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Center for Human Information Processing  
University of California, San Diego
THE QUARTERLY NEWSLETTER OF THE LABORATORY OF COMPARATIVE HUMAN COGNITION

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Introduction

In recent decades, there have been an increasing number of calls to surmount the restrictions of cross-cultural approaches, substituting the broader notion that research on cultural variation is but a sub-strategy for developing a general theory in which cultural mediation is assumed to play a central role in constituting human nature.

For example, Toulmin (1980) suggested that psychologists should reconsider Wilhelm Wundt's contention that in addition to an experimental program of research, psychologists need also to study those aspects of human psychological functioning that are shaped by the accumulated knowledge of the cultural group into which individuals are born. He pointed out that Wundt had advocated the study of cultural phenomena such as language, myth, and custom as a necessary complement to his more familiar studies of elementary psychological processes using experimental methods based on trained introspection. Toulmin explicitly translated Wundt's program of volkpsychologie using the term "cultural psychology."

Douglas Price-Williams (1979) suggested that psychologists should recognize the existence of cultural psychology which he defined as "that branch of inquiry that delves into the contextual behavior of psychological processes." (Price-Williams, 1979, p. 14; see also Price-Williams, 1980).

Quite recently, Richard Shweder, in a book entitled, Cultural Psychology: The Chicago Symposium on Culture and Human Development (1990) wrote that the basic idea of cultural psychology is that "no socio-cultural environment exists or has identity independent of the way human beings seize meaning and resources from it, while every human being has her or his subjectivity and mental life altered through the processes of seizing meanings and resources from some socio-cultural environment and using them." Shweder envisions an interdisciplinary approach to this topic, drawing on research from the humanities, as well as psychology and anthropology.

While we find all of these suggestions useful (see Cole, 1990 for a fuller discussion) one of the persistent shortcomings in recent discussion of the role of culture in thought among English speaking scholars is the failure to incorporate the long tradition of cultural historical thinking emanating from Germany. For those, like ourselves, who have long been influenced by the Soviet cultural-historical tradition in psychology, this gap in knowledge is especially unfortunate, because the Soviet approach formed in dialogue with its German counterpart.

Thanks to the efforts of Lutz Eckensberger, Gustav Jahoda, and Bernd Krewer, we have been able to present the following essays which give us a glimpse into the 19th century origins of cultural theories of mind, the form that this approach took in the early 20th century, and some of the ways that it has been developed by German scholars in the late 20th century.

The issue begins with a survey of contents and concerns of contributors to the Zeitschrift für Volkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft (Journal of Folkpsychology and Linguistics), which influenced Wilhelm Wundt, Wilhelm Dilthey, and many other German scholars influential in the discussions surrounding the formation of psychology as a scientific discipline in the later decades of the 19th century.

Next we present an extended excerpt from an article by Erich Stern, published in 1920, which represents a critique of the experimental approach in psychology that swept the field in the years following the opening of Wundt’s laboratory in Leipzig in 1879. While some of Stern's ideas may strike us as anachronistic, readers who are familiar with either the Soviet cultural-historical tradition or more recent calls for a cultural psychology by American scholars will find many currently fashionable ideas clearly laid out in this 70-year-old article.

In their extended reviews and synthetic discussions, Bernd Krewer and Lutz Eckensberger each provide unusually thorough and lucid arguments for the need to consider culture a fundamental constituent of human psychological functioning. Their contributions are especially noteworthy for bridging between cross-cultural approaches to psychology and the more inclusive category of a cultural psychology.

References


On the Scope of Lazarus and Steinhall’s “Völkerpsychologie” as Reflected in the Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft (1860-1890)

Bernd Krewer
Universität des Saarlandes

Gustav Jahoda
University of Strathclyde

The literature contains a number of extensive accounts of the development and importance of “Völkerpsychologie” within the general history of the human sciences (Belke, 1971; Beuchelt, 1974; Holzner, 1960; Hurwicz, 1920; Mühlmann, 1968; Sganzini, 1913). Such detailed treatment cannot be offered here, but some indication will be given of the outstanding influences on Lazarus and Steinhall’s thought. These include:

1) Hegel’s philosophy of history and his idea of the development of a universal human spirit (“objektiver Geist”) (cp. Frankenberger, 1914)

2) Herbart’s conception of the “soul” (“Seele”) and especially his axiom that the psychological constitution of an individual is socially determined: “Man is nothing but society. The completely single person is unknown.” (Hartenstein, 1850, p. 20) (cf. Geck, 1928/9)

3) The romantic rebellion against the Enlightenment (Shweder, 1984) and especially Herder’s concept of the “Volkgeist” as the productive and unifying source of the specific historical development of different peoples.

4) Wilhelm von Humboldt’s comparative linguistics and his ideas on the relationship between language and thought. He also introduced the concept of Völkerpsychologie as the analysis of a people’s mind through the study of their language (cf. Mühlmann, 1968).

Summary of Lazarus and Steinhall’s Aims

In their introductory article Lazarus and Steinhall (1860) describe at great length what they conceive to be the nature and task of Völkerpsychologie. That description subsumed and greatly expanded on some basic ideas already published by Lazarus in 1851, in an article entitled On the concept and possibility of a Völkerpsychologie. Statements about objectives are scattered throughout, with a considerable amount of repetition. On the other hand relatively little is said directly about the methods for achieving these objectives, although these are sometimes implied. An attempt will be made here to provide a concise summary of the salient issues.

Völkerpsychologie entails a concentrated approach by several disciplines, the main ones being psychology, anthropology, history and philology. The task of Völkerpsychologie is a dual one: (a) the study of mankind as a whole, and of the development of the human spirit (“Geist”); (b) the study of the specific characters of the various “Völker” that constitute mankind, how they came to be constituted, and the changes they have undergone.

As regards (a), the aim is to arrive at general laws governing the change and development of the human spirit (“Geist”); then, under (b) to investigate the factors producing differentiation resulting in the particular manifestations of the general laws among historical peoples. It is explicitly stated that these “laws” will be essentially the same as those of natural science “reducing things and properties to relationships” (p. 70).

Not much is said about how one might arrive at these laws: Völkerpsychologie has to begin from the facts of the life of peoples and discover the laws of the “Volkgeist” through observation, ordering and comparison of phenomena” (p. 23). Elsewhere the aim is expressed rather less ambitiously, in terms of demonstrating the lawfulness of historical change; or again, the development of humanity is to be inferred from historical data coupled with a knowledge of the mental characteristics of humans. On the whole these general aims of Völkerpsychologie, i.e.,
the synchronic and diachronic study of the laws governing
the development of "Volksgesit" follow from three com-
mitments made in the first part of this introductory article:

1) a psychological one, i.e., to analyse the basic pro-
cesses of individual as well as of collective minds,

2) an anthropological one, i.e., to analyse the causes of the
development of different Volksgeister of the different
peoples as modifications of a universal nature of human
mind,

3) a historical one, i.e., to analyse the laws explaining the
rise and sequence of historical phenomena and historical
periods.

The latter part of the article descends from these lofty
heights to list more concrete sources of descriptive infor-
mation.

Thus expressive forms of the Volksgeist are dis-
cussed as possible units of analysis for the Völkerpsy-
chologie and as indicators for specific historical stages of
development of the "Volksgeist." As the first product of
the "Volksgeist" the rise of self-consciousness of a "Volk"
is considered. But generally, language and mythology are
presented as the main roads to tracking the intellectual de-
velopment of the "Volksgeist."

Lazarus and Steinthal claim that, above all, there is a
need for a psychologically oriented science of language.
The vocabulary of a given people is an indication of its
conceptual range; thus historical studies of etymology,
language usage, and comparative grammar will provide
cues to collective mental development. In this connec-
tion, the relationship between the collective spirit
("Volksgeist") and individual psychology must be exam-
ine in their interaction.

Mythology is argued to cast light on the processes of
apparception over long time spans, providing a history of
"Volksgeist." As other manifestations of "Volksgeist"
literature, religion, art, literacy, custom, law, and modes of
subsistence economy should be studied.

Furthermore, it is claimed that the rise and fall of
"Volksgeist" should be examined through the study of
primitive tribes who give us a picture of the childhood of
a people. A series of possible determinants of such proc-
esses, of widely varying types, are proposed as important
areas of research. These are as follows: differences in
flexibility of thought; the consequences of contact be-
tween peoples, the ways in which a people perceives
others and communicate with them; the role of education;
and, finally, the internal dynamics linking the constituent
elements of the "Volksgeist" with individual minds.

It will be evident from this summary that the program
is vast and rather vague, a fact recognized by the authors
in their final passage. For the present purpose it may be
noted that it comprises two major parts, namely the
collection of relevant facts, to be followed subsequently
by the elaboration of laws.¹

In the next section the actual content of the journal
over the thirty years of its existence will be examined in
order to assess the extent to which the more modest
aspects of the program, i.e., the assembly of psychologi-
cally oriented information about peoples, was actually
achieved.

The Content of the Journal Over the Thirty Years

In order to gain some broad picture of the areas
covered by the Zeitschrift, a rough-and-ready content
analysis according to titles was carried out. After exclu-
sing reviews and other minor contributions, 202 titles were
scanned and a set of categories evolved. Independent
assessment by the two authors of this paper resulted in
complete agreement on the dominant frequencies and
lesser ones were averaged. Almost a third of the articles
were mainly philological, followed by a fifth concerned
with folklore and religion. The rest were about equally
distributed between Völkerpsychologie itself, psychol-
ogy, philosophy, art and literature, ethnology and other.
This should not be misunderstood, since all these topics
were evidently regarded by the editors as pertaining to
Völkerpsychologie. However, as will appear later, in
many of the articles no attempt was made to relate what
was often a highly specialized topic to wider issues.

Our analysis further looked at the regions with which
the articles were mainly concerned. About one-fifth was
confined to European countries German-speaking ones
being most prominent. Some one-tenth focused on coun-
tries outside Europe, and the remainder were either non-
specific or the category was inapplicable.

With regard to the time-perspective, about one-tenth
specified a particular time period; roughly one in six dealt
with historical changes while the rest appeared non-
historical.

Being based only on titles, the exercise was obviously
rather crude, and from more careful scrutiny of selected
articles it probably underestimated both the extent of historical references and examples drawn from a wider range of cultures. Apart from that, however, the overall picture seems accurate.

Survey of the Contributors and Count of Cited Authors

The impression gained by the analysis of the titles is confirmed by a survey of the 51 out of a total of 116 contributors (apart from Lazarus and Steintal) whose backgrounds could be ascertained from biographical sources. The dominance of Steinttal is evident from the fact that one of the general index Lazarus occupies less than one, and Steinttal more than six!

Before considering some features of the biographies of the contributors to the Zeitschrift, a more detailed look at the editors’ lives seems to be revealing.

Moritz Lazarus (1824-1903) was born as the son of a Jewish tradesman family living in a little village called Filen in Posen (eastern part of Germany). His Jewish education and his early experience of different religious, linguistic and cultural groups living together was often referred to as the source of his interest in the roots of the shared psychological features of collectivities. After attending grammar school in Braunschweig he studied philosophy (Kant), philosophy of history (Hegel), and psychology (Herbert) in Berlin. His doctoral thesis (1849) already treated a “völkercpsychological” subject: the contribution of particular peoples to the development of the “beautiful.” Until his time as professor of Völkercpsychologie in Bern (Switzerland) from 1859-1866 he intensively studied literature and linguistics in Berlin and during that time he came to know Steintal and Dilthey. After his return from Bern in 1866 to Berlin he was engaged in a variety of different societal activities (e.g., promotion of political organizations attending to the interests of the liberal Jewry) and taught at Berlin University and the Prussian Academy of War. (cp. Belke, 1971; Lazarus, 1913, Leicht, 1904; Stein, 1903)

Heymann Steintal (1823-1899) was born as the son of well educated but poor tradesman family in Größig, a little village in the eastern part of Germany not far from Berlin. Already during his childhood he attentively studied the dialects of different social classes and religious groups because his father was able to speak these different linguistic forms. His interest in language and his outstanding aptitude for acquiring foreign languages are the prominent features of his biography. In grammar school he studied classical languages, and at Berlin University he was engaged in studying Humboldt’s approaches to linguistics; his doctoral thesis treated a linguistic subject (Tübingen in 1847) and finally his habilitation concerned Humboldt’s linguistics and Hegel’s philosophy. From 1852 he worked in Paris on Chinese dialects and in 1853 he spent some months in London studying and writing about African languages. After 1856 he returned to Berlin and worked as a private teacher and continued publishing many contributions to theoretical problems in linguistics (for instance, de Saussure’s distinction of langue and parole probably has its root in Steintal’s lectures) and to specific language systems. He not merely carried the major editorial burden concerning the Zeitschrift but was also by far the most prolific contributor (with 134 contributions including short comments). The last part of his life was dedicated to studies in the philosophy of religion (cp. Belke, 1971).

The other 51 authors considered were also nearly all educated in German universities, Berlin leading with 32, followed by Leipzig (9) and Heidelberg (8). Among disciplines studied the most frequent were philosophy (21) and philology (19); history (11) and law (7); in comparison with the humanities medicine (7) and natural sciences (6) were rare. Not surprisingly, university (23) and school (13) teaching were the most common occupations; but there were also writers (12) and a sprinkling of politicians, poets and even painters.

Very few were reported as having visited places south of Europe, the great majority evidently lacking any firsthand experience of non-European cultures. However several, working on comparative linguistics in the tradition of Humboldt, had mastered all kinds of exotic languages. Berthold Delbrueck, August Friedrich Pott, Ludwig Tobler and Steintal himself were the most influential figures in that field. Other outstanding ones requiring mention include Bastian, one of the founders of German Ethnology, who had travelled the world as a ship’s doctor, George Simmel, one of the founders of German “Formale und Verstehende Soziologie,” and the philosophers Dilthey and Windelband; these two, who each contributed one article, gained fame by establishing the philosophical distinction between Nature-und Geisteswissenschaften.

On the basis of the name index a count was also undertaken of the prominent authors most (30 times or more) and least (10 or fewer times) frequently cited. The former yielded the following names: Kant (57); Homer (55); Herbart (48); W. Humboldt (39); Goethe (30); the
latter included: Darwin (9); Herder (8); Bastian (7); Descartes (7); Tylor (5); Waizt (5) and Spencer (3). These patterns reflect the predominantly classical, philosophical and philological bias of the contributions.

While these facts and (approximate) figures help to give some idea of the scope of the Zeitschrift, they cannot convey the “feel” of the content. For this purpose a random sample of thirty substantive articles was drawn and summaries, grouped into topic areas, are set out below.

Summaries of Randomly Selected Articles

I. General Theory of “Völkerpsychologie”

The two articles in this category are both by the founders. Lazarus, M.: On the relationship of the individual to the collectivity (II: 394-453). Lazarus sees its elucidation as a critical task for Völkerpsychologie and stresses that the collective is more than the sum of its parts. It follows that Völkerpsychologie is distinct from individual psychology. There ensues a series of speculative arguments concerning the basis of the unity and totality existing at the level of the Volk. Referring to Herbart and anticipating Durkheim he asserts the priority of the collective consciousness over the individual. Lazarus further seeks to analyze the factors leading to the development of the Volksgeist, among which common language and joint activity are prominent. The effective bond is romanticized and the tone rather jingoistic.

Steinthal, H.: The concept of Völkerpsychologie (XVII: 233-264). Written in response to a powerful attack by Wundt who had criticized Völkerpsychologie as being too old-fashioned, Herbartian and excessively ambitious. Having to concede many points, Steinthal tries to show that much of the critique resulted from misunderstanding; but this somewhat forlorn pleading signals awareness of the weakness of his case.

II. Elements of the Volksgeist

a) Abstract-theoretical considerations

1) Philology and linguistics

In several of these articles (and as exemplified in the first) a close parallel between language and thought is taken for granted.

Jensen, R.: Exclamation, question and negation in the Semitic languages (XVIII: 419-430). A technical discus-
ing three types of "feelings" assumed to underlie morals: (a) taste, smell, etc.; (b) pleasure and pain (Unlust); (c) aesthetic. Moral feelings as such divided into subcategories of "sympathy" and "antipathy." Discusses the influence, both positive and negative, of religion on morality. In the course of the extended discussion the author offers numerous examples from a wide range of cultures and even refers to animal behaviors—one of the very few instances encountered in the journal. Deals at the end with nativist and empiricist views of morals without committing himself to either, which is odd in view of his clear demonstration that there has been moral development.

Bastian A.: On comparative psychology (V: 153-180). Birth and death both require coming to terms with the supernatural and Bastian provides an extensive survey of related customs in a wide range of primitive cultures. He draws a parallel between the couvade and the philosophical and theological discussions in the West concerning the transmission of psychic elements ("des Seelischen") from father to children. The concept of "sympathetic rapport" regarded as the basis for such transmission is viewed by Bastian as a manifestation of the universal process of association of ideas. He explains the differing forms of the process in terms of regular stages of development undergone by all peoples, and this also accounts for various customs, taboos and rites.

Haberland, C.: The mirror in the beliefs and customs of peoples (XIII: 324-347). Puts forward the view that the mirror image symbolizes man's soul. Cites chiefly European folklore but also some material from primitive cultures and concludes that the data support his interpretation.

Kleinpaul, R.: On the theory of gestural language (VI: 353-375). Stresses the significance of gesture language as a universal medium of communication, in many ways equivalent to verbal language—"Mimic of life, language of all mankind" (p. 356). For the analysis of gestural language he refers to deaf-mutes, primitive peoples who have a developed gesture language, and parallels among animals. There follows an account of various forms of non-verbal expression (greetings, signalling superiority, drawing attention, threatening etc.). Ethnographic material, especially from German-speaking countries, and evidence from antiquity are used to demonstrate the variability of gestural forms and to venture speculations about origins.

Delbrueck, B.: On the relationship between religion and mythology (III: 487-497). Mythology is defined as a kind of appearance applied to natural phenomena, which are regarded as due to the actions of certain beings. Clearly distinguishes mythology from religion by considering the development of the concept of God in the child. Though based on a novel (Gottfried Keller's Der gruene Heinrich) it is the only detailed treatment of child development in all the material. Tries to reconstruct the genesis of religion etymologically as well as through the emergence of feelings associated with certain experiences. An ambitious attempt to link individual and cultural development.
b) Elements of the Volksgeist as specific manifestations of the spirit of peoples

1) Language, art and literature

Arendt, C.: *Some interesting characteristics of the Hungarian language* (II: 216-224; IV: 77-85). Presents the gist of stories by various authors which illustrate a parallel between mental events and natural phenomena. Arendt describes such parallelism as typical of Hungarian lyric.

