on the list. > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 1:23 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > Greg, > > John, wrote a book titled *Conversational Realities* > > He suggests three realms of knowing. > > 1] knowing that > > 2] knowing how > > 3] knowing from or knowing within. > > > > Here is a comment from Annika's paper describing *learning activity*. > > "Learning activity as a concept REFERS to the meaning making AS how > > students engage in collaborative tasks and not what they learn." > > > > Greg, I *read* this explanation as a form of conversational knowing > > addressing knowing as a knowing HOW. > > John would say this explanation is composed in a > > *referential-representational* mode of knowing. Knowing of the second > kind. > > > > On page 18 of John's book in a section titled "knowing of the third kind: > > Knowing from WITHIN" he elaborates the distinction between realms. > Knowing > > how is participating and collaborating and instituting various centers of > > institutionalized social life and knowing how is knowing the permitted > > forms of talk within the institution [discursive discourses] > > > > John argues there are many other forms of talk currently without a > *voice* > > which have their own properties. If these modes of talking were to gain a > > *voice* it could transform our lives. This special kind of *unvoiced* > > knowledge is NOT formalized into theoretical knowledge. [Knowing that in > > Ryle's term for theoretical knowledge.] > > > > This *unvoiced* knowledge is knowledge of a third kind that cannot be > > reduced to either knowing-that or knowing-how [skillful knowing]. This > > third kind of knowledge is knowing FROM-WITHIN a situation, institution > or > > society. > > Greg, John Shotter's book explores the various implications of giving > this > > knowing from-within a clear and distinct voice. > > Wittgenstein used the metaphor of *crisscrossing* to explore the > > *language-games* that have developed within the relatively bounded and > > sedimented multiple CENTERS of institutionalized discourse as already > > FORMED. [framed analysis of formed knowing-how]. John is fascinated by > the > > disorganized, uncertain, unformulated ways of talking that are negotiated > > as common *sense* beyond the centers of already formed discourse. > > He is suggesting this is a rhetorical-RESPONSIVE third realm of practical > > knowing [Gadamer's phronesis]. It is the realm of *voice* distinct from > the > > realm of *framing*. > > John suggests it is within this third realm of *joint action* that the > FELT > > MOVEMENT [experienced as vitality] emerges within perception and action. > > > > Greg, I hope this was clear? > > His book also has a section on *Vico* and the concept of *communis > sensus* > > A section on Bahktin and dialogue. > > And a section on Vygotsky. > > > > All contributing to bring to *voice* knowing FROM WITHIN joint action. > > > > Larry > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 11:19 AM, Greg Thompson > > wrote: > > > > > Larry, > > > Many thanks for this. These are wonderful connections. > > > Don't know if I have the Shotter you are referring to. Do you have a > > cite? > > > or perhaps could email me a paper offline? > > > Also, I'm wondering if you could say more about Shotter's idea of a > third > > > realm. Again, I'm a little slow here - I didn't catch what the first > and > > > second realms were? > > > And finally, could you elaborate a bit on what the third realm is? > > > Thanks, > > > -greg > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 11:06 AM, Larry Purss > > > wrote: > > > > > > > Anti, > > > > I have downloaded Annika's paper and will listen to how she weaves > > > together > > > > CHAT and frame analysis. > > > > Two quick comments. > > > > Greg asked about how we understand *agency* and if there are > > alternatives > > > > to *sovereign possessive agency* that continue to confirm *agency* > but > > a > > > > less emphatic agency more receptive to emerging and participating > > within > > > > conversations. He also asked if settings or contexts also exhibit > > > *agency* > > > > I believe this concept of agency has relevance. > > > > 2nd > > > > Metaphors may not be merely *vehicles* to carry *sense*. Metaphors > may > > > > actually *be* ways of thinking [as modes, genres, tropes, or kinds]. > > > > Therefore Goffman's metaphor of *framing* biases us to modes of > > *seeing* > > > > and *perceiving* what PREVIOUSLY FORMED and this framing guides our > > > > anticipations going forward. > > > > > > > > John Shorter is *turning* our attention away from *framing* [not as > > > > misleading but as biased to understand as picturing] > > > > He is suggesting there is another realm [what he calls a third realm] > > > that > > > > has remained invisible in plain sight. > > > > He calls this realm *conversational realities* which he suggests is > > > entered > > > > through alternative metaphors AS *talking*. > > > > The central metaphor of *voice* as distinct from the metaphor of > > > *framing*. > > > > Voice as metaphor moves to Bahktin and dialogue as emerging within > > micro > > > > processes. Mike cautions we are referring to different time scales. > > > > Shorter is also calling our attention to what is hidden in plain > view. > > > When > > > > talking we pay attention to processes of collaboration [Andy's 3 > > types]. > > > I > > > > find Shotter's turning our attention to this third realm [captured in > > the > > > > metaphor of voice] adding a realm to Goffman's metaphor of framing > [as > > > > previously FORMED frames] > > > > > > > > If these two alternative metaphors are making distinct a difference > > then > > > a > > > > gap opens within which agency may enter as creative reflection. > > > > Question 1 on agency I hope can be further elaborated > > > > Larry > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 7:32 AM, Antti Rajala > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > Lubomir, thanks for suggesting symbolic interactionism as a frame > of > > > > > incorporating these ideas. Anna-Maija Puroila discusses the > legacies > > of > > > > > Goffman in her dissertation (in Finnish) and mentions that there > are > > > many > > > > > competing and contested interpretation's of Goffman's work. Some > say > > > that > > > > > his work was structuralist but more often he is associated with > > > symbolic > > > > > interactionism, ethnomethodology, or phenomenological sociology. > > Where > > > > > would activity theory fit in among these? > > > > > > > > > > To me Goffman's student's Goodwin's ethno-methdological approach > > seems > > > > > partly compatible with CHAT. In his paper, Action and embodiment > > within > > > > > situated human interaction (2000), Goodwin writes: > > > > > > > > > > "This emphasis on cognition as a public, social process embedded > > within > > > > an > > > > > historically > > > > > shaped material world is quite consistent with both Vygotskian > > > > perspectives > > > > > and > > > > > recent work in the social and anthropological study of scientific > and > > > > > workplace practice > > > > > ..., but adds to such perspectives an equally strong focus on the > > > details > > > > > of language > > > > > use and conversational organization." > > > > > > > > > > Like Goodwin, I believe that this attention to details of language > > use > > > > and > > > > > conversational organization, and to embodied interactions, in > > > particular, > > > > > can enrich CHAT analyses. After all, in many classical CHAT work, > we > > > > mainly > > > > > see analyses of spoken interaction. Greg, to me Goodwin's work on > > > > > professional vision gives an elaborate account on the relationships > > > > between > > > > > meanings and sensory fabric. In particular, in my case of students > > in a > > > > > bird-watching field trip the way he analyzes expert-novice > > interaction > > > is > > > > > very valuable. I can, for example, see lots of highlighting on the > > part > > > > of > > > > > the bird expert. > > > > > > > > > > Goodwin's focus on the practices of seeing seems to me very > > compatible > > > > with > > > > > Leontiev's theorizing of sensory fabric as constituting and being > > > > > constituted of action. Yet, in Goodwin's work the socio-emotional > > > issues > > > > > brought in with the Leontiev's personal sense - in line with what > > Larry > > > > has > > > > > written - seems to be given less attention in Goodwin. I wonder > > whether > > > > > Goodwin's approach contradicts Leontiev's approach that emphasizes > > such > > > > > internal issues as goals and motives. In my understanding > > > > > ethnomethdologists do not usually focus on goals and such. > > > > > > > > > > The Gothenburg center lead by Roger S?lj? has explored > > > > ethnomethodological > > > > > inspired aspects of Goffman in relation to their version of > > > sociocultural > > > > > perspective. See e.g the dissertation of Annika Lantz-Andersson: > > > > > > https://gupea.ub.gu.se/bitstream/2077/19736/1/gupea_2077_19736_1.pdf > > > > > > > > > > Greg, Greeno has theorized the ways in which frames "create certain > > > > > affordances that solicit various types of behavior (whether > > > 'cognitive', > > > > > 'emotional', or some other emically named type)." To my knowledge > > > > Greeno's > > > > > work here focuses more on cognitive aspects and not that much on > > > > emotional > > > > > aspects. He uses the notion of positioning in association with > frames > > > > > (which he relates to Goffman). "This refers to ways in which an > > > > individual > > > > > is > > > > > entitled, expected, or perhaps obligated to participate in > > interactions > > > > of > > > > > an activity system, such as a classroom or an experimental session > > > > > involving interaction with a computer program." (see, A Theory Bite > > on > > > > > Contextualizing, Framing, and Positioning: A Companion to Son and > > > > > Goldstone, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07370000903014386) > > > > > > > > > > Greg wrote: > > > > > "I might add to this that Goffman speaks of the way in which > > > motivations > > > > > are, to a certain extent, entailed by frames (yes, "to a certain > > > extent" > > > > - > > > > > this does not mean the frames determine them!). Thus, frames bring > > with > > > > > them motivational relevancies as much as individuals do!" > > > > > > > > > > I wonder if this interplay between collective frames and > individuals > > > can > > > > be > > > > > conceptualized with meaning and sense. Object of an activity is > > framed > > > in > > > > > terms of collectively shared meanings. Yet, each individual > develops > > a > > > > > personal relationship to the object, that is, a personal sense. > > > > > > > > > > By the way, thanks Mike for pointing out this overstatement of > > > stability > > > > > with respect to meanings. This has bothered me a lot, too. A > > colleague > > > of > > > > > mine even asserts that sense is never shared enough to become > > > > legitimately > > > > > called a shared meaning in Vygotsky/Leontiev sense. > > > > > > > > > > Antti > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 3:01 AM, mike cole > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > I agree, very clearly statements of the sense/meaning relation, > > along > > > > > with > > > > > > the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I wanted to say, and > > > > > thought, > > > > > > unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows." > > > > > > > > > > > > In the quote here, I think LSV is somewhat overstating the > > stability > > > of > > > > > > meaning across contexts; yes relative to the microgenetic > processes > > > of > > > > > > sense making capturable with > > > > > > modern technologies, but not totally "context independent." Even > > > > > dictionary > > > > > > meanings change, as LSV was well aware from his interest in the > > > history > > > > > of > > > > > > words in relation to their appearance in children's vocabularies > in > > > > > > ontogeny. > > > > > > > > > > > > Keeping the simultaneous relevance of several time scales in mind > > in > > > > > these > > > > > > discussions seems really important, as hard as it is to do. > > > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > Visiting Assistant Professor > > > Department of Anthropology > > > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > Brigham Young University > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Visiting Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > From lspopov@bgsu.edu Mon Aug 19 13:36:17 2013 From: lspopov@bgsu.edu (Lubomir Savov Popov) Date: Mon, 19 Aug 2013 20:36:17 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities Message-ID: <4DF034EF2396694597A7D328E23F09E10127F7@BY2PRD0510MB353.namprd05.prod.outlook.com> Dear Antti, At this time, I am still searching for a direction. I can share my intuitions and my epistemological beliefs. The intuitions might be wrong or premature. The epistemological beliefs might be a bit rigid and restrictive. Below are just a few thoughts regarding this epistemological situation. In my research (user activities and needs in relation to built environment), traditional AT models haven't helped me much. The reason is that they are developed for other purposes. They work well in psychology, education, ergonomics/human factors, organizational development, organizational behavior, and so on. In all these areas, the models are somewhat different, but their foundations are similar. Activity theory works pretty well there. But when I try to apply it to facilities planning and building user needs research, I find that I need to make considerable changes in the process of adaptation. I found that the nature of the activity model depends very much on the subject matter and the objectives of the research. I mean an activity model that is used as a methodological tool for collecting and interpreting information. In your research, your goals and objectives, as well as the process that you study, are very different from what I need. In this respect, I am not sure I can either support or push aside a particular direction of exploration. I need to find out a way to research user activities for the purpose of unveiling activity needs (including user needs, resources, restrictions, etc. ) Traditional AT has other concerns and works at higher levels of abstraction. It evidently works well in pedagogy and ergonomics. These areas are strongly supported and rely on psychology, which is the discipline that originated or at least developed most of AT. However, I need to work with larger spatial-material objects that are appropriated with molar activities. The philosophical basis of AT (Historical Materialism) and the humanist paradigms are very different. I am not sure how knowledge from different paradigms can be made to work together. Historical Materialism allows assimilation of knowledge and field research methods from Positivism. I have seen how this is done and am sure in it. Of course, there are limits. The limits are at philosophical and theoretical levels. But at field research level, there is a lot of borrowing and adaptation. Most of the Soviet textbooks on field research sociological methods evidently borrowed from prominent Positivist textbooks. About integration of knowledge, I see two options at this time, but I can discuss them in very general terms. One is an objective/external conceptual configurator. I still haven't seen an example of this. It has to be some kind of a framework. It needs to have a protocol for translation of ideas from each paradigm to the framework. Because Symbolic Interactionism has a history of pragmatism, I suggested that this might be a possible option. I personally stick to SI simply because I work that way. I have to admit that I am biased. The other option is to integrate everything in the mind of the researcher, often subconsciously, and to recast it in one selected paradigmatic environment or framework. That is how most often things happen. Most inventions emerge subconsciously, even when there is a purposeful, conscious pursuit of the solution. Lubo -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Antti Rajala Sent: Monday, August 19, 2013 10:33 AM To: Mike Cole; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities Lubomir, thanks for suggesting symbolic interactionism as a frame of incorporating these ideas. Anna-Maija Puroila discusses the legacies of Goffman in her dissertation (in Finnish) and mentions that there are many competing and contested interpretation's of Goffman's work. Some say that his work was structuralist but more often he is associated with symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology, or phenomenological sociology. Where would activity theory fit in among these? To me Goffman's student's Goodwin's ethno-methdological approach seems partly compatible with CHAT. In his paper, Action and embodiment within situated human interaction (2000), Goodwin writes: "This emphasis on cognition as a public, social process embedded within an historically shaped material world is quite consistent with both Vygotskian perspectives and recent work in the social and anthropological study of scientific and workplace practice ..., but adds to such perspectives an equally strong focus on the details of language use and conversational organization." Like Goodwin, I believe that this attention to details of language use and conversational organization, and to embodied interactions, in particular, can enrich CHAT analyses. After all, in many classical CHAT work, we mainly see analyses of spoken interaction. Greg, to me Goodwin's work on professional vision gives an elaborate account on the relationships between meanings and sensory fabric. In particular, in my case of students in a bird-watching field trip the way he analyzes expert-novice interaction is very valuable. I can, for example, see lots of highlighting on the part of the bird expert. Goodwin's focus on the practices of seeing seems to me very compatible with Leontiev's theorizing of sensory fabric as constituting and being constituted of action. Yet, in Goodwin's work the socio-emotional issues brought in with the Leontiev's personal sense - in line with what Larry has written - seems to be given less attention in Goodwin. I wonder whether Goodwin's approach contradicts Leontiev's approach that emphasizes such internal issues as goals and motives. In my understanding ethnomethdologists do not usually focus on goals and such. The Gothenburg center lead by Roger S?lj? has explored ethnomethodological inspired aspects of Goffman in relation to their version of sociocultural perspective. See e.g the dissertation of Annika Lantz-Andersson: https://gupea.ub.gu.se/bitstream/2077/19736/1/gupea_2077_19736_1.pdf Greg, Greeno has theorized the ways in which frames "create certain affordances that solicit various types of behavior (whether 'cognitive', 'emotional', or some other emically named type)." To my knowledge Greeno's work here focuses more on cognitive aspects and not that much on emotional aspects. He uses the notion of positioning in association with frames (which he relates to Goffman). "This refers to ways in which an individual is entitled, expected, or perhaps obligated to participate in interactions of an activity system, such as a classroom or an experimental session involving interaction with a computer program." (see, A Theory Bite on Contextualizing, Framing, and Positioning: A Companion to Son and Goldstone, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07370000903014386) Greg wrote: "I might add to this that Goffman speaks of the way in which motivations are, to a certain extent, entailed by frames (yes, "to a certain extent" - this does not mean the frames determine them!). Thus, frames bring with them motivational relevancies as much as individuals do!" I wonder if this interplay between collective frames and individuals can be conceptualized with meaning and sense. Object of an activity is framed in terms of collectively shared meanings. Yet, each individual develops a personal relationship to the object, that is, a personal sense. By the way, thanks Mike for pointing out this overstatement of stability with respect to meanings. This has bothered me a lot, too. A colleague of mine even asserts that sense is never shared enough to become legitimately called a shared meaning in Vygotsky/Leontiev sense. Antti On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 3:01 AM, mike cole wrote: > I agree, very clearly statements of the sense/meaning relation, along > with the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I wanted to say, and > thought, unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows." > > In the quote here, I think LSV is somewhat overstating the stability > of meaning across contexts; yes relative to the microgenetic processes > of sense making capturable with modern technologies, but not totally > "context independent." Even dictionary meanings change, as LSV was > well aware from his interest in the history of words in relation to > their appearance in children's vocabularies in ontogeny. > > Keeping the simultaneous relevance of several time scales in mind in > these discussions seems really important, as hard as it is to do. > mike > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Mon Aug 19 14:10:56 2013 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Mon, 19 Aug 2013 14:10:56 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> <520444BA.2000808@mira.net> <520460F0.5030506@mira.net> <19E63C50-A0D2-4A0F-BBA7-63853414FDAA@gmail.com> <4195A368-C7B9-4AB0-AAA5-A244135DC331@gmail.com> <520ADCDD.9000406@mira.net> <520C3970.6000803@mira.net> Message-ID: I will give a very quick reply. Voice as I understand Shotter is the ongoing way we enter into and within each other's voice. The question, *Is this my voice or your voice speaking?* As a metaphor it is linking our voices together through joint action. It privileges *responding* as NECESSARY for *voice* to exist. The key to understand Shotter is his positing a realm outside of discourse and discursive formations already formed. *Voice* is presenting conversational REALITIES as negotiated and contested and always ongoing in what he calls the hurly burly of life. He suggests that by turning toward this realm [which is in plain sight but not seen] we can change our ways of talking away from privileging already formed discourses to also focus our attention on conversations within their dialogical forming. Shotter is suggesting that *sense* [perception & action mediated through felt situations] involves 3 kinds of knowing. However, within departments, and discourses which privilege the already formed ways of knowing the emerging dialogical conversations as forming realities are in the background. Shotter wants to place these rhetorical-responsive conversations in the foreground as vital to understanding sense.. I will now go offline. However, Shotter does reference Vygotsky as confirming this way of understanding voice. I could give examples if asked On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 1:27 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Larry, > This is great. > So I'm still a little confused at the notion of voice. You write: > "John argues there are many other forms of talk currently without a *voice* > which have their own properties. If these modes of talking were to gain a > *voice* it could transform our lives. This special kind of *unvoiced* > knowledge is NOT formalized into theoretical knowledge. [Knowing that in > Ryle's term for theoretical knowledge.]" > > In the first sentence, did you mean to say that forms of talk have a > "voice"? That kind of threw me. I'm used to people talking about people > having voices or people being able to call upon voices that exist in some > cultural real. If forms of talk can have "voices", then I'd certainly like > to hear more about that. What exactly does Shotter mean by "voice"? > > -greg > p.s. I'm wondering if this conversation should move off the list since this > is probably review (or of little relevance) for many people on the list. > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 1:23 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > Greg, > > John, wrote a book titled *Conversational Realities* > > He suggests three realms of knowing. > > 1] knowing that > > 2] knowing how > > 3] knowing from or knowing within. > > > > Here is a comment from Annika's paper describing *learning activity*. > > "Learning activity as a concept REFERS to the meaning making AS how > > students engage in collaborative tasks and not what they learn." > > > > Greg, I *read* this explanation as a form of conversational knowing > > addressing knowing as a knowing HOW. > > John would say this explanation is composed in a > > *referential-representational* mode of knowing. Knowing of the second > kind. > > > > On page 18 of John's book in a section titled "knowing of the third kind: > > Knowing from WITHIN" he elaborates the distinction between realms. > Knowing > > how is participating and collaborating and instituting various centers of > > institutionalized social life and knowing how is knowing the permitted > > forms of talk within the institution [discursive discourses] > > > > John argues there are many other forms of talk currently without a > *voice* > > which have their own properties. If these modes of talking were to gain a > > *voice* it could transform our lives. This special kind of *unvoiced* > > knowledge is NOT formalized into theoretical knowledge. [Knowing that in > > Ryle's term for theoretical knowledge.] > > > > This *unvoiced* knowledge is knowledge of a third kind that cannot be > > reduced to either knowing-that or knowing-how [skillful knowing]. This > > third kind of knowledge is knowing FROM-WITHIN a situation, institution > or > > society. > > Greg, John Shotter's book explores the various implications of giving > this > > knowing from-within a clear and distinct voice. > > Wittgenstein used the metaphor of *crisscrossing* to explore the > > *language-games* that have developed within the relatively bounded and > > sedimented multiple CENTERS of institutionalized discourse as already > > FORMED. [framed analysis of formed knowing-how]. John is fascinated by > the > > disorganized, uncertain, unformulated ways of talking that are negotiated > > as common *sense* beyond the centers of already formed discourse. > > He is suggesting this is a rhetorical-RESPONSIVE third realm of practical > > knowing [Gadamer's phronesis]. It is the realm of *voice* distinct from > the > > realm of *framing*. > > John suggests it is within this third realm of *joint action* that the > FELT > > MOVEMENT [experienced as vitality] emerges within perception and action. > > > > Greg, I hope this was clear? > > His book also has a section on *Vico* and the concept of *communis > sensus* > > A section on Bahktin and dialogue. > > And a section on Vygotsky. > > > > All contributing to bring to *voice* knowing FROM WITHIN joint action. > > > > Larry > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 11:19 AM, Greg Thompson > > wrote: > > > > > Larry, > > > Many thanks for this. These are wonderful connections. > > > Don't know if I have the Shotter you are referring to. Do you have a > > cite? > > > or perhaps could email me a paper offline? > > > Also, I'm wondering if you could say more about Shotter's idea of a > third > > > realm. Again, I'm a little slow here - I didn't catch what the first > and > > > second realms were? > > > And finally, could you elaborate a bit on what the third realm is? > > > Thanks, > > > -greg > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 11:06 AM, Larry Purss > > > wrote: > > > > > > > Anti, > > > > I have downloaded Annika's paper and will listen to how she weaves > > > together > > > > CHAT and frame analysis. > > > > Two quick comments. > > > > Greg asked about how we understand *agency* and if there are > > alternatives > > > > to *sovereign possessive agency* that continue to confirm *agency* > but > > a > > > > less emphatic agency more receptive to emerging and participating > > within > > > > conversations. He also asked if settings or contexts also exhibit > > > *agency* > > > > I believe this concept of agency has relevance. > > > > 2nd > > > > Metaphors may not be merely *vehicles* to carry *sense*. Metaphors > may > > > > actually *be* ways of thinking [as modes, genres, tropes, or kinds]. > > > > Therefore Goffman's metaphor of *framing* biases us to modes of > > *seeing* > > > > and *perceiving* what PREVIOUSLY FORMED and this framing guides our > > > > anticipations going forward. > > > > > > > > John Shorter is *turning* our attention away from *framing* [not as > > > > misleading but as biased to understand as picturing] > > > > He is suggesting there is another realm [what he calls a third realm] > > > that > > > > has remained invisible in plain sight. > > > > He calls this realm *conversational realities* which he suggests is > > > entered > > > > through alternative metaphors AS *talking*. > > > > The central metaphor of *voice* as distinct from the metaphor of > > > *framing*. > > > > Voice as metaphor moves to Bahktin and dialogue as emerging within > > micro > > > > processes. Mike cautions we are referring to different time scales. > > > > Shorter is also calling our attention to what is hidden in plain > view. > > > When > > > > talking we pay attention to processes of collaboration [Andy's 3 > > types]. > > > I > > > > find Shotter's turning our attention to this third realm [captured in > > the > > > > metaphor of voice] adding a realm to Goffman's metaphor of framing > [as > > > > previously FORMED frames] > > > > > > > > If these two alternative metaphors are making distinct a difference > > then > > > a > > > > gap opens within which agency may enter as creative reflection. > > > > Question 1 on agency I hope can be further elaborated > > > > Larry > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 7:32 AM, Antti Rajala > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > Lubomir, thanks for suggesting symbolic interactionism as a frame > of > > > > > incorporating these ideas. Anna-Maija Puroila discusses the > legacies > > of > > > > > Goffman in her dissertation (in Finnish) and mentions that there > are > > > many > > > > > competing and contested interpretation's of Goffman's work. Some > say > > > that > > > > > his work was structuralist but more often he is associated with > > > symbolic > > > > > interactionism, ethnomethodology, or phenomenological sociology. > > Where > > > > > would activity theory fit in among these? > > > > > > > > > > To me Goffman's student's Goodwin's ethno-methdological approach > > seems > > > > > partly compatible with CHAT. In his paper, Action and embodiment > > within > > > > > situated human interaction (2000), Goodwin writes: > > > > > > > > > > "This emphasis on cognition as a public, social process embedded > > within > > > > an > > > > > historically > > > > > shaped material world is quite consistent with both Vygotskian > > > > perspectives > > > > > and > > > > > recent work in the social and anthropological study of scientific > and > > > > > workplace practice > > > > > ..., but adds to such perspectives an equally strong focus on the > > > details > > > > > of language > > > > > use and conversational organization." > > > > > > > > > > Like Goodwin, I believe that this attention to details of language > > use > > > > and > > > > > conversational organization, and to embodied interactions, in > > > particular, > > > > > can enrich CHAT analyses. After all, in many classical CHAT work, > we > > > > mainly > > > > > see analyses of spoken interaction. Greg, to me Goodwin's work on > > > > > professional vision gives an elaborate account on the relationships > > > > between > > > > > meanings and sensory fabric. In particular, in my case of students > > in a > > > > > bird-watching field trip the way he analyzes expert-novice > > interaction > > > is > > > > > very valuable. I can, for example, see lots of highlighting on the > > part > > > > of > > > > > the bird expert. > > > > > > > > > > Goodwin's focus on the practices of seeing seems to me very > > compatible > > > > with > > > > > Leontiev's theorizing of sensory fabric as constituting and being > > > > > constituted of action. Yet, in Goodwin's work the socio-emotional > > > issues > > > > > brought in with the Leontiev's personal sense - in line with what > > Larry > > > > has > > > > > written - seems to be given less attention in Goodwin. I wonder > > whether > > > > > Goodwin's approach contradicts Leontiev's approach that emphasizes > > such > > > > > internal issues as goals and motives. In my understanding > > > > > ethnomethdologists do not usually focus on goals and such. > > > > > > > > > > The Gothenburg center lead by Roger S?lj? has explored > > > > ethnomethodological > > > > > inspired aspects of Goffman in relation to their version of > > > sociocultural > > > > > perspective. See e.g the dissertation of Annika Lantz-Andersson: > > > > > > https://gupea.ub.gu.se/bitstream/2077/19736/1/gupea_2077_19736_1.pdf > > > > > > > > > > Greg, Greeno has theorized the ways in which frames "create certain > > > > > affordances that solicit various types of behavior (whether > > > 'cognitive', > > > > > 'emotional', or some other emically named type)." To my knowledge > > > > Greeno's > > > > > work here focuses more on cognitive aspects and not that much on > > > > emotional > > > > > aspects. He uses the notion of positioning in association with > frames > > > > > (which he relates to Goffman). "This refers to ways in which an > > > > individual > > > > > is > > > > > entitled, expected, or perhaps obligated to participate in > > interactions > > > > of > > > > > an activity system, such as a classroom or an experimental session > > > > > involving interaction with a computer program." (see, A Theory Bite > > on > > > > > Contextualizing, Framing, and Positioning: A Companion to Son and > > > > > Goldstone, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07370000903014386) > > > > > > > > > > Greg wrote: > > > > > "I might add to this that Goffman speaks of the way in which > > > motivations > > > > > are, to a certain extent, entailed by frames (yes, "to a certain > > > extent" > > > > - > > > > > this does not mean the frames determine them!). Thus, frames bring > > with > > > > > them motivational relevancies as much as individuals do!" > > > > > > > > > > I wonder if this interplay between collective frames and > individuals > > > can > > > > be > > > > > conceptualized with meaning and sense. Object of an activity is > > framed > > > in > > > > > terms of collectively shared meanings. Yet, each individual > develops > > a > > > > > personal relationship to the object, that is, a personal sense. > > > > > > > > > > By the way, thanks Mike for pointing out this overstatement of > > > stability > > > > > with respect to meanings. This has bothered me a lot, too. A > > colleague > > > of > > > > > mine even asserts that sense is never shared enough to become > > > > legitimately > > > > > called a shared meaning in Vygotsky/Leontiev sense. > > > > > > > > > > Antti > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 3:01 AM, mike cole > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > I agree, very clearly statements of the sense/meaning relation, > > along > > > > > with > > > > > > the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I wanted to say, and > > > > > thought, > > > > > > unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows." > > > > > > > > > > > > In the quote here, I think LSV is somewhat overstating the > > stability > > > of > > > > > > meaning across contexts; yes relative to the microgenetic > processes > > > of > > > > > > sense making capturable with > > > > > > modern technologies, but not totally "context independent." Even > > > > > dictionary > > > > > > meanings change, as LSV was well aware from his interest in the > > > history > > > > > of > > > > > > words in relation to their appearance in children's vocabularies > in > > > > > > ontogeny. > > > > > > > > > > > > Keeping the simultaneous relevance of several time scales in mind > > in > > > > > these > > > > > > discussions seems really important, as hard as it is to do. > > > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > Visiting Assistant Professor > > > Department of Anthropology > > > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > Brigham Young University > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Visiting Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Mon Aug 19 14:57:57 2013 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Mon, 19 Aug 2013 15:57:57 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> <520444BA.2000808@mira.net> <520460F0.5030506@mira.net> <19E63C50-A0D2-4A0F-BBA7-63853414FDAA@gmail.com> <4195A368-C7B9-4AB0-AAA5-A244135DC331@gmail.com> <520ADCDD.9000406@mira.net> <520C3970.6000803@mira.net> Message-ID: Huw, I like the way that you point to your point indirectly here. So, to answer in kind, yes, the explicit articulation of motives are sometimes helpful for activity (particularly when the activity has at its goal the furthering of the desires and motivations of individuals - and, thank you for taking my interests into account here!!). I guess I just don't see motivation as necessary to a definition of "activity." -greg p.s. just in case the question was serious, I think Larry described nicely what I am trying to achieve - a notion of activity that does not have at its center a sovereign subject. My post questioning the merging of phenomenology with activity theory speaks to the central intellectual concern and the "for what" of what I'm hoping to do in my work. On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 2:34 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > I don't mind the chatter. :) > > But I am not clear on what you're trying to achieve. Is there something > you wish to reveal or analyse, or is this more about understanding social > situations. > > Huw > > On 19 August 2013 21:27, Greg Thompson wrote: > > > Larry, > > This is great. > > So I'm still a little confused at the notion of voice. You write: > > "John argues there are many other forms of talk currently without a > *voice* > > which have their own properties. If these modes of talking were to gain a > > *voice* it could transform our lives. This special kind of *unvoiced* > > knowledge is NOT formalized into theoretical knowledge. [Knowing that in > > Ryle's term for theoretical knowledge.]" > > > > In the first sentence, did you mean to say that forms of talk have a > > "voice"? That kind of threw me. I'm used to people talking about people > > having voices or people being able to call upon voices that exist in some > > cultural real. If forms of talk can have "voices", then I'd certainly > like > > to hear more about that. What exactly does Shotter mean by "voice"? > > > > -greg > > p.s. I'm wondering if this conversation should move off the list since > this > > is probably review (or of little relevance) for many people on the list. > > > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 1:23 PM, Larry Purss > wrote: > > > > > Greg, > > > John, wrote a book titled *Conversational Realities* > > > He suggests three realms of knowing. > > > 1] knowing that > > > 2] knowing how > > > 3] knowing from or knowing within. > > > > > > Here is a comment from Annika's paper describing *learning activity*. > > > "Learning activity as a concept REFERS to the meaning making AS how > > > students engage in collaborative tasks and not what they learn." > > > > > > Greg, I *read* this explanation as a form of conversational knowing > > > addressing knowing as a knowing HOW. > > > John would say this explanation is composed in a > > > *referential-representational* mode of knowing. Knowing of the second > > kind. > > > > > > On page 18 of John's book in a section titled "knowing of the third > kind: > > > Knowing from WITHIN" he elaborates the distinction between realms. > > Knowing > > > how is participating and collaborating and instituting various centers > of > > > institutionalized social life and knowing how is knowing the permitted > > > forms of talk within the institution [discursive discourses] > > > > > > John argues there are many other forms of talk currently without a > > *voice* > > > which have their own properties. If these modes of talking were to > gain a > > > *voice* it could transform our lives. This special kind of *unvoiced* > > > knowledge is NOT formalized into theoretical knowledge. [Knowing that > in > > > Ryle's term for theoretical knowledge.] > > > > > > This *unvoiced* knowledge is knowledge of a third kind that cannot be > > > reduced to either knowing-that or knowing-how [skillful knowing]. This > > > third kind of knowledge is knowing FROM-WITHIN a situation, institution > > or > > > society. > > > Greg, John Shotter's book explores the various implications of giving > > this > > > knowing from-within a clear and distinct voice. > > > Wittgenstein used the metaphor of *crisscrossing* to explore the > > > *language-games* that have developed within the relatively bounded and > > > sedimented multiple CENTERS of institutionalized discourse as already > > > FORMED. [framed analysis of formed knowing-how]. John is fascinated by > > the > > > disorganized, uncertain, unformulated ways of talking that are > negotiated > > > as common *sense* beyond the centers of already formed discourse. > > > He is suggesting this is a rhetorical-RESPONSIVE third realm of > practical > > > knowing [Gadamer's phronesis]. It is the realm of *voice* distinct from > > the > > > realm of *framing*. > > > John suggests it is within this third realm of *joint action* that the > > FELT > > > MOVEMENT [experienced as vitality] emerges within perception and > action. > > > > > > Greg, I hope this was clear? > > > His book also has a section on *Vico* and the concept of *communis > > sensus* > > > A section on Bahktin and dialogue. > > > And a section on Vygotsky. > > > > > > All contributing to bring to *voice* knowing FROM WITHIN joint action. > > > > > > Larry > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 11:19 AM, Greg Thompson > > > wrote: > > > > > > > Larry, > > > > Many thanks for this. These are wonderful connections. > > > > Don't know if I have the Shotter you are referring to. Do you have a > > > cite? > > > > or perhaps could email me a paper offline? > > > > Also, I'm wondering if you could say more about Shotter's idea of a > > third > > > > realm. Again, I'm a little slow here - I didn't catch what the first > > and > > > > second realms were? > > > > And finally, could you elaborate a bit on what the third realm is? > > > > Thanks, > > > > -greg > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 11:06 AM, Larry Purss > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > Anti, > > > > > I have downloaded Annika's paper and will listen to how she weaves > > > > together > > > > > CHAT and frame analysis. > > > > > Two quick comments. > > > > > Greg asked about how we understand *agency* and if there are > > > alternatives > > > > > to *sovereign possessive agency* that continue to confirm *agency* > > but > > > a > > > > > less emphatic agency more receptive to emerging and participating > > > within > > > > > conversations. He also asked if settings or contexts also exhibit > > > > *agency* > > > > > I believe this concept of agency has relevance. > > > > > 2nd > > > > > Metaphors may not be merely *vehicles* to carry *sense*. Metaphors > > may > > > > > actually *be* ways of thinking [as modes, genres, tropes, or > kinds]. > > > > > Therefore Goffman's metaphor of *framing* biases us to modes of > > > *seeing* > > > > > and *perceiving* what PREVIOUSLY FORMED and this framing guides our > > > > > anticipations going forward. > > > > > > > > > > John Shorter is *turning* our attention away from *framing* [not as > > > > > misleading but as biased to understand as picturing] > > > > > He is suggesting there is another realm [what he calls a third > realm] > > > > that > > > > > has remained invisible in plain sight. > > > > > He calls this realm *conversational realities* which he suggests is > > > > entered > > > > > through alternative metaphors AS *talking*. > > > > > The central metaphor of *voice* as distinct from the metaphor of > > > > *framing*. > > > > > Voice as metaphor moves to Bahktin and dialogue as emerging within > > > micro > > > > > processes. Mike cautions we are referring to different time > scales. > > > > > Shorter is also calling our attention to what is hidden in plain > > view. > > > > When > > > > > talking we pay attention to processes of collaboration [Andy's 3 > > > types]. > > > > I > > > > > find Shotter's turning our attention to this third realm [captured > in > > > the > > > > > metaphor of voice] adding a realm to Goffman's metaphor of framing > > [as > > > > > previously FORMED frames] > > > > > > > > > > If these two alternative metaphors are making distinct a difference > > > then > > > > a > > > > > gap opens within which agency may enter as creative reflection. > > > > > Question 1 on agency I hope can be further elaborated > > > > > Larry > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 7:32 AM, Antti Rajala > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > Lubomir, thanks for suggesting symbolic interactionism as a frame > > of > > > > > > incorporating these ideas. Anna-Maija Puroila discusses the > > legacies > > > of > > > > > > Goffman in her dissertation (in Finnish) and mentions that there > > are > > > > many > > > > > > competing and contested interpretation's of Goffman's work. Some > > say > > > > that > > > > > > his work was structuralist but more often he is associated with > > > > symbolic > > > > > > interactionism, ethnomethodology, or phenomenological sociology. > > > Where > > > > > > would activity theory fit in among these? > > > > > > > > > > > > To me Goffman's student's Goodwin's ethno-methdological approach > > > seems > > > > > > partly compatible with CHAT. In his paper, Action and embodiment > > > within > > > > > > situated human interaction (2000), Goodwin writes: > > > > > > > > > > > > "This emphasis on cognition as a public, social process embedded > > > within > > > > > an > > > > > > historically > > > > > > shaped material world is quite consistent with both Vygotskian > > > > > perspectives > > > > > > and > > > > > > recent work in the social and anthropological study of scientific > > and > > > > > > workplace practice > > > > > > ..., but adds to such perspectives an equally strong focus on the > > > > details > > > > > > of language > > > > > > use and conversational organization." > > > > > > > > > > > > Like Goodwin, I believe that this attention to details of > language > > > use > > > > > and > > > > > > conversational organization, and to embodied interactions, in > > > > particular, > > > > > > can enrich CHAT analyses. After all, in many classical CHAT work, > > we > > > > > mainly > > > > > > see analyses of spoken interaction. Greg, to me Goodwin's work on > > > > > > professional vision gives an elaborate account on the > relationships > > > > > between > > > > > > meanings and sensory fabric. In particular, in my case of > students > > > in a > > > > > > bird-watching field trip the way he analyzes expert-novice > > > interaction > > > > is > > > > > > very valuable. I can, for example, see lots of highlighting on > the > > > part > > > > > of > > > > > > the bird expert. > > > > > > > > > > > > Goodwin's focus on the practices of seeing seems to me very > > > compatible > > > > > with > > > > > > Leontiev's theorizing of sensory fabric as constituting and being > > > > > > constituted of action. Yet, in Goodwin's work the socio-emotional > > > > issues > > > > > > brought in with the Leontiev's personal sense - in line with what > > > Larry > > > > > has > > > > > > written - seems to be given less attention in Goodwin. I wonder > > > whether > > > > > > Goodwin's approach contradicts Leontiev's approach that > emphasizes > > > such > > > > > > internal issues as goals and motives. In my understanding > > > > > > ethnomethdologists do not usually focus on goals and such. > > > > > > > > > > > > The Gothenburg center lead by Roger S?lj? has explored > > > > > ethnomethodological > > > > > > inspired aspects of Goffman in relation to their version of > > > > sociocultural > > > > > > perspective. See e.g the dissertation of Annika Lantz-Andersson: > > > > > > > > https://gupea.ub.gu.se/bitstream/2077/19736/1/gupea_2077_19736_1.pdf > > > > > > > > > > > > Greg, Greeno has theorized the ways in which frames "create > certain > > > > > > affordances that solicit various types of behavior (whether > > > > 'cognitive', > > > > > > 'emotional', or some other emically named type)." To my knowledge > > > > > Greeno's > > > > > > work here focuses more on cognitive aspects and not that much on > > > > > emotional > > > > > > aspects. He uses the notion of positioning in association with > > frames > > > > > > (which he relates to Goffman). "This refers to ways in which an > > > > > individual > > > > > > is > > > > > > entitled, expected, or perhaps obligated to participate in > > > interactions > > > > > of > > > > > > an activity system, such as a classroom or an experimental > session > > > > > > involving interaction with a computer program." (see, A Theory > Bite > > > on > > > > > > Contextualizing, Framing, and Positioning: A Companion to Son and > > > > > > Goldstone, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07370000903014386) > > > > > > > > > > > > Greg wrote: > > > > > > "I might add to this that Goffman speaks of the way in which > > > > motivations > > > > > > are, to a certain extent, entailed by frames (yes, "to a certain > > > > extent" > > > > > - > > > > > > this does not mean the frames determine them!). Thus, frames > bring > > > with > > > > > > them motivational relevancies as much as individuals do!" > > > > > > > > > > > > I wonder if this interplay between collective frames and > > individuals > > > > can > > > > > be > > > > > > conceptualized with meaning and sense. Object of an activity is > > > framed > > > > in > > > > > > terms of collectively shared meanings. Yet, each individual > > develops > > > a > > > > > > personal relationship to the object, that is, a personal sense. > > > > > > > > > > > > By the way, thanks Mike for pointing out this overstatement of > > > > stability > > > > > > with respect to meanings. This has bothered me a lot, too. A > > > colleague > > > > of > > > > > > mine even asserts that sense is never shared enough to become > > > > > legitimately > > > > > > called a shared meaning in Vygotsky/Leontiev sense. > > > > > > > > > > > > Antti > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 3:01 AM, mike cole > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > I agree, very clearly statements of the sense/meaning relation, > > > along > > > > > > with > > > > > > > the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I wanted to say, > and > > > > > > thought, > > > > > > > unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows." > > > > > > > > > > > > > > In the quote here, I think LSV is somewhat overstating the > > > stability > > > > of > > > > > > > meaning across contexts; yes relative to the microgenetic > > processes > > > > of > > > > > > > sense making capturable with > > > > > > > modern technologies, but not totally "context independent." > Even > > > > > > dictionary > > > > > > > meanings change, as LSV was well aware from his interest in the > > > > history > > > > > > of > > > > > > > words in relation to their appearance in children's > vocabularies > > in > > > > > > > ontogeny. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Keeping the simultaneous relevance of several time scales in > mind > > > in > > > > > > these > > > > > > > discussions seems really important, as hard as it is to do. > > > > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > > Visiting Assistant Professor > > > > Department of Anthropology > > > > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > > Brigham Young University > > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Visiting Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Visiting Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Mon Aug 19 15:52:11 2013 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Mon, 19 Aug 2013 23:52:11 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> <520444BA.2000808@mira.net> <520460F0.5030506@mira.net> <19E63C50-A0D2-4A0F-BBA7-63853414FDAA@gmail.com> <4195A368-C7B9-4AB0-AAA5-A244135DC331@gmail.com> <520ADCDD.9000406@mira.net> <520C3970.6000803@mira.net> Message-ID: On 19 August 2013 22:57, Greg Thompson wrote: > Huw, > I like the way that you point to your point indirectly here. > So, to answer in kind, yes, the explicit articulation of motives are > sometimes helpful for activity (particularly when the activity has at its > goal the furthering of the desires and motivations of individuals - and, > thank you for taking my interests into account here!!). > I guess I just don't see motivation as necessary to a definition of > "activity." > -greg > p.s. just in case the question was serious, I think Larry described nicely > what I am trying to achieve - a notion of activity that does not have at > its center a sovereign subject. You disagree with it? Or you wish to go beyond it? Do you want a genetic theory or a descriptive method? > My post questioning the merging of > phenomenology with activity theory speaks to the central intellectual > concern and the "for what" of what I'm hoping to do in my work. > The "the notion of sensory fabric" email? That seems fine to me. I would call that memory. Best, Huw > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 2:34 PM, Huw Lloyd >wrote: > > > I don't mind the chatter. :) > > > > But I am not clear on what you're trying to achieve. Is there something > > you wish to reveal or analyse, or is this more about understanding social > > situations. > > > > Huw > > > > On 19 August 2013 21:27, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > > > > Larry, > > > This is great. > > > So I'm still a little confused at the notion of voice. You write: > > > "John argues there are many other forms of talk currently without a > > *voice* > > > which have their own properties. If these modes of talking were to > gain a > > > *voice* it could transform our lives. This special kind of *unvoiced* > > > knowledge is NOT formalized into theoretical knowledge. [Knowing that > in > > > Ryle's term for theoretical knowledge.]" > > > > > > In the first sentence, did you mean to say that forms of talk have a > > > "voice"? That kind of threw me. I'm used to people talking about people > > > having voices or people being able to call upon voices that exist in > some > > > cultural real. If forms of talk can have "voices", then I'd certainly > > like > > > to hear more about that. What exactly does Shotter mean by "voice"? > > > > > > -greg > > > p.s. I'm wondering if this conversation should move off the list since > > this > > > is probably review (or of little relevance) for many people on the > list. > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 1:23 PM, Larry Purss > > wrote: > > > > > > > Greg, > > > > John, wrote a book titled *Conversational Realities* > > > > He suggests three realms of knowing. > > > > 1] knowing that > > > > 2] knowing how > > > > 3] knowing from or knowing within. > > > > > > > > Here is a comment from Annika's paper describing *learning activity*. > > > > "Learning activity as a concept REFERS to the meaning making AS how > > > > students engage in collaborative tasks and not what they learn." > > > > > > > > Greg, I *read* this explanation as a form of conversational knowing > > > > addressing knowing as a knowing HOW. > > > > John would say this explanation is composed in a > > > > *referential-representational* mode of knowing. Knowing of the second > > > kind. > > > > > > > > On page 18 of John's book in a section titled "knowing of the third > > kind: > > > > Knowing from WITHIN" he elaborates the distinction between realms. > > > Knowing > > > > how is participating and collaborating and instituting various > centers > > of > > > > institutionalized social life and knowing how is knowing the > permitted > > > > forms of talk within the institution [discursive discourses] > > > > > > > > John argues there are many other forms of talk currently without a > > > *voice* > > > > which have their own properties. If these modes of talking were to > > gain a > > > > *voice* it could transform our lives. This special kind of *unvoiced* > > > > knowledge is NOT formalized into theoretical knowledge. [Knowing that > > in > > > > Ryle's term for theoretical knowledge.] > > > > > > > > This *unvoiced* knowledge is knowledge of a third kind that cannot be > > > > reduced to either knowing-that or knowing-how [skillful knowing]. > This > > > > third kind of knowledge is knowing FROM-WITHIN a situation, > institution > > > or > > > > society. > > > > Greg, John Shotter's book explores the various implications of giving > > > this > > > > knowing from-within a clear and distinct voice. > > > > Wittgenstein used the metaphor of *crisscrossing* to explore the > > > > *language-games* that have developed within the relatively bounded > and > > > > sedimented multiple CENTERS of institutionalized discourse as already > > > > FORMED. [framed analysis of formed knowing-how]. John is fascinated > by > > > the > > > > disorganized, uncertain, unformulated ways of talking that are > > negotiated > > > > as common *sense* beyond the centers of already formed discourse. > > > > He is suggesting this is a rhetorical-RESPONSIVE third realm of > > practical > > > > knowing [Gadamer's phronesis]. It is the realm of *voice* distinct > from > > > the > > > > realm of *framing*. > > > > John suggests it is within this third realm of *joint action* that > the > > > FELT > > > > MOVEMENT [experienced as vitality] emerges within perception and > > action. > > > > > > > > Greg, I hope this was clear? > > > > His book also has a section on *Vico* and the concept of *communis > > > sensus* > > > > A section on Bahktin and dialogue. > > > > And a section on Vygotsky. > > > > > > > > All contributing to bring to *voice* knowing FROM WITHIN joint > action. > > > > > > > > Larry > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 11:19 AM, Greg Thompson > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > Larry, > > > > > Many thanks for this. These are wonderful connections. > > > > > Don't know if I have the Shotter you are referring to. Do you have > a > > > > cite? > > > > > or perhaps could email me a paper offline? > > > > > Also, I'm wondering if you could say more about Shotter's idea of a > > > third > > > > > realm. Again, I'm a little slow here - I didn't catch what the > first > > > and > > > > > second realms were? > > > > > And finally, could you elaborate a bit on what the third realm is? > > > > > Thanks, > > > > > -greg > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 11:06 AM, Larry Purss < > lpscholar2@gmail.com> > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > Anti, > > > > > > I have downloaded Annika's paper and will listen to how she > weaves > > > > > together > > > > > > CHAT and frame analysis. > > > > > > Two quick comments. > > > > > > Greg asked about how we understand *agency* and if there are > > > > alternatives > > > > > > to *sovereign possessive agency* that continue to confirm > *agency* > > > but > > > > a > > > > > > less emphatic agency more receptive to emerging and participating > > > > within > > > > > > conversations. He also asked if settings or contexts also exhibit > > > > > *agency* > > > > > > I believe this concept of agency has relevance. > > > > > > 2nd > > > > > > Metaphors may not be merely *vehicles* to carry *sense*. > Metaphors > > > may > > > > > > actually *be* ways of thinking [as modes, genres, tropes, or > > kinds]. > > > > > > Therefore Goffman's metaphor of *framing* biases us to modes of > > > > *seeing* > > > > > > and *perceiving* what PREVIOUSLY FORMED and this framing guides > our > > > > > > anticipations going forward. > > > > > > > > > > > > John Shorter is *turning* our attention away from *framing* [not > as > > > > > > misleading but as biased to understand as picturing] > > > > > > He is suggesting there is another realm [what he calls a third > > realm] > > > > > that > > > > > > has remained invisible in plain sight. > > > > > > He calls this realm *conversational realities* which he suggests > is > > > > > entered > > > > > > through alternative metaphors AS *talking*. > > > > > > The central metaphor of *voice* as distinct from the metaphor of > > > > > *framing*. > > > > > > Voice as metaphor moves to Bahktin and dialogue as emerging > within > > > > micro > > > > > > processes. Mike cautions we are referring to different time > > scales. > > > > > > Shorter is also calling our attention to what is hidden in plain > > > view. > > > > > When > > > > > > talking we pay attention to processes of collaboration [Andy's 3 > > > > types]. > > > > > I > > > > > > find Shotter's turning our attention to this third realm > [captured > > in > > > > the > > > > > > metaphor of voice] adding a realm to Goffman's metaphor of > framing > > > [as > > > > > > previously FORMED frames] > > > > > > > > > > > > If these two alternative metaphors are making distinct a > difference > > > > then > > > > > a > > > > > > gap opens within which agency may enter as creative reflection. > > > > > > Question 1 on agency I hope can be further elaborated > > > > > > Larry > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 7:32 AM, Antti Rajala < > ajrajala@gmail.com> > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > Lubomir, thanks for suggesting symbolic interactionism as a > frame > > > of > > > > > > > incorporating these ideas. Anna-Maija Puroila discusses the > > > legacies > > > > of > > > > > > > Goffman in her dissertation (in Finnish) and mentions that > there > > > are > > > > > many > > > > > > > competing and contested interpretation's of Goffman's work. > Some > > > say > > > > > that > > > > > > > his work was structuralist but more often he is associated with > > > > > symbolic > > > > > > > interactionism, ethnomethodology, or phenomenological > sociology. > > > > Where > > > > > > > would activity theory fit in among these? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > To me Goffman's student's Goodwin's ethno-methdological > approach > > > > seems > > > > > > > partly compatible with CHAT. In his paper, Action and > embodiment > > > > within > > > > > > > situated human interaction (2000), Goodwin writes: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > "This emphasis on cognition as a public, social process > embedded > > > > within > > > > > > an > > > > > > > historically > > > > > > > shaped material world is quite consistent with both Vygotskian > > > > > > perspectives > > > > > > > and > > > > > > > recent work in the social and anthropological study of > scientific > > > and > > > > > > > workplace practice > > > > > > > ..., but adds to such perspectives an equally strong focus on > the > > > > > details > > > > > > > of language > > > > > > > use and conversational organization." > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Like Goodwin, I believe that this attention to details of > > language > > > > use > > > > > > and > > > > > > > conversational organization, and to embodied interactions, in > > > > > particular, > > > > > > > can enrich CHAT analyses. After all, in many classical CHAT > work, > > > we > > > > > > mainly > > > > > > > see analyses of spoken interaction. Greg, to me Goodwin's work > on > > > > > > > professional vision gives an elaborate account on the > > relationships > > > > > > between > > > > > > > meanings and sensory fabric. In particular, in my case of > > students > > > > in a > > > > > > > bird-watching field trip the way he analyzes expert-novice > > > > interaction > > > > > is > > > > > > > very valuable. I can, for example, see lots of highlighting on > > the > > > > part > > > > > > of > > > > > > > the bird expert. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Goodwin's focus on the practices of seeing seems to me very > > > > compatible > > > > > > with > > > > > > > Leontiev's theorizing of sensory fabric as constituting and > being > > > > > > > constituted of action. Yet, in Goodwin's work the > socio-emotional > > > > > issues > > > > > > > brought in with the Leontiev's personal sense - in line with > what > > > > Larry > > > > > > has > > > > > > > written - seems to be given less attention in Goodwin. I wonder > > > > whether > > > > > > > Goodwin's approach contradicts Leontiev's approach that > > emphasizes > > > > such > > > > > > > internal issues as goals and motives. In my understanding > > > > > > > ethnomethdologists do not usually focus on goals and such. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > The Gothenburg center lead by Roger S?lj? has explored > > > > > > ethnomethodological > > > > > > > inspired aspects of Goffman in relation to their version of > > > > > sociocultural > > > > > > > perspective. See e.g the dissertation of Annika > Lantz-Andersson: > > > > > > > > > > https://gupea.ub.gu.se/bitstream/2077/19736/1/gupea_2077_19736_1.pdf > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Greg, Greeno has theorized the ways in which frames "create > > certain > > > > > > > affordances that solicit various types of behavior (whether > > > > > 'cognitive', > > > > > > > 'emotional', or some other emically named type)." To my > knowledge > > > > > > Greeno's > > > > > > > work here focuses more on cognitive aspects and not that much > on > > > > > > emotional > > > > > > > aspects. He uses the notion of positioning in association with > > > frames > > > > > > > (which he relates to Goffman). "This refers to ways in which > an > > > > > > individual > > > > > > > is > > > > > > > entitled, expected, or perhaps obligated to participate in > > > > interactions > > > > > > of > > > > > > > an activity system, such as a classroom or an experimental > > session > > > > > > > involving interaction with a computer program." (see, A Theory > > Bite > > > > on > > > > > > > Contextualizing, Framing, and Positioning: A Companion to Son > and > > > > > > > Goldstone, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07370000903014386) > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Greg wrote: > > > > > > > "I might add to this that Goffman speaks of the way in which > > > > > motivations > > > > > > > are, to a certain extent, entailed by frames (yes, "to a > certain > > > > > extent" > > > > > > - > > > > > > > this does not mean the frames determine them!). Thus, frames > > bring > > > > with > > > > > > > them motivational relevancies as much as individuals do!" > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I wonder if this interplay between collective frames and > > > individuals > > > > > can > > > > > > be > > > > > > > conceptualized with meaning and sense. Object of an activity is > > > > framed > > > > > in > > > > > > > terms of collectively shared meanings. Yet, each individual > > > develops > > > > a > > > > > > > personal relationship to the object, that is, a personal sense. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > By the way, thanks Mike for pointing out this overstatement of > > > > > stability > > > > > > > with respect to meanings. This has bothered me a lot, too. A > > > > colleague > > > > > of > > > > > > > mine even asserts that sense is never shared enough to become > > > > > > legitimately > > > > > > > called a shared meaning in Vygotsky/Leontiev sense. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Antti > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 3:01 AM, mike cole > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I agree, very clearly statements of the sense/meaning > relation, > > > > along > > > > > > > with > > > > > > > > the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I wanted to say, > > and > > > > > > > thought, > > > > > > > > unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows." > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > In the quote here, I think LSV is somewhat overstating the > > > > stability > > > > > of > > > > > > > > meaning across contexts; yes relative to the microgenetic > > > processes > > > > > of > > > > > > > > sense making capturable with > > > > > > > > modern technologies, but not totally "context independent." > > Even > > > > > > > dictionary > > > > > > > > meanings change, as LSV was well aware from his interest in > the > > > > > history > > > > > > > of > > > > > > > > words in relation to their appearance in children's > > vocabularies > > > in > > > > > > > > ontogeny. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Keeping the simultaneous relevance of several time scales in > > mind > > > > in > > > > > > > these > > > > > > > > discussions seems really important, as hard as it is to do. > > > > > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > > > Visiting Assistant Professor > > > > > Department of Anthropology > > > > > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > > > Brigham Young University > > > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > Visiting Assistant Professor > > > Department of Anthropology > > > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > Brigham Young University > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Visiting Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > From lchcmike@gmail.com Mon Aug 19 16:24:02 2013 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Mon, 19 Aug 2013 16:24:02 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: [commfac] Re: FW: femtechnet: DOCC 2013: top listed story on Inside Higher Ed In-Reply-To: References: <9D4B2287-66DC-4E06-858A-CD578E43D7EF@gmail.com> <9AF3C2A4-7F25-470B-A126-C349E6391F3B@ucsd.edu> Message-ID: Dear Xmcaers- The following link to femnet mooc seems to me to offer a very interesting model for members of xmca to think of following. We here at UCSD have been thinking along such lines, but this is a developed model that might actually provide some kind of strategic guide to action. I can imagine any number of stimulating such efforts various congeries of xmca could cook up. mike Forwarded from Lisa Cartwright at ucsd. > > Hi everyone, the DOCC 2013 MOOC alternative course discussed today today > in Inside Higher Ed had one of its pilots taught in our department last > spring by Liz Losh and me with Monika Sengul Jones, Cristina Visperas, > Lousie Hickman, Erika Cheng, Yelena Guzman and others leading the effort to > produce innovative course design and materials and hosting a conference > dedicated to it--big shout-out to these graduate students for making this > launch happen. We are one of the 17 colleges offering the class to > undergrads in this coming year. I thought some of you you might enjoy > reading this alternative effort given the pervasive of MOOC discussions > right now. Best to everyone, Lisa > > I suggest you take a look. mike > ------------------------------ > > http://www.insidehighered.com/ > > _______________________________________________ > femtechnet mailing list > femtechnet@lists.uoregon.edu > https://lists-prod.uoregon.edu/mailman/listinfo/femtechnet > > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Mon Aug 19 16:33:06 2013 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Mon, 19 Aug 2013 23:33:06 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [commfac] Re: FW: femtechnet: DOCC 2013: top listed story on Inside Higher Ed In-Reply-To: References: <9D4B2287-66DC-4E06-858A-CD578E43D7EF@gmail.com> <9AF3C2A4-7F25-470B-A126-C349E6391F3B@ucsd.edu> Message-ID: <1375C18A-4051-4C6E-A779-E10BAA9CBA01@uniandes.edu.co> I especially like the concluding paragraphs: Among the forms of MOOC hype that Balsamo said she hoped the DOCC would combat is the idea that massive online courses allow some "best" professor to interact with students everywhere, so that all can learn from the superstar. It's not that there aren't very talented professors out there, she said, but the superstar emphasis is wrong ("Is there really a 'best'?" she asks) and doesn't encourage group learning. Said Balsamo: "The idea of the one best talking head, the best expert in the world, that couldn't be more patriarchal. That displays a hubris that is unthinkable from a feminist perspective." Read more: http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/08/19/feminist-professors-create-alternative-moocs#ixzz2cSdlb7pt Inside Higher Ed On Aug 19, 2013, at 6:24 PM, mike cole wrote: > Dear Xmcaers- > > The following link to femnet mooc seems to me to offer a very interesting > model for members of xmca to think of following. We here at UCSD have been > thinking along > such lines, but this is a developed model that might actually provide some > kind of > strategic guide to action. I can imagine any number of stimulating such > efforts various > congeries of xmca could cook up. > mike > > Forwarded from Lisa Cartwright at ucsd. >> >> Hi everyone, the DOCC 2013 MOOC alternative course discussed today today >> in Inside Higher Ed had one of its pilots taught in our department last >> spring by Liz Losh and me with Monika Sengul Jones, Cristina Visperas, >> Lousie Hickman, Erika Cheng, Yelena Guzman and others leading the effort to >> produce innovative course design and materials and hosting a conference >> dedicated to it--big shout-out to these graduate students for making this >> launch happen. We are one of the 17 colleges offering the class to >> undergrads in this coming year. I thought some of you you might enjoy >> reading this alternative effort given the pervasive of MOOC discussions >> right now. Best to everyone, Lisa >> >> I suggest you take a look. > mike > > >> ------------------------------ >> >> http://www.insidehighered.com/ >> >> _______________________________________________ >> femtechnet mailing list >> femtechnet@lists.uoregon.edu >> https://lists-prod.uoregon.edu/mailman/listinfo/femtechnet >> >> > From lchcmike@gmail.com Mon Aug 19 16:44:35 2013 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Mon, 19 Aug 2013 16:44:35 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [commfac] Re: FW: femtechnet: DOCC 2013: top listed story on Inside Higher Ed In-Reply-To: <1375C18A-4051-4C6E-A779-E10BAA9CBA01@uniandes.edu.co> References: <9D4B2287-66DC-4E06-858A-CD578E43D7EF@gmail.com> <9AF3C2A4-7F25-470B-A126-C349E6391F3B@ucsd.edu> <1375C18A-4051-4C6E-A779-E10BAA9CBA01@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: It is unthinkable from the perspective of any world view that values diversity. XMCA values diversity. Ergo....... or is that er.... go?? mike On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 4:33 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > I especially like the concluding paragraphs: > > Among the forms of MOOC hype that Balsamo said she hoped the DOCC would > combat is the idea that massive online courses allow some "best" professor > to interact with students everywhere, so that all can learn from the > superstar. It's not that there aren't very talented professors out there, > she said, but the superstar emphasis is wrong ("Is there really a 'best'?" > she asks) and doesn't encourage group learning. > > Said Balsamo: "The idea of the one best talking head, the best expert in > the world, that couldn't be more patriarchal. That displays a hubris that > is unthinkable from a feminist perspective." > > > Read more: > http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/08/19/feminist-professors-create-alternative-moocs#ixzz2cSdlb7pt > Inside Higher Ed > > > On Aug 19, 2013, at 6:24 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > Dear Xmcaers- > > > > The following link to femnet mooc seems to me to offer a very interesting > > model for members of xmca to think of following. We here at UCSD have > been > > thinking along > > such lines, but this is a developed model that might actually provide > some > > kind of > > strategic guide to action. I can imagine any number of stimulating such > > efforts various > > congeries of xmca could cook up. > > mike > > > > Forwarded from Lisa Cartwright at ucsd. > >> > >> Hi everyone, the DOCC 2013 MOOC alternative course discussed today today > >> in Inside Higher Ed had one of its pilots taught in our department last > >> spring by Liz Losh and me with Monika Sengul Jones, Cristina Visperas, > >> Lousie Hickman, Erika Cheng, Yelena Guzman and others leading the > effort to > >> produce innovative course design and materials and hosting a conference > >> dedicated to it--big shout-out to these graduate students for making > this > >> launch happen. We are one of the 17 colleges offering the class to > >> undergrads in this coming year. I thought some of you you might enjoy > >> reading this alternative effort given the pervasive of MOOC discussions > >> right now. Best to everyone, Lisa > >> > >> I suggest you take a look. > > mike > > > > > >> ------------------------------ > >> > >> http://www.insidehighered.com/ > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> femtechnet mailing list > >> femtechnet@lists.uoregon.edu > >> https://lists-prod.uoregon.edu/mailman/listinfo/femtechnet > >> > >> > > > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Mon Aug 19 19:44:38 2013 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2013 12:44:38 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <5212D816.8040808@mira.net> Greg, perhaps we could try some alternative words to "motivation"? What about "ideal" or "concept"? The ideal or concept of a project defines the norms which characterise the activity, and give us the best go at making sense of the "motivation of an activity". I say "the best go" because "motivation" seems to me to be a word which is applicable only to individual persons. Leontyev used the word "motive" for what defined an activity in a way that is ambiguous. It can be, as in Manfred Holodynski's interpretation, the end which is being served by the immediate goals of the actions making up the activity, in the subjective sense that a person is going to the window (goal) because they want give a speech (motive), but also in the objective sense, for example, that an arms factory is producing guns because the community needs guns. In this latter sense, the motive of "producing guns for the community" is an "only understood motive," and what motivates the factory worker (sets her in motion) is the need to earn a wage to raise their family - that is the "really effective motive." But the concept of "arms production" does not rely on the questionable idea of "corporate motivation", just the norms of participation in "arms production". Does that assist at all in your issue, Greg? Andy Greg Thompson wrote: > ... > p.s. ... I think Larry described nicely > what I am trying to achieve - a notion of activity that does not have at > its center a sovereign subject. My post questioning the merging of > phenomenology with activity theory speaks to the central intellectual > concern and the "for what" of what I'm hoping to do in my work. > > From r.j.s.parsons@open.ac.uk Tue Aug 20 01:16:04 2013 From: r.j.s.parsons@open.ac.uk (rjsp2) Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2013 09:16:04 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: References: <520ADCDD.9000406@mira.net> <520C3970.6000803@mira.net> Message-ID: <521325C4.3050308@open.ac.uk> Speaking as a more or less permanent lurker on this forum, please don't. It is immensely informative. Thank you, and everyone else, for your contributions to my learning and thinking - which I can only repay in tiny measure. Rob On 19/08/2013 21:27, Greg Thompson wrote: > I'm wondering if this conversation should move off the list since this > is probably review (or of little relevance) for many people on the list. -- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC 038302). From glassman.13@osu.edu Tue Aug 20 05:32:05 2013 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2013 12:32:05 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [commfac] Re: FW: femtechnet: DOCC 2013: top listed story on Inside Higher Ed In-Reply-To: References: <9D4B2287-66DC-4E06-858A-CD578E43D7EF@gmail.com> <9AF3C2A4-7F25-470B-A126-C349E6391F3B@ucsd.edu> <1375C18A-4051-4C6E-A779-E10BAA9CBA01@uniandes.edu.co>, Message-ID: <54248F6464A3874BB28FFF75F616AED69EF15779@CIO-KRC-D1MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> I think one of the things we really need to do is change the vocabulary and the way we talk about different initiatives in Internet infused education. Massive Open Online Courses is a marketing scheme not a point of debate about education. MOOC sounds kind of cute but it is so broad as to be completely meaningless, and the appropriation of it is an attempt of those with the largest megaphone and smallest intellectual memories to take control of the conversation (same thing that happened with the phrase educational reform I think). Ironically when the phrase was first introduced it mean something completely different from what we automatically think it means now. It was introduced to describe a twenty-five person online course with high levels of connectivity by George Siemans at the University of Manitoba. It was appropriated by venture capital companies like Udacity and EdX I would surmise because it is kind of a cute way of describing things like Teletubbies. The trouble is then we are constantly arguing against the way MOOCs are which creates an uncomfortable bifurcation - is the Internet good for education or bad for education. I think we would be much better off it we used the United Nations terms which are much more descriptive - Open Educational Content and Open Educational Resources. Open Educational Content sort of describes Udacity while Open Educational Resources describes better Balsamo's project. This gives us the opportunity to say which is better for educational purposes. We can ask the question, "Why do you think Open Content" is enough for an educational experience? Does OEC limit students more than OER? Basically what those proposing OEC are doing is throwing out centuries of not only discussions of education but pretty much every argument since Des Cartes. They should be called on this publicly and made to answer for it. Michael ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of mike cole [lchcmike@gmail.com] Sent: Monday, August 19, 2013 7:44 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [commfac] Re: FW: femtechnet: DOCC 2013: top listed story on Inside Higher Ed It is unthinkable from the perspective of any world view that values diversity. XMCA values diversity. Ergo....... or is that er.... go?? mike On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 4:33 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > I especially like the concluding paragraphs: > > Among the forms of MOOC hype that Balsamo said she hoped the DOCC would > combat is the idea that massive online courses allow some "best" professor > to interact with students everywhere, so that all can learn from the > superstar. It's not that there aren't very talented professors out there, > she said, but the superstar emphasis is wrong ("Is there really a 'best'?" > she asks) and doesn't encourage group learning. > > Said Balsamo: "The idea of the one best talking head, the best expert in > the world, that couldn't be more patriarchal. That displays a hubris that > is unthinkable from a feminist perspective." > > > Read more: > http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/08/19/feminist-professors-create-alternative-moocs#ixzz2cSdlb7pt > Inside Higher Ed > > > On Aug 19, 2013, at 6:24 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > Dear Xmcaers- > > > > The following link to femnet mooc seems to me to offer a very interesting > > model for members of xmca to think of following. We here at UCSD have > been > > thinking along > > such lines, but this is a developed model that might actually provide > some > > kind of > > strategic guide to action. I can imagine any number of stimulating such > > efforts various > > congeries of xmca could cook up. > > mike > > > > Forwarded from Lisa Cartwright at ucsd. > >> > >> Hi everyone, the DOCC 2013 MOOC alternative course discussed today today > >> in Inside Higher Ed had one of its pilots taught in our department last > >> spring by Liz Losh and me with Monika Sengul Jones, Cristina Visperas, > >> Lousie Hickman, Erika Cheng, Yelena Guzman and others leading the > effort to > >> produce innovative course design and materials and hosting a conference > >> dedicated to it--big shout-out to these graduate students for making > this > >> launch happen. We are one of the 17 colleges offering the class to > >> undergrads in this coming year. I thought some of you you might enjoy > >> reading this alternative effort given the pervasive of MOOC discussions > >> right now. Best to everyone, Lisa > >> > >> I suggest you take a look. > > mike > > > > > >> ------------------------------ > >> > >> http://www.insidehighered.com/ > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> femtechnet mailing list > >> femtechnet@lists.uoregon.edu > >> https://lists-prod.uoregon.edu/mailman/listinfo/femtechnet > >> > >> > > > > > > From glassman.13@osu.edu Tue Aug 20 05:46:15 2013 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2013 12:46:15 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [commfac] Re: FW: femtechnet: DOCC 2013: top listed story on Inside Higher Ed In-Reply-To: <54248F6464A3874BB28FFF75F616AED69EF15779@CIO-KRC-D1MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> References: <9D4B2287-66DC-4E06-858A-CD578E43D7EF@gmail.com> <9AF3C2A4-7F25-470B-A126-C349E6391F3B@ucsd.edu> <1375C18A-4051-4C6E-A779-E10BAA9CBA01@uniandes.edu.co>, , <54248F6464A3874BB28FFF75F616AED69EF15779@CIO-KRC-D1MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: <54248F6464A3874BB28FFF75F616AED69EF1578E@CIO-KRC-D1MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> One more thing - just to show how ridiculous the acronym MOOC is. The most successful "MOOC" I have witnessed had nothing to do with brilliant social entrepenuers who are bringing education into the 21st century (sarcasm). It was when Sanjay Gupta admitted he was wrong about marijuana and linked to research. Michael ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Glassman, Michael [glassman.13@osu.edu] Sent: Tuesday, August 20, 2013 8:32 AM To: lchcmike@gmail.com; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [commfac] Re: FW: femtechnet: DOCC 2013: top listed story on Inside Higher Ed I think one of the things we really need to do is change the vocabulary and the way we talk about different initiatives in Internet infused education. Massive Open Online Courses is a marketing scheme not a point of debate about education. MOOC sounds kind of cute but it is so broad as to be completely meaningless, and the appropriation of it is an attempt of those with the largest megaphone and smallest intellectual memories to take control of the conversation (same thing that happened with the phrase educational reform I think). Ironically when the phrase was first introduced it mean something completely different from what we automatically think it means now. It was introduced to describe a twenty-five person online course with high levels of connectivity by George Siemans at the University of Manitoba. It was appropriated by venture capital companies like Udacity and EdX I would surmise because it is kind of a cute way of describing things like Teletubbies. The trouble is then we are constantly arguing against the way MOOCs are which creates an uncomfortable bifurcation - is the Internet good for education or bad for education. I think we would be much better off it we used the United Nations terms which are much more descriptive - Open Educational Content and Open Educational Resources. Open Educational Content sort of describes Udacity while Open Educational Resources describes better Balsamo's project. This gives us the opportunity to say which is better for educational purposes. We can ask the question, "Why do you think Open Content" is enough for an educational experience? Does OEC limit students more than OER? Basically what those proposing OEC are doing is throwing out centuries of not only discussions of education but pretty much every argument since Des Cartes. They should be called on this publicly and made to answer for it. Michael ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of mike cole [lchcmike@gmail.com] Sent: Monday, August 19, 2013 7:44 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [commfac] Re: FW: femtechnet: DOCC 2013: top listed story on Inside Higher Ed It is unthinkable from the perspective of any world view that values