Mistelli, F.: *On the formation of analogies, especially in Ugrian* (XIII: 81-143). A follow-up from a previous article in which Mistelli had argued that in certain non-Indo-Germanic languages such as Finnish or Hungarian analogy plays a less significant role, and therefore, the language is of less “psychic value” (“geistiger Wert”). A Hungarian scholar took exception to the notion that Magyar is an unsatisfactory psychic tool. Mistelli translated and reprinted his critics attack and then tried to refute it. A key passage seems worth citing:

Thereby a cultural and literary language displays such a poor grammar that ... one would find sharper thinking in half-educated people. Languages are not like clothes that one puts on or off as one pleases, but they are the expression of a particular world view; whether fine or crude, they constitute one's own working out of the world of the senses through the 'Volksgeist.' (p. 142)

Kradolfer, J.: *The Italian proverb and its relation to the German*. A “völkerspsychologische” study (IX: 185-271). A preacher who travelled through Italy with a book of proverbs in his knapsack, Kradolfer is among the very few who obtained material in the field rather than the library. He argues that proverbs are a better indicator of national character than either statistical statistics, which refer to a deviant minority, or literary productions by a small elite. On comparing the proverbs of the two nations he finds many common themes but also important differences. He points out that concepts are often not easily translated, offering numerous examples. The article that proverbs are the most genuine and unvarnished expression of the national soul (“Volkssseele”). Unusually fun to read!

Luebke, W.: *The gothic style and the nationalities* (II: 257-278). Compares the development and reception of the gothic architectural style in France, England, Germany and Italy. He interprets the various particular forms of that movement as expressions of certain historical developments and conditions of emerging nationhood, related to enduring national trains. Concludes that gothic architecture reflects within the same basic forms in each country its particular mode of being (“Volksstum”).

2) Folklore and ethnology

Haberland, C.: *Mid-day as the ghost hour* (XIII: 310-324). A listing of folk-beliefs about mid-day ghosts, confined to Germany and a few other European regions.

Hoefer, C.: *Calendar of cult periods in Upper Bavaria for the year 1887, with special reference to the folk medicine of Upper Bavaria* (XIX: 264-275). Claims that traditional cures are related to particular parts of the year, especially important transitions like winter or summer solstice. The bulk of it is a “calendar” of folk beliefs in part of Bavaria.

Bastian, A.: *Masks and the occasions of their use* (XIV: 335-358). Descriptions of the various forms and occasions (ceremonies related to war, cults of the dead, dances, games, religious ceremonies, etc.) for wearing masks in different cultures and epochs. Proposes that frightening and scaring away is the general purpose originally underlying the wearing of masks.

Laspeyres, E.: *On the statistics of morals. The influence of housing on behavior* (VI: 1-112). A secondary analysis of (rather dubious) data collected in Paris (probably under the influence of Quetelet) whereby quality of housing was related to four categories of behavior from “good” to “very bad.” This piece is of interest as being the only example of empirical statistical research outside the tradition of Völkerpsychologie.

III. Development of the Volksgeist-Effects of Contact Between Cultures

Erdmann, O.: *On the historical consideration of German syntax* (XV: 387-413). Looks at Indo-Germanic origins and then at modifications within the Germanic tongue, the question being whether foreign “Kultursprachen” had an influence on German syntax. Erdmann was pleased to note that, apart from some (mainly 18th century) Gallicisms, German had remained largely unaffected. He observes that “... the pursuit of syntactic usage from the oldest until the most recent times opens an insight into the mental life of the collectivity” (p. 412). However, he fails to explain how one arrives at such insight, or even what it was.
Weise, O.: *The borrowing and creation of words* (XIII: 233-247). Considers how far loan words may be an indication of the extent of external cultural influences. Points out that one has to take into account the creation of neologisms for cultural importations. Deals with specific examples drawn from classical languages.


**IV. Miscellaneous**

Meyer, J.B.: *Genius and talent* (XI: 269-302). Discursive rehearsal of various philosophical speculations. Mentions Galton only to dismiss him as "too statistical."


**A General Evaluation of the Conception of "Völkerpsychologie" as Reflected in the Zeitschrift**

Lazarus and Steinthal had a grand vision about uniformities in the development of the human spirit and its particular manifestations within the Volk or national community that largely shapes its psychology. It was a powerful idea but one that was, and remains, difficult to research effectively. Their program envisaged what we would call a multidisciplinary approach including not only Geisteswissenschaften, but also science in order to do justice to the dual nature of Völkerpsychologie. The content of the Zeitschrift, while drawing on several Geisteswissenschaften, was almost completely devoid of science, even in the limited sense of keeping in touch with contemporary developments in German psychology. This is perhaps not surprising in view of the humanistic background of the bulk of the contributors. It is also noteworthy that the Zeitschrift kept aloof from Darwinian evolutionary ideas that excited not merely biologists but educated laymen of the period. Indeed, all the notions of "development" propagated by Lazarus and Steinthal and their followers were essentially those inherited from the 18th century Enlightenment and Romantic Historicism.

Their main method for studying such development was that of philology, tracing linguistic changes. Here the influence of Steinthal was probably predominant. The approach was based on the conviction that the language and mythology of a people reflect salient features of their minds, and therefore, linguistic changes constitute, as it were, markers in the development of the human spirit. Since such studies required written materials, they were largely confined to Indo-Germanic and Middle Eastern sources.

The other main method stemmed from the belief, inherited from the 18th century, that primitive peoples constitute an earlier stage of the development of humanity. The Zeitschrift itself contained very few first-hand reports of empirical studies of primitive peoples. Such ethnographic material as was employed drew largely on the then available extensive compilations, such as that of Waitz, for information about primitive languages, myths and customs. Such material was then used for two main purposes: one was to extract communalities with a view to making inferences about fundamental and invariant aspects of the human spirit; the other was to study its development and changes by combining the data on primitives with historical material on the more advanced peoples.

Most articles are either highly speculative reflections on the theoretical and conceptual nature of the elements constituting the "Volksgeist," or collections as well as concrete descriptive accounts of past and present manifestations of these elements. Thus one of the major declared goals of the Lazarus and Steinthal’s program, i.e., inductively arriving at the general laws of development of the "Volksgeist" from its manifestations, was hardly ever even attempted.

There is also a lack of explicit consideration of possible determinants of the development of the "Volksgeist" as envisaged in the initial program. Again, it is only in the linguistic domain that several contributions sought to demonstrate the influence of foreign language systems on the development of actual linguistic forms.

Apart from such comparative analyses over time and space, efforts were made to identify the singularities of the spirit of a particular—usually European—"Volk," most commonly in terms of its language and myths. Many such accounts are strongly tinged by the then burgeoning German nationalism. It is also noteworthy that studies seeking to characterize a particular "Volksgeist" usually consisted of speculations relating to a single expressive cultural element, be it literature, architecture or belief systems; the outcome then often closely resembled contemporary stereotypes of the people concerned.

What has been sketched above are the central themes that may be discerned in the Zeitschrift, but apart from
these there are of course numerous and varied contributions of more limited scope. Prominent among these are bare descriptions of folklore in specific regions, which after 1890 became the sole purpose of the revamped journal. It was in fact Wundt’s (1888) scathing critique of Lazarus & Steinthal’s Oeuvre that signalled the demise of the original version of Völkerpsychologie.

The purpose of Wundt’s attempt (in ten massive volumes) to establish an empirical-evolutionary Völkerpsychologie, was to complement his study of individual psychic processes. Without being able to go into details of his ideas, some indication of the way his own conception of Völkerpsychologie differed from that of Lazarus & Steinthal’s may be briefly sketched. Wundt (1888) wrote his critique of their program many years before the publication of the first volume of his VP. In it he argued that the program was far too wide-ranging, invading areas already occupied by other disciplines such as philosophy, history or ethnology. He also objected to Lazarus & Steinthal’s rather obscure notion of the “Volkgeist”, according to Wundt the product of a combination of two incompatible approaches, namely Hegel’s “Geist” and Herbert’s “Seelenatmismus”. He proposed to replace it by the concept of the “Volkssseele” (soul of the “Volk”) denoting the totality of all shared inner experiences, thereby not merely seeking to limit their scope of Völkerpsychologie but also to make its orientation more strictly psychological. Moreover, in parallel to the constituents of individual consciousness (imagination, feeling and will) Wundt considered language, myth and custom in their interrelationships as the fundamental constituents of the “Volkssseele.”

Summing up, it cannot be said that the Zeitschrift significantly furthered the grandiose objectives of Lazarus and Steinthal. They and their contributors worked on assumptions we now know to be largely unfounded, and with few exceptions the articles do not repay the effort of labouring through their somewhat baroque style and are of mainly antiquarian interest. One cannot deny the truth of Whitman’s view that, “These men shared, not a scientific approach, but a set of metascientific myths, borrowed from the humanist tradition...” (1984, p. 219). Nonetheless, such a judgement is perhaps unduly harsh; because although as children of their time they were unable to implement them, these men put forward some creative ideas that in modified form are gaining ground. On a general level one can discern similarities between aspects of Lazarus & Steinthal’s program and issues that still arouse lively debate in cross-cultural psychology and cultural anthropology:

1) the question as to whether and how far cultural phenomena can be considered as manifestations of general “laws” (the general and specific parts of Völkerpsychologie);

2) the problem of defining a cultural unit (their “Volk”);

3) the problem of relating individual psychological development to shared meaning systems (their concern with the relationship between the individual and the “Volkgeist”).

Thus Lazarus & Steinthal should be credited with having formulated important questions; and if they have not been able to answer them, neither have we done so adequately. The idea of a Völkerpsychologie and the effort to bring it into being within the pages of the Zeitschrift are perhaps better described as a movement than a genuine discipline (cf. Vierkandt, 1914). Yet, in spite of what we can now readily perceive as its weaknesses, this movement kept alive an interest in collective psychological phenomena, first adumbrated by Vico and Herder, in a period when psychology was characterized by a predominantly biological image of humanity (Thurnwald 1924).

Note

A detailed table, referring to original text passages, which provides an overview of Lazarus and Steinthal’s intended approach is available by writing to: Bernd Krewer, Universität des Saarlandes, FR Psychologie, 6600 Saarbruecken, West Germany; or, Gustav Jahoda, University of Strathclyde, Department of Psychology, Turnbull Building, 155 George Street, Glasgow, G1 1RD, Scotland.

References


looks at the scientific activities of psychology he will turn away in disappointment: he finds nothing of interest, only lifeless doctrines, theories and formulas, which are not capable of offering him anything, and he does not understand that this is what psychology, the science of mental experience, is supposed to be. And indeed, it must have something strange about it in the first place because there is nothing so closely associated with humans, so true to life, as the mind and yet the science which is concerned with it seems so remote from life.

Psychology has developed in isolation from life, from social and cultural experiences. Although it is among the oldest sciences of western society—as far as we know Aristotle had already produced its first literary works—it was the last of all fields of research to develop into an independent science. It was caught in the chains of metaphysics until the middle of the last century and formed a playground for wild speculation. Then when the natural sciences proceeded on their triumphal march and when biology had gained in importance independently of physics and chemistry, one began to see mental phenomena drawn into the sphere of scientific studies. The only real science in place, however, was natural science and the only scientific method the natural scientific one; it is not surprising therefore that psychology was completely oriented to it. It wanted to be a natural science and it wanted to experiment. Overlooked, on the one hand, was the fact that the experiment in psychology has its limitations and, on the other hand, that there is a fundamental difference between the experiment in psychology and in all other [natural] sciences.

Quite early on Elsenhans (1897) recognised that only a very narrowly defined part of the mental processes is accessible to experimentation, essentially that of sensory perception. If psychology was to be founded on philosophical materialism, it was only natural that its founders wanted to relate all mental processes to processes in the central nervous system, primarily to the cerebral cortex. To be more precise, it was assumed that the mental processes are determined by physiological brain processes and that the brain discharges thoughts, like the liver discharges gall or the kidneys urine. A mental process was considered exhaustively described when its correlation to a brain process had been shown. However, that was only really possible with the sensory processes; here animal experiments and anatomical findings in man had established a correlation between sensation and certain regions of the cerebral cortex. Quantitative analysis, as required by experimentation—at least rigid experimentation—in a natural scientific sense, which discovers general laws to be ex-

Problems of Cultural Psychology

Erich Stern
Giessen

The outsider or even a scientist from another field of research has a unique misconception of psychology; he believes it concerns a particularly interesting field of research which is competent to give the outsider an abundance of ideas and valuable insight into learning how to observe, assess and deal with human beings. But if he then

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pressed in formulas—was most likely to be possible here, while generally the mind would resist the application of quantitative analysis quite tenaciously. The higher mental functions, for which it was not and could not be possible to show a physiological correlation—given our stage of development and because of the nature of the matter—were at first not drawn into the field of studies at all. There were certainly other reasons for this, as we will now show. In any case the sphere of studies, and so psychology’s borders, was narrowly restricted.

There are very important differences, which were at first simply overlooked, between natural scientific and psychological experiments. In psychology it is not possible, at least not nearly to the same extent, to repeat the conditions under which an experiment has taken place. This is due to the special characteristics of the mind and the formation of new dispositions. Moreover in all psychological experiments, the prerequisite being the subject’s good will, we are always dependent on momentary change’s of mood, signs of fatigue, the constellation of feelings etc., and in addition, we cannot base any experiment solely on objective symptoms, but must take the subject’s statements into account too. But these statements are rarely free of subjective associations, of intuitions, etc. All these facts greatly complicate the evaluation of statements and results, so that a critical approach is especially recommended. Furthermore it is to be noted that we are only given this set of mental processes introspectively, and that from this point on we must deduce the physiological processes which accompany or cause them (to be more general, correspond to them), so that a further uncertainty is involved.

Even if one recognises the significant role the experiment plays in psychology—as we do—one must be aware of the differences existing between the natural scientific and the psychological experiment; only a mechanistic-atomistic interpretation of the mind could overlook these fundamental differences. Indeed every science must make abstractions, and every experiment must abstract from a series of conditions, which can be considered constant, and must create other conditions at random; but in psychology creating such precisely reproducible experimental conditions is only possible in very few cases, in fact only in the sensory processes, which are therefore open to experimental studies in the first place. Extracting individual mental processes from the totality of the mental subject matter is impossible in higher mental functions, and must therefore necessarily lead to distortions and serious misrepresentations of reality. Human psychological processes form a unity; mental life is experienced as a single, inseparable flow and every extraction of individual parts means an artificial separation of that which in life is intimately bound together. In the separation from other subject matter the individual substance loses its life and becomes an entity which finds itself far removed from life.

There are three reasons why experimental psychology seems to me to abstract from, must abstract from correlations in which the individual psychological process is related to the total experience of the personality. First of all—we have already indicated this—at any given moment there is not only a sensation, a feeling, an existing aspiration, but, against a background of numerous processes, individual ones stand out more and enter consciousness; their roots however reach far into the unconscious and each experience is conditioned by this, influenced in its particular nuance, in its course, by the totality of all existing psychological processes. At no time do humans experience only a sensation, a feeling or an aspiration, but at any given moment—we adhere to the old division of the mind into the three parts of feeling, thinking and will—sensations, feelings and aspirations exist side by side and together. The thinking person experiences feelings simultaneously—logical feelings—which again influence his thinking to a very large extent and his aspirations—determining tendencies allow him to bear in mind the starting point and the goal. There is however always a variety of individual experiences existent at any given moment. In the mind, the result of this combination of individual factors is not the sum of its parts, the product is something completely new: An experiment will always encounter difficulties if it wants to extract individual parts from the totality. There are undoubtedly experiences which show a relative independence from those existing simultaneously, and which, therefore, can easily be extracted. Above all, sensations belong to these. A certain stimulus, for example oscillations of a particular frequency or air waves of a particular wavelength, will always be perceived—with the exception of pathological cases—as a particular color or a particular sound. But even the intensity will appear different to us, depending on the momentary constellation of feelings. In a somewhat agitated mood, a sound which we would otherwise feel quite indifferent to may seem loud and annoying to us. Nevertheless the sensations will maintain their independence up to a certain point, and thus be open to experimental study. It is more difficult with feelings and aspirations and with those higher functions which occur, so to speak, on the highest levels of the mind and which, in fact, constitute the core of our psychological nature, so that this separation seems absolutely impossible. It will often lead to totally false results, and only an experiment which takes the
The totality of experiences into account can give us insight into mental experience.

The second direction in which we have to pursue the correlations of experience is the chronological one. Each experience is determined not only by external factors and by the momentary mental constellation, but, as the latter depends on the individual’s whole past, also by earlier experiences, feelings, aspirations. Everything human experience has an effect at any given moment. People carry, so to speak, their whole past around with them. There is no mental experience which disappears and whose effect is exhausted in a moment. Here there is again a fundamental contrast with the natural scientific experiment. If we drop a stone and then return it to its original position it possesses exactly the same content of energy as before. Or if we combine sulphur and iron so that the chemical compound ferrous sulfide is formed, and then in the course of chemical analysis separate them again, neither the iron nor the sulphur will possess more characteristics than before. It is a quite different matter in the mind, as Simmel (1907) once aptly pointed out with reference to moral development, where every moral action not only brings its immediate success in train but also prepares the ground for a second moral course of action. The first moral action leaves a human disposed to further moral deeds, and this disposition develops more and more with further moral behaviour, so that finally the moral action becomes a matter of course, without premeditation. This is similarly applicable to all psychological realities. In a certain sense, therefore, the constitution of a personality differs at any given moment, having been enriched by the experiences of the previous one; it is the old picture of Heraclitus—one can never step into the same river twice, as new waters are always flowing through it. This inconstancy of the personality, which is based on a transformation and re-formation of dispositions, is aptly described by William Stern (1918) as plasticity of the personality.

The more complicated the mental process, the greater the influence of a person’s mental past on its course. In this case too sensory perceptions prove to be relatively independent from the past but even when they show clear traces of this after-effect; I call to mind the manifestations of after-images, the fact that one sees movements when two or more stimuli follow one another rapidly, or the increasing diminution of the areas of tactile search when exercising, etc. The further working of sensory perceptions however is, to a great extent, determined by our mental past. What we have really “seen,” that is perceived, when we look at an object, depends, to a great extent, on our interest, knowledge, earlier perceptions etc., in short on mental factors, which in their creation extend far back into the past. These factors may, to a great extent, be disregarded with reference to sensations, and this contributes considerably to facilitating precise experimental study. This disregard is impossible however where the higher mental processes are concerned; they cannot be extracted from the chronological flow of experience without suffering a loss of comprehension; without the chronological relation, they are nothing more than a confused, incoherent chaos.

And finally, psychology usually observes the isolated person, separate from all interrelations with nature, with other people and with culture. But no person can possibly be independent from these factors; thinking, feeling, aspirations, and values can only be understood from these interrelations. The whole natural environment in which a person grows up has an immense influence on their mental behaviour: a person who has grown up in the mountains has a completely different mental constitution than a person living on the coast. A person’s character is formed in his relations with other people, and completely new characteristics will emerge from constantly being combined and opposed to one another. Man is a social being and can only be understood as such. The impact is most forceful where humans and culture join in their effect on other humans. Although culture also has an effect on its own, cultural forms like religion and law influence people to a very great extent, most forcefully where this influence combines with people’s activity, as in the institution of confession, marriage, schooling, etc. Every person is a child of his time; he is influenced by its ideas and if he does not share them he must in some way take a position on them. No person can remove himself from the natural and cultural environment in which he lives. At this point I need only indicate how socially (culturally) dependent all our values are. In the past the killing of—and in some tribes even the eating of—old people unable to fend for themselves was considered moral; thus, each individual was bound to this value, and shared it as much as we today value the opposite. Our moral and artistic judgements have proved to be dependent on historical periods, that is determined by our present culture. But the effective course of our reasoning also shows this dependence. Such socially and culturally determined factors are to be found in all our thinking; we shall be able to go into this in more detail later in another context. Nevertheless it should be stressed again that a deeper understanding of even the individual personality is simply impossible without these interrelations, “not only because man living in isolation is in general a fiction, but also because the development of the individual to a self-conscious personality requires...
living together with other self-conscious men” (Wundt, 1918, p. 8).

Experimental psychology, however, disregards all these interrelations; especially the social and cultural dependence of the mental experience, and it has, so to speak, become a dogma that “scientific psychology is basically restricted to the analysis of isolated and culturally neutral individuals” (Krüger, 1916, p. 130). With an increasing scientific culture, psychology has “lost track more and more of the social life of mankind and its intellectual creations - culture” (Krüger, 1916, p. 130). These last observations lead us to the question of how the human mind is related to culture and, furthermore, psychology to the cultural sciences (at least there seems to us to be a close connection between these two questions). An analysis of Windelband’s (1894) and Rickert’s (1915) views is necessary to discuss this problem. But first we want to summarise the observations we have made so far.

We have shown that experimental psychology disregards, must disregard, the threefold intricacy of the psychic experience: the sum of the momentary totality, the chronological correlations and the social and cultural dependence of all psychic experience. The possibility to disregard these correlations exists, as we have shown, primarily in the sensations, and therefore these offered a field for experimental study; here the usual experimental methods may be used most easily, the introduction of quantitative analysis meets the least resistance, resulting in certain correlations between the individual factors which can be expressed in formulas, for example between the intensity of stimulus and sensation, stimulus threshold, different degrees of sensitivity, etc. In the psychology of sensory perception—which is basically a physiological psychology—a quite high degree of precision may be achieved, which is nowhere near as possible in other branches of experimental psychology. Psychology should however not be restricted solely to those fields which are only verifiable through experimentation. “The experimental process is even more restricted in psychology; the more the objects of the study have a historical character, the more they are determined historically by cultural development. This again applies mostly to the more central functions and formations of the mind, which have more preconditions” (Krüger, 1916, p. 128). We enter psychology’s own field first when we deal with these higher psychological processes; “physiological psychology is not a true psychology, but basically the science of energy processes, which accompany the mental processes (with absolutely no energy characteristics). The study of the latter alone can give us a true psychology. It is a natural science just as much as a cultural science, because it must study self-consciousness in nature as well as in man and his cultural products” (Steffen, 1912a, p. 15).

With these last observations we have, in a certain sense, anticipated later conclusions because they deal with the position of psychology within the system of sciences. In his famous speech as rector in Strasburg, Windelband (1894) rejected the old division of the sciences into natural sciences and humanities; not substantial but only methodological moments should determine the division of the sciences. Two paths were at man's disposal to comprehend reality scientifically: one made it its task to advance to general laws about natural phenomena; its ideal would be to break the world up into a system of empirically base formulas, which would allow future events to be determined in advance with absolute certainty, with astronomical assurance, as Dubois-Reymond once suggested. The sciences would have to abstract away from any coincidence, from any peculiarity of the concrete individual case, and only take the typical, universally valid into account. In studying a free falling object, the prevailing air resistance would have to be disregarded and instead one would have to observe and account for the objects’ fall in a vacuum. The final aim of these sciences would always be to establish generally accepted laws. On the other hand, the second group of sciences would have exactly the opposite task: their duty would be to describe the particular, the special, the individual case. While the scientist in the first group asks what will happen again and again, given certain conditions, the second group in contrast will research what really happened, what in fact occurred at a certain place and at a certain time. These sciences have no further aim; it is especially not their task to establish general laws about the individual occurrence. This also applies to history, which is the typical representative of this group of sciences: it has to make the course of events clear, but not to establish “historical” laws.

Like Windelband, but quite independently, Rickert (1915) continued with this strain of thought. He also rejected the old division of the sciences into natural sciences and humanities, replacing it with a division of the sciences into natural and cultural sciences. This, however, did not mean that the former would be concerned with natural phenomena and the latter with cultural; for him, too, only methodological factors were decisive. For Rickert the natural sciences are the sciences of general laws, while the cultural sciences should aim at describing the unique, the individual; for Rickert, too, history is the prototype of a cultural science. Of course the cultural scientist, and especially the historian, could not encompass
the complete wealth of the existing material, he would have to make a selection and consequently he would have to be guided by aspects of value. Not that the historian should have to make a value judgement about the actual occurrence of events; according to Rickert, the historian must free himself from that problem, a view which is in no way valid for the totality of cultural science. Herkner (1916), for example, rejects this view for the field of economic research, and calls it a serious mistake to want to exclude all values, because it is impossible for man completely to free himself from these same values. However we expect the historian to distance himself as much as possible from them. Something quite different is meant here: at the moment when a scientist begins to work on writing the history of a particular period, all the available material separates itself into two parts. The first is of absolutely no significance to the course of events; it concerns events which are observed from a sufficient distance and from a particular point of view (from which the history will be written), which had no influence on the further course of things; the other part comprises all events which have gained a more or less prominent significance. How this significance is assessed can be disputable in individual cases but as a rule, differences in opinion about whether we are dealing with a historically important fact or not will not occur. An event must therefore lie above a certain "threshold," as Simmel (1907) put it, in order to be important for the historian. For Rickert too, it cannot be the task of cultural sciences to formulate laws concerning cultural occurrences.

Although in the second half of the last century natural science was considered the only valid science and the historical sciences were denied any scientific character because they could not experiment, were not precise, did not lead to generally accepted laws and did not allow the use of quantitative analysis, Windelband and Rickert emphasized most strongly that the cultural sciences are sciences in the strict sense of the word, and that they are of far greater significance for the formation of a world view than the views of materialistic philosophy would admit. This seems without hesitation justified. The on-side overestimation of the natural sciences, which was quite understandable as a reaction against the all-powerful, fanciful, unrealistic Hegelian philosophy, must be absolutely condemned; the cultural sciences must be recognised for their great significance. However, the extent to which the division of the sciences into natural sciences and cultural sciences is justified and might be able to replace the old division into natural sciences and humanities, is arguable. We will consider this matter further below.

Closely connected to this issue is the position allotted to psychology in the system of the sciences. Rickert claimed that psychology's aim is to establish general laws of the mind and as such is a natural science and jurisprudence. Scientists who work in the field of cultural sciences do not need experimental psychology, its methods and results. On the contrary, they need the naive, intuitive psychology of daily life, which the scientist must bring with him, the empathic understanding of strange characteristics which he may or may not possess, but which he cannot acquire with the help of modern experimental psychological research.

This view shows an absolute misunderstanding of the problems of psychological science, of the science of the psychological processes. Nobody has shown this more forcibly than Steffen. The mind is absolutely distinct from nature, this being emphasized by the fact that it has been capable of producing culture. Psychology "cannot be described as a mathematical science of energy any more than as a natural science." "Its subject matter is neither the manifestations which we describe scientifically in terms of energy (physical-chemical matter and processes) nor the proven facts that we rightfully consider to be natural phenomena in contrast to the institutions and activities of human culture" (1912a, p. 15). Psychology is certainly a natural science just as man is, on the one hand, a natural being, but it is not only a natural science, any more than man is only a natural being. Man differs fundamentally from all the rest of nature owing to the fact that man alone possesses culture. We must of course credit animals, in some cases, with a quite highly organised mind, but no species of animal has advanced so much as to establish a material or even mental culture, which could be transmitted from one generation to another; this is not even the case for the most highly organised animal.

"Because animals have no culture, they are therefore condemned, if there is a change of environmental conditions, either to die out or to change their physical structure continuously" (Krüger, 1916, p. 128). If we look at the surrounding animal world, we must admit that the individual animal species have not developed side by side in a disconnected way, but have developed from each other. The path led from the more primitive to the more sophisticated species, to species which were better adapted in their organisation to environmental conditions. Only those species, teaches Darwin, could survive, having advantages over the others. All adaptation lies in the reformation of the external organisation. And a species must, if the environmental conditions change decisively, either perish, or change its physical structure correspondingly. In
the course of phylogenetic development the brain and psychological processes of animals have developed further and organized themselves higher, but they have not by any means adapted to the same extent as man's.

Since man's entry into history his physical structure has not changed considerably. The prototype has remained constant. The enormous development which man has however gone through was only possible because the development of his mind substituted, so to speak, for the physical change, in order to adapt, and therewith led to all the creations which we call "culture" today. Primitive man does not possess any culture; he lives like an animal, from which there is very little to differentiate. He lives in complete dependence on nature; he only knows his essential needs; he demands nothing from life but life itself. Nature offers him everything he requires to live: in it he finds his food, leaves which serve as a cover for his body (if he knows this at all), and the caves which serve as a shelter. He does not yet experience the help of others, as the earth is only sparsely populated and each man has enough to do to fend for himself; but he is not dependent on the help of others to keep alive: what he needs he provides himself. Sophisticated technology, the preparation of meals, tools have not appeared yet, and man does not know yet about making provisions, about keeping reserves. Where he finds his food he eats it, and at times lives in total glut and at times suffers from terrible shortage. Nature is the source from which he satisfies his needs, but it is also his enemy from which he is threatened by death and ruin. He encounters obstacles everywhere; and he fights a hard, difficult struggle for survival with nature.

For many hundreds of thousands of years man has had the recurring experience daily and hourly of being surrounded by solid, divisible bodies: His existence and being depended on his ability to deal with these bodies, to divide them up or join them together and make use of their characteristics and forces. Man first becomes man when he begins to break off branches, to collect stones, to strip the branches of their leaves and to break up the stones, to acquire artificial tools, because his natural assets, especially his hands and teeth, are inadequate to satisfy his increasing demands. In this perhaps longest, purely human experience as tool maker and tool user, man has developed his intelligence, which, to a great extent though not exclusively, has consequently become a mental tool in the "craftsman's" fight for survival. (Steffen, 1912b, p. 82)

The capacity to gain knowledge was originally—is even today up to a certain point—a means, a powerful tool, in the fight for survival. What role it plays and how it has developed is a question which requires special attention. First a few general remarks on cognition are called for here. Man must possess a certain amount of knowledge, without which it is simply impossible even to stay alive. Without a doubt, man perceives much, and indeed he perceives many things correctly, in contrast to skepticism; he could otherwise not take a step without falling down and hurting himself. On the other hand man does not know everything; he is confronted with the totality of the world; all subject matter can become an object of his knowledge (cf. Simmel, 1916), but the sum total of the subject matter is so infinitely big, that he is only capable of knowing a part of it. Life and man, however, are purposeful; no natural scientific theory of life is capable of obscuring that fact. It does not do to try to explain life in the manner of machines, as Jacques Loeb (1906) tries to do, and there is no sense in saying that there is no major difference between machines and life forms, thus making it possible to produce life forms in the laboratory. All life is, we insist, purposeful. That explains why all perception is selected knowledge, certainly not a conscious, voluntary selection, but a selection determined by our whole psychological and physical make-up. We are not capable of recognising sounds above or below a certain level, electromagnetic oscillations are only directly accessible to us within a certain wavelength; our perceptiveness has certain limitations—in short we find barriers set up everywhere to our perception. The human intellect has been capable of overcoming these barriers to a certain degree by constructing aids, tools and apparatuses which, so to speak, expand the mind (Weiner, 1900); but here too man comes up against barriers. In the end man can only perceive that which is capable of affecting his mind, and that is always something which is in some way related to his life. If one wishes to put this view into a pointed formula, one can say that man is only capable of perceiving what is necessary for him to perceive, that which hinders or supports his life. Of course this relation is not always clear or transparent any more than thinking today has ceased to serve the fight for survival. But science, which is no longer a means, but now an end in itself, has developed, if we may say so, from this thinking essential to life.

The intellect thus serves life; but that applies in fact to all psychological life; that is what William Stern (1918, p. 223) means, when he says the mind serves the personality. When man had developed to a certain stage, he could not manage with the means nature offered him directly. He himself could not reshape his body any more, so his intellect developed more and more and guided him to more and more perfect tools. A material culture developed. But here too feelings, stimuli and aspirations partici-
pated to a great extent. Man is not only a tool maker, not only a tool user; besides that, other natural instincts urge him towards more independent activity. It is quite wrong to say that primitive man is filled with wonder at the brilliance of the stars and the blinding rays of the sun, that he observes full of awe and timidity the eternal change and the constant return of day and night, low and high tide, and that he tries to explain these processes in his primitive manner, portraying them in myths and religious systems. The situation is quite different in reality. Man is afraid of all these things because he feels dependent on them. He fears death above all, from death emanate secret forces, which can harm him, and he tries to escape them by magic and spells. Here is the source of spiritual belief and religion; they too at the beginning serve to preserve life, and then later become independent in exactly the same way that we have shown with regard to the intellect and its creations. But there is an instinct to play in man and this instinct also gains new life, frees itself from its original significance and leads, together with other motives, to art.

And the strange fact is this: while the animal learns something in its individual life, this always remains his own property but the creations and achievements of man have a lasting existence and transmit themselves from one generation to the next. This fact is the reason for man’s immense development, the fact that each generation did not always have to begin anew, but could continue its work where its predecessor left off. The last of all material and mental achievements, the real driving and creative forces found in man’s mind, is the possibility to transmit these manifestations from one generation to the next; from these facts it is possible to define culture, which is not really composed of its material results and facts, but of its forces, which cause these results (Schultz, 1912, p. 4). But it (human mind and culture) is, as we have already shown, not the work of a single individual. Rather—and we will have to give reasons for this in more detail later on—it is the work of human society. Society consists not only of those living now, it also reaches into the past and future.

But at the same time this powerful heritage is lifeless and ineffective if it is not kept alive in the generations of the present, working to create something new; it can lie dormant in the works of the past for a while, but only so long as it is alive is it really culture. Culture is the inheritance of the work of previous generations, as far as it is embodied in the aptitude, the consciousness, the work and the results thereof of each generation. (Schultz, 1912, p. 5)

And with this we return to the question, Is psychology important for the cultural sciences? This question led us to consider whether there is a psychological moment in culture, a question which we must answer in the affirmative as a consequence of the above discussion. Culture is, in the end, a mental process and cultural science is ascribable to mental experiences. If, however, one wanted to say that scientific-psychological research is without value or significance, one would not adhere to the conventional belief that scientific methods are capable of explaining and reinforcing prescientific knowledge. Messer (1914) rightly emphasises that the cultural scientist, especially the historian, can and must base his work on the results of scientific psychology, while he can leave the psychologist to work out the methods and clarify the concepts.

Behind all cultural processes stand mental experiences; all cultural processes are ‘inspired’ and consequently psychology must (this cannot be stressed enough) be of fundamental significance for the cultural sciences. We have already pointed out above with reference to Steffen, that the true field of psychology is to be found here; but we can also introduce Wundt’s (1911, p. 136) view here: ‘the fact that psychology has to solve independent problems, that at the same time it occupies an irreplaceable position in relation to the empirical sciences hardly needs further explanation. This becomes most evident when one looks at the fields which can be regarded as the fields of application of psychology and which, to clarify this relation, we summarise under the collective name of ‘humanities’. And furthermore ‘that which connects philology, history, jurisprudence, etc., is, besides other characteristics which I do not wish to expand on here, the psychological interpretation common to them all. This, however, is common to them because these fields, like psychology, include the immediate experience, unlike natural science, which involves experience after abstraction from the subject. (Wundt, 1911, p. 137)

We therefore adopt the position here that the old division of sciences into natural sciences and humanities is fully justified, and that within the humanities psychology is of fundamental significance, but certainly not experimental psychology as it has developed in the course of the last 50 years. Its tasks lie in a completely different direction, and while its significance should not be underestimated in any way it is not suitable for the humanities for reasons that we have explained above in detail. In the humanities the only possible psychology is one which stems from living man, a psychology which is the science of the positive, outwardly-influencing uniqueness of human individuals (in fact of all living organisms)—the science of their desires and impulses, their natural tendencies to think, feel and act in one way and not in another—like chemistry
is the science of the characteristics of the various chemical elements as outwardly—influencing entities. Organic individualities or consciousnesses and especially human consciousnesses or personalities are at least as much 'tenable' units as chemical 'basic elements' and compounds, or as the 'bodies' in physics; as a consequence of experience, like physical units, they can not only be influenced, but in turn exert influence. Psychology is the science of the characteristics, and the behaviour of individualities, differing completely from chemical—physical bodies, and of those changing processes which we must describe as outward and inward-moving influences. (Steffen, 1912b, p. 16)

All cultural occurrences are, as we have shown, not the work of a single individual but of human society; all cultural occurrences are mentally, and at the same time socially, conditioned. A psychology which wishes to become significant and valuable for understanding cultural occurrences must therefore always be a social psychology. We would like to define this more precisely however and so understand the science of the mental processes, which are the basis of sociological processes, i.e., of socialisation; we want to call the psychology which is concerned with the psychological processes upon which cultural occurrences are based cultural psychology.

It is notable in all this discussion how little the humanities have so far been concerned with psychological questions, which, as we have shown, are in the end the basis of all historical, all cultural occurrences. They have described the external occurrences, how they occurred in their peculiarity and uniqueness; but only in such a way that the deeper relations had to remain unrevealed to them. In practice, of course, one advanced, instinctively as it were, beyond determining and describing processes and tried to grasp the key psychological moments, but not consciously, and above all, not in a scientific psychological way: on the one hand, because one did not want to discuss psychological questions, and, on the other hand, because the only prevailing psychology was not at all capable of doing that.