diversity. XMCA values diversity. Ergo....... or is that er.... go?? mike On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 4:33 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > I especially like the concluding paragraphs: > > Among the forms of MOOC hype that Balsamo said she hoped the DOCC would > combat is the idea that massive online courses allow some "best" professor > to interact with students everywhere, so that all can learn from the > superstar. It's not that there aren't very talented professors out there, > she said, but the superstar emphasis is wrong ("Is there really a 'best'?" > she asks) and doesn't encourage group learning. > > Said Balsamo: "The idea of the one best talking head, the best expert in > the world, that couldn't be more patriarchal. That displays a hubris that > is unthinkable from a feminist perspective." > > > Read more: > http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/08/19/feminist-professors-create-alternative-moocs#ixzz2cSdlb7pt > Inside Higher Ed > > > On Aug 19, 2013, at 6:24 PM, mike cole wrote: > > > Dear Xmcaers- > > > > The following link to femnet mooc seems to me to offer a very interesting > > model for members of xmca to think of following. We here at UCSD have > been > > thinking along > > such lines, but this is a developed model that might actually provide > some > > kind of > > strategic guide to action. I can imagine any number of stimulating such > > efforts various > > congeries of xmca could cook up. > > mike > > > > Forwarded from Lisa Cartwright at ucsd. > >> > >> Hi everyone, the DOCC 2013 MOOC alternative course discussed today today > >> in Inside Higher Ed had one of its pilots taught in our department last > >> spring by Liz Losh and me with Monika Sengul Jones, Cristina Visperas, > >> Lousie Hickman, Erika Cheng, Yelena Guzman and others leading the > effort to > >> produce innovative course design and materials and hosting a conference > >> dedicated to it--big shout-out to these graduate students for making > this > >> launch happen. We are one of the 17 colleges offering the class to > >> undergrads in this coming year. I thought some of you you might enjoy > >> reading this alternative effort given the pervasive of MOOC discussions > >> right now. Best to everyone, Lisa > >> > >> I suggest you take a look. > > mike > > > > > >> ------------------------------ > >> > >> http://www.insidehighered.com/ > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> femtechnet mailing list > >> femtechnet@lists.uoregon.edu > >> https://lists-prod.uoregon.edu/mailman/listinfo/femtechnet > >> > >> > > > > > > From ablunden@mira.net Tue Aug 20 05:58:36 2013 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2013 22:58:36 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [commfac] Re: FW: femtechnet: DOCC 2013: top listed story on Inside Higher Ed In-Reply-To: <54248F6464A3874BB28FFF75F616AED69EF15779@CIO-KRC-D1MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> References: <9D4B2287-66DC-4E06-858A-CD578E43D7EF@gmail.com> <9AF3C2A4-7F25-470B-A126-C349E6391F3B@ucsd.edu> <1375C18A-4051-4C6E-A779-E10BAA9CBA01@uniandes.edu.co>, <54248F6464A3874BB28FFF75F616AED69EF15779@CIO-KRC-D1MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: <521367FC.8090606@mira.net> What, in your opinion then, Michael, is the best thing a group or university teachers, with technical support and access to a website, but no appreciable amount of money, could do to offer education in CHAT free to the world? Andy Glassman, Michael wrote: > I think one of the things we really need to do is change the vocabulary and the way we talk about different initiatives in Internet infused education. Massive Open Online Courses is a marketing scheme not a point of debate about education. MOOC sounds kind of cute but it is so broad as to be completely meaningless, and the appropriation of it is an attempt of those with the largest megaphone and smallest intellectual memories to take control of the conversation (same thing that happened with the phrase educational reform I think). Ironically when the phrase was first introduced it mean something completely different from what we automatically think it means now. It was introduced to describe a twenty-five person online course with high levels of connectivity by George Siemans at the University of Manitoba. It was appropriated by venture capital companies like Udacity and EdX I would surmise because it is kind of a cute way of describing things like Teletubbies. The trou > ble is then we are constantly arguing against the way MOOCs are which creates an uncomfortable bifurcation - is the Internet good for education or bad for education. > > I think we would be much better off it we used the United Nations terms which are much more descriptive - Open Educational Content and Open Educational Resources. Open Educational Content sort of describes Udacity while Open Educational Resources describes better Balsamo's project. This gives us the opportunity to say which is better for educational purposes. We can ask the question, "Why do you think Open Content" is enough for an educational experience? Does OEC limit students more than OER? Basically what those proposing OEC are doing is throwing out centuries of not only discussions of education but pretty much every argument since Des Cartes. They should be called on this publicly and made to answer for it. > > Michael > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of mike cole [lchcmike@gmail.com] > Sent: Monday, August 19, 2013 7:44 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [commfac] Re: FW: femtechnet: DOCC 2013: top listed story on Inside Higher Ed > > It is unthinkable from the perspective of any world view that values > diversity. > XMCA values diversity. > Ergo....... or is that er.... go?? > mike > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 4:33 PM, Martin John Packer >> wrote: >> > > >> I especially like the concluding paragraphs: >> >> Among the forms of MOOC hype that Balsamo said she hoped the DOCC would >> combat is the idea that massive online courses allow some "best" professor >> to interact with students everywhere, so that all can learn from the >> superstar. It's not that there aren't very talented professors out there, >> she said, but the superstar emphasis is wrong ("Is there really a 'best'?" >> she asks) and doesn't encourage group learning. >> >> Said Balsamo: "The idea of the one best talking head, the best expert in >> the world, that couldn't be more patriarchal. That displays a hubris that >> is unthinkable from a feminist perspective." >> >> >> Read more: >> http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/08/19/feminist-professors-create-alternative-moocs#ixzz2cSdlb7pt >> Inside Higher Ed >> >> >> On Aug 19, 2013, at 6:24 PM, mike cole wrote: >> >> >>> Dear Xmcaers- >>> >>> The following link to femnet mooc seems to me to offer a very interesting >>> model for members of xmca to think of following. We here at UCSD have >>> >> been >> >>> thinking along >>> such lines, but this is a developed model that might actually provide >>> >> some >> >>> kind of >>> strategic guide to action. I can imagine any number of stimulating such >>> efforts various >>> congeries of xmca could cook up. >>> mike >>> >>> Forwarded from Lisa Cartwright at ucsd. >>> >>>> Hi everyone, the DOCC 2013 MOOC alternative course discussed today today >>>> in Inside Higher Ed had one of its pilots taught in our department last >>>> spring by Liz Losh and me with Monika Sengul Jones, Cristina Visperas, >>>> Lousie Hickman, Erika Cheng, Yelena Guzman and others leading the >>>> >> effort to >> >>>> produce innovative course design and materials and hosting a conference >>>> dedicated to it--big shout-out to these graduate students for making >>>> >> this >> >>>> launch happen. We are one of the 17 colleges offering the class to >>>> undergrads in this coming year. I thought some of you you might enjoy >>>> reading this alternative effort given the pervasive of MOOC discussions >>>> right now. Best to everyone, Lisa >>>> >>>> I suggest you take a look. >>>> >>> mike >>> >>> >>> >>>> ------------------------------ >>>> >>>> http://www.insidehighered.com/ >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> femtechnet mailing list >>>> femtechnet@lists.uoregon.edu >>>> https://lists-prod.uoregon.edu/mailman/listinfo/femtechnet >>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> >> > > > > > > -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts http://marxists.academia.edu/AndyBlunden From peg.griffin@att.net Tue Aug 20 06:38:30 2013 From: peg.griffin@att.net (Peg Griffin) Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2013 06:38:30 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: <5212D816.8040808@mira.net> References: <5212D816.8040808@mira.net> Message-ID: <1377005910.8295.YahooMailNeo@web181205.mail.ne1.yahoo.com> I like the idea of a "well-motivated argument" as used in classical and contemporary logic.? So I say stick to motivated. It works so nicely with the distinction between "merely understood" and "really effective" -- and the transition as merely understood motive becomes really effective.? The subject may engage in the actions that are motivated by two different activity systems with two different motives -- but say the second is merely understood by the subject and the first is really effective for the subject.? When the human conflict-ing (Luria) mash-up happens and the person lapses into a mosaically related but contradictory action -- poof -- the merely understood is now the motive! So the child you and Leontyev describe doing homework is first really effectively motivated by play with adult rules of priority/timing etc. but when that child scrunches up his homework paper and throws it in the waste basket and starts all over -- poof-- the really effective motive/activity falls apart and the merely understood socio-cultural motive/activity is ready and willing and takes up the slack.? Having alluded to both Luria and Leontyev, I now bring in the Beatles -- it's a long and winding road.? Not a one-time enlightenment! But praxis makes possible. When we at LCHC, ages ago, were running the after-school school we called "Field College" (pun and polysemy intended), a funding program officer (Marge Martus) commented that she hadn't seen a single child off task in two hours.? And believe me they were not school or adult governed children!? It was because Field College was strewn with motives that virtually begged for children to engage but also to transition from really effective to merely understood and hence to "grow" into a new activity.? It would be, I told Marge, like being in a rainstorm and trying to avoid the raindrops if a child were off-all-the available operating tasks! We had "center table" rituals and "fifth dimension" constitutions that exposed the merely understood motives. And we had participant structures, tasks, procedures, a lot of bells and whistles that fit in dual activity systems/motives, some combonation of which elicited the child's voluntary engagement in a really effective way. Peg ________________________________ From: Andy Blunden To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Monday, August 19, 2013 10:44 PM Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities Greg, perhaps we could try some alternative words to "motivation"? What about "ideal" or "concept"? The ideal or concept of a project defines the norms which characterise the activity, and give us the best go at making sense of the "motivation of an activity". I say "the best go" because "motivation" seems to me to be a word which is applicable only to individual persons. Leontyev used the word "motive" for what defined an activity in a way that is ambiguous. It can be, as in Manfred Holodynski's interpretation, the end which is being served by the immediate goals of the actions making up the activity, in the subjective sense that a person is going to the window (goal) because they want give a speech (motive), but also in the objective sense, for example, that an arms factory is producing guns because the community needs guns. In this latter sense, the motive of "producing guns for the community" is an "only understood motive," and what motivates the factory worker (sets her in motion) is the need to earn a wage to raise their family - that is the "really effective motive." But the concept of "arms production" does not rely on the questionable idea of "corporate motivation", just the norms of participation in "arms production". Does that assist at all in your issue, Greg? Andy Greg Thompson wrote: > ... > p.s. ... I think Larry described nicely > what I am trying to achieve - a notion of activity that does not have at > its center a sovereign subject. My post questioning the merging of > phenomenology with activity theory speaks to the central intellectual > concern and the "for what" of what I'm hoping to do in my work. > >? From glassman.13@osu.edu Tue Aug 20 06:46:11 2013 From: glassman.13@osu.edu (Glassman, Michael) Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2013 13:46:11 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [commfac] Re: FW: femtechnet: DOCC 2013: top listed story on Inside Higher Ed In-Reply-To: <521367FC.8090606@mira.net> References: <9D4B2287-66DC-4E06-858A-CD578E43D7EF@gmail.com> <9AF3C2A4-7F25-470B-A126-C349E6391F3B@ucsd.edu> <1375C18A-4051-4C6E-A779-E10BAA9CBA01@uniandes.edu.co>, <54248F6464A3874BB28FFF75F616AED69EF15779@CIO-KRC-D1MBX01.osuad.osu.edu>, <521367FC.8090606@mira.net> Message-ID: <54248F6464A3874BB28FFF75F616AED69EF157B1@CIO-KRC-D1MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Hi Andy, I think, and this is just my line of thinking, that the best way to put CHAT education, and education in other ideas, is to create embedded initiatives. It is really important not to create any bifurcations - I would suggest there are a number of moving parts that we are going to have to figure out - and it will be an ongoing exploration. I think for Open Educational Content CHAT investigators could develop a series a common resource pools, something akin to the longer threads that sometimes emerge on this list, or also what you Andy have created with your Marxists.org site. At another level, OER, you could do what Dr. Balsamo is doing, create platforms where individual can interconnect/link up different resource pools and help develop strategies for remixing them for specific purposes. And then at the local level you can develop problem solving groups looking into specific ideas and develop strategies that fit into the lives and the interrelationships between space and place at that particular moment of teaching history. What is really cool is that these local levels have the potential of developing their own common resource pools that can then be interconnected with other groups. Education then becomes less an exercise "banking" and more of a journey through a "web of trails." What is great about this I think is it takes almost no money except at the local level where you need to actually pay the teachers facilitating the groups. All of the applications you need are free and out there. Michael ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of Andy Blunden [ablunden@mira.net] Sent: Tuesday, August 20, 2013 8:58 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [commfac] Re: FW: femtechnet: DOCC 2013: top listed story on Inside Higher Ed What, in your opinion then, Michael, is the best thing a group or university teachers, with technical support and access to a website, but no appreciable amount of money, could do to offer education in CHAT free to the world? Andy Glassman, Michael wrote: > I think one of the things we really need to do is change the vocabulary and the way we talk about different initiatives in Internet infused education. Massive Open Online Courses is a marketing scheme not a point of debate about education. MOOC sounds kind of cute but it is so broad as to be completely meaningless, and the appropriation of it is an attempt of those with the largest megaphone and smallest intellectual memories to take control of the conversation (same thing that happened with the phrase educational reform I think). Ironically when the phrase was first introduced it mean something completely different from what we automatically think it means now. It was introduced to describe a twenty-five person online course with high levels of connectivity by George Siemans at the University of Manitoba. It was appropriated by venture capital companies like Udacity and EdX I would surmise because it is kind of a cute way of describing things like Teletubbies. The trou > ble is then we are constantly arguing against the way MOOCs are which creates an uncomfortable bifurcation - is the Internet good for education or bad for education. > > I think we would be much better off it we used the United Nations terms which are much more descriptive - Open Educational Content and Open Educational Resources. Open Educational Content sort of describes Udacity while Open Educational Resources describes better Balsamo's project. This gives us the opportunity to say which is better for educational purposes. We can ask the question, "Why do you think Open Content" is enough for an educational experience? Does OEC limit students more than OER? Basically what those proposing OEC are doing is throwing out centuries of not only discussions of education but pretty much every argument since Des Cartes. They should be called on this publicly and made to answer for it. > > Michael > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] on behalf of mike cole [lchcmike@gmail.com] > Sent: Monday, August 19, 2013 7:44 PM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [commfac] Re: FW: femtechnet: DOCC 2013: top listed story on Inside Higher Ed > > It is unthinkable from the perspective of any world view that values > diversity. > XMCA values diversity. > Ergo....... or is that er.... go?? > mike > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 4:33 PM, Martin John Packer >> wrote: >> > > >> I especially like the concluding paragraphs: >> >> Among the forms of MOOC hype that Balsamo said she hoped the DOCC would >> combat is the idea that massive online courses allow some "best" professor >> to interact with students everywhere, so that all can learn from the >> superstar. It's not that there aren't very talented professors out there, >> she said, but the superstar emphasis is wrong ("Is there really a 'best'?" >> she asks) and doesn't encourage group learning. >> >> Said Balsamo: "The idea of the one best talking head, the best expert in >> the world, that couldn't be more patriarchal. That displays a hubris that >> is unthinkable from a feminist perspective." >> >> >> Read more: >> http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/08/19/feminist-professors-create-alternative-moocs#ixzz2cSdlb7pt >> Inside Higher Ed >> >> >> On Aug 19, 2013, at 6:24 PM, mike cole wrote: >> >> >>> Dear Xmcaers- >>> >>> The following link to femnet mooc seems to me to offer a very interesting >>> model for members of xmca to think of following. We here at UCSD have >>> >> been >> >>> thinking along >>> such lines, but this is a developed model that might actually provide >>> >> some >> >>> kind of >>> strategic guide to action. I can imagine any number of stimulating such >>> efforts various >>> congeries of xmca could cook up. >>> mike >>> >>> Forwarded from Lisa Cartwright at ucsd. >>> >>>> Hi everyone, the DOCC 2013 MOOC alternative course discussed today today >>>> in Inside Higher Ed had one of its pilots taught in our department last >>>> spring by Liz Losh and me with Monika Sengul Jones, Cristina Visperas, >>>> Lousie Hickman, Erika Cheng, Yelena Guzman and others leading the >>>> >> effort to >> >>>> produce innovative course design and materials and hosting a conference >>>> dedicated to it--big shout-out to these graduate students for making >>>> >> this >> >>>> launch happen. We are one of the 17 colleges offering the class to >>>> undergrads in this coming year. I thought some of you you might enjoy >>>> reading this alternative effort given the pervasive of MOOC discussions >>>> right now. Best to everyone, Lisa >>>> >>>> I suggest you take a look. >>>> >>> mike >>> >>> >>> >>>> ------------------------------ >>>> >>>> http://www.insidehighered.com/ >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> femtechnet mailing list >>>> femtechnet@lists.uoregon.edu >>>> https://lists-prod.uoregon.edu/mailman/listinfo/femtechnet >>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> >> > > > > > > -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts http://marxists.academia.edu/AndyBlunden From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Tue Aug 20 07:16:27 2013 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2013 14:16:27 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] New translation of Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception In-Reply-To: <54248F6464A3874BB28FFF75F616AED69EF157B1@CIO-KRC-D1MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> References: <9D4B2287-66DC-4E06-858A-CD578E43D7EF@gmail.com> <9AF3C2A4-7F25-470B-A126-C349E6391F3B@ucsd.edu> <1375C18A-4051-4C6E-A779-E10BAA9CBA01@uniandes.edu.co>, <54248F6464A3874BB28FFF75F616AED69EF15779@CIO-KRC-D1MBX01.osuad.osu.edu>, <521367FC.8090606@mira.net> <54248F6464A3874BB28FFF75F616AED69EF157B1@CIO-KRC-D1MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> Message-ID: <625D31EA-561C-4D1B-B523-95EEF9BDB617@uniandes.edu.co> First published in 1945, Maurice Merleau-Ponty?s monumental Ph?nom?nologie de la perception signalled the arrival of a major new philosophical and intellectual voice in post-war Europe. Breaking with the prevailing picture of existentialism and phenomenology at the time, it has become one of the landmark works of twentieth-century thought. This new translation, the first for over fifty years, makes this classic work of philosophy available to a new generation of readers. Phenomenology of Perception stands in the great phenomenological tradition of Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre. Yet Merleau-Ponty?s contribution is decisive, as he brings this tradition and other philosophical predecessors, particularly Descartes and Kant, to confront a neglected dimension of our experience: the lived body and the phenomenal world. Charting a bold course between the reductionism of science on the one hand and "intellectualism" on the other, Merleau-Ponty argues that we should regard the body not as a mere biological or physical unit, but as the body which structures one?s situation and experience within the world. Merleau-Ponty enriches his classic work with engaging studies of famous cases in the history of psychology and neurology as well as phenomena that continue to draw our attention, such as phantom limb syndrome, synaesthesia, and hallucination. This new translation includes many helpful features such as the reintroduction of Merleau-Ponty?s discursive Table of Contents as subtitles into the body of the text, a comprehensive Translator?s Introduction to its main themes, essential notes explaining key terms of translation, an extensive Index, and an important updating of Merleau-Ponty?s references to now available English translations. Also included is a new foreword by Taylor Carman and an introduction to Merleau-Ponty by Claude Lefort. Translated by Donald A. Landes. ==== "It is impossible to define an object in cutting it off from the subject through which and for which it is an object; and the subject reveals itself only through the objects in which it is engaged. Such an affirmation only makes the content of naive experience explicit, but it is rich in consequences. Only in taking it as a basis will one succeed in building an ethics to which man can totally and sincerely adhere. It is therefore of extreme importance to establish it solidly and to give back to man this childish audacity that years of verbal submission have taken away: the audacity to say: "I am here." This is why The Phenomenology of Perception by Maurice Merleau-Ponty is not only a remarkable specialist work but a book that is of interest to the whole of man and to every man; the human condition is at stake in this book." - Simone de Beauvoir, 1945 ==== Foreword, Taylor Carman Introduction, Claude Lefort Preface Introduction: Classical Prejudices and the Return to Phenomena I. Sensation II. Association and the Projection of Memories III. Attention and Judgment IV. The Phenomenal Field Part 1: The Body 1. The Body as an Object and Mechanistic Physiology 2. The Experience of the Body and Classical Psychology 3. The Spatiality of the One?s Own Body and Motility 4. The Synthesis of One?s Own Body 5. The Body as a Sexed Being 6. Speech and the Body as Expression Part 2: The Perceived World 7. Sensing 8. Space 9. The Thing and the Natural World 10. Others and the Human World Part 3: Being-For-Itself and Being-In-The-World 11. The Cogito 12. Temporality 13. Freedom Original Bibliography Bibliography of English Translations cited Additional Work Cited Index Maurice Merleau-Ponty was born in 1908 in Rochefort-sur-Mer, France. Drawn to philosophy from a young age, Merleau-Ponty would go on to study alongside Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, and Simone Weil at the famous ?cole Normale Sup?rieure. He completed a Docteur ?s lettres based on two dissertations, La structure du comportement (1942) andPh?nom?nologie de la perception (1945). After a brief post at the University of Lyon, Merleau-Ponty returned to Paris in 1949 when he was awarded the Chair of Psychology and Pedagogy at the Sorbonne. In 1952 he became the youngest philosopher ever appointed to the prestigious Chair of Philosophy at the Coll?ge de France. He died suddenly of a stroke in 1961 aged fifty-three, at the height of his career. He is buried in P?re Lachaise Cemetery in Paris. From ablunden@mira.net Tue Aug 20 07:48:13 2013 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Wed, 21 Aug 2013 00:48:13 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: <1377005910.8295.YahooMailNeo@web181205.mail.ne1.yahoo.com> References: <5212D816.80 40808@mira.net> <1377005910.8295.YahooMailNeo@web181205.mail.ne1.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <521381AD.4010407@mira.net> I think your example and your way of explaining is perfect, Peg, for the purposes of psychology and education. The "socio-cultural motive/activity is ready." It is just this objectivist stance in relation to the societal activities which has always been my main problem with Leontyev. I know, of course, that you and Mike and the others involved in 5thD designed activities which were well aligned to widely held aims for the children's development, but where did they come from? Speaking generally, what is the dynamic of the activities we see around us? When surveying social and cultural life in general it is obviously not sufficient to say "Mike and Peg designed these activities" any more than it was sufficient to say that the Politburo decided the targets for social production. So it seems to me that Greg's main problem remains unsolved in your approach, Peg. What do we mean by the "motive" of the activity? *Whose* motive? Andy Peg Griffin wrote: > I like the idea of a "well-motivated argument" as used in classical > and contemporary logic. So I say stick to motivated. > It works so nicely with the distinction between "merely understood" > and "really effective" -- and the transition as merely understood > motive becomes really effective. The subject may engage in the > actions that are motivated by two different activity systems with two > different motives -- but say the second is merely understood by the > subject and the first is really effective for the subject. When the > human conflict-ing (Luria) mash-up happens and the person lapses into > a mosaically related but contradictory action -- poof -- the merely > understood is now the motive! > So the child you and Leontyev describe doing homework is first really > effectively motivated by play with adult rules of priority/timing etc. > but when that child scrunches up his homework paper and throws it in > the waste basket and starts all over -- poof-- the really effective > motive/activity falls apart and the merely understood socio-cultural > motive/activity is ready and willing and takes up the slack. Having > alluded to both Luria and Leontyev, I now bring in the Beatles -- it's > a long and winding road. Not a one-time enlightenment! But praxis > makes possible. > > When we at LCHC, ages ago, were running the after-school school we > called "Field College" (pun and polysemy intended), a funding program > officer (Marge Martus) commented that she hadn't seen a single child > off task in two hours. And believe me they were not school or adult > governed children! It was because Field College was strewn with > motives that virtually begged for children to engage but also to > transition from really effective to merely understood and hence to > "grow" into a new activity. It would be, I told Marge, like being in > a rainstorm and trying to avoid the raindrops if a child were > off-all-the available operating tasks! > We had "center table" rituals and "fifth dimension" constitutions that > exposed the merely understood motives. And we had participant > structures, tasks, procedures, a lot of bells and whistles that fit in > dual activity systems/motives, some combonation of which elicited the > child's voluntary engagement in a really effective way. > Peg > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *From:* Andy Blunden > *To:* "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > *Sent:* Monday, August 19, 2013 10:44 PM > *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities > > Greg, > perhaps we could try some alternative words to "motivation"? > What about "ideal" or "concept"? The ideal or concept of a project > defines the norms which characterise the activity, and give us the > best go at making sense of the "motivation of an activity". I say "the > best go" because "motivation" seems to me to be a word which is > applicable only to individual persons. Leontyev used the word "motive" > for what defined an activity in a way that is ambiguous. It can be, as > in Manfred Holodynski's interpretation, the end which is being served > by the immediate goals of the actions making up the activity, in the > subjective sense that a person is going to the window (goal) because > they want give a speech (motive), but also in the objective sense, for > example, that an arms factory is producing guns because the community > needs guns. In this latter sense, the motive of "producing guns for > the community" is an "only understood motive," and what motivates the > factory worker (sets her in motion) is the need to earn a wage to > raise their family - that is the "really effective motive." But the > concept of "arms production" does not rely on the questionable idea of > "corporate motivation", just the norms of participation in "arms > production". > > Does that assist at all in your issue, Greg? > Andy > > Greg Thompson wrote: > > ... > > p.s. ... I think Larry described nicely > > what I am trying to achieve - a notion of activity that does not have at > > its center a sovereign subject. My post questioning the merging of > > phenomenology with activity theory speaks to the central intellectual > > concern and the "for what" of what I'm hoping to do in my work. > > > > > > > -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts http://marxists.academia.edu/AndyBlunden From peg.griffin@att.net Tue Aug 20 08:52:33 2013 From: peg.griffin@att.net (Peg Griffin) Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2013 08:52:33 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: <521381AD.4010407@mira.net> References: <5212D816.80 40808@mira.net> <1377005910.8295.YahooMailNeo@web181205.mail.ne1.yahoo.com> <521381AD.4010407@mira.net> Message-ID: <1377013953.4126.YahooMailNeo@web181202.mail.ne1.yahoo.com> I see it as dynamic ( ready meaning ready to grow) because I see subjective-object and objective-subject? rather than objective or subjective. As diverse "who" are the? obejctive-subjects the odds of changes in the subjective-object motives go way up.? We might all change enough to survive after all.? Working on diversity wasn't an accidental part of LCHC's concern, nor was it for charity or to be nice.? It's the dynamism and hope bought by diversity that might separate me (and probably Mike) from the Politburo :) ________________________________ From: Andy Blunden To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Tuesday, August 20, 2013 10:48 AM Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities I think your example and your way of explaining is perfect, Peg, for the purposes of psychology and education. The "socio-cultural motive/activity is ready." It is just this objectivist stance in relation to the societal activities which has always been my main problem with Leontyev. I know, of course, that you and Mike and the others involved in 5thD designed activities which were well aligned to widely held aims for the children's development, but where did they come from? Speaking generally, what is the dynamic of the activities we see around us? When surveying social and cultural life in general it is obviously not sufficient to say "Mike and Peg designed these activities" any more than it was sufficient to say that the Politburo decided the targets for social production. So it seems to me that Greg's main problem remains unsolved in your approach, Peg. What do we mean by the "motive" of the activity? *Whose* motive? Andy Peg Griffin wrote: > I like the idea of a "well-motivated argument" as used in classical and contemporary logic.? So I say stick to motivated. > It works so nicely with the distinction between "merely understood" and "really effective" -- and the transition as merely understood motive becomes really effective.? The subject may engage in the actions that are motivated by two different activity systems with two different motives -- but say the second is merely understood by the subject and the first is really effective for the subject.? When the human conflict-ing (Luria) mash-up happens and the person lapses into a mosaically related but contradictory action -- poof -- the merely understood is now the motive! > So the child you and Leontyev describe doing homework is first really effectively motivated by play with adult rules of priority/timing etc. but when that child scrunches up his homework paper and throws it in the waste basket and starts all over -- poof-- the really effective motive/activity falls apart and the merely understood socio-cultural motive/activity is ready and willing and takes up the slack.? Having alluded to both Luria and Leontyev, I now bring in the Beatles -- it's a long and winding road.? Not a one-time enlightenment! But praxis makes possible. > > When we at LCHC, ages ago, were running the after-school school we called "Field College" (pun and polysemy intended), a funding program officer (Marge Martus) commented that she hadn't seen a single child off task in two hours.? And believe me they were not school or adult governed children!? It was because Field College was strewn with motives that virtually begged for children to engage but also to transition from really effective to merely understood and hence to "grow" into a new activity.? It would be, I told Marge, like being in a rainstorm and trying to avoid the raindrops if a child were off-all-the available operating tasks! > We had "center table" rituals and "fifth dimension" constitutions that exposed the merely understood motives. And we had participant structures, tasks, procedures, a lot of bells and whistles that fit in dual activity systems/motives, some combonation of which elicited the child's voluntary engagement in a really effective way. > Peg > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *From:* Andy Blunden > *To:* "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > *Sent:* Monday, August 19, 2013 10:44 PM > *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities > > Greg, > perhaps we could try some alternative words to "motivation"? > What about "ideal" or "concept"? The ideal or concept of a project defines the norms which characterise the activity, and give us the best go at making sense of the "motivation of an activity". I say "the best go" because "motivation" seems to me to be a word which is applicable only to individual persons. Leontyev used the word "motive" for what defined an activity in a way that is ambiguous. It can be, as in Manfred Holodynski's interpretation, the end which is being served by the immediate goals of the actions making up the activity, in the subjective sense that a person is going to the window (goal) because they want give a speech (motive), but also in the objective sense, for example, that an arms factory is producing guns because the community needs guns. In this latter sense, the motive of "producing guns for the community" is an "only understood motive," and what motivates the factory worker (sets her in motion) is the need to earn a wage to raise their family - that is the "really effective motive." But the concept of "arms production" does not rely on the questionable idea of "corporate motivation", just the norms of participation in "arms production". > > Does that assist at all in your issue, Greg? > Andy > > Greg Thompson wrote: > > ... > > p.s. ... I think Larry described nicely > > what I am trying to achieve - a notion of activity that does not have at > > its center a sovereign subject. My post questioning the merging of > > phenomenology with activity theory speaks to the central intellectual > > concern and the "for what" of what I'm hoping to do in my work. > > > > > > -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts http://marxists.academia.edu/AndyBlunden From lchcmike@gmail.com Tue Aug 20 11:53:32 2013 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2013 11:53:32 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [commfac] Re: FW: femtechnet: DOCC 2013: top listed story on Inside Higher Ed In-Reply-To: <521367FC.8090606@mira.net> References: <9D4B2287-66DC-4E06-858A-CD578E43D7EF@gmail.com> <9AF3C2A4-7F25-470B-A126-C349E6391F3B@ucsd.edu> <1375C18A-4051-4C6E-A779-E10BAA9CBA01@uniandes.edu.co> <54248F6464A3874BB28FFF75F616AED69EF15779@CIO-KRC-D1MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <521367FC.8090606@mira.net> Message-ID: Precisely the right question, Andy. mike On Tue, Aug 20, 2013 at 5:58 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > What, in your opinion then, Michael, is the best thing a group or > university teachers, with technical support and access to a website, but no > appreciable amount of money, could do to offer education in CHAT free to > the world? > > Andy > > > Glassman, Michael wrote: > >> I think one of the things we really need to do is change the vocabulary >> and the way we talk about different initiatives in Internet infused >> education. Massive Open Online Courses is a marketing scheme not a point >> of debate about education. MOOC sounds kind of cute but it is so broad as >> to be completely meaningless, and the appropriation of it is an attempt of >> those with the largest megaphone and smallest intellectual memories to take >> control of the conversation (same thing that happened with the phrase >> educational reform I think). Ironically when the phrase was first >> introduced it mean something completely different from what we >> automatically think it means now. It was introduced to describe a >> twenty-five person online course with high levels of connectivity by George >> Siemans at the University of Manitoba. It was appropriated by venture >> capital companies like Udacity and EdX I would surmise because it is kind >> of a cute way of describing things like Teletubbies. The trou >> ble is then we are constantly arguing against the way MOOCs are which >> creates an uncomfortable bifurcation - is the Internet good for education >> or bad for education. >> >> I think we would be much better off it we used the United Nations terms >> which are much more descriptive - Open Educational Content and Open >> Educational Resources. Open Educational Content sort of describes Udacity >> while Open Educational Resources describes better Balsamo's project. This >> gives us the opportunity to say which is better for educational purposes. >> We can ask the question, "Why do you think Open Content" is enough for an >> educational experience? Does OEC limit students more than OER? Basically >> what those proposing OEC are doing is throwing out centuries of not only >> discussions of education but pretty much every argument since Des Cartes. >> They should be called on this publicly and made to answer for it. >> >> Michael >> ______________________________**__________ >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.**edu [ >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.**edu ] on >> behalf of mike cole [lchcmike@gmail.com] >> Sent: Monday, August 19, 2013 7:44 PM >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [commfac] Re: FW: femtechnet: DOCC 2013: top listed >> story on Inside Higher Ed >> >> It is unthinkable from the perspective of any world view that values >> diversity. >> XMCA values diversity. >> Ergo....... or is that er.... go?? >> mike >> >> >> On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 4:33 PM, Martin John Packer < >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co >> >> >>> wrote: >>> >>> >> >> >> >>> I especially like the concluding paragraphs: >>> >>> Among the forms of MOOC hype that Balsamo said she hoped the DOCC would >>> combat is the idea that massive online courses allow some "best" >>> professor >>> to interact with students everywhere, so that all can learn from the >>> superstar. It's not that there aren't very talented professors out there, >>> she said, but the superstar emphasis is wrong ("Is there really a >>> 'best'?" >>> she asks) and doesn't encourage group learning. >>> >>> Said Balsamo: "The idea of the one best talking head, the best expert in >>> the world, that couldn't be more patriarchal. That displays a hubris that >>> is unthinkable from a feminist perspective." >>> >>> >>> Read more: >>> http://www.insidehighered.com/**news/2013/08/19/feminist-** >>> professors-create-alternative-**moocs#ixzz2cSdlb7pt >>> Inside Higher Ed >>> >>> >>> On Aug 19, 2013, at 6:24 PM, mike cole wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>>> Dear Xmcaers- >>>> >>>> The following link to femnet mooc seems to me to offer a very >>>> interesting >>>> model for members of xmca to think of following. We here at UCSD have >>>> >>>> >>> been >>> >>> >>>> thinking along >>>> such lines, but this is a developed model that might actually provide >>>> >>>> >>> some >>> >>> >>>> kind of >>>> strategic guide to action. I can imagine any number of stimulating such >>>> efforts various >>>> congeries of xmca could cook up. >>>> mike >>>> >>>> Forwarded from Lisa Cartwright at ucsd. >>>> >>>> >>>>> Hi everyone, the DOCC 2013 MOOC alternative course discussed today >>>>> today >>>>> in Inside Higher Ed had one of its pilots taught in our department last >>>>> spring by Liz Losh and me with Monika Sengul Jones, Cristina Visperas, >>>>> Lousie Hickman, Erika Cheng, Yelena Guzman and others leading the >>>>> >>>>> >>>> effort to >>> >>> >>>> produce innovative course design and materials and hosting a conference >>>>> dedicated to it--big shout-out to these graduate students for making >>>>> >>>>> >>>> this >>> >>> >>>> launch happen. We are one of the 17 colleges offering the class to >>>>> undergrads in this coming year. I thought some of you you might enjoy >>>>> reading this alternative effort given the pervasive of MOOC discussions >>>>> right now. Best to everyone, Lisa >>>>> >>>>> I suggest you take a look. >>>>> >>>>> >>>> mike >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> ------------------------------ >>>>> >>>>> http://www.insidehighered.com/ >>>>> >>>>> ______________________________**_________________ >>>>> femtechnet mailing list >>>>> femtechnet@lists.uoregon.edu >>>>> https://lists-prod.uoregon.**edu/mailman/listinfo/**femtechnet >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > > -- > ------------------------------**------------------------------** > ------------ > *Andy Blunden* > Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts > http://marxists.academia.edu/**AndyBlunden > > > > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Tue Aug 20 14:03:29 2013 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2013 15:03:29 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> <520444BA.2000808@mira.net> <520460F0.5030506@mira.net> <19E63C50-A0D2-4A0F-BBA7-63853414FDAA@gmail.com> <4195A368-C7B9-4AB0-AAA5-A244135DC331@gmail.com> <520ADCDD.9000406@mira.net> <520C3970.6000803@mira.net> Message-ID: Huw, I wonder if it might be worthwhile to add another "aspect" to it. And again, to Lubomir's point, I wonder if this is even possible - to bring in something from a different tradition. -greg On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 4:52 PM, Huw Lloyd wrote: > On 19 August 2013 22:57, Greg Thompson wrote: > > > Huw, > > I like the way that you point to your point indirectly here. > > So, to answer in kind, yes, the explicit articulation of motives are > > sometimes helpful for activity (particularly when the activity has at its > > goal the furthering of the desires and motivations of individuals - and, > > thank you for taking my interests into account here!!). > > I guess I just don't see motivation as necessary to a definition of > > "activity." > > -greg > > p.s. just in case the question was serious, I think Larry described > nicely > > what I am trying to achieve - a notion of activity that does not have at > > its center a sovereign subject. > > > You disagree with it? Or you wish to go beyond it? > > Do you want a genetic theory or a descriptive method? > > > > My post questioning the merging of > > phenomenology with activity theory speaks to the central intellectual > > concern and the "for what" of what I'm hoping to do in my work. > > > > The "the notion of sensory fabric" email? That seems fine to me. I would > call that memory. > > Best, > Huw > > > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 2:34 PM, Huw Lloyd > >wrote: > > > > > I don't mind the chatter. :) > > > > > > But I am not clear on what you're trying to achieve. Is there > something > > > you wish to reveal or analyse, or is this more about understanding > social > > > situations. > > > > > > Huw > > > > > > On 19 August 2013 21:27, Greg Thompson > > wrote: > > > > > > > Larry, > > > > This is great. > > > > So I'm still a little confused at the notion of voice. You write: > > > > "John argues there are many other forms of talk currently without a > > > *voice* > > > > which have their own properties. If these modes of talking were to > > gain a > > > > *voice* it could transform our lives. This special kind of *unvoiced* > > > > knowledge is NOT formalized into theoretical knowledge. [Knowing that > > in > > > > Ryle's term for theoretical knowledge.]" > > > > > > > > In the first sentence, did you mean to say that forms of talk have a > > > > "voice"? That kind of threw me. I'm used to people talking about > people > > > > having voices or people being able to call upon voices that exist in > > some > > > > cultural real. If forms of talk can have "voices", then I'd certainly > > > like > > > > to hear more about that. What exactly does Shotter mean by "voice"? > > > > > > > > -greg > > > > p.s. I'm wondering if this conversation should move off the list > since > > > this > > > > is probably review (or of little relevance) for many people on the > > list. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 1:23 PM, Larry Purss > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > Greg, > > > > > John, wrote a book titled *Conversational Realities* > > > > > He suggests three realms of knowing. > > > > > 1] knowing that > > > > > 2] knowing how > > > > > 3] knowing from or knowing within. > > > > > > > > > > Here is a comment from Annika's paper describing *learning > activity*. > > > > > "Learning activity as a concept REFERS to the meaning making AS how > > > > > students engage in collaborative tasks and not what they learn." > > > > > > > > > > Greg, I *read* this explanation as a form of conversational knowing > > > > > addressing knowing as a knowing HOW. > > > > > John would say this explanation is composed in a > > > > > *referential-representational* mode of knowing. Knowing of the > second > > > > kind. > > > > > > > > > > On page 18 of John's book in a section titled "knowing of the third > > > kind: > > > > > Knowing from WITHIN" he elaborates the distinction between realms. > > > > Knowing > > > > > how is participating and collaborating and instituting various > > centers > > > of > > > > > institutionalized social life and knowing how is knowing the > > permitted > > > > > forms of talk within the institution [discursive discourses] > > > > > > > > > > John argues there are many other forms of talk currently without a > > > > *voice* > > > > > which have their own properties. If these modes of talking were to > > > gain a > > > > > *voice* it could transform our lives. This special kind of > *unvoiced* > > > > > knowledge is NOT formalized into theoretical knowledge. [Knowing > that > > > in > > > > > Ryle's term for theoretical knowledge.] > > > > > > > > > > This *unvoiced* knowledge is knowledge of a third kind that cannot > be > > > > > reduced to either knowing-that or knowing-how [skillful knowing]. > > This > > > > > third kind of knowledge is knowing FROM-WITHIN a situation, > > institution > > > > or > > > > > society. > > > > > Greg, John Shotter's book explores the various implications of > giving > > > > this > > > > > knowing from-within a clear and distinct voice. > > > > > Wittgenstein used the metaphor of *crisscrossing* to explore the > > > > > *language-games* that have developed within the relatively bounded > > and > > > > > sedimented multiple CENTERS of institutionalized discourse as > already > > > > > FORMED. [framed analysis of formed knowing-how]. John is fascinated > > by > > > > the > > > > > disorganized, uncertain, unformulated ways of talking that are > > > negotiated > > > > > as common *sense* beyond the centers of already formed discourse. > > > > > He is suggesting this is a rhetorical-RESPONSIVE third realm of > > > practical > > > > > knowing [Gadamer's phronesis]. It is the realm of *voice* distinct > > from > > > > the > > > > > realm of *framing*. > > > > > John suggests it is within this third realm of *joint action* that > > the > > > > FELT > > > > > MOVEMENT [experienced as vitality] emerges within perception and > > > action. > > > > > > > > > > Greg, I hope this was clear? > > > > > His book also has a section on *Vico* and the concept of *communis > > > > sensus* > > > > > A section on Bahktin and dialogue. > > > > > And a section on Vygotsky. > > > > > > > > > > All contributing to bring to *voice* knowing FROM WITHIN joint > > action. > > > > > > > > > > Larry > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 11:19 AM, Greg Thompson > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > Larry, > > > > > > Many thanks for this. These are wonderful connections. > > > > > > Don't know if I have the Shotter you are referring to. Do you > have > > a > > > > > cite? > > > > > > or perhaps could email me a paper offline? > > > > > > Also, I'm wondering if you could say more about Shotter's idea > of a > > > > third > > > > > > realm. Again, I'm a little slow here - I didn't catch what the > > first > > > > and > > > > > > second realms were? > > > > > > And finally, could you elaborate a bit on what the third realm > is? > > > > > > Thanks, > > > > > > -greg > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 11:06 AM, Larry Purss < > > lpscholar2@gmail.com> > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > Anti, > > > > > > > I have downloaded Annika's paper and will listen to how she > > weaves > > > > > > together > > > > > > > CHAT and frame analysis. > > > > > > > Two quick comments. > > > > > > > Greg asked about how we understand *agency* and if there are > > > > > alternatives > > > > > > > to *sovereign possessive agency* that continue to confirm > > *agency* > > > > but > > > > > a > > > > > > > less emphatic agency more receptive to emerging and > participating > > > > > within > > > > > > > conversations. He also asked if settings or contexts also > exhibit > > > > > > *agency* > > > > > > > I believe this concept of agency has relevance. > > > > > > > 2nd > > > > > > > Metaphors may not be merely *vehicles* to carry *sense*. > > Metaphors > > > > may > > > > > > > actually *be* ways of thinking [as modes, genres, tropes, or > > > kinds]. > > > > > > > Therefore Goffman's metaphor of *framing* biases us to modes of > > > > > *seeing* > > > > > > > and *perceiving* what PREVIOUSLY FORMED and this framing guides > > our > > > > > > > anticipations going forward. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > John Shorter is *turning* our attention away from *framing* > [not > > as > > > > > > > misleading but as biased to understand as picturing] > > > > > > > He is suggesting there is another realm [what he calls a third > > > realm] > > > > > > that > > > > > > > has remained invisible in plain sight. > > > > > > > He calls this realm *conversational realities* which he > suggests > > is > > > > > > entered > > > > > > > through alternative metaphors AS *talking*. > > > > > > > The central metaphor of *voice* as distinct from the metaphor > of > > > > > > *framing*. > > > > > > > Voice as metaphor moves to Bahktin and dialogue as emerging > > within > > > > > micro > > > > > > > processes. Mike cautions we are referring to different time > > > scales. > > > > > > > Shorter is also calling our attention to what is hidden in > plain > > > > view. > > > > > > When > > > > > > > talking we pay attention to processes of collaboration [Andy's > 3 > > > > > types]. > > > > > > I > > > > > > > find Shotter's turning our attention to this third realm > > [captured > > > in > > > > > the > > > > > > > metaphor of voice] adding a realm to Goffman's metaphor of > > framing > > > > [as > > > > > > > previously FORMED frames] > > > > > > > > > > > > > > If these two alternative metaphors are making distinct a > > difference > > > > > then > > > > > > a > > > > > > > gap opens within which agency may enter as creative reflection. > > > > > > > Question 1 on agency I hope can be further elaborated > > > > > > > Larry > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 7:32 AM, Antti Rajala < > > ajrajala@gmail.com> > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Lubomir, thanks for suggesting symbolic interactionism as a > > frame > > > > of > > > > > > > > incorporating these ideas. Anna-Maija Puroila discusses the > > > > legacies > > > > > of > > > > > > > > Goffman in her dissertation (in Finnish) and mentions that > > there > > > > are > > > > > > many > > > > > > > > competing and contested interpretation's of Goffman's work. > > Some > > > > say > > > > > > that > > > > > > > > his work was structuralist but more often he is associated > with > > > > > > symbolic > > > > > > > > interactionism, ethnomethodology, or phenomenological > > sociology. > > > > > Where > > > > > > > > would activity theory fit in among these? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > To me Goffman's student's Goodwin's ethno-methdological > > approach > > > > > seems > > > > > > > > partly compatible with CHAT. In his paper, Action and > > embodiment > > > > > within > > > > > > > > situated human interaction (2000), Goodwin writes: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > "This emphasis on cognition as a public, social process > > embedded > > > > > within > > > > > > > an > > > > > > > > historically > > > > > > > > shaped material world is quite consistent with both > Vygotskian > > > > > > > perspectives > > > > > > > > and > > > > > > > > recent work in the social and anthropological study of > > scientific > > > > and > > > > > > > > workplace practice > > > > > > > > ..., but adds to such perspectives an equally strong focus on > > the > > > > > > details > > > > > > > > of language > > > > > > > > use and conversational organization." > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Like Goodwin, I believe that this attention to details of > > > language > > > > > use > > > > > > > and > > > > > > > > conversational organization, and to embodied interactions, in > > > > > > particular, > > > > > > > > can enrich CHAT analyses. After all, in many classical CHAT > > work, > > > > we > > > > > > > mainly > > > > > > > > see analyses of spoken interaction. Greg, to me Goodwin's > work > > on > > > > > > > > professional vision gives an elaborate account on the > > > relationships > > > > > > > between > > > > > > > > meanings and sensory fabric. In particular, in my case of > > > students > > > > > in a > > > > > > > > bird-watching field trip the way he analyzes expert-novice > > > > > interaction > > > > > > is > > > > > > > > very valuable. I can, for example, see lots of highlighting > on > > > the > > > > > part > > > > > > > of > > > > > > > > the bird expert. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Goodwin's focus on the practices of seeing seems to me very > > > > > compatible > > > > > > > with > > > > > > > > Leontiev's theorizing of sensory fabric as constituting and > > being > > > > > > > > constituted of action. Yet, in Goodwin's work the > > socio-emotional > > > > > > issues > > > > > > > > brought in with the Leontiev's personal sense - in line with > > what > > > > > Larry > > > > > > > has > > > > > > > > written - seems to be given less attention in Goodwin. I > wonder > > > > > whether > > > > > > > > Goodwin's approach contradicts Leontiev's approach that > > > emphasizes > > > > > such > > > > > > > > internal issues as goals and motives. In my understanding > > > > > > > > ethnomethdologists do not usually focus on goals and such. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > The Gothenburg center lead by Roger S?lj? has explored > > > > > > > ethnomethodological > > > > > > > > inspired aspects of Goffman in relation to their version of > > > > > > sociocultural > > > > > > > > perspective. See e.g the dissertation of Annika > > Lantz-Andersson: > > > > > > > > > > > > https://gupea.ub.gu.se/bitstream/2077/19736/1/gupea_2077_19736_1.pdf > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Greg, Greeno has theorized the ways in which frames "create > > > certain > > > > > > > > affordances that solicit various types of behavior (whether > > > > > > 'cognitive', > > > > > > > > 'emotional', or some other emically named type)." To my > > knowledge > > > > > > > Greeno's > > > > > > > > work here focuses more on cognitive aspects and not that much > > on > > > > > > > emotional > > > > > > > > aspects. He uses the notion of positioning in association > with > > > > frames > > > > > > > > (which he relates to Goffman). "This refers to ways in which > > an > > > > > > > individual > > > > > > > > is > > > > > > > > entitled, expected, or perhaps obligated to participate in > > > > > interactions > > > > > > > of > > > > > > > > an activity system, such as a classroom or an experimental > > > session > > > > > > > > involving interaction with a computer program." (see, A > Theory > > > Bite > > > > > on > > > > > > > > Contextualizing, Framing, and Positioning: A Companion to Son > > and > > > > > > > > Goldstone, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07370000903014386) > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Greg wrote: > > > > > > > > "I might add to this that Goffman speaks of the way in which > > > > > > motivations > > > > > > > > are, to a certain extent, entailed by frames (yes, "to a > > certain > > > > > > extent" > > > > > > > - > > > > > > > > this does not mean the frames determine them!). Thus, frames > > > bring > > > > > with > > > > > > > > them motivational relevancies as much as individuals do!" > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I wonder if this interplay between collective frames and > > > > individuals > > > > > > can > > > > > > > be > > > > > > > > conceptualized with meaning and sense. Object of an activity > is > > > > > framed > > > > > > in > > > > > > > > terms of collectively shared meanings. Yet, each individual > > > > develops > > > > > a > > > > > > > > personal relationship to the object, that is, a personal > sense. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > By the way, thanks Mike for pointing out this overstatement > of > > > > > > stability > > > > > > > > with respect to meanings. This has bothered me a lot, too. A > > > > > colleague > > > > > > of > > > > > > > > mine even asserts that sense is never shared enough to become > > > > > > > legitimately > > > > > > > > called a shared meaning in Vygotsky/Leontiev sense. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Antti > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 3:01 AM, mike cole < > lchcmike@gmail.com > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I agree, very clearly statements of the sense/meaning > > relation, > > > > > along > > > > > > > > with > > > > > > > > > the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I wanted to > say, > > > and > > > > > > > > thought, > > > > > > > > > unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows." > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > In the quote here, I think LSV is somewhat overstating the > > > > > stability > > > > > > of > > > > > > > > > meaning across contexts; yes relative to the microgenetic > > > > processes > > > > > > of > > > > > > > > > sense making capturable with > > > > > > > > > modern technologies, but not totally "context independent." > > > Even > > > > > > > > dictionary > > > > > > > > > meanings change, as LSV was well aware from his interest in > > the > > > > > > history > > > > > > > > of > > > > > > > > > words in relation to their appearance in children's > > > vocabularies > > > > in > > > > > > > > > ontogeny. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Keeping the simultaneous relevance of several time scales > in > > > mind > > > > > in > > > > > > > > these > > > > > > > > > discussions seems really important, as hard as it is to do. > > > > > > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > > > > Visiting Assistant Professor > > > > > > Department of Anthropology > > > > > > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > > > > Brigham Young University > > > > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > > Visiting Assistant Professor > > > > Department of Anthropology > > > > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > > Brigham Young University > > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Visiting Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Visiting Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Tue Aug 20 14:03:09 2013 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2013 15:03:09 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> <520444BA.2000808@mira.net> <520460F0.5030506@mira.net> <19E63C50-A0D2-4A0F-BBA7-63853414FDAA@gmail.com> <4195A368-C7B9-4AB0-AAA5-A244135DC331@gmail.com> <520ADCDD.9000406@mira.net> <520C3970.6000803@mira.net> Message-ID: Yes, Larry, the key, I think, to all the worry about inside and outside and subject/object is really to conceive of conceiving as felt relations between something and something. Qualia are first order relations. We get concepts at the second order (relations between relations), and concepts become more abstract as they move to a third order and beyond (relations between relations between relations between... - although I'm not sure that the human mind can get much beyond the third order). Concepts as relations certainly seems like a Vygotskian point, but not sure if I'm reading too much into it. And thanks Mike for suggesting timescales - sense as changing on relatively shorter timescales than does meaning. I was a bit anxious about Vygotsky's assumption of stability of meaning across time. Perhaps one's reading of Vygotsky here depends on how one experiences the permanence of stones... -greg On Sat, Aug 17, 2013 at 8:15 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > Here are two excerpts from Thought and Language which may support Greg's > proposal. > "A word acquires its sense from the context in which it appears.; in > different contexts it changes its sense. Meaning remains stable throughout > the changes of sense The dictionary meaning of a word is no more than a > stone in the edifice of sense; no more than a potentiality that finds > diversified REALIZATION in speech."[245] > > Here is another more specific excerpt to support Greg's proposal. > > "Thought is not merely expressed in words; it comes into EXISTENCE THROUGH > them. Every thought tends to connect SOMETHING WITH SOMETHING else, to > establish a relation between things." [218] > > In my reading of these two excerpts I experience a family resemblance with > the basic *givenness* of phenomenology that thought comes into existence > within *AS* structure. [something AS something else] > > Greg invites us to consider some *affinities* between these alternativeways > of talking [which may make common *sense*] in developing the "edifice of > sense* > Sense AS including both perception and action mediated through *felt* > existence. > > Phenomenology uses the language of primordial givenness [which may as a > term for historical reasons produce reaction rather than resonance]. > > Larry > > > > > On Sat, Aug 17, 2013 at 1:44 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > Greg, > > I fully endorse the *felt* understanding of this post. > > You have summarized the possibility of integrating phenomenological > > accounts into CHAT. > > My understanding of *phenomenology* is the focus on *givenness* > > Husserl tried to locate *givenness within perception. Others try to > locate > > *givenness in action. Still others try to locate *givenness* in events > > [beyond agency] > > My reading of phenomenology is they are now giving accounts of *as* > > [something as something else] as *givenness*. > > This reading *turns* the conversation to how we compose accounts as > given. > > Greg, an side the word sovereign comes from *superannus* so Freud may > have > > been articulating a type of character formation which made *common* > sense* > > in Vienna at the turn of the 19th century to the 20th. > > > > I also see a place for an *agency* that is partially intentional and also > > an agency within *frames* or *windows* > > > > Phenomenology is NOT grounded in perception which is a secondary or > > derived phenomena. > > It is not grounded in language. > > It is *grounded* in *AS* phenomena. > > > > Moving back to *meaning* & *sense* which is central to our accounts. > > Meaning AS *objects* is one account. Meaning as *affinities* is an > > alternative account. WITHIN affinities the participants speak FROM > WITHIN > > common accounts [Shotter] > > He is participating in developing a rhetorical-RESPONSIVE psychology > which > > he calls psychology AS *joint action* > > > > His turning to Vygotsky to extend his psychology may be helpful in > > response to your proposal [and question] > > Shorter wrote: > > In shifting debates in psychology to the nature of our psychological > > nature Vygostky focused on accounts AS *instructive* > > In Shotter's words, > > "I want to call upon aspects of Vygotsky's important account of words AS > > *psychological tools or instruments* Words function in this instrumental > > fashion when, for instance, others make use of various FORMS of talk, to > > draw our attention to featurs of our circumstances that otherwise would > > escape our notice, or, how to conduct ourselves in certain circumstances; > > they can instruct us in HOW to manage or organize our WAYS OF perceiving > > and acting. AS Vygotsky [1978:32] comments, in learning to coordinate > their > > actions linguistically with those around them, "the child begins to > > PERCEIVE the world not only through his eyes but also THROUGH his > speech." > > Shorter adds, > > Vygotsky goes on to show how the ways in which others first verbally > > instruct us, can later become our own; AS they verbally instructed us, so > > we can come to verbally come to instruct ourselves. > > [in Conversational Realities:35] > > > > Greg, if phenomenology is seen as not privileging perception AS GIVEN [a > > fallacy] but rather positing {as} as *givenness* then their may be a way > to > > link phenomenology as currently understood [not as Husserl posited > > perception AS *given*] > > > > This *turns* to Vygotsky exploring *sense* AS perception & action > MEDIATED > > THROUGH FELT experience[as Dewey understood experience] > > > > FELT experience is the medium through which perception & action are > > mediated. > > > > Greg, I am not sure if this is clarifying [or confusing] your proposal. > > *Boundary objects* as liminal and dynamic WITHIN felt *frames* as showing > > *agency* > > Larry > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, Aug 17, 2013 at 10:36 AM, Greg Thompson < > greg.a.thompson@gmail.com > > > wrote: > > > >> Antti and other inter-Actants, > >> I think that the notion of sensory fabric in an observational study of > >> naturally occurring interactions is NOT too far fetched. Seems like > >> something like this is absolutely needed. And I'd be interested to hear > >> how > >> you would plan to use Goodwin's Professional Vision article - it is a > >> personal favorite (so maybe offline if others aren't interested). > >> > >> Also, Antti, in your work, I like your attention to the role of the > >> physical body in making frames. > >> (see also John Rae on body posture and framing, e.g. see: > >> > >> > http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1207/S15327973RLSI34-2_4#.Ug7fiJLiiM4and > >> maybe more central in this regard is Adam Kendon's work on body > posture). > >> > >> I might add to this that Goffman speaks of the way in which motivations > >> are, to a certain extent, entailed by frames (yes, "to a certain > extent" - > >> this does not mean the frames determine them!). Thus, frames bring with > >> them motivational relevancies as much as individuals do! > >> > >> We could speak of the way that frames create certain affordances that > >> solicit various types of behavior (whether "cognitive", "emotional", or > >> some other emically named type). When we are in certain types of > >> interactions, it suddenly becomes possible to *feel* a certain way that > >> one > >> couldn't otherwise have felt. Similarly, one can be a head taller than > >> oneself when in certain interactions. And, conversely, one can find > >> oneself > >> becoming quite smaller in others! > >> > >> I think that this role of context is important and can be easily > >> overlooked > >> if you start from the motives of individuals. > >> > >> In addition to Goffman, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty also point in this > >> direction with their notions of "calling forth" and > >> "affordances/solicitations", respectively. These approaches to > >> understanding people result in a reduction of the perceived agency of > the > >> individual (and hence a reduced role for intentionality, motive, and > even > >> conscious reflection), and I think many people often chafe at these > ideas > >> (esp. in American where the individual is king! Sovereign Lords - all of > >> us!). > >> > >> But, imho, there is still an agent in all of these accounts - perhaps a > >> bit > >> smaller than in other accounts, but present nonetheless. And, as the > >> phenomenologists like to say, this account is truer to the phenomena. > [and > >> I don't know whether this is relevant or not, but it seems to me that > this > >> account accords well with my reading of Marx]. > >> > >> At the end of the day, I think the central issue that all of this turns > on > >> is our ontology of *the mental*. Phenomenologists like to suggest that > >> others subscribe to "a myth of the mental" (see Hubert Dreyfus's paper > The > >> Return of the Myth of the Mental: > >> > >> > http://www.sjsu.edu/people/anand.vaidya/courses/c2/s1/The_Return_Myth_Mental_Dreyfus-1.pdf > >> ). > >> This is a pervasive belief and perhaps there is some justification for > it, > >> but I happen to find the phenomenologists' position compelling. I > further > >> wonder if CHAT tends to subscribe to the myth of the mental? Do our > >> concepts of concepts involve reifications of mental processes that > perhaps > >> are not warranted? > >> > >> If the phenomenologists' position hold water, and admittedly it's a lot > of > >> water to swallow, then the question is really Lubomir's question of > >> whether > >> or not CHAT can integrate other perspectives, here the phenomenological > >> perspective (and it seems like some say yes, some say no), or whether > you > >> will necessarily have to go somewhere else to get that perspective. So, > is > >> this an ontological commitment of CHAT? Can there be some middle ground? > >> > >> It seems like Shotter and others (e.g., Martin Packer here on XMCA) have > >> been marking out this space, but perhaps what remains to be seen is > >> whether > >> or not this space falls within > >> the bounds of CHAT. > >> Who decides that? > >> -greg > >> > >> > >> > >> On Fri, Aug 16, 2013 at 6:21 AM, Antti Rajala > wrote: > >> > >> > Greg, > >> > > >> > Thanks for inviting me to the discussion and for your nice > introduction > >> to > >> > Goffman's work. I indeed found these reflections about the > relationships > >> > between Goffman and AT very useful. My project in which I am > considering > >> > using Goffman's concept of frame together with Leontjev's theory of > >> > activity is still at a very initial stage (I had to postpone this > >> project > >> > for a while to engage in another project meanwhile). > >> > > >> > My take into the discussion is that I am interested to analyze sensory > >> > aspects of students' actions (of observing birds) in bird-watching > >> school > >> > fieldtrip. Like Larry, I have previously worked with concepts of > >> personal > >> > sense and meaning, and now I found very interesting Leontjev's > >> explication > >> > of the structure of consciousness in terms of three dialectically > >> > interrelated elements (or moments), personal sense, meaning, and > sensory > >> > fabric. Yet, Leontiev seems not to have written much that would help > me > >> to > >> > analyze embodied interactions from video. I think that I need to > >> > incorporate concepts from elsewhere to capture the evolving > >> > moment-to-moment interactions. Here, I was turning to Goffman's frame > >> > analysis, and the work of his students M. and C. Goodwin may be > >> > interesting, too. > >> > > >> > I have talked to many colleagues in CHAT and so far everyone has > >> encouraged > >> > me to explore the connections between frames and Leontiev (even > though a > >> > lot of work needs to be done). In this connection, I found interesting > >> > Lubomir's opinion of the incompatibility between the two. I add > >> Gutierrez > >> > to Greg's list of scholars who connect Goffman and Leontiev. > >> > > >> > Gutierrez and colleagues have used defined their well-known notion of > >> > script in terms of the notion of frame. In their article (1995, > Script, > >> > counterscript and underlife in the classroom; > >> > http://lchc.ucsd.edu/mca/Paper/kris.pdf) they write: "Nevertheless, > the > >> > teacher's script is hardly interrupted by student re-keyings, his > script > >> > (or "frame" in Goffman's terms) has ..." (p. 460). Gutierrez and > >> colleagues > >> > also use other Goffman's concepts such as keying and underlife. > >> > > >> > One connection to Greg's reflection about motives and frames. To me, > it > >> > seems that there are some connections between the notions of personal > >> sense > >> > and framing. "Sense expresses the relation of motive of activity to > >> > immediate goal of action" (Leontiev, 1978, p. 171). For a participant > >> of an > >> > activity, explication of this relation between motive and goal seems > to > >> > amount to asking: "what it is that is going on here?", that is, what > is > >> the > >> > frame? > >> > > >> > I would also like to ask the list, if you think that involving the > >> notion > >> > of sensory fabric in an observational study of naturally occuring > >> > interactions is too far fetched. After all, Leontiev's own studies > >> employed > >> > exprimental research methods. I am considering dropping Leontiev > >> altogether > >> > and use work like Goodwin's professional vision instead. > >> > > >> > Antti > >> > > >> > > >> > On Thu, Aug 15, 2013 at 6:22 PM, Larry Purss > >> wrote: > >> > > >> > > Andy, > >> > > I was hoping you could elaborate on the two terms *modes* and > >> > *archeTYPES* > >> > > when discussing collaboration within projects [activities] > >> > > *modes* seem related to *models* *media* *medium* *mediation*. > >> > > *Actions* when *operationalized* are ALWAYS WITHIN modes of > >> > collaboration. > >> > > What phenomena are not included within human processes that are > beyond > >> > > activities? > >> > > Shotter, exploring social life says, > >> > > "different people in different positions at different moments live > in > >> > > different realities." > >> > > In other words "reality" we must re-think "reality" as being > >> > > differentiated, consisting in different regions and moments all with > >> > > different properties to these realities. > >> > > Shotter adds, > >> > > "WE can begin to think of social reality at large as a turbulent > flow > >> of > >> > > continuous social activity, containing within it [reality] two BASIC > >> > KINDS > >> > > of activity: > >> > > 1] a set of relatively stable centers of well ordered, > >> self-reproducing > >> > > activity sustained by those WITHIN them being accountable to each > >> other > >> > for > >> > > their actions ... - but with the forms of justification used being > >> > > themselves open to contest (Billig, McIntyre) > >> > > 2] with these diverse regions or moments of institutionalized order > >> being > >> > > separated from each other by zones of much more disorderly, > >> > unaccountable, > >> > > chaotic activity. > >> > > It is in these unaccountable, marginal regions - on the edge of > chaos, > >> > away > >> > > from the orderly centers of social life - that the events of > interest > >> to > >> > us > >> > > occur" > >> > > > >> > > Shotter is suggesting the *models* we specify to help us understand > >> the > >> > > uncertainty, vagueness, and ambiguity [REAL features of much of the > >> world > >> > > in which we live] influence the nature of our future lives together. > >> > > > >> > > To return to collaboration operating WITHIN *modes* [as archeTYPES]. > >> The > >> > 3 > >> > > types [master/servant - customer/provider - and collaboration per > se]. > >> > Can > >> > > *we* through *education* develop *dis-positions* which *turn* away > >> from > >> > the > >> > > first two archetypes and *turn* towards collaboration per se? Can we > >> also > >> > > through education envision a turn towards the *interhuman* as a > >> *model* > >> > > that is a general archetype for understanding collaboration per se? > >> > > Is Shotter's composition of two basic KINDS of activity [sedimented > >> and > >> > > disorderly] helpful in understanding community forming within types > or > >> > > modes of communication [collaboration]. > >> > > > >> > > I struggle with the ambivalence of *addressing* my audience. This > is a > >> > CHAT > >> > > forum and I have a tendency to *turn* the conversation. I will > close > >> by > >> > > re-focusing on the dialectic of meaning and *sense*. > >> > > Sense involves [revolves?] perception AND action mediated THROUGH > >> felt > >> > > experience. I believe Shotter's conVERSEational "realities* as > >> > > collaborations per se may contribute to our interhuman > understandings > >> as > >> > a > >> > > way to turn away from master/slave and customer/provider activity > >> > settings. > >> > > Larry > >> > > Larry > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > Thanks Andy > >> > > On Wed, Aug 14, 2013 at 7:14 PM, Andy Blunden > >> wrote: > >> > > > >> > > > Two things Greg. > >> > > > > >> > > > Firstly, most definitely the caddy and the player are involved in > >> the > >> > > same > >> > > > project or activity. Self-evidently. Each are also involved in > other > >> > > > activities, and reflecting on these other activities may shed > light > >> on > >> > > how > >> > > > they come to be collaborating in the shared project of the > player's > >> > game. > >> > > > Like master and servant, people always collaborate in a particular > >> > mode. > >> > > > The archetypes of these modes of collaboration are master-servant, > >> > > > customer-provider and collaboration per se. It is important to > >> > recognise > >> > > > these different modes of collaboration because otherwise we tend > to > >> > force > >> > > > *all* collaboration into the same mode, which may cause us to > >> > misconstrue > >> > > > some relations. The fact that different participants have > different > >> > > social > >> > > > positions within a project means that they each are bound by > >> different > >> > > > sides of the same norms. That is, the norms of meaning, belief and > >> > action > >> > > > prevailing in the project mandate different meanings, beliefs and > >> > actions > >> > > > for different participants. The tensions arising from these > >> > asymmetrical > >> > > > relationships is one of the motors of change. > >> > > > > >> > > > Secondly, no, projects do not exist *between* persons, persons > exist > >> > > > *between* projects. This is just another effort by you, Greg, to > >> make > >> > the > >> > > > unit of analysis the individual person. The relevants units of > >> analysis > >> > > of > >> > > > Activity Theory are operation, action and activity. :) > >> > > > > >> > > > Andy > >> > > > > >> > > > Greg Thompson wrote: > >> > > > > >> > > >> ... > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > >> "Motive" seems a slippery concept to rest too much on. Andy I'm > >> > > wondering > >> > > >> how you answer the question you put to Roland, namely whether or > >> not > >> > > master > >> > > >> and slave are participating in the same activity/project? Or, > what > >> > > about a > >> > > >> golfer and caddy? And so on down to, as Phillip and Carol point > >> out - > >> > > the > >> > > >> different participants in a discussion on XMCA. > >> > > >> > >> > > >> ... > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > >> Goffman's answer is interesting in that he doesn't rely on the > >> motives > >> > > >> (motivational relevancies) of the participants, but rather > creates > >> a > >> > > notion > >> > > >> of the local context as a "frame" that exists somewhere between > >> > > >> participants. No one person can dictate the frame (even dictators > >> have > >> > > to > >> > > >> deal with the possibility of duplicitousness - the word with a > >> > > side-wards > >> > > >> glance - hence irony is a powerful weapon of the weak - even if > >> James > >> > > Scott > >> > > >> didn't recognize this, Bakhtin clearly did). Frames emerge as > >> > > participants > >> > > >> take parts in the unfolding play of some event or happening, and, > >> to a > >> > > >> certain extent, without regard to alignment of the motives of the > >> > > >> participants. Every once in a while the motives of all > participants > >> > > create > >> > > >> a frame may be relatively closely aligned, but it seems much more > >> > common > >> > > >> that frames are built out of a plethora of motives. > >> > > >> > >> > > >> > >> > > > > >> > > > > >> > > > >> > > >> > >> > >> > >> -- > >> Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > >> Visiting Assistant Professor > >> Department of Anthropology > >> 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > >> Brigham Young University > >> Provo, UT 84602 > >> http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > >> > > > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Visiting Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Tue Aug 20 14:15:35 2013 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2013 22:15:35 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> <520444BA.2000808@mira.net> <520460F0.5030506@mira.net> <19E63C50-A0D2-4A0F-BBA7-63853414FDAA@gmail.com> <4195A368-C7B9-4AB0-AAA5-A244135DC331@gmail.com> <520ADCDD.9000406@mira.net> <520C3970.6000803@mira.net> Message-ID: On 20 August 2013 22:03, Greg Thompson wrote: > Huw, > I wonder if it might be worthwhile to add another "aspect" to it. And > again, to Lubomir's point, I wonder if this is even possible - to bring in > something from a different tradition. > -greg > If you're willing to do the philosophical and theoretic work, I see no reason why not. The world we are referring to is one. If one of your systems of thought doesn't recognise that, then "repairing" that may be your starting place. For example, in recent work I have been studying the integration of natural systems/functional views with Russian Marxian dialectics. They are compatible but ones needs to a good amount of work to identify their relations (to the degree of precision one requires). Huw > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 4:52 PM, Huw Lloyd >wrote: > > > On 19 August 2013 22:57, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > > > > Huw, > > > I like the way that you point to your point indirectly here. > > > So, to answer in kind, yes, the explicit articulation of motives are > > > sometimes helpful for activity (particularly when the activity has at > its > > > goal the furthering of the desires and motivations of individuals - > and, > > > thank you for taking my interests into account here!!). > > > I guess I just don't see motivation as necessary to a definition of > > > "activity." > > > -greg > > > p.s. just in case the question was serious, I think Larry described > > nicely > > > what I am trying to achieve - a notion of activity that does not have > at > > > its center a sovereign subject. > > > > > > You disagree with it? Or you wish to go beyond it? > > > > Do you want a genetic theory or a descriptive method? > > > > > > > My post questioning the merging of > > > phenomenology with activity theory speaks to the central intellectual > > > concern and the "for what" of what I'm hoping to do in my work. > > > > > > > The "the notion of sensory fabric" email? That seems fine to me. I > would > > call that memory. > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 2:34 PM, Huw Lloyd > > >wrote: > > > > > > > I don't mind the chatter. :) > > > > > > > > But I am not clear on what you're trying to achieve. Is there > > something > > > > you wish to reveal or analyse, or is this more about understanding > > social > > > > situations. > > > > > > > > Huw > > > > > > > > On 19 August 2013 21:27, Greg Thompson > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > Larry, > > > > > This is great. > > > > > So I'm still a little confused at the notion of voice. You write: > > > > > "John argues there are many other forms of talk currently without a > > > > *voice* > > > > > which have their own properties. If these modes of talking were to > > > gain a > > > > > *voice* it could transform our lives. This special kind of > *unvoiced* > > > > > knowledge is NOT formalized into theoretical knowledge. [Knowing > that > > > in > > > > > Ryle's term for theoretical knowledge.]" > > > > > > > > > > In the first sentence, did you mean to say that forms of talk have > a > > > > > "voice"? That kind of threw me. I'm used to people talking about > > people > > > > > having voices or people being able to call upon voices that exist > in > > > some > > > > > cultural real. If forms of talk can have "voices", then I'd > certainly > > > > like > > > > > to hear more about that. What exactly does Shotter mean by "voice"? > > > > > > > > > > -greg > > > > > p.s. I'm wondering if this conversation should move off the list > > since > > > > this > > > > > is probably review (or of little relevance) for many people on the > > > list. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 1:23 PM, Larry Purss > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > Greg, > > > > > > John, wrote a book titled *Conversational Realities* > > > > > > He suggests three realms of knowing. > > > > > > 1] knowing that > > > > > > 2] knowing how > > > > > > 3] knowing from or knowing within. > > > > > > > > > > > > Here is a comment from Annika's paper describing *learning > > activity*. > > > > > > "Learning activity as a concept REFERS to the meaning making AS > how > > > > > > students engage in collaborative tasks and not what they learn." > > > > > > > > > > > > Greg, I *read* this explanation as a form of conversational > knowing > > > > > > addressing knowing as a knowing HOW. > > > > > > John would say this explanation is composed in a > > > > > > *referential-representational* mode of knowing. Knowing of the > > second > > > > > kind. > > > > > > > > > > > > On page 18 of John's book in a section titled "knowing of the > third > > > > kind: > > > > > > Knowing from WITHIN" he elaborates the distinction between > realms. > > > > > Knowing > > > > > > how is participating and collaborating and instituting various > > > centers > > > > of > > > > > > institutionalized social life and knowing how is knowing the > > > permitted > > > > > > forms of talk within the institution [discursive discourses] > > > > > > > > > > > > John argues there are many other forms of talk currently without > a > > > > > *voice* > > > > > > which have their own properties. If these modes of talking were > to > > > > gain a > > > > > > *voice* it could transform our lives. This special kind of > > *unvoiced* > > > > > > knowledge is NOT formalized into theoretical knowledge. [Knowing > > that > > > > in > > > > > > Ryle's term for theoretical knowledge.] > > > > > > > > > > > > This *unvoiced* knowledge is knowledge of a third kind that > cannot > > be > > > > > > reduced to either knowing-that or knowing-how [skillful knowing]. > > > This > > > > > > third kind of knowledge is knowing FROM-WITHIN a situation, > > > institution > > > > > or > > > > > > society. > > > > > > Greg, John Shotter's book explores the various implications of > > giving > > > > > this > > > > > > knowing from-within a clear and distinct voice. > > > > > > Wittgenstein used the metaphor of *crisscrossing* to explore the > > > > > > *language-games* that have developed within the relatively > bounded > > > and > > > > > > sedimented multiple CENTERS of institutionalized discourse as > > already > > > > > > FORMED. [framed analysis of formed knowing-how]. John is > fascinated > > > by > > > > > the > > > > > > disorganized, uncertain, unformulated ways of talking that are > > > > negotiated > > > > > > as common *sense* beyond the centers of already formed discourse. > > > > > > He is suggesting this is a rhetorical-RESPONSIVE third realm of > > > > practical > > > > > > knowing [Gadamer's phronesis]. It is the realm of *voice* > distinct > > > from > > > > > the > > > > > > realm of *framing*. > > > > > > John suggests it is within this third realm of *joint action* > that > > > the > > > > > FELT > > > > > > MOVEMENT [experienced as vitality] emerges within perception and > > > > action. > > > > > > > > > > > > Greg, I hope this was clear? > > > > > > His book also has a section on *Vico* and the concept of > *communis > > > > > sensus* > > > > > > A section on Bahktin and dialogue. > > > > > > And a section on Vygotsky. > > > > > > > > > > > > All contributing to bring to *voice* knowing FROM WITHIN joint > > > action. > > > > > > > > > > > > Larry > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 11:19 AM, Greg Thompson > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > Larry, > > > > > > > Many thanks for this. These are wonderful connections. > > > > > > > Don't know if I have the Shotter you are referring to. Do you > > have > > > a > > > > > > cite? > > > > > > > or perhaps could email me a paper offline? > > > > > > > Also, I'm wondering if you could say more about Shotter's idea > > of a > > > > > third > > > > > > > realm. Again, I'm a little slow here - I didn't catch what the > > > first > > > > > and > > > > > > > second realms were? > > > > > > > And finally, could you elaborate a bit on what the third realm > > is? > > > > > > > Thanks, > > > > > > > -greg > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 11:06 AM, Larry Purss < > > > lpscholar2@gmail.com> > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Anti, > > > > > > > > I have downloaded Annika's paper and will listen to how she > > > weaves > > > > > > > together > > > > > > > > CHAT and frame analysis. > > > > > > > > Two quick comments. > > > > > > > > Greg asked about how we understand *agency* and if there are > > > > > > alternatives > > > > > > > > to *sovereign possessive agency* that continue to confirm > > > *agency* > > > > > but > > > > > > a > > > > > > > > less emphatic agency more receptive to emerging and > > participating > > > > > > within > > > > > > > > conversations. He also asked if settings or contexts also > > exhibit > > > > > > > *agency* > > > > > > > > I believe this concept of agency has relevance. > > > > > > > > 2nd > > > > > > > > Metaphors may not be merely *vehicles* to carry *sense*. > > > Metaphors > > > > > may > > > > > > > > actually *be* ways of thinking [as modes, genres, tropes, or > > > > kinds]. > > > > > > > > Therefore Goffman's metaphor of *framing* biases us to modes > of > > > > > > *seeing* > > > > > > > > and *perceiving* what PREVIOUSLY FORMED and this framing > guides > > > our > > > > > > > > anticipations going forward. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > John Shorter is *turning* our attention away from *framing* > > [not > > > as > > > > > > > > misleading but as biased to understand as picturing] > > > > > > > > He is suggesting there is another realm [what he calls a > third > > > > realm] > > > > > > > that > > > > > > > > has remained invisible in plain sight. > > > > > > > > He calls this realm *conversational realities* which he > > suggests > > > is > > > > > > > entered > > > > > > > > through alternative metaphors AS *talking*. > > > > > > > > The central metaphor of *voice* as distinct from the metaphor > > of > > > > > > > *framing*. > > > > > > > > Voice as metaphor moves to Bahktin and dialogue as emerging > > > within > > > > > > micro > > > > > > > > processes. Mike cautions we are referring to different time > > > > scales. > > > > > > > > Shorter is also calling our attention to what is hidden in > > plain > > > > > view. > > > > > > > When > > > > > > > > talking we pay attention to processes of collaboration > [Andy's > > 3 > > > > > > types]. > > > > > > > I > > > > > > > > find Shotter's turning our attention to this third realm > > > [captured > > > > in > > > > > > the > > > > > > > > metaphor of voice] adding a realm to Goffman's metaphor of > > > framing > > > > > [as > > > > > > > > previously FORMED frames] > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > If these two alternative metaphors are making distinct a > > > difference > > > > > > then > > > > > > > a > > > > > > > > gap opens within which agency may enter as creative > reflection. > > > > > > > > Question 1 on agency I hope can be further elaborated > > > > > > > > Larry > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 7:32 AM, Antti Rajala < > > > ajrajala@gmail.com> > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Lubomir, thanks for suggesting symbolic interactionism as a > > > frame > > > > > of > > > > > > > > > incorporating these ideas. Anna-Maija Puroila discusses the > > > > > legacies > > > > > > of > > > > > > > > > Goffman in her dissertation (in Finnish) and mentions that > > > there > > > > > are > > > > > > > many > > > > > > > > > competing and contested interpretation's of Goffman's work. > > > Some > > > > > say > > > > > > > that > > > > > > > > > his work was structuralist but more often he is associated > > with > > > > > > > symbolic > > > > > > > > > interactionism, ethnomethodology, or phenomenological > > > sociology. > > > > > > Where > > > > > > > > > would activity theory fit in among these? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > To me Goffman's student's Goodwin's ethno-methdological > > > approach > > > > > > seems > > > > > > > > > partly compatible with CHAT. In his paper, Action and > > > embodiment > > > > > > within > > > > > > > > > situated human interaction (2000), Goodwin writes: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > "This emphasis on cognition as a public, social process > > > embedded > > > > > > within > > > > > > > > an > > > > > > > > > historically > > > > > > > > > shaped material world is quite consistent with both > > Vygotskian > > > > > > > > perspectives > > > > > > > > > and > > > > > > > > > recent work in the social and anthropological study of > > > scientific > > > > > and > > > > > > > > > workplace practice > > > > > > > > > ..., but adds to such perspectives an equally strong focus > on > > > the > > > > > > > details > > > > > > > > > of language > > > > > > > > > use and conversational organization." > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Like Goodwin, I believe that this attention to details of > > > > language > > > > > > use > > > > > > > > and > > > > > > > > > conversational organization, and to embodied interactions, > in > > > > > > > particular, > > > > > > > > > can enrich CHAT analyses. After all, in many classical CHAT > > > work, > > > > > we > > > > > > > > mainly > > > > > > > > > see analyses of spoken interaction. Greg, to me Goodwin's > > work > > > on > > > > > > > > > professional vision gives an elaborate account on the > > > > relationships > > > > > > > > between > > > > > > > > > meanings and sensory fabric. In particular, in my case of > > > > students > > > > > > in a > > > > > > > > > bird-watching field trip the way he analyzes expert-novice > > > > > > interaction > > > > > > > is > > > > > > > > > very valuable. I can, for example, see lots of highlighting > > on > > > > the > > > > > > part > > > > > > > > of > > > > > > > > > the bird expert. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Goodwin's focus on the practices of seeing seems to me very > > > > > > compatible > > > > > > > > with > > > > > > > > > Leontiev's theorizing of sensory fabric as constituting and > > > being > > > > > > > > > constituted of action. Yet, in Goodwin's work the > > > socio-emotional > > > > > > > issues > > > > > > > > > brought in with the Leontiev's personal sense - in line > with > > > what > > > > > > Larry > > > > > > > > has > > > > > > > > > written - seems to be given less attention in Goodwin. I > > wonder > > > > > > whether > > > > > > > > > Goodwin's approach contradicts Leontiev's approach that > > > > emphasizes > > > > > > such > > > > > > > > > internal issues as goals and motives. In my understanding > > > > > > > > > ethnomethdologists do not usually focus on goals and such. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > The Gothenburg center lead by Roger S?lj? has explored > > > > > > > > ethnomethodological > > > > > > > > > inspired aspects of Goffman in relation to their version of > > > > > > > sociocultural > > > > > > > > > perspective. See e.g the dissertation of Annika > > > Lantz-Andersson: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > https://gupea.ub.gu.se/bitstream/2077/19736/1/gupea_2077_19736_1.pdf > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Greg, Greeno has theorized the ways in which frames "create > > > > certain > > > > > > > > > affordances that solicit various types of behavior (whether > > > > > > > 'cognitive', > > > > > > > > > 'emotional', or some other emically named type)." To my > > > knowledge > > > > > > > > Greeno's > > > > > > > > > work here focuses more on cognitive aspects and not that > much > > > on > > > > > > > > emotional > > > > > > > > > aspects. He uses the notion of positioning in association > > with > > > > > frames > > > > > > > > > (which he relates to Goffman). "This refers to ways in > which > > > an > > > > > > > > individual > > > > > > > > > is > > > > > > > > > entitled, expected, or perhaps obligated to participate in > > > > > > interactions > > > > > > > > of > > > > > > > > > an activity system, such as a classroom or an experimental > > > > session > > > > > > > > > involving interaction with a computer program." (see, A > > Theory > > > > Bite > > > > > > on > > > > > > > > > Contextualizing, Framing, and Positioning: A Companion to > Son > > > and > > > > > > > > > Goldstone, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07370000903014386) > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Greg wrote: > > > > > > > > > "I might add to this that Goffman speaks of the way in > which > > > > > > > motivations > > > > > > > > > are, to a certain extent, entailed by frames (yes, "to a > > > certain > > > > > > > extent" > > > > > > > > - > > > > > > > > > this does not mean the frames determine them!). Thus, > frames > > > > bring > > > > > > with > > > > > > > > > them motivational relevancies as much as individuals do!" > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I wonder if this interplay between collective frames and > > > > > individuals > > > > > > > can > > > > > > > > be > > > > > > > > > conceptualized with meaning and sense. Object of an > activity > > is > > > > > > framed > > > > > > > in > > > > > > > > > terms of collectively shared meanings. Yet, each individual > > > > > develops > > > > > > a > > > > > > > > > personal relationship to the object, that is, a personal > > sense. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > By the way, thanks Mike for pointing out this overstatement > > of > > > > > > > stability > > > > > > > > > with respect to meanings. This has bothered me a lot, too. > A > > > > > > colleague > > > > > > > of > > > > > > > > > mine even asserts that sense is never shared enough to > become > > > > > > > > legitimately > > > > > > > > > called a shared meaning in Vygotsky/Leontiev sense. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Antti > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 3:01 AM, mike cole < > > lchcmike@gmail.com > > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I agree, very clearly statements of the sense/meaning > > > relation, > > > > > > along > > > > > > > > > with > > > > > > > > > > the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I wanted to > > say, > > > > and > > > > > > > > > thought, > > > > > > > > > > unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows." > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > In the quote here, I think LSV is somewhat overstating > the > > > > > > stability > > > > > > > of > > > > > > > > > > meaning across contexts; yes relative to the microgenetic > > > > > processes > > > > > > > of > > > > > > > > > > sense making capturable with > > > > > > > > > > modern technologies, but not totally "context > independent." > > > > Even > > > > > > > > > dictionary > > > > > > > > > > meanings change, as LSV was well aware from his interest > in > > > the > > > > > > > history > > > > > > > > > of > > > > > > > > > > words in relation to their appearance in children's > > > > vocabularies > > > > > in > > > > > > > > > > ontogeny. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Keeping the simultaneous relevance of several time scales > > in > > > > mind > > > > > > in > > > > > > > > > these > > > > > > > > > > discussions seems really important, as hard as it is to > do. > > > > > > > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > > > > > Visiting Assistant Professor > > > > > > > Department of Anthropology > > > > > > > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > > > > > Brigham Young University > > > > > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > > > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > > > Visiting Assistant Professor > > > > > Department of Anthropology > > > > > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > > > Brigham Young University > > > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > Visiting Assistant Professor > > > Department of Anthropology > > > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > Brigham Young University > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Visiting Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > From lspopov@bgsu.edu Tue Aug 20 15:05:30 2013 From: lspopov@bgsu.edu (Lubomir Savov Popov) Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2013 22:05:30 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> <520444BA.2000808@mira.net> <520460F0.5030506@mira.net> <19E63C50-A0D2-4A0F-BBA7-63853414FDAA@gmail.com> <4195A368-C7B9-4AB0-AAA5-A244135DC331@gmail.com> <520ADCDD.9000406@mira.net> <520C3970.6000803@mira.net> Message-ID: <4DF034EF2396694597A7D328E23F09E1013D04@BY2PRD0510MB353.namprd05.prod.outlook.com> Hi Huw, Integrating systems and systems-functional views with dialectical/historical materialism is not a problem at all because of their objectivist nature. In addition, dialectical/historical materialists claim that the founders of their philosophy are precursors of systems thinking. Several of their capital writings are usually cited as examples. There is a huge difference between Positivism and Dialectical/Historical Materialism regarding their foundational axioms and principles, as well as their attitudes to the role of induction/deduction in the process of knowledge production. However, at lower levels of abstraction, they exchange knowledge with ease. I already mentioned this regarding field research methods. However, it happens also when borrowing theoretical products. Now, try to integrate systems thinking with the humanistic paradigms. I am very interested in good examples of such work. I mean epistemologically sound examples, not eclectic attempts to put together their concepts in one text. It is interesting to study how ideas about holistic presentation of reality are operationalized/concretized in Dialectical Materialism and in the humanist approaches. I see a huge difference in preferred topics, concepts, and terminology. All this makes the translation of knowledge from one tradition to the other very complicated, complex, and prone with errors. People interpret the words (the terms are always paradigm and discipline specific) the way they want, with full disregard to the original intentions and the habitual interpretation of these terms in their original paradigmatic environment. I have seen that very often. I myself have experienced such states of mind many times. You will be astonished, but many historical materialist concept are interpreted very differently by authors outside that community. The background for interpretation is different; there are huge inaccuracies in translating words instead of terms and concepts; many of the terms and concepts simply cannot be translated; and so on. Usually, the definitions of terms and concepts cover only their core. The "mantle" around the core cannot be explicated because it is very fluid, requires a lot of text, and actually, there is no full agreement about it. Researches develop a sense about the periphery by constantly reading authors that are very close in thinking. This is one example of tacit knowledge (we talked about that yesterday). Let me stop here... Lubomir Lubo -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Huw Lloyd Sent: Tuesday, August 20, 2013 5:16 PM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities On 20 August 2013 22:03, Greg Thompson wrote: > Huw, > I wonder if it might be worthwhile to add another "aspect" to it. And > again, to Lubomir's point, I wonder if this is even possible - to > bring in something from a different tradition. > -greg > If you're willing to do the philosophical and theoretic work, I see no reason why not. The world we are referring to is one. If one of your systems of thought doesn't recognise that, then "repairing" that may be your starting place. For example, in recent work I have been studying the integration of natural systems/functional views with Russian Marxian dialectics. They are compatible but ones needs to a good amount of work to identify their relations (to the degree of precision one requires). Huw > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 4:52 PM, Huw Lloyd >wrote: > > > On 19 August 2013 22:57, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > > > > Huw, > > > I like the way that you point to your point indirectly here. > > > So, to answer in kind, yes, the explicit articulation of motives > > > are sometimes helpful for activity (particularly when the activity > > > has at > its > > > goal the furthering of the desires and motivations of individuals > > > - > and, > > > thank you for taking my interests into account here!!). > > > I guess I just don't see motivation as necessary to a definition > > > of "activity." > > > -greg > > > p.s. just in case the question was serious, I think Larry > > > described > > nicely > > > what I am trying to achieve - a notion of activity that does not > > > have > at > > > its center a sovereign subject. > > > > > > You disagree with it? Or you wish to go beyond it? > > > > Do you want a genetic theory or a descriptive method? > > > > > > > My post questioning the merging of phenomenology with activity > > > theory speaks to the central intellectual concern and the "for > > > what" of what I'm hoping to do in my work. > > > > > > > The "the notion of sensory fabric" email? That seems fine to me. I > would > > call that memory. > > > > Best, > > Huw > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 2:34 PM, Huw Lloyd > > > > > >wrote: > > > > > > > I don't mind the chatter. :) > > > > > > > > But I am not clear on what you're trying to achieve. Is there > > something > > > > you wish to reveal or analyse, or is this more about > > > > understanding > > social > > > > situations. > > > > > > > > Huw > > > > > > > > On 19 August 2013 21:27, Greg Thompson > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > Larry, > > > > > This is great. > > > > > So I'm still a little confused at the notion of voice. You write: > > > > > "John argues there are many other forms of talk currently > > > > > without a > > > > *voice* > > > > > which have their own properties. If these modes of talking > > > > > were to > > > gain a > > > > > *voice* it could transform our lives. This special kind of > *unvoiced* > > > > > knowledge is NOT formalized into theoretical knowledge. > > > > > [Knowing > that > > > in > > > > > Ryle's term for theoretical knowledge.]" > > > > > > > > > > In the first sentence, did you mean to say that forms of talk > > > > > have > a > > > > > "voice"? That kind of threw me. I'm used to people talking > > > > > about > > people > > > > > having voices or people being able to call upon voices that > > > > > exist > in > > > some > > > > > cultural real. If forms of talk can have "voices", then I'd > certainly > > > > like > > > > > to hear more about that. What exactly does Shotter mean by "voice"? > > > > > > > > > > -greg > > > > > p.s. I'm wondering if this conversation should move off the > > > > > list > > since > > > > this > > > > > is probably review (or of little relevance) for many people on > > > > > the > > > list. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 1:23 PM, Larry Purss > > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > Greg, > > > > > > John, wrote a book titled *Conversational Realities* He > > > > > > suggests three realms of knowing. > > > > > > 1] knowing that > > > > > > 2] knowing how > > > > > > 3] knowing from or knowing within. > > > > > > > > > > > > Here is a comment from Annika's paper describing *learning > > activity*. > > > > > > "Learning activity as a concept REFERS to the meaning making > > > > > > AS > how > > > > > > students engage in collaborative tasks and not what they learn." > > > > > > > > > > > > Greg, I *read* this explanation as a form of conversational > knowing > > > > > > addressing knowing as a knowing HOW. > > > > > > John would say this explanation is composed in a > > > > > > *referential-representational* mode of knowing. Knowing of > > > > > > the > > second > > > > > kind. > > > > > > > > > > > > On page 18 of John's book in a section titled "knowing of > > > > > > the > third > > > > kind: > > > > > > Knowing from WITHIN" he elaborates the distinction between > realms. > > > > > Knowing > > > > > > how is participating and collaborating and instituting > > > > > > various > > > centers > > > > of > > > > > > institutionalized social life and knowing how is knowing the > > > permitted > > > > > > forms of talk within the institution [discursive discourses] > > > > > > > > > > > > John argues there are many other forms of talk currently > > > > > > without > a > > > > > *voice* > > > > > > which have their own properties. If these modes of talking > > > > > > were > to > > > > gain a > > > > > > *voice* it could transform our lives. This special kind of > > *unvoiced* > > > > > > knowledge is NOT formalized into theoretical knowledge. > > > > > > [Knowing > > that > > > > in > > > > > > Ryle's term for theoretical knowledge.] > > > > > > > > > > > > This *unvoiced* knowledge is knowledge of a third kind that > cannot > > be > > > > > > reduced to either knowing-that or knowing-how [skillful knowing]. > > > This > > > > > > third kind of knowledge is knowing FROM-WITHIN a situation, > > > institution > > > > > or > > > > > > society. > > > > > > Greg, John Shotter's book explores the various implications > > > > > > of > > giving > > > > > this > > > > > > knowing from-within a clear and distinct voice. > > > > > > Wittgenstein used the metaphor of *crisscrossing* to explore > > > > > > the > > > > > > *language-games* that have developed within the relatively > bounded > > > and > > > > > > sedimented multiple CENTERS of institutionalized discourse > > > > > > as > > already > > > > > > FORMED. [framed analysis of formed knowing-how]. John is > fascinated > > > by > > > > > the > > > > > > disorganized, uncertain, unformulated ways of talking that > > > > > > are > > > > negotiated > > > > > > as common *sense* beyond the centers of already formed discourse. > > > > > > He is suggesting this is a rhetorical-RESPONSIVE third realm > > > > > > of > > > > practical > > > > > > knowing [Gadamer's phronesis]. It is the realm of *voice* > distinct > > > from > > > > > the > > > > > > realm of *framing*. > > > > > > John suggests it is within this third realm of *joint > > > > > > action* > that > > > the > > > > > FELT > > > > > > MOVEMENT [experienced as vitality] emerges within perception > > > > > > and > > > > action. > > > > > > > > > > > > Greg, I hope this was clear? > > > > > > His book also has a section on *Vico* and the concept of > *communis > > > > > sensus* > > > > > > A section on Bahktin and dialogue. > > > > > > And a section on Vygotsky. > > > > > > > > > > > > All contributing to bring to *voice* knowing FROM WITHIN > > > > > > joint > > > action. > > > > > > > > > > > > Larry > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 11:19 AM, Greg Thompson > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > Larry, > > > > > > > Many thanks for this. These are wonderful connections. > > > > > > > Don't know if I have the Shotter you are referring to. Do > > > > > > > you > > have > > > a > > > > > > cite? > > > > > > > or perhaps could email me a paper offline? > > > > > > > Also, I'm wondering if you could say more about Shotter's > > > > > > > idea > > of a > > > > > third > > > > > > > realm. Again, I'm a little slow here - I didn't catch what > > > > > > > the > > > first > > > > > and > > > > > > > second realms were? > > > > > > > And finally, could you elaborate a bit on what the third > > > > > > > realm > > is? > > > > > > > Thanks, > > > > > > > -greg > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 11:06 AM, Larry Purss < > > > lpscholar2@gmail.com> > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Anti, > > > > > > > > I have downloaded Annika's paper and will listen to how > > > > > > > > she > > > weaves > > > > > > > together > > > > > > > > CHAT and frame analysis. > > > > > > > > Two quick comments. > > > > > > > > Greg asked about how we understand *agency* and if there > > > > > > > > are > > > > > > alternatives > > > > > > > > to *sovereign possessive agency* that continue to > > > > > > > > confirm > > > *agency* > > > > > but > > > > > > a > > > > > > > > less emphatic agency more receptive to emerging and > > participating > > > > > > within > > > > > > > > conversations. He also asked if settings or contexts > > > > > > > > also > > exhibit > > > > > > > *agency* > > > > > > > > I believe this concept of agency has relevance. > > > > > > > > 2nd > > > > > > > > Metaphors may not be merely *vehicles* to carry *sense*. > > > Metaphors > > > > > may > > > > > > > > actually *be* ways of thinking [as modes, genres, > > > > > > > > tropes, or > > > > kinds]. > > > > > > > > Therefore Goffman's metaphor of *framing* biases us to > > > > > > > > modes > of > > > > > > *seeing* > > > > > > > > and *perceiving* what PREVIOUSLY FORMED and this framing > guides > > > our > > > > > > > > anticipations going forward. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > John Shorter is *turning* our attention away from > > > > > > > > *framing* > > [not > > > as > > > > > > > > misleading but as biased to understand as picturing] He > > > > > > > > is suggesting there is another realm [what he calls a > third > > > > realm] > > > > > > > that > > > > > > > > has remained invisible in plain sight. > > > > > > > > He calls this realm *conversational realities* which he > > suggests > > > is > > > > > > > entered > > > > > > > > through alternative metaphors AS *talking*. > > > > > > > > The central metaphor of *voice* as distinct from the > > > > > > > > metaphor > > of > > > > > > > *framing*. > > > > > > > > Voice as metaphor moves to Bahktin and dialogue as > > > > > > > > emerging > > > within > > > > > > micro > > > > > > > > processes. Mike cautions we are referring to different > > > > > > > > time > > > > scales. > > > > > > > > Shorter is also calling our attention to what is hidden > > > > > > > > in > > plain > > > > > view. > > > > > > > When > > > > > > > > talking we pay attention to processes of collaboration > [Andy's > > 3 > > > > > > types]. > > > > > > > I > > > > > > > > find Shotter's turning our attention to this third realm > > > [captured > > > > in > > > > > > the > > > > > > > > metaphor of voice] adding a realm to Goffman's metaphor > > > > > > > > of > > > framing > > > > > [as > > > > > > > > previously FORMED frames] > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > If these two alternative metaphors are making distinct a > > > difference > > > > > > then > > > > > > > a > > > > > > > > gap opens within which agency may enter as creative > reflection. > > > > > > > > Question 1 on agency I hope can be further elaborated > > > > > > > > Larry > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 7:32 AM, Antti Rajala < > > > ajrajala@gmail.com> > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Lubomir, thanks for suggesting symbolic interactionism > > > > > > > > > as a > > > frame > > > > > of > > > > > > > > > incorporating these ideas. Anna-Maija Puroila > > > > > > > > > discusses the > > > > > legacies > > > > > > of > > > > > > > > > Goffman in her dissertation (in Finnish) and mentions > > > > > > > > > that > > > there > > > > > are > > > > > > > many > > > > > > > > > competing and contested interpretation's of Goffman's work. > > > Some > > > > > say > > > > > > > that > > > > > > > > > his work was structuralist but more often he is > > > > > > > > > associated > > with > > > > > > > symbolic > > > > > > > > > interactionism, ethnomethodology, or phenomenological > > > sociology. > > > > > > Where > > > > > > > > > would activity theory fit in among these? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > To me Goffman's student's Goodwin's > > > > > > > > > ethno-methdological > > > approach > > > > > > seems > > > > > > > > > partly compatible with CHAT. In his paper, Action and > > > embodiment > > > > > > within > > > > > > > > > situated human interaction (2000), Goodwin writes: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > "This emphasis on cognition as a public, social > > > > > > > > > process > > > embedded > > > > > > within > > > > > > > > an > > > > > > > > > historically > > > > > > > > > shaped material world is quite consistent with both > > Vygotskian > > > > > > > > perspectives > > > > > > > > > and > > > > > > > > > recent work in the social and anthropological study of > > > scientific > > > > > and > > > > > > > > > workplace practice > > > > > > > > > ..., but adds to such perspectives an equally strong > > > > > > > > > focus > on > > > the > > > > > > > details > > > > > > > > > of language > > > > > > > > > use and conversational organization." > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Like Goodwin, I believe that this attention to details > > > > > > > > > of > > > > language > > > > > > use > > > > > > > > and > > > > > > > > > conversational organization, and to embodied > > > > > > > > > interactions, > in > > > > > > > particular, > > > > > > > > > can enrich CHAT analyses. After all, in many classical > > > > > > > > > CHAT > > > work, > > > > > we > > > > > > > > mainly > > > > > > > > > see analyses of spoken interaction. Greg, to me > > > > > > > > > Goodwin's > > work > > > on > > > > > > > > > professional vision gives an elaborate account on the > > > > relationships > > > > > > > > between > > > > > > > > > meanings and sensory fabric. In particular, in my case > > > > > > > > > of > > > > students > > > > > > in a > > > > > > > > > bird-watching field trip the way he analyzes > > > > > > > > > expert-novice > > > > > > interaction > > > > > > > is > > > > > > > > > very valuable. I can, for example, see lots of > > > > > > > > > highlighting > > on > > > > the > > > > > > part > > > > > > > > of > > > > > > > > > the bird expert. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Goodwin's focus on the practices of seeing seems to me > > > > > > > > > very > > > > > > compatible > > > > > > > > with > > > > > > > > > Leontiev's theorizing of sensory fabric as > > > > > > > > > constituting and > > > being > > > > > > > > > constituted of action. Yet, in Goodwin's work the > > > socio-emotional > > > > > > > issues > > > > > > > > > brought in with the Leontiev's personal sense - in > > > > > > > > > line > with > > > what > > > > > > Larry > > > > > > > > has > > > > > > > > > written - seems to be given less attention in Goodwin. > > > > > > > > > I > > wonder > > > > > > whether > > > > > > > > > Goodwin's approach contradicts Leontiev's approach > > > > > > > > > that > > > > emphasizes > > > > > > such > > > > > > > > > internal issues as goals and motives. In my > > > > > > > > > understanding ethnomethdologists do not usually focus on goals and such. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > The Gothenburg center lead by Roger S?lj? has explored > > > > > > > > ethnomethodological > > > > > > > > > inspired aspects of Goffman in relation to their > > > > > > > > > version of > > > > > > > sociocultural > > > > > > > > > perspective. See e.g the dissertation of Annika > > > Lantz-Andersson: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > https://gupea.ub.gu.se/bitstream/2077/19736/1/gupea_2077_19736_1.pdf > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Greg, Greeno has theorized the ways in which frames > > > > > > > > > "create > > > > certain > > > > > > > > > affordances that solicit various types of behavior > > > > > > > > > (whether > > > > > > > 'cognitive', > > > > > > > > > 'emotional', or some other emically named type)." To > > > > > > > > > my > > > knowledge > > > > > > > > Greeno's > > > > > > > > > work here focuses more on cognitive aspects and not > > > > > > > > > that > much > > > on > > > > > > > > emotional > > > > > > > > > aspects. He uses the notion of positioning in > > > > > > > > > association > > with > > > > > frames > > > > > > > > > (which he relates to Goffman). "This refers to ways > > > > > > > > > in > which > > > an > > > > > > > > individual > > > > > > > > > is > > > > > > > > > entitled, expected, or perhaps obligated to > > > > > > > > > participate in > > > > > > interactions > > > > > > > > of > > > > > > > > > an activity system, such as a classroom or an > > > > > > > > > experimental > > > > session > > > > > > > > > involving interaction with a computer program." (see, > > > > > > > > > A > > Theory > > > > Bite > > > > > > on > > > > > > > > > Contextualizing, Framing, and Positioning: A Companion > > > > > > > > > to > Son > > > and > > > > > > > > > Goldstone, > > > > > > > > > http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07370000903014386) > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Greg wrote: > > > > > > > > > "I might add to this that Goffman speaks of the way in > which > > > > > > > motivations > > > > > > > > > are, to a certain extent, entailed by frames (yes, "to > > > > > > > > > a > > > certain > > > > > > > extent" > > > > > > > > - > > > > > > > > > this does not mean the frames determine them!). Thus, > frames > > > > bring > > > > > > with > > > > > > > > > them motivational relevancies as much as individuals do!" > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I wonder if this interplay between collective frames > > > > > > > > > and > > > > > individuals > > > > > > > can > > > > > > > > be > > > > > > > > > conceptualized with meaning and sense. Object of an > activity > > is > > > > > > framed > > > > > > > in > > > > > > > > > terms of collectively shared meanings. Yet, each > > > > > > > > > individual > > > > > develops > > > > > > a > > > > > > > > > personal relationship to the object, that is, a > > > > > > > > > personal > > sense. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > By the way, thanks Mike for pointing out this > > > > > > > > > overstatement > > of > > > > > > > stability > > > > > > > > > with respect to meanings. This has bothered me a lot, too. > A > > > > > > colleague > > > > > > > of > > > > > > > > > mine even asserts that sense is never shared enough to > become > > > > > > > > legitimately > > > > > > > > > called a shared meaning in Vygotsky/Leontiev sense. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Antti > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 3:01 AM, mike cole < > > lchcmike@gmail.com > > > > > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I agree, very clearly statements of the > > > > > > > > > > sense/meaning > > > relation, > > > > > > along > > > > > > > > > with > > > > > > > > > > the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I > > > > > > > > > > wanted to > > say, > > > > and > > > > > > > > > thought, > > > > > > > > > > unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows." > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > In the quote here, I think LSV is somewhat > > > > > > > > > > overstating > the > > > > > > stability > > > > > > > of > > > > > > > > > > meaning across contexts; yes relative to the > > > > > > > > > > microgenetic > > > > > processes > > > > > > > of > > > > > > > > > > sense making capturable with modern technologies, > > > > > > > > > > but not totally "context > independent." > > > > Even > > > > > > > > > dictionary > > > > > > > > > > meanings change, as LSV was well aware from his > > > > > > > > > > interest > in > > > the > > > > > > > history > > > > > > > > > of > > > > > > > > > > words in relation to their appearance in children's > > > > vocabularies > > > > > in > > > > > > > > > > ontogeny. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Keeping the simultaneous relevance of several time > > > > > > > > > > scales > > in > > > > mind > > > > > > in > > > > > > > > > these > > > > > > > > > > discussions seems really important, as hard as it is > > > > > > > > > > to > do. > > > > > > > > > > mike > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > > > > > Visiting Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology > > > > > > > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University > > > > > > > Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > > > Visiting Assistant Professor > > > > > Department of Anthropology > > > > > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > > > Brigham Young University > > > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > > Visiting Assistant Professor > > > Department of Anthropology > > > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > > Brigham Young University > > > Provo, UT 84602 > > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Visiting Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Tue Aug 20 15:20:44 2013 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2013 22:20:44 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: <4DF034EF2396694597A7D328E23F09E1013D04@BY2PRD0510MB353.namprd05.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: <8A0B69D9-CE11-406E-888C-97046ACA52BF@uniandes.edu.co> Earlier today I tried to send a message about a new translation of Merleau-Ponty's book Phenomenology of Perception. Apparently my message disappeared into the aether - which is unfortunate because I think that M-P provides an example of what Lubomir is looking for. Merleau-Ponty wrote about both humanism/existentialism and marxism, and his philosophical/psychological writings dissolved the boundaries between these two. I am copying below the publisher's information and a link. Martin On Aug 20, 2013, at 5:05 PM, Lubomir Savov Popov wrote: > It is interesting to study how ideas about holistic presentation of reality are operationalized/concretized in Dialectical Materialism and in the humanist approaches. First published in 1945, Maurice Merleau-Ponty?s monumental Ph?nom?nologie de la perception signalled the arrival of a major new philosophical and intellectual voice in post-war Europe. Breaking with the prevailing picture of existentialism and phenomenology at the time, it has become one of the landmark works of twentieth-century thought. This new translation, the first for over fifty years, makes this classic work of philosophy available to a new generation of readers. Phenomenology of Perception stands in the great phenomenological tradition of Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre. Yet Merleau-Ponty?s contribution is decisive, as he brings this tradition and other philosophical predecessors, particularly Descartes and Kant, to confront a neglected dimension of our experience: the lived body and the phenomenal world. Charting a bold course between the reductionism of science on the one hand and "intellectualism" on the other, Merleau-Ponty argues that we should regard the body not as a mere biological or physical unit, but as the body which structures one?s situation and experience within the world. Merleau-Ponty enriches his classic work with engaging studies of famous cases in the history of psychology and neurology as well as phenomena that continue to draw our attention, such as phantom limb syndrome, synaesthesia, and hallucination. This new translation includes many helpful features such as the reintroduction of Merleau-Ponty?s discursive Table of Contents as subtitles into the body of the text, a comprehensive Translator?s Introduction to its main themes, essential notes explaining key terms of translation, an extensive Index, and an important updating of Merleau-Ponty?s references to now available English translations. Also included is a new foreword by Taylor Carman and an introduction to Merleau-Ponty by Claude Lefort. Translated by Donald A. Landes. ==== "It is impossible to define an object in cutting it off from the subject through which and for which it is an object; and the subject reveals itself only through the objects in which it is engaged. Such an affirmation only makes the content of naive experience explicit, but it is rich in consequences. Only in taking it as a basis will one succeed in building an ethics to which man can totally and sincerely adhere. It is therefore of extreme importance to establish it solidly and to give back to man this childish audacity that years of verbal submission have taken away: the audacity to say: "I am here." This is why The Phenomenology of Perception by Maurice Merleau-Ponty is not only a remarkable specialist work but a book that is of interest to the whole of man and to every man; the human condition is at stake in this book." - Simone de Beauvoir, 1945 ==== Foreword, Taylor Carman Introduction, Claude Lefort Preface Introduction: Classical Prejudices and the Return to Phenomena I. Sensation II. Association and the Projection of Memories III. Attention and Judgment IV. The Phenomenal Field Part 1: The Body 1. The Body as an Object and Mechanistic Physiology 2. The Experience of the Body and Classical Psychology 3. The Spatiality of the One?s Own Body and Motility 4. The Synthesis of One?s Own Body 5. The Body as a Sexed Being 6. Speech and the Body as Expression Part 2: The Perceived World 7. Sensing 8. Space 9. The Thing and the Natural World 10. Others and the Human World Part 3: Being-For-Itself and Being-In-The-World 11. The Cogito 12. Temporality 13. Freedom Original Bibliography Bibliography of English Translations cited Additional Work Cited Index Maurice Merleau-Ponty was born in 1908 in Rochefort-sur-Mer, France. Drawn to philosophy from a young age, Merleau-Ponty would go on to study alongside Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, and Simone Weil at the famous ?cole Normale Sup?rieure. He completed a Docteur ?s lettres based on two dissertations, La structure du comportement (1942) andPh?nom?nologie de la perception (1945). After a brief post at the University of Lyon, Merleau-Ponty returned to Paris in 1949 when he was awarded the Chair of Psychology and Pedagogy at the Sorbonne. In 1952 he became the youngest philosopher ever appointed to the prestigious Chair of Philosophy at the Coll?ge de France. He died suddenly of a stroke in 1961 aged fifty-three, at the height of his career. He is buried in P?re Lachaise Cemetery in Paris. From lchcmike@gmail.com Tue Aug 20 15:28:35 2013 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2013 15:28:35 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Vanderbilt Univ. Faculty Positions; 1 in Cognitive Development In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Bethany Rittle-Johnson Date: Tue, Aug 20, 2013 at 12:08 PM Subject: [COGDEVSOC] Vanderbilt Univ. Faculty Positions; 1 in Cognitive Development To: "cogdevsoc@virginia.edu" One of the positions targets someone who does research in Cognitive Development. See ad for details. The Vanderbilt University Department of Psychology and Human Development has two tenure-line positions in the areas of *CLINCAL* and *DEVELOPMENTAL*psychological science. The department is composed of internationally recognized scholars who work to increase the understanding and application of basic psychological processes related to the development of typical and atypical cognitions, behaviors, and emotions in family, school, and other natural contexts. We seek candidates whose research addresses cross-cutting themes in our department through interdisciplinary research focused on (1) basic processes of cognitive, social, and emotional development, (2) the implications of such basic research for learning, education, developmental psychopathology, and developmental disorders, and (3) the translation of basic findings to inform interventions designed to prevent or treat problems of development, learning, mental health and physical well-being. Primary responsibilities of these faculty positions include establishing an active program of research, teaching and mentoring undergraduate and graduate students, and service to the department, university, and the field. We especially encourage applications from underrepresented minorities. Our *Developmental Science Program* is seeking an outstanding developmental scientist for a tenure track position at the assistant professor rank and will consider candidates in any area of *cognitive development*. Our program goal is to build on our strength in cognitive development by adding a colleague whose research expands our range of expertise. Candidates whose research focuses on learning processes and developmental mechanisms, education and/or educational neuroscience, social cognition, and/or adolescence will receive special consideration. The Developmental Sciences area consists of 8-10 full-time faculty whose strengths are complemented by professors in other units in the university, including the Department of Psychology, Educational Neuroscience, Special Education, and Teaching & Learning.**** The *Clinical Psychological Science Program* invites applications for a tenure track Assistant Professor position in clinical psychological science, with an emphasis in child/adolescent psychopathology. The Vanderbilt Clinical Science Program is nationally recognized for research on the etiology, treatment, and prevention of psychopathology, developmental disorders, and health problems in children and adolescents. We are interested in clinical researchers whose work focuses on the interface of neurobiological processes (e.g., clinical neuroscience, genetics, psychophysiology) with affective, cognitive, and behavioral dimensions that underlie new and emerging models of psychopathology (e.g., Research Domain Criteria: RDoC) and has translational implications for interventions, developmental psychopathology, developmental disorders, developmental clinical neuroscience, or pediatric psychology. We seek an individual with a strong record of high quality and methodologically rigorous research, sustained productivity, potential for obtaining extramural funding, and teaching effectiveness. A Ph.D. in Clinical Psychology from an APA-accredited clinical program and completion of an APA-accredited internship is required. For information about the faculty, department, and interdisciplinary opportunities, see http://peabody.vanderbilt.edu/departments/psych/index.php .**** Applicants should send a brief cover letter, curriculum vitae, copies of up to 3 representative publications, a letter describing research and teaching interests, and at least three letters of reference to:**** Clinical Search Committee OR Developmental Search Committee (pick one)**** Psychology and Human Development **** Vanderbilt University, 0552 GPC**** 230 Appleton Place **** Nashville, TN 37203-5721**** Applicants may also apply electronically, sending materials to ChildClinicalSearch@vanderbilt.edu (for the Clinical position) or to DevelopmentalSearch@vanderbilt.edu (for the Developmental position). Letters of recommendation can also be sent to these email addresses with the applicant?s last name and the word ?recommendation? in the subject line. **** To receive full consideration, applications should arrive by November 1, 2013, though the search will remain open until the positions have been filled. Vanderbilt University is an affirmative action/equal opportunity employer.**** -------------------- Bethany Rittle-Johnson Associate Professor Director of Developmental Sciences Program Psychology and Human Development Vanderbilt University Office: 219B Hobbs Phone: 615-322-8301 Mail: 230 Appleton Place, Peabody #552, Nashville, TN 37203 =========== To post to the CDS listserv, send your message to: cogdevsoc@virginia.edu (If you belong to the listserv and have not included any large attachments, your message will be posted without moderation--so be careful!) To leave the CDS listserv, send a message to sympa@virginia.edu. The subject line should read: "unsubscribe cogdevsoc" (no quotes). Leave the message body blank. For other information about the listserv, including how to update your email address and how to subscribe, visit http://www.cogdevsoc.org/listserv.php ============ -------------- next part -------------- =========== To post to the CDS listserv, send your message to: cogdevsoc@virginia.edu (If you belong to the listserv and have not included any large attachments, your message will be posted without moderation--so be careful!) To leave the CDS listserv, send a message to sympa@virginia.edu. The subject line should read: "unsubscribe cogdevsoc" (no quotes). Leave the message body blank. For other information about the listserv, including how to update your email address and how to subscribe, visit http://www.cogdevsoc.org/listserv.php ============ From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Tue Aug 20 16:35:48 2013 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Wed, 21 Aug 2013 00:35:48 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: <4DF034EF2396694597A7D328E23F09E1013D04@BY2PRD0510MB353.namprd05.prod.outlook.com> References: <5202B8CC.3040502@mira.net> <52030FD3.5010807@mira.net> <520444BA.2000808@mira.net> <520460F0.5030506@mira.net> <19E63C50-A0D2-4A0F-BBA7-63853414FDAA@gmail.com> <4195A368-C7B9-4AB0-AAA5-A244135DC331@gmail.com> <520ADCDD.9000406@mira.net> <520C3970.6000803@mira.net> <4DF034EF2396694597A7D328E23F09E1013D04@BY2PRD0510MB353.namprd05.prod.outlook.com> Message-ID: On 20 August 2013 23:05, Lubomir Savov Popov wrote: > Hi Huw, > > Integrating systems and systems-functional views with > dialectical/historical materialism is not a problem at all because of their > objectivist nature. It is not always straightforward. The "single basis" of the dialectical unit is one such problem. > In addition, dialectical/historical materialists claim that the founders > of their philosophy are precursors of systems thinking. Several of their > capital writings are usually cited as examples. There is a huge difference > between Positivism and Dialectical/Historical Materialism regarding their > foundational axioms and principles, as well as their attitudes to the role > of induction/deduction in the process of knowledge production. However, at > lower levels of abstraction, they exchange knowledge with ease. I already > mentioned this regarding field research methods. However, it happens also > when borrowing theoretical products. > Positivism in the "measuring elements" sense is not holistic. > > Now, try to integrate systems thinking with the humanistic paradigms. I am > very interested in good examples of such work. I mean epistemologically > sound examples, not eclectic attempts to put together their concepts in one > text. > Yes. > > It is interesting to study how ideas about holistic presentation of > reality are operationalized/concretized in Dialectical Materialism and in > the humanist approaches. I see a huge difference in preferred topics, > concepts, and terminology. All this makes the translation of knowledge from > one tradition to the other very complicated, complex, and prone with > errors. People interpret the words (the terms are always paradigm and > discipline specific) the way they want, with full disregard to the original > intentions and the habitual interpretation of these terms in their original > paradigmatic environment. I have seen that very often. I myself have > experienced such states of mind many times. You will be astonished, but > many historical materialist concept are interpreted very differently by > authors outside that community. The background for interpretation is different; there are huge inaccuracies > in translating words instead of terms and concepts; many of the terms and > concepts simply cannot be translated; and so on. Usually, the definitions > of terms and concepts cover only their core. The "mantle" around the core > cannot be explicated because it is very fluid, requires a lot of text, and > actually, there is no full agreement about it. Researches develop a sense > about the periphery by constantly reading authors that are very close in > thinking. This is one example of tacit knowledge (we talked about that > yesterday). > These are all difficulties. But this is not the same as "not possible". Best, Huw > > Let me stop here... > > Lubomir > > Lubo > > > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Tue Aug 20 16:38:36 2013 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Wed, 21 Aug 2013 00:38:36 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: <8A0B69D9-CE11-406E-888C-97046ACA52BF@uniandes.edu.co> References: <4DF034EF2396694597A7D328E23F09E1013D04@BY2PRD0510MB353.namprd05.prod.outlook.com> <8A0B69D9-CE11-406E-888C-97046ACA52BF@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: I received it. On 20 August 2013 23:20, Martin John Packer wrote: > Earlier today I tried to send a message about a new translation of > Merleau-Ponty's book Phenomenology of Perception. Apparently my message > disappeared into the aether - which is unfortunate because I think that M-P > provides an example of what Lubomir is looking for. Merleau-Ponty wrote > about both humanism/existentialism and marxism, and his > philosophical/psychological writings dissolved the boundaries between these > two. I am copying below the publisher's information and a link. > > Martin > > On Aug 20, 2013, at 5:05 PM, Lubomir Savov Popov > wrote: > > > It is interesting to study how ideas about holistic presentation of > reality are operationalized/concretized in Dialectical Materialism and in > the humanist approaches. > > > > First published in 1945, Maurice Merleau-Ponty?s monumental Ph?nom?nologie > de la perception signalled the arrival of a major new philosophical and > intellectual voice in post-war Europe. Breaking with the prevailing picture > of existentialism and phenomenology at the time, it has become one of the > landmark works of twentieth-century thought. This new translation, the > first for over fifty years, makes this classic work of philosophy available > to a new generation of readers. > > Phenomenology of Perception stands in the great phenomenological tradition > of Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre. Yet Merleau-Ponty?s contribution is > decisive, as he brings this tradition and other philosophical predecessors, > particularly Descartes and Kant, to confront a neglected dimension of our > experience: the lived body and the phenomenal world. Charting a bold course > between the reductionism of science on the one hand and "intellectualism" > on the other, Merleau-Ponty argues that we should regard the body not as a > mere biological or physical unit, but as the body which structures one?s > situation and experience within the world. > > Merleau-Ponty enriches his classic work with engaging studies of famous > cases in the history of psychology and neurology as well as phenomena that > continue to draw our attention, such as phantom limb syndrome, > synaesthesia, and hallucination. This new translation includes many helpful > features such as the reintroduction of Merleau-Ponty?s discursive Table of > Contents as subtitles into the body of the text, a comprehensive > Translator?s Introduction to its main themes, essential notes explaining > key terms of translation, an extensive Index, and an important updating of > Merleau-Ponty?s references to now available English translations. > > Also included is a new foreword by Taylor Carman and an introduction to > Merleau-Ponty by Claude Lefort. > > Translated by Donald A. Landes. > > ==== > "It is impossible to define an object in cutting it off from the subject > through which and for which it is an object; and the subject reveals itself > only through the objects in which it is engaged. Such an affirmation only > makes the content of naive experience explicit, but it is rich in > consequences. Only in taking it as a basis will one succeed in building an > ethics to which man can totally and sincerely adhere. It is therefore of > extreme importance to establish it solidly and to give back to man this > childish audacity that years of verbal submission have taken away: the > audacity to say: "I am here." This is why The Phenomenology of Perception > by Maurice Merleau-Ponty is not only a remarkable specialist work but a > book that is of interest to the whole of man and to every man; the human > condition is at stake in this book." - Simone de Beauvoir, 1945 > > ==== > Foreword, Taylor Carman > Introduction, Claude Lefort > Preface > Introduction: Classical Prejudices and the Return to Phenomena > I. Sensation > II. Association and the Projection of Memories > III. Attention and Judgment > IV. The Phenomenal Field > Part 1: The Body > 1. The Body as an Object and Mechanistic Physiology > 2. The Experience of the Body and Classical Psychology > 3. The Spatiality of the One?s Own Body and Motility > 4. The Synthesis of One?s Own Body > 5. The Body as a Sexed Being > 6. Speech and the Body as Expression > Part 2: The Perceived World > 7. Sensing > 8. Space > 9. The Thing and the Natural World > 10. Others and the Human World > Part 3: Being-For-Itself and Being-In-The-World > 11. The Cogito > 12. Temporality > 13. Freedom > Original Bibliography > Bibliography of English Translations cited > Additional Work Cited > Index > > Maurice Merleau-Ponty was born in 1908 in Rochefort-sur-Mer, France. Drawn > to philosophy from a young age, Merleau-Ponty would go on to study > alongside Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, and Simone Weil at the > famous ?cole Normale Sup?rieure. He completed a Docteur ?s lettres based on > two dissertations, La structure du comportement (1942) andPh?nom?nologie de > la perception (1945). After a brief post at the University of Lyon, > Merleau-Ponty returned to Paris in 1949 when he was awarded the Chair of > Psychology and Pedagogy at the Sorbonne. In 1952 he became the youngest > philosopher ever appointed to the prestigious Chair of Philosophy at the > Coll?ge de France. He died suddenly of a stroke in 1961 aged fifty-three, > at the height of his career. He is buried in P?re Lachaise Cemetery in > Paris. > > From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Tue Aug 20 17:00:02 2013 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2013 18:00:02 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: <5212D816.8040808@mira.net> References: <5212D816.8040808@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy, I think that this notion of "motive" gets a lot closer to where I'm trying to get to. If we want to speak of motivations, then we need to speak of them as distributed between people. This articulation of "motive" does it very nicely. (I'm not thrilled with the distinction between "only understood motives" vs. "really effective motives") The one place where I might still suggest some tweaking is in the sense in which a motivation appears as a highly intentional thing - as if it is something that is reflected upon and then undertaken. I think most activity does not have this quality - we too often find ourselves doing things that we didn't necessarily plan to do. Or to put this another way, we are often captured by moods such that it is only in retrospect that we construct a "motivation". And, of course, there are habitual actions that we engage in all the time, but which lack any sense of reflection. But this is not to say that there aren't many instances of intentional reflection upon one's motivations. -greg On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 8:44 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Greg, > perhaps we could try some alternative words to "motivation"? > What about "ideal" or "concept"? The ideal or concept of a project defines > the norms which characterise the activity, and give us the best go at > making sense of the "motivation of an activity". I say "the best go" > because "motivation" seems to me to be a word which is applicable only to > individual persons. Leontyev used the word "motive" for what defined an > activity in a way that is ambiguous. It can be, as in Manfred Holodynski's > interpretation, the end which is being served by the immediate goals of the > actions making up the activity, in the subjective sense that a person is > going to the window (goal) because they want give a speech (motive), but > also in the objective sense, for example, that an arms factory is producing > guns because the community needs guns. In this latter sense, the motive of > "producing guns for the community" is an "only understood motive," and what > motivates the factory worker (sets her in motion) is the need to earn a > wage to raise their family - that is the "really effective motive." But the > concept of "arms production" does not rely on the questionable idea of > "corporate motivation", just the norms of participation in "arms > production". > > Does that assist at all in your issue, Greg? > Andy > > Greg Thompson wrote: > >> ... >> p.s. ... I think Larry described nicely >> >> what I am trying to achieve - a notion of activity that does not have at >> its center a sovereign subject. My post questioning the merging of >> phenomenology with activity theory speaks to the central intellectual >> concern and the "for what" of what I'm hoping to do in my work. >> >> >> > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Visiting Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From ablunden@mira.net Tue Aug 20 19:47:12 2013 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Wed, 21 Aug 2013 12:47:12 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: References: <5212D816.8040808@mira.net> Message-ID: <52142A30.8070302@mira.net> The reservations you mention are precisely the issues. That is why I look to concepts or ideals from which one can deduce norms of belief, action and meaning, rather than just relying on intentional pursuit of an externally existing aim. Andy Greg Thompson wrote: > Andy, > I think that this notion of "motive" gets a lot closer to where I'm > trying to get to. If we want to speak of motivations, then we need to > speak of them as distributed between people. This articulation of > "motive" does it very nicely. > (I'm not thrilled with the distinction between "only understood > motives" vs. "really effective motives") > The one place where I might still suggest some tweaking is in the > sense in which a motivation appears as a highly intentional thing - as > if it is something that is reflected upon and then undertaken. I think > most activity does not have this quality - we too often find ourselves > doing things that we didn't necessarily plan to do. Or to put this > another way, we are often captured by moods such that it is only in > retrospect that we construct a "motivation". And, of course, there are > habitual actions that we engage in all the time, but which lack any > sense of reflection. > But this is not to say that there aren't many instances of intentional > reflection upon one's motivations. > -greg > > > > On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 8:44 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > Greg, > perhaps we could try some alternative words to "motivation"? > What about "ideal" or "concept"? The ideal or concept of a project > defines the norms which characterise the activity, and give us the > best go at making sense of the "motivation of an activity". I say > "the best go" because "motivation" seems to me to be a word which > is applicable only to individual persons. Leontyev used the word > "motive" for what defined an activity in a way that is ambiguous. > It can be, as in Manfred Holodynski's interpretation, the end > which is being served by the immediate goals of the actions making > up the activity, in the subjective sense that a person is going to > the window (goal) because they want give a speech (motive), but > also in the objective sense, for example, that an arms factory is > producing guns because the community needs guns. In this latter > sense, the motive of "producing guns for the community" is an > "only understood motive," and what motivates the factory worker > (sets her in motion) is the need to earn a wage to raise their > family - that is the "really effective motive." But the concept of > "arms production" does not rely on the questionable idea of > "corporate motivation", just the norms of participation in "arms > production". > > Does that assist at all in your issue, Greg? > Andy > > Greg Thompson wrote: > > ... > p.s. ... I think Larry described nicely > > what I am trying to achieve - a notion of activity that does > not have at > its center a sovereign subject. My post questioning the merging of > phenomenology with activity theory speaks to the central > intellectual > concern and the "for what" of what I'm hoping to do in my work. > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Visiting Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts http://marxists.academia.edu/AndyBlunden From ablunden@mira.net Tue Aug 20 19:50:00 2013 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Wed, 21 Aug 2013 12:50:00 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: <1377013953.4126.YahooMailNeo@web181202.mail.ne1.yahoo.com> References: <5212D816.80 40808@mira.net> <1377005910.8295.YahooMailNeo@web181205.mail.ne1.yah oo.com> <521381AD.4010407@mira.net> <1377013953.4126.YahooMailNeo@web181202.mail.ne1.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <52142AD8.10506@mira.net> That's exactly right, Peg, but it is not enough to state that activities are subject-objects and dynamic, unless we can explain exactly how their dynamism is formed. Exactly *what* are the dynamics of activities? I agree that diversity is a part of it though. Andy Peg Griffin wrote: > I see it as dynamic ( ready meaning ready to grow) because I see > subjective-object and objective-subject rather than objective or > subjective. > As diverse "who" are the obejctive-subjects the odds of changes in > the subjective-object motives go way up. We might all change enough > to survive after all. Working on diversity wasn't an accidental part > of LCHC's concern, nor was it for charity or to be nice. > It's the dynamism and hope bought by diversity that might separate me > (and probably Mike) from the Politburo :) > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *From:* Andy Blunden > *To:* "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > *Sent:* Tuesday, August 20, 2013 10:48 AM > *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities > > I think your example and your way of explaining is perfect, Peg, for > the purposes of psychology and education. The "socio-cultural > motive/activity is ready." It is just this objectivist stance in > relation to the societal activities which has always been my main > problem with Leontyev. I know, of course, that you and Mike and the > others involved in 5thD designed activities which were well aligned to > widely held aims for the children's development, but where did they > come from? Speaking generally, what is the dynamic of the activities > we see around us? When surveying social and cultural life in general > it is obviously not sufficient to say "Mike and Peg designed these > activities" any more than it was sufficient to say that the Politburo > decided the targets for social production. > > So it seems to me that Greg's main problem remains unsolved in your > approach, Peg. What do we mean by the "motive" of the activity? > *Whose* motive? > > Andy > > Peg Griffin wrote: > > I like the idea of a "well-motivated argument" as used in classical > and contemporary logic. So I say stick to motivated. > > It works so nicely with the distinction between "merely understood" > and "really effective" -- and the transition as merely understood > motive becomes really effective. The subject may engage in the > actions that are motivated by two different activity systems with two > different motives -- but say the second is merely understood by the > subject and the first is really effective for the subject. When the > human conflict-ing (Luria) mash-up happens and the person lapses into > a mosaically related but contradictory action -- poof -- the merely > understood is now the motive! > > So the child you and Leontyev describe doing homework is first > really effectively motivated by play with adult rules of > priority/timing etc. but when that child scrunches up his homework > paper and throws it in the waste basket and starts all over -- poof-- > the really effective motive/activity falls apart and the merely > understood socio-cultural motive/activity is ready and willing and > takes up the slack. Having alluded to both Luria and Leontyev, I now > bring in the Beatles -- it's a long and winding road. Not a one-time > enlightenment! But praxis makes possible. > > > > When we at LCHC, ages ago, were running the after-school school we > called "Field College" (pun and polysemy intended), a funding program > officer (Marge Martus) commented that she hadn't seen a single child > off task in two hours. And believe me they were not school or adult > governed children! It was because Field College was strewn with > motives that virtually begged for children to engage but also to > transition from really effective to merely understood and hence to > "grow" into a new activity. It would be, I told Marge, like being in > a rainstorm and trying to avoid the raindrops if a child were > off-all-the available operating tasks! > > We had "center table" rituals and "fifth dimension" constitutions > that exposed the merely understood motives. And we had participant > structures, tasks, procedures, a lot of bells and whistles that fit in > dual activity systems/motives, some combonation of which elicited the > child's voluntary engagement in a really effective way. > > Peg From lpscholar2@gmail.com Tue Aug 20 21:35:51 2013 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2013 21:35:51 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: <8A0B69D9-CE11-406E-888C-97046ACA52BF@uniandes.edu.co> References: <4DF034EF2396694597A7D328E23F09E1013D04@BY2PRD0510MB353.namprd05.prod.outlook.com> <8A0B69D9-CE11-406E-888C-97046ACA52BF@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: Martin, Thanks for mentioning Merleau-Ponty as a scholar who tried to work across discourses. I want to return to a summary of the theme of the book: "It is impossible to define an object in cutting it off from the subject through which and for which it is an object; and the subject reveals itself only through the objects in which it is engaged. Such an affirmation only makes the content of naive experience explicit, but it is rich in consequences. Only in taking it as a basis will one succeed in building an ethics to which man can totally and sincerely adhere. It is therefore of extreme importance to establish it solidly and to give back to man this childish audacity that years of verbal submission have taken away: the audacity to say: "I am here." M-P is attempting to make the content of naive experience EXPLICIT. THIS realm is the BASIS for building an *ethics* to which man can totally and sincerely adhere. I would suggest John Shotter in trying to make distinct 3 realms of knowing is trying to explore naive experience with the audacity to say: "I am here". I would add [ventriloquating John Shotter] the confirmation: "I hear you" I read M-P as embracing the ambivalence and tension of "I am here" & "I hear you" Dreyfus, who is writing on Foucault's method of archeology shows how Foucault & Merleau-Ponty [Foucault's teacher] approached existential phenomenology. There is a difference that I find interesting as a difference in style and attitude. Foucault called M-P's existential phenomenology "the analysis of actual experience". His evaluation of his teacher's project he called *ambiguous* and a discourse of mixed nature which can never be completed. Foucault writes of M-P's approach, "What is given in experience and what renders experience possible correspond to one another in an ENDLESS OSCILLATION. Now here is the difference in attitude or style [tone]. Dreyfus notes for M-P precisely this incompleteability and ambiguity of the the analytic of actual experience was what made it so fascinating. On the other hand for Foucault this same ambiguity and incompleteability shows that M-P's project was HOPELESS from the start. For Foucault there is no way to OVERCOME the instability of the limitations of the body. Foucault responds to M-P's project by saying, "Its congentital problems will only be (dis)solved when anthropological discourse is discarded." Martin, what I find interesting is how for M-P the ambiguity and incompleteability of actual experience is understood as an ethical virtue. "I am here" & "I hear you" WITHIN naive *folk* psychology are embraced. For Foucault this same 'actuality' must be *overcome* To return to Shotter, "conversational realities" form WITHIN the gap of "I am here" and "I hear you". Sedimented actuality & spontaneous actuality, formed & forming experience, discourses & conversations. THIS calls forth a different KIND of agency, not soverign, but still forming within enculturated 2nd natures. The "self" AS artifactual or hybrid. Do we need to transcend humanistic discourses as Foucault recommends? Or is the ambiguity and incompleteabity the *givenness* of our human life forms. If the intent is to recapture child like naive actual existential phenomenology [something as something else] I believe Shotter's knowing FROM WITHIN can add to a style or attitude of paying attention to "conversational realities" in their ambiguity and incompleteability. "I am here" & "I hear you". Sense AS perception and action "turns" when the felt style or attitude shifts within activities. I hope it is ok to participate in criss-crossing discourses [which is how Wittgenstein .described his approach to showing how we participate in language activities.] I am ambivalent. Larry On Tue, Aug 20, 2013 at 3:20 PM, Martin John Packer wrote: > Earlier today I tried to send a message about a new translation of > Merleau-Ponty's book Phenomenology of Perception. Apparently my message > disappeared into the aether - which is unfortunate because I think that M-P > provides an example of what Lubomir is looking for. Merleau-Ponty wrote > about both humanism/existentialism and marxism, and his > philosophical/psychological writings dissolved the boundaries between these > two. I am copying below the publisher's information and a link. > > Martin > > On Aug 20, 2013, at 5:05 PM, Lubomir Savov Popov > wrote: > > > It is interesting to study how ideas about holistic presentation of > reality are operationalized/concretized in Dialectical Materialism and in > the humanist approaches. > > > > First published in 1945, Maurice Merleau-Ponty?s monumental Ph?nom?nologie > de la perception signalled the arrival of a major new philosophical and > intellectual voice in post-war Europe. Breaking with the prevailing picture > of existentialism and phenomenology at the time, it has become one of the > landmark works of twentieth-century thought. This new translation, the > first for over fifty years, makes this classic work of philosophy available > to a new generation of readers. > > Phenomenology of Perception stands in the great phenomenological tradition > of Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre. Yet Merleau-Ponty?s contribution is > decisive, as he brings this tradition and other philosophical predecessors, > particularly Descartes and Kant, to confront a neglected dimension of our > experience: the lived body and the phenomenal world. Charting a bold course > between the reductionism of science on the one hand and "intellectualism" > on the other, Merleau-Ponty argues that we should regard the body not as a > mere biological or physical unit, but as the body which structures one?s > situation and experience within the world. > > Merleau-Ponty enriches his classic work with engaging studies of famous > cases in the history of psychology and neurology as well as phenomena that > continue to draw our attention, such as phantom limb syndrome, > synaesthesia, and hallucination. This new translation includes many helpful > features such as the reintroduction of Merleau-Ponty?s discursive Table of > Contents as subtitles into the body of the text, a comprehensive > Translator?s Introduction to its main themes, essential notes explaining > key terms of translation, an extensive Index, and an important updating of > Merleau-Ponty?s references to now available English translations. > > Also included is a new foreword by Taylor Carman and an introduction to > Merleau-Ponty by Claude Lefort. > > Translated by Donald A. Landes. > > ==== > "It is impossible to define an object in cutting it off from the subject > through which and for which it is an object; and the subject reveals itself > only through the objects in which it is engaged. Such an affirmation only > makes the content of naive experience explicit, but it is rich in > consequences. Only in taking it as a basis will one succeed in building an > ethics to which man can totally and sincerely adhere. It is therefore of > extreme importance to establish it solidly and to give back to man this > childish audacity that years of verbal submission have taken away: the > audacity to say: "I am here." This is why The Phenomenology of Perception > by Maurice Merleau-Ponty is not only a remarkable specialist work but a > book that is of interest to the whole of man and to every man; the human > condition is at stake in this book." - Simone de Beauvoir, 1945 > > ==== > Foreword, Taylor Carman > Introduction, Claude Lefort > Preface > Introduction: Classical Prejudices and the Return to Phenomena > I. Sensation > II. Association and the Projection of Memories > III. Attention and Judgment > IV. The Phenomenal Field > Part 1: The Body > 1. The Body as an Object and Mechanistic Physiology > 2. The Experience of the Body and Classical Psychology > 3. The Spatiality of the One?s Own Body and Motility > 4. The Synthesis of One?s Own Body > 5. The Body as a Sexed Being > 6. Speech and the Body as Expression > Part 2: The Perceived World > 7. Sensing > 8. Space > 9. The Thing and the Natural World > 10. Others and the Human World > Part 3: Being-For-Itself and Being-In-The-World > 11. The Cogito > 12. Temporality > 13. Freedom > Original Bibliography > Bibliography of English Translations cited > Additional Work Cited > Index > > Maurice Merleau-Ponty was born in 1908 in Rochefort-sur-Mer, France. Drawn > to philosophy from a young age, Merleau-Ponty would go on to study > alongside Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, and Simone Weil at the > famous ?cole Normale Sup?rieure. He completed a Docteur ?s lettres based on > two dissertations, La structure du comportement (1942) andPh?nom?nologie de > la perception (1945). After a brief post at the University of Lyon, > Merleau-Ponty returned to Paris in 1949 when he was awarded the Chair of > Psychology and Pedagogy at the Sorbonne. In 1952 he became the youngest > philosopher ever appointed to the prestigious Chair of Philosophy at the > Coll?ge de France. He died suddenly of a stroke in 1961 aged fifty-three, > at the height of his career. He is buried in P?re Lachaise Cemetery in > Paris. > > From schweighartc@gmail.com Tue Aug 20 22:39:11 2013 From: schweighartc@gmail.com (schweighartc@gmail.com) Date: Wed, 21 Aug 2013 05:39:11 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] =?utf-8?q?_Systems_views?= Message-ID: <52145288.4c560f0a.7e80.ffffd4b2@mx.google.com> From schweighartc@gmail.com Tue Aug 20 22:51:02 2013 From: schweighartc@gmail.com (schweighartc@gmail.com) Date: Wed, 21 Aug 2013 05:51:02 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] =?utf-8?q?Systems_views_=5Bleontievactivity=5D?