We can then understand why one arrived at the opinion that research on relations based on laws within the humanities was of no significance, because general laws are not to be found in the external forms of phenomena. It is, as it were, like flowing water, where wave follows wave according to certain basic laws. But one cannot recognise the general laws, if one only observes the surface, the waves visible to the observing eye, and furthermore if one tries to keep one wave distinct from the other. One sees, at the most, that one wave follows the other, but one does not perceive how it happens. That can only be taught by an observation which, in a literal and figurative sense, goes deeper, which traces effective forces in depth, which examines and considers these forces and their effect on the visible occurrences. The forces, however, which influence a cultural phenomenon, which drive it, first make it possible, are mental forces and general laws can only be based on the fact that relations are established between these forces and the forms of phenomena. The historical laws have to be, like all cultural scientific laws, psychological laws, but not in the sense of experimental psychology, which examines man's sensations, feelings and desires in their abstraction from this threefold intricacy, but in the sense of a cultural psychology, which is distinctive because it brings these relations to the forefront of the research. "The problems of culture, of community life in general, and its development are obviously scientific, as is all thinking of our time, but one does not understand them in many cases as scientific—psychological" (Krüger, 1916, p. 142). And we can add that one does not recognise general laws as psychological, but one would certainly have to grasp them as socially and culturally psychological. (Steffen, 1912b, p. 20ff)

Culture can only be understood, and we must again stress this here, from man's cohabitation, from individualities constantly being together and opposing each other. Therefore a one-sided individualistic psychology cannot solve the existing tasks. An individualistically one-sided individual psychology is not a complete psychology, because the most important part of man's consciousness exists in cohabitation or his interaction with others. Psychology would probably be much more advanced as a science if it had begun as social psychology instead of, as has happened, beginning as an extremely individualistic psychology. Only when sociology will have been able to make clear the immense propagation and far-reaching significance of social psychological facts in the mind of natural man as in that of the cultural man, and in the child as in that of the pure individual, is there a chance of replacing the present narrow-minded intellectual, individualistic and physiological psychology with an all encompassing one, illuminating clearly man's feelings and desires and his social dependence. Then we will be capable of advancing to cultural psychological laws, to general laws of the cultural event. Cultural psychology will then become the doctrine of the general laws of cultural development.

These laws are certainly quite different than the laws of physics and chemistry. In the latter, one determines what will, and must, happen under certain recurring conditions, under conditions which may be realised again and
again with practically the same exactitude. There is no sense in saying that, "if exactly the same conditions were to recur in the field of cultural occurrences the same result as before would be achieved," because the same conditions, in the same constellation, would never be realisable a second time. Something else is meant by general laws, i.e., the determination of both the mental and cultural occurrences. We must certainly accept such universal causal determinateness. Causality is a category which is essential for scientific observation but whereby its importance to ethics has not yet been determined. If one wanted to introduce principles like the determination of will, science would be negated because an absolutely unpredictable coincidence would substitute for general laws and necessity. But if one wanted to use the above formulation to express the idea that the laws of the cultural events were the same as the laws of natural science, then we would most definitely object.

First it must be pointed out that even if the portrayal of the individual, of the true course of events, the unique, shapes the task of the historical sciences, a deeper psychological approach leads to generally typical processes, only in a different sense than in the natural sciences. Marbe (1918) declares that the study of the change and development of human purposes and their means is the main object of historical study. All human activities are determined by purpose, serving to achieve this purpose, whereby means are applied which often become a purpose for whole groups of people. But whatever may be the case, all activity is dominated by purposes and purposes are nowhere else as effective as in the mind of the acting person.

Not all transformations and developments of means and purposes are an object of historical research, but only such occurrences as are regarded as typical for the goal-setting or means-creating behaviour of certain groups of men. But what does that mean? The unique individual aspect in history is based on a typical, general aspect in individuals. That which is really unique, in a strict sense, never gains historical significance. In this respect the great man, the leader, the genius, is not unique, but rather is a child of his time—Wernle (1918) writes for example, "even Jesus was a child of his time and a Jew of the ancient people of Israel. Whomsoever this may seem unimportant to or whoever wants to reject it must first open his eyes to how God forms and determines deep inside all people through homeland, folklore and history" (p. 1) -he only gains significance if he finds an echo in the hearts of those who are to follow him, those he is destined to have an effect on and to lead. His mental experiences must, in a certain sense, also be or cause typical ones. This is what Hegel meant when he described the great man as the one who only senses and expresses clearly that which is unclear and obscure in the masses. One only needs to read what Wieser (1912) wrote in his excellent sociological study on this relationship. And finally fame and success, which reflect the influence of great men on their time and beyond, are also a typical experience. If one returns to the mental functions, one will also encounter typical, general behavioural patterns. And if one carries the analysis further, one will find a certain number of recurring motives, for example, that men would rather be rich than poor, would rather dominate than be oppressed, that every dominating class tries to pass the responsibility of the burdens they impose onto others, appear again and again with great regularity (cf. Messer, 1914). Buchar (1919) has recently written that what really keeps the workers’ councils alive is the craving for dignity, for respect and power, for a rise in social status. “Man has the drive in him to rise above others....To have power and to wield it is valued highly if one has always had to be obedient” (p. 13). Another example is that men’s egotism plays the main role in all economic enterprises; there is a limit to be found here, which lies in the nature of men, at least in the men of today. Wilbrandt (1919) also emphasized its natural limit in the over reaching organisation of consumer associations. If one wants to achieve something, one has to, in the same way in which the Capitalist economic structure has done, interest the leaders of enterprises in their activities, as the saying goes. Martin (1919) comes to exactly the same conclusions.

So all analysis of cultural occurrences leads us not only to mental factors per se, but with great lawfulness to certain mental experiences, which we have already clarified in saying that men would rather be rich than poor etc., and that such motives dominate historical as well as cultural events. We must arrive at motives which seem to us humanly comprehensible and empathic. These motives, and the structure of the contents, which take shape over time, together with external relations, must lead to success, which in turn makes these comprehensible to us, and in fact give them the appearance of necessity. An example of this process is the current striving for power of the working classes determined by our whole economic and political development, the momentary prevailing conditions, and by the influence of these moments on the minds of individuals and of the masses. Therewith we find a form of historical general law, and we continue on the ensuing course into the future; we can never be sure of the future because we cannot survey it in its totality owing to the immense complexity of conditions, but can reach an approximate guide to development, as Muller-Lyer calls.
this kind of foresight. If we want to clarify how high the degree of probability of this foresight can be, we only need to call to mind how the end of the War, as it really happened, was predicted by those who were objective and weighed up our forces correctly; above all I call to mind Czernin’s report of September 1917 or Rathenau’s viewpoint. At no time has there been a shortage of men who have predicted the course of development of events, based on knowledge of man’s nature, the development and momentary constellation of forces.

The fact that general laws in the cultural sciences cannot be identical with those in the natural sciences is absolutely clear from the differing structure of the historical and the scientific concept of time (Simmel, 1916). In the natural sciences time has, if we may say so, only a functional significance; every time unit is exactly the same as the next one; time is empty, therefore it makes no difference which time unit we take into consideration, whether it be the time unit of today or of yesterday or of 1000 years ago or in a 1000 years to come; the freely falling stone will always obey the same law, the lever law will never lose its validity. But in history and in all cultural sciences we are not dealing with empty, unfilled time but with a time filled with events, with historical occurrences. Here one time particle is never exactly the same as the next one, because the occurrences of the preceding moment have an effect on the following. The change here is not simply a function of time as in the natural sciences; the times are not so easily comparable with each other. This in fact applies to all mental processes. The newly formed or transformed dispositional foundations always play a great role, so that we must take these into consideration regarding all developments. We cannot—as with the natural sciences, have the development begin at whatever point we choose, as we, for example, say: the stone is now in a resting position, the fall begins at this moment and takes its course quite independently from whatever movements the stone has made beforehand; the occurrence to be studied begins at an exactly determinable moment and is concluded in another, equally determinable moment without effects reaching out to a further sphere of occurrences. The historical or cultural occurrence does not begin at any exactly determinable point of time, a fact which complicates the division into certain periods very much, and so determining the true beginning of an occurrence becomes uncertain. If one wanted to say for example, that the Revolution in Germany began on 9 November 1918, one would only hit upon a completely external date; in reality no specifically determined day can be given; or if one wants to ask oneself when Germany’s ruin began or when the mood in the neutral countries abroad changed; one can only give an external date for the beginning of the World War: the point of time when warlike activities broke out externally. If one wanted to ask when those mental processes began in the leading personalities and in the masses, which had to cause the catastrophe, one is again confronted with an impossibility. And if we have to attribute not only all historical occurrences, but all cultural occurrences as such, as we have explained above, to mental processes and would not be satisfied until we had achieved this and advanced to causal mental facts, it is clear from the considerations expounded on above, that we cannot arrive at general laws in the field of cultural sciences, which correspond to those of the natural sciences.

But other kinds of lawfulness are possible. We have already said that only those occurrences which are based on mental processes which are typical for a great number of individuals, are of “historical significance.” In general, cultural developments take on a certain form. Every man, says Steffen, who we again draw upon, is born different from the next, but he goes through a binding series of physical and intellectual changes, which we call his “life” or his “development,” and which can be described as typical. In the same way, every culture, however different it may be, goes through a series of stages, which we find to be the same or similar in other cultures. The social structures lead again and again to similar forms and so we can, as it were, find a corresponding lawful series for these forms. This is not a new idea. It can be found in Comte’s doctrine with a different approach and form; a doctrine which encountered opposition again and again, and which, in its original form, was certainly not able to stand up, but, it seems to me, whose concept is basically correct and is closely related to Steffen’s essay referred to above. And here too general laws are founded not so much on the external occurrences as on the basic psychological processes in individuals. As I understand it, and as Steffen (1919a, p. 792) writes,

we can define everything which must be included in the general concept ‘history’ provisionally with the expression ‘history of society and culture.’ State, economy, religion, marriage, intellectual development, social life, sport, customs and fashion are included therein; and anything which may have been forgotten can be added freely within this framework. Every time the descriptions of a series of developments in political society clearly characterise a historical process, it will naturally be appropriate to give those historical periods names, which are borrowed from the evolution of the state. Of course one must constantly be careful not to hide a social or cultural development of another kind when claiming such a succession of political periods.
The fact that intellectual forces show their true nature is clearest where a certain compatibility can always be observed between the individual cultural occurrences. Each period appears, as it were, dominated by a single idea. Simmel talks here of central ideas, radiating and reflecting the activities of intellectual and cultural life. Thus he proves that at the turn of the 19th century the concept of nature stood at the centre of life, that philosophical as well as political ideas can, in the same way, be derived from that same concept of nature, and that they were represented in one person, in the figure of Jean Jacques Rousseau. In the middle of the last century materialism dominated not only in philosophy, but, in the same way, in economic life, in history and religion, and in our time too, this common intellectual foundation of the totality of cultural occurrences is shown only too clearly. It is man's opposition to the extreme rationalisation of life, and his renewed interest in the irrational. In art this movement has for several years been represented by Expressionism, in religious life in a new mysticism and in politics we see how old and transmitted forms and strata, how traditions, which were accepted for thousands of years, and which involved the exploitation of the oppressed by the dominating upper classes, are breaking down and how again the ideas of equality in everything involving man's existence are appearing, striving for realisation in life in this world. An ideal is alive in the masses and they will try to realise it. And the same is manifested in the field of economics. One advocates the realm of eternal peace and beauty to the masses, reviving the old Millenarian doctrine and what is more important, one believes in it. We find the same uniformity in the other direction too: one advocates a dependence based on God's will—although one in practice makes concessions—in politics and in the economy, a rational Christendom, rejecting any new art. Steffen (1919b) also emphasises similar correlations when he writes that an economic democracy would be unthinkable without a political one or vice versa. Men's ideas cannot be realised in one area of life and culture, while something to the contrary exists in another, without encountering serious conflicts. Unfortunately this was overlooked at the beginning of the Revolution here, much to our disadvantage; had economic democracy been taken seriously from the beginning we would have been spared many battles and difficulties! This common ground of life's occurrences and expressions makes the division of time periods possible. If we wish to establish general laws—and for that we must not only take the political occurrences of an epoch but also the totality of life and culture into consideration—they must lie in the driving forces of the intellect common to all occurrences. They are subject to development and this development conditions the development of cultural occurrences. The laws of culture are therefore mostly laws of development.

With this we have indicated some of the forms of historical, or let us say more generally, of cultural general laws; but at the same time we do not want to say that they are the only ones and that others do not exist. Particular methods, however, correspond to the different forms. If we wish to study the general laws in the second sense, it is to our advantage to use Muller-Lyer's (1918) phaseological method. We try to visualise the whole course of the development and then break this up into a series of phases. Then we study each phase separately and try to determine general laws of development by comparing the individual phases of the development. When we study different cultures completely independent of each other in the same way, phaseologically, and compare the results thereof with each other, we will then find a great uniformity in the development, and this is always in this sense, the prerequisite for general laws. And then we ask ourselves which psychological moments have triggered the development and we will then encounter the same or similar moments. Thus we finally trace this form of general laws to the first. We want to find motives which make the course of the development comprehensible to us and which makes it appear necessary.

But how do developments appear comprehensible to us? By the fact that we are capable of empathising with them. Therewith we refer again to Rickert, who postulated for the historian the psychology of empathy, which he denied real scientific character. Rickert primarily considers psychology to be experimental psychology and its methods. We agree with Rickert that experimental psychology is totally unsuitable for explaining and studying cultural phenomena, as we have shown above in detail. But we have also shown that experimental psychology is not the only psychology. What we need is a social psychology, which studies the basic psychological elements of social life, and a cultural psychology whose task it is to research mental facts which are the fundamentals of all cultural occurrences. These have their own methods: visualising the course of development, breaking it up into phases and within these phases returning to the mental factors, which are externally visible as cultural occurrences, analysing these mental findings, whose understanding the researcher gains from introspection which, we wish to be quite explicit here, is also a totally scientific method. Psychology is, as Steffen explains (1912a, p. 15), "the science in which man's consciousness is scientifically active in order to research himself." Here man first
understands the motives which determine the activities not only of other individuals, but also of the whole of cultural development.

Man cannot recognise the general laws of all cultural development until he has advanced to psychological findings. Man’s path is constantly leading, whichever direction it takes, to the recognition, i.e., awareness, of the problems. As Muller-Lyer emphasises rightly, in sociology, which is the fundamental cultural science, this stage of self-awareness has not been reached yet, but it is beginning to appear. Therewith a means will be given to man to dominate not only nature, which we have achieved up to a certain degree and which we are especially proud of, but also to dominate culture. Wilbrandt (1919) explains in his Socialism, that men must first be educated to Socialism and its different forms, the consumer and producer organisations etc. This education is only possible, however, if we know the aims and the means. Only such aims can be realised, which lie in the path of development and which correspond to human nature. The Socialist too must take the egotism of today’s man into consideration and adapt his practical measures in such a way that first of all this egotism, but also and more important, the common wealth is satisfied. It is primarily science which gives us the means to influence the course of development in a purposeful way and that is its aim. “It is a leftover of the old social and cultural theory of laissez-faire if one imagines that the social structure would have to change itself according to some inner laws of development, independent of our will, and that we will achieve the best possible cultural relations hereby, without a particular aim or striving. This fatalism in social and cultural development is scientifically untenable, because it has been determined scientifically that man’s conscious striving is an independent factor with rapidly increasing significance in our social and cultural development. If we want to be justified in hoping for better times for the human race we must form our ideas of the future and fight for the realisation of these ideas — without wanting to bind future generations to the imperfections which necessarily accompany our social and cultural ideas” (Steffen, 1919b).

But we would like to repeat our point here that only the aim has a chance of realisation, which can be established as a prediction on the basis of scientific studies. Anything else is Utopia, which may well inspire the masses temporarily, but which can never be lasting. We can arrive at the predictions when, and here we again summarise our observations briefly, we recognise the general laws of the cultural occurrence based on psychological factors, that is when we go back, at all times, and in all cases, to the psychological data. In so doing we will be led to a series of cultural- psychological laws; dealing with them is the task of a general cultural psychology, while a special cultural psychology has to study the individual concrete occurrences and reveal the mental driving forces effective in men, thus validating the laws of general cultural psychology. Further studies are necessary to deal with these questions.

Notes

1Published originally in Zeitschrift fur die gesamte Staatswissenschaft (1920), 75, 267-301. This article was translated by Kyka Schmidt and slightly abridged by the Editors. References taken from the original German source. Standard format information not available.

2This is the important factor: the intensity of a sound is a physical phenomenon; in psychology the sensitivity to the sound is of the same importance.

3In my opinion, such research of the individual personality is a task of psychology.

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man product transcends behavior as studied in psychology," Poortinga & Malpass, 1986, p. 20) to an emphasis of the necessity of including culture in psychological theorizing ("... developmental psychology needs to become culture-inclusive," Valsiner, 1989, p. 3). I shall argue that this discussion cannot be separated from reflections on the genuine subject matter of psychology and its capacity to encompass the essential features of man. Thus, a "psychology", as the science of the internal logic of the fundamentals of human doings and human thinking, has to refer to meaning as the sine qua non of all psychic phenomena. Yet an analysis of meaning-systems always transcends the consideration of a single individual because these systems are built on the necessity of interpersonal communication and cooperation and are exactly that historically transmitted symbolic universe which psychic development is inseparable connected with from birth on. That is why I would state that a psychology neglecting sociocultural structures as bases of the functioning of its subjects as well as of its own constructors is an illusion caused by unreflected acceptance of natural scientific models in psychology.

The Concept of Culture in the Human Sciences

The Prescientific Use of the Term "Culture"

Before directly tackling the meaning of the concept of culture as it is treated in scientific disciplines (for a discussion of the concept of culture in different disciplines of the social sciences and within different philosophical traditions, see Schneider, 1973; Wuthnow, Hunter, Bergesen & Kurzweil, 1984), it might be instructive to have a look at what was originally intended by introducing the term culture into the consideration of man. Etymologically the word "culture" is derived from the Latin word "colere" (to cultivate, to inhabit, to honour) (Schwemmer, 1984). According to this original meaning, the term was conceived to refer to "the totality of all human achievements and orientations, which extend and transcend mere human nature." In full congruence with this meaning, until the 19th century, "culture" was mainly understood as the formation of the bodily, psychic and mental capacities and virtues of the human being.