= Message-ID: <5214554c.8c2c0f0a.0709.ffffdebd@mx.google.com> Hi Huw ,Lubomir, Work in the systems community since the seventies has made contributions which are not eclectic, moving beyond functional to phenomenological approaches. I am working in an area relating these at present. Other researchers begin with the work of Bogdanov to examine shared roots. Christine From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Tue Aug 20 23:17:03 2013 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Wed, 21 Aug 2013 07:17:03 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Systems views [leontievactivity] In-Reply-To: <5214554c.8c2c0f0a.0709.ffffdebd@mx.google.com> References: <5214554c.8c2c0f0a.0709.ffffdebd@mx.google.com> Message-ID: Hi Christine, Thanks for this. I am a little confused and curious. In what way are functional approaches not a part of these systems? Luria (1963, p.35) provides a good working definition in line with how tend to think about them in this work: ?The view has often been expressed in the literature that the term ?function? implies two totally different concepts. On the one hand it may denote the direct and manifest activity of a tissue (the secretory functions of the glands, the contractile function of muscle, and so on); in this sense the ?function? naturally is characteristic of and inseparable from the particular tissue; the tissue cannot change its function nor take on a new one. On the other hand the term ?function? may have a completely different meaning when we speak of ?functions? as the basic form of adaption of the living organism to its environment and the principal manifestations of its vital activity. Expressions such as the ?respiratory functions?, the ?digestive function? or the complex ?locomotor functions? and, finally, the still more complex ?psychological functions? (speech, writing, and so on) have a quite different meaning. We are concerned here with complex adaptive activity (biological at some stages of development and socio-historical at others), satisfying a particular demand and playing a particular role in the vital activity of the animal. A complex adaptive ?function? such as this will usually be executed by a group of structural units and, as Anokhin (1947) showed, these will be integrated into a ?functional system.? The parts of this system may be scattered over a wide area of the body and united only in the execution of their common task (for example, respiration or locomotion). Between these parts there is a pliable yet strong temporary connexion, uniting them into one system and synchronizing their activity. This ?functional system? works as a complete entity, organizing the flow of excitation and co-ordinating the activity of individual organs.? Best, Huw On 21 August 2013 06:51, wrote: > Hi Huw ,Lubomir, > Work in the systems community since the seventies has made contributions > which are not eclectic, moving beyond functional to phenomenological > approaches. > I am working in an area relating these at present. > Other researchers begin with the work of Bogdanov to examine shared roots. > Christine > > From ablunden@mira.net Tue Aug 20 23:32:17 2013 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Wed, 21 Aug 2013 16:32:17 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Systems views [leontievactivity] In-Reply-To: References: <5214554c.8c2c0f0a.0709.ffffdebd@mx.google.com> Message-ID: <52145EF1.8090106@mira.net> Do you mean "functionalist" approaches, Christine? Andy Huw Lloyd wrote: > Hi Christine, > > Thanks for this. I am a little confused and curious. In what way are > functional approaches not a part of these systems? > > Luria (1963, p.35) provides a good working definition in line with how tend > to think about them in this work: > > ?The view has often been expressed in the literature that the term > ?function? implies two totally different concepts. On the one hand it may > denote the direct and manifest activity of a tissue (the secretory > functions of the glands, the contractile function of muscle, and so on); in > this sense the ?function? naturally is characteristic of and inseparable > from the particular tissue; the tissue cannot change its function nor take > on a new one. > > On the other hand the term ?function? may have a completely different > meaning when we speak of ?functions? as the basic form of adaption of the > living organism to its environment and the principal manifestations of its > vital activity. Expressions such as the ?respiratory functions?, the > ?digestive function? or the complex ?locomotor functions? and, finally, the > still more complex ?psychological functions? (speech, writing, and so on) > have a quite different meaning. We are concerned here with complex adaptive > activity (biological at some stages of development and socio-historical at > others), satisfying a particular demand and playing a particular role in > the vital activity of the animal. A complex adaptive ?function? such as > this will usually be executed by a group of structural units and, as > Anokhin (1947) showed, these will be integrated into a ?functional system.? > The parts of this system may be scattered over a wide area of the body and > united only in the execution of their common task (for example, respiration > or locomotion). Between these parts there is a pliable yet strong temporary > connexion, uniting them into one system and synchronizing their activity. > This ?functional system? works as a complete entity, organizing the flow of > excitation and co-ordinating the activity of individual organs.? > Best, > Huw > > On 21 August 2013 06:51, wrote: > > >> Hi Huw ,Lubomir, >> Work in the systems community since the seventies has made contributions >> which are not eclectic, moving beyond functional to phenomenological >> approaches. >> I am working in an area relating these at present. >> Other researchers begin with the work of Bogdanov to examine shared roots. >> Christine >> >> >> > > > -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts http://marxists.academia.edu/AndyBlunden From schweighartc@gmail.com Wed Aug 21 03:35:56 2013 From: schweighartc@gmail.com (Christine Schweighart) Date: Wed, 21 Aug 2013 11:35:56 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Systems views [leontievactivity] Message-ID: Thanks for this. I am a little confused and curious. In what way are functional approaches not a part of these systems? The way systems ideas are used doesn't assume causal relations, so in the spirit of 'bracketing' and exploring 'direct appearance' in dialogue- using systems notions as means of getting to focus in an understood sense through an indirect 'mediational frame' ( I'm borrowing this from this community's use of the concept of dual-stimulation). However as this is in dialogue any 'function' of use of systems concepts is formed within not a priori. The relation with reality is explored, systems ideas do not function as 'ideal types', nor is action envisaged as 'realising the concept of system as represented in modelling' Various notions of system can be useeful in such dialogue, the motive is to gain systemic understanding of relations within practices '. Peter Checkland and Ray Ison work in this way. Luria (1963, p.35) provides a good working definition in line with how tend to think about them in this work: ?The view has often been expressed in the literature that the term ?function? implies two totally different concepts. On the one hand it may denote the direct and manifest activity of a tissue (the secretory functions of the glands, the contractile function of muscle, and so on); in this sense the ?function? naturally is characteristic of and inseparable from the particular tissue; the tissue cannot change its function nor take on a new one. Perhaps this could be refined with Maturana's notion of 'structure' within an organism, but he and Varela used this at the same time as the held the notion of 'Organisation' in autopoieisis - where 'organisation (unobservable) prescribes the limits of change possible in structure' ( before entropy ,death etc) However they studied the nervous system, Varela went on to be concerned about 'energy' , but as yet there is little understanding of how endocrine systems regulate 'functions'. So neuroscience is not the relevant source, but study of substrates and enzymes. In relation to changing their environment organism 'parts' do change function when interpreted through endocrinal action. The significant difference is the concept of 'structural-coupling -- rather than a notion that organisms only adapt to given environment conditions ( and the simplistic notion of evolution this entails). On the other hand the term ?function? may have a completely different meaning when we speak of ?functions? as the basic form of adaption of the living organism to its environment and the principal manifestations of its vital activity. Organisms as 'self-producing - living- are not in this kind of relation, but this is a systemic unity. Expressions such as the ?respiratory functions?, the ?digestive function? Well, these are ways of considering a systemic unity as a composite unity - and these are not separate functions they are in dynamic relation. or the complex ?locomotor functions? and, finally, the still more complex ?psychological functions? (speech, writing, and so on) have a quite different meaning. We are concerned here with complex adaptive activity (biological at some stages of development and socio-historical at others), Aren't they always inevitably inter-twined ? satisfying a particular demand and playing a particular role in the vital activity of the animal. If we say 'the animal' have we included all those 'complex' socio-historical aspects still? So we don't have 'the animal' as unit of analysis now. A complex adaptive ?function? such as this will usually be executed by a group of structural units [??] and, as Anokhin (1947) showed, these will be integrated into a ?functional system.? The parts of this system may be scattered over a wide area of the body and united only in the execution of their common task (for example, respiration or locomotion). Between these parts there is a pliable yet strong temporary connexion, uniting them into one system and synchronizing their activity. This ?functional system? works as a complete entity, organizing the flow of excitation and co-ordinating the activity of individual organs.? Best, Huw . . Where would you see Bateson's boundary - not 'the skin'? The kind of work T. Parson's did was labelled 'functionalist', but he didn't acccept that label. It was 'evolutionary' in this way of regarding humanity as a totality. There was a rebound against / after Parsons, and the 'interpretive' stance that became influential in Systems research after that emerged shaped 'in contrast to' 'functionalist' causal assumptions. ( And cybernetic, second order cybernetic strands also co-exist still). So It difficult to locate 'function' from Luria's quote . Anohkin's quote hints at Maturana and Varela's 'Organisation', yet their conclusions are drawn from neural laboratory work and study ofcognition. This isn't life-science grounded to explain such relations within cultural lifeworlds. The temporal seems to frame singular co-ordinations, but doesn't provide a basis for relations in practices, with contradictory motives . Vasilyuk's work suggests an aesthetic work in that ( earlier in the Leontiev thread Andy situates it). Christine From jack@actionresearch.net Wed Aug 21 03:52:41 2013 From: jack@actionresearch.net (Jack Whitehead) Date: Wed, 21 Aug 2013 12:52:41 +0200 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Systems views [leontievactivity] In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <9137186B-7282-4701-84A1-3232D3087E48@actionresearch.net> Dear Christine (and all), I was pleased to see your mention of Vasilyuk's work: On 21 Aug 2013, at 12:35, Christine Schweighart wrote: > Vasilyuk's work suggests an aesthetic work in that ( earlier in the > Leontiev thread Andy situates it). I'm wondering if anyone knows of clarifications of the conceptual links between energy and value: ?The Energy Paradigm Conceptions involving energy are very current in psychology, but they have been very poorly worked out from the methodological standpoint. It is not clear to what extent these conceptions are merely models of our understanding and to what extent they can be given ontological status. Equally problematic are the conceptual links between energy and motivation, energy and meaning, energy and value, although it is obvious that in fact there are certain links: we know how ?energetically? a person can act when positively motivated, we know that the meaningfuness of a project lends additional strength to the people engaged in it, but we have very little idea of how to link up into one whole the physiological theory of activation, the psychology of motivation, and the ideas of energy which have been elaborated mainly in the field of physics. (pp. 63-64) Vasilyuk, F. (1991) The Psychology of Experiencing: the Resolution of Life?s Critical Situations. Hemel Hempstead; Harvester Wheatsheaf. Love Jack. ----------------------------------------------------------------- When Martin Dobson, a colleague, died in 2002 the last thing he said to me was 'Give my Love to the Department'. In the 20 years I'd worked with Martin it was his loving warmth of humanity that I recall with great life affirming pleasure and I'm hoping that in Love Jack we can share this value of common humanity. Jack Whitehead , Adjunct Professor, Liverpool Hope University, UK. Visiting Professor at the University of Cumbria Life-time member of OMNIBUS (All Bath University Staff). Secretary of Bath and West Co-operative Party. web-site http://www.actionresearch.net with email address. From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Wed Aug 21 06:24:59 2013 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Wed, 21 Aug 2013 14:24:59 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Systems views [leontievactivity] In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 21 August 2013 11:35, Christine Schweighart wrote: > Thanks for this. I am a little confused and curious. In what way are > functional approaches not a part of these systems? > > The way systems ideas are used doesn't assume causal relations, so in > the spirit of 'bracketing' and exploring 'direct appearance' in > dialogue- using systems notions as means of getting to focus in an > understood sense through an indirect 'mediational frame' ( I'm > borrowing this from this community's use of the concept of > dual-stimulation). However as this is in dialogue any 'function' of > use of systems concepts is formed within not a priori. > Ok. Functional views as "a priori projections" is to use them a narrow non-genetic manner. >From your description it sounds like general systems heuristics are being used to look at the phenomena in a tentative way. Thanks for clarifying. Best, Huw > > The relation with reality is explored, systems ideas do not function > as 'ideal types', nor is action envisaged as 'realising the concept of > system as represented in modelling' Various notions of system can be > useeful in such dialogue, the motive is to gain systemic understanding > of relations within practices '. > > Peter Checkland and Ray Ison work in this way. > > Luria (1963, p.35) provides a good working definition in line with how > tend > to think about them in this work: > > ?The view has often been expressed in the literature that the term > ?function? implies two totally different concepts. On the one hand it may > denote the direct and manifest activity of a tissue (the secretory > functions of the glands, the contractile function of muscle, and so on); in > this sense the ?function? naturally is characteristic of and inseparable > from the particular tissue; the tissue cannot change its function nor take > on a new one. > > Perhaps this could be refined with Maturana's notion of 'structure' > within an organism, but he and Varela used this at the same time as > the held the notion of 'Organisation' in autopoieisis - where > 'organisation (unobservable) prescribes the limits of change possible > in structure' ( before entropy ,death etc) However they studied the > nervous system, Varela went on to be concerned about 'energy' , but as > yet there is little understanding of how endocrine systems regulate > 'functions'. So neuroscience is not the relevant source, but study of > substrates and enzymes. In relation to changing their environment > organism 'parts' do change function when interpreted through > endocrinal action. > The significant difference is the concept of 'structural-coupling -- > rather than a notion that organisms only adapt to given environment > conditions ( and the simplistic notion of evolution this entails). > On the other hand the term ?function? may have a completely different > meaning when we speak of ?functions? as the basic form of adaption of the > living organism to its environment and the principal manifestations of its > vital activity. > Organisms as 'self-producing - living- are not in this kind of > relation, but this is a systemic unity. > Expressions such as the ?respiratory functions?, the > ?digestive function? > > Well, these are ways of considering a systemic unity as a composite > unity - and these are not separate functions they are in dynamic > relation. > or the complex ?locomotor functions? and, finally, the > still more complex ?psychological functions? (speech, writing, and so on) > have a quite different meaning. We are concerned here with complex adaptive > activity (biological at some stages of development and socio-historical at > others), > Aren't they always inevitably inter-twined ? > satisfying a particular demand and playing a particular role in > the vital activity of the animal. > If we say 'the animal' have we included all those 'complex' > socio-historical aspects still? So we don't have 'the animal' as unit > of analysis now. > > A complex adaptive ?function? such as > this will usually be executed by a group of structural units > [??] > and, as > Anokhin (1947) showed, these will be integrated into a ?functional system.? > The parts of this system may be scattered over a wide area of the body and > united only in the execution of their common task (for example, respiration > or locomotion). Between these parts there is a pliable yet strong temporary > connexion, uniting them into one system and synchronizing their activity. > This ?functional system? works as a complete entity, organizing the flow of > excitation and co-ordinating the activity of individual organs.? > > Best, > Huw > . . > Where would you see Bateson's boundary - not 'the skin'? > > The kind of work T. Parson's did was labelled 'functionalist', but he > didn't acccept that label. It was 'evolutionary' in this way of > regarding humanity as a totality. There was a rebound against / after > Parsons, and the 'interpretive' stance that became influential in > Systems research after that emerged shaped 'in contrast to' > 'functionalist' causal assumptions. ( And cybernetic, second order > cybernetic strands also co-exist still). So It difficult to locate > 'function' from Luria's quote . Anohkin's quote hints at Maturana > and Varela's 'Organisation', yet their conclusions are drawn from > neural laboratory work and study ofcognition. This isn't life-science > grounded to explain such relations within cultural lifeworlds. The > temporal seems to frame singular co-ordinations, but doesn't provide a > basis for relations in practices, with contradictory motives . > Vasilyuk's work suggests an aesthetic work in that ( earlier in the > Leontiev thread Andy situates it). > > Christine > From peg.griffin@att.net Wed Aug 21 06:49:58 2013 From: peg.griffin@att.net (Peg Griffin) Date: Wed, 21 Aug 2013 06:49:58 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: <52142AD8.10506@mira.net> References: <5212D816.80 40808@mira.net> <1377005910.8295.YahooMailNeo@web181205.mail.ne1.yah oo.com> <521381AD.4010407@mira.net> <1377013953.4126.YahooMailNeo@web181202.mail.ne1.yahoo.com> <52142AD8.10506@mira.net> Message-ID: <1377092998.41814.YahooMailNeo@web181202.mail.ne1.yahoo.com> I agree!? And that's what research on all the relevant kinds of genesis in Field College types of places is all about -- seldom supported and sustained enough for long enough but worth keeping the eye on that prize.?? By the way we are celebrating the 50th anniversary of the March on Washington this week and lots of new historical insight are being published. Also lots of celebration including shouting and food and drink!? I'll raise toasts when I can to distant friends, meaning folks like you and otheres on XMCA. Peg ________________________________ From: Andy Blunden To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Tuesday, August 20, 2013 10:50 PM Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities That's exactly right, Peg, but it is not enough to state that activities are subject-objects and dynamic, unless we can explain exactly how their dynamism is formed. Exactly *what* are the dynamics of activities? I agree that diversity is a part of it though. Andy Peg Griffin wrote: > I see it as dynamic ( ready meaning ready to grow) because I see subjective-object and objective-subject? rather than objective or subjective. > As diverse "who" are the? obejctive-subjects the odds of changes in the subjective-object motives go way up.? We might all change enough to survive after all.? Working on diversity wasn't an accidental part of LCHC's concern, nor was it for charity or to be nice. It's the dynamism and hope bought by diversity that might separate me (and probably Mike) from the Politburo :) > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *From:* Andy Blunden > *To:* "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > *Sent:* Tuesday, August 20, 2013 10:48 AM > *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities > > I think your example and your way of explaining is perfect, Peg, for the purposes of psychology and education. The "socio-cultural motive/activity is ready." It is just this objectivist stance in relation to the societal activities which has always been my main problem with Leontyev. I know, of course, that you and Mike and the others involved in 5thD designed activities which were well aligned to widely held aims for the children's development, but where did they come from? Speaking generally, what is the dynamic of the activities we see around us? When surveying social and cultural life in general it is obviously not sufficient to say "Mike and Peg designed these activities" any more than it was sufficient to say that the Politburo decided the targets for social production. > > So it seems to me that Greg's main problem remains unsolved in your approach, Peg. What do we mean by the "motive" of the activity? *Whose* motive? > > Andy > > Peg Griffin wrote: > > I like the idea of a "well-motivated argument" as used in classical and contemporary logic.? So I say stick to motivated. > > It works so nicely with the distinction between "merely understood" and "really effective" -- and the transition as merely understood motive becomes really effective.? The subject may engage in the actions that are motivated by two different activity systems with two different motives -- but say the second is merely understood by the subject and the first is really effective for the subject.? When the human conflict-ing (Luria) mash-up happens and the person lapses into a mosaically related but contradictory action -- poof -- the merely understood is now the motive! > > So the child you and Leontyev describe doing homework is first really effectively motivated by play with adult rules of priority/timing etc. but when that child scrunches up his homework paper and throws it in the waste basket and starts all over -- poof-- the really effective motive/activity falls apart and the merely understood socio-cultural motive/activity is ready and willing and takes up the slack.? Having alluded to both Luria and Leontyev, I now bring in the Beatles -- it's a long and winding road.? Not a one-time enlightenment! But praxis makes possible. > > > > When we at LCHC, ages ago, were running the after-school school we called "Field College" (pun and polysemy intended), a funding program officer (Marge Martus) commented that she hadn't seen a single child off task in two hours.? And believe me they were not school or adult governed children!? It was because Field College was strewn with motives that virtually begged for children to engage but also to transition from really effective to merely understood and hence to "grow" into a new activity.? It would be, I told Marge, like being in a rainstorm and trying to avoid the raindrops if a child were off-all-the available operating tasks! > > We had "center table" rituals and "fifth dimension" constitutions that exposed the merely understood motives. And we had participant structures, tasks, procedures, a lot of bells and whistles that fit in dual activity systems/motives, some combonation of which elicited the child's voluntary engagement in a really effective way. > > Peg From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed Aug 21 08:11:59 2013 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Wed, 21 Aug 2013 08:11:59 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: <1377092998.41814.YahooMailNeo@web181202.mail.ne1.yahoo.com> References: <521381AD.4010407@mira.net> <1377013953.4126.YahooMailNeo@web181202.mail.ne1.yahoo.com> <52142AD8.10506@mira.net> <1377092998.41814.YahooMailNeo@web181202.mail.ne1.yahoo.com> Message-ID: Greg, Thanks for making the distinction between *qualia* [as to conceive *conceiving* AS felt relations between something else as a 1st order level] AND *abstract concepts* [relations between relations] at the 2nd level. You also bring in the notion of *moods* which we are often *captured by* which you contrast with intentionally planned activity. These *moods* as primordial and then after the mood flows through us [from within] we retrospectively [in our conversational realities including inner dialogue] compose understandings AS motivations. I hope qualia and moods as 1st order level understandings dynamically flowing through activities can become fore-grounded as this 1st level seems vital to Merleau-Ponty's existential phenomenology of actual experience within na?ve *folk* psychology. Activities *capture us* within moods and this level of qualia as spontaneous may be primordial. Merleau-Ponty used the phrase *expressive cognition* to explore this realm of qualia. How it links up with concepts is an open question. Systems, and functional explanations seem to focus on knowing-how something functions with something else. This form of knowing seems to front load concepts. Christine's exploring *valencia* [spelling?] I read as an approach to systems and structure that includes 1st order qualia. Larry On Wed, Aug 21, 2013 at 6:49 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: > I agree! And that's what research on all the relevant kinds of genesis in > Field College types of places is all about -- seldom supported and > sustained enough for long enough but worth keeping the eye on that prize. > > By the way we are celebrating the 50th anniversary of the March on > Washington this week and lots of new historical insight are being published. > Also lots of celebration including shouting and food and drink! I'll > raise toasts when I can to distant friends, meaning folks like you and > otheres on XMCA. > > > Peg > > > ________________________________ > From: Andy Blunden > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Sent: Tuesday, August 20, 2013 10:50 PM > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities > > > That's exactly right, Peg, but it is not enough to state that activities > are subject-objects and dynamic, unless we can explain exactly how their > dynamism is formed. Exactly *what* are the dynamics of activities? I agree > that diversity is a part of it though. > > Andy > > Peg Griffin wrote: > > I see it as dynamic ( ready meaning ready to grow) because I see > subjective-object and objective-subject rather than objective or > subjective. > > As diverse "who" are the obejctive-subjects the odds of changes in the > subjective-object motives go way up. We might all change enough to survive > after all. Working on diversity wasn't an accidental part of LCHC's > concern, nor was it for charity or to be nice. It's the dynamism and hope > bought by diversity that might separate me (and probably Mike) from the > Politburo :) > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *From:* Andy Blunden > > *To:* "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > *Sent:* Tuesday, August 20, 2013 10:48 AM > > *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities > > > > I think your example and your way of explaining is perfect, Peg, for the > purposes of psychology and education. The "socio-cultural motive/activity > is ready." It is just this objectivist stance in relation to the societal > activities which has always been my main problem with Leontyev. I know, of > course, that you and Mike and the others involved in 5thD designed > activities which were well aligned to widely held aims for the children's > development, but where did they come from? Speaking generally, what is the > dynamic of the activities we see around us? When surveying social and > cultural life in general it is obviously not sufficient to say "Mike and > Peg designed these activities" any more than it was sufficient to say that > the Politburo decided the targets for social production. > > > > So it seems to me that Greg's main problem remains unsolved in your > approach, Peg. What do we mean by the "motive" of the activity? *Whose* > motive? > > > > Andy > > > > Peg Griffin wrote: > > > I like the idea of a "well-motivated argument" as used in classical > and contemporary logic. So I say stick to motivated. > > > It works so nicely with the distinction between "merely understood" > and "really effective" -- and the transition as merely understood motive > becomes really effective. The subject may engage in the actions that are > motivated by two different activity systems with two different motives -- > but say the second is merely understood by the subject and the first is > really effective for the subject. When the human conflict-ing (Luria) > mash-up happens and the person lapses into a mosaically related but > contradictory action -- poof -- the merely understood is now the motive! > > > So the child you and Leontyev describe doing homework is first really > effectively motivated by play with adult rules of priority/timing etc. but > when that child scrunches up his homework paper and throws it in the waste > basket and starts all over -- poof-- the really effective motive/activity > falls apart and the merely understood socio-cultural motive/activity is > ready and willing and takes up the slack. Having alluded to both Luria and > Leontyev, I now bring in the Beatles -- it's a long and winding road. Not > a one-time enlightenment! But praxis makes possible. > > > > > > When we at LCHC, ages ago, were running the after-school school we > called "Field College" (pun and polysemy intended), a funding program > officer (Marge Martus) commented that she hadn't seen a single child off > task in two hours. And believe me they were not school or adult governed > children! It was because Field College was strewn with motives that > virtually begged for children to engage but also to transition from really > effective to merely understood and hence to "grow" into a new activity. It > would be, I told Marge, like being in a rainstorm and trying to avoid the > raindrops if a child were off-all-the available operating tasks! > > > We had "center table" rituals and "fifth dimension" constitutions that > exposed the merely understood motives. And we had participant structures, > tasks, procedures, a lot of bells and whistles that fit in dual activity > systems/motives, some combonation of which elicited the child's voluntary > engagement in a really effective way. > > > Peg > From lchcmike@gmail.com Wed Aug 21 08:43:25 2013 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Wed, 21 Aug 2013 08:43:25 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Polls are open for MCA article to discuss Message-ID: Vote, chat. mike http://lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/Journal/poll.html From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Wed Aug 21 09:16:15 2013 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Wed, 21 Aug 2013 10:16:15 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: References: <521381AD.4010407@mira.net> <1377013953.4126.YahooMailNeo@web181202.mail.ne1.yahoo.com> <52142AD8.10506@mira.net> <1377092998.41814.YahooMailNeo@web181202.mail.ne1.yahoo.com> Message-ID: Yes, but there is a strange way in which once qualia is named, then we are thrown into the 2nd order. I think "moods" are probably somewhat similar and I tend to see moods as something that is distributed between people (as in "the mood of a room" or "the mood of a situation"). In doing some looking into Victor Shklovsky, I came across this post from David Kellogg back in 2007 that seems rather relevant to our discussions of motive and mood: "Vygotsky talks about native language learning as a progression from unconscious use of language to conscious, deliberate analysis and synthesis (for example, the use of a monolingual dictionary). He talks about the learning of science as being a progression from the spontaneous, unselfconscious use of ideas to the rigorous definition and deliberate use of concepts. He talks about moral development in terms of a progression from other-regulation to conscious, volitional self-regulation. Now, all of these things are forms of cognition. In each case, the new element is not cognition but VOLITION, that is, the deliberate exercise of human will power. So it seems to me that Vygotsky is really talking about word-sense as a unit of VOLITION. Remember that LSV lived through a period of great ferment in the verbal arts. At the beginning of the 20th Century, literati from T.S. Eliot to Shklovsky agreed on one thing: meaning comes to us from the outside, not from within our souls. Eliot claimed it came from "tradition" and Shklovsky from disembodied structure. LSV is neither a traditionalist nor a structuralist, but he certainly DOES hold that volition comes to us, not from within ourselves, but from out there. If you think a minute, you will see that it has to be that way. Expecting human volition to come from within is like, as Luria says, expecting a shadow to carry stones. Or expecting a monolingual dictionary to make "sense"!" This seems to resonate nicely with Andy's more distributed reading of motive (volition) as residing outside the individual. But I can't help but wonder if David K is reading too much into Vygotsky's work? What is the nature of this "deliberate exercise of human will power"? Of volition? (and Larry, can we do the same thing with "mood" - seeing it as an inside that comes from without? Or would you say that moods are more primal than volitions?). -greg On Wed, Aug 21, 2013 at 9:11 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > Greg, > Thanks for making the distinction between *qualia* [as to conceive > *conceiving* AS felt relations between something else as a 1st order level] > AND *abstract concepts* [relations between relations] at the 2nd level. > You also bring in the notion of *moods* which we are often *captured by* > which you contrast with intentionally planned activity. > These *moods* as primordial and then after the mood flows through us [from > within] we retrospectively [in our conversational realities including inner > dialogue] compose understandings AS motivations. > > I hope qualia and moods as 1st order level understandings dynamically > flowing through activities can become fore-grounded as this 1st level seems > vital to Merleau-Ponty's existential phenomenology of actual experience > within na?ve *folk* psychology. > Activities *capture us* within moods and this level of qualia as > spontaneous may be primordial. Merleau-Ponty used the phrase *expressive > cognition* to explore this realm of qualia. How it links up with concepts > is an open question. > Systems, and functional explanations seem to focus on knowing-how something > functions with something else. This form of knowing seems to front load > concepts. Christine's exploring *valencia* [spelling?] I read as an > approach to systems and structure that includes 1st order qualia. > > Larry > > > > On Wed, Aug 21, 2013 at 6:49 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: > > > I agree! And that's what research on all the relevant kinds of genesis > in > > Field College types of places is all about -- seldom supported and > > sustained enough for long enough but worth keeping the eye on that prize. > > > > By the way we are celebrating the 50th anniversary of the March on > > Washington this week and lots of new historical insight are being > published. > > Also lots of celebration including shouting and food and drink! I'll > > raise toasts when I can to distant friends, meaning folks like you and > > otheres on XMCA. > > > > > > Peg > > > > > > ________________________________ > > From: Andy Blunden > > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > Sent: Tuesday, August 20, 2013 10:50 PM > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities > > > > > > That's exactly right, Peg, but it is not enough to state that activities > > are subject-objects and dynamic, unless we can explain exactly how their > > dynamism is formed. Exactly *what* are the dynamics of activities? I > agree > > that diversity is a part of it though. > > > > Andy > > > > Peg Griffin wrote: > > > I see it as dynamic ( ready meaning ready to grow) because I see > > subjective-object and objective-subject rather than objective or > > subjective. > > > As diverse "who" are the obejctive-subjects the odds of changes in the > > subjective-object motives go way up. We might all change enough to > survive > > after all. Working on diversity wasn't an accidental part of LCHC's > > concern, nor was it for charity or to be nice. It's the dynamism and hope > > bought by diversity that might separate me (and probably Mike) from the > > Politburo :) > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > *From:* Andy Blunden > > > *To:* "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > > *Sent:* Tuesday, August 20, 2013 10:48 AM > > > *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities > > > > > > I think your example and your way of explaining is perfect, Peg, for > the > > purposes of psychology and education. The "socio-cultural motive/activity > > is ready." It is just this objectivist stance in relation to the societal > > activities which has always been my main problem with Leontyev. I know, > of > > course, that you and Mike and the others involved in 5thD designed > > activities which were well aligned to widely held aims for the children's > > development, but where did they come from? Speaking generally, what is > the > > dynamic of the activities we see around us? When surveying social and > > cultural life in general it is obviously not sufficient to say "Mike and > > Peg designed these activities" any more than it was sufficient to say > that > > the Politburo decided the targets for social production. > > > > > > So it seems to me that Greg's main problem remains unsolved in your > > approach, Peg. What do we mean by the "motive" of the activity? *Whose* > > motive? > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > Peg Griffin wrote: > > > > I like the idea of a "well-motivated argument" as used in classical > > and contemporary logic. So I say stick to motivated. > > > > It works so nicely with the distinction between "merely understood" > > and "really effective" -- and the transition as merely understood motive > > becomes really effective. The subject may engage in the actions that are > > motivated by two different activity systems with two different motives -- > > but say the second is merely understood by the subject and the first is > > really effective for the subject. When the human conflict-ing (Luria) > > mash-up happens and the person lapses into a mosaically related but > > contradictory action -- poof -- the merely understood is now the motive! > > > > So the child you and Leontyev describe doing homework is first really > > effectively motivated by play with adult rules of priority/timing etc. > but > > when that child scrunches up his homework paper and throws it in the > waste > > basket and starts all over -- poof-- the really effective motive/activity > > falls apart and the merely understood socio-cultural motive/activity is > > ready and willing and takes up the slack. Having alluded to both Luria > and > > Leontyev, I now bring in the Beatles -- it's a long and winding road. > Not > > a one-time enlightenment! But praxis makes possible. > > > > > > > > When we at LCHC, ages ago, were running the after-school school we > > called "Field College" (pun and polysemy intended), a funding program > > officer (Marge Martus) commented that she hadn't seen a single child off > > task in two hours. And believe me they were not school or adult governed > > children! It was because Field College was strewn with motives that > > virtually begged for children to engage but also to transition from > really > > effective to merely understood and hence to "grow" into a new activity. > It > > would be, I told Marge, like being in a rainstorm and trying to avoid the > > raindrops if a child were off-all-the available operating tasks! > > > > We had "center table" rituals and "fifth dimension" constitutions > that > > exposed the merely understood motives. And we had participant structures, > > tasks, procedures, a lot of bells and whistles that fit in dual activity > > systems/motives, some combonation of which elicited the child's voluntary > > engagement in a really effective way. > > > > Peg > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Visiting Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Wed Aug 21 10:14:13 2013 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Wed, 21 Aug 2013 11:14:13 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Shklovsky Message-ID: A favorite quote that, for me, seems quite interesting contemplation of perception, but also happens to be one that pushes in the other direction from what Heidegger seems to be pointing to: "And so life is reckoned as nothing. Habitualization devours work, clothes, furniture, one's wife, and the fear of war. "If the whole complex lives of many people unconsciously, then such lives are as if they had never been." And art exists that one may recover the sensation of life; it exists to make one feel things, to make the stone stony. The purpose of art is to impart the sensation of things as they are perceived and not as they are known. The technique of art is to make objects "unfamiliar" to make forms difficult, to increase the difficulty and length of perception because the process of perception is an aesthetic end in itself and must be prolonged. Art is a way of experiencing the artfulness of an object: the object IS not important..." This is lovely, but I'm wondering if anyone can make sense of this alongside of Heidegger's project - this gets to the central question that I keep trying to chase down - how to think of essence of the human subject as being in reflection or as being in absorption. (and maybe Heidegger answers with both. Vygotsky too?). -greg On Wed, Aug 21, 2013 at 10:16 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Yes, but there is a strange way in which once qualia is named, then we are > thrown into the 2nd order. I think "moods" are probably somewhat similar > and I tend to see moods as something that is distributed between people (as > in "the mood of a room" or "the mood of a situation"). > > In doing some looking into Victor Shklovsky, I came across this post from > David Kellogg back in 2007 that seems rather relevant to our discussions of > motive and mood: > > "Vygotsky talks about native language learning as a progression from > unconscious use of language to conscious, deliberate analysis and synthesis > (for example, the use of a monolingual dictionary). He talks about the > learning of science as being a progression from the spontaneous, > unselfconscious use of ideas to the rigorous definition and deliberate use > of concepts. He talks about moral development in terms of a progression > from other-regulation to conscious, volitional self-regulation. Now, all of > these things are forms of cognition. In each case, the new element is not > cognition but VOLITION, that is, the deliberate exercise of human will > power. > > So it seems to me that Vygotsky is really talking about word-sense as a > unit of VOLITION. Remember that LSV lived through a period of great ferment > in the verbal arts. At the beginning of the 20th Century, literati from > T.S. Eliot to Shklovsky agreed on one thing: meaning comes to us from the > outside, not from within our souls. Eliot claimed it came from "tradition" > and Shklovsky from disembodied structure. LSV is neither a traditionalist > nor a structuralist, but he certainly DOES hold that volition comes to us, > not from within ourselves, but from out there. > > If you think a minute, you will see that it has to be that way. Expecting > human volition to come from within is like, as Luria says, expecting a > shadow to carry stones. Or expecting a monolingual dictionary to make > "sense"!" > > This seems to resonate nicely with Andy's more distributed reading of > motive (volition) as residing outside the individual. But I can't help but > wonder if David K is reading too much into Vygotsky's work? > What is the nature of this "deliberate exercise of human will power"? Of > volition? > (and Larry, can we do the same thing with "mood" - seeing it as an inside > that comes from without? Or would you say that moods are more primal than > volitions?). > -greg > > > On Wed, Aug 21, 2013 at 9:11 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > Greg, > > Thanks for making the distinction between *qualia* [as to conceive > > *conceiving* AS felt relations between something else as a 1st order > level] > > AND *abstract concepts* [relations between relations] at the 2nd level. > > You also bring in the notion of *moods* which we are often *captured by* > > which you contrast with intentionally planned activity. > > These *moods* as primordial and then after the mood flows through us > [from > > within] we retrospectively [in our conversational realities including > inner > > dialogue] compose understandings AS motivations. > > > > I hope qualia and moods as 1st order level understandings dynamically > > flowing through activities can become fore-grounded as this 1st level > seems > > vital to Merleau-Ponty's existential phenomenology of actual experience > > within na?ve *folk* psychology. > > Activities *capture us* within moods and this level of qualia as > > spontaneous may be primordial. Merleau-Ponty used the phrase *expressive > > cognition* to explore this realm of qualia. How it links up with concepts > > is an open question. > > Systems, and functional explanations seem to focus on knowing-how > something > > functions with something else. This form of knowing seems to front load > > concepts. Christine's exploring *valencia* [spelling?] I read as an > > approach to systems and structure that includes 1st order qualia. > > > > Larry > > > > > > > > On Wed, Aug 21, 2013 at 6:49 AM, Peg Griffin > wrote: > > > > > I agree! And that's what research on all the relevant kinds of genesis > > in > > > Field College types of places is all about -- seldom supported and > > > sustained enough for long enough but worth keeping the eye on that > prize. > > > > > > By the way we are celebrating the 50th anniversary of the March on > > > Washington this week and lots of new historical insight are being > > published. > > > Also lots of celebration including shouting and food and drink! I'll > > > raise toasts when I can to distant friends, meaning folks like you and > > > otheres on XMCA. > > > > > > > > > Peg > > > > > > > > > ________________________________ > > > From: Andy Blunden > > > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > > Sent: Tuesday, August 20, 2013 10:50 PM > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities > > > > > > > > > That's exactly right, Peg, but it is not enough to state that > activities > > > are subject-objects and dynamic, unless we can explain exactly how > their > > > dynamism is formed. Exactly *what* are the dynamics of activities? I > > agree > > > that diversity is a part of it though. > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > Peg Griffin wrote: > > > > I see it as dynamic ( ready meaning ready to grow) because I see > > > subjective-object and objective-subject rather than objective or > > > subjective. > > > > As diverse "who" are the obejctive-subjects the odds of changes in > the > > > subjective-object motives go way up. We might all change enough to > > survive > > > after all. Working on diversity wasn't an accidental part of LCHC's > > > concern, nor was it for charity or to be nice. It's the dynamism and > hope > > > bought by diversity that might separate me (and probably Mike) from the > > > Politburo :) > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > *From:* Andy Blunden > > > > *To:* "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > > > *Sent:* Tuesday, August 20, 2013 10:48 AM > > > > *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities > > > > > > > > I think your example and your way of explaining is perfect, Peg, for > > the > > > purposes of psychology and education. The "socio-cultural > motive/activity > > > is ready." It is just this objectivist stance in relation to the > societal > > > activities which has always been my main problem with Leontyev. I know, > > of > > > course, that you and Mike and the others involved in 5thD designed > > > activities which were well aligned to widely held aims for the > children's > > > development, but where did they come from? Speaking generally, what is > > the > > > dynamic of the activities we see around us? When surveying social and > > > cultural life in general it is obviously not sufficient to say "Mike > and > > > Peg designed these activities" any more than it was sufficient to say > > that > > > the Politburo decided the targets for social production. > > > > > > > > So it seems to me that Greg's main problem remains unsolved in your > > > approach, Peg. What do we mean by the "motive" of the activity? *Whose* > > > motive? > > > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > > > Peg Griffin wrote: > > > > > I like the idea of a "well-motivated argument" as used in classical > > > and contemporary logic. So I say stick to motivated. > > > > > It works so nicely with the distinction between "merely understood" > > > and "really effective" -- and the transition as merely understood > motive > > > becomes really effective. The subject may engage in the actions that > are > > > motivated by two different activity systems with two different motives > -- > > > but say the second is merely understood by the subject and the first is > > > really effective for the subject. When the human conflict-ing (Luria) > > > mash-up happens and the person lapses into a mosaically related but > > > contradictory action -- poof -- the merely understood is now the > motive! > > > > > So the child you and Leontyev describe doing homework is first > really > > > effectively motivated by play with adult rules of priority/timing etc. > > but > > > when that child scrunches up his homework paper and throws it in the > > waste > > > basket and starts all over -- poof-- the really effective > motive/activity > > > falls apart and the merely understood socio-cultural motive/activity is > > > ready and willing and takes up the slack. Having alluded to both Luria > > and > > > Leontyev, I now bring in the Beatles -- it's a long and winding road. > > Not > > > a one-time enlightenment! But praxis makes possible. > > > > > > > > > > When we at LCHC, ages ago, were running the after-school school we > > > called "Field College" (pun and polysemy intended), a funding program > > > officer (Marge Martus) commented that she hadn't seen a single child > off > > > task in two hours. And believe me they were not school or adult > governed > > > children! It was because Field College was strewn with motives that > > > virtually begged for children to engage but also to transition from > > really > > > effective to merely understood and hence to "grow" into a new activity. > > It > > > would be, I told Marge, like being in a rainstorm and trying to avoid > the > > > raindrops if a child were off-all-the available operating tasks! > > > > > We had "center table" rituals and "fifth dimension" constitutions > > that > > > exposed the merely understood motives. And we had participant > structures, > > > tasks, procedures, a lot of bells and whistles that fit in dual > activity > > > systems/motives, some combonation of which elicited the child's > voluntary > > > engagement in a really effective way. > > > > > Peg > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Visiting Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Visiting Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From mpacker@uniandes.edu.co Wed Aug 21 10:51:15 2013 From: mpacker@uniandes.edu.co (Martin John Packer) Date: Wed, 21 Aug 2013 17:51:15 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Shklovsky In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <85B51B64-03FB-47D8-A30F-C993A6D4005B@uniandes.edu.co> I would say that yes, both say both. Martin On Aug 21, 2013, at 12:14 PM, Greg Thompson wrote: > how to think of essence of the human subject as > being in reflection or as being in absorption. (and maybe Heidegger answers > with both. Vygotsky too?). From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed Aug 21 14:54:45 2013 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Wed, 21 Aug 2013 14:54:45 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Shklovsky In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Greg, When Martin posted the notice of the reprinting of Merleau-Ponty's book and M-P's attempt to bridge distinct discourses I returned to a book by Lawrence Hass on Merleau-Ponty and his relevance for understanding our human situation. For myself I composed a summary in a word document of the *double project* of phenomenology [affirmation & critique] that may be one possible answer to your question: "This is lovely, but I'm wondering if anyone can make sense of this alongside of Heidegger's project - this gets to the central question that I keep trying to chase down - how to think of essence of the human subject as being in reflection or as being in absorption. (and maybe Heidegger answers with both. Vygotsky too?)." Here is the summary as an attachment. Not sure if others will find it relevant. It does include Heiddeger and M-P critiquing Husserl's transcendental assumptions but acknowledging the *method* they learned from Husserl. Larry On Wed, Aug 21, 2013 at 10:14 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > A favorite quote that, for me, seems quite interesting contemplation of > perception, but also happens to be one that pushes in the other direction > from what Heidegger seems to be pointing to: > > "And so life is reckoned as nothing. Habitualization devours work, clothes, > furniture, one's wife, and the fear of war. "If the whole complex lives of > many people unconsciously, then such lives are as if they had never been." > And art exists that one may recover the sensation of life; it exists to > make one feel things, to make the stone stony. The purpose of art is to > impart the sensation of things as they are perceived and not as they are > known. The technique of art is to make objects "unfamiliar" to make forms > difficult, to increase the difficulty and length of perception because the > process of perception is an aesthetic end in itself and must be prolonged. > Art is a way of experiencing the artfulness of an object: the object IS not > important..." > > This is lovely, but I'm wondering if anyone can make sense of this > alongside of Heidegger's project - this gets to the central question that I > keep trying to chase down - how to think of essence of the human subject as > being in reflection or as being in absorption. (and maybe Heidegger answers > with both. Vygotsky too?). > > -greg > > On Wed, Aug 21, 2013 at 10:16 AM, Greg Thompson > wrote: > > > Yes, but there is a strange way in which once qualia is named, then we > are > > thrown into the 2nd order. I think "moods" are probably somewhat similar > > and I tend to see moods as something that is distributed between people > (as > > in "the mood of a room" or "the mood of a situation"). > > > > In doing some looking into Victor Shklovsky, I came across this post from > > David Kellogg back in 2007 that seems rather relevant to our discussions > of > > motive and mood: > > > > "Vygotsky talks about native language learning as a progression from > > unconscious use of language to conscious, deliberate analysis and > synthesis > > (for example, the use of a monolingual dictionary). He talks about the > > learning of science as being a progression from the spontaneous, > > unselfconscious use of ideas to the rigorous definition and deliberate > use > > of concepts. He talks about moral development in terms of a progression > > from other-regulation to conscious, volitional self-regulation. Now, all > of > > these things are forms of cognition. In each case, the new element is not > > cognition but VOLITION, that is, the deliberate exercise of human will > > power. > > > > So it seems to me that Vygotsky is really talking about word-sense as a > > unit of VOLITION. Remember that LSV lived through a period of great > ferment > > in the verbal arts. At the beginning of the 20th Century, literati from > > T.S. Eliot to Shklovsky agreed on one thing: meaning comes to us from the > > outside, not from within our souls. Eliot claimed it came from > "tradition" > > and Shklovsky from disembodied structure. LSV is neither a traditionalist > > nor a structuralist, but he certainly DOES hold that volition comes to > us, > > not from within ourselves, but from out there. > > > > If you think a minute, you will see that it has to be that way. > Expecting > > human volition to come from within is like, as Luria says, expecting a > > shadow to carry stones. Or expecting a monolingual dictionary to make > > "sense"!" > > > > This seems to resonate nicely with Andy's more distributed reading of > > motive (volition) as residing outside the individual. But I can't help > but > > wonder if David K is reading too much into Vygotsky's work? > > What is the nature of this "deliberate exercise of human will power"? Of > > volition? > > (and Larry, can we do the same thing with "mood" - seeing it as an inside > > that comes from without? Or would you say that moods are more primal than > > volitions?). > > -greg > > > > > > On Wed, Aug 21, 2013 at 9:11 AM, Larry Purss > wrote: > > > > > Greg, > > > Thanks for making the distinction between *qualia* [as to conceive > > > *conceiving* AS felt relations between something else as a 1st order > > level] > > > AND *abstract concepts* [relations between relations] at the 2nd level. > > > You also bring in the notion of *moods* which we are often *captured > by* > > > which you contrast with intentionally planned activity. > > > These *moods* as primordial and then after the mood flows through us > > [from > > > within] we retrospectively [in our conversational realities including > > inner > > > dialogue] compose understandings AS motivations. > > > > > > I hope qualia and moods as 1st order level understandings dynamically > > > flowing through activities can become fore-grounded as this 1st level > > seems > > > vital to Merleau-Ponty's existential phenomenology of actual experience > > > within na?ve *folk* psychology. > > > Activities *capture us* within moods and this level of qualia as > > > spontaneous may be primordial. Merleau-Ponty used the phrase > *expressive > > > cognition* to explore this realm of qualia. How it links up with > concepts > > > is an open question. > > > Systems, and functional explanations seem to focus on knowing-how > > something > > > functions with something else. This form of knowing seems to front load > > > concepts. Christine's exploring *valencia* [spelling?] I read as an > > > approach to systems and structure that includes 1st order qualia. > > > > > > Larry > > > > > > > > > > > > On Wed, Aug 21, 2013 at 6:49 AM, Peg Griffin > > wrote: > > > > > > > I agree! And that's what research on all the relevant kinds of > genesis > > > in > > > > Field College types of places is all about -- seldom supported and > > > > sustained enough for long enough but worth keeping the eye on that > > prize. > > > > > > > > By the way we are celebrating the 50th anniversary of the March on > > > > Washington this week and lots of new historical insight are being > > > published. > > > > Also lots of celebration including shouting and food and drink! I'll > > > > raise toasts when I can to distant friends, meaning folks like you > and > > > > otheres on XMCA. > > > > > > > > > > > > Peg > > > > > > > > > > > > ________________________________ > > > > From: Andy Blunden > > > > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > > > Sent: Tuesday, August 20, 2013 10:50 PM > > > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities > > > > > > > > > > > > That's exactly right, Peg, but it is not enough to state that > > activities > > > > are subject-objects and dynamic, unless we can explain exactly how > > their > > > > dynamism is formed. Exactly *what* are the dynamics of activities? I > > > agree > > > > that diversity is a part of it though. > > > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > > > Peg Griffin wrote: > > > > > I see it as dynamic ( ready meaning ready to grow) because I see > > > > subjective-object and objective-subject rather than objective or > > > > subjective. > > > > > As diverse "who" are the obejctive-subjects the odds of changes in > > the > > > > subjective-object motives go way up. We might all change enough to > > > survive > > > > after all. Working on diversity wasn't an accidental part of LCHC's > > > > concern, nor was it for charity or to be nice. It's the dynamism and > > hope > > > > bought by diversity that might separate me (and probably Mike) from > the > > > > Politburo :) > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > > *From:* Andy Blunden > > > > > *To:* "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > > > > *Sent:* Tuesday, August 20, 2013 10:48 AM > > > > > *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities > > > > > > > > > > I think your example and your way of explaining is perfect, Peg, > for > > > the > > > > purposes of psychology and education. The "socio-cultural > > motive/activity > > > > is ready." It is just this objectivist stance in relation to the > > societal > > > > activities which has always been my main problem with Leontyev. I > know, > > > of > > > > course, that you and Mike and the others involved in 5thD designed > > > > activities which were well aligned to widely held aims for the > > children's > > > > development, but where did they come from? Speaking generally, what > is > > > the > > > > dynamic of the activities we see around us? When surveying social and > > > > cultural life in general it is obviously not sufficient to say "Mike > > and > > > > Peg designed these activities" any more than it was sufficient to say > > > that > > > > the Politburo decided the targets for social production. > > > > > > > > > > So it seems to me that Greg's main problem remains unsolved in your > > > > approach, Peg. What do we mean by the "motive" of the activity? > *Whose* > > > > motive? > > > > > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > > > > > Peg Griffin wrote: > > > > > > I like the idea of a "well-motivated argument" as used in > classical > > > > and contemporary logic. So I say stick to motivated. > > > > > > It works so nicely with the distinction between "merely > understood" > > > > and "really effective" -- and the transition as merely understood > > motive > > > > becomes really effective. The subject may engage in the actions that > > are > > > > motivated by two different activity systems with two different > motives > > -- > > > > but say the second is merely understood by the subject and the first > is > > > > really effective for the subject. When the human conflict-ing > (Luria) > > > > mash-up happens and the person lapses into a mosaically related but > > > > contradictory action -- poof -- the merely understood is now the > > motive! > > > > > > So the child you and Leontyev describe doing homework is first > > really > > > > effectively motivated by play with adult rules of priority/timing > etc. > > > but > > > > when that child scrunches up his homework paper and throws it in the > > > waste > > > > basket and starts all over -- poof-- the really effective > > motive/activity > > > > falls apart and the merely understood socio-cultural motive/activity > is > > > > ready and willing and takes up the slack. Having alluded to both > Luria > > > and > > > > Leontyev, I now bring in the Beatles -- it's a long and winding road. > > > Not > > > > a one-time enlightenment! But praxis makes possible. > > > > > > > > > > > > When we at LCHC, ages ago, were running the after-school school > we > > > > called "Field College" (pun and polysemy intended), a funding program > > > > officer (Marge Martus) commented that she hadn't seen a single child > > off > > > > task in two hours. And believe me they were not school or adult > > governed > > > > children! It was because Field College was strewn with motives that > > > > virtually begged for children to engage but also to transition from > > > really > > > > effective to merely understood and hence to "grow" into a new > activity. > > > It > > > > would be, I told Marge, like being in a rainstorm and trying to avoid > > the > > > > raindrops if a child were off-all-the available operating tasks! > > > > > > We had "center table" rituals and "fifth dimension" constitutions > > > that > > > > exposed the merely understood motives. And we had participant > > structures, > > > > tasks, procedures, a lot of bells and whistles that fit in dual > > activity > > > > systems/motives, some combonation of which elicited the child's > > voluntary > > > > engagement in a really effective way. > > > > > > Peg > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Visiting Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Visiting Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: AUGUST 21 2013 Merleau-Ponty NOTES from the book.docx Type: application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document Size: 17845 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20130821/dd02b8b8/attachment.bin From VanDerRiet@ukzn.ac.za Wed Aug 21 15:10:31 2013 From: VanDerRiet@ukzn.ac.za (Mary van der Riet) Date: Wed, 21 Aug 2013 22:10:31 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: References: <521381AD.4010407@mira.net> <1377013953.4126.YahooMailNeo@web181202.mail.ne1.yahoo.com> <52142AD8.10506@mira.net> <1377092998.41814.YahooMailNeo@web181202.mail.ne1.yahoo.com> Message-ID: <1529586782.2269932.1377123030198.JavaMail.rim@b13.c13.bise7.blackberry> Sent from my BlackBerry? wireless device -----Original Message----- From: Larry Purss Sender: Date: Wed, 21 Aug 2013 08:11:59 To: Peg Griffin; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Reply-To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities Greg, Thanks for making the distinction between *qualia* [as to conceive *conceiving* AS felt relations between something else as a 1st order level] AND *abstract concepts* [relations between relations] at the 2nd level. You also bring in the notion of *moods* which we are often *captured by* which you contrast with intentionally planned activity. These *moods* as primordial and then after the mood flows through us [from within] we retrospectively [in our conversational realities including inner dialogue] compose understandings AS motivations. I hope qualia and moods as 1st order level understandings dynamically flowing through activities can become fore-grounded as this 1st level seems vital to Merleau-Ponty's existential phenomenology of actual experience within na?ve *folk* psychology. Activities *capture us* within moods and this level of qualia as spontaneous may be primordial. Merleau-Ponty used the phrase *expressive cognition* to explore this realm of qualia. How it links up with concepts is an open question. Systems, and functional explanations seem to focus on knowing-how something functions with something else. This form of knowing seems to front load concepts. Christine's exploring *valencia* [spelling?] I read as an approach to systems and structure that includes 1st order qualia. Larry On Wed, Aug 21, 2013 at 6:49 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: > I agree! And that's what research on all the relevant kinds of genesis in > Field College types of places is all about -- seldom supported and > sustained enough for long enough but worth keeping the eye on that prize. > > By the way we are celebrating the 50th anniversary of the March on > Washington this week and lots of new historical insight are being published. > Also lots of celebration including shouting and food and drink! I'll > raise toasts when I can to distant friends, meaning folks like you and > otheres on XMCA. > > > Peg > > > ________________________________ > From: Andy Blunden > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Sent: Tuesday, August 20, 2013 10:50 PM > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities > > > That's exactly right, Peg, but it is not enough to state that activities > are subject-objects and dynamic, unless we can explain exactly how their > dynamism is formed. Exactly *what* are the dynamics of activities? I agree > that diversity is a part of it though. > > Andy > > Peg Griffin wrote: > > I see it as dynamic ( ready meaning ready to grow) because I see > subjective-object and objective-subject rather than objective or > subjective. > > As diverse "who" are the obejctive-subjects the odds of changes in the > subjective-object motives go way up. We might all change enough to survive > after all. Working on diversity wasn't an accidental part of LCHC's > concern, nor was it for charity or to be nice. It's the dynamism and hope > bought by diversity that might separate me (and probably Mike) from the > Politburo :) > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *From:* Andy Blunden > > *To:* "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > *Sent:* Tuesday, August 20, 2013 10:48 AM > > *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities > > > > I think your example and your way of explaining is perfect, Peg, for the > purposes of psychology and education. The "socio-cultural motive/activity > is ready." It is just this objectivist stance in relation to the societal > activities which has always been my main problem with Leontyev. I know, of > course, that you and Mike and the others involved in 5thD designed > activities which were well aligned to widely held aims for the children's > development, but where did they come from? Speaking generally, what is the > dynamic of the activities we see around us? When surveying social and > cultural life in general it is obviously not sufficient to say "Mike and > Peg designed these activities" any more than it was sufficient to say that > the Politburo decided the targets for social production. > > > > So it seems to me that Greg's main problem remains unsolved in your > approach, Peg. What do we mean by the "motive" of the activity? *Whose* > motive? > > > > Andy > > > > Peg Griffin wrote: > > > I like the idea of a "well-motivated argument" as used in classical > and contemporary logic. So I say stick to motivated. > > > It works so nicely with the distinction between "merely understood" > and "really effective" -- and the transition as merely understood motive > becomes really effective. The subject may engage in the actions that are > motivated by two different activity systems with two different motives -- > but say the second is merely understood by the subject and the first is > really effective for the subject. When the human conflict-ing (Luria) > mash-up happens and the person lapses into a mosaically related but > contradictory action -- poof -- the merely understood is now the motive! > > > So the child you and Leontyev describe doing homework is first really > effectively motivated by play with adult rules of priority/timing etc. but > when that child scrunches up his homework paper and throws it in the waste > basket and starts all over -- poof-- the really effective motive/activity > falls apart and the merely understood socio-cultural motive/activity is > ready and willing and takes up the slack. Having alluded to both Luria and > Leontyev, I now bring in the Beatles -- it's a long and winding road. Not > a one-time enlightenment! But praxis makes possible. > > > > > > When we at LCHC, ages ago, were running the after-school school we > called "Field College" (pun and polysemy intended), a funding program > officer (Marge Martus) commented that she hadn't seen a single child off > task in two hours. And believe me they were not school or adult governed > children! It was because Field College was strewn with motives that > virtually begged for children to engage but also to transition from really > effective to merely understood and hence to "grow" into a new activity. It > would be, I told Marge, like being in a rainstorm and trying to avoid the > raindrops if a child were off-all-the available operating tasks! > > > We had "center table" rituals and "fifth dimension" constitutions that > exposed the merely understood motives. And we had participant structures, > tasks, procedures, a lot of bells and whistles that fit in dual activity > systems/motives, some combonation of which elicited the child's voluntary > engagement in a really effective way. > > > Peg > From lchcmike@gmail.com Wed Aug 21 15:38:40 2013 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Wed, 21 Aug 2013 15:38:40 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: <1529586782.2269932.1377123030198.JavaMail.rim@b13.c13.bise7.blackberry> References: <521381AD.4010407@mira.net> <1377013953.4126.YahooMailNeo@web181202.mail.ne1.yahoo.com> <52142AD8.10506@mira.net> <1377092998.41814.YahooMailNeo@web181202.mail.ne1.yahoo.com> <1529586782.2269932.1377123030198.JavaMail.rim@b13.c13.bise7.blackberry> Message-ID: Missing something from your message, Mary. Re Greg remark on motivation being distributed -- Might there be some affinity between the notions of distributed and shared in this usage? mike On Wed, Aug 21, 2013 at 3:10 PM, Mary van der Riet wrote: > > Sent from my BlackBerry? wireless device > > -----Original Message----- > From: Larry Purss > Sender: > Date: Wed, 21 Aug 2013 08:11:59 > To: Peg Griffin; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity< > xmca-l@mailman.ucsd.edu> > Reply-To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities > > Greg, > Thanks for making the distinction between *qualia* [as to conceive > *conceiving* AS felt relations between something else as a 1st order level] > AND *abstract concepts* [relations between relations] at the 2nd level. > You also bring in the notion of *moods* which we are often *captured by* > which you contrast with intentionally planned activity. > These *moods* as primordial and then after the mood flows through us [from > within] we retrospectively [in our conversational realities including inner > dialogue] compose understandings AS motivations. > > I hope qualia and moods as 1st order level understandings dynamically > flowing through activities can become fore-grounded as this 1st level seems > vital to Merleau-Ponty's existential phenomenology of actual experience > within na?ve *folk* psychology. > Activities *capture us* within moods and this level of qualia as > spontaneous may be primordial. Merleau-Ponty used the phrase *expressive > cognition* to explore this realm of qualia. How it links up with concepts > is an open question. > Systems, and functional explanations seem to focus on knowing-how something > functions with something else. This form of knowing seems to front load > concepts. Christine's exploring *valencia* [spelling?] I read as an > approach to systems and structure that includes 1st order qualia. > > Larry > > > > On Wed, Aug 21, 2013 at 6:49 AM, Peg Griffin wrote: > > > I agree! And that's what research on all the relevant kinds of genesis > in > > Field College types of places is all about -- seldom supported and > > sustained enough for long enough but worth keeping the eye on that prize. > > > > By the way we are celebrating the 50th anniversary of the March on > > Washington this week and lots of new historical insight are being > published. > > Also lots of celebration including shouting and food and drink! I'll > > raise toasts when I can to distant friends, meaning folks like you and > > otheres on XMCA. > > > > > > Peg > > > > > > ________________________________ > > From: Andy Blunden > > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > Sent: Tuesday, August 20, 2013 10:50 PM > > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities > > > > > > That's exactly right, Peg, but it is not enough to state that activities > > are subject-objects and dynamic, unless we can explain exactly how their > > dynamism is formed. Exactly *what* are the dynamics of activities? I > agree > > that diversity is a part of it though. > > > > Andy > > > > Peg Griffin wrote: > > > I see it as dynamic ( ready meaning ready to grow) because I see > > subjective-object and objective-subject rather than objective or > > subjective. > > > As diverse "who" are the obejctive-subjects the odds of changes in the > > subjective-object motives go way up. We might all change enough to > survive > > after all. Working on diversity wasn't an accidental part of LCHC's > > concern, nor was it for charity or to be nice. It's the dynamism and hope > > bought by diversity that might separate me (and probably Mike) from the > > Politburo :) > > > > > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > *From:* Andy Blunden > > > *To:* "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > > *Sent:* Tuesday, August 20, 2013 10:48 AM > > > *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities > > > > > > I think your example and your way of explaining is perfect, Peg, for > the > > purposes of psychology and education. The "socio-cultural motive/activity > > is ready." It is just this objectivist stance in relation to the societal > > activities which has always been my main problem with Leontyev. I know, > of > > course, that you and Mike and the others involved in 5thD designed > > activities which were well aligned to widely held aims for the children's > > development, but where did they come from? Speaking generally, what is > the > > dynamic of the activities we see around us? When surveying social and > > cultural life in general it is obviously not sufficient to say "Mike and > > Peg designed these activities" any more than it was sufficient to say > that > > the Politburo decided the targets for social production. > > > > > > So it seems to me that Greg's main problem remains unsolved in your > > approach, Peg. What do we mean by the "motive" of the activity? *Whose* > > motive? > > > > > > Andy > > > > > > Peg Griffin wrote: > > > > I like the idea of a "well-motivated argument" as used in classical > > and contemporary logic. So I say stick to motivated. > > > > It works so nicely with the distinction between "merely understood" > > and "really effective" -- and the transition as merely understood motive > > becomes really effective. The subject may engage in the actions that are > > motivated by two different activity systems with two different motives -- > > but say the second is merely understood by the subject and the first is > > really effective for the subject. When the human conflict-ing (Luria) > > mash-up happens and the person lapses into a mosaically related but > > contradictory action -- poof -- the merely understood is now the motive! > > > > So the child you and Leontyev describe doing homework is first really > > effectively motivated by play with adult rules of priority/timing etc. > but > > when that child scrunches up his homework paper and throws it in the > waste > > basket and starts all over -- poof-- the really effective motive/activity > > falls apart and the merely understood socio-cultural motive/activity is > > ready and willing and takes up the slack. Having alluded to both Luria > and > > Leontyev, I now bring in the Beatles -- it's a long and winding road. > Not > > a one-time enlightenment! But praxis makes possible. > > > > > > > > When we at LCHC, ages ago, were running the after-school school we > > called "Field College" (pun and polysemy intended), a funding program > > officer (Marge Martus) commented that she hadn't seen a single child off > > task in two hours. And believe me they were not school or adult governed > > children! It was because Field College was strewn with motives that > > virtually begged for children to engage but also to transition from > really > > effective to merely understood and hence to "grow" into a new activity. > It > > would be, I told Marge, like being in a rainstorm and trying to avoid the > > raindrops if a child were off-all-the available operating tasks! > > > > We had "center table" rituals and "fifth dimension" constitutions > that > > exposed the merely understood motives. And we had participant structures, > > tasks, procedures, a lot of bells and whistles that fit in dual activity > > systems/motives, some combonation of which elicited the child's voluntary > > engagement in a really effective way. > > > > Peg > > > > From VanDerRiet@ukzn.ac.za Wed Aug 21 21:13:01 2013 From: VanDerRiet@ukzn.ac.za (Mary van der Riet) Date: Thu, 22 Aug 2013 04:13:01 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities In-Reply-To: References: <521381AD.4010407@mira.net> <1377013953.4126.YahooMailNeo@web181202.mail.ne1.yahoo.com> <52142AD8.10506@mira.net> <1377092998.41814.YahooMailNeo@web181202.mail.ne1.yahoo.com> <1529586782.2269932.1377123030198.JavaMail.rim@b13.c13.bise7.blackberry> Message-ID: <288215034.2275762.1377144779560.JavaMail.rim@b13.c13.bise7.blackberry> Apologies for empty message (either me or toddler inadvertently pressing phone buttons) Mary Sent from my BlackBerry? wireless device ________________________________ From: mike cole Date: Wed, 21 Aug 2013 15:38:40 -0700 To: Mary van der Riet; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity ReplyTo: Subject: Re: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities Missing something from your message, Mary. Re Greg remark on motivation being distributed -- Might there be some affinity between the notions of distributed and shared in this usage? mike On Wed, Aug 21, 2013 at 3:10 PM, Mary van der Riet > wrote: Sent from my BlackBerry? wireless device -----Original Message----- From: Larry Purss > Sender: > Date: Wed, 21 Aug 2013 08:11:59 To: Peg Griffin>; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity> Reply-To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities Greg, Thanks for making the distinction between *qualia* [as to conceive *conceiving* AS felt relations between something else as a 1st order level] AND *abstract concepts* [relations between relations] at the 2nd level. You also bring in the notion of *moods* which we are often *captured by* which you contrast with intentionally planned activity. These *moods* as primordial and then after the mood flows through us [from within] we retrospectively [in our conversational realities including inner dialogue] compose understandings AS motivations. I hope qualia and moods as 1st order level understandings dynamically flowing through activities can become fore-grounded as this 1st level seems vital to Merleau-Ponty's existential phenomenology of actual experience within na?ve *folk* psychology. Activities *capture us* within moods and this level of qualia as spontaneous may be primordial. Merleau-Ponty used the phrase *expressive cognition* to explore this realm of qualia. How it links up with concepts is an open question. Systems, and functional explanations seem to focus on knowing-how something functions with something else. This form of knowing seems to front load concepts. Christine's exploring *valencia* [spelling?] I read as an approach to systems and structure that includes 1st order qualia. Larry On Wed, Aug 21, 2013 at 6:49 AM, Peg Griffin > wrote: > I agree! And that's what research on all the relevant kinds of genesis in > Field College types of places is all about -- seldom supported and > sustained enough for long enough but worth keeping the eye on that prize. > > By the way we are celebrating the 50th anniversary of the March on > Washington this week and lots of new historical insight are being published. > Also lots of celebration including shouting and food and drink! I'll > raise toasts when I can to distant friends, meaning folks like you and > otheres on XMCA. > > > Peg > > > ________________________________ > From: Andy Blunden > > To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > Sent: Tuesday, August 20, 2013 10:50 PM > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities > > > That's exactly right, Peg, but it is not enough to state that activities > are subject-objects and dynamic, unless we can explain exactly how their > dynamism is formed. Exactly *what* are the dynamics of activities? I agree > that diversity is a part of it though. > > Andy > > Peg Griffin wrote: > > I see it as dynamic ( ready meaning ready to grow) because I see > subjective-object and objective-subject rather than objective or > subjective. > > As diverse "who" are the obejctive-subjects the odds of changes in the > subjective-object motives go way up. We might all change enough to survive > after all. Working on diversity wasn't an accidental part of LCHC's > concern, nor was it for charity or to be nice. It's the dynamism and hope > bought by diversity that might separate me (and probably Mike) from the > Politburo :) > > > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > *From:* Andy Blunden > > > *To:* "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" > > > *Sent:* Tuesday, August 20, 2013 10:48 AM > > *Subject:* [Xmca-l] Re: Leontyev's activities > > > > I think your example and your way of explaining is perfect, Peg, for the > purposes of psychology and education. The "socio-cultural motive/activity > is ready." It is just this objectivist stance in relation to the societal > activities which has always been my main problem with Leontyev. I know, of > course, that you and Mike and the others involved in 5thD designed > activities which were well aligned to widely held aims for the children's > development, but where did they come from? Speaking generally, what is the > dynamic of the activities we see around us? When surveying social and > cultural life in general it is obviously not sufficient to say "Mike and > Peg designed these activities" any more than it was sufficient to say that > the Politburo decided the targets for social production. > > > > So it seems to me that Greg's main problem remains unsolved in your > approach, Peg. What do we mean by the "motive" of the activity? *Whose* > motive? > > > > Andy > > > > Peg Griffin wrote: > > > I like the idea of a "well-motivated argument" as used in classical > and contemporary logic. So I say stick to motivated. > > > It works so nicely with the distinction between "merely understood" > and "really effective" -- and the transition as merely understood motive > becomes really effective. The subject may engage in the actions that are > motivated by two different activity systems with two different motives -- > but say the second is merely understood by the subject and the first is > really effective for the subject. When the human conflict-ing (Luria) > mash-up happens and the person lapses into a mosaically related but > contradictory action -- poof -- the merely understood is now the motive! > > > So the child you and Leontyev describe doing homework is first really > effectively motivated by play with adult rules of priority/timing etc. but > when that child scrunches up his homework paper and throws it in the waste > basket and starts all over -- poof-- the really effective motive/activity > falls apart and the merely understood socio-cultural motive/activity is > ready and willing and takes up the slack. Having alluded to both Luria and > Leontyev, I now bring in the Beatles -- it's a long and winding road. Not > a one-time enlightenment! But praxis makes possible. > > > > > > When we at LCHC, ages ago, were running the after-school school we > called "Field College" (pun and polysemy intended), a funding program > officer (Marge Martus) commented that she hadn't seen a single child off > task in two hours. And believe me they were not school or adult governed > children! It was because Field College was strewn with motives that > virtually begged for children to engage but also to transition from really > effective to merely understood and hence to "grow" into a new activity. It > would be, I told Marge, like being in a rainstorm and trying to avoid the > raindrops if a child were off-all-the available operating tasks! > > > We had "center table" rituals and "fifth dimension" constitutions that > exposed the merely understood motives. And we had participant structures, > tasks, procedures, a lot of bells and whistles that fit in dual activity > systems/motives, some combonation of which elicited the child's voluntary > engagement in a really effective way. > > > Peg > From ablunden@mira.net Wed Aug 21 23:24:59 2013 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Thu, 22 Aug 2013 16:24:59 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] meaning and sense In-Reply-To: References: <19E63C50-A0D2-4A0F-BBA7-63853414FDAA@gmail.com> <4195A368-C7B9-4AB0-AAA5-A244135DC331@gmail.com> <520ADCDD.9000406@mira.net> <520C3970.6000803@mira.net> Message-ID: <5215AEBB.3070001@mira.net> I was just looking into this business about Vygotsky imputing excessive stablility to word meaning. The following key passage from Chapter 7 of "Thinking and Speech" does not, it appers to me, to imply such stability: "First, in inner speech, we find a predominance of the word?s sense over its meaning. Paulhan significantly advanced the psychological analysis of speech by introducing the distinction between a word?s sense and meaning. A word?s sense is the aggregate of all the psychological facts that arise in our consciousness as a result of the word. Sense is a dynamic, fluid, and complex formation which has several zones that vary in their stability. Meaning is only one of these zones of the sense that the word acquires in the context of speech. It is the most stable, unified, and precise of these zones. In different contexts, a word?s sense changes. In contrast, meaning is a comparatively fixed and stable point, one that remains constant with all the changes of the word?s sense that are associated with its use in various contexts. Change in the word?s sense is a basic factor in the semantic analysis of speech. The actual meaning of the word is inconstant. In one operation, the word emerges with one meaning; in another, another is acquired. The dynamic nature of meaning leads us to Paulhan?s problem, to the problem of the relationship between meaning and sense. Isolated in the lexicon, the word has only one meaning. However, this meaning is nothing more than a potential that can only be realized in living speech, and in living speech meaning is only a cornerstone in the edifice of sense." As I read this, the stability of meaning is merely relative to that of sense, i.e., in the context of speech, rather than "teh aggregate of all psychological facts." He is not at all denying the fact of polysemy or the cultural and historical migration of meaning. Andy mike cole wrote: > I agree, very clearly statements of the sense/meaning relation, along with > the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I wanted to say, and thought, > unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows." > > In the quote here, I think LSV is somewhat overstating the stability of > meaning across contexts; yes relative to the microgenetic processes of > sense making capturable with > modern technologies, but not totally "context independent." Even dictionary > meanings change, as LSV was well aware from his interest in the history of > words in relation to their appearance in children's vocabularies in > ontogeny. > > Keeping the simultaneous relevance of several time scales in mind in these > discussions seems really important, as hard as it is to do. > mike > > > From schweighartc@gmail.com Thu Aug 22 03:56:21 2013 From: schweighartc@gmail.com (Christine Schweighart) Date: Thu, 22 Aug 2013 11:56:21 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Systems views [leontievactivity] Message-ID: Hi Huw,Lubomir, Jack, Thanks for your replies. I find it difficult to scan the research of biologists' boundaries with psychologists in this area, biology research is funded to find results in areas such as diabetes etc and so goes in that direction; psychiatry seems to pick up from research from pharma industry funded work - anyone with useful theoretical bridges please share them! At present the neuroscience field has captivated attention, but work such as that of G. S. Berns boundaries neuroscience with language and social context without consideration of enzyme/endocrine regulation. In Information Systems work discussion of phenomenological work has explored 'mood' as an aspect, but this hasn't any life-science ground to relate it to Maturana's concept of autopoiesis, which has been influential. Also there has been some exploration of auto-affection (relating to 'collective subjectivity' not to phenomena of 'mood') - contrasting cultural settings - questioning action-research assumptions. What interests me is your comment, Huw, about ' Functional views as "a priori projections" is to use them a narrow non-genetic manner.' It's not a case of 'general systems heuristics'; when a practitioner is sensitive to personal sense, and begins conversations from already held meanings within intervention settings the 'general systems' are those brought to the conversation. What is 'genetic manner' ? If Andy's suggestion that unit of analysis expands to produce 'system', systems approaches/methodology concepts have been developed over periods of decades through research efforts. Originator practitioners have a sense of process of development of their concept meaning, and begin recreating milestone shifts of meaning towards articulation. In this way they have craft skill introducing and developing 'germ cell' thinking, not an 'a priori projection' ( method). A little while ago discussing Lewin and A-R, there was an observation that the action-research community were not trying to define 'method' , I was introduced to the idea that method is particular, developed 'in-situ' . What the notion of 'genetic manner' makes me curious about is whether dual stimulation is more 'micro' than apprising 'given' meanings of a nexus of conceptual relations ( a complex 'system'); in what way dual stimulation -as spontaneous creative actions -might contribute to a local history, and forming of a sense of 'germ cell' ( motive of enquiry); when we mention 'genetic method' ,whether we have confused dual stimulation with 'germ cell'. All rather too much for a thread, as I cannot participate much at the moment. Christine. From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Thu Aug 22 05:56:08 2013 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Thu, 22 Aug 2013 13:56:08 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Systems views [leontievactivity] In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: On 22 August 2013 11:56, Christine Schweighart wrote: > Hi Huw,Lubomir, Jack, > Thanks for your replies. > I find it difficult to scan the research of biologists' boundaries with > psychologists in this area, biology research is funded to find results in > areas such as diabetes etc and so goes in that direction; psychiatry seems > to pick up from research from pharma industry funded work - anyone with > useful theoretical bridges please share them! At present the neuroscience > field has captivated attention, but work such as that of G. S. Berns > boundaries neuroscience with language and social context without > consideration of enzyme/endocrine regulation. > > In Information Systems work discussion of phenomenological work has > explored 'mood' as an aspect, but this hasn't any life-science ground to > relate it to Maturana's concept of autopoiesis, which has been > influential. Also there has been some exploration of auto-affection > (relating to 'collective subjectivity' not to phenomena of 'mood') - > contrasting cultural settings - questioning action-research assumptions. > > What interests me is your comment, Huw, about ' > > Functional views as "a priori projections" is to use them a narrow > non-genetic manner.' > > > It's not a case of 'general systems heuristics'; when a practitioner is > sensitive to personal sense, and begins conversations from already held > meanings within intervention settings the 'general systems' are those > brought to the conversation. What is 'genetic manner' ? To reveal significant morphological development that are explained by the processes (e.g. of exchange) that are studied as part of the unit of analysis, wherin the changing functions discerned (and analysed within this morpological analysis) constrain (and afford) such development. It's not clear to me at what point "system" enters into the descriptions you provide, Christine. e.g. are you looking at it as a social construct (which, as such, does not need to be rigorous) or as a means to explain, in which case it does. > If Andy's > suggestion that unit of analysis expands to produce 'system', systems > approaches/methodology concepts have been developed over periods of decades > through research efforts. Originator practitioners have a sense of process > of development of their concept meaning, and begin recreating milestone > shifts of meaning towards articulation. In this way they have craft skill > introducing and developing 'germ cell' thinking, not an 'a priori > projection' ( method). > A little while ago discussing Lewin and A-R, there was an observation that > the action-research community were not trying to define 'method' , I was > introduced to the idea that method is particular, developed 'in-situ' . > Yes, seems reasonable. > > What the notion of 'genetic manner' makes me curious about is whether dual > stimulation is more 'micro' than apprising 'given' meanings of a nexus > of conceptual relations ( a complex 'system'); in what way dual stimulation > -as spontaneous creative actions -might contribute to a local history, and > forming of a sense of 'germ cell' ( motive of enquiry); when we mention > 'genetic method' ,whether we have confused dual stimulation with 'germ > cell'. > Dual stimulation is an experimental paradigm. For me it makes sense to consider this at the level of action (in Leontyev's sense), because actions are the means of organising activity, which is what dual stimulation is about. Re local history, dual stimulation can be used to explore what subjects remember etc. If you want to think at an operational level, Luria's combined motor method may be more appropriate. Germ cell is the "abstract universal" which is the single basis that forms the Russian dialectical materialist approach to a unit of analysis. "Germ cell" has got nothing to do with real, biological cells. It is concerned with the phenomena of human activity rather than natural phenomena per se. > > All rather too much for a thread, as I cannot participate much at the > moment. > With plenty of room for cross-meanings, too. Hope this helps, Huw > > Christine. > From schweighartc@gmail.com Thu Aug 22 06:59:25 2013 From: schweighartc@gmail.com (Christine Schweighart) Date: Thu, 22 Aug 2013 14:59:25 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Systems views [leontievactivity] Message-ID: Hi Huw, You queried: 'It's not clear to me at what point "system" enters into the descriptions you provide, Christine. e.g. are you looking at it as a social construct (which, as such, does not need to be rigorous) or as a means to explain, in which case it does.' That's the point, the development from notion to concept of 'system' and whether that is 'universal' in a general way, or appears only through local and particular practice 'immanently'. Cheers, Christine. From schweighartc@gmail.com Thu Aug 22 06:36:40 2013 From: schweighartc@gmail.com (Christine Schweighart) Date: Thu, 22 Aug 2013 14:36:40 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Systems views [leontievactivity] Message-ID: Jack, Perhaps a way of distinguishing significant aspects coherently across various sciences would be helpful. There is research in http://www.journals.elsevier.com/psychoneuroendocrinology/ cortisol and memory work http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/03064530/36/3 cortisol and stress kind of work done in variable separating lab work; * but not reaching to 'values'as a bridge to be able to work in the 'everyday' context in fieldwork....... http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306453013002667 developmental influence on structural capacities. http://www.psyneuen-journal.com/article/S0306-4530(12)00303-4/abstract Anyone with useful reading suggestions please send an email. Christine From lpscholar2@gmail.com Thu Aug 22 07:12:33 2013 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Thu, 22 Aug 2013 07:12:33 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: meaning and sense In-Reply-To: <5215AEBB.3070001@mira.net> References: <19E63C50-A0D2-4A0F-BBA7-63853414FDAA@gmail.com> <4195A368-C7B9-4AB0-AAA5-A244135DC331@gmail.com> <520ADCDD.9000406@mira.net> <520C3970.6000803@mira.net> <5215AEBB.3070001@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy, Thanks for keepin Thanks for keeping this topic of sense and meaning alive. Mike also is drawing our attention to the mystery of the creative process with this comment: "I agree, very clearly statements of the sense/meaning relation, along with the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I wanted to say, and thought, unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows." Thought, unembodied, returns to the hall of shadows. I have been reflecting on the phenomenological method or *bias* to prioritize *showing* as an action which brings thoughts from the shadows. The concept or term "metaphor" which can itself be considered a metaphor. Metaphor is derived from the verb *metapherein" which means "to transfer" which originally described a CONCRETE reality [Ernesto Grassi]. Therefore *presenting* a new metaphor IS an argument or a reason [a showing in phenomenological discourse] The question is if presenting [as a showing or gesture] a metaphor is presenting a *vehicle* or an "egg" which "carries" thoughts from speaker to hearer [which suggests the word is then decoded and RE-presented in the listener's "mind" Or, on the other hand, is presenting a metaphor actually metapherein [a verb] which "transfers" [shifts, turns] knowing in a phenomenological "aha" moment? Metaphor AS showing or presenting [FORMING sense], not metaphor as a *carrier* of thought which *represents* the sense of the speaker. I am "over my head" in these realms and my "logic" may be faulty, but the power of metaphor as "hinge" or "pivot" seems central. Peter Jones made a comment on literacy and "representation" Ernesto Grassi is making the point that presenting [showing] a new metaphor IS an argument producing a type of knowledge [sense] Can metapherein be *seen* [picture language] as new and novel ways of acting as transfering *sense* to *pictures* as a *psychological instrument* and thus as a cultural resource? The ACT of 'transfer' as presentation within metaphor [something AS something else] understood as a psychological and cultural tool, a PRACTICAL intersubjective resource with which [and THROUGH which we think, act, and perceive. Sense AS perception & action mediated through felt experience which is "presented" [shown] through *turning* objects to present other sides and therefore to perceive other aspects. Polysemy through metepherein as one *way* of knowing as argumentation. This is questioning the relation between *forming* as presentation/showing & *formed* as representation of what was previously presented. Merleau-Ponty's dynamic between sedimentation/spontaneityg this topic of sense and meaning alive. Mike also is drawing our attention to the mystery of the creative process with this comment: "I agree, very clearly statements of the sense/meaning relation, along with the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I wanted to say, and thought, unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows." Thought, unembodied, returns to the hall of shadows. I have been reflecting on the phenomenological method or *bias* to prioritize *showing* as an action which brings thoughts from the shadows. The concept or term "metaphor" which can itself be considered a metaphor. Metaphor is derived from the verb *metapherein" which means "to transfer" which originally described a CONCRETE reality [Ernesto Grassi]. Therefore *presenting* a new metaphor IS an argument or a reason [a showing in phenomenological discourse] The question is if presenting [as a showing or gesture] a metaphor is presenting a *vehicle* or an "egg" which "carries" thoughts from speaker to hearer [which suggests the word is then decoded and RE-presented in the listener's "mind" Or, on the other hand, is presenting a metaphor actually metapherein [a verb] which "transfers" [shifts, turns] knowing in a phenomenological "aha" moment? Metaphor AS showing or presenting [FORMING sense], not metaphor as a *carrier* of thought which *represents* the sense of the speaker. I am "over my head" in these realms and my "logic" may be faulty, but the power of metaphor as "hinge" or "pivot" seems central. Peter Jones made a comment on literacy and "representation" Ernesto Grassi is making the point that presenting [showing] a new metaphor IS an argument producing a type of knowledge [sense] Can metapherein be *seen* [picture language] as new and novel ways of acting as transfering *sense* by showing and creating metaphors as *pictures* as a *psychological instrument* and thus as a cultural resource? The ACT of 'transfer' as presentation within metaphor [something AS something else] understood as a psychological and cultural tool, a PRACTICAL intersubjective resource with which [and THROUGH which] we think, act, and perceive. Greg, I wonder if this showing is always volitional [under our control] or if we spontaneously "respond" intersubjectively? Sense AS perception & action mediated through felt experience which is "presented" [shown] through *turning* objects to present other sides and therefore to perceive other aspects. Polysemy through metepherein as one *way* of knowing as argumentation. Intersubjective not subjective. This is questioning the relation between *forming* as presentation/showing & *formed* as representation of what was previously presented. Merleau-Ponty's dynamic between sedimentation/spontaneity as expressive cognition. I hope I am making sense in my drawing attention to the relation between thoughts and shadows. Huw, asked if there is a question here? I would say the question is the models of "sense" as presentations [showings] and representations. Merleau-Ponty understood words AS GESTURES. Is there any "truth" to this notion? Larry On Wed, Aug 21, 2013 at 11:24 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > I was just looking into this business about Vygotsky imputing excessive > stablility to word meaning. The following key passage from Chapter 7 of > "Thinking and Speech" does not, it appers to me, to imply such stability: > > "First, in inner speech, we find a predominance of the word?s sense > over its meaning. Paulhan significantly advanced the psychological > analysis of speech by introducing the distinction between a word?s > sense and meaning. A word?s sense is the aggregate of all the > psychological facts that arise in our consciousness as a result of > the word. Sense is a dynamic, fluid, and complex formation which has > several zones that vary in their stability. Meaning is only one of > these zones of the sense that the word acquires in the context of > speech. It is the most stable, unified, and precise of these zones. > In different contexts, a word?s sense changes. In contrast, meaning > is a comparatively fixed and stable point, one that remains constant > with all the changes of the word?s sense that are associated with > its use in various contexts. Change in the word?s sense is a basic > factor in the semantic analysis of speech. The actual meaning of the > word is inconstant. In one operation, the word emerges with one > meaning; in another, another is acquired. The dynamic nature of > meaning leads us to Paulhan?s problem, to the problem of the > relationship between meaning and sense. Isolated in the lexicon, the > word has only one meaning. However, this meaning is nothing more > than a potential that can only be realized in living speech, and in > living speech meaning is only a cornerstone in the edifice of sense." > > As I read this, the stability of meaning is merely relative to that of > sense, i.e., in the context of speech, rather than "teh aggregate of all > psychological facts." He is not at all denying the fact of polysemy or the > cultural and historical migration of meaning. > > Andy > mike cole wrote: > >> I agree, very clearly statements of the sense/meaning relation, along with >> the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I wanted to say, and thought, >> unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows." >> >> In the quote here, I think LSV is somewhat overstating the stability of >> meaning across contexts; yes relative to the microgenetic processes of >> sense making capturable with >> modern technologies, but not totally "context independent." Even >> dictionary >> meanings change, as LSV was well aware from his interest in the history of >> words in relation to their appearance in children's vocabularies in >> ontogeny. >> >> Keeping the simultaneous relevance of several time scales in mind in these >> discussions seems really important, as hard as it is to do. >> mike >> >> >> >> > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Thu Aug 22 17:47:09 2013 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Thu, 22 Aug 2013 17:47:09 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Systems views [leontievactivity] In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Christine, You are exploring structures and systems and whether the concept of *system* develops in a *general* way or does it appear [making or finding!?] immanantly within particular practices. I will share a perspective from John Shotter who is attempting to make an ontological case for *conversational joint activities. He critiques *systems* thinking as a form of *scientific* thinking and he links it to a particular form of social practices that could exist only within literate societies. He is not making a case for *literacy* in general but literacy as used within scientific communities. Here is a summary of his position, [coming from a bias of conversational realities as the background within which scientific and *systems* ways of *knowing* develop. Shotter's account takes place as a response or answer to Bhaskar's *realist* perspective on scientific knowledge. Shotter says Bhaskar [and realists in general] neglect the TEXTUAL nature of the productive and reproductive process in science. Bhaskar says the most important practice supporting a science is its *methodology*: the assumption that proper, scientific knowledge is ONLY acquired as a result of systematic thought and orderly investigation. Shotter says that this *methodology* only has sense, and only MAKES sense, within a context of other activities and practices. Central among these other practices is the production of WRITTEN TEXTS. All professionally conducted science moves from text to text, usually beginning with the reading of already written text and ending in the writing of further texts. Within the many forms of linguistic communication written text has a special place. Texts can be used by readers [with the appropriate prior showing training] to construct a meaning by reference to linguistic resources which the reader possesses within themselves. The reader [as writer] carefully composes an interwoven sequence of written sentences, structured within ITSELF [to a much larger degree than conversational compositions] by essentially intralinguistic or syntactical relations. Thus to a critical degree scientific text is a relatively de-contextualized FORM of communication. Shotter says, to the extent that a *scientific* theory is always something written and published and making claims that things are not what they ordinarily seem to be, but are IN REALITY something else, the theory is not intelligible in the same way as terms are intelligible in ordinary conversational language. If we want to be taken seriously in our scientific claims we need to be INSTRUCTED in HOW [knowing-how] to *see* various social phenomena AS having a certain psychological character. Shotter gives examples to be able to *see* social phenomena AS social structure, or AS social classes. Other examples is to see social phenomena AS social representations, AS rules. Being instructed in HOW to read scientific texts INSTRUCTS us in how TO SEE social life AS consisting in structures and systems. What Shotter wants to add to this understanding is that science is also conducted within a context of argumentation. Shotter says Bhaskar's realist account lacks a certain *reflexiveness* and is biased toward propositions and statements rather than metaphors. Christine, not sure if my *turn* was a *swerve off course* but Shotter holds up *systems* as an object and gives us another perspective on this object of discussion. Larry On Thu, Aug 22, 2013 at 6:36 AM, Christine Schweighart < schweighartc@gmail.com> wrote: > Jack, > Perhaps a way of distinguishing significant aspects coherently across > various sciences would be helpful. > There is research in > http://www.journals.elsevier.com/psychoneuroendocrinology/ > > cortisol and memory work > http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/03064530/36/3 > cortisol and stress kind of work done in variable separating lab work; * > but not reaching to 'values'as a bridge to be able to work in the > 'everyday' context in fieldwork....... > http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306453013002667 > > developmental influence on structural capacities. > > http://www.psyneuen-journal.com/article/S0306-4530(12)00303-4/abstract > > Anyone with useful reading suggestions please send an email. > > Christine > From schweighartc@gmail.com Fri Aug 23 02:06:33 2013 From: schweighartc@gmail.com (Christine Schweighart) Date: Fri, 23 Aug 2013 10:06:33 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Systems views [leontievactivity] Message-ID: Hi Larry, I mentioned 'structure' in relation to biological organisms, Maturana does not consider autopoiesis beyond that - i.e unlike Luhmann, he considers human beings with languaging cognition who realise autopoiesis structurally coupled within a social context that makes autopoisis possible. A rough summary I'm making quickly, to clarify that. Shotter is referring to a mode of using systems ideas but there are others, which he does not consider - as these do not sit clearly within his account that you present. When different efforts to work in areas of Information Systems, community settings, agricultural ecology, were undertaken this 'scientific' mode was exposed to different kinds of need - with contracticting values and perspectives. It was a time of movement to participative reseach and evaluation and the approaches taken have become a focus of interest in Methodology and systems philosophy again. In different centres these stances are 'interpretive; 'critical' , and also research area oriented. Thanks for the use of this to explore scientific writing - academic writing is also part of a kind of conversation; albeit a lengthy one-sided preparation to write to a number of perspectives. It is also a process to enter amongst political factions. Best, Christine. From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Fri Aug 23 08:09:21 2013 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Fri, 23 Aug 2013 09:09:21 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Systems views [leontievactivity] In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Just thought I'd mention that it sounds like there are strong resonances between Shotter's ideas here and Goodwin's paper Professional Vision that Antti recently mentioned. In that piece, Goodwin looks at the processes of coding, highlighting, and the articulation of graphic representations. He shows first how these practices function in archaeology to define particular shadings of dirt as evidence of posts of a building (rhetorically the paper is brilliant - to start off with a neutral profession such as archaeology and then move to the much more emotionally charged issue of the police beating of Rodney King). Then he moves to the Rodney King case to show how the coding, highlighting, and representational practices of the police justified the brutal beating of Rodney King. Goodwin's key points resonate well with not just Shotter, but with Activity Theory: "The ability to build and interpret a material cognitive artifact, such as an archaeological map, is embedded within a web of socially articulated discourse." and, "Within such a framework the ability to see relevant entities is not lodged in the individual mind, but instead within a community of competent practitioners." and further: "As argued by Wittgenstein (1958) a category or rule cannot determine its own application; seeing what can count as a "change of slope" or "aggression" in a relevant domain of scrutiny is both a contingent accomplishment, and a locus for contestation, indeed a central site for legal argument. Categories and the phenomena to which they are being applied, mutually elaborate each other (Goodwin 1992; Heritage 1984; Keller and Keller 1993)," I think Goodwin's account is interesting b.c. it is mostly descriptive of the phenomena. While pointing in some ways to the injustice of the Rodney King trial, he doesn't go so far as to say that the work of "professionals" is entirely a ruse. Rather, it seems like his point is that there are better and worse ways of doing it. E.g., the archaeologist student is able to engage with the materials herself while learning, whereas the jurist is expected to passively sit and listen to the testimony of "experts" (strange to think that "inquiry" - as in "an inquiry" - and legal proceedings could be linked - or, at least, this is a strange form of "inquiry" conducted entirely by "experts"). Wondering where Shotter stands on the the usefulness of science. Is there value to be had in the scientific field of meaning? Or is it just a ruse? E.g., is there value in seeing "social structure" and "class" in the world? -greg On Thu, Aug 22, 2013 at 6:47 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > Christine, > You are exploring structures and systems and whether the concept of > *system* develops in a *general* way or does it appear [making or > finding!?] immanantly within particular practices. > > I will share a perspective from John Shotter who is attempting to make an > ontological case for *conversational joint activities. He critiques > *systems* thinking as a form of *scientific* thinking and he links it to a > particular form of social practices that could exist only within literate > societies. > He is not making a case for *literacy* in general but literacy as used > within scientific communities. Here is a summary of his position, [coming > from a bias of conversational realities as the background within which > scientific and *systems* ways of *knowing* develop. > Shotter's account takes place as a response or answer to Bhaskar's > *realist* perspective on scientific knowledge. Shotter says Bhaskar [and > realists in general] neglect the TEXTUAL nature of the productive and > reproductive process in science. Bhaskar says the most important practice > supporting a science is its *methodology*: the assumption that proper, > scientific knowledge is ONLY acquired as a result of systematic thought and > orderly investigation. Shotter says that this *methodology* only has sense, > and only MAKES sense, within a context of other activities and practices. > Central among these other practices is the production of WRITTEN TEXTS. All > professionally conducted science moves from text to text, usually beginning > with the reading of already written text and ending in the writing of > further texts. Within the many forms of linguistic communication written > text has a special place. Texts can be used by readers [with the > appropriate prior showing training] to construct a meaning by reference to > linguistic resources which the reader possesses within themselves. The > reader [as writer] carefully composes an interwoven sequence of written > sentences, structured within ITSELF [to a much larger degree than > conversational compositions] by essentially intralinguistic or syntactical > relations. Thus to a critical degree scientific text is a relatively > de-contextualized FORM of communication. Shotter says, to the extent that a > *scientific* theory is always something written and published and making > claims that things are not what they ordinarily seem to be, but are IN > REALITY something else, the theory is not intelligible in the same way as > terms are intelligible in ordinary conversational language. > If we want to be taken seriously in our scientific claims we need to be > INSTRUCTED in HOW [knowing-how] to *see* various social phenomena AS having > a certain psychological character. Shotter gives examples to be able to > *see* social phenomena AS social structure, or AS social classes. Other > examples is to see social phenomena AS social representations, AS rules. > Being instructed in HOW to read scientific texts INSTRUCTS us in how TO SEE > social life AS consisting in structures and systems. > > What Shotter wants to add to this understanding is that science is also > conducted within a context of argumentation. Shotter says Bhaskar's realist > account lacks a certain *reflexiveness* and is biased toward propositions > and statements rather than metaphors. > > Christine, not sure if my *turn* was a *swerve off course* but Shotter > holds up *systems* as an object and gives us another perspective on this > object of discussion. > > Larry > > > On Thu, Aug 22, 2013 at 6:36 AM, Christine Schweighart < > schweighartc@gmail.com> wrote: > > > Jack, > > Perhaps a way of distinguishing significant aspects coherently across > > various sciences would be helpful. > > There is research in > > http://www.journals.elsevier.com/psychoneuroendocrinology/ > > > > cortisol and memory work > > http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/03064530/36/3 > > cortisol and stress kind of work done in variable separating lab work; * > > but not reaching to 'values'as a bridge to be able to work in the > > 'everyday' context in fieldwork....... > > http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306453013002667 > > > > developmental influence on structural capacities. > > > > http://www.psyneuen-journal.com/article/S0306-4530(12)00303-4/abstract > > > > Anyone with useful reading suggestions please send an email. > > > > Christine > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Visiting Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Fri Aug 23 08:16:52 2013 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Fri, 23 Aug 2013 09:16:52 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: meaning and sense In-Reply-To: <5215AEBB.3070001@mira.net> References: <19E63C50-A0D2-4A0F-BBA7-63853414FDAA@gmail.com> <4195A368-C7B9-4AB0-AAA5-A244135DC331@gmail.com> <520ADCDD.9000406@mira.net> <520C3970.6000803@mira.net> <5215AEBB.3070001@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy, I'm not convinced that this gets to the cultural-historical transformation of meanings. Seems like he is saying that a word can have different meanings in different contexts. He says "Isolated in the lexicon, the word has only one meaning." That seems to suggest a culturally historically synchronic view. But that is not to say that Vygotsky doesn't have a strong appreciation for the transformation of meanings across time (it would be weird if he didn't). Just that I'm not seeing it here in this example. -greg On Thu, Aug 22, 2013 at 12:24 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > I was just looking into this business about Vygotsky imputing excessive > stablility to word meaning. The following key passage from Chapter 7 of > "Thinking and Speech" does not, it appers to me, to imply such stability: > > "First, in inner speech, we find a predominance of the word?s sense > over its meaning. Paulhan significantly advanced the psychological > analysis of speech by introducing the distinction between a word?s > sense and meaning. A word?s sense is the aggregate of all the > psychological facts that arise in our consciousness as a result of > the word. Sense is a dynamic, fluid, and complex formation which has > several zones that vary in their stability. Meaning is only one of > these zones of the sense that the word acquires in the context of > speech. It is the most stable, unified, and precise of these zones. > In different contexts, a word?s sense changes. In contrast, meaning > is a comparatively fixed and stable point, one that remains constant > with all the changes of the word?s sense that are associated with > its use in various contexts. Change in the word?s sense is a basic > factor in the semantic analysis of speech. The actual meaning of the > word is inconstant. In one operation, the word emerges with one > meaning; in another, another is acquired. The dynamic nature of > meaning leads us to Paulhan?s problem, to the problem of the > relationship between meaning and sense. Isolated in the lexicon, the > word has only one meaning. However, this meaning is nothing more > than a potential that can only be realized in living speech, and in > living speech meaning is only a cornerstone in the edifice of sense." > > As I read this, the stability of meaning is merely relative to that of > sense, i.e., in the context of speech, rather than "teh aggregate of all > psychological facts." He is not at all denying the fact of polysemy or the > cultural and historical migration of meaning. > > Andy > mike cole wrote: > >> I agree, very clearly statements of the sense/meaning relation, along with >> the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I wanted to say, and thought, >> unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows." >> >> In the quote here, I think LSV is somewhat overstating the stability of >> meaning across contexts; yes relative to the microgenetic processes of >> sense making capturable with >> modern technologies, but not totally "context independent." Even >> dictionary >> meanings change, as LSV was well aware from his interest in the history of >> words in relation to their appearance in children's vocabularies in >> ontogeny. >> >> Keeping the simultaneous relevance of several time scales in mind in these >> discussions seems really important, as hard as it is to do. >> mike >> >> >> >> > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Visiting Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From ablunden@mira.net Fri Aug 23 08:29:37 2013 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Sat, 24 Aug 2013 01:29:37 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: meaning and sense In-Reply-To: References: <4195A368-C7B9-4AB0-AAA5-A244135DC331@gmail.com> <520ADCDD.9000406@mira.net> <520C3970.6000803@mira.net> <5215AEBB.3070001@mira.net> Message-ID: <52177FE1.10309@mira.net> As you suggest, Greg, we know from elsewhere that Vygotsky is acutely aware of the cultural and historical variation of word meanings, as well as polysemy. But that is *not the topic of this paragraph* (in the last chapter of T&S). He is making a point about psychology, about thinking and speech. The statement "Isolated in the lexicon, the word has only one meaning," is of course only a relative truth. But actually I have never accept that the so-called meaning of a word found in a dictionary is what Vygotsky is concerned with when he makes "word meaning" a unit of analysis for the intellect. I have always taken "meaning"as a gerund. The word "dog" has one meaning in the dictionary (OK, of course it has dozens, but let's restrict it to the four-legged canine for the purposes of making a completely different point). But when spoken, i.e., in the context of speech, saying it to another person for some reason, the word acquires in the mind of the speaker a whole plethora of "psychological facts," which have nothing to do with the definition of "dog." What they might be depends on the situation of course: danger, friend, help, teeth, loud, close ... It is around this same point in T&S that he talks about thinking being "predicative" and the psychological subject or object not being the same as the grammatical subject or object. He is talking about the transition back and forth between the linear flow of words in speech and the complex dynamics of thinking. Here I think "sense" has to be understood quite differently than it is taken in linguistics. Andy Greg Thompson wrote: > Andy, > I'm not convinced that this gets to the cultural-historical > transformation of meanings. Seems like he is saying that a word can > have different meanings in different contexts. > > He says "Isolated in the lexicon, the word has only one meaning." That > seems to suggest a culturally historically synchronic view. > > But that is not to say that Vygotsky doesn't have a strong > appreciation for the transformation of meanings across time (it would > be weird if he didn't). Just that I'm not seeing it here in this example. > -greg > > > On Thu, Aug 22, 2013 at 12:24 AM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > I was just looking into this business about Vygotsky imputing > excessive stablility to word meaning. The following key passage > from Chapter 7 of "Thinking and Speech" does not, it appers to me, > to imply such stability: > > "First, in inner speech, we find a predominance of the word?s sense > over its meaning. Paulhan significantly advanced the psychological > analysis of speech by introducing the distinction between a word?s > sense and meaning. A word?s sense is the aggregate of all the > psychological facts that arise in our consciousness as a result of > the word. Sense is a dynamic, fluid, and complex formation > which has > several zones that vary in their stability. Meaning is only one of > these zones of the sense that the word acquires in the context of > speech. It is the most stable, unified, and precise of these zones. > In different contexts, a word?s sense changes. In contrast, meaning > is a comparatively fixed and stable point, one that remains > constant > with all the changes of the word?s sense that are associated with > its use in various contexts. Change in the word?s sense is a basic > factor in the semantic analysis of speech. The actual meaning > of the > word is inconstant. In one operation, the word emerges with one > meaning; in another, another is acquired. The dynamic nature of > meaning leads us to Paulhan?s problem, to the problem of the > relationship between meaning and sense. Isolated in the > lexicon, the > word has only one meaning. However, this meaning is nothing more > than a potential that can only be realized in living speech, and in > living speech meaning is only a cornerstone in the edifice of > sense." > > As I read this, the stability of meaning is merely relative to > that of sense, i.e., in the context of speech, rather than "teh > aggregate of all psychological facts." He is not at all denying > the fact of polysemy or the cultural and historical migration of > meaning. > > Andy > mike cole wrote: > > I agree, very clearly statements of the sense/meaning > relation, along with > the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I wanted to say, > and thought, > unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows." > > In the quote here, I think LSV is somewhat overstating the > stability of > meaning across contexts; yes relative to the microgenetic > processes of > sense making capturable with > modern technologies, but not totally "context independent." > Even dictionary > meanings change, as LSV was well aware from his interest in > the history of > words in relation to their appearance in children's > vocabularies in > ontogeny. > > Keeping the simultaneous relevance of several time scales in > mind in these > discussions seems really important, as hard as it is to do. > mike > > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Visiting Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts http://marxists.academia.edu/AndyBlunden From lpscholar2@gmail.com Fri Aug 23 10:56:09 2013 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Fri, 23 Aug 2013 10:56:09 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Systems views [leontievactivity] In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Greg, Your question, Wondering where Shotter stands on the the usefulness of science. Is there value to be had in the scientific field of meaning? Or is it just a ruse? E.g., is there value in seeing "social structure" and "class" in the world? I believe Shotter would answer by saying that "social structure" and "class" are ways of talking and carry values within these particular ways of talking. He would want to FOCUS our attention on what is normally the background within which our frames positing "social structure" and "class" are ways of talking. He describes his approach as "rhetorical-RESPONSIVE". Therefore talk of "social structure" and "classes" is a way of participating in an ongoing dialogue that is *partially sedimented" and "partially open". He would say that academic discourses with their written language bias are only able to exist as instructed discourses using analytic tools for making de-cisions are always carried out within conversational realities which are expressing particular values. By foregrounding this conversational ontology Shotter hopes to reveal the contested argumentative, negotiated and value informed collaboration within which all discourses and model building are carried out. He uses the metaphor of partially sedimented centers of discourse where we are INSTRUCTED in know-HOW exist within a background of ongoing spontaneous conversational realities. He emphasizes that written modes of communication emerge within conversational realities and take on an assumed reality that occludes the hurly burly of the spontaneous dis-organized background within which the instructed partially sedimented discourses occur. Greg, he would acknowledge the reality of "social structures" and "classes" as ways of talking with REAL AND ACTUAL consequences. However he would say they do not exist outside of our ways of talking which are open ended, negotiated, and within which the talk of "social structure" and "classes" gets organ-ized I would guess he would say that "social structures" and "classes" as ways of talking emerge within literately informed and instructed ways of talking. All this social structure talk emerges within our de-cisions and ways of talking. Now these ways of talk REALLY MATTER and have real existence in the world. He would not reject the talk of social structures but he would say they come into existence within the background of our ways of talking. His project is to FOCUS OUR ATTENTION on this hurly burly background which is ALWAYS FORMING and foreground what has been invisible in plain sight. In the language of phenomenology he is attempting to "say to show" LOOK, FOCUS, the world is partially sedimented. We do require to be INSTRUCTED and develop the tools to carry on within these partially structured cultural historically formED worlds. These worlds exist. How we talk about these worlds are not formed but formING. Without our talk informing ourselves dialogically [he says joint action] our informed worlds would cease to exist. What Shotter wants to SHOW us [make explicit] is THIS background "field" within which our centers of discourse using our psychological tools are INSTRUCTED as "knowing-HOW". Shotter emphasizes the tension within our ways of talking and he wants to shift from *picture* meataphors of "frames" to alternative metaphors of *voice* which come into existence THROUGH the response of the other. KNOWING "from within" privileges the realm of values and asks if everyone has a voice. This voice is not a subjective inner voice but rather a voice which emerges within the hurly burly dis-organized places between the centers of instructed discourse. To find one's voice only within the discourses as already formed and instructed is to loose the vitality of life within the hurly burly. In this "sense ability" I would say he is developing a way of talking that shares Merleau-Ponty's understanding that all analysis and "de-cision making" has LIMITS which do not exhaust the EXCESS and SYNERGY OF LIVING existence lived within expressive cognition. Both M-P and Shotter want to [using a gestalt metaphor] shift or turn our FOCUS from the figured foreground with its marked boundaries to the background and bring it to the fore. This fore is where we "shape" the "social structures" and "classes". Greg, this is my interpretation. I do not see it as questioning but adding to CHAT. In this I may be naive or mis-informed. That is why I tune in and try to focus on these other perspectives. Larry On Fri, Aug 23, 2013 at 8:09 AM, Greg Thompson wrote: > Just thought I'd mention that it sounds like there are strong resonances > between Shotter's ideas here and Goodwin's paper Professional Vision that > Antti recently mentioned. > > In that piece, Goodwin looks at the processes of coding, highlighting, and > the articulation of graphic representations. He shows first how these > practices function in archaeology to define particular shadings of dirt as > evidence of posts of a building (rhetorically the paper is brilliant - to > start off with a neutral profession such as archaeology and then move to > the much more emotionally charged issue of the police beating of Rodney > King). Then he moves to the Rodney King case to show how the coding, > highlighting, and representational practices of the police justified the > brutal beating of Rodney King. > > Goodwin's key points resonate well with not just Shotter, but with Activity > Theory: > "The ability to build and interpret a material cognitive artifact, such as > an archaeological map, is embedded within a web of socially articulated > discourse." > > and, "Within such a framework the ability to see relevant entities is not > lodged in the individual mind, but instead within a community of competent > practitioners." > > and further: > "As argued by Wittgenstein (1958) a category or rule cannot determine its > own application; seeing what can count as a "change of slope" or > "aggression" in a relevant domain of scrutiny is both a contingent > accomplishment, and a locus for contestation, indeed a central site for > legal argument. Categories and the phenomena to which they are being > applied, mutually elaborate each other (Goodwin > 1992; Heritage 1984; Keller and Keller 1993)," > > I think Goodwin's account is interesting b.c. it is mostly descriptive of > the phenomena. While pointing in some ways to the injustice of the Rodney > King trial, he doesn't go so far as to say that the work of "professionals" > is entirely a ruse. Rather, it seems like his point is that there are > better and worse ways of doing it. E.g., the archaeologist student is able > to engage with the materials herself while learning, whereas the jurist is > expected to passively sit and listen to the testimony of "experts" (strange > to think that "inquiry" - as in "an inquiry" - and legal proceedings could > be linked - or, at least, this is a strange form of "inquiry" conducted > entirely by "experts"). > > Wondering where Shotter stands on the the usefulness of science. Is there > value to be had in the scientific field of meaning? Or is it just a ruse? > E.g., is there value in seeing "social structure" and "class" in the world? > > -greg > > > > On Thu, Aug 22, 2013 at 6:47 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > Christine, > > You are exploring structures and systems and whether the concept of > > *system* develops in a *general* way or does it appear [making or > > finding!?] immanantly within particular practices. > > > > I will share a perspective from John Shotter who is attempting to make an > > ontological case for *conversational joint activities. He critiques > > *systems* thinking as a form of *scientific* thinking and he links it to > a > > particular form of social practices that could exist only within literate > > societies. > > He is not making a case for *literacy* in general but literacy as used > > within scientific communities. Here is a summary of his position, [coming > > from a bias of conversational realities as the background within which > > scientific and *systems* ways of *knowing* develop. > > Shotter's account takes place as a response or answer to Bhaskar's > > *realist* perspective on scientific knowledge. Shotter says Bhaskar [and > > realists in general] neglect the TEXTUAL nature of the productive and > > reproductive process in science. Bhaskar says the most important practice > > supporting a science is its *methodology*: the assumption that proper, > > scientific knowledge is ONLY acquired as a result of systematic thought > and > > orderly investigation. Shotter says that this *methodology* only has > sense, > > and only MAKES sense, within a context of other activities and practices. > > Central among these other practices is the production of WRITTEN TEXTS. > All > > professionally conducted science moves from text to text, usually > beginning > > with the reading of already written text and ending in the writing of > > further texts. Within the many forms of linguistic communication written > > text has a special place. Texts can be used by readers [with the > > appropriate prior showing training] to construct a meaning by reference > to > > linguistic resources which the reader possesses within themselves. The > > reader [as writer] carefully composes an interwoven sequence of written > > sentences, structured within ITSELF [to a much larger degree than > > conversational compositions] by essentially intralinguistic or > syntactical > > relations. Thus to a critical degree scientific text is a relatively > > de-contextualized FORM of communication. Shotter says, to the extent > that a > > *scientific* theory is always something written and published and making > > claims that things are not what they ordinarily seem to be, but are IN > > REALITY something else, the theory is not intelligible in the same way as > > terms are intelligible in ordinary conversational language. > > If we want to be taken seriously in our scientific claims we need to be > > INSTRUCTED in HOW [knowing-how] to *see* various social phenomena AS > having > > a certain psychological character. Shotter gives examples to be able to > > *see* social phenomena AS social structure, or AS social classes. Other > > examples is to see social phenomena AS social representations, AS rules. > > Being instructed in HOW to read scientific texts INSTRUCTS us in how TO > SEE > > social life AS consisting in structures and systems. > > > > What Shotter wants to add to this understanding is that science is also > > conducted within a context of argumentation. Shotter says Bhaskar's > realist > > account lacks a certain *reflexiveness* and is biased toward propositions > > and statements rather than metaphors. > > > > Christine, not sure if my *turn* was a *swerve off course* but Shotter > > holds up *systems* as an object and gives us another perspective on this > > object of discussion. > > > > Larry > > > > > > On Thu, Aug 22, 2013 at 6:36 AM, Christine Schweighart < > > schweighartc@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > > Jack, > > > Perhaps a way of distinguishing significant aspects coherently across > > > various sciences would be helpful. > > > There is research in > > > http://www.journals.elsevier.com/psychoneuroendocrinology/ > > > > > > cortisol and memory work > > > http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/03064530/36/3 > > > cortisol and stress kind of work done in variable separating lab work; > * > > > but not reaching to 'values'as a bridge to be able to work in the > > > 'everyday' context in fieldwork....... > > > http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306453013002667 > > > > > > developmental influence on structural capacities. > > > > > > http://www.psyneuen-journal.com/article/S0306-4530(12)00303-4/abstract > > > > > > Anyone with useful reading suggestions please send an email. > > > > > > Christine > > > > > > > > > -- > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > Visiting Assistant Professor > Department of Anthropology > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > Brigham Young University > Provo, UT 84602 > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > From sungwookim92@gmail.com Fri Aug 23 11:44:00 2013 From: sungwookim92@gmail.com (Sungwoo Kim) Date: Sat, 24 Aug 2013 03:44:00 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: meaning and sense In-Reply-To: References: <19E63C50-A0D2-4A0F-BBA7-63853414FDAA@gmail.com> <4195A368-C7B9-4AB0-AAA5-A244135DC331@gmail.com> <520ADCDD.9000406@mira.net> <520C3970.6000803@mira.net> <5215AEBB.3070001@mira.net> Message-ID: Dear Larry Purss This is my first time to use this mailing list. I hope this message will reach you somehow. I cannot directly address your questions due to my limited knowledge in phenomenology, but recent work in cognitive linguistics, especially in the field of conceptual metaphor theory can shed some light on them. The traditional view on metaphor has regarded it as an ornamental device in rhetorical process. Thus it does not have direct impact upon our thinking process.However, a large body of work in cognitive linguistics since Lakoff and Johnson's seminal work *Metaphors We Live By *(1980) is showing that metaphor is not merely rhetorical device, but a set of thinking patterns, some of which are universal and some culture-specific. This means that using new metaphors can shape and direct our thinking processes. To put it another way, new metaphors can lead to new ways of thinking. For example, Thibodeau and Boroditsky show that different kinds of metaphor can have substantial impact on our reasoning. Here's part of the abstract. "The way we talk about complex and abstract ideas is suffused with metaphor. In five experiments, we explore how these metaphors influence the way that we reason about complex issues and forage for further information about them. We find that even the subtlest instantiation of a metaphor (via a single word) can have a powerful influence over how people attempt to solve social problems like crime and how they gather information to make 'well-informed decisions." http://www-psych.stanford.edu/~lera/papers/crime-metaphors.pdf This principle of "metaphor-as-tihnking-pattern" has been adopted by many practitioners as well as researchers. Now it is applied in many fields including counseling, consulting, web and application design, political strategy planning, marketing, and so on. (Of course there are some cautious voices about the power of metaphor, too. e.g. http://www.economist.com/blogs/johnson/2013/01/political-language) Sungwoo On Thu, Aug 22, 2013 at 11:12 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > Andy, > > Thanks for keepin > Thanks for keeping this topic of sense and meaning alive. > Mike also is drawing our attention to the mystery of the creative process > with this comment: "I agree, very clearly statements of the sense/meaning > relation, along with the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I wanted > to say, and thought, unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows." > Thought, unembodied, returns to the hall of shadows. > I have been reflecting on the phenomenological method or *bias* to > prioritize *showing* as an action which brings thoughts from the shadows. > The concept or term "metaphor" which can itself be considered a metaphor. > Metaphor is derived from the verb *metapherein" which means "to transfer" > which originally described a CONCRETE reality [Ernesto Grassi]. > Therefore *presenting* a new metaphor IS an argument or a reason [a showing > in phenomenological discourse] > The question is if presenting [as a showing or gesture] a metaphor is > presenting a *vehicle* or an "egg" which "carries" thoughts from speaker to > hearer [which suggests the word is then decoded and RE-presented in the > listener's "mind" > Or, on the other hand, is presenting a metaphor actually metapherein [a > verb] which "transfers" [shifts, turns] knowing in a phenomenological "aha" > moment? Metaphor AS showing or presenting [FORMING sense], not metaphor as > a *carrier* of thought which *represents* the sense of the speaker. > I am "over my head" in these realms and my "logic" may be faulty, but the > power of metaphor as "hinge" or "pivot" seems central. > Peter Jones made a comment on literacy and "representation" > Ernesto Grassi is making the point that presenting [showing] a new metaphor > IS an argument producing a type of knowledge [sense] > Can metapherein be *seen* [picture language] as new and novel ways of > acting as transfering *sense* to *pictures* as a *psychological instrument* > and thus as a cultural resource? The ACT of 'transfer' as presentation > within metaphor [something AS something else] understood as a psychological > and cultural tool, a PRACTICAL intersubjective resource with which [and > THROUGH which we think, act, and perceive. > Sense AS perception & action mediated through felt experience which is > "presented" [shown] through *turning* objects to present other sides and > therefore to perceive other aspects. Polysemy through metepherein as one > *way* of knowing as argumentation. > This is questioning the relation between *forming* as presentation/showing > & > *formed* as representation of what was previously presented. > Merleau-Ponty's dynamic between sedimentation/spontaneityg this topic of > sense and meaning alive. > > Mike also is drawing our attention to the mystery of the creative process > with this comment: "I agree, very clearly statements of the sense/meaning > relation, along with the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I wanted > to say, and thought, unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows." > > Thought, unembodied, returns to the hall of shadows. > I have been reflecting on the phenomenological method or *bias* to > prioritize *showing* as an action which brings thoughts from the shadows. > > The concept or term "metaphor" which can itself be considered a metaphor. > Metaphor is derived from the verb *metapherein" which means "to transfer" > which originally described a CONCRETE reality [Ernesto Grassi]. > Therefore *presenting* a new metaphor IS an argument or a reason [a showing > in phenomenological discourse] > The question is if presenting [as a showing or gesture] a metaphor is > presenting a *vehicle* or an "egg" which "carries" thoughts from speaker to > hearer [which suggests the word is then decoded and RE-presented in the > listener's "mind" > Or, on the other hand, is presenting a metaphor actually metapherein [a > verb] which "transfers" [shifts, turns] knowing in a phenomenological "aha" > moment? Metaphor AS showing or presenting [FORMING sense], not metaphor as > a *carrier* of thought which *represents* the sense of the speaker. > I am "over my head" in these realms and my "logic" may be faulty, but the > power of metaphor as "hinge" or "pivot" seems central. > Peter Jones made a comment on literacy and "representation" > Ernesto Grassi is making the point that presenting [showing] a new metaphor > IS an argument producing a type of knowledge [sense] > Can metapherein be *seen* [picture language] as new and novel ways of > acting as transfering *sense* by showing and creating metaphors > as *pictures* as a *psychological instrument* and thus as a cultural > resource? The ACT of 'transfer' as presentation within metaphor [something > AS something else] understood as a psychological and cultural tool, a > PRACTICAL intersubjective resource with which [and THROUGH which] we think, > act, and perceive. > Greg, I wonder if this showing is always volitional [under our control] or > if we spontaneously "respond" intersubjectively? > > Sense AS perception & action mediated through felt experience which is > "presented" [shown] through *turning* objects to present other sides and > therefore to perceive other aspects. Polysemy through metepherein as one > *way* of knowing as argumentation. Intersubjective not subjective. > This is questioning the relation between > *forming* as presentation/showing > & > *formed* as representation of what was previously presented. > > Merleau-Ponty's dynamic between sedimentation/spontaneity as expressive > cognition. > > I hope I am making sense in my drawing attention to the relation between > thoughts and shadows. > Huw, asked if there is a question here? I would say the question is the > models of "sense" as presentations [showings] and representations. > Merleau-Ponty understood words AS GESTURES. > Is there any "truth" to this notion? > Larry > > > On Wed, Aug 21, 2013 at 11:24 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > I was just looking into this business about Vygotsky imputing excessive > > stablility to word meaning. The following key passage from Chapter 7 of > > "Thinking and Speech" does not, it appers to me, to imply such stability: > > > > "First, in inner speech, we find a predominance of the word?s sense > > over its meaning. Paulhan significantly advanced the psychological > > analysis of speech by introducing the distinction between a word?s > > sense and meaning. A word?s sense is the aggregate of all the > > psychological facts that arise in our consciousness as a result of > > the word. Sense is a dynamic, fluid, and complex formation which has > > several zones that vary in their stability. Meaning is only one of > > these zones of the sense that the word acquires in the context of > > speech. It is the most stable, unified, and precise of these zones. > > In different contexts, a word?s sense changes. In contrast, meaning > > is a comparatively fixed and stable point, one that remains constant > > with all the changes of the word?s sense that are associated with > > its use in various contexts. Change in the word?s sense is a basic > > factor in the semantic analysis of speech. The actual meaning of the > > word is inconstant. In one operation, the word emerges with one > > meaning; in another, another is acquired. The dynamic nature of > > meaning leads us to Paulhan?s problem, to the problem of the > > relationship between meaning and sense. Isolated in the lexicon, the > > word has only one meaning. However, this meaning is nothing more > > than a potential that can only be realized in living speech, and in > > living speech meaning is only a cornerstone in the edifice of sense." > > > > As I read this, the stability of meaning is merely relative to that of > > sense, i.e., in the context of speech, rather than "teh aggregate of all > > psychological facts." He is not at all denying the fact of polysemy or > the > > cultural and historical migration of meaning. > > > > Andy > > mike cole wrote: > > > >> I agree, very clearly statements of the sense/meaning relation, along > with > >> the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I wanted to say, and > thought, > >> unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows." > >> > >> In the quote here, I think LSV is somewhat overstating the stability of > >> meaning across contexts; yes relative to the microgenetic processes of > >> sense making capturable with > >> modern technologies, but not totally "context independent." Even > >> dictionary > >> meanings change, as LSV was well aware from his interest in the history > of > >> words in relation to their appearance in children's vocabularies in > >> ontogeny. > >> > >> Keeping the simultaneous relevance of several time scales in mind in > these > >> discussions seems really important, as hard as it is to do. > >> mike > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > > > > > -- Peace, Sungwoo Kim Learner, Teacher, Researcher, Blogger Photos: *https://there.jux.com/* Personal: http://www.sungwookim.com From greg.a.thompson@gmail.com Fri Aug 23 12:09:12 2013 From: greg.a.thompson@gmail.com (Greg Thompson) Date: Fri, 23 Aug 2013 13:09:12 -0600 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Systems views [leontievactivity] In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Seems like there is third approach to take with regard to the figure and ground ("figure" being the traditional object of analysis, "ground" being Shotter's object of analysis) that will be familiar to any artist in training - namely, figures in nature do not have boundary lines. For convenience we tend to draw them as such, with the result being a heightening of the 2-dimensional nature of the drawing. They look flat (much like social scientific descriptions of the world!). It is only when we draw objects using shading and contrast, light and dark between figure and ground ("chiaroscoro") that the figures appear as having 3-dimensionality. Perhaps there is a lesson in this for social scientists? -greg p.s. check out this book on chiaroscuro - with a number of lovely portraits: http://www.amazon.com/Artists-Complete-Guide-Drawing-Head/dp/0823003590/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1377284355&sr=1-1 On Fri, Aug 23, 2013 at 11:56 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > Greg, > Your question, > Wondering where Shotter stands on the the usefulness of science. Is there > value to be had in the scientific field of meaning? Or is it just a ruse? > E.g., is there value in seeing "social structure" and "class" in the world? > I believe Shotter would answer by saying that "social structure" and > "class" are ways of talking and carry values within these particular ways > of talking. He would want to FOCUS our attention on what is normally the > background within which our frames positing "social structure" and "class" > are ways of talking. He describes his approach as "rhetorical-RESPONSIVE". > > Therefore talk of "social structure" and "classes" is a way of > participating in an ongoing dialogue that is *partially sedimented" and > "partially open". > He would say that academic discourses with their written language bias are > only able to exist as instructed discourses using analytic tools for making > de-cisions are always carried out within conversational realities which are > expressing particular values. By foregrounding this conversational ontology > Shotter hopes to reveal the contested argumentative, negotiated and value > informed collaboration within which all discourses and model building are > carried out. > He uses the metaphor of partially sedimented centers of discourse where we > are INSTRUCTED in know-HOW exist within a background of ongoing spontaneous > conversational realities. He emphasizes that written modes of > communication emerge within conversational realities and take on an assumed > reality that occludes the hurly burly of the spontaneous dis-organized > background within which the instructed partially sedimented discourses > occur. > Greg, he would acknowledge the reality of "social structures" and "classes" > as ways of talking with REAL AND ACTUAL consequences. However he would say > they do not exist outside of our ways of talking which are open ended, > negotiated, and within which the talk of "social structure" and "classes" > gets organ-ized > I would guess he would say that "social structures" and "classes" as ways > of talking emerge within literately informed and instructed ways of > talking. > All this social structure talk emerges within our de-cisions and ways of > talking. Now these ways of talk REALLY MATTER and have real existence in > the world. > He would not reject the talk of social structures but he would say they > come into existence within the background of our ways of talking. > His project is to FOCUS OUR ATTENTION on this hurly burly background which > is ALWAYS FORMING and foreground what has been invisible in plain sight. In > the language of phenomenology he is attempting to "say to show" LOOK, > FOCUS, the world is partially sedimented. We do require to be INSTRUCTED > and develop the tools to carry on within these partially structured > cultural historically formED worlds. These worlds exist. > How we talk about these worlds are not formed but formING. Without our talk > informing ourselves dialogically [he says joint action] our informed worlds > would cease to exist. > > What Shotter wants to SHOW us [make explicit] is THIS background "field" > within which our centers of discourse using our psychological tools are > INSTRUCTED as "knowing-HOW". > Shotter emphasizes the tension within our ways of talking and he wants to > shift from *picture* meataphors of "frames" to alternative metaphors of > *voice* which come into existence THROUGH the response of the other. > KNOWING "from within" privileges the realm of values and asks if everyone > has a voice. This voice is not a subjective inner voice but rather a voice > which emerges within the hurly burly dis-organized places between the > centers of instructed discourse. To find one's voice only within the > discourses as already formed and instructed is to loose the vitality of > life within the hurly burly. In this "sense ability" > I would say he is developing a way of talking that shares Merleau-Ponty's > understanding that all analysis and "de-cision making" has LIMITS which do > not exhaust the EXCESS and SYNERGY OF LIVING existence lived within > expressive cognition. Both M-P and Shotter want to [using a gestalt > metaphor] shift or turn our FOCUS from the figured foreground with its > marked boundaries to the background and bring it to the fore. > This fore is where we "shape" the "social structures" and "classes". > Greg, this is my interpretation. I do not see it as questioning but adding > to CHAT. In this I may be naive or mis-informed. That is why I tune in and > try to focus on these other perspectives. > Larry > > > On Fri, Aug 23, 2013 at 8:09 AM, Greg Thompson >wrote: > > > Just thought I'd mention that it sounds like there are strong resonances > > between Shotter's ideas here and Goodwin's paper Professional Vision that > > Antti recently mentioned. > > > > In that piece, Goodwin looks at the processes of coding, highlighting, > and > > the articulation of graphic representations. He shows first how these > > practices function in archaeology to define particular shadings of dirt > as > > evidence of posts of a building (rhetorically the paper is brilliant - to > > start off with a neutral profession such as archaeology and then move to > > the much more emotionally charged issue of the police beating of Rodney > > King). Then he moves to the Rodney King case to show how the coding, > > highlighting, and representational practices of the police justified the > > brutal beating of Rodney King. > > > > Goodwin's key points resonate well with not just Shotter, but with > Activity > > Theory: > > "The ability to build and interpret a material cognitive artifact, such > as > > an archaeological map, is embedded within a web of socially articulated > > discourse." > > > > and, "Within such a framework the ability to see relevant entities is not > > lodged in the individual mind, but instead within a community of > competent > > practitioners." > > > > and further: > > "As argued by Wittgenstein (1958) a category or rule cannot determine its > > own application; seeing what can count as a "change of slope" or > > "aggression" in a relevant domain of scrutiny is both a contingent > > accomplishment, and a locus for contestation, indeed a central site for > > legal argument. Categories and the phenomena to which they are being > > applied, mutually elaborate each other (Goodwin > > 1992; Heritage 1984; Keller and Keller 1993)," > > > > I think Goodwin's account is interesting b.c. it is mostly descriptive of > > the phenomena. While pointing in some ways to the injustice of the Rodney > > King trial, he doesn't go so far as to say that the work of > "professionals" > > is entirely a ruse. Rather, it seems like his point is that there are > > better and worse ways of doing it. E.g., the archaeologist student is > able > > to engage with the materials herself while learning, whereas the jurist > is > > expected to passively sit and listen to the testimony of "experts" > (strange > > to think that "inquiry" - as in "an inquiry" - and legal proceedings > could > > be linked - or, at least, this is a strange form of "inquiry" conducted > > entirely by "experts"). > > > > Wondering where Shotter stands on the the usefulness of science. Is there > > value to be had in the scientific field of meaning? Or is it just a ruse? > > E.g., is there value in seeing "social structure" and "class" in the > world? > > > > -greg > > > > > > > > On Thu, Aug 22, 2013 at 6:47 PM, Larry Purss > wrote: > > > > > Christine, > > > You are exploring structures and systems and whether the concept of > > > *system* develops in a *general* way or does it appear [making or > > > finding!?] immanantly within particular practices. > > > > > > I will share a perspective from John Shotter who is attempting to make > an > > > ontological case for *conversational joint activities. He critiques > > > *systems* thinking as a form of *scientific* thinking and he links it > to > > a > > > particular form of social practices that could exist only within > literate > > > societies. > > > He is not making a case for *literacy* in general but literacy as used > > > within scientific communities. Here is a summary of his position, > [coming > > > from a bias of conversational realities as the background within which > > > scientific and *systems* ways of *knowing* develop. > > > Shotter's account takes place as a response or answer to Bhaskar's > > > *realist* perspective on scientific knowledge. Shotter says Bhaskar > [and > > > realists in general] neglect the TEXTUAL nature of the productive and > > > reproductive process in science. Bhaskar says the most important > practice > > > supporting a science is its *methodology*: the assumption that proper, > > > scientific knowledge is ONLY acquired as a result of systematic thought > > and > > > orderly investigation. Shotter says that this *methodology* only has > > sense, > > > and only MAKES sense, within a context of other activities and > practices. > > > Central among these other practices is the production of WRITTEN TEXTS. > > All > > > professionally conducted science moves from text to text, usually > > beginning > > > with the reading of already written text and ending in the writing of > > > further texts. Within the many forms of linguistic communication > written > > > text has a special place. Texts can be used by readers [with the > > > appropriate prior showing training] to construct a meaning by reference > > to > > > linguistic resources which the reader possesses within themselves. The > > > reader [as writer] carefully composes an interwoven sequence of written > > > sentences, structured within ITSELF [to a much larger degree than > > > conversational compositions] by essentially intralinguistic or > > syntactical > > > relations. Thus to a critical degree scientific text is a relatively > > > de-contextualized FORM of communication. Shotter says, to the extent > > that a > > > *scientific* theory is always something written and published and > making > > > claims that things are not what they ordinarily seem to be, but are IN > > > REALITY something else, the theory is not intelligible in the same way > as > > > terms are intelligible in ordinary conversational language. > > > If we want to be taken seriously in our scientific claims we need to be > > > INSTRUCTED in HOW [knowing-how] to *see* various social phenomena AS > > having > > > a certain psychological character. Shotter gives examples to be able to > > > *see* social phenomena AS social structure, or AS social classes. > Other > > > examples is to see social phenomena AS social representations, AS > rules. > > > Being instructed in HOW to read scientific texts INSTRUCTS us in how TO > > SEE > > > social life AS consisting in structures and systems. > > > > > > What Shotter wants to add to this understanding is that science is also > > > conducted within a context of argumentation. Shotter says Bhaskar's > > realist > > > account lacks a certain *reflexiveness* and is biased toward > propositions > > > and statements rather than metaphors. > > > > > > Christine, not sure if my *turn* was a *swerve off course* but Shotter > > > holds up *systems* as an object and gives us another perspective on > this > > > object of discussion. > > > > > > Larry > > > > > > > > > On Thu, Aug 22, 2013 at 6:36 AM, Christine Schweighart < > > > schweighartc@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > > > > Jack, > > > > Perhaps a way of distinguishing significant aspects coherently > across > > > > various sciences would be helpful. > > > > There is research in > > > > http://www.journals.elsevier.com/psychoneuroendocrinology/ > > > > > > > > cortisol and memory work > > > > http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/03064530/36/3 > > > > cortisol and stress kind of work done in variable separating lab > work; > > * > > > > but not reaching to 'values'as a bridge to be able to work in the > > > > 'everyday' context in fieldwork....... > > > > http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306453013002667 > > > > > > > > developmental influence on structural capacities. > > > > > > > > > http://www.psyneuen-journal.com/article/S0306-4530(12)00303-4/abstract > > > > > > > > Anyone with useful reading suggestions please send an email. > > > > > > > > Christine > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. > > Visiting Assistant Professor > > Department of Anthropology > > 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower > > Brigham Young University > > Provo, UT 84602 > > http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson > > > -- Gregory A. Thompson, Ph.D. Visiting Assistant Professor Department of Anthropology 883 Spencer W. Kimball Tower Brigham Young University Provo, UT 84602 http://byu.academia.edu/GregoryThompson From smago@uga.edu Fri Aug 23 14:18:20 2013 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Fri, 23 Aug 2013 21:18:20 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] a three-day program -- Discover Development NYC Message-ID: THIS IS A FORWARDED MESSAGE. PLEASE DO NOT REPLY TO THE SENDER. READ THE MESSAGE CAREFULLY FOR INFORMATION ON THE ORIGINAL SENDER From: Carrie Lobman [mailto:melissaj@eastsideinstitute.ccsend.com] Hello! I am writing to let you know about an exciting opportunity for students and colleagues. As you know, I work closely with Lois Holzman at the East Side Institute, the NYC-based independent research and training center that she and Fred Newman founded almost 30 years ago. In October (and then again in May), the Institute is offering a three-day program -- Discover Development NYC -- that gives people an opportunity to work (and play) with Lois as part of a creative and experiential weekend of rigorous study and playful activities across New York City. Here's the premise: we want to give people the opportunity to spend three days in New York - soak up the (cosmopolitan) culture and energy - get a feel for the creative community that New York is so famous for - and do this as part of a small-group exploration of what you've heard Lois and me speak about with regard to "New York's development community." Lois will be the guide for a challenging three days of playing, observing and going behind the scenes to explore some of the showcase, developmental hot spots at the East Side Institute, the Social Therapy Group, Performance of a Lifetime, the All Stars Project and the Castillo Theatre. We'll talk to the builders of these programs - explore the history, the stumbling blocks, the controversy and their success in using an activity-theoretic, postmodern, performance-based methodology to help people from all walks of life come together to develop. I am particularly excited about giving this opportunity to colleagues working in university settings and students. Lois is a remarkable teacher, and her community-based, human development projects, combined with her love, passion and knowledge of New York City, provide a wonderful complement to university study/work. Actually a great way to do this program would be to organize a group of students and colleagues to come and participate together (reduced registration for groups is available). But individual applicants are of course welcome. If you want to hear more or have questions, I would be happy to be in touch. All Best Regards, Carrie Lobman The East Side Institute presents... Discover Development NYC A 3-day, group-building exploration of New York's Development Community Friday-Sunday, October 25-27, 2013 Registration: $395. Limited to 12 participants. Spend three days in the incomparable City of New York with fellow explorers investigating performances of personal and community development. [New York Watertower] Today's buzzwords of innovation, creativity, collaboration and happiness will come alive as your 'discovery group' visits developmental hot spots from Times Square/42nd Street to the Flatiron, and from Fort Greene to Newark. "Most memorable to me was meeting people from different walks of life, sharing and being vulnerable, playing, 'unscheduled conversations' and, of course, walking around the city!" Your guide for the three days will be East Side Institute director Lois Holzman, a developmental psychologist and expert in developmental learning and performance activism. Over a challenging, immersive course of study, observation and play, [LoisNYC] Holzman will introduce you to a diverse development community, where people of all ages and walks of life perform new roles and relationships and imagine/create a more humane world. Holzman offers an historical look at the success of the community's multi-faceted development programs - built upon 40 years of experimentation outside of traditional institutions. "Going to the Off-Off-Broadway theater exposed me to artists who are creating both works of art and development." Discover performance spaces across NYC: * Visit a community therapy center in Brooklyn, where clients perform their emotional development. * Go backstage at an experimental, Off-Off-Broadway theatre. [Castillo Theatre/Sally &Tom] * Visit innovative after-school programs, including the flagship youth development programs of the All Stars Project. * Let loose in an exclusive improv theatre-skills workshop. [http://ih.constantcontact.com/fs102/1101246158194/img/280.jpg] "The improvisation games and activities were the most eye opening moments of my development during the weekend." * Perform as a philosopher in a "developmental philosophy" class. * Meet the architects, educators, actors, designers, therapists, fundraisers, physicians, community organizers, young people and parents who built these programs. [Discover Development NYC] * Have dinner with Holzman and your new colleagues in a Greenwich Village bistro. Discuss what you've seen, how you've seen it, and how to bring development home. "Our collective performance was inspiring. The creativity we are capable of when we dive into the unknown!" [SmoothSpot Studio] In the course of the three days, you will be introduced to Holzman's mentor and development community founder, the late public philosopher Fred Newman. You'll learn how in building the East Side Institute community, she and Newman reimagined the contributions of Lev Vygotsky and Ludwig Wittgenstein to devise a postmodern practice of method that is being put to work by a global network of grassroots practitioners. Register Today! Program is limited to 12 participants. Questions? For more information, contact: Melissa Meyer, mmeyer@eastsideinstitute.org +1-212-941-8906 x304. [Like us on Facebook] www.EastSideInstitute.org Forward this email [http://img.constantcontact.com/letters/images/SafeUnsubscribe_Footer_Logo_New.png] [http://img.constantcontact.com/letters/images/CC_Footer_Logo_New.png] This email was sent to smago@uga.edu by carrie.lobman@gse.rutgers.edu | Update Profile/Email Address | Instant removal with SafeUnsubscribe(tm) | Privacy Policy. East Side Institute | 920 Broadway | 14th Floor | New York | NY | 10010 From lpscholar2@gmail.com Fri Aug 23 17:12:06 2013 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Fri, 23 Aug 2013 17:12:06 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: meaning and sense In-Reply-To: References: <19E63C50-A0D2-4A0F-BBA7-63853414FDAA@gmail.com> <4195A368-C7B9-4AB0-AAA5-A244135DC331@gmail.com> <520ADCDD.9000406@mira.net> <520C3970.6000803@mira.net> <5215AEBB.3070001@mira.net> Message-ID: Sungwoo, Thanks for participating in this online chat. I am aware of this approach that says metaphors are central to our ways of thinking. I will read the article you sent. My curiosity is in the question of words *carrying* thought [which would imply thought comes first and is then put into the chosen word that *represents* the thought [as primary], or if the word IS thought. If metaphor is thought [not a way to bring our thoughts out into the shared world] then metaphors of thought AS *PICTURES* [frames] in contrast to metaphors of thought AS *VOICE* actually means we are participating in different KINDS of thinking [conversations externally or internally] Sungwoo, I am in over my head but am curious about your question. This site is the place to be if you want to go deeper into this question. Vygotsky's exploration of the distinction between meaning and sense leads right into the heart of your question. I will read your article attached as I am fascinated with the place of metaphor in our modes of thinking. I do believe the notion that the concept *metaphor* is itself a metaphor DERIVED from the practice of *metapherein* [the verb *to transfer*] which originally described a CONCRETE activity This insight may be relevant. The book "Rhetoric as Philosophy" by Ernesto Grassi [1980] which explores Vico and his response to the *new science* may be a lead to follow. Shotter in his book refer's to Grassi's understanding of metaphor. Others on this site have explored the relation of metaphor and thinking. Larry On Fri, Aug 23, 2013 at 11:44 AM, Sungwoo Kim wrote: > Dear Larry Purss > > This is my first time to use this mailing list. I hope this message will > reach you somehow. > > I cannot directly address your questions due to my limited knowledge in > phenomenology, but recent work in cognitive linguistics, especially in the > field of conceptual metaphor theory can shed some light on them. > > The traditional view on metaphor has regarded it as an ornamental device in > rhetorical process. Thus it does not have direct impact upon our thinking > process.However, a large body of work in cognitive linguistics since Lakoff > and Johnson's seminal work *Metaphors We Live By *(1980) is showing that > metaphor is not merely rhetorical device, but a set of thinking patterns, > some of which are universal and some culture-specific. This means that > using new metaphors can shape and direct our thinking processes. To put it > another way, new metaphors can lead to new ways of thinking. For > example, Thibodeau and Boroditsky show that different kinds of metaphor can > have substantial impact on our reasoning. Here's part of the abstract. > > "The way we talk about complex and abstract ideas is suffused with > metaphor. In five experiments, we explore how these metaphors influence the > way that we reason about complex issues and forage for further information > about them. We find that even the subtlest instantiation of a metaphor (via > a single word) can have a powerful influence over how people attempt to > solve social problems like crime and how they gather information to make > 'well-informed decisions." > > http://www-psych.stanford.edu/~lera/papers/crime-metaphors.pdf > > This principle of "metaphor-as-tihnking-pattern" has been adopted by many > practitioners as well as researchers. Now it is applied in many fields > including counseling, consulting, web and application design, political > strategy planning, marketing, and so on. (Of course there are some cautious > voices about the power of metaphor, too. e.g. > http://www.economist.com/blogs/johnson/2013/01/political-language) > > Sungwoo > > > On Thu, Aug 22, 2013 at 11:12 PM, Larry Purss > wrote: > > > Andy, > > > > Thanks for keepin > > Thanks for keeping this topic of sense and meaning alive. > > Mike also is drawing our attention to the mystery of the creative process > > with this comment: "I agree, very clearly statements of the sense/meaning > > relation, along with the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I > wanted > > to say, and thought, unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows." > > Thought, unembodied, returns to the hall of shadows. > > I have been reflecting on the phenomenological method or *bias* to > > prioritize *showing* as an action which brings thoughts from the shadows. > > The concept or term "metaphor" which can itself be considered a metaphor. > > Metaphor is derived from the verb *metapherein" which means "to transfer" > > which originally described a CONCRETE reality [Ernesto Grassi]. > > Therefore *presenting* a new metaphor IS an argument or a reason [a > showing > > in phenomenological discourse] > > The question is if presenting [as a showing or gesture] a metaphor is > > presenting a *vehicle* or an "egg" which "carries" thoughts from speaker > to > > hearer [which suggests the word is then decoded and RE-presented in the > > listener's "mind" > > Or, on the other hand, is presenting a metaphor actually metapherein [a > > verb] which "transfers" [shifts, turns] knowing in a phenomenological > "aha" > > moment? Metaphor AS showing or presenting [FORMING sense], not metaphor > as > > a *carrier* of thought which *represents* the sense of the speaker. > > I am "over my head" in these realms and my "logic" may be faulty, but the > > power of metaphor as "hinge" or "pivot" seems central. > > Peter Jones made a comment on literacy and "representation" > > Ernesto Grassi is making the point that presenting [showing] a new > metaphor > > IS an argument producing a type of knowledge [sense] > > Can metapherein be *seen* [picture language] as new and novel ways of > > acting as transfering *sense* to *pictures* as a *psychological > instrument* > > and thus as a cultural resource? The ACT of 'transfer' as presentation > > within metaphor [something AS something else] understood as a > psychological > > and cultural tool, a PRACTICAL intersubjective resource with which [and > > THROUGH which we think, act, and perceive. > > Sense AS perception & action mediated through felt experience which is > > "presented" [shown] through *turning* objects to present other sides and > > therefore to perceive other aspects. Polysemy through metepherein as one > > *way* of knowing as argumentation. > > This is questioning the relation between *forming* as > presentation/showing > > & > > *formed* as representation of what was previously presented. > > Merleau-Ponty's dynamic between sedimentation/spontaneityg this topic of > > sense and meaning alive. > > > > Mike also is drawing our attention to the mystery of the creative process > > with this comment: "I agree, very clearly statements of the sense/meaning > > relation, along with the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I > wanted > > to say, and thought, unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows." > > > > Thought, unembodied, returns to the hall of shadows. > > I have been reflecting on the phenomenological method or *bias* to > > prioritize *showing* as an action which brings thoughts from the shadows. > > > > The concept or term "metaphor" which can itself be considered a metaphor. > > Metaphor is derived from the verb *metapherein" which means "to transfer" > > which originally described a CONCRETE reality [Ernesto Grassi]. > > Therefore *presenting* a new metaphor IS an argument or a reason [a > showing > > in phenomenological discourse] > > The question is if presenting [as a showing or gesture] a metaphor is > > presenting a *vehicle* or an "egg" which "carries" thoughts from speaker > to > > hearer [which suggests the word is then decoded and RE-presented in the > > listener's "mind" > > Or, on the other hand, is presenting a metaphor actually metapherein [a > > verb] which "transfers" [shifts, turns] knowing in a phenomenological > "aha" > > moment? Metaphor AS showing or presenting [FORMING sense], not metaphor > as > > a *carrier* of thought which *represents* the sense of the speaker. > > I am "over my head" in these realms and my "logic" may be faulty, but the > > power of metaphor as "hinge" or "pivot" seems central. > > Peter Jones made a comment on literacy and "representation" > > Ernesto Grassi is making the point that presenting [showing] a new > metaphor > > IS an argument producing a type of knowledge [sense] > > Can metapherein be *seen* [picture language] as new and novel ways of > > acting as transfering *sense* by showing and creating metaphors > > as *pictures* as a *psychological instrument* and thus as a cultural > > resource? The ACT of 'transfer' as presentation within metaphor > [something > > AS something else] understood as a psychological and cultural tool, a > > PRACTICAL intersubjective resource with which [and THROUGH which] we > think, > > act, and perceive. > > Greg, I wonder if this showing is always volitional [under our control] > or > > if we spontaneously "respond" intersubjectively? > > > > Sense AS perception & action mediated through felt experience which is > > "presented" [shown] through *turning* objects to present other sides and > > therefore to perceive other aspects. Polysemy through metepherein as one > > *way* of knowing as argumentation. Intersubjective not subjective. > > This is questioning the relation between > > *forming* as presentation/showing > > & > > *formed* as representation of what was previously presented. > > > > Merleau-Ponty's dynamic between sedimentation/spontaneity as expressive > > cognition. > > > > I hope I am making sense in my drawing attention to the relation between > > thoughts and shadows. > > Huw, asked if there is a question here? I would say the question is the > > models of "sense" as presentations [showings] and representations. > > Merleau-Ponty understood words AS GESTURES. > > Is there any "truth" to this notion? > > Larry > > > > > > On Wed, Aug 21, 2013 at 11:24 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > > > > I was just looking into this business about Vygotsky imputing excessive > > > stablility to word meaning. The following key passage from Chapter 7 of > > > "Thinking and Speech" does not, it appers to me, to imply such > stability: > > > > > > "First, in inner speech, we find a predominance of the word?s sense > > > over its meaning. Paulhan significantly advanced the psychological > > > analysis of speech by introducing the distinction between a word?s > > > sense and meaning. A word?s sense is the aggregate of all the > > > psychological facts that arise in our consciousness as a result of > > > the word. Sense is a dynamic, fluid, and complex formation which has > > > several zones that vary in their stability. Meaning is only one of > > > these zones of the sense that the word acquires in the context of > > > speech. It is the most stable, unified, and precise of these zones. > > > In different contexts, a word?s sense changes. In contrast, meaning > > > is a comparatively fixed and stable point, one that remains constant > > > with all the changes of the word?s sense that are associated with > > > its use in various contexts. Change in the word?s sense is a basic > > > factor in the semantic analysis of speech. The actual meaning of the > > > word is inconstant. In one operation, the word emerges with one > > > meaning; in another, another is acquired. The dynamic nature of > > > meaning leads us to Paulhan?s problem, to the problem of the > > > relationship between meaning and sense. Isolated in the lexicon, the > > > word has only one meaning. However, this meaning is nothing more > > > than a potential that can only be realized in living speech, and in > > > living speech meaning is only a cornerstone in the edifice of > sense." > > > > > > As I read this, the stability of meaning is merely relative to that of > > > sense, i.e., in the context of speech, rather than "teh aggregate of > all > > > psychological facts." He is not at all denying the fact of polysemy or > > the > > > cultural and historical migration of meaning. > > > > > > Andy > > > mike cole wrote: > > > > > >> I agree, very clearly statements of the sense/meaning relation, along > > with > > >> the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I wanted to say, and > > thought, > > >> unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows." > > >> > > >> In the quote here, I think LSV is somewhat overstating the stability > of > > >> meaning across contexts; yes relative to the microgenetic processes of > > >> sense making capturable with > > >> modern technologies, but not totally "context independent." Even > > >> dictionary > > >> meanings change, as LSV was well aware from his interest in the > history > > of > > >> words in relation to their appearance in children's vocabularies in > > >> ontogeny. > > >> > > >> Keeping the simultaneous relevance of several time scales in mind in > > these > > >> discussions seems really important, as hard as it is to do. > > >> mike > > >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > Peace, > Sungwoo Kim > Learner, Teacher, Researcher, Blogger > Photos: *https://there.jux.com/* > Personal: http://www.sungwookim.com > From huw.softdesigns@gmail.com Sat Aug 24 07:33:53 2013 From: huw.softdesigns@gmail.com (Huw Lloyd) Date: Sat, 24 Aug 2013 15:33:53 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: Systems views [leontievactivity] In-Reply-To: <9137186B-7282-4701-84A1-3232D3087E48@actionresearch.net> References: <9137186B-7282-4701-84A1-3232D3087E48@actionresearch.net> Message-ID: On 21 August 2013 11:52, Jack Whitehead wrote: > Dear Christine (and all), I was pleased to see your mention of Vasilyuk's > work: > > On 21 Aug 2013, at 12:35, Christine Schweighart wrote: > > > Vasilyuk's work suggests an aesthetic work in that ( earlier in the > > Leontiev thread Andy situates it). > > I'm wondering if anyone knows of clarifications of the conceptual links > between energy and value: > ?The Energy Paradigm > > Mobilisation of functional systems: the mobilisation required to construe value and the means of their mobilisation. Huw > Conceptions involving energy are very current in psychology, but they > have been very poorly worked out from the methodological standpoint. It is > not clear to what extent these conceptions are merely models of our > understanding and to what extent they can be given ontological status. > Equally problematic are the conceptual links between energy and motivation, > energy and meaning, energy and value, although it is obvious that in fact > there are certain links: we know how ?energetically? a person can act when > positively motivated, we know that the meaningfuness of a project lends > additional strength to the people engaged in it, but we have very little > idea of how to link up into one whole the physiological theory of > activation, the psychology of motivation, and the ideas of energy which > have been elaborated mainly in the field of physics. (pp. 63-64) > > Vasilyuk, F. (1991) The Psychology of Experiencing: the Resolution of > Life?s Critical Situations. Hemel Hempstead; Harvester Wheatsheaf. > > Love Jack. > ----------------------------------------------------------------- > When Martin Dobson, a colleague, died in 2002 the last thing he said to me > was 'Give my Love to the Department'. In the 20 years I'd worked with > Martin it was his loving warmth of humanity that I recall with great life > affirming pleasure and I'm hoping that in Love Jack we can share this > value of common humanity. > > Jack Whitehead , Adjunct Professor, Liverpool Hope University, UK. > > Visiting Professor at the University of Cumbria > > Life-time member of OMNIBUS (All Bath University Staff). > > Secretary of Bath and West Co-operative Party. > > web-site http://www.actionresearch.net with email address. > > > > From lchcmike@gmail.com Sat Aug 24 08:56:54 2013 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Sat, 24 Aug 2013 08:56:54 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Voting in Progress. Message-ID: People are active voting for an MCA article for discusssion for the second special issue on emotions. Take a moment to check out the options and choose something you would like to discuss. mike http://lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/Journal/poll.html From smago@uga.edu Sat Aug 24 10:50:28 2013 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Sat, 24 Aug 2013 17:50:28 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] JoLLE 2014 Spring Conference Call for Proposals Message-ID: Please see the attached pdf file for a call for proposals for the 2nd annual Spring Conference hosted by the Journal of Language and Literacy Education. Thx,p Peter Smagorinsky Distinguished Research Professor of English Education Department of Language and Literacy Education The University of Georgia 315 Aderhold Hall Athens, GA 30602 [Description: http://jolle.coe.uga.