... just as the soil can only produce crops when it is cultivated, so man can only develop and be productive when his innate capacities are especially cultivated... culture in this sense is that which is added to human nature by man for the sake of his own perfection." (Schwemmer, 1984, p. 508). This core idea is also reflected in the growing interest in debates on the real essence of human

Psyche and Culture—Can a Culture-Free Psychology Take into Account the Essential Features of the Species "Homo Sapiens"?

Bernd Krewer
Universitaet des Saarlandes

"Man is nothing apart from society. The completely single person is unknown; we only know for sure that he would lack humanity." (Herbart, 1850)

Even within approaches explicitly investigating psychological functions and their development in different cultures, there is an ongoing controversy about the importance of the concept of culture for theories of psychology. The positions range from a plea for a total omission of culture from psychological theories ("... culture as a hu-
nature during the Enlightenment. It is in the philosophical considerations of that era that the common roots of both anthropology and psychology can be discovered without their later disciplinary demarcations (cf. Jahoda, 1982). Without wishing to present here the somewhat divergent pivots of these "enlightened" philosophical reflections of the different national intellectual traditions (for France, see Jahoda, 1982; Moravia, 1977; Stocking, 1968; for Britain, see Harris, 1968; for Germany, see Beuchelt, 1974; Greverus, 1978; Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1952; Mühlmann, 1968), it can be stated, that the term "culture" or "civilization" achieved during that period its present conceptual range within the sciences of man and became a leading term for alluding to the psychic unity of mankind as well as to the specific development of different cultural groups.

Kant considers culture the product of the autonomy of man seen in his creation of his own rules and laws of acting and living (cf. Schwemmer, 1984; Wolandt, 1988). He "defines the culture of man as exactly that world of freely created action and life which man alone is responsible for because he created it on his own" (Schwemmer, 1984, p. 509). Although Kant's conception of culture is based on the unity of man's creative capacity rooted in the features of reason of the transcendental subject, he attributes to anthropology, as an empirical philosophy, the task of analyzing, "what he (man) as a freely acting being makes of himself or can and should make of himself" (Wolandt, 1988, p. 362). The tension between culture as universal human potential and as a concrete form of existence in Kant's reflections points to two aspects of the term, which from that time on decisively influenced the development of the empirical scientific consideration of culture:

1) Culture as a universal feature of mankind most clearly reflected in the early unilinear evolutionary approaches of the arising science of culture. Tylor's book *Primitive Culture* (1871) is often cited as an outstanding example of this orientation and his summation definition of culture is generally considered to constitute the beginning of modern cultural anthropology.

2) A relativist conception of culture as the real life-world of man, based on, at least partly, free and autonomous decisions and achievements of past generations and thus dependent on the at least partly arbitrary specific history and tradition of certain cultural groups. This latter perspective was most clearly elaborated by the so-called Romantic rebellion against the Enlightenment (Shweder, 1984b) and found its basic formu-

lation in Herder's attempt to outline a history of the human mind according to historical periods and peoples (cf. Mühlmann, 1968). Herder concentrates his analysis on the specific biography of man in order to come to grips with the development of the genuine features of mankind based on the unfolding of the individual's natural resources within a specific environmental and cultural context. Analogous to his view that the biography of an individual is based on facts which are created by the individual himself in earlier stages, Herder points out that the history of culture can only be described with reference to the specific developments of single peoples and communities (cf. Wefelmeyer, 1988). Herder's emphasis on the historical quality of all psychic and cultural phenomena laid the foundations for the core idea of that historical particularism which, through Boas's work, deeply influenced the rise of American cultural anthropology (the role of historicism in German ethnology is the subject of Mueller's contribution to this issue). Even earlier formulations of the historical individualizing view of the development of the human mind can be traced back to the philosophical reflections of Shaftesbury, Vico and Leibniz in the 17th and early 18th centuries (cf. Mühlmann, 1968).

These two conceptions for cultural analysis—the study of culture vs. the study of cultures (Bohannon, 1973; Greverus, 1978)—point to a basic dichotomy in the history of human sciences in general concerning the problem of what might be the most suitable model for thinking about the species Homo Sapiens: On the one hand, there is a conception of man as an objectively observable, biological being whose ontogenetic and phylogenetic development follow universal laws based on his physio-biological design and on the influence of environmental stimulation. In contrast to this understanding of man as a natural being, there is a tradition which considers man as a subject able to create culture and his own systems of action. The development of this man-made world depends on subjective human perceptions and decisions and on the history of past generations. Essential for this view of man as a cultural being is his constructive capacity to create a kind of secondary nature as basis for his orientation in the world.

This double nature of man as a natural and a cultural being had already been traced out by Descartes (in his "Discours de la methode pour bien conduire sa raison, et chercher la verite dans les sciences," published in 1637) in his classical distinction between res extensa and res cogi-
tans as the two components of human existence (body-soul dualism, epistemological dualism of subject and object, cf. Broughton, 1980). This distinction influenced, in more or less explicit form, the history of both psychological and anthropological theories. Thus Herrmann (1987) states that it is "the historical dialectics of the history of psychology which as a whole suitable deals with the double nature of man: the human being who describes and explains his behavior and his experience (perception) partially in patterns of speaking and thinking of intentionality and subjectivity and partially in patterns of speaking and thinking of functioning according to natural laws" (p. 116).

But this contrast between the Leibnizian and Lockeian tradition of psychology (Blumenthal, 1980)—or the exogenetic-endogenetic antinomy, as Gergen (1985, p. 8) called it—found its most prominent expression on a more general level in the different "rounds" (Apel, 1978) of the methodological "Verstehen-Erklären" (understanding-explaining) controversy (Groeben, 1986; Riedel, 1978; Valsiner, 1986; a problem also tackled in Webik's contribution to this issue). The different disciplines of human sciences were confronted with the problem of whether the form of explanation borrowed from the classical natural sciences would also be appropriate for human affairs. While this methodological discussion is also relevant for anthropology (cf. Stagle, 1980; Ulin, 1984), this discipline has subsequently focused on a discussion of the "natural vs. cultural being" distinction as the basic dimension in the history of cultural theories. Mühlimann (1968) distinguishes between "hominid" and "humanid" approaches in anthropology (pp. 21-22), that is, between biological and cultural anthropology. As regards the history of ecological approaches in cultural anthropology, we have tried to reconstruct the continuous pendulum swings between these poles of considering culture as the major dimension of theory construction (Kreweer & Eckensberger, in press).

Although conceptions of culture are embedded, as much as any other kind of human theorizing, in major philosophical traditions designing models of man, this short historical review should have demonstrated that the term culture was originally formulated especially to deal with man's specific human capacity for creating his own "Lebenswelt" (life-world). At least within psychology, the exclusion of the concept of culture from the scientific manual seems to correlate with the often criticized neglect of the context of discovery in mainstream scientific psychology. Following the strain of the cult of empiricism (Toulmin & Leary, 1985) the "science game" of psychol-

ogy was determined by an unwarranted trust in statistical methodology and inductive inference (Groeben, 1986; Valsiner, 1986, 1988b) and not by reflections on the appropriateness of models for the analysis of man and his psychic development. Thus, the recurrence of "culture" not only calls into question the narrowness of the concept of man prominent in psychology but also provide a workable frame for interdisciplinary cooperation by pointing to the interrelatedness and the common origins of questions and models concerning man and his development.

When turning to the meaning of culture within the sciences of culture (cultural anthropology and ethology) it seems more advantageous to come to grips with the changing scientific interests behind different concepts of culture than merely to emphasize the chaotic multitude and arbitrariness of existing definitions. Thus, especially when we are interested in examining the usefulness of the concept of culture for psychology, it might, for instance, be more instructive to read carefully Kroeber and Kluckhohn's (1952) informed historical analysis of the origin of the concept and its development, than, as is usually done, to cite their collection of 164 definitions of culture in order to demonstrate the vagueness of "culture" as a scientific subject. Therefore, instead of presenting different definitions of the term, I will try to extract three main aspects of the changing content and range of the concept of culture, which correspond to changing orientations within cultural anthropology.

Dimensions of the Scientific Conceptualization of Culture

Changing foci in defining the concept of culture. As mentioned above, within cultural anthropology "culture", as a core concept, was introduced to capture those genuine features of man that transcend his basic biological and physiological equipment. Even in recent anthropological approaches such a broad comprehension of the term culture is discussed. Accordingly Weiss (1973) considers culture to be "... our (cultural anthropology's) generic term for all human nongeneric, or metabolic, phenomena" (p. 1382). But generally in contrast to this perspective, there is a tendency in anthropological theorizing away from these enumerating sum-total definitions of culture (such as the often cited definitions of Tylor or Kroeber & Kluckhohn (1952) towards an explicit concentration on the essential rules and principles by which the basic elements of the shared life-worlds are constituted, organized and transmitted (cf. Keesing, 1974; Renner, 1983).
Following this line, Geertz (1973) pleads "...for a narrowed, specialized, and ...theoretically more powerful concept of culture to replace Tylor's famous ... pot-au-feu theorizing" (p. 4). If we delimit our analysis to the psychologically oriented approaches of cultural anthropology, this process of concentration on constitutive structures and processes is itself marked by a certain shift in the defining domain: from mainly socio-emotional approaches (culture and personality school) to mainly cognitive approaches (cf. Jahoda, 1982) and in recent years to theories of human action and practice (Dolgin, Kemnitzer, & Schneider, 1977; Dougherty, 1985; Ortner, 1984).

The culture and personality approaches conceptualize culture around basic features of the typical personality structure of its members, whereas the cognitive theories consider it to be a system of shared knowledge anchored in linguistic systems (Goodenough, 1981), a cultural model of thinking (Quinn & Holland, 1987), a system of symbols and meanings (Schneider, 1976) or an expression of the basic design of the human mind (Levi-Strauss). The action-theoretical approaches developed out of a convergence of cognitive and symbolic anthropology (cf. Colby, Fernandez & Kronenfeld, 1981) and out of the intention to rebind ideational systems of meaning to the context of practice, where they are produced and reproduced (cf. Dougherty, 1985; Culture in this perspective is understood as a shared action guiding system expressed and rooted in the everyday practices and communicative exchanges of its members. Within the context of symbolic anthropology Geertz (1973) had already formulated a definition of culture 15 years ago which clearly demonstrates this turn to theories of practice, understanding culture

...as a set of control mechanisms—plans, recipes, rules, instructions (what computer engineers call programs) -for the governing of behavior" (p. 44) and claiming that culture "...denotes an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic form by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and towards life, (p. 89).

The concept of culture as the paradigmatic key to shifts in the history of cultural anthropology. Similar to changes of the target subject in the history of psychology (cf. Graumann's (1984)) discussion of the changing "title concepts" of psychology ("consciousness," "experience," "behavior"), and their methodological consequences (Eckensberger, 1979; Stockols, 1987), the changing definitions of culture are also discussed as embedded in different paradigms or, less ambitiously, in different schools within cultural anthropology. These considerations render it obvious that there are common mainstreams in the development of the central models of the different social scientific disciplines, and that the different definitions of culture and the above mentioned foci of these definitions can be better understood and used when this embedment is reflected. Following this line of conceptual analysis, Seiler (1979) distinguishes three different paradigms of early anthropological theories: culture as history (historical particularism), culture as "gestalt" (configurationalism) and culture in nature (cultural ecology). A broader attempt in this direction is Renner's (1980-1983) attribution of different cultural anthropological paradigms (with an explicit reference to Kuhn's terminology) to the descriptive-taxonomic order of culture-concepts offered by Kroeber & Kluckhohn (1952). He examines the meaning of culture in evolutionist approaches, culture-historical theories, the culture and personality school, cultural relativist conceptions, cross-cultural studies, structural approaches, cognitive anthropology and finally in materialistic theories of culture. Bargatzky (1985) referring to Kaplan & Manners (1972) proposes distinguishing four different groups of culture theories: techno-economical, socio-structural, mental and sociobiological formulations, each of which points to different basic foundations of culture in the features of man and his environment. It is not intended to evaluate these examples here as regards their quality and range in representing anthropological theories, but the theoretical embedding of the concept of culture should be emphasized. That might demonstrate that, in order to discuss the potential use of the concept of culture for psychology, it is necessary first to examine the compatibility of the, mostly, implicit models of man and underlying world views which led both in psychology and anthropology to different theoretical schools (Eckensberger, Krewer & Kasper, 1984). Such a perspective would not emphasize the differences between psychology and anthropology concerning theoretical approaches (for instance, process vs. content-orientation, individual vs. collective level) and methodological strategies (laboratory vs. field methods) (Barry, 1979; Eckensberger, 1970), but the emphasis on common assumptions and compatible questions could shed light on the possibilities of a mutual enrichment for both disciplines (Cole & Scribner, 1974; Cole, 1985; Jahoda, 1982; Jahoda & Lewis, 1987; Lave, 1988, Valsiner, 1989).

The enduring controversy about the ontological status of the concept of culture. Not in unequivocal relation to the above mentioned changes in the core
extensions of the culture concept, there is an ongoing theoretical discussion on the ontological status of the concept, that is, where should a cultural analysis look for its empirical target: in the material and social conditions of life and subsistence of a cultural group, or in the heads of the cultural members, or in structures of interpersonal communication and cooperation, or is culture a mere abstraction reflecting a social scientist’s attempts to come to grips with shared features of different populations (what Rohner (1984) called the cultural nominalist in contrast to the cultural realist approach)? Several issues in anthropological theorizing, frequently discussed, are connected with these questions:

1) Is culture an empirical phenomenon of the real world or a feature of the mind and its structure? This dichotomy appears under different labels. Keesing (1974) distinguishes between cultures as adaptive systems (evolutionary and ecological approaches) and ideational theories of culture; Goodenough (1981) discusses culture as phenomenal vs. ideational order, a distinction which was already formulated in 1921 by Sapir (quoted from Renner, 1983): “culture may be defined as what a society does and thinks”; Birdsey (1951) speaks of realistic vs. idealistic approaches to culture; and to mention a last example, Leach (1978) compared the empiricist and the rationalist position within structural theories of culture.

2) Is culture a feature of individuals or is it a collective feature, a kind of superindividual, superorganic structure (as Kroeber (1917) called it) with its own right of existence or is it both (culture as a double mode of encoding information: inside and outside of the individual human being as Bohannan (1973) formulated it)? This question points to one of the most central issues of cultural theories, the relationship between collective and individual phenomena. In congruence with the above described thematic shifts, this dichotomy was also discussed under different labels: LeVine (1973) offers an overview of the different conceptions of culture-personality relations, Jahoda (1982) discusses the relationship between individual thinking and collective representations and D’Andrade (1984) points to the dynamic and overlapping relationship between individual experience and cultural meaning systems. Sperber (1985) considers cultural phenomena to be ecological patterns of psychological phenomena. And to present a final example of the ambiguity of this collective-individual-relationship in the recent theoretical reflection in cultural anthropology—Varenne (1984) offers a reinterpretation of major classical and recent anthropological works demonstrating their holistic, social understanding of culture, which is not—according to his opinion—appropriately taken up and maintained in American anthropological scientific discourse because of the individualistic background of the American scientific community. These discussions reveal that, apart from untenable reductionist positions (psychological or culturologic reductionism), there are different mediating concepts between the individual psyche and the collective structure, such as “basic or modal personality structure,” “learning environments,” “shared” or “learned” meaning systems, “ideal” action competence or “frame”/“constraint system”/“canalization”/“stage.”

All these concepts take into account the variability of distribution of culture among cultural members, creating a limited indeterminacy to the process of individual development (Valsiner, 1987).

3) There are some further methodological controversies, which are well known from debates in psychology, especially cross-cultural psychology, which need only be mentioned here: holistic vs. atomistic conceptions of cultures; culture as a specific, unique system rooted in a specific historical tradition and accordingly the preference of emic approaches as methodological tool vs. culture as a universal feature of mankind, appearing in different forms or at different stages, which can be analysed by etic approaches (a dichotomy I have already referred to above) (Berry, 1969; Harris, 1976; Jahoda, 1983; Pelto, 1970).

4) A last problem ensuing from the ontological status of the concept of culture concerns subcultural differentiations, a problem especially important in complex societies. In German “Volkskunde”, for example, there is an ongoing discussion on the core segment as the most representative resource for cultural studies of a people. In that respect an historical shift of interest in “Volkskunde” can be traced back from a former concentration on “Hochkultur” (the culture of the elite), to popular culture (the culture of the poor people), to mass culture (the critical reflection on the influence of processes of unification and disappearance of individualism), to socio-culture (a concentration on processes of active participation of cultural members) and finally to every-day culture as a kind of broad access to the life-world of a people (cf. Bausinger, 1982; 1987). These different foci of cultural analysis not only demonstrate the variable local-
ization of the concept of culture, but also make it obvious that anthropology, as a kind of science treating the crisis of human self-understanding in different periods of cultural contacts has also built its central concept of culture choosing a suitable “cultural domain” as the basic issue for cultural analyses (Bitterli, 1982; Dolgin et al., 1977; Schwemmer, 1980; Stagle, 1974). Kroebber & Kluckhohn (1952) had already distinguished between reality culture (material objects, techniques, economy), value culture (world view, religion, ideological systems) and social culture (family, kinship, social organization). The attempts, mostly within action-theoretical approaches, to relate individual psychological competence to cultural structures have led to a discussion about the selection of contexts of every-day practical and social/or dramaturgical activities, of suitable scenes or episodes, of situational taxonomies, or of appropriate action fields or types of action. Such prototypical activity domains are considered to be not only a “dense” expression of basic cultural meaning systems but also the decisive frame of transmission of cultural and psychological structures.

The Reception of the Concept of Culture in Psychology

Now, what is the consequence of the above described discussion about the concept of “culture” for psychology? If one concentrates one’s consideration of the importance of the concept of culture on that branch of psychology which is explicitly engaged in doing research on the cultural multiplicity of psychological phenomena, i.e., Cross-Cultural Psychology, then two opposing perspectives become obvious (cf. the debate on a conception of culture for Cross-Cultural Psychology, Jahoda (1984), Rohner (1984), Segall (1984)).