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/JoLLE_logo_MECHlores1.jpg] Advisor, Journal of Language and Literacy Education Follow JoLLE on twitter @Jolle_uga -------------- next part -------------- -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: image001.jpg Type: image/jpeg Size: 605134 bytes Desc: image001.jpg Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20130824/493f7c6a/attachment-0001.jpg -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: jolle call for proposals (2).pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 336118 bytes Desc: jolle call for proposals (2).pdf Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20130824/493f7c6a/attachment-0001.pdf From lpscholar2@gmail.com Sun Aug 25 09:04:48 2013 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Sun, 25 Aug 2013 09:04:48 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: New translation of Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception In-Reply-To: <625D31EA-561C-4D1B-B523-95EEF9BDB617@uniandes.edu.co> References: <9D4B2287-66DC-4E06-858A-CD578E43D7EF@gmail.com> <9AF3C2A4-7F25-470B-A126-C349E6391F3B@ucsd.edu> <1375C18A-4051-4C6E-A779-E10BAA9CBA01@uniandes.edu.co> <54248F6464A3874BB28FFF75F616AED69EF15779@CIO-KRC-D1MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <521367FC.8090606@mira.net> <54248F6464A3874BB28FFF75F616AED69EF157B1@CIO-KRC-D1MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <625D31EA-561C-4D1B-B523-95EEF9BDB617@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: I wanted to send an article that explores *dialogical interstitial spaces* as a way of learning thinking. It gives concrete examples and brings in Merleau-Ponty and Bahktin. Greg, I also believe it is a different understanding of *agency* that your question calls us to consider. Is there *agency* existing WITHIN *dialogical interstitial spaces*? Larry On Tue, Aug 20, 2013 at 7:16 AM, Martin John Packer wrote: > > > First published in 1945, Maurice Merleau-Ponty?s monumental Ph?nom?nologie > de la perception signalled the arrival of a major new philosophical and > intellectual voice in post-war Europe. Breaking with the prevailing picture > of existentialism and phenomenology at the time, it has become one of the > landmark works of twentieth-century thought. This new translation, the > first for over fifty years, makes this classic work of philosophy available > to a new generation of readers. > > Phenomenology of Perception stands in the great phenomenological tradition > of Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre. Yet Merleau-Ponty?s contribution is > decisive, as he brings this tradition and other philosophical predecessors, > particularly Descartes and Kant, to confront a neglected dimension of our > experience: the lived body and the phenomenal world. Charting a bold course > between the reductionism of science on the one hand and "intellectualism" > on the other, Merleau-Ponty argues that we should regard the body not as a > mere biological or physical unit, but as the body which structures one?s > situation and experience within the world. > > Merleau-Ponty enriches his classic work with engaging studies of famous > cases in the history of psychology and neurology as well as phenomena that > continue to draw our attention, such as phantom limb syndrome, > synaesthesia, and hallucination. This new translation includes many helpful > features such as the reintroduction of Merleau-Ponty?s discursive Table of > Contents as subtitles into the body of the text, a comprehensive > Translator?s Introduction to its main themes, essential notes explaining > key terms of translation, an extensive Index, and an important updating of > Merleau-Ponty?s references to now available English translations. > > Also included is a new foreword by Taylor Carman and an introduction to > Merleau-Ponty by Claude Lefort. > > Translated by Donald A. Landes. > > ==== > "It is impossible to define an object in cutting it off from the subject > through which and for which it is an object; and the subject reveals itself > only through the objects in which it is engaged. Such an affirmation only > makes the content of naive experience explicit, but it is rich in > consequences. Only in taking it as a basis will one succeed in building an > ethics to which man can totally and sincerely adhere. It is therefore of > extreme importance to establish it solidly and to give back to man this > childish audacity that years of verbal submission have taken away: the > audacity to say: "I am here." This is why The Phenomenology of Perception > by Maurice Merleau-Ponty is not only a remarkable specialist work but a > book that is of interest to the whole of man and to every man; the human > condition is at stake in this book." - Simone de Beauvoir, 1945 > > ==== > Foreword, Taylor Carman > Introduction, Claude Lefort > Preface > Introduction: Classical Prejudices and the Return to Phenomena > I. Sensation > II. Association and the Projection of Memories > III. Attention and Judgment > IV. The Phenomenal Field > Part 1: The Body > 1. The Body as an Object and Mechanistic Physiology > 2. The Experience of the Body and Classical Psychology > 3. The Spatiality of the One?s Own Body and Motility > 4. The Synthesis of One?s Own Body > 5. The Body as a Sexed Being > 6. Speech and the Body as Expression > Part 2: The Perceived World > 7. Sensing > 8. Space > 9. The Thing and the Natural World > 10. Others and the Human World > Part 3: Being-For-Itself and Being-In-The-World > 11. The Cogito > 12. Temporality > 13. Freedom > Original Bibliography > Bibliography of English Translations cited > Additional Work Cited > Index > > Maurice Merleau-Ponty was born in 1908 in Rochefort-sur-Mer, France. Drawn > to philosophy from a young age, Merleau-Ponty would go on to study > alongside Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, and Simone Weil at the > famous ?cole Normale Sup?rieure. He completed a Docteur ?s lettres based on > two dissertations, La structure du comportement (1942) andPh?nom?nologie de > la perception (1945). After a brief post at the University of Lyon, > Merleau-Ponty returned to Paris in 1949 when he was awarded the Chair of > Psychology and Pedagogy at the Sorbonne. In 1952 he became the youngest > philosopher ever appointed to the prestigious Chair of Philosophy at the > Coll?ge de France. He died suddenly of a stroke in 1961 aged fifty-three, > at the height of his career. He is buried in P?re Lachaise Cemetery in > Paris. > > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: August 24 2013 WEGERIF Dialogical within interstial spaces.pdf Type: application/pdf Size: 317452 bytes Desc: not available Url : https://mailman.ucsd.edu/mailman/private/xmca-l/attachments/20130825/48d46058/attachment.pdf From lchcmike@gmail.com Sun Aug 25 12:34:12 2013 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Sun, 25 Aug 2013 12:34:12 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: New translation of Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception In-Reply-To: References: <9D4B2287-66DC-4E06-858A-CD578E43D7EF@gmail.com> <9AF3C2A4-7F25-470B-A126-C349E6391F3B@ucsd.edu> <1375C18A-4051-4C6E-A779-E10BAA9CBA01@uniandes.edu.co> <54248F6464A3874BB28FFF75F616AED69EF15779@CIO-KRC-D1MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <521367FC.8090606@mira.net> <54248F6464A3874BB28FFF75F616AED69EF157B1@CIO-KRC-D1MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <625D31EA-561C-4D1B-B523-95EEF9BDB617@uniandes.edu.co> Message-ID: The new M-P is 5% cheaper with free delivery in the us on Amazon. mike On Sun, Aug 25, 2013 at 9:04 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > I wanted to send an article that explores *dialogical interstitial spaces* > as a way of learning thinking. > It gives concrete examples and brings in Merleau-Ponty and Bahktin. > Greg, I also believe it is a different understanding of *agency* that your > question calls us to consider. > Is there *agency* existing WITHIN *dialogical interstitial spaces*? > > Larry > > > On Tue, Aug 20, 2013 at 7:16 AM, Martin John Packer < > mpacker@uniandes.edu.co > > wrote: > > > > > > > First published in 1945, Maurice Merleau-Ponty?s monumental > Ph?nom?nologie > > de la perception signalled the arrival of a major new philosophical and > > intellectual voice in post-war Europe. Breaking with the prevailing > picture > > of existentialism and phenomenology at the time, it has become one of the > > landmark works of twentieth-century thought. This new translation, the > > first for over fifty years, makes this classic work of philosophy > available > > to a new generation of readers. > > > > Phenomenology of Perception stands in the great phenomenological > tradition > > of Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre. Yet Merleau-Ponty?s contribution is > > decisive, as he brings this tradition and other philosophical > predecessors, > > particularly Descartes and Kant, to confront a neglected dimension of our > > experience: the lived body and the phenomenal world. Charting a bold > course > > between the reductionism of science on the one hand and "intellectualism" > > on the other, Merleau-Ponty argues that we should regard the body not as > a > > mere biological or physical unit, but as the body which structures one?s > > situation and experience within the world. > > > > Merleau-Ponty enriches his classic work with engaging studies of famous > > cases in the history of psychology and neurology as well as phenomena > that > > continue to draw our attention, such as phantom limb syndrome, > > synaesthesia, and hallucination. This new translation includes many > helpful > > features such as the reintroduction of Merleau-Ponty?s discursive Table > of > > Contents as subtitles into the body of the text, a comprehensive > > Translator?s Introduction to its main themes, essential notes explaining > > key terms of translation, an extensive Index, and an important updating > of > > Merleau-Ponty?s references to now available English translations. > > > > Also included is a new foreword by Taylor Carman and an introduction to > > Merleau-Ponty by Claude Lefort. > > > > Translated by Donald A. Landes. > > > > ==== > > "It is impossible to define an object in cutting it off from the subject > > through which and for which it is an object; and the subject reveals > itself > > only through the objects in which it is engaged. Such an affirmation only > > makes the content of naive experience explicit, but it is rich in > > consequences. Only in taking it as a basis will one succeed in building > an > > ethics to which man can totally and sincerely adhere. It is therefore of > > extreme importance to establish it solidly and to give back to man this > > childish audacity that years of verbal submission have taken away: the > > audacity to say: "I am here." This is why The Phenomenology of Perception > > by Maurice Merleau-Ponty is not only a remarkable specialist work but a > > book that is of interest to the whole of man and to every man; the human > > condition is at stake in this book." - Simone de Beauvoir, 1945 > > > > ==== > > Foreword, Taylor Carman > > Introduction, Claude Lefort > > Preface > > Introduction: Classical Prejudices and the Return to Phenomena > > I. Sensation > > II. Association and the Projection of Memories > > III. Attention and Judgment > > IV. The Phenomenal Field > > Part 1: The Body > > 1. The Body as an Object and Mechanistic Physiology > > 2. The Experience of the Body and Classical Psychology > > 3. The Spatiality of the One?s Own Body and Motility > > 4. The Synthesis of One?s Own Body > > 5. The Body as a Sexed Being > > 6. Speech and the Body as Expression > > Part 2: The Perceived World > > 7. Sensing > > 8. Space > > 9. The Thing and the Natural World > > 10. Others and the Human World > > Part 3: Being-For-Itself and Being-In-The-World > > 11. The Cogito > > 12. Temporality > > 13. Freedom > > Original Bibliography > > Bibliography of English Translations cited > > Additional Work Cited > > Index > > > > Maurice Merleau-Ponty was born in 1908 in Rochefort-sur-Mer, France. > Drawn > > to philosophy from a young age, Merleau-Ponty would go on to study > > alongside Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, and Simone Weil at the > > famous ?cole Normale Sup?rieure. He completed a Docteur ?s lettres based > on > > two dissertations, La structure du comportement (1942) andPh?nom?nologie > de > > la perception (1945). After a brief post at the University of Lyon, > > Merleau-Ponty returned to Paris in 1949 when he was awarded the Chair of > > Psychology and Pedagogy at the Sorbonne. In 1952 he became the youngest > > philosopher ever appointed to the prestigious Chair of Philosophy at the > > Coll?ge de France. He died suddenly of a stroke in 1961 aged fifty-three, > > at the height of his career. He is buried in P?re Lachaise Cemetery in > > Paris. > > > > > From lchcmike@gmail.com Sun Aug 25 14:54:31 2013 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Sun, 25 Aug 2013 14:54:31 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] =?windows-1252?q?Fwd=3A_NYTimes=2Ecom=3A_Amanda_Ripley=92s_=91Sm?= =?windows-1252?q?artest_Kids_in_the_World=92?= In-Reply-To: <521a68fd.6a48420a.4714.470eSMTPIN_ADDED_MISSING@mx.google.com> References: <521a68fd.6a48420a.4714.470eSMTPIN_ADDED_MISSING@mx.google.com> Message-ID: XMCA topic of discussion makes the NY Times Book Review!! Look how influential you all are!! :-) mike > Amanda Ripley?s ?Smartest Kids in the World? > By > ANNIE MURPHY PAUL > > Amanda Ripley follows three Americans abroad to examine how and why other > nations educate their students so much more effectively than we do. > Or, copy and paste this URL into your browser: http://nyti.ms/19MAXZ3 > To > ensure delivery to your inbox, please add nytdirect@nytimes.com to your > address book. Advertisement > > Copyright 2013 > | The New York Times Company > | NYTimes.com 620 Eighth Avenue New York, NY 10018 > > > From member@linkedin.com Mon Aug 26 01:19:11 2013 From: member@linkedin.com (luisa aires via LinkedIn) Date: Mon, 26 Aug 2013 08:19:11 +0000 (UTC) Subject: [Xmca-l] Irasema, please add me to your LinkedIn network Message-ID: <1965517704.26325358.1377505151382.JavaMail.app@ela4-bed81.prod> LinkedIn ------------ luisa aires requested to add you as a connection on LinkedIn: ------------------------------------------ I'd like to add you to my professional network on LinkedIn. Accept invitation from luisa aires http://www.linkedin.com/e/b9j7b5-hktf018e-5u/d2n7Nwz_vopval4FO27dxWuc_J0U51L/blk/I795468751_25/3wOtCVFbmdxnSVFbm8JrnpKqlZJrmZzbmNJpjRQnOpBtn9QfmhBt71BoSd1p65Lr6lOfPkOnP4RdPwSd3kVdQALq3hvdRpJk4gLd3oUdPoVczoRdj4LrCBxbOYWrSlI/eml-comm_invm-b-in_ac-inv28/?hs=false&tok=03bw8Y-yhjklU1 View profile of luisa aires http://www.linkedin.com/e/b9j7b5-hktf018e-5u/rso/199857437/QcUX/name/26551329_I795468751_25/?hs=false&tok=3rJgbM8YdjklU1 ------------------------------------------ You are receiving Invitation emails. This email was intended for Irasema Ortega. Learn why this is included: http://www.linkedin.com/e/b9j7b5-hktf018e-5u/plh/http%3A%2F%2Fhelp%2Elinkedin%2Ecom%2Fapp%2Fanswers%2Fdetail%2Fa_id%2F4788/-GXI/?hs=false&tok=0AtXpQbLtjklU1 (c) 2012, LinkedIn Corporation. 2029 Stierlin Ct, Mountain View, CA 94043, USA. From smago@uga.edu Mon Aug 26 02:22:41 2013 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Mon, 26 Aug 2013 09:22:41 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] FW: are-free-digital-textbooks-future-uga-students In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Possibly of interest to those interested in what college will look like down the road: http://onlineathens.com/uga/2013-08-25/are-free-digital-textbooks-future-uga-students From laires11@gmail.com Mon Aug 26 03:18:31 2013 From: laires11@gmail.com (Luisa Aires) Date: Mon, 26 Aug 2013 11:18:31 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [commfac] Re: FW: femtechnet: DOCC 2013: top listed story on Inside Higher Ed In-Reply-To: References: <9D4B2287-66DC-4E06-858A-CD578E43D7EF@gmail.com> <9AF3C2A4-7F25-470B-A126-C349E6391F3B@ucsd.edu> <1375C18A-4051-4C6E-A779-E10BAA9CBA01@uniandes.edu.co> <54248F6464A3874BB28FFF75F616AED69EF15779@CIO-KRC-D1MBX01.osuad.osu.edu> <521367FC.8090606@mira.net> Message-ID: Dear All I apologize for the late participation, but I would like to comment Michael's perspective about CHAT Education. I think that Michael's perspective about open *contents* and open *resources* is a fruitful option for CHAT. We can create a wide diversity of learning environments that may be used in different contexts and methodologies and mediated by different local groups. This may be a very interesting option of open educational resources;-) In what concerns the issue ?MOOCs?, the discussion ?still goes in the churchyard?. An interesting way to approach this issue, may be to deconstruct the inherent intentions of this movement, as we are doing in XMCA now. Best wishes, Lu?sa Aires On 20 August 2013 19:53, mike cole wrote: > Precisely the right question, Andy. > mike > > > On Tue, Aug 20, 2013 at 5:58 AM, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > What, in your opinion then, Michael, is the best thing a group or > > university teachers, with technical support and access to a website, but > no > > appreciable amount of money, could do to offer education in CHAT free to > > the world? > > > > Andy > > > > > > Glassman, Michael wrote: > > > >> I think one of the things we really need to do is change the vocabulary > >> and the way we talk about different initiatives in Internet infused > >> education. Massive Open Online Courses is a marketing scheme not a > point > >> of debate about education. MOOC sounds kind of cute but it is so broad > as > >> to be completely meaningless, and the appropriation of it is an attempt > of > >> those with the largest megaphone and smallest intellectual memories to > take > >> control of the conversation (same thing that happened with the phrase > >> educational reform I think). Ironically when the phrase was first > >> introduced it mean something completely different from what we > >> automatically think it means now. It was introduced to describe a > >> twenty-five person online course with high levels of connectivity by > George > >> Siemans at the University of Manitoba. It was appropriated by venture > >> capital companies like Udacity and EdX I would surmise because it is > kind > >> of a cute way of describing things like Teletubbies. The trou > >> ble is then we are constantly arguing against the way MOOCs are which > >> creates an uncomfortable bifurcation - is the Internet good for > education > >> or bad for education. > >> > >> I think we would be much better off it we used the United Nations terms > >> which are much more descriptive - Open Educational Content and Open > >> Educational Resources. Open Educational Content sort of describes > Udacity > >> while Open Educational Resources describes better Balsamo's project. > This > >> gives us the opportunity to say which is better for educational > purposes. > >> We can ask the question, "Why do you think Open Content" is enough for > an > >> educational experience? Does OEC limit students more than OER? > Basically > >> what those proposing OEC are doing is throwing out centuries of not only > >> discussions of education but pretty much every argument since Des > Cartes. > >> They should be called on this publicly and made to answer for it. > >> > >> Michael > >> ______________________________**__________ > >> From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.**edu < > xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu>[ > >> xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.**edu ] on > >> behalf of mike cole [lchcmike@gmail.com] > >> Sent: Monday, August 19, 2013 7:44 PM > >> To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > >> Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: [commfac] Re: FW: femtechnet: DOCC 2013: top > listed > >> story on Inside Higher Ed > >> > >> It is unthinkable from the perspective of any world view that values > >> diversity. > >> XMCA values diversity. > >> Ergo....... or is that er.... go?? > >> mike > >> > >> > >> On Mon, Aug 19, 2013 at 4:33 PM, Martin John Packer < > >> mpacker@uniandes.edu.co > >> > >> > >>> wrote: > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> > >>> I especially like the concluding paragraphs: > >>> > >>> Among the forms of MOOC hype that Balsamo said she hoped the DOCC would > >>> combat is the idea that massive online courses allow some "best" > >>> professor > >>> to interact with students everywhere, so that all can learn from the > >>> superstar. It's not that there aren't very talented professors out > there, > >>> she said, but the superstar emphasis is wrong ("Is there really a > >>> 'best'?" > >>> she asks) and doesn't encourage group learning. > >>> > >>> Said Balsamo: "The idea of the one best talking head, the best expert > in > >>> the world, that couldn't be more patriarchal. That displays a hubris > that > >>> is unthinkable from a feminist perspective." > >>> > >>> > >>> Read more: > >>> http://www.insidehighered.com/**news/2013/08/19/feminist-** > >>> professors-create-alternative-**moocs#ixzz2cSdlb7pt< > http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/08/19/feminist-professors-create-alternative-moocs#ixzz2cSdlb7pt > > > >>> Inside Higher Ed > >>> > >>> > >>> On Aug 19, 2013, at 6:24 PM, mike cole wrote: > >>> > >>> > >>> > >>>> Dear Xmcaers- > >>>> > >>>> The following link to femnet mooc seems to me to offer a very > >>>> interesting > >>>> model for members of xmca to think of following. We here at UCSD have > >>>> > >>>> > >>> been > >>> > >>> > >>>> thinking along > >>>> such lines, but this is a developed model that might actually provide > >>>> > >>>> > >>> some > >>> > >>> > >>>> kind of > >>>> strategic guide to action. I can imagine any number of stimulating > such > >>>> efforts various > >>>> congeries of xmca could cook up. > >>>> mike > >>>> > >>>> Forwarded from Lisa Cartwright at ucsd. > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> Hi everyone, the DOCC 2013 MOOC alternative course discussed today > >>>>> today > >>>>> in Inside Higher Ed had one of its pilots taught in our department > last > >>>>> spring by Liz Losh and me with Monika Sengul Jones, Cristina > Visperas, > >>>>> Lousie Hickman, Erika Cheng, Yelena Guzman and others leading the > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> effort to > >>> > >>> > >>>> produce innovative course design and materials and hosting a > conference > >>>>> dedicated to it--big shout-out to these graduate students for making > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> this > >>> > >>> > >>>> launch happen. We are one of the 17 colleges offering the class to > >>>>> undergrads in this coming year. I thought some of you you might enjoy > >>>>> reading this alternative effort given the pervasive of MOOC > discussions > >>>>> right now. Best to everyone, Lisa > >>>>> > >>>>> I suggest you take a look. > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> mike > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>> > >>>>> ------------------------------ > >>>>> > >>>>> http://www.insidehighered.com/ > >>>>> > >>>>> ______________________________**_________________ > >>>>> femtechnet mailing list > >>>>> femtechnet@lists.uoregon.edu > >>>>> https://lists-prod.uoregon.**edu/mailman/listinfo/**femtechnet< > https://lists-prod.uoregon.edu/mailman/listinfo/femtechnet> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>> > >>> > >>> > >>> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > > -- > > ------------------------------**------------------------------** > > ------------ > > *Andy Blunden* > > Home Page: http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > > Book: http://www.brill.nl/concepts > > http://marxists.academia.edu/**AndyBlunden< > http://marxists.academia.edu/AndyBlunden> > > > > > > > > > -- Lu?sa Aires Universidade Aberta, Porto R.Amial, n? 752 4200-055 Porto laires@uab.pt From lpscholar2@gmail.com Tue Aug 27 17:00:52 2013 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2013 17:00:52 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: meaning and sense In-Reply-To: References: <19E63C50-A0D2-4A0F-BBA7-63853414FDAA@gmail.com> <4195A368-C7B9-4AB0-AAA5-A244135DC331@gmail.com> <520ADCDD.9000406@mira.net> <520C3970.6000803@mira.net> <5215AEBB.3070001@mira.net> Message-ID: Sungwoo, I would like to recommend a book that gives a good summary of the history of understanding of metaphor that puts your question in a larger context. The book is "Communicative Praxis and the Space of Subjectivity" by Calvin O Schrag. Chapter One is "Figures of Discourse" [pages 17 to 31]. Schrag is critiquing the subjectivism and emotivist BIAS which has dominated views on metaphor, and explores an understanding of metaphor as central to ways of knowing and communicating. Here is a sample of his approach in his commentary on Mary Hesse's book "Models and Analogies in Science": Schrag comments, "Although Hess has succeeded in freeing metaphor from its bondage to the noncognitive, emotive, and merely decorative, the liberation of metaphor AS an autonomous form of disclosure and communication has not been fully attained in her thought. Metaphor remains a supplement to the reductive MODEL of scientific explanation, achieving reference only through a circuitous linkage with the explanandum of the primary SYSTEM." My emphasis to focus on how metaphor, model, system are concepts that participate within communicative praxis. This chapter, "Figures AS Discourse" gives many further references and leads to follow if you are fascinated with the transformative power of metaphor. Larry On Fri, Aug 23, 2013 at 5:12 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > Sungwoo, > Thanks for participating in this online chat. I am aware of this approach > that says metaphors are central to our ways of thinking. I will read the > article you sent. My curiosity is in the question of words *carrying* > thought [which would imply thought comes first and is then put into the > chosen word that *represents* the thought [as primary], or if the word IS > thought. If metaphor is thought [not a way to bring our thoughts out into > the shared world] then metaphors of thought AS *PICTURES* [frames] in > contrast to metaphors of thought AS *VOICE* actually means we are > participating in different KINDS of thinking [conversations externally or > internally] > Sungwoo, I am in over my head but am curious about your question. This > site is the place to be if you want to go deeper into this question. > Vygotsky's exploration of the distinction between meaning and sense leads > right into the heart of your question. > I will read your article attached as I am fascinated with the place of > metaphor in our modes of thinking. > I do believe the notion that the concept *metaphor* is itself a metaphor > DERIVED from the practice of *metapherein* [the verb *to transfer*] which > originally described a CONCRETE activity > This insight may be relevant. > The book "Rhetoric as Philosophy" by Ernesto Grassi [1980] which explores > Vico and his response to the *new science* may be a lead to follow. Shotter > in his book refer's to Grassi's understanding of metaphor. > Others on this site have explored the relation of metaphor and thinking. > Larry > > > On Fri, Aug 23, 2013 at 11:44 AM, Sungwoo Kim wrote: > >> Dear Larry Purss >> >> This is my first time to use this mailing list. I hope this message will >> reach you somehow. >> >> I cannot directly address your questions due to my limited knowledge in >> phenomenology, but recent work in cognitive linguistics, especially in the >> field of conceptual metaphor theory can shed some light on them. >> >> The traditional view on metaphor has regarded it as an ornamental device >> in >> rhetorical process. Thus it does not have direct impact upon our thinking >> process.However, a large body of work in cognitive linguistics since >> Lakoff >> and Johnson's seminal work *Metaphors We Live By *(1980) is showing that >> metaphor is not merely rhetorical device, but a set of thinking patterns, >> some of which are universal and some culture-specific. This means that >> using new metaphors can shape and direct our thinking processes. To put it >> another way, new metaphors can lead to new ways of thinking. For >> example, Thibodeau and Boroditsky show that different kinds of metaphor >> can >> have substantial impact on our reasoning. Here's part of the abstract. >> >> "The way we talk about complex and abstract ideas is suffused with >> metaphor. In five experiments, we explore how these metaphors influence >> the >> way that we reason about complex issues and forage for further information >> about them. We find that even the subtlest instantiation of a metaphor >> (via >> a single word) can have a powerful influence over how people attempt to >> solve social problems like crime and how they gather information to make >> 'well-informed decisions." >> >> http://www-psych.stanford.edu/~lera/papers/crime-metaphors.pdf >> >> This principle of "metaphor-as-tihnking-pattern" has been adopted by many >> practitioners as well as researchers. Now it is applied in many fields >> including counseling, consulting, web and application design, political >> strategy planning, marketing, and so on. (Of course there are some >> cautious >> voices about the power of metaphor, too. e.g. >> http://www.economist.com/blogs/johnson/2013/01/political-language) >> >> Sungwoo >> >> >> On Thu, Aug 22, 2013 at 11:12 PM, Larry Purss >> wrote: >> >> > Andy, >> > >> > Thanks for keepin >> > Thanks for keeping this topic of sense and meaning alive. >> > Mike also is drawing our attention to the mystery of the creative >> process >> > with this comment: "I agree, very clearly statements of the >> sense/meaning >> > relation, along with the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I >> wanted >> > to say, and thought, unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows." >> > Thought, unembodied, returns to the hall of shadows. >> > I have been reflecting on the phenomenological method or *bias* to >> > prioritize *showing* as an action which brings thoughts from the >> shadows. >> > The concept or term "metaphor" which can itself be considered a >> metaphor. >> > Metaphor is derived from the verb *metapherein" which means "to >> transfer" >> > which originally described a CONCRETE reality [Ernesto Grassi]. >> > Therefore *presenting* a new metaphor IS an argument or a reason [a >> showing >> > in phenomenological discourse] >> > The question is if presenting [as a showing or gesture] a metaphor is >> > presenting a *vehicle* or an "egg" which "carries" thoughts from >> speaker to >> > hearer [which suggests the word is then decoded and RE-presented in the >> > listener's "mind" >> > Or, on the other hand, is presenting a metaphor actually metapherein [a >> > verb] which "transfers" [shifts, turns] knowing in a phenomenological >> "aha" >> > moment? Metaphor AS showing or presenting [FORMING sense], not metaphor >> as >> > a *carrier* of thought which *represents* the sense of the speaker. >> > I am "over my head" in these realms and my "logic" may be faulty, but >> the >> > power of metaphor as "hinge" or "pivot" seems central. >> > Peter Jones made a comment on literacy and "representation" >> > Ernesto Grassi is making the point that presenting [showing] a new >> metaphor >> > IS an argument producing a type of knowledge [sense] >> > Can metapherein be *seen* [picture language] as new and novel ways of >> > acting as transfering *sense* to *pictures* as a *psychological >> instrument* >> > and thus as a cultural resource? The ACT of 'transfer' as presentation >> > within metaphor [something AS something else] understood as a >> psychological >> > and cultural tool, a PRACTICAL intersubjective resource with which [and >> > THROUGH which we think, act, and perceive. >> > Sense AS perception & action mediated through felt experience which is >> > "presented" [shown] through *turning* objects to present other sides and >> > therefore to perceive other aspects. Polysemy through metepherein as one >> > *way* of knowing as argumentation. >> > This is questioning the relation between *forming* as >> presentation/showing >> > & >> > *formed* as representation of what was previously presented. >> > Merleau-Ponty's dynamic between sedimentation/spontaneityg this topic of >> > sense and meaning alive. >> > >> > Mike also is drawing our attention to the mystery of the creative >> process >> > with this comment: "I agree, very clearly statements of the >> sense/meaning >> > relation, along with the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I >> wanted >> > to say, and thought, unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows." >> > >> > Thought, unembodied, returns to the hall of shadows. >> > I have been reflecting on the phenomenological method or *bias* to >> > prioritize *showing* as an action which brings thoughts from the >> shadows. >> > >> > The concept or term "metaphor" which can itself be considered a >> metaphor. >> > Metaphor is derived from the verb *metapherein" which means "to >> transfer" >> > which originally described a CONCRETE reality [Ernesto Grassi]. >> > Therefore *presenting* a new metaphor IS an argument or a reason [a >> showing >> > in phenomenological discourse] >> > The question is if presenting [as a showing or gesture] a metaphor is >> > presenting a *vehicle* or an "egg" which "carries" thoughts from >> speaker to >> > hearer [which suggests the word is then decoded and RE-presented in the >> > listener's "mind" >> > Or, on the other hand, is presenting a metaphor actually metapherein [a >> > verb] which "transfers" [shifts, turns] knowing in a phenomenological >> "aha" >> > moment? Metaphor AS showing or presenting [FORMING sense], not metaphor >> as >> > a *carrier* of thought which *represents* the sense of the speaker. >> > I am "over my head" in these realms and my "logic" may be faulty, but >> the >> > power of metaphor as "hinge" or "pivot" seems central. >> > Peter Jones made a comment on literacy and "representation" >> > Ernesto Grassi is making the point that presenting [showing] a new >> metaphor >> > IS an argument producing a type of knowledge [sense] >> > Can metapherein be *seen* [picture language] as new and novel ways of >> > acting as transfering *sense* by showing and creating metaphors >> > as *pictures* as a *psychological instrument* and thus as a cultural >> > resource? The ACT of 'transfer' as presentation within metaphor >> [something >> > AS something else] understood as a psychological and cultural tool, a >> > PRACTICAL intersubjective resource with which [and THROUGH which] we >> think, >> > act, and perceive. >> > Greg, I wonder if this showing is always volitional [under our control] >> or >> > if we spontaneously "respond" intersubjectively? >> > >> > Sense AS perception & action mediated through felt experience which is >> > "presented" [shown] through *turning* objects to present other sides and >> > therefore to perceive other aspects. Polysemy through metepherein as one >> > *way* of knowing as argumentation. Intersubjective not subjective. >> > This is questioning the relation between >> > *forming* as presentation/showing >> > & >> > *formed* as representation of what was previously presented. >> > >> > Merleau-Ponty's dynamic between sedimentation/spontaneity as expressive >> > cognition. >> > >> > I hope I am making sense in my drawing attention to the relation between >> > thoughts and shadows. >> > Huw, asked if there is a question here? I would say the question is the >> > models of "sense" as presentations [showings] and representations. >> > Merleau-Ponty understood words AS GESTURES. >> > Is there any "truth" to this notion? >> > Larry >> > >> > >> > On Wed, Aug 21, 2013 at 11:24 PM, Andy Blunden >> wrote: >> > >> > > I was just looking into this business about Vygotsky imputing >> excessive >> > > stablility to word meaning. The following key passage from Chapter 7 >> of >> > > "Thinking and Speech" does not, it appers to me, to imply such >> stability: >> > > >> > > "First, in inner speech, we find a predominance of the word?s sense >> > > over its meaning. Paulhan significantly advanced the psychological >> > > analysis of speech by introducing the distinction between a word?s >> > > sense and meaning. A word?s sense is the aggregate of all the >> > > psychological facts that arise in our consciousness as a result of >> > > the word. Sense is a dynamic, fluid, and complex formation which >> has >> > > several zones that vary in their stability. Meaning is only one of >> > > these zones of the sense that the word acquires in the context of >> > > speech. It is the most stable, unified, and precise of these zones. >> > > In different contexts, a word?s sense changes. In contrast, meaning >> > > is a comparatively fixed and stable point, one that remains >> constant >> > > with all the changes of the word?s sense that are associated with >> > > its use in various contexts. Change in the word?s sense is a basic >> > > factor in the semantic analysis of speech. The actual meaning of >> the >> > > word is inconstant. In one operation, the word emerges with one >> > > meaning; in another, another is acquired. The dynamic nature of >> > > meaning leads us to Paulhan?s problem, to the problem of the >> > > relationship between meaning and sense. Isolated in the lexicon, >> the >> > > word has only one meaning. However, this meaning is nothing more >> > > than a potential that can only be realized in living speech, and in >> > > living speech meaning is only a cornerstone in the edifice of >> sense." >> > > >> > > As I read this, the stability of meaning is merely relative to that of >> > > sense, i.e., in the context of speech, rather than "teh aggregate of >> all >> > > psychological facts." He is not at all denying the fact of polysemy or >> > the >> > > cultural and historical migration of meaning. >> > > >> > > Andy >> > > mike cole wrote: >> > > >> > >> I agree, very clearly statements of the sense/meaning relation, along >> > with >> > >> the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I wanted to say, and >> > thought, >> > >> unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows." >> > >> >> > >> In the quote here, I think LSV is somewhat overstating the stability >> of >> > >> meaning across contexts; yes relative to the microgenetic processes >> of >> > >> sense making capturable with >> > >> modern technologies, but not totally "context independent." Even >> > >> dictionary >> > >> meanings change, as LSV was well aware from his interest in the >> history >> > of >> > >> words in relation to their appearance in children's vocabularies in >> > >> ontogeny. >> > >> >> > >> Keeping the simultaneous relevance of several time scales in mind in >> > these >> > >> discussions seems really important, as hard as it is to do. >> > >> mike >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > >> >> >> >> -- >> >> Peace, >> Sungwoo Kim >> Learner, Teacher, Researcher, Blogger >> Photos: *https://there.jux.com/* >> Personal: http://www.sungwookim.com >> > > From ablunden@mira.net Wed Aug 28 00:27:34 2013 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Wed, 28 Aug 2013 17:27:34 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] A Question about Reading and Motivation Message-ID: <521DA666.2030203@mira.net> Re: Peg Griffin - http://lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/Mail/xmcamail.2011_05.dir/msg00530.html and Peg and Mike et al: http://lchc.ucsd.edu/People/NEWTECHN.pdf The first article sets up a scenario in 5thD where kids "sneak" a look at piece of writing in order to find an answer to a current affairs question. As opposed to telling the kids to read a text and then (for example) testing them on it. The second talks about "reading for meaning" where assistance is given to kids to read in order to find out something they want to know about the world. As opposed to decoding "Jack and Jill" stories containing nothing of interest to them at all (and actually humiliating). I am trying to get my head around the issue of the motivation which the teachers are trying to engender in the child which facilitates learning to read. Following A N Leontyev, Peg talks about the "merely understood" motive for the child "to be a productive, informed, literate citizen" which is what the education system is supposed to be doing. Peg says this motive was "in the social interactions and ready to replace the 'really effective' motives that got the kid to come to/put up with our reading group." ... *in the social interactions*! Generally speaking I think there is no doubt that the distinction between "really effective" and "merely understood" motives is valid, and that in general children who have difficulty in reading, read only for "effective" but "external" motives which do not succeed in them learning to read effectively. Further, the task of the teacher may be or may be supposed to be to get the child to learn to read so as "to be a productive, informed, literate citizen." This objective is somewhere in the complex of motives underlying a teacher's motives, certainly in 5thD, but I suspect often a "merely understood" motive for many teachers, alongside earning a wage for their own family, having a quiet day and the kids getting good test scores, etc. But I question whether it is *ever* the child's motive "to be a productive, informed, literate citizen." This may be an "internal reward" for learning to read, but not for learning to read any particular text or even a particular type of text. Would this explanation make sense: Learning to read is like happiness. It does not generally arise through being the motivation of the activity which produces it. People learn to read as a byproduct of struggling to get something they want out of particular texts. And this applies to adults as much as children. I think people can only learn to read philosophy if they are struggling to get something out of a book on philosophy (other than pass the exam or acquire an air of erudition). In Peg's email message we learn that the kids jumped on the newspaper article to extract information they wanted in (what they took to be) /another/ task. In the QAR story, adults mediate kids' relation to a text which is in turn mediating their real and meaningful relation to the world. (I think if a kid is strongly enough motivated to pass a reading test, and assisted, they will usually manage to learn to read, but it is for those for whom this doesn't work that the issue arises, isn't it?) But in general I think it is neither necessary nor likely that a child has their eye on becoming a literate citizen when they struggle with a text and learn to read in the process. Isn't it always more proximate motives? The "internal" reward in reading a particular text is the particular content of that text, not actually anything to do with books, or texts, or reading or citizenship. I know there are dozens of experts in literacy education out there, so please help me. Andy -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.mira.net/~andy/ From sungwookim92@gmail.com Wed Aug 28 00:38:13 2013 From: sungwookim92@gmail.com (Sungwoo Kim) Date: Wed, 28 Aug 2013 16:38:13 +0900 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: meaning and sense In-Reply-To: References: <19E63C50-A0D2-4A0F-BBA7-63853414FDAA@gmail.com> <4195A368-C7B9-4AB0-AAA5-A244135DC331@gmail.com> <520ADCDD.9000406@mira.net> <520C3970.6000803@mira.net> <5215AEBB.3070001@mira.net> Message-ID: Larry, Thank you for this wonderful reference. I will check the volume. Actually, my dissertation was on a cognitive linguistic approach to second language development. I used conceptual metaphor as a mediational tool to encourage second language writers to reflect upon and transform their composition practices. The impact was quite impressive, at least to me. By the way, I am still pondering upon your previous mail. I am inclined to conceptualize meaning as the process based on embodied cognition rather than a kind of mental representation. So I would like to ask you whether you are referring specifically to Vygotsky's use of the term "meaning and sense" or a broader array of theoretical concepts in linguistics, including the recent development in cognitive science. -- Sungwoo On Wed, Aug 28, 2013 at 9:00 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > Sungwoo, > I would like to recommend a book that gives a good summary of the history > of understanding of metaphor that puts your question in a larger context. > The book is "Communicative Praxis and the Space of Subjectivity" by Calvin > O Schrag. > Chapter One is "Figures of Discourse" [pages 17 to 31]. > Schrag is critiquing the subjectivism and emotivist BIAS which has > dominated views on metaphor, and explores an understanding of metaphor as > central to ways of knowing and communicating. > Here is a sample of his approach in his commentary on Mary Hesse's book > "Models and Analogies in Science": > Schrag comments, > > "Although Hess has succeeded in freeing metaphor from its bondage to the > noncognitive, emotive, and merely decorative, the liberation of metaphor AS > an autonomous form of disclosure and communication has not been fully > attained in her thought. Metaphor remains a supplement to the reductive > MODEL of scientific explanation, achieving reference only through a > circuitous linkage with the explanandum of the primary SYSTEM." > My emphasis to focus on how metaphor, model, system are concepts that > participate within communicative praxis. > > This chapter, "Figures AS Discourse" gives many further references and > leads to follow if you are fascinated with the transformative power of > metaphor. > Larry > > > On Fri, Aug 23, 2013 at 5:12 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > Sungwoo, > > Thanks for participating in this online chat. I am aware of this approach > > that says metaphors are central to our ways of thinking. I will read the > > article you sent. My curiosity is in the question of words *carrying* > > thought [which would imply thought comes first and is then put into the > > chosen word that *represents* the thought [as primary], or if the word IS > > thought. If metaphor is thought [not a way to bring our thoughts out into > > the shared world] then metaphors of thought AS *PICTURES* [frames] in > > contrast to metaphors of thought AS *VOICE* actually means we are > > participating in different KINDS of thinking [conversations externally or > > internally] > > Sungwoo, I am in over my head but am curious about your question. This > > site is the place to be if you want to go deeper into this question. > > Vygotsky's exploration of the distinction between meaning and sense leads > > right into the heart of your question. > > I will read your article attached as I am fascinated with the place of > > metaphor in our modes of thinking. > > I do believe the notion that the concept *metaphor* is itself a metaphor > > DERIVED from the practice of *metapherein* [the verb *to transfer*] which > > originally described a CONCRETE activity > > This insight may be relevant. > > The book "Rhetoric as Philosophy" by Ernesto Grassi [1980] which explores > > Vico and his response to the *new science* may be a lead to follow. > Shotter > > in his book refer's to Grassi's understanding of metaphor. > > Others on this site have explored the relation of metaphor and thinking. > > Larry > > > > > > On Fri, Aug 23, 2013 at 11:44 AM, Sungwoo Kim >wrote: > > > >> Dear Larry Purss > >> > >> This is my first time to use this mailing list. I hope this message will > >> reach you somehow. > >> > >> I cannot directly address your questions due to my limited knowledge in > >> phenomenology, but recent work in cognitive linguistics, especially in > the > >> field of conceptual metaphor theory can shed some light on them. > >> > >> The traditional view on metaphor has regarded it as an ornamental device > >> in > >> rhetorical process. Thus it does not have direct impact upon our > thinking > >> process.However, a large body of work in cognitive linguistics since > >> Lakoff > >> and Johnson's seminal work *Metaphors We Live By *(1980) is showing that > >> metaphor is not merely rhetorical device, but a set of thinking > patterns, > >> some of which are universal and some culture-specific. This means that > >> using new metaphors can shape and direct our thinking processes. To put > it > >> another way, new metaphors can lead to new ways of thinking. For > >> example, Thibodeau and Boroditsky show that different kinds of metaphor > >> can > >> have substantial impact on our reasoning. Here's part of the abstract. > >> > >> "The way we talk about complex and abstract ideas is suffused with > >> metaphor. In five experiments, we explore how these metaphors influence > >> the > >> way that we reason about complex issues and forage for further > information > >> about them. We find that even the subtlest instantiation of a metaphor > >> (via > >> a single word) can have a powerful influence over how people attempt to > >> solve social problems like crime and how they gather information to make > >> 'well-informed decisions." > >> > >> http://www-psych.stanford.edu/~lera/papers/crime-metaphors.pdf > >> > >> This principle of "metaphor-as-tihnking-pattern" has been adopted by > many > >> practitioners as well as researchers. Now it is applied in many fields > >> including counseling, consulting, web and application design, political > >> strategy planning, marketing, and so on. (Of course there are some > >> cautious > >> voices about the power of metaphor, too. e.g. > >> http://www.economist.com/blogs/johnson/2013/01/political-language) > >> > >> Sungwoo > >> > >> > >> On Thu, Aug 22, 2013 at 11:12 PM, Larry Purss > >> wrote: > >> > >> > Andy, > >> > > >> > Thanks for keepin > >> > Thanks for keeping this topic of sense and meaning alive. > >> > Mike also is drawing our attention to the mystery of the creative > >> process > >> > with this comment: "I agree, very clearly statements of the > >> sense/meaning > >> > relation, along with the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I > >> wanted > >> > to say, and thought, unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows." > >> > Thought, unembodied, returns to the hall of shadows. > >> > I have been reflecting on the phenomenological method or *bias* to > >> > prioritize *showing* as an action which brings thoughts from the > >> shadows. > >> > The concept or term "metaphor" which can itself be considered a > >> metaphor. > >> > Metaphor is derived from the verb *metapherein" which means "to > >> transfer" > >> > which originally described a CONCRETE reality [Ernesto Grassi]. > >> > Therefore *presenting* a new metaphor IS an argument or a reason [a > >> showing > >> > in phenomenological discourse] > >> > The question is if presenting [as a showing or gesture] a metaphor is > >> > presenting a *vehicle* or an "egg" which "carries" thoughts from > >> speaker to > >> > hearer [which suggests the word is then decoded and RE-presented in > the > >> > listener's "mind" > >> > Or, on the other hand, is presenting a metaphor actually metapherein > [a > >> > verb] which "transfers" [shifts, turns] knowing in a phenomenological > >> "aha" > >> > moment? Metaphor AS showing or presenting [FORMING sense], not > metaphor > >> as > >> > a *carrier* of thought which *represents* the sense of the speaker. > >> > I am "over my head" in these realms and my "logic" may be faulty, but > >> the > >> > power of metaphor as "hinge" or "pivot" seems central. > >> > Peter Jones made a comment on literacy and "representation" > >> > Ernesto Grassi is making the point that presenting [showing] a new > >> metaphor > >> > IS an argument producing a type of knowledge [sense] > >> > Can metapherein be *seen* [picture language] as new and novel ways of > >> > acting as transfering *sense* to *pictures* as a *psychological > >> instrument* > >> > and thus as a cultural resource? The ACT of 'transfer' as presentation > >> > within metaphor [something AS something else] understood as a > >> psychological > >> > and cultural tool, a PRACTICAL intersubjective resource with which > [and > >> > THROUGH which we think, act, and perceive. > >> > Sense AS perception & action mediated through felt experience which is > >> > "presented" [shown] through *turning* objects to present other sides > and > >> > therefore to perceive other aspects. Polysemy through metepherein as > one > >> > *way* of knowing as argumentation. > >> > This is questioning the relation between *forming* as > >> presentation/showing > >> > & > >> > *formed* as representation of what was previously presented. > >> > Merleau-Ponty's dynamic between sedimentation/spontaneityg this topic > of > >> > sense and meaning alive. > >> > > >> > Mike also is drawing our attention to the mystery of the creative > >> process > >> > with this comment: "I agree, very clearly statements of the > >> sense/meaning > >> > relation, along with the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I > >> wanted > >> > to say, and thought, unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows." > >> > > >> > Thought, unembodied, returns to the hall of shadows. > >> > I have been reflecting on the phenomenological method or *bias* to > >> > prioritize *showing* as an action which brings thoughts from the > >> shadows. > >> > > >> > The concept or term "metaphor" which can itself be considered a > >> metaphor. > >> > Metaphor is derived from the verb *metapherein" which means "to > >> transfer" > >> > which originally described a CONCRETE reality [Ernesto Grassi]. > >> > Therefore *presenting* a new metaphor IS an argument or a reason [a > >> showing > >> > in phenomenological discourse] > >> > The question is if presenting [as a showing or gesture] a metaphor is > >> > presenting a *vehicle* or an "egg" which "carries" thoughts from > >> speaker to > >> > hearer [which suggests the word is then decoded and RE-presented in > the > >> > listener's "mind" > >> > Or, on the other hand, is presenting a metaphor actually metapherein > [a > >> > verb] which "transfers" [shifts, turns] knowing in a phenomenological > >> "aha" > >> > moment? Metaphor AS showing or presenting [FORMING sense], not > metaphor > >> as > >> > a *carrier* of thought which *represents* the sense of the speaker. > >> > I am "over my head" in these realms and my "logic" may be faulty, but > >> the > >> > power of metaphor as "hinge" or "pivot" seems central. > >> > Peter Jones made a comment on literacy and "representation" > >> > Ernesto Grassi is making the point that presenting [showing] a new > >> metaphor > >> > IS an argument producing a type of knowledge [sense] > >> > Can metapherein be *seen* [picture language] as new and novel ways of > >> > acting as transfering *sense* by showing and creating metaphors > >> > as *pictures* as a *psychological instrument* and thus as a cultural > >> > resource? The ACT of 'transfer' as presentation within metaphor > >> [something > >> > AS something else] understood as a psychological and cultural tool, a > >> > PRACTICAL intersubjective resource with which [and THROUGH which] we > >> think, > >> > act, and perceive. > >> > Greg, I wonder if this showing is always volitional [under our > control] > >> or > >> > if we spontaneously "respond" intersubjectively? > >> > > >> > Sense AS perception & action mediated through felt experience which > is > >> > "presented" [shown] through *turning* objects to present other sides > and > >> > therefore to perceive other aspects. Polysemy through metepherein as > one > >> > *way* of knowing as argumentation. Intersubjective not subjective. > >> > This is questioning the relation between > >> > *forming* as presentation/showing > >> > & > >> > *formed* as representation of what was previously presented. > >> > > >> > Merleau-Ponty's dynamic between sedimentation/spontaneity as > expressive > >> > cognition. > >> > > >> > I hope I am making sense in my drawing attention to the relation > between > >> > thoughts and shadows. > >> > Huw, asked if there is a question here? I would say the question is > the > >> > models of "sense" as presentations [showings] and representations. > >> > Merleau-Ponty understood words AS GESTURES. > >> > Is there any "truth" to this notion? > >> > Larry > >> > > >> > > >> > On Wed, Aug 21, 2013 at 11:24 PM, Andy Blunden > >> wrote: > >> > > >> > > I was just looking into this business about Vygotsky imputing > >> excessive > >> > > stablility to word meaning. The following key passage from Chapter 7 > >> of > >> > > "Thinking and Speech" does not, it appers to me, to imply such > >> stability: > >> > > > >> > > "First, in inner speech, we find a predominance of the word?s > sense > >> > > over its meaning. Paulhan significantly advanced the > psychological > >> > > analysis of speech by introducing the distinction between a > word?s > >> > > sense and meaning. A word?s sense is the aggregate of all the > >> > > psychological facts that arise in our consciousness as a result > of > >> > > the word. Sense is a dynamic, fluid, and complex formation which > >> has > >> > > several zones that vary in their stability. Meaning is only one > of > >> > > these zones of the sense that the word acquires in the context of > >> > > speech. It is the most stable, unified, and precise of these > zones. > >> > > In different contexts, a word?s sense changes. In contrast, > meaning > >> > > is a comparatively fixed and stable point, one that remains > >> constant > >> > > with all the changes of the word?s sense that are associated with > >> > > its use in various contexts. Change in the word?s sense is a > basic > >> > > factor in the semantic analysis of speech. The actual meaning of > >> the > >> > > word is inconstant. In one operation, the word emerges with one > >> > > meaning; in another, another is acquired. The dynamic nature of > >> > > meaning leads us to Paulhan?s problem, to the problem of the > >> > > relationship between meaning and sense. Isolated in the lexicon, > >> the > >> > > word has only one meaning. However, this meaning is nothing more > >> > > than a potential that can only be realized in living speech, and > in > >> > > living speech meaning is only a cornerstone in the edifice of > >> sense." > >> > > > >> > > As I read this, the stability of meaning is merely relative to that > of > >> > > sense, i.e., in the context of speech, rather than "teh aggregate of > >> all > >> > > psychological facts." He is not at all denying the fact of polysemy > or > >> > the > >> > > cultural and historical migration of meaning. > >> > > > >> > > Andy > >> > > mike cole wrote: > >> > > > >> > >> I agree, very clearly statements of the sense/meaning relation, > along > >> > with > >> > >> the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I wanted to say, and > >> > thought, > >> > >> unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows." > >> > >> > >> > >> In the quote here, I think LSV is somewhat overstating the > stability > >> of > >> > >> meaning across contexts; yes relative to the microgenetic processes > >> of > >> > >> sense making capturable with > >> > >> modern technologies, but not totally "context independent." Even > >> > >> dictionary > >> > >> meanings change, as LSV was well aware from his interest in the > >> history > >> > of > >> > >> words in relation to their appearance in children's vocabularies in > >> > >> ontogeny. > >> > >> > >> > >> Keeping the simultaneous relevance of several time scales in mind > in > >> > these > >> > >> discussions seems really important, as hard as it is to do. > >> > >> mike > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > >> > >> > >> > >> -- > >> > >> Peace, > >> Sungwoo Kim > >> Learner, Teacher, Researcher, Blogger > >> Photos: *https://there.jux.com/* > >> Personal: http://www.sungwookim.com > >> > > > > > -- Peace, Sungwoo Kim Learner, Teacher, Researcher, Blogger Photos: *https://there.jux.com/* Personal: http://www.sungwookim.com From r.j.s.parsons@open.ac.uk Wed Aug 28 01:43:32 2013 From: r.j.s.parsons@open.ac.uk (rjsp2) Date: Wed, 28 Aug 2013 09:43:32 +0100 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A Question about Reading and Motivation In-Reply-To: <521DA666.2030203@mira.net> References: <521DA666.2030203@mira.net> Message-ID: <521DB834.9060301@open.ac.uk> The first thing I thought on reading "assistance is given to kids to read in order to find out something they want to know about the world" was "This is basic Freire". Adult literacy had the same problem of meaningless texts till Freire came along and started teaching them about things that mattered to them. It also made me reflect on the idea of motive, whihc has for a long time been a question I have been intending to examine "when I have time". When I met the activity triangle, one of the most obvious issues about it was that it contains no separate place for motive. After a while that seemed logical because the motive was in the object, and maybe one of our difficulties is that we separate motive out from object in order to understand it better, and then forget to put it back in again. Children are just like people, they do need a reason to do things. I've always been puzzled by the idea of andragogy, the suggestion that adults learn differently from children. Proponents usually list several reasons which usually make no sense to me. One of the reasons usually given is that adults need to know why they are doing something, the unspoken contrast being presumably that children happily do what they're told. The kind of research you refer to here, Andy, suggests that children do need to know why they are doing something, but lack the power to say so. Hence, I think, a lot of the problems evident in our UK schooling system (lots of great schools, in my opinion, dreadful educational policies dictate that children are machined through exams in order to maintain the school's place in the league table. So there is a reason why the children do what they do, it is just not relevant to the child.) Rob On 28/08/2013 08:27, Andy Blunden wrote: > Re: Peg Griffin - > http://lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/Mail/xmcamail.2011_05.dir/msg00530.html > and Peg and Mike et al: http://lchc.ucsd.edu/People/NEWTECHN.pdf > > The first article sets up a scenario in 5thD where kids "sneak" a look > at piece of writing in order to find an answer to a current affairs > question. As opposed to telling the kids to read a text and then (for > example) testing them on it. > The second talks about "reading for meaning" where assistance is given > to kids to read in order to find out something they want to know about > the world. As opposed to decoding "Jack and Jill" stories containing > nothing of interest to them at all (and actually humiliating). > > I am trying to get my head around the issue of the motivation which > the teachers are trying to engender in the child which facilitates > learning to read. > > Following A N Leontyev, Peg talks about the "merely understood" motive > for the child "to be a productive, informed, literate citizen" which > is what the education system is supposed to be doing. Peg says this > motive was "in the social interactions and ready to replace the > 'really effective' motives that got the kid to come to/put up with our > reading group." ... *in the social interactions*! > > Generally speaking I think there is no doubt that the distinction > between "really effective" and "merely understood" motives is valid, > and that in general children who have difficulty in reading, read only > for "effective" but "external" motives which do not succeed in them > learning to read effectively. Further, the task of the teacher may be > or may be supposed to be to get the child to learn to read so as "to > be a productive, informed, literate citizen." This objective is > somewhere in the complex of motives underlying a teacher's motives, > certainly in 5thD, but I suspect often a "merely understood" motive > for many teachers, alongside earning a wage for their own family, > having a quiet day and the kids getting good test scores, etc. > > But I question whether it is *ever* the child's motive "to be a > productive, informed, literate citizen." This may be an "internal > reward" for learning to read, but not for learning to read any > particular text or even a particular type of text. > > Would this explanation make sense: Learning to read is like happiness. > It does not generally arise through being the motivation of the > activity which produces it. People learn to read as a byproduct of > struggling to get something they want out of particular texts. And > this applies to adults as much as children. I think people can only > learn to read philosophy if they are struggling to get something out > of a book on philosophy (other than pass the exam or acquire an air of > erudition). In Peg's email message we learn that the kids jumped on > the newspaper article to extract information they wanted in (what they > took to be) /another/ task. In the QAR story, adults mediate kids' > relation to a text which is in turn mediating their real and > meaningful relation to the world. (I think if a kid is strongly enough > motivated to pass a reading test, and assisted, they will usually > manage to learn to read, but it is for those for whom this doesn't > work that the issue arises, isn't it?) > > But in general I think it is neither necessary nor likely that a child > has their eye on becoming a literate citizen when they struggle with a > text and learn to read in the process. Isn't it always more proximate > motives? The "internal" reward in reading a particular text is the > particular content of that text, not actually anything to do with > books, or texts, or reading or citizenship. > > I know there are dozens of experts in literacy education out there, so > please help me. > > Andy > -- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC 038302). From mwsmith@temple.edu Wed Aug 28 06:59:06 2013 From: mwsmith@temple.edu (MICHAEL W SMITH) Date: Wed, 28 Aug 2013 09:59:06 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A Question about Reading and Motivation In-Reply-To: <521DB834.9060301@open.ac.uk> References: <521DA666.2030203@mira.net> <521DB834.9060301@open.ac.uk> Message-ID: A colleague and I just completed a study of the nature and variety of pleasure adolescents take from their out-of-school reading that draws on Dewey?s delineation of four kinds of educative interest in *Interest and Effort in Education. *One kind of pleasure we identified is what we call work pleasure in which readers use a text as a tool to accomplish some other end. That?s the kind of pleasure that Andy seems to be talking about when he writes about someone?s struggling to read a philosophical text to get something out of it that could then be usefully employed in some other context. But there are other kinds of pleasure. As Dewey explains ?There are cases where action is direct and immediate. It puts itself forth with no thought of anything beyond. It satisfies in and of itself. The end is the present activity, and so there is no gap in the mind between means and end. All play is of this immediate character.? Readers experience the pleasure of play when they read narratives to immerse themselves in a story world. What matters to them is the pleasure they get from living through the experiences of characters in the here and now not what they can accomplish as a consequence of their reading at some future time. Another kind of pleasure is intellectual pleasure. Dewey explains that ?instead of thinking things out and discovering them for the sake of the successful achievement of an activity (work pleasure),? we may institute an activity for the intellectual pleasure of figuring something out. An example would be reading to unravel the complexities of poem as an end in itself. Finally there are social pleasures in reading. People read to affiliate with others. That seems to me to be a kind of pleasure people on this listserv take. Or people read to mark their place in the world. They do a kind of identity work by using their reading to assert their difference from others. One of the informants in our study avoided reading the books that were most popular among her friends and instead read what she called dark fiction. That reading was an important part of how she understood herself. As she said ?I?m weird in the way that [I don't have] inhibitions like most people. I can read dark fiction and not be disturbed by it.? I?d argue that teachers are most likely to foster motivation to read by creating contexts in which students can experience all four kinds of pleasure. On Wed, Aug 28, 2013 at 4:43 AM, rjsp2 wrote: > The first thing I thought on reading "assistance is given to kids to > > read in order to find out something they want to know about the world" > was "This is basic Freire". Adult literacy had the same problem of > meaningless texts till Freire came along and started teaching them about > things that mattered to them. It also made me reflect on the idea of > motive, whihc has for a long time been a question I have been intending > to examine "when I have time". When I met the activity triangle, one of > the most obvious issues about it was that it contains no separate place > for motive. After a while that seemed logical because the motive was in > the object, and maybe one of our difficulties is that we separate motive > out from object in order to understand it better, and then forget to put > it back in again. > > Children are just like people, they do need a reason to do things. I've > always been puzzled by the idea of andragogy, the suggestion that adults > learn differently from children. Proponents usually list several reasons > which usually make no sense to me. One of the reasons usually given is > that adults need to know why they are doing something, the unspoken > contrast being presumably that children happily do what they're told. > The kind of research you refer to here, Andy, suggests that children do > need to know why they are doing something, but lack the power to say so. > Hence, I think, a lot of the problems evident in our UK schooling system > (lots of great schools, in my opinion, dreadful educational policies > dictate that children are machined through exams in order to maintain > the school's place in the league table. So there is a reason why the > children do what they do, it is just not relevant to the child.) > > Rob > > > On 28/08/2013 08:27, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> Re: Peg Griffin - >> http://lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/Mail/**xmcamail.2011_05.dir/msg00530.**html >> and Peg and Mike et al: http://lchc.ucsd.edu/People/**NEWTECHN.pdf >> >> The first article sets up a scenario in 5thD where kids "sneak" a look >> at piece of writing in order to find an answer to a current affairs >> question. As opposed to telling the kids to read a text and then (for >> example) testing them on it. >> The second talks about "reading for meaning" where assistance is given >> to kids to read in order to find out something they want to know about >> the world. As opposed to decoding "Jack and Jill" stories containing >> nothing of interest to them at all (and actually humiliating). >> >> I am trying to get my head around the issue of the motivation which >> the teachers are trying to engender in the child which facilitates >> learning to read. >> >> Following A N Leontyev, Peg talks about the "merely understood" motive >> for the child "to be a productive, informed, literate citizen" which >> is what the education system is supposed to be doing. Peg says this >> motive was "in the social interactions and ready to replace the >> 'really effective' motives that got the kid to come to/put up with our >> reading group." ... *in the social interactions*! >> >> Generally speaking I think there is no doubt that the distinction >> between "really effective" and "merely understood" motives is valid, >> and that in general children who have difficulty in reading, read only >> for "effective" but "external" motives which do not succeed in them >> learning to read effectively. Further, the task of the teacher may be >> or may be supposed to be to get the child to learn to read so as "to >> be a productive, informed, literate citizen." This objective is >> somewhere in the complex of motives underlying a teacher's motives, >> certainly in 5thD, but I suspect often a "merely understood" motive >> for many teachers, alongside earning a wage for their own family, >> having a quiet day and the kids getting good test scores, etc. >> >> But I question whether it is *ever* the child's motive "to be a >> productive, informed, literate citizen." This may be an "internal >> reward" for learning to read, but not for learning to read any >> particular text or even a particular type of text. >> >> Would this explanation make sense: Learning to read is like happiness. >> It does not generally arise through being the motivation of the >> activity which produces it. People learn to read as a byproduct of >> struggling to get something they want out of particular texts. And >> this applies to adults as much as children. I think people can only >> learn to read philosophy if they are struggling to get something out >> of a book on philosophy (other than pass the exam or acquire an air of >> erudition). In Peg's email message we learn that the kids jumped on >> the newspaper article to extract information they wanted in (what they >> took to be) /another/ task. In the QAR story, adults mediate kids' >> relation to a text which is in turn mediating their real and >> meaningful relation to the world. (I think if a kid is strongly enough >> motivated to pass a reading test, and assisted, they will usually >> manage to learn to read, but it is for those for whom this doesn't >> work that the issue arises, isn't it?) >> >> But in general I think it is neither necessary nor likely that a child >> has their eye on becoming a literate citizen when they struggle with a >> text and learn to read in the process. Isn't it always more proximate >> motives? The "internal" reward in reading a particular text is the >> particular content of that text, not actually anything to do with >> books, or texts, or reading or citizenship. >> >> I know there are dozens of experts in literacy education out there, so >> please help me. >> >> Andy >> >> > -- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an > exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC > 038302). > > -- Michael W. Smith Professor and Chair Department of Teaching and Learning Temple University College of Education 351 Ritter Hall 1301 Cecil B. Moore Avenue Philadelphia, PA 19122 From emily@uidaho.edu Wed Aug 28 07:32:33 2013 From: emily@uidaho.edu (Duvall, Emily) Date: Wed, 28 Aug 2013 14:32:33 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A Question about Reading and Motivation In-Reply-To: References: <521DA666.2030203@mira.net> <521DB834.9060301@open.ac.uk>, Message-ID: Very interesting. It sounds like you have begun to adjust the usual dichotomy of efferent vs aesthetic reading. Do you consider Rosenblatt in your work? Emily Duvall, PhD Associate Research Director, PIRLS Boston College ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of MICHAEL W SMITH Sent: Wednesday, August 28, 2013 6:59 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A Question about Reading and Motivation A colleague and I just completed a study of the nature and variety of pleasure adolescents take from their out-of-school reading that draws on Dewey?s delineation of four kinds of educative interest in *Interest and Effort in Education. *One kind of pleasure we identified is what we call work pleasure in which readers use a text as a tool to accomplish some other end. That?s the kind of pleasure that Andy seems to be talking about when he writes about someone?s struggling to read a philosophical text to get something out of it that could then be usefully employed in some other context. But there are other kinds of pleasure. As Dewey explains ?There are cases where action is direct and immediate. It puts itself forth with no thought of anything beyond. It satisfies in and of itself. The end is the present activity, and so there is no gap in the mind between means and end. All play is of this immediate character.? Readers experience the pleasure of play when they read narratives to immerse themselves in a story world. What matters to them is the pleasure they get from living through the experiences of characters in the here and now not what they can accomplish as a consequence of their reading at some future time. Another kind of pleasure is intellectual pleasure. Dewey explains that ?instead of thinking things out and discovering them for the sake of the successful achievement of an activity (work pleasure),? we may institute an activity for the intellectual pleasure of figuring something out. An example would be reading to unravel the complexities of poem as an end in itself. Finally there are social pleasures in reading. People read to affiliate with others. That seems to me to be a kind of pleasure people on this listserv take. Or people read to mark their place in the world. They do a kind of identity work by using their reading to assert their difference from others. One of the informants in our study avoided reading the books that were most popular among her friends and instead read what she called dark fiction. That reading was an important part of how she understood herself. As she said ?I?m weird in the way that [I don't have] inhibitions like most people. I can read dark fiction and not be disturbed by it.? I?d argue that teachers are most likely to foster motivation to read by creating contexts in which students can experience all four kinds of pleasure. On Wed, Aug 28, 2013 at 4:43 AM, rjsp2 wrote: > The first thing I thought on reading "assistance is given to kids to > > read in order to find out something they want to know about the world" > was "This is basic Freire". Adult literacy had the same problem of > meaningless texts till Freire came along and started teaching them about > things that mattered to them. It also made me reflect on the idea of > motive, whihc has for a long time been a question I have been intending > to examine "when I have time". When I met the activity triangle, one of > the most obvious issues about it was that it contains no separate place > for motive. After a while that seemed logical because the motive was in > the object, and maybe one of our difficulties is that we separate motive > out from object in order to understand it better, and then forget to put > it back in again. > > Children are just like people, they do need a reason to do things. I've > always been puzzled by the idea of andragogy, the suggestion that adults > learn differently from children. Proponents usually list several reasons > which usually make no sense to me. One of the reasons usually given is > that adults need to know why they are doing something, the unspoken > contrast being presumably that children happily do what they're told. > The kind of research you refer to here, Andy, suggests that children do > need to know why they are doing something, but lack the power to say so. > Hence, I think, a lot of the problems evident in our UK schooling system > (lots of great schools, in my opinion, dreadful educational policies > dictate that children are machined through exams in order to maintain > the school's place in the league table. So there is a reason why the > children do what they do, it is just not relevant to the child.) > > Rob > > > On 28/08/2013 08:27, Andy Blunden wrote: > >> Re: Peg Griffin - >> http://lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/Mail/**xmcamail.2011_05.dir/msg00530.**html >> and Peg and Mike et al: http://lchc.ucsd.edu/People/**NEWTECHN.pdf >> >> The first article sets up a scenario in 5thD where kids "sneak" a look >> at piece of writing in order to find an answer to a current affairs >> question. As opposed to telling the kids to read a text and then (for >> example) testing them on it. >> The second talks about "reading for meaning" where assistance is given >> to kids to read in order to find out something they want to know about >> the world. As opposed to decoding "Jack and Jill" stories containing >> nothing of interest to them at all (and actually humiliating). >> >> I am trying to get my head around the issue of the motivation which >> the teachers are trying to engender in the child which facilitates >> learning to read. >> >> Following A N Leontyev, Peg talks about the "merely understood" motive >> for the child "to be a productive, informed, literate citizen" which >> is what the education system is supposed to be doing. Peg says this >> motive was "in the social interactions and ready to replace the >> 'really effective' motives that got the kid to come to/put up with our >> reading group." ... *in the social interactions*! >> >> Generally speaking I think there is no doubt that the distinction >> between "really effective" and "merely understood" motives is valid, >> and that in general children who have difficulty in reading, read only >> for "effective" but "external" motives which do not succeed in them >> learning to read effectively. Further, the task of the teacher may be >> or may be supposed to be to get the child to learn to read so as "to >> be a productive, informed, literate citizen." This objective is >> somewhere in the complex of motives underlying a teacher's motives, >> certainly in 5thD, but I suspect often a "merely understood" motive >> for many teachers, alongside earning a wage for their own family, >> having a quiet day and the kids getting good test scores, etc. >> >> But I question whether it is *ever* the child's motive "to be a >> productive, informed, literate citizen." This may be an "internal >> reward" for learning to read, but not for learning to read any >> particular text or even a particular type of text. >> >> Would this explanation make sense: Learning to read is like happiness. >> It does not generally arise through being the motivation of the >> activity which produces it. People learn to read as a byproduct of >> struggling to get something they want out of particular texts. And >> this applies to adults as much as children. I think people can only >> learn to read philosophy if they are struggling to get something out >> of a book on philosophy (other than pass the exam or acquire an air of >> erudition). In Peg's email message we learn that the kids jumped on >> the newspaper article to extract information they wanted in (what they >> took to be) /another/ task. In the QAR story, adults mediate kids' >> relation to a text which is in turn mediating their real and >> meaningful relation to the world. (I think if a kid is strongly enough >> motivated to pass a reading test, and assisted, they will usually >> manage to learn to read, but it is for those for whom this doesn't >> work that the issue arises, isn't it?) >> >> But in general I think it is neither necessary nor likely that a child >> has their eye on becoming a literate citizen when they struggle with a >> text and learn to read in the process. Isn't it always more proximate >> motives? The "internal" reward in reading a particular text is the >> particular content of that text, not actually anything to do with >> books, or texts, or reading or citizenship. >> >> I know there are dozens of experts in literacy education out there, so >> please help me. >> >> Andy >> >> > -- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an > exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland (SC > 038302). > > -- Michael W. Smith Professor and Chair Department of Teaching and Learning Temple University College of Education 351 Ritter Hall 1301 Cecil B. Moore Avenue Philadelphia, PA 19122 From mwsmith@temple.edu Wed Aug 28 08:08:14 2013 From: mwsmith@temple.edu (MICHAEL W SMITH) Date: Wed, 28 Aug 2013 11:08:14 -0400 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A Question about Reading and Motivation In-Reply-To: References: <521DA666.2030203@mira.net> <521DB834.9060301@open.ac.uk> Message-ID: We don't. Her distinction focuses on a reader's stance rather than on a reader's pleasure. But our work would suggest that the distinction is a false binary. On occasion one kind of pleasure would dominate, but very often readers experienced more than one kind of pleasure from their reading. On Wed, Aug 28, 2013 at 10:32 AM, Duvall, Emily wrote: > > Very interesting. It sounds like you have begun to adjust the usual > dichotomy of efferent vs aesthetic reading. Do you consider Rosenblatt in > your work? > > > Emily Duvall, PhD > Associate Research Director, PIRLS > Boston College > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of MICHAEL W SMITH > Sent: Wednesday, August 28, 2013 6:59 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A Question about Reading and Motivation > > A colleague and I just completed a study of the nature and variety of > pleasure adolescents take from their out-of-school reading that draws on > Dewey?s delineation of four kinds of educative interest in *Interest and > Effort in Education. *One kind of pleasure we identified is what we call > work pleasure in which readers use a text as a tool to accomplish some > other end. That?s the kind of pleasure that Andy seems to be talking about > when he writes about someone?s struggling to read a philosophical text to > get something out of it that could then be usefully employed in some other > context. But there are other kinds of pleasure. As Dewey explains ?There > are cases where action is direct and immediate. It puts itself forth with > no thought of anything beyond. It satisfies in and of itself. The end is > the present activity, and so there is no gap in the mind between means and > end. All play is of this immediate character.? Readers experience the > pleasure of play when they read narratives to immerse themselves in a story > world. What matters to them is the pleasure they get from living through > the experiences of characters in the here and now not what they can > accomplish as a consequence of their reading at some future time. Another > kind of pleasure is intellectual pleasure. Dewey explains that ?instead of > thinking things out and discovering them for the sake of the successful > achievement of an activity (work pleasure),? we may institute an activity > for the intellectual pleasure of figuring something out. An example would > be reading to unravel the complexities of poem as an end in itself. > Finally > there are social pleasures in reading. People read to affiliate with > others. That seems to me to be a kind of pleasure people on this listserv > take. Or people read to mark their place in the world. They do a kind of > identity work by using their reading to assert their difference from > others. > One of the informants in our study avoided reading the books that were most > popular among her friends and instead read what she called dark fiction. > That reading was an important part of how she understood herself. As she > said ?I?m weird in the way that [I don't have] inhibitions like most > people. I can read dark fiction and not be disturbed by it.? I?d argue > that teachers are most likely to foster motivation to read by creating > contexts in which students can experience all four kinds of pleasure. > > > On Wed, Aug 28, 2013 at 4:43 AM, rjsp2 wrote: > > > The first thing I thought on reading "assistance is given to kids to > > > > read in order to find out something they want to know about the world" > > was "This is basic Freire". Adult literacy had the same problem of > > meaningless texts till Freire came along and started teaching them about > > things that mattered to them. It also made me reflect on the idea of > > motive, whihc has for a long time been a question I have been intending > > to examine "when I have time". When I met the activity triangle, one of > > the most obvious issues about it was that it contains no separate place > > for motive. After a while that seemed logical because the motive was in > > the object, and maybe one of our difficulties is that we separate motive > > out from object in order to understand it better, and then forget to put > > it back in again. > > > > Children are just like people, they do need a reason to do things. I've > > always been puzzled by the idea of andragogy, the suggestion that adults > > learn differently from children. Proponents usually list several reasons > > which usually make no sense to me. One of the reasons usually given is > > that adults need to know why they are doing something, the unspoken > > contrast being presumably that children happily do what they're told. > > The kind of research you refer to here, Andy, suggests that children do > > need to know why they are doing something, but lack the power to say so. > > Hence, I think, a lot of the problems evident in our UK schooling system > > (lots of great schools, in my opinion, dreadful educational policies > > dictate that children are machined through exams in order to maintain > > the school's place in the league table. So there is a reason why the > > children do what they do, it is just not relevant to the child.) > > > > Rob > > > > > > On 28/08/2013 08:27, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > >> Re: Peg Griffin - > >> http://lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/Mail/**xmcamail.2011_05.dir/msg00530.**html< > http://lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/Mail/xmcamail.2011_05.dir/msg00530.html> > >> and Peg and Mike et al: http://lchc.ucsd.edu/People/**NEWTECHN.pdf< > http://lchc.ucsd.edu/People/NEWTECHN.pdf> > >> > >> The first article sets up a scenario in 5thD where kids "sneak" a look > >> at piece of writing in order to find an answer to a current affairs > >> question. As opposed to telling the kids to read a text and then (for > >> example) testing them on it. > >> The second talks about "reading for meaning" where assistance is given > >> to kids to read in order to find out something they want to know about > >> the world. As opposed to decoding "Jack and Jill" stories containing > >> nothing of interest to them at all (and actually humiliating). > >> > >> I am trying to get my head around the issue of the motivation which > >> the teachers are trying to engender in the child which facilitates > >> learning to read. > >> > >> Following A N Leontyev, Peg talks about the "merely understood" motive > >> for the child "to be a productive, informed, literate citizen" which > >> is what the education system is supposed to be doing. Peg says this > >> motive was "in the social interactions and ready to replace the > >> 'really effective' motives that got the kid to come to/put up with our > >> reading group." ... *in the social interactions*! > >> > >> Generally speaking I think there is no doubt that the distinction > >> between "really effective" and "merely understood" motives is valid, > >> and that in general children who have difficulty in reading, read only > >> for "effective" but "external" motives which do not succeed in them > >> learning to read effectively. Further, the task of the teacher may be > >> or may be supposed to be to get the child to learn to read so as "to > >> be a productive, informed, literate citizen." This objective is > >> somewhere in the complex of motives underlying a teacher's motives, > >> certainly in 5thD, but I suspect often a "merely understood" motive > >> for many teachers, alongside earning a wage for their own family, > >> having a quiet day and the kids getting good test scores, etc. > >> > >> But I question whether it is *ever* the child's motive "to be a > >> productive, informed, literate citizen." This may be an "internal > >> reward" for learning to read, but not for learning to read any > >> particular text or even a particular type of text. > >> > >> Would this explanation make sense: Learning to read is like happiness. > >> It does not generally arise through being the motivation of the > >> activity which produces it. People learn to read as a byproduct of > >> struggling to get something they want out of particular texts. And > >> this applies to adults as much as children. I think people can only > >> learn to read philosophy if they are struggling to get something out > >> of a book on philosophy (other than pass the exam or acquire an air of > >> erudition). In Peg's email message we learn that the kids jumped on > >> the newspaper article to extract information they wanted in (what they > >> took to be) /another/ task. In the QAR story, adults mediate kids' > >> relation to a text which is in turn mediating their real and > >> meaningful relation to the world. (I think if a kid is strongly enough > >> motivated to pass a reading test, and assisted, they will usually > >> manage to learn to read, but it is for those for whom this doesn't > >> work that the issue arises, isn't it?) > >> > >> But in general I think it is neither necessary nor likely that a child > >> has their eye on becoming a literate citizen when they struggle with a > >> text and learn to read in the process. Isn't it always more proximate > >> motives? The "internal" reward in reading a particular text is the > >> particular content of that text, not actually anything to do with > >> books, or texts, or reading or citizenship. > >> > >> I know there are dozens of experts in literacy education out there, so > >> please help me. > >> > >> Andy > >> > >> > > -- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an > > exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland > (SC > > 038302). > > > > > > > -- > Michael W. Smith > Professor and Chair > Department of Teaching and Learning > Temple University > College of Education > 351 Ritter Hall > 1301 Cecil B. Moore Avenue > Philadelphia, PA 19122 > > -- Michael W. Smith Professor and Chair Department of Teaching and Learning Temple University College of Education 351 Ritter Hall 1301 Cecil B. Moore Avenue Philadelphia, PA 19122 From emily@uidaho.edu Wed Aug 28 08:14:41 2013 From: emily@uidaho.edu (Duvall, Emily) Date: Wed, 28 Aug 2013 15:14:41 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A Question about Reading and Motivation In-Reply-To: References: <521DA666.2030203@mira.net> <521DB834.9060301@open.ac.uk> , Message-ID: <61182038c9e94c9facf89696746d1312@BY2PR04MB221.namprd04.prod.outlook.com> Yes, I see. I am excited by the work in regards to the 'false binary'.... are you looking to address this? Emily Duvall, PhD Associate Research Director, PIRLS Boston College ________________________________________ From: xmca-l-bounces+emily=uidaho.edu@mailman.ucsd.edu on behalf of MICHAEL W SMITH Sent: Wednesday, August 28, 2013 8:08 AM To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A Question about Reading and Motivation We don't. Her distinction focuses on a reader's stance rather than on a reader's pleasure. But our work would suggest that the distinction is a false binary. On occasion one kind of pleasure would dominate, but very often readers experienced more than one kind of pleasure from their reading. On Wed, Aug 28, 2013 at 10:32 AM, Duvall, Emily wrote: > > Very interesting. It sounds like you have begun to adjust the usual > dichotomy of efferent vs aesthetic reading. Do you consider Rosenblatt in > your work? > > > Emily Duvall, PhD > Associate Research Director, PIRLS > Boston College > > ________________________________________ > From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu > on behalf of MICHAEL W SMITH > Sent: Wednesday, August 28, 2013 6:59 AM > To: eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity > Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A Question about Reading and Motivation > > A colleague and I just completed a study of the nature and variety of > pleasure adolescents take from their out-of-school reading that draws on > Dewey?s delineation of four kinds of educative interest in *Interest and > Effort in Education. *One kind of pleasure we identified is what we call > work pleasure in which readers use a text as a tool to accomplish some > other end. That?s the kind of pleasure that Andy seems to be talking about > when he writes about someone?s struggling to read a philosophical text to > get something out of it that could then be usefully employed in some other > context. But there are other kinds of pleasure. As Dewey explains ?There > are cases where action is direct and immediate. It puts itself forth with > no thought of anything beyond. It satisfies in and of itself. The end is > the present activity, and so there is no gap in the mind between means and > end. All play is of this immediate character.? Readers experience the > pleasure of play when they read narratives to immerse themselves in a story > world. What matters to them is the pleasure they get from living through > the experiences of characters in the here and now not what they can > accomplish as a consequence of their reading at some future time. Another > kind of pleasure is intellectual pleasure. Dewey explains that ?instead of > thinking things out and discovering them for the sake of the successful > achievement of an activity (work pleasure),? we may institute an activity > for the intellectual pleasure of figuring something out. An example would > be reading to unravel the complexities of poem as an end in itself. > Finally > there are social pleasures in reading. People read to affiliate with > others. That seems to me to be a kind of pleasure people on this listserv > take. Or people read to mark their place in the world. They do a kind of > identity work by using their reading to assert their difference from > others. > One of the informants in our study avoided reading the books that were most > popular among her friends and instead read what she called dark fiction. > That reading was an important part of how she understood herself. As she > said ?I?m weird in the way that [I don't have] inhibitions like most > people. I can read dark fiction and not be disturbed by it.? I?d argue > that teachers are most likely to foster motivation to read by creating > contexts in which students can experience all four kinds of pleasure. > > > On Wed, Aug 28, 2013 at 4:43 AM, rjsp2 wrote: > > > The first thing I thought on reading "assistance is given to kids to > > > > read in order to find out something they want to know about the world" > > was "This is basic Freire". Adult literacy had the same problem of > > meaningless texts till Freire came along and started teaching them about > > things that mattered to them. It also made me reflect on the idea of > > motive, whihc has for a long time been a question I have been intending > > to examine "when I have time". When I met the activity triangle, one of > > the most obvious issues about it was that it contains no separate place > > for motive. After a while that seemed logical because the motive was in > > the object, and maybe one of our difficulties is that we separate motive > > out from object in order to understand it better, and then forget to put > > it back in again. > > > > Children are just like people, they do need a reason to do things. I've > > always been puzzled by the idea of andragogy, the suggestion that adults > > learn differently from children. Proponents usually list several reasons > > which usually make no sense to me. One of the reasons usually given is > > that adults need to know why they are doing something, the unspoken > > contrast being presumably that children happily do what they're told. > > The kind of research you refer to here, Andy, suggests that children do > > need to know why they are doing something, but lack the power to say so. > > Hence, I think, a lot of the problems evident in our UK schooling system > > (lots of great schools, in my opinion, dreadful educational policies > > dictate that children are machined through exams in order to maintain > > the school's place in the league table. So there is a reason why the > > children do what they do, it is just not relevant to the child.) > > > > Rob > > > > > > On 28/08/2013 08:27, Andy Blunden wrote: > > > >> Re: Peg Griffin - > >> http://lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/Mail/**xmcamail.2011_05.dir/msg00530.**html< > http://lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/Mail/xmcamail.2011_05.dir/msg00530.html> > >> and Peg and Mike et al: http://lchc.ucsd.edu/People/**NEWTECHN.pdf< > http://lchc.ucsd.edu/People/NEWTECHN.pdf> > >> > >> The first article sets up a scenario in 5thD where kids "sneak" a look > >> at piece of writing in order to find an answer to a current affairs > >> question. As opposed to telling the kids to read a text and then (for > >> example) testing them on it. > >> The second talks about "reading for meaning" where assistance is given > >> to kids to read in order to find out something they want to know about > >> the world. As opposed to decoding "Jack and Jill" stories containing > >> nothing of interest to them at all (and actually humiliating). > >> > >> I am trying to get my head around the issue of the motivation which > >> the teachers are trying to engender in the child which facilitates > >> learning to read. > >> > >> Following A N Leontyev, Peg talks about the "merely understood" motive > >> for the child "to be a productive, informed, literate citizen" which > >> is what the education system is supposed to be doing. Peg says this > >> motive was "in the social interactions and ready to replace the > >> 'really effective' motives that got the kid to come to/put up with our > >> reading group." ... *in the social interactions*! > >> > >> Generally speaking I think there is no doubt that the distinction > >> between "really effective" and "merely understood" motives is valid, > >> and that in general children who have difficulty in reading, read only > >> for "effective" but "external" motives which do not succeed in them > >> learning to read effectively. Further, the task of the teacher may be > >> or may be supposed to be to get the child to learn to read so as "to > >> be a productive, informed, literate citizen." This objective is > >> somewhere in the complex of motives underlying a teacher's motives, > >> certainly in 5thD, but I suspect often a "merely understood" motive > >> for many teachers, alongside earning a wage for their own family, > >> having a quiet day and the kids getting good test scores, etc. > >> > >> But I question whether it is *ever* the child's motive "to be a > >> productive, informed, literate citizen." This may be an "internal > >> reward" for learning to read, but not for learning to read any > >> particular text or even a particular type of text. > >> > >> Would this explanation make sense: Learning to read is like happiness. > >> It does not generally arise through being the motivation of the > >> activity which produces it. People learn to read as a byproduct of > >> struggling to get something they want out of particular texts. And > >> this applies to adults as much as children. I think people can only > >> learn to read philosophy if they are struggling to get something out > >> of a book on philosophy (other than pass the exam or acquire an air of > >> erudition). In Peg's email message we learn that the kids jumped on > >> the newspaper article to extract information they wanted in (what they > >> took to be) /another/ task. In the QAR story, adults mediate kids' > >> relation to a text which is in turn mediating their real and > >> meaningful relation to the world. (I think if a kid is strongly enough > >> motivated to pass a reading test, and assisted, they will usually > >> manage to learn to read, but it is for those for whom this doesn't > >> work that the issue arises, isn't it?) > >> > >> But in general I think it is neither necessary nor likely that a child > >> has their eye on becoming a literate citizen when they struggle with a > >> text and learn to read in the process. Isn't it always more proximate > >> motives? The "internal" reward in reading a particular text is the > >> particular content of that text, not actually anything to do with > >> books, or texts, or reading or citizenship. > >> > >> I know there are dozens of experts in literacy education out there, so > >> please help me. > >> > >> Andy > >> > >> > > -- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC 000391), an > > exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity registered in Scotland > (SC > > 038302). > > > > > > > -- > Michael W. Smith > Professor and Chair > Department of Teaching and Learning > Temple University > College of Education > 351 Ritter Hall > 1301 Cecil B. Moore Avenue > Philadelphia, PA 19122 > > -- Michael W. Smith Professor and Chair Department of Teaching and Learning Temple University College of Education 351 Ritter Hall 1301 Cecil B. Moore Avenue Philadelphia, PA 19122 From ablunden@mira.net Wed Aug 28 16:51:35 2013 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Thu, 29 Aug 2013 09:51:35 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A Question about Reading and Motivation In-Reply-To: References: <521DA666.2030203@mira.net> <521DB834.9060301@open.ac.uk> Message-ID: <521E8D07.9010701@mira.net> Thank you Michael! It is always such a wonderful thing when someone reveals to you what was before your eyes but you didn't see! I had to put down a novel to read your message. I think I take "the world" to be inclusive of imaginative world evoked by a text, and suddenly, yes, I can see that youngsters generally read lots of fiction and if they enjoy it, that is a royal road to becoming a reader - even though, in a sense, the printed words disappear under their gaze as they evoke that imaginary world. I also think the social motivations are broadly covered by my initial very 'utilitarian' view of the object of reading. But what you describe as "the intellectual pleasure of figuring something out," which I guess is one of the things that used to motivate me at school with maths, and that is something else! Thank you. The world is always richer than what one at first thought, isn't it? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.mira.net/~andy/ MICHAEL W SMITH wrote: > > A colleague and I just completed a study of the nature and variety of > pleasure adolescents take from their out-of-school reading that draws > on Dewey?s delineation of four kinds of educative interest in > /Interest and Effort in Education. /One kind of pleasure we > identified is what we call work pleasure in which readers use a text > as a tool to accomplish some other end. That?s the kind of pleasure > that Andy seems to be talking about when he writes about someone?s > struggling to read a philosophical text to get something out of it > that could then be usefully employed in some other context. But there > are other kinds of pleasure. As Dewey explains ?There are cases where > action is direct and immediate. It puts itself forth with no thought > of anything beyond. It satisfies in and of itself. The end is the > present activity, and so there is no gap in the mind between means and > end. All play is of this immediate character.? Readers experience the > pleasure of play when they read narratives to immerse themselves in a > story world. What matters to them is the pleasure they get from > living through the experiences of characters in the here and now not > what they can accomplish as a consequence of their reading at some > future time. Another kind of pleasure is intellectual pleasure. Dewey > explains that ?instead of thinking things out and discovering them for > the sake of the successful achievement of an activity (work > pleasure),? we may institute an activity for the intellectual pleasure > of figuring something out. An example would be reading to unravel the > complexities of poem as an end in itself. Finally there are social > pleasures in reading. People read to affiliate with others. That > seems to me to be a kind of pleasure people on this listserv take. Or > people read to mark their place in the world. They do a kind of > identity work by using their reading to assert their difference from > others. One of the informants in our study avoided reading the books > that were most popular among her friends and instead read what she > called dark fiction. That reading was an important part of how she > understood herself. As she said ?I?m weird in the way that [I don't > have] inhibitions like most people. I can read dark fiction and not be > disturbed by it.? I?d argue that teachers are most likely to foster > motivation to read by creating contexts in which students can > experience all four kinds of pleasure. > > > > On Wed, Aug 28, 2013 at 4:43 AM, rjsp2 > wrote: > > The first thing I thought on reading "assistance is given to kids to > > read in order to find out something they want to know about the world" > was "This is basic Freire". Adult literacy had the same problem of > meaningless texts till Freire came along and started teaching them > about > things that mattered to them. It also made me reflect on the idea of > motive, whihc has for a long time been a question I have been > intending > to examine "when I have time". When I met the activity triangle, > one of > the most obvious issues about it was that it contains no separate > place > for motive. After a while that seemed logical because the motive > was in > the object, and maybe one of our difficulties is that we separate > motive > out from object in order to understand it better, and then forget > to put > it back in again. > > Children are just like people, they do need a reason to do things. > I've > always been puzzled by the idea of andragogy, the suggestion that > adults > learn differently from children. Proponents usually list several > reasons > which usually make no sense to me. One of the reasons usually given is > that adults need to know why they are doing something, the unspoken > contrast being presumably that children happily do what they're told. > The kind of research you refer to here, Andy, suggests that > children do > need to know why they are doing something, but lack the power to > say so. > Hence, I think, a lot of the problems evident in our UK schooling > system > (lots of great schools, in my opinion, dreadful educational policies > dictate that children are machined through exams in order to maintain > the school's place in the league table. So there is a reason why the > children do what they do, it is just not relevant to the child.) > > Rob > > > On 28/08/2013 08:27, Andy Blunden wrote: > > Re: Peg Griffin - > http://lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/Mail/xmcamail.2011_05.dir/msg00530.html > and Peg and Mike et al: http://lchc.ucsd.edu/People/NEWTECHN.pdf > > The first article sets up a scenario in 5thD where kids > "sneak" a look > at piece of writing in order to find an answer to a current > affairs > question. As opposed to telling the kids to read a text and > then (for > example) testing them on it. > The second talks about "reading for meaning" where assistance > is given > to kids to read in order to find out something they want to > know about > the world. As opposed to decoding "Jack and Jill" stories > containing > nothing of interest to them at all (and actually humiliating). > > I am trying to get my head around the issue of the motivation > which > the teachers are trying to engender in the child which facilitates > learning to read. > > Following A N Leontyev, Peg talks about the "merely > understood" motive > for the child "to be a productive, informed, literate citizen" > which > is what the education system is supposed to be doing. Peg says > this > motive was "in the social interactions and ready to replace the > 'really effective' motives that got the kid to come to/put up > with our > reading group." ... *in the social interactions*! > > Generally speaking I think there is no doubt that the distinction > between "really effective" and "merely understood" motives is > valid, > and that in general children who have difficulty in reading, > read only > for "effective" but "external" motives which do not succeed in > them > learning to read effectively. Further, the task of the teacher > may be > or may be supposed to be to get the child to learn to read so > as "to > be a productive, informed, literate citizen." This objective is > somewhere in the complex of motives underlying a teacher's > motives, > certainly in 5thD, but I suspect often a "merely understood" > motive > for many teachers, alongside earning a wage for their own family, > having a quiet day and the kids getting good test scores, etc. > > But I question whether it is *ever* the child's motive "to be a > productive, informed, literate citizen." This may be an "internal > reward" for learning to read, but not for learning to read any > particular text or even a particular type of text. > > Would this explanation make sense: Learning to read is like > happiness. > It does not generally arise through being the motivation of the > activity which produces it. People learn to read as a byproduct of > struggling to get something they want out of particular texts. And > this applies to adults as much as children. I think people can > only > learn to read philosophy if they are struggling to get > something out > of a book on philosophy (other than pass the exam or acquire > an air of > erudition). In Peg's email message we learn that the kids > jumped on > the newspaper article to extract information they wanted in > (what they > took to be) /another/ task. In the QAR story, adults mediate kids' > relation to a text which is in turn mediating their real and > meaningful relation to the world. (I think if a kid is > strongly enough > motivated to pass a reading test, and assisted, they will usually > manage to learn to read, but it is for those for whom this doesn't > work that the issue arises, isn't it?) > > But in general I think it is neither necessary nor likely that > a child > has their eye on becoming a literate citizen when they > struggle with a > text and learn to read in the process. Isn't it always more > proximate > motives? The "internal" reward in reading a particular text is the > particular content of that text, not actually anything to do with > books, or texts, or reading or citizenship. > > I know there are dozens of experts in literacy education out > there, so > please help me. > > Andy > > > -- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC > 000391), an exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity > registered in Scotland (SC 038302). > > > > > -- > Michael W. Smith > Professor and Chair > Department of Teaching and Learning > Temple University > College of Education > 351 Ritter Hall > 1301 Cecil B. Moore Avenue > Philadelphia, PA 19122 > From lchcmike@gmail.com Wed Aug 28 18:27:00 2013 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Wed, 28 Aug 2013 18:27:00 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A Question about Reading and Motivation In-Reply-To: <521E8D07.9010701@mira.net> References: <521DA666.2030203@mira.net> <521DB834.9060301@open.ac.uk> <521E8D07.9010701@mira.net> Message-ID: Yes, once one learns to read for meaning in Dewey's sense, and mine, marvelous things may result. The acquisition of reading, however, is not governed by phylogenetic constraints in the same way that the acquisition of oral/sign language is. It is a cultural-historically developed mode of mediated meaning making. With few exceptions, it requires literate others to arrange for it to happen. Consequently, getting there through the meat grinder of modern schooling, is a continuing issue. As is the notion of the violence of literacy. mike (The Dickens freak) On Wed, Aug 28, 2013 at 4:51 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > Thank you Michael! It is always such a wonderful thing when someone > reveals to you what was before your eyes but you didn't see! I had to put > down a novel to read your message. I think I take "the world" to be > inclusive of imaginative world evoked by a text, and suddenly, yes, I can > see that youngsters generally read lots of fiction and if they enjoy it, > that is a royal road to becoming a reader - even though, in a sense, the > printed words disappear under their gaze as they evoke that imaginary > world. I also think the social motivations are broadly covered by my > initial very 'utilitarian' view of the object of reading. But what you > describe as "the intellectual pleasure of figuring something out," which I > guess is one of the things that used to motivate me at school with maths, > and that is something else! Thank you. The world is always richer than what > one at first thought, isn't it? > Andy > ------------------------------**------------------------------** > ------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > > > MICHAEL W SMITH wrote: > >> >> A colleague and I just completed a study of the nature and variety of >> pleasure adolescents take from their out-of-school reading that draws on >> Dewey?s delineation of four kinds of educative interest in /Interest and >> Effort in Education. /One kind of pleasure we identified is what we call >> work pleasure in which readers use a text as a tool to accomplish some >> other end. That?s the kind of pleasure that Andy seems to be talking about >> when he writes about someone?s struggling to read a philosophical text to >> get something out of it that could then be usefully employed in some other >> context. But there are other kinds of pleasure. As Dewey explains ?There >> are cases where action is direct and immediate. It puts itself forth with >> no thought of anything beyond. It satisfies in and of itself. The end is >> the present activity, and so there is no gap in the mind between means and >> end. All play is of this immediate character.? Readers experience the >> pleasure of play when they read narratives to immerse themselves in a story >> world. What matters to them is the pleasure they get from living through >> the experiences of characters in the here and now not what they can >> accomplish as a consequence of their reading at some future time. Another >> kind of pleasure is intellectual pleasure. Dewey explains that ?instead of >> thinking things out and discovering them for the sake of the successful >> achievement of an activity (work pleasure),? we may institute an activity >> for the intellectual pleasure of figuring something out. An example would >> be reading to unravel the complexities of poem as an end in itself. >> Finally there are social pleasures in reading. People read to affiliate >> with others. That seems to me to be a kind of pleasure people on this >> listserv take. Or people read to mark their place in the world. They do a >> kind of identity work by using their reading to assert their difference >> from others. One of the informants in our study avoided reading the books >> that were most popular among her friends and instead read what she called >> dark fiction. That reading was an important part of how she understood >> herself. As she said ?I?m weird in the way that [I don't have] inhibitions >> like most people. I can read dark fiction and not be disturbed by it.? I?d >> argue that teachers are most likely to foster motivation to read by >> creating contexts in which students can experience all four kinds of >> pleasure. >> >> >> >> On Wed, Aug 28, 2013 at 4:43 AM, rjsp2 > r.j.s.parsons@open.ac.**uk >> wrote: >> >> The first thing I thought on reading "assistance is given to kids to >> >> read in order to find out something they want to know about the world" >> was "This is basic Freire". Adult literacy had the same problem of >> meaningless texts till Freire came along and started teaching them >> about >> things that mattered to them. It also made me reflect on the idea of >> motive, whihc has for a long time been a question I have been >> intending >> to examine "when I have time". When I met the activity triangle, >> one of >> the most obvious issues about it was that it contains no separate >> place >> for motive. After a while that seemed logical because the motive >> was in >> the object, and maybe one of our difficulties is that we separate >> motive >> out from object in order to understand it better, and then forget >> to put >> it back in again. >> >> Children are just like people, they do need a reason to do things. >> I've >> always been puzzled by the idea of andragogy, the suggestion that >> adults >> learn differently from children. Proponents usually list several >> reasons >> which usually make no sense to me. One of the reasons usually given is >> that adults need to know why they are doing something, the unspoken >> contrast being presumably that children happily do what they're told. >> The kind of research you refer to here, Andy, suggests that >> children do >> need to know why they are doing something, but lack the power to >> say so. >> Hence, I think, a lot of the problems evident in our UK schooling >> system >> (lots of great schools, in my opinion, dreadful educational policies >> dictate that children are machined through exams in order to maintain >> the school's place in the league table. So there is a reason why the >> children do what they do, it is just not relevant to the child.) >> >> Rob >> >> >> On 28/08/2013 08:27, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> Re: Peg Griffin - >> http://lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/Mail/**xmcamail.2011_05.dir/msg00530.** >> html >> and Peg and Mike et al: http://lchc.ucsd.edu/People/** >> NEWTECHN.pdf >> >> The first article sets up a scenario in 5thD where kids >> "sneak" a look >> at piece of writing in order to find an answer to a current >> affairs >> question. As opposed to telling the kids to read a text and >> then (for >> example) testing them on it. >> The second talks about "reading for meaning" where assistance >> is given >> to kids to read in order to find out something they want to >> know about >> the world. As opposed to decoding "Jack and Jill" stories >> containing >> nothing of interest to them at all (and actually humiliating). >> >> I am trying to get my head around the issue of the motivation >> which >> the teachers are trying to engender in the child which facilitates >> learning to read. >> >> Following A N Leontyev, Peg talks about the "merely >> understood" motive >> for the child "to be a productive, informed, literate citizen" >> which >> is what the education system is supposed to be doing. Peg says >> this >> motive was "in the social interactions and ready to replace the >> 'really effective' motives that got the kid to come to/put up >> with our >> reading group." ... *in the social interactions*! >> >> Generally speaking I think there is no doubt that the distinction >> between "really effective" and "merely understood" motives is >> valid, >> and that in general children who have difficulty in reading, >> read only >> for "effective" but "external" motives which do not succeed in >> them >> learning to read effectively. Further, the task of the teacher >> may be >> or may be supposed to be to get the child to learn to read so >> as "to >> be a productive, informed, literate citizen." This objective is >> somewhere in the complex of motives underlying a teacher's >> motives, >> certainly in 5thD, but I suspect often a "merely understood" >> motive >> for many teachers, alongside earning a wage for their own family, >> having a quiet day and the kids getting good test scores, etc. >> >> But I question whether it is *ever* the child's motive "to be a >> productive, informed, literate citizen." This may be an "internal >> reward" for learning to read, but not for learning to read any >> particular text or even a particular type of text. >> >> Would this explanation make sense: Learning to read is like >> happiness. >> It does not generally arise through being the motivation of the >> activity which produces it. People learn to read as a byproduct of >> struggling to get something they want out of particular texts. And >> this applies to adults as much as children. I think people can >> only >> learn to read philosophy if they are struggling to get >> something out >> of a book on philosophy (other than pass the exam or acquire >> an air of >> erudition). In Peg's email message we learn that the kids >> jumped on >> the newspaper article to extract information they wanted in >> (what they >> took to be) /another/ task. In the QAR story, adults mediate kids' >> relation to a text which is in turn mediating their real and >> meaningful relation to the world. (I think if a kid is >> strongly enough >> motivated to pass a reading test, and assisted, they will usually >> manage to learn to read, but it is for those for whom this doesn't >> work that the issue arises, isn't it?) >> >> But in general I think it is neither necessary nor likely that >> a child >> has their eye on becoming a literate citizen when they >> struggle with a >> text and learn to read in the process. Isn't it always more >> proximate >> motives? The "internal" reward in reading a particular text is the >> particular content of that text, not actually anything to do with >> books, or texts, or reading or citizenship. >> >> I know there are dozens of experts in literacy education out >> there, so >> please help me. >> >> Andy >> >> >> -- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC >> 000391), an exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity >> registered in Scotland (SC 038302). >> >> >> >> >> -- >> Michael W. Smith >> Professor and Chair >> Department of Teaching and Learning >> Temple University >> College of Education >> 351 Ritter Hall >> 1301 Cecil B. Moore Avenue >> Philadelphia, PA 19122 >> >> > From ablunden@mira.net Wed Aug 28 20:19:46 2013 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Thu, 29 Aug 2013 13:19:46 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A Question about Reading and Motivation In-Reply-To: References: <521DA666.2030203@mira.net> <521DB834.9060301@open.ac.uk> <521E8D07.9010701@mira.net> Message-ID: <521EBDD2.9000601@mira.net> So what this leads to is that my earlier formulation of motivations for reading which can create the conditions for someone to "learn to read" has to be generalised. And I guess that different "interests" or "pleasures" to be had from reading can be used to make an effective motive for reading. But I am trying to put my finger on the differene between offering a "reward" for reading and the object which turns out to be attainable essentially only through reading, be that the satisfaction of solving an integral equation, or the joy of entering Jane Austen's world or simply being able to read what everyone is talking about. Does this mean that the teacher's task is to somehow allow the learner, with assistance, to get a taste of that object, whichever it is that turns on this reader? Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.mira.net/~andy/ mike cole wrote: > Yes, once one learns to read for meaning in Dewey's sense, and mine, > marvelous things may result. > > The acquisition of reading, however, is not governed by phylogenetic > constraints in the same way that the acquisition of oral/sign language > is. It is a cultural-historically developed mode of mediated meaning > making. With few exceptions, it requires literate others to arrange > for it to happen. > > Consequently, getting there through the meat grinder of modern > schooling, is a continuing > issue. As is the notion of the violence of literacy. > > mike > (The Dickens freak) > > > On Wed, Aug 28, 2013 at 4:51 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > Thank you Michael! It is always such a wonderful thing when > someone reveals to you what was before your eyes but you didn't > see! I had to put down a novel to read your message. I think I > take "the world" to be inclusive of imaginative world evoked by a > text, and suddenly, yes, I can see that youngsters generally read > lots of fiction and if they enjoy it, that is a royal road to > becoming a reader - even though, in a sense, the printed words > disappear under their gaze as they evoke that imaginary world. I > also think the social motivations are broadly covered by my > initial very 'utilitarian' view of the object of reading. But what > you describe as "the intellectual pleasure of figuring something > out," which I guess is one of the things that used to motivate me > at school with maths, and that is something else! Thank you. The > world is always richer than what one at first thought, isn't it? > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > > > MICHAEL W SMITH wrote: > > > A colleague and I just completed a study of the nature and > variety of pleasure adolescents take from their out-of-school > reading that draws on Dewey?s delineation of four kinds of > educative interest in /Interest and Effort in Education. /One > kind of pleasure we identified is what we call work pleasure > in which readers use a text as a tool to accomplish some other > end. That?s the kind of pleasure that Andy seems to be talking > about when he writes about someone?s struggling to read a > philosophical text to get something out of it that could then > be usefully employed in some other context. But there are > other kinds of pleasure. As Dewey explains ?There are cases > where action is direct and immediate. It puts itself forth > with no thought of anything beyond. It satisfies in and of > itself. The end is the present activity, and so there is no > gap in the mind between means and end. All play is of this > immediate character.? Readers experience the pleasure of play > when they read narratives to immerse themselves in a story > world. What matters to them is the pleasure they get from > living through the experiences of characters in the here and > now not what they can accomplish as a consequence of their > reading at some future time. Another kind of pleasure is > intellectual pleasure. Dewey explains that ?instead of > thinking things out and discovering them for the sake of the > successful achievement of an activity (work pleasure),? we may > institute an activity for the intellectual pleasure of > figuring something out. An example would be reading to > unravel the complexities of poem as an end in itself. Finally > there are social pleasures in reading. People read to > affiliate with others. That seems to me to be a kind of > pleasure people on this listserv take. Or people read to mark > their place in the world. They do a kind of identity work by > using their reading to assert their difference from others. > One of the informants in our study avoided reading the books > that were most popular among her friends and instead read what > she called dark fiction. That reading was an important part of > how she understood herself. As she said ?I?m weird in the way > that [I don't have] inhibitions like most people. I can read > dark fiction and not be disturbed by it.? I?d argue that > teachers are most likely to foster motivation to read by > creating contexts in which students can experience all four > kinds of pleasure. > > > > On Wed, Aug 28, 2013 at 4:43 AM, rjsp2 > > >> wrote: > > The first thing I thought on reading "assistance is given > to kids to > > read in order to find out something they want to know > about the world" > was "This is basic Freire". Adult literacy had the same > problem of > meaningless texts till Freire came along and started > teaching them > about > things that mattered to them. It also made me reflect on > the idea of > motive, whihc has for a long time been a question I have been > intending > to examine "when I have time". When I met the activity > triangle, > one of > the most obvious issues about it was that it contains no > separate > place > for motive. After a while that seemed logical because the > motive > was in > the object, and maybe one of our difficulties is that we > separate > motive > out from object in order to understand it better, and then > forget > to put > it back in again. > > Children are just like people, they do need a reason to do > things. > I've > always been puzzled by the idea of andragogy, the > suggestion that > adults > learn differently from children. Proponents usually list > several > reasons > which usually make no sense to me. One of the reasons > usually given is > that adults need to know why they are doing something, the > unspoken > contrast being presumably that children happily do what > they're told. > The kind of research you refer to here, Andy, suggests that > children do > need to know why they are doing something, but lack the > power to > say so. > Hence, I think, a lot of the problems evident in our UK > schooling > system > (lots of great schools, in my opinion, dreadful > educational policies > dictate that children are machined through exams in order > to maintain > the school's place in the league table. So there is a > reason why the > children do what they do, it is just not relevant to the > child.) > > Rob > > > On 28/08/2013 08:27, Andy Blunden wrote: > > Re: Peg Griffin - > > http://lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/Mail/xmcamail.2011_05.dir/msg00530.html > and Peg and Mike et al: > http://lchc.ucsd.edu/People/NEWTECHN.pdf > > The first article sets up a scenario in 5thD where kids > "sneak" a look > at piece of writing in order to find an answer to a > current > affairs > question. As opposed to telling the kids to read a > text and > then (for > example) testing them on it. > The second talks about "reading for meaning" where > assistance > is given > to kids to read in order to find out something they > want to > know about > the world. As opposed to decoding "Jack and Jill" stories > containing > nothing of interest to them at all (and actually > humiliating). > > I am trying to get my head around the issue of the > motivation > which > the teachers are trying to engender in the child which > facilitates > learning to read. > > Following A N Leontyev, Peg talks about the "merely > understood" motive > for the child "to be a productive, informed, literate > citizen" > which > is what the education system is supposed to be doing. > Peg says > this > motive was "in the social interactions and ready to > replace the > 'really effective' motives that got the kid to come > to/put up > with our > reading group." ... *in the social interactions*! > > Generally speaking I think there is no doubt that the > distinction > between "really effective" and "merely understood" > motives is > valid, > and that in general children who have difficulty in > reading, > read only > for "effective" but "external" motives which do not > succeed in > them > learning to read effectively. Further, the task of the > teacher > may be > or may be supposed to be to get the child to learn to > read so > as "to > be a productive, informed, literate citizen." This > objective is > somewhere in the complex of motives underlying a teacher's > motives, > certainly in 5thD, but I suspect often a "merely > understood" > motive > for many teachers, alongside earning a wage for their > own family, > having a quiet day and the kids getting good test > scores, etc. > > But I question whether it is *ever* the child's motive > "to be a > productive, informed, literate citizen." This may be > an "internal > reward" for learning to read, but not for learning to > read any > particular text or even a particular type of text. > > Would this explanation make sense: Learning to read is > like > happiness. > It does not generally arise through being the > motivation of the > activity which produces it. People learn to read as a > byproduct of > struggling to get something they want out of > particular texts. And > this applies to adults as much as children. I think > people can > only > learn to read philosophy if they are struggling to get > something out > of a book on philosophy (other than pass the exam or > acquire > an air of > erudition). In Peg's email message we learn that the kids > jumped on > the newspaper article to extract information they > wanted in > (what they > took to be) /another/ task. In the QAR story, adults > mediate kids' > relation to a text which is in turn mediating their > real and > meaningful relation to the world. (I think if a kid is > strongly enough > motivated to pass a reading test, and assisted, they > will usually > manage to learn to read, but it is for those for whom > this doesn't > work that the issue arises, isn't it?) > > But in general I think it is neither necessary nor > likely that > a child > has their eye on becoming a literate citizen when they > struggle with a > text and learn to read in the process. Isn't it always > more > proximate > motives? The "internal" reward in reading a particular > text is the > particular content of that text, not actually anything > to do with > books, or texts, or reading or citizenship. > > I know there are dozens of experts in literacy > education out > there, so > please help me. > > Andy > > > -- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC > 000391), an exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity > registered in Scotland (SC 038302). > > > > > -- > Michael W. Smith > Professor and Chair > Department of Teaching and Learning > Temple University > College of Education > 351 Ritter Hall > 1301 Cecil B. Moore Avenue > Philadelphia, PA 19122 > > > From helen.grimmett@monash.edu Wed Aug 28 21:25:14 2013 From: helen.grimmett@monash.edu (Helen Grimmett) Date: Thu, 29 Aug 2013 14:25:14 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A Question about Reading and Motivation In-Reply-To: <521EBDD2.9000601@mira.net> References: <521DA666.2030203@mira.net> <521DB834.9060301@open.ac.uk> <521E8D07.9010701@mira.net> <521EBDD2.9000601@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy Blunden wrote: Does this mean that the teacher's task is to somehow allow the learner, with assistance, to get a taste of that object, whichever it is that turns on this reader? Yes, absolutely, which is why we encourage parents to read great books to their children and engage them in literacy-rich activities like cooking from recipes, shopping, sending emails to Grandpa, reading junk-mail etc so that they have a burning desire to conquer this mysterious task of reading... ...and then we send them to school and provide them with the drivel of levelled readers...and phonics worksheets...and controlled vocabulary...and decontextualised sight word flashcards...and wonder why that burning desire so often turns to disappointment, discouragement and despair. Grrr, Helen Dr Helen Grimmett Lecturer, Student Adviser, Faculty of Education, Building 902, Room 159 Monash University, Berwick campus Phone: 9904 7171 On 29 August 2013 13:19, Andy Blunden wrote: > So what this leads to is that my earlier formulation of motivations for > reading which can create the conditions for someone to "learn to read" has > to be generalised. And I guess that different "interests" or "pleasures" to > be had from reading can be used to make an effective motive for reading. > But I am trying to put my finger on the differene between offering a > "reward" for reading and the object which turns out to be attainable > essentially only through reading, be that the satisfaction of solving an > integral equation, or the joy of entering Jane Austen's world or simply > being able to read what everyone is talking about. Does this mean that the > teacher's task is to somehow allow the learner, with assistance, to get a > taste of that object, whichever it is that turns on this reader? > > > Andy > ------------------------------**------------------------------** > ------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > > > mike cole wrote: > >> Yes, once one learns to read for meaning in Dewey's sense, and mine, >> marvelous things may result. >> >> The acquisition of reading, however, is not governed by phylogenetic >> constraints in the same way that the acquisition of oral/sign language is. >> It is a cultural-historically developed mode of mediated meaning making. >> With few exceptions, it requires literate others to arrange for it to >> happen. >> >> Consequently, getting there through the meat grinder of modern schooling, >> is a continuing >> issue. As is the notion of the violence of literacy. >> >> mike >> (The Dickens freak) >> >> >> On Wed, Aug 28, 2013 at 4:51 PM, Andy Blunden > ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >> >> Thank you Michael! It is always such a wonderful thing when >> someone reveals to you what was before your eyes but you didn't >> see! I had to put down a novel to read your message. I think I >> take "the world" to be inclusive of imaginative world evoked by a >> text, and suddenly, yes, I can see that youngsters generally read >> lots of fiction and if they enjoy it, that is a royal road to >> becoming a reader - even though, in a sense, the printed words >> disappear under their gaze as they evoke that imaginary world. I >> also think the social motivations are broadly covered by my >> initial very 'utilitarian' view of the object of reading. But what >> you describe as "the intellectual pleasure of figuring something >> out," which I guess is one of the things that used to motivate me >> at school with maths, and that is something else! Thank you. The >> world is always richer than what one at first thought, isn't it? >> Andy >> ------------------------------**------------------------------** >> ------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.mira.net/~andy/ >> >> >> >> MICHAEL W SMITH wrote: >> >> >> A colleague and I just completed a study of the nature and >> variety of pleasure adolescents take from their out-of-school >> reading that draws on Dewey?s delineation of four kinds of >> educative interest in /Interest and Effort in Education. /One >> kind of pleasure we identified is what we call work pleasure >> in which readers use a text as a tool to accomplish some other >> end. That?s the kind of pleasure that Andy seems to be talking >> about when he writes about someone?s struggling to read a >> philosophical text to get something out of it that could then >> be usefully employed in some other context. But there are >> other kinds of pleasure. As Dewey explains ?There are cases >> where action is direct and immediate. It puts itself forth >> with no thought of anything beyond. It satisfies in and of >> itself. The end is the present activity, and so there is no >> gap in the mind between means and end. All play is of this >> immediate character.? Readers experience the pleasure of play >> when they read narratives to immerse themselves in a story >> world. What matters to them is the pleasure they get from >> living through the experiences of characters in the here and >> now not what they can accomplish as a consequence of their >> reading at some future time. Another kind of pleasure is >> intellectual pleasure. Dewey explains that ?instead of >> thinking things out and discovering them for the sake of the >> successful achievement of an activity (work pleasure),? we may >> institute an activity for the intellectual pleasure of >> figuring something out. An example would be reading to >> unravel the complexities of poem as an end in itself. Finally >> there are social pleasures in reading. People read to >> affiliate with others. That seems to me to be a kind of >> pleasure people on this listserv take. Or people read to mark >> their place in the world. They do a kind of identity work by >> using their reading to assert their difference from others. >> One of the informants in our study avoided reading the books >> that were most popular among her friends and instead read what >> she called dark fiction. That reading was an important part of >> how she understood herself. As she said ?I?m weird in the way >> that [I don't have] inhibitions like most people. I can read >> dark fiction and not be disturbed by it.? I?d argue that >> teachers are most likely to foster motivation to read by >> creating contexts in which students can experience all four >> kinds of pleasure. >> >> >> >> On Wed, Aug 28, 2013 at 4:43 AM, rjsp2 >> >> > >> >> >> >>> >> wrote: >> >> The first thing I thought on reading "assistance is given >> to kids to >> >> read in order to find out something they want to know >> about the world" >> was "This is basic Freire". Adult literacy had the same >> problem of >> meaningless texts till Freire came along and started >> teaching them >> about >> things that mattered to them. It also made me reflect on >> the idea of >> motive, whihc has for a long time been a question I have been >> intending >> to examine "when I have time". When I met the activity >> triangle, >> one of >> the most obvious issues about it was that it contains no >> separate >> place >> for motive. After a while that seemed logical because the >> motive >> was in >> the object, and maybe one of our difficulties is that we >> separate >> motive >> out from object in order to understand it better, and then >> forget >> to put >> it back in again. >> >> Children are just like people, they do need a reason to do >> things. >> I've >> always been puzzled by the idea of andragogy, the >> suggestion that >> adults >> learn differently from children. Proponents usually list >> several >> reasons >> which usually make no sense to me. One of the reasons >> usually given is >> that adults need to know why they are doing something, the >> unspoken >> contrast being presumably that children happily do what >> they're told. >> The kind of research you refer to here, Andy, suggests that >> children do >> need to know why they are doing something, but lack the >> power to >> say so. >> Hence, I think, a lot of the problems evident in our UK >> schooling >> system >> (lots of great schools, in my opinion, dreadful >> educational policies >> dictate that children are machined through exams in order >> to maintain >> the school's place in the league table. So there is a >> reason why the >> children do what they do, it is just not relevant to the >> child.) >> >> Rob >> >> >> On 28/08/2013 08:27, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> Re: Peg Griffin - >> http://lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/Mail/** >> xmcamail.2011_05.dir/msg00530.**html >> and Peg and Mike et al: >> http://lchc.ucsd.edu/People/**NEWTECHN.pdf >> >> The first article sets up a scenario in 5thD where kids >> "sneak" a look >> at piece of writing in order to find an answer to a >> current >> affairs >> question. As opposed to telling the kids to read a >> text and >> then (for >> example) testing them on it. >> The second talks about "reading for meaning" where >> assistance >> is given >> to kids to read in order to find out something they >> want to >> know about >> the world. As opposed to decoding "Jack and Jill" stories >> containing >> nothing of interest to them at all (and actually >> humiliating). >> >> I am trying to get my head around the issue of the >> motivation >> which >> the teachers are trying to engender in the child which >> facilitates >> learning to read. >> >> Following A N Leontyev, Peg talks about the "merely >> understood" motive >> for the child "to be a productive, informed, literate >> citizen" >> which >> is what the education system is supposed to be doing. >> Peg says >> this >> motive was "in the social interactions and ready to >> replace the >> 'really effective' motives that got the kid to come >> to/put up >> with our >> reading group." ... *in the social interactions*! >> >> Generally speaking I think there is no doubt that the >> distinction >> between "really effective" and "merely understood" >> motives is >> valid, >> and that in general children who have difficulty in >> reading, >> read only >> for "effective" but "external" motives which do not >> succeed in >> them >> learning to read effectively. Further, the task of the >> teacher >> may be >> or may be supposed to be to get the child to learn to >> read so >> as "to >> be a productive, informed, literate citizen." This >> objective is >> somewhere in the complex of motives underlying a teacher's >> motives, >> certainly in 5thD, but I suspect often a "merely >> understood" >> motive >> for many teachers, alongside earning a wage for their >> own family, >> having a quiet day and the kids getting good test >> scores, etc. >> >> But I question whether it is *ever* the child's motive >> "to be a >> productive, informed, literate citizen." This may be >> an "internal >> reward" for learning to read, but not for learning to >> read any >> particular text or even a particular type of text. >> >> Would this explanation make sense: Learning to read is >> like >> happiness. >> It does not generally arise through being the >> motivation of the >> activity which produces it. People learn to read as a >> byproduct of >> struggling to get something they want out of >> particular texts. And >> this applies to adults as much as children. I think >> people can >> only >> learn to read philosophy if they are struggling to get >> something out >> of a book on philosophy (other than pass the exam or >> acquire >> an air of >> erudition). In Peg's email message we learn that the kids >> jumped on >> the newspaper article to extract information they >> wanted in >> (what they >> took to be) /another/ task. In the QAR story, adults >> mediate kids' >> relation to a text which is in turn mediating their >> real and >> meaningful relation to the world. (I think if a kid is >> strongly enough >> motivated to pass a reading test, and assisted, they >> will usually >> manage to learn to read, but it is for those for whom >> this doesn't >> work that the issue arises, isn't it?) >> >> But in general I think it is neither necessary nor >> likely that >> a child >> has their eye on becoming a literate citizen when they >> struggle with a >> text and learn to read in the process. Isn't it always >> more >> proximate >> motives? The "internal" reward in reading a particular >> text is the >> particular content of that text, not actually anything >> to do with >> books, or texts, or reading or citizenship. >> >> I know there are dozens of experts in literacy >> education out >> there, so >> please help me. >> >> Andy >> >> >> -- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC >> 000391), an exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity >> registered in Scotland (SC 038302). >> >> >> >> >> -- Michael W. Smith >> Professor and Chair >> Department of Teaching and Learning >> Temple University >> College of Education >> 351 Ritter Hall >> 1301 Cecil B. Moore Avenue >> Philadelphia, PA 19122 >> >> >> >> > From ablunden@mira.net Wed Aug 28 21:34:22 2013 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Thu, 29 Aug 2013 14:34:22 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A Question about Reading and Motivation In-Reply-To: References: <521DA666.2030203@mira.net> <521DB834.9060301@open.ac.uk> <521E8D07.9010701@mira.net> <521EBDD2.9000601@mira.net> Message-ID: <521ECF4E.604@mira.net> You remind me of my mother's reaction when I came home from my first day's school. Right away I got out a big sheet of drawing paper, as I was wont to do as a child, and then went straight to the top left corner and started writing out the alphabet across the top. She almost cried, so she told me. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.mira.net/~andy/ Helen Grimmett wrote: > Andy Blunden wrote: > Does this mean that the teacher's task is to somehow allow the > learner, with assistance, to get a taste of that object, whichever it > is that turns on this reader? > > Yes, absolutely, which is why we encourage parents to read great books > to their children and engage them in literacy-rich activities like > cooking from recipes, shopping, sending emails to Grandpa, reading > junk-mail etc so that they have a burning desire to conquer this > mysterious task of reading... > > ...and then we send them to school and provide them with the drivel of > levelled readers...and phonics worksheets...and controlled > vocabulary...and decontextualised sight word flashcards...and wonder > why that burning desire so often turns to > disappointment, discouragement and despair. > > Grrr, > Helen > > > Dr Helen Grimmett > Lecturer, Student Adviser, > Faculty of Education, > Building 902, Room 159 > Monash University, Berwick campus > Phone: 9904 7171 > > > > > On 29 August 2013 13:19, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > So what this leads to is that my earlier formulation of > motivations for reading which can create the conditions for > someone to "learn to read" has to be generalised. And I guess that > different "interests" or "pleasures" to be had from reading can be > used to make an effective motive for reading. But I am trying to > put my finger on the differene between offering a "reward" for > reading and the object which turns out to be attainable > essentially only through reading, be that the satisfaction of > solving an integral equation, or the joy of entering Jane Austen's > world or simply being able to read what everyone is talking about. > Does this mean that the teacher's task is to somehow allow the > learner, with assistance, to get a taste of that object, whichever > it is that turns on this reader? > > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > > > mike cole wrote: > > Yes, once one learns to read for meaning in Dewey's sense, and > mine, marvelous things may result. > > The acquisition of reading, however, is not governed by > phylogenetic constraints in the same way that the acquisition > of oral/sign language is. It is a cultural-historically > developed mode of mediated meaning making. With few > exceptions, it requires literate others to arrange for it to > happen. > > Consequently, getting there through the meat grinder of modern > schooling, is a continuing > issue. As is the notion of the violence of literacy. > > mike > (The Dickens freak) > > > On Wed, Aug 28, 2013 at 4:51 PM, Andy Blunden > > >> wrote: > > Thank you Michael! It is always such a wonderful thing when > someone reveals to you what was before your eyes but you > didn't > see! I had to put down a novel to read your message. I think I > take "the world" to be inclusive of imaginative world > evoked by a > text, and suddenly, yes, I can see that youngsters > generally read > lots of fiction and if they enjoy it, that is a royal road to > becoming a reader - even though, in a sense, the printed words > disappear under their gaze as they evoke that imaginary > world. I > also think the social motivations are broadly covered by my > initial very 'utilitarian' view of the object of reading. > But what > you describe as "the intellectual pleasure of figuring > something > out," which I guess is one of the things that used to > motivate me > at school with maths, and that is something else! Thank > you. The > world is always richer than what one at first thought, > isn't it? > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > > > > > MICHAEL W SMITH wrote: > > > A colleague and I just completed a study of the nature and > variety of pleasure adolescents take from their > out-of-school > reading that draws on Dewey?s delineation of four kinds of > educative interest in /Interest and Effort in > Education. /One > kind of pleasure we identified is what we call work > pleasure > in which readers use a text as a tool to accomplish > some other > end. That?s the kind of pleasure that Andy seems to be > talking > about when he writes about someone?s struggling to read a > philosophical text to get something out of it that > could then > be usefully employed in some other context. But there are > other kinds of pleasure. As Dewey explains ?There are > cases > where action is direct and immediate. It puts itself forth > with no thought of anything beyond. It satisfies in and of > itself. The end is the present activity, and so there > is no > gap in the mind between means and end. All play is of this > immediate character.? Readers experience the pleasure > of play > when they read narratives to immerse themselves in a story > world. What matters to them is the pleasure they get from > living through the experiences of characters in the > here and > now not what they can accomplish as a consequence of their > reading at some future time. Another kind of pleasure is > intellectual pleasure. Dewey explains that ?instead of > thinking things out and discovering them for the sake > of the > successful achievement of an activity (work > pleasure),? we may > institute an activity for the intellectual pleasure of > figuring something out. An example would be reading to > unravel the complexities of poem as an end in itself. > Finally > there are social pleasures in reading. People read to > affiliate with others. That seems to me to be a kind of > pleasure people on this listserv take. Or people read > to mark > their place in the world. They do a kind of identity > work by > using their reading to assert their difference from > others. > One of the informants in our study avoided reading > the books > that were most popular among her friends and instead > read what > she called dark fiction. That reading was an important > part of > how she understood herself. As she said ?I?m weird in > the way > that [I don't have] inhibitions like most people. I > can read > dark fiction and not be disturbed by it.? I?d argue that > teachers are most likely to foster motivation to read by > creating contexts in which students can experience all > four > kinds of pleasure. > > > > On Wed, Aug 28, 2013 at 4:43 AM, rjsp2 > > > > > > >>> wrote: > > The first thing I thought on reading "assistance > is given > to kids to > > read in order to find out something they want to know > about the world" > was "This is basic Freire". Adult literacy had > the same > problem of > meaningless texts till Freire came along and started > teaching them > about > things that mattered to them. It also made me > reflect on > the idea of > motive, whihc has for a long time been a question > I have been > intending > to examine "when I have time". When I met the > activity > triangle, > one of > the most obvious issues about it was that it > contains no > separate > place > for motive. After a while that seemed logical > because the > motive > was in > the object, and maybe one of our difficulties is > that we > separate > motive > out from object in order to understand it better, > and then > forget > to put > it back in again. > > Children are just like people, they do need a > reason to do > things. > I've > always been puzzled by the idea of andragogy, the > suggestion that > adults > learn differently from children. Proponents > usually list > several > reasons > which usually make no sense to me. One of the reasons > usually given is > that adults need to know why they are doing > something, the > unspoken > contrast being presumably that children happily do > what > they're told. > The kind of research you refer to here, Andy, > suggests that > children do > need to know why they are doing something, but > lack the > power to > say so. > Hence, I think, a lot of the problems evident in > our UK > schooling > system > (lots of great schools, in my opinion, dreadful > educational policies > dictate that children are machined through exams > in order > to maintain > the school's place in the league table. So there is a > reason why the > children do what they do, it is just not relevant > to the > child.) > > Rob > > > On 28/08/2013 08:27, Andy Blunden wrote: > > Re: Peg Griffin - > > http://lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/Mail/xmcamail.2011_05.dir/msg00530.html > and Peg and Mike et al: > http://lchc.ucsd.edu/People/NEWTECHN.pdf > > The first article sets up a scenario in 5thD > where kids > "sneak" a look > at piece of writing in order to find an answer > to a > current > affairs > question. As opposed to telling the kids to read a > text and > then (for > example) testing them on it. > The second talks about "reading for meaning" where > assistance > is given > to kids to read in order to find out something > they > want to > know about > the world. As opposed to decoding "Jack and > Jill" stories > containing > nothing of interest to them at all (and actually > humiliating). > > I am trying to get my head around the issue of the > motivation > which > the teachers are trying to engender in the > child which > facilitates > learning to read. > > Following A N Leontyev, Peg talks about the > "merely > understood" motive > for the child "to be a productive, informed, > literate > citizen" > which > is what the education system is supposed to be > doing. > Peg says > this > motive was "in the social interactions and > ready to > replace the > 'really effective' motives that got the kid to > come > to/put up > with our > reading group." ... *in the social interactions*! > > Generally speaking I think there is no doubt > that the > distinction > between "really effective" and "merely understood" > motives is > valid, > and that in general children who have > difficulty in > reading, > read only > for "effective" but "external" motives which > do not > succeed in > them > learning to read effectively. Further, the > task of the > teacher > may be > or may be supposed to be to get the child to > learn to > read so > as "to > be a productive, informed, literate citizen." This > objective is > somewhere in the complex of motives underlying > a teacher's > motives, > certainly in 5thD, but I suspect often a "merely > understood" > motive > for many teachers, alongside earning a wage > for their > own family, > having a quiet day and the kids getting good test > scores, etc. > > But I question whether it is *ever* the > child's motive > "to be a > productive, informed, literate citizen." This > may be > an "internal > reward" for learning to read, but not for > learning to > read any > particular text or even a particular type of text. > > Would this explanation make sense: Learning to > read is > like > happiness. > It does not generally arise through being the > motivation of the > activity which produces it. People learn to > read as a > byproduct of > struggling to get something they want out of > particular texts. And > this applies to adults as much as children. I > think > people can > only > learn to read philosophy if they are > struggling to get > something out > of a book on philosophy (other than pass the > exam or > acquire > an air of > erudition). In Peg's email message we learn > that the kids > jumped on > the newspaper article to extract information they > wanted in > (what they > took to be) /another/ task. In the QAR story, > adults > mediate kids' > relation to a text which is in turn mediating > their > real and > meaningful relation to the world. (I think if > a kid is > strongly enough > motivated to pass a reading test, and > assisted, they > will usually > manage to learn to read, but it is for those > for whom > this doesn't > work that the issue arises, isn't it?) > > But in general I think it is neither necessary nor > likely that > a child > has their eye on becoming a literate citizen > when they > struggle with a > text and learn to read in the process. Isn't > it always > more > proximate > motives? The "internal" reward in reading a > particular > text is the > particular content of that text, not actually > anything > to do with > books, or texts, or reading or citizenship. > > I know there are dozens of experts in literacy > education out > there, so > please help me. > > Andy > > > -- The Open University is incorporated by Royal > Charter (RC > 000391), an exempt charity in England & Wales and > a charity > registered in Scotland (SC 038302). > > > > > -- Michael W. Smith > Professor and Chair > Department of Teaching and Learning > Temple University > College of Education > 351 Ritter Hall > 1301 Cecil B. Moore Avenue > Philadelphia, PA 19122 > > > > > From lpscholar2@gmail.com Wed Aug 28 21:40:37 2013 From: lpscholar2@gmail.com (Larry Purss) Date: Wed, 28 Aug 2013 21:40:37 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A Question about Reading and Motivation In-Reply-To: <521EBDD2.9000601@mira.net> References: <521DA666.2030203@mira.net> <521DB834.9060301@open.ac.uk> <521E8D07.9010701@mira.net> <521EBDD2.9000601@mira.net> Message-ID: Andy, I have wondered if in a culture where hunting with bows and arrows is valued, the child grows ups motivated to be skilled with using a bow. Is the motivation *learning to read* the identification of wanting to be like the others who participate in your world. In our culture, [especially within schools], if reading is the way people participate in sharing narrative than this MODE of communication is valued. Is identification with doing what others are doing a motivation? Beginning reading activity is a form of collaboration. As you mentioned, collaboration may be master/slave, producer/consumer, or collaboration per se. However, the activity *learning to read* can be displayed in all three types of collaboration. The motivation is identification WITH ...??? in all 3 types of collaboration. Larry On Wed, Aug 28, 2013 at 8:19 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > So what this leads to is that my earlier formulation of motivations for > reading which can create the conditions for someone to "learn to read" has > to be generalised. And I guess that different "interests" or "pleasures" to > be had from reading can be used to make an effective motive for reading. > But I am trying to put my finger on the differene between offering a > "reward" for reading and the object which turns out to be attainable > essentially only through reading, be that the satisfaction of solving an > integral equation, or the joy of entering Jane Austen's world or simply > being able to read what everyone is talking about. Does this mean that the > teacher's task is to somehow allow the learner, with assistance, to get a > taste of that object, whichever it is that turns on this reader? > > > Andy > ------------------------------**------------------------------** > ------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > > > mike cole wrote: > >> Yes, once one learns to read for meaning in Dewey's sense, and mine, >> marvelous things may result. >> >> The acquisition of reading, however, is not governed by phylogenetic >> constraints in the same way that the acquisition of oral/sign language is. >> It is a cultural-historically developed mode of mediated meaning making. >> With few exceptions, it requires literate others to arrange for it to >> happen. >> >> Consequently, getting there through the meat grinder of modern schooling, >> is a continuing >> issue. As is the notion of the violence of literacy. >> >> mike >> (The Dickens freak) >> >> >> On Wed, Aug 28, 2013 at 4:51 PM, Andy Blunden > ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >> >> Thank you Michael! It is always such a wonderful thing when >> someone reveals to you what was before your eyes but you didn't >> see! I had to put down a novel to read your message. I think I >> take "the world" to be inclusive of imaginative world evoked by a >> text, and suddenly, yes, I can see that youngsters generally read >> lots of fiction and if they enjoy it, that is a royal road to >> becoming a reader - even though, in a sense, the printed words >> disappear under their gaze as they evoke that imaginary world. I >> also think the social motivations are broadly covered by my >> initial very 'utilitarian' view of the object of reading. But what >> you describe as "the intellectual pleasure of figuring something >> out," which I guess is one of the things that used to motivate me >> at school with maths, and that is something else! Thank you. The >> world is always richer than what one at first thought, isn't it? >> Andy >> ------------------------------**------------------------------** >> ------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.mira.net/~andy/ >> >> >> >> MICHAEL W SMITH wrote: >> >> >> A colleague and I just completed a study of the nature and >> variety of pleasure adolescents take from their out-of-school >> reading that draws on Dewey?s delineation of four kinds of >> educative interest in /Interest and Effort in Education. /One >> kind of pleasure we identified is what we call work pleasure >> in which readers use a text as a tool to accomplish some other >> end. That?s the kind of pleasure that Andy seems to be talking >> about when he writes about someone?s struggling to read a >> philosophical text to get something out of it that could then >> be usefully employed in some other context. But there are >> other kinds of pleasure. As Dewey explains ?There are cases >> where action is direct and immediate. It puts itself forth >> with no thought of anything beyond. It satisfies in and of >> itself. The end is the present activity, and so there is no >> gap in the mind between means and end. All play is of this >> immediate character.? Readers experience the pleasure of play >> when they read narratives to immerse themselves in a story >> world. What matters to them is the pleasure they get from >> living through the experiences of characters in the here and >> now not what they can accomplish as a consequence of their >> reading at some future time. Another kind of pleasure is >> intellectual pleasure. Dewey explains that ?instead of >> thinking things out and discovering them for the sake of the >> successful achievement of an activity (work pleasure),? we may >> institute an activity for the intellectual pleasure of >> figuring something out. An example would be reading to >> unravel the complexities of poem as an end in itself. Finally >> there are social pleasures in reading. People read to >> affiliate with others. That seems to me to be a kind of >> pleasure people on this listserv take. Or people read to mark >> their place in the world. They do a kind of identity work by >> using their reading to assert their difference from others. >> One of the informants in our study avoided reading the books >> that were most popular among her friends and instead read what >> she called dark fiction. That reading was an important part of >> how she understood herself. As she said ?I?m weird in the way >> that [I don't have] inhibitions like most people. I can read >> dark fiction and not be disturbed by it.? I?d argue that >> teachers are most likely to foster motivation to read by >> creating contexts in which students can experience all four >> kinds of pleasure. >> >> >> >> On Wed, Aug 28, 2013 at 4:43 AM, rjsp2 >> >> > >> >> >> >>> >> wrote: >> >> The first thing I thought on reading "assistance is given >> to kids to >> >> read in order to find out something they want to know >> about the world" >> was "This is basic Freire". Adult literacy had the same >> problem of >> meaningless texts till Freire came along and started >> teaching them >> about >> things that mattered to them. It also made me reflect on >> the idea of >> motive, whihc has for a long time been a question I have been >> intending >> to examine "when I have time". When I met the activity >> triangle, >> one of >> the most obvious issues about it was that it contains no >> separate >> place >> for motive. After a while that seemed logical because the >> motive >> was in >> the object, and maybe one of our difficulties is that we >> separate >> motive >> out from object in order to understand it better, and then >> forget >> to put >> it back in again. >> >> Children are just like people, they do need a reason to do >> things. >> I've >> always been puzzled by the idea of andragogy, the >> suggestion that >> adults >> learn differently from children. Proponents usually list >> several >> reasons >> which usually make no sense to me. One of the reasons >> usually given is >> that adults need to know why they are doing something, the >> unspoken >> contrast being presumably that children happily do what >> they're told. >> The kind of research you refer to here, Andy, suggests that >> children do >> need to know why they are doing something, but lack the >> power to >> say so. >> Hence, I think, a lot of the problems evident in our UK >> schooling >> system >> (lots of great schools, in my opinion, dreadful >> educational policies >> dictate that children are machined through exams in order >> to maintain >> the school's place in the league table. So there is a >> reason why the >> children do what they do, it is just not relevant to the >> child.) >> >> Rob >> >> >> On 28/08/2013 08:27, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> Re: Peg Griffin - >> http://lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/Mail/** >> xmcamail.2011_05.dir/msg00530.