Keeping Psychology and Culture Apart

In complete congruence with the long dominant approach which defines Cross-Cultural Psychology as one methodological strategy of nonmethodical mainstream psychology basically relying on experimental laboratory research Segall (1984) pleads for a view of culture as a bundle of independent variables. The criterion for selecting the interesting cultural element depends only on the research problem. There will be no need of a theoretically based concept of culture within such an approach if you use culture as treatment and if you consider cross-cultural comparisons as quasi-experimental designs (Strodtbeck, 1964). Without discussing the methodological problems and technical limitations of such a strategy in detail here (Berry, 1969; 1980; Cole & Means, 1981; Eckensberger, 1970; Valsiner, 1987, 1988b), it should be emphasized that the somewhat paradoxical goal for a cross-cultural psychology in the sense of attempt at eliminating culture is directly related to an explicit restriction of the core subject domain of psychology: the search for similarities by “peeling the onion called culture... until in the end they (the cross-cultural differences) have disappeared and with them the variable culture” (Poortinga, van der Vlijver, Joe & van de Koppel, 1987, p. 22) reduces the nature of psychological phenomena to universal dimensions, which are rooted in the psychophysiological and biological basic design of humanity as well as in the universal physical-material structures of his conditions of life. It is this view which Valsiner (1989a), surveying the field of developmental psychology, criticizes as an unreflected hidden assumption of nativism.

Such a restriction in cross-cultural psychological approaches—if consequently realized—becomes obvious in limited research questions (meaning-free, non-social, contest-independent perceptual, cognitive or affective functions) as well as in explicit statements about the genuine subject of psychology. Thus, Poortinga & Malpass (1986), discussing metamethodological paradigms in cross-cultural psychology (see also Eckensberger, 1979), refer only to descriptive and behavioral approaches. They argue against the widening perspective that would result from organismic, systemic and action-theoretical paradigms, because the potential insights of these new perspectives would not be part of psychology as they see it: “...culture as a human product transcends behavior as studied in psychology” (p. 20).

Pleas for a Culture-Inclusive Psychology

It is precisely this restricted perspective of a “biopsychology” which is not accepted by another group of cross-cultural researchers (Boesch, 1980, 1987; Cole, Gay, Glick & Sharp, 1971; Cole and Scribner, 1974; Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition, 1983; Jahoda, 1982, 1986a; Price-Williams, 1980; Shwed, 1984a; Valsiner, 1987, 1988c, 1989). They claim that the reduction of psychological laws to basic biological processes and to adaptation to the environment cannot take into account that most psychological functions are built on the genuinely human capacity to create and transmit meaning and symbolic systems (of which the most important one, of course, is language), to create and transmit material tools and environmental structures as well as social institutions. A model of humans as “cultural beings,” who
produce their own conditions of life and who are able to transmit these new kinds of tools for dealing with life to subsequent generations, makes it necessary to include culture and history in psychological theorizing. In such a perspective, culture cannot play the role of an independent or index variable; rather psychology itself must be conceptualized as a culture-inclusive science (Cole, 1988; Valsiner, 1988a). Rohner's (1984) plea for a theoretical reflection on the concept of culture in Cross-Cultural Psychology seems to be a necessary step in that direction. He defines culture as "...the totality of equivalent and complementary learned meanings maintained by a human population, or by identifiable segments of a population, and transmitted from one generation to the next" (p. 119-120). Even if limited to the ideational sphere, such a conception of culture can be useful for psychology enabling us to gain insight into processes of structuring and transfer of psychological functions, which are based on the shared structure of a man-made environment. Accordingly, Cole and colleagues (Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition, 1983) distinguish four different ways, by means of which the mutual relationship of culture and individual mind is established:

1) The role of culture in selecting contexts, in which individual development takes place;

2) The connection of different cultural contexts, which is basic for solving transfer problems on the individual plane;

3) The interpersonal constitution and transmission of cultural practices, in which cultural meaning systems are produced and reproduced by the interaction and cooperation between cultural novices and experts;

4) Finally the leading role of cultural prescriptions in guiding the care-takers’ attempts to shape the interaction with the child in such a way, that cultural conceptions about age-related competence and behavior are achieved.

Especially this last point, which is basically built on Vygotsky's approach towards an analysis of the zone of proximal development (Zoped) (cf. Cole, 1985), was recently thoroughly elaborated by Valsiner (1987), who supplemented the Zoped by an analysis of the zones of free movement and of promoted action in order to gain a more differentiated insight into the role of culture as an organizer of the children's development. Without the intention of proposing an integrated theory, Jahoda (1982), presents a detailed consideration of potential complementary aspects of psychological theories of cognitive and affective development, on the one hand, and cultural anthropological approaches to the study of collective representations and symbolism, on the other.

Particularly in the study of "higher mental functions," psychological theories depend on an elaborate concept of culture, or to refer to Jahoda’s plea for a fresh conception of culture in Cross-Cultural Psychology: "...if we are to account for higher-level psychological functioning in different cultures we also need some means of characterizing the intricate yet orderly patterning of various social worlds..." (Jahoda, 1984, p. 150). Unfortunately today it seems necessary to emphasize that this insight is not a new one at all, but is as old or even older than scientific psychology. From this perspective the reintroduction of the concept of culture into psychology is more a rediscovery than a real innovation (Cole, 1989). That is exactly what Zitterbarth (1988) expressed when attempting to specify the place of "cultural psychology" among existing approaches: "...to determine...what cultural psychology might be, means both a new beginning and a reconstruction of the past" (p. 328). The exclusion of culture as the product and context of human constructive capacity in psychological theorizing might be at least one parameter of the enduring "crises" of the science of psychology when following blindly the standards of natural scientific models.

Even before Wundt began his famous experimental period at Leipzig, during his time as lecturer in Heidelberg recognized the necessity to supplement the experimental study of basic processes of individual consciousness (which he called "Individualpsychologie") by the study of higher mental processes rooted in the cultural achievements of language, myths and customs (which he called "Völkerspsychologie," a research program already formulated before Wundt, cf. (Graumann, 1980) as well as Krewer & Jahoda's contribution to this issue). But although the experimental, nomothetic approach became dominant in psychology, the critical reflections on its limitations continuously called into question the construction of a purely natural scientific psychology. Stern's (1920, translation in this issue) article on the problems of cultural psychology is a good example for quite modern sounding arguments against a psychology purely defined on the basis of objective methods. As a kind of interim balance after a quarter of a century of psychology, Bühler (1927) and Vygotsky (1928) independently diagnosed a crisis in psychology caused by divergent, unintegrated schools of thought (especially the exclusiveness of the natural scientific and
cultural scientific ("geistwissenschaftlich") approach as proposed by Spranger's "Zweithheitslehre" (dualism), to whom both refer), by the absence of a general agreement on the basic subject matter of the developing discipline, and by an exaggerated trust in methods for treating wrong questions causing the accumulation of a large amount of uninterpretable empirical results. Buhler considers meaning to be the central feature of all psychic phenomena. As an integration of the existing divergent approaches of psychology of that time he conceptualizes psychology as the science of life, while meaning, as an intentional, teleological principle of guidance, is rooted in inner experience (the subject of theories of association, of sensualism, and the psychology of will), meaningful behavior (the subject of behaviorism) and the correlation of these two aspects with the products of the "objective mind" (the subject of Dilthey's "geistwissenschaftlicher" psychology) (p. 29). In analogy to his model of language, in which the meaning of linguistic utterances concerns inner experiences ("Erlebnisfunktion"), interpersonal relationship ("Appellfunktion") and the reference to the world of things and events ("Darstellungsfunktion"), he claims that psychology has to turn to dual interpersonal systems, where the coordination of inner experience, meaningful behavior and their reference to material and symbolic cultural achievements constitutes the basis of psychological development (a model recently elaborated thoroughly in Habermas' (1981) Theory of Communicative Action). Vygotsky (1928), also struggling with the missing unity of psychological approaches, argues for the establishment of materialistic psychology bringing together the two basic divergent streams of construction of psychological models, which he calls "psychobiology and psychoteleology" (p. 200). He claims that a Marxist psychology can only be a natural science (p. 247) ("nature is everything which really exists" p. 248), and that accordingly "subjectivity" as the basic subject matter of psychology has to be understood as the product of two objective processes (p. 246). Thus, he pleads for the conceptualization of psychological development as a general natural-historical process following the laws of dialectics. But as the application of the abstract principles of dialectical materialism for the analysis of history had to be mediated and concretized by the project of historical materialism, Vygotsky considers the future task of psychology to be the development of a psychological materialism mediating between the general principles of dialectics and psychological development (pp. 251-252). Holzkamp's "Critical Psychology" -school in Berlin (for a comprehensive description of its goals and its research for almost 20 years see Holzkamp (1983), Riegel's Dialectical Psychology (Riegel, 1980) and Kesselring's (1981) dialectical reconstruction of Piaget's theory illustrate recent attempts to realize this abstractly sketched program.

Whereas the critical reflections on psychology of the pre-war era emphasized the struggle between the two opposing approaches in psychology as to whether to take the "subject"—or the object-qualities of man as the core subject matter, mainstream psychology after the second world war became even more clearly dominated by a monistic, natural scientific orientation. Nevertheless, mostly during the recent years, there has been a growing critical debate on the restricted knowledge and limited predictive value of the empirical results gained (Broughton, 1987; Maiers & Markard, 1987; Van Ijzendoorn & Van der Veer, 1984). There are at least four common pivots of criticism in recent approaches of "Critical Psychology":

1) As a continuation of the above mentioned controversy between an object vs. subject-conception of psychology and its correlation with the "Erklaerungs-Verstehens" (Explanation-Understanding) debate on the methodological plane, there is ongoing debate on the true subject matter of psychology. In contrast to mainstream psychology (whose unity as a science is based on a consensus about the "correct" methodological strategy to gain valid results and at the same time on a neglect of the context of discovery), critical approaches try to come to grips with the subject-qualities and the constructive capacity of man (Gergen & Davies, 1985; Maiers & Markard, 1987b; Valsiner, 1986). Consequently it points to the necessity of hermeneutic and dialogic methods as suitable tools for a science analyzing human subjects. Aschenbach (1984, p. 27) for example, defines the subject matter of psychology to be "...man as a 'cultural being endowed with language' or as a 'reflective subject' within his 'voluntary' acting and orienting which depends on linguistic achievements."

2) The claim that psychological processes cannot be appropriately captured by research built purely on the individual, independent of situations and time. Consequently there is an increasing demand for the inclusion of context in psychological theories. Apart from approaches in Cross-Cultural Psychology (see Eckensberger's contribution to this issue) and within the Socio-Historical School (Cole, 1988; Valsiner, 1987; Wertsch, 1985) a synchronic analysis of the relationship between psychic structures and specific contexts is advocated by "Ecological Psychology" (Graumann, 1978; Miller, 1986; Walter & Oertel, 1979). There is an equivalent need to consider the diachronic context
as a necessary component of theories of psychological development, which is central in life-span developmental psychology (Baltes, 1987; Lerner, 1988) and in the recently emergent perspective of "Historical Psychology" (Juttermann, 1986; 1988).

3) This subject-quality and context-inclusiveness of psychological functioning is claimed for psychology's subjects' as well as for the scientists' activities; accordingly in nearly all critical approaches new reciprocal research strategies (dialogical methods, action research) come to the fore so that the cultural and historical background of theory construction is reflected.

4) "Critical psychology" often tries to take into account the societal usefulness of its scientific results and considers the field of application in the real world to be the field of practice, where theories have to demonstrate their usefulness. Thus, critical perspectives often blame traditional psychology for its failure to deliver answers to real-life problems.

Apart from the fact that a theoretical concept of culture as the product and context of human constructive ability might improve the compatibility of theoretical models in psychology and the species-specific capacities of mankind, the explicit integration of cultural structures into psychological theorizing could also point to the cultural embeddedness of all psychological model and theory construction (Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition, 1979; Valsiner, 1987). The, at least in Cross-Cultural Psychology, often recognized problem of the rootedness of psychological theories in Western Euro-American cultural assumptions would then no longer be an astonishing discovery on the part of empirical researchers, but would indicate that the social foundation of psychological processes will have to be taken into account not only as regards the analysis of the traditional subjects of psychology but the process of theory construction. The hidden assumptions of folk-psychologies reflected in scientific models (LeVine, Caron & New, 1980; Valsiner, 1989a) could be integrated as variable factors into culture-inclusive psychological theories, as for instance the culture-dependent concept of agency in ethno-psychological approaches (Heelas & Locke, 1981; Marsella, Devos & Hsa, 1985; Shweder & Bourne, 1984; White & Kirckpatrick, 1985), the context-specific approach to cognitive development (Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition, 1983), the social constructivist approach to psychological functions and structures (Gergen & Davies, 1985) or the "cultural niche" concept for culture-embedded studies on infancy (Super & Harkness, 1986).

Thus, a culture-inclusive psychology or "cultural psychology," (in my opinion best described as a psychological science, which considers contextualist construction as the basic process of psychological development), might be a workable perspective for overcoming the old Cartesian duality and its derivatives in scientific models and methodologies, which under different labels (subject-object, "erklaeren- verstehen", universal-specific, theory-practice, natural-cultural, mainstream psychology-critical psychology) have come to the fore within this article. In such a perspective, the psychological development of an active constructing subject has to be conceptualized as a sphere of constraints and possibilities, determined by biological-physiological features of the individual and the physical structure of the environment to which the individual has to adapt as well as by the socio-cultural achievements (mostly language), which from birth structure the development of the child's instrumental and social action competence and motivation.

In sum, it should be emphasized that the integration of a concept of culture as a human-produced condition of human existence inseparably connected with the organization of psychological functions and structures, is a necessary supplement to the restricted view of humans as natural beings, whose cross-cultural variability can be reduced to basic regularities of a pan-cultural human design. To avoid misunderstandings, it should be pointed out that I would not like to argue for a quasi-arbitrary cultural plasticity of human beings (cf. J. H. de Vries's 1986b) critique of Gergen's social constructivist position), however I claim that psychologists looking for regularities in human thinking and human doings should not restrict their search for explanations to biophysiological structures and necessary adaptations to physical properties of the environment, but should also refer to regularities caused by the specific human capacity of creating and transmitting symbolic/material conditions of human operation and cooperation. These latter foundations of human action in particular allow the consideration of genuine "psychological" forms of existence, namely human beings' capacity to assume self-guidance and responsibility for their own actions on the basis of self-created means and goals.

Within such a perspective, culture could best be conceptualized as a historically transmitted and accumulated field of action (cf. Boesch, 1980), which puts constraints on the developing individual's action structures by its specific structure of the world of objects, its forms of social institutions, social interaction and cooperation and its shared meaning and rule-systems (language, rituals, conventions, etc., cf. Shweder, 1980). These cultural
constituents of the external action field represent the basic dimensions of the meaningful symbolic universe, in which psychological development occurs. The place where these different cultural features are produced and reproduced is to be sought in the different types of social and instrumental co-actions, in which the individual cultural member is involved from birth on.

The need for a workable concept encompassing the interrelationships of context and developing psychological structures is underlined by the increasing reference to every-day action contexts and their interpersonal construction mostly within cross-cultural developmental psychology (Bruner, 1983; Cole, 1988; Doise & Mugny, 1984; Jahoda, 1986a; Jahoda & Lewis, 1987; Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition, 1983; Lave, 1988; Rogoff & Lave, 1984; Super & Harkness, 1986; Valsiner, 1987, 1988c, 1989).

It is first and foremost in order to come to grips with these external, man-made structurations of individual development that a concept of culture must have its incontestable place in psychology.

Notes

1 I thank Peter Burgard and Joachim Wutke for their detailed and useful comments and Anne-Mary Jenkins for her patience in improving my English.

2 Der Mensch ist Nichts auber der Gesellschaft. Den voellig Einzelnen kennen wir gar nicht; wir wissen nur soviet mit Bestimmtheit, dass die Humanitaet ihm fehlen wuerde.*

3 Culture is “that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.” (Tylor, 1871).

4 Culture is a product; is historical; includes ideas, patterns, and values; is selective; is learned; is based upon symbols; and is an abstraction from behavior and the products of behavior.” (Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1952).

References


From Cross-Cultural Psychology to Cultural Psychology

Lutz H. Eckensberger
Universitaet des Saarlandes

Introduction

I can well imagine that from the outside contemporary psychology looks like a consolidated science: There exists a tremendous network of Psychological Institutes in Universities and Academies in almost every nation around the globe; numerous national and international associations and journals were founded in the first half of this century, and their number is still increasing; and last but not least, psychology has a great influence on practical decisions in medicine, education, industry and even international affairs. All this is certainly true. And yet, it is also true that psychology from the very beginning has been struggling for its identity as a human science. Although psychology may seem to have successfully come of age, it is still an open question whether or not it can be further developed according to the principles of natural science, or whether it should have some unique features. Human beings, the way they think, feel and act, cannot easily be explained by “natural laws” alone; “cultural rules” have also to be taken into consideration. But these rules are

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genuinely of another ontological status than natural laws because they are themselves human creations, and hence are not binding because human beings can change them.

This tension between natural laws and cultural rules as explanatory frameworks for human activities is evident in Wundt’s first programmatic ideas (cf. Graumann, 1980); it is the basis of the famous “crisis of Psychology,” which was, interestingly enough, diagnosed in the very same year, 1927, by Karl Buhler and Lev Vygotsky; it prompted “critical reflections on psychology” in the seventies (Schultz, 1970), and it can readily be seen in the most recent efforts to develop a variety of “new Psychologies” like Historical Psychology, Dialectical Psychology, Cultural Psychology and Indigenous Psychology to mention just a few (see also Krewer, this issue).

I am therefore convinced that in the long run what psychology really has to deal with is exactly the tension between biological laws and cultural rules — how they regulate each other by setting boundaries or by facilitating specific conditions for the developing organisms and how they interrelate in emergent developmental processes in terms of history, phylogeny, ontogeny as well as micro-processes (actualgenesis) of a single act (cf. Vogel & Eckensberger, 1988).

In the present article I will restrict my argument only to the “cultural side” of this problem. Although I am aware of the inadequacy of this decision (it is genuinely undialectical), I feel justified in restricting myself in this way, because it is more often culture which is neglected in modern psychology than the biological basis for human activities. It should be kept in mind, however, that the following argument should be taken only as the first step in a much longer theoretical discourse.

In developing my argument, I will choose the cross-cultural perspective. I have argued for ten years (Eckensberger, 1979) that this perspective is particularly fruitful and challenging since cross-cultural psychologists can detect certain limitations and/or deficiencies in methods and theories of mainstream psychology much more easily than their colleagues. Cross-cultural psychologists are compelled from the outset to take a hard, critical look at the scientific routines and frameworks they use. Cross-cultural experience makes them vividly aware of the limitations of pure experimental strategies, sampling techniques, as well as of the dangers and pitfalls of comparing data gleaned by formally identical methods. However, important in the present discussion is the need to consider the cultural context of data collection and interpretation; and hence the importance of specifying the culture concept itself. Knowledge of cultural rules for the reconstruction of behavior is an essential part of this subbranch of Psychology.