**html >> and Peg and Mike et al: >> http://lchc.ucsd.edu/People/**NEWTECHN.pdf >> >> The first article sets up a scenario in 5thD where kids >> "sneak" a look >> at piece of writing in order to find an answer to a >> current >> affairs >> question. As opposed to telling the kids to read a >> text and >> then (for >> example) testing them on it. >> The second talks about "reading for meaning" where >> assistance >> is given >> to kids to read in order to find out something they >> want to >> know about >> the world. As opposed to decoding "Jack and Jill" stories >> containing >> nothing of interest to them at all (and actually >> humiliating). >> >> I am trying to get my head around the issue of the >> motivation >> which >> the teachers are trying to engender in the child which >> facilitates >> learning to read. >> >> Following A N Leontyev, Peg talks about the "merely >> understood" motive >> for the child "to be a productive, informed, literate >> citizen" >> which >> is what the education system is supposed to be doing. >> Peg says >> this >> motive was "in the social interactions and ready to >> replace the >> 'really effective' motives that got the kid to come >> to/put up >> with our >> reading group." ... *in the social interactions*! >> >> Generally speaking I think there is no doubt that the >> distinction >> between "really effective" and "merely understood" >> motives is >> valid, >> and that in general children who have difficulty in >> reading, >> read only >> for "effective" but "external" motives which do not >> succeed in >> them >> learning to read effectively. Further, the task of the >> teacher >> may be >> or may be supposed to be to get the child to learn to >> read so >> as "to >> be a productive, informed, literate citizen." This >> objective is >> somewhere in the complex of motives underlying a teacher's >> motives, >> certainly in 5thD, but I suspect often a "merely >> understood" >> motive >> for many teachers, alongside earning a wage for their >> own family, >> having a quiet day and the kids getting good test >> scores, etc. >> >> But I question whether it is *ever* the child's motive >> "to be a >> productive, informed, literate citizen." This may be >> an "internal >> reward" for learning to read, but not for learning to >> read any >> particular text or even a particular type of text. >> >> Would this explanation make sense: Learning to read is >> like >> happiness. >> It does not generally arise through being the >> motivation of the >> activity which produces it. People learn to read as a >> byproduct of >> struggling to get something they want out of >> particular texts. And >> this applies to adults as much as children. I think >> people can >> only >> learn to read philosophy if they are struggling to get >> something out >> of a book on philosophy (other than pass the exam or >> acquire >> an air of >> erudition). In Peg's email message we learn that the kids >> jumped on >> the newspaper article to extract information they >> wanted in >> (what they >> took to be) /another/ task. In the QAR story, adults >> mediate kids' >> relation to a text which is in turn mediating their >> real and >> meaningful relation to the world. (I think if a kid is >> strongly enough >> motivated to pass a reading test, and assisted, they >> will usually >> manage to learn to read, but it is for those for whom >> this doesn't >> work that the issue arises, isn't it?) >> >> But in general I think it is neither necessary nor >> likely that >> a child >> has their eye on becoming a literate citizen when they >> struggle with a >> text and learn to read in the process. Isn't it always >> more >> proximate >> motives? The "internal" reward in reading a particular >> text is the >> particular content of that text, not actually anything >> to do with >> books, or texts, or reading or citizenship. >> >> I know there are dozens of experts in literacy >> education out >> there, so >> please help me. >> >> Andy >> >> >> -- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC >> 000391), an exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity >> registered in Scotland (SC 038302). >> >> >> >> >> -- Michael W. Smith >> Professor and Chair >> Department of Teaching and Learning >> Temple University >> College of Education >> 351 Ritter Hall >> 1301 Cecil B. Moore Avenue >> Philadelphia, PA 19122 >> >> >> >> > From djwdoc@yahoo.com Wed Aug 28 22:04:27 2013 From: djwdoc@yahoo.com (Douglas Williams) Date: Wed, 28 Aug 2013 22:04:27 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: meaning and sense In-Reply-To: References: <19E63C50-A0D2-4A0F-BBA7-63853414FDAA@gmail.com> <4195A368-C7B9-4AB0-AAA5-A244135DC331@gmail.com> <520ADCDD.9000406@mira.net> <520C3970.6000803@mira.net> <5215AEBB.3070001@mira.net> Message-ID: <1377752667.23841.YahooMailNeo@web164701.mail.gq1.yahoo.com> Hi-- I have to say I'm a little surprised that no one seems to have mentioned the various cognitive metaphor books-George Lakoff's Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things; Mark Turner's Death is the Mother of Beauty, etc. Ronald Langacker makes an argument that something akin to metaphor is operating in grammar (Foundations of Cognitive Grammar), which rather implies that meaning emerges out of embodied experience reified into metonymy and metaphor. For this list, if death is not perhaps the mother of beauty, and reason the child of illusion, then surely a montage of collisions might be the father of thought. Among the diminishing number of things that are still fairly uniquely human, narratives endure, and narrative, to the extent that we can grasp it at this point, is at the heart of the mystery of consciousness. In the context of this list, the pantomimes of activity that Mayakovsky in theater, Eisenstein in film, and various others developed, surely operates thorough something of a collision of representation and reality to form meaning and sense out of what (in a strictly prosaic sense) is utter nonsense, or at best, sense resting on illusions, or partial truths.? Is there such a thing as thought that is not, at its root, metaphor, metonymy, a simulacra of perception reified into a pseudoobjective thing? I would doubt it.? But these are questions for those of you in academe, so I will return to the shadows, and ponder your pondering.? Cheers, Doug ________________________________ From: Larry Purss To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Tuesday, August 27, 2013 5:00 PM Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: meaning and sense Sungwoo, I would like to recommend a book that gives a good summary of the history of understanding of metaphor that puts your question in a larger context. The book is "Communicative Praxis and the Space of Subjectivity" by Calvin O Schrag. Chapter One is "Figures of Discourse" [pages 17 to 31]. Schrag is critiquing the subjectivism and emotivist BIAS which has dominated views on metaphor, and explores an understanding of metaphor as central to ways of knowing and communicating. Here is a sample of his approach in his commentary on Mary Hesse's book "Models and Analogies in Science": Schrag comments, "Although Hess has succeeded in freeing metaphor from its bondage to the noncognitive, emotive, and merely decorative, the liberation of metaphor AS an autonomous form of disclosure and communication has not been fully attained in her thought. Metaphor remains a supplement to the reductive MODEL of scientific explanation, achieving reference only through a circuitous linkage with the explanandum of the primary SYSTEM." My emphasis to focus on how metaphor, model, system are concepts that participate within communicative praxis. This chapter, "Figures AS Discourse" gives many further references and leads to follow if you are fascinated with the transformative power of metaphor. Larry On Fri, Aug 23, 2013 at 5:12 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > Sungwoo, > Thanks for participating in this online chat. I am aware of this approach > that says metaphors are central to our ways of thinking. I will read the > article you sent. My curiosity is in the question of words *carrying* > thought [which would imply thought comes first and is then put into the > chosen word that *represents* the thought [as primary], or if the word IS > thought. If metaphor is thought [not a way to bring our thoughts out into > the shared world] then metaphors of thought AS *PICTURES* [frames] in > contrast to metaphors of thought AS *VOICE*? actually means we are > participating in different KINDS of thinking [conversations externally or > internally] > Sungwoo, I am in over my head but am curious about your question. This > site is the place to be if you want to go deeper into this question. > Vygotsky's exploration of the distinction between meaning and sense leads > right into the heart of your question. > I will read your article attached as I am fascinated with the place of > metaphor in our modes of thinking. > I do believe the notion that the concept *metaphor* is itself a metaphor > DERIVED from the practice of *metapherein* [the verb *to transfer*] which > originally described a CONCRETE activity > This insight may be relevant. > The book "Rhetoric as Philosophy" by Ernesto Grassi [1980] which explores > Vico and his response to the *new science* may be a lead to follow. Shotter > in his book refer's to Grassi's understanding of metaphor. >? Others on this site have explored the relation of metaphor and thinking. > Larry > > > On Fri, Aug 23, 2013 at 11:44 AM, Sungwoo Kim wrote: > >> Dear Larry Purss >> >> This is my first time to use this mailing list. I hope this message will >> reach you somehow. >> >> I cannot directly address your questions due to my limited knowledge in >> phenomenology, but recent work in cognitive linguistics, especially in the >> field of conceptual metaphor theory can shed some light on them. >> >> The traditional view on metaphor has regarded it as an ornamental device >> in >> rhetorical process. Thus it does not have direct impact upon our thinking >> process.However, a large body of work in cognitive linguistics since >> Lakoff >> and Johnson's seminal work *Metaphors We Live By *(1980) is showing that >> metaphor is not merely rhetorical device, but a set of thinking patterns, >> some of which are universal and some culture-specific. This means that >> using new metaphors can shape and direct our thinking processes. To put it >> another way, new metaphors can lead to new ways of thinking. For >> example, Thibodeau and Boroditsky show that different kinds of metaphor >> can >> have substantial impact on our reasoning. Here's part of the abstract. >> >> "The way we talk about complex and abstract ideas is suffused with >> metaphor. In five experiments, we explore how these metaphors influence >> the >> way that we reason about complex issues and forage for further information >> about them. We find that even the subtlest instantiation of a metaphor >> (via >> a single word) can have a powerful influence over how people attempt to >> solve social problems like crime and how they gather information to make >> 'well-informed decisions." >> >> http://www-psych.stanford.edu/~lera/papers/crime-metaphors.pdf >> >> This principle of "metaphor-as-tihnking-pattern" has been adopted by many >> practitioners as well as researchers. Now it is applied in many fields >> including counseling, consulting, web and application design, political >> strategy planning, marketing, and so on. (Of course there are some >> cautious >> voices about the power of metaphor, too. e.g. >> http://www.economist.com/blogs/johnson/2013/01/political-language) >> >> Sungwoo >> >> >> On Thu, Aug 22, 2013 at 11:12 PM, Larry Purss >> wrote: >> >> > Andy, >> > >> > Thanks for keepin >> > Thanks for keeping this topic of sense and meaning alive. >> > Mike also is drawing our attention to the mystery of the creative >> process >> > with this comment: "I agree, very clearly statements of the >> sense/meaning >> > relation, along with the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I >> wanted >> > to say, and thought, unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows." >> > Thought, unembodied, returns to the hall of shadows. >> > I have been reflecting on the phenomenological method or *bias* to >> > prioritize *showing* as an action which brings thoughts from the >> shadows. >> > The concept or term "metaphor" which can itself be considered a >> metaphor. >> > Metaphor is derived from the verb *metapherein" which means "to >> transfer" >> > which originally described a CONCRETE reality [Ernesto Grassi]. >> > Therefore *presenting* a new metaphor IS an argument or a reason [a >> showing >> > in phenomenological discourse] >> > The question is if presenting [as a showing or gesture] a metaphor is >> > presenting a *vehicle* or an "egg" which "carries" thoughts from >> speaker to >> > hearer [which suggests the word is then decoded and RE-presented in the >> > listener's "mind" >> > Or, on the other hand, is presenting a metaphor actually metapherein [a >> > verb] which "transfers" [shifts, turns] knowing in a phenomenological >> "aha" >> > moment? Metaphor AS showing or presenting [FORMING sense], not metaphor >> as >> > a *carrier* of thought which *represents* the sense of the speaker. >> > I am "over my head" in these realms and my "logic" may be faulty, but >> the >> > power of metaphor as "hinge" or "pivot" seems central. >> > Peter Jones made a comment on literacy and "representation" >> > Ernesto Grassi is making the point that presenting [showing] a new >> metaphor >> > IS an argument producing a type of knowledge [sense] >> > Can metapherein be *seen* [picture language] as new and novel ways of >> > acting as transfering *sense* to *pictures* as a *psychological >> instrument* >> > and thus as a cultural resource? The ACT of 'transfer' as presentation >> > within metaphor [something AS something else] understood as a >> psychological >> > and cultural tool, a PRACTICAL intersubjective resource with which [and >> > THROUGH which we think, act, and perceive. >> > Sense AS perception & action mediated through felt experience which is >> > "presented" [shown] through *turning* objects to present other sides and >> > therefore to perceive other aspects. Polysemy through metepherein as one >> > *way* of knowing as argumentation. >> > This is questioning the relation between *forming* as >> presentation/showing >> > & >> > *formed* as representation of what was previously presented. >> > Merleau-Ponty's dynamic between sedimentation/spontaneityg this topic of >> > sense and meaning alive. >> > >> > Mike also is drawing our attention to the mystery of the creative >> process >> > with this comment: "I agree, very clearly statements of the >> sense/meaning >> > relation, along with the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I >> wanted >> > to say, and thought, unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows." >> > >> > Thought, unembodied, returns to the hall of shadows. >> > I have been reflecting on the phenomenological method or *bias* to >> > prioritize *showing* as an action which brings thoughts from the >> shadows. >> > >> > The concept or term "metaphor" which can itself be considered a >> metaphor. >> > Metaphor is derived from the verb *metapherein" which means "to >> transfer" >> > which originally described a CONCRETE reality [Ernesto Grassi]. >> > Therefore *presenting* a new metaphor IS an argument or a reason [a >> showing >> > in phenomenological discourse] >> > The question is if presenting [as a showing or gesture] a metaphor is >> > presenting a *vehicle* or an "egg" which "carries" thoughts from >> speaker to >> > hearer [which suggests the word is then decoded and RE-presented in the >> > listener's "mind" >> > Or, on the other hand, is presenting a metaphor actually metapherein [a >> > verb] which "transfers" [shifts, turns] knowing in a phenomenological >> "aha" >> > moment? Metaphor AS showing or presenting [FORMING sense], not metaphor >> as >> > a *carrier* of thought which *represents* the sense of the speaker. >> > I am "over my head" in these realms and my "logic" may be faulty, but >> the >> > power of metaphor as "hinge" or "pivot" seems central. >> > Peter Jones made a comment on literacy and "representation" >> > Ernesto Grassi is making the point that presenting [showing] a new >> metaphor >> > IS an argument producing a type of knowledge [sense] >> > Can metapherein be *seen* [picture language] as new and novel ways of >> > acting as transfering *sense* by showing and creating metaphors >> > as *pictures* as a *psychological instrument* and thus as a cultural >> > resource? The ACT of 'transfer' as presentation within metaphor >> [something >> > AS something else] understood as a psychological and cultural tool, a >> > PRACTICAL intersubjective resource with which [and THROUGH which] we >> think, >> > act, and perceive. >> > Greg, I wonder if this showing is always volitional [under our control] >> or >> > if we spontaneously "respond" intersubjectively? >> > >> >? Sense AS perception & action mediated through felt experience which is >> > "presented" [shown] through *turning* objects to present other sides and >> > therefore to perceive other aspects. Polysemy through metepherein as one >> > *way* of knowing as argumentation. Intersubjective not subjective. >> > This is questioning the relation between >> >? *forming* as presentation/showing >> > & >> >? *formed* as representation of what was previously presented. >> > >> > Merleau-Ponty's dynamic between sedimentation/spontaneity as expressive >> > cognition. >> > >> > I hope I am making sense in my drawing attention to the relation between >> > thoughts and shadows. >> > Huw, asked if there is a question here? I would say the question is the >> > models of "sense" as presentations [showings] and representations. >> > Merleau-Ponty understood words AS GESTURES. >> > Is there any "truth" to this notion? >> > Larry >> > >> > >> > On Wed, Aug 21, 2013 at 11:24 PM, Andy Blunden >> wrote: >> > >> > > I was just looking into this business about Vygotsky imputing >> excessive >> > > stablility to word meaning. The following key passage from Chapter 7 >> of >> > > "Thinking and Speech" does not, it appers to me, to imply such >> stability: >> > > >> > >? ? "First, in inner speech, we find a predominance of the word?s sense >> > >? ? over its meaning. Paulhan significantly advanced the psychological >> > >? ? analysis of speech by introducing the distinction between a word?s >> > >? ? sense and meaning. A word?s sense is the aggregate of all the >> > >? ? psychological facts that arise in our consciousness as a result of >> > >? ? the word. Sense is a dynamic, fluid, and complex formation which >> has >> > >? ? several zones that vary in their stability. Meaning is only one of >> > >? ? these zones of the sense that the word acquires in the context of >> > >? ? speech. It is the most stable, unified, and precise of these zones. >> > >? ? In different contexts, a word?s sense changes. In contrast, meaning >> > >? ? is a comparatively fixed and stable point, one that remains >> constant >> > >? ? with all the changes of the word?s sense that are associated with >> > >? ? its use in various contexts. Change in the word?s sense is a basic >> > >? ? factor in the semantic analysis of speech. The actual meaning of >> the >> > >? ? word is inconstant. In one operation, the word emerges with one >> > >? ? meaning; in another, another is acquired. The dynamic nature of >> > >? ? meaning leads us to Paulhan?s problem, to the problem of the >> > >? ? relationship between meaning and sense. Isolated in the lexicon, >> the >> > >? ? word has only one meaning. However, this meaning is nothing more >> > >? ? than a potential that can only be realized in living speech, and in >> > >? ? living speech meaning is only a cornerstone in the edifice of >> sense." >> > > >> > > As I read this, the stability of meaning is merely relative to that of >> > > sense, i.e., in the context of speech, rather than "teh aggregate of >> all >> > > psychological facts." He is not at all denying the fact of polysemy or >> > the >> > > cultural and historical migration of meaning. >> > > >> > > Andy >> > > mike cole wrote: >> > > >> > >> I agree, very clearly statements of the sense/meaning relation, along >> > with >> > >> the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I wanted to say, and >> > thought, >> > >> unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows." >> > >> >> > >> In the quote here, I think LSV is somewhat overstating the stability >> of >> > >> meaning across contexts; yes relative to the microgenetic processes >> of >> > >> sense making capturable with >> > >> modern technologies, but not totally "context independent." Even >> > >> dictionary >> > >> meanings change, as LSV was well aware from his interest in the >> history >> > of >> > >> words in relation to their appearance in children's vocabularies in >> > >> ontogeny. >> > >> >> > >> Keeping the simultaneous relevance of several time scales in mind in >> > these >> > >> discussions seems really important, as hard as it is to do. >> > >> mike >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > >> >> >> >> -- >> >> Peace, >> Sungwoo Kim >> Learner, Teacher, Researcher, Blogger >> Photos: *https://there.jux.com/* >> Personal: http://www.sungwookim.com >> > > From djwdoc@yahoo.com Wed Aug 28 22:18:43 2013 From: djwdoc@yahoo.com (Douglas Williams) Date: Wed, 28 Aug 2013 22:18:43 -0700 (PDT) Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: meaning and sense In-Reply-To: References: <19E63C50-A0D2-4A0F-BBA7-63853414FDAA@gmail.com> <4195A368-C7B9-4AB0-AAA5-A244135DC331@gmail.com> <520ADCDD.9000406@mira.net> <520C3970.6000803@mira.net> <5215AEBB.3070001@mira.net> Message-ID: <1377753523.85834.YahooMailNeo@web164706.mail.gq1.yahoo.com> Ah--there we go.? Though second language development is an interesting idea, and not, as I recall anyway, something particularly noted in the cog linguistics literature--but I am out of date.? One of the intriguing things that has turned up of late is the degree to which gender identity of inanimate objects in langauges tends to affect the implicit understandings of these objects to speakers of that language, as utterly arbitrary as these gender designations so often seem to be. In German, a bridge (Die Br?cke) is more likely to be thought of as beautiful, graceful, possessing charm; in Spanish, a bridge (el puente) is more likely to be thought of as strong, powerful, sturdy. "When French speakers saw a picture of a fork (la fourchette), most of them wanted it to speak in a woman?s voice, but Spanish speakers, for whom el tenedor is masculine, preferred a gravelly male voice for it. More recently, psychologists have even shown that ?gendered languages? imprint gender traits for objects so strongly in the mind that these associations obstruct speakers? ability to commit information to memory." http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/29/magazine/29language-t.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 As for those of us in English, we have the illusion of being freer to tell cross-gendered stories about our tableware--though not perhaps any freer, really.... http://shine.yahoo.com/healthy-living/why-time-think-fork-knife-spoon-213800647.html Rather reminiscent of Bruner and Postman's trick with the red ace of spades,?n'est-ce pas? And thus the world of our illusions peeks through to say "boo!" Cheers, Doug ________________________________ From: Sungwoo Kim To: "eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity" Sent: Wednesday, August 28, 2013 12:38 AM Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: meaning and sense Larry, Thank you for this wonderful reference. I will check the volume. Actually, my dissertation was on a cognitive linguistic approach to second language development. I used conceptual metaphor as a mediational tool to encourage second language writers to reflect upon and transform their composition practices. The impact was quite impressive, at least to me. By the way, I am still pondering upon your previous mail. I am inclined to conceptualize meaning as the process based on embodied cognition rather than a kind of mental representation. So I would like to ask you whether you are referring specifically to Vygotsky's use of the term "meaning and sense" or a broader array of theoretical concepts in linguistics, including the recent development in cognitive science. -- Sungwoo On Wed, Aug 28, 2013 at 9:00 AM, Larry Purss wrote: > Sungwoo, > I would like to recommend a book that gives a good summary of the history > of understanding of metaphor that puts your question in a larger context. > The book is "Communicative Praxis and the Space of Subjectivity" by Calvin > O Schrag. > Chapter One is "Figures of Discourse" [pages 17 to 31]. >? Schrag is critiquing the subjectivism and emotivist BIAS which has > dominated views on metaphor, and explores an understanding of metaphor as > central to ways of knowing and communicating. > Here is a sample of his approach in his commentary on Mary Hesse's book > "Models and Analogies in Science": > Schrag comments, > > "Although Hess has succeeded in freeing metaphor from its bondage to the > noncognitive, emotive, and merely decorative, the liberation of metaphor AS > an autonomous form of disclosure and communication has not been fully > attained in her thought. Metaphor remains a supplement to the reductive > MODEL of scientific explanation, achieving reference only through a > circuitous linkage with the explanandum of the primary SYSTEM." > My emphasis to focus on how metaphor, model, system are concepts that > participate within communicative praxis. > > This chapter, "Figures AS Discourse" gives many further references and > leads to follow if you are fascinated with the transformative power of > metaphor. > Larry > > > On Fri, Aug 23, 2013 at 5:12 PM, Larry Purss wrote: > > > Sungwoo, > > Thanks for participating in this online chat. I am aware of this approach > > that says metaphors are central to our ways of thinking. I will read the > > article you sent. My curiosity is in the question of words *carrying* > > thought [which would imply thought comes first and is then put into the > > chosen word that *represents* the thought [as primary], or if the word IS > > thought. If metaphor is thought [not a way to bring our thoughts out into > > the shared world] then metaphors of thought AS *PICTURES* [frames] in > > contrast to metaphors of thought AS *VOICE*? actually means we are > > participating in different KINDS of thinking [conversations externally or > > internally] > > Sungwoo, I am in over my head but am curious about your question. This > > site is the place to be if you want to go deeper into this question. > > Vygotsky's exploration of the distinction between meaning and sense leads > > right into the heart of your question. > > I will read your article attached as I am fascinated with the place of > > metaphor in our modes of thinking. > > I do believe the notion that the concept *metaphor* is itself a metaphor > > DERIVED from the practice of *metapherein* [the verb *to transfer*] which > > originally described a CONCRETE activity > > This insight may be relevant. > > The book "Rhetoric as Philosophy" by Ernesto Grassi [1980] which explores > > Vico and his response to the *new science* may be a lead to follow. > Shotter > > in his book refer's to Grassi's understanding of metaphor. > >? Others on this site have explored the relation of metaphor and thinking. > > Larry > > > > > > On Fri, Aug 23, 2013 at 11:44 AM, Sungwoo Kim >wrote: > > > >> Dear Larry Purss > >> > >> This is my first time to use this mailing list. I hope this message will > >> reach you somehow. > >> > >> I cannot directly address your questions due to my limited knowledge in > >> phenomenology, but recent work in cognitive linguistics, especially in > the > >> field of conceptual metaphor theory can shed some light on them. > >> > >> The traditional view on metaphor has regarded it as an ornamental device > >> in > >> rhetorical process. Thus it does not have direct impact upon our > thinking > >> process.However, a large body of work in cognitive linguistics since > >> Lakoff > >> and Johnson's seminal work *Metaphors We Live By *(1980) is showing that > >> metaphor is not merely rhetorical device, but a set of thinking > patterns, > >> some of which are universal and some culture-specific. This means that > >> using new metaphors can shape and direct our thinking processes. To put > it > >> another way, new metaphors can lead to new ways of thinking. For > >> example, Thibodeau and Boroditsky show that different kinds of metaphor > >> can > >> have substantial impact on our reasoning. Here's part of the abstract. > >> > >> "The way we talk about complex and abstract ideas is suffused with > >> metaphor. In five experiments, we explore how these metaphors influence > >> the > >> way that we reason about complex issues and forage for further > information > >> about them. We find that even the subtlest instantiation of a metaphor > >> (via > >> a single word) can have a powerful influence over how people attempt to > >> solve social problems like crime and how they gather information to make > >> 'well-informed decisions." > >> > >> http://www-psych.stanford.edu/~lera/papers/crime-metaphors.pdf > >> > >> This principle of "metaphor-as-tihnking-pattern" has been adopted by > many > >> practitioners as well as researchers. Now it is applied in many fields > >> including counseling, consulting, web and application design, political > >> strategy planning, marketing, and so on. (Of course there are some > >> cautious > >> voices about the power of metaphor, too. e.g. > >> http://www.economist.com/blogs/johnson/2013/01/political-language) > >> > >> Sungwoo > >> > >> > >> On Thu, Aug 22, 2013 at 11:12 PM, Larry Purss > >> wrote: > >> > >> > Andy, > >> > > >> > Thanks for keepin > >> > Thanks for keeping this topic of sense and meaning alive. > >> > Mike also is drawing our attention to the mystery of the creative > >> process > >> > with this comment: "I agree, very clearly statements of the > >> sense/meaning > >> > relation, along with the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I > >> wanted > >> > to say, and thought, unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows." > >> > Thought, unembodied, returns to the hall of shadows. > >> > I have been reflecting on the phenomenological method or *bias* to > >> > prioritize *showing* as an action which brings thoughts from the > >> shadows. > >> > The concept or term "metaphor" which can itself be considered a > >> metaphor. > >> > Metaphor is derived from the verb *metapherein" which means "to > >> transfer" > >> > which originally described a CONCRETE reality [Ernesto Grassi]. > >> > Therefore *presenting* a new metaphor IS an argument or a reason [a > >> showing > >> > in phenomenological discourse] > >> > The question is if presenting [as a showing or gesture] a metaphor is > >> > presenting a *vehicle* or an "egg" which "carries" thoughts from > >> speaker to > >> > hearer [which suggests the word is then decoded and RE-presented in > the > >> > listener's "mind" > >> > Or, on the other hand, is presenting a metaphor actually metapherein > [a > >> > verb] which "transfers" [shifts, turns] knowing in a phenomenological > >> "aha" > >> > moment? Metaphor AS showing or presenting [FORMING sense], not > metaphor > >> as > >> > a *carrier* of thought which *represents* the sense of the speaker. > >> > I am "over my head" in these realms and my "logic" may be faulty, but > >> the > >> > power of metaphor as "hinge" or "pivot" seems central. > >> > Peter Jones made a comment on literacy and "representation" > >> > Ernesto Grassi is making the point that presenting [showing] a new > >> metaphor > >> > IS an argument producing a type of knowledge [sense] > >> > Can metapherein be *seen* [picture language] as new and novel ways of > >> > acting as transfering *sense* to *pictures* as a *psychological > >> instrument* > >> > and thus as a cultural resource? The ACT of 'transfer' as presentation > >> > within metaphor [something AS something else] understood as a > >> psychological > >> > and cultural tool, a PRACTICAL intersubjective resource with which > [and > >> > THROUGH which we think, act, and perceive. > >> > Sense AS perception & action mediated through felt experience which is > >> > "presented" [shown] through *turning* objects to present other sides > and > >> > therefore to perceive other aspects. Polysemy through metepherein as > one > >> > *way* of knowing as argumentation. > >> > This is questioning the relation between *forming* as > >> presentation/showing > >> > & > >> > *formed* as representation of what was previously presented. > >> > Merleau-Ponty's dynamic between sedimentation/spontaneityg this topic > of > >> > sense and meaning alive. > >> > > >> > Mike also is drawing our attention to the mystery of the creative > >> process > >> > with this comment: "I agree, very clearly statements of the > >> sense/meaning > >> > relation, along with the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I > >> wanted > >> > to say, and thought, unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows." > >> > > >> > Thought, unembodied, returns to the hall of shadows. > >> > I have been reflecting on the phenomenological method or *bias* to > >> > prioritize *showing* as an action which brings thoughts from the > >> shadows. > >> > > >> > The concept or term "metaphor" which can itself be considered a > >> metaphor. > >> > Metaphor is derived from the verb *metapherein" which means "to > >> transfer" > >> > which originally described a CONCRETE reality [Ernesto Grassi]. > >> > Therefore *presenting* a new metaphor IS an argument or a reason [a > >> showing > >> > in phenomenological discourse] > >> > The question is if presenting [as a showing or gesture] a metaphor is > >> > presenting a *vehicle* or an "egg" which "carries" thoughts from > >> speaker to > >> > hearer [which suggests the word is then decoded and RE-presented in > the > >> > listener's "mind" > >> > Or, on the other hand, is presenting a metaphor actually metapherein > [a > >> > verb] which "transfers" [shifts, turns] knowing in a phenomenological > >> "aha" > >> > moment? Metaphor AS showing or presenting [FORMING sense], not > metaphor > >> as > >> > a *carrier* of thought which *represents* the sense of the speaker. > >> > I am "over my head" in these realms and my "logic" may be faulty, but > >> the > >> > power of metaphor as "hinge" or "pivot" seems central. > >> > Peter Jones made a comment on literacy and "representation" > >> > Ernesto Grassi is making the point that presenting [showing] a new > >> metaphor > >> > IS an argument producing a type of knowledge [sense] > >> > Can metapherein be *seen* [picture language] as new and novel ways of > >> > acting as transfering *sense* by showing and creating metaphors > >> > as *pictures* as a *psychological instrument* and thus as a cultural > >> > resource? The ACT of 'transfer' as presentation within metaphor > >> [something > >> > AS something else] understood as a psychological and cultural tool, a > >> > PRACTICAL intersubjective resource with which [and THROUGH which] we > >> think, > >> > act, and perceive. > >> > Greg, I wonder if this showing is always volitional [under our > control] > >> or > >> > if we spontaneously "respond" intersubjectively? > >> > > >> >? Sense AS perception & action mediated through felt experience which > is > >> > "presented" [shown] through *turning* objects to present other sides > and > >> > therefore to perceive other aspects. Polysemy through metepherein as > one > >> > *way* of knowing as argumentation. Intersubjective not subjective. > >> > This is questioning the relation between > >> >? *forming* as presentation/showing > >> > & > >> >? *formed* as representation of what was previously presented. > >> > > >> > Merleau-Ponty's dynamic between sedimentation/spontaneity as > expressive > >> > cognition. > >> > > >> > I hope I am making sense in my drawing attention to the relation > between > >> > thoughts and shadows. > >> > Huw, asked if there is a question here? I would say the question is > the > >> > models of "sense" as presentations [showings] and representations. > >> > Merleau-Ponty understood words AS GESTURES. > >> > Is there any "truth" to this notion? > >> > Larry > >> > > >> > > >> > On Wed, Aug 21, 2013 at 11:24 PM, Andy Blunden > >> wrote: > >> > > >> > > I was just looking into this business about Vygotsky imputing > >> excessive > >> > > stablility to word meaning. The following key passage from Chapter 7 > >> of > >> > > "Thinking and Speech" does not, it appers to me, to imply such > >> stability: > >> > > > >> > >? ? "First, in inner speech, we find a predominance of the word?s > sense > >> > >? ? over its meaning. Paulhan significantly advanced the > psychological > >> > >? ? analysis of speech by introducing the distinction between a > word?s > >> > >? ? sense and meaning. A word?s sense is the aggregate of all the > >> > >? ? psychological facts that arise in our consciousness as a result > of > >> > >? ? the word. Sense is a dynamic, fluid, and complex formation which > >> has > >> > >? ? several zones that vary in their stability. Meaning is only one > of > >> > >? ? these zones of the sense that the word acquires in the context of > >> > >? ? speech. It is the most stable, unified, and precise of these > zones. > >> > >? ? In different contexts, a word?s sense changes. In contrast, > meaning > >> > >? ? is a comparatively fixed and stable point, one that remains > >> constant > >> > >? ? with all the changes of the word?s sense that are associated with > >> > >? ? its use in various contexts. Change in the word?s sense is a > basic > >> > >? ? factor in the semantic analysis of speech. The actual meaning of > >> the > >> > >? ? word is inconstant. In one operation, the word emerges with one > >> > >? ? meaning; in another, another is acquired. The dynamic nature of > >> > >? ? meaning leads us to Paulhan?s problem, to the problem of the > >> > >? ? relationship between meaning and sense. Isolated in the lexicon, > >> the > >> > >? ? word has only one meaning. However, this meaning is nothing more > >> > >? ? than a potential that can only be realized in living speech, and > in > >> > >? ? living speech meaning is only a cornerstone in the edifice of > >> sense." > >> > > > >> > > As I read this, the stability of meaning is merely relative to that > of > >> > > sense, i.e., in the context of speech, rather than "teh aggregate of > >> all > >> > > psychological facts." He is not at all denying the fact of polysemy > or > >> > the > >> > > cultural and historical migration of meaning. > >> > > > >> > > Andy > >> > > mike cole wrote: > >> > > > >> > >> I agree, very clearly statements of the sense/meaning relation, > along > >> > with > >> > >> the Mandelshtam line, " I forgot the thought I wanted to say, and > >> > thought, > >> > >> unembodied, returned to the hall of shadows." > >> > >> > >> > >> In the quote here, I think LSV is somewhat overstating the > stability > >> of > >> > >> meaning across contexts; yes relative to the microgenetic processes > >> of > >> > >> sense making capturable with > >> > >> modern technologies, but not totally "context independent." Even > >> > >> dictionary > >> > >> meanings change, as LSV was well aware from his interest in the > >> history > >> > of > >> > >> words in relation to their appearance in children's vocabularies in > >> > >> ontogeny. > >> > >> > >> > >> Keeping the simultaneous relevance of several time scales in mind > in > >> > these > >> > >> discussions seems really important, as hard as it is to do. > >> > >> mike > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > > >> > > >> > >> > >> > >> -- > >> > >> Peace, > >> Sungwoo Kim > >> Learner, Teacher, Researcher, Blogger > >> Photos: *https://there.jux.com/* > >> Personal: http://www.sungwookim.com > >> > > > > > -- Peace, Sungwoo Kim Learner, Teacher, Researcher, Blogger Photos: *https://there.jux.com/* Personal: http://www.sungwookim.com From ablunden@mira.net Wed Aug 28 22:25:47 2013 From: ablunden@mira.net (Andy Blunden) Date: Thu, 29 Aug 2013 15:25:47 +1000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A Question about Reading and Motivation In-Reply-To: References: <521DA666.2030203@mira.net> <521DB834.9060301@open.ac.uk> <521E8D07.9010701@mira.net> <521EBDD2.9000601@mira.net> Message-ID: <521EDB5B.9000009@mira.net> Yes, all 3 modes of collaboration, Larry. I think this is a gap in Activity Theory. I don't think "subjective" or personal motive becoming the "objective" or "merely understood" motive copes with the issue of motivation or the psychological import of joining a project. Literacy education is not my archetype though, so it was a bit of a struggle for me to get this. I have learnt that reading itself responds to at least 4 distinct types of motive, so these concepts of collaboration far from exhaust the problem. Andy ------------------------------------------------------------------------ *Andy Blunden* http://home.mira.net/~andy/ Larry Purss wrote: > Andy, > > I have wondered if in a culture where hunting with bows and arrows is > valued, the child grows ups motivated to be skilled with using a bow. > Is the motivation *learning to read* the identification of wanting to > be like the others who participate in your world. > In our culture, [especially within schools], if reading is the way > people participate in sharing narrative than this MODE of > communication is valued. Is identification with doing what others are > doing a motivation? > > Beginning reading activity is a form of collaboration. As you > mentioned, collaboration may be master/slave, producer/consumer, or > collaboration per se. However, the activity *learning to read* can be > displayed in all three types of collaboration. The motivation is > identification WITH ...??? in all 3 types of collaboration. > > Larry > > > > > On Wed, Aug 28, 2013 at 8:19 PM, Andy Blunden > wrote: > > So what this leads to is that my earlier formulation of > motivations for reading which can create the conditions for > someone to "learn to read" has to be generalised. And I guess that > different "interests" or "pleasures" to be had from reading can be > used to make an effective motive for reading. But I am trying to > put my finger on the differene between offering a "reward" for > reading and the object which turns out to be attainable > essentially only through reading, be that the satisfaction of > solving an integral equation, or the joy of entering Jane Austen's > world or simply being able to read what everyone is talking about. > Does this mean that the teacher's task is to somehow allow the > learner, with assistance, to get a taste of that object, whichever > it is that turns on this reader? > > > Andy > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > > > mike cole wrote: > > Yes, once one learns to read for meaning in Dewey's sense, and > mine, marvelous things may result. > > The acquisition of reading, however, is not governed by > phylogenetic constraints in the same way that the acquisition > of oral/sign language is. It is a cultural-historically > developed mode of mediated meaning making. With few > exceptions, it requires literate others to arrange for it to > happen. > > Consequently, getting there through the meat grinder of modern > schooling, is a continuing > issue. As is the notion of the violence of literacy. > > mike > (The Dickens freak) > > > On Wed, Aug 28, 2013 at 4:51 PM, Andy Blunden > > >> wrote: > > Thank you Michael! It is always such a wonderful thing when > someone reveals to you what was before your eyes but you > didn't > see! I had to put down a novel to read your message. I think I > take "the world" to be inclusive of imaginative world > evoked by a > text, and suddenly, yes, I can see that youngsters > generally read > lots of fiction and if they enjoy it, that is a royal road to > becoming a reader - even though, in a sense, the printed words > disappear under their gaze as they evoke that imaginary > world. I > also think the social motivations are broadly covered by my > initial very 'utilitarian' view of the object of reading. > But what > you describe as "the intellectual pleasure of figuring > something > out," which I guess is one of the things that used to > motivate me > at school with maths, and that is something else! Thank > you. The > world is always richer than what one at first thought, > isn't it? > Andy > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > > > > > MICHAEL W SMITH wrote: > > > A colleague and I just completed a study of the nature and > variety of pleasure adolescents take from their > out-of-school > reading that draws on Dewey?s delineation of four kinds of > educative interest in /Interest and Effort in > Education. /One > kind of pleasure we identified is what we call work > pleasure > in which readers use a text as a tool to accomplish > some other > end. That?s the kind of pleasure that Andy seems to be > talking > about when he writes about someone?s struggling to read a > philosophical text to get something out of it that > could then > be usefully employed in some other context. But there are > other kinds of pleasure. As Dewey explains ?There are > cases > where action is direct and immediate. It puts itself forth > with no thought of anything beyond. It satisfies in and of > itself. The end is the present activity, and so there > is no > gap in the mind between means and end. All play is of this > immediate character.? Readers experience the pleasure > of play > when they read narratives to immerse themselves in a story > world. What matters to them is the pleasure they get from > living through the experiences of characters in the > here and > now not what they can accomplish as a consequence of their > reading at some future time. Another kind of pleasure is > intellectual pleasure. Dewey explains that ?instead of > thinking things out and discovering them for the sake > of the > successful achievement of an activity (work > pleasure),? we may > institute an activity for the intellectual pleasure of > figuring something out. An example would be reading to > unravel the complexities of poem as an end in itself. > Finally > there are social pleasures in reading. People read to > affiliate with others. That seems to me to be a kind of > pleasure people on this listserv take. Or people read > to mark > their place in the world. They do a kind of identity > work by > using their reading to assert their difference from > others. > One of the informants in our study avoided reading > the books > that were most popular among her friends and instead > read what > she called dark fiction. That reading was an important > part of > how she understood herself. As she said ?I?m weird in > the way > that [I don't have] inhibitions like most people. I > can read > dark fiction and not be disturbed by it.? I?d argue that > teachers are most likely to foster motivation to read by > creating contexts in which students can experience all > four > kinds of pleasure. > > > > On Wed, Aug 28, 2013 at 4:43 AM, rjsp2 > > > > > > >>> wrote: > > The first thing I thought on reading "assistance > is given > to kids to > > read in order to find out something they want to know > about the world" > was "This is basic Freire". Adult literacy had > the same > problem of > meaningless texts till Freire came along and started > teaching them > about > things that mattered to them. It also made me > reflect on > the idea of > motive, whihc has for a long time been a question > I have been > intending > to examine "when I have time". When I met the > activity > triangle, > one of > the most obvious issues about it was that it > contains no > separate > place > for motive. After a while that seemed logical > because the > motive > was in > the object, and maybe one of our difficulties is > that we > separate > motive > out from object in order to understand it better, > and then > forget > to put > it back in again. > > Children are just like people, they do need a > reason to do > things. > I've > always been puzzled by the idea of andragogy, the > suggestion that > adults > learn differently from children. Proponents > usually list > several > reasons > which usually make no sense to me. One of the reasons > usually given is > that adults need to know why they are doing > something, the > unspoken > contrast being presumably that children happily do > what > they're told. > The kind of research you refer to here, Andy, > suggests that > children do > need to know why they are doing something, but > lack the > power to > say so. > Hence, I think, a lot of the problems evident in > our UK > schooling > system > (lots of great schools, in my opinion, dreadful > educational policies > dictate that children are machined through exams > in order > to maintain > the school's place in the league table. So there is a > reason why the > children do what they do, it is just not relevant > to the > child.) > > Rob > > > On 28/08/2013 08:27, Andy Blunden wrote: > > Re: Peg Griffin - > > http://lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/Mail/xmcamail.2011_05.dir/msg00530.html > and Peg and Mike et al: > http://lchc.ucsd.edu/People/NEWTECHN.pdf > > The first article sets up a scenario in 5thD > where kids > "sneak" a look > at piece of writing in order to find an answer > to a > current > affairs > question. As opposed to telling the kids to read a > text and > then (for > example) testing them on it. > The second talks about "reading for meaning" where > assistance > is given > to kids to read in order to find out something > they > want to > know about > the world. As opposed to decoding "Jack and > Jill" stories > containing > nothing of interest to them at all (and actually > humiliating). > > I am trying to get my head around the issue of the > motivation > which > the teachers are trying to engender in the > child which > facilitates > learning to read. > > Following A N Leontyev, Peg talks about the > "merely > understood" motive > for the child "to be a productive, informed, > literate > citizen" > which > is what the education system is supposed to be > doing. > Peg says > this > motive was "in the social interactions and > ready to > replace the > 'really effective' motives that got the kid to > come > to/put up > with our > reading group." ... *in the social interactions*! > > Generally speaking I think there is no doubt > that the > distinction > between "really effective" and "merely understood" > motives is > valid, > and that in general children who have > difficulty in > reading, > read only > for "effective" but "external" motives which > do not > succeed in > them > learning to read effectively. Further, the > task of the > teacher > may be > or may be supposed to be to get the child to > learn to > read so > as "to > be a productive, informed, literate citizen." This > objective is > somewhere in the complex of motives underlying > a teacher's > motives, > certainly in 5thD, but I suspect often a "merely > understood" > motive > for many teachers, alongside earning a wage > for their > own family, > having a quiet day and the kids getting good test > scores, etc. > > But I question whether it is *ever* the > child's motive > "to be a > productive, informed, literate citizen." This > may be > an "internal > reward" for learning to read, but not for > learning to > read any > particular text or even a particular type of text. > > Would this explanation make sense: Learning to > read is > like > happiness. > It does not generally arise through being the > motivation of the > activity which produces it. People learn to > read as a > byproduct of > struggling to get something they want out of > particular texts. And > this applies to adults as much as children. I > think > people can > only > learn to read philosophy if they are > struggling to get > something out > of a book on philosophy (other than pass the > exam or > acquire > an air of > erudition). In Peg's email message we learn > that the kids > jumped on > the newspaper article to extract information they > wanted in > (what they > took to be) /another/ task. In the QAR story, > adults > mediate kids' > relation to a text which is in turn mediating > their > real and > meaningful relation to the world. (I think if > a kid is > strongly enough > motivated to pass a reading test, and > assisted, they > will usually > manage to learn to read, but it is for those > for whom > this doesn't > work that the issue arises, isn't it?) > > But in general I think it is neither necessary nor > likely that > a child > has their eye on becoming a literate citizen > when they > struggle with a > text and learn to read in the process. Isn't > it always > more > proximate > motives? The "internal" reward in reading a > particular > text is the > particular content of that text, not actually > anything > to do with > books, or texts, or reading or citizenship. > > I know there are dozens of experts in literacy > education out > there, so > please help me. > > Andy > > > -- The Open University is incorporated by Royal > Charter (RC > 000391), an exempt charity in England & Wales and > a charity > registered in Scotland (SC 038302). > > > > > -- Michael W. Smith > Professor and Chair > Department of Teaching and Learning > Temple University > College of Education > 351 Ritter Hall > 1301 Cecil B. Moore Avenue > Philadelphia, PA 19122 > > > > > From dkirsh@lsu.edu Wed Aug 28 23:39:14 2013 From: dkirsh@lsu.edu (David H Kirshner) Date: Thu, 29 Aug 2013 06:39:14 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A Question about Reading and Motivation In-Reply-To: References: <521DA666.2030203@mira.net> <521DB834.9060301@open.ac.uk> <521E8D07.9010701@mira.net> <521EBDD2.9000601@mira.net> Message-ID: <1F3A303FB8B8A9429CE2720B7C8D4B7338162E59@BY2PRD0610MB354.namprd06.prod.outlook.com> In thinking about the relationship between socialization and identity, I find it useful to distinguish between two distinct notions of socialization: spontaneous enculturation into a unitary cultural milieu, and deliberate acculturation into a subculture whose practices are distinctive among a range of other subcultures'. The social psychology of personal space, or proxemics (Hall, 1966; Li, 2001), provides a clear example of the former. Proxemics is the tendency for members of a national culture to draw specific perimeters around their physical bodies for various social purposes. For example, natives of France tend to prefer closer physical proximity for conversation than do Americans (Remland, Jones, & Brinkman, 1991). What is interesting about proxemic practices (and enculturation, more generally) is that they are acquired without volition or conscious awareness through enmeshment in a cultural environment (Parsons, 1951). Indeed, as Omar (2010) explains, for cultural norms to be "normative" they have to be unconscious: "Parsons defined 'internalization' as 'unconscious introjection' which meant that if an actor was socialized into a norm, then the actor was unconscious of how that norm determined her conduct. In essence, the Parsonian socialized actor cannot take norms as an object of reflexive consideration and strategization, for if that were the case then the norm would lose its status as 'normative' and would become just another instrumental resource for action." The counterpart to spontaneous processes of enculturation into an enveloping culture, is an individual's deliberate adaptation to a subculture through emulation of its distinctive practices. For obvious reasons, acculturation is the more salient process, and historically was identified much earlier (Powell, 1883). Indeed, we might not be aware of proxemic practices at all, if not for crosscultural experience and scholarship. But by the same token, we probably should assume that enculturation is a ubiquitous aspect of cultural participation. Even in cases when one actively seeks membership in a subculture through acculturationist strategies, enculturation is the more basic processes; a culture is comprised of innumerable cultural practices of which only a limited number can be addressed through conscious strategies of acculturation. For a practice like reading, it can be difficult to parse where enculturation leaves off and acculturation begins. Literacy, obviously, is an important subcultural marker of certain social classes. As such, practices of reading can be undertaken as a strategy of acculturation. Even within a household, a child may see literacy as a means of projecting oneself into the subculture of adulthood over one's current identity as a child (am I pushing the notion of subculture too far?). On the other hand, at a more fine-grained level of analysis, there may be a wide variety of culturally specific manners of reading that are not consciously recognized as subcultural markers, and hence absorbed spontaneously through enculturation. David Hall, E. T. (1966) The hidden dimension. New York: Doubleday. Li, S. (2001). How close is too close?: A comparison of proxemic reactions of Singaporean Chinese to male intruders of four ethnicities. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 93, 124-126. Omar (2010, January 16). Is your (institutional) theory "Parsonian"? A technical criterion. Orgtheory.net. Parsons, T. (1951). The social system. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Powell, J. W. (1883). Human evolution: Annual address of the President, J. W. Powell, Delivered November 6, 1883. Transactions of the Anthropological Society of Washington, 2, 176-208. Remland, M.S., Jones, T. S., & Brinkman, H. (1991). Proxemic and haptic behavior in three European countries. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 15(4), 215-232. -----Original Message----- From: xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu [mailto:xmca-l-bounces@mailman.ucsd.edu] On Behalf Of Larry Purss Sent: Wednesday, August 28, 2013 11:41 PM To: Andy Blunden; eXtended Mind, Culture, Activity Subject: [Xmca-l] Re: A Question about Reading and Motivation Andy, I have wondered if in a culture where hunting with bows and arrows is valued, the child grows ups motivated to be skilled with using a bow. Is the motivation *learning to read* the identification of wanting to be like the others who participate in your world. In our culture, [especially within schools], if reading is the way people participate in sharing narrative than this MODE of communication is valued. Is identification with doing what others are doing a motivation? Beginning reading activity is a form of collaboration. As you mentioned, collaboration may be master/slave, producer/consumer, or collaboration per se. However, the activity *learning to read* can be displayed in all three types of collaboration. The motivation is identification WITH ...??? in all 3 types of collaboration. Larry On Wed, Aug 28, 2013 at 8:19 PM, Andy Blunden wrote: > So what this leads to is that my earlier formulation of motivations > for reading which can create the conditions for someone to "learn to > read" has to be generalised. And I guess that different "interests" or > "pleasures" to be had from reading can be used to make an effective motive for reading. > But I am trying to put my finger on the differene between offering a > "reward" for reading and the object which turns out to be attainable > essentially only through reading, be that the satisfaction of solving > an integral equation, or the joy of entering Jane Austen's world or > simply being able to read what everyone is talking about. Does this > mean that the teacher's task is to somehow allow the learner, with > assistance, to get a taste of that object, whichever it is that turns on this reader? > > > Andy > ------------------------------**------------------------------** > ------------ > *Andy Blunden* > http://home.mira.net/~andy/ > > > mike cole wrote: > >> Yes, once one learns to read for meaning in Dewey's sense, and mine, >> marvelous things may result. >> >> The acquisition of reading, however, is not governed by phylogenetic >> constraints in the same way that the acquisition of oral/sign language is. >> It is a cultural-historically developed mode of mediated meaning making. >> With few exceptions, it requires literate others to arrange for it to >> happen. >> >> Consequently, getting there through the meat grinder of modern >> schooling, is a continuing issue. As is the notion of the violence of >> literacy. >> >> mike >> (The Dickens freak) >> >> >> On Wed, Aug 28, 2013 at 4:51 PM, Andy Blunden > ablunden@mira.net>> wrote: >> >> Thank you Michael! It is always such a wonderful thing when >> someone reveals to you what was before your eyes but you didn't >> see! I had to put down a novel to read your message. I think I >> take "the world" to be inclusive of imaginative world evoked by a >> text, and suddenly, yes, I can see that youngsters generally read >> lots of fiction and if they enjoy it, that is a royal road to >> becoming a reader - even though, in a sense, the printed words >> disappear under their gaze as they evoke that imaginary world. I >> also think the social motivations are broadly covered by my >> initial very 'utilitarian' view of the object of reading. But what >> you describe as "the intellectual pleasure of figuring something >> out," which I guess is one of the things that used to motivate me >> at school with maths, and that is something else! Thank you. The >> world is always richer than what one at first thought, isn't it? >> Andy >> ------------------------------**------------------------------** >> ------------ >> *Andy Blunden* >> http://home.mira.net/~andy/ >> >> >> >> MICHAEL W SMITH wrote: >> >> >> A colleague and I just completed a study of the nature and >> variety of pleasure adolescents take from their out-of-school >> reading that draws on Dewey's delineation of four kinds of >> educative interest in /Interest and Effort in Education. /One >> kind of pleasure we identified is what we call work pleasure >> in which readers use a text as a tool to accomplish some other >> end. That's the kind of pleasure that Andy seems to be talking >> about when he writes about someone's struggling to read a >> philosophical text to get something out of it that could then >> be usefully employed in some other context. But there are >> other kinds of pleasure. As Dewey explains "There are cases >> where action is direct and immediate. It puts itself forth >> with no thought of anything beyond. It satisfies in and of >> itself. The end is the present activity, and so there is no >> gap in the mind between means and end. All play is of this >> immediate character." Readers experience the pleasure of play >> when they read narratives to immerse themselves in a story >> world. What matters to them is the pleasure they get from >> living through the experiences of characters in the here and >> now not what they can accomplish as a consequence of their >> reading at some future time. Another kind of pleasure is >> intellectual pleasure. Dewey explains that "instead of >> thinking things out and discovering them for the sake of the >> successful achievement of an activity (work pleasure)," we may >> institute an activity for the intellectual pleasure of >> figuring something out. An example would be reading to >> unravel the complexities of poem as an end in itself. Finally >> there are social pleasures in reading. People read to >> affiliate with others. That seems to me to be a kind of >> pleasure people on this listserv take. Or people read to mark >> their place in the world. They do a kind of identity work by >> using their reading to assert their difference from others. >> One of the informants in our study avoided reading the books >> that were most popular among her friends and instead read what >> she called dark fiction. That reading was an important part of >> how she understood herself. As she said "I'm weird in the way >> that [I don't have] inhibitions like most people. I can read >> dark fiction and not be disturbed by it." I'd argue that >> teachers are most likely to foster motivation to read by >> creating contexts in which students can experience all four >> kinds of pleasure. >> >> >> >> On Wed, Aug 28, 2013 at 4:43 AM, rjsp2 >> > >> > >> >> >> > >>> >> wrote: >> >> The first thing I thought on reading "assistance is given >> to kids to >> >> read in order to find out something they want to know >> about the world" >> was "This is basic Freire". Adult literacy had the same >> problem of >> meaningless texts till Freire came along and started >> teaching them >> about >> things that mattered to them. It also made me reflect on >> the idea of >> motive, whihc has for a long time been a question I have been >> intending >> to examine "when I have time". When I met the activity >> triangle, >> one of >> the most obvious issues about it was that it contains no >> separate >> place >> for motive. After a while that seemed logical because the >> motive >> was in >> the object, and maybe one of our difficulties is that we >> separate >> motive >> out from object in order to understand it better, and then >> forget >> to put >> it back in again. >> >> Children are just like people, they do need a reason to do >> things. >> I've >> always been puzzled by the idea of andragogy, the >> suggestion that >> adults >> learn differently from children. Proponents usually list >> several >> reasons >> which usually make no sense to me. One of the reasons >> usually given is >> that adults need to know why they are doing something, the >> unspoken >> contrast being presumably that children happily do what >> they're told. >> The kind of research you refer to here, Andy, suggests that >> children do >> need to know why they are doing something, but lack the >> power to >> say so. >> Hence, I think, a lot of the problems evident in our UK >> schooling >> system >> (lots of great schools, in my opinion, dreadful >> educational policies >> dictate that children are machined through exams in order >> to maintain >> the school's place in the league table. So there is a >> reason why the >> children do what they do, it is just not relevant to the >> child.) >> >> Rob >> >> >> On 28/08/2013 08:27, Andy Blunden wrote: >> >> Re: Peg Griffin - >> http://lchc.ucsd.edu/MCA/Mail/** >> xmcamail.2011_05.dir/msg00530.**html >> and Peg and Mike et al: >> >> http://lchc.ucsd.edu/People/**NEWTECHN.pdf> e/NEWTECHN.pdf> >> >> The first article sets up a scenario in 5thD where kids >> "sneak" a look >> at piece of writing in order to find an answer to a >> current >> affairs >> question. As opposed to telling the kids to read a >> text and >> then (for >> example) testing them on it. >> The second talks about "reading for meaning" where >> assistance >> is given >> to kids to read in order to find out something they >> want to >> know about >> the world. As opposed to decoding "Jack and Jill" stories >> containing >> nothing of interest to them at all (and actually >> humiliating). >> >> I am trying to get my head around the issue of the >> motivation >> which >> the teachers are trying to engender in the child which >> facilitates >> learning to read. >> >> Following A N Leontyev, Peg talks about the "merely >> understood" motive >> for the child "to be a productive, informed, literate >> citizen" >> which >> is what the education system is supposed to be doing. >> Peg says >> this >> motive was "in the social interactions and ready to >> replace the >> 'really effective' motives that got the kid to come >> to/put up >> with our >> reading group." ... *in the social interactions*! >> >> Generally speaking I think there is no doubt that the >> distinction >> between "really effective" and "merely understood" >> motives is >> valid, >> and that in general children who have difficulty in >> reading, >> read only >> for "effective" but "external" motives which do not >> succeed in >> them >> learning to read effectively. Further, the task of the >> teacher >> may be >> or may be supposed to be to get the child to learn to >> read so >> as "to >> be a productive, informed, literate citizen." This >> objective is >> somewhere in the complex of motives underlying a teacher's >> motives, >> certainly in 5thD, but I suspect often a "merely >> understood" >> motive >> for many teachers, alongside earning a wage for their >> own family, >> having a quiet day and the kids getting good test >> scores, etc. >> >> But I question whether it is *ever* the child's motive >> "to be a >> productive, informed, literate citizen." This may be >> an "internal >> reward" for learning to read, but not for learning to >> read any >> particular text or even a particular type of text. >> >> Would this explanation make sense: Learning to read is >> like >> happiness. >> It does not generally arise through being the >> motivation of the >> activity which produces it. People learn to read as a >> byproduct of >> struggling to get something they want out of >> particular texts. And >> this applies to adults as much as children. I think >> people can >> only >> learn to read philosophy if they are struggling to get >> something out >> of a book on philosophy (other than pass the exam or >> acquire >> an air of >> erudition). In Peg's email message we learn that the kids >> jumped on >> the newspaper article to extract information they >> wanted in >> (what they >> took to be) /another/ task. In the QAR story, adults >> mediate kids' >> relation to a text which is in turn mediating their >> real and >> meaningful relation to the world. (I think if a kid is >> strongly enough >> motivated to pass a reading test, and assisted, they >> will usually >> manage to learn to read, but it is for those for whom >> this doesn't >> work that the issue arises, isn't it?) >> >> But in general I think it is neither necessary nor >> likely that >> a child >> has their eye on becoming a literate citizen when they >> struggle with a >> text and learn to read in the process. Isn't it always >> more >> proximate >> motives? The "internal" reward in reading a particular >> text is the >> particular content of that text, not actually anything >> to do with >> books, or texts, or reading or citizenship. >> >> I know there are dozens of experts in literacy >> education out >> there, so >> please help me. >> >> Andy >> >> >> -- The Open University is incorporated by Royal Charter (RC >> 000391), an exempt charity in England & Wales and a charity >> registered in Scotland (SC 038302). >> >> >> >> >> -- Michael W. Smith >> Professor and Chair >> Department of Teaching and Learning >> Temple University >> College of Education >> 351 Ritter Hall >> 1301 Cecil B. Moore Avenue >> Philadelphia, PA 19122 >> >> >> >> > From smago@uga.edu Thu Aug 29 02:42:01 2013 From: smago@uga.edu (Peter Smagorinsky) Date: Thu, 29 Aug 2013 09:42:01 +0000 Subject: [Xmca-l] FW: A.Word.A.Day--prolepsis In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: Mike's favorite word hits the big time! From: Wordsmith [mailto:wsmith@wordsmith.org] Sent: Thursday, August 29, 2013 12:05 AM To: Peter Smagorinsky Subject: A.Word.A.Day--prolepsis Wordsmith.org The Magic of Words Enjoy The Greatest Books & Never Read a Word Listen to the 100 Greatest Books of All Time preloaded on an mp3 player enjoytheclassics . com How to be a sponsor Aug 29, 2013 This week's theme Words and Medicine This week's words apheresis syncope aspirate prolepsis Erratum Yesterday's A THOUGHT FOR TODAY should have been attributed to Charles John Darling. ________________________________ [Bookmark and Share][Facebook][Twitter][Digg][MySpace][Bookmark and Share] A.Word.A.Day with Anu Garg prolepsis PRONUNCIATION: (pro-LEP-sis) [http://wordsmith.org/words/images/sound-icon.png] MEANING: noun: 1. The use of a descriptive word in anticipation of the result. Example: The word hot in hot water heater. 2. The anticipation and answering of an objection or argument before it's raised. Also known as prebuttal. 3. The representation of an event before it actually happened. Example: He lost the game even before the match began. 4. The anachronistic representation of an event before its actual time. Also known as prochronism. Example: A depiction of people talking wirelessly over long distances in 18th century. 5. A literary technique in which the author drops hints of things to come. Also known as foreshadowing. 6. The return of a paroxysm of a periodic disease before its usual time or at progressively shorter intervals. ETYMOLOGY: >From Greek prolepsis, from prolambanein (to anticipate), from pro- (before) + lambanein (to take). Earliest documented use: 1450. USAGE: "As preservationists and residents threatened with displacement join 're-open Charity' proponents, planners symbolically engage in prolepsis, rhetorically precluding opposing arguments with flash forward of supposedly 'done deals.'" Anne Lovell; Debating Life After Disaster; Medical Anthropology Quarterly; Jun 2011. "You have no right to interrupt the council's session, and such a dangerous prolepsis as this will not be allowed to change the debate." Kim Stanley Robinson; Galileo's Dream; Spectra; 2009. "The thought threw me into a vernal prolepsis, a mental flash-forward to spring." Verlyn Klinkenborg; The Farm From Afar; The New York Times; Mar 22, 2013. Explore "prolepsis" in the Visual Thesaurus. A THOUGHT FOR TODAY: A quiet conscience sleeps in thunder. -English proverb Unsubscribe | Subscribe | Update address | Gift subscription | Contact us (c) 2013 Wordsmith.org From lchcmike@gmail.com Thu Aug 29 09:33:42 2013 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Thu, 29 Aug 2013 09:33:42 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: soc sci opportunity! please share with colleagues In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: An unusual way to go on the job front. mike Dear Social Science Colleagues, I'm writing to alert to a unique opportunity to connect your social science research to decision-making and to encourage you to develop a partnership with NOAA to do so. The National Science Foundation Science, Engineering, and Education for Sustainability (SEES) Program is offering a one to three year SEES Fellowship in which scientists partner with, and are based at, a government agency. The Fellowship, which targets interdisciplinary research and education, enables scientists to apply their research to management and policy priorities by working directly with Federal program managers and decision makers. Consequently, this Fellowship is a unique opportunity to learn first hand how science can be transitioned to policy. Social science is gaining increased attention within NOAA and, consequently, we are seeking partnerships with social scientists who would like to apply their research to NOAA priorities - weather, climate, coasts and fisheries. We are particularly keen to pursue partnerships related to the following social science areas: Risk communication to understand how best to convey hazard warnings to the public Weather response behavior to understand how to ensure timely and effective protective actions Socioeconomic assessments to optimize marine fisheries management Ecosystem service valuations to demonstrate the importance of coastal management Interdisciplinary decision support work for climate assessments Social coastal vulnerabilities to understand and mitigate risk Incorporation of economics into resource damage assessments Understanding and communicating the value of NOAA's products and services To pursue this opportunity, please review the NSF Fellowship solicitation ( http://www.nsf.gov/funding/pgm_summ.jsp?pims_id=504673 - click solicitation 12-601) . This opportunity is open to early-career scholars (within 36 months of receiving their Ph.D. and not tenure-track). SEES awards provide salary support, research expenses and travel support for a maximum of 3 years. Twenty awards ( http://www.nsf.gov/geo/oce/programs/sees-fellows-awards-fy-2012.pdf? WT.si_n=ClickedAbstractsRecentAwards&WT.si_x=1&WT.si_cs=1 &WT.z_pims_id=504673&) were granted last year. Proposals are due November 21, 2013. Questions about NSF-specific issues can be addressed to Dr. Robert O'Connor (roconnor@nsf.gov). If your interests are relevant to the above NOAA topics, and you would like to pursue a partnership, please contact me and I will connect you with NOAA colleagues with relevant interests. Please note there is no set-aside for this announcement. Proposals for SBE investigators to spend time at NOAA must compete with all the other proposals. Nevertheless, our interest in working with you should lead to strong proposals. Please share this announcement with potentially interested colleagues. We looking forward to building a partnership with you! Leah - Leah Bunce Karrer, Ph.D. Social Science Team Office of Program Planning and Integration National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 1315 East-West Highway Silver Spring, MD 29210 leah.karrer@noaa.gov 202 679-6640 (cell) ** -- ** Penny Dockry Center for Marine Biodiversity and Conservation 858-822-2790 pdockry@ucsd.edu From lchcmike@gmail.com Fri Aug 30 15:05:13 2013 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2013 15:05:13 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] Post-Doctoral Position at Harvard University In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Felix Warneken Date: Fri, Aug 30, 2013 at 9:14 AM Subject: [COGDEVSOC] Post-Doctoral Position at Harvard University To: cogdevsoc@virginia.edu *Post-Doctoral Position in Developmental Psychology at Harvard University* DESCRIPTION: Associate Professor Dr. Felix Warneken is seeking to hire a post-doctoral fellow to conduct research on the development of cooperative behaviors and social cognition in children. Our lab uses experimental methods to study the psychological processes underlying cooperative behaviors such as helping, resource sharing, and peer collaboration. The post-doctoral researcher is expected to conduct research on an NSF-funded project that investigates the ontogeny of cooperation by combining developmental, social-psychological, and evolutionary approaches ( http://nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1253676). The post-doctoral researcher will participate in the intellectual life of Dr. Warneken?s Social Cognitive Development Group, which is part of the Harvard Laboratory for Developmental Studies at Harvard?s Department of Psychology. For more information see https://software.rc.fas.harvard.edu/lds/. The position is for two years. Review of materials will begin immediately and will continue until the position is filled. QUALIFICATIONS: A Ph.D. in Psychology or a related field is required. Research experience in experimental psychology is expected and familiarity testing especially young children is desired. U.S. Citizenship is not required. TO APPLY: Candidates should send a CV, a statement of interest (not exceeding 2 pages), and 2 reprints or preprints to Natalie Benjamin at nbenjamin@fas.harvard.edu. Please arrange for 3 letters of reference to be sent to the same address. =========== To post to the CDS listserv, send your message to: cogdevsoc@virginia.edu (If you belong to the listserv and have not included any large attachments, your message will be posted without moderation--so be careful!) To leave the CDS listserv, send a message to sympa@virginia.edu. The subject line should read: "unsubscribe cogdevsoc" (no quotes). Leave the message body blank. For other information about the listserv, including how to update your email address and how to subscribe, visit http://www.cogdevsoc.org/listserv.php ============ -------------- next part -------------- =========== To post to the CDS listserv, send your message to: cogdevsoc@virginia.edu (If you belong to the listserv and have not included any large attachments, your message will be posted without moderation--so be careful!) To leave the CDS listserv, send a message to sympa@virginia.edu. The subject line should read: "unsubscribe cogdevsoc" (no quotes). Leave the message body blank. For other information about the listserv, including how to update your email address and how to subscribe, visit http://www.cogdevsoc.org/listserv.php ============ From lchcmike@gmail.com Fri Aug 30 15:05:48 2013 From: lchcmike@gmail.com (mike cole) Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2013 15:05:48 -0700 Subject: [Xmca-l] Fwd: [COGDEVSOC] POSITION: ASSISTANT PROFESSOR IN DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: David Barner Date: Thu, Aug 29, 2013 at 10:34 AM Subject: [COGDEVSOC] POSITION: ASSISTANT PROFESSOR IN DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO To: cogdevsoc Dear all, Please circulate this position announcement. Regards, Dave Barner ------------------- Academic Title: Assistant Professor Description: DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO. The Psychology Department (http://psy.ucsd.edu/) within the Division of Social Sciences at UC, San Diego is committed to academic excellence and diversity within the faculty, staff and student body. The Department invites applications for a tenure track Assistant Professor position in Developmental Psychology. Candidates must have a Ph.D. and have a record of publishable research in any area of developmental psychology, including cognitive, perceptual, and social development. The preferred candidate will have demonstrated strong leadership or a commitment to support diversity, equity, and inclusion in an academic setting. Salary: Salary is commensurate with qualifications and based on University of California pay scales. Closing Date: Review of applications will begin November 1, 2013 and will continue until the position is filled. To Apply: Candidates should submit cover letter, curriculum vitae, research statement, teaching statement, reprints, names of three to five referees, and a personal statement that summarizes their past or potential contributions to diversity (see http://facultyequity.ucsd.edu/Faculty-Applicant-C2D-Info.asp for further information) electronically via UCSD's Academic Personnel On-Line RECRUIT at https://apol-recruit.ucsd.edu/apply/JPF00386. Please apply to the following job posting: Psychology Assistant Professor (10-592). UCSD is an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Employer with a strong institutional commitment to excellence through diversity. -- David Barner, Ph.D. Associate Professor Departments of Psychology & Linguistics University of California, San Diego 5336 McGill Hall, 9500 Gilman Drive La Jolla, CA 92093-0109 t: 858-246-0874 f: 858-534-7190 http://www.ladlab.com =========== To post to the CDS listserv, send your message to: cogdevsoc@virginia.edu (If you belong to the listserv and have not included any large attachments, your message will be posted without moderation--so be careful!) To leave the CDS listserv, send a message to sympa@virginia.edu. The subject line should read: "unsubscribe cogdevsoc" (no quotes). Leave the message body blank. For other information about the listserv, including how to update your email address and how to subscribe, visit http://www.cogdevsoc.org/listserv.php ============ -------------- next part -------------- =========== To post to the CDS listserv, send your message to: cogdevsoc@virginia.edu (If you belong to the listserv and have not included any large attachments, your message will be posted without moderation--so be careful!) To leave the CDS listserv, send a message to sympa@virginia.edu. The subject line should read: "unsubscribe cogdevsoc" (no quotes). Leave the message body blank. For other information about the listserv, including how to update your email address and how to subscribe, visit http://www.cogdevsoc.org/listserv.php ============