In the present paper, I will not present a further description or enumeration of methodological and/or empirical results that cross-cultural psychology may contribute to mainstream psychology. Instead, I will explicitly take a normative stance. I will argue that if some trends in cross-cultural research and theorizing are taken seriously, then cross-cultural psychology as well as mainstream psychology, will move towards what one might call “cultural psychology,” i.e., a psychology which explicitly contains “culture” as a feature unique to human beings.

Some Trends in Cross-Cultural Psychology Which Argue for a Rethinking of Psychological Methods and Theories

Without claiming to cover the entire field of cross-cultural psychology, I would like to point out three trends that I consider important. I shall focus primarily on cognitive development.

Developmental Concepts as Key Ingredients in a Psychological Theory

There is increasing agreement in cross-cultural theorizing that developmental processes are necessary ingredients of any psychological theory because any interaction between cultural conditions and individuals takes place over a long period of time. This position is most explicitly formulated by Heron and Kroeger (1981) who claim that “any serious and systematic attempt to study human behavior and experience must, in the very nature of things, be both developmental in depth and cross-cultural in breadth” (p. 1).

Given the plausibility of this proposition it is astonishing that cross-cultural psychology is rarely developmentally oriented; and few theories or concepts of developmental psychology have been expanded to include cross-cultural research (cf. Jahoda, 1986). The conclusion drawn by Heron and Kroeger (1981) is therefore a challenge for cross-cultural as well as for mainstream psychology. The former explicitly has to turn to developmental theories, and the latter has to expand its research to consider cross-cultural contexts.

Fortunately, over the years cross-cultural psychology has become more developmentally oriented; a trend which
can be seen in such areas as motor development (Super & Harkness, 1981) and motivational development (Kornadt, Eckensberger & Emminghaus, 1981). The developmental approach is most prominent, however, in the field of cognitive development, where theories proposed by Piaget, Kohlberg, and Witkin have become very influential.

Owing to the influence of these theoretical frameworks, two basic assumptions have become discernible and can be understood as alternative conceptions of development. These assumptions replace those that dominated early cross-cultural psychology rooted in learning theory and/or ideas of cultural relativism. The first assumption is that development is a process actively produced by the subject. (Super & Harkness, 1981). The second is the claim that developmental stages or formal aspects of performance (like differentiation) are universal.²

**Contextualism: Universalism and Constructivism Under Attack**

Although a general developmental orientation has been increasingly accepted in theorizing and in the research, at least in the domain of cognition, the notions of universalism and self-evolving constructivism have come under heavy attack. The universality claim has been questioned simply because there exist considerable empirical cross-cultural variations of most psychological processes. In addition, the assumption of the self-developing individual has been questioned because these variations turn out to be context specific; that is, they are at least co-determined by environmental conditions.

There are several excellent recent reviews on this issue (Jahoda, 1986; Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition, 1983). For this reason, I will give here only a brief summary of some of the important aspects of this discussion.

What are the so-called facts?

- First, the data indicate that most context-specific variations are not general cross-cultural variations in performance, but tend to be rather fairly specific.

- Second, and even more important, a deficiency in one domain (as viewed from a western standard) often goes hand in hand with a superiority in another.

- Third, and most important, it is often possible to specify an interaction between advantages/deficiencies in psychological processes and specific cultural conditions.

This means that a systematic correspondence between cultural and psychological conditions can be determined, a fact of utmost importance for all of psychology.

- Fourth, context specific variability applies to almost every psychological process, domain or variable: Data exist on motor development, sleep/wake cycles, indicators for attachment, perceptual skills, classification tasks, memory, and on motives like aggression and achievement. Hence, context specific variability applies to processes which traditionally have been interpreted as indicators of neurological maturity of the brain (e.g., sleep/wake cycles) as well as to domains which, by contrast, have traditionally been assumed to be determined primarily by experience.

As can be expected, the correct theoretical interpretation of these “facts” is highly disputed. In the field of cognitive development in particular, two divergent positions have been predominant: One interpreted the data in the constructivist tradition with reference to some central processes, and the other placed the locus of development in cultural practices, i.e., in activities specifically demanded within a cultural context (LCHC, 1983). Recently, however, these positions seem to have been merged to some extent (cf. Jahoda, 1986). Rather than give a historical review of this 20-year-old discussion here, I shall confine myself to addressing some of the theoretical dimensions arising out of this debate, focussing on both their general theoretical aspects as well as their more specific dimensions.

**General theoretical dimensions.** Thirty two years ago, Boesch, one of the pioneers of cross-cultural psychology in Germany, pointed out that different cultures offer individuals different possibilities and constraints, thus enabling them to have specific experiences, which in turn can be interpreted as incitement or triggering conditions for an “active development.” Furthermore, it was clear to Boesch that this process applies to the physical as well as to the social and symbolic environment (Boesch, 1958). These differences in availability of experiences in different cultures certainly may account for some of the culture-specific variance in cross-cultural data. It has to be borne in mind, however, that this first aspect does not challenge the idea of an active subject constructing his/her own development: It only leads to certain cultural or regional specifications of it. Therefore, recently, the term “local constructivism” (Dases, 1980; Harris & Heelas, 1979) has been used, which in my opinion, should instead be generalized and given the label “contextualistic constructivism.”
A second, somewhat more convoluted argument was recently developed by Glick (1985). He suggested that cultures not only offer different possibilities for experiences but that these possibilities also imply rules or laws which are "hidden" to varying degrees in different cultures. Especially in the case of technical (artificially created) cultural elements, e.g., a computer, one would probably need a "tutor" to discover its underlying structure or built-in rules. The same is not necessarily true for the comprehension of the larger part of natural processes; for example, comprehending that water conserves mass or weight when it is poured from one glass into another, no matter what the individual design or form of the glass may be. Glick's position emphasizes that this dimension is more difficult to cope with from a Piagetian constructivistic perspective, since basically a co-construction of an individual structure is called for. I will return to this issue soon.

At the same time, Glick's position draws attention to and clarifies the notion that most "constructions" or "co-constructions" of cognitive structures during development are in fact "re-constructions" of knowledge, because most of them are already inherent in the culture one grows up in. Furthermore, it is also implied in Glick's argument that cultural elements are initially produced by humans and not only reconstructed by them (as is the case with "natural" processes). Finally, from examples given and arguments set out by Boesch (1958), Glick (1985), Goodnow & Cashmore (1985), Super & Harkness (1981), Valsiner (1987) and others, it can be learned that cultures not only offer different amounts and types of experiences for subjects but also that different domains of experience are also differently evaluated in different cultures. They may be positively valued (considered to be appropriate, natural, good or useful, cf. Goodnow & Cashmore, 1985) or they may be negatively valued (considered to be inappropriate, unnatural, bad or just useless). It is therefore argued that in the first case, there will be a resulting "selective pressure of the culture," a pressure which may be low, moderate or strong, and may therefore reach from support of, to demands for, behavior. In the latter case, culture will produce "canalizing constraints" which may vary from simple disincentives to prohibitions to taboos.

These last "dimensions" clearly come close to the ideas proposed by Michael Cole and his associates at the Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition because here the locus of development is seen primarily in the culture and not in the individual. In fairness, however, it must be stressed that the LCHC group has pointed out that co-operations, far from being excluded from Piagetian theory, have in fact played an important role in it. It is true that Piaget is often accused of having interpreted developmental processes in a rather idealistic or solipsistic manner, in that he focussed upon the developmental processes of the isolated subject. But this is certainly not the whole story. Even in one of his early and well-known books on the development of intelligence, Piaget (1943, Chapter 6) had explicitly underlined the necessity of action coordinations between subjects for the development of groupings. He even elaborated on the structural similarity between communication and thinking (or reflection), since the latter can be understood as communication with the self. Hence it becomes obvious that processes of cultural selection and canalisation serve not only to bring about the individual's own structures but also to promote some shared meaning of cultural elements amongst members of the same culture. To a certain extent, therefore even cognitive structures derived from interactions with physical objects can be perceived as being socially constructed.

Specific theoretical concepts or perspectives. The kind and number of empirically defined performance/context-interactions enumerated above also raise some doubts about the validity or usefulness of some explanatory concepts at the microlevel of developmental processes where the rather global concept of "constructivism" is broken down into specific mechanisms. Again the following arguments will be restricted to cognitive development.

The assumption of a highest stage. With reference to Piaget's theory, Davids (1983), Glick (1985) and Greenfield (1976) were the first to propose a clear distinction between the basic theoretical concepts underlying the general developmental theory and the stage theory itself. They argued that the latter is much closer to the operationalization of structures, therefore much more content-laden, and therefore also much more culturally biased. If this distinction is made carefully, however, it becomes evident that the general idea of a genetic epistemology leads neither to the specific choice of logical operations as being the highest stage of cognitive growth (Greenfield, 1976), nor to the acceptance of Kant's "categorical imperative" or of Rawl's "justice concept" as being of the highest stage in the domain of morality. Quite the contrary. The basic idea of a genetic epistemology only assumes that cognitive systems have to be analyzed via developmental processes because they are themselves developmentally constructed.

So this position would in fact only lead to a strategy that initially focuses on a search for structurally complex
(or most complex) notions of logical and ethical thinking in different cultures. A developmental reconstruction of these structures would then be the next task (cf. Davids, 1983). This approach would smooth out some of the difficulties encountered in, for example, scoring answers to moral dilemmas from different cultures. These difficulties arose from the fact that certain answers in moral dilemma interviews were highly structured, but they either referred to criterion judgements in Kohlberg’s manuals which dominate lower stages, or they did not match existing criterion judgements at all. Such difficulties have been reported for verbal material on higher stages of moral judgement from Tibetan monks, Israeli kibbutniks or Indian subjects. These populations referred to contents like collective happiness or nonviolence (Snarey, 1985), which are not central parts of any Western ethic, but which reflect principles central to ethical systems of the respective cultures.

In the context of the present argument, these answers can be understood to represent the core of higher moral stages that are specific to the respective cultures. This does not mean, however, that their developmental paths cannot be refracted through universal structures.

The assimilation/accommodation equilibrium. One could argue, that Piaget’s central idea of an equilibrium between assimilation and accommodation is also challenged by the various cultural sources of development (availability, selective pressure, canalizing constraints) mentioned above. However, the LCHC group (1983) argues convincingly that the “digestion analogy” implied in the process of equilibration can indeed be maintained in spite of these complications. They elaborate: “Just as parents prepare the food that children will consume, so, too, parents (and others in the child’s environment) prepare and constrain the type of intellectual experiences to which the child will be exposed” (p. 346).

Reflective abstraction. Whereas the above example is focused more on the assimilation aspect of the assimilation-accommodation equilibrium, it is again Glick (1985), who draws attention to the principle of reflective abstraction, which is used by Piaget especially as an explanatory concept for the constructivist part of cognitive development, and which can be understood as a system that operates as “reflections upon actions.” Glick (1985) underlines the ingenuity of this concept because it represents a non-innate, yet universal basis for the progression of knowledge. Glick criticizes it because it is “firmly fixed on the organism side” and is “fundamentally acultural” (p. 106). Therefore, he calls for “multiple theories of the growth of mind” after having demonstrated that some constructions via cultural contexts are, in fact, “co-constructions” (see above).

Optimization of development. Beyond these points of criticism in discussions about “cognition and culture,” rises the idea of an “optimization of development.” It is assumed that cognitive conflicts are especially productive for a subject, if they are produced by items of information slightly higher than the developmental stage of that subject. This idea is sometimes referred to as the “n+1”-condition,” or as “dosed discrepancies” and it is formulated in the somewhat more advanced concept of the “zone of proximal development, ZPD” (LCHC, 1983; Vygotsky, 1978), which is defined as “the distance between the actual developmental level of an individual, as determined by independent problem solving, and the level of potential development, as determined through problem solving under adult guidance or in collaboration with more capable peers (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 86, quoted after Valsiner, 1987, 107).

A very similar concept which is, however, formulated more radically, can be seen in what Fuerestin (1989) calls “mediated learning.” Like the “zone of proximal development” this concept also refers to processes which represent co-constructions of a child and a “tutor.” Fuerestin, however, even goes as far as to claim that this type of learning is constitutive for humans and forms the essence of culture.

Individualism/Collectivism

A third trend in modern cross-cultural psychology involves the dichotomy between individualism and collectivism. There are various indicators from cross-cultural research that challenge the individualistic orientation of the western “model of man,” and are in direct contrast to the collectivistic orientation of other cultures. However, neither the content, dimensionality, or the logical status, nor the evaluative implications of the concept of collectiveness have been agreed upon (Kagitcibasi, 1987). In the present context it is especially striking that the dichotomy is primarily defined within a non-developmental social-psychological context. Apart from these weak points, which may be considered as quite natural in an emerging field, the topic itself is highly relevant today. In my opinion, however, it is not so much the dichotomy itself which is important here but the fact that the individualistic orientation of western mainstream psychology is, in itself, a quite tacit and unreflected assumption, rather than an explicitly formulated parameter in western psychologi-
ocal theories. It is true that considerable effort is made in research to control beliefs, self concepts and some related constructs (cf. Harter, 1983). It is also true that autonomy is accepted in most developmental theories of the self as the feature of a mature stage, but the basic potential capacity of human self-reflexivity is, in fact, rarely an explicit part of psychological theories (cf. Eckensberger, 1979). Once again, it is cross-cultural evidence which has initiated reflections on assumptions made by our western theories.

A Call for a Cultural Psychology

A conclusion that can be drawn from the foregoing discussion is that both future theorizing and research (even in cross-cultural psychology) do not necessarily have to focus upon comparisons between measurements collected in different cultural groups, but rather upon the cultural context of psychological dimensions or qualities.

This conclusion is a clear contradiction of the perspective of some reputable colleagues in the cross-cultural field such as Poortinga and his associates. On the contrary their intention is to decontextualize psychological variables to reveal underlying universal human characteristics by “peeling the onion called culture” layer after layer until the culture concept itself has vanished (Poortinga, van de Vijver, Joe & van de Kopp, 1987). Others, however, have drawn a similar conclusion to the one advanced in this paper. In 1980, Price-Williams argued in line with my own point of view and that of my colleagues that “the radical thesis is that any psychological variable cannot be taken apart from its association with the cultural medium in which it is embedded” (p. 81). First, he proposed the use of the name “cultural psychology” instead of cross-cultural psychology, and second, he argued “that the fundamental unit for a cultural psychology has to be organism-environment interactions” (p. 84).

Although I clearly agree with the underlying idea, I would prefer to define the “fundamental units” of a cultural psychology as “individual culture-interactions.” I assert this for the sake of systematizing the approach as well as for historical reasons. On the one hand, in the past decades the claim of “organism-environment-interactions” has been successfully substantiated outside cross-cultural circles (as in the “ecological psychology” and “environmental psychology movements” of the sixties and seventies). On the other hand, the term “culture” is much more tied to the species “homo sapiens” than the term “environment.”

Having said so much and so little at the same time, I should like to move towards specifying the term “cultural psychology” by enumerating at least the most basic questions of concern which this discipline should try to answer. Obviously, I will do so by drawing some implications from the foregoing discussion. It goes without saying that these conclusions can be formulated only very broadly in the present context, which also means that they may look a bit hybrid.

First, broadly speaking, cultural psychology should aim at an integration of the cultural and the individual level. Both cultural and individual changes should not only be interrelated (descriptively or systematically), but should be constructed within the same theoretical framework.

Second, cultural psychology should aim at an integration of individual and collective (cultural) meaning systems, as well as their development and interrelationship. Not the least important task of any such theory should be to determine the limits of agency in the sense of potential self-reflexivity.

Third, cultural psychology should try to bridge the gap between objectivism and subjectivism. The meaning of the context for individuals is obviously of central importance in reconstructing the way they think, feel, and act. Objective cultural and historical conditions, no less than the subjective meaning of these conditions for individuals have to be incorporated in any adequate theory of “cultural psychology.”

A Typology of Action-Fields: An Opening for an Adequate Theory of Cultural Psychology?

There are many reasons why a “cultural psychology” is not unanimously agreed upon in the cross-cultural scientific community. There are, of course, methodological objections based on the fear of a lowering of standards and a drop in prestige, but there is also doubt as to whether a theory of the required integrative power is even possible. In any event, there is a lack of consensus—regarding the definition of “individual-culture-interactions.”

Although a detailed discussion of all aspects of a theory suited for a cultural psychology is clearly beyond the scope of this paper, some comments may be helpful to delineate the theoretical framework my colleagues and I are trying to develop.
To prevent any misunderstanding, it must be emphasized first that a contextualistic orientation does not rule out comparisons. Price-Williams (1980) agrees in saying, "Contexts are not necessarily unique, they can be compared" (p. 82). And, in fact, Michael Cole's work in the Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition is an excellent example of this kind of comparison—hardly surprising as his approach was originally called "Experimental Anthropology." Unfortunately, however, there are also objections to this position, such as the practical doubts that Jahoda (1980) formulated some years ago, when he wrote that, "This approach appears to require extremely exhaustive, and in practice, almost endless explorations of quite different pieces of behavior with no guarantee of a decisive outcome" (p. 126). On the other hand, Jahoda also points toward a solution when he adds, "this might not be necessary if there were a workable 'theory of situations' at our disposal (...) what is lacking in the context specific approach are global theoretical constructs relating to cognitive processes of the kind Piaget provides, and which save the researcher from becoming submerged in a mass of unmanageable material" (1980, p. 126).

Our own theoretical and empirical efforts are aimed precisely at the development of such "global theoretical constructs." In fact, this effort has very much in common with the view advanced by Michael Cole and his group. However, our approach is rooted in different origins. While Cole and his associates are heavily influenced by Soviet psychology, especially by the work of Vygotsky, Luria and Leontiev, our work is primarily influenced by Boesch, who over the last thirty years has argued in support of a theory which comprises a cultural perspective, although it is still a genuinely psychological theory. Boesch's own system is built upon (a) Piagetian constructivism, (b) Janet's dynamic theory, (c) Lewinian field-theory, and (d) depth-psychological symbolism (cf. Eckensberger, 1989).  

Although we differ from Boesch's approach in several respects, and have proposed some systematizations which are beyond his own intentions, we consider his theoretical framework as a fertile ground for the unfolding of our own work. As will be seen, however, we also make use of some distinctions proposed by Habermas (1981).

The first basic orientation in our work is the idea that the concept of culture not only gives rise to some of the problems enumerated above in the context of cross-cultural psychology, but that it also provides some solutions. As early as 1958, at a meeting of UNESCO experts on cross-cultural research in child psychology, Boesch pro-

posed beginning with some main dimensions of culture to theorize about their "psychological relevance" — or their implications for the ontogeny of psychological processes. He distinguished forty cultural variables or groups of variables, which are compatible with later taxonomic approaches of concrete cultural groups (Textor, 1967) as well as with theoretical discussions of the culture concept in anthropology (cf. Renner, 1980; Geertz, 1965). Table 1 gives a summary of Boesch's (1958) cultural and psychological aspects, some of which have been used in cross-cultural research while others have not. They all demonstrate, however, that at least some of the implications of the cultural dimensions are of the utmost attractiveness for psychological research and theory, in general, and would in fact help to determine, clarify, and systematize the specific "cultural contents" that a psychological theory should make use of (see Table 1, next page).

Although these earlier writings still suggest that cultural dimensions should logically be treated as independent variables, a second orientation, which can be gleaned from Boesch's general approach (especially in later publications, Boesch, 1976; 1980; 1983; 1987) is that one should use "actions in cultural contexts" as the unit of analysis. This decision implies that neither a taxonomy of subjects, nor one of situations, is intended. Instead, we are working on a "typology" of actions in action contexts. Interestingly enough, the LCHC group's reaction to Jahoda's (1980) critique, mentioned above, implies a similar solution, in that they propose a taxonomy of situations based upon "domains of activities" (LCHC, 1983, p. 299, and 245 ff.). Such a typology also follows from Piaget's basic theory as expounded by Davids (1983). Finally, the indissoluble bond between context and action is also underlined in present-day discussions of contextualism as a general epistemological orientation. To cite Rosnow & Georgoudid (1986) "...an act or event cannot be said to have an identity apart from the context that constitutes it; neither can a context be said to exist independently of the act or event to which it refers" (p. 6). It is quite evident that it is impossible to expound or elaborate an entire psychology" solely on the basis of the theoretical orientation discussed here. However we will summarize at least four of its main features (cf. also Figure 1, see page 46).

First, although actions are executed by subjects in real life situations, we suggest that the action itself can be understood as the dynamic interface between the individual and the situational context. And as can be seen in Figure 1, the action forms the overlap between internal
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cultural Variables</th>
<th>Psychological Relevance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>a) Climate and Nature</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Geographical situation</td>
<td>Influence on physical conditions (health, metabolism, endocrine situation, etc.); effort and fatigue;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Variations of temperature, humidity and atmospheric pressure</td>
<td>anxiety and security;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Soil and possibilities of cultivation</td>
<td>breadth or narrowness of experience and human contacts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Closed or open area (possibilities of transportation)</td>
<td>religious and superstitious ideas, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Animals and vegetation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>b) Population</strong></td>
<td>Individual communication;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Density of population</td>
<td>various degrees of privacy;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Racial groups and mixture of races</td>
<td>nationalism and racial prejudice, similarity or opposition of attitudes;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Migrations of stability of population</td>
<td>attitudes towards propriety;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Languages</td>
<td>forms of thought, trends of communication (e.g. two language groups may always use only one or both of their languages for communication).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>c) Society</strong></td>
<td>Family-size and family life;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Dwellings</td>
<td>participation in public life;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Size of communities</td>
<td>attitudes of obedience or of individual initiative;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Structure of communities</td>
<td>interests;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Forms of community participation</td>
<td>possibilities of increasing personal economic status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Occupational characteristics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Economic characteristics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>d) Institutions</strong></td>
<td>Forms of initiation into social and occupational life;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. School or other educational institutions</td>
<td>religious constraints and ideas, formation of anxiety and feelings of security;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Church or other religious institutions</td>
<td>political interests and activities;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Administration and government bodies</td>
<td>interests in group and forms of group manifestations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Societies, groups, clans</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>e) Customs and habits</strong></td>
<td>Valuation of time;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Rhythms of life</td>
<td>rhythm of work;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time consciousness and value of time, individual life rhythms, social life rhythms</td>
<td>expectations connected with time attitude towards age;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1. continued:

**Cultural Variables**

2. Food and eating (kind of food, preparation, habits connected with eating, including social habits)

3. Verbal and non-verbal communication (forms of greeting, speaking, gestures)

4. Rituals for special occasions, like birth, initiation ceremonies, marriage, occupational initiation, death, house building, war-fare.

5. Clothing and nakedness

6. Health practices

7. Educational customs at home and in the group

f) **Beliefs**

- 1. In connection with nature
- 2. In connection with human fate
- 3. In connection with education
- 4. In connection with religion (including any kind of supernatural belief. Here the separation between theoretical or theological formulations and popular beliefs and attitudes is important; it is important, too, to look at religious models and their influence on non-religious forms of life, e.g. to consider the "existential example" of Christ or of Buddha for instance detached from their religious teaching)

**Psychological Relevance**

- Value of enjoyment, of physical fitness, of social gathering;
- Spontaneity or formalism of social approach;
- Attitudes of submission and command; repression of emotional reactions; anxiety formation and anxiety prevention;
- Separation between age-groups; attitudes towards sex and love;

- Superstitions, related to anxiety;
- Ideas of destiny and attempts to act on destiny;
- Formation of guilt, ideas of punishment and purification, spiritual ideals;
- Value formation and interiorisation, etc.

**g) Crisis**

- 1. Types of crisis occuring in the group (war, epidemics, revolutions, etc.)
- 2. Frequency of crisis
- 3. Ways of dealing with crisis
- 4. Prophylaxis of crisis

Security or insecurity of forms of life;

Social value of aggressive or of dominant behavior;

Consciousness of crisis;

Correspondence between ideals and reality; planning of social life.

**h) Material**

- 1. Materials for use
- 2. Materials for protection
- 3. Materials for embellishment
- 4. Materials for cults
- 5. Tools for manufacturing and working

Values attached to tools and materials;

Forms and levels of skill;

Importance of industrial forms of life.
Figure 1. A framework of a “cultural psychology”—A summary of action-theory terms.
and external "action fields." Hence we claim that this unit of analysis allows both individual development (ontogeny) and socio-historical changes to be incorporated within the same theoretical framework. Individuals structure their own actions and are, in turn, transformed by these actions (in the Piagetian sense), while objective changes in the culture are likewise products of actions. Both individual and cultural processes are part of what can be called "primary structuration."

Second, in following Habermas (1981) rather loosely, we distinguish at least two basic types of actions: one which is instrumental, in that it is effect-oriented and covers the material and physical world; and another which is oriented towards empathy and understanding and therefore covers the social world.

Third, we propose to distinguish analytically between three levels of activity which apply equally to both types of actions, and which, in addition, relate psychological concepts to cultural ones. To illustrate these levels, we will make use of some of the cultural dimensions, summarized in Table 1. It will be seen that the descriptive taxonomic status of these aspects is to some extent transformed in favor of a new significance within the terms of the theory.

(a) On the first level, actions are oriented towards "the world," which is represented by natural conditions such as climate and nature (geographical situation, temperature, humidity, kind of soil, openness of the terrain, animals, vegetation); by "phenomenal aspects of culture" (materials for use and protection, embellishment, artifacts); by other concrete individuals (relatives, peers, representatives of authority); by aspects of population (density, ethnic groups, migration-stability, language); by societal characteristics (dwellings, size and structure of communities, forms of participation, occupational characteristics); by institutions (schools, education, church, administrative bodies); by customs and habits (rhythms of life, food and eating; by types of communication, special rituals) and finally by the individual's own body (clothing and nakedness, health practices) (cf. Table 1). These types of action originate from personal concerns (goal structures) and basic motivations and are accompanied by simple emotions (e.g. rage, joy, fear, cf. Campos, et al, 1983). From the cognitive point of view, they lead primarily to a figurative schemata in the Piagetian sense. We assume, however, that although these actions share some basic features, as in the case of "effect-oriented" and "communication-oriented" actions, they are also markedly different with respect to specific properties.

(b) On the second level, actions are action-oriented and subject to regulations and reflections. Regulations are threefold: structural, affective or ergonomic; and they primarily are used to reconstruct the actual genesis (microprocess) of the single act. Instead, reflective processes are most important to reconstruct ontogeny, in the sense of reflected abstraction formulated by Piaget. Some important types of reflections are illustrated in Figure 2 (see next page).

As can be seen in this figure, we first distinguish between two types of abstractions. We speak of a "reflective abstraction" if the actors own actions are reflected upon. We speak of "understanding abstraction," however, if actions of one or more other actors are taken as the object of thought (cf. Eckensberger, 1987). If we also add the distinction between instrumental and communicative actions, it becomes evident that in any communicative action reflective and understanding processes are simultaneously present. If we finally complement these cases by taking Glick's (1985) discussion on co-actions into account, we then can even develop abstraction processes of "co-reflections" and "co-understanding," which are, however, intrinsically communicative processes. It may be noteworthy to mention that we do not claim that any reflection of "co-actions" by necessity has to be either abstraction by co-reflection or by co-understanding. So, while I agree that the notion of "co-constructions" is a more complicated matter than "pure" or "spontaneous constructions," I do not think that the acknowledgment of such processes destroys the idea of reflective abstraction in principle. We agree, however, that reflective processes upon co-actions or co-operations should get more attention in future theory and research, and we hope that some of the distinctions we make may serve a heuristic function in this endeavor.

Finally, we consider all types of reflections and regulations as being provoked by action barriers (problems in the case of effect-oriented actions; conflicts in the case of communication-oriented actions) as perceived by the subject or by crises as produced by the culture.5

Again, if one tries to link specific cultural aspects of Table 1 to the second level of actions, then it becomes evident that with regard to culture these secondary actions lead to those aspects of culture.
Figure 2. Types of reflective/understanding abstraction
which are known as “ideational” (Renner, 1980), and which represent beliefs and normative frameworks. That is, they relate to knowledge and rule-systems which refer to nature as well as to culture itself (like laws, ethics, esthetics, science, technology). In regard to the subject, parallel logical motivational and evaluative frameworks are constructed and reconstructed. Here precisely is the (theoretically located) dynamic interface between individual and cultural rule-systems which Shweder points to (1980).

(c) The third level of actions, finally, is agency-oriented. Although I have some conceptual difficulties with the concept of indigenous psychology as well as with the applications of individual constructs to groups (like the “consciousness of the clan” or “ego of the group,” cf. Parin, 1978) we do not want to exclude these concepts from our theoretical approach on a priori grounds. What is important, however, is the claim that there is an agency per se which acts and to which acts are related, whether the boundaries of the agency are restricted to a single individual or not. In any case, we assume the existence of a potential agency-oriented reflection-process, which has two aspects: One directed towards the agency, which we call “self-reflexivity,” and another oriented towards “culture,” which we identify as “dramaturgic aspects” of action, a term we again borrow from Habermas (1981) although we realize that he derives this concept within a somewhat different systematic framework.

With regard to culture (see Table 1), these third-order actions relate to roles and role-systems, while they lead to self-concepts or the notion of identity in the individual. While all three levels are differentiated analytically, they are (or can be) simultaneously present in a single act.

Fourth, we follow Boesch (1987) in accepting a further process, which we consider highly fruitful although it is still formulated rather speculatively. This is called the process of “secondary structuration.” Although it is as yet mainly conceived with reference only to the primary level of actions, and although the implications of these processes for socially oriented actions have not yet been elaborated in any great detail, secondary structurations are conceptualized by Boesch (cf. 1987) on the basis of the notion that any action and any goal has two dimensions or aspects. One, which is usually considered, is the instrumental aspect i.e., an action is carried out instrumentally in order to reach a goal (e.g., taking a hammer to drive a nail into the wall). There is, a second aspect in any action, which Boesch calls the subjective-functional aspect. Here the driving of the nail into the wall may have the meaning that one feels proud of being able to do so; one may also enjoy it, or it may relate to feelings of rage. In any case, the action of nailing acquires a meaning beyond its instrumental purpose, and which is not necessarily conscious.

The distinction between the two aspects of secondary structurations leads to several very stimulating consequences: Although these aspects can be distinguished analytically, they are always simultaneously present within the very same action. This is the reason why Boesch claims that actions are always polyvalent. He says “only in conjunction do both components constitute an action: without the one it would have no reality, without the other no meaning” (Boesch, 1987).

The meaning derived from the subjective-functional aspect of actions has, however, two aspects: First, the subject realizes his or her potential to act in a certain way. This leads to the subjective “results” of what Boesch calls “subjective functionality.” Second, the situation, or an object which is used in an action (the hammer for instance), now represents this subjective meaning. In other words: It symbolizes the functional potentiality of the actor for him or herself.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Environment/Object</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Obiectivization</td>
<td>ACTION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schema</td>
<td>Instrumental Aspect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(denotative meaning)</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjectivization</td>
<td>(Functional) Symbolization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>private</td>
<td>connotative meaning</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- FANTASMS: private regulators of actions
- MYTHS: collective regulators of actions

Figure 3. Processes of primary and secondary structuration in Boesch's action theory
This general idea is elaborated by Boesch in many directions, which can only be briefly mentioned in the present context. Boesch distinguishes different kinds of symbolic representations and applies the idea of subjective-functional aspect of actions to higher order rule systems or regulatory systems of actions at the individual and cultural level.

In the case of the individual level, he uses the term "fantasm" for private higher order regulatory systems, which can be rather basic or general. These symbolic representations are general ideas through which one tries to structure and lead one's life in relation to the world. Examples of these include private ideas of happiness, success, love, the "good life," of the person one wants to be, and the like.

On the cultural level, Boesch identifies "myths" as collective rule-systems which are "general, ideological guidelines of thought which regulate the specifications of social rules and provide systems of justification and conduct, as well as of explanations of events" (Boesch, 1987). This last aspect, in particular, could pave the way to a theoretical interpretation of the existence of and the relationships between individual and collective meaning systems.

There is a final important aspect to the theory of cultural psychology which we have not yet elaborated and can be only be named here. The logical status and structure of time: Time not only structures the single act (actual-genesis) but also forms part of ontogeny and cultural change. Beyond this, time also acquires a specific contextual meaning in terms of the biography of an individual and of the history of a culture (cf. Kreuer & Eckensberger, 1988).

Last but not least, it is important to realize that time is handled differently by different individuals and within different cultures. Rhythms of daily activities of work or of the seasons of the year—anything that offers a framework, or sets constraints, by means of customs and habits or through the individual’s own body, also has a physical relevance for the structure of time for the individual (cf. Super & Harkness, 1985). These actions originate from personal concerns (goal structures) and basic motivations. They are accompanied by simple affects/emotions (e.g., rage, joy, fear) and they lead primarily to figurative schemata in the Piagetian sense.

Closing Remarks

I hope that the foregoing discussion has adequately expressed my view that cross-cultural psychology provides a wealth of reasons for thoroughly reviewing the basic tenets of psychology; and that these very reasons, moreover, point the way to some of the solutions needed for the problems which have arisen in the discipline of psychology. This is so because the culture concept, despite its long and controversial history in human sciences, can nevertheless be used as a productive practical and theoretical guideline to determine specific individual-environment relations in our terms of "actions in cultural contexts."

Notes

1The following contribution is to a large extent based upon an invited paper read at the IACCP symposium, "The contributions of cross-cultural psychology to mainstream psychological theory" (convened by Walter J. Lonner) at the XXIV International Congress of Psychology, Sydney, Australia, Sept. 2, 1988. I would like to thank Doris Fritzche and Lucille Dunn for improving the style of an earlier version of this paper.

2To preclude any misunderstanding which might occur especially in the framework of the tension between biology and culture referred to in the introduction, it is important to realize that the universality claim in cognitive theories does not imply that the transformations of cognitive performances are based on genetic or maturational processes. Instead, it rests upon the fundamental assumption that there is a universal potential of the growing individual to construe his/her own cognitive schemata. Vogel & Eckensberger (1988) propose therefore not only to distinguish homologies based upon genetics and traditions, but to introduce a third type which is based upon logical constraints (p. 605).

3It is certainly true that basic changes in paradigms also imply methodological changes (cf. Eckensberger & Burgard, 1983). But a discussion of these changes is, not possible in the present context.

4It may be interesting to note that the similarities in the approach of Cole's and of our own work can probably be traced back to the common origins of Boesch's and Vygotsky's ideas.Valsiner (1988) enumerates various "European roots" of Vygotsky's ideas which overlap remarkably with the "bilding bricks" of Boesch's theory (Piaget, Janet, Lewin). Valsiner (1988) even calls Vygotsky a "European thinker" (p. 123).

5Some examples may be helpful of how we both identify and distinguish psychological processes within the two major action types. First, the designation of action barriers as problems or
conflicts implies that the subject interprets events and processes differentially. We propose (Eckensberger & Emmeringhaus, 1982) to speak of a problem, in those cases when a barrier is interpreted by the subject in terms of a material or causal process. This is the reason why these barriers can be removed only on the basis of the same (causal) principle. We speak of a barrier in terms of a conflict, however, in those cases when a barrier is interpreted by the subject as being produced intentionally by another agent (person or group). Consequently in this case, intentional and not causal processes have to be taken into consideration if this barrier is to be "removed," i.e., some type of conflict resolution has to be brought about. Second, with reference to types of barriers negative or "uncomfortable" emotions "occur" in the subject who experiences the barrier (cf. Campos, et al., 1983). Despite this similarity, however, the basic emotions differ in each action type because of the different psychological quality each displays. We try to convey this difference by using quite different terms for the same type of emotion. In effect-oriented actions barrier (problem)-related emotions are named "rage." However, in communication oriented actions barrier (conflict)-related emotions are named "anger." Similarly, like Campos, et al., (1983) and others, we also assume some "positive feelings" if an act is successfully brought to a conclusion. Again, however, we propose to differentiate emotional "colours" within these positive emotions depending on the type of action in which they are experienced. A successful communicative action (a process of mutual understanding), refers to some kind of emotional sharing. It is obvious that the attribution of the particular terms to the respective emotional conditions is a rather arbitrary one. What is important, however, is that we try to distinguish subtypes of emotional states or modes, which are produced by the kind of action within which they occur.

Clearly, equivalent processes can be assumed within communicative actions. The goal here is to understand another person, and to co-ordinate interactions. Therefore the emotional states of happiness, referred to above (see Footnote 2), represent self-oriented feelings of a "communicative success" equivalent to the "functional potentiality" that Boesch is talking about. In the case of communicative actions one may also argue that these feelings become associated with specific communicative partners, even with situations or places etc. Some interpretations and data from research on the development of attachment and early fear reactions in children (cf. Bower, 1979) are at least compatible with this notion. Obviously, however, much more research is needed before these concepts can be fully accepted within an action theory. But as yet they are clearly stimulating guidelines.

References


